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Habermas and Foucault: Thinkers for Civil Society?Author(s): Bent FlyvbjergSource: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 49, No. 2 (Jun., 1998), pp. 210-233Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The London School of Economics and Political ScienceStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/591310 .Accessed: 18/04/2011 02:03

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Bent Flyvbjerg

Habermas and Foucault: hinkers for civilsociety?l

ABSTRACT

Taken together, he works ofJurgen Habermas nd Michel Foucault highlight anessential ension n modernity. This s the tension between he normative nd thereal, between what should be done and what s actually done. Understanding histension is crucial to understanding modern democracy, what it is and what itcould be. It has been argued that an effective way of making democracy trongeris to strengthen civil society. This article contains a comparative nalysis of thecentral deas of Habermas nd Foucault as they pertain o the question of democ-racy and civil society. More specifically, he discourse ethics of Habermas s con-trasted with the power analytics nd ethics of Foucault valuating heir usefulnessfor those interested in understanding, and bringing about, democratic socialchange.

KEYWORDS: ivil ociety; democracy; modernity; ower; Michel Foucault;Jurgen Habermas

1.

Havel (1993:3) has observed hat a strong civil society s a crucial conditionof strong democracy. Empowering ivil society s a central concern for theproject of democracy, ust as the question of how best to think about suchempowerment s important o social and political theory. But what is 'civilsociety'? A search for clear definitions n the relevant iterature s in vain.Not because the concept lacks definitions; rather the definitions are toomultiple and varied to bring clarity. Most writers on civil society agree,however, hat civil society has an institutional ore constituted by voluntary

associations outside the sphere of the state and the economy. Such associ-ations range from, for example, churches, cultural associations, port clubsand debating societies to independent media, academies, groups of con-cerned citizens, grass-roots nitiatives nd organizations f gender, race andsexuality, all the way to occupational associations, political parties andlabour unions (Habermas 1992a: 453).

Brit. Jrzl. of Sociolon Volume no. 49 Issue no. 2 June 1998 ISSN 0007-1315 C) London School of Economics 1998

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Habermas and Foucault

211The fundamental act of citizenship in a pluralist democracy s that of

forming an association of this kind. Keane (1988a:14) ascribes to these

associations he task of maintaining and redefining he boundaries betweencivil society and state through two interdependent and simultaneous pro-cesses: the expansion of social equality and liberty, and the restructuringand democratizing f state nstitutions. This explains he importance of civilsociety to democracy. That importance s supported not only by social andpolitical theory but by historical-empirical vidence as well (Putnam 1993).

The works ofJurgen Habermas and Michel Foucault highlight an essen-tial tension in modernity. This is the tension between consensus and con-flict. With a point of departure n Kant, Habermas s the philosopher of

Moralitat ased on consensus. Foucault, ollowing Nietzsche, s the philoso-pher of wirkliche istorie real history) told in terms of conflict and power.This article presents a comparative nalysis of the central ideas of Haber-mas and Foucault as they pertain to the issue of empowering civil societyand democracy. We will ask whether such empowerment s best understood,and acted, in terms of consensus, or whether conflict is a more suitableframe of reference. Keane (1988b:21) xplicitlywarns s that nequality nddomination has been built into the concept of 'civil society' rom the start.Historically, civil ociety s established after the image of the civilised Euro-

pean] male individual,' Keane says, 'it rests on a foundation of excludedwomen, who are expected to live under conditions of household despot-ism'. Today, the problem of exclusion is raised not only by gender groupsbut also by groups defining themselves on the basis of, for instance, eth-nicity and sexuality. Clearly, f presently we are to build anything - andsomething as important as democracy on the concept of civil society, weneed to deal with the problems of exclusion, difference, diversity nd thepolitics of identity. Therefore, as a sub-theme o this article we will ask, whatdo Habermas and Foucault have to contribute to this task?

2.

'With Kant, the modern age is inaugurated,' says Habermas (1987:260),who cites the importance of Kant's attempt to develop a universal rationalfoundation for democratic nstitutions.2 Habermas agrees with Kant as tothe need to develop such a foundation for democracy and its institutions,

but he points out that Kant ailed to achieve his goal. According o Haber-mas (1987: 18-21, 302), this was because Kant's hinking was based upon asubjectwentered ationality. Moreover, Habermas points out that the laterphilosophers, from Hegel and Marx to contemporary hinkers, have alsobeen unable to develop the much sought-after ational and universal oun-dation for such social institutions. According o Habermas 1987: 294), thisis because they have all worked within a tradition he calls, 'the philosophyof the subject'.

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212 Bent Flyvbjerg

Most contemporary philosophers and social scientists have accepted theconsequences of more than two millennia of failed attempts o establish a

universal onstitution of philosophy, ocial science and social organization,having concluded that such a foundation does not seem feasible. NotHabermas, however, who thinks that his own work can provide this consti-tution, and that the consequences of abandoning it are unacceptable.Without a universally onstituted philosophy, science and democracy, aysHabermas, he result would be contextualism, relativism nd nihilism; allof which Habermas ees as dangerous.

According to Habermas, he problem with Kant and with subsequentthinkers on modernity s not that they were mistaken n their goal of con-

stituting society rationally, but that they had the wrong ideas of how toachieve the goal. For Habermas, he path toward a rational constitution andthe establishment of a bulwark against relativism s a reorientation romearlier philosophers' ocus on subjectivity, ithin which Habermas lassifiesboth Hegel's 'world spirit' and Marx's working lass,' to a focus on inter-subjectivity. And Habermas's own work, particularly his 'theory of com-municative action' and 'discourse ethics', is located in the intersubjectiveapproach to the problematic of modernity (Habermas 1983, 1987, 1990,1993).

The goal of Habermas's heory of communicative ction is that of 'clari-fying the presuppositions f the rationality f processes of reaching under-standing, which may be presumed to be universal because they areunavoidable' (Haberrnas 1985:196). In his Philosophical Discourse of Mod-ernity, Habermas develops his intersubjective pproach o modernity usingthe concept of 'communicative ationality'.

The communicative ationality ecalls older ideas of logos, inasmuch asit brings along with it the connotations of a noncoercively unifying, con-sensus-building orce of a discourse n which the participants vercometheir at first subjectively based views in favor of a rationally motivatedagreement (Habermas 1987: 294, 315).

Although Habermas ees communicative ationality s being threatened byactual modern society, he nevertheless argues that the core of communi-cative rationality, the unconstrained, unifying, consensus-bringing orce ofargumentative peech', is a 'central experience' n the life of a human being(Habermas 1983: 10). According to Habermas (1983: 316), this centralexperience is inherent in human social life: 'Communicative eason is

directly mplicated n social life processes nsofar as acts of mutual under-standing take on the role of a mechanism or coordinating action'. Haber-mas leaves no doubt that by 'inherent' he means universally nherent. Theuniversality derives from the fact that for Habermas human social life isbased upon processes or establishing eciprocal understanding. These pro-cesses are assumed to be 'universal because they are unavoidable' Haber-mas 1985: 196). In an earlier formulation, Habermas 1979: 97) states thisview even more clearly

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In action oriented to reaching understanding, alidity laims are 'always 213already' mplicitly aised. These universal laims s . are set in the generalstructures of possible communication. n these validity laims communi-cation theory can locate a gentle, but obstinate, a never silent althoughseldom redeemed claim to reason, a claim that must be recognised defacto whenever and wherever here is to be consensual action.

