a defense of egalitarianism

A Defense of EgalitarianismAuthor(s): Alan CarterSource: Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the AnalyticTradition, Vol. 131, No. 2 (Nov., 2006), pp. 269-302Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25471809 .

Accessed: 28/06/2014 17:40

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Philosophical Studies: AnInternational Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 185.31.194.38 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 17:40:34 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=springer

http://www.jstor.org/stable/25471809?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


Philosophical Studies (2006) 131:269-302 ? Springer 2006

DOI 10.1007/s 11098-004-7480-3

ALAN CARTER

A DEFENSE OF EGALITARIANISM

ABSTRACT. Recently in this journal, Michael Huemer has attempted to

refute egalitarianism. His strategy consists in: first, distinguishing between

three possible worlds (one with an equal distribution of well-being, one with

an unequal distribution at every moment but with an equal distribution

overall, and one with an unequal distribution at every moment as well as

overall); second, showing that the first world is equal in value to the second

world; third, dividing the second and third worlds into two temporal seg ments each, then showing that none of the temporal segments possesses

greater moral value than any other, thereby demonstrating that the second

and third worlds as a whole are equal in value; and finally, concluding that none of the three worlds has more value than any other. The present article

rebuts Huemer's critique of egalitarianism first, and most importantly, by

showing that his core argument rests upon an equivocation, and second, by

refuting his supplementary arguments.

I

If a pure mathematician were to argue that because x ? y and

y ? z then x ?

z, we can be sure that the transitivity holds, for

there is no reason to suspect either that any of the variables

"x", "y" and "z" or that the " = "

operator is being used

inconsistently. Unfortunately, when mathematical arguments are applied to the real world, inconsistencies may occasionally occur.

For example, in some attempted application of the above

mathematical argument to the real world, where "x" is taken at

first glance to translate into "a", ">" is taken at first glance to

translate into "?>", and "z" is taken at first glance to translate

into "c", "a = b" might turn out to be shorthand for "a equals b with respect to /", while "b = c" might turn out to be



270 ALAN CARTER

shorthand for "b equals c with respect to/'. But then we could

hardly conclude that because a = b and b = c, a = c.

To make this clearer, we might represent "a equals b with

respect to /" by "abRf\ and "b equals c with respect to/' by "bcRf\ Even though both "abRi" and "??cR/' are transitive relations (such that if abRi and bcRi, then acRi, and if r?R/ and

bcRj\ then acRj), it is obvious that we cannot conclude that

given abRi and bcRj, then acRi. Nor, it is equally obvious, can we conclude that given abRi and bcRj, then acRj. For in neither case does transitivity succeed.

Consider an example: if a = b with respect to the quantity of

apples each contains, and b = c with respect to the quantity of

oranges, then we can conclude neither that a = c with respect to

the quantity of apples nor that a ? c with respect to the quantity of oranges. And if one had concluded that a must equal c with

respect to either the quantity of apples or the quantity of oranges, then the mistaken conclusion would seem to have flowed from an

equivocation regarding the " = "

operator. For were one to use " = "

to mean "equal with respect to the quantity of apples" in

one's first premise (a =

b), and were one then to use " = "

to mean

"equal with respect to the quantity of oranges" in one's second

premise (b ?

c), then to conclude a = c on the basis of those two

premises would be to commit the fallacy of equivocation. For " = "

would not have meant the same thing throughout the

argument.

Now, some might wish to resist this conclusion, and they might want to argue instead that the equivocation concerns the variable

"?" rather than the " = "

operator. For example, if a equals 30

apples and c equals 2 oranges, obviously a ? c. But this, it might be argued, is because what a equals and what c equals differ.

Hence, we need to draw a distinction between the two things "Z?"

has been taken to represent. And if we do so, we shall see why

transitivity fails in this case. So, in order to see precisely why it is

that transitivity does not succeed when we are counting apples and oranges rather than just one category, let us distinguish between "b*wlQS" and "bomn^\ If we do, then we find that

a = ?>apples and bomnges = c. But no one would then conclude that

a ? c. Hence, when one simply employs "Z?" in such a case



A DEFENSE OF EGALITARIANISM 271

without distinguishing between "bapples" and "bomn^s'\ then in

deriving a ? c from a = b and b ~ c, one would still have

equivocated. But the equivocation would have concerned two

distinct meanings of the variable "6".

Rather than decide here between different possible diagnoses of the failure of transitivity in such cases, let us simply refer to the error committed as the "Fallacy of Equivocal Counting".

II

Now, it might seem unlikely that anyone would ever commit a

fallacy of this sort. And yet it is precisely just such a fallacy that

underpins Michael Huemer's recent attempt1 at refuting egali tarianism, and in particular what he refers to as "Axiological

Welfare Egalitarianism".2 In attempting to refute egalitarianism, Huemer defines the

"utility-value" of an event in a less than intuitive manner:

namely, as "the amount of non-instrumental good that the

event contains in virtue of the allocation of well-being among individuals involved in the event".3 It is important to note that

"totality utility" differs from "utility-value," for the latter includes any value arising from how the utility is distributed.

Huemer's definition of "utility-value" unfortunately makes it

even easier than usual to confuse welfarist egalitarianism with

hedonistic utilitarianism. The term "distribution value" would

greatly reduce the risk of such confusion. Nevertheless, in what

follows I shall use the term "utility-value" as Huemer defines it. Huemer then asks us to consider three possible worlds (see

Figure l),4 with each containing only two people, namely A and B. In World 1, A and B each enjoy well-being at level 75 at

any moment while they are alive. The total utility-value con tained in World 1 is VI, with "Via" representing the utility value contained in the first half of that world's history, and "VIb" representing the utility-value contained in the second. In

World 2, A enjoys well-being at level 100 at any moment in the first half of his life, and at level 50 at any moment in the second, while B enjoys well-being at level 50 at any moment in the first



272 ALAN CARTER

Time World 1 World 2 World 3

I AB AB AB

Figure 1. Three possible worlds.

half of his life, and at level 100 at any moment in the second. The total utility-value contained in World 2 is V2, with "V2a"

representing the utility-value contained in the first half of that world's history, and "V2b" representing the utility-value con

tained in the second. Finally, in World 3, A enjoys well-being at level 100 at any moment during his life, while B enjoys well

being at level 50 at any moment during his. The total utility value contained in World 3 is V3, with "V3a" representing the

utility-value contained in the first half of that world's history, and "V3b" representing the utility-value contained in the second.

With these temporally-specified utility-values identified in each World, Huemer's argument proceeds as follows:5

1. VI = V2 2. V2a = V3a

3. V3a = V3b 4. V2a = V2b 5. V2b = V3b 6. (V2a + V2b) = (V3a +V3b) 7. V2 =

(V2a + V2b) 8. V3 = (V3a + V3b) 9. V2 = V3

10. VI =V3

In other words, the conclusion of the argument is that the moral value

- the "utility-value"

- of the clearly unequal World




(World 3) equals that of the clearly equal one (World 1). Let us

call this "Huemer's paradox", for it is bound to strike many as

paradoxical in the extreme. And if Huemer's argument is

sound, then it refutes Axiological Welfare Egalitarianism. Furthermore, Huemer believes, it tells against other varieties of

egalitarianism, as well.

Ill

It is worth observing at the outset that were Huemer's argu ment sound, then it would seem to imply that if "A" in Figure 1 were instead to represent all of the world's men and "B" all of the world's women, then there would be no greater disvalue in

World 3 than in World 1, or if "A" were to represent all of the world's whites and "B" all of the world's blacks, the first world in Figure 1 would be morally indistinguishable from the third.

