5-11 fire protection.pdf

8/11/2019 5-11 Fire Protection.pdf

1/35

5.11 Fire Protection and Emergency Response


This section addresses the fire protection and emergency response resources related to the

proposed project. These resources include the existing services and capabilities of nearby firedepartments and neighboring oil and gas facilities, the internal fire protection plans, and the

systems and design of the facilities and their associated pipelines. The emergencies that would

require summoning these available resources include fire, oil spill, hazardous substance release,

or another event that could lead to these emergency situations, such as an earthquake, trafficaccident, pipeline rupture, etc. This section also evaluates the impacts of the proposed project

and alternatives on these services and capabilities and presents criteria used to determinesignificant impacts of the project.

5.11.1 Environmental Setting

5.11.1.1 Fire Fight ing Capabil ities in the Project Area

Santa Barbara County (SBC) operates many fire stations within County borders, and the cities ofLompoc and Santa Maria operate their own fire stations near the project area. The City of

Lompoc and SBC have a mutual aid agreement that allows city and county fire departments to

cooperate with one another. Therefore, the Lompoc City Fire Stations could also respond duringan emergency along the pipeline route or at the LOGP. The closest fire stations to the LOGP and

the route of the pipelines evaluated in this EIR are listed in Table 5.11.1 with street address,

equipment, number of personnel, and proximity to the projects. Figure 5.11-1 presents thelocation of each of the fire stations in relation to the project area (locations are numbered as in

Table 5.11.1).

SBC Fire Station Number (No.) 51 near Lompoc is the closest to the LOGP and would be first torespond to the LOGP in the event of a fire. The fire station is located within 10 miles (within 15

minutes response time) from most of the pipeline routes addressed in this document. The next

nearest fire stations to the LOGP are located in the City of Lompoc, including Lompoc FireStation No. 1 51 (5.3 miles from LOGP) and Lompoc City Fire Station No. 2 (7.5 miles from

LOGP). Furthermore, as presented in Table 5.11.1, Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB) FireDepartment also has emergency response capabilities. SBC Fire Station No. 31 in Buellton could

also be alerted to respond to an emergency at the LOGP.

In addition to the county and city emergency response equipment, oil facilities are required byFederal, State, and local regulations to maintain onsite fire fighting equipment as well as

materials to control oil spills or other hazardous materials releases. PXP has fire fighting and

emergency response capabilities at the LOGP in accordance with these regulations.


2/35


3/35


4/35


5.11.1.2 Fire Protect ion Capabili ties at the LOGP

The LOGP has a Fire Protection Plan approved by the Santa Barbara County Fire Department

(SBCFD). The LOGP is designed with fire prevention as a prime concern using concepts such asearly ignition detection and fire spread prevention at the basis of the design. The Fire Protection

System is shown in Figure 5.11-2 on the plant plot plan. Sources of open flame are grouped

together and segregated from areas with potentially flammable materials. The electricalinstallation was designed to conform to the National Electric Code (NEC) and National Fire

Protection Association Agency (NFPA) requirements. Potential ignition sources include the

heater treaters, thermal oxidizer, reclaim heater, glycol heater, flare, and occasional vehiclestraveling through the facility. A network of fire and flammable gas detectors located throughoutthe plant enhances early fire detection.

Spills and leaks of chemicals, oil and other hydrocarbon materials are cleaned up as soon as

reasonably possible after they are detected. Almost all of the LOGP facility is subject to the SBCAir Pollution Control District Fugitive Hydrocarbon Inspection and Maintenance Program,

which requires the timely repair of leaking components. Oil and chemical soaked rags are kept in

suitable containers in the facility prior to disposal. Grass and brush within 100 feet of the facilityperimeter is mowed to a height of 6 inches or less.

There is a road immediately adjacent to the LOGP that surrounds the entire facility. Additionally,there is a road within 1,000 feet of the LOGP that also surrounds the entire facility. Both

roadways are maintained at a minimum of 20-feet wide with paved or all weather surfaces ableto support 20-ton County fire apparatus.

Water is supplied to the LOGP from the existing PXP water system in the Lompoc Field.

Firewater at the LOGP is stored in two water tanks with respective capacities of 210,000 and420,000 gallons. The tanks are kept full by an automatic level control system. The 210,000-

gallon tank has a 4-inch National Standard male thread outlet for fire department engine use with

the outlet within 10 feet of the fire engine parking area. The mobile fire equipment includestwenty-four 20-pound dry chemical extinguishers, seven 10-pound dry chemical extinguishers,

two 5-pound dry chemical extinguishers, one 14-pound Halon extinguisher and one 17-pound

Halon extinguisher, and two portable 150-pound dry chemical extinguishers.

The fire water system includes the water tanks, foam system, pumps, valving, fire monitors anddetectors, hose reels, and fire hydrants and is shown in Figure 5.11-2. Two fire pumps withdiesel engines are designed to deliver 2500 gallons per minute (gpm) each at 150 pounds per

square inch (psi). The fire pumps and pump controllers comply with all requirements of NFPA

Standard 20. The fire system water mains comply with all requirements of NFPA Standard 24.All the valves meet NFPA Standards 22 and 24 requirements and are UL listed. The fire hydrants


5/35


flame or gas detection. Windows and frames on the plant side of the control building are

explosion-resistant.

All of the bermed or diked areas hold at least 1 1/2 times the volume of the largest vessel or tank

within the dike/berm. To prevent fire from spreading, the areas are sloped to prevent spills from

pooling around or under any vessel or tank. All onsite drainage is collected in either the bermaround the 100,000 barrels (bbl) oil surge tank or the retention basin, which is located away from

the process equipment to the south of the facility.

