a. coventry (2007) hume a guide for the perplexed

8/12/2019 A. Coventry (2007) Hume a Guide for the Perplexed

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THEGUIDESFOR THE PERPLEXED SERIESAdorno:A Guidefor thePerplexed, AlexThomsonDeleuze:A Guidefor thePerplexed, ClaireColebrookLevinas:A Guidefor thePerplexed, B. C.HutchensSartre: A Guidefor thePerplexed, GaryCoxWittgenstein: A Guidefor thePerplexed, MarkAddisMerleau-Ponty: A Guidefor thePerplexed, Eric MatthewsGadamer: A Guidefor thePerplexed, ChrisLawnHusserl: A Guidefor thePerplexed, MathesonRussellQuine: A Guidefor thePerplexed, GaryKempExistentialism:A Guidefor thePerplexed, StephenEarnshawKierkegaard: A Guidefor thePerplexed, ClareCarlisleRousseau:A Guidefor thePerplexed, Matthew SimpsonKant: A Guidefor thePerplexed, T. K. Seung


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Dedicated to Martin, Isabella and 'Baby Tummy'


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CONTENTS

Abbreviations xAcknowledgements xiiiIntroduction 1Chapter 1 : Life and Worksof David Hume 31.1. Publication Time-Line 11Chapter 2: Intellectual H eritage 142.1. The Growth of Science 142.2. Empiricism and Rationalism 152.3. Main Influences 172.3.1. Descartes 18

2.3.2. Malebranche 182.3.3. Newton 202.3.4. Locke 212.3.5. Berkeley 222.3.6. Bayle 242.4. Summary 25Chapter 3: Approach to Philosophy 283.1. Definitionof Philosophy 283.2. Characterization of thePresent Stateof Philosophy 293.3. The Science of H um an N ature 303.3.1. Thee xperime ntal m ethod 323.4. Summary 35Chapter4: Operations of the Mind 374.1. TheCopy Principle 384.1.1. Twoexamplesinsupport of theCopy Principle 40

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4.l .2. Thecaseof themissing shadeofblue 414.1.3. Impressionsand ideasfurther classified 44

4.2. TheSeparability Principle 464.3. Principles of the Association of Ideas 474.3.1. Relations 494.3.2. Substance and mode 504.3.3. Abstract ideas 53

4.4. Summary 56Chapter5: SpaceandTime 58

5.1. Against theInfinite Divisibilityof Spaceand Time 585.2. TheOriginof ourIdeasofSpaceandTime 615.3. TheVacuum 6 35.4. Three Objections Considered 675.5. Space, Timeand theCopy Principle 72

Chapter 6: Cause and Effect 786.1. TheRelationofCauseand Effect 786.2. Why aCause IsAlways Necessary 826.3. The Inferencefrom Cause to Effect 846.3.1. Thereason ofanimals 886.4. Belief 89

6.4.1. Thecausesof belief 926.4.2. The influenceof belief 94

6.5. Probability 946.6. RulestoJudge Causesand Effects 966.7. Kant's'Reply'toHume 98

Chapter 7:Necessary Connection 1057.1. TheIdeaofNecessary Connection 1057.2. Libertyand Necessity 1107.3. Moral andReligious Implications ofNecessity 1137.4. The Imaginary Standard of a Necessary Connection 1157.5. Summary 134

Chapter8: Scepticism 1398.1. Scepticism about Reason 1398.2. The ExistenceofExternal Objects 142

8.2.1. Senses 1428.2.2. Reason 1448.2.3. Imagination 145

8.3. Ancient Philosophy 1518.4. Modern Philosophy 1528.5. TheImmaterial Soul 154

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8.6. Personal Identity 1578.7. Effects of Scepticismon Philosophy 1618.8. Scepticismand theScienceofHuman Nature 165

Bibliography 169Index 174

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ABBREVIATIONS

AB David Hum e,4AnA bstractof aB ook lately published enti-tled A Treatise of Human Nature whereinthe chief argu-ment of that book is farther illustrated and explained'taken from TH N (see below). References cite the boo k,chapter, section,andparagraph to themost recent Oxfordedition followed by page numbers from the Selby-Bigge/Nidditch editions, prefixed by'SBN'.AT A ntoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole, Logic or The Art ofThinking. Trans. J. V. Buroker, Cam bridge: Cam bridgeUniversity Press, 1996. References cite page numbers only.CPR Immanuel Kant, Critiqueof Pu re Reason.Trans.P.Guyerand A. Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1997.References cite bothA' and 'B' editions.

CSM Ren Descartes, The PhilosophicalWritings of Descartes.Trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoif, and DugaldMurdoch, vols.I and II, NewYork: Cam bridge UniversityPress, 1985, 1993. References cite volume and pagenumber.DNR David Hum e, D ialogues Concerning Natural Religion(2ndedn). Ed. Richard H. Popkin, Indianapolis/Cam bridge:H ackett Un iversity Press, 1998.EC HU John Locke,An Essay Concerning H um an Understanding.Ed. P. H.Nidd itch, O xfo rd: Ox ford University Press, 1975.Referencescite boo k, chapter and paragraph num ber.EHU David Hum e, An Enquiry Concerning H um anUnderstanding. Ed. T. L Beauchamp, Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1999, and An Enquiry Concer ningHuman Understanding (3rd edn). Eds L. A. Selby-Bigge

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ABBREVIATIONS

and R H. Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.Referencescite the boo k, chapter, section, and paragrap hto the most recent Oxford edition followed by pagenumbersfrom the Selby-Bigge/Nidditch editions, prefixedby SBN .EM PL David Hume, Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary(revised edn). Ed. Eugene Miller, Indianapolis: LibertyFun d, 1985. References cite page num bers only.EPM David Hum e, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles ofMorals. Ed. T. L Beaucham p, O xford : Ox ford UniversityPress, 1998, and An Enquiry Concerning H um anUnderstanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals(3rd ed n). Eds. L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. N idditch,Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975. References citethebook,chapter, section,andparagraph to themost recent O xfo rdedition followed by page numbers from the Selby-Bigge/Nidditch editions, prefixedby6SBN'.

HD PierreBayle,H istoricalandCritical Dictionary:Selections.Trans. R. Popkin, Indianapolis/Cambridge: HackettUniversityPress, 1965. References cite page num bers only.MP Isaac N ew ton, The Mathematical Principles of NaturalPhilosophy. Twovols. Trans, and ed. Andrew Motte andrevisedbyFlorian Ca jori, Un iversityofCalifornia, 1962.Referencescite volum e and page number.OP Isaac Newton, Opticks, M inela: Dover Publications,

1952.References cite page num ber only.PHK George Berkeley,A Treatise Concerning the Principles ofHuman Knowledge. Ed. K. P. W inkler, Indianapolis:Hackett Publishing Com pany, 1982. References citePartand Section number.PR ImmanuelKant,P rolegomenato Any Future MetaphysicsThat CanQualify as aScience.Trans. Pau l Carus, Chicago :Open Co urt Publishing, 1997. References cite pagenum ber only.ST Nicolas M alebranche, The Search After Truth. Eds.Thomas Lennon and Paul Olscamp, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1997. References cite pagenum bers only.THN David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature. Eds. D. F.Norton and M. J. Norton, Oxford: Oxford Universi ty

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ABBREVIATIONS

Press, 2000, and A Treatise of Human Nature (2ndedn).Eds. L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch, Ox ford:Clarendon Press, 1978. References citethe book, chapter,section, andparagraphto themost recent Oxford editionfollowed by page numbers from the Selby-Bigge/Nidditcheditions, prefixed by 'SBN'.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Thanks to both Don Garrett and David Owen for their continualsupportandongoing inspirational Hume scholarship. Many thanksalsotoEric Steinbergforveryhelpfulcommentson thepenultimatedraft of this manuscript. Thanks to all of the students who havetaken m y various classes on H um e over the years and special ex trathanks also to Martin, Isabella and 'Baby Tummy' for the steadysupplyof distractions, fun and love.

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INTRODUCTION

David Hume isarguably the greatest philosopher tohave writteninthe English language. He made significant contributions in episte-mology, metaphysics, morality, psychology, politics and socialhistory, economics, history, religion, literary and aesthetic theory.This book attempts an accessible and unified presentation ofHume's most important contributions to epistemology and meta-physics in amanner that does not presuppose anyfamiliarity withHume on the reader's part. While th e present work isw ritten as aguidebook for beginner students, the scholarly debates that sur-round Hume's philosophy havenotbeen entirely ignored,but Ihavedone m y best to keep scholarly detail to a minim um . Further,although thisis awork primarilyinHume's metaphysicsand episte-mology, the topics including the origin and association of ideas,space and time, causal reasoning, necessary connections, free will,personal identity,and scepticism, Ihave also referred th e reader toother areas ofwork, particularly hisviewson the passions, morals,aesthetics and religion when appropriate. This work contains,however,no discussion of hispolitics, h istoryand economic theory.A finalcaveat. This w ork relies m oreheavily on thestructure anddetail of A Treatise of Human Nature, although material has alsobeen included from Enquiry ConcerningHuman Understanding whenjudged appropriate. The main reason for this reliance is that theTreatise simply,in m yeyes,providesamuch m ore complete pictureofhisphilosophy than the much abridged and polished Enquiry.Somescholars believe that thereareenough substantialdifferencesbetweenthe two works to warrant treating them separately. This approachtakes seriously Hume's renunciation of the Treatise in theAdvertisement to the last edition of the Enquiry, published 1777,


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which closes bysaying that 'henceforth, th e author desires, that thefollowingpiecesmayaloneberegardedascontaininghisphilosophi-calsentiments and principles'. At the same time however Hum e sayseven in the Advertisement that 'most of the principles, and reason-ings, contained in this volume, werepublished' in the Treatise, andthathe has'cast thewhole anewin thefollow ing pieces, where somenegligences in his former reasoningand more in the expression,are. . . corrected'. In his own autobiography also he claimed that theTreatise's lackof success'proceededmore from themanner than thematter ' (EMPL xxxv) and in a letter wrote that 'the philosophicalprinciples are the same in both'.1 This present work attempts toprovide an introduction to Hume's thought that combines the struc-ture and detail of the Treatisewith much of the clarityand styleo ftheEnquiry.

