VOL.400,APRIL4,2003 557Viernesvs.NationalLaborRelationsCommissionG.R.No.108405.April4,2003.*JAIME D. VIERNES, CARLOS R. GARCIA, BERNARDBUSTILLO, DANILO C. BALANAG, FERDINAND DELLA,EDWARDA.ABELLERA,ALEXANDERABANAG,DOMINGOASIA, FRANCISCO BAYUGA, ARTHUR M. ORIBELLO,BUENAVENTURA DE GUZMAN, JR., ROBERT A. ORDOO,BERNARD V. JULARBAL, IGNACIO C. ALINGBAS andLEODEL N. SORIANO, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABORRELATIONS COMMISSION (THIRD DIVISION), andBENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (BENECO),respondents.Labor Law Illegal Dismissal Reinstatement Words and PhrasesReinstatementmeansrestorationtoastateorconditionfromwhichonehadbeen removed or separated.Reinstatement means restoration to a state orcondition from which one had been removed or separated. In case ofprobationary employment, Article 281 of the Labor Code requires theemployer to make known to his employee at the time of the lattersengagement of the reasonable standards under which he may qualify as aregularemployee.Same Same Regular Employees A regular employee is one who isengaged to perform activities which are necessary or desirable in the usualbusiness or trade of the employer, or a casual employee who has renderedat least one year of service, whether continuous or broken, with respect tothe activity in which he is employed.The principle we have enunciated inBrent applies only with respect to fixed term employments. While it is truethat petitioners were initially employed on a fixed term basis as theiremploymentcontractswereonlyforOctober8to31,1990,afterOctober31,1990, they were allowed to continue working in the same capacity as meterreaders without the benefit of a new contract or agreement or without theterm of their employment being fixed anew. After October 31, 1990, theemployment of petitioners is no longer on a fixed term basis. Thecomplexion of the employment relationship of petitioners and privaterespondent is thereby totally changed. Petitioners have attained the status ofregularemployees.UnderArticle280oftheLaborCode,aregularemployeeisonewhoisengagedtoperformactivitieswhicharenecessaryordesirableintheusualbusinessortradeoftheemployer,oracasualemployeewhohasrendered at least one year of service, whether continuous or broken, withrespecttotheactivityinwhichheisemployed.Same Same Same.Clearly therefrom, there are two separateinstanceswherebyitcanbedeterminedthatanemploymentisregular:(1)_______________*SECONDDIVISION.558558 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATEDViernesvs.NationalLaborRelationsCommissionThe particular activity performed by the employee is necessary or desirablein the usual business or trade of the employer or (2) if the employee hasbeenperformingthejobforatleastayear.Same Same Same With the continuation of their employment beyondthe original term, petitioners, have become fullfledged regular employees.Thefactalone,thatpetitionersrenderedserviceforaperiodoflessthansixmonths does not make their employment status as probationary.Hereinpetitioners fall under the first category. They were engaged to performactivities that are necessary to the usual business of private respondent. Weagreewiththelaborarbiterspronouncementthatthejobofameterreaderisnecessarytothebusinessofprivaterespondentbecauseunlessameterreaderrecordstheelectricconsumptionofthesubscribingpublic,therecouldnotbeavalidbasisforbillingthecustomersofprivaterespondent.Thefactthatthepetitioners were allowed to continue working after the expiration of theiremployment contract is evidence of the necessity and desirability of theirservice to private respondents business. In addition, during the preliminaryhearing of the case on February 4, 1991, private respondent even offered toenterintoanothertemporaryemploymentcontractwithpetitioners.Thisonlyprovesprivaterespondentsneedfortheservicesofhereinpetitioners.Withthe continuation of their employment beyond the original term, petitionershave become fullfledged regular employees. The fact alone that petitionershave rendered service for a period of less than six months does not maketheiremploymentstatusasprobationary.SameSameSame Since petitioners are already regular employees atthe time of their illegal dismissal from employment, they are entitled to bereinstated to their former position as regular employees, not