Map of India and Pakistan 1950

A CAREFUL TREAD The Tenuous Military

Balance of

India and Pakistan

Rachel Farell

GOVT 451

Dr. Karber

7 December 2012

I. Introduction

Relations between India and Pakistan remain prominent on the world stage for their

notoriety. Deep tensions have brewed since the origins of their independence in 1947 and

continue to occupy a prominent position in world affairs and in the minds of nervous

military strategists. Their short history is plagued with wars, violence, and incursions;

despite profound new geopolitical realities 65 years after their bitter beginnings, the

contentious relationship between India and Pakistan remains unabated. With the current

arms race, lapse in diplomatic progress, improving nuclear capabilities of both countries,

and shifting regional paradigm with the imminent drawdown of US forces in

Afghanistan, military conflict in some form between the two states can arguably be

viewed only on a spectrum that ranges from “highly conceivable” to “inevitable.”

At the core of the bitter rivalry is the contested northern territory of Kashmir. A

tenuous ceasefire currently in effect between the two states gives limited reassurance to a

global audience that fears potential for the worst: nuclear Armageddon in the region.

Deterrence has heretofore avoided any worst-case scenario possibilities—nuclear

weapons remain unused and carefully secured—but the threat of their use between two

states with such deep-seated enmity necessitates a careful tread.

Of the two, India is clearly the more dominant power. Its military, economy, social

infrastructure, and global eminence far exceed those of Pakistan. And yet the nuclear

trump card serves to balance the calculation. But it also exponentially raises the stakes

should a conflict erupt on a large enough scale to necessitate their use. While it appears

that India would emerge superior in an armed conflict, the regional and global

implications the engagement would inflict would be colossal—and the gains India could

potentially extract would pale relative to the costs.

This paper seeks to explore the tenuous military balance between India and Pakistan

and briefly simulate how and why armed conflict might be reignited between them. This

will be done through a quantitative and qualitative measurement of the military

capabilities of both powers, the doctrines and ideologies driving them, and a glimpse at

future prospects between India and Pakistan.

II. Historical Background

Partition and Seeds of Tension: Kashmir

Despite strong cultural, linguistic, and historical ties, tension and violence have

plagued the India-Pakistan relationship since their inception as two independent nations

in 1947. While many distinct conflicts have arisen in the 65 years since their

independences, one issue has been at the core of the hostility from the beginning and

continues to drive current tensions today: the question of Kashmir.

During the British partition plan of 1947, the Union of India and the Dominion of

Pakistan were established largely on religious lines. Rulers of the 680 princely states that

composed the British Empire in India were offered the choice of which state to ultimately

join and pledge allegiance to; by and large, the Hindu-majority states coalesced to form

India, and the Muslim-majority states absorbed into larger Pakistan.

Kashmir was a large princely state at the northernmost tips of India and Pakistan. In

1947, the state was composed of a majority-Muslim population but was ruled by a Hindu

maharaja, Hari Singh. The maharaja was faced with the dilemma of choosing between his

personal alliances and the wishes of the population. Due to this, the king decided to

remain temporarily neutral and requested that India and Pakistan recognize the state as

such. He formulated an interim standstill agreement, which Pakistan signed and accepted

and India did not.1

However, in October 1947, Kashmir was invaded by a contingent of tribal Pakistanis

who were enraged by rumors of violent attacks against Muslims in the state. As a

defensive measure, the maharaja requested Indian military reinforcement. This move led

to the signing of the Instrument of Accession document shortly thereafter, which

conceded key state functions to India. The state was split, with India claiming the

southern two-thirds of Kashmir (Jammu and Kashmir) and Pakistan seizing the northern

third (Azad Kashmir). It is still hotly contested whether the Instrument of Accession was

1 “Kashmir Profile,” British Broadcasting Corporation, 3 November 2012. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11693674>

signed and legalized before the entry of Indian troops into Kashmir.2 China claimed the

eastern portion of Kashmir in the 1950s, amid bitter contestation by India and Pakistan.

Both states claim the territory of Kashmir in its entirety. Diplomatic attempts have

failed to resolve the issue. Pakistan continues to demand a referendum to negotiate the

final status of Kashmir, but India’s stance is that Kashmir has substantiated their

accession by continuing to vote in Indian elections. Both have claimed that Kashmir is an

integral part of their states.

