a brief history of capitalist development in turkey

8/13/2019 A Brief History of capitalist development in Turkey

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A Brief History of Capitalist

Development and WorkingClass Movement in Turkey

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A Brie History o Capitalist Development andWorking Class Movement in urkey

4 July 2012

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3A Brief Historyen.marksist.com

A Brie History o Capitalist

Development and WorkingClass Movement in urkey

Te process o the capitalist development o urkey is a rather belated processwith respect to the West. Tis historical delay ows rom the peculiar socio-economic structure upon which urkish capitalism developed. For this reason,

in order to understand the peculiarities o urkish capitalism, it is necessary tohave an overview o the economic and social history o the Ottoman Empire thatorms the historical background o modern urkey today.

Te Ottoman state was established at the beginning o the 14th century (in theyear 1300). It became a genuine empire only afer the conquest o Istanbul (1453).Examining the history o the Ottoman state, we can speak o three different peri-ods, each having its own properties, covering the 600 hundred years between itsestablishment and its collapse.

Te rst period, which lasted until 17th century, was a period o rise into a co-lossal empire in which the Ottoman State was expanding territorially, with con-quests both in Asia and Europe . From the standpoint o its socio-economic andpolitical structure, the Ottoman State reected the traits o a classical Orientaldespotism in this period, which took shape on the basis o an Asiatic mode oproduction.

Te second period that lasted rom 17th century to 19th was a period o alter-

ing beore the rising capitalist West. Te land system, which constitutes the eco-nomic basis o the Ottoman despotism, starts to spoil; corruption and disorder


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4 en.marksist.comA Brief History

increases in the administration o state; struggles or power among the rulingstate class intensies.

And nally the third period, covering the whole 19th century, is the period o

collapse in which the empire began to dissolve and disintegrate in every sphere,gradually becoming a semi-colony o the West.

Te Ottoman society and Asiatic mode o production

While investigating the historical evolution o pre-capitalist orms o propertyand production relations, Marx paid much attention to Asiatic mode o produc-tion and Oriental despotism. Tis socio-economic ormation seen in the East

was similar neither to the ancient slavery nor medieval eudal mode o produc-tion.

Te common eature o ancient slavery and medieval eudalism, which appearedunder certain historical conditions in the West, is that both these modes o pro-duction were based on individual-private property. It was the noble private land-owners who extracted the surplus created by the direct producers [slaves andsers] working on the soil in these societies Te state both in slavery and in eudalsociety was a special instrument o oppression, organised to insure the big land

owners rule over the direct producers.Yet, when we look at the historical evolution o these Eastern societies, both inthe property orms and the production relations, the ormation o classes and astate developed rather differently because there was no individual-private prop-erty on land in these societies, and there was no private property owning class ei-ther, as existed in the West. In Eastern societies the property o all land and natu-ral resources belonged to the higher unity, that is the state, at the head o whichsits the despot. As the real owner o all land, the state was also the real owner o

the surplus produced by the direct producers (agrarian communes). Te des-potic state was the centre o gravity or all agrarian communes and it appearedas a holy ather, saeguarding the order beore these communes. Being the rul-ing power o Eastern societies, the despotic state had three basic unctions; warand conquest (oreign loot), taxes on land (domestic loot), and the public works,which are necessary or reproduction.

Marx examined the Asiatic mode o production and Oriental despotism inhis Grundrisse and in Capital, and in his many writings on this subject assessed

the history o Ottoman society as a history o Oriental despotism, similar to the


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histories o India , China , Iran and Russia . Indeed the Ottoman society, at leastuntil the 19th century, constituted a typical example o Oriental despotism romthe standpoint o both the mode o production and the structure o the state.

In the period o its ounding and urther expansion, the Ottoman state was toconquer many lands, which then became the property o the state, with both theMuslim and non-Muslim populations [direct producers] becoming the taxpayersbonded to the land [reaya]. A Military bureaucracy [sipahi] was installed to carryout the administration o these lands.

Te military bureaucracy in the Ottoman Empire was the most important andsignicant section o the state ruling class. Sipahi who represented the centralauthority (sultan-state) in the land they administered, were responsible or man-

agement o the land, collecting the surplus (in the orm o taxes) produced byreaya and looking afer soldiers or the Ottoman army in case o war. Tis pro-duction relation established on land was very important or the Ottoman state,because its economy was based on war and land conquests and this productionrelationship enabled it to oster a big army.

No individual ruler, military or civil, in the Ottoman society could be the ownero land property in his own right, and consequently, unable to use the right oindividual exploitation on producer peasants. Te established status quo did notallow individuals to accumulate individual wealth and to use it as they wished.Tat means that there was no relationship, similar either to a seignior-ser re-lationship or to a patrician-slave relationship in the Ottoman order. Te centraldespotic structure o the Ottoman state and the overwhelming state ownershipo landed property never allowed an independent orce, that is seigniorisation,to develop against the central authority. Te only possessor o the landed prop-erty and the sovereignty was just the monolithic state personied in the monarch(sultan).

Tus the system o exploitation in the Ottoman Empire was working collectivelyrather than individually and it was taking place through the state. Te surplustaken rom direct producers in the orm o taxes was rst gathered in the treas-ury and then distributed to the ruling state class (the high offi cials in the palace,the top military-civil bureaucracy and the religious ulema) in the orm o salariesand grants. At the top o this ruling class pyramid, organised in a highly central-ised and hierarchic-bureaucratic manner, sits a despot (sultan), who is alleged torule over the land in the name o god and thereore promoted to a holy position.

Te sultan is the symbol o the centralised and concentrated state power.


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Te class structure o Ottoman society

Te social composition o Ottoman society consisted o a state ruling-class at thetop and the direct producers at the bottom (agrarians and crafsmen). Both the

agrarian communes and the crafsman guilds in towns were under tight controlo the central state.

Tere was not, and could not be, a matured merchant class o Western type in thesocial organism o the Ottoman Empire . Almost all o the surplus was concen-trated in the hands o the state and was used to satisy the needs o the state. Tusthere were no commodities lef or private trade and ree exchange. Under suchconditions, accumulation o a merchant capital and ormation o a merchantclass within the system was impossible. Te trade in Ottoman society consistedo long distance trade to satisy the needs o the palace (o the despot), army andthe high level military-civil bureaucracy, which inhabited the towns. Howeverthis kind o trade was perormed, either by the offi cials charged by the state or bythe merchants coming rom abroad (who were not part o the Ottoman system).Tus, what the state did was the exchange o use-values to satisy its needs ratherthan commodity trade.

As or the situation o producers at the bottom, who work in the agrarian com-

munes that constitute the essential basis o the Ottoman economy, they werecompletely out o the economic and social lie o the towns, and were living anisolated lie. In these Asiatic agrarian communes, private property, commodityand exchange relations had never developed. A very low level o division o la-bour, the undivided unity o agriculture and crafs, and the satisaction o everyneed rom within the commune; all these kept these communities in a positiono being sel-sustaining and isolated economic units. Due to these eatures, theagrarian communes reproduced themselves and vegetated during hundreds oyears under the Ottoman despotism.

Marx said that these Asiatic agrarian communes, innocent and harmless in ap-pearance, ormed the economic basis o Oriental despotism wherever they exist-ed. Te development o market and capitalist relations was impossible in a placewhere there was no private property and ree exchange. Tereore, Marx pointedout, the inner dynamics that would develop capitalism were lacking in Easternsocieties that were under the reign o an Asiatic mode o production, and thatcapitalism could break through only as a oreign agent in these societies.

Te evolution o Ottoman society constitutes an outright contrast to the Westerndevelopment. Te state in the West has taken shape along with the evolution o


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society itsel, that is, according to the supremacy o the social classes in economicrelationship. Yet, on the contrary, in the Ottoman society the social relations andclasses were moulded in the hands o state.

Te proportion o unproductive (parasitic) elements (offi cials in the palace, thetop military and civil bureaucracy and the religious ulema) in the Ottoman so-ciety was bigger than that in the medieval European eudal societies. Tus theywere to play an essential part in the ormation o the towns in Ottoman society.But these towns were not the autonomous towns that had ormed independent-ly rom the central authority in the West. On the contrary, they were built by thestate itsel and were some kind o administrative headquarters where the state-class populate. Te necessity o satisying the needs o the ruling class led to the

organisation o industry and trade in these towns. But both industry and tradedeveloped as a unction o state rather than a private activity o independent in-dividuals. Tus the industrial and trade activity were under the absolute controlo the state in Ottoman towns. Tis uncompromising statism prevented the or-mation o a market system, and the development o exchange as in the West, ora long time. Tus the process o primitive capital accumulation and developmento capitalist relations that was developing in the West in the 16th and 17th centu-ries could not be experienced in the Ottoman society.

