v

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements iii Table of Contents v List of Tables vi List of Maps viii

Introduction 1 Chapter One 13 The New American Century Chapter Two 48 Righteous Aggression Chapter Three 100 The Law of the Jungle Chapter Four 151 Israel: Rogue Ally

Chapter Five 202 Vetoing the United Nations Conclusion 289

Select Bibliography 294

Appendix I 300 Tables of United Nations General Assembly Resolutions Appendix II 417 Maps

vi

List of Tables

TABLE I 309 40th Session of the United Nations General Assembly: September 24, 1985 – December 18, 1985 TABLE II 317 41st Session of the United Nations General Assembly: October 10, 1986 – December 19,1986 TABLE III 326 42nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly: October 7, 1987 – August 17, 1998 TABLE IV 334 43rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly: October 17, 1988 – April 20, 1989

TABLE V 342 44th Session of the United Nations General Assembly: September 28, 1989 – September 17, 1990

TABLE VI 349 45th Session of the United Nations General Assembly: September 18, 1990 – August 27, 1991

TABLE VII 354 46th Session of the United Nations General Assembly: September 17, 1991 – August 25, 1992

TABLE VIII 358 47th Session of the United Nations General Assembly: September 22, 1992 – September 14, 1993

TABLE IX 362 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly: October 8, 1993 – September 19, 1994

TABLE X 366 49th Session of the United Nations General Assembly: October 17, 1994 – September 14, 1995

TABLE XI 370 50th Session of the United Nations General Assembly: October 12, 1995 – September 17, 1996

vii

TABLE XII 374 51st Session of the United Nations General Assembly: October 15, 1996 – September 15, 1997

TABLE XIII 379 52nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly: October 15, 1997 - September 8, 1998

TABLE XIV 383 53rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly: October 1, 1998 - September 13, 1999 TABLE XV 386 54th Session of the United Nations General Assembly: September 14, 1999 – September 5, 2000 TABLE XVI 390 55th Session of the United Nations General Assembly: September 5, 2000 – September 7, 2001

TABLE XVII 394 56th Session of the United Nations General Assembly: September 15, 2001 – September 9, 2002

TABLE XVIII 398 57th Session of the United Nations General Assembly: September 10, 2002 – September 15, 2003

TABLE XIX 403 58th Session of the United Nations General Assembly: October 16, 2003 – September 13, 2004

TABLE XX 408 59th Session of the United Nations General Assembly: October 11, 2004 – September 13, 2005 TABLE XXI 412 60th Session of the United Nations General Assembly: September 16, 2005 – July 7, 2006

viii

List of Maps

MAP I 417 Landownership in Palestine and the UN Partition Plan, 1947; Palestine Villages Depopulated in 1948 and 1967 MAP II 418 The Near East after the 1967 June War MAP III 419 The Wall in the West Bank (2003) MAP IV 420 The Wall and Projected Israeli Unilateral Disengagement (February 2005)

MAP V 421 The Wall in Jerusalem (2005) MAP VI 422 The Occupation’s “Convergence Plan” (April 2006)

Introduction

We have about 50% of the world's wealth, but only 6.3% of its population. . . . In this

situation, we cannot fail to be the object of envy and resentment. Our real task in the

coming period is to devise a pattern of relationships which will permit us to maintain this

position of disparity. . . . To do so, we will have to dispense with all sentimentality and

day-dreaming; and our attention will have to be concentrated everywhere on our

immediate national objectives. . . . We should cease to talk about vague and . . . unreal

objectives such as human rights, the raising of the living standards, and democratization.

The day is not far off when we are going to have to deal in straight power concepts. The

less we are then hampered by idealistic slogans, the better.

George Kennan

State Department Policy Planning Study 23 24 February 19481

According to the 2002 United States National Security Strategy, rogue states:

Brutalize their own people and squander their natural resources for the personal gain of the rulers; display no regard for international law, threaten their neighbors, and callously violate international treaties to which they are party; are determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction, along with other advanced military technology, to be used as threats or offensively to achieve the aggressive design of their regimes; sponsor terrorism around the globe; reject basic human values (and hate the United States and everything for which it stands).2

The primary purpose of this thesis is to illustrate the chasm-like contradictions between

the lofty, idealistic rhetoric and the foreign and domestic policies of the corporate and

1 George Kennan, Policy Planning Study 23, cited in Noam Chomsky, What Uncle Sam Really

Wants (Berkeley: Odonian Press, 1992), 9-10; Policy Planning Study 23 can be found in the official history of the State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1948, Vol. I, Part II, 510-529. For a more complete discussion of the secret policy document, see Chomsky, Deterring Democracy (London: Verso Press, 1991).

2 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States, <www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>.

2

political elite in the United States and prove that the United States government meets

every qualification of its own definition of a rogue state, including fearing real

democracy and despising the American people. Americans are unfortunately ignorant of

history and the mainstream media fail to place any event in context that would encourage

critical thinking or any response beside blind patriotism.3 When a president plans war on

false pretexts or infringes upon the civil liberties of American citizens, the press and the

pundits and the politicians treat it as an anomaly, a unique situation in American history

requiring obedience to and support for the government’s policy. However, if Americans

knew that many presidents have lied about the reasons for war, including James Madison

and the War of 1812, James Polk and the Mexican War, Abraham Lincoln and the Civil

War, William McKinley and the war in the Philippines, Woodrow Wilson and World

War I, Franklin Roosevelt and World War II, Harry Truman and the Korean War, Dwight

Eisenhower, John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, and Richard Nixon and Vietnam, Ronald

Regan and Grenada and Nicaragua, George H.W. Bush and Panama and Iraq, William

Clinton and Yugoslavia, and George W. Bush and Afghanistan and Iraq, if they knew

that all wars are imperial wars despite the rhetoric, then perhaps they would not be so

quick to support the president in another imperialistic venture. If Americans knew that

the government has incessantly attempted to curb civil liberties and real democracy (in

the form of popular criticism and control of policies) especially during war, through the

Alien and Sedition Act, Lincoln’s suspension of habeus corpus and the imprisonment of

war dissenters, the Espionage Act during World War I targeting dissenters, the Red

3 For convincing arguments and evidence that the media act as a propaganda machine for the

political and economic elite, see for instance Chomsky and Edward Herman, Manufacturing Consent: The

Political Economy of the Mass Media (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988); Chomsky, Necessary Illusions:

Thought Control in Democratic Societies (Boston, Mass.: South End Press, 1989); and Michael Parenti, Inventing Reality: The Politics of the Mass Media (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986).

3

Scares, COINTELPRO targeting leftist activists, and the Patriot Act, then perhaps they

would realize that the American public is one of the main targets of the government,

which creates and exacerbates threatening situations to force the people’s acquiescence.

The real history of the United States teaches two incontrovertible truths. The

first is that there is a fundamental conflict between the U.S. government and the

American people. James Madison, an influential member of the Constitutional

Convention, recognized that the function of government was to adjudicate the inevitable

conflict between those who own property and those who do not. As constitutional

scholars Charles Beard, J. Allen Smith and others have persuasively documented, the

primary aim of those drafting the constitution was to protect the wealthy minority from

the masses and somehow convince the majority that the constitution and the national

government served their interests.4 Essentially, American history is the history of class

warfare, slave owner against slave, capital against labor, rich against poor, with the deck

stacked in favor of the owning class through government and law. The second truth, a

logical consequence of the first, is that the government incessantly propagandizes and

deceives the American public. Edward Bernays, a member of President Woodrow

Wilson’s Committee on Public Information, established to manufacture consent for

American involvement in World War I, and a pioneer in the modern public-relations

industry, revealed:

The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society. Those who manipulate this

4 See James Madison, Journal of the Constitutional Convention, E.H. Scott, ed., (Chicago: Scott,

Foresman, and Company, 1893); Charles Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the

United States (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1935); J. Allen Smith, The Spirit of American

Government: A Study of the Constitution: Its Origin, Influence, and Relation to Democracy (Chautauqua, New York: The Chautauqua Press, 1911); and Bertell Ollman and Jonathan Birnbaum, eds., The United

States Constitution: 200 Years of Anti-Federalist, Abolitionist, Feminist, Muckraking, Progressive, and

Especially Socialist Criticism (New York: New York University Press, 1990).

4

unseen mechanism of society constitute an invisible government which is the true ruling power of our country.5 Moreover, Bernays argued that “the very essence of the democratic process” is “the

freedom to persuade and suggest,” otherwise known as the “engineering of consent.”

Bernays continued, “A leader frequently cannot wait for the people to arrive at even

general understanding . . . Democratic leaders must play their part in . . . engineering . . .

consent to socially constructive goals and values,” applying “scientific principles and

tried practices to the task of getting people to support ideas and programs.”6 The liberal

intellectual Walter Lippman wrote of the “revolution” in “the practice of democracy,” as

“the manufacture of consent” has become “a self-conscious art and a regular organ of

popular government.” Furthermore, “common interests very largely elude public opinion

entirely, and can be managed only by a specialized class whose personal interests reach

beyond the locality.”7 The linguist and media critic Noam Chomsky adds,

Fifteen years later, [political scientist] Harold Lasswell explained in the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences that we should not succumb to “democratic dogmatisms about men being the best judges of their own interests.” They are not; the best judges are the elites, who must, therefore, be ensured the means to impose their will, for the common good. When social arrangements deny them the requisite force to compel obedience, it is necessary to turn to “a whole new technique of control, largely through propaganda” because of the “ignorance and superstition [of] . . . the masses.” 8

5 Quoted in Garry Emmons, “Did PR Firm Invent Gulf War Stories?” In These Times, 22-28 January 1992, 2.

6 Alex Carey, “Reshaping the Truth,” Meanjin Quarterly (Australia), 35.4, 1976; and Gabriel

Kolko, Main Currents in American History (Pantheon, 1984), 284, as cited in Chomsky, Necessary

Illusions, 16.

7 Walter Lippman, Public Opinion (London: Allen and Unwin, 1932), 248, as cited in Ibid.

8 Harold Lasswell, Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences Vol. 12 (New York: Macmillan, 1933), as cited in Ibid.

5

Following media critics Chomsky and Edward Herman’s propaganda model,

which argues that the media serve the interests of state and corporate power by framing

their reporting and analysis in a manner supportive of established privilege and limiting

discussion and debate,9 former owner and publisher of the Washington Post Katherine

Graham, expressing contempt for real democracy, opined:

There are some things the general public does not need to know and shouldn’t. I believe democracy flourishes when the government can take legitimate steps to keep its secrets and when the press can decide whether to print what it knows.10

Lawrence Grossman, a former head of PBS and NBC, further revealed the role of the

corporate-owned press, admitting that “the job of the president is to set the agenda, and

the job of the press is to follow the agenda that the leadership sets.”11

As the historian and activist Howard Zinn argues, the American people are

indoctrinated to believe that the United States is an especially virtuous nation, morally

superior to all others, and endowed by Providence for a unique and special role in the

world. In every school, children swear an oath of loyalty to a flag, uncritically parroting

that this nation has “liberty and justice for all.” At all sporting events, athletes wear the

U.S flag on their uniforms and spectators must stand during the national anthem, an

extremely militant song, and salute “the land of the free and the home of the brave,”

sometimes while military jets, normally dropping bombs from the safety of twenty-

thousand feet, fly in patriotic formation overhead. After 9/11, Major League Baseball

decided to perform “God Bless America” during the 7th inning stretch arrogantly

9 See Chomsky and Herman, Manufacturing Consent, especially xi-xvi, 1-35. 10 Quoted in Joel Bleifuss, “The First Stone,” In These Times, 19-25 February 1992, 4.

11 Allan Nairn, “When Casualties Don’t Count,” The Progressive Vol. 55, No. 5, May 1991, 19.

6

expecting the white Anglo-Saxon Protestant and American god to favor one small nation

at the expense of all others. American exceptionalism and nationalism are the ideological

foundations justifying genocide against the Native Americans, slavery, and imperialistic

wars throughout the world. Discussing nationalism, Zinn writes that “we are penned in

by the arrogant idea that this country is the center of the universe, exceptionally virtuous,

admirably superior.” 12

Historians must educate Americans about history to arm them against government

deception and illustrate that American policy and its consequences contradict the

supposed benevolence and disinterest of their motives. Political rhetoric regarding such

exceptional American values such as democracy, freedom, international law, and human

rights does not inform American policy. Indeed, the United States foreign policy

consistently contradicts avowed American benevolent principles. The United States

record in the United Nations from 1980 to 2004, including its unjustifiable use of veto in

the Security Council to protect itself and its allies, especially Israel, from international

condemnation for blatant aggression and violations of international law and its opposition

to General Assembly resolutions iterated every session promoting peace, disarmament,

and social, political, and economic justice, provides important and underutilized evidence

supporting the contention that U.S. rhetoric and U.S. policy are mutually exclusive.

Thus, this thesis is for the American people, to encourage them to recognize the

emptiness of the political rhetoric, oppose the gratuitous and immoral resort to military

force, and accept nothing less than real participatory democracy with the attendant and

necessary control over both domestic and foreign policies.

12 Howard Zinn, “America’s Blinders,” The Progressive, Vol. 70, No. 4, April 2006, 22-24.

7

The first chapter discusses the foreign policy of the current George W. Bush

administration as outlined in the 2002 National Security Strategy, including the illegal

aggression against Afghanistan beginning immediately after the attacks against the

United States in September 2001 and Iraq beginning in March 2003 and the aggressive

belligerency toward Venezuela and Iran. In contradiction to the avowed principles

informing U.S. policy, such as democracy, human rights, and law, actual U.S. behavior

and strategic policy intimates that the United States relies on military supremacy and

military force in the pursuit of traditional American interests, which include resource and

market control and American business hegemony, at the expense of international law and

the United Nations Charter. The National Security Strategy egregiously violates the

letter and spirit of the United Nations Charter, and U.S. unilateralism and exceptionalism

contribute to a more dangerous and unjust world, where force and the law of the jungle

trump international law and ideals of real economic, political, and social democracy.

The second chapter examines the George H. W. Bush administration’s immediate

righteous and indignant reaction to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the underlying

motives which led to large-scale U.S. military intervention and the destruction of Iraqi

military capability and civilization to exacerbate the damage caused to the Iraqi people by

the brutal sanctions, which the U.S. illegally and immorally maintained long after the

Iraqi troops retreated from Kuwait. The Iraqi aggression allowed the United States an

opportunity to manipulate the United Nations to support essentially unilateral American

force and avoid a diplomatic solution to the crisis and instead resort to massive state

terrorism, exposing the rhetoric against aggression and the use of force as false, in order

to justify the continuation of the massive military budget after the cessation of the Cold

8

War, assert U.S. hegemony, acquire a more permanent presence in the vital Middle East

region, convince the American public of the efficacy of direct U.S. military intervention,

and destroy a perceived threat to Israel. The United States unilateral rejection of a

diplomatic solution to the crisis in violation of the United Nations Charter, in favor of the

use of military force against Iraq, illustrates the American contempt for international law

and the United Nations and the U.S.’s reliance on military power.

Chapter three examines U.S. aggression against the essentially defenseless nations

of Grenada, Libya, Panama, and Nicaragua during the 1980s to further elucidate that the

U.S. government does not principally oppose aggression or egregious violations of

international law. Moreover, the aggression demonstrates the U.S. government’s

contempt for democracy, human rights, and justice. The international community

condemned the U.S. military interventions; however, due to the use of the U.S. veto in

the Security Council, the United Nations could not adopt enforceable measures to affect

the behavior of the U.S. government and prevent future American aggression. The

selective American adherence to the principles of international law and the United

Nations Charter intimates that the United States will continue to rely on military force as

a first resort for territorial, economic, or political advantage, the control of resources and

markets, and the maintenance of U.S. hegemony.

The two remaining chapters examine the habitual U.S. support for Israeli

aggression, violations of international law, and noncompliance with United Nations

resolutions. Although the United States immediately sought enforceable Security

Council resolutions against Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait in order to force Iraq’s

withdrawal through sanctions and military intervention, various U.S. administrations

9

have prevented any condemnation of Israel for its aggression against neighboring Arab

states and its occupation of Palestinian territory since 1967. Chapter four provides

background information describing the origin of the Israeli-Arab conflict, the major crises

and wars between Israel and the Arab states, the massive injustice perpetrated on the

Palestinian Arabs, and the complete Israeli rejection of Palestinian human rights and self-

determination. The revisionist narrative illustrates the U.S. and Israel’s primacy in

preventing a just settlement for Middle East peace and the context to critically and

skeptically examine and understand the U.S. and Israeli indefensible, minority positions

in the United Nations Security Council examined in chapter five. Chapter five catalogues

Israel’s habitual noncompliance with Security Council resolutions and the blatant U.S.

effort to undermine the United Nations and prevent a just Middle East peace based upon

the international consensus through the blatant and habitual use of its veto, clearly

illustrating that Israel could not afford to maintain its illegal policies in violation of

international law and United Nations resolutions without the political, economic, and

military support of the United States.

United Nations General Assembly resolutions, discussed in the appendix, provide

a rich documentary record of the disparity between the U.S. rhetoric and policy and

elucidate the heinous double standard that the U.S. applies to the world because of its

massive military might. As the record indicates, the United States, standing virtually

alone, opposes resolutions iterated every session promoting peace, disarmament, and

social, political, and economic justice. This documentary record is ignored by the media

and hidden from the American public, preventing the awareness necessary to challenge

government policies.

10

A few simple truisms influenced this work. The first is the obvious observation

that war and violence can only make the world less secure and less inhabitable. The

ability to wage war mercilessly, causing all too predictable devastation and destruction,

does not mean that a nation’s causes or principles are just; it only means the continuation

of the use of force and violence to achieve certain ends. The ideals of peace, justice, and

participatory democracy are contradictory with the glorification and use of military

power. The American people must refuse to identify American military capability with

American greatness. As Zinn argues:

. . . in the face of the manifest unpredictability of social phenomena, all of history’s excuses for war and preparation for war--self-defense, national security, freedom, justice, stopping aggression--can no longer be accepted. Nor can civil war be tolerated. Massive violence, whether in war or internal upheaval, cannot be justified by any end, however noble, because no outcome is sure. Indeed, the most certain characteristic of any upheaval, like war or revolution, is its uncertainty. Any human and reasonable person must conclude that if the ends, however desirable, are uncertain, and the means are horrible and certain, those means must not be employed.13

The second truism is the moral concept of universality, any variation of the

Golden Rule: do onto others as you would have them do onto you. The elementary

principle of universality requires that people apply to themselves the same standards that

they hold others. If an action or behavior is wrong for another, then it is wrong for me.

If an action is right for me, then it is right for everyone else. If it is criminal for an

individual to use violence as a solution to conflict, then it is criminal for nations, with

their massive capability for force, to use violence to solve domestic and international

problems. American exceptionalism is essentially an ideology trumping the principle of

universality. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor is a clear example of President George

W. Bush’s doctrine of preemptive or preventative war. However, while the Japanese

13 Zinn, “The Optimism of Uncertainty,” in Howard Zinn on History (New York: Seven Stories

Press, 2001), 21-22, emphasis in original.

11

attack on a U.S. naval base in the Pacific Ocean is heinous and infamous, U.S.

preventative attacks are righteous and just. President Reagan cited Article 51 of the

United Nations charter as justification for the bombing of Libya in 1986, claiming that

the U.S. has the right to use violent force “in self-defense against future attack.” The

‘liberal’ New York Times columnist Anthony Lewis applauded this “legal argument that

violence against the perpetrators of repeated violence is justified as an act of self-

defense.”14

U.S. administrations have incessantly paid tribute to the rule of law. However, as

is quite evident, the U.S. government and the elites determining policy consider the rule

of law applicable only to other peoples and nations. Putting aside for the moment that

elites from the Constitutional Convention designed the legal system to protect the

“opulent minority” from the masses,15 that progressive changes have only resulted from

large popular struggle, and that what is legal is not always right, and what is right is not

always legal,16 international law based on fairness and justice ought to be the barometer

14 Article 51 of the UN charter states that “Nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent

right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security measures taken by members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present charter to take at any time such actions as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.” The right of self-defense does not apply to preventative attacks against some future, indeterminate threat, <www.un.org/aboutun/charter/index.html>. Anthony Lewis, New York Times, 17 April 1986 cited in Noam Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival:

America’s Quest for Global Dominance (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2003), 117. Chomsky asks us to “imagine the consequences if others were powerful enough to” utilize preventative action against the United States, clearly guilty of “repeated violence” against others.

15 Adam Smith: “Civil authority so far as it is instituted for the security of property, is in reality instituted for the defense of the rich against the poor, or of those who have some property against those whom have none at all,” from An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations cited by Parenti, Democracy for the Few (Fourth edition, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983), 5. For the designs of the framers of the Constitution see Ollman and Birnbaum, eds., The United States Constitution and Smith, The Spirit of the American Government.

12

by which all nations are equally judged and held accountable. All peoples and nations

may realize hope for a more just, equitable, and peaceful world only when international

law granting political and economic democracy is applied equally to all instead of the law

of the jungle and might makes right.

16 Anatole France observed that “The law in its majestic equality prohibits rich and poor alike

from stealing bread and sleeping under the bridges,” cited in Parenti, Democracy for the Few, 57.

Chapter One:

The New American Century

They look doubtful, but in reality they are not. There have been lies; yes, but they

were told in a good cause. We have been treacherous; but that was only in order that

real good might come out of apparent evil. True, we have crushed a deceived and

confiding people; we have turned against the weak and the friendless who trusted us; we

have stamped out a just and intelligent and well-ordered republic; we have stabbed an

ally in the back and slapped the face of a guest; we have bought a Shadow from an enemy

that hadn't it to sell; we have robbed a trusting friend of his land and his liberty; we have

invited our clean young men to shoulder a discredited musket and do bandit's work under

a flag which bandits have been accustomed to fear, not to follow; we have debauched

America's honor and blackened her face before the world; but each detail was for the

best. We know this. The Head of every State and Sovereignty in Christendom and 90 per

cent. of every legislative body in Christendom, including our Congress and our fifty State

Legislatures, are members not only of the church, but also of the Blessings-of-Civilization

Trust. This world-girdling accumulation of trained morals, high principles, and justice,

cannot do an unright thing, an unfair thing, an ungenerous thing, an unclean thing. It

knows what it is about. Give yourself no uneasiness; it is all right.

Mark Twain, 19011

“U.S. Compromises on Wording of Iran Nuclear Resolution” asserted a New York

Times headline on February 4, 2006.2 The headline makes sense only if ‘compromise’

means ‘complete rejection of world opinion’ in a classic example of Orwellian

doublespeak. The International Atomic Energy Agency delayed a vote on a “landmark”

resolution concerning Iran’s nuclear program because the world’s only superpower

1 Mark Twain, “To the Person Sitting in Darkness,” The Complete Essays of Mark Twain, Charles

Neider, ed., (Da Capo Press, 2000), 294-295.

2 Elaine Sciolino, “U.S. Compromises on Wording of Iran Nuclear Resolution,” New York Times, 4 Februrary 2006, <www.nytimes.com/2006/02/04/international/europe/04iran.html>.

14

opposed any linkage, criticism, or concern relating to Israel’s possession of nuclear

weapons. The Times acknowledges that Egypt and other Arab states, with much of the

world’s support, including Russia, China, and the European Union

routinely demand references to a ‘nuclear-free zone’ in the Middle East in Security Council documents. They argue that Israel--which has never admitted that it has nuclear weapons, and, unlike Iran, has never signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty--should be made part of a general security framework in the Middle East.3

The European Union submitted a clause recognizing that “a solution to the Iranian

nuclear issue would contribute to the goal of a Middle East free of all weapons of mass

destruction, and their means of delivery,” which U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza

Rice dismissed as a potential Iranian “propaganda weapon against Israel.” An

anonymous ambassador noted that “the Americans are worried that once [the clause] is

there, it will stay there forever and allow the Iranians to hide behind it.” In a revealing

remark, Sean McCormack, a State Department spokesman, stated that the U.S. “accepted

in principle” the “hope for a day when the Middle East achieves a state where there are

not nuclear weapons.”4

While the U.S. ‘hopes’ for a nuclear-free Middle East as if it did not have any

power to orchestrate such a reality, the newspaper of record ignores the question of

Israeli nuclear weapons and the relevant issue of the blatant U.S. hypocrisy and double

standard concerning weapons of mass destruction. Perhaps the paper should ask why the

country with the most nuclear weapons, in fact the only country to use them, and a

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

15

military budget larger than the rest of the world combined,5 could condemn any other

nation, especially when the U.S. itself could be cited for its “many failures and breaches

of its obligations” as a signatory of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

Weapons, which demands the world-wide elimination of nuclear weapons and their

means of delivery?6 The Times fails to wonder why Israel is not a signatory of the

Nuclear Nonproliferation treaty and fails to elucidate the reasons why the “routine

demand” of a nuclear-free Middle East, supported by a majority of the world, has never

been incorporated into enforceable Security Council resolutions. The article seems to

completely disregard the idea of a nuclear-free region while supporting this “landmark”

resolution against Iran, which has the legal right to produce nuclear power under the

terms of the treaty.7 As a revealing example of mainstream journalistic credibility, the

newspaper of record fails to consider that the U.S. use of force throughout its history, and

5 Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation, U.S. Military Spending VS the World,

<www.armscontrolcenter.org/archives/002244.php>, accessed 2/6/06; Winslow T. Wheeler, “Just How Big Is the Defense Budget?,” Counterpunch, 19 January, 2006, <www.counterpunch.org/wheeler01192006.html>. The Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation provides the following ranking in military spending for 2005 (billions of dollars): U.S.: 522; China (2004): 62.5; Russia (2004): 61.9; U.K.: 51.1; Japan: 44.7; France: 41.6; Germany: 30.2; India: 22; Saudi Arabia: 21.3; South Korea: 20.7. Of special note is the group composing the current U.S. ‘Axis of Evil’: North Korea (2004): 5.5; Iran: 4.9; Syria: 1.7; Cuba (2004): 1.4; Venezuela: 1.1. Perhaps we should remember that Germany and Japan were military powers at the start of World War II and the U.S. demonization of Iraq, Iran, Syria, Cuba, Venezuela, North Korea, and so on serves as propaganda for domestic consumption and does not reflect the realities of military power. It is telling that the U.S. rhetoric toward North Korea, which claims to have developed nuclear weapons, is not as belligerent and aggressive as for the other countries in the ‘Axis of Evil.’ The world spent an estimated $1,083 billion on defense in 2005 with the U.S. accounting for 48% of the total. Wheeler, Director of the Straus Military Reform Project at the Center for Defense Information, calculates that the U.S. defense budget for 2006, which includes non-DOD homeland security and supplemental spending for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, is $669.8 billion.