The consequence, for Habermas, s that human beings are defined asdemocratic beings, as homo democraticus.

As for the validity claims, Habermas (1990: 93) explains that validity s

defined as consensus without force: 'a contested norm cannot meet withthe consent of the participants n a practical discourse unless . . . all affectedcan freely [zwanglos] accept the consequences and the side effects that thegeneral observance of a controversial orm can be expected to have for thesatisfaction f the interests of each individual' (italics n original). This prin-ciple of validity, Habermas (1990: 120-1) calls '(U)', the 'universalisationprinciple' of discourse ethics. Similarly, n a key passage on truth, Haber-mas (1990: 198) states: Argumentation nsures that all concerned in prin-ciple take part, freely and equally, n a cooperative earch for truth, where

nothing coerces anyone except the force of the better argument'. The only'force' which is active n the ideal speech situation and in communicativerationality s thus this 'force of the better argument', which consequentlyobtains a critical place in Habermas's work.

Validity nd truth are ensured where the participants n a given discourserespect five key processual requirements of discourse ethics: (1) no partyaffected by what is being discussed should be excluded from the discourse(the requirement of generality); (2) all participants should have equalpossibility o present and criticize validity laims n the process of discourse

(autonomy); (3) participants must be willing and able to empathize witheach other's validity claims (ideal role taking); (4) existing power differ-ences between participants must be neutralized uch that these differenceshave no effect on the creation of consensus (power neutrality); nd (5) par-ticipants must openly explain their goals and intentions and in this con-nection desist from strategic action (transparence) (Habermas 1993: 31,1990: 65-6, Kettner 1993). Finally, given the implications of the first fiverequirements, we could add a sixth: unlimited time.

In a society following this model, citizenship would be defined in terms

of taking part n public debate. Participation s discursive participation. Andparticipation s detached articipation, n as much as communicative ation-ality requires ideal role taking, power neutrality, etc. Habermas's model,i.e., discourse ethics, should not be confused with contingent types of bar-gaining or with models of strategically egotiated compromises among con-flicting particular interests. What is missing in strategic pursuits andrational-choice models is the recourse to ultimate normative ustificationthat Habermas laims to give us (Dallmayr 990: 5). Empirically, Habermas

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214

Bent7yvbjerg

sees theew social movementsas agents of communicative

ationality nd

of hangen the publicsphere.

Habermas'sefinitionsof discourse ethics and

communicative ration-

ality,ndhe proceduralequirements mentioned above, make t clear

that

wearealking about proceduralas opposed to substantive

ationality: Dis-

coursethics does not setup substantive rientations.

nstead t establishes

aprocedureased on presuppositionsnd designed to guarantee

he impar-

tialityfhe process of judging'(Habermas 1990: 122).

Habermas s a uni-

versalistic,top-down'moralist as concerns process:

the rules for correct

processre normativelyiven in advance, n the

form of the requirements

for thedeal speech situation.Conversely, s regards content,

Habermas s

abottom-up'ituationalist:hat s right and true in

a given communicative

processs determined solelyby the participants n that process.

As aonsequence the studyof processes or establishing

consensus and

thealiditylaims on whichthe processes are built

stands at the centre of

Habermas'sork. Habermas'sview of the democratic

process is directly

linkedojudicial institutionalization:I wish to conceive of the

democratic

procedures the legal institutionalizationf those forms of communication

necessaryor rational politicalwill formation' Habermas

undated: 15) says.

Onhe relationship betweenlaw and power in this

process, Habermas

(undated:8)tatesthat ' authorisation fpower

by aw and the sanctioningof law

byower ust both occuruno acto' (emphasis n original). Habermas

hus

makest clear that he operateswithin a perspective of law

and sovereignty.

As ewill see below, thisis a perspective which

contrasts with Foucault

(1980a:7-8) who findsthis conception of power

'by no means adequate'.

Foucault1980a: 82, 90)says about his own 'analytics

f power' that it 'can

beonstituted nly if it freesitself completely rom [this]

representation f

powerhat I would term... "juridico-discursive"

. . a certain image of

power-law,f power-sovereignty'.t is in this connection

that Foucault

(1980a:9) madehis famous argument o

'cut off the head of theking' in

politicalnalysis nd replace t by a decentred understandingf power. For

Habermashe head of theking is still very much on,

in the sense that sov-

ereigntys a prerequisiteor the regulation of power

by law.

Habermas s substantiallymore optimistic and uncritical

about mod-

ernityhan both Max Weberand members of the Frankfurt

chool, such as

MaxHorkheimer andTheodor Adorno. Habermas's

main 'methods of

progress', or instance orstrengthening ivilsociety,

are the writing of con-

stitutions nd institutionaldevelopment, which thereby

become central

elements nand endpoints or Habermas's

roject. t is hard to over-empha-

size he importance of this point. Habermas 1994: 514)quite simply sees

constitutions s the maindevice for uniting citizens

n a pluralist ociety

What unites the citizensof a society shaped by social,

cultural, and philo-

sophical [weltanschaulich]pluralism are first of all

the abstract principles

of an artificial epublicanorder, created through

the medium of law.

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Habermas and Foucault 215

If Habermas s right about the importance of constitution-writing nd insti-tutional reforms, he prospects ook good indeed for changing government

in a more democratic direction by means of discourse ethics and the theoryof communicative rationality. The problem, however, as pointed out byPutnam (1993: 17-8), is that ' [t]wo centuries of constitution-writing roundthe world warn us . . . that designers of new institutions are often writing onwater . . That institutional reforms alter behavior s an hypothesis, not anaxiom.' The problem with Habermas s that he has the axiom and thehypothesis reversed: he takes or granted that which should be subjected oempirical and historical est.

The basic weakness of Habermas's project is its lack of agreement

between ideal and reality, between intentions and their implementation.This incongruity pervades both the most general as well as the most con-crete phenomena of modernity and it is rooted in an insufficient concep-tion of power. Habermas himself observes that discourse cannot by itselfinsure that the conditions for discourse ethics and democracy are met. Butdiscourse about discourse ethics is all Habermas has to offer. This is thefundamental political dilemma n Habermas's hinking: he describes o usthe utopia of communicative ationality but not how to get there. Haber-mas (1990: 209) himself mentions lack of 'crucial institutions', lack of

'crucial socialization' and 'poverty, abuse, and degradation' as barriers odiscursive decision making. But he has little to say about the relations ofpower that create these barriers and how power may be changed in orderto begin the kinds of institutional and educational change, improvementsin welfare, and enforcement of basic human rights that could help lowerthe barriers. n short, Habermas acks the kind of concrete understandingof relations of power that is needed for political change.