In this kind o social structure the inner dynamics that would allow capitalismto develop was absent. As Engels said in an article he wrote in 1890 in Neue Zeit:Indeed, just as all the Eastern rules, the urkish rule is also incompatible with acapitalist society; because it is impossible to save the surplus rom the strangle-hold o tyrant governors and greedy pashas; here we can not see the rst essentialcondition o bourgeois property, that is the security o merchant and his goods.

Period o vacillation o Ottoman despotism

Afer the discovery o America and opening o new paths o trade, there was aprocess o rapid development o trade and o primitive accumulation o capital inWestern Europe. Especially in Britain, where in the 16th and 17th centuries, theeudal production relations were dissolved, a new class (bourgeoisie) arose andthe preconditions (manuacture) o the uture industrial capitalism came intobeing. Tis period o mercantilism was accompanied by a policy o colonialismall over the world. Tis everish process o capitalist development kept going ongrowing by leaps and bounds in 18th and 19th centuries.

Yet the situation o the Ottoman Empire was completely different in the same


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period. Because o its stagnant structure the Ottoman state lost its power be-ore the developing West and entered a period o standstill, beginning rom the17th century. Te Asiatic land system o the Ottomans began to disintegrate inthis period. Absence o new land conquests, the declining importance o Easterntrade routes, increased smuggling, inadequacy o agrarian production etc., led todecreases in the revenues o the Ottoman state. At the beginning o the 17th cen-tury the expenditures o the Ottoman state had inated to a level o three old itsrevenues. Being gripped in such a nancial shortage the Ottoman treasury musthave immediately recourse to new sources o revenue. But there was no source tobe squeezed other than the land revenues. In order to raise the revenues the statewas compelled to offer its right to collect taxes or sale by way o competitive bid-ding. Tus taking the administration o the lands rom the hands o its military

bureaucracy (sipahi), the state began to hand it over to private individuals whowere called multezim (they were inuential people who had accumulated indi-

vidual wealth in some way or another). Tis was a very important developmentthat would lead to the complete degeneration and dissolution o the Ottomanland system. So important, that the power to control the agrarian production andthe surplus was changed. Now private individuals were replacing the state thathad been directly expropriating the surplus in the agriculture, under the ormo taxes. In this way new elements sharing the revenues o the state emerged.

Tis situation would lead to the ormation o new political orces alongside thestate class (sultan and military-civil bureaucracy). Afer a while the property othe lands that essentially belonged to the state had de acto, though not de jure,passed to the hands o the multezims. Tus, along with the old Asiatic land sys-tem, based on state property, now a new land system (some kind o local despot-ism and landlordism), based on de acto property o private individuals (i.e. landusurpation) and relations o private exploitation had emerged. Tese inuentialpeople began to orm their private armed orces with time and dey the central

authority. From the 18th century on, the central authority (sultans) became in-creasingly desperate against this local despotism and its lords and was unable toovercome these centriugal orces.

Other sections anxious to participate in obtaining the state owned lands werethe high offi cials such as viziers, pashas, and provincial governors and the reli-gious ulema, who were part o the state class itsel. According to the Ottomanlaws, these offi cials were prohibited rom possessing individually, private landproperty. But the offi cials had ound a solution to this obstacle. In the Ottoman

Empire it was possible to allocate land to the waqs (some sort o oundation)that were established or religious charities and social solidarity, and the right


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to run the lands could be handed over to these waqs. Having established suchwaqs, the governors and pashas were able to get hold o the state owned landsthrough these waqs. Tus the state owned lands began to be looted by the topstate bureaucracy along with the local despots and lords in the provinces. In theeconomic history o urkey this system o waqs has played a very importantrole in looting the public property. Strangely enough, this system o waqs hascontinued to exist in the history o republic, and is even still in existence underthe wings o the bourgeois state. Possessing assets o millions o dollars and hun-dreds o undertakings, these state waqs, that are the relics o the Ottoman tradi-tion, still remain, able to be plundered by the ruling bureaucracy.

O course the ones that suffered most rom the spoilage o the Ottoman land sys-

tem were the producers working on the soil (reaya). Reaya were ormerly respon-sible only beore the state and or paying the taxes, but now they were subjectedto the merciless repression and exploitation o the local despots. Beore long,this merciless repression and exploitation o local despots, landlords and usurermultezims (special tax collectors) became intolerable or the reaya. As a result othis transormation, the peasants lef the soil and got unemployed in the 17th and18th centuries. But because there was not an industrial development in the Otto-man system, capable o employing these masses ejected rom the soil, they eitherormed gangs o bandits or went to the towns to orm the unemployed herd oidlers. In the remote regions, ar rom the centre o the Empire, a complete anar-chy, disorder and chaos prevailed.

Te process o dissolution

A more substantial dissolution in the traditional structure o the Ottoman Em-pire took place in the 19th century, through its relations with Western capitalism.Tis process ended with the Ottoman Empire becoming a semi-colony and its

collapse. Tereore we can say that the crucial role in the nal dissolution o theOttoman Empire was played by Western capitalism, which was an external agent.

With the 19th century the Ottoman market was opened to Western capitalism.At the same time the dependence o the state on Western bankers through or-eign debts increased. On the other hand, the railways and a network o commu-nication were established in the same period, by the oreign capital as the sinequa non basis or the development o a capitalist market. Maritime transporta-tion, shipbuilding, the opening o some mines and actories or military purpose,etc. are some other developments in this period. Alongside these processes meas-


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ures were taken to develop the private landed property, together with a growtho a comprador bourgeoisie, primarily composed o non-Muslims around theseaports

At the beginning o 20th century when capitalism reached its imperialist stage,this long process o dissolution o the Ottoman Empire entered its last phase. Inthis phase, the Ottoman Empire became a semi-colony in the real sense o theword, just like Iran and China. For example the Ottoman Bank that had been es-tablished by the French capitalism, gradually began to unction as a central bank,taking over the management o the Ottoman currency. Likewise, afer the severedebt crises, the Ottoman treasury was handed over to an international councilcalled Dyun-u Umumiye (the General Debts), which was comprised o the rep-

resentatives o the Western states.But the Ottoman ruling class did not accept this process, which amounted to ageneral decline, passively, neither did it act in a monolithic manner. o keep upthey were compelled to introduce reorms like those in sarist Russian, to rein-orce state apparatus (most o all the army). All these developments led to the or-mation o roughly two wings within the Ottoman ruling class in general, whichhad opposite interests and views. Both these wings had the intention o savingthe Ottoman state in their own ways. While one o them contended that this goal

could be achieved by maintaining the old despotic traditions, the other one stoodor the way o Westernisation and modernisation. Having materialised as theYoung urk movement, this reormist wing established its independent politicalorganisation under the name o the Committee or Union and Progress. Afer along process o struggles and clashes, this wing managed to take power in 1908and proclaimed a constitutional monarchy. Almost all the cadres who would lat-er lead the establishment o the bourgeois republic came out o this movementand organisation.

Te nationalist leadership o the Committee or Union and Progress reckonedthat the remedy or salvation was to approach the rising German imperialism,and to side with it in the world war. Te rising German imperialism had estab-lished, at the expense o its imperialist rivals, a great inuence over the OttomanEmpire and condemned it to a nancial slavery at the turn o the century. TeOttoman state entered the world war with its weak economy and eeble armedorces, and was deeated and ruined. Afer the war the imperialist orces occu-pied all the lands o the Empire, except a small region in the central Anatolia.

Tis led to the sharpening o contradictions within the Ottoman ruling class, andhence the decisive breakaway o the wing that would lead the establishment o


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the bourgeois republic later.

Te War o Independence and oundation

o bourgeois republic: 1919-1923

Te bourgeois republic was established in 1923, and this represented an histori-cal turning point pertaining to the beginning o the development o capitalismin urkey. For reasons we pointed out above, there was not a Western type capi-talist development in the Ottoman society until the end o the First World War.Tereore a national bourgeoisie, as in the West, had not been developed ade-quately. Tus the offi cers o the Ottoman army were the only coherent orce able

to maintain the tradition o being the old state class, and took upon themselvesthe leadership o the national independence struggle against the European impe-rialist, who were occupying Anatolia afer the First World War. First among theseOttoman pashas was Mustaa Kemal, who set out to create a Western type capi-talist nation-state in the liberated parts o Anatolia. Tus the historical mission othe national bourgeoisie was to be carried out by the Ottoman pashas!