The fire protection system is designed for a worst-case release from the largest vessel, which is

the oil surge tank with 100,000 bbls capacity and 134 feet in diameter, and subsequent fire. Theoil surge tank is protected by a fixed foam system as shown on Figure 5.11-2. There are threefoam chambers mounted on the tank. A header is installed outside the bermed area to control the

foam application. There is a 3,000-gallon atmospheric foam concentrate tank that is kept 1/3 full

of foam concentrate. The concentrate is pumped into a distribution loop, which parallels thewater mains. There is a light water pressure control valve and proportioner at each monitor,

hose reel and the surge tank foam system. The concentrate pumps are run by an electric motor.

Both pumps are a part of the emergency power system. The foam system, including foam pumps,

tank, piping, proportioners, and applicators comply with NFPA Standard 11. An additional1,200 gallons of foam concentrate is stored in 55-gallon drums.

The incoming and outgoing oil and gas pipelines are equipped with automatic shutdown valves.These valves will close in the event of high vessel pressure or high levels. The valves also can be

closed by activating the emergency shutdown system in the control room or in the plant. The

incoming oil line automatic valve is located downstream of the first oil/water separator. Eachvessel, tank, and pump is equipped with manual valves, which will isolate individual pieces of

equipment.

The emergency power generator is equipped with both manual and automatic startup,synchronizing, and shutdown. These functions are provided by a switchgear, which feeds the

essential loads of the facility including flammable gas detectors, the H2S detectors, and the flamedetectors. Essential loads also include the facilitys leak detection August Control System, power

to the control building, power to the instrument air, and the electrical panel for the diesel

firewater pumps.

PXP holds monthly safety meetings at each work site that include fire prevention. The LOGP

also has periodic unannounced fire drills to ensure that the employees know their area of

responsibility in the event of a fire. In the event of a small fire, employees will attempt toextinguish it using fire extinguishers and/or hose reels. In the event of a major fire, employees

will activate the emergency system shutdown, with subsequent initiation of the ERP. It should be

noted that since 19921

there has not been a fire event at the LOGP that was connected to the


6/35


Santa Barbara County Planning Commission Staff Report (June 2002), the response by

Torch/Nuevo to the fire was considered satisfactory as they provided fire response activities and

resources considered to be appropriate given the nature of the fire. The fire proved extremelyhard to fight; however, the report indicated that the difficulty was not attributed to a lack of

dedicated resources from Torch/Nuevo.

The LOGP facility is required to operate according to the safety rules contained in the PXP

Safety Inspection, Maintenance and Quality Assurance Program (SIMQAP), as defined by the

Point Pedernales Project Final Development Plan (FDP) Conditions. This program covers theLOGP, the three pipelines connecting the LOGP to Platform Irene, and the sales gas pipeline,

and is required to be implemented during construction and operations.

The program is a dynamic document that is required to be regularly updated for new procedures,

safety and maintenance technologies and processes, and then reviewed and approved by the

Countys Systems Safety and Reliability Review Committee (SSRRC), which includes theSBCFD.

5.11.1.3 Fire Protection at Platform Irene

Figures 5.11-3a and 5.11-3b show the main fire protection equipment on both decks of theplatform. This equipment includes fire and smoke/heat detectors, fire monitors, combustible gasdetectors, fire alarms and alarm pulls, fire extinguishers, hose reels, and breathing apparatus

systems. Foam concentrate is stored in a 300-gallon tank. Foam can be delivered to hose reels,

spraying systems, and to sprinklers, which are strategically located throughout the platform.Water to the foam system can be supplied by two electrical firewater pumps or by a new vertical

turbine pump with a diesel engine. All three pumps use seawater. In addition, the two electrical

firewater pumps can also utilize water from the 8-inch produced water return pipeline.

Because of the specifics of the offshore location, personnel are instructed to evacuate in case of

any major emergency including a large fire. Survival capsules are provided for these types of

emergencies.

5.11.1.4 Fire Protection at Orcutt Pump Station

The entire Orcutt Pump Station, including all pumps, sumps, equipment and aboveground piping,

is curbed, guttered, and sloped so that any oil spilled will drain into a large pit. The magnitude ofa spill that could occur from a leak at the pump station is approximately 160 bbls (UNOCAP

ERP, 2000), given the pump station flowrate, oil volumes contained in station piping, leakdetection system recognition and response times, and valve closure time (approximately 50

seconds).

Fi t f th t ti i li d b th t di t i t Th fi t i l d 250


7/35


operation is maintained through ConocoPhillips SIMQAP that is updated on a regular basis in

the same fashion as the LOGP SIMQAP.

5.11.1.5 Emergency Response

PXP and ConocoPhillips have implemented a three-tier emergency response organizationfollowing the Incident Command approach (see Table 5.11.2). PXPs Incident Commander (IC)

will be the first PXP employee at the scene of an emergency incident and will take commanduntil relieved by a more senior company employee. After conducting preliminary reconnaissance

and reporting the situation to the IC, the first level of response will be mobilized by activating

the Immediate Response Team. The team made up of PXP employees will be the first to respond

to any incident, regardless of size. For minor incidents, this Level One response will likely besufficient. The Point Pedernales onshore pipeline and facility personnel can field two shifts of

the Immediate Response Team with the assistance of the District personnel. In the event of any

emergency, including an oil spill at Platform Irene, the Clean Seas organization will also beamong the first responders. ConocoPhillips would follow the same approach at its facilities. This

approach is detailed in the UNOCAP Sisquoc Pipeline and Point Pedernales Pipeline Project

Emergency Response Plan (PXP ERP 2004, with minor updates in May and August 2005).

The second level of response would be used when the magnitude of the incident or its impacts

indicate the need for additional personnel. In a Level Two response, the District Sustained

Response Team will augment the response with members drawn from the PXP or ConocoPhillips Santa Maria District employees.

The third level of response is initiated when the size of the incident dictates the need for a majorsustained response effort. In a Level Three response, the Unified Command would be mobilized.

This team is made up of specialists and specifically trained employees from various State and

County agencies and contract companies.