And even many of Huemer's fellow "libertarians" might baulk at accepting his reasoning, given a further seeming implication of the style of argument he deploys: namely, if it were freedom rather than utility that was represented by the width of the bars in Figure 1, then it would seem to follow that no greater moral value would arise from an equal distribution of freedom than from a highly unequal one.

But what reasons does Huemer provide for each of his

argument's premises? Premise 1 rests on his assumption of

"intrapersonal non-egalitarianism". In other words, Huemer

holds that "equality in the distribution of utility across times in a single individual's life is evaluatively neutral".6 Premise 2 rests on the assumption that any value a distribution might possess strongly supervenes upon that distribution. If the shape of the distribution in the first half of World 2 is intrinsically identical to the shape of the distribution in the first half of

World 3, then the utility-values of those distributions must be the same. Premises 3 and 4 are justified by parallel reasons to that justifying the second premise. Premise 5 follows from

Premises 2, 3 and 4. Premise 6 follows from Premises 2 and 5. Premises 7 and 8 follow from assuming "the cross-temporal additivity of utility-value", which holds that, "given two events,



274 ALAN CARTER

A and B, occupying nonoverlapping time intervals, the utility value of the fusion of A and B equals the utility-value of A plus the utility-value of B".7 Premise 9 follows from Premises 6, 7 and 8. And the Conclusion (10) follows from Premises 1 and 9.

I shall not dwell at this time on how Huemer attempts to

justify each of his premises. For the core of my rebuttal of his

argument is, by and large, orthogonal to the reasons he offers. It depends simply on showing that in the course of his argu

ment, Huemer commits the "Fallacy of Equivocal Counting".

IV

In order to show that Huemer's argument rests upon an

equivocation, we first need to draw a distinction between two

different ways in which an egalitarian might value some dis

tribution. She might value the final outcome in a world com

prising two people for being an equal one on the grounds that over the course of their whole lives they both ended up having

enjoyed the same quantity of whatever the egalitarian believes

should be equalized (call it "G", which might be well-being), even though they enjoyed different quantities of G at any par ticular time (as in World 2 in Figure 1). If an egalitarian were to value the distribution of G at any one time solely in terms of its

contribution or, alternatively, expected contribution to such an

equal final outcome with respect to the complete lives of the

individuals in question, then I shall refer to the egalitarian as

valuing teleologically. On the other hand, if the egalitarian were

to value an equal distribution of G at any one time regardless of

whether or not it contributed or is expected to contribute to

such a final outcome, then I shall refer to the egalitarian as

valuing non-teleologically. To help make clearer this notion of valuing teleologically,

consider for a moment how a utilitarian whose consequential

ism is based on actual results rather that on probable results8

might value the rightness or wrongness of an action. Imagine that someone is very sick, and further imagine that the only

way I can cure her is by first giving her a poison, and then later




giving her an antidote to that poison. Now imagine three

possible courses of action: (1)1 give her neither the poison nor

the antidote but a glass of water, instead. The result is that she remains very ill and in slight pain until she eventually dies. (2) I

give her the poison but fail to give her the antidote. The result is that she dies prematurely and in extreme agony. (3) I give her the poison and then later give her the antidote. Because the antidote acts before the poison causes her any pain and after it has destroyed the bacteria responsible for her illness, the result is that she is cured and lives out the rest of her life pleasurably. Is there more value in giving her the poison or in not giving it to her? If one evaluates the Tightness of the action or inaction

teleologically (in other words, with respect to the final overall

outcome), and if one does so in terms of the actual results, then not giving her the poison in (1) is better than giving it to her in

(2), but worse than giving it to her in (3). On such purely id

eological valuing, the value of an action is dependent upon its contribution to the final overall outcome. Hence, the action cannot be appraised independently of that outcome. In this

particular case, one cannot say whether it is or was right or

wrong to give the poison in abstraction from a later action or inaction regarding the giving of the antidote.

So now consider an egalitarian who values teleologically (but not as a utilitarian), and who evaluates on the basis of actual results. She is concerned with bringing about the least unequal outcome (that maximizes utility-value, which, recall, includes a

distribution value) rather than with bringing about the outcome that maximizes utility. Is, in her view, Via better than, worse than or equal to V2a? Given the later Vlb, and given the later

V2b, then Via = V2a. And given the earlier Via and the earlier

V2a, Vlb = V2b. And if (Via + Vlb) = VI, and if

(V2a + V2b) = V2, then VI = V2. Hence, for such a teleo

logical egalitarian, Premise 1 of Huemer's argument would

appear to stand.

But is it the case that, for such an egalitarian, V2a is better than, worse than or equal to V3a? Given the later V2b and the later V3b, V2a is most certainly not equal, in such a tel

eological egalitarian's view, to V3a. V2a has positive value in



276 ALAN CARTER

contributing towards an equal final outcome, whereas V3a

has, say, negative value in contributing towards a final out

come that is highly unequal. Hence, for an egalitarian who values teleologically in this way, it is not the case that V2a = V3a. And therefore Premise 2 of Huemer's argument should be rejected by any teleological egalitarian who is concerned with actual results.

It should be noted that this form of teleological egalitari anism does not need to contravene cross-temporal additivity. For VI could be held to equal the sum of Via and Vlb, V2

could be held to equal the sum of V2a and V2b, and V3 could be held to equal the sum of V3a and V3b. It would just be the case that neither Via nor Vlb would possess any value for such a teleological egalitarian independently of its relation to the final outcome, namely VI. Similarly, for such a teleological egalitarian, the values of V2a and V2b would depend upon V2, and the values of V3a and V3b would depend upon V3.

Nor has teleological egalitarianism in general any need to

contravene intrapersonal non-egalitarianism. For a teleological

egalitarian could easily hold that the final outcome is inde

pendent of precisely when persons enjoy the utility in their lives.

Moreover, teleological egalitarianism concerned with actual results need no more contravene supervenience than does the

utilitarian notion of right action when it is based on actual

results. For a standard moral consequentialist, if two outcomes

are non-morally identical, then they cannot differ morally. But if

they do differ non-morally, then they may differ morally, as well.

And according to the utilitarian whose consequentialism is based on actual results, the Tightness of an action contributing to some

final outcome supervenes upon that outcome. (It may do so via

the goodness of that outcome.) Similarly, for a teleological

egalitarian of the kind we are presently considering, the moral

value of a momentary distribution may be held to supervene

upon the overall distribution of the utility in all of the complete lives which that momentary distribution itself contributes

towards. (It, too, may do so via the goodness of the overall

outcome.) In short, for the teleological thinker who is concerned

with actual results, the value of an action, or alternatively of an




earlier distribution, derives either from the final outcome or from

the value of that outcome. In the latter case, values other than

that of the final outcome as a whole are derivative ones.

But what of an egalitarian who values non-teleologically? For her, V2a is equal in disvalue to V3a. Hence, Premise 2 of

Huemer's argument would appear to stand. But Via displays an equality, whereas V2a displays an inequality. Hence, for

such an egalitarian, it is not the case that Via = V2a. More

over, Vlb displays an equality, whereas V2b displays an

inequality. Thus, for such an egalitarian, it is also not the case

that Vlb = V2b. Let us imagine that she assigns a value of x to

the equality in the first temporal half of World 1 (Via), and let us also imagine that she assigns a value of x to the equality in

the second temporal half of that world (Vlb). Let us further

imagine that she assigns a value of -x to the inequality in the first temporal half of World 2 (V2a). Finally, imagine that she

assigns a value of -x to the inequality in the second temporal half of that world (V2b). If V2 =

(V2a + V2b), then V2 has a

total value of ~2x. But if V2 = (V2a + V2b), then it must

equally be the case that VI = (Via + Vlb). And if

VI = (Via + Vlb), then VI has a total value of 2x. But as 2x

most certainly does not equal -2x, then VI would not equal V2.

