ANGELAKIjournal of the theoretical humanitiesvolume14 number 3 december 2009

Hegels famous descriptions of themasterslave dialectic, and the moregeneral analysis of the struggle for recognition

that it is a part of, have been remarkably

influential throughout the nineteenth and twen-

tieth centuries. This dialectic has been very

important to almost the entire Marxist tradition,

Friedrich Nietzsche, psychoanalysis (especially

Jacques Lacan, Slavoj Zizek, and Donald

Winnicott), existentialism (especially Jean-Paul

Sartre), feminism (Simone de Beauvoir, Jessica

Benjamin, and Judith Butler), the Frankfurt

School, contemporary German theorists of recog-

nition (especially Axel Honneth), and arguably

also post-structuralism.1 As one of the most

enduring motifs of contemporary European

philosophy it is even arguable that it has helped

to hold together the usual suspects associated

with this tradition, who, as Simon Glendinning

has observed, seem to lack the methodological

or thematic points of convergence to allow one

to attribute any kind of unity to continental

philosophy.2 It is plausible to suggest that the

influence of the masterslave dialectic (even

where it is argued against) grounds the enduring

continental attempts to positively thematize

inter-subjectivity, along with the various reasons

proffered for why we should not begin with an

atomistic assumption of a rational, self-interested

agent. Bound up with the dominance of this idea,

however, has been a corresponding treatment

of sadism and masochism as complicit projects

that are mutually necessary for one another in

a manner that is structurally isomorphic with

the way in which master and slave depend on one

another in Hegels (and Karl Marxs) famous

analyses. In clinical diagnoses it is almost

invariably asserted that sadism and masochism

are causally connected, with one of these

pathologies being seen to derive from an

inversion or displacement of the other. Gilles

Deleuze, however, in Difference and Repetition,

Coldness and Cruelty, and elsewhere, rejects

the primacy of the masterslave dialectic (and the

struggle for recognition) for understanding social

relations, at least in so far as it relies upon the

themes of negativity, contradiction, opposition,

and he also rejects the resultant treatment of

sadism and masochism. Moreover, if his sympto-

matology of the latter (especially masochism)

convinces us that the masterslave dialectic not

only does not understand these ways of existing

but necessarily could not, then we are faced with

an important challenge to any conception of

social relations that is too closely tied to the

jack reynolds

THE MASTER^SLAVEDIALECTIC AND THESADO-MASOCHISTICENTITYsome deleuzian objections

ISSN 0969-725X print/ISSN1469-2899 online/09/030011^16 2009 Taylor & Francis and the Editors of AngelakiDOI:10.1080/09697250903407492

11

dialectic of lordship and bondage as it is

sometimes known. While it might be maintained

that sadism and masochism are but marginal and

borderline cases that do not invalidate the more

normatively inclined account of the structure

of social life that has been thematized by the

struggle for recognition, Deleuze will also give

us reasons for doubting this. This paper, then,

will be composed of four main sections: i, an

exposition of Hegels treatment of the master

slave dialectic; ii, a selective account of later

understandings of social relations that are

indebted to it; iii, a recital of Deleuzes objections

to the masterslave dialectic and its reliance upon

three key components: contradiction, opposition,

and negativity; and iv, an argument, extending

Deleuzes work, for the manner in which the

masterslave dialectic has also been bound up

with, and made possible, the belief in a sado-

masochistic unity (i.e., the way in which they

are envisaged as complementary opposites, or as

causally connected symptoms). Finally, in con-

clusion, I will argue that Deleuze is right to

suggest that there are different and mutually

exclusive logics and symptoms involved in sadism

and masochism, differences that have tended to

be obscured partly because of the influence of the

masterslave dialectic. I will also suggest that

this points, more generally, to problems

with what might be called, following Maurice

Merleau-Ponty, bad dialectical thinking, although

not necessarily with the dialectic per se.

i hegel and themaster^ slave dialectic

Despite its influence, the masterslave dialectic

plays quite a small role in Hegels Phenomenology

of Spirit. Hegels account of the development of

self-consciousness via a struggle for recognition,

unlike say Hobbes state of nature idea, puts

the other at the heart of the self, as a condition

of self-consciousness and the ability to reflect on

oneself as an I. It thus initiated a revolution

in thinking about social life and identity,

moving us away from conceiving of ourselves

as fundamentally a monadological consciousness.

Instead, self-consciousness is produced through

historical encounters with others, and we can

understand this in many different senses,

including developmental, phenomenological,

historical, and even in relation to nation formation

and the conflict that obtains between nations.

This means, however, that the masterslave

dialectic is not merely a fiction, an elaborate

thought experiment. It also has another status

in Hegels work, being claimed to be both

historically evidenced and inferred as a transcen-

dental condition to explain social life and the

necessary co-imbrication of the Iwe relation.

To briefly describe the key stages of this

dialectic, we need to start by noting Hegels

view that our desire for objects (e.g., food) and

the subsequent satisfaction of this desire per-

mits a minimal experience of self-awareness.

Nonetheless, this form of self-consciousness is

primitive and unstable in that it requires that

we incessantly desire and absorb various

other objects to keep in touch with our self.

This consciousness acts with violence towards its

objects and sees them as things to be consumed.

On this picture, then, desire begins as a kind

of natural solipsism, naively self-centred, egoistic,

and narcissistic.

Hegel then envisages two consciousnesses

coming together and each seeing a reflection or

mirror of itself in the other. Each of the parties

knows that the other is another for-itself in

Hegels language. The immediate reaction to

this experience of the others symmetry is that

it relativizes our own subjectivity; we are one

amongst others. Our independent conception

of ourselves is put into question and this

realization constitutes a torture of sorts since we

are vulnerable to a perspective that is not our

own. Our identity and freedom is shown to be

radically dependent on others, and for this

reason, as Robert Williams suggests, the con-

frontation with the other is experienced as an

abrupt self-transcendence, a plunge into relation-

ality and otherness that is a loss of the self.3

The need is felt to overcome this particularity,

to reinstitute ones own universality as ground

of value, and there is thus an attempt to solicit

the recognition from the other of ones own

absolute freedom and independence. The two

interlocutors hence both try to bring their

subjective self-certainty of their value to objective

expression. Each desiring subject asserts its

master^ slave dialectic

12

independence and self-identity by negating the

other desiring subject. Most dramatically, the

subject can reveal its universality and transcen-

dence of its particular existence by risking its own

life and seeking to kill the other, thus showing

that the perpetrator is not tied to the preservation

of their particular identity and natural animal

existence but is instead invested in something

greater.