NOTE

1 SeeGrieg(1932:1 , 158).

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CHAPTER 1

LIFEANDWORKSOFDAVIDHUME

David Humewasborn inEdinburgh on26thApril 1711to JosephandKatherine Home. Both parents wereof agood, although notespecially wealthy, background.Hisfather sfamilyis abranchof theEarlofHome sand hisancestors have been proprietorsof amodestestateforseveral generations, whilehismotherw as thedaughterofSir David Falconer,adistinguished lawyerwhobecame Presidentofthe Collegeof Justice.1

Notmuchisknown about Hume s early childhoodandeducation.It is likelythathespenthischildhood divided betweenthe family'sEdinburgh houseon thesouth sideof theLawnmarket,thedwellingpresumablywithin which Humew asborn,andNinewells,thefamilyestate on theWhiteadderRiver in the border lowlands near Berwick.The house atNinewells stands on a bluff above the waters of theWhiteadder.2Down the bluff a fewyards to the south-east of thehouse,anoverhanging rock formsashallow cave where local legendhas it he indulged in profound philosophical reflections.3 Furtheralongthewatersidearemore caves, quarriesandfreestone rocks,anditisaround thesepartswhere Hume probably playedas ayoungboywithhiselder brother John,inaddition toengaginginactivities likehunting,fishing and horseriding.4 Since attendance at church wasrequiredby law atthattime presumably Humeand hisfamily alsoattended thelocal Church ofScotland pastored by hisuncle.5JustafterHume s second birthday,hisfather died, leaving him,hiselder brother John and sister Katherine under the care of theirmother,who'devotedherself entirelyto therearingand educatingofherChildren'(EMPL xxxii).Hismother reported thatheryoungDavid was good natured and 'uncommon wake-minded', thatis,uncommonly acute, in accordance with the local dialect of the

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period.6Indeed his earliest surviving letter from Ninewells dated 4 thJuly1727,writtenat the age ofsixteen, indicates thathe wasalreadyengaged in the writing of what would end up being his first andarguably greatest work, A Treatise of Human Nature: Being anAttempt to Introduce theExperimental Method of Reasoning intoMoral Subjects, the first twovolumesofwhich wouldbepublishedanonymously by the time he was twenty-seven.7 Hume himselfobservesonmany occasions thathisinterestinliterature beganat avery earlyage and that mostof hislifehasbeen devotedto'literaryPursuits andOccupations'.8 He claims that since'earliestInfancy,[he]found alwiseastrong Inclination toBooks&Literature',9 thathe was'seizedvery early withapassionforLiterature whichhasbeenthe ruling Passion of [his] Life, and the great Source of [his]Enjoyments'(EMPL xxxii-xxxiii). However, beingthesecondson ofa notvery rich family meant that therewas not enough money toallow himself full-time devotion to literary pursuits, so he alwayshad toearnalivingtosupplementhisincome.

Most likely educated at homeby local tutors in addition to hismother s instruction, untilat the age ofeleven, Hume accompaniedhis brother to Edinburgh University.His studies there probablyincluded Latin, Greek, logic, metaphysics, moral philosophy,history, mathematics and natural philosophy. He left EdinburghUniversity in either 1725or 1726,whenhe wasaround fifteenyearsold, withoutformally takingadegreeto pursuehiseducation pri-vately.Hisscholarly disposition, coupled withthefactthatbothhisfather and maternal grandfather had been lawyers, meant that acareerin law wasencouraged,but hisscholarly interests soon turnedto literatureandphilosophy.In fact, hewritesin hisautobiographythat he 'found an unsurmountable aversion to everything but thepursuits of philosophy and general learning' (EMPL xxxiii).Pursuing the goalof becoming'aScholar &Philosopher',10hefol-lowedarigorous program of reading, reflection,and taking notes.During this time of private study,he found nothing but 'endlessDisputes evenin themost fundamentalof m atters.1 1 Upon this dis-covery,'acertain BoldnessofTemper'grew within him, leavinghimdisinclined to trust authorities on any subject. He sought afterinstead'somenewMedium'bywhich'Truthmightbeestablisht'.12In spring1729afterthree yearsofstudy, things startedtofallintoplacefor theyoung scholar.Hedescribeshow at the age ofeighteen,a 'New Scene of Thought' opened up to him, transporting him

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LIFE ANDWORKS OFDAVID HUME

'beyond m easure' .1 3He applied himself intense ly to his studies, un tilhefoundhimself m entally exh austed. Thenafter some nine months,physical symptoms emerged with the mental.1 4 Scurvy spotsappearedon his fingers forwhichaphysician prescribed a productof citrus fruit juices. ByApril 1730, Hume consulted a physicianagain to complain of a 'Watryness in the mouth'.15 The doctorapparently laughed andtoldhimthathe hadgottenthe'DiseaseoftheLearned',prescribing 'ACourseofBitters&Anti-Hysteric Pills'along withan 'EnglishPint of Claret Wine everyDay'and a longhorseback ride.16Despite some improvement underthe newregime,hiscondition continued toaffecthisstudies.Thistimehe wasunabletocomprehend hismaterial as awholeand giveit acoherent form;hewrites that he w as'notable to follow out any Train of Thoughtby one continued Stretch of View' but only 'by repeatedInterruptions,& byrefreshingmy eyefromTimetoTime upon otherObjects'.1 7Insuchastate, therew as nochance thathecould de liverhis work 'with such Elegance & Neatness' so as to draw 'theAttention of theWorld'.1 8In 1734, H um e decided to rid himself of his physical and m entalcondition by entering'amore active scene oflife'(EM PL xxxiii). Hewentoff toBristoltopursueabusiness careeras aclerkin the officeof a West Indies sugar m erchant. He quickly found this unsuitableand left for France w ithin a few m onths determined to pursue hisstudies.HespentayearinRheims,andthen movedto LeFlche,avillage in Anjou best known for its Jesuit College. Here, whererenowned philosophers such as Ren Descartes (1596-1650) andMarin Mersenne(1588-1648)studied acentury before, Hume readFrenchandother continental authors,especiallyDescartes,NicolasMalebranche (1638-1715) and Pierre Bayle (1647-1706). He alsocomposed most of his three-volumeA Treatise of Human Nature.BookI 'Of the Understanding' and BookII'Of thePassions' werepublished in the last week of January 1739, and Book III 'OfM orals' was published on 5

thNovember 1740.The Treatiseexploresa variety of philosophical topics such as the origin of ideas, space,time, causality, personal identity, external objects, scepticism, theimmaterialityof thesoul,thepassions,freewill,andm orality. Todayit is thought to be his most important work and one of the mostim portant works in the history of philosophy.HereturnedtoEngland inmid-September 1737, carryingaman-uscript with him. He spent the next year revising the work and

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arrangingfor itspublication. Hume chosetowithholdthesectiononmiracles, some saypossibly toavoid givingoflfence to English the-ologianandphilosopher Joseph Butler(1692-1752),whose endorse-ment of the work he sought. By September 1738, he signed acontract for thepublication of the first twobooks of the Treatiseand thebooks wereoffered forsalefor thepriceof tenshillingsthefollowing January. Early sales of the Treatise were disappointing.Hume famously noted thatthis work f e l l dead-bornfrom thepress,without reaching such distinction, as even to excite a murmuramongthezealots (EMPL xxxiv).Heblamedthelackofsuccessofthe Treatise on stylistic issues,'proceedingmore from the mannerthan th e matter' and admitted of being 'guilty' of publishing th ework'tooearly'(EMPLxxxv).The Treatisewasreviewedinvariousliterary journals in both Britain and the Continent, such as theHistory of the Works of theLearnedand GttingischeZeitungen.19 Inresponsetosomeof themore unfavorable reviews, Hume composedand publishedanAbstract of the Treatise on the 11thMarch 1740,whichw as ananonymous sixpenny thirty-two page pamphlet sum-marizingthemain argumentin the firstbook.20After thepublicationof the first twoinstallmentsof the Treatise,Hume went to live with his mother and brother at hisbrother scountry houseand continued towrite.In 1741and 1742,hepub-lishedEssays MoralandPoliticalin twovolumes.TheEssayswerepublishedin aseriesofvolumesbeforebeing gathered together intoone volume near the end of Hume s life. The Essayswere muchbetter received than the Treatise and their success increased hisreputation, leading to his candidacy for a philosophy chair atEdinburgh Universityin thesummerof 1744.Hewithdrewhiscan-didacy, however,due togreat opposition bymembersof the acade-mic community,theEdinburgh clergyandother civic leaders.Oneormorepamphlet/seven circulated thataccusedhim of advocatingextreme scepticism, atheism, and underminingthe foundationsofmorality, towhich Hume composed a letter that summarizesandreplies to the charges made against him. It was published anony-mously as ALetter from a Gentlemanto his Friend inEdinburgh.In 1751-1752, Hume also sought a Logic chair vacated by hisgood friend, Scottish philosopher and economist Adam Smith(1723-1790), at the University of Glasgow and was once againunsuccessful becausehe wasdeemedathreatto theestablished reli-gion. Religiousoppositionremained arecurring theme throughout

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hislife.Humewas nearly excomm unicated by theGeneralAssemblyof the K irk, which is the Scottish C hurch's highest jud icial body. In1756,the case against Hu m e was brough tbeforea comm ittee of theGeneral Assembly,but adecisionwasmade to drop thematter.In1761, the Roman Catholic Church put all of his writings on theIndex Librorum Prohibitorum(List of ProhibitedBooks), the listofforbidden publications censoredby the Church.In 1745,Hum e acceptedanonerinEnglandtoworkas atutorfo rthe young M arquis of A nnandale, only to find the M arquis m entallyunstableand hisestatemanagerdishonest.Thatyear alsohismotherdied.21In 1746, Hume accepted the invitation of a distant relation,Lieu tenant-G enera l Jam es S t. Clair, to be his secretary on a m ilitaryexpeditionagainst the French inQuebec.The expeditionwaseven-tuallyaband oned, only to take up a new ex pedition that ended in anunsuccessful raid on the coast of L'Orient in Brittany. Hume alsoaccom panied St. Clair on an ex tended diplom atic m ission to Viennaand Turin in 1748.W hilehe was inTurin, the Philosophical EssaysConcerning Human Understanding appeared, bearing his nameprominantly. A recasting of the central ideas of Book I of theTreatise,with some added m aterialonmiraclesand thedesign argu-ment for the existence of God, the Philosophical Essays reached athird edition w ithin three years of its publication, and were eventu-ally reprinted under the title by which they are known today, AnEnquiry ConcerningHuman Understanding.Hume's appointments withth e Marquis and St. Clair raised hisfinances to'nearathousan dpounds'(EMPLxxxv)and in 1749,hereturne d to his brother's cou ntry ho use for two years. Here, he com-posed Political D iscourses(acollection of essaysoneconomicandpolitical subjects) and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles ofMorals (which recasts Book III of his Treatise). In 1751, Humemoved inw ithhissisterinEdinburgh. Soonafter hisarrival,he waselected joint secretary of the Philosophical Society of Edinburgh,whichhad been established origina lly in 1731to collect and pub lishessayson m edicine and su rgery, the scope of which was enlarged toinclude philosophy and literature in 1737.22 Under Hume's editor-ship,two volumes had been published in 1754 and 1756,but he hadresignedthepostsometime beforethethird volum ewaspublishedin1771. In add ition to join ing the Philosophical Society in 1751 , hisEnquiry Concerningthe Principles of Morals was published thatsame year. Hume described the second Enquiry as 'incomparably

