a case study of counter violent extremism (cve) programming: lessons from oti’s kenya transition...

8/11/2019 A Case Study of Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) Programming: Lessons from OTIs Kenya Transition Initiative

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Khalil, J and Zeuthen, M 2014 A Case Study of Counter Violent Extremism(CVE) Programming: Lessons from OTIs Kenya Transition Initiative. Stability:International Journal of Security & Development, 3(1): 31, pp. 1-12, DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.ee

RESEARCH ARTICLE

A Case Study of Counter Violent Extremism(CVE) Programming: Lessons from OTIsKenya Transition Initiative

James Khalil*and Martine Zeuthen

stability

Between 2011 and 2014 the USAID Oce of Transition Initiatives (OTI)s KenyaTransition Initiative implemented what was essentially a pilot program of the newCountering Violent Extremism (CVE) concept. Aiming to counter the drivers ofviolent extremism (VE), this operated through a system of small grants fundingactivities such as livelihood training, cultural events, community debates onsensitive topics, counselling for post-traumatic stress disorder, and so on. Thispaper delivers lessons from the program, generated via an independent evaluation,oering insights of relevance to the broader CVE community of practitioners. A rstoverarching conclusion is that programming decisions would have benetted from amore comprehensive understanding of VE in the local context. For instance, subsetsof the population more narrowly at-risk of being attracted to VE should have beenidentied and targeted (e.g. potentially teenagers, ex-convicts, members of specicclans, and so on), and a greater focus should have been placed upon comprehendingthe relevance of material incentives, fear, status-seeking, adventure-seeking, andother such individual-level drivers. A second conclusion is that the KTI team wouldhave proted from additional top-level guidance from their donors, for instance,providing direction on the extent to which eorts should have been targeted atthose supportive of violence versus those directly involved in its creation, therisks associated with donor branding, and contexts in which the pejorative termextremism should have been pragmatically replaced by neutral terminology. As apriority donors and the wider community should also provide suitable denitions

of the CVE concept, rather than leaving practitioners to construe (undoubtedlyinconsistently) its meaning from the available denitions of VE.

Introduction

The September 2013 attack at the Westgateshopping mall brought worldwide atten-tion to Kenya, with Al-Shabaab claiming

responsibility and maintaining that it wasconducted in revenge against Kenyan militaryoperations in Somalia.1 However, this par-ticular incident represents only one of manyexamples of violent extremism (VE) in Kenyaover in recent years, and indeed the intensity

has escalated over recent months. Home tomany individuals of Somali descent, Nairobisdistrict of Eastleigh is one prominent VE hot-spot. Such violence also occurs with relative

* Independent Conict Specialist, London, UK

[email protected] Consultant and Specialist in CVE inthe Horn of Africa, Nairobi, [email protected]
http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.eemailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.ee


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Khalil and Zeuthen: A Case Study of Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) ProgrammingArt. 31, page 2 of 12

frequency along the Kenyan coast, both drivenby and provoking elevated tensions betweenreligious communities, particularly after thekilling of prominent clerics such as SheikhsAboud Rogo (August 2012), Ibrahim Rogo

(October 2013), Abubakar Shariff (April 2014),and Idris Mohamed (June 2014).

Within this tense context USAIDs Office ofTransition Initiative (OTI) implemented whatwas essentially a pilot program of the newCountering Violent Extremism (CVE) con-cept, forming one component of the widerKenya Transition Initiative (KTI). Between2011 and 2013 the program was operationalin Eastleigh and its environs, and in 2012

it was expanded to the coastal regions ofLamu, Kilifi, Kwale, Malindi and Mombasa. Itwas delivered via a flexible funding mecha-nism that supported individuals, networksand organisations, often with small grantsimplemented over a short duration. Thesegrants funded a broad range of activitiesaiming to counter the drivers of VE, includ-ing livelihood training, community debateson sensitive topics, cultural events, counsel-