Hence, for an egalitarian who values non-teleologically, there

are good grounds for rejecting Premise 1 of Huemer's argu ment. In other words, if one is a non-teleological egalitarian, his

argument never even gets going.

So, if one is a teleological egalitarian concerned with actual

results, Huemer's argument is unsound because Premise 2 is

false. Alternatively, if one is a non-teleological egalitarian, Huemer's argument is equally unsound

- in this case because

Premise 1 is false. Why, then, does his argument appear, on a

cursory inspection, to be valid when it clearly fails? Because of the Fallacy of Equivocal Counting.

It will be recalled that we considered two different diagnoses of this fallacy. Those who prefer the first diagnosis would argue that Premise 1 (VI

= V2) is only compelling when it is short hand for "VI is equal to V2 with respect to teleological value", while Premise 2 (V2a

= V3a) is only compelling when it is



278 ALAN CARTER

shorthand for "V2a is equal to V3a with respect to non-teleo

logical value". Put another way, in Premise 1, " = "

means

"equal with respect to teleological value", while in Premise 2, " = " means "equal with respect to non-teleological value". In a

word, Huemer equivocates with respect to the meaning of the " = "

operator.

Alternatively, those who prefer the second diagnosis of the

Fallacy of Equivocal Counting would insist on distinguishing between the kinds of values that are being counted. In order to do

so, let us add the superscript "TV" when the value being counted is teleological with respect to the actual results, and let us add the

superscript "NTV" when it is non-teleological. If we do so, then Premise 1 is only compelling when it is clearly understood to mean

V1TV - V2TV, and not V1NTV -

V2NTV; while Premise 2 is

only compelling when it is clearly understood to mean

V2aNTV - V3aNTV,andnotV2aTV

- V3aTV. But then, Premise 2 can only be used to support the claim that V2NTV = V3NTV. Premises 1 and 9 of Huemer's argument would thus become

V1TV = V2TV and V2NTV = V3NTV, respectively. But from these

premises one can conclude neither that VI = V3 nor that

V1NTV = V3NTV. In a word, on this diagnosis, Huemer equivo cates between two distinct meanings of "V2": namely, between "V2TV" and "V2NTV"

9 Put another way, he equivocates between

"V2" construed as a teleological value and "V2" construed as a

non-teleological value.

Thus, regardless of how one diagnoses the Fallacy of

Equivocal Counting, Huemer commits it.10 Consequently, in

thus equivocating, his argument purporting to refute egalitari anism is invalid.

Huemer could respond by attacking non-teleological egali tarianism. Indeed, his critique of the "simultaneous seg

ments"11 view could be taken to constitute just such an attack. But had he proven that non-teleological egalitarianism is

erroneous, then the teleological egalitarian concerned with

actual results would have been left free to dismiss the second

premise of Huemer's argument, and it would therefore fail.

Alternatively, Huemer could attack teleological egalitarianism. But were he only to succeed in proving that teleological




egalitarianism is erroneous, then the non-teleological egalitar ian would be left free to dismiss the first premise of Huemer's

argument, and it would therefore fail.

What does all this mean? It means that Huemer's paradox does no work. It rests upon an equivocation, and is thus the

outcome of an invalid argument. Hence, if Huemer has refuted

egalitarianism in any form, as he claims to have done, then the

refutation depends solely upon the supplementary arguments he marshals against the possible responses he anticipates an

egalitarian making.

V

So let us turn to Huemer's supplementary arguments. We shall

begin with his critique of the simultaneous segments view. This view insists that we "compare simultaneous time-slices of

individuals".12 Huemer's critique of this view depends upon his

presumption that "egalitarianism is usually motivated by the idea that inequality involves unfairness"}3 But this relies

heavily on Larry Temkin's individualist construal of egalitari anism.14 Yet Temkin's is widely rejected by egalitarian philos ophers (so much so, that it is barely even cited by them).15

Moreover, it could be argued, contra Huemer, that it is equality that is primitive, and that the moral value of fairness derives from a straightforward concern with equality. For unfairness is

widely understood as consisting in an unjustifiable inequality. But if one must justify an inequality, then this would seem to

suggest that equality should hold unless some consideration defeats it.16

But this aside, Huemer asks of the simultaneous segments

egalitarian: "to whom might world 2 be unfair?"17 And he then maintains that "the simultaneous segments Egalitarian will want to answer that the first half of the world is unfair to B, while the second half is unfair to A. But this.. .does not tell us to whom he thinks the world as a whole is unfair".18 This strikes me as a singularly bizarre argument against the simultaneous

segments egalitarian, for it appears to presuppose the



280 ALAN CARTER

contrasting "complete lives" view, which maintains that "the amount of (interpersonal) inequality in a world should be

computed by comparing complete lives"}9 Why must the simultaneous segments egalitarian care about the overall dis

tribution in the world as a whole over an extended time period, and not just about each smaller segment?

For example, the simultaneous segments egalitarian might be Parfitian with respect to personal identity,20 and reject the

conception of persons that the complete lives view would seem to require. For if I turn out to be a different person in the

future, I have reason for caring about an inequality that obtains now. This is because others would not be compensating me in the future, were that their intention, but giving more to

another, instead. In short, Huemer presumes that the simulta

neous segments egalitarian is unable to say to whom World 2 has been unfair. But she can quite intelligibly say, if she is at all

Parfitian, that it was unfair both to the older A and to the

younger B.

In addition, surely one can say that the first half of World 2 is unfair to B, and the second half is unfair to A. If I am nasty to B, and then nice to him, and if I am nice to A and then nasty to him, are we really inclined to ask rhetorically "to whom have I been

nasty?" And surely we can say that there was nastiness in the

world given how I acted. Why, then, can we not say that in World 2 there was an unfairness to B and then an unfairness to A, and

the world as a whole contained a great deal of unfairness? Even if it were to balance out over time, an egalitarian might well view the

momentary unfairness as constituting a disvalue.21

Huemer has two further objections to simultaneous segments

egalitarianism. It implies that World 3 is no worse than World

2, and this, he thinks, egalitarians would want to deny. But

again, this objection appears to presuppose the contrasting complete lives view. A consistent simultaneous segments egal

itarian would not be concerned with the overall distribution in

the world as a whole over an extended time period. And if she were Parfitian with respect to personal identity, she would have no reason for preferring World 2 to World 3, but good reason

for preferring World 1 to World 2.




Huemer's second objection is that simultaneous segments

egalitarianism entails that everyone should go to the dentist's at

the same time in order to equalize suffering temporally, and this seems counter-intuitive. But egalitarians could easily reply that

this objection presupposes a construal of simultaneous segments

egalitarianism that is temporally far too fine-grained. For

simultaneous segments of too short a duration would be utterly

impracticable as a guide to policy. And hence egalitarians would not evaluate in terms of such segments. The impracticability is

clear when one recalls that egalitarians are concerned with

inequalities within a whole society. Hence, instead of asking whether or not two people should go to the dentist's at the same

time, we should ask more relevantly: Should the whole of a

society (say, 300 million) have dental treatment at exactly the same time? But then, the egalitarian will answer "Obviously not, for who would be treating the dentists' teeth at that time?" And if it is not possible for everyone to have dental treatment at the same

time, then egalitarianism, as a moral doctrine, does not demand

it. And it does not demand it simply because, as is widely held, we are not morally obliged to do what we cannot do. Moreover, some people do, in fact, think that they should share the pains of others. For example, it is not unknown for mothers to take the

medicine, too, when giving it to their children. Hence, Huemer's second objection relies on an intuition that is not universally shared.