The organization and resources available for each level of response are described in detail in the

Lompoc Oil and Gas Plant Emergency Response Plan (LOGP ERP) revised by PXP inDecember, 2004 with minor updates in May and August of 2005, and in the UNOCAP ERP. The

Oil Spill Response Plan developed for Platform Irene (November 2004) details the oil spill

response at the platform and includes available company and outside resources. In the event that

emergency assistance is needed, PXP has formal relationships with other firms and organizations

in the local petroleum industry.

The SBC Area Oil and Gas Industry Emergency Response Plan (P-4 Plan) may be activatedduring an emergency that involves more than one onshore facility or involves offsite impacts to

or threatens the public, livestock, property, or the environment. The P-4 Plan would be activatedwhen the required response to an emergency incident is beyond the capabilities of the


8/35


activities. PXP and ConocoPhillips are members of Clean Seas and can call upon that

organizations resources to assist in the clean up of a spill. If an oil spill were to occur at

Platform Irene or offshore pipelines or at the Santa Ynez River at a time when there is enoughflow to carry oil toward the ocean, assistance would be sought from Clean Seas for containment

and cleanup operations. Other petroleum companies with emergency response capabilities

operating in the Santa Maria Basin can also be called upon if assistance is needed.

Information in the event evacuation is required because of a hazardous material release can be

found in the Santa Barbara County Hazardous Material Emergency Response Area Plan(September 2003) at the following website: http://www.sbcfire.com/hm/hazmatrespplan03.pdf.

The discussion below summarizes the specific instructions for the public. The effectiveness ofsheltering-in-place is dependent on initial public information and periodic informational updates.

The public should be instructed to do the following:

Close all internal and external doors and close and lock all windows

Stop drafts: use wet towels in gaps under doors and duct tape (or other thick tape) around sides/cracks

on doors and windows.

Turn off outside ventilation (e.g., heat, air conditioner) and close vents to the outside.

Turn off all sources of ignition, if it is safe to do so (e.g., heating systems, open flame, electrical

appliances, and vehicles).

Turn home air-conditioners and switch inlets to closed position. Seal any gaps around air-

conditioners window units with tape and plastic sheeting, wax paper, or aluminum wrap.

Turn off and cover exhaust fans in kitchens, bathrooms, dryer vents and other spaces.

Turn off clothes dryer.

Close fireplace dampers.

Hold a wet cloth or handkerchief over nose and mouth.

For a higher degree of protection, stay in the bathroom, close the door, turn on the cold water in the

shower on a strong spray to wash the air.

If an explosion is possible outdoors, close drapes, curtains, and shades over windows. Stay away from

windows to prevent potential injury from flying glass.

Minimize the use of elevators in buildings. Elevators tend to pump outdoor air through a buildingas they travel up and down.

Once the toxic cloud passes and all steps have been taken to ensure that the incident will not recur,

ventilation must be increased by opening windows and doors, turning on ventilation systems and

moving occupants outdoors.


9/35


10/35


11/35


Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB) is the primary response agency during incidents that occur

within the boundaries of the Base or on joint-jurisdictional property. VAFB may lend assistanceto the County when the emergency/disaster is beyond the scope of civil authority resources.

Requests for assistance may go directly to VAFB if immediate help is needed to save lives,

prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage.

5.11.2 Regulatory Setting

There are numerous codes and standards that apply to fire protection and emergency response forfacilities such as the ones affected by the proposed project. The applicable rules and regulations

are listed in Table 5.11.3. Fire protection systems associated with the project must be detailed inthe fire protection plan and include systems and design that ensure compliance to with a range of

codes and standards. These are specified by the NFPA, American National Standards Institute

(ANSI), Industrial Risk Insurers (IRI), American Petroleum Institute (API), SBCFD Criteria andGuidelines, and the Uniform Fire Code (UFC).

Table 5.11.3 Project Appl icable Standards and Codes

Code/Standard DescriptionANSI B31.4 Liquid Petroleum Transportation Piping SystemsAPI RP 500 Classification of Hazardous Areas in Petroleum Pipeline Facilities

API Pub 2004 Inspection for Fire ProtectionAPI Pub 2510 Design and Construction of LPG InstallationsAPI Pub 2510A Fire-Protection Considerations for the Design and Operation of LPG Storage

Facilities

IRI IM.2.5.2 Plant Layout and Spacing for Oil and Chemical PlantsNFPA Standard 11 Low Expansion Foam and Combined Agent Systems

NFPA Standard 15 Water Spray Fixed SystemsNFPA Standard 22 Water Tanks for Private Fire ProtectionNFPA Standard 24 Installation of Private Fire Service Mains and Their Appurtenances

NFPA Standard 25 Inspection, Testing and Maintenance of Water-Based Fire Protection SystemsNFPA Standard 30 Flammable and Combustible Liquids CodeNFPA Standard 58 Standard for the Storage and Handling of Liquefied Petroleum GasesNFPA Standard 70 National Electric CodeSBC Code Chapter 15 Amendments to the UFC

SBC Permit Conditions VariousSBC Public WorksEngineering Design Standards

Roadways

SBCFD Standard 2A Fire Protection Water Regulations Flows and Hydrant SpacingSBCFD Standard 3 Fire Protection Hazard Area RequirementsSBCFD Standard 6 Hazardous Materials ConditionsSBCFD Standard 7 Alarms & Signaling SystemsSBCFD Evacuation Near Flammable or Combustible PipelineUFC Article 02 Division II Special Procedures


12/35


Table 5.11.3 Project Appl icable Standards and Codes

Code/Standard Description

UFC Article 79 Flammable and Combustible LiquidsUFC Article 80 Hazardous MaterialsUFC Article 85 Electrical Systems

IRI Guideline 17 indicates that fire water supplies should be capable of supplying at least 500gallons per minute for 4 hours for pumping stations (IRI 17.3.3) and 3,000 gallons per minute for

4 hours to all areas of an oil storage terminal (IRI 17.3.4). These total a supply of 120,000 to720,000 gallons of water.