With his characteristically omprehensive approach, Habermas (1987:322) lets us know that his theory of communicative action opens him to

criticism as an idealist: It is not so simple to counter the suspicion hat withthe concept of action oriented to validity laims, he idealism of a pure, non-situated reason slips in again'. I will argue here that not only is it difficultto counter this suspicion, t is impossible. And this impossibility onstitutesa fundamental problem in Habermas's work.

'There is a point in every philosophy,' writes Nietzsche (1966:15[8]),'when the philosopher's "conviction" ppears on the stage'.3 For Habermasthat point is the foundation of his ideal speech situation and universal alid-ity claims upon a Kirkegaardian leap of faith'.4 Habermas, as mentioned,

states that consensus-seeking nd freedom from domination are universallyinherent as forces in human conversation, and he emphasizes these par-ticular aspects. Other important philosophers and social thinkers havetended to emphasize the exact opposite. Machiavelli (1984: 96), whomCrick (1983: 1S, 17) and others have called 'a most worthy humanist' and'distinctly modern', and whom, like Habermas, s concerned with 'the busi-ness of good government,' tates: One can make this generalisation aboutmen: they are ungrateful, ickle, iars, and deceivers'. Less radically, ut still

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Bent7yvbjerg

in ontrasto Habermas, are statementsby Nietzsche, Foucault, Derrida

andanythers that communications at all times already penetrated

by

power:power s always resent', saysFoucault (1988: 11, 18). It is therefore

meaningless,ccording o these thinkers,o operate with a concept of com-

municationn which power s absent.

Fortudents of power, communications more typically haracterized y

non-rationalhetoric and maintenanceof interests han by freedom from

dominationnd consensus-seeking.n rhetoric, 'validity' s established

via

the ode f communicatione.g., eloquence, hidden control,

rationaliz-

ation,harisma, using dependencyrelations between participants

rather

thanhrough rational argumentsoncerning he matter at hand. Seen

from

thiserspective Habermas (1987:297-8) seems overlynaive andidealistic

whene contrasts successful' with'distorted' utterance n human conver-

sation,ecause success n rhetorics associated precisely with distortion.

Whether he communicative r therhetorical position is 'correct' s

not

importantere. What is decisive,rather, is that a non-idealistic

point of

departure ust take account ofthe fact that both positions are

possible,

andven simultaneously ossible.In an empirical-scientific ontext,

some-

thingo which Habermas otherwiseakes great pains to define himself,

the

question f communicative rationalityversus rhetoric must therefore

remainpen. The question mustbe settled by concrete examination

of the

caset hand. The researcher mustask how communication akes place, and

howolitics and democracy operate.Is communication characterized

by

consensus-seeking nd absenceof power? Or is communication

he exer-

cise f power and rhetoric?How do consensus-seeking and

rhetoric,

freedomrom domination and exerciseof power, eventually ome together

inndividual acts of communication?5The basic question being raised

here is whether one can meaningfully

distinguish ationality nd powerfrom each other in communication

and

whether ationality an be viewedn isolation from power, as does

Haber-

mas. o assume an answer o thisquestion a przorz sjust as invalid as pre-

suming hat one can ultimatelyanswer the biblical question of

whether

humans re basically good or basicallyvil. And to assume either position

exante, to universalize t and builda theory upon it, as Habermas

does,

makes or problematic philosophyand speculative social science.

This is

one eason we have to be cautiouswhen using the theory of communicative

rationality o understand and actin relation to civil society.6

Constituting ationality and democracyon a leap of faith is hardly sus-

tainable. Habermas here seemsto forget his own axiom that philosophical

questions ught to be subject oempirical verification. And it is precisely n

this sense that Habermas mustbe seen as utopian. Richard Rorty

does not

use these exact words, but it isnevertheless he same issues which

impel

Rorty 1989: 68) to criticize communicativeationality or having religious

status n Habermas's hinking, andfor being 'a healing and unitring

power

which will do the work once doneby God'. As Rorty says, 'We no

longer

need [that]'.

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217abermas and Foucault

There may be a substantial element of truth in the benefits of consti-tution-writing a la Habermas. And Habermas's home country, Germany,

clearly needed new constitutional principles after World War II, a fact thatseems to have been formative for Habermas's thinking. But Habermas(1994: 513-4) relies on something as weak as Verfassungspatriotismus consti-tutional patriotism) as the main means to have constitutional principlestake root and gain practical importance in a society

[C]onstitutional principles can only take root in the hearts of citizensonce they have had good experiences with democratic institutions andhave accustomed themselves to conditions of political freedom. In sodoing, they also learn, within the prevailing national context, to com-prehend the republic and its Constitution as an attainment. Without ahistorical, consciously formed vision of this kind, patriotic ties derivingfrom and relating to the Constitution cannot come about. For such tiesare connected, for example, with pride in a successful civil rights move-ment.

Studies of struggles over the actual writing, implementation and modifi-cation of real constitutions in real societies prove this account - with itsemphasis on conflict-free phenomena like 'good experiences', 'vision' and

'pride' - to be far from sufficient (Putnam 1993). Something infinitelymore complex than these phenomena are at work in real life situations,perhaps because humans are infinitely more complex than Habermas'shomo democraticus. eople know how to be, at the same time, tribal anddemocratic, dissidents and patriots, experts atjudging how far a democraticconstitution can be bent and used in non-democratic ways for personal andgroup advantage (Flyvbjerg 1998).

Machiavelli is a more enlightened guide to social and political changethan Habermas when it comes to constitution-writing. In The Discourses

Machiavelli (1983: 111-2[I.3]) recapitulates that '[a]ll writers on politicshave pointed out . . . that in constituting and legislating for a common-wealth it must be taken for granted that all men are wicked and that theywill always give vent to the malignity that is in their minds when opportunityoffers'.7 If Machiavelli and other writers are right in this 'worst-case' think-ing, then we might clearly end up in trouble if we use Habermas's discourseethics as a basis for organizing our society, as Habermas advocates we do,since discourse ethics contains no checks and balances - other than anabstract appeal to reason - to control the wickedness which Machiavelli

talks about. Such wickedness is assumed away by Habermas's leap of faithfor the good. History teaches us, however, that assuming evil away may givefree reign to evil. Thus, the lesson to be learnt from Machiavelli is not somuch that moralism is hypocrisy. The lesson is that the first step to becom-ing moral is realizing we are not.

Furthermore, by determining validity, truth, justice, etc., as an outcomeof 'the better argument', Habermas simply moves the problems of determi-nation from the former concepts to the latter. As Bernstein (1992: 220)

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218

Bent7yvbjerg

correctlyoints out, 'the betterargument', and with it communicative

rationality,s an empiricallyempty concept: 'Abstractly, there

is something

enormouslyttractiveabout Habermas's appeal to the

"force of the better

argument"ntil we ask ourselveswhat this means and presupposes'. The

problemere is that in non-trivialsituations there are few clear

criteria for

determining hat is consideredan argument, how good it is,

and how

differentrguments are to beevaluated against each other.