But, of course, the death of the other would

be a false victory for the obvious reason that

one cannot be acknowledged or recognized by

a corpse. Each self-consciousness hence realizes

that it needs both its own life and the life of the

other. What Hegel calls the abstract negation of

murder hence needs to be displaced in favour

of determinate or limited negation. The point,

then, is that one of the protagonists will back

away from this struggle to the death and renounce

their demand for genuine recognition of their

independence, thereby also accepting that they

are a dependent (slave-like) consciousness. On the

other hand, the victorious protagonist succeeds

in having their independence acknowledged.

In a sense, they risked their life and stared

death in the face in order to prove their

independence. Asymmetrical relations of mastery

and slavery are hence instituted, and this unequal

recognition eliminates the prospect of brute

violence or a literal struggle to the death. The

dominant person lives for themselves (they

eat and enjoy), whereas the slave works for

another in order to survive. The slave is like

a mirror that reflects an image of the master

back to themselves (i.e., recognition that they are

the master), but the master gives the slave no

such reciprocal recognition but merely an image

of their own desires; the slave is recognizing,

while the master alone is recognized.

This is not, of course, the end of the dialectical

process, since another reversal takes place in

which each begins to turn into its opposite.

The masters victory is hollow, since they remain

dependent on the slave both materially and

psychically. Materially, over a period of time

the master becomes a passive consumer, while the

slave gets stronger and more skilled. In fact,

the slave attains a certain kind of mastery in

the way they are able to curb their desire,

be disciplined, and develop their abilities and

skills in a manner that their master never does.

The lord has a desire for the object and enjoys

it, but, because they do not work and produce

an object with their labour, their desire lacks

objectivity and is not externalized. The slave has

a closer relationship to nature and a more

materialized and objective manifestation of their

freedom. They concretely apprehend through

their activity how one can transform the world

through collective labour and from this they

acquire a sense of their own personal identity.4

The master is also always psychically depen-

dent upon the slave continuing to recognize them

as such. Not only is there always a chance that

the slave might not do this despite the prospect

of death (or, say, being sacked), but the master

is inevitably haunted by the fact that they have

essentially bribed the slave into acknowledging

their independence. This is not the kind of

recognition that the master wanted that is,

recognition and respect from an equal. The

master is hence confronted with a problem

regarding the truth of their attempted self-

assertion of their value and identity. If they

believe the slave who they have extorted to flatter

them, the master deludes him- or herself and

lapses into false consciousness; if they do not

believe the slave, they will be suspicious

and paranoid. It is in this sense that the

winner of the masterslave dialectic actually

can be said to lose.5

If fear of death initially decided the position

that each of the parties occupies in their

relationship to one another, here too a dialectical

reversal takes place. There is a sense in which

the bravado of the master actually never really

confronted the prospect of death (rather than

overcame their fear of death), since the slave

confronted this prospect first when they averted

the struggle to the death and assented to be the

slave. It is hence the slave rather than the master

who has experienced their own limits and their

finitude. The slave has experienced fear of death

(of not being) and the absolute melting away of

everything stable, something like a revelation

of the essential aspects of self-consciousness,

and as such is less attached to natural existence

than the master. This is the basis, along with

reynolds

13

physical labour, for an absolute negativity that

can transform things and the slave gains a mind

and will of their own.

But despite this paradoxical reversal of the

positions of master and slave, both are still what

Hegel calls unhappy consciousnesses because

of the relation of domination that persists

between them. The master cannot gain genuine

recognition of their independence and value,

except that form of which they extort from the

slave. The slave is dependent upon the master

and is denied proper recognition of their freedom

and humanity despite their skills and abilities.

They are both hence unhappy and alienated.

Various ideologies come to take hold to forestall

the recognition of this unhappiness. Hegel

describes three such ideologies: stoicism; scepti-

cism; religion. This unhappiness and alienation

can only be overcome, according to Hegel, by

recognizing that my subjectivity is always

mediated by my relations with others, by my

being recognized within an inter-subjective con-

text of rational interaction. In the end, Hegel

envisages the two parties involved in the

struggle for recognition as turning into indepen-

dent craftspeople when they realize that they

benefit more from rational cooperation and

mutual recognition than political domination.

As Williams suggests, being with the other is no

longer a limitation or restriction on freedom

but rather an enhancement and concrete actuali-

sation of freedom.6

ii themaster^ slave dialecticafter hegel

Without being able to dwell in detail upon the

innumerable reinventions and revisions of the

masterslave dialectic, a brief and selective

sketch will suffice to intimate its importance

in four areas Marxism, existentialism, feminism

and psychoanalysis the last two of which are

considered precisely because they are perhaps not

as obvious as the first two.

As almost goes without saying, Marx made

extensive use of the masterslave dialectic in

transforming Hegels purportedly idealist analysis

into what subsequently came to be known as

dialectical materialism. Marx comments, for

instance, that Phenomenology of Spirit contains

all of the elements of the criticism concealed

[i.e., his own criticisms], often already prepared

and elaborated in a way that far surpasses Hegels

own point of view.7 He points to the notion

of the unhappy consciousness in conflict with

itself as one such key point. He also mentions the

struggle between noble and base consciousnesses.

Marx says these sections contain the elements,

though still in an alienated form, of a criticism

of whole spheres like religion, the state, civil

life, and the like.8 On Marxs view, Hegel

also correctly sees that religion is an alienated

expression of, and a protest against, the real

suffering that obtains in unequal social relations.

While he argues that Hegels philosophy does

not address the cause of the suffering, the social

conditions that prompt this false consolation,

Hegels analysis in this regard clearly exerted a

major influence upon Marxs critique of religion,

and, although the lineage is more complicated,

it also influenced Nietzsches masterslave

typology of the advent of Judaeo-Christian

morality.9 Likewise, we know that for Marx, as

for Hegel, contradiction is seen to be a pivotal

agent in historical change. Marx pays particular

attention to the contradiction between two classes

whose dialectical relationship to one another

closely resembles that described by Hegel in the

masterslave dialectic. Neither the proletariat

nor the bourgeoisie can be properly understood

unless they are considered as contradictory

aspects of a single totality in which the forces

of production expand through factories and

socialized labour, but at the same time this

conflicts with essential dependence on private

property relations. Famously, the material abun-

dance that is made possible by the former is

frustrated by the latter, the anarchic inequality

of the market, and the tension which obtains

between them means that this economic and class

divide must be overcome.