Te establishment o a bourgeois republic and the transition to capitalism in ur-key was being carried out in the imperialist age. Tis period was also a historic

period in which the great October Revolution broke the imperialist-capitalistchain. Establishment o the power o workers and peasants soviets had im-mediately become a source o inspiration or the liberation o oppressed peo-ples. Tereore the national independence struggle in urkey, a neighbour o theUSSR, developed under the inuence o two different tendencies: October revo-lution and Bolsheviks on the one hand and bourgeois nationalism on the other.

Tis resulted in two separate movements or independence against the occupy-ing imperialists. First was the nationalist movement led by Kemal, which was

composed o the offi cers o the Ottoman army, Anatolian merchant bourgeoisieand big landowners rom Anatolia. Te second one, which was called the GreenArmy, was under the inuence o the revolution in Russia and the peasant sovi-ets, and it waged essentially a guerrilla war, basing itsel primarily on the peas-antry. Tis movement was also, to some extent, in contact with the still youngcommunist movement.

Te nationalist movement led by the Ottoman pashas and bureaucrats achievedits aims through successully exploiting the new world balances created at the

end o the world war and the existence o the Soviet Union. Although the im-


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perialist powers occupied a large part o Anatolia, in act they had been greatlyweakened as a result o the world war. A great revolutionary unrest and revolthad arisen among the working class in Europe and also powerul movements oindependence in the colonies, had begun to rise. Moreover a revolutionary Inter-national had been established under the leadership o the new revolutionary re-gime in Soviet Russia, which was trying to embrace and lead both these dynam-ics. Both the objective ground and the ear and threat caused by the CommunistInternational and Soviet Union were disadvantageous actors weakening the am-bitions o the imperialists. Te nationalist leadership in Anatolia was skilul instepping over this weakness o the imperialists, and at the same time in showingutmost zeal in toadying to the Soviet Union, and in getting vital nancial andmilitary aid rom her.

Te nationalist leadership, which behaved independently rom the governmentin Istanbul under British occupation, created some sort o a situation o dualpower, by establishing a new National Assembly and a government in Ankaraas early as 1920. Yet even at this stage the nationalist movement led by Kemalstarted diplomatic contacts with British imperialism. In these contacts the Brit-ish asked them to stay away rom the Soviet Union, get rid o both the youngcommunist movement and the guerrilla orces o the Green Army, composed opeasants. All these elements were liquidated at the turn o 1921, as the British hadwished, and the Ankara government then achieved its aim o being invited to theconerence held in London in February 1921.

Contrary to what is alleged, the regular army led by Kemal did not ght directlywith the imperialist orces. Afer the London Conerence Western occupationarmies began to withdraw their orces rom Anatolia. Te so-called War o Inde-pendence was in act a war against Armenians in the east and mostly against theGreek occupation in the west. Neither the British, who occupied Istanbul and its

environs, nor the Italians who occupied the Aegean and the Mediterranean re-gion, nor the French who occupied southern and south-eastern parts o Anato-lia, were waged war against. Although there was a small-scale armed resistanceagainst the French orces, we must remember that in reality those French troopswere composed o Armenians.

Afer succeeding in deeating the Greeks (incidentally, the British gave up sup-porting the Greeks soon afer the London Conerence) in Western Anatolia, thegovernment led by Mustaa Kemal in Ankara was recognised offi cially by the im-

perialist states, at the Lausanne Conerence in 1923. With the proclamation o arepublic (29 October 1923) three months afer the Lausanne Agreement, which


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had been signed in July, the birth o the urkish bourgeois republic on the Ana-tolian soil, replacing the ruined Ottoman Empire, was accomplished.

Te urkish bourgeoisie was very weak and cowardly in its attempt to establish

the Republic. It was struggling or its national independence against the imperi-alist West on the one hand, and yet was earul o carrying out the requirementso the bourgeois democratic revolution on the other hand, because it eared apeoples movement in Anatolia similar to the Soviet revolution. Tats why theurkish bourgeoisie did not totally abolish the old despotic, Asiatic state tradi-tions o the Ottomans. On the contrary, it has taken them all, and mixed them to-gether and garnished them with a little republican sauce. So the democratic con-tent o the new bourgeois republic established by Mustaa Kemal was very weak.

On the other hand, its oppressive and totalitarian character was very apparent.Tus the social and political reorms necessary or modern capitalism to de-

velop in urkey were carried out rom above, with Bismarckian methods! Teywere not the result o a radical bourgeois democratic revolution. Te new bour-geois republic compromised with the landlords and shared the power with them.Tereore they ollowed a Prussian way o capitalist development until the 1960s.So the development o capitalism in urkey has been an extremely belated, pain-ul process.

Te class base o the new political power was composed o the ollowing ele-ments: military-civil bureaucracy, which still maintained its traditional position(in the Ottoman ashion) o ruling class; merchant bourgeoisie; and big landowners in Anatolia. Te hegemonic element in this ruling class block was themilitary-civil bureaucracy led by Kemal. Te Kemalist power had already pro-claimed, in the Economy Congress in 1923, that it would ollow the capitalistway. By doing this the new government declared that it was in avour o a capi-talist economy on the basis o liberal relations, and that it had no problem with

the oreign capital. Accordingly, the Ankara government undertook responsibil-ity or the Ottoman debts and gave assurances that during the six years ahead itwould not touch the customs privileges and exemptions o the imperialist states,that they had obtained in Ottoman times.

Te ounding o the Communist Party o urkey

Te Communist Party o urkey (KP) was ounded in 1920 as a section o the

Comintern, under the direct inuence o the October revolution. Its oundingcongress was held in Baku under the auspices o the Bolsheviks. But afer only


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one year, Mustaa Kemals bourgeois nationalist movement, in agreement withBritish imperialism, was to carry out several conspiracies against the edgingurkish communist party. It was terried at the prospects o the growth o theurkish CP and the possibility o a worker-peasant revolution leading to a soviettype government. And in one conspiracy, 15 leading members o the CP, includ-ing the rst secretary-general o the party, Mustaa Suphi, were killed on 28 Janu-ary 1921 by being drowned in the dark waters o the Black Sea.

Tis page o history is a complete tragedy or urkish communists. Te bourgeoisnationalist movement o Mustaa Kemal was ollowing a hypocritical policy osecret agreements with imperialism to crush the urkish communist movement,by resorting to intrigues and conspiracies, whilst at the same time it pretended to

be an anti-imperialist, populist movement, seeking help rom the Soviet Union.And unortunately it was quite successul in its tactics. In act this historical real-ity was a striking example o the mistake o trusting the bourgeoisie in nationalliberation movements and o regarding it as an ally. A similar example would beexperienced by the Soviet Union in China with Chiang Kai-shek.

As a matter o act, the socialist movement in urkey could not understand, ora long time, the mission o the Bismarckian type bourgeois leader Mustaa Ke-mal, and the real character o Kemalism. Te undamental weakness o the great

majority o the lef in urkey is a conception o anti-imperialism without an anti-capitalist content. Tat is why the lef in urkey considered Kemals movementas really anti-imperialist or years, and even today there is sympathy or Kemal-ism among the lef. Another misconception o the lef is to equate, more or less,the state capitalism o Kemalism with socialism. So the lef movement in generalconsidered as its duty to look afer that statism, which nurtured the capitalism inurkey and provided the native bourgeoisie with capital accumulation. What apity! But its the reality. Tis is a most important point. Because o this mistaken

approach towards Kemalism, the urkish lef are blind in many spheres, particu-larly in the Kurdish question, where they have assumed a chauvinist attitude upuntil today.

Te history o bourgeois republic in urkey is the history o never-ending per-secutions, prohibitions and state terror on the working class and socialist move-ment. For example, the urkish Communist Party [KP], the oldest lef party ourkey, during its 70 years history could legally work only 2 years. Te rest wasunder conditions o illegality and secrecy.

Te KP ollowed the offi cial Stalinist Soviet line throughout almost its whole


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existence. Although some opposition groups did emerge in the KP in the past,none o them could break with Stalinism. Tere was only one exception to thisin the history o the KP, which was the Workers Opposition, organised in1932 and supported by the great urkish poet Nazm Hikmet. But this opposi-tion group was accused o being rotskyist, and liquidated by the Stalinist partyleadership.