6 <www.iaea.org/publications/documents/infcircs/others/infcirc140.pdf>. Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons states: “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”

7 Ibid. Article IV of Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons states that “Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. . . .”

16

its selection of militarily weak targets, encourages countries understandably fearful of

attack to develop weapons as a necessary deterrent against the world’s only superpower.

The United States, perhaps in a maneuver to persuade the domestic population of

international support for punishment against Iran for its “many failures and breaches of

its obligations” as a signatory of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

Weapons, is pushing for immediate Security Council action while much of the world,

acknowledging that Iran is voluntarily allowing international scrutiny and inspection of

its nuclear program beyond the mandates of the International Atomic Energy Agency,

prefers diplomacy over the U.S. modus operandi as the world’s supreme military power:

military force.8

The historian Gary Leupp has written several articles during the past few years

chronicling the Bush administration’s policy toward Iran. In a recent article, entitled

“Wilkerson Fingers the Neo-Cons on Iran,” Leupp reported that General Lawrence

Wilkerson, Colin Powell’s former chief of staff, acknowledged that in May 2003 the

government of Iran, using the Swiss ambassador to Tehran as an intermediary, requested

diplomatic meetings with the U.S. to address Iran’s nuclear program, the lifting of

sanctions, and the normalization of relations between the two countries. According to

Wilkerson, while the Secretary of State supported diplomacy, Vice President Cheney and

the neo-conservative “secret cabal” in the administration “got what [they] wanted: no

negotiations with Tehran.”9

8 Sciolino.

9 Gary Leupp, “Wilkerson Fingers the Neo-Cons on Iran,” Counterpunch, 26 April 2006,

<www.counterpunch.org/leupp04262006.html>.

17

One of the main propagandists for the war against Iraq, Douglas Feith, while

Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, “hired neo-con ideologue and Iran-Contra

principal Michael Ledeen” for the Office of Special Plans in 2002. Ledeen, “an

American Enterprise Institute Scholar and journalist for the neo-con National Review,”

maintained a relationship with the Iranian arms dealer and “fellow Iran-Contra plotter”

Manucher Ghorbanifar. Leupp intimates that Ghorbanifar was a likely source for

Congressman Curt Weldon’s book Countdown to Terror: The Top-Secret Information

That Could Prevent the Next Terrorist Attack on America . . . and How the CIA Has

Ignored It, which claimed that Iran was sheltering Osama bin Laden, preparing an attack

on the U.S., building nuclear weapons, and aiding the insurgency in Iraq.10

Leupp observes that while many in the Bush administration support military

action against Iran on any pretext and despite the consequences, some policymakers and

lifelong bureaucrats oppose force. John Negroponte, current director of national

intelligence and President Ronald Regan’s ambassador to Honduras during the U.S.

sponsored terror against Nicaragua and no dove, warned the National Press Club on 20

April 2006:

The developments in Iran, clearly they’re troublesome. By the same token, our assessment at the moment is that even though we believe that Iran is determined to acquire or obtain a nuclear weapon, we believe that it is still many years off before they are likely to have enough fissile material to assembly into, or to put into a nuclear weapon; perhaps into the next decade. So I think it’s important that the issue be kept in perspective.11

Considering that the U.S. poses a more severe threat to Iran than Iran does to the

United States, the Bush administration’s underlying motives must be questioned. Linda

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

18

S. Heard, a British writer on the Middle East, reports in a recent article entitled “Is the

U.S. Waging Israel’s Wars?” that in November 2003, Israeli Minister of Defense Shaul

Mofaz told U.S. officials in Washington that “under no circumstances would Israel be

able to abide by nuclear weapons in Iranian possession.” That same month, Meir Dagan,

the director of Mossad, the Israeli intelligence agency, asserted that Iran posed an

“existential threat” to Israel. More recently, Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom

elevated the rhetoric stating “the idea that this tyranny of Iran will hold a nuclear bomb is

a nightmare, not only for us but also for the whole world.”12

Independent journalist and author Joshua Frank writes that at the American Israel

Public Affairs Committee annual conference in 2005 Republicans and Democrats alike

called for military action against Iran. The prominent neo-con Richard Perle commented

that “if Iran is on the verge of a nuclear weapon, I think we will have no choice but to

take decisive action.” The Democratic minority leader Nancy Pelosi observed that “the

greatest threat to Israel’s right to exist, with the prospect of devastating violence, now

comes from Iran.”13 Frank records in another article a speech delivered by Senator

Hillary Clinton during a Hanukkah dinner in December 2005:

I held a series of meetings with Israeli officials [last summer], including the prime minister and the foreign minister and the head of the [Israeli Defense Force] to discuss such challenges we confront. In each of these meetings, we talked at length about the dire threat posed by the potential of a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to Israel, but also to Europe and Russia. Just this week, the new president of Iran made further outrageous comments that attacked Israel’s right to exist that are simply beyond the pale of international discourse and acceptability. During my meeting with Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, I was reminded vividly of the threats that Israel faces every hour of every day. . . . It became even more clear how important it is for the United

12 Linda S. Heard, “Is the U.S. Waging Israel’s Wars?,” Counterpunch, 25 April 2006,

<www.counterpunch.org/heard04252006.html>.

13 Joshua Frank, “The Facts Don’t Matter: Bombing Iran,” Counterpunch, 3 June 2005, <www.counterpunch.org/frank06032005.html>.

19

States to stand with Israel . . . .14 Notice Clinton’s identification with Israeli interests, implying perhaps her loyalty to

Israel or her belief that U.S. interests and Israeli interests are identical. Tellingly, Clinton

stated that a nuclear-armed Iran would be a threat to Israel, Europe, and Russia, which is

strange considering Europe and Russia have intimate ties with Iran. However, the

senator does not mention that Iran poses any threat to the United States.

The investigative journalist Doug Ireland writes that the AIPAC espionage

scandal, dismissed or hidden in the apologist mainstream media, was “about helping to

prepare an attack by Israel on Iran.” In an article headlined “America Would Back Israel

Attack on Iran,” the British Daily Telegraph recorded the following George W. Bush

quote:

Clearly, if I was the leader of Israel and I’d listened to some of the statements by the Iranian ayatollahs that regarded the security of my country, I’d be concerned about Iran having a nuclear weapon as well. And in that Israel is our ally, and in that we’ve made a very strong commitment to support Israel, we will support Israel if her security is threatened.15 The Daily Telegraph observed that “his comments appeared to be a departure from the

administrations’ line that there are no plans to attack at present and that Washington

backs European diplomatic efforts. The remarks may have reflected Mr. Bush’s personal

thinking on an issue causing deep concern in Washington . . . . " Ireland comments that

“Bush’s slip of the tongue that revealed his real intentions was front-page news in Le

14 Frank, “Hillary Clinton, AIPAC and Iran,” Counterpunch, 3 January 2006, <www.counterpunch.org/1032006.html>.

15 Doug Ireland, “The Real AIPAC Spy Ring Story--It Was All about Iran,” Z Magazine, 7

August 2005, <www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?sectionID=15&ItemID=8464>.

20

Monde and other European dailies but received little attention in the state-side major

media.”16

Moreover, Ireland cites a London Times article, dated 13 March 2005, reporting

that “the inner cabinet of Ariel Sharon, the Israeli Prime Minister, gave ‘initial

authorisation’ for an attack at a private meeting last month on his ranch in the Negev

Desert.” The Times continues: “U.S. officials warned last week that a military strike on

Iranian nuclear facilities by Israeli or American forces had not been ruled out should the

issue become deadlocked at the United Nations.” The Israeli daily Ha’aretz warned on

13 September 2004 that “what the Americans are unable to do, because of European,

United Nations and Congressional pressure, Israel will do.”17

Clearly, if the leader of Iran, after listening to some of the statements by the

American and Israeli leaders and observing blatant American and Israeli aggression,

would be threatening the security of the Iranian people if he did not attempt to acquire

any deterrent to the predictable U.S. or Israeli military action.

Concerning the AIPAC spy scandal, the investigative journalist Justin Raimondo

in an article entitled “AIPAC and Espionage: Guilty as Hell,” writes:

This case has received relatively little publicity in relation to its importance. It isn’t just the fact that, for the first time in recent memory, Israel’s powerful lobby has been humbled. What is going on here is the exposure of Israel’s underground army in the U.S. covert legion of propagandists and outright spies, whose job it is to not only make the case for Israel but to bend American policy to suit Israel’s needs and in the process, penetrate closely-held U.S. secrets.18

16 Ibid. 17 Ibid.

18 Justin Raimondo, “AIPAC and Espionage: Guilty as Hell,” 30 September 2005,

<www.antiwar.com/justin/?articleid=7454>.

21

The case involves Douglas Feith’s deputy, Lawrence Franklin, who leaked

classified documents to Israel through AIPAC. The indictment of two AIPAC officials,

Steve Rosen and Keith Weissman, describes “extensive contracts with a wide range of

U.S. government officials, Israeli diplomats, and other individuals . . . .” One cited

official, Kenneth Pollack, who served on the National Security Council during the

William Clinton administration, handed over classified information about “strategy

options” against a “Middle Eastern country.” Pollack wrote The Threatening Storm

influencing many liberals to support the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Raimondo notes that “the

indictments issued against Franklin, Rosen, and Weisman describe a systematic attempt

by Israel’s fifth column in Washington to garner top-secret U.S. intelligence about Iran,

its weapons program, and U.S. deliberations about what actions to take.”19

On 26 January 2006, Lawrence Franklin was sentenced to 151 months in prison

and fined $10,000 as a result of pleading guilty and providing information helpful to the

state’s case. The case against Rosen and Weissman is currently in jeopardy as the judge

decides whether to accept the defense’s arguments, including First Amendment rights,

and dismiss the case or go to trial, and potentially exposing the extent of the Israeli

lobby’s influence on U.S. policy.20

19 Ibid.

20 See for example, <www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Larry_Franklin> for Franklin’s sentence. For

the dismissal hearings, see the court transcripts at <www.fas.org/sgp/jud/rosen032406.html> and <www.fas.org/sgp/jud/rosen042106.html>. See also, James Petras, “AIPAC on Trial,” Counterpunch, 7-8 January 2006, <www.counterpunch.org/petras01072006.html>; Grant Smith, “Let the AIPAC Spy Trial Begin,” 24 April 2006, <www.antiwar.com/orig/gsmith.php?articleid=8891>; and the series of articles by Walter Pincus in the Washington Post from March-April 2006, including, Pincus, “First Amendment Issues Raised about Espionage Act,” Washington Post, 31 March 2006, A6; and Pincus, “In Rare Move, 2nd AIPAC Dismissal Hearing Set,” Washington Post, 20 April 2006, A11. In addition to arguing that the case should be dismissed on First Amendment grounds, the defense for the former AIPAC lobbyists claimed during the dismissal hearings that Rosen and Weismann did not violate the World War I-era Espionage Act because U.S. and Israeli interests are identical; therefore, the passing of information to Israel did not harm

22

In a final note, the British journalist Robert Fisk in an article entitled “Breaking

the Last Taboo: The United States of Israel?” discusses the Israeli lobby in the United

States. John Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, and Stephen

Walt, a professor at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, recently

published an academic paper entitled “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy,” which

Fisk states:

what to many non-Americans is obvious: that the U.S. has been willing to set aside its own security and that of many of its allies in order to advance the interests of Israel, that Israel is a liability in the “war on terror,” that the biggest Israeli lobby group, AIPAC, is in fact the agent of a foreign government and has a stranglehold in Congress--so much so that the U.S. policy towards Israel is not debated there--and that the lobby monitors and condemns academics who are critical of Israel.21

A few observations are in order. The 2006 National Security Strategy claims that

Iran is the greatest challenge to the United States, not only due to supposed nuclear

proliferation concerns, but because the “regime sponsors terrorism; threatens Israel; seeks

to thwart Middle East peace; disrupts democracy in Iraq; and denies the aspirations of its

people for freedom.”22 The aforementioned are pretexts that will justify a preventative

attack against Iran. According to a Leupp article from July 2005, “Is Iran Being Set

Up?,” Philip Giraldi in the American Conservative indicated that the Vice President’s

the U.S. or benefit a foreign country at the expense of the United States. For evidence that traditional American interests and Israeli interests are not congruent see Cheryl Rubenberg, Israel and the American

National Interest: A Critical Examination (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986) and Chapters four and five of this thesis. Although the case has received little in-depth press coverage, with the mainstream media supporting the ex-lobbyists for a foreign country on the grounds that journalists’ First Amendment rights are in jeopardy, one need only replace Israel with another country, such as Cuba, Iran, North Korea, or the Soviet Union, and imagine the media and government’s response to such a case to recognize not only the power of the Israeli lobby in the United States, but also the strange identification with Israeli interests of many U.S. politicians and members of the American media.

21 Robert Fisk, “Breaking the Last Taboo: The United States of Israel?,” Counterpunch, 27 April

2006, <www.counterpunch.org/fisk04272006.html>.

22 The 2006 National Security Strategy can be found at <www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006>.

23

Office has informed the Pentagon that the military would attack Iran immediately after

“another 9-11.”23 Leupp cites Giraldi remarking that military action was “not conditional

on Iran actually being involved in the act of terrorism directed against the United

States.”24 While Iran is not a viable threat to the United States, the United States poses an

immediate and definitive threat to Iran. Mike Whitney, in an article entitled “Offers and

Ultimatums: Endgaming Iran,” opines that the recent offer by Secretary of State

Condoleezza Rica to have direct negotiations with Iran “is less a departure from the

normal U.S. belligerence than it is a means of enlisting support from Russia and China

for future punitive action.”25 Rice commented that the negotiations would provide Iran

“one last excuse” to resist American demands, demands which counter the United

Nations Charter and international law by attempting to revoke Iran’s inalienable right to

peaceful nuclear technology.26 Whitney writes that the U.S. had already rejected Iranian

proposals allowing for surprise inspection of any Iranian facility suspected of secret

nuclear activity and enrichment of uranium in Russia instead of Iran. Further reflecting

the inflexibility of the American position, Secretary Rice announced at the end of May

that “security guarantees for Iran were off the table.”27 The U.S. position begs the

question of why the Iranians should forgo an inalienable right to produce nuclear energy

23 Leupp, “Is Iran Being Set Up?,” Counterpunch, 27 July 2005, <www.counterpunch.org/leupp07272005.html>.

24 Ibid. 25 Mike Whitney, “Offers and Ultimatums: Endgaming Iran,” Counterpunch, 1 June 2006,

<www.counterpunch.org/whitney06012006.html>.

26 Ibid.; see also, David Peterson, “Iran: A Manufactured Crisis: Will the Security Council Go Along for the Ride Again?,” Counterpunch, 1 June 2006, <www.counterpunch.org/peterson01062006.html>.

27 Whitney.

24

if the United States offers nothing in return. Furthermore, the U.S. belligerent threats

toward Iran represent a clear breach of the letter and spirit of the United Nations Charter.

The unwillingness of the Bush administration to negotiate with Iran to prevent

nuclear proliferation in return for a promise not to attack is incomprehensible unless that

is not the real motive for a U.S. invasion. An attack on Iran would only radicalize its

leaders and other targets to produce a nuclear weapon quickly to deter the United States

or Israel from future action. An attack on Iran would only make the United States more

susceptible to retail terrorism. If Iran attempted to attack Israel or the United States, it

would face certain annihilation from two countries that both possess awesome nuclear

weapon arsenals. The American people must ask why the U.S. government is so anxious

for waging perpetual war.

While preparing the world for aggression against Iran due to its supposed nuclear

malfeasance and its potential to develop nuclear weapons, the United States reached a

‘historic’ nuclear pact with India, helping supply its civilian energy requirements while

permitting the continued development of nuclear weapons, thus rewarding the nuclear

power for its dismissal of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The

plan meaninglessly subjects those nuclear power reactors classified as civilian to

international inspection, while allowing its current and future military facilities to operate

outside the jurisdiction of the International Atomic Energy Agency. President Bush

declared that the agreement “will help both our peoples” and that Congressional

opponents “just don’t want to change and change with the times. But this agreement is in

our interest.” Critics may highlight not only the threat of further nuclear proliferation,

but also the double standard as applied to Iran. However, the administration asserts that

25

India is a “responsible nuclear power,” as of course are the United States and Israel, and

U.S. corporations have a moral right to sell nuclear energy to India’s “booming”

economy and population. According to R. Nicholas Burns, the under secretary of state

for political affairs:

India is unique. It has developed its entire nuclear program over 30 years alone because it has been isolated. So the question we faced was the following: Is it better to maintain India in isolation, or is it better to try to bring it into the international mainstream? And President Bush felt the latter.28

A disingenuous comment considering the international mainstream favors the elimination

of nuclear weapons as evident in various United Nations General Assembly resolutions

and the U.S. is currently isolating Iran because it has the potential to develop nuclear

weapons in the future. A senior Indian official imagines that the agreement will force the

international community to recognize India “in a category of its own,” eroding further the

universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Perhaps there is

no linkage between the disparate U.S. policies toward Iran and India; however, in a just

world all nations, including the United States would be held to the same standards.29

The United States rejected during diplomatic negotiations, which the economist

and media critic Edward Herman defines as “restating to the enemy the terms of our [the

U.S.] ultimatum” and not “the process of arriving at a settlement by mutual concessions,”

any linkage between Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait and Israel’s occupation of Palestine, let

28 Elisabeth Bumiller and Somini Sengupta, “U.S. and India Reach Agreement on Nuclear

Cooperation,” New York Times, 2 March 2006, <www.nytimes.com/2006/03/02/international/asia/02cnd-prexy.html>; National Security Strategy of 2002: “The concept of free trade is a moral principle. If you can make something that others value, you should be able to sell it to them. If others make something that you value, you should be able to buy it. This is real freedom. . . .”

29 Ibid.

26

alone the U.S. invasion and occupation of Panama the previous year.30 The mainstream

media acting as propaganda service of the government and defense department in the

moral crusade against Iraq failed to provide linkage between the enforcement of United

Nations Security Council resolutions condemning Iraqi aggression and the complete lack

of enforcement of dozens of resolutions condemning Israel for various war crimes and

crimes against humanity, including the occupation and settlement of Palestine, the

invasion of Lebanon, and the destruction of the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirik.31 Needless

to say, there are no Security Council Resolutions characterizing the U.S. as an aggressive

rogue nation and demanding immediate demilitarization and disarmament.

Simultaneously, the mainstream media continues to participate in the Bush

administration’s demonization of Venezuela’s President Chavez.32 Secretary of Defense

Donald Rumsfeld speaking to an audience ignorant of history and unquestioning of the

administration’s stance against real democracy made the gratuitous comparison to Hitler:

We saw dictatorships there [Latin America]. And then we saw most of those countries, with the exception of Cuba, for the most part move toward democracies. We also saw corruption in that part of the world. And corruption is something that is corrosive of democracy. We’ve seen some populist leadership appealing to masses of people in those countries. And elections like Evo Morales in Bolivia take place that are clearly worrisome. I mean, we’ve got Chavez in Venezuela with a lot of oil money. He’s a person who was elected legally just as Adolf Hitler was elected legally and then consolidated power and now is, of course, working with Fidel Castro and Mr. Morales

30 Edward Herman, Beyond Hypocrisy: Decoding the News in an Age of Propaganda (Boston:

South End Press, 1992), 133.

31 On the occupation of Palestine and invasion of Lebanon, see the fourth and fifth chapters of this thesis; for the destruction of the Iraqi nuclear reactor see General Assembly resolution 36/27 at <www.un.org/documents/resga.htm>.

32 It is interesting to consider that during the winter of 2005-2006 Venezuela provided heating oil

forty-percent below the market price to 150,000 low income residents in nine northeastern U.S. states and various Native American communities and free oil to soup kitchens and emergency shelters in five states, discounts and giveaways worth more than $30 million. Larry Lack, “Is Chavez Hitler or Father Christmas? Venezuela’s Handout to Uncle Sam’s Shivering Poor,” Counterpunch vol 13 no ¾, February 2006.

27

and others.33

Negroponte testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee that President

Chavez “appears ready to use his control of the legislature and other institutions to

continue to stifle the opposition, to reduce press freedom, and entrench himself through

measures which are technically legal, but which nonetheless constrict democracy.” The

Times amazingly reports without comment that Negroponte said, “Mr. Chavez’s populist

government was seeking closer economic and military ties with Iran and North Korea,

while meddling in the internal affairs of neighboring countries [by backing particular

candidates for elected office].”34

Perhaps a different perspective is in order. The Venezuelan-American attorney

Eva Golinger, author of The Chavez Code: Cracking U.S. Intervention in Venezuela,

writes that

over the past few years, the Bush administration has funneled millions upon millions of dollars into building up an opposition movement to the Chavez administration in Venezuela, utilizing U.S. taxpayer dollars filtered through the National Endowment for Democracy and the U.S. Agency for International Development, and has backed a failed coup d’etat against President Chavez and oil industry sabotage that caused billions of dollars in damages to the nation yet failed to oust the government from power. For the year 2006, the U.S. congress has allocated more than $9 million dollars to opposition groups in Venezuela and has launched a psychological operations campaign coordinated from the Pentagon’s Special Operations Command in Tampa, Florida. In a document published by the U.S. Army in October 2005 entitled “Doctrine for Asymmetric War Against Venezuela,” President Chavez and the Bolivarian Revolution were labeled as the “largest threat since the Soviet Union and

33 AP, Washington Post, “Rumsfeld likens Chavez’s Rise to Hitler’s, 3 February 2006, <www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/03/AR2006020301050-pf>.

34 Juan Forero, “Chavez ousts U.S. diplomat on spying charge,” New York Times, 3 February 2006, <www.nytimes.com/2006/02/03/international/americas/03venz.html>; qualifier in brackets found in Eva Golinger, “Increasing U.S. hostility toward Venezuela: Rumsfeld and Negroponte Amp up Attacks on Chavez,” Counterpunch, 3 February 2006, <www.counterpunch.org/golinger02032006.html>.

28

communism.”35

One can only understand Negroponte and Rumsfeld with an Orwellian

Doublespeak dictionary close at hand. The two are clearly describing and opposing what

Herman calls an excess of democracy, “a situation in which the forms of government by

the people actually threaten to be infused with participatory substance.”36 Apparently,

the mainstream media does not care to remind readers of U.S. economic and military

support throughout Latin America, a region the U.S. has sought to control since its early

imperial beginnings of the Monroe Doctrine, for corrupt dictatorships mindful of U.S.

corporate interests and opposed to the needs of their own people in Cuba, Haiti, El

Salvador, Nicaragua, and Chile to name a few.37 The mainstream corporate press does

not even challenge the government when it accuses others of foreign intervention or

constricting democracy, when the United States has a long history of both resulting in the

domestic limitation and foreign eradication of real democracy in favor of corporate and

elite interests.38 The widespread government spying on American citizens, the Patriot

Act, and the illegal and immoral aggression against Afghanistan and Iraq during the

George W. Bush administration are but the most recent examples.

What is democracy if it is not a populist government ‘appealing to the masses of

people in those countries’? How can the Bush administration lecture on democracy? The

35 Golinger.

36 Herman, Beyond Hypocrisy, 131. 37 See for example William Blum, Killing Hope: U.S. Military and C.I.A. Interventions Since

WWII (updated edition, Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 2004).

38 Ibid; For domestic history see Howard Zinn, A People’s History of the United States (New York: HarperCollins, 2001).

29

Supreme Court consisting of nine people appointed George W. Bush president in 2000,39

and there is enough evidence of voter fraud to question the results of 2004 and the

dubious political capital claimed by the Bush administration.40 If we remember the

doublespeak definition of democracy, then the demonization of Chavez becomes clear.

Herman defines democracy as “a system that allows the people to vote for their leaders

from among a set cleared by the political investment community. In application to the

Third World, it means rule by an elite that understands our [American] interests and

needs.”41 Clearly, the government and mainstream media use Orwellian language to

mask true foreign and domestic policy objectives. The Americans belligerent behavior

toward Iran and Venezuela illustrates the inherent and consequent hypocrisy and double

standard when international law and the principle of universality are engulfed by a policy

of might makes right.

39 “The federal judiciary is not only the most important of our Constitutional checks on the people, but is also the means of preserving and enforcing all the other checks.” J. Allen Smith, The Spirit of the

American Government: A Study of the Constitution: Its Origin, Influence and Relation to Democracy

(Chautauqua, New York: 1911), 65. Moreover, Smith argues persuasively in Chapter five that the Supreme Court’s purpose is to defeat reform and diminish the few rights guaranteed in the Constitution.

40 See for example the United States Government Accountability Office September 2005 report to Congress: “Elections: Federal Efforts to Improve Security and Reliability of Electronic Voting Systems Are Under Way, But Key Activities Need to Be Completed,” warning of the unreliability of electronic voting machines and the ease of changing the results, <reform.house.gov/uploadedfiles/GAO-05-956.pdf>; recall that the discrepancy between exit polls delivering key states to Democratic nominee John Kerry and the official tallies of those states, including Ohio, have never been adequately explained. See, Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., “Was the 2004 Election Stolen?” Rolling Stone, 1 June 2006. Also, Harvey Wasserman and Bob Fitrakis, co-authors of How the GOP Stole America’s 2004 Election & Is Rigging 2008 and co-editors of the forthcoming What Happened in Ohio, write that “thus far up to 10 percent of the Ohio electorate—some 500,000 voters—has been stripped from the state’s registration rolls, all from Democratic strongholds,” in a GOP effort to maintain power despite majority opposition to Republican policies. See their “The New Totalitarianism,” Z Magazine, Vol. 19, No. 6, June 2006.

41 Herman, Beyond Hypocrisy, 131.

30

The current War on Terror, a more overt manifestation of an American foreign

policy that has been remarkably consistent during the twentieth century, has two main

intertwining objectives: the first is a more complete control of the domestic population;

the second is American hegemony over strategic and vital resources and markets.