ling for post-traumatic stress disorder, and soon. While the CVE concept is essentially stillunder development (as discussed below), itnow commonly forms one component of awider response to VE that also incorporateslaw-enforcement, counterterrorism, develop-ment and other initiatives. While this articlefocuses narrowly upon CVE programming, akey determinant of the extent to which VEis countered will undoubtedly be the degreeto which these diverse efforts are adequately

prioritized and coordinated.With the KTI team eager for the lessons

from this pilot to be disseminated to thewider community of CVE practitioners,this essay summarises a qualitative evalua-tion undertaken by Integrity Research andConsultancy as part of the program close-down phase.2 With implementing organi-zations rarely willing and/or able to revealtheir lessons learned to a broader audience,

we believe that it offers the reader a rareaccess inside a highly significant US-funded

security initiative.3 We also believe that itsrelevance is heightened both because theCVE concept continues to grow in promi-nence amongst US and European donors, andas many insights presented in this paper are

also of substantial relevance to stabilization,counterterrorism and other related forms ofprogramming. Although it is unfortunatelynot possible to provide additional detailsgiven the sensitive nature of the program,during the field research we collected con-siderable qualitative evidence to suggest thatKTIs efforts achieved a positive impact in dis-suading certain individuals from followingthe VE path. We also concluded that a criti-

cal strength of the program was its flexibility,enabling rapid responses to the aftermath ofspecific incidents such as the Westgate attackand the killing of Sheikh Aboud Rogo. It alsoshowed flexibility in its ability to scale-upassociations with successful grantees.

This essay is structured loosely to reflectthe KTI program lifecycle, sequentially focus-sing upon the goal statement, drivers of VE,vulnerable population subsets, the interven-

tion logic, and negative effects. The final sec-tion delivers two overarching conclusionsintended to be of relevance to the wider CVEcommunity. Firstly, we argue that KTI pro-gramming decisions would have benefittedfrom a more comprehensive understandingof VE within the local context. For instance,subsets of the population more narrowly at-risk of being attracted to VE should have beenidentified and targeted (potentially includingteenagers, members of specific clans, ex-con-

victs, etc.), and a greater focus should havebeen placed upon comprehending the roleof material incentives, fear, status-seeking,adventure-seeking, and other individual-leveldrivers. A second is that the KTI team wouldhave profited from additional top-level guid-ance from their donors, for instance, provid-ing direction on the extent to which effortsshould have been targeted at those support-ive of violence versus those directly involved

in its creation, the risks associated with inap-propriate donor branding, and the contexts in


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Khalil and Zeuthen: A Case Study of Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) Programming Art. 31, page 3 of 12

which the pejorative term extremism shouldbe pragmatically replaced by neutral termi-nology. As a priority donors and the widercommunity should also provide suitable defi-nitions of the CVE concept, rather than leav-

ing practitioners to construe, undoubtedlyinconsistently, its meaning from the avail-able definitions of VE.

Dening the program goalProviding a platform for the subsequent dis-cussions, and CVE objective-setting morebroadly, this initial section comments uponthe KTI program goal statement, stipulatedas: Stronger identity and self-confidence of

youth to allow them to reject extremism.This statement is problematic for a varietyof reasons. Firstly, we argue that the termidentity should have been omitted giventhat the relationship between this conceptand VE is highly complex and nuanced (e.g.Schwartz et al 2009), and this runs counter tothe need to maintain simplicity in the over-arching goal.4 Indeed, there was confusionamongst KTI stakeholders regarding the basic

point of whether the term was intended torefer to national, religious or clan identity,or even identity as youth (widely defined asthose between 16 and 35 in Kenya). The focusupon self-confidence is also problematic as itimplies an association between this psycho-logical factor and an attraction to VE, despitean apparent absence of supporting evidencefor this link. This is of particular relevancegiven the growing consensus against the ideathat it is possible to create suitable psycholog-

ical profiles (e.g. Sageman 2008: 17). In anycase, the converse relationship is also plausi-ble, i.e. that elevated levels of self-confidencemay be associated with an attractionto VE.

