a c d is NUR 1 1985 OCCPAP ACDIS Library

THE SOVIET-CUBAN MILITARY INTERVENTION

IN AFRICAA THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

June, 1985

Maqsud H Nun

Program in Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 330 Davenport Hall

607 South Mathews Street Urbana, Illinois 61801

Maqsud Ul Hasan Nun is a Ford Research Associate with the Office of Arms Control for the year 1984-85 A Pakistani national Mr Nun holds an MSc (International Relations) from the Quald-e-Azam University, Islamabad and an MA (International Relations) from the Australian National University Canberra After a year of doctoral work at The Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Switzerland, he is completing a doctorate m International Studies from the University of South Carolina, Columbia His professional experience includes service as a commissioned officer in the Pakistan army after having graduated from The Pakistan Military Academy, Kakul At present, Mr Nun is affiliated with the Pakistan Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad

Acknowledgements

I am thankful to Profs James M Roherty and Gordon B Smith of the Dept of Government and International Studies University of South Carolina for their helptul comments on an earlier draft of this research article My grateful thanks are also due to the Program m Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security, University of Illinois at Urbana for providing necessary funding, which made the research and completion of this research piece possible and finally but not least profuse thanks to Mary Anderson and Suzanne Osmundson for their prompt and superb typing workThe author is exclusively responsible for the views expressed and neither the above named gentlemen nor the Program in Arms Control, University of Illinois necessarily support these opinions

I BACKGROUND AND STATEMENT Oí THE PROBLEM

Since the early 1970s and more specifically from 1975 onwards the

Soviet-Cuban relationship has assumed a meaningful military dimension in

sub-Saharan Africa The African continent once the exclusive preserve of

European colonial powers is today, an arena for the Superpowers and for former

colonial and African regional powers as well With the intrusion of

extra-continental powers such as the Soviet Union and Cuba a new variable has

been introduced in the military equation on the African continent More

specifically, the active collaboration and co-ordination of the Soviet-Cuban

military machines in the internal civil war of Angola (1975-76) and later in the

Ethiopian - Somali border war of Ogaden (1977-78) has led many observers to

postulate grandiose designs on the part of International Communism sponsored

and supported from the nerve center in Moscow * Cuba as a Communist state

located m the Western Hemisphere is consequently seen as a tool or adjunct of

Moscow - ready and willing to do Moscow s bidding in Third World countries

While the close congruence of objectives in Africa was facilitated by

certain systemic factors e g the prevailing atmosphere of 'detente and the

collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire following the 25 April 1974

"Captain's Coup" in Lisbon, this rather unusual instance of symbiotic military

partnership between the Soviet Union and a small developing power like Cuba

merits a systematic inquiry The Soviet-Cuban military nexus, has impacted

heavily on the military fortunes of these two states At present besides

Angola and Ethiopia which claim to be Marxist-Leninist there are in Africa four

others, and another ten are designated by the USSR as progressive which entails

a demonstration of socialist orientation' While the Soviet-Cuban military

presence is felt in these states, it is nowhere as pronounced as in Angola and

2

2Ethiopia where sizeable Cuban military contingents still remain deployed

II SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

Characterized as a subordinate state system in international relations

Africa is likely to remain, in the foreseeable future, politically

economically, and militarily dependent on outside powers for support The

African state structure is inherently weak and has lately come under increased

strain due to economic debts crushing refugee problems ̂ border fratricidal

conflicts due to arbitrary colonial partition schemes,^ and inter-ethnic and

religious tensions Above all this, is superimposed the phenomenon of

modernization whicbj has accentuated these problems further Moreover, the

impotency of regional organizations, such as the OAU (Organization of African

Unity) and others has led to erosion of regional norms, portending further

prospects of intervention and counter-intervention by regional^ and

extra-regional powers ̂ Thus, according to many observers, intra-nation and

inter-nation conflijct and violence are likely to be dominant in Africa for the

balance of the century ®Whether military intervention is brought about by internal factors of

weakness and internal dissension of states (targets of intervention) or

occasioned by Big Power rivalry (strategic economic or political), it is

becoming an increasingly multilateral phenomenon lhat is, Big Powers seldom

act unilateraly for fear of rival Superpower retaliation and international

opprobrium As part of their strategy, the Superpowers tend to co-opt and

enlist their allies for intervention Also, it has been observed that in a

joint or collaborative interventionary undertaking the intervening actors

usually have common interests and objectives This is amply manifested in the

i

boviet-Cuban military interventions in Africa fo be sure there are

differences between the two, but they have been able to act within broadly

defined common goals and objectives However if future interventionary

behavior is a likely feature of the African sub-system, there will also be

intra-alliance strains ^The proxy" or "patron relationship is difficult to identify as reliable

information of a strictly military nature is not easily available Where such a

relationship exists the parties are loath to admit it The major partner does

not like to advertise its domination and control, while the junior partner is

reticent to acknowledge its subordination and coercion Moreover there are

some conceptual difficulties as to how much influence a "patron" wields over its

"proxy" When does a "proxy" act on its own interests as opposed to that of its

"patron" and what are the "national" or "real" interests of different parties9

Furthermore "proxies" are not a homogenous group but are differentiated by

critical differences m functions and tasks The Cubans, East Germans, North

Koreans and other East European nations — all m various capacities are

performing specialized roles and functions m Africain the case of Cuba its African exploits cover besides strictly combat

roles, the added functions of a "civic soldier" 10 In Central America, Cubans

have concentrated more on providing arms, training, and propaganda support to

various leftist factions (particularly to the ruling regime in Nicaragua and

opposing leftist factions in El Salvador) ^ The East Germans for their part

are mainly involved m a training and advisory capacity, especially pertaining

to intelligence and security type functions As far as South Yemen is

concerned, it may serve only one function, i e to provide base facilities

North Korea has relied on providing military advisory teams, and finally, other

4

members of the Lastern bloc (Czechoslovakia Hungary Bulgaria and Poland)

specialize in the provision of diverse military functions ranging from

training, support, provision of weapons and internal security ^

This study will try to demonstrate that smaller powers linked to

Superpowers, can employ the disadvantage of smaller size to their own benefit by

exercising leverage on some issues vis-a-vis their 'patron in fact, the

smaller powers aligned to Superpowers have certain assets to their credit, e g

the ability to concentrate on a single issue, willingness to take greater risks,

a greater threshold for sacrifice and suffering, if required centralization of

its decision-making structures, effective use of its natural resources, and

possibly threatening a new alignment with the opposite Superpower In

addition military interventions by outside powers differ qualitatively

depending on the size of the intervening power While those by major powers are

generally related to strategic power balances, ideological, economic diplomatic

or military interests, for the minor powers the prime motivations for

interventionary behavior are target regime's incompatibility and border disputes

arising before independence Therefore, when a major and a minor power have

participated m tandem in a military operation m another country, the goals and

objectives of the two participating states are often mixed ^

III CONCEPTUALIZATION OF TERMINOLOGY

Since this is a study of the proxy' relationship there is a need to

operationalise the concept for better understanding Military intervention in

coming decades, will increase m scope and frequency, and will more often than

not take a more indirect dimension ^ The Big Powers will want to influence the outcome of internal conflicts of different developing nations by having recourse

5

to such multiple instruments as intelligence activities international fronts

special cultural activities, overt and covert propaganda provision of arms and

logistical support direct military and political support and advisory training

in the countries contiguous to the conflict deployment of large military

formations m aid of local states and internal security training and

assistance ^In tact the term 'proxy'^ has been a recent addition to the vocabulary of

international relations While 'proxy' behavior is not a new phenomenon in the

conflict of nations it has come into vogue only after World War II Post-World

War II developments make 'proxy' expecially employable as a form for a variety

of reasons In the first place with the advent of nuclear weapons and the

consequent fear of a strategic nuclear exchange chances of direct confrontation

between the two Superpowers have receded Secondly 'proxies' it not suiting

the interests of the Superpowers can be easily disposed of thirdly it is the

Superpowers who have the capability, interest and will to arm and support these

'proxies' The states functioning as 'proxies' often choose to identify with a

Super or a Big Power for economic and security reasons Lately, however, some

middle ranking powers have attempted to cultivate and promote these 'proxies'