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thebest' of all his works (EMPL xxxvi).The Political D iscoursesappearedinprintin1752,and was an immediate success,reachingathird edition withintw oyears.In 1753, Hume brought together col-lected editions of his works, excluding the Treatise and includingEssays, Moral and Political, Philosophical Essays ConcerningHuman Understanding, Enquiry ConcerningthePrinciplesof Morals,and Political D iscourses.The first edition of EssaysandT reatisesonSeveral Subjects came out in four volumes between 1753-1756 andby 1764had reached afourthedition.23On 28 thJanuary 1752,Hum e received anoffer to serve as librarianto theE dinburgh Facultyof Advocates. Thisopportunitygavehimthe resources to work on another project, The History of England,which was published in six installments between 1754-1762. HisHistory of Englandbecame a best-seller and was widely regardedas a standard work fo r many decades, eventually going throughoveronehundred editions. This work established hisliteraryreputa-tion with eighteeth-century readers. French philosopher Voltaire(1694-1778) even praised hisH istoryas perhaps the best ever writteninanylanguage.During his stint at the library, Hume also completed writing histw o important works in the philosophy of religion: the DialoguesConcerningNatural Religionand The Natural History of Religion'.TheD ialogues,a drama tic conversation abou t religion in twelve partsconducted by three characters, Cleanthes, Demea and Philo,remained unpublished until 1779, some say due to the advice offriends who wished to steer Hume away from religious controversy.TheDialoguesisw idely regardedas notonlythegreatest workonphi-losophyof religionin theEnglish language,but alsoas thebest dia-logue written in English. The Natural History of Religion' waspublished as part of FourDissertationsin January 1757,with'Of thePassions','Of Tragedy'and anessayon aesthetics, 'Of the Standardof Taste'. The Natural History of Religion'wasorig inally includedin a volume of Hume's essays titled Five Dissertations, ready fordistributionin1756with'Of thePassions', 'OfTragedy','Of Suicide'and 'Of the Immortality of the Soul'. The latter tw o essayswere removed, some say due to pressure applied by the ReverendWilliam Warburton (1698-1779), who threatened Hume's publisherwithp rosecution if theessayswas published.24T heprinted copiesofFive Dissertations were altered, without 'Of Suicide' and 'Of theImmortality of theSoul', and withanew, hastily written, essay'Of

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LIFEANDWORKSOFDAVIDHUME

the Standard of Taste'inserted inplace of the tworemoved essays.Theessayswerethen bound withthe newtitleFourD issertationsanddistributedthe followingyear.His post at theAdvocates Library, while extremely productive,wasnot entirely without controversy. In 1754,he wasaccused ofordering several'indecentBooks unworthyof aplace in alearnedLibrary'25 and the order wascancelledby the curators. Humewasfurious, to say the least,but did not resign becausehestill neededaccessto theLibrary s resourcesasresearchfor hisHistorywas notyet complete, although he did donate his salary to a blind poet,Thomas Blacklock. When researchfor theHistorywasdonein1757,Hume promptlyresigned.26Around 1761at the age of fifty,Hume writesthathe was'opulent'byw ay ofmoney givento him by thebooksellers,and heretired toScotland,'determinednever more to. . .set. ..footout ofit'(EMPLxxxviii).Sometwoyears later, however, Hume left forFranceagain,accepting an invitation from Lord Hertford, the Ambassador toFrance, to serveas hisprivate secretary. During histhree yearsinParis, Hume became Secretary to the Embassy and eventuallyitscharg d'affaires. He was very well-received there, indeed, herecorded of the first fewweeksinFrance that hereceivedsomuchflattery he w as confoundedandembarrassed,findingthat th emorehe'recoiledfrom their excessive Civilities ,themorehe'wasloadedwith them'.27 He become the rage of the Parisian intellectualsalons, enjoying the conversation and company of Denis Diderot(1713-1784), Jean leRonde D Alembert (1717-1783), and Barond'Holbach(1723-1789)andfound himselftheobjectofgreat atten-tion fromtheladiesat theFrenchcourt.Returning to London in 1766,hebrought withhimSwiss-bornphilosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), who had beenordered out of Switzerland by the government in Berne. Humeoffered Rousseau refuge in England, even using his contacts tosecure agovernment pension forRousseau from King George III.Shortlyafter arrivinginEngland, however,thefriendship dissolved.A rather paranoid Rousseau became suspicious that Hume andsomeof hisfriends were plotting againsthim andthathe hadbeeninvited to England for the sole purpose of becoming an objectofridicule. Rousseau refused his pension and in a letter to Humethreatened to go public with his accusations. Hume defended himselfby preemptively publishing A Concise and GenuineAccount of the

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Dispute betweenMr.H u m eand Mr.Rousseau,which docum ents therelevant correspondence between them withaconnecting narrative.After ayear(1767-1768)servingas an Under-Secretary of Statein L ondon, Hum e finally returned to Ed inburgh to stay. By autum nof 1770,he was actively supervising in the building of a house on St.Andrew Square in a street which was to become known as St.David'sS treet.28Hum e described the process of b uilding a house asthe 'second great Operation of human Life'; taking a wife was the

first,whichhe hoped would 'comeintime'.29He neverdid marry,however, spending his late years quietlyand comfortably, reading,writing and dining with friends in his new house with his sisterKatherine and a little pomeranian dog called Foxey. Brother andsister were known for their gracious hospitality. One of their firstguestswas avisitorfromAmerica: Benjamin Franklin(1706-1790).In London soon after Franklin spoke of Hume as one who had'entertain'd [him] withthegreatest Kindn essand Hospitality'.30Ataround 1772,Humew asbeco ming increasinglyil lwithaboweldisorder. Three y ears later, the progress of the decline was rapid. Hesuffered from high fevers at night, severe diarrhoea and internalhaemorrhages. He prepared for his death by going about his usualactivities: reading, writing letters, and revising his works for new edi-tions of theHistoryof England,and hisEssaysandTreatises,whichnow contained hiscollected essays,the twoEnquiries, A D issertationon the Passions and The Natural History of Religion'. In theAdvertisementto thelast ed itionof theEnquiry,published in1777,he calls the Treatise a 'juvenile work, which the author neveracknowledged' and closes by saying that 'henceforth, the authordesires, that thefollowingpieces may alone be regarded as co ntain-ing his philosophical sentiments and principles'. He also arrangedfor the posthumous publication of the Dialogues ConcerningNaturalRe ligion,w hichwasseen throug h thepressby hisnephewin1779. Throughout the period, he remained in good humour andserene spirits. Thereareaccountsof hisvisits with friend sin his finalmonths written by James Boswell (1740-1795), William Cullen(1710-1790)andSmith. Boswell luredhimintoaconversation abou timmortalityand wasthen astonished todiscoverone whofacedtheprospect of his own imm inent death w ith complete equan im ity andgood spirits.In his An Accountof MyLast Interview With DavidHume,Esq.',Boswell writes that wh enhe metw ith Humeon 7thJuly1776,he'askedh im if it was notpossible that there migh tbe a future


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state'.Heanswered'Itwaspossible tha tapieceofcoalputuponthefirewouldnot burn;and he added thatit was a most unreasonablefancy that he should exist fo r ever'.31 Hume died on Sunday, 25thAugust 1776 at about four o'clock in the afternoon.After his death, prev iously unpublished works appeared. T he firstwas a short autobiography, 'My Own Life', which was publishedwithaletterbySmith w ritten soon afterHume's death.Inthis letter,he famo usly writes of Hum e: 'upon the whole, I have always con-sidered him, both in his life-time and since his death, as approach-ing nearly to the idea of a perfectly wise and virtuous man, asperhapsthenatureofhumanfrailtywilladmit'.32Twoyears later,in1779, Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion appeared.Finally, in 1783,the suppressed essayson suicide and immortalitywere published. This edition was a reprint of an anonymous copyof the essays circulated in 1777; ano ther anon ym ous copy hadappeared previously in French seven years earlier. Along withHum e's two essays, the editor of the 1783 edition included anony -m ous critical responses to bo th pieces w ith excerptsfrom Rousseau'sLa Nouvelle H eloiseon the subjectof suicide.