Perhaps of greater relevance, the phraseallow them to reject extremism should havebeen adapted as it is suggestive of top-downassumptions, implicitly removing degrees ofagency from individuals who often self-selectto travel the VE path. Put another way, it infers

that radicalisation is a process that happensto individuals, rather than being something

that is actively pursued. Seeking to coun-ter this common perception, Marc Sageman(2004: 122) asserts that joining the jihadis more akin to the process of applying to ahighly selective college. He continues that

many try to get in but only a few succeed,and that candidates are enthusiastic ratherthan reluctant (Sageman 2004: 122). Whilecounterexamples certainly do exist of VE enti-ties actively recruiting from the populace, thewider point is that it is mistaken to assumethat enlistment is solely a top-down process.

Of greater relevance still, the languageis somewhat ambiguous, and this reflectsbroader issues that remain with the con-

ceptualisation of CVE. Indeed, the conceptof CVE is itself rarely defined by donors, andthis undoubtedly results in inconsistentinterpretations as implementers are simplyleft to construe its meaning from the avail-able definitions of VE. Compounding thisissue, the VE concept is extremely broad asit focuses upon both those directly involvedin the production of violence, and theirsupporters. For instance, the USAID paper

Development Response to Violent Extremismand Insurgency (from which the KTI teamdrew heavily throughout program designand implementation) identifies VE (USAID2011: 2) as advocating, engaging in, prepar-ing, or otherwise supporting ideologicallymotivated or justified violence to furthersocial, economic and political objectives.The Australian National Counter-TerrorismCommittee similarly defines the concept asa willingness to use or support the use of

violence to further particular beliefs, includ-ing those of a political, social or ideologicalnature (cited in Nasser-Eddine et al 2011: 8).

With this breadth in mind, and pendingsuitable definitions of CVE from donors, wetentatively suggest the following goal state-ments for future initiatives:51) To reduce therate of VE acts in Location X, and 2) To reducethe level of support for VE acts in Location X.In practice, however, we also argue that the

comparative importance of the latter objec-tive varies according to context. In particular,


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CVE initiatives should place an elevated focuson undermining support for VE in locationswhere the perpetrators of violence are highlydependent on local communities for mate-rial resources, shelter, information on stateforces, and so on. This should also be thecase in locations where support for VE isparticularly widespread, and thus long-termsolutions necessarily involve extensive efforts

to change attitudes. This has programmaticimplications given that supporters of violenceare often considerably more numerous thanthose who are directly involved (Khalil 2014),6and thus interventions would have to target abroader cross-section of the populace.

Identifying the drivers of violentextremism push factorsHowever articulated, efforts to achieve

CVE aims require an ample understand-ing of what drives this violence in anygiven environment, and in pursuit of such

comprehension the KTI team adopted thelanguage of push and pull factors, as out-lined in USAIDs Development Response.According to this paper (2011: 34), theformer are important in creating the condi-tions that favor the rise or spread in appealof violent extremism or insurgency, whereasthe latter are associated with the personalrewards which membership in a group or

movement, and participation in its activi-ties, may confer. Development Response doesnot aim to offer a definitive list of potentialdrivers, and the KTI team correctly sought toidentify factors of specific relevance withintheir areas of implementation, as indicatedin Figure 1. It should be briefly observedthat, while the concepts of push and pullprovide a convenient means through whichto structure an understanding of VE drivers,

other such systems of categorization mayalso be adopted, e.g. distinguishing betweenmotivators and enablers.

Figure 1:Push and pull factors (summarised from project documents).