Te rst phase o the Kemalist power: 1923-1930

Te economic policies pursued in the rst years o the bourgeois state were liber-al economic policies, in the ramework o seeking to develop its relations with theWestern capitalism. Te main purpose o these policies was to create a national

economy, by proceeding along capitalist development. But there was neither anational bourgeois class nor an adequate accumulation o capital in urkey, toinitiate the capitalist investments. Tereore, the centrality o the economic poli-cies o the state during this period was to encourage and support private capital-ist entrepreneurship. Te young bourgeois state, established under the leadershipo the Ottoman offi cers, wanted to prevent the capital that had been owing toEurope, sent by the non-Muslim comprador bourgeois, rom leaving urkey. Itwas the native bourgeoisie in urkey that should use this capital, and or invest-

ment in urkey, rather than have it continue to ow to the West.Te political power remained largely in the hands o military-civil bureaucratcadres during this period. Tese cadres were in a sense patronising the nascentnational bourgeoisie. Tis is a peculiar aspect o the process o capitalist develop-ment in urkey. Teir aim was to create a bourgeois class and a bourgeois stateo Western type. And the same state cadres established the Republican PeoplesParty (CHP) or this purpose.

But despite both liberal policies and the enactment o encouraging laws, nei-ther a capitalist industrial advancement nor a desired level o a national bour-geois class could be created. Tere was not an adequate amount o native capi-tal accumulation or this, and there was not an inow o oreign capital romthe West either. Although the Kemalist general policy aimed at Westernisation(which means to become a capitalist country), the Western capitalist states stillapproached with caution the young urkish Republic. As a result, during thisrst phase, urkey remained largely an agrarian country with pre-capitalistproduction relations.

In these rst years some super-structural reorms, which ormed the ramework


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o capitalist development, were carried out. Pioneering this movement o re-orms, Mustaa Kemal presented the aim o the young bourgeois republic as ol-lows: to reach the contemporary level o Western civilisation. But these West-ernisation reorms, tried by Mustaa Kemal in the social sphere, were indeeddiffi cult to be acquired by a society that is the continuation o Ottoman society.Moreover, or these reorms to be viable there must have been appropriate trans-ormations on the base (industrialisation, land reorm etc.). But these were theones that urkey lacked! Landlordism was still there, especially in Eastern andSouth-eastern parts (urkish Kurdistan). However, rather than liquidating thislandlordism, the Kemalist bureaucracy had allied itsel with this landlordism.Tereore, most o the super-structural reorms in the social sphere remained assupercial reorms, that could not go beyond ormal limits and that are alien to

the people.

Te capitalist world crisis and the period ostate capitalism in urkey: 1930-1946

In the year 1930 the economic plight o the young urkish Republic was notpromising at all, and this was during the period o the outbreak o the deep crisiso the world capitalist system [1929-1933]. Tis crisis affected the urkish econ-omy through its oreign trade. Since the exports o urkey were primarily basedon agriculture, decreases in the prices o agricultural products lessened the rev-enues o both the state and the landowners. urkish currency lost its value sig-nicantly in this period. Moreover, the urkish treasury was in diffi culty owingto urkey commencing to pay the Ottoman debts at this unortunate time! Tesedebts devoured nearly one tenth o the budget.

Tese unavourable conditions orced the young bourgeois state to develop a neweconomic strategy. And this strategy involved the direct intervention o the stateon economic lie (statism) to start the industrialisation and to build a nationaleconomy. And the mood o the military-civil bureaucrat cadres, who were in thehegemonic position in the state, was also similarly inclined to implement thisstrategy. Because they had already been in the position o a ruling class, now theyound themselves as both the owner o the state and the protector o the society.Te Kemalist bureaucracy believed that a national capitalism in urkey couldonly be established through the state. Te world conjuncture reinorced them inthis view. Te economy o the Soviet Union, a neighbouring state, which seemed

to be based on statism, was not signicantly inuenced by the crisis, but on the


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contrary, kept on growing, and urkeys leaders were noticing the growth o theUSSR during this period.

Under these conditions the urkish state started to prepare its rst ve years

economic plans, similar in a sense to those in the Soviet Union. Tis period, ex-tending rom 1930 to 1946, was a period o absolute statism that existed in allspheres o the economy. Te political lie was under the one-party dictatorship othe offi cial state party, the Republican Peoples Party (CHP), which representedthe rule o the bureaucracy. Although the name o the party included the wordPeople it had nothing to do with the people and its interests. On the contrary,this party was the representative o the block o bureaucracy-bourgeoisie-biglandowners, against the working people.

Capitalism developed in this period under state management and guidance.Tereore there was no competitive period o capitalism in urkey, contrary tothe West. In this period state enterprises spread rapidly and their share o the in-dustry in the economy doubled. Until 1950, banking, big industrial institutions,mining, energy, chemistry, transportation, communication, textile, alcoholicdrinks, cigarette (tobacco) etc. were run by the state. Te basic and long termaim o this practice o statism and state capitalism, was to create the ground orthe development o a native capitalist industry and a national bourgeois class,

by means o a rapid capital accumulation, through overexploitation o labour in-side the nation.

Tis statism in these years was implemented in an utmost authoritarian and re-pressive political ramework, and the labouring masses were not permitted tohave a say, nor there was a worthwhile improvement in their standards o lie.But the state could implement this capitalist policy, based on overexploitation olabour, only under the veil o a general rhetoric o populism and anti-imperi-alism. Tese practises o Kemalist power were supported by some o the leaders

o the Communist Party o urkey (KP) that was by then a Stalinist party. Tey(among them was the then General Secretary o the party) wanted the party totail end the Kemalist power. Some o these leaders lef the party to publish a pa-per (Kadro, meaning cadre) in support o the statism o CHP. Tey applaudedthis state capitalism as a populist and anti-imperialist policy, disregarding thebourgeois nationalist class nature o Kemalist power. Tey deended the ollow-ing idea: Our statism is such a national statism that it is not based on any classand can be an example or the peoples o the world that wage an independence

war. Tis proound illusion, that identies statism with socialism and classlesssociety, has remained alive in lef movements in urkey rom that period, and


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still exists today!

Afer Mustaa Kemals death in 1938, who had been previously proclaimed asthe eternal chie , there did not occur even the slightest change in the structure

o the one-party dictatorship, and another ex-Ottoman pasha, Ismet Inonu, giv-en the title o national chie , rose to the presidency.

Although urkey did not participate in the Second World War, the labouringmasses were drawn into unprecedented misery, as i they were in a war. Steepincrease in military expenditures, shrinkage o production by 5-6% on a yearlybasis, recruitment o the productive population largely to the army, with proli-eration o war proteering all over the country, aggravated the misery and dep-rivation. Moreover the labouring masses were tormented under a system o se-

vere repression and terror. And the minorities living in urkey, such as Greeks,Armenians, Jews etc., also got their share o this repression. Teir properties andassets were seized, many o them being exiled to labour camps as a result o op-erations like the one carried out under the title o ax on Wealth, reminiscento Nazi Germany.

Tese conditions, together with economic and political measures taken againstsome sections o the ruling class, aggravated the discontent and contradictionswithin society, preparing the way or the political splitting o the ruling classblock in the afermath o the war.

It should be noted that although urkey did not take side in the war, she did notrerain rom making her preparations to sell hersel to the imperialist camp thatwould probably be victorious. For example, they let a racist ascist tendency de-

velop within the state, which was in collaboration with the Nazis, just in case o avictory o Nazi Germany. Only afer it became clear that Germany would be theloser was this current liquidated.

Post-war period: new world balancesand urkey (1946-1950)

Since urkey ollowed an unreliable attitude during the Second World War, anddid not take part in the war against Nazism alongside her European allies, herposition was regarded as ambiguous by the allies. But once the deeat o Germanybecame certain, urkey hypocritically declared war against Germany, in order to

compensate or her slippery record. Tis declaration was made very late, just be-ore the collapse o Germany itsel.


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In the new world juxtaposition, the urkish ruling class was to nd that it wasacing a considerable changed world relationship. Liberal winds were blowing inEurope afer the deeat o Fascism, and urkey was thus compelled to introduceliberal measures o her own in the political sphere, in order to adapt to thesechanges. Te urkish bourgeoisie, aced with serious economic problems, wasdesperate or economic aid rom Western capitalism, and in this context she wasespecially keen to approach the American Imperialism. However, appreciatingthat a one-party dictatorship could not be continued in this new world conjunc-ture, in 1946 urkey was compelled to accept the establishment o new politicalparties.

In short, both the new circumstances all over the world, and the new relation-

ship with the US imperialism, would have their repercussions on the politicallie in the coming period. As a result the CHP, which had been dominated by thebureaucracy, now ceased to be acceptable or some sections o the ruling class(especially or big landowners and merchants). Tereore the coalition that hadbeen ormed by the ruling classes around the CHP underwent an essential split.Te big landowners and merchants lef the CHP and ormed the DemocraticParty (DP). Te creation o the DP was an essential step by the big landownersand merchants to ree themselves rom the political patronage o the Kemalistbureaucracy. And in 1950, with the coming to power o the Democrat Party, theone-party dictatorship o the CHP, that had lasted almost 30 years, came to anend. It also meant the closing o a period in the history o republic.