1.1. PUBLICATIONTIME-LINE1739 A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt toIntroduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning intoMoral Subjects, Book I 'Of th e Understanding' and

BookII 'Of thePassions'1740 (a)A Treatise of H um an Nature,BookIII 'Of Morals '(b) An Abstract of a Book lately Published; entituled,A Treatise of Human Nature, & c. Wherein the chiefArgument of that Book is farther Illustrated andExplained1741 1742 Essays MoralandP olitical1745 ALetter from a Gentlemanto hisFriend inEdinburgh:Containing Some Observationson a Specim en of thePrinciples concerning Religion and Morality, said tobe maintaind in a Book lately publish'd, intituled, ATreatise of H um an Nature1748 Philosophical Essays Concerning H um anUnderstanding, later titled An Enquiry ConcerningHuman Understanding


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1751 An Enquiry Concerning thePrinciples of Morals1752 Political Discourses1753 1756 Essaysand Treatises onSeveral Subjects1754 1762 The History of England from the Invasion of Julius

Casar to theRevolutionin16881757 FourDissertations1766 A Concise and GenuineAccountof theDispute between

Mr. Hume and Mr. Rousseau: with the Letters thatPassed between themdu ring their Controversy

1111 'MyOwnLife'1779 Dialogues Concerning NaturalReligion1783 'Of Suicide'and 'Of theImmortalityof theSoul'

NOTES1 See the second paragraph of Hume's autobiography 'M y Own Life'.Referencesto 'M yOwnLife'aretakenfrom EM PL with page numbers.2 SeeM ossner (1980:20-21).3 Mossner (1980:22).4 Mossner (1980:20-22).5 Mossner (1980:32-33).6 Fate Norton: (1993:2). This remark by Hume's mother isrecorded inBurton(1846:1,294n).7 Mossner (1980:62-63).8 Grieg (1932:1,13).9 Grieg(1932:1,13).10 Grieg(1932:1,13).11 Grieg(1932:1,13).12 Grieg(1932:1,13).13 Grieg(1932:1,13).14 M ossner (1980:66).15 M ossner (1980: 67).16 Mossner (1980:67).17 Mossner (1980:70).18 Mossner(1980:70).19 For a thorough discussion of the initial reception of the Treatise,seeMossner (1980: PartI, chapter 10),andMossner (1947:31-43).20 Theoriginal announcementin TheDaily Advertiserof March 11th 1740described the title of the pamphlet as: An Abstract of a LatePhilosophical P erforma nce, entitled A Treatise of Human Nature,& c.Wherein the chief Argumentand Designof that Book, whichhas m etwith such Opposition, and been represented in soterrifyinga Light, isfurther illustrated andexplain'd.'21 The exact date of her death isunknown but it took place before themiddle of June that yearat which time Hume w rotein aletter thathe

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LIFEANDWORKS OFDAVID HUME

was receiving 'melancholy' letters from his brother, noting that hismother'sdeath'makes. ..animm ense void inourFamily',Grieg (1932:I, 17).22 M ossner (1980: 257).23 M ossner (1980: 224).24 Mossner (1980: 324).25 The offensive books included the Contes of Jean de La Fontaine(1621-1695) and Roger de Bussy-Rabutin's (1618-1693) HistorieamoureusedesG aules.Hew rote that,'ifevery booknotsuperiorinm erittoLaFontainebeexpelledfromtheLibrary,Ishall engagetoc arry awayall that remains in my pocket. I know not indeed if any will remainexcept our fifty pound Bible, which is too bulky for me to carryaway. . .Bythebye,BussyRabutincontainsnobawdyatall, thou ghif itdid,I see not that it wouldbe a whit the worse', see Mossner (1980:252-3).26 M ossner (1980: 253).27 Mossner (1980: 443).28 Mossner (1980: 562).29 M ossner (1980: 566).30 M ossner (1980: 573).31 Mossner (1980:597-8).32 Mossner (1980:604-5).

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CHAPTER2

INTELLECTUAL HERITAGE

Hume is commonly classifiedas the last of the three great Britishempiricists followingin the tradition of John Locke (1632-1704)and George Berkeley(1685-1753) in the Early Modern period ofphilosophy, which spans roughly th e seventeenth and eighteenthcenturies.TheEarly Modern periodisnotedfor itsremarkably highlevelof philosophical activity,nodoubt linkedto significant devel-opments in science, religion and culture.1 To understand what itmeans to beclassified aBritish empiricistatthis timein thehistoryofphilosophyit isprudent tobegin withthegrowthof science.2

2.1. THEGROWTHOFSCIENCEIn 1543, astronomer Nicolaus Copernicus (1473-1543) publishedRevolutionsof Heavenly Spheres. Inthis work, whichwas censoredbythe Catholic Church, Copernicus produced arguments that theearth revolved around thesun, thereby discoveringtheheliocentricorsun-centered modelof thesolar system. Copernicus heliocentrictheoryof theuniversewasentirely mathematical, in the sense thatthe predictions of the observed positions of celestial bodies werebased on an underlying geometry. The heliocentric theory chal-lenged the traditional belief, held by medieval thinkers, that theplanetsandstars revolved around theearth, whichwasassumed asthecenterof theuniverse. This gaverise towhat became knownasth e'CopernicanRevolution'.German astronomer Johannes Kepler (o r Keppler) (1571-1630)andItalian scientist Galileo Galilei(1564-1642)also made significantcontributionsto thegrowthofscience. Following Copernicus, Kepleralso applied mathematical principlesto astronomy.He formulated

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three important laws of planetary motion to which mathematicalequations were added to support mere observation. Galileo, amongother things, builtatelescopeandformu lated lawsofaccelerationanddynamics.He thought that scientific results should consist inm athe-maticallypreciselaws,somadehisphysics thoroug hly mathem atical,famously claiming that 'this grand book, the universe. . .is writtenin. . .mathematical characters'.3 In 1632,the Catholic Church cen-soredGalileo'sDialogueConcerning the TwoChief World Systems foropenly advocating the Copernican theory.The endorsement of theCopernican theory in this work also prom pted his trial and condem-nationin the followingyearon achargeofheresy.Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727), the legendary English scientist,added to the picture with his own famous laws of motion, not tomentionhistheoryofgravitation,inwhichhecom bined Kepler's lawsforp lanetary mo tionandGalileo's law offallingbodies intothesingleinverse-square law of gravitational attraction.In hisgroundbreaking1687 scientific work, The Mathematical Principles of Philosophy(Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica), a system of theworld is presented modeled on the geometry of the ancient Greekmathematician Euclid (c. 325 CE-C. CE265), wherein theorems arederived from axiom s and postulates. In accordance w ith the geomet-ricalstyle,the firstvolumeof thePrincipiabegins w ithdefinitions andaxiomsfrom which propositionsaredem onstrated.Unlike medieval thinkers who proceeded for the most part byreading traditional texts,theearly m ode rn scientists laid great stresson observation, experiments and mathematical calculation.Facedwith the overwhelming success of the new sciences, Early Modernphilosophers aimed to make philosophical knowledge as secure asscientific knowledge. These newscientific modes of thought influ-enced philosophic thoughtbygiving riseto twomodels of how wegain ourknowledgeof theworld: empiricism and rationalism.

2.2. EMPIRICISMAND RATIONALISMThe terms 'empiricism'and 'rationalism'can mean many differentthings. In the present context, these terms refer specifically to thegrowth of empiricism in the British Isles (sometimes referred to as'Britishempiricism') and the riseof rationalism primarilyinconti-nental Europe (sometimes referredto as'Contintentalrationalism')duringtheseventeenthandeighteenth centuries. M ajo rfigures in the

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empiricist tradition include Francis B acon (1561 -1626), Tho m asHobbes (1588-1679), Locke, Berkeley and, of course, Hume.Rationalism originated with Descartes. Other major figures in thetradition include Malebranche, Benedict (Baruch) Spinoza(1632-1677),and Gottfried Leibniz(1646-1716).Em piricists em phasize experienceand observationas theprimarysource of all knowledge. Bacon is an early example of those whoadvocated the exp erimental and observa tional m ethod for the acqui-sition and defenseof knowledge.He claimed in The New Organonthatour understanding of things extends onlyso far as towhathasbeen'observedof the order ofnature',so the first step of inquiry isto 'elicit the discovery of true causes and axioms from every kindof experience' supported by 'illuminating. . .experiments'.4 Lockethought that all knowledgeisfounded on experience. Specifically,the twofountainsof knowledge, from which all of our ideas origi-nate, are sensation and reflection. The form er are observations fromoursenses about 'external, sensible Objects', which give riseto ideassuch as sweet or b itter, blue orred,hot or cold,hardorsoftetc.Thelatter are observations derivedfrom reflection,w hich are ideas of theinternal operations of our own minds, such as thinking, doubting,reasoning, believing, and willing (ECHU 2.1.2^1). Berkeley andHume mostly agree but with some important modifications.Berkeley thinks that the 'objects of human knowledge' come fromeither (i) ideas from the senses, or (ii) ideas perceived when onereflects on the 'passions or operations of the mind', or (iii)ideasformedby the m em ory and im agination(PHK1 :1).Hume thoughtthatthe faculties of m em ory an d imagination deal with ideas; ideasthemselvesare acquired from impressions of sensation and impres-sions of reflection(seethis v olume Chap ter4.1-3).Whereastheempiricists assigna fundamental roleto experienceas the basis of our k now ledge claims, philosoph ers in the rationalisttradition tendto think that human reasoncan infactbe thesourceof all knowledge about the way the world is, thereby privilegingknowledgegained by reason over knowledge gained bysense expe-rience. Descartes, Malebranche and Spinoza, for instance, allem phasize that sense experience can be deceptive and unreliable asasourceofknowledgeandneedsto beaidedorcorrectedby the useof reason.5 Unlike empiricism, which begins with observation andexperienceas the source of knowledge, rationalism begins with self-evidenttruths thatformthe basis for know ledge. These truths , which

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are held to be certain and indubitable, constitute th e foundationfrom which further knowledgeisdeduced, knowledge whichisalsoheld to be certain and indubitable. Rationalist philosophy is moremodeledon theexampleofmathematicsas itinvolves reason ing log-ically from self-evident truths, in the style exemplifiedingeometry.Spinoza's Ethics epitomizes the geometrical method. Each of thefiveparts of the Ethics begins with numbered axioms and defini-tions,fromwhich numbered propositions aredem onstrated, aswellasthe occasional corollary.It is impo rtant to note the lim itations of this distinction between'empiricism' and 'rationalism', which was drawn only much later.First, the distinction overlooks the fact that there are importantdifferences in many points amongst individual philosophers classi-fiedinthesame camp. Forexam ple, while both LockeandBerkeleyagreethat theobjectofhum an knowledgeisideas derivedfrom sen-sation and reflection, many points of disagreement remain betweenthem; infact, Berkeley wanted to rid Locke's philosophyof theele-ments deemed inconsistent with empiricism, such as the theory ofabstract ideas and the nature of an external world (see Chapter2.3.5). Second, the distinction tends to underplay the similaritiesbetween the philosophers appointed in opposing camps. Forinstance,both Descartesand Spinoza emphasize the importance ofexperiments and sensory observation in the attainment of knowl-edge,andB acon, LockeandH ume certainlydo not rejecttheroleofreason in their philosophies. H um e tho ugh t that reason w as a veryimportant featureoraspect belongingto theimaginative facultyandcomesin twotypes: dem onstrative andprobableormoral reasoning(seeChapter 4.3.1).6