In the 1930s, Alexandre Koje`ve lectured on

Hegel in Paris. At seminars attended by various

French intellectual luminaries he foregrounded

an existentialist (or Heideggerian) reading of the

masterslave dialectic, arguing for the impor-

tance of facing up to the prospect of ones own

death for freedom. Whether or not Sartre himself

master^ slave dialectic

14

actually attended these lectures which remain

debatable their influence was profound. Sartre

and de Beauvoirs differing versions of existenti-

alism both insisted that the masterslave dialectic

was central to understanding social life. We will

consider Sartres work shortly, but it is too often

ignored that almost all of de Beauvoirs texts

are punctuated by prolific references to Hegel,

and Nancy Bauer convincingly argues that

The Second Sex is a strikingly original act of

philosophical appropriation of Hegels work

and especially the idea of the masterslave

dialectic.10 After all, as is well known, and

sometimes controversial, in the Introduction to

this book de Beauvoir argues that otherness

is fundamental and unavoidable; no group

ever sets itself up as the one, or as a unity,

without targeting the others who it excludes

from this oneness foreigners, outsiders, the

mad, etc.11 Her implication is that the self

(or community) needs to distinguish itself against

such otherness in order to define itself as a

unitary subject (or group). She also argues that

we cannot fully understand this oneother

dynamic unless we posit some kind of master

slave dialectic along the lines of that which

Hegel, and then Sartre, have argued for that is,

unless we admit that there are mutual antagon-

isms between people, and some kind of hostility

towards other consciousnesses. When these

groups come into contact, however, through

wars, trading, etc., this absolute notion of

otherness is lessened and its relativity is made

manifest.12 The first thing they realize is that

this culture has also designated them as other,

and that there is hence some kind of reciprocity.

Given this suggestion that the positing of an

absolute Other tends to break down through

contact, de Beauvoir is faced with an obvious

question. Why is it that one sex has been made

the norm and the other sex so consistently

rendered the Other? Why is it that the reciprocity

has not been recognized between the sexes?

Women are not a minority. Historically speaking,

there seems to have been no Hegelian death

struggle between men and women, so how

would this situation possibly have come about?

De Beauvoirs answer is that, despite its

centrality, Hegels account of the masterslave

dialectic leaves something out that helps to explain

why women might renounce their claims to

independence. To summarize, we might say that

for Hegel we desire to be recognized as a subject,

a for-itself. For de Beauvoir, things are more

complicated than that; we desire to be recognized

as an in-itself, a thing too.13 By insisting on the

fundamentality of this second desire, the desire

to be a thing or object, she allows us to see how

and why the two sexes might have conspired

together to maintain a situation in which woman

is Other. All of us want recognition, de Beauvoir

(like Hegel) maintains, but we want it to be

achieved once and for all, rather than engage in

permanent struggle; we dream, she says, of rest

in restlessness.14 So, men and women conspire,

in bad faith, to posit woman as intermediary

what de Beauvoir calls the dream of woman,

a figure who is not quite an object and not quite a

free subject in an impossible effort to escape

the implacability of the struggle for recognition.

Men and women have conspired together to

achieve a state of rest in which recognition is

achieved once and for all (women recognize men),

and it is not a struggle. But human beings cannot

achieve permanent recognition, for de Beauvoir,

and the masterslave dialectic requires the con-

stant negotiation of competing demands and

desires. Womans status as intermediary is, of

course, illusory, and all who are party to sustaining

this delusion tacitly realize it. It is, ultimately,

an unhappy situation for all involved, even if it is

clearly to the material advantage of men.

The masterslave dialectic has been an

important touchstone for many other parts of

feminist theory, perhaps most notably Benjamin

and Butler.15 It has also been influential on

psychoanalysis, even if Sigmund Freuds indebt-

edness to it is not immediately clear. Indeed,

prima facie, one important difference seems to be

that the concern with self and other in Hegel

(and more particularly with another persons

recognition) is not as important in Freud as the

ways in which desire is polymorphously shaped

from the subjects point of view. There are

various drives, self-preservation drives and sexual

drives, for instance, which tend to go through

myriad changes as they are shaped in relation to

the complexes, pre-eminently the Oedipus and

reynolds

15

castration complexes.16 Nonetheless, it seems

plausible to say that, for Freud, there is

constitutive or systematic misrecognition built

into the mummy, daddy, me triad (concrete

interpersonal others), which is thereafter invested

into objects of all kinds. Indeed, the naturalizing

of this familial triad is what Deleuze and Guattari

object to in Anti-Oedipus. On this understanding,

then, rather than fundamentally disagreeing with

some of the major postulates of the masterslave

dialectic, Freud would just be more pessimistic

than Hegel, Marx, and others, regarding the

possibilities for simple recognition.

We will return to Freud in the next section

in relation to a consideration of the aetiology of

masochism, but with Lacan the masterslave

dialectic is rather more clearly foregrounded. The

childhood encounter with another (e.g., a parent),

or with the mirror, makes possible reflection

upon ourselves as a stable I. Lacan gives us

a developmental account of how the self or ego is

produced through interaction and identification

with others. Moreover, as Lacan (and subse-

quently Zizek) keeps saying, desire is desire of

the other (big Other), which is another way of

saying that desire is fundamentally the desire for

recognition. The big Other may not exist, isolable

anywhere in the world, but, on this view, the

desire for recognition from this ideal witness or

tribunal is nonetheless ubiquitous. More basi-

cally, we need to identify with certain norms

and social conventions in order to function

within society and avoid neuroses. Another way

of understanding this claim that for psycho-

analysis desire is the desire for recognition

(and thus can be at least partly elucidated

through Hegels masterslave dialectic17) is to

ask how the talking cure works, in as much as

it achieves some measure of success. When

someones symptoms are recognized by the

analysand (who remains neutral) they are often

at least partly ameliorated, and, sometimes, they

even seem to disappear. For Lacan, this suggests

that the symptoms (or the patients unconscious)

have some kind of intrinsic need to be recognized

by an other. We might also note, further, that the

child desires its mother (as absent object, or lack)

and that in resolving the Oedipus complex

the child comes to identify with the Father

(big Other) and thus wants recognition from

them. Recognition, then, is fundamental to non-

pathological adult life. We might also note that

sublime objects of ideology, on the Zizekian

politicization of Lacan, can conspire to keep us

in a situation of servitude, much as Marxists

have held. Ideological fantasies revolving around

certain master signifiers keep us in serfdom. And,

of course, for Zizek and Lacan what is pivotal

to understanding this situation is the concept of

jouissance, perhaps best understood as transgres-

sive pleasure, or a pleasurepain compound of

some kind. We love and enjoy authority and

relationships of power that are not good for us.18

This is something that Benjamins psychoanalytic

feminism also explores, with the masterslave

dialectic explicitly deployed in explaining what

she refers to in the singular as the sadomaso-

chistic fantasy and the pure culture of

domination.19 But the question we will return

to is whether such an explanation, which invokes

a single syndrome and understands it via the

struggle for recognition, is adequate.