In short, if Huemer's rejection of egalitarianism stands or

falls on his specific objections to simultaneous segments egali tarianism (as it must once his paradox has been exposed as

resting upon an equivocation), then it is far from compelling. And if the simultaneous segments egalitarian has not been

defeated, then she is free to avoid Huemer's paradox simply by rejecting his first premise.

VI

Huemer's critique of egalitarianism also rests upon his

assumption that an individual has no reason to prefer an equal



282 ALAN CARTER

distribution of well-being over the course of her life to an

unequal one if the quantity of well-being is the same in both

cases, and that there is no good reason to prefer the happier period's coming earlier to its coming later.

But is it actually non-rational, as Huemer assumes, to prefer

equal welfare over the course of one's life, or more now and less

later, or vice versal Huemer argues that the rational person has

no good reason to prefer any one of the three distributions to

either of the other two. But how many people know exactly when they will die? Very few. So how many middle-aged people know whether they are half-way through their lives, two-thirds

of the way through, or nine-tenths of the way through because

they will soon contract a terminal illness? Again, not many. If we are incapable of ascertaining the half-way point in advance, then Huemer's argument at this point is misleading. For in

order to choose rationally, what we would actually need to

know is whether, if the average life-expectancy is, say, 80 years, it is rational to prefer equal welfare over the course of one's life, or more welfare for the first 40 years and less for the next 40, or

vice versa. Clearly, it is highly irrational to put off the greater welfare until after one has lived for 40 years. For with an

average life expectancy of 80 years, one might still easily die at

40. So, consider World 2, and let the first temporal half total

40 years. Should an egalitarian be indifferent with respect to

A's and B's differences in well-being? If they were both to end

up dying at 40, then A would have done well and B badly. An

egalitarian can easily regard that as the sort of potential unfairness that should be avoided. Hence, to avoid any such

possible unfairness, the egalitarian has good reason to prefer the first half of World 1 to the first half of World 2.

Now, it might be objected that in World 1, if one person dies

before the other, then she will have enjoyed a smaller total

quantity of utility. But this may well not be what an egalitarian is fundamentally concerned with. It is far too easy to confuse

welfarist egalitarianism with hedonistic utilitarianism. For the

pure egalitarian is not fundamentally concerned with totals but

with distributions. The egalitarian is often concerned with some

getting considerably less of whatever it is (in this case




well-being) while they are still alive. That is the unfairness

individuals experience. Individuals are not ordinarily concerned

with someone continuing to get benefits after others have died.

That is not ordinarily perceived by anyone as unfair. The

simplest way of dealing with some getting considerably less of

whatever it is while they are alive is to prefer the first half of

World 1 to the first half of World 2. But then, and if an egal itarian does so, Huemer's paradox does not arise for it is pre

mised upon intrapersonal non-egalitarianism. And as we have

just established, intrapersonal non-egalitarianism is far too

unconvincing a premise to provide the basis for a refutation of

welfarist egalitarianism.

VII

What, though, if one were an egalitarian who rejected the

simultaneous segments view? Huemer seems to presume that, in

order to side-step his critique, such an egalitarian will be forced to assign some independent value to compensation received for

having suffered an inequality. And he proceeds to present a

number of arguments against the moves he believes an egali tarian will be compelled to make. But the view that Huemer discusses is clearly not teleological egalitarianism. One can

value teleologically in terms of complete lives. But one can also value complete lives non-teleologically. And it is the latter form

of egalitarian valuing that Huemer's arguments are directed

against. Hence, Huemer has offered no critique at all of teleo

logical egalitarianism - a form of egalitarianism that is not

dependent upon assigning any independent value to compen

sation. Yet teleological egalitarianism based on actual results, and standing on its own, is immune to Huemer's paradox, for it

justifiably rejects Premise 2 of his argument. Hence, Huemer has signally failed to refute the teleological egalitarian who is concerned with actual results.

For an example of the way in which Huemer overlooks the

possibility of a teleological egalitarian possessing an easy response to his arguments, consider the following. Believing



284 ALAN CARTER

that he has finished off the simultaneous segments egalitarian, Heumer confidently asserts:

Whether or not one accepts the Strong Supervenience of Utility-Value in

general, it would seem bizarre to hold that the first half of world 2 was better or worse than the first half of world 3, given that they are identical.22

But it is not in the least bizarre for a teleological egalitarian concerned with actual results to view the first half of World 2 as better than the first half of World 3. Think back to the poison case. Imagine that in the first half of a possible world, let us call it World-with-Antidote, I give the sick woman the poison, and in the second half of that world I give her the antidote. And further imagine that in the first half of another possible world, let us call it World-without-Antidote, I give her the poison, and in the second half of that world I fail to provide the antidote.

For a non-teleological thinker, the first half of World-with Antidote might seem identical to the first half of World-with

out-Antidote, insofar as I give the woman the poison in both of those temporal segments. But for a teleological thinker con

cerned with actual results, there is a clear difference between them. In the first half of World-with-Antidote I act in a way that will lead to the woman being cured, while in the first half of

World-without-Antidote I act in a way that will lead to her

premature and agonizing death. For such a teleological thinker, her being cured in World-with-Antidote makes the adminis

tering of the poison the right thing to have done, while her

agonizing death in World-without-Antidote makes the admin

istering of the poison the wrong thing to have done.

Similarly, a teleological egalitarian concerned with actual results will regard the first half of World 2 as better than the

first half of World 3, for the former contributes to a final outcome that consists in an overall equality, while the latter contributes to a final outcome that consists in an overall

inequality. And the positive value represented by "V2a" is, in her view, determined by the positive value represented by "V2", while the negative value, say, represented by "V3a" would be determined by the negative value represented by "V3". But

such a teleological egalitarian can insist all this without having




to assign any independent value to compensation received for

having suffered an inequality. And hence such an egalitarian can also hold that V2a = V2b (for the second half of World 2 contributes exactly the same to the final outcome in that world as does the first half) and that V3a = V3b (for the second half of World 3 also contributes exactly the same to the final out come in that world as does the first). And in so doing, and for the same reasons, the teleological egalitarian will also hold that

V2a = Via = V2b = Vlb (for all four segments contribute

equally to the same overall distributive outcome), thus side

stepping all of the objections that Huemer levels against the

egalitarian who is driven to assign an independent value to

compensation. It is also worth noting that, for a teleological thinker who is

concerned with actual results, a later action may contribute to

determining the moral value of a previous action. Consider once again the poison example. I administer the poison to the sick woman with the intention of later administering the anti dote. But when I come to give her the antidote, I find that it has

already been used up. My intentions were indeed admirable. I had hoped to cure her. But that does not prevent the teleo

logical thinker concerned with actual results from now con

cluding that it was wrong for me to have given her the poison. In other words, for such a teleological thinker it is possible for

us, at times, seemingly to alter the moral status of the past.

Hence, such teleological thinkers have good reason for rejecting

strong supervenience, and employing global supervenience, instead. The case of poison administered with the intention of

curing a sick woman clearly shows that if one is concerned with actual results, the rightness or wrongness of an action may well

depend upon what happens later. But if rightness, say, strongly and locally supervened upon an action, then an action could

not be made wrong by a later action or inaction. But the case of the medicinal poison shows that for such a teleological thinker it can be. And the fact that an action can, for such a thinker, be

made right or wrong by a later action or inaction demonstrates

that, again for such a thinker, rightness and wrongness do not

strongly and locally supervene.