American foreign policy has been largely unencumbered since the demise of the Soviet

Union and the end of the Cold War. Contrary to popular belief, the United States did not

contain the Soviet Union from seeking and achieving world domination, but the Soviet

Union prevented the United States from always using large-scale force to achieve

hegemony.42 The American government utilized the exaggerated and incessant Soviet

threat to justify military intervention abroad and suppress domestic opposition at home.

The historian Samuel Huntington remarked that “you may have to sell military

intervention in such a way as to create the misimpression that it is the Soviet Union that

you are fighting. That is what the U.S. has done ever since the Truman doctrine.”43

A fundamental principle of government is control of public opinion. Absolute

monarchies and dictatorships may maintain power and control through the state

monopoly on violence and force. Democracies, while not altogether eschewing state

violence on the domestic population, often rely on subtle thought control to maintain the

42 As an example of this belief, the 2002 United States National Security Strategy states: “the nature of the Cold War threat required the United States . . . to emphasize deterrence of the enemy’s use of force.” For the view that the Soviet Union constrained the United States, see for example, Rabab Hadi’s interview with Noam Chomsky and Eqbal Ahmad, “The Gulf Crisis: How We Got Here,” in Greg Bates, ed., Mobilizing Democracy: Changing the U.S. Role in the Middle East (Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 1991), 9; and Blum, Freeing the World to Death: Essays on the American Empire (Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 2005), 70-72.

43 Samuel Huntington, International Security, Summer 1981, cited in Noam Chomsky, Necessary

Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies (Boston: South End Press, 1989), 18.

31

public acceptance or tolerance of elite dominance and policies.44 As George Orwell has

made evident, language is a fundamental tool in thought control. While terrorism is “the

calculated use of violence or threat of violence to attain goals that are political, religious,

or ideological in nature . . . through intimidation, coercion, or instilling fear,” the word is

only applied to enemies.45 The American use of large-scale state violence is never

considered terrorism even though it is clearly so. Instead it is almost always legitimate;

at worst, a strategic or tactical mistake.

Noam Chomsky, philosophy and linguistics professor at MIT and political critic,

relates the anecdote of the pirate and the emperor. Alexander the Great asks a captured

pirate, “How dare you molest the sea?” And the pirate’s indignant response? “How dare

you molest the whole world? I do it with but one ship and am called a pirate. You do it

with an entire navy and are called an emperor.”46 Those fighting against the U.S.

occupation of Iraq or the Israeli occupation of Palestine are defined as terrorists,

insurgents, evildoers, while the American president, the Israeli prime minister, and the

soldiers doing their bidding with the world’s most destructive weapons are heroes

deserving our admiration and unquestionable support. An example of the U.S. stance on

terrorism is the negative vote for General Assembly resolution 42/159 (1987) concerning

measures to prevent international terrorism. The resolution reads in part:

Nothing in the present resolution could in anyway prejudice the right to self-

44 “To deny the right of the people to control the government leads naturally to denial of their right to criticize those who shape its policy.” Smith, The Spirit of the American Government, 152.

45 Chomsky, “International Terrorism: Image and Reality” in Alexander George, ed., Western

State Terrorism cited in Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest for Global Dominance (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2003), 188.

46 Chomsky, Pirates and Emperors: International Terrorism in the Real World (Brattleboro, Vt.:

Amana Books, 1990), 1.

32

determination, freedom, and independence, as derived from the charter of the United Nations, of people forcibly deprived of that right . . . particularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes and foreign occupation.47 The United Nations has determined that those suffering under foreign occupation have

the right to struggle for freedom and self-determination. The U.S. and Israel reject this

right and instead refer to the victims of their massive violence as terrorists who must

renounce violence and consent to the oppressor’s unjust and unilateral demands.

Perhaps it is an irony of history that the American soldiers fighting for independence and

self-determination against the British would fall under the rubric of terrorists and

insurgents today (remember that President Reagan compared the Contra terrorists in

Nicaragua favorably with the Founding Fathers); and that Jews who suffered ethnic

cleansing and genocide during World War II would ethnically cleanse the Palestinians to

eliminate the demographic problem in the racist Jewish state of Israel.

As an ongoing part of its War on Terror, and despite unprecedented worldwide

protest, the United States attacked Iraq in March 2003, an egregious example of

aggression, the supreme international crime encompassing all other war crimes and

crimes against humanity.48 Evidence to the contrary, the Bush administration and the

mainstream media incessantly propagandized to the American public that Saddam

47 General Assembly Resolution 42/159 (1987): “Measures to prevent international

terrorism which endangers or takes innocent human lives or jeopardizes fundamental freedoms

and study of the underlying causes of those forms of terrorism and acts of violence which lie in misery, frustration, grievance and despair and which cause some people to sacrifice human lives,

including their own, in an attempt to effect radical changes : A. Report of the Secretary-General ; B. Convening, under the auspices of the United Nations, of an international conference to define

terrorism and to differentiate it from the struggle of peoples for national liberation.” The

resolution passed 153-2-1. The United States and Israel cast the negative votes and Honduras abstained.

48 In March 2003, the United States, recognizing that it did not have the requisite support, decided not to force a vote in the Security Council on a resolution authorizing military force against Iraq, rendering subsequent U.S. military action as an illegal violation of the United Nations Charter.

33

Hussein was responsible for the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on

September 11, 2001 and possessed weapons of mass destruction, which he could use at

some indeterminate future time to harm the United States and allies.49 At the beginning

of the George W. Bush administration, Secretary of State Colin Powell argued for the

success of American policy towards Iraq:

. . . the fact that the sanctions exist--not for the purpose of hurting the Iraqi people, but for the purpose of keeping in check Saddam Hussein’s ambitions toward developing weapons of mass destruction. We should constantly be reviewing our policies, constantly be looking at those sanctions to make sure that they are directed toward that purpose. That purpose is every bit as important now as it was ten years ago when we began it. And frankly, they have worked. He has not developed any significant capability with respect to weapons of mass destruction. He is unable to project conventional power against his neighbors. So in effect, our policies have strengthened the security of the neighbors of Iraq . . . .50

Disregarding for a moment the disingenuous claim that the harming of the Iraqi people

was not a primary aim of the sanctions when it was readily apparent that the sanctions

exacerbated the already tenuous life support system of a modern nation reliant on

technology due to the enormous destruction of Iraqi infrastructure during the Gulf War,

Powell justifies the sanctions because Iraq is not a threat to any country in the Middle

49 Neither the media nor the government deemed it necessary to inform the public as to why another country would attack the world’s only superpower at extreme risk of national suicide except for meaningless comments as “they hate our freedom.” A Zogby poll released 28 February 2006 indicated that 85% of U.S. soldiers in Iraq believe that the war is retaliation for Saddam Hussein’s role in 9/11; 77% believe that the purpose of the war was “to stop Saddam [Hussein] from protecting al Qaeda in Iraq”; and 93% believed that Iraq’s supposed possession of weapons of mass destruction were not the motive for the invasion, <www.zogby.com/news/Readnews.dbm?ID=1075>. The infamous Downing Street Memo, largely ignored in the mainstream U.S. press, provided evidence that the Bush administration intended to invade Iraq on any pretext and the facts would be made to support the policy. See <www.downingstreetmemo.com> and <www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-1593607,00.html>.

50 <www.state.gov/secretary/former/Powell/remarks/2001/933.htm>.

34

East, let alone the United States.51 On 29 July 2001 National Security Advisor

Condoleezza Rice supported Powell:

But in terms of Saddam Hussein being there, let’s remember that his country is divided in effect. He does not control the northern part of his country. We are able to keep arms from him. His military forces have not been rebuilt.52 Scott Ritter, the chief United Nations weapons inspector in Iraq, stated in September

2002:

Since 1998 Iraq has been fundamentally disarmed: 90-95% of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capability has been verifiably eliminated. This includes all of the factories used to produce chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, and long-range ballistic missiles; the associated equipment of these factories; and the vast majority of the products coming out of these factories.53

Mohamed El Baradei, the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency,

reported in October 2002:

Before being barred from Iraq in 1998 [by the United States], the International Atomic Energy Agency dismantled extensive nuclear weapons-related facilities. We neutralized Iraq’s nuclear program. We confiscated its weapon-usable material. We destroyed, removed or rendered harmless all its facilities and equipment relevant to nuclear weapons production. And while we did not claim absolute certainty, we were confident that we had not missed any significant component of Iraq’s nuclear program.54

51 John Ryan, “Madeline Albright and U.S. Foreign Policy,” Counterpunch, 10 December 2005, <www.counterpunch.org/ryan12102005.html>. Madeline Albright, responding to a question on 60 Minutes 11 May 1996 stated that the death of over 500,000 Iraqi children due to the sanctions was worth it for U.S. policy goals. United Nations reports state that in the first eight years of sanctions, two million Iraqis died, including one million children. See also Ramsey Clark, The Fire This Time: U.S. War Crimes in the Gulf (New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 1992); The Children Are Dying: The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq (New York: International Action Center, 1998); and Anthony Arnove, ed., Iraq Under Siege: The Deadly

Impact of Sanctions and War (Cambridge, Mass.: South End Press, 2002).

52 CNN Late Night with Wolf Blitzer, <transcripts.cnn.com/transcripts/0107/29/le.00.html>. 53 The Guardian (London), 19 September 2002, as cited in Blum, Freeing the World to Death, 42.

54 Washington Post, 21 October 2002, A25, as cited in Ibid.

35

Strange, then, that harmless Iraq suddenly became such a threat to the United

States and its allies after the September 11, 2001 attacks. If the Americans destroyed

Iraq’s military capability during the first Gulf War and prevented Hussein from

rebuilding as the second Bush administration claimed, how could it credibly assert to the

American public and the world’s nations that an attack on Iraq was necessary and just?55

Since Iraq did not possess weapons of mass destruction and was not involved in 9/11,

then what were the underlying motives for the U.S. attack and subsequent military

occupation?

Leupp describes the desperate Iraqi peace proposals, which are still unknown to

most of the American public. In February 2003, through an intermediary, Saddam

Hussein attempted to prevent a U.S. attack on Iraq. In exchange for a U.S. promise not to

attack, Iraq would “(1) cooperate in fighting terrorism; (2) give ‘full support’ for any U.S.

plan ‘in the Arab-Israeli peace process’; (3) give ‘first priority [to the U.S.] as it relates to

Iraq oil, mining rights;’ (4) cooperate with U.S. strategic interests in the region; and (5)

allow ‘direct U.S. involvement on the ground in disarming Iraq.’” Richard Perle,

chairman of the Defense Policy Board at the Pentagon and the highest ranking official

involved in the discussion, dismissed the Iraqi appeasement offers as U.S. policy was

ostensibly regime change.56 Although international law forbids the threat of or use of

55 The historian Thomas Bailey justifies the Bush administration’s deception: “Because the masses are notoriously short-sighted and generally cannot see danger until it is at their throats, our statesmen are forced to deceive them into an awareness of their own long-run interests. Deception of the people may in fact become increasingly necessary unless we are willing to give our leaders in Washington a free hand.” Thomas A. Bailey, The Man in the Street: The Impact of American Public Opinion on Foreign Policy

(New York: 1948), 13 cited in Jesse Lemisch, On Active Service in War and Peace: Politics and Ideology

in the American Historical Profession (Toronto: New Hogstown Press, 1975), 88-89, and Chomsky, Necessary Illusions, 17-18.

56 Leupp, “Wilkerson Fingers the Neo-Cons on Iran.”

36

force to coerce concessions, the U.S. seemingly could have avoided war while ensuring

the demilitarization of Iraq and gaining economic, political and strategic objectives.

While all of the Bush administration’s pretexts for invasion ring false, one must wonder

as to the true motives and policies.

Heard directs attention to Oded Yinon, “an Israeli journalist with links to the

Israeli Foreign Ministry,” who wrote an article published in the World Zionist

Organization’s Kivunim in 1982 outlining Israel’s strategic objectives in the Middle East.

Yinon argued that to survive “Israel must become an imperial regional power and must

also ensure the break-up of all Arab countries so that the region may be carved up into

small ineffectual states unequipped to stand up to Israeli military might.” Yinon asserted

that

the dissolution of Syria and Iraq into ethnically or religiously unique areas such as in Lebanon is Israel’s primary target on the eastern front. Iraq, rich in oil on the one hand and internally torn on the other, is guaranteed as a candidate for Israel’s targets. . . . In the short run, it is Iraqi power which constitutes the greatest threat to Israel.57

Yinon predicted that “an Iraqi-Iranian war will tear Iraq apart and cause its

downfall at home even before it is able to organize a struggle on a wide front against us.”

Although Iraq survived intact after eight years of war with Iran, the first U.S. invasion,

and more than a decade of sanctions, the 2003 aggression has caused civil war and

dissolution, fulfilling Yinon’s strategic dream. He envisioned that “in Iraq, a division

into provinces along ethnic/religious lines as in Syria during Ottoman times is possible.

So, three (or more) states will exist around the three major cities: Basra, Baghdad, and

Mosul and Shiite areas in the south will separate from the Sunni and Kurdish north.”58

57 Heard.

58 Ibid.

37

In his “Anti-Empire Report,” the investigative journalist William Blum cites

Philip Zelikow, executive director of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon

the United States and White Burkett Miller professor of history at the University of

Virginia who stated on 10 September 2002 at the University of Virginia that the U.S.

attacked Iraq to eliminate a threat to Israel: “Why would Iraq attack America or use

nuclear weapons against us? I’ll tell you what I think the real threat [is] and actually has

been since 1990--it’s the threat against Israel.”59 In “Time for Full Disclosure,” William

Hughes mentions important members of the Bush administration who have close ties to

Israel, perhaps even dual citizenship, putting into question their loyalty and motives.60

Perhaps, Israeli objectives were not the impetus for war in Iraq; however, the

consequences have been to Israel’s advantage while harming the security of the American

people. The current U.S. policy toward Iran and Syria seems to fit into Yinon’s design.

Although Syria fought with the U.S. against Iraq in the first Gulf War, joined the “war on

terror,” and supported the resolution authorizing force against Iraq in 2003, the United

States has recently accused Syria of hiding Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, harboring

terrorists, and allowing foreign fighters into Iraq. Moreover, the U.S. forced Syria to

withdraw its army from Lebanon, and the United Nations is investigating Syria for

involvement in the assassination of Rafik Hariri. While some critics of American policy,

such as Noam Chomsky, argue that a politically and economically weak U.S. (compared

to the European Union, Japan, and even China) must use its overwhelmingly military

59 Blum, “The Anti-Empire Report,” Counterpunch, 6 April 2004, <www.counterpunch.org/blum04062004.html>.

60 William Hughes, “Time for Full Disclosure,” Counterpunch, 22 February 2003,

<www.counterpunch.org/hughes02222003.html>.

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force to retain its dominance and hegemony, one cannot dismiss lightly American

politicians’ seemingly odd veneration of Israel, which will be discussed more fully in the

fourth and fifth chapters.

Along with Iraq’s dubious involvement in 9/11, al Qaeda’s role in the September

11 attack was not firmly established before the invasion of Afghanistan. The Taliban

rulers, wishing to avoid the imminent U.S. attack, were willing to capture and extradite to

the United States those responsible if the Bush administration could provide proof of

culpability.61 In June 2002 FBI director Robert Mueller testified before Congress that

investigators believe the idea of the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon came from al Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan. We think the masterminds of it were in Afghanistan, high in the al Qaeda leadership.62

Disregarding for a moment that armed force is not a viable solution to international

conflict, if American intelligence agencies only believe and think that al Qaeda leaders in

Afghanistan were responsible, what right does the U.S. have to invade and occupy a

sovereign nation? The 2002 National Security Strategy provides clues pertaining to U.S.

designs on world hegemony.

Even though it is written in Orwellian doublespeak, corrupting the meaning and

nuance of the English language, masking the administration’s true aims in glib rhetoric,

the 2002 National Security Strategy is a compelling document sometimes overtly

articulating to the public policy goals that had been somewhat hidden by past

61 Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival, 199.

62 Walter Pincus, Washington Post, 6 June 2002 cited in Ibid., 200.

39

administrations.63 The introduction claims that “the U.S. national security strategy will

be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values

and our national interests.”64 It is worth discussing in depth to understand the real

motives behind the words and realize the real politick underneath the idealism,

illustrating American hypocrisy and blatant double standards.

According to the strategy, American principles will inform “our government’s

decision about international cooperation, the character of our foreign assistance, and the

allocation of resources.” The principles ostensibly refer to vague concepts as

‘democracy’ and ‘freedom.’ However, an honest examination of American history would

conclude that the U.S. government does not act with benevolent disinterest. The

document elucidates real administration values and principles, which essentially fall

under taxpayer-funded corporate welfare. The administration touts “pro-growth legal and

regulatory polices” which value profit over unimportant trivialities that ensure the

economic and social well-being of the world’s citizens such as environmental protection,

worker safety, living wages, quality healthcare and education. Tax policies, including

lower marginal tax rates for the wealthy instead of a truly progressive tax system,

“improve incentives for work and investment,” while social welfare for the poor

somehow acts as a disincentive to work, encouraging ‘welfare queens’ to be lazy and live

63 The concept of National Security has played a large role in domestic politics since the

Constitutional Convention. J. Allen Smith found that advocates of ratification encouraged the public’s fear of European invasion [and the Indian threat] to promote the idea that a strong national government was vital for defense. See Smith, The Spirit of the American Government, 49. Regarding national interests, the founding father John Jay stated “the people who own the country ought to govern it,” reflecting the anti-democratic principle function of the national government to protect the interests of the wealthy from the interests of the masses. Jay quoted in Bertell Ollman and Jonathan Birnbaum, eds., The United States

Constitution: 200 Years of Anti-Federalist, Abolitionist, Feminist, Muckraking, Progressive, and Especially

Socialist Criticism (New York: New York University Press, 1990).

64 Unless otherwise noted, all quotes are from the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States, found at <www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>.

40

a life of leisure on government largesse. Apparently, the government and private sector

must reward the wealthy to encourage their productivity, while the government must

slash measly benefits to the poor to encourage them to work.65 The administration’s

primary function is to implement “sound fiscal policies to promote business activity,”

instead of embodying the true ideals of a participatory democracy and enacting the

policies necessary to ensure the economic and social welfare of the American people.66

As the government’s response to the devastating Hurricane Katrina has demonstrated, the

security of the American people is not a priority.

The administration equates democracy with capitalism, dismissing the form and

participatory substance of a democratic government and emphasizing the undemocratic

yet fundamental purpose of the federal government, protecting the wealthy minority from

the majority. The government heavily influences the U.S. economy, essentially

subsidizing big business through the military, technology, and agricultural sectors. The

government, instead of meeting the needs of the people, serves the interests of the

corporate elite.67 However, the Bush administration unabashedly asserts that

the lessons of history are clear: market economies, not command-and-control economies with the heavy hand of government, are the best way to promote prosperity

65 See Michael Parenti, Democracy for the Few (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1977) and his

discussion on supply side economics.

66 Russell Long, the Congressional Democrat from Louisiana, honestly remarked that “many of these [corporate] people have much influence. I, like others, have importuned some of them for campaign contributions for my party and myself. Nevertheless, we owe it to the people, now and then, to save one or two votes for them . . . . We democrats can trade on the dubious assumption that we are protector of the public interest only so long if we permit things like this patent giveaway.” Congressional Record Vol 112 Part 9 2 June 1966, cited in Parenti, Democracy for the Few, 230.

67 Senator Boies Penrose (late nineteenth-century Pennsylvania Republican) spoke to a business

audience: “I believe in a division of labor: you send us to Congress; we pass the laws under which you make money . . . and out of your profits you further contribute to our campaign funds to send us back again to pass more laws to enable you to make more money.” Quoted in Mark Green, “Stamping Out Corruption,” New York Times, 28 October 1986, A35, cited in Ollman and Birnbaum, eds., The United

States Constitution, 3-4.

41

and reduce poverty. President Bush describes consumerism as the moral principle that precedes human rights,

justice, equality, and compassion:

The concept of free trade is a moral principle: If you can make something that others value, you should be able to sell it to them. If others make something that you value, you should be able to buy it. This is real freedom, the freedom for a person--or a nation--to make a living. Real freedom, the freedom to make a profit and endlessly consume, is justification for a

government-subsidized military that destroys life and the precarious ecosystem of our

planet to protect the interests, resources, and markets of private corporations.

A majority of the document deals with the perceived threats to the United States

and its interests. Although the ‘national interest’ is often utilized to justify American

foreign policy, it remains nothing more than a vague, undefined, and nebulous concept.

The government propagandizes that the national interest benefits all Americans, while

few profit and most suffer from the domestic and foreign policies of the national

government. An obvious example is that the U.S. response to the 9/11 attack has only

exacerbated the threat of retail terrorism against Americans. The real motive behind

American foreign policy has been control over resources and markets, and various

administrations have justified the U.S. military presence throughout the world as a

rational response to exaggerated and even unfounded threats from international

communists and terrorists incessantly and unquestionably obsessed with the destruction

of the United States. As Michael Parenti has observed, the U.S. hysterically determined

that the Communist ideology would infiltrate the entire world as an untreatable virus

without realizing that the anti-Communist ideology already had.68 After the

68 Michael Parenti, The Anti-communist Impulse (New York: Random House, 1969).

42

disintegration of the Soviet Union and its integration into the capitalist fold, rogue states

and terrorism became the great threat to the American people and the national interest

and preventative war against weak states, not deterrence against strong ones, became the

modus operandi for the U.S. The National Security Strategy says the following to justify

the morally indefensible concept of preventative war:

We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States.

For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat--most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack.

The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction--and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.

The reasons for our actions will be clear, the force measured, and the cause just.

While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self- defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country.

Preventative war simply masks aggression, the supreme international crime, and renames

it self-defense. The U.S. claims the right to attack another country on the slimmest of

pretexts that at some indeterminate time in the future, the target country may harm the

U.S. or its interests. This policy is flawed because it fails the test of universality.

Imagine if another country, for example Cuba or Iran, understandably determined that the

43

U.S. was actively planning an attack or coup d’etat. By the logic of the National Security

Strategy, Cuba or Iran would have the right to preemptively attack the United States as a

preventative measure of self-defense. However, in the real world, the only countries with

the ability to enact preventative war are military powers against weaker foes. A military

weak nation could not act preemptively against a superpower without committing

national suicide. The U.S. preventative war strategy relies on unilateral military power

and declares international law and the United Nations irrelevant. Francis Fukuyama, a

prominent neo-conservative intellectual and member of the Project for a New American

Century,69 believes that the UN is “perfectly serviceable as an instrument of American

unilateralism and indeed may be the primary mechanism through which that unilateralism

will be exercised in the future.”70

In order to implement its ‘defense’ strategy, the United States requires military

superiority to act unilaterally and virtually unimpeded. The National Security Strategy

69 The Project for the New American Century includes the following charter members: Elliot

Abrams, Jeb Bush, Dick Cheney, Eliot Cohen, Francis Fukuyama, Zalmay Khalilzad, I. Lewis Libby, Dan Quayle, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz. PNAC’s statement of purpose idealizes the Regan administration and encourages a more active foreign policy: We seem to have forgotten the essential elements of the Reagan administration’s success: a military that is strong and ready to meet both present and future challenges; a foreign policy that boldly and purposefully promotes American principles abroad; and national leadership that accepts the United States’ global responsibilities. We need to accept responsibility for America’s unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles. Such a Reaganite policy of military strength and moral clarity may not be fashionable today. But it is necessary if the United States is to build on the success of this past century and to ensure our security and our greatness in the next. A second policy paper, entitled “Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Force, and Resources for a New Century,” realizes the difficulty of enacting their strategies: “Further, the process of transformation, even if it brings revolutionary change, is likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event – like a new Pearl Harbor.” Members of PNAC were well placed in the George W. Bush administration on 9/11 to capitalize on the attack and implement long range domestic and foreign policies that would strengthen American elite power at home and abroad <www.newamericancentury.org>.

70 Mark Curtis, The Ambiguities of Power (Zed, 1985), 183, cited in Chomsky, Hegemony or

Survival, 29.

44

resolves that “it is time to reaffirm the essential role of American military strength. We

must build and maintain our defenses beyond challenge.” The justifications, purposes,

and logical consequences are made disturbingly clear:

- the unparalleled strength of the United States armed forces, and their forward presence, have maintained the peace in some of the world’s most strategically vital regions

- to contend with uncertainty and to meet the many security challenges we face, the United States will require bases and stations within and beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia, as well as temporary access arrangements for the long-distance deployment of U.S. forces - to protect critical U.S. infrastructure and assets in outer space - to discourage aggression or any form of coercion against the United States - we will take the actions necessary to ensure that our efforts to meet our global security commitments and protect Americans are not impaired by the potential for investigations, inquiry, or prosecution by the International Criminal Court, whose jurisdiction does not extend to Americans and which we do not accept - this vulnerability [to terrorism] will persist long after we bring to justice those responsible for the September 11 attacks - we will be prepared to act apart when our interests and unique responsibilities require - our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States

Through the strategy document, the Bush administration has acknowledged that the U.S.

is involved in permanent war and being the only superpower, it has the ability to shun

international law and militarize the world and space to ensure its hegemony. The United

States has long maintained a military presence throughout the world on the pretexts of

security and stability. During the Cold War, the U.S. surrounded the Soviet Union with

military forces and nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union was understandably paranoid

considering that the Western powers had repeatedly invaded it. However, the Soviet

45

Union’s irresponsible and illogical attempt to place nuclear weapons in Cuba almost

provoked a nuclear war. Seemingly, the United States is the only country with the right

and responsibility to spread its military forces ubiquitously. An immediate consequence

of the wars against Afghanistan and Iraq has been the construction of U.S. military bases

throughout Central Asia. No other country has the right to develop military forces

capable of preventing or defending against a U.S. attack. The document criticizes China

for expanding its military capability and thus threatening the Asia-Pacific region. No

country has the right to doubt the benevolent and virtuous nature of U.S. foreign policy:

the U.S. strongly criticized Russia and France for questioning its motives regarding Iran

and Iraq.

The hypocrisy and arrogance of the Bush administration is most evident in its

characterizing of rogue states. According to the National Security Strategy, rogue states:

brutalize their own people and squander their national resources for the personal gain of the rulers; display no regard for international law, threaten their neighbors, and callously violate international treaties to which they are party; are determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction, along with other advanced military technology, to be used as threats or offensively to achieve the aggressive design of their regimes; sponsor terrorism around the globe; reject basic human values (and hate the United States and everything for which it stands).