Having been sick o the severe oppression o the one-party dictatorship, thebroad popular masses had voted or the Democratic Party in the 1950 elections,and carried it to the parliament with an overwhelming majority. Yet the DP, re-ecting the interests o the big landowners and capitalists, was in act a genuineparty o the existing order. Since the regime did not permit any other alterna-

tives to appear beore the people, they clung to the DP to get rid o the CHP at allcosts. Te DP was used to channel the anger o the masses by pretending to be inavour o democracy and liberties. Yet quite soon afer its victory the DP provedthat it was as capable o being as cruel an enemy o the working class and the lefin general, as was the CHP during its long dictatorship.

In 1946 some lef parties had also been established, along with the DP. For exam-ple, the KP had created two legal socialist parties, because it was still illegal tocreate a political party with the word communist in its title. One o them was

the Socialist Workers and Peasants Party o urkey and the other was the So-cialist Party o urkey. However the cowardly and slippery urkish bourgeoisie


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was soon to demonstrate how intolerant it was o lef parties. With the KemalistCHP still in power, whilst still claiming that liberal reorms were being carriedout, it closed these two socialist parties just six months afer their launch.

On the other hand, the urkish working class also made use o the new politicalconjuncture afer the war, and established legal unions. It was the rst time thatlabour unions were permitted since the beginning o the Republic. Hundreds olocal unions were established and thousands o workers were organised in theseunions. It was clear that this union movement was going to ourish. But theurkish bourgeoisie panicked. Afer just six months, the legal unions establishedby socialists and communists were closed and their offi cers were arrested. Tusthe bourgeoisie managed to suppress this emerging union movement.

Te history o the urkish republic has been a history o hindrance, prohibitionand oppression rom the standpoint o the economic and social rights o theworking class. A Labour Act, setting the legal ramework o industrial relations,was passed only 13 years afer the proclamation o the Republic in 1936. Never-theless this law did not include the right to set up unions, collective bargainingor going on strike. Only in 1947 did the workers win the right to set-up unions.Even then the right to go on strike and collective bargaining were made illegal.Tese were achieved only in 1963, 40 years afer the proclamation o a Republic.

On the other hand, the bourgeois state did not permit any legal socialist partiesuntil 1960. However, the articles that prohibited the communist propaganda,taken rom Mussolinis ascist penal code in 1936, were not abolished until 1990,and even afer these specic acts were abolished, the articles taken rom Musso-linis penal code were incorporated into the new acts, containing the same pro-hibitions.

Te period o Democratic Party rule: 1950-1960

As a result o an economic policy in avour o big landowners and import-exportmerchants, a renzied capitalist development in agriculture took place in this pe-riod, and the increase in agricultural production resulted in a widening o thesources o oreign debt. Tis rantic development o agriculture and also a con-siderable advance in industrialisation was dependant on the development o theworld economic conjuncture. Te driving orce o this development in 1950s wasthe opening o new lands to agriculture, and the use o advanced techniques inagriculture, that is, the development o capitalism in agriculture.

As or the developments in the political sphere, the liquidation o the traditional


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military-civil bureaucrat cadres rom the state administration who were in a-vour o ull-edged intervention o the state in the economy began in this peri-od, when the political power passed to the coalition o merchant bourgeoisie andbig land owners. But the conict between the traditional block that was in avouro interventionism in the economy, and the bourgeois section that was in avouro liberalism, continued without reaching an accommodation.

Relations between urkey and the US imperialism became much closer. Affi lia-tion to NAO (1952), the USs decision to include urkey into the Marshall Plan,ormation o CENO etc., all these took place in this period. And also in this pe-riod urkey actively supported the USs cold war policy through sending troopsto the Korean War, and became one o the closest allies o the US in the Middle

East.As or the class relations, the urkish state sought to control the trade unionmovement because they considered that on the existing level o capitalist de-

velopment it was not possible to stop the trade union movement o the workingclass other than through continued prohibitions and oppressive measures. Tus,with the guidance o the US, they had the Conederation o urkish Labour Un-ions (urk-) organised in 1952, which would operate under state control. Tisorganisation had some semi-offi cial status and sought to install an American

style business trade unionism on the urkish working class, plus liberal amountso nance rom the USA, with the urkish Ministry o Labour playing midwie toits birth. It made great strides in recruiting the public sector workers into urk-Is

Te period between 1950 and 1955 is a period o extreme liberalism. But it alsoprepared the preconditions or an economic and nancial crisis that was on thehorizon. Te bourgeois government had increased the oreign debts to a greatextent and ollowed a one-sided policy o investment, primarily in agriculturalinvestments, counting on the revenues rom agricultural exports. Tis suited the

interests o the imperialist capital, with both the US and the European capitalistpreerring to lending money with high interest rates, and making prot rom sell-ing their goods, instead o direct investments. And this would soon draw urkeyinto a downright economic and nancial impasse.

Te rst serious crisis o urkish capitalism broke out in 1958. Both a nancialand oreign debts crisis prepared the way or the overthrow o DP rule. Foreigntrade decit reached 60% o the total exports. Te import o the necessary inputsor industry (machines, equipment, raw material) became impossible. Tus the

investments decreased and the economy shrunk, and social expenditures were


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reduced. Finally, urkey ell into such a position that she could not repay her or-eign debts. O course the labouring classes suffered the most rom these devel-opments. But on the other hand the conditions o the lower rank offi cers in thearmy and the other offi cials within other state departments were also worsenedon a daily basis.

Te DP continued to pump nance rom state unds and banks to the big land-owners, despite the economic crisis, yet it did not support the industrial capital-ists adequately. Naturally this caused a reaction among the industrial bourgeoi-sie. Foolishly the DP also alienated the army by cutting the grants o the militarybureaucracy and weakening their political inuence.

Te industrial bourgeoisie had had enough and was seeking a way to remove the

domination o the big landowners. Coincidently, the imperialists were also inavour o putting an end to the power o the big landowners, which was an ob-stacle to the capitalist development o urkey. Imperialism now supported theimplementing o a planned capitalist development, under the lead o the indus-trial bourgeoisie. But it was also clear that such an essential transormation in theeconomy could not be brought about whilst the DP ruled, because they were notin avour o such a development.

Te new period opened by MilitaryCoup o May 27: 1960-1970

Many large student demonstrations erupted against the government in the lastdays o DP rule, giving rise to major contradictions within the urban middle andworking classes, very soon to be ollowed by a coup by the middle and lowerranking offi cers. Not long afer this coup the ex- Prime Minister Menderes andtwo o his prominent ministers were summarily tried and hanged. Whatever else

it achieved, both the urkish industrial bourgeoisie and imperialism welcomedthis coup, because, whatever the intentions o these lower ranking offi cers, it wasultimately to their benet, in the long term, that the coup had taken place.

In the opinion o these offi cers, they had carried out a revolution to deend andprotect the liberties and institutions o the Republic, introduced by Ataturk, andagainst the undemocratic practices o the DP! Nevertheless, these revolution-ary offi cers quickly outlined their real intentions, in the rst political statementthey made immediately afer the coup: We are respectul to all international

treaties. We are loyal to NAO and CENO. Such a statement rom a revolu-


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tionary junta must have quickened the hearts o the imperialist, assuring boththe US and the Europeans that it was business as usual and that there was noneed to worry!

Shortly afer the coup, the CHP, the party created by Mustaa Kemal, was calledon by the offi cers to take power. Te CHP represented the urban bourgeoisiegathered around Bankas (meaning Business Bank) which was, and still is, al-most the biggest bank o urkey, partly owned by CHP itsel and the bourgeoisintelligentsia and military-civil bureaucracy. Tese circles wanted a planned cap-italist industrialisation to be launched (they called it mixed economy), and alsoor oreign capital to be attracted. For this they ounded a state planning organi-sation, to prepare a ve year plan with the help o the imperialist West. Trough

these plans it was intended to carry out the liquidation o pre-capitalist produc-tion relations, a land reorm and a transer o resources rom agriculture to theindustry, which was basically a measure against the big landowners.

Afer this brie excitement, the regular routine o the parliamentary regime inurkey began to operate, including the electoral process, and in 1965 the JusticeParty [AP] came to power. Tough it had been ounded as an extension o theDP, now, unlike in the past, it also represented the industrial bourgeoisie. Te APollowed the policy o giving priority to industry, especially to the assembly-line

industry. Tis led to the inevitable growth in concentration and centralisation ocapital.