286 ALAN CARTER

Thus, the teleological egalitarian concerned with actual results can argue analogously that the second half of World 2 has contributed to making the first half of that world possess

positive value, and that the second half of World 3 has con tributed to making the first half of that world possess negative value, even though, to a non-teleological thinker, V2a and

V3a seem to be equal. And if a utilitarian can rely upon

global supervenience, why can the egalitarian not do so?

VIII

Demonstrating that Huemer commits the Fallacy of Equivocal Counting suffices for his critique of egalitarianism to be dis missed. However, it is worth noting that there is another way in which his argument might be challenged. Huemer is aware that

egalitarians might have reason for denying one of his core pre mises: namely, cross-temporal additivity.23 For one might try to

claim that because the difference in well-being between A and B

within each half of World 2 equals the difference in well-being between A and B within each half of World 3, then the difference in well-being between A and B within World 2 as a whole must

equal the difference in well-being between A and B within World 3 as a whole. But this would be clearly fallacious for, while there is indeed a difference in well-being between A and B in each of the four temporal segments, there is no overall difference at all in

well-being between A and B within World 2 as a whole.

Moreover, if one were to hold that "egalitarian distribution

value" supervenes upon an equal distribution, and if one were

also to hold that "egalitarian distribution disvalue" supervenes

upon an unequal distribution, then because World 2 contains

an overall equality and World 3 contains an overall inequality, one would hold World 2 to be clearly better than World 3.

(And if one were to view the whole history of a world as an

event,24 then egalitarian distribution value would strongly supervene upon the equal distribution in World 2, and egali tarian distribution disvalue would strongly supervene upon the

unequal distribution in World 3.) Hence, one might think, how




could egalitarianism possibly be subject to Huemer's para doxical conclusion?

Furthermore, the above seems to provide reason to claim

that the moral value of distributions between persons is not

additive across time, even if the utility within an individual's life

is additive. There is an inequality in both halves of World 2. An

egalitarian can view both inequalities as bad. But by the end of

the lives of A and B in World 2, there is an equality overall, which an egalitarian can view as good. But if utility-value locally and strongly supervenes upon distributions, and as the

distributions are not additive across time, then an egalitarian who adhered to strong, local supervenience could easily argue that utility-value (which, recall, includes distribution value) is not additive across time either.

Now, Huemer is aware that an egalitarian can argue in the

above manner, but there is a far more serious problem con

fronting his critique. For consider what would happen if one were concerned with distributions rather than with their value, and one were then to mimic the structure of Huemer's argu

ment. Let us call the overall distribution in World 1 "Dl", the overall distribution in World 2 "D2", and the overall distri bution in World 3 "D3". Paralleling Premise 1 of Huemer's

argument, clearly Dl = D2.

Now, let us call the distribution in the first half of World 1

"Dla", and the distribution in the second half of that world "Dlb". Let us similarly divide the distributions in World 2 into "D2a" and "D2b", and the distributions in World 3 into "D3a" and "D3b". Here, we are concerned with how equal the

distributions happen to be, and not with the moral value arising from those distributions. Mimicking Premises 2 through 9 of

Huemer's argument we obtain the following:

2a. D2a = D3a

3a. D3a - D3b 4a. D2a = D2b 5a. D2b = D3b 6a. (D2a + D2b) - (D3a + D3b) 7a. D2 =

(D2a + D2b)



288 ALAN CARTER

8a. D3 = (D3a + D3b)

9a. D2 - D3

We have already noted that Dl = D2, hence (from 9a), Dl = D2 - D3.

But what if we were to mimic further the structure of Huemer's argument, and apply it to Dl and D2, rather than to D2 and D3? Recall that we are here only concerned with how

equal the distributions happen to be. If a pair of distributions are unequal, let us use the symbol

" >

" to represent "closer to

equality than" (or colloquially: "more equal than"). We thus obtain the following:

2b. Dla > D2a 3b. D2a = D2b 4b. Dla = Dlb 5b. Dlb > D2b 6b. (Dla + Dlb) * (D2a + D2b) [from Premises 2b

and 5b] 7b. Dl -

(Dla + Dlb) 8b. D2 =

(D2a + D2b) 9b. Dl * D2

From 9a and 9b, Dl * D2 = D3. But we have already concluded that Dl = D2 = D3. Hence,

the structure of Huemer's argument generates both the con

clusion that Dl = D2 = D3 and the contradictory conclusion that it is not the case that Dl = D2 = D3, which is an absur

dity. And if Huemer's argument when applied to distributions is fallacious, as it clearly is in generating an absurd conclusion, then if the values strongly supervene upon those distributions, one is surely justified in fearing that that the argument is

equally fallacious when applied to the values, too. Indeed, this

would seem to provide very strong grounds indeed for rejecting local and for preferring global supervenience. Moreover, if

adding together the distributions in a Huemer-style fashion

generates a contradiction, then that provides extremely good

grounds for not adding together in that fashion the values they

supposedly directly entail.




But wouldn't this pose a fundamental problem for the pure welfarist egalitarian?25 No, because she isn't a hedonistic utili

tarian. Egalitarians often criticize utilitarians precisely because of the way the latter think in purely additive ways, and because of the seemingly inadequate way in which they treat distribu tions.

What explains the absurdity arising from applying a

Huemer-style argument to distributions? The answer, it would

seem, is Simpson's paradox. And what this paradox shows is that a mathematical claim can be true of the parts while not

being true of the whole, and vice versa. Nancy Cartwright has

presented an interesting example of Simpson's paradox.26 Some

had suspected that the graduate school within the University of California at Berkeley was discriminating against female

applicants. The reason for their suspicion was the greater rejection rate of women than of men who applied for admission to the school. But it transpired that, after each department had been investigated in isolation, women did not experience a

greater rate of rejection within any of the departments. How could this possibly be?

The answer is that if an equal number of women and men were to apply to the graduate school, but proportionately more women were to apply to a department with a greater rejection rate regardless of the sex of the applicants, and proportionately

more men were to apply to a department with a lower rejection rate regardless of the applicants' sex, then the global rejection rate will be higher for women than it will be for men. This

means that it is quite possible for there to be an equal rate of

acceptance for women and men within each department of the

graduate school at the University of California at Berkeley without that being true of the graduate school as a whole.

Because what is true mathematically of the parts need not be true of the whole, then two inequalities can create a greater

inequality (as in World 3), and they can also create an equality (as in World 2). Consequently, an egalitarian could, if she

chose, criticize the inequality in the first half of World 2 while

praising the overall outcome in that world. All she need do is

keep what is true mathematically of the parts distinct from



290 ALAN CARTER

what is true of the whole. And Simpson's paradox justifies that distinction.

IX

However, Huemer would seem to have a response when he

argues that the rejection of cross-temporal additivity would result in two paradoxes. Regarding the first, he asks us to consider World 4, which is the same as World 3 except that B

enjoys well-being at level 60 at any moment during the second half of his life. The utility-value of the first half of World 4 is

V4a, and the utility-value of the second half of that world is V4b. The first half of Worlds 2 and 4 contain the same distri bution. After having lived with that distribution, should the

egalitarian choose V2b or V4b as the second half of the world within which she lives? Huemer assumes that V2b = V2a = V4a. He also assumes that V4b is better than V4a. Therefore, he assumes that V4b is better than V2b.

Consequently, it is the second half of World 4 that the egali tarian should choose. What is paradoxical is that this is tan tamount to choosing World 4, but when faced with choosing between Worlds 2 and 4, the egalitarian would choose World 2.