Although the Bush administration considers all acts of terrorism illegitimate and

wishes to prevent all “further sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists,” the U.S.

selectively defines what constitutes terrorism, causing its rhetoric and idealism and

righteousness to reek of hypocrisy. Members of the U.S. government will never be

extradited and tried for war crimes against the people of the world. Terrorists harbored in

the U.S., including many responsible for war crimes in Latin America, will never receive

justice. The United States government meets every qualification of its own definition of

46

a rogue state, including fearing real democracy and despising the American people.

Countless people throughout the world who have suffered first-hand the effects of U.S.

arrogance and destructiveness would most certainly agree. It remains for the American

people, the enemy the government fears above all, to prevent all future U.S. crimes

against humanity, and instead to work for peace and justice for all humankind.

The United Nations and its founding charter oppose the U.S. and its avowed

policy of unilateral aggression. The fundamental purpose of the United Nations,

elucidated in the preamble to the Charter, is “to save succeeding generations from the

scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind.”71

The United Nations champions international law and peaceful conflict resolution,

including “negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement,

resort to regional agencies or arrangements,” as opposed to armed aggression.72 Article

Two demands that

All members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered. All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.73 Moreover, the Charter articulates a faith in universal human rights and determines to

achieve social and economic justice for all “without distinction as to race, sex, language,

or religion.” Membership is a privilege and responsibility, and any nation “which has

persistently violated the principles contained in the present charter may be expelled from

71 United Nations Charter. 72 Ibid. 73 Ibid.

47

the organization. . . .”74 While much power is vested in the Security Council and its

permanent members, the General Assembly represents participatory democracy and the

true ideals of the Charter. The U.S. votes in the General Assembly, examined in the

Appendix, illustrate the U.S. government’s double standard applied to others and

contempt for substantive democracy and universal human rights, justice and peace.

Although the world has not yet fulfilled the ideals embodied in the charter, it remains a

worthy goal for all peoples and nations desiring a more just and peaceful world.

The United States foreign policy during the George W. Bush administration in the

initial years of the twenty-first century illustrates a reliance on military force to achieve

economic and political objectives and a rejection of international law and the principles

of the United Nations Charter. The utilization of military intervention in the egregious

examples of aggression against Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 reflects a

continuation of a stable U.S. policy predicated on supremacy of war-making capability.

However, as the ostensible American indignation towards Iraqi aggression against

Kuwait in the summer of 1990 indicates, only the United States and its allies and clients

may disregard international law and the United Nations Charter, thus exposing American

rhetoric regarding the disavowal of force, democracy, international law, and human rights

as false and clearly elucidating the dangerous double standard whereby those nations with

the military capability operate outside international norms.

74 Ibid.

Chapter Two:

Righteous Aggression

I shall give a propagandist cause for starting the war. Never mind whether it is

plausible or not. The victor will not be asked, later on, whether or not he told the

truth. In starting and waging a war, it is not right that matters but victory.

Adolf Hitler 24 August 19391

“No nation will be permitted to brutally assault its neighbor,” righteously argued

President George H. W. Bush in a response to the unjustifiable Iraqi invasion of Kuwait

on 1 August 1990.2 A strange and hypocritical remark considering Bush ordered the

brutal assault of Panama barely eight months before in late December 1989, complete

with the installation of a new Panamanian government with the President sworn into

office on a U.S. military base.3 The United States’ belligerent and indignantly righteous

response to the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait fundamentally contrasts with blatant U.S.

aggression and intervention throughout American history, especially during the latter half

of the twentieth century and continuing apace in the new American century. As the

examples of U.S. aggression against Grenada, Panama, Libya, and Nicaragua during the

1 John Balkwill, “Kinder George’s Well-Oiled Propaganda Machine,” In These Times, 20-26

March 1991, 18.

2 Joel Bleifuss, “The First Stone,” In These Times, 20-26 March 1991, 5.

3 Allan Nairn, “The Eagle is Landing,” The Nation, 3 October 1994, 346 as cited in William Blum, Killing Hope: U.S. Military and C.I.A. Interventions Since World War II (updated edition, Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 2004), 313. For more discussion on the U.S. invasion of Panama see Chapter three.

49

1980s and overt political, economic, and military support for the illegal aggression and

violation of international law of its allies and clients, especially Israel and apartheid

South Africa, indicate, the United States government does not principally oppose

aggression or egregious violations of international law.

The international community considers aggression to be the supreme international

crime. The Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals following the allied victory in World War II

concomitant with the drafting of the United Nations Charter elucidated to the world that

not only was armed aggression the supreme international crime, but nations could no

longer utilize force to resolve conflicts with other states.4 The United Nations resolved

that only the Security Council could authorize an international force to preserve peace

and enforce international law save those situations requiring immediate self-defense. If

international law is to have any validity, the United Nations must deter, condemn, and

repel all acts of aggression regardless of the perpetrator. The standard definition of

aggression, the General Assembly resolution adopted at its 2319th plenary meeting on 14

December 1974, states:5

4 The judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal stated: “War is essentially an evil thing. Its

consequences are not confined to the belligerent states alone, but affect the whole world. To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.” Moreover, Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, the U.S. Chief Prosecutor at the Nuremberg Tribunal, declared: “Any resort to war--any kind of war--is a resort to means that are inherently criminal. War inevitably is a course of killings, assaults, deprivations of liberty, and destruction of property. An honestly defensive war is, of course, legal and saves those lawfully conducting it from criminality. But inherently criminal acts cannot be defended by showing that those who committed them were engaged in a war, when war itself is illegal. The very minimum legal consequence of the treaties making aggressive war illegal is to strip those who incite or wage them of every defense the law ever gave, and to leave the war-makers subject to judgment by the usually accepted principles of the laws of crimes.” Nuremberg Tribunal Judgment, 26, and Robert H. Jackson, The Nuremberg Case as Presented by Robert H. Jackson, Chief of Counsel for the

United States, Together With Other Documents (New York: Cooper Square Publishers Inc., 1971), 82-84, cited in Michael Mandel, How America Gets Away With Murder: Illegal Wars, Collateral Damage and

Crimes Against Humanity (London: Pluto Press, 2004), 6.

5 United Nations General Assembly, Twenty-Ninth Session, Official Records, Supplement 31, Definition of Aggression, A/RES/3314 (XXIX), 1974.

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Article 1

Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this Definition.

Article 2

The first use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter shall constitute prima facie evidence of an act of aggression although the Security Council may, in conformity with the Charter, conclude that a determination that an act of aggression has been committed would not be justified in the light of other relevant circumstances, including the fact that the acts concerned or their consequences are not of sufficient gravity.

Article 3

Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, subject to and in accordance with the provisions of article 2, qualify as an act of aggression:

1. The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof;

2. Bombardment by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State;

3. The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State; 4. An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets of another State;

5. The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the termination of the agreement;

6. The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetuating an act of aggression against a third State;

7. The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars, or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.

51

Article 4

The acts enumerated above are not exhaustive and the Security Council may determine that other acts constitute aggression under the provision of the Charter.

Article 5

1. No consideration of whatever nature, whether political, economic, military or otherwise, may serve as a justification for aggression.

2. A war of aggression is a crime against international peace. Aggression gives rise to international responsibility. 3. No territorial acquisition or special advantage resulting from aggression is or

shall be recognized as lawful.

Article 6

Nothing in this Definition shall be construed as in any way enlarging or diminishing the scope of the Charter, including its provisions concerning cases in which the use of force is lawful.

Article 7

Nothing in this Definition, and in particular article 3, could in any way prejudice the right to self-determination, freedom and independence, as derived from the Charter, of peoples forcibly deprived of that right and referred to in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, particularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes or other forms of alien domination: nor the right of these peoples to struggle to that end and to seek and receive support, in accordance with the principles of the Charter and in conformity with the above-mentioned Declaration.

Article 8

In their interpretation and application the above provisions are interrelated and each provision should be construed in the context of the other provisions.

As the world’s reigning military superpower, the United States has utilized force

for economic and political objectives favorable to traditional American interests. While

the U.S. castigated Iraq for violations of American-drafted United Nations resolutions

and international conventions, the United States violated those same Security Council

resolutions, the Charter, and international law including the Geneva Conventions by

overstepping the United Nations mandate requiring the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from

52

Kuwait and causing apocalyptic devastation to Iraqi infrastructure and the civilian

population, suggesting that the removal of Iraq from Kuwait was a pretext for U.S.

military action and not the primary concern. While the U.S. habitually opposed

intervention and even sanctions against Israel and apartheid South Africa as U.S. vetoes

in the Security Council and negative votes in the General Assembly obviously illustrate,

there was no hesitation by the Bush administration (as well as the following two

administrations) to enforce brutal sanctions and undertake a destructive war on the people

of Iraq. The Bush administration’s belligerency toward Iraq and marked determination to

prevent any diplomatic or political settlement serves as a foil to U.S. aggression and the

international lawlessness of its allies to illustrate a dangerous double standard whereby

power is the determining factor as to whether a nation must adhere to international law.

The United States rejected serious international condemnation of Israeli and apartheid

South African crimes and prevented the adoption and enforcement of Security Council

resolutions calling for sanctions and other measures as a means to terminate Israeli

occupation of Palestinian territory and aggression against Middle East nations, including

Lebanon, Egypt, and Syria and apartheid South African racist oppression of its black

population and aggression against neighboring African states including Angola and

Namibia. Moreover, in the decade preceding the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the United

State committed unjustifiable aggression against Grenada, Panama, Libya, and

Nicaragua. Although the world community condemned U.S. actions against these weak,

poor, and defenseless populations, there were no Security Council resolutions demanding

sanctions and a military operation against the U.S. decimating vital infrastructure,

53

targeting civilians, and eliminating its military capability in order to prevent extremely

probable American military action in the future.

The U.S. response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, predicated from the onset on

military force and thus dismissing a diplomatic settlement and a central role for the

United Nations beyond ceremonially acceding to the American diktat, exceeded the

Security Council mandate, which demanded only the removal of Iraqi troops from

Kuwait and the restoration of Kuwait’s legitimate (and undemocratic) government, by

destroying Iraq’s military capability and civilian infrastructure and imposing brutal

sanctions for over a decade after Iraqi troops retreated from Kuwait. While not justifying

the Iraqi invasion, the background discussing the immediate causes of the Iraqi

aggression intimates that the United States encouraged Kuwait to avoid compromise with

Iraq on the border dispute and access to the Persian Gulf and illustrates that Saddam

Hussein invaded only after various attempts to negotiate and compromise with Kuwait

failed, contrasting, for instance, with the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 undertaken

to prevent a political settlement with the Palestinian leadership. Dismissing legitimate

Iraqi grievances against Kuwait, the United States ardently sought to manipulate the

United Nations and avoid a diplomatic solution and instead resorted to massive state

terrorism, exposing the rhetoric against aggression, intervention, and the use of force for

political and economic ends as false, to justify the massive U.S. military budget after the

demise of the Soviet Union and the cessation of the Cold War, assert U.S. hegemony,

acquire a more permanent military presence in the Middle East, convince the American

public of the efficacy of direct U.S. military intervention, countering the so-called

Vietnam syndrome, and destroy a perceived enemy of Israel. Additionally, as political

54

science professor Manning Marable observes, “Every empire requires an external enemy

to justify measures to suppress domestic unrest and silence internal critics.”6 A foreign

adventure distracts the public from more pressing domestic concerns and allows the

perpetrators of the military intervention to distance themselves from domestic economic

and social problems as the government encourages patriotic fervor and national unity,

implying that critical dissent of policies undermines the national interest, national

security, and the American troops.

Immediately after the Iraqi invasion, the Bush administration incessantly declared

that Iraq undertook unprovoked aggression, thus vehemently dismissing any legitimate

Iraqi grievances against Kuwait and essentially precluding any just diplomatic settlement

based on compromise and addressing the fundamentally underlying problems in the

region leading to the conflict. The Iraqi grievances against Kuwait, regarding the

vaguely defined border between the two countries with the resultant conflict over control

of the underlying Rumalia oil field and Iraqi access to the Persian Gulf, have both

historical roots, centered on the fact that Kuwait had been a district of Iraq under the rule

of the Ottoman empire, and more immediate causes, mainly Kuwait’s economic warfare

against Iraq during and after Iraq’s aggressive war against Iran from 1980 to 1988. To

provide context for the incessant border disputes between Iraq and Kuwait, it is necessary

to consider that until the British gained control over much of the Middle East during

World War I, Kuwait was a district of Iraq under Ottoman rule. The British colonial

power unilaterally determined that Kuwait was separate from Iraq, essentially restricting

Iraq’s access to the Persian Gulf as a means to maintain control over the vital oil

6 Manning Marable, “The Quest for Empire and the Struggle for Peace and Justice,” in Greg

Bates, ed., Mobilizing Democracy: Changing the U.S. Role in the Middle East (Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 1991), 83.

55

resources in the region. After the British benevolently granted Kuwait independence in

1961, Iraq has attempted periodically to regain control over its former territory and

acquire vital access to the Persian Gulf through immediate annexation or lease of the two

small islands which are considered part of Kuwait and prevent any independent Iraqi

shipping access to the Gulf.7

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was a direct consequence of the Iran-Iraq war, an

example of Iraqi aggression which failed to provoke the interest let alone the

condemnation of the international community. Furthermore, the United States instigated

the Iraqi aggression against Iran to punish its former client state after revolutionaries

overthrew the U.S.-imposed Shah and held Americans in the embassy hostage in

response to over twenty years of the oppressive dictatorship and to weaken both countries

as a means to prevent either from becoming regional powers. Interestingly, the United

States failed to present any draft resolutions to the Security Council condemning the Iraqi

aggression, demanding Iraq’s immediate withdrawal, and invoking enforcement measures

to coerce Iraqi compliance. Although the U.S. supported both combatants with

intelligence and arms to prolong the war and Israel, perceiving Iraq to be a larger threat,

provided arms to Iran, the United States ultimately tipped the balance in Iraq’s favor to

prevent the spread of Islamic fundamentalism and the anti-American influence of the

Iranian government to the rest of the Middle East.8 After the brutal and destructive war,

7 For background information see Ramsey Clark, The Fire This Time: U.S. War Crimes in the Gulf

(New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 1992), Chapter one; Geoff Simons, Iraq: From Sumer to Post-Saddam

(Houndmills, Great Britain: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), Chapters five-eight; Walid Khalidi, “The Gulf Crisis: Origins and Consequences,” Journal of Palestine Studies Vol. 20, No. 2, Winter 1991, 9-10; and Blum, 320-325.

8 For more in-depth examinations of the war between Iran and Iraq and U.S. involvement, see Clark, Chapter one, Simons, Chapter seven; and Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military

Conflict (New York: Routledge, 1991).

56

Iraqi President Saddam Hussein accused Kuwait of stealing $2.4 billion worth of oil from

the Rumalia oil field underneath the vaguely defined border between the two countries.

Hussein further accused Kuwait of preemptively and unilaterally attempting to demarcate

the border and gain control over a large portion of the underlying oil field by building

military structures on Iraqi territory, while, he asserted, Iraq was protecting the

monarchies of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia by fighting against the spread of Iranian Shiite

extremism. Furthermore, subsequent the conclusion of the war between Iran and Iraq,

Kuwait increased its production of oil beyond the OPEC [Organization of the Petroleum

Exporting Countries] quota, driving prices down when Iraq desperately needed the oil

revenue to recover from the war.9 Thus Hussein thought that while Iraq fought a

destructive war to protect Kuwait and the other Arab nations from the Iranian

fundamentalists, Kuwait was undertaking economic warfare against Iraq.

Evidence intimates that the United States colluded with Kuwait to provoke

Hussein to invade Kuwait, perhaps merely to provide a pretext for American military

intervention. Considering the ulterior motives informing the Bush administration’s

policy and the complete rejection of a feasible peaceful solution to the dispute between

the two countries, it is not farfetched to imagine that the United States capitalized on if

not orchestrated the Iraqi aggression for goals that had nothing to do with the principles

of nonaggression.10 In a February 1990 speech at a League of Arab States summit,

9 For a discussion of Iraqi grievances, see for example, Clark, Chapter one; Simons, Chapter eight;

Khalidi, 10-12; and Blum, 320-325.

10 Clark reveals that the U.S. military created War Plan 1002-90 regarding the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and/or Saudi Arabia to replace the contingencies associated with the (exaggerated) Soviet threat that justified enormous military expenditures and incessant U.S. intervention since World War II. Additionally, Blum relates that intelligence agencies provided information to the White House that Iraq would attack Kuwait at least one week before the actual invasion. Yet the administration did not react until immediately after the invasion. See Clark, Chapter one, and Blum, 320-325.

57

Hussein, referring to the large U.S. military presence in the Middle East, advised that “if

the Gulf people and the rest of the Arabs along with them fail to take heed, the Arab Gulf

region will be ruled by American will.” He continued that the U.S. seeks to control the

oil resources in the Middle East “all on the basis of a special outlook which has to do

solely with U.S. interests and in which no consideration is given to the interests of

others.”11 Perhaps Hussein, as with Noriega only months before, asserted too much

independence from his American handlers and benefactors, causing the U.S. intervention

in a former client state to illustrate that “what we [the United States] say goes.”12

In a letter to the League of Arab States in July 1990, Hussein accused Kuwait of

refusing to negotiate with Iraq and contended that Kuwait should cancel the Iraqi debt

accrued during the war with Iran, reimburse Iraq for the oil taken from the Rumalia oil

field, and accede to the OPEC quotas.13 The Palestinian leader Yassir Arafat later stated

that after Kuwait rebuffed an Iraqi proposal to negotiate a settlement acceptable to both

countries in May 1990, he thought “the U.S. was encouraging Kuwait not to offer any

compromise which meant there could be no negotiated solution to avoid the Gulf

crisis.”14 Jordan’s King Hussein asserted that the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister declared “we

are not going to respond to [Iraq] . . . if they don’t like it, let them occupy our

territory . . . we are going to bring in the Americans.”15 Cataloging the Iraqi grievances

against Kuwait and the failed attempts to reach a diplomatic solution with Kuwait, the

11 Ralph Schoenman, Iraq and Kuwait: A History Suppressed (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Veritas

Press), 11-12, and New York Review of Books, 16 January 1992, 51, as cited in Blum, 323.

12 See various examples below of “what we say goes” terminology.

13 Khalidi, 10-12.

14 Christian Science Monitor, 5 February 1991, 1, as cited in Blum, 323.

58

Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz wrote to the United Nations Secretary-General soon

after the Iraqi invasion that “it was inconceivable” that Kuwait “could risk in engaging in

a conspiracy of such magnitude against a large, strong country such as Iraq, if it were not

being supported and protected by a great power; and that power was the United States of

America.”16 The Kuwait Minister of Oil and Finance admitted American complicity after

the war: “But we knew that the United States would not let us be overrun. I spent too

much time in Washington to make that mistake, and received a constant stream of visitors

here. The American policy was clear. Only Saddam didn’t understand it.”17

However, the United States sent Hussein various misleading signals. State

Department officials, including the ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, iterated that the

United States had no interest in Iraq’s border dispute with Kuwait. Shortly before the

invasion, Glaspie related directly to Hussein that “I have direct instructions from the

president to seek better relations with Iraq.”18 State Department spokesperson Margaret

Tutwiler declared that “we do not have any defense treaties with Kuwait, and there are no

special defense or security commitments to Kuwait.”19 Seemingly, the Bush

15 Michael Emery, “How Mr. Bush Got His War,” in Greg Ruggiero and Stuart Sahulka, eds.,

Open Fire (New York: The New York Press, 1993), 39,40,52, as cited in Ibid. 16 Schoenman, 12-13, from a letter sent by the Iraqi Foreign Minister to the Secretary-General of

the United Nations, 4 September 1990; Emery, 32-33, as cited in Ibid., 324.

17 Milton Viorst, “A Reporter at Large: After the Liberation,” The New Yorker, 30 September 1991, 66, as cited in Ibid., 323.

18 Transcript of a discussion between Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and Ambassador April Glaspie, 25 July 1990, as cited by Sheila Ryan, “Power Projection in the Middle East: Maintaining Control at Any Cost,” in Bates, ed., 41-42.

19 James Ridgeway, ed., The March to War (New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 1991), 30; New York Times, 23 September 1990, cited in Blum, 322.

59

administration failed to inform Hussein of its opposition to an Iraqi attack against

Kuwait, almost implicitly providing if not outright approval then at least tacit

acceptance.20

The historical and immediate causes leading to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait do

not justify the Iraqi aggression. However, the immediate causes of the Iraqi aggression

intimate that the United States encouraged Kuwait to avoid compromise with Iraq on the

border dispute and access to the Persian Gulf and illustrate that Saddam Hussein invaded

only after various attempts to negotiate and compromise with Kuwait failed. Moreover,

the Iraqi aggression did not justify American military intervention, considering that the

U.S. rejected any diplomatic solution and merely manipulated the Iraqi aggression as a

pretext to achieve underlying motives.

The George H. W. Bush administration, merely months after ordering the illegal

aggression against Panama, justified the military deployment to the Middle East and the

massive air war and subsequent ground war against Iraq as a principled response to

unprovoked Iraqi aggression. Immediately after Iraq invaded Kuwait, the White House

condemned the invasion as “blatant use of military aggression” and demanded the

“immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces.”21 Invoking principles the

United States has failed to uphold regarding its own actions and that of its allies President

Bush, in an address to the nation in response to the Iraqi action, asserted that “a puppet

regime imposed from the outside is unacceptable. The acquisition of territory by force is

20 For more evidence supporting the argument that the U.S. gave Hussein permission to invade Kuwait, see Clark, Chapter one and sources cited; Simons, Chapter eight and sources cited; Noam Chomsky, The Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel, and the Palestinians (Boston: South End Press, 1983); and Alexander Cockburn, “Beat the Devil,” The Nation Vol. 251, No. 11, October 1990, 370-371.

21 New York Times, 2 August 1990, 1; Washington Post, 3 August 1990, 1, as cited in Blum, 325; see United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2932nd Meeting, S/PV.2932, 13, in which the U.S. ambassador quotes the White House statement, as discussed below.

60

unacceptable.” Ridiculously comparing Hussein’s Iraq to Hitler’s Germany as a pretext

to avoid any diplomatic solution with Iraq so as not to appease aggressive nations, Bush

prepared the nation for war by declaring that “standing up for our principles is an

American tradition. . . . America has never wavered when its purpose is driven by

principle.” 22 America’s avowed principles served the objectives iterated by the Bush

administration:

The immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait; the restoration of Kuwait’s legitimate government; security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf; and protection of the lives of American citizens abroad.23

Furthermore, without a hint of embarrassment or acknowledgement of U.S. history, Bush

pretended to be concerned about fighting aggression and preserving the sovereignty of

nations and proclaimed that “. . . America stands where it always has--against aggression,

against those who would use force to replace the rule of law.”24

Beside the lofty rhetoric illustrating the ostensible and dubious American

opposition to aggression, the Bush administration provided multiple explanations for

military intervention, which obscured the fundamental reasons for a blatant show of U.S.

military force, in order to garner domestic support for the first U.S. large-scale war since

Vietnam. Acknowledging government propaganda efforts, Congressperson Les Aspin,

admitted “what is stated publicly . . . is often aimed at domestic audiences and does not

22 George H.W. Bush, “The Arabian Peninsula: U.S. Principles,” Current Policy No. 1292

(Washington, D.C.: United States Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public

Communication, 8 August 1990).

23 George H. W. Bush, “Against Aggression in the Persian Gulf” Current Policy No. 1293 (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public

Communication, 15 August 1990); see also, Ibid.

24 George H.W. Bush, “America’s Stand Against Aggression,” Current Policy No. 1294 (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public

Communication, 20 August 1990).

61

reflect actual intentions.”25 The President contended that “our jobs, our way of life, our

own freedom, and the freedom of friendly countries around the world would all suffer if

control of the world’s great oil reserves fell into the hands of Saddam Hussein.”26

Disregarding the absurdity that a war with its attendant death and destruction was

justified to protect American jobs and conspicuous consumption of the world’s resources

and that Iraq posed a threat to the freedom of the American people, it was illogical to

insinuate that Iraq was attempting to do anything but slightly raise the price of oil in

pursuit of its own interests, a fact understood and supported by the Bush administration

as Ambassador Glaspie acknowledged to Hussein when stating that Americans in the oil

industry favored higher prices.27 Hussein would only be hurting the people of Iraq if he

inexplicably refused to export oil, as the U.S. sanctions against Iraq after the war, which

initially prevented Iraq from selling any oil but eventually allowed for limited export of

Iraqi oil for vital food and medicine, proved.

As a clear indication that the Bush administration sought any pretext that the

domestic population would support, President Bush propagandized and exaggerated the

nuclear threat that Iraq posed after an opinion poll indicated that a majority of the

American public would support military action to destroy Hussein’s nuclear capability.

However, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, John

H. Kelly, testified to Congress on 26 April 1990 that “we do not believe Iraq is close to

25 Les Aspin, “The Military Option: The Conduct and Consequences of War in the Persian Gulf,”

in The Aspin Papers: Sanctions, Diplomacy, and War in the Persian Gulf (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1991), 59. Although Aspin was referring to the governments of Arab coalition partners, the statement equally applies to the U.S. government.

26 George H. W. Bush, “Against Aggression in the Persian Gulf”; see also Theodore Draper, “The True History of the Gulf War,” The New York Review of Books, 30 January 1992, 41, as cited in Blum, 329.

27 Ryan, 41.

62

possessing a nuclear weapon, and we recognize that Iraq’s nuclear program is under

safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),” which reported that Iraq

was not producing nuclear weapons. 28 Furthermore, according to the Progressive, a left-

leaning monthly magazine, Iraq would not have a nuclear weapon for at least five or ten

years and would still lack a delivery method. Moreover, the Progressive logically

observed that nuclear weapons act as deterrents to unprovoked aggression; if Iraq used a

nuclear weapon, it would be committing national suicide. Exposing the U.S. double

standard regarding possession of nuclear weapons, the Progressive queried “what if so

mercurial and bellicose a figure as Ariel Sharon were to come to power in Israel, and

assume control of that nation’s arsenal? Would the United States mass 400,000 troops on

Israel’s border?”29 The historical record indicates that while Sharon was prime minister

of Israel from February 2001 until his incapacitating stroke in late 2005, the United States

never threatened or attacked Israel due to its possession of nuclear weapons or its

aggression against the Palestinian people. The U.S. policy of preemptive or preventative

war begs the question of whether the certainty of mass death and destruction in a U.S.

instigated military intervention can be justified to prevent a possible future attack against

the U.S. at some indeterminate time and place. Basic morality dictates that war with its

attendant destruction of life and unknowable consequences is certainly unjustifiable,

especially when the rationale for unprovoked immediate aggression is the prevention of

some future unknowable aggression, a complete transmogrification of the theory of self-

defense.