Te year 1960 is an important turning point rom the point o view o the de-velopment o both capitalism and also o the development o the working classmovement, into a mass movement. A new constitution had been launched as aresult o the military coup on 27th May 1960. A new period was opened, with thecoming o a relative democratisation in both political and social lie.

During the rst 40 years o the republic, the native bourgeoisie ourished thanksto the capital accumulation supplied by state capitalism. And it started privateindustrial investments. Te private capitalist industry developed by leaps andbounds in this period. And parallel with this, the working class began to growrapidly and stir as well. In the 60s the whole society showed a tendency to pros-per politically and culturally. All sections o the society began to set up its or-ganisations, associations, co-operatives, etc. For the rst time or 40 years theprohibited and suppressed lefist books began to be published publicly. Te so-cialist ideas attracted attention o the broad intellectual sections. Although these

developments began an unstructured process, with leaps and bounds, how be-


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lated a process it was compared to the history o the proletarian movements inEuropean countries!

Tere were important developments concerning the working class movement a-

ter 1960. In 1961 a legal socialist party IP (Workers Party o urkey) was ound-ed, which would become the rst mass party in the history o the republic. It wasounded by trade unionists at rst and then joined by socialist intellectuals. At-tracting immediately the attention o the active workers in the unions, rom the

very beginning IP was very popular, both in the towns and in the rural areas.In 1965 the IP achieved the election o 15 Members to Parliament, taking ad-

vantage o the more democratic system then available. Tese successes encour-aged the workers, and in 1963 a Code o Strike and Collective Bargaining was

won. Te working class continued its struggles afer 1963, encouraged by its suc-cesses. At this time there was only the state controlled conederation, urk-Is,and it became quickly apparent that it was unable and unwilling to support therising economic struggles o the working class. It proved itsel alien to the causeo the workers, and very soon a strong opposition developed within the urk-Isitsel. Te new generation o workers and their leaders were critical about thekind o unionism that is servile to the bourgeois state, under the guise o supra-party and non-political unionism, and they sought to open a new channel orthe trade union struggle. Four unions (Maden-Is, Lastik-Is, Basn-Is, Gda-Is)were expelled rom urk-Is and ounded a new conederation, the DISK (Con-ederation o Revolutionary Workers Unions) in February 1967. Tese unionshad always been in the oreront o the struggles and organised particularly inthe private sector.

Te DISK became a centre o attraction in the union struggle all around urkey,and also became a ocus o the socialist circles working within the proletariat.And then another important turning point in the history o the urkish working

class was reached: the year 1968.Te actions o youth and the wave o general strikes in Europe in 1968 imme-diately inuenced the youth in urkey and mobilised them. And the wave ostruggles o the working class that begun at that time, also went beyond the legalramework o the bourgeoisie, increasing in intensity and breadth, using suchtactics as actory occupations, boycotts, and outlawed strikes. Although theywere developed spontaneously they all contained a revolutionary essence. Tesewere immediately accompanied by the rising demands o the youth in avour

o national independence and the demonstrations and land occupations o thepeasants in the rural areas. Te DISK got stronger, and also the workers belong-


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ing to urk-Is began struggling to leave it and become members o the DISK.

In 1968 the only legal mass lef party was IP. Many lefist circles and individuals,having different political tendencies were carrying out political work within this

party. Te illegal KP, on the other hand, did not try a separate organisation until1973 and it worked within IP, too. In act the majority o the leaders o IP werethe old KP members. In spite o this, there was a complete gap between the oldcadres o KP and young generations, ignorant o the history o the KP. Yet theKP was the oldest, and in some senses the historical party o the urkish work-ing class, and continued to have an effect, directly or indirectly, on many politicalormations in urkey, not excluding the IP.

In the 60s, in the process o political mobilisation in urkey, guerrillaism and

Maoism began to be organised, particularly within the youth movement, as inmany other countries at that time. Because o this and other actors, IP, whichhad united various lef ractions in its body at rst, gradually began to experiencea chronic split. Since then there has never been a comparable mass legal party othe working class in urkey, as in the rst growth period o IP. An unortunatebut inevitable split took place within the IP: guerrillaism and Maoism on theone side and the proletarian revolutionists who continued to deend working inthe proletarian organisations, on the other side.

At this time the state started to organise the religious reactionary movementsand direct them against workers and students, in order to suppress the rising lefmovement. Te Arab-American oil companies like ARAMCO in the MiddleEast, directly nanced these reactionary organisations.

Te bourgeoisie began preparing to attack not only the trade union organisationso the working class, but also against union rights in general. Te bourgeois gov-ernment started the attack by bringing orward legislative measures to close theDISK, and the working class immediately responded with massive count-attacks.On June 15 and 16 a workers demonstration took place, involving over 150,000workers in Istanbul and Izmit. Tese dates, June 15 and 16, 1970 are very signi-cant dates in the history o struggle o the urkish working class. Te streets oIstanbul and Izmit, which are the cradle o the modern urkish working class,were shaken by the strength and virility o the demonstrations during these twodays. On those days, the bosses either hid themselves in their homes or immedi-ately lef Istanbul. Te police and army attacked the workers with guns, resultingin 3 deaths and over 200 injured. Martial law was declared, prohibiting the mass-

es rom leaving their homes, implementing a virtual curew! Tis curew was to


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last or two months, in an attempt to suppress all demonstrations, but despite allthese measures it could not break the resolve o the working class, now rising onan enthusiasm or change. Never beore had there been such a strong lef wingwind blowing.

1970-1980

Te period o the monopolisation o capital in urkeyTis period is the period o the acceleration o the monopolisation in industry.Te usion o bank and industrial capital, the ormation o nance-capital groupslike in the West, and the rise o their role in politics, took place in this period.

And the differentiation among the capitalist class developed urther. For exam-ple, the big bourgeoisie that is based on bank and industrial capital created itsown separate organisation, USIAD, which is now called Club o Riches inurkey. It was established in 1970 and has become a decisive element on politicalpower ever since.

Te distinctive characteristic o capitalist development in this period is the im-plementation o an industrialisation model, based on oreign debts and importsubstitution. Te concrete expression o this was the rapid development in as-sembly-line industry in the 1970s. For example, the automobile industry and du-rable consumer goods industry in urkey were installed as assembly-line indus-tries rom the beginning. Te components were imported rom abroad and thenassembled here. Tose capitalists who invested in these industries made a hugecapital accumulation in a short period o time through giving very low wages tothe workers and increasing the rate o exploitation.

Te Military Coup o 12 March 1971Having considered that it had managed to paciy the working class through op-pressive policies since the beginning o the republic, the urkish bourgeoisie eltcomortable or a long period o time. However, when the bourgeoisie saw thatthe opposition o the working class was growing by leaps and bounds in a periodo relative reedom, then it immediately began to develop a strategy to counter-act this opposition. Tus, afer only ten years, a second military coup came. Teact that the workers movement had developed by leaps and bounds and be-came increasingly militant, with the anti-American acts o the youth increasing

etc., scared both the ruling classes in urkey and the US imperialism. Moreover,


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the currents o anti-Americanism and national independence had also been de-veloping within the army. Te ruling powers ound the solution in staging an-other military coup (12 March 1971) and closed the parliament. As it was rstportrayed as a lefist coup, certain petit-bourgeois revolutionists were extremelymisled. In act it was a reactionary (rightist) coup, carried out under the guid-ance o the US!

In this period o extraordinarily oppressive, semi-military regimes, between 1971and 1974, both the workers movement and the developing socialist movementreceived a harsh blow. Te only legal party o the working class, IP, was closed.Te activities o the trade unions that were DISK affi liates, and the youth asso-ciations, were banned. Tousands o socialist intellectuals, workers, revolution-

ary youths, unionists etc. were arrested and tortured. Te lefist movement wascompletely disintegrated and the organisations scattered. Te urkish bourgeoisstate hanged three leaders o the youth movement, who were university studentsat the age o just above 20, on the charge o violating the constitution. Te aim othe bourgeoisie was to intimidate the revolutionary youth and to isolate the so-cialists and revolutionaries rom the people. Te urkish bourgeoisie turned thisextraordinary political regime (oppressive police state practices) almost into aregular regime in order not to give a respite to the working class.