Foam is frequently used in combination with the cooling water to extinguish fires associated with

crude oil storage tanks. Foam can be applied to a liquid spill to suffocate a fire or preventignition of the flammable material spill. NFPA Standard 11 is applicable to foam application for

protection of outdoor vertical atmospheric storage tanks containing flammable and combustible

liquids by means of fixed foam discharge outlets. It specifies that application rates of foam

should be at least 0.1 gpm/ft

2

of liquid surface area of the fixed-roof tank to be protected. NFPA11 also states that for extinguishing crude petroleum fixed-roof storage tank fires, the adequate

foam supply should last 30 to 55 minutes, depending on the type of foam outlet (NFPA 11, 3-3).

For floating roof storage tanks, the adequate foam supply should last for at least 20 minutes withan application rate of 0.3 gpm. For dike fires, NFPA requires a foam supply with a minimum

discharge rate of 0.16 gpm/ft2(for foam monitors) and minimum discharge time of 30 minutes

for Class I hydrocarbons fires (NFPA 11, 3-7). Minimum foam application rate and dischargetime for non-diked spill for adequate fire protection are 0.10 gpm/ft

2and 15 minutes,

respectively.

Safe equipment spacing requirements for petrochemical plants are given in IRI GuidelinesIM2.5.2, NFPA Fire Protection Handbook, and Standard 30. Specific requirements for spacing of

the vessels containing pressurized LPG are given in the API standard 2510. The applicablerequirements to the proposed project spacing are summarized in Table 5.11.4.

IRI IM2.5.2 also gives guidelines for the overall oil and chemical plants layout. The mostimportant of these include the following:

There should be at least two entrances to the plant;

The overall site should be subdivided into general areas (blocks) with a maximum size of 300 feet x

600 feet;

Access roadways should be provided between the blocks to allow access to each block from at least


13/35


Table 5.11.4 a-e Appl icable NFPA, API and IRI Equipment Spacing Requirements

a. Inter-Unit Spacing Requirements (feet)

Flares

Flares - Loading

Racks

Loading Racks 300 50 Service

Buildings

Service Buildings 300 200 - Control

Rooms

Control Rooms 300 200 - - FireWater

Pumps

Fire Water Pumps 300 200 50 50 -ProcessUnitsHigh

Hazard

Process Units High Hazard 300 200 400 300 300 200 PressureStorage

Tanks

Pressure Storage Tanks 400 350 350 350 350 350 * AtmosphericStorage

Tanks

Atmospheric Storage Tanks 300 250 250 250 350 350 * *-= there is no spacing requirement

* = see table C (Storage Tanks Spacing Requirements)

b. Intra-Unit Spacing Requirements (feet)

Compressors

Compressors 30 Piperacks

Pipe racks 50 - FiredHeaters

Fired Heaters 50 50 25 HeatExchanges

Heat Exchanges 30 10 50 5HighHazardPumps

High Hazard Pumps 30 15 50 15 5 Em

ergencycontrols

Emergency controls 50 50 50 50 50 - Analy

zerrooms

Analyzer rooms 50 50 50 50 50 - -

c. Storage Tanks Spacing Requirements (feet)

FloatingRoofT

anks

3,000300 LPG loading racks 300 Yes

Firewater Pumps a >300 any equipment 300 flare

200 - loading racks

Yes

YesNotes: a, b, c, d letters correspond to the specific tables in Table 5.11.4.

The LOGP facility would continue to require response services for a longer period of time thanprojected in the approved Point Pedernales Project. This constitutes an extension of life impact.

However, the public response services are partially funded by PXP to provide response servicesto the LOGP and other related facilities. This funding would continue to be provided if the life of

the facilities is extended.

Equipment changes that are connected with the increased oil and gas throughput are minor and

would not have significant impact to the fire protection or emergency response. The LOGPfacility along with its fire protection system was designed to process a maximum of 36,000 bpd

of dry oil, therefore operation at higher oil and gas processing rates would not have a significant

impact on fire protection or emergency response. Also, the facilitys Fire Protection andEmergency Response Plans were developed for maximum flowrates of 36,000 bpd of dry oil,therefore these plans would be applicable for the expected increase in oil flow rates. Because of

adequate facility design, sufficient response capabilities and response time the impacts on the fire

protection and emergency response resources for the LOGP facility are considered adverse, butnot significant.

Mitigation Measures

No mitigation measures have been identified.

Residual Impact

Impact Fire.4 is adverse but not significant (Class III).

5.11.5 Impact Analysis for the Alternatives


20/35


occur, respectively. However, no extension of life of Point Pedernales facilities (Platform Irene,

pipelines, and LOGP) is assumed under either scenario. With the No Project Alternative

Scenarios 2 and 3, Impacts Fire.1 through Fire.4 would not occur because there would not bechanges at Valve Site #2, including installation of a new power line, and no changes in oil flow

rates over current conditions (i.e., baseline).

Options for Meeting California Fuel Demand. The relative fire protection and emergency

services impacts associated with the various options for meeting California fuel demand are

summarized in Table 5.11.6.

Table 5.11.6 No Project Alternative Comparison to Options for Meeting California

Fuel Demand, Fire Protection and Emergency Response

Source of Energy Impacts

Other Conventional Oil & Gas

Domestic onshore crude oil and gas Likely to displace, rather than eliminate, fireprotection and emergency response impacts.

Increased marine tanker imports of crude oil Would likely displace fire protection impacts, butwould increase emergency response impacts

proportionately to increased oil spill risk.Increased gasoline imports1 Would increase fire protection and emergencyresponse impacts, especially if tanker trucks areused.

Increased natural gas imports (LNG) Would increase fire protection and emergencyresponse impacts due to either increased tankertrucks or tankering.