28 John H. Kelly, “U.S. Relations with Iraq,” Current Policy No. 1273 (Washington, D.C.: United

States Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication, 26 April 1990); for IAEA report see, “Comment: Propaganda War,” The Progressive Vol. 55, No. 1, January 1991, 8-9.

29 Ibid.

63

Although the United States falsely claimed indignation at Iraqi aggression, the

Bush administration’s underlying motives, which essentially assured military force

against Iraq to decimate its military capability and civilian infrastructure instead of any

diplomatic settlement, were to justify the massive U.S. military budget after the demise of

the Soviet Union and the cessation of the Cold War, assert U.S. hegemony, acquire a

more permanent military presence in the Middle East, convince the American public of

the efficacy of direct U.S. military intervention, countering the so-called Vietnam

syndrome, and destroy a perceived threat to Israel. Although on the eve of the bombing

campaign, Bush claimed “the allied countries with forces in the Gulf” have “exhausted all

reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful resolution and have no choice but to drive Saddam

from Kuwait by force,” the administration effectively prevented all attempts at serious

negotiation and intimated that military force was the desired option to meet U.S. goals

not mandated by the Security Council, illustrating that United Nations’ authorization

served as propaganda to convince the domestic population to acquiesce to war and

supported Francis Fukuyama’s contention that the United Nations was “perfectly

serviceable as an instrument of American unilateralism and indeed may be the primary

mechanism through which that unilateralism will be exercised in the future.”30

While the stated policy of the Bush administration centered on the removal of Iraq

from Kuwait, ostensibly through sanctions and possibly a negotiated settlement, the Bush

administration and elite opinion in the U.S. acknowledged the underlying motives and

tacitly admitted that U.S. policy differed from the idealistic rhetoric. The Progressive

reported that in early November 1990 President Bush announced that he planned to

30 Bush quote from Ridgeway, 173; Fukuyama quoted in Mark Curtis, The Ambiguities of Power

(Zed, 1985), 183, cited in Noam Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest for Global Dominance (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2003), 29.

64

violate the United States Constitution and seek without Congressional approval an

“offensive option” against Iraq to prevent a conflict at some future indeterminate time.31

Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney admitted on 25 November that even if Hussein “were

to come into compliance [with United Nations resolutions] and withdraw from Kuwait,

you are still going to have to worry about the problem of his acquisition of sophisticated

weapons” and to deal with these capabilities would require a “far more aggressive set of

sanctions.”32 On 3 December, Cheney testified before the Senate Armed Services

Committee that “. . . it is far better to deal with [Hussein] now while the coalition is intact

. . . than it will be for us to deal with him five or ten years from now when the members

of the coalition have gone their disparate ways and when Saddam has become an even

better armed and more threatening regional superpower than he is at present.” 33 While

the Security Council determined that its policies were only to coerce the withdrawal of

Iraqi troops from Kuwait, the United States decided unilaterally to impose further

conditions requiring large-scale military force, thus violating the United Nations Charter.

Elite opinion in the mainstream media further illustrated an acute understanding

of administration goals that exceeded the United Nations’ mandate, thus implying

recognition and support for extralegal military action. Contradicting avowed U.S.

principles of non-intervention and national sovereignty, the editors of the Wall Street

Journal, reminiscing about U.S. control over Japan after World War II, advised the Bush

administration to “take Baghdad and install a MacArthur regime,” and the National

31 Michael T. Klare, “One, Two, Many Iraqs,” The Progressive Vol. 55, No. 4, April 1991, 20-21;

Ridgeway, 133.

32 Ibid., 21.

33 Ibid.

65

Review called for the “overthrow of Saddam and the permanent reduction of Iraqi

military power.”34 Thomas Friedman, a columnist for the New York Times and former

Middle East correspondent from Israel, wrote on 2 September 1990:

In the last 50 years the U.S., whatever its oratory, has tended to support democracy when it serves the interests of stability and to back away from insisting on it when it could destabilize an area of national interest. At stake in the Gulf is the stability of oil supplies.35

Friedman later opined that Historians may question whether it was ever right for the Bush administration to make the ‘liberation of Kuwait’ a prime war aim instead of focusing exclusively on dismantling Iraq’s offensive capabilities which after all were the real threat to stability in the Gulf and therefore the real threat to U.S. interests.36

After the war, journalist Patrick Tyler acknowledged that U.S. interests trump the

interests of other states, and therefore the United States has the unique right if not the

responsibility to interfere throughout the world to protect its perceived interests at the

expense of other peoples and nations. Tyler wrote:

In the Middle East and Southwest Asia, our overall objective is to remain the predominant outside power in the region and preserve U.S. and Western access to the region’s oil. . . . As demonstrated by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, it remains fundamentally important to prevent a hegemon or alignment of powers from dominating the region.37

34 Wall Street Journal, 29 August 1990, and National Review, 3 September 1990, as quoted in

John B. Judis, “Tactical Debate Brews Behind Unanimity Show,” In These Times, 12-18 September 1990, 3.

35 Thomas Friedman, New York Times, 2 September 1990, as quoted in Joel Bleifuss, “The First Stone,” In These Times, 3-9 October 1990, 4.

36 Alexander Cockburn, “The Press and the ‘Just War,’” The Nation Vol. 252, No. 6, 18 February 1991, 188.

37 Patrick Tyler, “U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop,” New York Times, 8 March 1992, A1, as cited in Clark, 3-4.

66

The air and ground war against Iraq was necessary to assert American power and

justify the continuation of taxpayer-funded welfare to the military-industrial complex.

The demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War eliminated the justifications

and rationales for the enormous military budget that had subsidized the U.S. economy

since World War II. As Theodore Sorenson observed:

The touchstone for our nation’s security concept--the containment of Soviet military and ideological power--is gone. The primary threat cited over forty years in justification for most of our military budget, bases, and overseas assistance is gone.38 While the domestic population pressured politicians to consider transferring a large

portion of the military budget to address pressing domestic concerns, policymakers,

perhaps recognizing an opportunity for more overt military intervention to propagate U.S.

hegemony, began highlighting third-world threats to U.S. interests and security to replace

the Soviet Union and justify massive military expenditures. In April 1990, General Carl

Vuono asserted “because the U.S. is a global power with vital interests that must be

protected throughout an increasingly turbulent world, we must look beyond the European

continent and consider other threats to our national security.”39 General A. M. Gray,

commandant of the Marine Corps, reinforced Vuono’s observations and argued:

The underdeveloped world’s growing dissatisfaction over the gap between rich and poor nations will create a fertile breeding ground for insurgencies. These insurgencies have the potential to jeopardize regional stability and our access to vital economic and military resources. This situation will become more critical as our nation and allies, as well as potential adversaries, become more and more dependent on these strategic resources. If we are to have stability in these regions, maintain access to their resources, protect our citizens abroad, defend our vital installations, and deter conflict, we must maintain within our active force structure a credible military power projection capability with the flexibility to respond to conflict across the spectrum of violence

38 Theodore C. Sorenson, “Rethinking National Security,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 3,

Summer 1990, 1, quoted in Ryan, 43.

39 Klare, 23.

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throughout the globe.40

Unsurprisingly, immediately after Iraq invaded Kuwait, President Bush let slip

that Iraqi aggression “underscores the need to go slowly in restructuring U.S. defense

forces.”41 Illustrating the pervasive and alarming militancy of the United States, the

Washington Post reported on 10 August 1990:

Less than a year after political change in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union sent the defense industry reeling under the threat of dramatic cutbacks, executives and analysts say the crisis in the Persian Gulf has provided military companies with a tiny glimmer of hope. “If Iraq does not withdraw and things get messy, it will be good for the industry. You will hear less rhetoric from Washington about the peace dividend,” said Michael Lauer, an analyst with Kidder, Peabody & Co. in New York.42 While perpetuating the myth that the U.S. military budget served to prepare the United

States to defend against Soviet expansionism instead of recognizing the offensive nature

of the U.S. military to assert American hegemony, the Los Angeles Times reinforced the

Washington Post’s observations that Pentagon contractors were a main beneficiary of

Iraq’s aggression:

The political backdrop of the U.S. military deployment in Saudi Arabia played a significant role in limiting defense cuts in Sunday’s budget agreement, halting the military spending “free fall” that some analysts had predicted two months ago, budget aids said. Capitol Hill strategists said that Operation Desert Shield forged a major change in the political climate of the negotiations, forcing lawmakers who had been advocating deep cuts on the defensive. The defense budget compromise . . . would leave not only funding for Operation Desert Shield intact but would spare much of the funding that has been spent each year to prepare for a major Soviet onslaught on Western Europe.43

40 General A.M. Gray, Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps, “Defense Policy for the 1990s,” Marine

Corps Gazette, Vol. 74, No. 5, May 1990, 19, quoted in Ibid., 47.

41 Summary of Bush’s remarks in the Washington Post, 3 August 1990, as cited in Blum, 325.

42 Washington Post, 10 August 1990, cited in Ibid., 325-326.

43 Los Angeles Times, 2 October 1990, 18, as cited in Ibid., 326.

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However, as James Webb, a former Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Navy

during the Reagan administration, warned:

The President should be aware, that, while most Americans are laboring very hard to support him, a mood of cynicism is just beneath their veneer of respect. Many are claiming that the buildup is little more than a “Pentagon budget drill,” designed to preclude cutbacks of an Army searching for a mission as bases in NATO begin to disappear.44

Concomitant with providing a continuing justification for large military budgets,

the Bush administration perceived a successful war against Iraq as a propaganda tool to

persuade the American public to accept large-scale military intervention. From an elite

standpoint, the war against Iraq served to illustrate to the American public the efficacy

and success of large-scale U.S. military intervention and American benevolence and

support for lofty principles and ideals such as international law and nonaggression. The

campaign against Iraq partially centered on convincing the American public to accept

military force as an extension of benign and benevolent American power and a means to

perpetuate American morals and values. The Bush administration and the political elite

absurdly equated military supremacy with the extension of morality as if military power

causing nothing but death and destruction remotely correlates with freedom, democracy,

international law, and supposedly American and Christian moral precepts valuing life.

The President argued “. . . there is no substitute for American leadership, and American

leadership can not be effective in the absence of American strength.”45 On 1 February

1990, President Bush proclaimed:

When we win, and we will, we will have taught a dangerous dictator, and any tyrant tempted to follow in his footsteps, that the U.S. has a new credibility, and what we say

44 New York Times, 23 September 1990, as cited in Ibid.

45 Bush, “Against Aggression in the Persian Gulf.”

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goes, and there is no place for lawless aggression in the Persian Gulf.46 Asserting that “what we say goes” does not bode well for democracy or international law.

Moreover, rejecting an Iraqi offer to withdraw from Kuwait on 15 February 1991, Bush

confidently asserted that “the American people are strongly in support, not only of the

troops, but [our] objectives . . . it is my hope that we have kicked once and for all the so-

called Vietnam syndrome.”47 After the annihilation of Iraq, Bush proudly exclaimed “by

God, we’ve kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all,” and “what we say goes.”48

Dante Fascell, a Democrat Representative from Florida, exhibiting the bipartisan

enthusiasm for the war, echoed President Bush

There is no Vietnam syndrome. It’s behind us. We know that the American people are willing to go to war and win. And in the rest of the world there is great respect not only for the power of the United States, but for the western values that we have been espousing for so long.49

Bush, disturbingly equating military might with moral standing, stated that “among the

nations of the world only the United States has both the moral standing and the means to

back it up.”50 The Wall Street Journal, palpably ecstatic over the military success against

Iraq, declared that the war helped “America, and above all its elite, recover a sense of

self-confidence and self-worth.”51

46 Robert Parry, “The Peace Feeler That Was,” The Nation Vol. 252, No. 14, 15 April 1991, 482.

47 Ridgeway, 178.

48 Christopher Hitchens, “Minority Report,” The Nation Vol. 252, No. 11, 25 March 1991, 366.

49 “Comment: America Triumphant,” The Progressive Vol. 55, No. 4, April 1991, 8.

50 “Comment: The War Some Wanted,” The Progressive Vol. 55, No. 3, March 1991, 9.

51 Quoted in Nairn, “When Casualties Don’t Count,” The Progressive Vol. 55, No. 5, May 1991,

17.

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The militancy of the United States concomitant with its enormous military power

and the equating of morality and benevolence with military operations is extremely

threatening to international law and a peaceful world as are all ideological tenets

justifying violence against others. The American people need to realize that there is no

reason to be proud about massive military power which causes severe suffering and

destruction throughout the world. An individual who commits violence and murder is

justly removed from society; however a nation which commits violence and murder on an

exponentially larger scale considers itself to be the most virtuous, benevolent, and

democratic nation on the planet.

Another fundamental goal of American policy was to eliminate a perceived threat

to Israel and prevent any linkage between the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and the Israeli

occupation of Arab territory. Nancy Murray and Hady Amr, Director and National

Coordinator respectively of the Middle East Justice Network during the war, write:

In the debates of November and December, U.S. negotiators had four primary goals: to prevent the Security Council from playing a meaningful role in overseeing the Israeli occupation; to avoid any reference in a binding resolution to a future international peace conference, on the grounds that Saddam Huseein might regard this as a “victory”; to evade any specific mention of Jerusalem as part of the occupied territories; and to avoid using its veto.52

As Secretary of State James Baker asserted, “we have taken care of the greatest threat to

Israel’s security.”53 Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir declared that not only would

Israel never give up the occupied territories, but it would not tolerate any resolution that

52 Nancy Murray and Hady Amr, “Reclaiming Democracy: Congress and the Creation of a Just

Middle East Policy,” in Greg Bates, ed., 166.

53 James Baker, on “This Week with David Brinkley,” ABC-TV, 17 March 1991, as cited in Donald Neff, “The U.S., Iraq, Israel, and Iran: Backdrop to War,” Journal of Palestine Studies Vol. 20, No. 4, Summer 1991, 23.

71

would appease Saddam Hussein at its expense, implying that Israeli compliance with

international law and dozens of United Nations resolutions condemning Israeli aggression

and occupation of Arab territory is appeasement of the Iraqi dictator on the scale of

appeasement to Adolf Hitler prior to World War II and not the concerted demand of the

international community.54 Reinforcing the Israeli Prime Minister’s belligerent obstinacy

to world opinion, members of Congress sent a letter to Secretary of State Baker

demanding a veto of any Security Council resolution critical of Israel because such a

resolution would appease Hussein for Iraq’s aggression:

Inevitably, any UN resolution on the Palestine question at this time will implicitly be linked with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. This is clearly one of the aims of Saddam Hussein. To permit the passage of such a resolution now would only reward Saddam Hussein’s aggression.55

Vice President Dan Quayle further elucidated U.S. unconditional support for Israeli

violations of Security Council resolutions and international law by maintaining that

“Palestine is not an issue on the table. There is no linkage.”56 Murray and Amr write that

the Jerusalem Post opined on 17 October 1990 that “a solution which left Iraq intact

would be, for Israel ‘the worst of all possible outcomes.’”57 On 5 December 1990 Israeli

Foreign Minister David Levy proclaimed that Israel may attack Iraq if the U.S. failed to

force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait and destroy Iraq’s military capability.58

Furthermore, implying that the protection of Israel on all fronts is somehow a traditional

American interest, even though blatant unconditional support for Israeli policies have

54 Murray, 173-174.

55 Ibid., 173.

56 Ridgeway, 149.

57 Murray, 173-174.

58 Ridgeway, 149.

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seriously undermined traditional U.S. interests in the Middle East region and security at

home, the Assistant Secretary of State Kelly, testified to Congress:

If Iraq should seek to play to a spoiler’s role in the Middle East peace process, threaten the security of Israel and other countries in the area, and continue to violate human rights on a widespread scale, the United States and Iraq would become increasingly at odds. We would take appropriate action on behalf of American interests.59

The underlying motives of the Bush administration essentially made war

inevitable and assured complete rejection of a viable peaceable solution to the crisis.

Even though the United States pressed the United Nations to impose economic sanctions

on Iraq and maintained the brutal sanctions for over a decade beyond the Iraqi withdrawal

from Kuwait in clear violation of those Security Council resolutions, historically the U.S.

has opposed sanctions as an ineffective measure to coerce apartheid South Africa and

Israel to comply with international law and United Nations resolutions. While William J.

Crowe, a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, commented that “if the sanctions

will work in twelve to eighteen months instead of six months, the trade-off of avoiding

war with its attendant sacrifices and uncertainties would be worth it,” President Bush

argued that “I don’t think there’s time politically for that strategy.”60

A Congressional report determined that the Iraqis invaded Kuwait to attract the

attention of the international community, negotiate improvements to their economic

situation, and withdraw. The committee concluded that “a diplomatic solution

satisfactory to the interests of the U.S. may well have been possible since the earliest

59 Kelly.

60 Crowe quoted in “Comment: Propaganda War,” The Progressive Vol. 55, No. 1, January 1991,

8-9; Bush quoted in Jon Wiener, “Why We Fought,” The Nation Vol. 252, No. 22, 10 June 1991, 782.

73

days of the invasion.”61 Despite its rhetoric, the Bush administration failed to seriously

consider any peace initiative, especially proposals that recognized the interconnectedness

of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and the Israeli occupation of Lebanon, the Syrian

Golan, and Palestinian territory. Although not an exhaustive account, the following

examples of viable proposals illustrate that the United States rejected a diplomatic

settlement.

Three months before the invasion of Kuwait, the Iraqi government offered to

destroy all non-conventional weapons if Israel would reciprocate. A week after the

attack, on 9 August 1990, Iraq proposed to the United States a peace plan offering

withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait in exchange for access to the Gulf, control of the

Rumalia oil field, and negotiations with the U.S. on oil prices. The Bush administration

responded negatively, contending that nothing in the proposal merited its pursuit. Three

days later Iraq offered to withdraw from Kuwait if Israel withdrew from the Palestinian

and Syrian occupied territories and both Israel and Syria withdrew from Lebanon. On 23

August Iraq decreased its demands and proposed withdrawal from Kuwait for access to

the Gulf and control of the Rumalia oil field. The Iraqi ambassador to Brussels proposed

that Iraq would pull out of Kuwait immediately if the U.S. publicly supported the

implementation of all United Nations resolutions on the Middle East. Furthermore, Iraq

would dismantle all unconventional weapons if the rest of the Middle East did too. Tariq

Aziz, Iraq’s Foreign Minister, highlighted the U.S. double standard and argued logically

that if United Nations resolutions against Iraq were being enforced, then the resolutions

61 Parry, 481.

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against Israel should be enforced; if weapons of mass destruction were to be denied to

Iraq, then they should be denied to all others in the region as well.62

Members of the international community sought to foster a diplomatic solution

and avoid an American war. After Iraq released all foreign hostages by the end of

December 1990, Japan, concerned that President Bush was closed to compromise and

oblivious to how the destruction of Iraq would affect Arab opinion of the west, suggested

concessions to Iraq on Gulf access, territory, and oil prices. The French called for an

international conference on the Middle East, and the Baltic States appealed to the United

Nations to extend the January deadline for Iraqi withdrawal and forestall certain war.63

The Soviet Union had earlier proposed a three-stage plan under the aegis of the

United Nations to settle the Iraqi-Kuwait conflict and the Israeli-Palestinian issue and

eliminate all chemical and nuclear weapons in the region, and on 21 February, a joint

Soviet and Iraqi proposal designed to avert a U.S. ground offensive offered “full and

unconditional withdraw” within three weeks. Bush rejected the proposal and threatened

and initiated a ground war after the six weeks of debilitating and virtually unopposed

aerial bombardment on the Iraqi people because Hussein failed to withdraw within two

days time.64

The Bush administration and the mainstream media exhibited an inexplicable

unwillingness to settle the conflict peacefully and a palpable enthusiasm for

62 See for example, “A New World Order Whose Time Has Passed,” In These Times, 16-22

January 1991, 14; Parry; Chomsky, “America’s Isolation in the Gulf,” in Ridgeway, 104. 63 See for example, “A Plan for Peace as the Danger of War Recedes,” In These Times, 19-25

December 1990, 14; Hitchens, “Minority Report,” The Nation Vol. 252, No. 5, 11 February 1991, 150; Cockburn, “Beat the Devil,” The Nation Vol. 252, No. 4, 4 February 1991, 114.

64 See for example, The Nation Vol. 251, No. 18, 26 November 1990, 633; “A Plan for Peace as the Danger of War Recedes,” In These Times, 19-25 December 1990, 14.

75

warmongering. On the eve of the war, the Washington Post wrote that the Bush

administration feared Iraqi withdrawal as “a nightmare scenario” because “the beginning

of an Iraqi withdrawal could make it impossible for Bush to launch military action.”65

The journalists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak reported in the final days of the war

that the White House had lived in “fear of a peace deal” and praised Bush for exhibiting

“eagerness to avoid peace and confront war.”66 Barely a week into the unprecedented air

war against Iraq, the New York Times quoted an administration official who stated “all

along we worried about the implications of a diplomatic success” and reported that the

administration could not express the goal of eliminating Iraq as a military power since

war was the only method to accomplish it.67 Ted Koppel, a member of the adversarial

press and host of the television news program Nightline, commenting on a Soviet peace

initiative, stated that “it would probably be too harsh to call it a peace scare . . . but there

is a sense of apprehension in Washington that the Soviet peace initiative may provide

Saddam Hussein with too much of an opportunity to save face, and, more to the point, to

retain power.”68 Joshua Epstein, a defense analyst with the Brookings Institute,

expressing contempt for real democracy, admitted “when you come right down to it, it is

now evident that all along the Bush administration and its military allies wanted to

destroy Hussein and annihilate his military power so it can never be a threat. So we were

65 Quoted in Nairn, “When Casualties Don’t Count,” 16.

66 Ibid.

67 Andrew Rosenthal, “U.S. Aims Include Elimination of Baghdad as Regional Power,” New York

Times, 22 January 1991, as cited in Joel Bleifuss, “The First Stone,” In These Times, 30 January–5 February 1991, 4.

68 Quoted in Joel Bleifuss, “The First Stone,” In These Times, 27 February–19 March 1991, 5.

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not prepared to negotiate and we set a deadline to avoid the political pressure of a

debate.”69 Fortune magazine approvingly reported that

The President and his men worked overtime to quash freelance peacemakers in the Arab world, France, and the Soviet Union who threatened to give Saddam a face- saving way out of the box Bush was building. Over and over, Bush repeated the mantra: no negotiations, no deals, no face-saving, no rewards, and specifically no linkage to a Palestinian peace conference [a point raised by Iraq on several occasions].70 Although Secretary of State Baker traveled to Geneva, Switzerland to supposedly

negotiate with Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz on the eve of the United Nations’ deadline for

Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, President Bush instructed Baker that there were to be

absolutely “no negotiations, no compromises, no attempts at face-saving, no rewards for

aggression,” thus rendering the administration’s claims that the U.S. sought a diplomatic

settlement as completely false.71

Not only was the U.S. rejection of a diplomatic solution counter to the letter and

spirit of the United Nations Charter, but the war against Iraq constitutes aggression and

terrorism. Terrorism is “the calculated use of violence or threat of violence to attain

goals that are political, religious, or ideological in nature . . . through intimidation,

coercion, or instilling fear.”72 The U.S. war against the people of Iraq was nothing less

than state terrorism considering that the Bush administration rejected all proposals for a

diplomatic settlement, violated the United Nations Charter, exceeded the mandate of the

Security Council resolutions demanding only the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, and

69 Quoted in Sheryl McCarthy, “Truth of the Gulf War on the Streets,” in Ridgeway, 222.

70 Fortune, 11 February 1991, 46, as cited in Blum, 328-329.

71 Ridgeway, 172.

72 Chomsky, “International Terrorism: Image and Reality” in Alexander George, ed., Western

State Terrorism cited in Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival, 188.

77

dismissed all international law and norms protecting civilians and civilian infrastructure

during time of war.