Tis period o the second military dictatorship lasted 3 years and it was the re-hearsal o the bourgeoisie or the military ascist regime o September 12, 1980. Ithad drawn many lessons or its own sake, not least the introduction o new pro-hibitions to obstruct the development o the lef. It changed the relatively moreliberal Constitution o 1961 entirely, by abolishing all the democratic articles othe old constitution. It introduced new anti-socialist articles into the Penal Code.On the other hand, it dressed the Peoples Party, the 50-years old state party, tomake it seem like a social democratic party, to mislead the working class. Te ar-

chitect o this manipulation was the Prime Minister Ecevit.

Afer 1973 and the rising workers movementIn 1973 new elections were held and in 1974 Ecevits seemingly lef party cameto power. A new political conjuncture was to begin, both or the bourgeoisie andthe lef. Te lef movement was now entirely disintegrated and split into tens onew organisations.

Ideologically and politically there were two main tendencies among this disinte-

grated lef. First, the traditional Stalinist lef tendency that aimed at organising


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among the working class and trade union movement, and ollowed the line othe offi cial CPSU. Secondly, the revolutionary populist tendency, which was or-ganised among the student youth, and the petty bourgeois layers o towns andprovinces. O course the ideological nurturing source o this tendency was alsoStalinism. Teir political line was embodied in Maoism and guerrillaism.

Unortunately, there was not an internationalist communist tendency, organisedon the basis o revolutionary Marxism, in that period. Although there were sometiny intellectual circles deending rotskys ideas and criticising Stalinism, theycould not orm an active political organisation among the lef movement, or evena current o thought, because the Stalinist current was so very strong among theurkish lef movement, and the conception o Stalinist state socialism was so

widely accepted among the socialist intellectuals. At the time, among the lefistso urkey there was, and still is, a strong negative prejudice against rotsky androtskyism. In their opinion rotsky is an enemy o Leninism, an adventurist,a traitor, etc.

In 1973 the KP, which had existed only as an external bureau in Moscow oryears, decided to organise anew on an illegal basis within the country. Tis wasa big step orward or the KP, but even with illegality it enjoyed a rapid andimproving popularity. Te principal reason or this was, that, beside its illegal

organisation, it had also created a broad legal mass movement on its periphery,which was able to affect the trade union movement to a great extent, by dominat-ing the leadership o DISK. Between 1970 and 1980 many members o this ille-gal KP managed to be elected to the executive committees o many unions andlegal mass organisations. Alongside there were also legal associations o youth,teachers, technical employees, and women, having tens o thousands o mem-bers, ounded directly under the partys control. And o course, there were hun-dreds o secret party cells composed o workers in the actories.

Tis method o organising by the KP was, as a matter o act, correct. Unor-tunately, both its political line and leadership were entirely social reormist andclass collaborationist. Because the leadership o the KP was dependent on theSoviet bureaucracy, and ollowed the line decided by Moscow without challenge,the inevitable result was a split in the party, between those wishing to take a morerevolutionary road and the reormist. At this time there were many legal and il-legal socialist parties ormed, but none o them had the effect on the workersmovements as did the KP.

In the period between 1970 and 1980 the growth in the working class movement


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was unprecedented, and at the same time, socialist ideas were spreading amongthe working class. Te DISK, under the direction o the KP, organised or therst time a mass rally in 1976 to celebrate the Mayday, which had been prohib-ited or the past 50 years, and driven almost entirely out o the proletariats mind.200 thousand people joined the rally and the trade union movement organisedstrikes, which were the most prolonged strikes in the history o urkey. Te mostmilitant union o DISK, the union o metal workers, started the strikes, whichcovered 120 actories in the private sector, with 40 thousand workers, and wouldlast 11 months. A wide and strong solidarity movement ormed around thesestrikes. Te youth movement, the movement o labouring women, intellectualsetc. all kept solidarity watch around the strike tents, together with the strikingworkers, during the months o the strikes. Te strikers amilies were not isolated

and lef to themselves, but were offered support rom all these groups.

Te urkish bourgeoisie were terried at these events and correctly anticipatedthat even larger numbers would support the next Mayday celebrations. Tere wasnow a lefward swing in the industrial and political perspectives, the bourgeoisiecould see it, and in May 1977 over 500 thousand people, rom every section osociety, took part in the Mayday celebrations. However the bourgeoisie had al-ready taken its counter measures, preparing every kind o provocation in orderto obstruct the moving lefwards o the masses, coinciding with the growth o thetrade union power. In this counter-revolutionary action the urkish bourgeoisiewas aided by US imperialisms secret services.

Tis great Mayday rally was to witness a bloody provocation, staged by theAmerican and urkish secret services, when the 500 thousand demonstratorswere subjected deliberately to volley re by contra-guerrilla teams, placed in thesurrounding buildings. Te shooting, or being run over by special police vehi-cles, killed around 40 workers.

Te memory o the Mayday o 1977 has never been orgotten in the minds o theworkers and revolutionaries, and is an historical event, when the urkish andAmerican bourgeoisie set out to massacre workers and revolutionaries demon-strating their solidarity. And to celebrate the Mayday, whatever the circumstanc-es, has become a tradition or the revolutionaries o urkey.

Te political atmosphere began to change afer 1977 Mayday, with the bourgeoi-sie stepping up its counter-revolutionary provocations. Once more, it was pre-paring to block the rising o the lefward movement with a military coup, as it al-

ways does. But beore that, the alse social democrat Bulent Ecevit and his party,


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the Republican Peoples Party (CHP), started anticommunist attacks. Ecevit wasalready preparing to break the inuence o the KP in DISK and to paciy DISK.

On the other hand, workers leaders and revolutionaries began to be attacked by

paramilitary-armed gangs, lead by the ascist MHP (Nationalist Movement Par-ty) in the cities, especially in the working class districts. Tey began to kill selec-tively the known gures in the revolutionary struggle and in the workers move-ment. Death lists were being published in the ascist papers, naming the peoplebeing targeted or the next murder. And then political assassinations by thesecontra-guerrilla orces, trained by the CIA, began targeting important politicalgures. Everyday dozens o people were being killed. A complete mass pacica-tion was intended in this way. In this process and in the counter-revolutionary

campaign nearly 5.000 people were killed.Eventually, they killed the president o DISK, Kemal urkler, who was the leadero the metal workers. Te Metal workers are the leading section o the urkishworking class, and Kemal urkler was well known and respected by the wholeworking class and his assassination meant an important turning point along theroad to the military coup. Tere were over 500 thousand workers in his uneralrom both Istanbul and outside Istanbul, unionised workers and non-unionisedworkers. But unortunately the working class movement lacked a really revolu-

tionary leadership, which would carry the struggle orward and resist the mili-tary coup. Te bureaucratic leadership o the KP was retreating to a position ocomplete surrender, compromising shameully with the Ecevit government. TeKP tried to play the role o a priest paciying the working class.

Te military coup o September 12Under these unavourable circumstances the working class movement began toretreat, becoming pacied afer Mayday 1977, and the result was a mixture o

horror, pacism and exhaustion on a mass scale, just as the putschists intended.Te urkish bourgeoisie had decided to control the economic and political crisis,intensied just beore 1980, by tanks, cannons and guns. And in September 12,1980 urkey witnessed the third military coup. Te Constitution and the parlia-ment was abolished, all parties, including also the bourgeois parties, were closed.Te party leaders were arrested, the DISK was shut down, unionists were arrest-ed, and all the collective agreements signed by unions were cancelled, and thenthe workers wages were rozen. In the 12th September coup, the military dicta-

torship arrested tens o thousands o people who were then tortured, with hun-dreds killed, hanged and disabled. Here are some gures:


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- 650 thousand people were arrested, the majority o them were tortured,

- Over 50 thousand people were orced to migrate to European countries as po-litical immigrants,

- 700 death sentences were demanded, 480 o them sentenced to death, 216 weresuspended in the parliament, 48 were hanged,

- Around 200 people were killed under torture,

- 23,677 association were banned.

Te military coup o 12th September is the counter-revolutionary response o thebourgeoisie to the rising lefward movement o the working class and lef politi-

cal movements. Tis ascistic military regime has not only saved the bourgeoisierom its impasse, but also restructured the bourgeois political order on reaction-ary bases, the effects o which are still continuing now. While an impression wasbeing given that, with the calling o parliamentary elections in 1983, the militaryregime had ended, in reality nothing has changed in urkey. Unable to smothertheir ear o the working class and the lef, the bourgeoisie is still trying to main-tain its oppressive regime by dressing it with a so-called parliament. But eventhis cannot save the bourgeois order rom its impasse; on the contrary, it brings itdeeper into the swamp. Now the bourgeoisie with its so-called parliamentary re-

gime can neither deceive the people at home nor the world. Tereore it is strug-gling desperately in its economic, social and political crises.