2.3. MAIN INFLUENCESOn2 6thAugust 1737,shortly after leavingLaFlchewherehew rotemost of his Treatise of Human Nature, Hume wrote a letter to afriend inBritain sugg estingfourwo rks which would helpinunder-standing the metaphysical parts of his reasoning. The four worksare Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy, Malebranche'sThe Search After Truth, Berkeley's Treatise Concerning thePrinciples of Human Knowledge and Bayle'sH istoricalandCriticalDictionary (Dictionaire historiqueetcritique)', of particular interestwerearticlesonZenoofElea(c. 495CE-C.CE430)and Spinoza. For

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the sake of completeness, Newton's Mathematical Principles ofPhilosophy and Locke's Essay Concerning H um an Understandinghave been added to the list in the ensuing discussion of Hume'smain influences.2.3.7. DescartesIn his Meditations on the First Philosophy, Descartesjudged thatmanyof hisbeliefsm ight wellbefalse, and documentshisquestfortrue beliefsand certain knowledge.Hethought thatcertain knowl-edgerequired a firm and unshakeable fo und ation. Once the foun da-tion of knowledgeisdiscovered,further knowledgecan beinferredfrom that foundation, thereby acquiring true beliefsthat rest on afirmfoundation. Playingtheroleof asceptic discoversthebasisforknowledge. Descartes doubts all those beliefs that can possibly bedoubted in order to determine whether there is any belief immuneto dou bt u pon w ith which a solid structure of know ledge can be con-structed. To put itanotherw ay: knowledgeis put on asecure foun -dation by doubting our beliefs and that which cannot be doubtedwill constitute the certain foundation for inferring further knowl-edge.Descartes then arrives at one indu bitable truth , his own exis-tence, and uses this as a foundation for demonstrating knowledgethroughout therestof the Meditations,in particular, knowledgeofGod's existence,the 'realdistinction' between the mind and bodyand theex istenceof an external world.Hume was very much concerned with the use of scepticism andwas influenced by, and critical of, Descartes' m ethod of do ub t.Hume was also very critical of many of the views that Descartesdeveloped, on topics to do with substance (see Chapter 4.3.2), theexistenceof avacuum (seeChapter5.3), causation (seeChapter7.1)and the immateriality of the soul (see Chapter 8.5).7Finally, in hisim po rtan t discussion of why a cause is always necessary, H um e usesthe idea that nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible (seeChapter 6.2), borrowing from Descartes' maxim that 'Existence iscontained in the idea or concept of every single thing, sincewecannot conceiveof anything exceptasexisting'(CSM II: 117).2.3.2. MalebrancheTwo aspects of Malebranche's SearchAfter Truth were especiallyinfluential in Hume's philosophy and theseare hisdoctrines of thevisionin God and Occasionalism. The vision in God is theviewthat

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wesee all thingsbymeans of ideas in God. The argument for theposition that begins w ith the claim thatit is universally agreed upo nthatwe do notdirectly perceive external objects, sincewe see the sunand thestarsand it canhardlybe thecase tha t'thesoul should leavethebodytostroll about theheavens'to see theobjects present there(ST217).What we perceive instead are ideas. The mind's imm ediateobjectw hen it sees the sun is not the sun, but an idea of the sun. Ourminds get ideas of external objects because God himself containsideas of all ex ternal things, and He reveals these ideas to o ur m indsat the appropriate time. Hume was influenced by Malebranche'sclaim that it is only through the presence of ideas that we can per-ceive material bodies.8At Treatise 1.2.6 Hu me presen ts a universalprinciple that 'nothingis ever really present with the mind but itsperceptions or impressions and ideas, and that external objectsbecome know nto usonlybythose p erceptions theyoccasion' (THN1.2.6.7; SBN 67). Since the mind has nothing but perceptions infront of it, even when wefocus our attention 'to the heavens, or tothe utmost limits of the universe; we never really advance a stepbeyond ourselves, nor can conceive any kind of existence, butthose perceptions' (TH N 1 .2.6.8; SBN 67). W hile Hume, likeMalebranche, arguesfor theimpossibilityof ourhavinganyideasofexternalexistence not of the same kind as our perceptions or ideas,it is important to note that he certainly does not adoptMalebranche's theological conclusion thatwe seeexternal objectsbyviewingtheir images as they reside in God .

The universal principle plays an important part of Hume'ssystem, appearing a total of three timesin Book 1 of the Treatise(1.2.6.7; 1.4.2.21; 1.4.5.15). The principle also turns up again inBook 2 in his theory of the passions (2.2.2.22), and in his moraltheory in Book 3 (3.1.1.2). The principle also appears in thefinal section on scepticism in An Enquiry Concerning HumanUnderstanding (EHU 12.9-16;SBN152-5).Other philosopherswhoembraced th e universal principle include Antoine Arnauld(1612-1694) and P ierre Nicole (1625-1695), whose discussion of thenature and origin of ideas in The Art of Thinkingbegins with theclaim that 'wecan have no know ledge of w hat is outside us exceptby means of the ideas in us' (A T 25). Hume ranks The Art ofThinking as one of 'the common systems of logic' alongsideMalebranche's Search After Truth and Locke's Essay ConcerningHuman Understanding in the Abstract to the Treatise.9 Locke was a

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fan of theuniversal principle also.In thesecond book of the Essayon the origin of ideas, he claims that the mind 'stirs not one jotbeyond those Ideas,whichSensesor Reflection, haveoffered for itsContemplation'(ECHU 2.1.24).An ideaisdefined as the immedi-ateobjectofperception' (ECHU2.8.8)and'SincetheMind. ..hathno other immediate Objectbut its ownIdeas, whichitalone doesorcan contemplate, it isevident,thatour Knowledge isonly conver-sant about them' (ECHU 4.1.1).It stands to reason that Locke sfocuswhen explaining our knowledge of the existence of externalobjects is our ideas, as it is the 'actual receiving of Ideas fromwithout that gives us notice' of the existence of external things(ECHU 4.11.2).Malebranche s Occasionalism also influenced Hume. Central tothis doctrineis thedefinition of a'truecause'.Atrue cause'isonesuchthatthemind perceivesanecessary connection betweenit andits effect' (S T 450). The necessary connection is a connection bywhich the effect must follow necessarily from the cause: the causenecessitatesthe effect, makingitimpossible that the effect does notfollow. Theonly thing whoseeffects follownecessarily from it is anomnipotent (all powerful) will. God is the only being with anomnipotent will,so God is theonly true cause.God has to be theonly true causeas it isinconceivable thatGod shouldwillsomethingto occur and for that event not to occur without the other. Thismeans thatG od is theprincipal forcebehindallcausal connectionsbetween eventsin theworld.Forexample, whenacricketbatstrikesacricket ball,God is theactual causeof themotionof theball.Thecricketbat ismerelytheoccasional orincidental cause which signalsGod to actually movethe ball. God isalso the true cause behindhuman bodily motion. For example, when I willfully turn on mycomputer,mywillisonlytheoccasional cause,and G od is the truecause of the motion. While Hume argued vigorously againstMalebranche s theological solution to theproblemof causality,hisdiscussion of the nature of a necessary connection between causeand effect ismuch indebted to Malebranche s formulation of theissue (see Chapter 7.1).102.3.3.NewtonIt is generally thought that Newton s scientific work, TheMathematicalPrinciples ofPhilosophy,greatlyinfluenced thephilos-ophy of the Britishempiricists,1 1 particularlyHume.1 2Inparticular,

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it isthought that H um ewasinfluencedby theexperimental m ethodutilized byNewton (see Chapter 3.3.1),inadditiontoN ewton's fourrules of scientific reasoning outlined in the second volume of theMathematical Principles,wh ich were later adopted inpartbyHumeinthe Treatise (see Chapter 6.6). Further, Newton's theoryofgravi-tational attraction in the natural world shaped Hume's talk of anattraction in the m ental world (see Ch apter 4.3).There are important differences between these two thinkershowever. One difference between their philosophies concerns thenatureofspace (see Chapter 5.3).A nother differencebetween themconcerns theological matters. Newton thought that th ediscoveriesof science provided evidence for belief in God as the first non-mechanical cause responsiblefor theu ltimate originandcontinuingorder of nature (MP II: 544).13 His reasoning is a version of theDesign Argu m ent. The design, order, harm ony o f plane tary m otion,asformu latedin the scientific lawsof motion and gravity, impliesaliving, intelligent and powerful creator, God, the first cause. WhileHumewascertainly interestedin and wrote much about thesubjectmatter of religion,hepointedly avoids making theological specula-tions in hisphilosophical conclusions. In his famous search for theimpression of power or necessary connection in 'Of the Idea ofNecessaryConnexion'in Section VII of the Enquiry, he rejectsthe'theoryof the universal energy and operations of the SupremeBeing'because it carries usbeyond sensory experience (see Chapter 7.1).Further, at the end of liberty and necessity in Section VIII of theEnquiry, when responding to an objection, herecommends thatweavoiduncertainties to do w ith God as the first cause of the universe.ThereisalsoHume's sustainedcritiqueof thedesign argum entin'Ofa Particular Providence and a Future State' (Enquiry, Section XI),and in theD ialoguesConcerningN atural Religion.Indeed , accordingto some scholars, Hume's critique of the design argument in theseworksis a direct attack on Newton and his followers.142.3.4. LockeHume places Locke's Essay Concerning H um an Understanding asone of 'the common systems of logic' alongside Arnauld andNicole's The Art of Thinkingand Malebranche's SearchAfter Truthand in theAbstract to the Treatise.15 InBook 1 of theEssay,Lockeprefaceshis theorythata ll ideas are derivedfromexperience w ith anattack on the doctrine that certain innate principles, such as