Prior Wars

Following wars in 1947 and 1965 over Kashmir, India and Pakistan clashed again in

1971. The 1971 war led to the creation and independence of Bangladesh and culminated

in the Simla Agreement in 1972, which officially established the Line of Control (LOC)

as the de facto border between Indian and Pakistani Kashmir and set guidelines for future

relations between India and Pakistan. Insurgencies broke out in 1989 and continued in the

90s, leading up to the 1999 Kargil incident between India and Pakistani soldiers and

militants who infiltrated the LOC border into Jammu and Kashmir. After India fully

militarized along the border and began an offensive to retake the territory, Pakistan was

internationally pressured to retreat. This was the first conflict after both powers obtained

nuclear weapons in 1998 that had the potential to escalate to dangerous levels; restraint

2 Ibid 1.

Image 1: Map of Kashmir, 1947 and 2007

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/629/629/6922293.stm

was demonstrated on both sides.3 A military standoff at the LOC was initiated in 2001

following terrorist attacks on the Indian parliament in Delhi attributed to Pakistan. Both

states massed troops along the LOC in an offensive posture until the conflict was abated

through international pressure and mediation. Troop drawdown was successfully

completed in 2002, but it served to scare to the international community due to its

potential to escalate quickly. The most recent large-scale conflict occurred in 2008 with

the terrorist attacks in Mumbai.4

While tensions have visibly cooled over the past several years, the events of the last

decade served to deepen the divide and mistrust between India and Pakistan. The

contentious issues that drove the two states to war in the past still remain. There is a

distinct possibility that conflict will once again enter in to the India-Pakistan

relationship—and with nuclear weapons on the table, the stakes have never been higher.

Table 1: Timeline of Major Events between India and Pakistan

Year Event

1947 India and Pakistan gain independence; was breaks out over Kashmir;

territory divided between India and Pakistan

1965 Brief but bloody war over Kashmir fought to a standstill

1971 War breaks out over East Pakistan; Bangladesh gains independence

1972 Simla Agreement signed, Line of Control established as the recognized

border between Indian and Pakistani Kashmir

1984 Indian Army gains control of Siachen Glacier

1989 Muslim insurgencies break out in Jammu and Kashmir and continues

through the 90s; India attempts to quell it

1998 Both countries successfully test nuclear weapons

1999 Unofficial Kargil war erupts; Pakistan loses; relations severed

2001 Terrorist attack on Indian parliament in Delhi; leads to military standoff

with massive troop buildup at the Line of Control

2008 Terrorist attacks on Mumbai further strain India-Pakistan relations

2010 Protests in Jammu and Kashmir erupt against the Indian army

3 Peter R. Lavoy, “Asymmetric warfare in South Asia: the causes and consequences of the Kargil Conflict,”

Cambridge University Press, 2009. 4 Angel Rabasa, “The lessons of Mumbai,” RAND, 2009.

III. Current Status: Tense Deterrence

After decades of research and development, India and Pakistan each successfully

detonated nuclear weapons in 1998. It can be argued that nuclear weapons have provided

a provided a stable form of deterrence. Despite several uncomfortably tense moments

within the last decade and a half, India and Pakistan have exercised restraint (albeit under

extreme pressure from the international community to do so) and have refrained from

using any type of nuclear weapons capability against the other. This situation has resulted

in what RAND’s Ashley Tellis describes as “ugly stability.” Her study concludes that

neither Pakistan nor India has been able to decisively defeat the other in conventional

military engagement, and both have rejected the usage of nuclear weapons to claim

decisive victory.5 Thus, stability has held due to lack of better alternatives, but tensions

remain high due to the mutual discontent of both parties.

The Mumbai terrorist attacks were devastating to India and Pakistan’s gradual

diplomatic gestures in the wake of the 2001-02 conflict. Although Pakistan invoked

plausible deniability, India claimed it had evidence of Pakistan’s implication in the

planning and implementation of the large-scale attacks. While India did not retaliate with

force, relational progress that was being made on other fronts was stalled.

Bilateral dialogue resumed, however, in 2011. A report by the United States Institute

of Peace in 2011 stated that, while there is reason for optimism in the progression of

talks, “Terrorism and the Kashmir issue remain the most toxic points of divergence which

could derail progress as in past bilateral talks.”6 The 67

th session of the United Nations

General Assembly (UNGA) in October 2012 highlighted this tension, with Indian and

Pakistani representatives trading barbs about the status of Jammu Kashmir and exercising

5 Ashley J. Tellis, “Stability in South Asia,” RAND, 1997.

<http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a326200.pdf> 6 Megan Neville, “Optimism and Obstacles in India-Pakistan Peace Talks,” United States Institute of Peace, 15 July 2011. <http://www.usip.org/files/resources/PB98.pdf>

their rights reply to fuel a heated debate.7 Despite tangible progress in the softening of

the India-Pakistan bilateral relationship, tensions remain ripe.

IV. Military Balance

Doctrine and Ideology

India and Pakistan’s military doctrines and ideologies have vastly shifted over the past

twenty years. While both countries continue to strategically view conflict in terms of

potential war with the other, lessons from history and new geopolitical realities have

prompted the progressive reevaluation of military planning. The fact that both countries

have obtained nuclear weapons has dramatically altered notions of what a military

conflict between the two could potentially entail and both states are coldly cognizant of

the higher stakes.

INDIA

India’s rising regional and global status has profoundly impacted the way it

approaches its military and foreign policies. Whereas many past calculations were region-

centric, India now looks to maintain its economic, military, and political prestige on an

international level. However, India’s chronic tensions with Pakistan remain the focal

point of its foreign policy; at this juncture, its sudden rise as an economic powerhouse on

the global scene also means that is has much more at stake in a potential future military

confrontation with Pakistan.