iii deleuzes objections to themaster^ slave dialectic

Deleuze does not simply seek to refute all

versions of dialectical thinking. Despite the

reservations about the dialectic that he expresses

in Nietzsche and Philosophy, in particular,

Deleuze continually refers to the long history

of the distortion of the dialectic.20 As the term

distortion intimates, this does not entail a

repudiation of the dialectic per se, but what are

his reservations about this distorted version of

it (which includes the masterslave dialectic)?

Largely, they are to do with the manner in which

it insists on understanding difference (and social

conflict) through concepts like contradiction,

opposition and negation, themes that are

endemic to the masterslave dialectic in most of

its guises, certainly in both Hegel and Sartres

understanding. For Hegel, Marx, Honneth, and

myriad figures in between, the opposition

between the master and the slave, the landowner

and the worker, is eventually supposed to be

sublated and overcome, either by the move-

ment of Geist, by material and structural

master^ slave dialectic

16

transformation of the ownership of the means

of production, or by a combination of the two.

It is this teleological understanding of opposition

and contradiction as both the cause of social

transformation and the potential cure that

Deleuze rejects. It is important to see, though,

that it is not only the end of history grand

narrative that accompanies some of the most

famous versions of the masterslave dialectic, the

delimitation of the future as both known and

inevitable, that is called in to question. Rather,

any priority given to the causal phenomena of

opposition and contradiction (rather than para-

dox) also misconstrues difference by simplifying

the complex of factors and problems that are

at play.21 In fact, he suggests that the appearance

of contradiction, such as in the reified contraries

of the master and the slave but also any other

structurally equivalent opposition, is but an epi-

phenomenon, a derivative ossification of a more

fundamental swarm of differences (a productive

multiplicity). He even provocatively tells us that

contradiction is not the weapon of the proletariat

but the manner in which the bourgeoisie defends

itself,22 suggesting again its derivative status.

It is for similar reasons, as we have seen, that

Deleuze and Guattari object to the Freudian

model of social relations which focuses on familial

contradiction (the mummy, daddy, me triad)

as the key factor in the channelling of desire

and the determination of the psyche, and which

excludes from consideration investments in the

broader social milieu.23 For Deleuze, all of these

reinventions of the masterslave dialectic artifi-

cially and erroneously cut out a particular

opposition from a larger milieu of overlapping

perspectives, a multiplicity. The posing of an

opposition or contradiction between two forces

(when there is really a multiplicity of forces) is a

key component in this simplification. In what

sense, though, might it be said that there is a

priority accorded to negativity by the master

slave dialectic? Well, the other is primarily

apprehended negatively, as a not-me who

recognizes and apprehends a part of me that

I cannot myself apprehend or control, and

therefore alienates me from my transcendent

projects in the world. This is certainly the case

on Sartres analysis, as well as on Hegels and

Koje`ves, where the experience of this negativity

is considered vital. To sum up, then, it seems

plausible to claim, as Deleuze does, that the

various versions of the masterslave dialectic

privilege three fundamental tropes, namely con-

tradiction, opposition, and negativity. Now these

are clearly part of our experience of social life,

but, according to Deleuze, they are not part of the

fundamental level of desire, and the assumption

that they are ensures that difference became

subsumed by oppositional thinking and incom-

mensurability became ignored. The next section

will examine whether or not this is so in regard

to the particular cases of sadism and masochism.

iv the connection between themaster^ slave dialectic and thesado-masochistic entity: somedeleuzian objections

Given the pervasiveness of the masterslave

dialectic of social relations in European philoso-

phy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and

the general image of thought that it is arguably an

instantiation of,24 it is perhaps not surprising,

from a Deleuzian perspective, that the sympto-

matologies of sadism and masochism would

also be conflated by many major theorists and

clinicians in this period of time. Hegels

Phenomenology of Spirit, written in 1808,

portrays a dialectical relationship between self

and other that privileges contradiction, negation

and opposition, which are both phenomena

themselves and also conceptual tools that are

used to understand other phenomena. Shortly

afterwards, nineteenth-century psychiatrists

quickly came to refer to a sado-masochistic

entity, arguing for the causal connection between

these two pathologies as well as their mutual

dependence upon one another as sustainable

projects in the world (a sadist requires a

masochist and vice versa). Is this an accident?

Deleuzes work allows us to see, I contend, that it

is not. The masterslave dialectic and the belief

in what Richard von Krafft-Ebing, Freud,

Sartre, Benjamin, and many others have called

the sado-masochistic entity both rely on the

tropes of opposition, contradiction, and negati-

vity. Once we have called these prejudices into

reynolds

17

question, Deleuze suggests that any adequate

symptomatology, whether it be based on empiri-

cal data or the writings of the Marquis de Sade

and Leopold von Sacher-Masoch, will show us

that sadism and masochism are not adequately

understood as opposing but mutually reinforcing

modalities of being.

But first, let us briefly attend to the connection

between the masterslave dialectic and the

positing of a sado-masochistic entity in the

work of Sartre and Freud, two of the more

influential theorists of the twentieth century.

After all, if the masterslave dialectic (and the

more general struggle for recognition) is a pivotal

part of social life, and functions through nega-

tion, opposition, and contradiction, then one

would suspect that sadism and masochism would

be diverging responses to inter-subjective life that

would find in their opposite at least a temporary

solution to their respective needs and desires.

