7 JANUARY 2016

Whatever progress is made on the Myanmar peace process or political reform in 2016 and be-yond, it will be on the foundations built by vari-ous stakeholders over the past four years.

While the trust emerging between the Chair-person of the Myanmar Peace Centre, Minister U Aung Min, and his team and ethnic armed groups has been significant, what is becoming more ap-parent is the internal cohesion and increased capacity of ethnic armed groups to organise, ne-gotiate, articulate their interests and needs, and network internally, politically, and amongst them-selves.

Despite the fact the solidarity of these ethnic armed groups has been severely tested over the last year, they have to date maintained a reason-able working relationship that ensures they can still function as a cohesive negotiating body dur-ing the next stages of the peace process. This is due to both the strategic and visionary leadership among the groups, which is supported by local constituencies longing for peace, as well as sig-nificant financial and capacity investment in eth-nic armed group leadership structures, including training, technical assistance and international exposure visits.

The National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), signed on October 15, 2015, was a significant milestone in the Myanmar peace process. Nota-bly, the Joint Monitoring Committee, comprising civilians, members of the Tatmadaw Myanmar armed forces, and Non-State Armed Group (NSAG) representatives, met immediately after the signing, and have met several times since.

Strengthening key components of this cease-fire mechanism is important. Likewise, further solidif ication of cross-table relationships and reinforcing each party’s ability to implement the ceasefire will be crucial to the agreement’s future success. Indeed, effective implementation of the NCA will prove to the constituencies of ethnic group leaders who signed the agreement that the right decision was made and that the Myanmar Government and Tatmadaw are sincere.

Equally, genuine implementation and the asso-ciated peace dividends are important factors that will be carefully observed by those yet to sign. Smaller groups like the Karenni National Pro-gressive Party (KNPP) and New Mon State Party (NMSP) are still battling internal divisions, skep-ticism, limited capacity and misinformation, and

01

A ceasefire, an election, a new government: Progress towards peace in MyanmarEmma Leslie

The Current Situation in Myanmar

require ongoing accompaniment and support. On the other hand, larger non-signatory groups like the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) need to maintain close relationships with similar sized NSAG structures that did sign on, such as the Karen National Union (KNU).

It is yet to be seen how the National League for Democracy (NLD), under the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi, will manifest their values and policies in the national peace process. Early post-election meetings between ethnic armed group leaders, Daw Suu and senior NLD officials, as well as between Daw Suu and representatives of the Myanmar Peace Centre (MPC) bode well for a continuation of the process. Furthermore, re-cent public statements by Daw Suu committing the incoming government to working towards a comprehensive national peace indicate the NLD’s positive intent to build on the progress made in the last four years. The adoption of the Frame-work for the National Political Dialogue indicates that the process will continue at least into the coming months.

NSAGs like the Karen National Unity have been building bridges with the NLD for some time, and key figures within the MPC, such as Hla Maung Shwe, are close to the NLD inner cir-cle. To date there is no serious threat to the on-going ethnic peace process and its developments. However, it is yet to be seen how the NLD lead-ership might tackle other complex sensitive issues that could affect national reconciliation, such as the Rohingya issue and the ongoing activities of the more extreme, xenophobic anti-Muslim movements.

Aside from the NLD’s inf luence, the Tat-madaw will remain a significant and influential

strategic stakeholder in the peace process for many years to come.

2016 and beyond will see more community-based conf l icts emerging around land, infra-structure developments, business developments, resources and labour. Again, State parliaments, c iv i l ian and non-State actors w i l l need to strengthen their capacities to implement the out-comes of the peace process.

In our work with State-level civil servants, community-based peace organisations and eth-nic armed groups, we regularly hear there is still confusion about the peace process and its impli-cations for different areas and groups. Thus, this capacity building is as much about providing ac-curate information about the process as it is about continuing to make available case study examples and lessons from other actors involved in peace processes in the region.

More efforts should be made to promote un-derstanding and normalisation of the concept of ceasefires and peace processes. In particular, support needs to focus on how to transition from an armed group to a peace actor, building trust within organisations as well as with the “other”, and what it means to be given the space to gov-ern. Groups from Myanmar have benef itted from hearing the Communist Party-Maoist in Nepal reflect on their challenges in passing a new constitution and from the Moro Islamic Libera-tion Front in Mindanao as they prepare to govern an autonomous region in the Philippines.

Support for Myanmar’s ‘peace infrastructure’ of NSAG Liaison Offices (LO), civil society or-

02

Looking ahead

National Ceasefire Agreement Signing Ceremony, October 15, 2015 Naypyidaw, Myanmar

ganisations and civil servants across the country should focus on ensuring they are updated on the peace process, exchange experiences, and build confidence and capacity in resolving local confl icts and managing the complex relationships they handle at the community level.

NSAGs experiencing difficulties with internal unity require ongoing support in strengthening re-lationships, sharing analysis and information, and developing joint strategies with splinter groups.

Despite critics of the long road towards a na-tional ceasefire, progress in the Myanmar peace process has often come swiftly and unexpectedly, with shifting and changing dynamics seemingly the norm. Emerging key players and organisa-tions involved in the process have demonstrated an adaptability and fl exibility that enables them to quickly respond to opportunities and openings.

Our experience with armed groups, as well as with the government, has routinely demonstrated the need to be able to respond quickly when such stakeholders are ready to engage in confl ict transformation activities. Similar opportunities will continue to emerge in the future to positively engage with key confl ict actors in Myanmar and this f lexibility and adaptability of response will remain essential in effectively supporting the country’s peace process.

Emma Leslie, 7 January 2016Director, the Centre for Peace and Confl ict Stud-ies (CPCS) CPCS is a Cambodia-based NGO working in the fi eld of peacebuilding and confl ict transformation in Asia.Emma Leslie has worked on confl ict transforma-tion and peacebuilding throughout Asia since 1993. While living in Cambodia, Emma founded numerous peacebuilding organisations and ac-tively supports peace processes across the region, particularly in Myanmar and the Philippines.

Find out more about the CPCS

03

remain essential in effectively supporting the