In 2004, India (under Bharatiya Janata Party leadership, which favors a strong national

defense policy) declassified its Pakistan-specific military doctrine.8 The new doctrine,

developed by the Indian Army in response to its inhibited mobilization due to its large

size, is referred to as “Cold Start.” Its offensive nature is a radical departure from its

previous defensive posture toward Pakistan. The aim of Cold Start is to launch a swift,

punitive offensive against Pakistan powerful enough to inflict severe damage on

Pakistan’s offensive and defensive capabilities, yet restrained enough to avoid crossing

7 “India, Pak Clash At UNGA Over Kashmir,” Kashmir Observer, 3 October 2012.

<http://kashmirobserver.in/news/india-pak-clash-unga-over-kashmir> 8 Firdaus Ahmed, “The Day After 'Cold Start‘,”‖ Military Articles, No. 2424, Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies, 23 November 2007. <http://www.ipcs.org/article/military/the-day-after-cold-start-2424.html>

redlines that would trigger nuclear retaliation. According to retired Pakistani Navy

Commander Muhammad Azam Khan, “Central to Cold Start of a synergetic effort aimed

at the destruction of Pakistan’s military potential without much collateral damage.”9

The doctrine envisions launching a limited multi-front attack of small Integrated

Battle Groups (IBGs) into various regions of Pakistan in an unpredictable fashion. The

doctrine required a shift in the composition of the Indian Army; rather than three

offensive strike corps, the it necessitates its division into eight battle groups that are

outfitted with mechanized infantry, armor, and artillery in order to allow for rapid

mobilization within a 72-hour tome period.10

The strength of the doctrine lies in its

ability to control the element of surprise and its ability to speed its military’s

Observation, Orientation, Decision, Action (OODA) loop.

Cold Start is not intended to culminate in the invasion of Pakistan, but rather

overwhelm its ability to cognitively react in any organized way and extract modest

territorial gains that could be leveraged in subsequent negotiations.11

The quick and

short-term penetrations of the IBGs into Pakistan aim to establish the initiative and set the

tempo for the remainder of the military engagement; essentially, it would “attack first and

mobilize later.”12

It seeks to “impose a higher military and political price on Pakistan

without giving it cause for commencing a nuclear exchange.”13

Operationally, India would aim for a mutually-assured, three-pronged approach

incorporating its air force, naval, and ground force capabilities under Cold Start. While

the doctrine emphasizes the criticality of ground force operations, the air force would be

effectively used in strategic bombing to cripple critical infrastructure facilities in advance

9 “India’s Cold Start Strategy: Limited Strikes against Targets vs. Hot War Leading to Nuclear Armageddon,” 6 January 2010. <http://pakalert.wordpress.com/2010/01/06/india> 10 David Slungaard, “Revisiting Cold Start – Weighing Strategic Shifts in South Asia,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1 February 2012. <http://csis.org/blog/revisiting-cold-start-weighing-strategic-shifts-south-asia> 11 Walter C. Ladwig III. "A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine." International Security 32, no. 3 (Winter 2007/08): 158-190 12

Arif Jamal, “Pakistan’s Ongoing Azm-e-Nau-3 Military Exercises Define Strategic Priorities,” The Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 18, 7 May 2010. 13 Vasantha R. Raghavan, “Limited War and Nuclear Escalation in South Asia,” The Nonprolieration Review, Fall/Winter 2001.

of ground operations. It would subsequently provide ground support during the IBG

campaigns. The navy would also provide support for the ground offensives.

Cold Start, however, has not been publicly adopted by Prime Minister Manmohan

Singh or other Indian government officials post-BJP leadership. There is much internal

and external debate surrounding its merit and feasibility. Some speculate that it is merely

a deterrent factor and was not developed as a serious guiding doctrine. A well-known

Wikileaks cable about Cold Start calls the doctrine “a mixture of myth and reality” and

predicts that its implementation would be met with “mixed results” due to logistical

glitches, unforeseen elements of Pakistani geography or infrastructure, and delayed

reinforcement.14

Although the credibility of the source is questionable, it provides an

eloquent summary of the doubts that cloud the Indian strategic debate on Cold Start.

Additionally, Cold Start cannot guarantee that Pakistan will not choose to launch a

nuclear retaliation—despite being well-calculated and relatively restrained, it is still a

gamble.

Despite doubts as to the doctrine’s validity, India has conducted multiple military

exercises to test and apparently institutionalize Cold Start, including Divya Astra (2004),

Vijra Shakti (2005), Desert Strike (2005), Sang-i-Shakti (2006), Shatrunash (2007),

Ashwamedh (2007), and Hind Shakti (2009). These exercises largely occurred along the

border with Pakistan and effectively demonstrated the strategic elements of Cold Start.15

India envisions limited conflict—both in duration and weapons use—of conventional

nature. Its challenge is to be militarily proactive without forcing Pakistan into a position

where it feels a nuclear response is its only viable response. In the meantime, India’s

logical strategy appears to be to enhance its weapons capabilities and challenge

Pakistan’s economic ability to compete in a costly arms race.

