A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878; The First Year by David HarrisReview by: Dwight E. LeeThe Journal of Modern History, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Sep., 1937), pp. 385-387Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1898883 .

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BOOK REVIEWS 385

its aftermath under Nicholas I; the emancipation of the serfs; the assassina- tion of the Tsar Liberator; Red Sunday; the revolution of 1917; and the seiz- ure of power by the Bolsheviks. Four sections are allotted to France, includ- ing the peace-making at Versailles in 1871 and 1919; six to the United States, and four to Central Europe, including the Tangier and Bjorko incidents.

However, the writing seems to be for atmospheric effect rather than for narrating history. If Mr. Guedalla is writing history, why is there no mention of the intellectual, scientific and religious forces which were so important in shaping the One Hundred Years? The statement that Karl Marx "mistook his own continuous irritability for a critical analysis of other people's views" (p. 56), cannot pass unchallenged; nor would there be general agreement with the conclusion, so far as Germany was concerned, that the Anglo-French divi- sion of the spoils in Egypt and Morocco in 1903-4 was an "eminently reason- able settlement" (p. 249). That the Kaiser betrayed his country into a funda- mental error when he sponsored a large navy is the consensus of opinion, but the motive is not so simple as the Kaiser's Anglomania, as suggested by Mr. Guedalla (p. 251).. Nor were England's obligations to France in 1914 so misty as the author would have us believe (pp. 260-61), if one may judge from the anguished words of Mr. Winston Churchill that England had all the obliga- tions of an alliance without any of its benefits. The statement that the "American system. . . . unlike its European counterparts.. . .. does not ex- clude men from public life on the bare suspicion of intellectual attainments" (p. 290), considering either England or France or both, seems a trifle wild.

But if Mr. Guedalla is writing for atmosphere, he succeeds superbly. He combines a majesty of phrase and a flowing style which are reminiscent of Macaulay, with a skill in word painting that is comparable to Hardy. Indeed the book in certain of its passages which detail a panoramic view of the whole scene has been compared to The dynasts. Mr. Guedalla is equally felicitous in his powers of characterization, his analysis of William II's personality and purposes being a distinct achievement. Considering the magnitude of the task the author set for himself and the many perplexities involved in the choice of material, the book represents a solid accomplishment.

MIRIAM B. URBAN University of Cincinnati

A diplomatic history of the Balkan crisis of 1875-1878; the first year. By DAVID HARRIS, associate professor of history, Stanford University. ("Hoo- ver War Library publications," No. 11 .) Stanford University, Calif.: Stan- ford University Press, 1936. Pp. 474. $4.00. This study is the first attempt at a thorough and comprehensive treatment

of the diplomacy of the Balkan crisis to be based primarily upon the docu- ments in the archives of Vienna and London as well as the published source material. In describing the background for understanding the insurrections in Bosnia and Herzegovina of 1875 and the complicated negotiations which en-

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386 BOOK REVIEWS

sued, not only are the conditions in Turkey and the divergent interests of the European powers brought out but also the conflicting elements within each country which made a concert of Europe and a vigorous and consistent policy on the part of any one power practically impossible.

Count Andrassy, despite the desire of Austro-Hungarian Slavs and military men for intervention and annexation, wanted to maintain the status quo and to pacify the insurrectionary provinces by reforms agreed upon among the members of the three emperors' league under Austro-Hungarian leadership. Gorchakov and Alexander II, though opposed in this by such Pan-Slavists as Ignatyev who actively worked to prevent a settlement with Austria were will- ing to accord the initiative to Andrassy, but modified his plans by insisting upon the concerted action of the six great powers. Great Britain, under the suspicious Lord Derby and the romantic Disraeli, at first grudgingly followed the other two. Bismarck had no ax to grind except to keep his allies in agree- ment and prevent France from taking advantage of participation in the Rus- sian-inspired concert of six to increase her prestige and influence at Germany's expense. It was in large part fear of the latter contingency which led to his abortive overture to England in January, 1876. France and Italy were less important throughout the first year of the crisis than Serbia and Montenegro, who were with great difficulty restrained from going to the aid of their fellow- Slavs. The Porte, in its attitude toward the powers and the insurrectionaries, pursued its usual course of obstructiveness and ineptitude.

