5. hans renders dovo - geneva international centre … renders june 2015 unclassified unclassified...

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ERW management in Belgium

Hans Renders

June 2015

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

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BELGIUM300 km Max distance..11 Mio peopleEuropean and international org.Mainly industry and services

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• Origin ERW pollution in Belgium

• History of bomb disposal

• Actual Situation– CMD Conventional Mun disposal

– OCW Old Chem weapons

– IEDD improvised explo device disposal

– UW EOD under water EOD

• Risk management

Origin/ History/ Actual situation /risk managementCMD/ OCW/ IEDD/ UW EOD

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5


66

• In Flanders fields:

600 000 KIA


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77


– 600 000 KIA

– 550 000 KIA in the trenches


88


– 600 000 KIA


– 300 000 still buried


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99


– 600 000 KIA



– 200 000 missing


1010


– 600 000 KIA



– 200 000 missing

– 1 500 000 wounded


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1111


– 600 000 KIA



– 200 000 missing

– 1 500 000 wounded

– 50 nationalities


1212

In Flanders fields:

– 600 000 KIA



– 200 000 missing

– 1 500 000 wounded


– Several hundreds of milliosn shells


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1313


– 600 000 KIA



– 200 000 missing

– 1 500 000 wounded

– 50 natinalities

– Several hundreds of millions shells


1414


– 600 000 KIA



– 200 000 missing

– 1 500 000 wounded


– Several hundreds of millions shells

– 30% duds / 4,5% toxic


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WORLD WAR II

Less concentratedMore bombsVariety of GER,FRA, UK, US ……Different volumes per county


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Year KIA Wounded

1918 ?? ?? military, prisoners, own population ‐

1919 ?? ?? no skilled Pers needed.

1920 ?? ?? Government stops scrap trade due to many accidents

1921 ?? ?? contract with civil Coy 15 000 T/year

1922 ?? ?? contract with civil Coy 15 000 T/year dumping & drowning

1923 ?? ?? PROBLEM SOLVED: end of contracts

1924 ?? ?? end of active approach based on METAL value.

1925 ?? ?? reactive service due to many accidents

1926 ?? ?? still reporting scrap metal trade

1927 ?? ??

1928 ?? ??

1929 ?? ??

1930 ?? ??

1931 ?? ??

1932 ?? ??

1933 ?? ??

1934 ?? ??

1935 ?? ??

1936 ?? ??


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Year KIA Wounded

1945 62 148 more complex munitions: chem delay, anti handling

1946 27 62 training from GER, UK ….

1947 4 19 Need for skilled Pers

1948 0 2

1949 2 7

1950 0 3 PROBLEM SOLVED AGAIN.

1951 2 8 reactive service 50‐200 pers

1952 2 3 open pit/ dumping , dwawning

1953 0 3

1954 0 4

1955 1 7

1956 1 1

1957 0 3

1963 1 0

1964 0 4

1967 0 1

1969 7 1

1970 1 9


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Year KIA Wounded

1972 0 0 end of dumping OCW

1978 0 9

1979 0 3

1980 0 3 IEDD threat homeland

1981 0 1

1982 0 4

1984 0 2

1985 0 2

1986 4 1

1987 0 1 approval to constuct dismanteling facilities

1998 0 1 construction finished

2006 0 2 new CDC / new technology

2007 0 2

2008 1 1 new CDC / new technology

2012 1 6 accident open burning + accident dismanteling

2016 New SDC

116 324 BEL EOD KIA and wounded since end of WW2

mainly on homeland Ops.


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Drilling

DISMANTLINGOrigin/ History/ Actual situation /risk management

CMD/ OCW/ IEDD/ UW EOD

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• Conventional Munition Disposal (CMD) ‐ Disposal of Ammunition WW I & WW II (*)

• Dismantling Toxic Ammunition WW I – Old Chemical Weapons (OCW) (*)

• Improvised Explosive Device Disposal (IEDD) ‐Technical assistance to the Judicial Authorities / Fight against organized crime and terrorism (*)

• Underwater EOD

• Support to Mil Ops (incl Airborne Ops)

• Education and training

(*) Exclusivity of Defense ‐ Protocol between MOD, Justice, Interior (June 2014)+ Small Arms Ammunition – Protocol between MOD, Justice, Interior (Dec 2014)+ Fireworks – Protocol between MOD, Justice, Economy (Dec 2014)


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Workforce (Jan 15)

18 ‐ 102 ‐ 70 (190)

PO ELKAPELLE MEERD AAL

EOD

Staff Battalion

IEDD Platoon

CMD PlatoonCMD Platoon

OCW Platoon

CMD Platoon

Diving School

BRUSSELS

POELKAPELLE

ZEEBRUGGE

MEERDAAL

EOD School

Territorial Waters

Company Meerdaal

Company Poelkapelle

Company Zeebrugge


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Reported by civilians to police ‐> REQUEST for intervention.