This does not

meanhat we should not attemptto identify arguments and evaluate

them.

YetsBernstein (1992: 221) states,'Any society must have some

procedures

forealing with conflicts thatcannot be resolved by argumentation

- even

whenll parties are committedto rational argumentation.'

In real civil

society-s opposedto Habermas's ideal types - it

is precisely these kinds

ofonflicts which are of interest,both empirically and normatively.

Agnes Heller, Albrecht Wellmer,Herman Lubbe and Niklas Luhmann

havexpressed similarly strongcriticisms of discourse ethics.

In comment-

ingpon Habermas's universalizationprinciple (U) mentioned earlier,

Heller1984-5: 7) simply rejectsthe value of Habermas's approach:

'Put

bluntly,f we look to moral philosophyfor guidance in our actions here

and

now, e cannot obtain anypositive guidance from the

Habermasian

reformulation f the categoricalimperative'. Wellmer (1986:

63) is equally

harsh hen hewrites that adhering to the

universalization principle in

moraludgment 'would makejustified moral judgment an impossibility

[einem ing der Unmoglichkeit]'.t the level of institutional analysis,

Lubbe

(1990) nd Luhmann commentsthat upholding any concrete

institutions

tohe demands of discourseethics would paralyse institutional

life to the

point f a breakdown (Benhabib1990).

Even Habermas's most sympatheticinterpreters, such as Seyla Benhabib

andAlessandro Ferrara, havebegun to criticize Habermas

for his formal-

ism,dealism and insensitivityto context. They are trying to

provide a cor-

rective o Habermas'sthinking on precisely these

weak points and to

introduce an element of phronesisnto critical theory (Ferrara 1989).8

I

would rgue that critical theoryand Habermas's work also need

to bring in

theelement of power. In hisBetween acts and Norms and other

recent work,

Habermas (1996a, b; 1995) hasattempted to deal with power,

and he has,

at he same time, developeda deeper analysis of civil society

(Carleheden

and Rene 1996). Despite theseefforts, however, Habermas's

approach

remains strongly normative andprocedural, paying scant attention

to the

preconditions of actual discourse,to substantive ethical values

and to the

problem ofhow communicative rationality

gets a foothold in society in the

face of massive non-communicative forces. Habermas also continues todis-

regard the particular problemsrelating to identity and cultural

divisions as

well as the non-discursive waysof safeguarding reason that are

being devel-

oped by so-called minority groupsand new social movements.

Habermas's universalizationof the democracy problematic,

besides

being unsustainable, may alsobe unnecessary. For instance,

the groups in

civil society which workedfor the expansion of suffrage

from

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property-owning men to include all adult men did not necessarily have anyultimate democratic vision that voting rights should also include women.

Nevertheless, their efforts unwittingly laid the groundwork for the subse-quent enfranchisement of women. Similarly, those civil rights groups whoworked for the right to vote for adult women did not necessarily envisage asituation where suffrage would also include 18-year-olds, even though thislater came to pass in many countries. The struggle was carried out from caseto case and utilized the arguments and means which worked in the specificsocio-historical context. This mode of action is also pertinent to today's newsocial movements, where we still do not know what will be meant by democ-racy in the future; we know only that, as democrats, we would like to have

more of it.Rorty (1991: 190) is correct in noting that the 'cash value' of Habermas's

notions of discourse ethics and communicative rationality consists of thefamiliar political freedoms of modern liberal democracies, freedoms thatare essential to the functioning of civil society. But such notions are not'foundations' or 'defences' of free institutions; they are those institutions,says Rorty: 'We did not learn about the importance of these institutions . . .by thinking through the nature of Reason or Man or Society; we learnedabout this the hard way, by watching what happened when those institutions

were set aside'.The vocabulary of Enlightenment rationalism, although it was essential

to the beginning of liberal democracy, has become an impediment to thepreservation and progress of democratic societies (Rorty 1989: 44). Onereason for this is that Enlightenment rationalism has little to offer in under-standing power and in understanding the related discrepancy betweenformal rationality and RBalrationalitat (real rationality) in modern democ-racies. In staying close to the Enlightenment vocabulary Habermas hasdeveloped little understanding of power and thus tends to become part of

the problem he wishes to solve. Habermas's efforts to achieve more ration-ality and democracy, however laudable, draw attention away from criticalrelations of power. The neglect of power is unfortunate, because it is pre-cisely by paying attention to power relations that we may achieve moredemocracy. If our goal is to move toward Habermas's ideal - freedom fromdomination, more democracy, a strong civil society- then our first task isnot to understand the utopia of communicative rationality, but to under-stand the realities of power. Here we turn to the work of Michel Foucault,who has tried to develop such an understanding.

3.

Both Foucault and Habermas are political thinkers. Habermas's thinking iswell developed as concerns political ideals, but weak in its understandingof actual political processes. Foucault's thinking, conversely, is weak withreference to generalized ideals - Foucault is a declared opponent of ideals,

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220

Bentlyvbjerg

understoods definitive answersto Kant's question, 'What ought

I to do?'

or enin'sWhat is to be done?'- but his work reflects a sophisticated

understandingf Realpolitik.Both Foucault and Habermas

agree that in

politicsne must 'side withreason'. Referring to Habermas and similar

thinkers,owever, Foucault(1980b) warns that 'to respect

rationalism as

andeal hould never constitutea blackmail to prevent the analysis

of the

rationalitieseally at work' (Rajchman1988: 170). In the following

com-

parisonf Foucault and Habermas,emphasis will be placed on

what

Descombes1987) has calledthe 'American Foucault', the

Foucault who

sawiberal democracy as a promisingsocial experiment and who regarded

himselfs a citizen in a democraticsociety working on the project

of human

liberty.Foucault was familiar with the work of Habermas and the Frankfurt

School,ust as Habermas is familiarwith the work of Foucault. Foucault

occasionallyven built uponthe work of Habermas which

is a fact of some

significance or someone whorarely built upon contemporary

philoso-

phers.n an interview, Foucault(1984a: 248) said he was 'completely

in

agreement' ith Habermas regardingthe importance of Kant. 'If one

aban-

donshe work of Kant', explainedFoucault, 'one runs the risk of

lapsing

intorrationality'. And, likeHabermas, Foucault was unequivocal

in his

evaluation f thesignificance of rationality as

an object of study. Foucault

suggests, owever, that thework of Kant might have been too narrowly

interpreted y Habermas andhis followers. ' [I]f the Kantian

question was

that f knowing what limits knowledgehas to renounce transgressing',

says

Foucault 1984b: 45), 'it seemsto me that the critical question

today has to

beurned back into a positiveone . . . The point, in brief, is

to transform

the ritique conducted in theform of necessary limitation

into a practical

critique hat takes the formof a possible transgression'.