merelyprobationary.Sincepetitionersarealreadyregularemployeesatthetimeoftheir illegal dismissal from employment, they are entitled to be reinstated totheirformerpositionasregularemployees,notmerelyprobationary.Same Same Same An illegally dismissed employee is entitled to fullbackwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or theirmonetaryequivalentcomputedfromthetimehiscompensationwaswithheldfromhimuptothetimeofhisactualreinstatement.Astothesecondissue,Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6715, which tookeffect on March 21, 1989, provides that an illegally dismissed employee isentitled to full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefitsor their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation waswithheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. Sincepetitioners were employed on October 8, 1990, the amended provisions ofArticle279oftheLaborCodeshallapplytothepresentcase.Hence,itwaspatentlyerroneous,tantamounttograveabuse559VOL.400,APRIL4,2003 559Viernesvs.NationalLaborRelationsCommissionof discretion on the part of the public respondent in limiting to one year thebackwagesawardedtopetitioners.SameSameSameAnemployerbecomesliabletopayindemnitytoanemployee who has been dismissed if, in effecting such dismissal, theemployer fails or comply with the requirements of due process.Withrespecttothethirdissue,anemployerbecomesliabletopayindemnitytoanemployee who has been dismissed if, in effecting such dismissal, theemployer fails to comply with the requirements of due process. Theindemnity is in the form of nominal damages intended not to penalize theemployer but to vindicate or recognize the employees right to proceduraldue process which was violated by the employer. Under Article 2221 of theCivil Code, nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of theplaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may bevindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying theplaintiffforanylosssufferedbyhim.Same Same Same Backwages are granted on grounds of equity toworkers for earnings lost due to their illegal dismissal from work. On theother hand, the award of indemnity is meant to vindicate or recognize theright of an employee to due process which has been violated by the employer.We do not agree with the ruling of the NLRC that indemnity isincompatible with the award of backwages. These two awards are based ondifferent considerations. Backwages are granted on grounds of equity toworkers for earnings lost due to their illegal dismissal from work. On theother hand, the award of indemnity, as we have earlier held, is meant tovindicate or recognize the right of an employee to due process which hasbeenviolatedbytheemployer.Same Same Same In effecting the dismissal of petitioners from theiremployment, private respondent failed to comply with the provisions ofArticle283oftheLaborCodewhichrequiresanemployertoserveanoticeof dismissal upon the employees sought to be terminated and to theDepartment of Labor, at least one month before the intended date of termination.In the present case, the private respondent, in effecting thedismissal of petitioners from their employment, failed to comply with theprovisions of Article 283 of the Labor Code which requires an employer toserve a notice of dismissal upon the employees sought to be terminated andto the Department of Labor, at least one month before the intended date oftermination. Petitioners were served notice on January 3, 1991 terminatingtheir services, effective December 29, 1990, or retroactively, incontravention of Article 283. This renders the private respondent liable topayindemnitytopetitioners.Same Same Same Rule VIII of the New Rules of Procedure of theNLRCprovidesthatshouldtherebeamotionforreconsiderationenter560560 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATEDViernesvs.NationalLaborRelationsCommissiontainedpursuanttoSection14,RuleVIIoftheseRules,thedecisionshallbeexecuted after ten calendar days from receipt of the resolution on suchmotion.As to the last issue, Article 223 of the Labor Code is plain andclear that the decision of the NLRC shall be final and executory after ten(10) calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties. In addition, Section2(b), Rule VIII of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides thatshouldtherebeamotionforreconsiderationentertainedpursuanttoSection14, Rule VII of these Rules, the decision shall be executory after tencalendardaysfromreceiptoftheresolutiononsuchmotion.Same Same Same Since the Rules allow the filing of a motion forreconsideration of a decision of the NLC, it simply follows that the tendayperiod provided under Article 223 of the Labor Code should be reckonedfrom the date of receipt by the parties of the resolution on such motion.We find nothing inconsistent or contradictory between Article 223 of theLabor Code and Section 2(b), Rule VIII, of the NLRC Rules of Procedure.The aforecited provision of the NLRC Rules of Procedure merely providesfor situations where a motion for reconsideration is filed. Since the RulesallowthefilingofamotionforreconsiderationofadecisionoftheNLRC,itsimply follows that the tenday period provided under Article 223 of theLaborCodeshouldbereckonedfromthedateofreceiptbythepartiesoftheresolution on such motion. In the case at bar, petitioners received theresolutionoftheNLRCdenyingtheirmotionforreconsiderationonOctober22, 1992. Hence, it is on November 2, 1992 that the questioned decisionbecameexecutory.SPECIALCIVILACTIONintheSupremeCourt.Certiorari.ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.NellieM.Olairezforpetitioners.Bustamante,MinasandAssociatesforprivaterespondents.AUSTRIAMARTINEZ,J.:Before us is a petition for certiorari seeking to annul the decisionpromulgated by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)on July 2, 1992 in NLRC CA No. L00038492,1 and its resolutiondated September 24, 1992 denying petitioners motion forreconsideration._______________1 Entitled, Jaime D. Viernes, et al., ComplainantsAppellants, versus BenguetElectric Cooperative, Inc. represented by Gerardo P. Verzosa, Acting GeneralManager,RespondentAppellant.561VOL.400,APRIL4,2003 561Viernesvs.NationalLaborRelationsCommissionThe factual background of this case, as summarized by the LaborArbiter,isasfollows:Fifteen (15) in all, these are consolidated cases for illegal dismissal,underpayment of wages and claim for indemnity pay against a commonrespondent, the Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc., (BENECO for short)representedbyitsActingGeneralManager,GerardoP.Versoza.Complainants services as meter readers were contracted for hardly a1.months duration, or from October 8 to 31, 1990. Their employmentcontracts,couchedinidenticalterms,read:You are hereby appointed as METER READER (APPRENTICE) under BENECONEA Management with compensation at the rate of SIXTYSIX PESOS ANDSEVENTYFIVECENTAVOS(P66.75)perdayfromOctober08to31,1990.xxx.(AnnexB,ComplainantsJointPositionPaper)The said term notwithstanding, the complainants were allowed to workbeyondOctober31,1990,oruntilJanuary2,1991.OnJanuary3,1991,theywere each served their identical notices of termination dated December 29,1990.Thesameread:Please be informed that effective at the close of office hours of December 31, 1990,yourserviceswiththeBENECOwillbeterminated.Yourterminationhasnothingtodo with your performance. Rather, it is because we have to retrench on personnel aswearealreadyoverstaffed.xxx.(AnnexC,CJPP)On the same date, the complainants filed separate complaints for illegaldismissal.Andfollowingtheamendmentofsaidcomplaints,theysubmittedtheir joint position paper on April 4, 1991. Respondent filed its positionpaperonApril2,1991.Itisthecontentionofthecomplainantsthattheywerenotapprenticesbutregularemployeeswhoseserviceswereillegallyandunjustlyterminatedinamannerthatwaswhimsicalandcapricious.Ontheotherhand,therespondentinvokes Article 283 of the Labor Code in defense of the questioneddismissal.2On October 18, 1991, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision, thedispositiveportionofwhichreadsasfollows:WHEREFORE,judgmentisherebyrendered:Dismissing the complaints for illegal dismissal filed by thecomplainantsforlackofmerit.Howeverinviewoftheofferoftherespondent_______________2NLRCRecords,p.110.562562 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATEDViernesvs.NationalLaborRelationsCommission2.A.a)b)c)B.C.to enter into another temporary employment contract with thecomplainants, the respondent is directed to so extend such contractto each complainant, with the exception of Jaime Viernes, and topay each the amount of P2,590.50, which