In short, the various experiences o the past experienced by the European coun-tries; rise and all in the workers movement, massacres, ascist attacks, bloodymilitary dictatorships, etc.; all were experienced successively and intensivelywithin last 40 years in urkey.

One o the objectives o the 12 September regime has been to surpass the do-

mestic market oriented capital accumulation regime, which was prevalent untilthe 80s. Te 24 January Decrees that were the symbol o the military regimein the economic sphere, have given way to a new economic structuring, orientedtowards exports. Te Ozalist line (the urkish version o Tatcherism) that over-turned all obstacles to restructuring, has taken many serious steps towards theintegration o urkey to imperialism. One o these steps is the question o mem-bership to the EU, which is still a big problem.

Te development o capitalism in urkey took a different path rom the classical

path in the West. It is not the civil political orces that marked the oundation o


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the bourgeois republic, but mainly the military bureaucracy. For this reason thebourgeois regime in this land has never worked like the bourgeois democracy inthe West. Whenever elt in trouble in the ace o any escalation o the struggle othe working class and the toiling masses, the bourgeoisie has called on the mili-tary to its rescue and abandoned the political arena to an extra-ordinary orm oregime wherein the military rules supreme. It was also the case when the bour-geoisie carried on its affairs taking reuge behind its traditional saviour, i.e. themilitary, and the military-ascist regime throughout the period o everish struc-tural change o urkish capitalism in the 1980s. It is common place that the mili-tary tutelage regime which constitutes the peculiarity o urkish political lie hasby no means arisen recently.

In Western countries, which are the classical terrain o capitalist development,the political sphere has taken shape and served as a means to develop capitalistprivate property and civil society as an expression o it. But in urkey the tradi-tional bourgeois political sphere has generally been hostile to civil society andsupported only a kind o capitalist process o development which is under stateprotection. Tis mode and structuring o politics which is an extension o thetradition o despotic state tradition has increasingly become hindrance to chang-ing needs o urkish capitalism and the new process underway.

Te need to overcome this hindrance is the real motive behind the act that cer-tain sections o the bourgeoisie in urkey has begun to deend civil politics,which is very late in comparison to the Western countries. On the same histori-cal ground, let alone the act that urkish capitalism has been unable to create aSocial-Democratic Party, it has not even given chance or a liberal tendency todevelop in the political sphere.

In act it is only afer structural economic change carried out under extra-or-dinary regimes in the wake o 1980 that the bourgeois circles took up and pro-

moted these issues in the orm o debates. It is quite opportune here to remindour analyses on this aspect o the process going on in urkey. (For an extensivereading see E.al, Bonapartizmden Faizme [From Bonapartism to Fascism])

When we look into the period preceding the 12 September military-ascist coupwe see that the big bourgeoisie with its various elements in manuacturing, com-merce, banking etc. was now more strengthened and ully established in a syn-thesis o nance-capital. 1980 is a crucial turning point which sets the scene ornance-capital to orce all realms o lie under its hegemony through its octopus-

like tentacles and the long-craved leap orward towards oreign markets.


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At this turning point big capital made its preparations or a ully-edged blow toovercome the hindrances in its way to accomplish a huge capitalist breakthroughinside and go outside at ull speed to oreign markets. From the standpoint onance-capital which has now ully grown and become hegemonic it became in-evitable to overcome the bottleneck created by the mode o accumulation basedon domestic market and carry out structural changes. Because, coupled withthe tendency o recession in world capitalism at the time, the structural crisis ourkish capitalism created by its long-time autarchic mode o operation now be-came mature and the heap o problems reached to great dimensions as the solu-tion had been delayed.

Because o the severe tension between its quest or a breakthrough and the exist-

ing situation, big capital went into offensive in all ronts, economic, political, etc.And while it started its move o structural change by the January 24 Decisions toremove the hindrances on its way, on the other hand it aimed to stop the rise othe working class movement and end the revolutionary situation that threatenedthe bourgeois order through the military regime o 12 September. Te 12 Sep-tember ascism was a serious blow hard to recover rom, resulting in the workingclass being atomized, intimidated and made deeply earul o organised struggle.

Te period afer 12 September 1980Te role o the military in the political lie o urkey, which had already been amajor one, has become more intense and consolidated with the 12 September re-gime. With the blows inicted by the military bureaucracy to the parliamentaryregime and the new legislation brought by it (the 1982 constitution being theoremost which is still in effect) they aimed to construct such a military dictator-ship that would guarantee the role o the military in political lie as i almost eter-nally. Tis situation has resulted in a strengthened position o the military chies

in politics that has been going on or so many years despite the act that by 1983elections the military junta seemingly abandoned power leaving it to parliament.

Although the bloody military dictatorship o September 12 - which was por-trayed as a mild military regime in the West - has begun to dissolve with time,its legacy continues today. For example, the code o laws installed by the military

junta is still basically in orce, although some amendments to the constitutionhave been made recently.

Another important act besides all these is that the military-despotic aspect othe urkish state has been strengthened more and more during the period o the


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national liberation struggle o the Kurdish people in the urkish part o Kurdis-tan.

During this war, waged by the urkish army against Kurdish national resist-

ance, thirty thousand Kurds have been killed, ten thousand have been put in jail,thousands have been tortured, hundreds o thousands o Kurdish peasants havebeen orcibly evicted rom their homelands and their villages have been burned.Forced to migrate to the big cities, these people have been condemned to unem-ployment and hunger.

Afer 1983 there was a kind o bourgeois rule with a parliamentary mechanismon the one hand and those institutions and practices established by the extraor-dinary regime on the other hand, which on the whole was a reak o nature, up

until the general elections o 2002. In other words the urkish parliamentarysystem, which already had a crippled democratic content in comparison to theWestern European examples, was much more crippled due to the impact o the12 September regime up until the elections on 3 November 2002. And broadpopular masses taught a lesson to those political parties whom they see as rep-resentatives o the statist, oppressing and pro-status quo orces by bringing AKPto power.

In the afermath o the 1983 parliamentary elections when neo-liberal windswere blown throughout the world zal was at the steering wheel o economy. Hewas now the prime-minister and had been the architect o the January 24 Deci-sions. And the rules o the economy that had been in the list o untouchables orlong were changed according to the demands o SAD. For instance nation-alist and protective measures such as the law that protects the urkish currencywas abolished and the regime o oreign trade was liberalised. Under zal, atthe expense o decomposing society, urkish capitalism underwent a structuralchange (going international, a deeper integration into imperialist system) in the

interests o nance-capital.urkeys peculiarities are no secret. Military chies have always been at the centreo politics which is unprecedented in European countries. Tis military bureau-cracy has always regarded bourgeois civil attempts to lessen its role in politicsas a domestic threat to the regime and has taken a stand against such attempts.When we consider the period since 1980 it is in a sense indeed diffi cult to pin-point when the extraordinary mode o rule o the bourgeoisie ends and when theordinary bourgeois parliamentary regime begins in urkey, which is different

rom European countries.


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Hence afer 1983 we had a kind o bourgeois rule with a parliamentary mecha-nism on the one hand and those institutions and practices established by the ex-traordinary regime on the other hand, which on the whole was a reak o nature,up until the general elections o 2002. In other words the urkish parliamentarysystem, which already had a crippled democratic content in comparison to theWestern European examples, was much more crippled due to the impact o the12 September regime up until the elections on 3 November 2002. And broadpopular masses taught a lesson to those political parties whom they see as rep-resentatives o the statist, oppressing and pro-status quo orces by bringing AKPto power.

While these times seem to have gone it must not be orgotten that the big bour-

geoisie and its organisations like USIAD were the main supporters o the ascistdictatorship headed by the military junta and subsequently the Bonapartist re-gime under Ozal. Tese orces watched in happiness and submission the movescarried out by the extraordinary regimes to open up the economy and suppressthe revolutionary movement and the workers movement.

Tere are important issues not to be overlooked when we discuss the 12 Sep-tember regime. Te end o ascism in urkey does not resemble the processesin Spain, Greece, Portugal or some Latin American countries. Tere was a blow

coming rom below in these countries when the ascist dictatorships got weak-ened, which was not the case in urkey. Likewise, there were other things thatwere lacked in urkey which happened in those countries, such as a mass move-ment o toilers, revolutionary uprisings or everish mobilisation o political orc-es to divert such a kind o rise rom the road o revolution and revive bourgeoisdemocracy.

In cases where masses revolted to overthrow the ascist military dictatorship, theputschist generals were brought to the court with the orce o the wave o revolt.

But the ascist putsc

a brief history of capitalist development in turkey

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