The White House and the mainstream media incessantly repeated the propaganda

that Hussein was responsible for Iraqi casualties resulting from the U.S. aerial

bombardment and subsequent ground war. The Washington Post opined that “the

contrast between the determined American effort to avoid civilian casualties and the

determined Iraqi effort to inflict them is becoming the moral fingerprint of the war.”73

White House spokesperson Marlin Fitzwater argued that “Iraqi deaths are attributable to

the invasion [of Kuwait]. . . . You will not find Americans feeling guilty for Saddam

Hussein’s invasion and the destruction of his own people.”74 NBC news anchor Tom

Brokaw announced that “we must point out again and again that it’s Saddam Hussein

who put these innocents in harm’s way.”75 By using the subjective “we” in place of

reporting that the U.S. government claimed that Hussein was responsible for Iraqi

casualties, Brokaw was tacitly implying his allegiance to the government and

internalization of U.S. policies and propaganda, speaking volumes about the

independence and role of the press in the American-style democracy.76

73 Washington Post, 21 January 1991, as cited in Joel Bleifuss, “The First Stone,” In These Times,

30 January–5 February 1991, 4.

74 Nairn, “When Casualties Don’t Count,” 17.

75 Ibid.

76 Racism, prevalent in American society throughout U.S. history, must factor into the determination of U.S. military targets. The facisle demonization of Saddam Hussein and the complete disregard for the lives of Iraqi civilians expressed throughout the media supports the contention that racism influenced policy. I doubt the U.S. would be so quick to threaten the use of force if the aggressor were a European country or Israel. For example, Margaret Spillane describes that on the eve of the air war against Iraq, the host of the Tonight Show, Jay Leno, joked: “What do Hiroshima, Nagsaki, and Baghdad have in common? Nothing . . . yet.” A Today Show regular and a supposed journalist, Deborah Norville, queried, “I wonder what language they speak in Kuwait?” Jennie Anderson, in an article entitled “Blame the Arabs: Tensions in the Gulf Brings Bigotry at Home,” catalogues numerous examples of vicious and violent

78

Contrary to the propaganda, according to all norms of international law and even

U.S. law the United States government was responsible for the immense death and

destruction in Iraq. Although the Bush administration explained civilian casualties as

unintentional collateral damage, morally and legally the government was ultimately

responsible because the death and destruction were predictable consequences of the

bombing campaign, a bombing campaign in which the United States and its coalition

partners dropped 177 million pounds of bombs, utilized depleted uranium weapons

contrary to international norms against the use of chemical and biological weapons, and

destroyed two operational civilian nuclear reactors contrary to a United Nations

resolution prohibiting such an action. If an individual targets another and in the process

kills or maims innocent bystanders, legally that individual is responsible for all the

violence perpetrated. The United States seemingly was attempting to once again blame

the victims for the crimes resulting from U.S. aggression as it had blamed the Grenadian,

racism against Middle Easterners in the United States. For example, a road crew in Maryland attacked and beat an Iranian-American family. One of the attackers said, “I want to kill these foreigners to teach them a lesson about complaining in our country.” A neighbor of a Palestinian family in Maryland threatened that “if my oldest son sees your children, he is going to run them over.” On Howard Stern’s syndicated radio show, anti-Arab remarks, such as “Arabs are dogs, so treat them as such. Take a newspaper and hit them on the head when they misbehave,” were common. A popular t-shirt pictures a U.S. marine pointing a rifle at a supine Arab, with the caption “HOW MUCH IS OIL NOW?” Interestingly, psychologist Dr. Jerrold Post, profiling Saddam Hussein for Congress, argued: “. . . In pursuing his goals, Saddam uses aggression instrumentally. He uses whatever force is necessary, and will, if he deems it expedient, go to extremes of violence, including the use of weapons of mass destruction. . . . He is ready for retaliation and, not without reason, sees himself as surrounded by enemies. But he ignores his role in creating those enemies and righteously threatens his targets. . . .” Moreover, “Saddam’s world view is narrow and distorted, and he has scant experience out of the Arab world.” Finally, “honor and reputation must be interpreted in an Arab context. . . . His past history reveals a remarkable capacity to find face-saving justification when reversing his course in very difficult circumstances.” The psychological profile, of course, applies to many U.S. politicians and presidents, including George H. W. Bush and his son, George W. Bush. As with the demonization and belittlement of Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez and Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the U.S. politicians and press criticize foreign leaders for characteristics that the U.S. politicians exhibit themselves. A history of warfare illustrates that the dehumanization of the enemy allows for horrendous crimes against humanity. See Margaret Spillane, “M*U*S*H,” The Nation Vol. 252, No. 7, 25 February 1991, 237-239; Jennie Anderson, “Blame the Arabs: Tensions in the Gulf Brings Bigotry at Home,” The Progressive,

February 1991, 28-29; and Aspin, “The Role of Sanctions in Securing U.S. Interests in the Persian Gulf,” in The Aspin Papers, 20-23.

79

Panamanian, Libyan, and Nicaraguan governments for American violence during the

1980s. Understood is the underlying assumption that only unworthy victims of U.S.

violence are responsible for the crimes committed against them. Although no one would

argue that the United States government was ultimately responsible for the terrorist attack

on September 11, 2001, perhaps Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein are responsible

for the thousands of casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq since the U.S. acted in self-

defense against the perpetrators of that attack. Moreover, U.S. allies and clients have the

exclusive right to blame the victims. Israeli “reprisals” against Palestinian civilians are

always undertaken in self-defense, and civilian casualties, although regrettable, are

ultimately the responsibility of the Palestinian leadership for “terrorism” against Israel.

The Israeli government is never responsible for Israeli worthy victims, even if its

policies, such as the illegal settlement building in the occupied territories provoke

Palestinian self-defense of their homeland.

Furthermore, the United States overtly admitted that the military targeted

civilians, thus undermining the pretenses at moral superiority. “After the war, the

Pentagon admitted that non-military facilities had been extensively targeted for political

reasons.”77 Government studies after World War II concluded: “the dread of disease and

the hardship imposed by the lack of sanitary facilities were bound to have a demoralizing

effect upon the civilian populations.” Moreover, investigative journalist William Blum

summarizes “There was a ‘reliable and striking’ correlation between the disruption of

public utilities and the willingness of the German population to accept unconditional

77 Washington Post, 23 June 1991, as cited in Blum, 335.

80

surrender.”78 Illustrating that the U.S. undertook war to achieve political objectives, an

air force planner admitted:

Big picture, we wanted to let people know “get rid of this guy and we’ll be more than happy to assist in rebuilding. We’re not going to tolerate Saddam Hussein or his regime. Fix that, and we’ll fix your electricity.”79 Reinforcing the evidence that U.S. military force was state terrorism, Colonel John A.

Warden III observed that as a result of the bombing and the destruction of Iraqi

infrastructure and civilization

If there are political objectives that the UN coalition has, it can say, “Saddam when you agree to do these things, we will allow people to come in and fix your electricity.” It gives us long term leverage.80

One Pentagon planner explained the correlation between the bombing and the sanctions: People say, “You didn’t recognize that [the bombing] was going to have an effect on water and sewage.” Well, what were we trying to do with sanctions--help out the Iraqi people? No. What we were doing with the attacks on the infrastructure was to accelerate the effect of sanctions.81

The Los Angeles Times reported that “officials said Bush assumes that the American

public will be mainly concerned about the number of U.S. casualties, not the tens of

thousands of Iraqis who stand to die or be maimed in a massive air assault, and that even

the killing of thousands of civilians, including women and children, probably won’t

undermine American support for the war effort.”82

78 Middle East Watch/Human Rights Watch, Needless Deaths in the Gulf War: Civilian Casualties

During the Air Campaign and Violations of the Laws of War, November 1991, 177-180, as cited in Ibid.

79 Washington Post, 23 June 1991, as cited in Ibid., 335-336.

80 “Comment,” The Progressive Vol. 55, No. 8, August 1991, 10.

81 Barton Gellman, “Allied War Struck Broadly in Iraq,” Washington Post, as cited in Clark, 62.

82 Nairn, “When Casualties Don’t Count,” 16.

81

After the bombing of a Baghdad bomb shelter, in which the U.S. incinerated as

many as 1500 civilians, overwhelmingly women and children and despite the evidence

that the military maintained constant and unimpeded aerial surveillance over the area,

White House spokesperson Marlin Fitzwater piously claimed that the shelter was “a

military target . . . We don’t know why civilians were at this location, but we do know

that Saddam Hussein does not share our value in the sanctity of life,” and President Bush

asininely declared that “I am concerned about the suffering of innocents.”83

A reporter writing for the Columbian Journalism Review described the unedited

Baghdad television footage of the aftermath at the shelter:

They showed scenes of incredible carnage. Nearly all the bodies were charred into blackness; in some cases the heat had been so great that entire limbs were burned off. Among the corpses were those of at least six babies and ten children, most of them so severely burned that their gender could not be determined. Rescue workers collapsed in grief, dropping corpses; some rescuers vomited from the stench of the still- smoldering bodies.84

Subsequent Iraqi acceptance of Security Council resolution 660 and the initial

withdrawal of its troops from Kuwait, Randall Richard of the Providence Journal

reported on 26 February 1991 from the U.S.S. Ranger that “air strikes against Iraqi troops

retreating from Kuwait were being launched so feverishly from this carrier today that

pilots said they took whatever bombs happened to be closest to the flight deck.”85 An

American pilot, referring to the bombing of retreating troops, enthusiastically proclaimed

“this was the road to Daytona Beach at Spring Break; just bumper to bumper. Spring

83 Needless Deaths . . . , 128-147; Los Angeles Times, 18 February 1991, as cited in Blum, 335;

for description of the bombing, casualty figures, and evidence that the U.S. military knew that the shelter was for civilians, see Clark, 70-72 and sources cited; and Alexander Cockburn, “Beat the Devil,” The

Nation Vol. 252, No. 8, 4 March 1991, 258.

84 Laurie Garrett, “The Dead,” Columbia Journalism Review, May/June 1991, as cited in Clark, 70.

85 Hitchens, “Minority Report,” The Nation Vol. 252, No. 11, 25 March 1991, 366.

82

Break’s over.”86 The bombing of retreating troops reflects another clear American

violation of the Security Council resolutions and a perpetuation of an act of aggression

which the international community failed to punish by imposing sanctions or invading

according to the new world order.

Commenting on Bush’s public approval rating and the media’s complicity in

supporting the war and preventing serious discussion of the destruction of Iraq, one

journalist wrote:

One minute of nightly truth on the “popular” war would have changed American public opinion. . . . If for just 60 seconds the 6 o’clock Monday news had shown 5,000 Iraqi soldiers with hideous phosphorous burns that alter human anatomy followed by 60 seconds Tuesday night of the slaughter at the Baghdad bomb shelter. . . . What if on Wednesday Americans had seen 10,000 Iraqi soldiers incinerated by American high- tech weapons.87 A United Nations inspection team concluded that the U.S. bombing transformed Iraq into

a “pre-industrial age nation.”88 Moreover, “the recent conflict has wrought near-

apocalyptical results on the infrastructure of what had been, until January 1991, a rather

highly urbanized and mechanized society. Now most means of modern life support have

been destroyed or rendered tenuous.”89

The United Nations Security Council, contrary to the spirit of the Charter,

sanctioned the American annihilation of Iraq. Contrary to its habitual vetoing of

enforceable Security Council resolutions, the United States immediately orchestrated

86 Ibid. For gruesome descriptions of the wholesale slaughter of the Iraqi army, see Clark, Chapter

two.

87 Dennis Bernstein, quoted in the Newsletter of the National Association of Arab Americans

(Greater Los Angeles Chapter), July 1991, as cited in Blum, 337.

88 “The Gulf War and Its Aftermath,” The 1992 Information Please Almanac (Boston, 1992), 974, as cited in Ibid., 338.

89 Klare, “High-Death Weapons of the Gulf War,” The Nation Vol. 252, No. 21, 3 June 1991, 738.

83

Security Council measures against Iraq within days of its invasion of Kuwait. Between

August and December 1990, the United Nations Security Council drafted and adopted

twelve resolutions demanding the unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait,

the immediate release of all foreign hostages, and the restoration of Kuwait’s legitimate

government. The U.S. maneuverings manipulating the Security Council to impose

expansive sanctions on Iraq within days of the invasion and by late November authorize

the use of essentially unilateral U.S. military force without accountability to the Security

Council illustrates an unjustifiable double standard whereby the U.S. influence and use of

veto in the Security Council habitually prevented draft resolutions calling for sanctions

on Israel and apartheid South Africa, condemning the military aggressions of the United

States and its allies, and enforcing compliance with United Nations decisions.

Commenting on the U.S. manipulation of the Security Council, British political observer

Edward Pearce wrote that the United Nations “functions like an English medieval

parliament: consulted, shown ceremonial courtesy, but mindful of divine prerogative, it

mutters and gives assent.”90 While Pearce criticized the undemocratic mechanisms of the

United Nations, the Boston Globe approvingly reported that United States control of the

organization meant “the United Nations may finally achieve the lofty status its founders

sought 45 years ago.”91

Violating the principles of the Charter, the United States bribed and threatened

the international community to form the “coalition” against Iraq and support the

American diktat. For example, the U.S. cancelled Egypt’s debt, allowed Saudi Arabia to

90 The Guardian (London), 9 January 1991, as cited in Blum, 327.

91 Boston Globe, 6 August 1990, as cited in Cockburn, “Ashes and Diamonds,” In These Times

Vol. 14, No. 33, 29 August–11 September 1990, 17.

84

curtail the religious and political civil liberties of American soldiers stationed there to

“protect” it from Iraqi invasion, bribed Syria and overlooked its partial occupation of

Lebanon, and abstained from “criticizing the human rights record of any coalition

member.”92 After the Yemeni ambassador cast a negative vote on resolution 678

authorizing the use of force, Secretary of State James Baker, presiding over the Security

Council meeting, reportedly said “I hope he enjoyed that applause, because this will turn

out to be the most expensive vote he ever cast,” foreshadowing a drastic decrease in U.S.

aid to the Gulf nation.93 The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Javier Perez de

Cuellar, although tacitly aiding the American cause in the months leading to war,

admitted that “any intervention . . . would not be in accordance with either the letter or

the spirit of the United Nations Charter.”94 After the annihilation of Iraq, Perez de

Cuellar observed “it was not a United Nations war. General [Norman] Schwarzkopf

[commander of the coalition forces] was not wearing a blue helmet.”95

Within hours of the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, the Security Council adopted

resolution 660 demanding the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops.

The resolution states that

The Security Council, Alarmed by the invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 by the military forces of Iraq, Determining that there exists a breach of international peace and security as regards the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait,

92 Quote is Blum’s summary, 327; for examples of the U.S. bribing and manipulating the members

of the United Nations, see “Choose Peace,” The Nation Vol. 252, No. 22, 24 December 1990, 809; Hitchens, “Minority Report,” The Nation Vol. 252, No. 5, 11 February 1991, 150; and Blum, 327 and sources cited.

93 Elaine Sciolino, The Outlaw State: Saddam Hussein’s Quest for Power and the Gulf Crisis

(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1991), 237-238, as cited in Blum, 327.

94 Quoted in “Overkill,” In These Times Vol. 14, No. 33, 29 August–11 September 1990, 14.

95 Los Angeles Times, 4 May 1991, as cited in Blum, 327.

85

Acting under Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter of the United Nations,96 1. Condemns the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait; 2. Demands that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which they were located on 1 August 1990; 3. Calls upon Iraq and Kuwait to begin immediately intensive negotiations for the

resolution of their differences and supports all efforts in this regard, and especially those of the League of Arab States; 4. Decides to meet again as necessary to consider further steps to ensure compliance with the present resolution.97

The resolution passed unanimously among the fourteen members of the Security Council

participating in the vote.98 The U.S. ambassador quoted a White House press release

which stated “the United States strongly condemns the Iraqi military invasion of Kuwait

and calls for the immediate unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces. . . . We deplore

96 The following articles are found under Chapter VII of the Charter, which addresses “action with

respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.” Article 39: The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what means shall be taken in accordance with articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security. Article 40: In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures. Article 41: The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations. Article 42: Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

97 The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1990-1996 (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), 167.

98 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2932nd Meeting, S/PV.2932, 27. The Yemeni delegation did not participate in the vote due to a lack of instructions from its government.

86

this blatant use of military aggression and violation of the United Nations Charter.”99

The ambassador contended that

It is our understanding that the present aggression was completely unprovoked. United States policy has been to support every diplomatic effort to resolve the present crisis. Thus we did not arrive lightly at our position of calling for a Security Council meeting or seeking an immediate resolution which would condemn the Iraqi invasion, call for the immediate unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops, and support a process of negotiated solution to the differences between Iraq and Kuwait, and particularly the efforts being undertaken by the Arab League in this regard.100 Furthermore, illustrating the United States selective application of avowed principles and

contrasting with the American response to the Israeli invasions of neighboring Arab

states and the occupation of Palestinian territory, repeated South African aggression

against Angola, and U.S. aggression and intervention too numerous to catalogue, the

ambassador argued that

We have been in touch with many States in the region in an effort to seek their additional support for the action of the international community to bring about an end to this heinous act of the use of military force, contrary to the Charter, international law, and all the fully accepted norms of international behavior.101 Further contradicting habitual American rejection of any serious Security Council action

regarding Israeli, apartheid South African, or American violations of international law

and aggression, whereby the U.S. has repeatedly and absurdly claimed that the United

Nations was not the proper organization to deal with the crisis in question, the American

delegation absurdly stated:

99 Ibid., 13.

100 Ibid.

101 Ibid., 14-15.

87

The Security Council has seldom faced a more blatant use of force. The Council should act immediately in dealing with this problem. . . . The Council can certainly do no less in this time of present crisis than to deal effectively and rapidly with this transcendental problem of the aggressive use of force.102

The international community, although conspicuously acceding to the American

policies, recognized the inherent hypocrisy of the American position. As one example of

universality, the Columbian ambassador argued:

Whatever the circumstances, we have always opposed the use of force and, indeed, the very threat of use of force, regardless of excuses or arguments employed to justify the use of force. . . . That is why, for the same reason we condemned the invasion of Panama in December, we are now co-sponsoring the draft resolution before the Council, a text which condemns the intervention in Kuwait.103

In an unprecedented manner, the Security Council adopted the U.S. drafted and

sponsored resolution 661 within one week of the Iraqi invasion, quickly invoking Chapter

VII of the Charter, imposing extensive economic sanctions on the Iraqi people and further

isolating the Iraqi regime. The resolution states:

The Security Council, Reaffirming its resolution 660 of 2 August 1990, Deeply concerned that that resolution has not been implemented and that the invasion by Iraq of Kuwait continues, with further loss of human life and material destruction, Determined to bring the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq to an end and to restore the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait, Noting that the legitimate Government of Kuwait has expressed it readiness to comply with resolution 660, Mindful of its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security, Affirming the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense, in response to the armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter, Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter 1. Determines that Iraq so far has failed to comply with paragraph 2 of resolution 660 and has usurped the authority of the legitimate Government of Kuwait;

102 Ibid.

103 Ibid., 16.

88

2. Decides, as a consequence, to take the following measures to secure compliance of Iraq with paragraph 2 of resolution 660 and to restore the authority of the legitimate Government of Kuwait;

3. Decides that all States shall prevent: (a) the import into their territories of all commodities and products originating in Iraq or Kuwait exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution; (b) any activities by their nationals or in their territories which would promote or are calculated to promote the export or trans-shipment of any commodities or products from Iraq or Kuwait; and any dealings by their nationals or their flag vessels or in their territories in any commodities or products originating in Iraq or Kuwait and exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution, including in particular any transfer of funds to Iraq or Kuwait for the purposes of such activities or dealings; (c) the sale or supply by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels of any commodities or products, including weapons or any other military equipment, whether or not originating in their territories but not including supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs, to any person or body in Iraq or Kuwait or to any person or body for the purposes of any business carried on in or operated from Iraq or Kuwait, and any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote such sale or supply of such commodities or products;

4. Decides that all States shall not make available to the Government of Iraq, or to any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking in Iraq or Kuwait, any funds or any other financial or economic resources and shall prevent their nationals and any persons within their territories from removing from their territories or otherwise making available to that Government or to any such undertaking any such funds or resources and from remitting any other funds to persons or bodies within Iraq or Kuwait, except payments exclusively for strictly medical or humanitarian purposes and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs; 5. Calls upon all States, including States non-members of the United Nations, to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution notwithstanding any contract entered into or license granted before the date of the present resolution;

6. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of the provisional rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council, to undertake the following tasks and to report on its work to the Council with its observations and recommendations: (a) to examine the reports on the progress of the implementation of the present resolution which will be submitted by the Secretary- General; (b) to seek from all States further information regarding the action taken by them concerning the effective implementation of the provisions laid down in the present resolution;

7. Calls upon all States to cooperate fully with the Committee in the fulfillment of its tasks, including supplying such information as may be sought by the Committee in

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pursuance of the present resolution;

8. Requests the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance to the Committee and to make the necessary arrangements in the Secretariat for that purpose;

9. Decides that, notwithstanding paragraphs 4 to 8 above, nothing in the present resolution shall prohibit assistance to the legitimate Government of Kuwait, and calls upon all States: (a) to take appropriate measures to protect assets of the legitimate Government of Kuwait and its agencies; (b) not to recognize any regime set up by the occupying Power;

10. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress made in the implementation of the present resolution, the first report to be submitted within thirty days;

11. Decides to keep this item on its agenda and to continue its efforts to put an early end to the invasion by Iraq.104

While the Yemeni and Cuban delegations abstained from the vote, the other thirteen

members of the Security Council voted to adopt the resolution, imposing unprecedented

sanctions on Iraq.105 The Kuwaiti ambassador observed, in language that applies as well

to the United States and Israel, that

. . . [the members of the Security Council] are recording a historic shift in the work of the Security Council and demonstrating its influence in ensuring that the will of the international community is exerted, through the imposition of sweeping sanctions--an overall embargo against a country that has refused to heed the will of the international community and has, in an unprecedented manner, flouted all principles and values and international norms. . . .106

The United States manipulation of the Council to quickly invoke Chapter VII of

the Charter so as to impose sanctions and authorize the use of force clearly elucidates the

American double standard regarding accountability to international law and the United

104 The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1990-1996, 168-169.

105 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2933rd Meeting,

S/PV.2933, 54, 55.

106 Ibid., 11.

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Nations Charter. After historically protecting Israel and supporting its noncompliance

with United Nations resolutions, the United States hypocritically declared that “the draft

resolution is in response to Iraq’s blatant aggression against Kuwait . . . and Iraq’s

unacceptable failure to comply with resolution 660. . . .”107 After failing for years to

invoke Chapter VII in resolutions against Israel or apartheid South Africa in order to

implement measures to enforce Security Council decisions, the U.S. quickly maintained

that “by this draft resolution, we declare to Iraq that we will use the means available to us

provided in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to give effect to United Nations

Security Council resolution 660, . . .” because “Iraq must learn that its disregard for

international law will have crippling political and economic costs. . . .”108 Arrogantly

implying that the international community must accept United States aggression and

military intervention and thus illustrating the double standard by which the U.S. operates,

the ambassador hypocritically proclaimed “Our concerted resolve will demonstrate that

the international community does not--and will not--accept Baghdad’s preference for the

use of force, coercion and intimidation.”109

Ironically reminiscent of the excuses utilized by the American and European

allies of apartheid South Africa in opposition of sanctions to end apartheid and South

African aggression, the Canadian ambassador argued that while “we recognize . . . that

these sanctions will impose hardships on many countries, on public and private

organizations, and indeed on individuals throughout the world,” the “sacrifices are

necessary to maintain the peace and security of States and the integrity of the

107 Ibid., 16.

108 Ibid., 18.

109 Ibid.

91

international system.”110 The United States determined that sanctions against the racist

regime of South Africa would harm innocents as well as the government, thus advocating

more constructive diplomatic measures, even though the international community

through General Assembly resolutions and representatives of the majority of South

Africans demanded international sanctions. However, the United States imposed

different standards and criteria upon Iraq. Addressing the United Nations Security

Council, Secretary of State James Baker dissembled that “[the sanctions] are not aimed at

the people of Iraq, who are being forced to live with the consequences of a misguided

policy.”111

The ambassador from the United Kingdom made two interesting but false

declarations. First, by stating that “economic sanctions are designed to avoid the

circumstances in which military action might otherwise arise,” the ambassador implied

that sanctions would be given adequate time to be effective and military intervention was

not the desired policy, contradicting the U.S. goal of destroying Iraq’s military

capability.112 Second, the ambassador maintained that “. . . the draft resolution [the

sanctions] will remain in effect only so long as resolution 660 is not complied with.” 113

The United States and the United Kingdom, in clear violation of the resolution, enforced

brutal sanctions against Iraq for over a decade after the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait,

arguing that the sanctions would remain in place to destroy Iraq’s military capability and

110 Ibid., 24-25.

111 James Baker, “U.S. Support for Additional UN Action Against Iraq” Current Policy No. 1302

(Washington, D.C.: United States Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public

Communication, 25 September 1990).

112 Ibid., 27.

113 Ibid.

92

perhaps instigate regime change. Recall that Secretary of State Madeline Albright

determined that the hundreds of thousands of Iraqi deaths directly caused by the sanctions

were worth it to weaken Saddam Hussein.114 Clearly, while a coalition of nations

invaded Iraq ostensibly because it failed to comply with Security Council resolutions, the

United States violated those same decisions.

While the international community supported condemnation of Iraqi aggression

and resolutions demanding Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait, the world’s nations did not

unanimously support American military intervention in Iraq. The Malaysian ambassador

explained that

Malaysia’s support for the draft resolution is predicated on the premise that it will remove the prospect of any unilateral military or quasi-military action in the region by outside Powers. There should not be any justification to utilize the provisions of the draft resolution to take military action.115

The Cuban delegation, perhaps the most vocally critical of the American

manipulation of the United Nations, first declared unequivocal condemnation of the Iraqi

aggression:

To Cuba, the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of States, no matter what reason, of the non-use of force in international relations, of the peaceful settlement of disputes between States and of respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations are essential principles of our international order. It is in defense of these principles that we have expressed our disapproval and condemnation of the entry of Iraqi forces into the territory of Kuwait a few days ago and that we have declared that the state of affairs must be ended with the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait territory and the full restoration of Kuwait’s sovereignty.116

114 John Ryan, “Madeline Albright and U.S. Foreign Policy,” Counterpunch,

<www.counterpunch.org/ryan12102005.html>;

115 S/PV.2933, 22.

116 Ibid., 37-38.

93

However, the Cuban ambassador boldly illustrated the United States hypocrisy regarding

the principles expressed above, and thus his speech to the Security Council is quoted

liberally:

We cannot help recalling that for 23 years all the States of the region . . . all the non- aligned States and the General Assembly, almost unanimously, have condemned Israel’s occupation of the territories which we have come to describe, by diplomatic tradition, as the occupied territories. . . . There seems to be no need to impose sanctions against the occupier when it is Israel. Was any account taken of the opinions of the non-aligned countries and the countries of the Middle Eastern region, with proposals for more effective actions to compel Israel to withdraw its troops from the occupied territories and recognize the rights of that other Arab people, the people of Palestine? But all of us know that some six months ago this same Security Council considered in informal consultations a draft resolution on the latest developments with respect to the occupied territories. What did the Council do? Was it able to act? Why was it not able to act? Is there anybody who does not know the reason? We all know that it was the opposition of the delegation of the United States of America even to a declaration that the occupation was illegal, let alone to sanctions or to more effective means against the occupying State. The territory of Angola--part of it--was occupied for some 15 years by the South African regime’s troops. My delegation does not recall any occasion when anybody discovered the principle of non-interference and respect for territorial integrity, let alone urged the imposition of effective sanctions upon South Africa to compel it to abandon Angolan territory.117 Commenting upon the U.S.’s pious indignation that Iraq (ineptly) installed a puppet

regime in Kuwait and referring to the U.S. invasion of Panama in December 1989, the

Cuban ambassador observed

There was one innovation in that case which was perhaps without precedent: it installed a new Government, perhaps the first in the world in which the President, the Head of Government, took the oath of office at a United States military base, naturally in the presence of the commanding general of the occupying forces.118 The imposition of sanctions against Iraq, brutally maintained long after the Iraqi retreat

from Kuwait, was nothing less than state terrorism, in violation of all international law

and moral norms, designed to commit genocide against the Iraqi people through

117 Ibid., 42.

118 Ibid., 43; see note 2 above and Chapter three.

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starvation and disease in order to achieve political gains. Although Iraqi aggression

against Kuwait was brutal and unjustifiable, it was a minor affair compared to the

resultant American bombing and intended destruction of the Iraqi nation and the Iraqi

people. Geoff Simons, author of Iraq: From Sumer to Post-Saddam, wrote in 1995 that

The entire Iraqi people, supposedly allowed access to foodstuffs and medical supplies under the terms of the UN resolutions, are suffering appalling privations: diseases, many previously eradicated, are spreading through the population, and hundreds of thousands of men, women, children and babies are dying of preventable illnesses or starving to death. . . . Iraqi claims that a million people have so far been killed by the U.S.-protected embargo are largely supported by the independent aid agencies.119 “And in the rest of the world there is great respect not only for the power of the United

States, but for the western values that we have been espousing for so long.”120

While directing the proceedings of the Security Council, the United States drafted

and sponsored Resolution 678 which was essentially an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein as

it authorized the forced withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait by “all necessary means.”