represents a monthssalary, as indemnity for its failure to give complainants the 30daynotice mandated under Article 283 of the Labor Code or, at theoption of the complainants, to pay each financial assistance in theamountofP5,000.00andtheP2,590.50abovementioned.Respondentisalsoordered:Topaycomplainantstheamountrepresentingunderpaymentoftheirwages:Jaime Viernes, Carlos Garcia, Danilo Balanag, Edward Abellera,Francisco Bayuga, Arthur Oribello, Buenaventura de Guzman, Jr.,Robert Ordoo, Bernard Jularbal and Leodel Soriano, P1,994.25eachBernardBustilloandDomingoAsia,P1,838.50eachandFerdinand Della, Alexander Abanag and Ignacio Alingbas,P1,816.25each.To extend to complainant Jaime Viernes an appointment as regularemployee for the position of meter reader, the job he held prior tohis termination, and to pay him P2,590.50 as indemnity, plus theunderpaymentofhiswagesasabovestated.TopayP7,000.00asandforattorneysfees.Nodamages.SOORDERED.3AggrievedbytheLaborArbitersdecision,thecomplainantsandtherespondentfiledtheirrespectiveappealstotheNLRC.OnJuly2,1992,theNLRCmodifieditsjudgment,towit:WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby renderedmodifying the appealed decision by declaring complainants dismissalillegal, thus ordering their reinstatement to their former position as meterreaders or to any equivalent position with payment of backwages limited tooneyearariddeletingtheawardofindemnityandattorneysices.TheawardofunderpaymentofwagesisherebyAFFIRMED.SOORDERED.4On August 27, 1992, complainants filed a Motion for ClarificationandPartialReconsideration.5OnSeptember24,1992,the_______________1.2.3Ibid.4NLRCRecords,p.325.5Id.,atp.328563VOL.400,APRIL4,2003 563Viernesvs.NationalLaborRelationsCommissionNLRC issued a resolution denying the complainants motion forreconsideration.6Hence,complainantsfiledhereinpetition.PrivaterespondentBENECOfileditsCommenttheOfficeoftheSolicitorGeneral(OSG)filedaManifestationandMotioninLieuofComment public respondent NLRC filed its own Comment andpetitioners filed their Manifestation and Motion In Lieu ofConsolidated Reply. Public respondent NLRC, herein petitioners,and private respondent filed their respective memoranda, and theOSG,itsManifestationin1994.Pursuant to our ruling in Rural Bank of Alaminos EmployeesUnionvs.NLRC,7towit:. . . in the decision in the case of St. Martin Funeral Homes vs. NationalLabor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 130866, 295 SCRA 494,promulgatedonSeptember16,1998,thisCourtpronouncedthatpetitionsforcertiorari relating to NLRC decisions must be filed directly with the Courtof Appeals, and labor cases pending before this Court should be referred tothe appellate court for proper disposition. However, in cases where theMemoranda of both parties have been filed with this Court prior to thepromulgationoftheSt.Martindecision,theCourtgenerallyoptstotakethecaseitselfforitsfinaldisposition.8and considering that the parties have filed their respectivememoranda as of .1994, we opt to resolve the issues raised in thepresentpetition.Thepartiesraisedthefollowingissues:Whether the respondent NLRC committed grave abuse ofdiscretion in ordering the reinstatement of petitioners totheir former position as meter readers on probationarystatusinspiteofitsfindingthattheyareregularemployeesunderArticle280oftheLaborCode.Whether the respondent NLRC committed grave abuse ofdiscretion in limiting the backwages of petitioners to oneyear only in spite of its finding that they were illegally3.4.dismissed, which is contrary to the mandate of fullbackwagesuntilactualreinstatementbutnottoexceedthreeyears._______________6Id.,atp.371.7317SCRA669(1999).8Id.,atp.678.564564 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATEDViernesvs.NationalLaborRelationsCommissionWhether the respondent NLRC committed grave abuse ofdiscretionindeletingtheawardofindemnitypaywhichhadbecome final because it was not appealed and in deletingthe award of attorneys fees because of the absence of atrialtypehearing.Whether the mandate of immediately executory on thereinstatementaspectevenpendingappealasprovidedinthedecisionofLaborArbitersequallyappliesinthedecisionofthe National Labor Relations Commission even pendingappeal, by means of a motion for reconsideration of theorder reinstating a dismissed employee or pending appealbecause the case is