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Whilst it is beyond the scope of this paperto comment upon all such drivers, the roleof discrimination and profiling in push-ing individuals to VE is worth highlight-ing. This issue is routinely discussed withinthe Kenyan literature, for instance, with theInternational Crisis Group (2012: 10) report-ing that the war against Al-Shabaab has ledto an increase in ethnic profiling and dis-crimination against Somalis in particular,and Muslims in general. Anneli Botha (2013:9), from the Institute for Security Studies,similarly states that members of the Somali-

Kenyan and Somali communities claim to bevictims of racial or ethnic profiling and tohave been rounded up and arrested for lit-tle reason other than their race and ethnic-ity. Indeed, in response to escalating levelsof violence, such patterns have increased in2014 through Operation Usalama Watch.7This initiative was launched in the after-math of the Westgate incident and associ-ated attacks in Nairobi, with its many critics

asserting that it applies a disproportionateuse of force against these same communities(e.g. Amnesty International 2014).

While poverty and unemployment werealso identified as drivers by KTI, there is sub-stantial debate in the wider literature as towhether such factors actually correlate withVE (e.g. Mercy Corps 2013; USAID 2009: v;Venhaus 2010: 5). Critically, even if a rela-tionship between these factors and VE isrevealed in a specific location, it should notbe taken for granted that the former drivethe latter given that there are other poten-tial causal routes. Specifically, as shown inFigure 2, unemployment may drive individ-uals towards VE, orconversely VE may lead

to a lack of employment opportunities (per-haps as individuals become tainted by theformer), or an external variable (clan affili-ation, education levels, and so on) may driveboth. Complexity is added, however, as cau-sality may flow in multiple directions simul-taneously (e.g. X causes Y andY causes X).Such considerations are of critical relevancegiven that initiatives to enhance employ-ment in any specific region will notserve to

reduce VE if the uppermost option in Figure2is incorrect. Of course, this logic is poten-tially also applicable to all candidate drivers

Figure 2:Potential directions of causality.


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of VE (i.e. those identified in Figure 1), andso alternate causal directions should be con-sidered in each instance.

Furthermore, while the issue of causaldirection is of clear relevance, it should be

recognised that it represents no more thanthe tip of the iceberg in terms of complexeffects. The idea of a simple linear relation-ship between causes (e.g. unemployment)and effects (i.e. VE), gives way to a reality oftipping points, disproportionate feedbackloops, interaction effects between multi-ple variables, and other complexities. Theseissues are exacerbated as the analysis is com-monly performed on data of questionable

quality given that study informants mayoffer false or misleading information, (a) asthey themselves are misinformed, (b) to dis-credit others, (c) to be viewed favourably bythe interviewer (often referred to as socialdesirability bias), (d) out of fear of poten-tial repercussions of divulging information,(e) to aggrandise their own role in events, or(f) as a process of unwitting self-deception.8Thus, rather than attempt to prove causality,

the more modest aim of studies designed toinform CVE efforts should be to draw cave-ated findings to support or contest a prede-termined list of hypotheses on the potentialdrivers of VE, i.e. including those listed inFigure 1. And, with such considerationsin mind, we argue that CVE practitionersshould certainly not treat the resultant find-ings as being definitive. Arguably, the KTIteam placed too much faith in their commis-sioned research.

Identifying the drivers pull factorsIn any case, even if discrimination, unem-ployment, poverty and other such pushfactors are shown to drive VE in specific envi-ronments, it is increasingly recognised thatan exclusive focus upon these variables isinsufficient. As observed in USAIDs Guide toDrivers (2009: 11) document, efforts to bringabout significant reductions in such alleged

root causes as high unemployment, perva-sive poverty, systematic political exclusion,

endemic corruption, and a lack of politicaland economic opportunities (to name buta few) will require large-scale investments,carried out through hard-to-implement andexpensive programs sustained over long

periods of time. In other words, there arefew quick wins achievable on the push side.In addition, it is often observed (e.g. USAID2009: ii) that such push factors are commonto many global regions, whereas VE remainscomparatively rare. Thus, at best these driversprovide insufficient explanations for VE, andit is thus necessary to additionally considerwhat pulls individuals towards violence.