By declaring its willingness to use force and reject any form of peaceful settlement, the

Security Council placed the onus and responsibility of the predictable war on Saddam

Hussein and Iraq. The resolution states

The Security Council, Recalling and reaffirming its resolutions 660 of 2 August 1990, 661 of 6 August 1990, 662 of 9 August 1990, 664 of 18 August 1990, 665 of 25 August 1990, 666 of 13 September 1990, 667 of 16 September 1990, 669 of 24 September 1990, 670 of 25 September 1990, 674 of 29 October 1990 and 677 of 28 November 1990, Noting that, despite all efforts by the United Nations, Iraq refuses to comply with its obligations to implement resolution 660 and the above-mentioned subsequent relevant resolutions, in flagrant contempt of the Security Council, Mindful of its duties and responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance and preservation of international peace and security,

119 Geoff Simons, Iraq: From Sumer to Post-Saddam, (3rd edition, Houndmills, Great Britain:

Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), ix.

120 See quote by Dante Fascell above and sources cited in note 49.

95

Determined to secure full compliance with its decisions, Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, 1. Demands that Iraq comply fully with resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions, and decides, while maintaining all its decisions, to allow Iraq one final opportunity, as a pause of goodwill, to do so;

2. Authorizes Member States cooperating with the Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements, as set forth in paragraph 1 above, the above-mentioned resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area;

3. Requests all States to provide appropriate support for the actions undertaken in pursuance of paragraph 2 above;

4. Requests the States concerned to keep the Security Council regularly informed on the progress of actions undertaken pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 above; 5. Decides to remain seized of the matter.121

While Cuba and Yemen cast negative votes and China abstained, the twelve

remaining members of the Security Council voted for military force after a brief period

allowing Hussein to withdraw unconditionally.122 Due to the undemocratic nature of the

Council whereby the five permanent members have the right to veto unacceptable

resolutions, the Cuban and Yemeni negative votes did not prevent the adoption of the

draft as the negative vote by the United States has rendered various draft resolutions moot

and meaningless despite the twelve, thirteen, or fourteen affirmative votes of the other

members of the Council.

The Yemeni ambassador, boldly voting against the resolution, observed that

“there is in the Middle East region another crisis that is not being dealt with by the same

121 The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1990-1996, 178.

122 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2963rd Meeting,

S/PV.2963, 64-65.

96

standard as the Security Council has been applying to the crisis in the Gulf.”123

Furthermore, the Yemeni delegation drew attention to another example of American

hypocrisy, the incessant U.S. claim that only peaceful negotiation can settle the conflict

between the Arabs and Israelis as compared to the belligerency against Iraq. The

ambassador noted “it is ironic that those States which have for years been lecturing us in

the Arab world about the virtues of dialogue and diplomatic negotiation are now the ones

who are saying no to the peace initiatives and peace plans.”124

In the words of the Cuban delegation:

We have also expressed our concern here over the enormous and increasing concentration of military forces from the United States of America and its allies in the Gulf, and over the danger of the outbreak of a war which . . . would bring enormous destruction. . . .125 Iterating the blatant American double standard which it highlighted in the discussion on

the resolution regarding sanctions, the Cuban delegation stated

We have on previous occasions pointed out here the contrast between the attitude of the Council towards the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and, to mention just two examples, towards the United States invasion of Panama not long ago and the situation in Palestine and the Arab territories, under occupation for 23 years now.126

Illustrating not only the hypocrisy of the United States policy, but also the

American determination to prevent any Security Council action regarding the Israeli

occupation of Arab territories, the Cuban ambassador declared

Leaving aside moral, legal and historical considerations, Cuba has not attempted--it does not consider it realistic in the present situation--to establish any linkage between an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and the Arab territories occupied by Israel.

123 Ibid., 32.

124 Ibid., 37.

125 Ibid., 54-55.

126 Ibid., 56.

97

However, is it not scandalously incongruous to invoke norms for some that we ignore for others? Is this not the very same Council that has been holding consultations these past few days on another draft resolution, which said the minimum, was moderate and exclusively humanitarian, on the subject of Palestine? . . . Yet the President of the Council127 ignored the request to convene this body, bypassing the established rules and procedures. Can it be that the long-suffering Palestinian people is even now, in the new, post-Cold War era, not considered worthy of the treatment meted out to other people? Can it be that, like the Lebanese, they can have used against them all the terror and brutality of the sophisticated military might of a strategic ally of the United States, without shocking those who say they are shocked by other actions that equally violate international laws and norms?128 Predicting the intended consequences of the draft resolution and explaining its negative

vote, the Cuban delegation proclaimed that

Cuba believes that it would not be advisable to adopt a resolution which is a virtual declaration of war, a fixed-term ultimatum before hostilities are launched, and is equivalent to giving the United States and its allies carte blanche to use their enormous sophisticated military capability.129

Explaining that the United Nations Charter allows for the use of military force

only in self-defense against an imminent attack before the Security Council can decide a

course of action or under Security Council supervision as a result of Security Council

authorization, the Cubans observed that “the text before us moreover violates the Charter

of the United Nations by authorizing some States to use military force in total disregard

of the procedures established by the Charter.”130 Recall that Secretary-General Perez de

127 The presidency of the Security Council revolves among the members of the Council on a

monthly basis. During the month of November, the United States delegation presided over the proceedings of the Council.

128 Ibid., 56-57.

129 Ibid., 58.

130 Ibid.

98

Cuellar admitted “it was not a United Nations war. General [Norman] Schwarzkopf

[commander of the coalition forces] was not wearing a blue helmet.”131

The United States Secretary of State James Baker declared that

We can use the end of the Cold War to get beyond the whole pattern of settling conflicts by force, or we can slip back into even more savage regional conflicts in which might alone makes right. We can take the high road towards peace and the rule of law, or we can take Saddam Hussein’s path of brutal aggression and the law of the jungle.132 U.S. history indicates that the American government, contrary to rhetoric and avowed

principles, has habitually chosen the “path of brutal aggression and the law of the jungle.”

The war against Iraq serves adequately to illustrate the United States opposition to

aggression and intervention and the extent that the political and business elite value

economic interests over life, freedom, democracy, human rights, and international law.

The United States clearly overstepped the United Nations mandate to remove Iraqi troops

from Kuwait by destroying Iraq’s military capability and civilian infrastructure, imposing

brutal sanctions on the Iraqi people long after the war, and maintaining control over Iraqi

airspace and violating its sovereignty, illustrating that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait served

as a pretext for the U.S. to justify the massive military budget after the cessation of the

Cold War, secure U.S. hegemony, acquire a more permanent military presence in the

Middle East, destroy a perceived threat to Israel, convince the American public of the

efficacy of direct U.S. military intervention, countering the so-called Vietnam syndrome,

and distract the domestic population from more pressing domestic concerns and, in the

process, silence dissent. The blatant aggression against essentially defenseless Grenada,

Libya, Panama, and Nicaragua during the 1980s, undertaken on the dubious pretext of

131 See above and sources cited in note 95.

132 S/PV.2963, 104-105.

99

self-defense, underscores that the United States has habitually used violence and

aggression to serve political and economic interests, thus exposing itself as a rogue nation

rejecting international law and natural justice and morality in favor of remaining the

world’s only superpower.

Chapter Three:

The Law of the Jungle

The United States aggression against the essentially defenseless nations of

Grenada, Libya, Panama, and Nicaragua during the 1980s further illustrates that the U.S.

government does not principally oppose aggression or egregious violations of

international law. Moreover, the aggression demonstrates the U.S. government’s

contempt for democracy, human rights, and justice. The international community

condemned the U.S. military interventions; however, due to the use of the U.S. veto in

the Security Council, the United Nations could not adopt enforceable measures to affect

the behavior of the U.S. government and prevent future American aggression. The

selective American adherence to the principles of international law and the United

Nations Charter intimates that the United States will continue to rely on military force as

a first resort for territorial, economic, or political advantage, the control of resources and

markets, and the maintenance of U.S. hegemony. As the world’s only superpower, the

law of the jungle is the only law that applies to American actions.

101

I. Grenada

Draft resolution S/16077/Rev.1 of 27 October 1983 states in part that the Security

Council, “reaffirming the sovereign and inalienable right of Grenada freely to determine

its own political, economic and social system, and to develop its international relations

without outside intervention, interference, subversion, coercion or threat in any form

whatsoever,” “gravely concerned at the military intervention taking place and determined

to ensure a speedy return to normalcy in Grenada,” and “conscious of the need for States

to show consistent respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations,”

1. Deeply deplores the armed intervention in Grenada, which constitutes a flagrant violation of international law and of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of that State;

2. Deplores the death of innocent civilians resulting from the armed intervention;

3. Calls on all States to show strictest respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Grenada;

4. Calls for an immediate cessation of the armed intervention and the immediate withdrawal of the foreign troops from Grenada;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to follow closely the development of the situation in Grenada and to report to the Council within forty-eight hours on the implementation of this resolution.1

Although three countries abstained, the United States recorded the only negative

vote against eleven affirmative ones.2 Exercising its right of veto, the U.S. ambassador

claimed without evidence that “Maurice Bishop [the socialist leader of the New Jewel

Movement, which acceded to power in a 1979 coup] freely offered his island as a base

1 United Nations Security Council draft resolution S/16077/Rev.1 of 27 October 1983.

2 United Nations Security Council Official Records, Thirty-Eighth Year: 2491st Meeting,

S/PV.2491, 39.

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for the projection of Soviet military power in the hemisphere.”3 Dissembling further, the

ambassador echoed the Reagan administration’s unsubstantiated allegations that “an

enormous, truly enormous, arsenal of Soviet weapons has been come across in the past

three days” and “the total number of Cubans present on Grenada is still unknown, but it

appears likely that there were over 1000. . . .”4 Essentially, throughout his speech to the

Security Council, the U.S. ambassador reiterated the same unconvincing and verifiably

false justifications for the world’s largest military power to invade an island nation of

110,000 people:

Those circumstances [in Grenada] include danger to innocent United States nationals, the absence of a minimally responsible government in Grenada, and the danger posed to the OECS [Organization of Eastern Caribbean States] by the relatively awesome military might that those responsible for the murder of the Bishop government now had at their disposal.5

Interestingly, the United States attempted to unilaterally reinterpret international

law and the United Nations Charter by proclaiming that “the prohibitions against the use

of force in the Charter are contextual, not absolute.”6 The Jordanian ambassador, echoing

a majority of Security Council members and the General Assembly in interpreting the

Charter, argued that “we cannot accept invasion and occupation under the pretext that

such and such a party has the intention to commit aggression.” Moreover, “likewise, the

right to self-defense does not imply the right to carry out preventative action or to invade

and occupy other countries.”7 The United Nations Charter is brutally absolute on the use

3 Ibid., 6.

4 Ibid., 7.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid., 6.

7 Ibid., 37-38.

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of force and indeed U.S. preventative attacks, as the Jordanian ambassador clearly

argued, are crimes of aggression and cannot in any way be justified as self-defense.

Highlighting further the unjustifiable pretexts for a military invasion with all its

attendant consequences, the American ambassador asserted that “we intend . . . to leave

Grenada just as soon as law is restored and the instruments of self-government--

democratic government--have been put in place.” As regarding the current occupation of

Iraq, the United States ignores or dismisses the obvious fact that a country cannot form a

democratic government while under foreign occupation. The ambassador claimed that

“when asked to assist this effort, the United States, whose own nationals and vital

interests were independently affected, joined the effort to restore minimal conditions of

law and order in Grenada and to eliminate the threat posed to the security of the entire

region.”8 As the text of the vetoed draft indicates, no country has the right to interfere in

the domestic affairs of sovereign states and initiate a preventative attack on a possibly

perceived but non-manifested threat. However, the United States government, despite the

rhetoric concerning democracy and freedom, maintains the unilateral and exceptional

right to operate as the world’s only superpower above international law and against the

opinion of humankind.

Investigate reporter and author William Blum easily exposes the various

justifications for a military attack as falsifications disguising the underlying motive for

the Reagan administration: the invasion of Grenada was a necessary morale booster for

the American psyche, to convince the public of the inherent superiority and goodness of

8 Ibid., 7-8.

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the U.S. military.9 “One of the fundamental falsehoods” was that the OECS, fearing

aggression from a leftist regime that had deposed and murdered the socialist leader

Maurice Bishop, requested United States intervention as a preventative measure in clear

violation of international law due to the absence of any aggressive action.10 As for the

ruse that the ceremonial governor-general, a position appointed by the British queen in

reminiscence of the former British empire, requested military intervention, the British

Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe “was emphatic that there had been no request for

intervention from [governor-general] Sir Paul Scoon.”11

According to Blum, the U.S. had been planning an operation in Grenada even

before the overthrow of Bishop, as the U.S. ambassador to France Evan Galbraith

intimated over French television, and persuaded the other Caribbean nations through the

usual threats and bribery to request U.S. intervention.12 Blum illustrates that immediately

after Bishop assumed power, the United States expressed its opposition, in the form of a

letter from the U.S. ambassador which stated in part:

Although my government recognizes your concern over allegations of a possible counter-coup [perhaps from the recently deposed Eric Gairy, exiled in the United

9 Much of the following discussion is taken from William Blum, Killing Hope: U.S. Military and

C.I.A. Interventions Since World War II (updated edition, Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 2004), chapter 45, 269-277, which, as the title implies, is an extremely useful reference guide for U.S. intervention since World War II.

10 Ibid., 270.

11 The Guardian, 31 October 1983 as cited in Ibid.

12 Hugh O’Shaughnessy, Grenada: Revolution, Invasion and Aftermath (London 1984), 153 as cited in Ibid., and discussion on 270 providing evidence that the U.S. approached the Caribbean states with the idea of an invasion.

105

States], it also believes that it would not be in Grenada’s best interests to seek assistance from a country such as Cuba to forestall such an attack. We would view with displeasure any tendency on the part of Grenada to develop closer ties with Cuba.13

Moreover, the U.S. instigated destabilization measures, including a domestic propaganda

campaign designed to limit tourism to Grenada and convince the American people that

the Soviets and Cubans were dangerously militarizing the island, thus threatening the

United States. As for the ubiquitous and superficial U.S. criticism that Bishop never held

elections and thus Grenada was not a democratic state, Bishop thoughtfully argued:

There are those (some of them our friends) who believe that you cannot have a democracy unless there is a situation where every five years, and for five seconds in those five years, a people are allowed to put an “X” next to some candidate’s name, and for those five seconds in those five years they become democrats, and for the remainder of the time, four years and 364 days, they return to being non-people without the right to say anything to their government, without any right to be involved in running the country.14

However, as with numerous other examples including Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Soviet

Union, the Grenadian participatory democracy never had a chance to function as the

United States habitually and immediately attempted to destroy any alternative to the

American form of capitalism and democracy that combined genuine democracy with

economic and social justice.

Another main justification noted above was the safety of American citizens in

Grenada. As discussed earlier, the government’s genuine concern for the security and

well-being of the American people is somewhat dubious, especially considering the

obvious social, economic, and political inequality inherent in our democratic system (the

13 Cited by Maurice Bishop in his speech of 13 April 1979, in Chris Searle, ed., In Nobody’s

Backyard: Maurice Bishop’s Speeches 1979-1983 (London, 1984), as found in Ibid., 274.

14 O’Shaughnessy, 85, cited in Ibid., 273.

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government (lack of) response to the victims of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans should

suffice to dispel any notion that national security pertains to the real security of most

Americans); therefore, the safety of nationals in foreign countries serves as a useful

pretext for intervention and propaganda for domestic consumption, inculcating the

necessary jingoistic, nationalistic, and patriotic fervor for war. Regarding Reagan’s

justification that the U.S. needed to evacuate its citizens through a military invasion,

Blum writes that

Two members of the U.S. embassy in Barbados, Ken Kurze and Linda Flohr, reported over the weekend before the invasion that “U.S. students in Grenada were, for the most part, unwilling to leave or be evacuated. They were too intent on their studies.”15

Moreover, “the White House acknowledged that two days before the invasion, Grenada

had offered the United States ‘an opportunity to evacuate American citizens. But officials

said the Reagan administration came to distrust the offer.’” The administration distrust

stemmed from the claim that the Grenada airport was closed on the day before the

invasion, preventing American evacuation; however, the White House later admitted that

planes left the airport on the day in question, even evacuating a few American citizens,

exposing as false another justification.16

During the invasion, Reagan announced that the military discovered “a complete

base of weapons and communications equipment which makes it clear a Cuban

occupation of the island had been planned.” A warehouse “contained weapons and

ammunition stacked almost to the ceiling, enough to supply thousands of terrorists.”

15 O’Shaughnessy, 165, as cited in Ibid., 271.

16 For the U.S. explanation justifying the distrust of the Grenada offer, see the New York Times, 27

October 1983, and for the later admission of administration dissembling, see O’Shaughnessy, 205, both cited in Ibid.

107

Reagan declared that Grenada was “a Soviet-Cuban colony being readied as a major

military bastion to export terror and undermine democracy, but we got there just in

time.”17 In response, Blum, intimating a quite observable fact that the United States has

military bases all over the world projecting U.S. hegemony, writes:

The U.S./Grenada/Cuba scenario staged in Washington was comparable at the time to the Soviet Union invading Great Britain and then announcing that it has prevented an American takeover, and Marx-knows what else, because it had discovered 30,000 U.S. servicemen there, over 100 American military bases, a huge arsenal of nuclear weapons, and "enough arms to supply millions of terrorists." The Soviet president could then have declared that "We got there just in time."18

While the Grenadian government understandably sought to purchase weapons as a

possible but futile deterrent to obvious United States destabilization, the U.S. discoveries

proved to be overly exaggerated if not completely spun out of whole cloth, while the

American military presence in Great Britain and indeed throughout the world is very real

and very large, thus illustrating a very dangerous double standard where only the U.S.

and its allies have the right to militarize the world while no other country seemingly has

the right to self-defense against American intervention. The Guardian of London

reported that in the warehouse “that contained most of the weapons, there were only five

mortars to be seen, one recoilless rifle, one Soviet-made quadric-barrelled anti-aircraft

gun, and two Koran-vintage British Bren guns on display.”19 The New York Times

limited its report to “significant stockpiles of Soviet arms but also a number of antiquated

guns, including rifles manufactured in the 1870s.”20 After the invasion, the New York

Times reported that the administration “acknowledged that in their effort to rally public

17 New York Times, 28 October 1983, cited in Ibid., 271-272.

18 Ibid., 272.

19 The Guardian, 31 October 1983, cited in Ibid.

20 New York Times, 1 November 1983, cited in Ibid.

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support for the invasion of Grenada, they may have damaged the Government’s

credibility by making sweeping charges about Soviet and Cuban influence on the island

without so far providing detailed evidence.”21

After contradicting every Reagan administration justification for the gratuitous

military invasion of Grenada, Blum provides a more plausible impetus for a military

operation:

The president managed to link the invasion of Grenada with the shooting down of a Korean airliner by the Soviet Union, the killing of U.S. soldiers in Lebanon, and the taking of American hostages in Iran. Clearly, the invasion symbolized an end to this string of humiliations for the United States. Even Vietnam was being avenged.22

As for the continued U.S. hostility to international law and opinion, Reagan arrogantly

opined that “one hundred nations in the UN have not agreed with us on just about

everything that’s come before them where we’re involved, and it didn’t upset my

breakfast at all.”23

21 New York Times, 1 November 1983, cited in Ibid., 273. According to Blum, the Cuban

government stated there were 784 Cubans in Grenada, 636 construction workers, 43 military personnel, and the rest public health workers, teachers, and others in public service. See O’Shaughnessy, 15, 16, 204 as cited in Ibid., 272. As a side note, Blum writes that the U.S. military damaged and looted the home of the Cuban ambassador, even adding “Eat shit, commie faggot” graffiti to one wall and forced Cuban hostages “to march in front of American jeeps as they advanced on Cuban positions,” an egregious violation of international law that only official enemies are capable of undertaking. See The Guardian, 25 and 27 November 1983 cited in Ibid., 276.

22 Ibid., 277. Reflecting the suppression of any historical fact contrary to the present propaganda campaign, Reagan, when asked about a direct U.S. invasion in Nicaragua in 1986, declared:

You’re looking at an individual that is the last one in the world that would ever want to put American troops in Latin America, because the memory of the great Colossus in the north is so widespread in Latin America. We’d lose all our friends if we did anything of that kind.

What does it say about a people who are so forgetful or ignorant of history and so easily swayed by the those in power that Reagan could simply erase the recent invasion of Grenada, the current interventions in such countries as El Salvador and Nicaragua, and the incessant hostility, brutal economic sanctions, and military terrorism against Cuba and claim that the U.S. had no intention to directly intervene in Latin America?

23 New York Times, 4 November 1983, 16 cited in Ibid., 276. Grenada soon mirrored other U.S.-

imposed democracies to the detriment of its inhabitants: In 1985 the Council on Hemispheric Affairs reported the following: “Reliable accounts are circulating of prisoners being beaten, denied medical attention and confined for long periods without being able to see lawyers. The country’s new U.S.-trained police force has acquired a reputation for brutality, arbitrary arrest and abuse of authority.” Moreover, the

109

II. Libya

Draft resolution S/18016/Rev.1 of 21 April 1986 states in part that the Security

Council, “strongly alarmed at the danger to international peace and security created by

the armed attacks against the Libyan cities of Tripoli and Benghazi by the armed forces

of the United States of America,” and “Recalling General Assembly resolution 40/61 of 9

December 1985, by which the Assembly unequivocally condemned as criminal, all acts,

methods and practices of terrorism wherever and by whomever committed, including

those which jeopardize friendly relations among States and their security,”

1. Condemns the armed attack by the United States of America in violation of the

Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international conduct;

2. Calls upon the United States of America to refrain forthwith from any attacks or threats thereof;

3. Condemns all terrorist activities whether perpetuated by individuals, groups or States;

4. Calls upon all parties to refrain from resorting to force, to exercise restraint in this critical situation and to resolve their differences by peaceful means in keeping with the Charter of the United Nations;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to take all appropriate steps to restore and ensure peace in the Central Mediterranean and to keep the Security Council regularly informed of the implementation of the present resolution;

6. Decides to remain seized of this matter.24

report mentioned U.S.-trained counter-insurgency forces, which exist to essentially fight against and terrorize the domestic population. See The Guardian, 3 January 1986 as cited in Ibid., 277.

24 United Nations Security Council draft resolution S/18016/Rev.1 of 21 April 1986.

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Three permanent members of the Security Council, France, the United Kingdom,

and the United States, were among the five voting against the draft resolution, thus

vetoing another condemnation of United States violence.25 As discussed below, a

bombing of a nightclub in West Germany killing two African-American soldiers was the

immediate pretext for the U.S. bombing of two Libyan cities, which was essentially an

assassination attempt against Colonel Muammar Qaddafi, in violation of U.S. law, even

though the U.S. provided no substantial evidence that Libya was involved. Even if

Libyans were implicated, international law allows for criminal proceedings much more

acceptable than a military strike against innocent civilians. Once again the U.S. holds the

leader of a foreign country responsible for actions of individuals, even without evidence

indicating Libyan involvement. However, as the recent controversy over American

military atrocities in Iraq indicates, not only is the entire invasion and occupation of Iraq

with the attendant large scale death and destruction not considered an atrocity or war

crime by the media and political elite, but George W. Bush is not responsible for the acts

of soldiers even though he is the Commander-in-Chief, even though all U.S. military

actions in Iraq are war crimes. The Pentagon will investigate and perhaps even punish

low-ranking soldiers, as it did in the aftermath of the Abu Gharib prison torture scandal,

only because the public became aware of these events, to illustrate the civility and the

benevolence of the enlightened U.S. military, to absolve the political and military

commanders, and to present the false propaganda that the U.S. military does not target

civilians, contrary to the historical record. Concerning the draft resolution, the United

States ambassador argued that “the idea that a State should be condemned for seeking to

25 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2682nd Meeting,

S/PV.2682, 43.

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protect the lives of its nationals who are subject to armed attack is too absurd for further

comment.”26 While clearly the statement is not applicable to the U.S. bombing of Libya,

which is not justified by any principle of self-defense, once again, according to this logic,

since Iraqi insurgents are fighting an illegal and immoral act of U.S. aggression and

subsequent occupation, a much stronger and more valid example of protecting those

subject to armed attack, especially considering that perhaps two million Iraqis have been

killed by the U.S. since the first Gulf War, it is absurd to deem these Iraqis as terrorists.