And finally, with the resurgence of nationalism, especially in the Third World,

the use of direct military threat and intervention by the Superpowers provokes

resentment and condemnation Hence one way to circumvent criticism is for the

Super Power to act indirectly through its intermediaries or 'proxy' forces to

further its global interestsMuch of the conceptual ambiguity of the term arises from a failure to

distinguish between 'proxy' as a classification of interstate relationship

(e g , X is a 'proxy' of Y) and proxy as a mode of strategic maneuver (eg X

6

intervened in Y through "proxy ) When we use the term "proxy as a bilateral

relationship between two states it invariably means the following

(1) lhat it is coerced, controlled or directed by the patron state

(2) That it is acting as a substitute for another state

(3) That its interests are subservient to the 'patron power and it is

principally serving those interests,

(4) That there is some commonality of interests between the two parties

However, in the case of "proxy" as a strategic maneouver it leads to a

less restrictive definition Although there is still the element to cater for

the principal partner's preponderant interest and collusive behavior for

intervention, it does not necessarily follow that the "patron" will or can

control the "proxy" Relatedly it is instructive to differentiate between a

"proxy and an ally' In the case of the latter, there is a perceived

commonality of interests or objectives combined with an element of a voluntary

and willing co-operationAccording to Walter Laqueur, the use of 'proxies has been "the most

interesting, innovative, and, on the whole the most effective technique" the

Soviets have employed m the Third World ^ As mentioned above, one way of

indirect intervention is not to act alone but to delegate responsibility to someone else entirely or in part in the words of Vanneman and James

In a proxy war the armed forces of one nation serve the interests of another nation The principal power is the sponsor in the sense that its material support makes the venture possible (emphasis added) and its clear disapproval would seriously deter the proxy from embarking on the venture ^

7

The extant literature speaks of these types of relationships in different

and sometimes confusing terminology A country which intervenes on behalf of a

Super Power is, for example, sometimes characterised as a tool' puppet',

'satellite' 'surrogate' 'agent', 'pawn', or using a somewhat milder

expression its 'client' Although there are many turns of this expression used

by both the Superpowers the most common and frequently used in professional

literature is that of 'proxy' or 'satellite We shall use these terms in the

course of our analysis in this study

It would be proper here to highlight the difference between a satellite

and a 'proxy' - thought to be synonymous by some scholars While 'satellite'

nations like e g , East Germany may perform many functions of surrogates' or

'proxies' m providing training missions, intelligence missions and tasks of

internal security to some Third World countries m the Middle East and Africa

their form and nature of relationship is quite distinct from that of a 'proxy'

'Proxy' states have the discretion to terminate the relationship with its

'patron' whenever desired from its 'patron' or 'principal' and in addition,

wield more leverage than the 'satellites' ^0 As an illustration, it is

unthinkable for any of the Eastern bloc countries and now even Afghanistan

(which forms a part of the Soviet security zone) to act independently in face of

direct Soviet military presence On the other hand 'proxies' (if we use them

in the commonly ascribed meanings) can threaten disengagement and enjoy greater

leverage over 'patron' power in foreign policy behavior The classic example

being that of Cuba

8

IV LITERAIURE REVIEW 01 PROXY'/"PATRON' RELATIONSHIP CUBA AND THE SOVIET UNION

Many writers have developed hypotheses on the nature and pattern of the

Soviet-Cuban relationship in Africa as demonstrated through the conjoint

military operations in Angola and EthiopiaOne school of thought sees Cuba as an indebted, compliant and servile state

of the USSR and hence a 'proxy' or 'surrogate' in Africa and elsewhere This

proxy' thesis is manifest, particularly in the various policy forums of the

U S government 21 The same theme of Soviet 'hegemony' and Cuban 'capitulation

is seen m the writings of Jorge Dominguez 22 Dominguez is a noted author of a

number of articles on the domestic roots of Cuban foreign policy Also U S

senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY)23 has termed the Cubans as the 'Gurkhas

of the Russian Empire'2^ This 'surrogate' thesis becomes quite pronounced in

the monographs of the Institute for the Study of Conflict (London) by e g

David Rees and Brian Cozier 25 The same thesis is implicit in the earlier

analyses of Peter Vanneman and Martin James 26 An Australian writer T B

Millar, in the same vein, opines that the Cubans are little more than

mercenaries m thin disguise 22 LiRewise, A Suarez and Lars Bondstam2^ echo

the same theme in their writings on the Soviet-Cuban nexus in Africa

Among the implications of the 'Soviet-surrogate' thesis is that Cuba not

only takes orders from Moscow regardless of its own interests, but also that the

USSR should be held accountable for Cuban involvement in the Third world In

point of fact, most of the writers advocating the 'dependency' or

'proxy/surrogate' thesis take the Soviet military invasion of Czechoslovakia of

August 1968 and Castro's endorsement (which is open to different

9

interpretations) as a benchmark event According to most of these writers this

marked a breakpoint event and henceforth Cuba had no independent will or

volition of its own and was too eager to do Moscow's bidding ^9 £n this

connection, it is germane to point out the latest study from the Center for

Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University in which Taylor and

Townsend propound the same well-worn thesis of Cuba as 'an archetype of a

proxy 'Another school those of the revisionists if we may so characterise them

posit the thesis that the Cubans are a self-directed, revolutionary nation which

has taken upon themselves the role of 'socialist internationalism or

'proletarian internationalism' to combat 'international imperialism by

providing moral and material support to the 'liberation movements' in the Third

World particularly m Africa, the Caribbean and Central America This argument

can be gleaned from testimony by Lourdes Casal in the Hearings before the

Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the Committee on International

Relations 31 Another writer, Nelson Valdes^ hews the same line as above

Finally African Sovietologists such as Nolutshunghu take a more sympathetic

view of Cuba as 'more of an independent maverick' than the Soviet's

catspawIn a rather well-documented and frequently quoted article on this subject

William Durch^ traces the roots of Cuban military involvement in the Third

World (Algeria, Vietnam and Syria) and other lesser military missions in Africa

prior to Angola A somewhat analogous analysis of Cuban African activities in

chronological order is provided by Jorge I Dominguez 35 The same line of

argument is also taken up by Connell-Smith-^ who views Cuban relations with the

Third World predating the Soviet Union and concludes, that during the last

10

twenty years Castro has been much less of a "puppet' than the pre-independence

Cuban leaders of the U b Jin Valenta^ plays down Moynihan's metaphor of the

Cubans as the "Gurkhas of the Russian Empire In his assessment, it is more a

case of congruence of common objectives and goals of allies between the Cubans

and the Soviets - at least m the case of Angola, if not later in Ethiopia

Yet another study by William Leo Grande^ traces U S -Cuban relations, and

ends on a prescriptive note At one point it mentions serious discrepancies in

the Soviet-Cuban policy outlook in the 1970s According to Le Grande's

analysis, the Soviet and Cuban perspectives diverged on some policy issues m

Angola and Ethiopia For example, in Angola, the Cuban troops helped the late

President Agostmho Neto's moderate faction of the MPLA to defeat the 1977 coup

attempt by Nito Alve's pro-Soviet faction Also m the case of Ethiopia there

were significant policy differences between the Cubans and the Soviets over

committing Cuban troops against Eritrean 'insurgency' in the northern province

of Eritrea, adjacent to the Red Sea In other words, while the Soviets pressed

hard for a military solution through the use of massive military force m the

solution of the Eritrean question, the Cubans insisted on a political settlement»in view of their previous support for the Eritrean cause of self-determination