Alternatives to Oil and Gas

Fuel Demand Reduction: increased fuelefficiencies, conservation, electrification2

Alternative transportation modes Proposed project impacts would be eliminated.Implementation of regulatory measures Proposed project impacts would be eliminated.Coal, Nuclear, Hydroelectric Proposed project impacts would be eliminated.

Construction and operation of power facilityinfrastructure could generate fire protection andemergency response impacts.

Alternative Transportation Fuels

Ethanol/Biodiesel3 Fire protection and emergency response impactswould increase due to increased truck traffic.

Hydrogen2

Proposed project impacts would be eliminated.Potential fire protection and emergency responseimpacts due to operation of hydrogen deliverysystems.

Other Energy Resources2

Solar2,4 Proposed project impacts would be eliminated.Operational fire protection and emergency


21/35


22/35


Because of the low likelihood of fire, adequate response capabilities, and adequate response

time, the impacts to fire protection and emergency response resources are considered to be

adverse but not significant (Class III). Mitigation Measures Fire-1 and Fire-2 would apply tomitigate this impact to the maximum extent feasible in accordance with SBC policies.

Impact Fire.3 - Pipeline Risk of Upsetwould not occur offshore but would increase onshore.The new pipelines,and drilling/production site, and pipeline tie-in station associated with this

alternative would generate risks to public safety and Base personnel (see Section 5.1.5.2, Risk of

Upset/Hazardous Materials). In the event of an oil spill, there would need to be emergencyresponse capabilities similar to what is required for the proposed project. Catchment basins

would need to be included in the pipeline design in accordance with Mitigation Measures OWR-5 and OWR-12. Impact Fire.3would stay the same as for the proposed project,adverse but not

significant (Class III).

Impact # Impact Description PhaseResidual

Impact

Fire.5 Pipeline and production/processing facilities construction

could create short-term impacts to fire protection and

emergency response.

Construction Class II

Construction of the new onshore pipeline, production/processing facilities, and power lineswould be short-term and is not expected to have significant impacts on emergency response

resources. The Applicant would be required to follow all fire and oil spill prevention measures,

and other safety precautions required by regulations for excavation.

The construction of the pipeline would require hot work for welding, which has the potential to

start fires. In addition, movement of the construction equipment could result in sparks that have

the potential to start fires. Although the pipeline construction would occur within high firehazard areas, it would be near existing roadways and UPRR right-of-way, reducing the

likelihood of a spark-generated fire and providing adequate emergency response accessibility.Further, a VAFB fire station is located on Coast Road, in close proximity to alternative facilities.

Mitigation Measures

Fire-3 All construction equipment shall be equipped with the appropriate spark arrestors andfunctioning mufflers. The applicantPXP shall submit the pipeline construction

procedures to the SBC Fire Department for review and approval prior to land useclearance.

Fire-4 A fire watch with appropriate fire fighting equipment (i.e., hydrants, water truck, etc.)

shall be available at the project site at all times when welding or grinding activities aretaking place. Further, welding or grinding shall not occur when sustained winds


23/35


containment of fires. The applicantPXP shall submit the pipeline construction

procedures to the SBC Fire Department for review and approval prior to land useclearance.

Residual Impact

The residual impact for Impact Fire.5 is considered significant but mitigable (Class II).

5.11.5.3 Casmalia East Oil Field Processing Location

Impacts Fire.1 to Fire.3 would be the same as for the proposed project.

Impact Fire.4 LOGP Upset: The part of Impact Fire.4 that is related to increased throughputwould be eliminated because the processing facilities that pose the greatest risk of upset anddemand for emergency resources would be moved to Casmalia. Because there still would be

pumps and compressors at the LOGP site beyond the currently projected life of the Point

Pedernales facilities, and these remaining facilities would have fire protection and emergency

response requirements, the part of Impact Fire.4 related to extension of life would remain,though greatly reduced in magnitude.

Impact Fire.5 Construction Risk of Upset: Construction of the Casmalia Alternative pipelinewould be short-term and is not expected to have significant impacts on emergency response

resources. The construction of the pipeline would require hot work for welding, which has the

potential to start fires. In addition, movement of the construction equipment could result in

sparks that have the potential to start fires. Since the pipeline construction would occur withinhigh fire hazard areas, the impact due to construction is considered significant but mitigable

(Class II)with the implementation of Mitigation Measure Fire-3, Fire-4, and Fire-5.

Impact # Impact Description Phase ResidualImpact

Fire.6 Construction of Casmalia site facilities and dismantling of

the LOGP could create short-term impacts to fire protection

and emergency response.

Construction Class III

Increased truck traffic involved in materials and equipment deliveries and the removal of refuse

from dismantling of the LOGP could increase the likelihood of road accidents. During the LOGP

dismantling, open-flame cutting (if used) of equipment and piping that were used for oilprocessing would increase the likelihood of fire. Open flame work (e.g., welding) at the new

facility site that is located in a high fire hazard area could also increase the likelihood of fire.

Trenching to install new pipelines would increase risk of damaging other hazardous pipelines orpower cables and could result in a fire or explosion. The California Fire Marshal Report on

hazardous liquids pipelines states that third-party damage is one of the leading causes of pipeline


24/35


adverse impacts would be mitigated by appropriate construction techniques and safety measures;

therefore, the impact would be adverse but not significant.

Mitigation Measures

Fire-6 For the new facilities, PXP shall follow all appropriate fire protection and safety

measures outlined in the Point Pedernales Project Final Development Plan (FDP),Systems Safety and Reliability, Part P. PXP shall submit the construction procedures

to the SBC Systems Safety Reliability Review Committee (SSRRC) for review and

approval prior to land use clearance.

Residual ImpactImpact Fire.6 is adverse but not significant (Class III).


Impact

Fire.7 Operation of the new oil and gas facility at Casmalia East

site could create long-term impacts to fire protection andemergency response.