Indeed, this is precisely what Sartre famously

argues in Being and Nothingness. In his view,

the relationship between sadism and masochism

is basically equivalent with the structure of

Hegels masterslave dialectic, except that

Sartre, unlike Hegel, sees no possibility of

overcoming this situation.25 For Sartre, we are

envisaged to be perennially thrown back and

forth between the attitudes of sadism and

masochism in an ultimately impossible attempt

to control how we are seen by others, and to

eliminate the prospect of shame and alienation

before the look of the other. All forms of desire

and love are understood on this model, and Sartre

arrives at this rather pessimistic conclusion on

account of the fundamental role that he gives to

the phenomenological experience of shame in the

looker/looked-upon dyad on which he bases his

analyses of concrete human relations. Sartre

famously describes a person peering through

a key-hole into the next room, entirely absorbed

in their activity. Suddenly, though, they hear

footsteps in the corridor behind them and they

are aware that somebody is now watching them.

No longer concerned with what is going on

behind the door, they are aware only that they

are the object of anothers look and that they are

being evaluated and judged in ways that they

cannot control. They are reduced to an object

in that other persons perceptual field, and this,

for Sartre, is the original meaning of relations

with others.26 As such, the other is primarily

apprehended negatively, as a symmetrical not-

me who recognizes and apprehends a part of me

that I cannot myself apprehend or control, and

therefore alienates me from my transcendent

projects in the world. Miche`le Le Deouff calls this

Sartres de facto solipsism.27 Although there

are certain variations within the alternative roles

that people might adopt as a response to the

phenomenological feeling of shame, for Sartre

one is essentially either the looker or the looked-

at, and he insists that two people cannot

simultaneously look at each other in his ontolo-

gical sense. On his dialectic of social relations, the

existence of a looker presupposes an interlocutor

who is the looked-at, and sadism and masochism

are two opposing ways of dealing with this

dilemma we can constantly judge and objectify

others and thereby seek to prevent the emergence

of our social self, or we can try and induce others

to see us exactly as we wish to be seen and

thereby control their subjectivity. More to the

point, a masochistic project requires a sadistic

collaborator, and vice versa, even though on

Sartres view both projects are doomed to failure

since neither can be stably maintained.

While empirical data and the literature of

Sacher-Masoch and de Sade arguably undermine

this analysis, since sadism and masochism seem

to be more stable and enduring than Sartres

account suggests, the key problem with it seems

to be that certain assumptions simplify the mode

of being of the masochist (and perhaps also the

sadist, although that is nor our prime concern).

Firstly, all is interpreted through the lens of this

alienating look and an ensnared consciousness

suddenly without time and history. When any

particular background is given, however, it

becomes clearer that what masochists generally

want is not merely to be deliberately seen as an

obscene object as Sartres analysis suggests

(and hence to mitigate against the possibility

of being surprised by how the other views us),

nor to divest themselves of all subjectivity

because of the anguish it induces. For Sacher-

Masoch and Deleuze, masochism is a more

complicated project than that, one that retains

master^ slave dialectic

18

subjectivity and activity in the manner in which

their accomplice is seduced into being a quasi-

sadist (this term quasi is very important, as

we will see), and it is this process, along with

the associated rituals, that is pleasurable.

Indeed, Sartres analysis gives little attention to

the sense in which masochism constitutes an

attempt to subvert, or play with, the typical

relationship between pleasure and the law, some-

thing that Deleuzes more psychoanalytic

account develops. Moreover, Sartres explanation

is unable to account for Sacher-Masochs explicit

desire for a third party to intervene between him

and the woman he loved (and their contractual

arrangements), precisely because part of what is

at stake, for Sacher-Masoch, is to show how the

contract that attempts to preclude this eventuality

is necessarily undermined. On Sartres analysis,

masochism and sadism seek to exclude the third

and shore up a dyadic relationship,28 and he

hence underestimates the performative dimension

of masochism, the way in which a law is set up

precisely for it to be problematized and turned

against itself over a long period of time.

That being said, opposition, contradiction, and

negation also undergird Freuds psychoanalytic

treatment of sadism and masochism in much the

same way as they do Sartres. It is well known

that Freuds meta-psychological model changed

throughout his career, but less recognized is the

transformation of his position on sadism and

masochism which included reversing the order of

priority that he thought obtained between them.

In his famous 1905 essay The Three Essays

on Sexuality, sadism was classified as one of the

component instincts of sexuality, with masochism

a secondary phenomenon, an inversion of

sadism.29 In the analysis of Little Hans, Freud

would not admit the existence of any kind of

separate aggressive instinct alongside those sexual

and self-preservation instincts. Later on in his

work, however, he argued for a rather different

distinction: one between life instincts and death

instincts, and it was the phenomena of sadism

and masochism which led to this later hypothesis

and the famous positing of a death instinct in

Beyond the Pleasure Principle and elsewhere.30

At this stage, he also maintained that masochism

or internal cruelty was more fundamental than

aggression against others. He did not completely

recapitulate his earlier view in that he argued

for a death instinct rather than an aggressivity

instinct, but he certainly argued for the priority

of the death instinct through the complex

histories of moral masochism that seemed to

him to point to a temporal priority of inward

aggression over outer aggression. Why is maso-

chism thought to testify to the existence of a

tendency to self-destruction that is more funda-

mental than sadism? Basically, this is because

initially there are no outer objects for the child.

Sadistic desires to hurt others must hence derive

from the more basic masochistic desires to harm

oneself, and such desires must come from some

prior instinct. Importantly, for Deleuze, Freud

also suggests that the repetition of something

occurs prior to its being pleasurable. As such,

this repetitive principle (which he understands as

a move to inertia and hence akin to the death

instinct) is prior to the pleasure principle. Some

measure of repetition is a necessary element

in the binding of energy or adaptation, yet when

carried to inordinate lengths repetition becomes

a means of throwing off adaptations and reinstat-

ing earlier psychic positions. The compulsion to

repeat, for Freud, can hence be seen as the effort

to restore a state that is both historically

primitive and also marked by the total draining

of energy, i.e., death.

Deleuze is quite critical of this materialist

understanding of the death instinct as ultimately

reducible to a desire to return to an inorganic

state,31 but in Coldness and Cruelty he is

attentive to this argument and is certainly more

impressed with this account than he was with

Freuds earlier position, which held that our

sadistic drives, if unable to express themselves

outwardly, would turn inward and attack the self

(e.g., through a cripplingly strong super-ego and

the experience of guilt). Nonetheless, as Deleuze

comments:

When Freud discovered the existence of a

primary masochism he made a great advance

in analysis, because he gave up trying to derive

masochism from sadism. It is true that the

inverse derivation is no more convincing:

the masochist and the sadist have no more

chance of being united in the same individual

reynolds

19

than they have of meeting each other in the

outside world, contrary to what the droll story

suggests.32

On Deleuzes view, both of Freuds positions

presuppose an aetiological connection between

sadism and masochism, and, moreover, that the

one is explicable in terms of the other. In an

inter-subjective sense, each is also seen as giving

the other what they want; they are complemen-

tary opposites.