elevated on certiorari before theSupremeCourt.9Wefindthepetitionpartlymeritorious.As to the first issue: We sustain petitioners claim that theyshouldbereinstatedtotheirformerpositionasmeterreaders,notonaprobationarystatus,butasregularemployees.Reinstatement means restoration to a state or condition fromwhichonehadbeenremovedorseparated.10Incaseofprobationaryemployment,Article281oftheLaborCoderequirestheemployertomakeknowntohisemployeeatthetimeofthelattersengagementofthereasonablestandardsunderwhichhemayqualifyasaregularemployee.A review of the records shows that petitioners have never beenprobationary employees. There is nothing in the letter ofappointment,toindicatethattheiremploymentasmeterreaderswason a probationary basis. It was not shown that petitioners wereinformed by the private respondent, at the time of the lattersemployment, of the reasonable standards under which they couldqualify as regular employees. Instead, petitioners were initiallyengaged to perform their job for a limited duration, theiremploymentbeingfixedforadefiniteperiod,fromOctober8to31,1990.PrivaterespondentsrelianceonthecaseofBrentSchool,Inc.vs.Zamora,11whereinweheldasfollows:Accordingly, and since the entire purpose behind the development oflegislation culminating in the present Article 280 of the Labor Code clearlyappearstohavebeen,asalreadyobserved,topreventcircumventionofthe_______________9Petition,Rollo,p.26.10 Judy Philippines, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 289 SCRA 755, 767(1998)DeGuzmanvs.NationalLaborRelationsCommission,312SCRA266,274(1999).11181SCRA702(1990).565VOL.400,APRIL4,2003 565Viernesvs.NationalLaborRelationsCommissionemployees right to be secure in his tenure, the clause in said articleindiscriminately and completely ruling out all written or oral agreementsconflictingwiththeconceptofregularemploymentasdefinedthereinshouldbe construed to refer to the substantive evil that the Code itself has singledout: agreements entered into precisely to circumvent security of tenure. Itshould have no application to instances where a fixed period of employmentwasagreeduponknowinglyandvoluntarilybytheparties,withoutanyforce,duress or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee andabsent any other circumstances vitiating his consent, or where itsatisfactorily appears that the employer and employee dealt with each otheron more or less equal terms with no moral dominance whatever beingexercisedbytheformeroverthelatter.12ismisplaced.The principle we have enunciated in Brent applies only withrespect to fixed term employments. While it is true that petitionerswere initially employed on a fixed term basis as their employmentcontracts were only for October 8 to 31, 1990, after October 31,1990,theywereallowedtocontinueworkinginthesamecapacityasmeterreaderswithoutthebenefitofanewcontractoragreementorwithout the term of their employment being fixed anew. AfterOctober 31, 1990, the employment of petitioners is no longer on afixedtermbasis.Thecomplexionoftheemploymentrelationshipofpetitioners and private respondent is thereby totally changed.Petitionershaveattainedthestatusofregularemployees.UnderArticle280oftheLaborCode,aregularemployeeisonewho is engaged to perform activities which are necessary ordesirableintheusualbusinessortradeoftheemployer,oracasualemployee who has rendered at least one year of service, whethercontinuous or broken, with respect to the activity in which he isemployed.InDe Leon vs. NLRC,13 and Abasolo vs. NLRC,14 we laid downthetestindeterminingregularemployment,towit:The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular employment is thereasonable connection between the particular activity performed by theemployeeinrelationtotheusualtradeorbusinessoftheemployer.Thetestiswhethertheformerisusuallynecessaryordesirable_______________12Id.,atp.716.13176SCRA615(1989).14346SCRA293(2000).566566 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATEDViernesvs.NationalLaborRelationsCommissionin the usual business or trade of the employer. The connection can bedetermined by considering the nature of the work performed and its relationto the scheme of the particular business or trade in its. entirety. Also if theemployee has been performing the job for at least a year, even if theperformance is not continuous and merely intermittent, the law deemsrepeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence ofthe necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the business. Hence,the employment is considered regular, but only with respect to such activityandwhilesuchactivityexists.15Clearlytherefrom,therearetwoseparateinstanceswherebyitcanbedeterminedthatanemploymentisregular:(1)Theparticularactivityperformed by the employee is necessary or desirable in the usualbusiness or trade of the employer or (2) if the employee has beenperformingthejobforatleastayear.Herein petitioners fall under the first category. They wereengagedtoperformactivitiesthatarenecessarytotheusualbusinessof private respondent. We agree with the labor arbiterspronouncement that the job of a meter reader is necessary to thebusinessofprivaterespondentbecauseunlessameterreaderrecordsthe electric consumption of the subscribing public, there could notbeavalidbasisforbillingthecustomersofprivaterespondent.Thefact that the petitioners were allowed to continue working after theexpirationoftheiremploymentcontractisevidenceofthenecessityand desirability of their service to private respondents business. Inaddition, during the preliminary hearing of the case on February 4,1991, private respondent even offered to enter into anothertemporary employment contract with petitioners. This only provesprivaterespondentsneedfortheservicesofhereinpetitioners.Withthe continuation of their employment beyond the original term,petitioners have become fullfledged regular employees. The factalonethatpetitionershaverenderedserviceforaperiodoflessthansixmonthsdoesnotmaketheiremploymentstatusasprobationary.Since petitioners are already regular employees at the time oftheir illegal dismissal from employment, they are entitled to bereinstated to their former position as regular employees, not merelyprobationary._______________15Id.,atp.304.567VOL.400,APRIL4,2003 567Viernesvs.NationalLaborRelationsCommissionAs to the second issue, Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amendedby R.A. No. 6715, which took effect on March 21, 1989, providesthat an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to full backwages,inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetaryequivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheldfromhimuptothetimeofhisactualreinstatement.Sincepetitionerswere employed on October 8, 1990, the amended provisions ofArticle279oftheLaborCodeshallapplytothepresentcase.Hence,itwaspatentlyerroneous,tantamounttograveabuseofdiscretiononthe part of the public respondent in limiting to one year thebackwagesawardedtopetitioners.With respect to the third issue, an employer becomes liable topay indemnity to an employee who has been dismissed if, ineffecting such dismissal, the employer fails to comply with therequirements of due process.16 The indemnity is in the form ofnominal damages intended not to penalize the employer but tovindicate or recognize the employees right to procedural dueprocesswhichwasviolatedbytheemployer.17UnderArticle2221ofthe Civil Code, nominal damages are adjudicated in order that aright of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by thedefendant,maybevindicatedorrecognized,andnotforthepurposeofindemnifyingtheplaintiffforanylosssufferedbyhim.We do not agree with the ruling of the NLRC that indemnity isincompatible with the award of backwages. These two awards arebased on different considerations. Backwages are granted ongrounds of equity to workers for earnings lost due to their illegaldismissalfromwork.18Ontheotherhand,theawardofindemnity,aswehaveearlierheld,ismeanttovindicateorrecognizetherightofan employee to due process which has been violated by theemployer.In the present case, the private respondent, in effecting thedismissal of petitioners from their employment, failed to complywith_______________16 Kwikway Engineering Works vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 195SCRA526,532(1991)Aureliovs.NationalLaborRelationsCommission,221SCRA432, 443 (1993) Sampaguita Garments Corporation vs. National Labor RelationsCommission,233SCRA260,265(1994).17BetterBuildings,Inc.vs.NationalLaborRelationsCommission,283SCRA242,251 (1997) Iran vs. National Labor Relations Commission, (Fourth Division), 289SCRA433,442(1998).18Paguiovs.PLDT,G.R.No.154072,December3,2002,393SCRA379.568568 