After the consular mission and the Andrassy note had successively failed because of Turkish equivocation and the refusal of the insurgents either to trust the Turks or to accept the conditions offered by Europe, the divergences among the most interested powers broke up the semblance of a concert. An- drassy, with Bismarck's support, defeated Gorchakov's proposals for a Euro- pean conference and a military occupation of the insurrectionary provinces and drew up a restatement of his previous reform plans in the Berlin Memo- randum of May, 1876. His efforts were frustrated by the revolutionary occur- rences at the Porte and the obstinate refusal of England to adhere to the Ber- lin plan. There followed a period in which France tried to restore the concert; Disraeli, more interested in breaking up the Three Emperors' League than in honestly grappling with Balkan problems, suddenly sought a rapprochement with Russia and then as suddenly, and not without promptings from Andras- sy, veered away; the Serbs and Montenegrins finally went to war with the Turks; and Austria and Russia drifted farther and farther apart, although at Reichstadt, in July, Andrassy and Gorchakov patched up an agreement on the basis of nonintervention for the present and possible territorial adjustments in the future. Thus the first year of the Balkan crisis ended with its problems farther from solution than before.

This brief summary does little justice to the careful workmanship and sound scholarship of the book which admirably clears up many of the former obscurities and misconceptions often arising from either false information or

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BOOK REVIEWS 387

deliberate misrepresentation on the part of the governments concerned. The inclusion of much hitherto unpublished material in footnotes and appendixes at the same time relieves the text of the cluttering effect of overmuch quota- tion and adds appreciably to the increasing body of published documents. The style -is clear and animated. There is little, in fact, at which to cavil ex- cept perhaps that the underlying forces behind the diplomatic relations are sometimes too little touched upon for a full appreciation of the reasons for actions and policies. The author is to be congratulated, however, upon this first volume in his study of the Balkan crisis, and every student of this period will look forward to the continuation of his work.

DWIGHT E. LEE Clark University,

Le origini della colonia Eritrea. By CARLO ZAGHI. Bologna: Cappelli, 1934. Pp. 190. L. 15.

Italia ed Etiopia dal trattato d'Uccialli alla battaglia di Adua. By CARLO CONTE

RossINI. Rome: Istituto per l'Oriente, 1935. Pp. xv+494. Ethiopia: a pawn in European diplomacy. By ERNEST WORK, professor of

history, Muskingum College, formerly advisor to the Ethiopian govern- ment. New York: Macmillan Co., 1935. Pp. 9254. $2.50. Zaghi is one of the outstanding colonial historians in Italy, and his scholar-

ship is thorough. The period he covers here is the decade from 1879 to 1889- the one in which Italy, hesitatingly and only half-conscious of what she was doing, took the plunge into the Red Sea. With the aid of scattered evidence, much of it in geographical publications, he has reconstructed the early history of Italian political penetration into Ethiopia. Throughout his narrative he centers his focus on Shoa, with Menelik and Antonelli the principal actors, and very little is said about the state of affairs in Italy or about international power politics. One result of Zaghi's work is to put the occupation of Massaua in 1885 into its proper historical perspective, where it is seen as not such a sharp break as has usually been supposed.

The volume by Count Rossini, whom the reviewer has previously had occa- sion to refer to in these pages as the foremost living authority on Ethiopian history, is the most original contribution of the three books under review. Count Rossini has undertaken the ungrateful task of recording the unhappy years of Italian policy in Africa which culminated in the defeat at Adua. A good half of the book is devoted to a thoroughly documented account of the campaign of 1895-96. He has done this with the aid of many unpublished documents in the colonial and war ministries. In addition to these as well as the more conventional sources, he has his own experience as colonial official in Eritrea and traveler in the old Ethiopia to draw upon. This volume may be regarded as about the most definitive treatment of the subject that are we likely to get for a very long time.

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