Going even further back, the Cuban brand of militant , revolutionary

overthrow of regimes in Latin America m the 1960s, did not go well with the

more circumspect and cautious Soviet approach This, sometimes, led to bitter

exchanges of doctrinal debate and polemics Furthermore, on other international

issues such as Cuba's zealous advocacy of the New International Economic Order

as leader of the Non-Aligned Movement m the Third World, the Soviet support has

remained at best, lukewarm and unenthusiastic Of particular note is the issue

of nuclear proliferation where the Soviets have been extremely conservative on

11

the question of passing nuclear technology to the developing countries And

last but not least the Soviets though ready and quick to exploit any domestic

turmoil in the Caribbean and Central America, are reluctant to have more Cubas'

in the region and therefore quite unwilling to further underwrite the increasing

costs of 'socialist construction' This is mainly due to their past repeated

failures in the Third World region with its intractable problems together with

increased strains on the Soviet economy in recent years ^ 9

ihe same perspective of Cuban independence of will and action is

highlighted in Vanneman and Martin ^0 They suggest that this is especially true

in the case of Ethiopia Likewise Bissell s ^ opinion about Egypt s military

intervention in South Yemen (1962-68) sensitises us to regional interests rather

than the Soviet sponsorship In a similar vein, writers like Halperin 2̂

Klmghof fer Skurnik,^ and Treverton^ advance the same above - mentioned

general thesis of Cuban autonomous-cum-self directed behaviorThe third perspective, which is more intellectually appealing to us, is

spelled out by Edward Gonzeles m his later writings Explicitly combining the

above two theses, he terms it as the 'paladin thesis '^6 This thesis maintains

that Cuba must necessarily capitalise upon Soviet interests and objectives in

the Third World, and in the process continue to advance its own interests This

thesis sees Cuba's motives as complex According to this view, by linking

itself with the Soviet Union and also the Third World in Latin America and Africa, it increases its leverage with both This leverage may mean as argued

by Lawrence H Theriot,attracting more economic and military aid from the

Soviet Union Or, it may enable it to derive a greater degree of independence

or given its assets, exercize more meaningful influence over Soviet policy in

Africa or to mobilize its population for 'internationalist duties' in Africa as

12

a foreign policy success - thus gaining legitimacy for the Castro regime This

point is well taken by another observer who sees Cuba's internationalism closely

linked to the nature of the regime and its continuity a major tenet of its

foreign policy being the 'irreversibility of the Cuban revolution' and thus the

survival of the regime itself ^ the same context James Nelson Goodsell

quotes a World Bank Cubanologist who remarked

fhe desires of both Cuba and the Soviet Union may coincide, and Cuba may be providing the troops that the Soviet Union is not would not provide But Cuba could not be there if it didn t want to be ^

The same theme was echoed by Brigadier-General James A Williams Deputy

Director for Estimates in the Defence Intelligence Agency, certainly not an

impartial observer when he testified at the 1978 House of Representatives

Hearings

I think, sir, that some of this zeal on the part of the Cubans who see themselves as the model for the Third World and developing nations truly believe that theirs is the way to go 50

Further, the very fact of Soviet 'expansionist' policy in the African

continent allows Cuba some degree of influence over its patron because of its

instrumental role in furthering those objectives These objectives in the

assessment of the same writer, could not be achievable by the Soviets alone in

AfricaAnother observer on Cuban foreign policy behavior m the Third World

(particularly Latin America and Africa), Carla Robbins,cites Cuba's

Afro-Spanish heritage and Third World revolutionary credentials as motivating factors in its African exploits Rather than being commissioned by the Soviet

13

Union to do the dirty' job argues the writer it was the mating of common

objectives and the provision of Soviet military and economic wherewithal with

availability of Cuban combat contingents which made joint Angola and Ethiopian

military operations a successAssigning merit to the Cuban initiatives m Africa Carla Robbins cites the

fact that the Cubans despite all the concessions to the Soviet Union after late

1960s did not for a moment yield m their unstinted support for African

liberation movements In fact, as she argued 'if there had been any radical

change it was in Moscow s policy toward Africa not Havana's 1 Continuing

further in the same study she states that Moscow's decision to join forces with

Havana in late 1975 by the airlift of Cuban troops to Angola and provision of

arms and equipment constituted a significant change where Moscow actually

seemed to be following Havana's lead - not the other way round ^2

And finally another observer of Cuban foreign policy behavior in Africa,

Merritt Robins, explained Cuba's assertiveness and activist posture in Africa m

mid-1970s as an attempt to end its isolation, secure allies and end its

'embarrassing one-way dependence" on the Soviet Union by serving as the bridge

between the Soviet bloc and the Third World and implicitly repaying the massive

debt to the USSR with military diplomacy as the medium of exchange ^3

V CUBA AND THE SOVIET UNION SMALL STA1E VS BIG STATE

One is tempted to see in the Cuban-Soviet relationship a prime example of a

small vs big state interaction If for example, during the 1960s the Cubans

were actively challenging the Soviet Union on various foreign policy issues, it

becomes difficult to understand how and why they should be subservient to them

in the 1970s We postulate the thesis that as a small power, Cuba has

14

maintained substantial leverage and bargaining position over its 'patron the

Soviet-Union Moreover Cuba s assertive role m Africa in the mid-1970s was

occasioned not so much by Soviet dictate or direction Many factors were

responsible e g the systemic environment of the Superpower's near strategic

equivalence the prevailing atmospherics of 'detente', the Portuguese hasty

decision to décolonisé the post-Vietnam and Watergate syndrome Moreover

Cuba historically, had already established links with the revolutionary

movements in Lusophone Africa since the early 1960s and there was now a

propitious opportunity to act And finally, there was the rise of the

non-aligned movement which Castro was eager to lead

Over the last decade certain international relations theorists have

focussed on small powers 54 one thesis from this literature particularly

appropriate to the Cuban case is Albert Hirschraan's 'dependency management

which suggests that under certain conditions a smaller power may come to

exercize greater leverage over its bigger partner, given its negotiating skill,

and political conditions Also even the strength with which the interests are

held may give the dependent or client state more power to choose than the

overall structure of inequality would suggest 55

As regards the often mentioned issue of 'exploitation' by the stronger

against the small, there is little empirical evidence to demonstrate it Sometimes, it is said, the bigger power may willingly wi^h to be 'exploited by

smaller states in international transactions First, as William Riker claims

the bigger power collects some sort of illusory psychological returns for being

the 'greatest' in exchange for what it is forced to pay off its more sensible

patron with real or tangible benefits, secondly acording to Olson and

Zeckhauser the collective goods of an alliance or of any other international

15

relationship selfishly mike more sense for the largest single member of the

whole such that it will make disproportionate efforts to keep the entire

structure going thirdly as to why larger states are likely to do small state s

bidding is that some sort of ideological concern for others got the large state

to become larger in the first place And finally based on the strength or weakness principle it is the smallest side which is least willing to yield on

concessions and can threaten re-alignment or even its extinction thus sometimes

raising its bargaining stakes in fact the extant literature offers five

basic approaches to the definitional problem of a small state First some

writers totally reject the concept of definition because of the insufficiencies

of the concept as an analytical tool A second group of writers laments the

problems and difficulties of definition and remains very skeptical as to the

operationalisation of the concept Among these are included Annette Baker Fox

V Sveics Mario Hirsh and 1 Mathisen A third approach tries to

operationalise the concept through employment of some tangible variables like

population area GNP and size and number of the armed forces This view is

advanced by among others, Peter Wiles, Ronald Barston, Simon Kuznets J

Rapapport, L Mateba and J Therattil A fourth group relates to the perceptual

aspect i e , those states which perceive themselves to be small The works of

R Keohane and R Rothstein, fall in this category The fifth approach

seemingly an eclectic one, integrates all the above criteria and is

characterized prominently in the works of R Vayrnyen and M Handel

For purposes of our study, the empirical referents for a small state would

include indices like 1) Low rank/status as measured by either objective (hard)

or subjective (perceptual) data (2) limited economic and military capability

(

l b

hence dependence and vulnerability to external threats and (J) limited scope of

interests

VI SELLC11VE USE OF ItRM "PROXY'