But no such paradox arises for the teleological egalitarian who is concerned with actual results. V4a and V4b both con

tribute to an unequal outcome, while V2a and V2b both con

tribute to an equal one. Hence, for such a teleological

egalitarian, (V2b - V2a) > V4a and (V2b = V2a) > V4b.27 So,

faced with the first choice, given that she holds V2b > V4b, she

would actually choose the second half of World 2, and not the

second half of World 4 as Huemer presumes. And faced with

the second choice she would, of course, choose World 2.

Therefore, in both cases she would be consistent in choosing, what is in effect, World 2.

Huemer then asks us to consider World 5, which consists in

both A and B suffering at level -100 at any moment during the

first half of their lives. The egalitarian is given two choices in

succession right at the beginning of the world. The first choice is




between the first half of World 5 and the first half of Worlds 2

and 4. The second choice is between the second half of Worlds 2

and 4. Huemer argues that, regarding the first choice, the first

half of World 5 would strike the egalitarian as less preferable, and hence she would not choose it; and regarding the second

choice, she would favor the second half of World 4. But her two

choices are tantamount to her choosing World 4 as a whole.

However, Huemer argues, what if she had just one choice, and

it was between the following four options: the first half of World 5 along with the second half of World 2; the first half

of World 5 along with the second half of World 4; the first half of World 2 along with the second half of World 2; or the first half of World 4 along with the second half of World 4? The

egalitarian would choose the first half of World 2 along with the second half of World 2. But this is tantamount to her

choosing World 2. And Huemer thinks it absurd that the first set of choices should yield a different outcome to the second.

But again, no such paradox arises for the teleological egali tarian who is concerned with actual results. As we have seen,

she holds that V2b > V4b, and not the converse as Huemer

presumes an egalitarian must. Thus, in all of Huemer's imag ined cases, she would be consistent in choosing, what is in

effect, World 2. In short, Huemer's decision-rule paradoxes do not arise for

the teleological egalitarian concerned with actual results. But Huemer assumes that the egalitarian will be faced with these

paradoxes, and that they arise because of three possible deci

sion-rules that one might adopt:

(i) Choose the action which is such that, if you choose it, the world will be best,

(ii) Choose the action which has the best overall conse

quences,

(iii) Choose the action such that, if you choose it, the future will be best.28

Huemer does admit that none of the paradoxes would arise if one were to act solely upon the first decision-rule, which enjoins one to bring about the best possible world, as opposed to the



292 ALAN CARTER

best possible set of consequences or the best possible future. Yet it is precisely this rule that the teleological egalitarian concerned with actual results could take as her guide. So why should such an egalitarian not confine herself to that decision rule?

Huemer's reply in anticipation, as it were, is that rules (ii) and (iii) have intuitive plausibility. However, it is extremely common for moral theories to reject incommensurable intu itions. Bentham, for example, wanted to revise our moral

intuitions in order to reject those that were incompatible with his utilitarianism. And Rawls' reflective equilibrium is no dif ferent in wanting to banish those intuitions that fail to cohere

with other intuitions and with our best theory. Moreover, it

appears to be (iii) that generates the problems Huemer thinks

he has identified. But why accept (iii)? Huemer offers the fol

lowing reason. Imagine

[y]ou are free to perform or refrain from performing some action, A. You

are reliably informed that, should you perform A, the rest of your life (your

future) will be worse than it would otherwise be. However, because of a

failure of Temporal Additivity, your life as a whole will have been better

than it would otherwise have been. Assume there are no other practically relevant considerations. Should you perform A?29

Huemer believes it to be intuitively obvious that you should not. This decision supports (iii). And he further believes that

this choice is analogous to the choice between the second half of

Worlds 2 and 4 after one has rejected the first half of World 5 -

the only difference being that the reasoning regarding your future is prudential, and Huemer holds that difference to be

irrelevant in this case.

But if I am concerned with acting morally rather than simply with acting prudentially, I might draw a very different conclu

sion. Imagine that throughout the first half of my life I have

benefited from an injustice. Now imagine that I have three

courses of action open to me: I could continue to benefit from

that injustice; I could simply stop benefiting from it; or I could

make amends. If I were only concerned with my future life

being prudentially the best possible, then I would take the first

course of action. If I were only concerned with my future life




being morally the best possible, then I would take the middle course of action. But if I were a truly moral person, it seems to

me that I would take the third. But that would be to act so as to make my life morally the best possible overall. And such a

choice follows from (i) as opposed to (iii). Moreover, this coheres with the teleological egalitarian who is concerned with actual results not choosing the second half of World 4 in

preference to the second half of World 2.

X

Huemer's final defense of his critique rests on the claim that

egalitarian intuitions are political, whereas strong superve

nience, intrapersonal non-egalitarianism and cross-temporal

additivity are not. And it is precisely political intuitions that are notable for their untrustworthiness. Hence, egalitarian intu itions should not trump moral ones, for the latter can be

expected to be more reliable. And the three moral intuitions that Huemer claims solely to have relied upon

- namely, strong

supervenience, intrapersonal non-egalitarianism and cross

temporal additivity -

combine, ostensibly, to refute egalitari anism.

But we have seen that one moral theory, namely utilitari

anism based on actual results, appears to reject strong, local

supervenience, at least with respect to rightness and wrongness, while nevertheless adhering to global supervenience. To claim that one's moral theory runs counter to our moral intuitions

unless all of the moral properties it includes display strong, local supervenience thus lacks cogency. Instead, as our earlier

focus upon rightness and wrongness would seem to establish,

global supervenience is quite adequate for a moral property. But teleological egalitarianism concerned with actual results is

compatible with global supervenience, intrapersonal non-egal

itarianism, and cross-temporal additivity. So what remains of

Huemer's rejection of egalitarianism? Nothing, it would seem. But imagine that Huemer were correct in thinking that any

acceptable set of moral beliefs must accord in some way with



294 ALAN CARTER

intrapersonal non-egalitarianism, with cross-temporal additiv

ity and not merely with global supervenience but with strong, local supervenience.30 However, I see no convincing reason for

thinking that each of the moral properties within one's moral

system must do so. Having at least one moral property that accords with intrapersonal non-egalitarianism, having at least one moral property that accords with cross-temporal additivity, and having at least one moral property that accords with strong supervenience should suffice for one's moral theory to accord

with Huemer's three moral principles. For example, a utilitar

ian could conceivably hold that goodness strongly supervenes, while rightness only supervenes globally. Rightness and good ness do not both have to supervene strongly and locally. Indeed, as we have seen, for the utilitarian whose consequen

tialism is based on actual results, rightness only supervenes

globally. An egalitarian might therefore conclude that she

requires a value that strongly supervenes and one that only globally supervenes. She might then argue that strong, local

supervenience entails that she should recognize the value at the core of non-teleological egalitarianism, while intrapersonal non-egalitarianism and cross-temporal additivity jointly entail that she should recognize the value at the core of teleological egalitarianism concerned with actual results.31 Hence, she

might ultimately conclude that both teleological and non-tele

ological distribution value (along with both teleological and

non-teleological distribution disvalue) are extremely important. But consider what would then follow. The dis value picked

out by non-teleological egalitarianism shows World 1 to be a

better world than either World 2 or World 3, while the dis value

picked out by teleological egalitarianism concerned with actual

results shows the first world to be a better world than the third.

Now, when one subscribes to more than one value, one must

frequently engage in trade-offs.32 But in the choice between

these three worlds, there is no need to engage in any trade-offs

whatsoever. This is because World 1 has no less teleological nor

non-teleological distribution value than either of the other

worlds, but it has greater non-teleological distribution value

than both of those worlds and greater teleological distribution




value than World 3. Thus, if one is an egalitarian and sub scribes both to teleological and to non-teleological distribution

value, then one should clearly prefer World 1 to World 3.