With many interventions focusing upon

push factors almost by default, the KTI teamcan be credited with placing an elevatedfocus upon those that pull. However, thedrivers identified by KTI diverge notably fromthose suggested in USAIDs DevelopmentResponse (see Figure 1), and in particularit can be noted that the team neglected tofocus on those that motivate at the indi-vidual level, rather than collectively.9 Forinstance, these include selective incentives

such as Al-Shabaabs reported monthly salaryof 50150 USD (Hassan 2012: 18).10Status-seeking is also commonly identified as a VEdriver, with a former member claiming thatwalking in the city with a gun as a memberof al-Shabaab ensured everybody feared andrespected you and that girls also liked you(Hassan 2012: 19). Adventure-seeking, fearand revenge are also routinely identified asmotivators in a range of cases (e.g. Kilcullen2009: 4041; Ribetti 2007).11 Having over-

looked such factors during their initialresearch efforts, the KTI subsequently down-played the relevance of these drivers as theydesigned their program and selected grants.

Such considerations have two main pro-grammatic implications. Firstly, individual-level drivers tend to be particularly applicableto those directly engaged in the production ofviolence, rather than the supporters of theseactivities, as they are often contingent upon

behaviours (Khalil 2014). Put another way,the benefits of material gain, elevated status,


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a sense of adventure, and so on, are not gen-erally gained by those who merely remain onthe sidelines. And, with these somewhat diver-gent motivations, this underlines the pointdiscussed above that it is necessary to treat

the perpetrators and supporters of violenceas distinct (albeit overlapping) populations.Secondly, programs within the scope of CVEcan be designed to counter at least some ofthese individual-level drivers if they are deter-mined to be of key significance. For instance, ifresearch reveals that revenge is an importantmotivator in a specific location, projects canbe established to bridge the gap between reli-gious, ethnic, and clan-based communities.

Identifying vulnerablesub-populationsWhile research into such push and pull fac-tors provides a suitable framework uponwhich to base CVE efforts, additional nuanceis required in the contextual understandingas certain individuals are more susceptiblethan others to the appeal of VE. Amongstpractitioners there is some resistance to the

idea of identifying such vulnerable indi-viduals as this is suggestive of stereotypingat a time when it is increasingly recognisedthat terrorist profiles either do not exist ormay never be identified (Horgan 2009: xxii;Sageman 2008: 17). However, we believe thatthis is misguided as the objective should notbe to precisely identify individual types, butmore modestly to narrow targeting efforts ona probabilistic basis. Indeed, this logic was inany case applied by KTI through placing an

emphasis upon Somalis and youth (taken tobe those between 16 and 35) as specificallyat-risk. It was also applied in a geographicalsense in that the program focus was upon spe-cific coastal regions and Eastleighs environs,rather than Kenya in its entirety, as these loca-tions were deemed to be highly susceptible.

There is some anecdotal evidence thatteenagers (i.e. a tightening of the conceptof youth), ex-convicts, members of specific

clans, and other narrow sub-populationsare specifically vulnerable to VE in Kenya.

We argue that the KTI program would havebenefited from additional research into thismatter, and that a greater proportion ofKTI grants should have targeted those sub-populations positively identified through

comprehensive research as being specificallyvulnerable. This conclusion applies in par-ticular given that VE is associated with a verysmall minority in the Kenyan context.12 Inpractice, however, our investigation revealedthat a number of interventions inadvert-ently selected againstthe most at-risk withinthe broad categories of Somalis and youths.While it is not possible to provide additionaldetails given the sensitive nature of this

programming, put simply, those individu-als most likely to follow the VE path wereseemingly less likely to attend a range of KTI-sponsored events.