Operations

Extension of Life

Class II

Operating the new oil and gas facility at the Casmalia site could create significant impacts to thefire protection or emergency response resources due to the increased demand that an oil and gas

processing facility would have on fire protection services in the southern Orcutt/Santa Mariaarea. The facility would generate potential fire hazards due to releases of crude oil, produced gas

and natural gas liquids. The facility would also generate toxic gas hazards due to a potential

release of produced gas or acid gas, which could be generated as part of the produced gastreatment process.

Under this alternative, the majority of the LOGP facility would be dismantled. However, crudeoil shipping pumps and produced gas compressors would still remain at the site. Therefore, fireprotection and emergency response requirements would still remain at the LOGP site, but they

would be substantially reduced. A new processing facility at Casmalia would shift the primary

emergency response capabilities from the Lompoc area to the Santa Maria area. The new site iswithin 8 to 10 miles from the fire stations in Santa Maria, which can provide response to the

Casmalia site within 15 minutes. Fire stations located in Lompoc (17 to 18 miles from the new

site) would serve as secondary response services. The Orcutt/Santa Maria fire stations currentlydo not have resources to be the primary responder to an oil and gas processing facility

emergency situation other than fire (e.g., HazMat teams, spill response capabilities).

The new facility would also extend the life of the remaining Point Pedernales facilities. Becausethe existing response resources could not provide adequate emergency response to the Casmalia

i t t fi t ti d id d t b


25/35


Fire-7 The new facility shall be designed in accordance with all applicable fire protection andemergency response standards. The new facility should be designed with all early firedetection and prevention of fire spread as the basis of the fire safety design. The

facility should have adequate supply of water and oil fire fighting foam as per the

National Fire Protection Association Agency (NFPA) requirements (i.e., Standards 11,

15, 22, 24, 25). The facility layout should provide sufficient access for emergencyresponse vehicles and provide adequate equipment spacing as per the American

Petroleum Institute (API) and Industrial Risk Insurers (IRI) guidelines (IRI IM 2.5.2).

The new facility should have fire detection monitors positioned in the locations mostlikely to be affected by fire. All appropriate equipment such as crude oil storage tanks

should have sufficient secondary containment. Grading under liquefied petroleum gas(LPG) storage vessels should be sloped to allow any spilled flammable liquids to flowoutward from the vessel and into an impoundment area. The applicant shall submit all

appropriate documentation for the new facility to the SSRRC for review and approval

prior to land use clearance

Fire-8 Fire protection, oil spill, and emergency response plans of the new facility shall bedeveloped or adjusted using the similar LOGP plans and coordinated with the SBC

Fire Department. These plans shall address the fire prevention measures at the facility,the fire suppression systems, the specific hazards at the facility, and fire and

emergency response training and planning. The Fire Protection, Oil Spill Response,

and Emergency Response Plans shall be submitted to the SBC Fire Department forreview and approval prior to land use clearance.

Fire-9 The facility operators/owners shall provide funding to the SBC Fire Department to

provide adequate staffing and equipment for the Santa Maria Fire Station to addressthe emergency response requirements of the Casmalia oil and gas processing facility.

The facility operators/owners shall enter into an agreement with the SBC to providethe reasonable share of funds for fire protection and emergency response. Theoperators/owners shall provide documentation of the monetary deposits into the

appropriate funds prior to land use clearance.

Residual Impact

With incorporation of the measures listed above and Mitigation Measure Fire-3, Impact Fire.7would be reduced to a less than significant level (Class II).


Impact

Fire.8 Operation of the sour gas pipeline to the new plant at

Casmalia East site could create long-term impacts to fireprotection and emergency response

Operations Class II


26/35


requirements on fire protection and emergency response. For a major portion of this pipeline, the

Santa Maria Fire Station No. 22 would be the primary responder. The Santa Maria fire stationsdo not currently have resources to be the primary responder to an oil and gas processing facility

emergency situation (e.g., HazMat teams, oil spill response capabilities) (see Table 5.11.1).

Because the adequate response resources are not available, this impact is considered to be

significant.

Mitigation Measures

Mitigation Measure Fire-9 would apply, along with these additional measures.

Fire-10 The sour gas pipeline shall be equipped with a leak detection system that is capable of

detecting leaks as small as inch. The pipeline shall be equipped with remotelyoperated block valves to limit the volume of material release in the event of a leak or

rupture. The applicant shall submit documentation for the pipeline controls design tothe SBC SSRRC for review and approval prior to land use clearance.

Fire-11 The pipeline shall be constructed following all applicable standards for sour gas

pipeline service. The applicant shall submit all pipeline documentation (e.g. route,

materials of construction, operation procedures) to the SBC SSRRC for review and

approval prior to land use clearance.

Mitigation Measure Risk-3 (see Section 5.1, Risk of Upset/Hazardous Materials) requires thatthe route of the LOGP-Casmalia pipeline to be not closer than 2,500 feet from southern Orcutt.

Residual Impact

With incorporation of the mitigation measures listed above and Mitigation Measure Risk-3, the

residual impact would be considered less thansignificant (Class II).

5.11.5.4 Alternative Power Line Routes to Valve Site #2

Impacts Fire.1, Fire.3, and Fire.4 would stay the same as for the proposed project. The

magnitude of Impact Fire.2 would greatly decrease as installation of a portion of the power linebelow ground, as opposed to above ground, would eliminate addition of a new ignition source to

a portion of the power line route, which is located in high fire hazard area.

5.11.5.5 Replacement of Oil Emulsion Pipeline from Platform Irene to LOGP

Impacts Fire.1 and Fire.2 would not occur because Valve Site #2 modifications would not beneeded. Impact Fire.4 would be the same as for the proposed project. Impacts Fire.6, Fire.7, and

Fire.8 (Casmalia construction and operations) would not apply to this alternative.