India maintains a no first-use policy for nuclear weapons and is among three countries

to do so (the other two being North Korea and Russia). However, it also claims to adhere

14

“WikiLeaks: US on Indian Army's Cold Start Doctrine,” Wikileaks, uploaded 2 December 2012. <http://www.ndtv.com/article/wikileaks-india-cables/wikileaks-us-on-indian-army-s-cold-start-doctrine-69859> 15

Ibid 12.

to “credible minimum deterrence,” which holds to the strong threat of unleashing

devastating second strike capabilities, and yet continues to quantitatively and

qualitatively improve its nuclear weapons program.16

India has threatened to respond

with a massive nuclear retaliation if it victim to a nuclear attack, adhering to a defensive

realism ideology.

PAKISTAN

As India has continued to grow in stature and might, Pakistan has battled internal and

external hardship. Economically, Pakistan is hopelessly constrained by geography and

geopolitics.17

Its unfortunate geographic location provides a lack of natural irrigation and

natural resources, and its struggle with internal instability and chaos along its northern

border with Afghanistan have perpetually inhibited its emergence as a reliable contributor

on the global stage. Pakistan’s distraction by international pressure to eradicate terrorist

cells and networks within its borders has swallowed much of its initiative. As a state that

is being left behind by its southern rival, Pakistan has its own set of strategic objectives.

While Pakistan’s military doctrine is inevitably India-centric, Pakistan cannot compete

on India’s level in a conventional sense. India’s military technology and capabilities have

largely surpassed Pakistan’s quantitatively and qualitatively. Thus, Pakistan’s military

planning must be shaped around India’s actions while seeking to maximize its

conventional and asymmetric capabilities. As Pakistani Army Chief of Staff General

Ashfaq Kayani said to Pakistani media in 2010, “We plan [according to] adversaries’

capabilities, not intentions.”18

Pakistan has not publicly issued its military doctrine, but an overview can be

extrapolated from historical trends and recent facts on the ground. Pakistan has been

influenced by military rule since its inception; although it currently hosts a civilian

government, its attitude toward war can appropriately be described as realist due to this

16 Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, “Tactical Nuclear Weapon: Deterrence Stability between India and Pakistan,” Center for Contemporary Conflict, January 2012. < http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lng=en&id=142884> 17

Peter Zeihan, “Three Points of View: The US, Pakistan, and India,” Stratfor Intelligence, 28 April 2012. <http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100427_three_points_view_united_states_pakistan_and_india> 18 Cyril Almeida, “Kayani spells out threat posed by Indian doctrine,” Dawn Archives. <http://archives.dawn.com/archives/44561>

heavy influence and trends of prior military leaders and strong personalities within the

military itself. According to retired Lieutenant General Pakistan’s focus in recent years

has been to balance India militarily; while Pakistan aspires to achieve parity with India as

a regional power, its conventional military capabilities render this goal difficult to

achieve.19

Thus, Pakistan has resorted to two main sources for achieving a level of

military balance: deterrence through nuclear weapons, and proxy wars through extremist

organizations and the cooption of tribal factions.

Pakistan’s acquirement of nuclear weapons alongside India’s has mutually raised the

costs of military conflict. Although Pakistan also claims to follow the policy of credible

minimum deterrence, it has continued to increase its nuclear stockpiles and capabilities

just as India has. However, Pakistan does not adhere to a “no first-use” policy. This may

contribute to its deterrence capability by indicating that it has less inhibition on the use of

nuclear weapons than India does, warning India that haphazard or ambivalent aggression

can be extremely costly. Pakistan has also clearly indicated that it will breach the nuclear

taboo if it comes under what it deems to be an existential attack.

Pakistan has also heartily adopted the doctrine of asymmetric warfare. Shahzad

Chaudhry, the former commander of the Pakistani Air Force Strategic Command, stated,

“Pakistan is in no position to catch up with India [on conventional weaponry] and we’re

very clear about it.”20

Aggression by Pakistan via proxy groups toward India has raged

(particularly in Kashmir) for decades and has arguably been an effective tool for

Pakistan. As a less overt form of warfare that has the potential of impunity if direct links

of responsibility cannot be traced, proxy warfare has allowed Pakistan to balance India

unconventionally in a way that India cannot control. Pakistan’s strong ties to tribal groups

in both Pakistan and Afghanistan have given it leverage in conducting these proxy wars.21

19 Mujib Mashal, “The Kashmir-Afghanisan puzzle,” Al Jazeera, 18 August 2011. <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/08/201188175314121853.html> 20

Rachel Oswald, “Pakistan-India Arms Race Destabilizing Strategic Balance, Experts Say,” Global Security Newswire, 20 July 2011. < http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/pakistan-india-arms-race-destabilizing-strategic-balance-experts-say/ 21

Ibid 17.

Asymmetric war is something India has little time or patience for. Additionally,

countering asymmetric war with conventional capabilities is likely much more costly.