As Deleuze points out, however, any philoso-

phical analysis or clinical aetiology of sadism and

masochism depends first of all on a good

symptomatology,33 and it is the latter which he

argues has been missing in the conflation that is

the sado-masochistic entity. In fact, he argues

that the linking of these two pathologies issues

forth from a confusion of syndromes with the

specific symptoms involved in the two kinds of

behaviour.34 As Daniel W. Smith notes in his

translators Introduction to Essays: Critical

and Clinical, the components of the concept are

the symptoms, the signs of the illness, and the

concept becomes the name of a syndrome, which

marks the meeting place of these symptoms, their

point of coincidence or convergence.35 Deleuze

claims, then, that sado-masochism is a crude

syndrome, a badly analysed composite of symp-

toms that is reliant upon hasty causal assump-

tions. But rather than the rectification of this

being solely a medical concern in which we

analyse symptoms and come up with a label to

explain them (such as Lou Gehrigs disease),

this logic of symptoms actually requires paying

attention to the novels of Sacher-Masoch, pro-

genitor of the term masochism, as well as those

of de Sade, progenitor of the term sadism.

These were the two basic perversions in psychia-

try in the nineteenth century, and, in a superficial

but nominally accurate sense, these perversions

were named after the two men who suffered these

illnesses. More profoundly, however, Deleuze

suggests that these authors must be seen as

clinicians themselves, revealing symptoms of a

way of life. He goes so far as to acclaim

Sacher-Masoch, in particular, as a great clin-

ician of civilization,36 precisely because he

manages to make clear how different and

incommensurable sadism and masochism are.

While Freud and Krafft-Ebbing and much of the

medical profession repeatedly linked the two,

hence the positing of a single sado-masochistic

syndrome, literature can show us their radical

differences by isolating particular ways of exist-

ing, and by giving us what we might call a more

radical phenomenology that allows the differen-

tiation of true symptoms from false syndromes

that generalize.

Let us consider, then, some of the main

differences that Deleuze highlights between these

two typologies.37 In Difference and Repetition,

Deleuze tells us that sadism functions by

ascending to principles, but principles under-

stood as some kind of original force, whereas

masochism descends towards consequences to

which one submits with all-too-perfect attention

to detail, and it tends to involve demonstration by

absurdity and working to rule.38 In Coldness

and Cruelty, where this difference is given far

more prolonged attention, sadism is said to

focus on the institutions that render the law

unnecessary and even obsolete. Replaced by a

dynamic model of action and authority, sadism

seeks the degradation of all laws and the

establishment of a superior power. But, for

Deleuze and de Sade alike, the impetus behind

sadism is not simply the desire for power over

others. Rather, it seeks to suspend what Deleuze,

in Logic of Sense, calls the entire other-

structure itself.39 The key aspect of sadism

consists in the idea that the law can be best

transcended through a kind of institutional

anarchy that ascends to reasoned principles but

reasons and principles that somehow exceed and

promulgate themselves and that thus question

our everyday normativity. An idea is taken to

extremes, compulsively repeated. By contrast,

Deleuze tells us that masochism highlights the

way in which it is the contract, or agreement

(tacit or otherwise), between parties and people

that generates the law, before then focusing

in detail on the inevitability of the way in

which the subsequent development of the law

then ignores or contravenes the very declaration

that brought it into being. For him, these are

very different ways of treating and overturning

the law. Rather than rely on the moral law of

master^ slave dialectic

20

convention, sadism surges upwards to find

rationality, living its own life, devoid of reference

to custom, but masochism immanently shows the

unjustifiable severity of law in the performative

enaction of it.

More to the point, they instantiate different

ways of responding to the relationship between

law (including social norms) and pleasure.

As Deleuze puts it in From Sacher-Masoch to

Masochism:

Generally, there are two ways of interpreting

the operation by which the law separates us

from a pleasure. Either we think that it repels

it . . . so that we can obtain pleasure only

through a destruction of the law (sadism).

Or we think that the law has taken the pleasure

into itself, is keeping it for itself; it is then

by scrupulously devoting ourselves to the law

and its consequences, that we will taste the

pleasure it has forbidden us.40

This succinctly captures the different logics at

stake in masochism and sadism, and suggests

that they are far from complementary opposites;

the fantasy of the masochist is not, for example,

predominantly about a sadist inflicting pain upon

them. On the contrary, according to Deleuzes

analysis of Sacher-Masochs work, the masochist

may not even find pain pleasurable. It is more

likely that the experience of pain is a precondi-

tion of pleasure, not the same as it, and that the

inter-subjective seductions and anticipations also

offer a different kind of pleasure. Moreover,

unlike the sadist who sees the law as needing

to be destroyed for pleasure, the masochist

finds pleasure in the performative dimensions

of the law. They join the law in a sense, but

surreptitiously subvert it from within. Both

sadism and masochism, on Deleuzes account,

are a response to patriarchal law, the former

which seeks pleasure in the abolition of law

(pleasure and law are viewed as antithetical), the

latter which seeks pleasure in the law. Likewise,

the attitude to fantasy is also very different.

As Deleuze observes, masochists need to believe

that they are dreaming even when they are not,

but sadism needs to be actual for sadists to

believe that they are not dreaming even when

they are.41 It is difficult to see how these very

different attitudes towards the law (including

social norms) and pleasure can co-exist in any

given dyad, or the sense in which a causal and

psychological connection might obtain between

them in any single psyche.

We can draw this contrast more tightly by

noting that Deleuze also intimates that there is an

important difference between sadism and maso-

chism in their relation to the calculable. Number,

quantity, and quantitative evaluations and repeti-

tions are the obsessions of sadism, but they are

not the focus of the more culturalist and aesthetic

masochist.42 The relation to, and experience of,

time involved in these two modalities is also

markedly distinct, as we have already partly seen

in Sartres failure to understand masochism.