Determining the intervention logicIn considering the topic of intervention logicit should firstly be noted that CVE program-ming paradoxically cannot alone serve tocounteract VE. For instance, it is beyond the

scope of CVE to provide protection to individ-uals who are coerced into VE, or to attemptto cut the funding of VE entities in orderto undermine their ability to offer materialincentives for such acts. And, in a striking dis-connect between policy and practice, neitheris it possible in certain US CVE lines to pro-vide training to officials in the security forcesor to engage with religious institutions thatmay play a key role in either provoking orpreventing VE.13 The former is of particular

relevance in contemporary Kenya as manystate officials seemingly remain unaware ofthe apparently counterproductive effects oftheir repressive practices. The simple retortto these observations is that CVE forms onlyone component of a wider response that alsooften involves law-enforcement, counterter-rorism, security sector reform, development,and other such initiatives. Yet, as observedabove, this riposte is only valid if these efforts

can be adequately coordinated and decon-flicted, and this is no trivial matter given the


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range of (often highly bureaucratic) agenciestypically involved.

As also noted above, we collected consid-erable qualitative evidence to suggest thatKTIs efforts achieved a positive impact, i.e.

in preventing certain individuals from fol-lowing the VE path. However, we also arguethat KTI could have enhanced this successthrough applying the Theories of Change(ToC) logic in order to maximize the likeli-hood that each separate grant contributed tothe broader program goal, and this sectionserves to provide a brief introduction to thistopic. ToC provide a map of the pathwaysfrom inputs (e.g. funds, time, etc.) through

to impacts (i.e. a reduction in VE or supportfor such acts), involving the articulation ofassumptions upon which such efforts arebased. Certain KTI grants aimed to enhancelivelihood opportunities through linkinglocal youth and financial institutions, withthe intention being that the former obtainloans or grants from the latter. Such effortsrested on assumptions that (inter alia) (a)youth did not already engage with such enti-

ties, (b) youth had the motivation/time toengage with these bodies, (c) financial insti-tutions were willing/able to support youth,(d) youth are able to channel such resourcesto enhance their livelihood opportunities, (e)a lack of opportunities for youth drives VE(as discussed above), and (f) individuals spe-cifically at-risk of being attracted to VE willpartake in such initiatives (also discussedabove). Ideally the resources would be avail-able for implementers to research each of

these assumptions, but the process of articu-lating such suppositions in itself commonlyreveals potential weak links. And, this ena-bles adjustments to be made to the programdesign at suitably early stages in the process.

Another example that perhaps even betterdemonstrates the role of ToC is offered by KTIefforts to combat post-traumatic stress disor-der (PTSD) amongst all community members.These initiatives rested upon assumptions

that (inter alia) (a) PTSD occurs in the com-munity, (b) individuals are willing to partake

in counselling despite the potential stigma,(c) it is possible to recruit suitably qualified/experienced counsellors, (d) such treatmentis able to successfully counter PTSD, (e) PTSDdrives VE, and (f) individuals specifically at-

risk of VE are willing and able to partake inthe counselling. While it is necessary to chal-lenge all of these assumptions as a matter ofdue process, the fifth is perhaps of particu-lar concern. A key KTI document maintainedthat former Al-Shabaab members are likely toreenlist if unable to get appropriate psycho-logical counselling to deal with their trauma,but this assertion seemingly lacked support-ing evidence. Indeed, focussing on a selected

sample of global Salafi mujahedin, MarcSageman (2004: 97) maintains that therewas no pattern of emotional trauma in theirpast, nor was there any evidence of pathologi-cal hatred or paranoia when the facts are ana-lysed. While counselling of this nature wouldundoubtedly have a positive impact uponthe community, clearly it will not serve toundermine VE if this disorder does not actu-ally drive this violence. The wider point is that

entire lines of programming may wholly failto contribute to the broader KTI goal if onlyone assumption is misguided.