While Pakistan realizes its inability to meet India’s capabilities in conventional forces,

it appears to cling loosely to the doctrine of “Offensive Defense,” which was developed

by General Mirza Aslam Beg in the 80s. Despite its being very old, the doctrine appears

to be one Pakistan may employ to counter Cold Start. According to retired Pakistani Air

Marshall Ayaz Khan, the doctrine centers on responding to an Indian land offensive by

using air and ground forces to attack and hold enemy territory.22

Although it was not

originally conceived as a response to Cold Start, it could turn the tables on an Indian

offensive by striking Indian territory while simultaneously responding to the Indian

advance on Pakistani soil.

Pakistan has been vocally disturbed by Cold Start. General Kayani remarked in 2010,

“Cold Start would permit the Indian Army to attack before mobilizing, increasing the

possibility of a sudden spiral escalation.”23

As a response to Cold Start, Pakistan

launched the military exercise Azm-e-Nau 3 in April 2010. This entailed simulating a

Cold Start-like attack with up to 50,000 troops along the border of eastern Pakistan.24

Pakistani antitank battalions used “dispersal tactics” to regain lost territory; the focus was

a ground campaign with close air support.25

The navy played an observer role, although it

can be speculated that the navy would be assigned an active role under real combat

operations, especially if the Indian navy is active.

The concept of “strategic depth” in Afghanistan is also a strategy that Pakistan has

pursued in the past and may still contemplate in a future conflict with India. Former Chief

of Staff of the Pakistani Army, General Mirza Aslam Beg, formulated the strategy during

the Soviet war in Afghanistan as a means to ensure a friendly regime.26

With the

22 Ayaz Khan, “India-Pakistan Military Balance,” Haq’s Musings Blog, 15 January 2009. <http://www.riazhaq.com/2009/01/india-pakistan-military-balance.html> 23 “Kayani Spells Out Threat Posed by Indian Doctrine,” Daily Dawn , 4 February 2010, http://pakistankakhudahafiz.wordpress.com/2010/02/04/kayani-spells-out-t... . 24

“Pakistan’s Ongoing Azm-e-Nau-3 Military Exercises Define Strategic Priorities,” Intelligence Quarterly , 6 July 2010, www.intelligencequarterly.com/2010/05 25 Ibid 12. 26

Ibid 12.

imminent drawdown of US forces in Afghanistan, Pakistan could once again look to this

strategy as a means counter India’s regional hegemony.

Capabilities

India and Pakistan both exhibit impressive military capability. India’s rising global

eminence calls for a stronger military front, and Pakistan’s history of strong military

leadership and weaker geopolitical situation necessitate one. India and Pakistan currently

engage in an arms race, although India’s robust economy and capabilities to indigenously

produce its own technology have rendered its conventional military position dominant.

Both countries have become large consumers of foreign military technology. India

imports the majority of its military goods from the US, France, Russia, and Israel.27

Pakistan partners with China in military trade and development.28

Below is a brief

quantitative and qualitative analysis of the military capabilities of India and Pakistan.

AIR FORCE

India has recently focused on improving the sophistication of its air force, with

cutting-edge technology and increased capability. India boasts sixty air bases, of which

one is located in Tajikistan.29

A growing number of Indian aircraft is being developed

indigenously, including the HAL Tejas, a light-weight multi-role fighter, and the HAL

Dhruv, a multi-role helicopter. Other strike and air defense fighters include the Russian

Sukhoi Su 30 Mk-1 multi-role fighter bomber, Mikoyan 4th

generation Mig-29s, Mig-21s,

and Mig-27s, and French SEPECAT Jaguars and 4th generation multi-role Dassault

Mirage-2000s. The IAF has recently acquired the French twin-engine Dassault Rafale

delta-wing fighter jet as its anchor strike aircraft.

The IAF also employs transport aircraft, such as the Antonov An-32, attack

helicopters, such as the Soviet Mil Mi-35 Hind-E, and reconnaissance aircraft. Its array of

27 “India world's largest arms importer according to new SIPRI data on international arms transfers,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 14 March 2011. <http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/2011/armstransfers> 28

Richard F. Grimmett, “U.S. Arms Sales to Pakistan,” Congressional Research Service, 24 August 2009. < http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RS22757.pdf> 29 Sudha Ramachandran, “India air base grounded in Tajikistan,” Asia Times, 1 December 2010. <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LL01Df02.html>

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) includes multiple Israeli models. India also utilizes

airborne warning and control (AEW&C) systems, such as the Beriev A-50 Phalcon.

Air Power (as of 2011) India Pakistan

Total aircraft 2,462 1,414

Helicopters 848 535

Air Bases 60 9

Serviceable Airports 352 148

UAV Capability Yes Limited

Pakistan maintains 9 airbases and an increasingly capable air force. It has limited

resources to produce indigenous craft (although some capacity does exist) and relies

heavily on China and the US for its reliable air technology. The most prominent fighter

aircraft include the Chinese JF-17 Thunder multi-role fighter, which Pakistan has begun

to produce domestically, and the US F-16 Fighter Falcon. Others include the French

Dassault Mirage III and V, and the Chinese F-7MG aircraft.