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATEDViernesvs.NationalLaborRelationsCommissionthe provisions of Article 283 of the Labor Code which requires anemployer to serve a notice of dismissal upon the employees soughttobeterminatedandtotheDepartmentofLabor,atleastonemonthbefore the intended date of termination. Petitioners were servednotice on January 3, 1991 terminating their services, effectiveDecember 29, 1990, or retroactively, in contravention of Article283. This renders the private respondent liable to pay indemnity topetitioners.Thus, we find that the NLRC committed grave abuse ofdiscretionindeletingtheawardofindemnity.InDelValvs.NLRC,19we held that the award of indemnity ranges from P1,000.00 toP10,000.00dependingontheparticularcircumstancesofeachcase.In the present case, the amount of indemnity awarded by the laborarbiter is P2,590.50, which is equivalent to petitioners onemonthsalary. We find no cogent reason to modify said award, for beingjustandreasonable.As to the award of attorneys fees, the same is justified by theprovisionsofArticle111oftheLaborCode,towit:Art. 111. Attorneys fees.(a) In cases of unlawful withholding of wagesthe culpable party may be assessed attorneys fees equivalent to ten percentoftheamountofwagesrecovered.(b) It shall be unlawful for any person to demand or accept, in anyjudicial or administrative proceedings for the recovery of the wages,attorneysfeeswhichexceedtenpercentoftheamountofwagesrecovered.Astothelastissue,Article223oftheLaborCodeisplainandclearthatthedecisionoftheNLRCshallbefinalandexecutoryafterten(10) calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties. In addition,Section2(b),RuleVIIIoftheNewRulesofProcedureoftheNLRCprovides that should there be a motion for reconsiderationentertained pursuant to Section 14, Rule VII of these Rules, thedecision shall be executory after ten calendar days from receipt oftheresolutiononsuchmotion.We find nothing inconsistent or contradictory between Article223 of the Labor Code and Section 2(b), Rule VIII, of the NLRCRulesofProcedure.TheaforecitedprovisionoftheNLRCRulesofProcedure merely provides for situations where a motion forreconsiderationisfiled.SincetheRulesallowthefilingofamotionfor_______________19296SCRA283,290(1998).569VOL.400,APRIL4,2003 569Viernesvs.NationalLaborRelationsCommissionreconsiderationofadecisionoftheNLRC,itsimplyfollowsthatthetendayperiodprovidedunderArticle223oftheLaborCodeshouldbereckonedfromthedateofreceiptbythepartiesoftheresolutiononsuchmotion.Inthecaseatbar,petitionersreceivedtheresolutionof the NLRC denying their motion for reconsideration on October22, 1992. Hence, it is on November 2, 1992 that the questioneddecisionbecameexecutory.WHEREFORE,thepetitionispartiallyGRANTED.Thedecisionof the National Labor Relations Commission dated July 2, 1992 isMODIFIED. Private respondent Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc.(BENECO)isherebyorderedtoreinstatepetitionerstotheirformeror substantially equivalent position as regular employees, withoutlossofseniorityrightsandotherprivilegesappurtenantthereto,withfull backwages from the time of their dismissal until they areactually reinstated. The amount of P2,590.50 awarded by the laborarbiter as indemnity to petitioners is REINSTATED. Privaterespondentisalsoorderedtopayattorneysfeesintheamountoftenpercent(10%)ofthetotalmonetaryawardduetothepetitioners.Inall other respects the assailed decision and resolution areAFFIRMED.CostsagainstprivaterespondentBENECO.SOORDERED. Bellosillo(Chairman),Mendoza,Quisumbing and Callejo,Sr.,JJ.,concur.Petitionpartiallygranted.Notes.Proceduraldueprocessrequiresthattheemployerservethe employees to be dismissed two (2) written notices before thetermination of their employment is effected: (a) the first, to apprisethem of the particular acts or omission for which their dismissal issought and (b) the second, to inform them of the decision of theemployer that they are being dismissed. (Perpetual Help CreditCooperative,Inc.vs.Faburada,366SCRA693[2001])An illegally dismissed employee is entitled to the twin relief of(a) either reinstatement or separation pay, if reinstatement is nolongerviable,and(b)backwages.Theawardofonedoesnotbartheother.(St.MichaelsInstitutevs.Santos,371SCRA383[2001])o0o570Copyright2015CentralBookSupply,Inc.Allrightsreserved.