Interestingly, an egalitarian who subscribes both to teleo

logical and to non-teleological distribution value would also have grounds for preferring World 2 to World 3. For World 2 has no less teleological nor non-teleological distribution value than World 3, but the former has greater teleological distri bution value than the latter. And the ranking of World 1 as better than World 2 and of World 2 as better than World 3 would seem to accord with common egalitarian intuitions.

Moreover, I suspect that many egalitarians would hold that any moment in World 1 was better than any moment in World 2, which in turn was better than any moment in World 3. Yet it is difficult to see how an egalitarian can rank these worlds in this

way unless she values both teleologically and non-teleologi cally. Hence, there is reason to think that even "pure" egali tarians respect more than one value.33 While this is a surprising result, and not one that I had anticipated in advance of

mounting this defense of egalitarianism, it is not unwelcome to a value-pluralist such as myself.

So, recognizing teleological and non-teleological distribution value as distinct values that both exercise their individual influ ences on one's moral evaluations provides one with grounds for

holding World 1 to be the best of the three possible worlds and for holding World 3 to be the worst. Huemer is prevented from

seeing that egalitarians can have clear grounds for regarding World 1 as the best of the three worlds (even if intrapersonal

non-egalitarianism, strong, local supervenience and cross-tem

poral additivity must play some role in any acceptable moral

philosophy) because, in failing to distinguish between teleolog ical and non-teleological distribution value, he proceeds to

equivocate between them when generating his seeming paradox. This becomes abundantly clear when Huemer's mistake is

seen to parallel the following erroneous reasoning. Imagine that

Janice wants to buy a car. Further imagine that she prefers fuel efficient cars to gas-guzzlers, and that she also prefers white cars

to red ones. Her local used-car dealer shows her three cars: first,



296 ALAN CARTER

a white fuel-efficient one; second, a white gas-guzzler; and

finally, a red gas-guzzler. Now imagine the car dealer telling Janice that she has no reason for preferring the white fuel efficient car to the red gas-guzzler because the first car she was shown is exactly the same color as the second, hence no better; and the second car is not any more fuel efficient than the third, and hence no better. And therefore Janice has no reason for

preferring the first car to the third; so she may as well buy the red gas-guzzler. Clearly, Janice does have good reason for

preferring the second car to the third, for while the former is no more fuel-efficient, it is a preferable color. And, clearly, she has

good reason for preferring the first car to the second, for while

they are both the same color, the former is more fuel-efficient. And furthermore, she has good reason for preferring the first car to the third, for the former is both more fuel-efficient and a

preferable color. Hence, she has good reason for regarding the first car as the best, and the third - the red gas-guzzler

- as the worst. By parity of reasoning, an egalitarian can have good reason for regarding the first world as the best, and the third

world as the worst.

So let us return to Huemer's main argument. Premise 1,

namely that VI = V2, rests on the assumption of intrapersonal

non-egalitarianism. The egalitarian can agree that VI = V2;

except that she will insist that VI = V2 only with respect to some form of teleological distribution value. Clearly, she will

add, VI ^ V2 with respect to non-teleological distribution

value, for at no moment in World 2 does an equal distribution

obtain, whereas an equal distribution obtains at every moment

in World 1. And Huemer has provided no argument even

suggesting that VI = V2 with respect to non-teleological dis tribution value, never mind establishing it. Premise 2, namely that V2a =

V3a, rests on the assumption of strong superve

nience. The egalitarian can also agree that V2a = V3a; except

that she will insist that V2a = V3a only with respect to non

teleological distribution value. Clearly, she will further add, V2a * V3a with respect to teleological distribution value (when one evaluates on the basis of actual results), for V2a contributes

towards an overall equality, whereas V3a contributes towards




an overall inequality. And Huemer has provided no argument

establishing that V2a = V3a with respect to any form of tele

ological distribution value. Indeed, he has provided no argu ment that even suggests it. But then, there is only reason to

conclude that V2 = V3 with respect to non-teleological distri bution value. Hence, Huemer has provided no argument that

compels his adversary to accept that VI = V2 with respect to

non-teleological distribution value or that V2 = V3 with

respect to some form of teleological distribution value. Thus,

duly sensitized to the Fallacy of Equivocal Counting, his

adversary has been given no reason to conclude that VI = V3.

Rather, she has been given good reason to conclude that

VI > V2 > V3.

XI

Finally, let me anticipate one likely objection. Earlier, I sought to undermine the strong supervenience of certain moral prop erties by focusing upon how "rightness" must be construed by that variety of utilitarianism that is concerned with actual results. But this is not the most common form of utilitarianism.

Moreover, it might be added, it is an implausible variety. Hence, relying on an implausible moral theory will not suffice

to refute our intuitions regarding the strong supervenience of

any moral property. The more common variety of utilitarianism assesses either

actions or rules in terms of expected, rather than in terms of

actual, results. Act utilitarianism based upon expected results, for example, requires one to consider all the available courses

of action open to one; and for each course of action, one is to

quantify the good that could arise, multiply it by its probability of arising, and then deduct from that figure the quantified bad that could result multiplied by its probability of arising. This is the expected utility of any course of action. And if one course of action has a greater expected utility than any other, then it is

right to pursue it, and wrong not to do so. Many regard this as a far preferable variety of consequentialism to one based on actual results.



298 ALAN CARTER

But in response, what is to prevent one from subscribing to a

form of teleological egalitarianism that paralleled utilitarianism based upon expected results? Such an egalitarian could argue that V2a is better than V3a because the first half of World 2 is

very likely to contribute to an equal overall outcome; whereas

the first half of World 3 is very likely to contribute to an un

equal one. Such an egalitarian would thus have just as good

grounds for rejecting Huemer's second premise as the teleo

logical egalitarian who is concerned solely with actual results.

However, what if one had no idea in advance what was going to happen in the second half of each world? For simplicity's sake, imagine that one did not know whether one was consid

ering the first half of World 2 or the first half of World 3.

Imagine that the overall equal outcome of World 2 had a value

of + 5, while the overall unequal outcome of World 3 had a

value of -5. In that case, the first half of World 2 would have a

50% chance of leading to an outcome valued at + 5, and a 50%

chance of leading to an outcome valued at -5. Were V2a to be

construed as an expected utility-value (in other words, as an

expected distribution value which is calculated by summing the

values of the various possible overall outcomes multiplied by their respective probabilities), then it would equal 5 divided by 2 subtracted from 5 divided by 2, which comes to 0. The first

half of World 3 would have the same chances of leading to the

same outcomes, thus V3a would also equal 0. In this case,

Huemer's second premise would stand.

But given the distributions that had occurred in the first

halves of Worlds 2 and 3, then it is certain that the distribution

in the second half of World 2 will lead to an equal overall

outcome, while the distribution in the second half of World 3

will certainly lead to an unequal one. Hence, for the teleological

egalitarian who is concerned solely with expected results, V2b

would equal 100% of + 5, while V3b would equal 100% of -5.

Thus, V2b would not equal V3b, and Huemer's fifth premise should be rejected by an egalitarian of this sort. But how can

Premise 5 be rejected when it follows from Premises 2, 3 and 4?