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'Whateveris,is'and The wholeisgreater than thepart',that are'stampedupontheMind',whichthesoul brings intotheworld withit (ECHU 1.2.1).Locke famously likensthemindto apieceofblankwhite paper, 'void of all characters, without any ideas ; the mindcomes to be furnished with ideasbyexperience (ECHU 2.1.1-2).Hume shares Locke s fundamental viewthattherootof allknowl-edge liesinexperience, although heclaims that his owndistinctionbetweentheperceptions of themind into impressions and ideasisan improvementofwhat Lockewasafterin hisdenialofinnate prin-ciples in the Essay (see Chapter 4.1-3). Both philosophers alsointend to discover, inLocke s words, 'the original, certainty, andextent of human knowledge' (ECHU 1.1.2); Hume s science ofhuman nature aims to acquaint us with 'the extent and force ofhumanunderstanding'(THN Intro.4; SBNxv).However, despite sharing a number of beliefsor methods andaims, Locke andHume draw verydifferent conclusions and posi-tions on many issues. Some examples to be discussed includeabstract ideas (see Chapters 2.3.5, 4.4.3), the association of ideas(seeChapter 4.3), substance (see Chapter 4.3.2), theexistenceof avacuum (see Chapter 5.3), causation (see Chapter 6.2), power (seeChapter 7.1)and thenatureofexternal objects (see Chapter 8.2-4).2.3.5. BerkeleyAnother work that Hume mentions in the letter is Berkeley sPrinciples of Human Knowledge. In this work, Berkeley defendsimmaterialism. According to this position, allphysical things existas collectionsofideasin themind thatare fed to usdirectlybyGod.Physical objects are thus mind-dependent, that is, the existenceofthem dependsonbeing perceivedby us and nosuch external objectsexist apart from our own knowledge or consciousness of them.Berkeleymaintains that theexistenceofthings withoutanyrelationtotheir being perceivedis notonly unintelligible,butimpossible- heclaims thatit is notpossiblefo rexternal objectstohaveanyexistence'out of themindsor thinking things which perceivethem'(PHK 1:3).16 Although rejecting Berkeley s theological solution, Humewasimpressed with Berkeley s arguments showing the difficulties ofaccessing anexternal world behind ourperceptions; hewritesthatmost of Berkeley s writings 'form the best lessons of scepticism,whichare to befound either amongtheancientormodern authors,Baylenot excepted (EHU 12.1.15n;SBN 155n).

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INTELLECTUALHERITAGE

HumewasalsoinfluencedbyBerkeley s critiqueof thedistinctionbetween primary and secondary qualities. This distinction has itsrootsinGalileo s The AssayerandDescartes Sixth Meditation, butperhaps the most famous expression of thisposition comes fromLocke sEssay.He thought that qualitiesarepowersinobjects'toproduce ideas in our minds (ECHU 2.8.8). Primary qualities,powers in objectstoproduce theideasof solidity, extension,figure,motion or rest, number, bulk, and texture, are the real, mind-independentpartsofobjects.Primaryqualitiesarepowersinbodiesthatnotonly resembleourideasofthem,butalsoare 'utterlyinsep-arable from the body in whatever state it is in' (ECHU 2.8.9).Secondary qualities,on theother hand,are thepowersinobjectstoproduce ideasofcolors, sounds, tastesandsmells. Thesearemind-relative qualitiesofobjects.Ourideasofsecondary qualities resem-ble nothingin theobject.Our ideasofcolors, soundsand so on, donot resemble secondary qualities which aremerely powers in theobjects toproduce such ideasin us of these qualities;nor do suchideas resemblethegroundsofthese powers, whichare theprimaryqualities of minute particles. Berkeley famouslydisputed this dis-tinction, arguing that therelativityof theideasofsecondary quali-tiesapplies equallytoprimary qualities. Justas the apparent colorofanobject changes whenourperceptual situation changes,sodoestheapparent size,shape,and so on.Further, bodies cannotbecon-ceivedashaving primary qualities unless theyarealso conceivedashavingatleast some secondary quality. Humewillhave muchto sayabout this distinction (see Chapter8.2-5).Finally, Berkeley s theory about abstract ideas is taken overbyHume (see Chapter 4.4.3). Hume claims that Berkeley s theoryofabstractionis'oneof thegreatestandmost valuable discoveries thathasbeen made of late years (THN 1.1.7.1; SBN 17).The topicofabstract ideas was a major source of dispute between Locke andBerkeley.Lockewasconcernedto explainhowabstractor generalideas are formed out of particular ones, inother words,the way inwhichaparticular idea, suchas apersonor acow, comesto standfor a general class of things: persons or cows. He illustrates theprocessbyexamples. Children begin with sense impressions of par-ticular individual persons, suchas'Nurse and Mamma' and therebynoticing that many things in the world resemble these individualpersons, they frame a general idea of 'person'(ECHU 3.3.7).Hegoes on to say that indoing so'theymake nothing new,butsimply

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leave out of the complex Idea they had of Peter and James, Maryand Jane, that whichispeculiar to themall andretain what onlyiscommontothemall'(ECHU 3.3.7).Theprocessofabstraction con-sists in our comparing ideas of various particulars encountered inexperience, noting their similarities and differences, ignoring thelatterandretainingin themind onlytheformeras ageneral abstractidea whichmay beemployed inclassifying further particulars thatwemeet.Berkeley took exception to this in the Principles ConcerningHumanK nowledge. Hethought Locke s argument resultsin theideaof ahuman that iscolored,but not a specific color,thathas asizeand shape but no determinate sizeor shape, and so forth (PHKIntro.8-9).Berkeley argues thathe hasnever been able,byintro-spection,todiscoveranyabstract ideasof this nature, claimingthat'theideaof a man that Iframe tomyself,mustbeeitherof awhite,orablack,or atawny,astraight,or acrooked,atallor alow,or amiddle-sizedman'(PHK Intro. 10). Second, Berkeley argues thatwedo not need itbecausea simpler explanation isavailable (PHKIntro.11-12).Berkeley allows thatwe canabstract 'in one sense'(PHK Intro.10).Allideasareparticular.Aparticular ideacan beusedtorepresentin ageneral way, justas adiagramof aparticulartrianglecan beusedto representall trianglesorwhenageometerdrawsalineon ablackboard, it istaken to representalllines, eventhough theline itselfisparticularand hasdeterminate qualities.H ewritesthat 'aword becomes generalbybeing made thesign,not ofan abstract general idea but, of several particular ideas,any one ofwhichitindifferently suggeststo themind' (PHK Intro. 11).Ideasremain particular, although a particular idea can function as ageneral idea. Berkeley sfinalargument turnsonLocke s descriptionof the abstract general idea of a triangle,an idea which 'must beneither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, norscalenon,but allandnoneof theseatonce'(ECHU4.7.9). Berkeleythinks that the described idea represents an impossible state ofaffairs, and istherefore inconceivable, since whateverisimpossibleisinconceivable (PHK Intro.13).172.3.6. fay/eThe last workisBayle sDictionary.Hume citestw oparticular arti-cles to dowith Zeno andSpinoza. Zenowasfamousfor aseriesofparadoxes that showthecontradictory natureofmotionand space.

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he reported having read most of the celebrated books inEnglish,French, and Latinand he wasacquiringtheItalian.20By the timeheleft university, he had exposure to classical authors like Cicero(106^3BCE),Seneca (c. 4 BCE-CE65), Tacitus (c. CE56-c. CE 117),Lucretius (c.99-c. 55 BCE)and Plutarch (c. BCE46-c. CE11 9). Hisearlyreading included many E nglish poetsandessayistsof theperiodsuch as John Milton (1608-1674), John Dryden (1631-1700), JohnRochester (1647-1680), Matthew Prior (1664-1721), AlexanderPope (1688-1744), Jonathan Swift (1667-1745), Joseph Addison(1672-1716)and Sir R icha rd Steele(1672-1729).In the Introductionto the Treatise, Hume mentions natural philosopher Robert Boyle(1627-1692) and the moral philosophy of Lord Shaftesbury(1671-1713), Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746),21 Butler and B ernardMandeville (1670-1733) and during the course of the work herefers to Hobbes, Biaise Pascal (1623-1662) and Samuel Clarke(1675-1729).22Otherfiguresimpactinghis thought include NiccolMachiavelli (1469-1527), Michel M on taign e (1533-1592), Hu goGrotius (1583-1645), Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655), Nicolas Boileau(1636-1711), Samuel von Pufendorf (1632-1694), Robert Hooke(1635-1703), BarondeM ontesqu ieu (1689-1755)andHenrySt.JohnBolingbroke(1678-1751).

NOTES1 For an excellent introduction to modern philosophy, see Thomson(2003), Introduction.2 This very short discussion of the growth of science is indebted toth eeditor's introduc tionsinMatthews(1989).3 In The Assayer, see Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo Galileo (1959:237-8).Than ks to T om Seppalainen for providing this reference.4 SeeThe New Organon,Bacon (2000:33,58).5 SeeDescartes' First and Sixth Meditations in the Meditations onFirstPhilosophy; Book I (The Senses')of Malebranche'sSearchAfter Truth

and BookII,Chapter 1 of Spinoza'sShortTreatiseonGod,ManandH isWell-Beingand the second scholium toProposition40 inPart2 of theEthics.6 For moreon the limitationsof the distinction between emp iricismandrationalism, seeThom son (2003: 6-7).7 For a close investigation of the relationship between Hume andDescartes' thought,seeAnto ny Flew (1986), especially chapter 1.8 Thanks to Brandon Watsonfor emphasizing this comparison betweenMalebrancheand Hume.26