Transport aircraft include the Lockheed Martin C-130 and Airbus A310. It employs

the Il-78 aerial refueling tanker and the Swedish 4 Saab 2000 Erieye AWE&C system. It

also has limited UAV capabilities.

ARMY

India’s Cold Start doctrine revolves around the employment of its capable ground

forces. Its ground forces boast 30 infantry regiments and 63 armored regiments. India

also employs four Rapid Action Divisions, which would likely spearhead strategic

ground offensives in Cold Start implementation. While the number of divisions within

the Indian Army is unknown, Global Security estimates it to be 37 (four of which are

Rapid Action Divisions).30

30

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/india/divisions.htm

The army is structured into six commands: Northern, Southern, Eastern, Western,

Central, and South Western.31

Personnel India Pakistan

Army 980,000 520,000

Navy 55,000 22,000

Air Force 110,000 45,000

Active Forces 1,325,000 617,000

Reserve Forces 1,747,000 515,500

Total personnel 3,047,000 921,000

Pakistan also has very capable ground forces and maintains 18 infantry regiments and

25 divisions along with additional independent formations.32

Ground forces would be

central to Pakistan’s counterstrategy to India’s Cold Start.

NAVY

The capabilities of the Indian navy far outclass those of the Pakistani navy. The

United States Department of State asserts that “The Indian Navy is by far the most

capable navy in the region.33

The navy is outfitted with an aircraft carrier, the nuclear-

armed S-2 Arihant ballistic missile submarine, mine sweepers, stealth ships, frigates,

marine aircraft, and armed warships. The navy guards India’s Sea Lines of

Communication (SLOCs) and allows for the safe passage of oil, of which 90% is

transported by sea.34

However, the navy is also adequately prepared to engage in

offensive posture or assume a support role for ground operations. India’s main naval

bases are located in Mumbai, Visakhapatnam, Goa, and the Andaman Islands.

31 Ibid 22. 32 “Pakistan Army Order of Battle – Divisions,” GlobalSecurity.org, 7 September 2011. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/pakistan/army-orbat-div.htm> 33

“Background Note: India,” Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, US Department of State, 17 April 2012. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3454.htm> 34

Ibid 33.

Naval Power (as of 2011) India Pakistan

Total Navy Ships 175 11

Major Ports and Terminals 7 2

Aircraft Carriers 1 0

Destroyers 8 1

Submarines 15 5

Frigates 12 11

Patrol Craft 31 15

Marine Warfare Craft 8 4

Amphibious Assault Craft 20 1

Pakistan’s navy is less impressive than India’s, but still possess a threat to India in a

potential future conflict. With its only naval port located in Karachi, Pakistan’s navy is

comprised of mine warfare boats, patrol boats, Chinese frigates, destroyers, and French

diesel submarines.

WEAPONS AND TECHNOLOGY

India has certainly won the arms race in terms of conventional weapons. It has

achieved credible second-strike capability and an anti-ballistic missile defense system.

Its armory is aging but decent, and much of it is of Russian origin. Many tanks have been

updated with new technology, such as the Ajeya’s addition of Israeli Elbit thermal

imaging systems.

India has an impressive collection of ballistic and cruise missiles. The indigenously-

developed nuclear-equipped Agni-3 is an operational IRBM, but the Agni-6 MIRVed

ICBM is currently under development. India also successfully retested the supersonic

cruise missile Brahmos in 2012. India also employs the 9K35 Strela-10 surface-to-air

missile (SAM) program and nuclear-capable long-range bombers such as the Russian

Tupolev Tu-22 and Tupolev Tu-142.

Weapons Data (as of 2011) India Pakistan

Logistical Vehicles 70,000 11,500

Anti-Aircraft Weapons 15,508 2,500

Anti-Tank Weapons 51,799 3,400

Mortars 5,000 3,200

Rocket Artillery (MLRSs) 292 200

Self-Propelled Guns 100 595

Towed Artillery 10,000 1,806

Armored Personnel Carriers

(APCs) and Infantry

Fighting Vehicles (IFVs)

3,000 2,640

Tanks 5,000 2,640

Total Land Weapons 75,191 16,461

Pakistan also employs sophisticated conventional technology, although its

acquirements are below India’s. Pakistan’s ballistic and cruise missile program includes

the new Babur cruise missile, the nuclear-capable Hatf 9 BRB surface-to-surface missile

with “shoot-and-scoot” capabilities, and the recently tested Shaheen-1A intermediate

range missile. It also employs FIM 92 Stinger SAMs and has a capable armory, including

Russian T-82 and T-90 tanks.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3015085.stm

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

While India dominates Pakistan in the realm of conventional weapons, the nuclear

realm is where Pakistan gains parity. However, the nuclear weapons programs of India

and Pakistan are difficult to measure due to the secrecy surrounding Pakistan’s program.