Report/Locate/Access/Identify/Render Safe/ Dispose

Origin/ History/ Actual situation /risk management


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230

500

000

500

000

500

000

500

000

500

31253046

3229

3539

3125

2960

3289

3004 2977 3027

2797

3326

2897 2939

4084

304203

291 245342

267

724

353205 219 189 184 146 140

301

Years




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Only if locatedDetection and historical survey ‐> civilian Co




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3 x 24/7 teams7 x routine (including heavy and UW EOD)




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Differentiated approach based on risk

– reactive

• Routine

• Urgent

• Immediate

– Active

• Restcapacity

• Based on evidence and risk




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Final identificationtracebility




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+‐10: 250‐2000 Lbs bombs/yearNeutralisation needs evacuationBuilt up area




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BEST AVAILABLE TECH STUDYdifferent Mun flowsOpen detonation restrictedenviromental legislationeg stockpile disposalSDC

Report/Locate/Access/Identify/Render Safe/ Disposal



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Report/Locate/Access/Identify/Render Safe/ Disposal



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Related tasks and issuesCollectors

Ex: law for collecting ERW , FFE, trade on internet.

source of accidents and illegal tradeFireworks illegal and unstabel. ADR.QC en QM of civil detection Co.Prevention on known polluted sitesLegal actions of civilians and Co.



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PAARDENMARKT

35000 T of tox shellsEstimated 20 billionSediment on topLeaks will be filteredCWC, OCW, ACW



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3535

Dismantling Contained Detonation

IDENTIFICATIONNon destructive

Identified OCW Platform

15239

OCW Non

OCW

Non OCW Platform

Scrap

“CLARK” HE‐R

HE‐R : High Explosive “RAUCH”, explosive projectile with smoke charge containing arsenic

Covered Earth

Detonation

Visual IDF X‐ray NAA

7

27

47

67

87

107

127

147

167

187

2150 2170 2190 2210 2230 2250 2270

data

backg roun d

2223 keV

2230 keV

E / keV

co un ts inelas tic sca tterin g

H

22

23

ke

V

S

22

30

ke

V

NAA: (Neutron Activation Analysis)

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Poelkapelle – Contained Detonating Chamber (CDC) DAVINCH

Total since 1998 : 18419 shells



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267

3489



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CONTAINED DETONATION CHAMBER

OFFGAS TREATMENT

Concept of dismantling OCWs with bottle solid filling

“CLARK”HE‐R



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CD

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116Requests

2014

0

50

100

150

200

250

1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012

2004

MADRID

2005

LONDON

2001

NEW YORK



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Current projectspreparation phase in Antwerprecovery 06 EA bombs



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MISSIONS ABROAD

CROATIA

BELBAT 1992‐97

UNTAES 1996‐98

Rft UNTAES 1996

BOSNIA‐HER

BOSNIAROAD 1992‐93

BELBOS 1994

BELUCA 1996‐97

BELUBG 1998‐2000

EXPLOSIVE WINTER 2003

ARMADILLO 2004

KOSOVO

KFOR 1999‐2002

BELUKOS 2000‐2004

DVI KOSOVO 2000

BELUKROKO 2002‐2003

ALBANIA

AFOR 1999

BENIN

GENIMED 2001

JORDANDIVERS 2007

LEBANON

UNIFIL 2006‐2011

IRAQPROVIDE COMFORT 1991

AFGHANISTAN

ISAF VI 2004‐2005

KAIA LN 2007‐2008

PRT KUNDUZ 2005‐DEC 2012

ANA ENGR SCHOOL 2012‐2013

TF PALADIN 2012‐2013

LAOS

UXOLAO 1998‐2005

CAMBODIA

CMAC 1994‐2004

INDONESIA

AMM 2005

SOMALIA

RESTORE HOPE/UNOSOM

1992‐1993

RD CONGO

AMABEL KINSHASA 2003

AVENIR 2004

KANANGA 2008

RWANDAKIGALI 1986

UNAMIR 1993‐94

REP CONGO

GREEN STREAM 1997

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EOD course TM 9 mTL 5y + 6 m