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9 See thefourthparagraphin theAbstractto theTreatise.Some have evencompared Book 1 of Hume's Treatisewith The Art of Thinking. SeeHendel's introductory essayinA rnauld andNicole(1964).For anexcel-lent account of Hume's acquaintance with The Art of Thinking andother logic texts, see Charles Ec helbarger's'Humeand the Logicians' inEaston(1977) .10 For a work on Hume that clearly highlights Malebranche'sinfluences,seeWright (1 983).11 Locke considers himself amere 'underlabourer'engaged inclearing awaysome rubble that liesin the path to knowledge incomparison to suchmasters in an agewhich includes the 'incomparable Mr. Newton', and'hisnever enough to beadmired Book'.SeeECHU:TheEpistle to theReader,pp.9-10;4.7.3.12 Whileit isgenerally supposed that Hum e's philosophywasgreatly influ-enced by New ton's work, some com mentato rs have recently claimed thatNewton'sinfluence is far less thanhasbeen allegedinHume scholarship.According to this interpretation, a close reading of his work revealsthat heactually knew very littleof Newton's work and about scienceingeneral, and that his philosophical considerations run counter toNewtonian principles. Seeparticularly Jones(1982),especiallypp. 11-19.Seealso M ichaelBarfoot, 'Humeand theCultureof Science',inStewart(1990:160-1)and Laudan (1981: 84). Elsewhere,I argue that anexami-nation of the method used by Newton and H ume in their philosophy sug-geststhat amore conciliatory approach on thematter isneeded. Ithinkthereislittle dou bt that H um ew asgreatly interestedin and influencedbythemethod outlinedinNew ton'sscientificwork,and inscienceingeneral.However, I also think that it is prudent not to overemphasize Newton'sinfluence on Hume because there are also some significant differencesbetween their positions whenitcomesto theapplication of this method,inparticular. SeeCoventry (2005).13 Seealso Newton's Opticks, particularly Queries28 and 31 .14 SeeH urlbutt(1 963: 135).15 See thefou rth paragraph in theAbstract to the Treatise.16 See also Berkeley (197 9).17 The debate between Locke and Berkeleyon abstraction is a matter ofsome interpretivedifficulty. For further reading,seeAyers(1991:chapter3,27-8);D ancy (1987: chapter 3);Mackie (1976: chapter4);Craig (1968:425-37); Pitcher (1977: chapter 5); and Fogelin (2001: chapters8-10).18 See Kem p Smith (1941 : chapter 14) for a classic discussion of Bayle's

(and Hutcheson's) influenceon Hume's thoughts onspace and time.19 See the editors' Introduction to theNorton and Norton edition of theTreatise,(2000: 12).20 See the Introduction to the Cambridge CompaniontoH u m e(1993: 2-3).21 For a thorough investigation of Hutcheson's influence on Hume, seeKemp)Sm ith (1941 : Part 1 ).22 This list of H ume's influences is drawn from the editors' Introduction totheNortonandNortonedition of the Treatise(2000: see p. 12,n.8).

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CHAPTER3

APPROACHTOPHILOSOPHY

The place to begin, as should be the case when tackling anyphilosophicalfigure, is to ask, 'What is thewriter s viewof phil-osophy?' Inother words, what exactly does Hume think that he isdoing?

3 1 DEFINITIONOF PHILOSOPHYHume divides 'philosophy' into two main branches: natural andmoral.1Natural philosophy concernstheworldofspatially extendedphysical objects and includes what we call now the physical ornatural sciences. Hume himself is primarily concerned with moralphilosophyorwhatissometimes referredto as the'moral sciences .The moral sciences relatesto thehuman mind andhuman lifegen-erally andincludes whatwewouldnowcall psychology, human orsocial sciences, political science, economics, criticism (i.e., of taste,as in'literarycriticism' or'artcriticism',thus includingthestudyofart, poetry, music),inaddition to core subjectsinphilosophy suchasreligion, ethics, knowledgeand logic. Hume also uses th e term'metaphysics' frequently, but not as a term for a distinct subjectmatter within philosophy to do with the nature of reality as iscommon practice today, but rather as a term for any difficult orabstract reasoning, regardlessof thesubject matter.Hume s most explicitdefinition of whathetakeshis owncontri-bution to moral philosophy to be occurs in theconclusion to theEnquiry ConcerningHuman Understanding. Here,hetellsus'philo-sophicaldecisions arenothing but the reflectionsof common life,methodizedandcorrected'(EHU12.3.25;SBN130).Therearethreeimportant partstoHume s definition:

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Common life Method CorrectionHume thinks that philosophical speculation should berelevant tohumanlife and notconcerned withfairytales inventedfo rpersonalamusement or forhidingour ignorance.Too often philosophy hasdevisedproofs which simply restate our ownprejudicesor producescepticism which leads to doubt, confusion and hinders action.Despite all this, onecontinues to act and engage in the affairs ofeverydaylife.Sincewe cancontinueto act in the face ofunconvinc-ing proofsandparalyzing doubts, there mustbesome principlesofhuman thought and action which guide us so wemust figure outwhatthese fundamental principlesofhuman nature are.The distinctive roleofphilosophyis tomethodize these principlesof human thought and action and to present them in aclear andunderstandable fashion, usingall thelatest scientific advances. Notethat Hume thinks that th egeneral principles of the mind can beinvestigatedon ascientific basis.Theunderlying assumption hereisthat human beingsarepart of the order of nature, sotheycan beexamined by the same procedures used in examining the rest ofnature.Finally,philosophyis tohaveatherapeutic value. Philosophywillbetter teach human beingshow to livewith each otherbyrevealingthe basic principlesofhuman thought and action.The function ofphilosophyis to becritical,toexpose misconceptionsand tohelpusavoid errors.A'carefullycultivated'philosophywillhelptoimprovesocietal affairs, as humans will better succeed in their activities ifthey clearly understand them. For example, 'The politician willacquire greater foresightand subtility...the lawyer more methodand finerprinciplesin hisreasonings;and thegeneral more regular-ity in hisdiscipline,andmore caution in hisplans and operations(EHU 1.9; SBN 10). Artists will better succeed in their crafts iffamiliarwith accurate knowledgeof theoperationsof themindandthe workingsof theemotions (EHU 1.8;SBN10).3 2 CHARACTERIZATION OF THEPRESENTSTATEOFPHILOSOPHY

Philosophy is in a crisis state, characterized by poor reasoning,endless disputes about every possible issue with no momentous29


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question givenany clear answer, and a triumph ofeloquence overreason. Thisisevident evento'therabble without doors ,who may'judgefromthenoiseandclamour, which they hear, thatallgoesnotwellwithin'whichhasgivenrise to'thatcommon prejudice againstmetaphysical reasonings of all kinds (THN Intro. 2; SBN xiv).People arewary of anything to dowith philosophy and themoreabstruseordifficult thereasoning involved,themore quicklythelineof thought is rejected. Consequently,anymetaphysical reasoningsorprofound philosophical arguments requiring special attentiononbehalf of the reader are immediately disregarded. People demandthat the reasonings brought before them 'at least be natural andentertaining',evenifthey'mustforeverbe apreytoerrorsanddelu-sions (THN Intro. 3; SBNxiv).Hume hopes to correct the disgraceful state of philosophy with ascientific studyof thenatureof thehuman mind.He does cautionhowever that the truth cannot be found without hard labour. Itwouldbe'vainandpresumptuous'tosuppose thatthetruthcan bearrivedat'withoutpains, whilethegreatest geniuses have fail d withthe utmost pains (THN Intro.3; SBNxiv).Inthis way,he isprepar-in gus for theintricate argumentsto follow.

3 3 THESCIENCEOFHUMAN NATUREHume claims that his anatomy of human nature reconciles tw odifferent ways of doing moral philosophy. The first approach seeshuman beingsasactive, social creatures,who areinfluenced bytheirmotivesand sentiments. So the philosophical taskis to arouse thesentimentsofhumansbycombining lotsof'striking'examples takenfrom common lifewithapleasing literary style, making 'u sfeel thedifferencebetweenviceandvirtue so theycan'bendourheartsto theloveofprobityandtruehonour'(EHU 1.1;SBN 5).This sortofphi-losophy ispopular because it is 'easy and obvious (EHU 1.3;SBN6). The second approach emphasizes the rational rather than activepartsof ournatures, endeavouring'toformhisunderstanding morethan cultivatehismanners andappealsto thereaderin itsemphasison rarefied speculationandabstract argument, liabletoseem'unin-telligibleto common readers (EHU 1.2;SBN 6). Thesecond sortofphilosophy isabstruseand accurate (EHU 1.3;SBN 6).Hume thought that both approaches capture important aspectsof human nature, but that neither tells the whole story. We are

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both active and reasonable creatures. A viewthatm ixes both stylesof philosophy will be best (EHU 1.6; SBN 9). Getting the rightmix between popular and abstruse philosophy will not be easyhowever.The problem w ith abstruse philosophy is not onlythatit is'painful and fatiguing' but also that it is too remote from ordinarylife to haveany practical application (EHU 1.11; SBN 11). It canindulge the worst excesses of human vanity and is an 'inevitablesource of uncertainty anderror'because it deals with subjects thatare beyond human comprehension (EHU 1.11; SBN 11). Further,the metaphysical argum ents arefrequentlyused as adefenseor cam-ouflage for popular superstitions, promoting religious fears andprejudices cloaked in profound-sounding but meaningless meta-physicaljargon.The popular philosophy is more useful as it 'enters more intocommonlife',touch ing the'heartsand affections'of people therebyreforming conduc t (EH U 1.3; SBN 7 ). The problem how ever w ithpopular philosophy is that some measure of exact and accuratemetaphysical description is needed (EH U 1.8; SBN 9). Delicate sen-timent requires just reasoning,and anadequate account ofjust rea-soning requires an accurate and precise metaphysics. The only wayto correct sentimentandavoidthesourcesof erroranduncertaintyrooted in abstruse philosophy, is to do m ore m etaphysics, but of theright kind. W e must pursue truem etaphysicsif we want tojettisonthesefalse and deceptiveviews(EHU 1.12;SBN12).Theprojectof true metaphysicsis thescienceofhum an nature:aserious investigation into the nature of human understanding, inwhichonestakesout thepartsof them indanddiscoversthepowersand limits of human understanding; engaging in a sort of 'mentalgeography' (EHU 1.13; SBN 13). This kind of mental geographythat constitutes true metaphysics will replace the old incoherentmetaphysics w iththeaccurate descriptionofcommon lifethatis theproper goal of philosophy. 'Accurate and just reasoning' abouthuman naturewill provideanexact pictureof thepowersandlimi-tations of human understanding and wewillsee that the capacitiesof the human understanding are not fit for abstruse or mysterioussubjects (EHU 1.12;SBN12).