While going through the literature on the patron-client" relationship - at

least in the case of Africa, one is struck by the importance given to the Soviet

Union while the role of the U S is either considered less interesting or less

extensive Of course a perusal of the Soviet press and publications reverses

this image and tends to go to the other extreme in this regard, some observers

feel that the discussion should be focused on other levels of analyses i e

not on the international level alone ^8As an illustration Girling5 ̂mentions at least two cases of American

"proxy" relationships in civil wars Taiwan acting as a "proxy" m Burma

between 1950 and I960, and South Africa during the civil war in Angola in

1975-76 An another example of "proxy" intervention is mentioned by Towle60

when he refers to the relationship between France and Morocco in connection with

the civil war in the Shaba province of Zaire In Shaba I (April 1977) the Moroccan troops flew in American trench and Belgian aircraft this becomes more

so in the case of Shaba II (May 1978), where an inter-African force of Moroccan

and Senegalese was supported by contingents from Togo Ivory Coast the

Gameroons, and Gabon to support the incumbent Mobutu regime in Zaire

Furthermore there have been instances of military intervention by regional

military powers like Tanzania against Uganda's Amin in North Africa Egypt s

military intervention in the South Yemen War (196Z-6/) involving nearly 80 000

troops, also Egypt's supportive intervention in Sudan against southern

secessionistic civil war and Libya s interventions m neighboring Chad 61

i 7

An analogous example in this controversy of patron-proxy could be cited

that of the U S -Israel relationship It hardly needs emphasis that the security and indeed survival of the present state of Israel could not have been

possible without the active U S military, economic and political support

Needless to say Israel's geo-political location m the Arab heartland and deep

emotional ties make it as a matter of vital interest' to the U S foreign

policy - thus accounting for this 'special relationship

Yet when the Soviet Union or other Communist or even Arab nations

castigate the Israelis as pawns' of the U S , it is rejected peremptorily both

by the U S its allies and Israel But as recent events in the Middle East m

the early 1980s have amply demonstrated the Israelis have not hesitated to take

some bold actions in line with their own national self-interest and contrary to

U S interests Of particular note is the pre-emptive strike against Iraq's

nuclear facilities (June 1981) preemptive military surgical strike in Lebanon

(June 1982) and assiduous consolidation of settlements on the Western Bank and

Gaza All these were purportedly in definance of U S policies and desires of

effecting reconciliation in the region ^2Likewise South Africa's military strike in Angola in 1976 and subsequent

punitive surgical attacks deep in Angolan and Mozambiquean territories since

1981 have been motivated by their own security concerns much to the discomfiture

of the U S Administration If this is added to South African go-slow and

sometimes foot-dragging anti-apartheid policies domestically U S faces

increased risk of condemnation by Black African states and other Third World

countries for failure of its 'constructive engagement policy in South Africa

In our opinion there emerges from the foregoing discussion a kind of a

synthesis of a mutual exploitation' thesis A perceptive study m this

ib

context is by David Ronteldt who detines one particular torm of small state

with his notion ot 'super-clients 64 According to this concept the very tact

of being publicly proclaimed as a 'client' of that Superpower gives that country

a special privileged status And, if that countLy is like former Shah's Iran

for the U S and present day Cuba for the Soviet Union it is bestowed based

on its geo-political salience a 'super-client status Having thus invested in

that smaller state its prestige it becomes rather obligatory upon that

Superpower to support defend and ensure the survival of that state Further

the status of this 'super-client' increases when the ideological atmosphere is

ideologically polarized or it is endowed with some unique geo-political or

resource assets or when its ethnic lobbies are firmly lodged in the 'patron

state or when the potential loss ' of the client threatens to become

significant for symbolic reasonsNonetheless it need not imply that a smaller power' can always manipulate

the Superpower to its advantage For the Superpower on its part, may also take

a few precautions as a safeguard For example, it may not give a blank cheque

to its smaller ally set limits to its behavior through moral pressure

withholding ot economic aid, or if worse comes to worst, retaliate with force to

inflict punishment Also a smaller power may use the stratagem of threatening

its collapse or extinction as a ploy for extorting military and economic aid

But this could be a risky venture, for in the event of being lightly taken or ignored by that Superpower it could mean a total future loss of bargaining

power

Applying the above super-client'analogy to the Cuban case we find that

the Soviet Union has come to place a high stake in its ideological premise of

the notion of irreversibility of socialist revolutions 65 This has led the

Soviet Union to be generally consistent and steadfast in support of the

Communist-installed regimes particularly m Eastern Europe That primarily

explains its military interventions around its peripheral areas (Hungary 1956

Czechoslovakia 1968 and Afghanistan 1979) and forward projection of military

power by intervening in tandem with Cuba in Angola and Ethiopia Although there

is no formal military treaty between the Soviet Union and Cuba the Soviet

commitment is guaranteed through the maintenance of a 300Û man strong brigade

permanently based m Cuba, together with 1600 military advisors and technical

personnel and further 3000 Soviet employed civilians In addition Bear-D

maritime reconnaissance planes MiG-21 184 Fishbeds of various types 37 MiG-23

BN, 23 BN Flogger-Fs and an interceptor squadron of 15 MiG-23 Flogger-Es are deployed on the island-nation 66 0n the economic side, the Soviet Union

maintains economic leverage through export of oil at subsidized rates market

for Cuban sugar, and membership in CMEA

Despite policy differences the Soviet Union seems committed to guarantee

Cuba's survival as a socialist state Like Israel for the U S , Cuba has

behaved at times like a recalcitrant ally, but the Soviets have paid this price

to demonstrate to its arch-rival the U S , its Warsaw Pact allies Third World

'socialist oriented' nations and the developing nations at large that it is

generally a steady and steadfast partner Although Brezhnev's predecessors

Khrushchev and Stalin reconciled to the rupture of ties with its socialist

allies like China and Yugoslavia, it seems difficult to believe that

post-Chernenko leadership wíl do likewise with Cuba under any conceivable

20

circumstancesAgain there is a caveat to the above thesis We do not postulate that

cuba is dictating the Soviet foreign policy behavior That will seem going to

the other end of the spectrum lo be sure, the Soviets, as befits a Superpower

have also kept Castro in line by keeping him in power through military and

economic support Also they have prevented him from becoming too

self-sufficient as to challenge the USSR Further they have been able to

harness and capitalize Castro's image and influence in the Third World to

support their otherwise difficult-to-achieve ambitions and foreign policy goals

particularly in Africa and Latin America in the late 1970s In sum through the

Cuban medium, they have garnered at least in the initial stages some sympathy

and recognition from most of the African nations via their support tor

liberation struggle in Lusophone AfricaGenerally speaking over the years the world system has tended towards