Impact Fire.3 Pipeline Risk of Upset would stay the same as for the proposed project as

discussed below The replacement pipeline would be designed maintained and operated using

5 11 Fi P t ti d E R


27/35


percent). However, the potential spill volume would be the same and in the event of an oil spill

there would still need to be emergency response capabilities similar to what is required for theproposed project. Therefore, Impact Fire.3 would stay the same as for the proposed project,adverse but not significant (Class III).

Impact Fire.5 Construction Risk of Upset: Construction of the replacement emulsion pipelinewould be short-term and is not expected to have significant impacts on emergency response

resources. There is a potential of encountering and damaging the existing Point Pedernales

pipelines during excavation; however, the pipelines would not be in operation duringconstruction. The applicant would be required to follow all fire and oil spill prevention measures

and other safety precautions required by regulations for excavation. This would include drainingthe existing pipelines prior to beginning the excavation work for the new pipeline.

The construction of the pipeline would require hot work for welding, which has the potential to

start fires. In addition, movement of the construction equipment could result in sparks that havethe potential to start fires. Since the pipeline construction would occur within high fire hazard

areas, the impact due to construction is considered significant but mitigable (Class II)with the

implementation of Mitigation Measures Fire-3, Fire-4, and Fire-5.

5.11.565 Alternative Drill Muds and Cuttings DisposalOnshore activities under these alternatives are the same as for the proposed project. Therefore,Impacts Fire.1 through Fire.4 would be the same as for the proposed project.

5.11.6 Cumulative Impacts

5.11.6.1 Offshore Oil and Gas Projects

Potential offshore oil and gas development projects within the proposed project area couldinclude the Rocky Point, Lion Rock, Point Sal, Santa Maria, Purisima Point, Bonito and Sword

Units, and Lease OCS-P 0409 (see Section 4.2). The hazardous nature of these facilities projectswould require well-developed fire protection and emergency response services. These new oil

and gas facilities projects could require significant additions to existing response services in theVAFB and Lompoc area; however, with project-specific requirements such as expanded or new

fire protection and emergency response facilities, services and personnel, cumulative impacts

would not be considered significant. Although the proposed project would prolong the life of the

Point Pedernales Project, and thus its need for such services, with project-specific mitigationmeasures for the other potential offshore oil and gas-related projects in the area, its incremental

contribution to cumulative impacts would not be considered significant. The other offshore andonshore oil and gas development projects discussed in Sections 4.3 and 4.4, respectively, are a

substantial distance away from the proposed project; consequently, no overlap with their related

fi t ti d i ld b ti i t d t

5 11 Fire Protection and Emergency Response


28/35


onshore developments. In addition, as presented in Section 4.4, a new County fire station and

sheriff substation, to be located near the intersection of Burton Mesa Boulevard and Harris GradeRoad, are currently under review. This would provide sufficient fire protection capabilities to

service the additional onshore developments in the proposed project area. Therefore, the

cumulative impacts on fire protection and emergency responses resources from the future

onshore development would not be expected to be significant.

5.11.7 Mitigation Monitor ing Plan

MitigationMeasure Mitigation Requirements and Timing Method ofVerification Timing ofVerification

PartyResponsible

ForVerification

Fire-1 PXP shall review and revise the Fire ProtectionPlan, Emergency Response Plan and Oil SpillResponse Plan that apply to all the facilitieswhich will have equipment or operationsmodifications due to the proposed project. The

plans shall be submitted to the SBC FireDepartment and P&D for review and approval

prior to land use clearance.

The plans shallbe reviewedprior to LandUse clearance.

Compliancewith the plans

shall beverified byannual drilland audit.

SBCFD

Fire-2 The applicant shall update the LOGP FireProtection Plan (FDP condition P-10) to includethe power line, in particular, the FlammableVegetation Management Plan, and FirePrevention and Inspection Programparts of the

plan to minimize possibility of a brush fire. Theapplicant shall submit the updated FireProtection Plan to SBC Fire Department forreview and approval prior to land use clearance.

Prior to LandUse clearance.

Compliancewith the Fire

Protection Planshall beverified

through regulardrills.

SBCFD

Fire-3

(VAFBOnshore,Casmalia,

andEmulsionPipeline

ReplacementAlternatives

only)

All construction equipment shall be equipped

with the appropriate spark arrestors andfunctioning mufflers. The applicant PXP shallsubmit the pipeline construction procedures tothe SBC Fire Department for review andapproval prior to land use clearance.

Prior to Land

Use clearance.

Review during

construction

SBCFD and

EQAP monitor

Fire-4(VAFB

Onshore,Casmalia,

andEmulsionPipeline

R l t

A fire watch with appropriate fire fightingequipment (i.e., hydrants, water truck, etc.) shall

be available at the project site at all times whenwelding or grinding activities are taking place.Further, welding or grinding shall not occurwhen sustained winds exceed 15-20 mph, asdetermined by SBC Fire Department, unless anSBC Fi D t t d i d hi ld i


Review duringconstruction

SBCFD andEQAP monitor



29/35


MitigationMeasure Mitigation Requirements and Timing

Method ofVerification

Timing ofVerification

PartyResponsible

ForVerification

Fire-5(VAFB

Onshore,Casmalia,

andEmulsionPipeline

ReplacementAlternatives

only)

All rubber-tired construction vehicles shall beequipped with appropriate fire fightingequipment, such as shovels and axes or pulaskis,to aid in the prevention or containment of fires.The applicant PXP shall submit the pipelineconstruction procedures to the SBC FireDepartment for review and approval prior toland use clearance.


Review duringconstruction

SBCFD andEQAP monitor

Fire-6(CasmaliaAlternative

only)

For the new facilities, PXP shall follow allappropriate fire protection and safety measuresoutlined in the Point Pedernales Project FinalDevelopment Plan (FDP), Systems Safety andReliability, Part P. PXP shall submit theconstruction procedures to the SBC SystemsSafety Reliability Review Committee (SSRRC)for review and approval prior to land useclearance.