The teleological egalitarian who is concerned with expected results cannot, as we have seen, reject Huemer's second premise




when nothing about the second halves of Worlds 2 and 3 is known in advance. However, Premise 3 states that V3a = V3b. But in the case we are considering, V3a would equal 0, while V3b would equal -5. Premise 4 states that V2a = V2b. But

again, in the case we are considering, V2a would equal 0, while

V2b would equal + 5. Hence, the teleological egalitarian who is concerned with expected results should also reject both

Huemer's third and fourth premises. However, it might then be objected that I have missed the

point. For my defense of egalitarianism fails because it rejects strong supervenience, whereas forms of utilitarianism based

upon expected results rather than upon actual ones do not

need to deny strong supervenience. This is because, the

objection might proceed, expected results are part of the

present. Yes, any expectation refers to the future; but it is a

present expectation regarding the future. Hence, it might be

argued, for a utilitarian whose consequentialism is based upon

expected results, the rightness of an action solely supervenes

upon the present state of affairs. Thus, for such a utilitarian, rightness may strongly supervene, contrary to my defense of

egalitarianism. But any such mooted objection would actually strengthen

my defense of egalitarianism. This is because the teleological egalitarian who evaluates in terms of expected outcomes could

then argue that, if the present probability of some future out come is part of the present state of affairs, the values V2a, V3a,

V2b and V3b all strongly supervene. But, as we have just seen, either V2a ^ V3a, and Huemer's second premise is false; or

V3a*V3b, V2a*V2b and V2b * V3b, and therefore Huemer's third, fourth and fifth premises are all false. In which case, we would have a form of teleological egalitarianism that

was compatible with intrapersonal non-egalitarianism, that could easily be made compatible with the cross temporal additivity of value, and which is compatible with strong, and not merely global, supervenience. In other words, when earlier

focusing upon a variety of teleological egalitarianism based

upon actual rather than upon expected outcomes, I relied on a

form that is less congenial to my case.



300 ALAN CARTER

In conclusion, given that Huemer's paradox rests upon his

committing the Fallacy of Equivocal Counting, his paradoxical critique of egalitarianism clearly fails. For an argument that rests upon an equivocation is invalid. And an invalid argument fails to refute anything. And given the lack of cogency in his

supplementary arguments, the whole of his critique fails.

NOTES

See Michael Huemer, "Non-egalitarianism", Philosophical Studies 114

(2003): 147-171. 2

Ibid., p. 148. 3

Ibid. 4

Figure 1 is adapted from ibid., p. 150. As Huemer writes of his Figure 1:

"The vertical dimension on the page represents time. The width of the bars

indicates the level of well-being that each individual enjoys; the height of the

bars indicates duration. Total utility enjoyed during a period of an indi

vidual's life is the area of the bar representing that period." Ibid. My Fig ure 1 differs from Huemer's insofar as I have made clear a distinction

between Via and Vlb that Huemer tellingly omits. 5

See ibid. 6

Ibid., p. 149. 7

Ibid. 8

For the distinction between "consequentialism based on actual results"

and "consequentialism based on probable results", see Tim Mulgan, The

Demands of Consequentialism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), p. 33. 9

It is clear that egalitarians will hold that VlaNTV > V2aNTV, and that

VlbNTV > V2bNTV Hence, if (VlaNTV + VlaNTV) = V1NTV and if

(V2aNTV + V2aNTV) = V2NTV, then V1NTV ^ V2NTV It is also clear that

egalitarians will hold that V2TV ^ V3TV Hence, V1NTV _? (V2NTV

= y3NTV)5 and (yjTV

= y^V) _? ̂TV Therefore? on no

consistent egalitarian construal of "VI" and "V3" does VI = V3. 10

This defeats certain of Huemer's uses of cross-temporal additivity, for

additivity requires that the same category of things be counted. And in

failing to distinguish between counting teleological and non-teleological

value, Huemer proceeds just as if he were adding up apples and oranges, and

counting the oranges as if they were apples. 11

See ibid., p. 154. On the distinction between the simultaneous segments view and the complete lives view, see Dennis McKerlie, "Equality and

time," Ethics 99 (April, 1989): 475-491. The simultaneous segments view is

exclusively concerned with temporary, synchronie distributions, and hence

with how much an individual enjoys in some part of her life history as




compared with how much other individuals enjoy during that same time

period; whereas the complete lives view is exclusively concerned with how

much an individual will have enjoyed in total over the whole course of her life as compared with how much other individuals will have enjoyed in total over the whole course of their lives. 12

See Huemer, op. cit., p. 153. 13

Ibid. 14

See Larry S. Temkin, Inequality (New York: Oxford University Press,

1996). 15 For one critique of Temkin, see Alan Carter, "Simplifying 'inequality,'

"

Philosophy and Public Affairs 30, 1 (2001): 88-100. 16

If so, then this provides an answer to Samuel Scheffler's recent objection to the lack of motivation behind "luck egalitarianism", as opposed to

Rawlsian political philosophy. See Samuel Scheffler, "What is egalitarian ism?", Philosophy and Public Affairs 31, 1 (2003): 5-39. 17

Huemer, op. cit., p. 153. 18

Ibid., p. 154. 19

Ibid., p. 153. 20

See Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987). 21 Indeed, an egalitarian might find disvalue in an inequality even when it

resulted from the free choices of all concerned. As John Baker writes: "there are big choices in life which are full of uncertainty, or depend on circum

stances, upbringing, emotion, and influence. Choices of education, of job, of

spouse, of residence, even of lifestyle - if these choices turn out badly, is it

really right to blame the people who make them, and to insist that they bear the consequences? Why not give them a second chance?" John Baker,

Arguing for Equality (London: Verso, 1987), p. 67. And as he adds: "A

policy of unrelieved suffering for past mistakes can't plausibly be described as a way of sharing equally the burdens of choice". Ibid. Also see Elizabeth S. Anderson, "What is the point of equality?", Ethics 109, 2 (1999): 287-337, especially pp. 295-6. 22

Huemer, op. cit., p. 154. 23

See ibid., p. 156. 24

Huemer defines "event" as including "any (nonzero) portion of the life of an individual," adding that "fusions of events are events". Ibid., p. 147. This

would seem to make a whole life an "event", and a pair of whole lives an

"event", too. 25

I should perhaps point out that I am far from being a pure welfarist

egalitarian. See Alan Carter, "Value-pluralist egalitarianism", Journal of Philosophy 99, 11 (2002): 577-599. But this doesn't prevent me from wishing to defend pure welfarist egalitarianism from erroneous objections. 26

I have taken Cartwright's example from Elliott Sober, Philosophy of Biology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 100.



302 ALAN CARTER

Here and in what follows, I return to the traditional use of the symbol " >

" to represent "better than".

28 Huemer, op. cit., p. 160.

29 Ibid., p. 162.

30 Perhaps because the utilitarian concerned with actual results might be

thought to hold that goodness strongly and locally supervenes (namely, upon

utility), and hence does not reject strong, local supervenience tout court. 31

As we have seen, she could cite utilitarianism when it is based on actual

results as a case where one moral property -

rightness -

only globally supervenes, even if goodness were taken to supervene locally. Consequently, she might think that there is a precedent for holding to a globally super

vening value (rightness) and to a locally supervening one (goodness). 32 See Carter, "Value-pluralist egalitarianism", op. cit., for how an egali

tarian with plural values might be forced to trade them off and yet still be

able to provide determinate answers to moral questions. 33 For the distinction between "Pure Egalitarians" and "Pluralist Egali

tarians", see Derek Parfit, Equality or Priority?: The Lindley Lecture

(Kansas: University of Kansas, 1995), p. 5.

Department of Philosophy University of Glasgow 67-69 Oakfield Avenue

Glasgow G12 8QQ United Kingdom E-mail: [email protected]



a defense of egalitarianism

Documents