greater polycentrism New nations have, in the process for a variety of

factors been able to exercize leverage vis a vis their patron powers Of

course their foreign policies have been circumscribed through supply and

control of military and economic aid by these donor pwoers yet these recipient

nations have sometimes very able capitalized on their unique geo-strategic

location resource capabilities, diversified arms procurement options and

improved more indigenous weapons production capabilities For the Superpowers

the need tor foreign exchange through sales of arms upkeep of their R and D

capabilities and increased competition among other suppliers - has all made the

recipients more flexible in their decision making Furthermore global powers

have global interests and have need for base rights intelligence and

surveillance requirements protection of threatened scarce raw materials and

2 i

mineral resources imperatives ol alliances to keep the balance ol power with

their adversary and sometimes need lor testing their weaponry m battle

conditions All these argue for a kind ol "reverse dependence " on their

proteges and hence the latter s enhanced bargaining position 67 Moreover

Superpowers may also require the services of "proxies" to further their

interests as war between proxies is probably less likely to escalate to

nuclear war whereas a direct confrontation between Superpowers runs that risk

VII PROXY/ALLILS/MhRCLNARIbS COhTRADiClIONS AND AMBIGUITIES

A close scrutiny of many studies of this Soviet-Cuban military nexus in

Africa reveal that many writers remain ambivalent about the use of these terms

lor example two very recent studies bearing on this relationship suffer trom

such typical contradictions As an example Taylor and Townsend*^ characterize

"proxy" as a symbiotic albeit lopsided relationship" But continuing in the

same context, they term Cuba as 'the archetype of proxy" and mention that the

Cubans are stationed in Africa not due to any revolutionary bent, but because of

Soviet military assistance and Kremlm"s approval ^9Another writer Bruce Porter, hews the same line in his recent book and

comments

the Soviet-Cuban relationship, as tar as it pertains to Third World conflicts has not been so much that of a commander and subordinate as that of a highly dependent Soviet ally obliging its mentor with enthusiasm

On another occasion in the same work, he cites Cuba's ideological links

close party ties and heavy economic dependence on the Soviet Union as cogent

reasons for Cuban "proxy status and behavior m Africa

21

Illustrative is the case also of the Strategic Survey 1978 where again

there seems some equivocation While Cuba's role in the Angolan civil war is

seen as that of a 'surrogate force through Soviet long range projection

capabilities m the same place by way of summary it is referred to as

Soviet-Cuban 'partnership' ^ However in the same context, when other examples

are enumerated of small powers which when provided with aid, have operated at

great distances from their own territories (e g Belgium, Senegal, and Morocco)

m the invasion of Shaba province of Zaire (1977-7B) the expressions used are

quite different ihey are like for instance Irench-Moroccan and U S -French

co-operation '

Another U S government study Annual Report to the Congress - 1Y 1986

invariably equates 'proxies for 'allies' while discussing Soviet power

projection capabilities in the Third world -̂3

Likewise K L Adelman sees the successful Soviet-Cuban military

interventions as having been consummated through 'Cuban mercenaries and Russian

arms' nonetheless the two above-mentioned French-Moroccan interventions are

euphemistically termed as 'rescue operations' ^4

A still another study of Soviet military aid to Africa by Major Bruce

Arlmghaus synonymously uses the terms 'allies' with 'surrogates ' While the

author headlines his title as 'Soviet surrogate', in his subsequent narration

and description of events, he tends to counter his own categorization And to

cap it all in his conclusive remarks sums up thusly

Even the closest Soviet allies m the region - the hast Europeans and the Cubans (emphasis added) - are not mere puppets of the Soviet policy Each appears to pursue, within limitation its own economic and political goals in the region ^5

23

Proceeding further in the same vein he also sees North Korea's policies

and aid programs to the newly independent Zimbabwe in a more independent line

and tree Irom Moscow's control which would preclude them I North Korea] from

acting as Soviet surrogates 7®

Aguila and Grabendorff two perceptive observers of Cuban policies in

Central America and the Caribbean view Cuba as a regional military power 77

although relying on the Soviet Union For Aguila it is a 'regionally intrusive

power',70 namely, a nation exhibiting politically significant involvement beyond

its borders - an involvement determined in turn by its very 'objective power

motivation location and international position' 7 ̂ However, later while

reviewing Cuba's pro-Soviet tilt m the NAM (Non Aligned Movement) and identical

"institutional-organizational and functional-behavioral traits of a Soviet-type

system ,®0 they tend to reverse their earlier formulations and characterize

Cuban behavior as 'proxy' of the Soviets ®*

Likewise, Warner succumbs to the same fallacy of equating Soviet's Cuban

'allies'®^ Wich Soviet sponsored 'surrogates' and 'clients' like the Cubans or

East Germans ®®

Relatedly, a recent study by the Department of Defence, The Soviet

Military 1985 faces the same conceptual confusion As an illustration, while

Cuba is termed as 'Soviet proxy'®^ and other socialist bloc countries as

'surrogates' and 'clients',®5 they are also referred to as 'counterparts'®® in

other placesFinally, it would be in order here to deal with the often used term

'mercenary' - sometimes used synonymously with 'proxy ' In an excellent study,

a serving U S Defence Intelligence officer, Gerry S Thomas makes five

24

functional goupings of military operative types in the African context (1)

Standing army (2) auxiliary (3) partisan (4) agent and (5) mercenary forces 87

His typology is as follows

MILITARY OPERAI1VL TYPES88

OPERATIVE LOCAL CITIZEN OWN GOVT SUPPORT

INTEGRATED INTO NATIONAL STRUCTURE

Army Yes/No Yes Yes

Auxiliary No Yes Yes/No

Agent No Yes No

Partisan Yes No No

Mercenary No No No

According to the above typology a mercenary is

1) Not a citizen of the country for which he is fighting

2) Neither receives nor is sent overt support by his government

3) Takes a direct part m the hostilities outside the established structure of

the standing army,

Judged by the above criteria, the Cuban early suppprt to the Lumumbist and

Mulelist secessionist rebels in Congo in 1964 may be characterized as 'agent

type of support, but is distinguishable from the large scale combat auxiliary'

presence in Angola (1973-76) and later m Ethiopia (1977-78) Theretore it is

not a case of 'mercenary' force in any of the above three cases 8 ̂ Nonetheless,

the support accorded to UNITA and FNLA, the rival organizations to the MPLA

25

through foreign nationals could be termed as "mercenary support" Also the

Katanga gendarmes sent to overthrow Zaire's Mobutu regime in Shaba crises had

"mercenary" support

Again perusing the Soviet press and literature one comes across frequent

use of "Western mercenaries" - invariably blurring their meanings and using it

as a catch-all term for all Western supported revolutionary or guerrilla 90groups

Vili OPERATIONALIZATION OF TERMINOLOGY

The foregoing discussion has sensitized us to the imperative of fixing

defined boundaries on these amorphous and easily-bandied-around terms In our

opinion, "proxy" relationship^ has specific dimensions to it To some

observers a "proxy intervention" appears to symbolize the interest of the

principal (A) to the proxy (B) However there has to be some degree of allied

and compatibility of mutual interests This aspect of interests has already

been referred to in the literature survey of writers like Bissell Berner

Connell-Sraith Duncan, Klinghoffer, Millar, Ra"anan, Traverton, Valenta and

Vanneman and James

Another dimension of "proxy relationship" is the material relationship

between A and B That is, without material support provided by A to B it would

not be possible for B to effect intervention on behalf of A Sometimes an

essential feature of all discussions of 'proxy relationship" is whether A

exercized influence or power over B However, power as a concept is difficult

to define It is generally referring to statements like that B is submissive

to A cannot resist its demands, or accept its directions and the like

26

And finally the relationship between A and ß is sometime also connected

with the idea of co-ordination of activities There is thus as idea of

burden-sharing or division of responsibilities so that the successful execution

of intervention is ultimately dependent on the actions of both parties Ihis

aspect is borne out, for instance in the writings of Bissell and Vanneman and

JamesIt is generally assumed that an intervenor intervenes on behalf of another

power because of positive or negative sanctions (or threats of such sanctions)

which may be directed against it For as commonly suggested, without such

sanctions, that supposed intervention may not come about 'Positive sanctions'