Prior to LandUse clearance,and regularly

duringoperations.

Compliancewith the newFDP shall be

verifiedthrough regularfacility audits.

SSRRC (includesSBCFD)


only)

The new facility shall be designed in accordancewith all applicable fire protection andemergency response standards. The new facilityshould be designed with all early fire detectionand prevention of fire spread as the basis of thefire safety design. The facility should haveadequate supply of water and oil fire fightingfoam as per the National Fire ProtectionAssociation Agency (NFPA) requirements (i.e.,Standards 11, 15, 22, 24, 25). The facility layout

should provide sufficient access for emergencyresponse vehicles and provide adequateequipment spacing as per the AmericanPetroleum Institute (API) and Industrial RiskInsurers (IRI) guidelines (IRI IM 2.5.2). Thenew facility should have fire detection monitors

positioned in the locations most likely to beaffected by fire. All appropriate equipment suchas crude oil storage tanks should have sufficientsecondary containment. Grading under liquefied

petroleum gas (LPG) storage vessels should besloped to allow any spilled flammable liquids toflow outward from the vessel and into animpoundment area. The applicant shall submitall appropriate documentation for the newfacility to the SSRRC for review and approvalprior to land use clearance


Throughreview of the

facilitydocumentation,such as facility

plot plans,P&IDs, etc.

SSRRC



30/35


MitigationMeasure Mitigation Requirements and Timing

Method ofVerification

Timing ofVerification

PartyResponsible

ForVerification


only)

Fire protection, oil spill, and emergencyresponse plans of the new facility shall bedeveloped or adjusted using the similar LOGP

plans and coordinated with the SBC FireDepartment. These plans shall address the fire

prevention measures at the facility, the firesuppression systems, the specific hazards at thefacility, and fire and emergency responsetraining and planning. The Fire Protection, OilSpill Response, and Emergency Response Plansshall be submitted to the SBC Fire Departmentfor review and approval prior to land useclearance.


Compliancewith the plans

is verifiedthrough regular

drills.

SBCFD


only)

The facility operators/owners shall providefunding to the SBC Fire Department to provideadequate staffing and equipment for the SantaMaria Fire Station to address the emergencyresponse requirements of the Casmalia oil andgas processing facility. The facility

operators/owners shall enter into an agreementwith the SBC to provide the reasonable share offunds for fire protection and emergencyresponse. The operators/owners shall providedocumentation of the monetary deposits into theappropriate funds prior to land use clearance.

Prior toissuance of the

FDP.

Review ofmonetary

deposits intothe appropriate

accounts.

SBCFD


only)

The sour gas pipeline shall be equipped with aleak detection system that is capable of detectingleaks as small as inch. The pipeline shall beequipped with remotely operated block valves to

limit the volume of material release in the eventof a leak or rupture. The applicant shall submitdocumentation for the pipeline controls designto the SBC SSRRC for review and approval

prior to land use clearance.


Review priorto constructionand operation

SSRRC


only)

The pipeline shall be constructed following allapplicable standards for sour gas pipelineservice. The applicant shall submit all pipelinedocumentation (e.g., route, materials ofconstruction, operation procedures) to the SBC

SSRRC for review and approval prior to landuse clearance.


Review priorto and duringconstruction

SSRRC

5.11.8 References

API. 1998. Recommended Practice 14C, Recommended Practice for Analysis, Design,



31/35

g y p

____. 1994. Design, Construction, Operation, Inspection and Maintenance of Tank and

Terminal Facilities, API Standard 2610.

____. 1999. Tank Inspection, Repair, Alteration, and Reconstruction, API Standard 653.California Code of Regulations. Title 1, Division 5.

City of Lompoc Fire Department; City of Santa Maria Fire Department. 2000. Unocap

Emergency Response Plan, May.

California Department of Fish and Game, July 2005. Burton Mesa Ecological Reserve

Administrative Draft Management Plan.

http://lompoconline.com/Ron_Fink/fire.html, A Burning Memory: The Darkest Day in theHistory of the Vandenberg AFB Fire Department and the Birth of the Vandenberg AFB

Hot Shots.

IRI. 1993 to1995. Guidelines for Loss Prevention and Control.

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). 2000. National Fire Codes, 2000 Edition.

____. 1997. Fire Protection Handbook, 18th

edition.

Nuevo Energy Company. 1999.Lompoc Oil and Gas Plant Safety Inspection, Maintenance, andQuality Assurance Program (revised January 2002).

PXP. 2005a. LOGP Fire Protection Plan. March.

____. 1999. Safety Inspection, Maintenance, and Quality Assurance Program. Lompoc Oil andGas Plant (revised January 2002).

____. 2005b. Emergency Response Plan. Platform Irene Production Pipeline from Beach to

Lompoc OGP and LOGP. August.____. 2004. Oil Spill Response Plan. Platform Irene and Point Pedernales 20-inch Wet Oil

Pipeline. November.

____. 2004 (updated May and August 2005). Emergency Response Plan. December.

Santa Barbara County, Planning and Development Department. 1995. Environmental Thresholds

and Guidelines Manual.

Santa Barbara County Planning Commission. 2002. Staff Report for Tranquillon Ridge Oil andGas Development Project, June 20.

Tosco Refining Company. May 2000. Unocal Sisquoc Pipeline Project: Fire Protection Plan.

____. 2001. Safety Inspection, Maintenance, and Quality Assurance Program. March 28.



32/35

Fire Station Locations andEmergency Response Facilities

5.11 Fire Pro


33/35

F

April 2008 5.11-33

AspenEnvironmental Group

PREPARED

BY


34/35



35/35

AspenEnvironmental Group

PREPARED

BY

Fire Protection Equipment -Platform Irene Drill Deck

Figure 5.11-3b

Source: MRS, 2002.

5.11-35April 2008 Final EIR

5-11 fire protection.pdf

Documents