Mitigating negative eectsOf course, it is necessary to consider notonly the positive effects of programs, butalso potential negative consequences. Forinstance, grantees and other stakeholdersmay be subject to threats or actual targetingas a result of their association with external

donors. Indeed, one grantee highlighted thatlocal youth distributed leaflets to denouncetheir KTI-funded activities, and that thesesame individuals subsequently threatenedstaff members. While KTI offered to cancelthis grant in order to resolve this issue, thegrantee elected to continue with the pro-ject. The obvious recommendation is thatsuch initiatives require robust systems of riskmanagement, assessment and mitigation. In

making this suggestion, however, it is neces-sary to recognise that CVE programs must


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also avoid the temptation to become overlyrisk-adverse as this will undoubtedly impingeupon their ability to achieve their programobjectives. Put simply, CVE efforts inevitablyentail elevated levels of risk.

A more specific recommendation is fordonors (and particularly those from the USgiven that ill-feelings towards the pivotalWestern nation are commonly pronounced)to be cautious with branding. KTIs policywas flexible, allowing grantees to operatewithout the USAID logo if they deemed itto be unsuitable. Advocates of branding inthis context argue that the logo serves todemonstrate the good-will of the US, and in

doing so it may draw individuals away fromthe VE path. Yet, this argument may be out-weighed, firstly, by the fact that those whoseek to encourage VE can utilise this brand-ing as evidence of external meddling, andthus it may inadvertently serve as a rallyingpoint for violence. Secondly, with oppositionto Western influence being common in manyregions, such branding may actually discour-age those individuals who are part-way down

the VE path from participating in CVE ini-tiatives. And, thirdly, it likely increases therisk of grantees and other associates beingthreatened or physically targeted throughadvertising their links to an external entity.Put simply, in certain contexts the net effectof branding may actually be to undermineprogress towards CVE aims, or to elevate thecosts of such efforts, and thus selectivity iscertainly required.

It is also necessary to reflect upon the nor-

mative nature of the VE/CVE concepts. Theextremism label (alongside terrorism andother such tags) is routinely utilized to vilifyopponents in an effort to isolate them fromthe wider populace.14However, this label mayinstead serve to polarise communities by dis-tinguishing between extremists and (implic-itly) normal or moderate individuals, andin doing so it may inadvertently cause someto shift towards the former camp. Such pejo-

rative labels are of course associated withattempts to shape perceptions and disguise

agendas, and the sense of being manipulatedmay in itself also discourage some from asso-ciating with initiatives that carry the CVE tag.In addition, the label may attract unwantedattention from unsavoury elements, thereby

elevating risk for grantees and other programstakeholders. Indeed, presumably with thisthreat in mind, various KTI grantees electedto tone-down the CVE language, insteadportraying their projects as being focusedupon, for instance, peace-messaging andcoexistence. In a very different sense thelabel may also undermine interventionsthrough implying that it is primarily or solelynonstate actors who are at fault for the vio-

lence (i.e. as extremists), thereby potentiallysteering practitioners away from pursuingnecessary state reforms. Each of these pos-sible consequences remain under-research (amatter that should be remedied as a priority),but all may substantially undermine CVE ini-tiatives. This is certainly not to suggest thatthe CVE terminology should be abandoned,but rather that it may be necessary to adoptneutral language in certain contexts.

ConclusionWhile this brief essay has covered substan-tial ground, from the program goal state-ments through to negative effects duringimplementation, it is worth concludingwith two overarching points. Firstly, KTIprogramming decisions would have benefit-ted from additional research in order to pro-vide a more thorough understanding of theVE context in Kenya. For instance, while the

KTI team correctly placed an elevated focusupon drivers that pull individuals to VE,they essentially neglected the role of mate-rial incentives, fear, revenge, status-seekingand other individual-level drivers. Similarly,the program team would have benefit-ted from a more precise understanding ofwhich subsets of the populace (potentiallyincluding ex-convicts, members of specificclans, teenagers, etc.) were specifically vul-

nerable to the appeal of VE, particularly ascomparatively few individuals are drawn to


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this violence in Kenya. More generally, CVEpractitioners should also aim to becomemore conversant in the limitations ofresearch and analysis in such environments.In particular, this applies to the reliability of

data collected from informants, and regard-ing questions of causality, e.g. to considerwhether a correlation between a lack of live-lihoods opportunities and VE in a specificregion may result from the former drivingthe latter, or vice versa, or whether an exter-nal factor is responsible for both.