DIVER courseDiver 6 mDive master 7 m

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• Introduction:

– (tripod beta investigation)

– BPR , EOD SOP validation process, documented Balance of risk mitigation and budget

– Local authority is risk owner based on bomb tech advice

–Reactive approach to reduce risk (activeonly if evidence and risk). Ex: quid bombsdetected with improved Tech

–PAM + input for emergency planning


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RISKRisk acceptance criteria change (also the Perception).=/= each intervention=/= during the intervention FRAFor procedures according to health and safety procedureScientificaly documented for legal liabilityEnviromental impactProb X Effect x expo


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PROBABILITYType of EOstate of the EO

security intact, springs, chem delayin general more difficult to handle.study of vibrations on EO

RSP appliedtechnological evolution allows safer RSP and disposal


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EFFECTscientifically validated based on US Field guideeconomic impactenviromental impacteg. Protective constructionpayload is still as designed

ex: Ypres


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People Exposedmaximum delayed neutralisationsevacuation always needed, always difficultpublic transport was targeted during the war.quid essential personnel


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QUESTIONS • Pictures slide 22‐27, 43, 54With permission of ian Aldema

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• EOD Battalion works daily for the safety of the Belgianpopulation : Conventional and Improvised Explosive Devices.

• Exclusivity of Defense governed by a Protocol signed betweenMOD, Justice, Interior (June 2014)

• Belgian EOD Expertise is internationaly recognised (UN and NATO)

• Intensity of the Ops is depending on the international / homeland threat level

• High level of risk => High standards of proficiency and high technology equipments improve the safety

• Investments are needed : adapt to the threat – migration IED from abroad to homeland (Radio Command IED and Home Made Explosives)

• New installation for the disposal of OCW is ongoing

CONCLUSIONS

567,7cm

20cm LIVENS

OLD CHEMICAL WEAPONS (OCW)

In the context of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) :• OCW are “… Chemical weapons which were produced before 1925 ...”• Dismantling/disposal processes compliant with CWC• Verification by OPCW

Specific MOU between OPCW and Belgian Defence mainly for the training of the OPCW inspectors

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OCW?

Visual IDF

N Y?

X‐ray

Non

OCW

OCW?

N ?

OCW?

NAA

N Y

15239

OCW

7

27

47

67

87

107

127

147

167

187

21 50 21 70 2 190 2210 2230 2250 2270

data

background

222 3 keV

223 0 keV

E / keV

counts ine las tic scatter ing

H

22

23

ke

V

S

22

30

ke

V

NAA: (Neutron Activation Analysis)

“CLARK”

5858

Dismantling Contained Detonation

IDENTIFICATIONNon destructive

Inflow

Daily found WWI ammunition

Identified OCW Platform

15239

OCW Non

OCW

Non OCW Platform

Scrap

“CLARK” HE‐R

HE‐R : High Explosive “RAUCH”, explosive projectile with smoke charge containing arsenic

Covered Earth

Detonation

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Shape Payload

Leichte Gasmine(DEU)7,6 cm750 g CG

Livens(GBR)19,5cm15,5 Kg CG

Condition

Armed ‐ unarmed

Fired – not fired

Corrosion

Leaking OCW

Damaged/deformedmunition

L F K Gr (7,7 cm)

More than 100 different toxic payloads !!Two main types of shell :

Liquid fillingBottle solid filling = CLARK projectile

OLD CHEMICAL WEAPONS (OCW)

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• Acquisition ongoing for a new installation to replace the damaged Dismantling Facility

• Installation will be of the type “Static Detonation Chamber” (SDC)• SDC‐technology is already in use in several countries (USA, GER, FRA, JAP,…)• To be delivered by end 2016

NEW INVESTMENTSTATIC DETONATION CHAMBER

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• SDC is a safer technology

• SDC is also able to treat:

– OCW with liquid content (All)

– OCW with solid content (NOT: Clarck 21 cm GER=>CDC)

– White Phosphorous

– Conventional ammunition (Up to 3 Kg NEQ)

– Small Arms Ammunition

– Pyrotechnics

NEW INVESTMENTSTATIC DETONATION CHAMBER

CDC : Contained Detonation ChamberOCW : Old Chemical WeaponsNEQ : Net Explosive Quantity

5. hans renders dovo - geneva international centre … renders june 2015 unclassified unclassified...

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