Although both sadism and masochism aim,

according to Deleuze, to suspend the time of

the living-present, they do this very differently;

they involve a respective acceleration and

deceleration of time.43 Things speed up with

the calculations of time and the sadistic expansion

of principles beyond law; the living-present

becomes so compressed and hurried as to be

obliterated. On the other hand, masochism is

about a certain experience of waiting that tries

not to anticipate or circumscribe the future by

weighing it down with the expectations that are

built into the habitual present. As we see detailed

in Sacher-Masochs novels, both the seduction

and the rituals involved may be insidiously slow,

allowing a relationship to slowly transmogrify

and the depth of ones co-imbrication with their

interlocutor, who can never be an unequivocal

master, to build and build.

Upon consideration of the work of Sacher-

Masoch and Sade, then, Deleuze argues that we

are struck by the impossibility of any encounter

between a sadist and a masochist.44 Not only are

they different modes of being with differing

logics but he also insists, contrary to Freud, that

the existence of a person who is a masochist, for

example (and the reverse also applies), does not

imply the existence of an antagonistic sadist who

inflicts suffering upon the masochist. Deleuze

argues that a genuine sadist would never tolerate

a willing masochist accomplice, and the whole

point of masochism on his analysis is that any

so-called punisher must first be educated and

reynolds

21

seduced into behaving in a manner that he terms

quasi-sadistic, which he rigorously distin-

guishes from sadism proper. They are more

akin to separate ways of life that admit of no

such clear-cut oppositionality, and the perceived

failure of one of these two attitudes does not

motivate us, as Sartre suggests in Being and

Nothingness and Freud suggests in Instincts

and their Vicissitudes, to adopt the alternative

perspective. Sadism, and more particularly

masochism, hence challenges the masterslave

dialectic and looms as something that it cannot

adequately explain without simplifying or falsify-

ing what is involved, most notably by the positing

of a sado-masochistic entity.

But is it not possible that these aspects of

social and sexual life might be accounted for by a

new and improved version of Hegels master

slave dialectic? Might it not be said that both the

sadist and the masochist are tacitly involved in

something like a struggle for recognition with

the other in which they each attempt to attain

to the universal? To put it another way, perhaps

the inability to achieve mutual recognition often

leads to a totalizing desire for domination,

as Benjamin maintains. The move to absolute

negation evinced by the sadist, and even the

desire for submission found in O in The Story of

O are seen by her to represent a particular

transposition of the desire for recognition.45

The position of the sadist does seem able to be

accommodated within the terms of the Hegelian

system and its psychoanalytic developments.

Likewise, Benjamins Hegelian-inspired analysis

of O does make perspicuous certain features

regarding why one might consent to, and even

wish for, submission to a powerful other.

Deleuze, however, would maintain that some-

thing more subtle is at stake with masochism

proper, as opposed to the quasi-masochism he

would associate with O. Recognition and social

norms (law and the relation to pleasure) are

precisely what is being played with in masochism,

and the desire for masochistic relationships is not

reducible to a desire for submission. In fact, it is

the whole activepassive, powerfulimpotent

binary that is disrupted. Now this is not to say

that masochism is entirely outside of the desire

for recognition, but that this desire is bound up

with other desires (along the lines of the Freudian

death drive) that are not so easily understood

in terms of a battle for recognition, and that

it also plays with this desire for recognition and

its putative primacy. Indeed, this account of the

death instinct (and associated desires, like

masochistic ones) as central to life rather than

opposed to it is very important to Deleuze in

differentiating his view from those indebted to

the masterslave dialectic, since there is a sense

in which the Hegelian and Sartrean positions

oppose life and death: self-consciousness is made

possible by a formative encounter with the threat

of death (a restricted conception of death), and

the significance of life and its relation to freedom

is secured through this opposition.46 This

opposition between life and death is perhaps not

so stable, however. What if there is this death

instinct that is part of life (and not a simple

aggressivity instinct), rather than something that

is opposed to it, as Deleuzes appropriation of

Freud maintains? This is a question that Hegels

account of desire and social life does not really

consider.

Of course, even if it were accepted that

masochism testifies to a form of desire (and

inter-subjective life) that the Hegelian story does

not have the resources to comprehend, it might

still be responded that sadism and masochism are

but marginal cases, the exception that proves

the rule, which is the dialectic of recognition

enumerated in so many different ways by

philosophers over the last couple of hundred

years. Deleuze, however, would disagree. The

formal characteristics of both sadism and maso-

chism are seen to be present, to greater and lesser

extents, in all of us, and, as my reconstruction

would have indicated, I think he is right about

this. These two affective (and logical) tendencies

cannot be thought of simply as pathological

activities on the margin of normality. This does

not, however, entail a direct repudiation of the

masterslave dialectic or the struggle for recogni-

tion that it so evocatively describes. After all,

such a view clearly captures some of the

constitutive conflicts in social life and it explains

a movement towards normalization and integra-

tion that is bound up with communicative action.

As Jurgen Habermas and Honneth would

master^ slave dialectic

22

maintain, many ethical norms do depend upon

reciprocal recognition of self-conscious agency

and identity. Following Deleuze in Logic of

Sense, we might say that the struggle for

recognition offers an important theoretical

elaboration of the other-structure, which he

describes as organizing and regulatory.47 On

the other hand, Deleuzes philosophy and the

literature of Sacher-Masoch and de Sade clearly

highlight the significance of something more akin

to what Deleuze himself calls the perverse

structure. This structure is one that subsists

beneath the sweetness of contiguities and

resemblances which allowed us to inhabit the

world. Nothing subsists but insuperable depths,

absolute distances and differences, or, on the

contrary, unbearable repetitions.48 Deleuze fre-

quently associates this perverse structure with

both masochism and the Freudian death

instinct,49 and he shows that this involves a

movement of desire and a structure of inter-

personal relations that is not reducible to

those thematized by the masterslave dialectic

(the other-structure). He also wants to make

the stronger claim, however, that the perverse

structure is a condition for the other-structure,

and it is here that I want to distance myself

from him and maintain that these movements are

equi-primordial. Both desires are present in us:

a desire for the stable and law-like which

makes possible communicative norms, as well as

a subversive desire. To ignore the latter, or to

attempt to explain it within a form of dialectical

thinking that is ensnared by contradiction,

opposition, and negation, is to perpetuate what

Merleau-Ponty calls a bad dialectic.50 Likewise,

however, to privilege the perverse over the

normative through a sometimes illegitimate use

of transcendental arguments in which a neutral

order of transcendental priority also surrepti-

tiously becomes an ethico-political one, is to

risk lapsing into dogmatism. I cannot make

good on this claim here,51 but suffice it to say

that I think we are better served seeing their

co-imbrication. In such a manner, we can be

attentive to the consequences of models of social

life (and thinking) that privilege opposition,

contradiction, and negation, without rendering

such accounts inert, sterile, or non-fundamental.