According to George Perkovich, director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie

Endowment for International peace, “Those who really know what’s going on in

Pakistan’s nuclear complex aren’t talking about it, and those who are talking, including

myself, don’t really know what’s going on in Pakistan’s nuclear complex.”35

According to the Arms Control Association, India has up to 100 nuclear weapons and

Pakistan has anywhere between 90 to 110.36

Both countries appear to be improving the

quantitative and qualitative aspects of their nuclear arsenals. According to a report in

35 George Perkovich, Remarks at event “Nuclear Security in Pakistan: Issues and Implications,” sponsored by the Hudson Institute, 8 March 2011. <http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/03/08/the_most_likely_apocalypse_in_our_future_an_indian_pakistani_nuclear_exchange> 36 “Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance,” Arms Control Association, updated November 2012. <http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat>

Global Security Newswire, “India…is pursuing a nuclear triad that would enable it to

wield nuclear weapons by air, land, and sea.”37

Pakistan will likely follow suit.

Many forms of Indian and Pakistani technology have been nuclearized. While

deterrence of strategic nuclear weapons seems to hold, the question of the future will be

whether tactical nuclear weapons can more easily breach the nuclear taboo than strategic

nukes. Cold Start may invite Pakistan to use tactical nuclear weapons to dislodge Indian

IBGs.38

Regardless, nuclear weapons for the present serve as a form of deterrence and not

an aggressive tool.

http://www.atomicarchive.com/Almanac/IndianFacilities_static.shtml

V. Conflict Conception and Operations

37

Ibid 20. 38 Muhammad Azam Khan, “India’s Cold Start is Too Hot,” US Naval Institute, Proceedings Magazine, March 2011. <http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2011-03/indias-cold-start-too-hot>

The most likely scenario for a future conflict between India and Pakistan would take

place after the US troop drawdown in Afghanistan. Many radicalized militants currently

reside in Khyber Paktunkhwa in northern Pakistan or in Afghanistan to disrupt US and

NATO efforts to stabilize the country. According to Nitin Pai, a fellow at the Indian

Takshashila Institute, “To the extent that the US withdrawal from Afghanistan frees up

militants to fight elsewhere, there is a risk that some of them will find their way to

Kashmir.”39

Pai fears that the US withdrawal will precipitate trickling down of

“thousands of armed, violent, radicalized” men to the Kashmir region once again.

Because Pakistan has a history of supporting rebel or militant groups to stir up trouble in

Kashmir, India worries that Pakistan may revert to old ways when it is politically

convenient to do so.

The drawdown of US troops in

Afghanistan may also prompt

political shifts in both India and

Pakistan. Government leadership

in Pakistan is likely to swing back

to military rule once Pakistani

citizens become disillusioned

with civilian rule. Military

hardliners may resume power. In India, a similar trend may take place as Indian citizens

recognize the increased vulnerability of India to terrorist attacks or militant incursions

into Kashmir following a decreased US presence in the region to occupy militants. The

BJP party, more centered on defense and military action, may take power in India once

again. Political leadership more willing to take an offensive posture at the spark of

conflict may induce military engagement where more conservative leadership would not.

Conflict could be sparked by incursions of militants along the LOC and culminating in

a terrorist attack by Pakistani-backed militants in Kashmir.40

With a BJP-led government

39

Ibid 19. 40 Christopher Clary, “What Might an India-Pakistan War Look Like?,” MIT Center for International Studies. <http://web.mit.edu/cis/precis/2012spring/india_pakistan.html#.UMMbh2f4LxM>

in power and the ghosts of Mumbai 2008 lurking in the background, India will have little

choice but to launch a punitive offensive against Pakistan. As a growing power in the

region, it cannot afford to allow Pakistan plausible deniability in initiating proxy wars

against it.

As is central to the Cold Start doctrine, India must tread carefully to avoid crossing

nuclear redlines. Even if strategic nuclear weapons are not used, tactical nuclear weapons

may be. The mutual concern of Pakistan is that India’s nuclear retaliation policy could be

triggered by the use of tactical nuclear weapons even on a small scale.

Assuming that India adheres to Cold Start, IBGs would be mobilized and active within

a 72-hour time period. The most logical positions for attacks would be Rajasthan and

Punjab. India would launch small IBGs of armored infantry followed by close air

support. Depending on the severity of the terrorist attack, India may first employ

strategic bombing to cripple Pakistani critical infrastructure before launching its Cold

Start IBG attacks. The Indian navy may provide aircraft support, but its main function

will be to protect the Indian SLOCs and assume an offensive posture aimed at Karachi in

an attempt to deter strong Pakistani retaliation.

India may choose to follow up its initial Cold Start limited penetration attacks into

Pakistan with a “two-front” strategy in the Himalayas, knocking a blow to Pakistan and

gaining the initiative before moving a slower tempo conflict with limited territorial

scope.41

While it is not in India’s interests to prolong the conflict and thus give Pakistan

the opportunity to regroup and launch asymmetric attacks, this particular approach

simultaneously has the potential to drag Pakistan into a contest of economic wills—a test

of which country can outlast the other in terms of economic and military resources. While

this approach may be long and drawn-out, India would obviously emerge the victor. A

slower-paced war would also give the international community a chance to broker a

ceasefire and pressure both sides to engage in diplomacy.