The reconciliation between popular and abstruse philosophy,aunion of 'profound enq uiry w ith clearness, and truth w ithnove lty',is necessary for three reasons (EHU 1.17;SBN 16). Humans aresocialand active beings,sotheywillbetter succeedintheir activities31


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if they clearly understand them. Second, a theoretical inquiry can-not succeed if it iscarried on inabstraction from human behavior.Third, whenatheoryisclearly related topractice we can'underminethefoundationsof anabstruse philosophy which seemstohave hith-erto served onlyas asheltertosuperstitionand acoverto absurdityanderror '(EHU 1.17;SBN16).This scienceofhu man natureisitselfthefund am en tal science.Thescience is fun dam en tal because all the other sciences depend on it. Heclaims that 'allthescienceshavearelation, greaterorless,to humannature'(THN Intro. 4; SBN xv) and that 'almosta ll thesciencesarecomprehended in thescienceofhuman natureand aredependent onit'(AB 3; SBN 646). Hume's point is that everyother science, logic,morals, criticism, politics,and including natural philosophy, religionandmathem atics,is aproductofhum an reasoning, judgedbyhumanpowersandfaculties. Given that'thescienceof man is theonly solidfoundation for the other sciences', the only course of action is'tomarchupdirectlyto thecapitalorcenterofthese sciences,tohumannatureitself (THN Intro.7; SBNx vi). Thenw e can 'extend ourcon-quests overallthose sciences'asThereis noquestionof importance,whose decision is not compriz'd in the scienceofman'(THN Intro.6;SBN xvi). There is thus a mu tual relationship betw een the scienceof human nature and the other sciences:not onlycan theother sci-encesbeused to study human u nderstandingbut alsothe scienceofhum an naturecan beusedtoinstructandimproveth eothe r sciences.The method proposed fo r this study of human nature is partlybased on the experimental methods utilized by Newton in thePrincipia.Newton proved themethod successful in natural philoso-phy and nowHume wishesto extend it to the realm of moral phi-losophy, accordingly, each book of the Treatise of Human Natureissubtitled 'Beinganattempt tointroduce theexperimental methodofreasoning into m oral sub jects'.Thisis whyscholars often saythingslikeit wasHum e's amb itionto be theNewton of themoral sciencesorthatHume is theNewton of the scienceofman.2 Other thinkersfollowing th e experimental method based on human nature areBacon, Locke, Shaftesbury, Mandeville, Hutcheson, and Butler(THN Intro.7; SBNxvii;AB 2; SBN646).3.3.1 Theexperimental methodHume thought that by introducing 'the experimental method ofreasoning into moral subjects', philosophy will be put on a 'solid

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foundation' of 'experience and observation', in the same mannerNewtonsuccessfullyprovidedasecure foundationin thenatural sci-ences(THN Intro.7; SBNxvi;AB 1;SBN645). Therearefoursim-ilarities between th e experimental method advanced in Newton snatural philosophyandtaken overbyHumefor use in themoral sci-ences,whichmay besummedup asfollows:(1 ) Relianceonexperienceand observation(2)Universality(3) Simplicity(4) Rejectionofoccult hypotheses thatgobeyond experienceInother words,notonlydoboth NewtonandHume hopetorenderprinciples asuniversallyaspossible,inaddition tomaking explana-tory principlesas few and assimpleaspossible,butbothalso agreethat this approach strictly cannot go beyond experienceand thatany hypothesis which goes beyond experience is to be abandonedimmediately.Newton argued that the results of all deductions concerningnature mustbederivedfrom andverified byobservationandexper-iment (MP II: 398-9). Based on these observations and experi-ments, general conclusionsarederived withan eye toexplainingalleffects from th e fewest causes,and 'from particular causestomoregeneral ones, till the argument end in themost general'(O P404).Further, Newton abidesby themaxim, deemedthe firstruleo f rea-soningin philosophy, according towhichonemustbe careful 'toadmitnomore causesinnatural things than suchasboth trueandsufficient to explain theirappearances'for'Natureis pleased withsimplicity,andaffectsnot thepompofsuperfluouscauses (MP II:398). Thatis, oneshould admit as fewprinciples, causes orexpla-nationsas areneededto explainthe phenomena. Finally, Newtonargued that hypothesis, defined as a theory, whether physical ormetaphysical,whichhas nobasisin ourexperienceo f phenomena,isnot to beregardedinexperimental philosophy(MP II:547).Theprinciple of gravitation is not hypothetical in character becausegravity is aproperty manifestinbodies, observablebyexperimen-tation(OP376,401).Howeverhemakesnoclaim about knowledgeof the ultimate nature of gravity. His law of gravitation specifiesthatthe sunactson theplanets,but herefusedto sayanything abouthow or why exactlythe sunactson theplanets, admitting famously,

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'But hitherto I havenot been able to discover the cause of thoseproperties of gravity from phenomenon, and I frame no hypothe-sis'(MP II:547).Hume also thinksthatone should alwaysrelyonexperience andobservation and 'promises to draw no conclusion but wherehe isauth orized by experience' (AB 2; SBN 646). In the science of hum annature, wecarefully observethe behavior of men and womenin allof their activities, caught up in the ordinary course of their lives,'Whereexperimentsof this kindarejudiciou sly collected and com-par'd,we mayhope to establishon thema science (THN Intro.10;SBN xix).Note that one 'disadvantage' of the application of themethod in the moral sciences is that conducting experiments onpurpose, with 'premeditation'is impossible (THN Intro. 10; SBNxix).3In thecaseofn atural philosophy,'WhenI am at alosstoknowthe effects of one body upon another in any situation, I need onlyput theminthatsituation,and observe what resultsfrom it' (THNIntro. 1 0; SBN x ix). In the science of hum an nature, exp eriments aretakenfrom theobservationsof theeverydaylivesofhumans,intheir'behaviour in company, in affairs, and in their pleasures' (THNIntro. 10;SBN xix ). Hume's ex periments are crucial to the science ofhuman nature. Takecareful note of them. In the discussion of loveand hatredin thesecond book of the Treatise,heoffers eight exper-iments to confirm his position (THN 2.2.2; SBN 332), and his'proofs'thatthe passions of fearan d hope are m ixtures of grief an djo yaresaidto be on parwith proofs concerning prism experimentsinoptics (THN 2.3.9.19;SB N 444).Second, the m ethod involves exp laining as many things as possi-bleintermsof oneun iversal principle.H ehopesthathisinquiry into'themental powersandeconomy,ifprosecuted w ith. ..caution'willshow that 'one operation and principle of the mind depends onanother; which again, may be resolved into one more general anduniversal',thereby m aking yo ur ex planatory principles as few and assimpleas possible (EHU 1.15;SBN14-5; THN Intro.8; SBNxvii).In fact, hethinks 'theutmost effort of human reason is, to reducetheprinciples. ..toagreate r simplicity,and toresolvethemany par-ticular effects into a few general causes' (EHU 4.1.12; SBN 30).4Finally, he recommends the rejection of all explanations which gobeyond the realm of experience and the avoidance of hypothesesabout unseen ultim ate entities (THN Intro. 8 ; SB Nxvii;A Bl;SBN646). Hume speaks approvingly of Newton's cautiousness about

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APPROACHTO PHILOSOPHY

making hypotheses about unobservable entities; he writes thatNewton'trodwith cautiousandthereforethemost secure steps,theonly road which leadstotrueph ilosophy'.5Hume thinks thatwestop our enquiry whenwereachthe mostgeneral principle still capable of empirical observation. Anythingbeyond thisthatismere hypothesisorconjectureisuseless becauseit can neverbe satisfied. Any explanation in anysubject matter issubject to the same limitations: all of the arts and sciences ulti-matelyarriveat a first orbasic principle beyond which they cannotproceedandnoneof themcan gobeyond experience (THN Intro.10;SBNxviii).Nomatter what explanation weoner,someone canalways ask, 'Why?' Since it is impossible to provide an answer toevery'Why?'question,w emust stop somewherein ourexplanationsand Hume chooses to stop his inquiry when we reach the mostgeneral principle capableof empirical observation. Oncethereadersees the impossibility of satisfying this desire fo r explanationsbeyond experience,thedesireshould disappear.Humeiswarningusthatwewillfind apoint beyond whichwecannotgo and that thiswillbejustfine.Knowing thereismuchwe do notknowandcannotknow,wewillnolonger want toknowit,while being content withwhatwe doknowfrom theresults achievedin thescienceof humannature, which despite being unable to explain ultimate principles,willstillbe ashelpful inhuman affairs as he hasalready arguedit is.It hasbeen remarkedbyStuart Hampshire thatit isthis very philo-sophical attitude that remainsas the 'stilllivingelement' inHume sphilosophy, an attitude which accepts and submits itself to 'thenatural order, the facts of human nature, without anxiety, andthereforewithout demand forultimate solutions'.6

3 4 SUMMARYThis chapter lookedatHume s definitionofphilosophy,hisopinionof the current state of philosophy and the proposed project of ascienceofhuman nature,or'mentalgeography',basedon theexper-imentalmethod.W eshould alwaysbe on thelookoutforHume suseof this method throughout hiswork.Next,weturn to the three fundamental principlesthat form thebasis of his scienceof human nature. It isimportant to get agoodgripon the fundamental principles in hissystem right awayas healwaysrelateshisargumentstobasic principlesheestablishesat the

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beginningof his work.Noticethatthismakesit easier to follow hiswriting because all of his arguments are based on what he saidbefore. That is whyHume's style of writing rewards the carefulreader.

NOTES1 HereI amdrawingfromGarrett (1997):4-5 and theeditors Introductionto the Norton andNorton editionof the Treatise (2000:1 3,n.l1 ).2 Capaldi (1975),seePrefaceand 49,Passmore (1952:43)andFlew (1961:

94).Seealso Jessop s, 'SomeMisunderstandings of Hume',inChappell(1966:46-7);P. L.Gardiner, 'Hume'sTheory of thePassions , inPears(1963:41).Seealso Stroud (1977:5).3 SeeJohn Biro s contribution, 'Hume'sNewScienceof theMind',in theCambridge Companion toHume(1993:35).4 Seealso THN 3.3.1.10; SBN 578 and theDialoguesConcerningNaturalReligion,inwhichPhiloclaims that 'Tomultiply causes, without neces-sity,isindeed contraryto philosophy' (DNR 36).5 Hume(1885:ch. lxxi) .6 See Hampshire s 'Hume's Place in Philosophy', in David Hume: ASymposium (1966:9-10).

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CHAPTER4

OPERATIONSOF THEMIND

Hume openshisinquirybyoutliningthe 'elements ofthis philoso-phy'(THN 1.1.4.7;SBN13).Themain elements centeronthree

a. coventry (2007) hume a guide for the perplexed

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