To consign the desire for recognition to second-

ary status is not necessary, but we need to see

that it is not the telos of social life. This

assumption blinds us to the com-

plicated and multifarious dimen-

sions of sociality, desire, and

sexuality, particularly those

evinced by masochism.

notesThe author would like to thank Philipa Rothfieldfor her comments on this paper, Jon Roffe fordiscussions about Deleuze and masochism, andthe Australian Research Council for financiallysupporting this research.

1 For an account that makes this plausible, seethe final chapters of Robert SinnerbrinksUnderstanding Hegelianism.

2 In The Idea of Continental Philosophy, SimonGlendinninghas claimed thatno suchphilosophicalunity can be found. I argue against this inContinental Philosophy and Chickening Out255^72.

3 Williams 67.

4 Of course, Marxs critique is that this notionof personality development through labour isapplicable only when the worker produces awhole chair and has some involvement in design.In the factory life that is typical of early capitalism,workers produce merely one tiny part andbecome an alienated appendage of the factorymachine. Although factories may not be the mainstructural apparatus for production in late capital-ism, such analyses still seem salient.

5 Williams 74.

6 Ibid. 68.

7 Marx 28.

8 Ibid.

9 This is perhaps especially evident in NietzschesOn the Genealogy of Morals. While the Deleuzianinterpretation of Nietzsche in terms of activeand reactive forces in Nietzsche and Philosophydownplays this element, it is difficult to disputethe influence of Hegels ontological account ofmastery and slavery on Nietzsches own revalua-tion of values.

reynolds

23

10 Bauer. See esp. chapter 5. Much of the follow-ing summarizes her analysis, and some of thetranslations of The Second Sex that I cite beloware also Bauers own translation rather thanParshleys.

11 De Beauvoir16^18.

12 Ibid.17.

13 Ibid.171^72.

14 Ibid.172^73.

15 See, for example, Butlers Subjects of Desire,and BenjaminsThe Bonds of Love and Like Subjects,Love Objects.

16 Comments like these were made to me byPhilipa Rothfield.

17 Honneth does this with thework ofWinnicottinThe Struggle for Recognition.

18 This paragraph and the preceding one areindebted to the interpretation of MatthewSharpe in a guest lecture he gave for a courseofmine.

19 See Benjamin, The Bonds of Love 55 and 52.Benjaminunderstands such fantasies andpracticesas fundamentally about the desire for recognition,but her account of masochism is distorted viathe centrality she accords to the Story of O which,from a Deleuzian perspective, gives us the worldof the sadist, with O better understood as aquasi-masochist rather than as evincing a formof masochism proper.Why this is so will becomeclear shortly.

20 Deleuze,Difference and Repetition 268.

21 Ibid. 50.

22 Ibid. 268.

23 Deleuze and Guattari100.

24 It seems to be a particular instantiation ofwhat Deleuze calls the dogmatic image ofthought, which functions through the categoriesof opposition, similitude, analogy, and identity.See Difference and Repetition137.

25 More accurately, Sartre sees no possibilityof redemption in Being and Nothingness. His aban-doned but subsequently published Notebooks foran Ethics is rathermore optimistic.

26 Sartre, Beingand Nothingness 259.

27 Le Doeuff 62^63.

28 Sartre, Beingand Nothingness 377.

29 Freud,TheThree Essays on Sexuality.

30 Idem, Beyond the Pleasure Principle.

31 See Deleuze, Difference and Repetition 111^13.See also Widder 412. This paper also shows verywell Deleuzes indebtedness to Freud, somethingthat is hinted at in this paper but not developed.

32 Deleuze,From Sacher-Masoch to Masochism130.

33 Ibid.125.

34 Idem,Coldness and Cruelty 40.

35 Smith xvi.

36 Inversely, doctors are themselves also said tobe artists, at least in the grouping of particularsymptoms together.

37 Some parts of the analysis of these differencesover the nextpagewere previously published in anessay of mine in Parrhesia: A Critical Journal ofPhilosophy 1 (2006) (http://www.parrhesiajournal.org), but the material on the relationshipbetween law and pleasure has been developedsince that time.

38 Deleuze,Difference and Repetition 5.

39 Idem, Logic of Sense 353. The perverse struc-ture is seen here to be more fundamental thantheother-structure.

40 Idem, From Sacher-Masoch to Masochism129.

41 Idem,Coldness and Cruelty 72.

42 Ibid. 70.

43 Ibid. 71.

44 Idem, From Sacher-Masoch to Masochism126.

45 See Benjamin,The Bonds of Love 56.

46 This is the well-made claim proposed byNathan Widder, and I agree. See The Time isOut of Joint 413.

47 Deleuze, Logic of Sense 353.

48 Ibid. 346.

49 Formore detail on this, see Kerslake.

master^ slave dialectic

24

50 Merleau-Ponty 94.

51 Many philosophers disagree with me aboutthis, but see any of these essays of mine:Transcendental Priority and DeleuzianNormativity 101^08; Deleuzes Other-Structure 67^88; Wounds and Scars 144^66;Deleuze and Dreyfus on lhabitude, Coping andTrauma in Skill Acquisition 539^59.

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Reynolds, Jack. Transcendental Priority andDeleuzian Normativity: A Reply to JamesWilliams.Deleuze Studies 2.1 (2008):101^08.

Reynolds, Jack. Wounds and Scars: Deleuze onthe Time (and the Ethics) of the Event. DeleuzeStudies1.2 (2007):144^66.

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Widder, N. The Time is Out of Joint ^ And SoAre We: Deleuzean Immanence and theFractured Self. Philosophy Today 50.4 (2006):405^17.

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Williams, Robert. The Concept of Recognitionin Hegels Phenomenology of Spirit. HegelsPhenomenology of Spirit. Ed. A. Denker andM.Vater.NewYork: Humanity, 2003. 59^92.

Jack Reynolds

Philosophy Department

School of Communications

Arts and Critical Enquiry

Rm 203, Humanities Building 2

La Trobe University

Bundoora

VIC 3086

Australia

E-mail: jack.reynolds@latrobe.edu.au

master^ slave dialectic

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