41

Ali Ahmed, “Ongoing Revision of Indian Army Doctrine,” Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 6 January 2012. <http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/OngoingRevisionofIndianArmyDoctrine_aahmed_060110>

In such a case, Pakistan would have two options. If it were prepared for an Indian

offensive, Pakistan would likely retaliate conventionally. If it was not prepared and it felt

that it faced an existential threat, it may employ nuclear weapons, even if it meant

launching a tactical nuclear missile at Indian IBGs within its own territory. Assuming the

first, Pakistan would attempt to use its armored tanks and infantry to drive the IBGs out

of Pakistan, only resorting to nuclear retaliation if absolutely necessary. Pakistan has

indicated that possible nuclear redlines would include “Indian seizure of substantial

Pakistani territory or Indian destruction of substantial portions of the Pakistan Army or

Air Force in conflict.”42

India must be careful to take Pakistan at its word.

Pakistan may attempt to launch its own simultaneous offensive inside India in keeping

with Offensive Defense, but that would depend on its level of preparation to counter Cold

Start, as well as its ability to gauge where the IBG penetrations will occur.

While such a conflict would likely incorporate the navy, air force, and army

synergistically, the army and air force would play the largest roles. Because of the short-

term nature of Cold Start, the limited scope of time involved in the ground campaigns

would limit the necessary use of the navy. Naval campaigns arguably require more time

than ground or air campaigns; thus, it is unlikely that the navy would play a huge role in

offensive stretches. India’s navy will assume an offensive posture, while Pakistan’s will

likely assume a defensive one. However, if the conflict gives an opportunity for Pakistan

to employ asymmetric tactics, it may wreak havoc in small ways with its naval forces, or

encourage militants to attack Indian naval assets.

In the air battle, India will attempt to gain air supremacy from the onset in order to

adequately provide close air support to ground forces. This is vital for its ground

operations to succeed. Pakistan will aim to deny India the victory in the air battle,

although it will be hard-pressed to do so considering the quantitative and qualitative air

advantage that India enjoys.

While the ground campaign is the focal point of Cold Start, India’s largest challenge

will be mobilization and speed. The longer it takes to mobilize, the more time Pakistan

42

Ibid 40.

has to defend or preemptively strike, and the more time the international community has

to intervene. If Pakistan realizes the imminent nature of an Indian attack and is able to

mobilize before India is able to, the conflict could escalate very quickly and spiral into

potential nuclear use.

One other component on the ground is the likely continuation of rogue militant

participation in the conflict. This becomes challenging for India, as smaller-scale attacks

(especially on civilians) can largely distract from the broader state-on-state conflict.

Another potential challenge for India is not only countering militants with strong

Pakistani affiliations or linkages, but also neutralizing radical, homegrown jihadists

within its own borders which may cause internal strife throughout the conflict.43

Assuming that nuclear weapons will not be used, the conflict would likely wind down

with India becoming nervous about crossing nuclear redlines and issuing an ultimatum to

Pakistan to stop aggression and rein in terrorist groups in exchange for a halt to

conventional attacks. With the aid of international pressure, it is likely that the conflict

would wind down with both sides demilitarizing the border and India issuing stern

warnings to Pakistan that Cold Start will penetrate deeper the next time if incursions and

militant attacks recur.

In this case scenario, both sides would be able to claim partial victory. India would

showcase the fact that it is capable of following through on credible threats to inflict

punishment on Pakistan. Pakistan would claim victory by highlighting that it withstood

the attacks of India’s conventional forces. “Victory,” then, would simply be a return to

Ashley Tellis’ “ugly stability” until another conflict broke out. While the use of nuclear

weapons certainly is not impossible, deterrence is arguably strong enough to hold.

VI. Future Predictions

Although deterrence seems reliable for the present, it cannot always last without

tangible progress on the issues that poison the India-Pakistan relationship. Unless the

seemingly impossible resolution of the Kashmir dispute is achieved, tension will continue

to plague the bilateral relationship of the two countries. Other contentious issues include

43 Gurmeet Kanwal, “Future Conflict Scenarios,” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 4 January 2010. <http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/future-conflict-scenarios-3036.html>

Pakistani-sponsored terrorism, water disputes, and arms control. If these factors cannot be

brought to the table with each state open to a compromise, the levels of conflict will

continue to escalate each time India and Pakistan enter into violent military engagement.

VII. Conclusion

Nuclear weapons are a great equalizer. Despite India’s obvious military advantages,

Pakistan has remained a powerful focal point of India’s strategic calculations due to its

nuclear capabilities. However, rationality typically prevails; even in an escalated military

conflict, the fear of a retaliatory nuclear strike should be powerful enough to deter an

initial one. While conflict within the near future does not seem to precipitate the usage of

nuclear weapons, this fact does not rule out their employment in the future as geopolitical

realities continue to shift. Thus, it is imperative that India and Pakistan work to resolve

what they can while deterrence is the dominating factor in their calculations. Failure to

recognize the potential of the present could jeopardize the fulfillment of the future.

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