This entails an

obvious onsequence, accordingto Foucault (1984b: 45-6), namely

'that

criticism sno longer going to be practiced

in the search for formal struc-

tureswith universal value, but rather as a historical investigation'.

Habermas's main complaintabout Foucault is what Habermas

sees as

Foucault's relativism. ThusHabermas (1987:276) harshly

dismisses

Foucault's genealogical historiographiesas 'relativistic, cryptonormative

llu-

sory science' (emphasis in original).Such critique for relativism is

correct,

if by relativistic we mean unfoundedin norms that can be rationally

and

universally grounded; and thisis what Habermas (1987: 294)

means when

he criticizes Foucault for notgiving an 'account of the normative

foun-

dations'for his thinking. By this standard,

however, Habermas's own work

is also relativistic. As we have seen, Habermas has not, so far, beenable to

demonstrate that rational anduniversal grounding of his discourse

ethics

is possible, he has only postulatedsuch grounding (Habermas

1985: 196,

1979: 97). And Habermas is notalone with this problem. Despite

more than

two thousand years of attemptsby rationalistic philosophers,

no one has

been able so far to live up toPlato's injunction that to avoid

relativism our

thinking must be rationally anduniversally grounded.

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221The reason may be that Plato was wrong. Perhaps the polarity relativism-foundationalism is just another artificial dualism that makes it easy to think

but hard to understand. Such dualisms simplit things conceptually butwith little reference to actual phenomena. Perhaps the horns of the dualismcan be avoided by contextualism. This is the strategy of Foucault. As we willsee, it is clearly wrong to criticize Foucault for being a relativist if we byrelativistic mean 'without norms' or 'anything goes'. 'I do not conclude',says Foucault (1984c: 374), 'that one may sayjust anything within the orderof theory'.

Foucault resolves the question of relativism versus foundationalism byfollowing Nietzsche (1974: 284-5) who says about what he calls 'historians

of morality' that[t]heir usual mistaken premise is that they affirm some consensus of thenations . . . concerning certain principles of morals, and then they inferfrom this that these principles must be unconditionally binding also foryou and me; or conversely, they see the truth that among differentnations moral valuations are necessarily different and then infer from thisthat no morality is at all binding. Both procedures are equally childish.(emphasis in original)

Employing this line of reasoning, Foucault rejects both relativism and foun-dationalism and replaces them by situational ethics, i.e., by context. Withexplicit reference to Kant and Habermas, Foucault (1984b: 46) says thatunlike these two thinkers he 'is not seeking to make possible a metaphysicsthat has finally become a science'.

Distancing himself from foundationalism and metaphysics does not leaveFoucault normless, however. His norms are expressed in a desire to chal-lenge 'every abuse of power, whoever the author, whoever the victims'(Miller 1993: 316) and in this way 'to give new impetus, as far and wide as

possible, to the undefined work of freedom' (Foucault 1984b: 46) . Foucaulthere is the Nietzschean dernocrat, for whom any form of government -liberal or totalitarian - must be subjected to analysis and critique based ona will not to be dominated, voicing concerns in public and withholdingconsent about anything that appears to be unacceptable. Foucault's normsare based on historical and personal context, and they are shared with manypeople around the world. The norms cannot be given a universal ground-ing independent of those people and that context, according to Foucault.Nor would such grounding be desirable, since it would entail an ethical uni-

formity with the kind of utopian-totalitarian implications that Foucaultwould warn against in any context, be it that of Marx, Rousseau or Haber-mas: 'The search for a form of morality acceptable by everyone in the sensethat everyone would have to submit to it, seems catastrophic to me'(Foucault 1984f: 37 quoted in Dreyfus and Rabinow 1986: 119). In a Fou-cauldian interpretation, such a morality would endanger civil society, notempower it. Instead, Foucault focuses on the analysis of evils and showsrestraint in matters of commitment to ideas and systems of thought about

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222 Bent Flyvbjerg

what is good for man, given the historical experience that few things haveproduced more suffering among humans than strong commitments to

implementing utopian visions of the good.Foucault's view of the value of universals in philosophy and social sciencestands in diametrical opposition to that of Habermas. 'Nothing is funda-mental', says Foucault (1984a: 247), 'That is what is interesting in the analy-sis of society'. Compare this with Foucault's (1984d: 87-8) remark that'nothing in man - not even his body- is sufficiently stable to serve as thebasis for self-recognition or for understanding other men'. Therefore,Foucault's analysis of 'the rationalities really at work' begins with theassumption that because no one has yet demonstrated the existence of uni-

versals in philosophy and social science, we must operate as if the univer-sals do not exist. That is, we should not waste our time searching in vain foruniversals. Where universals are said to exist, or where people tacitly assumethey exist, universals must be questioned, according to Foucault. ForFoucault, our history endows us with the possibility to become aware ofthose social arrangements which create problems, for instance a weak civilsociety, and those which create satisfaction, for instance empowering civilsociety. It follows that we have the possibility to either oppose or promotethese arrangements. This is Foucault's point of departure for social and

political change, not global moral norms.9The basis for understanding and acting is the attitude among those whounderstand and act, and this attitude is not based on idiosyncratic moral orpersonal preferences, but on a context-dependent common world view andinterests among a reference group, well aware that different groups typi-cally have different world views and different interests, and that there existsno general principle - including the 'force of the better argument' - bywhich all differences can be resolved. For Foucault the socially and histori-cally conditioned context, and not fictive universals, constitutes the most

effective bulwark against relativism and nihilism, and the best basis foraction. Our sociality and history, according to Foucault, is the only foun-dation we have, the only solid ground under our feet. And this socio-historical foundation is fully adequate.

According to Foucault, Habermas's (undated: 8) 'authorisation of powerby law' is inadequate (emphasis deleted). ' [The juridical system] is utterlyincongruous with the new methods of power', says Foucault (1980a: 89),'methods that are employed on all levels and in forms that go beyond thestate and its apparatus . . . Our historical gradient carries us further and

further away from a reign of law.' The law, institutions - or policies andplans - provide no guarantee of freedom, equality or democracy. Not evenentire institutional systems, according to Foucault, can ensure freedom,even though they are established with that purpose. Nor is freedom likelyto be achieved by imposing abstract theoretical systems or 'correct' think-ing. On the contrary, history has demonstrated - says Foucault- horrifyingexamples that it is precisely those social systems which have turned freedominto theoretical formulas and treated practice as social engineering, i.e., as

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Habermas and Foucault223

an epistemically derived techne, hat become most repressive. [People]reproach me for not presenting an overall theory', says Foucault (1984c:

375-6), 'I am attempting, o the contrary, part rom any totalisation whichwould be at once abstract nd limiting- to open up problems that are as con-crete nd general s possible' (emphasis n original).