may mean rewards like transfer of resources (military and economic aid), while

'negative sanctions' may signify either withholding of these benefits or

punitive measures like trade embargoes and moratoriums

Combining the power and material support relationship, we would rely on

Duner's typology of supposed proxy relationship ^2 It is as follows

Pressured to Not PressuredIntervene to Intervene

Receives (is dependent on) material support Proxy I Partner

Does not receive (is not dependent on) material support Proxy 2 Autonomous Actor

This phenomenon of intervention is now divided into four different cases -

thus making a more differentiated and a nuanced approach to the subject As

shown above, there are two different types of 'proxies' i e , (Proxy I and Proxy

27

2) It hardly needs mention that the one most discussed type in international

relations is m the left hand quadrant But from a theoretical angle it is

equally important to focus attention on the lower left-hand quadrant

The reason why there has always been interest in the first type of proxy

relationship' is the assumption that in view of the material support received,

it becomes obligatory for the recipient state to subordinate its interests to

the patron But as the typology shows it may well be that the intervenor is

not subservient but may well be acting on its own The literature thus surveyed

reveals that the Soviet ambitions and activist policies in Africa (Angola and

Ethiopia) could not have been possible if the junior partner had not chosen to

physically intervene with its own combat troops As regards the argument that

Cubans were indebted for Soviet military economic help, it did surely,

condition Cuban behavior Nonetheless, one has to go beyond these facile

explanations and appreciate the radical Cuban nationalism and Castro's fierce

defiance and independently charismatic image in most of the developing

countries Also, if one chronologically traces the Cuban interest in Africa,

one finds that due to a variety of reasons (ideological, cultural and ethnic)

their presence and support to African liberation movements predated those of the

Soviets— going back, to the mid-1960s

IX CONCLUSION

The focus of this study is on the nature, form and pattern of Soviet-Cuban

military relationship in Africa This is with particular reference to the two

case studies of Angola and Ethiopia and we would like to further analyze (in a

later study) this relationship in light of Duner's typology Admittedly, there

are not enough of replications of these type of joint Soviet-Cuban military

28

co-operation Nonetheless bat>ed on these two case studies we could

confidently draw some generalizations and should such similar interventions

take place m the future the findings could be further tested

The specific question posed in this study is Is this relationship

basically that of 'patron-client" or mutual partnership or one where the

junior ally or partner, given its unique assets tends to exercise some leverage

on its major partner7 There are three main hypotheses which will be tested in a

later study They are

(1) The greater the expanding global interests of the Soviet Union, the greater will be its dependence on allies to act on its behalf,(2) There is no direct correlation between provision of economic and military aid and as a consequence subservience of the recipient's domestic or even foreign policy policies to that of the donor's(3) Certain regional powers given their unique geostrategic assets, may act as autonomous actors (within broad parameters of its patron state) and also may exercise 'reverse influence'

In closing this study, in a modest way, has broadly surveyed the

literature on the Soviet-Cuban military nexus m Africa and laid a theoretical

framework for subsequent detailed analysis As a policy guideline, the lessons

learned could perhaps form a basis for the U S or any major power contemplating

any 'anticipatory involvement'^3 m a bid to avert likely future Third World

conflicts Needless to say, it is easier said than done lor m the complex

protean reality of the dynamics of ferment and change affecting most of the

developing world primarily which is indigenous and autonomous and hence beyond

the Superpowers to completely influence or control

29

END NOIES

1 This thesis is defended in e g I Greig The Communist Challenge to Africa An Analysis of Contemporary Soviet, Chinese and Cuban Policies (London foreign Affairs Pub Coy Ltd 1977) Also see Robert Moss 'On Standing Up to the Russians in Africa ' Policy Review voi 5, summer 1978 pp 98-116, Julian Araery, The Crisis m Southern Africa Policy Review fall 1977 Kenneth Adelman "The Black Man's Burden Foreign Policy Fall 1977, Bayard Rustin and Carl Gersham, Africa Soviet Imperialism and Retreat of American Power ’ Commentary, October 1977 A well-documented but sometimes verging on the alarmist side is Peter Vanneman and W Martin James III Soviet Foreign Policy in Southern Africa, Institute of South Africa, December 1982

2 At present approximately 35 000-37 000 Cuban troops are stationed m Sub-Saharan Africa (See U S Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 4th ed , (Washington GP0, April 1985) p 1163 I William Zartraan, Africa as a Subordinate State System in InternationalRelations 1 International Organization voi 21 No 3 19674 At present over half of the world's refugees are in Africa, totaling about five million and with the largest concentration in the Horn of Africa due to the 1978 Ethiopian-Somali conflict in the Ogaden For details on this read Aderanti Adepoju, "The Refugee Situation in the Horn of Africa and Sudan " Issues - A Journal of Africanist Opinion, vol XII, No 3, Spring-Summer 1982, pp 29-34

5 J Barron Boyd, Jr , 'The Origins of Boundary Conflict in Africa, in MarkW DeLancey ed , Aspects of International Relations in Africa (Columbia South Carolina, December 1978) pp 159-1906 For a good analytical study on military interventions from regional African powers and other multi-forms of interventions see S N MacFarlane,Intervention and Security m Africa,' International Affairs, London Voi 60

No 1, pp 53-67, Relatedly, on a general breakdown of regional norms in Africa read his "Africa's Decaying Security System and the Rise of Intervention," International Security Voi 8, No 4 Spring 1984 pp 127-149

7 That the regional dynamics of conflict in the Horn of Africa is further exacerbated by the Super-Power rivalry is ably argued by Samuel M Makmda 'Conflict and the Super-Power s in the Horn of Africa, ' Third World Quarterly, Voi 4, No 1, January 1982, pp 93-1038 A rather gloomy prognosis for increased conflict is spelled out in Raymond W Capson, "African Flashpoints Prospects for Armed International Conflict ' Orbis Voi 25 No 4 Winter 1982 pp 903-923 and Dennis Austin, "Things Fall Apart,' Ibid, pp 925-9479 For example, the American airlift operation involving Belgian and Moroccan interventionary forces during Shaba II and the British use of Ascension Islands during the 1982 Falkland war (See Gregory F Traverton, "Defence Beyond Europe," Survival Vol XXV No 5 September-October 1983, pp 216-226 )

30

10 This term is used by Jorge L Dominguez 'The Civil Soldier in J I Dominguez Cuba Order and Revolution (Ca Harvard University Press, 1978) pp 341-37911 This theme is reflected in Jin Valenta s 'Soviet Policy m Central America " Survey - A Journal of bast and West Studies Voi 27 Autumn-Winter 1983 pp 287-30312 Trond Gilberg 'Lastern European Military Assistance to the Third World in Daniel S Papp ed, Communist Nation's Military Assistance (Boulder Colo Westview Press 1983), pp 72-93

13 Lloyd Jensen Explaining Foreign Policy (Englewood Cliffs, NJ Prentice Hall Inc , 1982) pp 227-22814 Frederick S Pearson and Robert Baumann, Foreign Military Intervention by Large and Small Powers, International Interactions I (October 1977), p 277

15 On various instruments and levels of involvement (e g , direct and indirect combat involvement direct and indirect para-combat involvement, and direct supply activities see Bertil Duner "The Many-Pronged Spear External Military Intervention in Civil Wars m the 1970s Journal of Peace Research, Vol 20 No 1, 1983, p 6016 Bertil Duner, Military Involvement The Escalation of International Conllicts (Stockholm The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 1980) Research Report No 517 The subsequent theoretical discussion of 'proxy' behavior is heavily drawn from an excellent analysis done by Christopher Lamb, ' The Nature of Proxy Warfare" in William J Taylor, Jr and Steven Maaranen, The Future of Conflict in the 1980s (Lexington, Mass Lexington Books, 1982) pp 169-170