The second conclusion is that the KTIimplementers would have benefitted fromadditional top-level guidance from donors.

For instance, they would have gained fromdirection with regard to the extent to whichthe CVE concept should be intended to tar-get individuals who are directly involved inthe creation of violence, versus those whoonly support such acts in cases such as Kenya.Additional guidance would also have beenbeneficial, for instance, with regard to circum-stances in which practitioners may potentiallyundermine their own programs through the

inappropriate application of branding, and inwhich the pejorative term extremism shouldbe pragmatically replaced by neutral termi-nology. Above all, we argue that USAID andother donors should offer suitable definitionsof CVE, rather than leave practitioners to con-strue its meaning from the limited number ofavailable definitions of VE.

Notes 1 Debate continues regarding responsibil-

ity for these attacks, despite the claims ofAl-Shabaab.

2 A redacted version of the final report willshortly be available on the USAID web-site, within which the study methods areoutlined. Given the current insecurity inKenya the grantees have not been namedin either the report or this essay, and ithas been necessary to leave a number ofopinions uncited on this basis. A paral-

lel quantitative evaluation was also con-ducted during program close-down and

together these two studies represent thefinal evaluation.

3 A limited number of other such studiesare available, e.g. see USAID 2013 (whichalso focusses upon the Eastleigh compo-

nent of the KTI initiative).4 This is absolutely not to suggest that the

concept of identity should be neglected,but rather that it should be interwovenwithin the program logic, e.g. underpin-ning assumptions within the Theories ofChange.

5 The issue of how to research progresstowards/reversals away from the goal(including the thorny attribution prob-

lem) is discussed in the final report (seefootnote 2).

6 For instance, support for martyrdomoperations in the Palestinian Territorieshas reportedly reached as high as 66 percent, while those actually involved in cre-ating this violence remained at a fractionof that figure.

7 Usalama translates as security inKiswahili.

8

Such issues are discussed in detail inWood 2003: 3140. 9The underpinning theory is discussed in

Khalil 2014.10 It should be noted that there is no clean

division between push and pull factors.In this instance an example of the latter (i.e.a financial incentive from Al-Shabaab) is atleast partly dependent upon examples ofthe former (i.e. poverty, unemployment).

11 Particular caution must be taken when

assessing the role of fear as a driver as indi-viduals aiming to discredit Al-Shabaaband other such groups may overstate theextent to which individuals are coercedinto VE acts.

12 For instance, the International CrisisGroup (2012: 7) asserts that the supportbase for Al-Shabaab in Kenya is a tiny, buthighly radicalised, close-knit and secre-tive Salafi Jihadi fringe.

13

This is due to the Establishment Clausein the US.


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14 As is noted by Hoffman (2006: 23), forinstance, on one point, at least, everyoneagrees: Terrorism is a pejorative term.It is a word with intrinsically negativeconnotations that is generally applied to

ones enemies and opponents, or to thosewith whom one disagrees and would oth-erwise prefer to ignore.

AcknowledgementsThe authors wish to thank the many granteesand beneficiaries who kindly assisted withthe research. We also wish to extend thanksto the KTI team, who were highly supportivethroughout the process. It is to their consider-

able credit that they strongly encouraged thecreation of this article to enable the wider CVEcommunity to learn from their experiences.

ReferencesAmnesty International 2014 Somalis are

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How to cite this article: Khalil, J and Zeuthen, M 2014 A Case Study of Counter Violent Extremism(CVE) Programming: Lessons from OTIs Kenya Transition Initiative. Stability: International Journal ofSecurity & Development, 3(1): 31, pp. 1-12, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.ee

Published:30 September 2014

Copyright: 2014 The Author(s). This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of theCreative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License (CC-BY 3.0), which permits unrestricted use,distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.See http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/.

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