Given this background theory-based writing of constitutions does notoccupy a central place in Foucault's work as it does for Habermas, andconstitution-writing ould not be seen as an effective way of empoweringcivil society n a Foucauldian nterpretation. This is not because the writingof constitutions s without significance, but because Foucault views it as

more important both for understanding and for practice - to focus onthe concrete struggle over a constitution in a specific society: how theconstitution is interpreted, how it is practiced in actual institutions, andespecially, how interpretations and practises may be changed. In otherwords, Foucault's hinking as concerns laws, constitutions and democracyfocuses more on how existing constitutions and their associated nstitutionscan be utilized more democratically, hereas Habermas's roject s to estab-lish more democratic constitutions and institutions as such, where 'democ-racy' s defined by Habermas's discourse ethics.

In this sense, what Foucault calls 'the political task' sto criticise the working of institutions which appear to be both neutraland independent; to criticise them in such a manner that the politicalviolence which has always xercised tself obscurely hrough them will beunmasked, o that one can fight them. (Chomsky nd Foucault 1974: 171)

This is what, n a Foucauldian nterpretation, would be seen as an effectiveapproach to institutional change, including change in the institutions ofcivil society. With direct reference to Habermas, Foucault (1988: 18) adds

The problem s not of trying o dissolve [relations of power] n the utopiaof a perfectly ransparent ommunication, but to give . . . the rules of law,the techniques of management, and also the ethics . . . which would allowthese games of power to be played with a minimum of domination.

Here Foucault overestimates is differences with Habermas, or Habermasalso believes that the ideal speech situation cannot be established as a con-ventional reality n actual communication. Both thinkers ee the regulationof actual relations of dominance as crucial, but whereas Habermas

approaches regulation from a universalistic heory of discourse, Foucaultseeks out a genealogical understanding of actual power relations n specificcontexts. Foucault s thus oriented towards phronesis, hereas Habermas'sorientation s towards pisteme. or Foucault praxis nd freedom are derivednot from universals r theories. Freedom is a practice, and its ideal is not autopian absence of power. Resistance and struggle, n contrast to consen-sus, is for Foucault he most solid basis or the practice of freedom. It is pre-cisely on the issue of power and freedom that we find the most crucial

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224Bentlyvbjerg

difference between Foucault and Habermas, a differencereflected in

Foucault's 1988: 18) labelling of Habermas as 'utopian,'while Habermas

(1987: 53, 294) respondsby terming Foucault a 'cynic' and 'relativist'. This

kind f 'mud-slinging' is unproductive for concrete social and political

studies, owever, since nothing remains to be discoveredif everything is

power r if nothing is power, but instead ideal otopia.

Whereas Habermas emphasizes procedural macro politics,Foucault

stresses ubstantive micro politics, though with the importantshared

feature hat neither Foucault nor Habermas venture todefine the actual

content of political action. This is defined by the participants.Thus, both

Habermas nd Foucault are 'bottom-up' thinkers as concernsthe content

of olitics, butwhere Habermas thinks in a 'top-down' moralist fashion as

regards rocedural rationality- having sketched out the procedures to be

followed Foucault is a 'bottom-up' thinker as regards bothprocess and

content. n this interpretation, Habermas would want to tellindividuals and

groups n civil society how to go about their affairs as regardsprocedure for

discourse. He would not want, however, to say anything aboutthe outcome

of his procedure. Foucault would prescribe neither processnor outcome;

hewould only recommend a focus on conflict and powerrelations as the

most effective point of departure for the fight against domination.This

fight is centralto civil society both internally, i.e., in the relationship

between different groups within civil society - groups of different gender

or ethnicity, for instance - and externally, in the relationshipof civil society

to the spheres of government and business where the fightagainst domi-

nation can be said to be constitutive of civil society.

It is because of his double 'bottom-up' thinking that Foucaulthas been

described as non-action oriented. Foucault (1981) says aboutsuch criticism

It's true that certain people, such as those who work in theinstitutional

setting of the prison . . . are not likely to find advice or instructionsin my

books to tell them 'what is to be done.' But my project is precisely to bringit about that they 'no longer know what to do,' so that the

acts, gestures,

discourses that up until then had seemed to go without sayingbecome

problernatic, difficult, dangerous (Miller 1993: 235).

The depiction of Foucault as non-action oriented is correctto the extent

that Foucault hesitates to give directives for action, and hedirectly distances

himself from the kinds of universal 'What is to be dolle?'formulas which

characterize procedure in Habermas's communicative rationality.Foucault

believesthat 'solutions' of this type are themselves part of the problem.

Seeing Foucault as non-action oriented would be misleading, however,

in so far as Foucault's genealogical studies are carried outonly in order to

show how things can be done differently to 'separate out, fromthe contin-

gency that has made us what we are, the possibility of nolonger being,

doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think' (Foucault 1984b:45-7). Thus

Foucault was openly pleased when during a revolt in someof the French

prisons the prisoners in their cells read his Discipline andPunish. 'They

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shouted the text to other prisoners', Foucault told an interviewer. 'I knowit's pretentious to say', Foucault said, 'but that's a proof of a truth - a politi-

cal and actual truth - which started after the book was written' (Dillon 1980:5).10 This is the type of situated action Foucault would endorse, and as agenealogist, Foucault saw himself as highly action oriented, as 'a dealer ininstruments, a recipe maker, an indicator of objectives, a cartographer, asketcher of plans, a gunsmith' (Ezine 1985: 14).

The establishment of a concrete genealogy opens possibilities for actionby describing the genesis of a given situation and showing that this par-ticular genesis is not connected to absolute historical necessity. Foucault'sgenealogical studies of prisons, hospitals and sexuality demonstrate that

social practices may always take an alternative form, even where there is nobasis for voluntarism or idealism. Cornbined with Foucault's focus on domi-nation, it is easy to understand why this insight has been embraced byfeminists and minority groups. Elaborating genealogies of, for instance,gender and race leads to an understanding of how relations of dominationbetween women and men, and between different peoples, can be changed(McNay 1992, Bordo andJaggar 1990, Fraser 1989, Benhabib and Cornell1987). Given the interpretation above of Foucault as a practitioner ofphronesis, t comes as no surprise that the appropriation of Foucault by

feminists has recently been followed by a similar adoption of Aristotle - thephilosopher of phronesis ar excellence - despite the misogynic characterof some of Aristotle's thinking (Hirshman 1992a, b; Posner 1992; Nussbaum1992; Sherman 1989). Finally, given the emphasis in phronesis n practicalrationality and common sense knowledge, it is also not unexpected thatHabermas has distanced himself from phronesis nd neo-Aristotelianism,both of which he rhetorically has associated with neo-conservatism (Haber-mas 1987, 1990, 1993).

Foucault's emphasis on marginality makes his thinking sensitive to differ-

ence, diversity and the politics of identity, something which today is crucialfor understanding civil society and for acting in it. As mentioned in the intro-duction to this paper, historically the very idea of civil society contains agender bias, and this bias must be rooted out if today we are to build on theconcept of civil society. Feminists have found that for this task Foucault ismore helpful than Habermas, and progress has been slow in developing thetheory of communicative rationality in ways that would be sensitive togender and race. Even a sympathetic observer like Cohen (1995: 57) criti-cizes Habermas for his 'peculiar blindness to gender issues'. Other femin-

ists have been sceptical about Habermas's 'confidence in abstract rationality'as the general cure to social and political ailments, and researchers workingon race, ethnicity and sexuality have received Habermas in a similar manner(Ryan 1992: 262, Fraser 1987, Eley 1992, Simpson 1986).