18 Walter Laqueur in W Laqueur ed , The Pattern of Soviet Conduct m the Third World (New York Praeger, 1983) p 11

19 Peter Vanneman and Martin James "Soviet Thrust into the Horn of Africa, Strategic Review, Voi Spring 1978, p 3420 However, even these satellites' appear to pursue tyithin limits their owneconomic and political interests m Africa, and sometimes are even m competition with each other For an elaboration of this point of view see Bruce E Arlinghaus, Military Development in Africa The Political and Economic Risks of Arms Transfers (Boulder, Colo Westview Press, 1984), p 35 In additionalso see m the same context, Joseph P Smaldone, "Soviet and Chinese Military Aid and Arms Transfers to Africa A Contextual Analysis ' in Warren Weinstein and Thomas H Hennkson eds Soviet and Chinese Aid to African Nations (New York Praeger Pub 1980) pp 76-116 Further, also see Jay Ross 'North Korean Advisors Arrive to Train Force in Zimbabwe," Washington Post, August 11

1981 and ‘Zimbabwe Follies oí the Fifth brigade Economist pp 48-49

October 30 1982

21 bee e g , the Pentagon study Soviet Military Power 1985 4th ed, April 1983, (Washington D C US Govt Printing Office 1983) pp 113-131

22 Jorge Dominguez Cuban Foreign Policy Foreign Affairs Qtly, Voi 57 Summer 1978, pp 83-10823 See "Castro Russia's Cat's Paw U S News and World Report, June 12 1978, pp 20-2324 For a proper role of the Gurkha forces as a mercenary force see an account by a former Gurkha officer Robin Adshead "The Gurkhas - Past Present and Future7 ’ Jane's Defence Weekly Voi 3 No 9, 2 March 1985 p 359

25 See e g , David Rees, "Soviet Strategic Penetration of Africa," Conflict Studies No 77, pp 1-21 and especially Brian Cozier The Surrogate Forces of the Soviet Union," Conflict Studies No 92 February 1978 pp 1-20

26 Peter Vanneraan and Martin James The Soviet Intervention in Angola Intentions and Implications " Strategic Review, Summer 1976, pp 96-103 also see their later piece Soviet Coercive Diplomacy Saudi Arabia " Air Force Magazine, March 1981, p 120

27 T B Millar, "Conflict and Intervention" in Mohammad Ayub, ed , Conflict and Intervention m the Third World (London Croom Helm, 1980)

28 A Suarez, Soviet Influence on Internal Politics of Cuba’ in A Rubinstein, Soviet and Chinese Influence in the Third World, and Lars Bondstam,External Involvement in Ethiopia Eritrea, ’ in B Davidson, L Cliff and B H Selassie, Behind the War in Eritrea (Nottingham Spokesman 1980)

29 See e g , Carmelo Mesa Lago, Cuba in the 1970s K S Karol, Guerrillas in Power (Hill and Wang 1970) Edward Gonzeles, "Relationship with the Soviet Union" in Mesa lago ed , Revolutionary Change in Cuba (University of Pittsburgh Press 1970), Leon Goure and Julian Weinkle, "Cuba's New Dependency," Problems of Communism, March-Apnl 1972 In addition see Edward Gonzeles, Cuba Under Castro The Limits of Charisma (Houghton Mifflin, 1974), Irving Louis Horowitz, ed , Cuban Communism (Trans-Action Press, 1977) Jaime Suchlicki, ed Cuba, Castro and Revolution (University of Miami Press, 1972) However, some of these writers have revised some of their earlier views of Cuban behavior and have incorporated some other factors in light of Cuba's renewedinternationalism' after mid-1970s m Africa In this regard see e g , Edward

Gonzeles Castro and Cuba's New Orthodoxy, Problems of Communism January-February 197630 See William J Taylor, Jr and James J Townsend, ‘Soviet Proxy Warfarem Robert Kupperman and William J Taylor, Jr , eds , Strategic Requirements for the Army to the Year 2000 (Lexington, Mass Lexington Books, 1984), pp 209-226

32

31 Lourdes Casal's testimony in the Hearings betöre the Subcommittee onInternational House of Representatives 93th Congress 2nd Session March 14 and 15, April 5 and 12 1978, pp 80-8532 Nelson Valdes Revolutionary Solidarity in Angola m Cole ßiasier and Carmelo Mesa-Lago eds , Cuba in the World, (Pittsburgh University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979) pp 87-11933 Sam C Nolutshungu 'African Interests and Soviet Power The Local Context of Soviet Policy," Soviet Studies, Vol XXXIV No 3 July 1982 p 408

34 William J Durch, "The Cuban Military in Africa and the Middle Last IromAlgeria to Angola " Studies in Comparative Communism, Vol II 1978 pp 34-74

35 Jorge I Dominguez, "The Armed Forces and Foreign Relations m Blaster andMesa Lago, eds Cuba m the World, pp 53-86

36 Connel-Smith Castro's Cuba in World Affairs 1959-79," fhe World Today January 1979 pp 15-2337 Jin Valenta is a specialist and an acute observer of Soviet military interventionary behavior in Lastern behavior and the Third World countries In this case read his, "The Soviet-Cuban Intervention m Angola, 1975, Studies in Comparative Communism, Vol II 1978 pp 3-3338 William M Leo Grande, "Cuba's Policy Recycled, Foreign Policy, No 46 Spring 1982, pp 105-119

39 Ibid40 Peter Vanneman and Martin James "Soviet Intervention m the Horn of Africa Intentions and Implications,' Policy Review, No 5 1978, pp 15-36

41 R E Bissell, 'Soviet Use of Proxies in Third World The Case of Yeman " Soviet Studies, Voi 30, 1978, pp 87-10642 M Halperin, The Cuban Role in Southern Africa" in J Seller, ed ,Southern Africa Since the Portuguese Coup (Boulder Westview Press 1980) pp 23-4343 A J Klmghoffer Soviet Policy Toward Africa Impact of the Angolan War," in R W Duncan, ed , Soviet Policy in the Third World (NY Pergamon Press, 1980), pp 196-211 also see his "The Soviet Union and the Super Power rivalry in Africa in Bruce L Arlinghaus, ed , African Security Issues Sovereignty, Stability and Solidarity (Boulder, Col Westview Press, 1984), pp 19-3844 W A E Skurnik 'Africa and the Super-Powers, ' Current History, Voi 71, No 421, pp 145-148 179-180 184

33

45 G G Traverton, Cuba After Angola The World Today, January 1977 pp 17-2746 Ihis 'paladin thesis is very succinctly elaborated by Edward Gonzeles m Cuba, the Soviet Union, and Africa in David Albright ed Communism in

Africa (Bloomington and London Indiana University Press, 1980), pp 145-167

47 Lawrence H Theriot, Cuban Foreign Trade A Current Assessment (Washington D C US Department of Commerce, Office of L-W Policy and Planning, Industry and Trade Administration, 1978)

48 Enrique Baloyra Herp, Internationalism and the Limits of Autonomy Cuba's foreign Relations m Heraldo Munoz and Joseph S Tulchin, Latin American Nations m World Politics (Boulder and London Westview Press, 1984) p 169

49 As quoted m James Nelson Goodseli The Christian Science Monitor, March 21, 197850 See "The Impact of Cuban-Soviet Ties in the Western Hemisphere,' - Hearings before the House International Relations Committee March 14, 15 April 5, 12 1978 (Washington, D C US Govt Printing Office, 1978), p 14