Habermas (1992b: 466-7) has acknowledged that his analysis does notinclude 'gender, ethnicity, class, popular culture'. But Habermas insists,wrongly in myjudgment, that 'the critique of that which has been excludedfrom the public sphere', and from Habermas's analysis of it, can be carried

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226Bentlyvbjerg

outonly n the light of the declaredstandards and the manifest self-under-

standingf the proponentsand participants of these very

same public

spheres'.Howcould you critically assess the

inconspicuous repression of

ethnic,ultural, national, gender,and identity differences', asks Habermas,

'ifotn the light of this one basicstandard ["the force of more

or less good

reason"],owever interpreted,of procedures that all parties

presume will

providehe most rational solutionat hand, at a given time, in

a given

context?'emphasis added).Thus Habermas sees the struggle

over access

tohe ublic sphere as a matterof rational discourse. But Habermas's

analy-

sisoesnot stand up to historical-empiricaltest. With the demarcations

establishedy his use of the terms'only', 'one' and 'all' the analysis

is too

categorical.For xample, the critical assessment of the exclusion from the public

sphereabermas talks aboutcan be and has been carried

out unilaterally

byhe very groups that havebeen excluded, and without regard

to follow-

inghe 'declared standards'and 'manifest self-understanding'

of this

sphere. s a matter of fact,such standards and self-understanding

have

ofteneen seen as what wasin need of change; they were

the objects of

criticalssessment, not its basis(Eley 1992, Ryan 1992). Even

where the

standards nd self-understandingwere not seen as a problem, they

may not

haveeenviewed by excluded groups

as the most efficient meansfor

gaining ccess to the public sphere. Groups may therefore choose touse

other, on-discursive, meansto gain such access, the politics

of activism or

power olitics, for instance.Feminist and environmental initiatives,

today

central o the structure and functioningof civil society in many societies,

gotheir issues on the publicagenda not primarily by rational

consensus

buthrough the power strugglesand conflicts characteristic of

activism and

social hange (Wapner 1994;Spinosa, Flores and Dreyfus 1995).

Moreover,

as ley and Ryan have demonstrated,historically the very constitution

of

the ublicsphere took place, not solely

from rational discourse andcon-

sensus, ut 'from a field of conflict, contested meanings, and exclusion'

(Eley1992: 307). The claimto reason implied by the constitution

of the

public phere was simultaneouslya claim to power in Foucault's

sense, in

Eley's analysis. Rustow (1970)has similarly argued that democracy

has

generally come into existencenot because people wanted

this form of

government or because theyhad achieved a wide consensus

on 'basic

values' but because various groupshad been at each other's throat

for a

long time and finally came torecognize their mutual inability

to gain domi-

nanceand the need for some accommodation

(Hirschman 1994: 208).

In arguing that exclusion of ethnic, cultural, national and gendergroups

from the public sphere needsto be assessed by the discursive

standards of

the public sphere, Habermasuses the conduct of court cases

as a model for

such assessment. 'Court cases',says Habermas (1992b: 467),

'are meant to

settle practical conflicts in termsof mutual understanding and

intended

agreement'. And agreement isarrived at, according to Habermas,

by use of

the 'force of more or less goodreason', that is, the force of

the better

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argument, as 'the only alternative o overt or covert violence' (emphasisadded). It is correct that courts are meant to settle conflicts and that argu-

ments, rational or not, are used for this purpose. Yet such settlement s notdependent in the individual case on mutual understanding or agreementbetween the parties nvolved n the court case, as Habermas ays t is. It is,instead, dependent on an understanding by the parties hat once the argu-ments have been heard and the judge has ruled they will have to live by thisruling, whether they like it or not. If they choose not to respect the ruling,the judge is backed by an elaborate system of sanctions, and ultimately bypolice force and prisons. Thus court cases are typically ettled by power, notby mutual understanding and agreement. Courts n pluralist democracies

secure the type of conflict-resolution Richard Bernstein alked about abovewhen he said that any society must have some procedures or dealing withconflicts that cannot be resolved by argumentation, ven when all partiesare committed to rational argumentation. f courts relied on Habermas'sunderstanding of litigation, the court system would break down becausemany cases would never come to an end. While morally admirable andpolitically provocative, Habermas's hinking about rational argument hereseems not only utopian but sociologically naive.

If Habermas7s iscourse ethics were to be constituted as reality his would

not signify an end to power, t would be a way o regulate power. And to theextent that actual mplementation of discourse ethics would run counter tothe interests of social and political actors - which is bound to be the casefor societies and decisions of any complexity- discourse ethics will beopposed, whether such opposition can be rationally ustified or not. Thebasic contradiction here is that coercion would be needed to arrive atHabermas's non-coercive zwanglos) communication. Agreement would, inthis sense, be forced. So even if one could imagine the existence of whatHabermas (1992a: 453) calls 'a political public sphere unsubverted by

power', such a sphere could not be said to be free of power since it wasestablished through a claim to power. The Nietzschean insight that his-torically morality has typically been established by immoral means wouldhold true for Habermas's morality, oo. Power is needed to limit power.Even to understand how publicness can be established we need to think interms of conflict and power. There is no way around it. It is a basic con-dition for understanding ssues of exclusion and inclusion, and for under-standing civil society.

In sum, Foucault and Habermas agree that rationalization nd the misuseof power are among the most important problems of our time. They dis-agree as to how one can best understand and act in relation to theseproblems. Habermas's approach is oriented toward universals, context-independence and control via constitution-writing and institutionaldevelopment. Foucault ocuses his efforts on the local and context-depen-dent and toward the analysis of strategies and tactics as basis for powerstruggle.

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228Bentlyvbjerg

The value of Habermas's approach is that it contains a clearpicture of

what abermas understands by sdemocratic process', arldwhat precondi-

tions ust be fulfilled fora decision to be termed 'democratic'. His scheme

can e used as an abstract ideal for justification and application in relation

toegislation, institutional development and proceduralplanning. The

problem, owever, is that Habermas is idealistic. His workcontains little

understanding f how power functions or of those strategiesand tactics

which an ensure more of the sought after democracy. It iseasy to point to

constitution writing and institutional developtnent as a solution;it is some-

thing lse to implement specific constitutional and institutionalchanges.

Aside rom his general prescriptions regarding communicativerationality,

Habermas rovides uswith little guidance as to how such implementation

could ake place.The value of Foucault's approach is his emphasis on the

dynamics of

power. Understanding how power works is the first prerequisitefor action?

because action is the exercise of power. And such an understandingcan

bestbe achieved by focusing on the concrete. Foucault canhelp us with a

materialist understanding of RBalpolitik ncl RBalrationalitat, ndhow these

might be changed in a specific context. The problem withFoucault is that

because understanding and action have their points of departurein the par-

ticular nd the local,we may come to overlook more generalized conditions

concerning, for example, institutions, constitutions and structural issues.

From the perspective of the l-listory of philosophy and politicaltheory,

the difference between Foucault and Habermas lies in the factthat Foucault

works within a particularistic and contextualist tradition,with roots in

Thucydides via Machiavelli to Nietzsche. Foucault is one ofthe more impor-

tant twentieth century exponents of this tradition. Habermasis the most

prominent living exponent of a universalistic and theorizingtradition

derived from Socrates and Plato, proceeding over Kant. Inpower terms, we

are speakingof 'strategic' versus 'constitution' thinking, about struggle

versus control, conflict versus consensus.

4.

Generally, conflicts have been viewed as dangerous, corrosiveand poten-

tially destructive of social order and therefore in need ofbeing contained

and resolved. This view seems to cover Habermas's outlookon conflict,

which isunderstandable given Germany's, and Habermas's, experience

with Nazism, World War II and their after-effects. There is mounting evi-

dence, however, that social conflicts produce themselves thevaluable ties

that hold modern democratic societies together and providethem with the

strength and cohesion they need; that social conflicts are thetrue pillars of

democratic society (Hirschman 1994: 206). Governments andsocieties that

suppress conflict do so at their own peril. A basic reasonfor the deterio-

ration and loss of vitality of the Communist-dominated societiesmay be in

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Habermas and Foucault229

their success in suppressing overt social conflict. In a Foucauldian interpre-tation, suppressing conflict is suppressing freedom, because the privilege

to engage in conflict is part of freedom.If societies that suppress conflict are oppressive, perhaps social and politi-cal theories that ignore or marginalize conflict are potentially oppressive,too. And if conflict sustains society, there is good reason to caution againstan idealism that ignores conflict and power. In real social and political lifeself-interest and conflict will not give way to some all-embracing communalideal like Habermas's. Indeed, the more democratic a society, the more itallows groups to define their own specific ways of life, and the individualsto select the form in which such groups are composed, and legitimates the

inevitable conflicts of interest that arise between them.Political consensus

can never be brought to bear in a manner that neutralizes particular groupobligations, commitments and interests. To think that it can be is to repeatthe fallacy of Rousseau's belief in the General Will as distinct from theactual will of particular individuals and groups (Alexander 1991). A moredifferentiated conception of political culture than Habermas's is needed,one that will be more tolerant of conflict and difference, and more com-patible with the pluralization of interests.

As pointed out by Ryan (1992: 286), because everyday politics inevitably

falls short of the standards of communicative rationality,which was a

chimera even in the heyday of the bourgeois public sphere, the goal of pub-licness might best be allowed 'to navigate through wider and wilder terri-tory'. Such territory is imbued with conflict. Public life is best cultivated,not in an ideal sphere that assumes away power, but 'in many democraticspaces where obstinate differences in power, material status, and henceinterest can find expression'. With the plurality that a contemporaryconcept for civil society must contain, conflict becomes an inevitable partof this concept. Thus civil society does not mean 'civilized' in the sense of

well-mannered behavlour. Instrong civil societies, distrust and criticism of

authoritative action are omnipresent as is resulting political conflict. Moraloutrage is continuous, because actual authorities inevitably violate whateverideal norms civil society has for justice. Civil society guarantees only theexistence of a public, not public consensus (Alexander 1991). A strong civilsociety guarantees the existence of conflict. A strong understanding of civilsocietyt and of democracy, must therefore be based on thought that placesconflict and power at its centre, as Foucault does and Habermas does not.

This is not to reject the importance of the public sphere as a bulwark offreedom. Nor is it to deny that Habermas's work is morally admirable andintellectually stimulating, especially in a time when most philosophers havegiven up on the high ambitions for philosophy and social science thatHabermas still pursues, for instance regarding universal grounding of ourthoughts and actions Even if such ambitions cannot be fulfilled, the historyof philosophy and science shows that we have much to learn from atternptsat doing so. It must be said, however, that forms of public life that are practi-cal, committed and ready for conflict provide a superior paradigm of civic

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230

Bentlyvbjerg

citizenirtue than do formsof public life that are discursive,

detached and

consensus-dependent.or those who see things

this way, in order to enable

theublicphere to makea serious contribution to

genuine participation,

oneouldave to tie itback to precisely what it cannot accept in Haber-

mas'snterpretation: Foucault'sfocus on conflict, power

and partisanship.ll

Bent Flyvbjerg

(Dateccepted: August1997)

DepartmentfDevelopmentnd Planning

Aalborg University, Denmark

NOTES1. wish to thank Zygmunt

Bauman

andwo anonymous refereesfor their

helpfulomments. Thisarticle contains

partfhe theoretical andmethodological

considerationsehind(Flyvbjerg 1998).

Furtherheoretical andmethodological

considerationsehind thisbook can be

foundn my paper 'TowardsPhronetic

Socialnd Political Sciences:An Aris-

totelianpproachto Integrating Context,

thearticular, nd Narrative n Social and

Politicalnquiry,' forthcoming.

2. The following evaluationof Haber-

mas'sork concentrates onhis concept for

democracy. ther aspectsof his author-

shipre not taken up.

3. Nietzsche (1968: 188[app.A]) adds

thato the extent thatthe philosopher's

'conviction' s the basisof a 'system' of

thinkingt corrupts thesystem.

4. Some might arguethat the claim that

Habermas's niversalismnvolves a leap of

faiths misconstrued, sincehis fallibilisti-

callyonceived transcendentalargument s

subjecto forms of indirectconfirmation, as

Habermas llustrates throughhis concern

with Lawrence Kohlbergand develop-

mental sychology. To thisI would answer

that not only is this typeof confirmation

indirect, t is also partialand insufficient. As

Iwill argue below, Habermas'smphasis of

aspects of human developmentthat

confirm the transcendentalargument is

unsustainable when seenin relation to

aspects that do not confirmthis argument.

For more on this point,and on the prob-

lematic character of Habermas'sreformu-

lation of Kantian critique,see also

Hutchings (1996) and Dean(1994)

5. lyvbjerg ( 1998) contains an in-

depthxample of how thesequestions can

benalysedn empiricalresearch.

6.For a different view ofthe relation-

shipetween discourseethics and civil

society,ee Cohen andArato(1992) which

developsnd defendsHabermas's posi-

tion,ncluding a sympatheticcritique of

Foucault.7. Text corrected for misprint.

8. See, forexample, Bernstein's

debates1987, 1988) with Rorty (1987)

andallmayr (1988). Seealso Dallmayr

(1989)9. For more on this point,

see Dean

( 994)which developsand defends

Foucault'sosition, includinga critique of

Habermas.10. For more on Foucault

and prison

reform,ee Foucault andDeleuze (1977),

Foucault1974) and Deleuze(1986)

11. See also Spinosa,Flores and Dreyfus

(1995).

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