51 The reasons for Castro's 'New Internationalism' are very well spelled out in Carla Anne Robbins, The Cuban Threat (New Yorx McGraw Hill Book Company 1983) pp 181-18252 Ibid , p 20653 Merritt Robbins, The Soviet-Cuban Relationship in Roger E Kanet, ed , Soviet Foreign Policy in the 1980s (Praeger Special Studies, 1982) pp 154, 157-15854 The literature on the subject is substantial For a sampling see, for instance, Annette Baker Fox, The Power of Small State (Chicago University of Chicago Press 1967) V V Sveics, Small Nation Survival Political Defence m Unequal Conflict (Jericho, NY Exposition Press, 1970) Trygve Mathieson, The Functions of Small States in the Strategies of Great Powers (Oslo Universitetsforlaget, 1971) Peter Wiles, 'The Importance of Country Size A Question But Not a Subject,' Unpublished Paper 1978 Ronald P Barton, ed , The Other Powers Studies in the Foreign Policies of Small States (London George Allen and Unwin, 1973) Simon Kuznets, "Economic Growth of Small Nations' om AG Robinson ed , Economic Consequences of the Size of Nations (New York St Martin's Press, 1960) Jacques Rapaport Ernest Mateba and Joseph Theratili, Small States and Territory Status and Problems (New York UNITAR Studies, 1971) Robert 0 Keohane "Lilliputians' Dilemmas Small States in International Politics " International Organization, Spring 1969, Robert L Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York Columbia University Press, 1968), Raimo Vayrynen, 'On the Definition and Measurement of Small States," Co-Operation and Conflict, No 6, 1971 and Michael I Hendel, Weak States in the International System (London Frank Cass 1981)

34

53 Albert Hirschman Beyond Asynimetery critical Notes on Myself as a Young Man and on borne Other Old Friends International Organization, Voi 32 Winter 1978, pp 45-5056 The foregoing section is heavily drawn from an excellent analysis by George H Quester The Difficult Question of International Exploitation, The Jerusalem Journal of International Affairs Voi 6 No 2 I9ö2 pp 1-23

57 For details of this literature review see Neils Armstrup ’The Perennial Problem of Small States " Co-Operation and Conflict January 1976

58 In this regard a mention can be made to Johan Galtung's structural thesisthat the Western world's relationships with the Third world are already well established through a complex web of social, economic and political ties from pre-independence days (See Johan Caltung A Structural Theory of Imperialism, Journal of Peace and Conflict Research No 2 1971 pp 81-117

59 J L Girling, America and the Third World Revolution and Intervention (London, Boston and Heneley Routledge and Kegal Paul 1980)

60 P Towle, The Strategy Of War by Proxy, Working Paper No 20, (Canberra The Research School of Pacific Studies, The Australian National University 198061 lhat the international system is progressively getting diffuse and more decentralized by giving greater degree of autonomy and leverage, and hence military involvement by regional powers, is ably analyzed m Edward A Kolodziej and Robert Harkavy, "Developing States and the International Security System " Journal of International Affairs Voi 34, No 1, pp 59-87

In this context also refer to an excellent study of regional middle powers' defence policy formation from a comparative perspective by James M Roherty, ed , Defence Policy Formation Towards Comparative Analysis, International Relations Series No 6, Institute of International Studies (Durham N C Carolina Academic Press, 198U) For a case study of regional military involvement under former Shah's Iran see Maqsud Nun ’Regional Military Involvement A Case Study of Iran Under the Shah," Pakistan Horizon - Qtly , the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Karachi, Vol XXXVII, No 4, Fourth Quarter 1984, pp 32-4562 See Noam Chomsky's new book The Fateful Triangle The United States, Israel, and the Palestinians (London Pluto Press 1983, especially pp 464-46963 This 'mutual exploitation thesis is spelled out in libyan-Sovietrelationship by John W Amos "Libya in Chad Soviet Surrogate or Nomadic Imperialist " Conflict All Warfare Short of War - An International Journal Voi 5, No 1 1983, p 6

35

64 David Ronfeldt, Super-Clients and Super-Powers - Cuba Soviet Union/IranUnited States P-5945 (Santa Monica Calilornia Rand Corporation April 1978) Another small piece albeit proving the surrogate thesis implicitly underscores the indispensability of countries luce Cuba Vietnam and Israel for the Super-Powers See Charles E Waterman, Why Super-Powers Pay the bills for big Armies for Small friends Such Surrogates are a Relatively Cheap and 'Wondrous" Weapon ' Christian Science Monitor, June 6 1985 p 11

65 That this idealized principle has always corresponded to actual reality in Africa is open to question given the inability and constraints of the Soviet Union to influence and control events in these "client" nations

66 For details see, 'Soviet Military Presence in Cuba Jane's Defence Weekly Voi 3 No 17, 27 April 1985, pp 714-71567 An excellent empirical discussion of the increasing leverage of a number of these developing small states vis a vis the bigger states in terms of arms dependence can be found m Ariel Levite and Athanassios Platias, Evaluating Small State's Dependence on Arms Imports An Alternative Perspective,Occasional Perspective No 16 (Cornell University Peace Studies Program) June 1983 p 73 For increased arms production capacity in some areas - nearly 20 Third World countries, with brazil emerging as the fifth largest arms seller to many Persian Gulf and West African countries (nearly $2 billion in 1984) read Geoffrey Aronson The Third World's booming New Industry Weapons Washington Post 16 June 1985, p C-l68 William J Taylor and James J Townsend "Soviet Proxy Warfare ' in RobertH Kupperman and William J Taylor eds , Strategic Requirements for the Army to the Year 2000 (Lexington, Mass Lexington Books, 1984), p 210

69 Ibid70 bruce D Porter The USSR m Third World Conflicts Soviet Arms andDiplomacy in Local War 1945-1980 (London Cambridge University Press, 1984)P 230, p 55

71 Strategic Survey, 1978 (London IISS 1979), pp 12-17

72 Ibid , p 17

73 Caspar W Weinberger, Annual Report to the Congress - FY 1986 (WashingtonD C US Gov't Printing Office 1985), pp 19, 21, 30, 32

74 For instance read Kenneth L Adelman, 'African Security Facts andFantasies," Comparative Strategy - An International Journal, Voi 2, No 1, 1980, p 10375 Bruce E Arlmghaus Military Development in Africa The Political and Economic Risks of Arms fransfers (Boulder and London Westview Press, 1984),pp 34-35

36

76 Ibid , p 36 the same theme is reiterated in John F Copper and Daniel S Papp, eds Communist Nation's Military Assistance (Boulder Col Westview Press 1983)77 See Juan de Aguila Cuba's Foreign Policy in Central America and the Caribbean in Jennie K. Lincoln and Elizabeth G Fens eds fhe Dynamics of Latin American Policies Challenges for the 1980s Westview Special Studies on Latin America and the Caribbean (Boulder and London Westview Press 1984) pp 251-266, and Wolf Grabendorff, The Role of Regional Powers in Central America Mexico, Venezuela Cuba and Columbia, m Heraldo Munoz and Josephs Tulchi Latin American Nations in World Politics, 1984 (Boulder and London Westview Press 1984)78 Aguila The Dynamics of Latin American Policies p 252

79 Louis J Canton and Steven L Spiegai The International Relations ofRegions " in Richard A Falk and Saul H Menlovitz eds Regional Politics and World Order (San Francisco W H Freeman and Company 1973) as cited inIbid80 Antonio Jorge "How Exportable is the Cuban Model9 pp 211-233 in Barry B Levine, ed The New Cuban Presence in the Caribbean (Boulder Westview Press 1983), p 227

81 Aguila, The Dynamics of Latin American Policies p 257

82 See Edward L Warner III, "The Defence Policy of the Soviet Union' inDouglas J Murray and Paul R Viotti, eds , The Defence Policies of Nations A Comparative Study (Baltimore and London The Johns Hopkins Univ Press 1982)p ÏÏÏ6

83 Ibid , p 8884 See e g , Dept of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1985 (Washington, D CUS Gov't Printing Office) p 118 Although rich in description and details, this document tends to give only one-sided facts and figures and not comparative data so as to present the reader with a balanced perspective

85 Ibid , p 12186 Ibid p 12087 Gerry S Ihomas, Mercenary Troops in Modern Africa (Boulder and London Westview Press 1984) p 2

88 Ibid , pp 5-6