Since the U.S. bombing of innocent civilians was supposedly justified self-defense

against terrorism, the ambassador argued that “the text equates the criminal with his

victim,” illustrating that the United States has a unique definition of victim hood.27

The Pakistani representative made a relevant observation that “. . . the root cause

of the turmoil and turbulence, particularly the prevalence of terrorism, in one form or the

other, is the continued denial of the fundamental and legitimate right of the people of

Palestine to an independent and sovereign homeland.”28 As the fourth and fifth chapters

indicate, U.S. complicity in the Israeli occupation of Palestine and denial of Palestinian

rights is well-understood in the international community. The Ugandan ambassador

stated: “The United States, citing the bombing of a discotheque in West Berlin, invoked

article 51 of the Charter to try to justify its actions, claiming the inherent right of self-

defense.” However, the ambassador continued, “The purpose of the article is to grant the

right of self-defense to any United Nations Member State which is actually being

26 Ibid., 31.

27 Ibid., 32.

28 Ibid., 8.

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attacked, until the Security Council can take appropriate action.”29 Obviously, as the

draft states, the U.S. bombing of Libya was illegal and immoral, perhaps the most blatant

example of state terrorism during a year when the United States and its allies were

supposedly focused on combating the scourge of state terrorism, although in the United

States the bombing of civilians in Libya was not considered state terrorism because, by

definition, only the violence of official enemies is so characterized.

After the U.S. air attack on Libya, which resulted in between 40 and 100 deaths,

all but one civilian, including Qaddafi’s adopted daughter, White House spokesman

Larry Speakes stated that “it is our hope this action will preempt and discourage Libyan

attacks against innocent civilians in the future.”30 Perhaps Osama bin Laden’s

spokesman proclaimed that “it is our hope that the attack on the United States will

preempt and discourage American attacks against innocent civilians in the future and

force the United States government to reconsider its foreign policy, which has caused so

much suffering throughout the world.” Although both terrorist attacks were completely

abhorrent and unjustifiable, the imaginary bin Laden statement would make more sense

considering U.S. terrorism exponentially exceeds that of Qaddafi’s Libya. As for

Reagan’s statement that “our evidence is direct, it is precise, it is irrefutable,” regarding

Libyan culpability in the discotheque bombing, investigative reporter Seymour Hersh

found that the German government was “very critical and skeptical” of Libya’s

culpability and “some White House officials had immediate doubts that the case against

Libya was clear-cut.” Hersh further related: “What is more, the discotheque was known

29 Ibid., 14, 16.

30 Much of the discussion is taken from Blum, chapter 48, 280-289. For the casualty figures, see

Seymour Hersh, “Target Qaddafi,” The New York Times Magazine, 22 February 1987, 22 as cited in Blum, 281. For Speakes absurd comment, see New York Times, 15 April 1986, 11 as cited in Blum, 281.

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as a hangout for black soldiers, and the Libyans had never been known to target blacks or

other minorities.”31

According to Blum, the Reagan administration developed a plan to overthrow

Qaddafi early in its first term and orchestrated various assassination attempts as well as

provocative military measures to provoke Libyan retaliation, which would be construed

as Libyan aggression, including flights over Libyan territory and the downing of Libyan

jets on more than one occasion. The CIA plan, which Newsweek exposed in August

1981, was:

“a large-scale, multiphase and costly scheme to overthrow the Libyan regime” and obtain what the CIA called Qaddafi’s “ultimate” removal from power. The plan called for a “disinformation” program designed to embarrass Qaddafi and his government; the creation of a “counter government” to challenge his claim to national leadership; and an escalating paramilitary campaign of small-scale guerilla operations.32 Regarding the disinformation campaign, which included government reports that Qaddafi

was intimately involved in every act of terrorism during the 1980s and assertions that a

Libyan assassin squad was roaming the United States, Hersh later wrote:

According to key sources, there was little doubt inside [Deputy Secretary of State William] Clark’s task force about who was responsible for the spate of anti-Qaddafi leaks—the CIA, with the support of the President, [Secretary of State] Haig and Clark. “This item [the Libyan hit squad] stuck in my craw,” one involved official recalls. “We came out with this big terrorist threat to the U.S. Government. The whole thing was a complete fabrication.” . . . One task force official eventually concluded that [CIA Director William] Casey was in effect running an operation inside the American Government: “He was feeding the disinformation into the (intelligence) system so it would be seen as separate, independent reports” and taken seriously by other Government agencies.33

31 For Reagan’s quote, see New York Times, 15 April 1986, cited in Ibid., 281. For Hersh’s

investigative report, see Hersh, 74, cited in Ibid., 282.

32 Newsweek, 3 August 1981, 19 as cited in Ibid., 283.

33 Hersh, 24, 26, cited in Ibid., 284-285.

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Perhaps Qaddafi was another useful enemy whose real and supposed crimes

served as pretexts for American militarism and justified foreign policy initiatives. The

U.S. has throughout its history repeatedly demonized enemies to justify defense

spending, foreign intervention, and even the curtailing of civil liberties. Blum writes that

Qaddafi’s principle crime in Reagan’s eyes was not that he supported terrorist groups, but that he supported the wrong terrorist groups; i.e., Qaddafi was not supporting the same terrorists that Washington was, such as the Nicaraguan Contras, UNITA in Angola, Cuban exiles in Miami, the governments of El Salvador and Guatemala, and the U.S. military in Grenada.34

Moreover, Blum reports that the day after the U.S. bombed Libya, Reagan stated that “I

would remind the House voting this week that this archterrorist Qaddafi has sent $400

million [sic] and an arsenal of weapons and advisors into Nicaragua.”35

As a fitting summation of the almost surreal if not pathological American

obsession with Libya and Qaddafi, Blum quotes the following apt description:

It is like a grade B horror movie. A dozen times it rises from the dead and lurches towards the audience; a dozen times it is cut to ribbons, staggering back, collapsing in a heap; and a dozen times it rises again and clomps slowly forward. But it is not the mummy’s ghost, and it is not haunting the upper Nile. It is the notion that the Libyan leader, Col. Muammar Qaddafi, is responsible for every act of terrorism in the entire world, and it haunts the pages of the western press and the screens of western television sets.36

III. Panama

Draft resolution S/21048 of 22 December 1989 states in part that the Security

Council, “reaffirming the sovereign and inalienable right of Panama to determine freely

34 Ibid., 283.

35 New York Times, 16 April 1986, 1, 20, cited in Ibid.

36 Bill Schaap, Covert Action Information Bulletin (Washington, D.C.), No. 30, Summer 1988, 76,

cited in Ibid., 288.

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its social, economic and political system and to develop its international relations without

any form of foreign intervention, interference, subversion, coercion or threat” and

“recalling that, in conformity with Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United

Nations, all Member States are obliged to refrain in their international relations from the

threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any

State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations,”

1. Strongly deplores the intervention in Panama by the armed forces of the United States of America, which constitutes a flagrant violation of international law and of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of States;

2. Demands the immediate cessation of the intervention and the withdrawal of the United States armed forces from Panama;

3. Calls upon all States to uphold and respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Panama;

4. Requests the Secretary-General of the United Nations to monitor the developments in Panama and to report to the Security Council within a twenty-four-hour period after the adoption of the present resolution.37

The United States, France, and Great Britain vetoed the draft resolution

condemning the U.S. invasion of Panama, although the U.S. aggression was clearly an

unjustifiable breach of international law and the United States Charter.38 It is quite

revealing that the U.S. invaded Panama only eight months before Iraq invaded Kuwait.

To fully understand U.S. foreign policy and the functioning of the federal government, as

a first step to gaining control of both, the American people must realize that avowed

allegiance to nebulous concepts devoid of substantive meaning such as freedom,

democracy, and national security and principles such as international law are non-factors

37 United Nations Security Council draft resolution S/21048 of 22 December 1989.

38 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2902nd meeting,

S/PV.2902, 18-20.

116

in the formation of foreign and domestic policy. The only difference between the Iraqi

aggression against Kuwait and the much more pervasive United States aggression and

state terrorism throughout its history is that the United States is unaccountable to

international law and the opinion of humankind. Only the domestic population in the

United States has the power to thwart their rogue government.

The U.S. ambassador, aware of the ignorance of the American population, brashly asserted:

I am confident that I reflect the long-simmering outrage of the people of my own country . . . who are sick of stolen elections, sick of military dictatorships, sick of narco-strongmen and sick of people like Manuel Antonio Noriega.39 Considering that Noriega was a longtime CIA asset, considering that the United States

has trained, armed, funded, and implanted many military dictatorships, especially in Latin

America, considering the CIA’s known involvement in the illegal drug trade,40

considering the U.S. government and CIA’s known involvement in stealing countless

elections throughout the world for unpopular, yet U.S.-approved candidates,41 and

considering the inherent injustices in the U.S. electoral system and the two recent

presidential elections stolen by George W. Bush, one by a majority of the Supreme Court

and the second by an undoubtedly fraudulent election, the ambassador made quite a

hypocritical statement to the international community.42 Perhaps the American people

39 Ibid., 9-10.

40 See for example Alexander Cockburn and Jeffrey St. Clair, Whiteout: the CIA, Drugs, and the

Press (London; New York: Verso, 1998), Gary Webb, Dark Alliance: the CIA, the Contras, and the Crack

Cocaine Explosion (New York: Seven Stories Press, 1998), and the sources cited therein.

41 See for example, Blum.

42 See for example, Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., “Was the 2004 Election Stolen?” Rolling Stone, 1 June 2006.

117

are sick of such outrages; yet the U.S. government remains the largest perpetrator of such

crimes. Moreover, the ambassador lectured the United Nations that

It is time that the Organization welcomed Noriega’s departure, just as the world has in the past welcomed the departure of Somoza, Duvalier, Marcos and, more recently, Honecker, Zhivkov, Husak and Ceausecu. It is time this Organization put itself on the right side of history.43

Given that the U.S. supported Somoza in Nicaragua, Duvalier in Haiti, and

Marcos in the Philippines, and continued to support Somoza and Duvalier loyalists and

oppressive regimes in the Philippines, training and arming and funding the Contras to

overthrow the popular Sandinistas and directly overthrowing the popular socialist priest

Jean Bertrand Aristide in Haiti more than once, we may rightly wonder when the United

States will put itself on the right side of history. Perhaps it is somewhat superfluous to

add that not only did the ambassador intimate that the U.S., by supporting Somoza,

Duvalier, and Marcos, opposed world opinion, but that Somoza, Duvalier, and Marcos

were overthrown by their own people, not by a foreign government through illegal

military aggression. The U.S. contempt for international opinion and international law

and its transmogrification of history would be quite illustrative of a severe social disorder

if exhibited by an individual. It is not difficult to imagine how the U.S. government and

media would respond if an official enemy behaved in such an anti-social and psychotic

manner.

As justification for the invasion, the ambassador claimed that “the United States

acted in Panama in self-defense and in defense of the Panama Canal Treaties.”

Additional justifications alluded to protecting American lives, fully implementing the

Canal Treaties, combating narcotics trafficking, and helping the Panamanian people build

43 S/PV.2902, 12.

118

an authentic democracy. To illustrate the benevolent intentions of the U.S. military and

government, the ambassador optimistically stated:

We welcome the return of democracy to that country, and we shall do all we can to promote it, including through the withdrawal of our forces when their mission has been accomplished. Our problem has been with one man, one corrupt dictator.44 If perhaps anyone thought a military invasion with its attendant death and destruction was

slightly excessive to catch a supposed “outlaw and a fugitive from justice” and fulfill the

aims just mentioned, the ambassador had a ready, if ridiculous response, that “the United

States made an arduous effort to accomplish these goals through diplomatic and political

means.”45 Therefore, we have a myriad of aims, from bringing one man to justice for

crimes committed while under the good graces and pay of the United States to protecting

American citizens, in this case military personnel, to building more democracy, to weakly

and unconvincingly justify illegal aggression, the most egregious violation of

international law. Would the United States accept these justifications for aggression by

Iraq, or Cuba, or the former Soviet Union? Perhaps it is unnecessary to draw the obvious

parallels between Noriega and Hussein: Both were U.S. clients punished for asserting

more independence than Washington was willing to allow and both were put through

show trials for crimes committed while under the pay and tutelage of the U.S.

government. Once again the obvious contradiction and disconnect between massive

military force and democracy went unnoticed and unmentioned, reflecting and

foreshadowing the rationales for past and future unchecked U.S. aggression.

Foreshadowing the morally bankrupt Madeline Albright response to a question

concerning the sanctions against Iraq previously discussed, President George H. W.

44 Ibid., 9-10, 12, 15.

45 Ibid., 12, 16.

119

Bush, answering a reporter’s question on whether capturing Noriega was worth the

deaths and destruction in Panama, claimed “. . . every human life is precious, and yet I

have to answer, yes, it has been worth it.”46 If killing a half a million Iraqi children

through sanctions to punish Saddam and murdering perhaps thousands of Panamanians

and rendering 15,000 in a Panama City tenement barrio homeless to catch Noriega is

acceptable to those who mention incessantly that Americans value life, while official

enemies do not, then perhaps we ought reconsider what it means to value life and

recognize that an inherent characteristic of our political leaders is an amoral if not

completely immoral disregard for the human suffering resulting from the quest for U.S.

hegemony throughout the world.

“Operation Just Cause,” another example of Orwellian doublespeak, was the

seventh U.S. invasion of Panama since 1903, when the United States essentially removed

the state of Panama from Columbia in order to build the famous canal.47 President Bush

stated: “I appreciate the support that we’ve received, strong support from the United

States Congress, and from our Latin American neighbors.”48 However, with the United

States casting the lone negative vote, twenty countries in the Organization of American

States adopted a resolution “to deeply regret the military intervention in Panama.”

Richard Boucher, a State Department spokesman, declared in a very informative

46 Much of this discussion can be found in Blum, Chapter fifty, 305-314. For the Bush quote, see

New York Times, 22 December 1989, 16, cited in Blum, 305.

47 Ibid., 311; see Ibid., Appendix II, for descriptions of earlier U.S. invasions against Panama.

48 New York Times, 22 December 1989, 16, as quoted in Ibid., 312.

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statement, “We are outraged.” The OAS, he said, “missed an historic opportunity to get

beyond its traditional narrow concern with non-intervention.”49

While laying the groundwork for the invasion, the United States focused on

Noriega’s criminal activity, which led to a Federal indictment in 1988, the fraudulent

Panamanian election in 1989, and the supposed mistreatment of U.S. military personnel

in Panama. However, Blum rebuts each argument, elucidating U.S. culpability or

complicity in every instance. Blum meticulously describes how Noriega was involved in

drug trafficking and money laundering during the 1970s and early 1980s while working

as an informant and asset for the United States, receiving money from the CIA and

providing information to the Drug Enforcement Agency. Although the Federal

government was aware of his illegal activities, which ironically tapered off by 1984, four

years before his indictment, Noriega was a favorite of the Reagan administration until

Congressional pressure, the Iran-Contra scandal, the Federal indictment, and the 1988

election forced the Reagan administration to dissociate from Noriega and instigate his

resignation or removal from power, initially attempting economic sanctions and

diplomatic isolation, methods otherwise dismissed as ineffectual, especially when dealing

with South Africa or Israel.50 Moreover, Blum proposes that Noriega first lost favor with

the U.S. government after he asserted too much independence by supporting the

Contadora peace proposal for Central America discussed below, just as Saddam Hussein

overstepped his bounds by invading all of Kuwait.51

49 Los Angeles Times, 23 December 1989, as quoted in Ibid.

50 Ibid., 306-308.

51 Ibid., 298.

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Essentially, the administration needed a pretext to remove Noriega, which led to

the justifications concerning the fraudulent election in 1989 and Panamanian treatment of

military personnel. As for the fraudulent election, Blum indicates that in 1984, the CIA

and the U.S. government were quite complicit in the fraud perpetrated on the Panamanian

people when Noriega’s candidate for president, Nicolas Barletta, was determined the

winner despite widespread evidence of vote tampering. An unpublished American

embassy report concluded that Barletta had been defeated, yet Secretary of State George

Shultz attended the inauguration and the new Panamanian president met Reagan in the

White House.52 In light of U.S. complicity in the 1984 election, the historical evidence

regarding the U.S. (attempted) overthrow of many governments throughout the world

during the twentieth century and the demonstration elections in El Salvador, Vietnam,

Afghanistan, and Iraq, for example, for the American public’s consumption, the U.S.

indignation at the Panamanian fraudulent election in 1989 seems less than genuine.

As for the incident between American and Panamanian soldiers on 16-17

December 1989, the Defense Department reported to the press the following version of

events:

Four American servicemen, unarmed and in civilian clothes, got lost and inadvertently drove up to a PDF [Panamanian Defense Forces] roadblock, where they were manhandled. As they drove away, they were shot at, killing one and wounding another. At the same time, an American Navy officer and his wife who witnessed this scene were roughed up considerably by the PDF.53

52 For CIA involvement see, Los Angeles Times, 21 March 1992, A2 cited in Ibid., 309; for

excerpts of the report, see John Dinges, Our Man in Panama (revised edition, New York, 1991) 187-189, 195-200, 369-372, cited by Ibid., 309. Blum adds in the footnote that Dinges received a copy of the report through a Freedom of Information Act request.

53 New York Times, 18 December 1989, 8 cited by Ibid., 310.

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However, Blum paraphrases a Los Angeles Times report, which was published a year

later, that contended the incident

was a step in a pattern of aggressive behavior by a small group of U.S. troops who frequently tested the patience and reaction of Panamanian forces, particularly at roadblocks, which they would “dare” by driving up and then refusing to stop or suddenly pulling away. The Americans in this case were not lost; and they were armed. They drove up to a very sensitive roadblock and when told to leave the car by the PDF, the Americans all gave them the finger, shouted an obscenity, and drove off. The Panamanians then opened fire.54

A recorded phone conservation between a Marine at the American Embassy and his

mother substantiated the second version. The Marine said that the Americans

were out of bounds, owing to the fact that they had no reason to be there. The whole world knows that they shouldn’t have gone there. They messed up. If the United States set up a barricade anywhere and someone acted in the same way we would also start firing.55

Interestingly, Blum relates that two days after the incident, an off-duty American

lieutenant shot a Panamanian officer, because he “felt threatened” according to the Bush

administration.56 However, Blum observes, “it was not reported that Panama invaded the

United States as a result of this incident.”57 Blum further relays that not only had the

military been performing training maneuvers in Panama for months before the invasion,

even simulating a kidnapping raid as helicopters and jets flew low over Noriega’s house,

but the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William Crowe, advised General

Max Thurman, on his appointment as the Commander-in-Chief of the Southern

54 Los Angeles Times, 22 December 1990, cited and paraphrased by Ibid. Blum adds in the

footnote that the LAT article cited three U.S. military and civilian sources who verified the information independently of each other and the administration offered no evidence concerning the claim of Panamanian military personnel manhandling the American couple.

55 Kevin Buckley, Panama, the Whole Story (New York, 1991), 228-229, cited in Ibid.

56 New York Times, 19 December 1989, 12, cited in Ibid., 311.

57 Ibid., 311.

123

Command in late September 1989, that a military invasion of Panama was imminent:

“We’re going to go [but] I can’t tell you when.”58

Since other less violent alternatives existed if Noriega’s capture or trial was the

sole aim of the U.S. government, even though the U.S. has preferred force as its primary

method to achieve political and economic objectives, Blum posits that the United States

invaded Panama for three additional and plausible reasons. Perhaps President Bush

needed a quick military victory to enhance his image and assert his masculinity.

Considering that in the public relations game that is politics, image is everything and that

obviously George W. Bush’s Texas cowboy persona was spun out of whole cloth by his

handlers just as Reagan’s public image vastly differed from the reality of a figurehead not

cognizant of reality, perhaps President Bush needed a military triumph to portray the

image of a strong leader and increase his popularity. Perhaps the U.S. military-industrial

complex needed viable threats after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of

the Soviet Union in order to justify the massive military budget and the corporate welfare

for the technology sector in the United States economy and conversely the continued

stagnation and decline in social spending benefiting the domestic population. Perhaps the

Bush administration wished to send a signal to the Nicaraguan voters to choose the U.S.-

backed opposition to the Sandinistas in the upcoming 1990 election as if a decade of the

U.S. Contra War against the people of Nicaragua and incessant threats of perpetual

warfare were not persuasion enough. Regardless of the underlying motivations, the

58 For examples of provocation, see Buckley, 187, 191; Timothy Harding, “Why Are We In

Panama?,” LA Weekly, 29 December 1984–4 January 1990, 16, as cited in Ibid., 310-311; for Admiral Crowe’s quote, see Buckley, 193, citing the Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 22-28 January 1990, as cited in Ibid., 311.

124

gratuitous unjustified aggression against a defenseless people unfortunately illustrates

inherent U.S. foreign policy.59

IV. Nicaragua

When history is written, the contras will be folk heroes.

Elliott Abrams60

During the 1980s, as the U.S. waged a brutal proxy-war against Nicaragua, the

United States vetoed five Security Resolutions condemning American military

intervention and demanding immediate cessation of hostilities, respect for international

law and the territorial sovereignty of Nicaragua. The United States even caustically

dismissed the decision of the International Court of Justice, which demanded the U.S.

cease all hostile activities toward the government and people of Nicaragua and pay

reparations for the immense damage to the economy and fragile infrastructure of the third

world nation. Similar to its hostility toward Grenada, the U.S. opposed a popular

socialist Nicaraguan government, which overthrew the despised and U.S.-imposed

Somoza dictatorship and began a social program to meet the needs of the Nicaraguan

people. The United States again expressed contempt for international law and the rights

of other people, exposing its policies as vicious and hypocritical, contrasting the avowed

values associated with American democracy.

Draft resolution S/14941 of 1 April 1982 states in part that the Security Council,

“considering that the present crisis in the region of Central American and the Caribbean

59 Ibid., 310.

60 LA Weekly, 9-15 March 1990, 12, Ibid., 304.

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affects international peace and security and that all Member States have an interest in the

solution of the crisis by peaceful means,”

1. Reminds all Member States of their obligation to respect the principles of the Charter, and in particular those relating to: (a) non-intervention and non-interference in the domestic affairs of States; (b) self-determination of peoples; (c) non-use of force or threat of force; (d) the territorial integrity and political independence of States; (e) pacific settlement of disputes;

2. Reminds all Member States that [General Assembly] resolution 2131 [of 21 December 1965] condemns the use or threat of force in relations between States as acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

3. Appeals to all Member States to refrain from the direct, indirect, overt or covert use of force against any country of Central America and the Caribbean;

4. Appeals to all parties concerned to have recourse to dialogue and negotiation, as contemplated in the Charter of the United Nations, and calls upon all Member States to lend their support to the search for a peaceful solution to the problems of Central America and the Caribbean;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council informed concerning the development of the situation in Central America and the Caribbean.61

Although the text of the draft resolution is so mild as to not even mention the

United States by name, the U.S. cast the only negative vote, thus vetoing the opinion of

twelve countries on the Security Council who favored its adoption.62 The United States

ambassador proclaimed the following somewhat contradictory and completely false

remark regarding the U.S. subversion of the Sandinista government:

. . . I have also reiterated the attachment of my government to the principles of non- intervention in the internal affairs of other States, our respect for territorial integrity and national independence, the peaceful settlement of disputes and those principles of the Charter of the United Nations that govern the use and non-use of force. Obviously, none of this means that the United States renounces the right to defend itself, nor that we will not assist others to defend themselves under circumstances consistent with our

61 United Nations Security Council draft resolution S/14941 of 1 April 1982.

62 United Nations Security Council Official Records, Thirty-Seventh Year: 2347th Meeting,

S/PV.2347, 14.

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legal and political obligations and with the Charter.63 For example, a brief examination of American history, including the military

interventions against Grenada, Libya, Panama, and Nicaragua during the 1980s and the

more recent aggression against Afghanistan and Iraq during the George W. Bush

administration, renders the extent of the U.S. attachment to the aforementioned principles

undoubtedly clear. Moreover, the U.S. ambassador argued:

Mr. Ortega states that ‘the problem’ has to do with the danger posed by the United States to the independence and sovereignty of the countries of Central America. The definition of ‘the problem’ merely obfuscates the real issue that is at stake in Central America, which is a conflict between two concepts of organizing society, two ideologies if you will--the one democratic, the other totalitarian.64 “Totalitarian” is perhaps not the best description for a popular socialist government of a

third-world country, which is attempting to lift the people off the ground after decades of

a U.S.-imposed dictatorship, while under extreme pressure to defend itself from foreign

subversion. Of course, we are not meant to consider how a U.S. invasion or proxy-

invasion forces a government to militarize the country at the expense of social programs

and civil liberties, especially of those opposition groups armed and organized by the

United States. Examples from American history, such as the internment of Japanese-

Americans during World War II and the current crusade against civil liberties and

individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution, illustrate that during time of war, even if

not taking place on U.S. soil, the United States government takes advantage of

opportunities to curtail domestic dissent.

The ambassador disingenuously contended that “Nicaragua invokes the principle

of non-intervention but claims the right to intervene in the internal affairs of neighboring

63 Ibid., 2.

64 Ibid., 3.

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States,” namely El Salvador, although the evidence for this proved nonexistent as

discussed below.65 “The Sandinista leadership also opposes such elections [as those held

in El Salvador]. Indeed, they have called the Salvadoran election ‘an absolute denial of

democracy and civilization.’”66 While the United States government and media praised

the Salvadoran elections as positive steps toward democracy, as with the recent Afghani

and Iraqi elections, the U.S. motivation for holding elections was to demonstrate to the

American public that U.S. policies were justified. As discussed below, all the necessary

preconditions for a free and fair democratic election in El Salvador were completely

absent, while hundreds of foreign observers determined that the Nicaraguan elections in

1984 were legitimate. Moreover, given the fact that in the United States only two

political parties, essentially two factions of the same business party, have the requisite

capital to campaign for state and national elections concomitant with widespread voter

fraud and voter suppression, U.S. elections are “an absolute denial of democracy,”

leaving the United States without any justification to impose democracy on other peoples

and nations.

While the United States ambassador claimed that regional organizations, in this

case the Organization of American States, not the United Nations, should solve the

dispute between the U.S. and Nicaragua, perhaps because the U.S. could exert more

influence over the OAS than the United Nations, the U.S. prevented the League of Arab

States from adequately solving the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait since the U.S.

65 Ibid.

66 Ibid., 4.

128

preferred a military invasion to increase the U.S. presence in the Middle East and destroy

Iraq’s military capability and civilization as previously discussed.67

Twelve members of the Security Council supported draft resolution S/14941 and

opposed the U.S. veto, although Reagan probably suffered no loss of appetite or sleep as

a result. The German Democratic Republic ambassador, contradicting the American

allegiance to nonintervention, declared:

. . . the United States and the most reactionary forces of the region constantly violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Central American States, and under the guise of the struggle against so-called international terrorism and totalitarianism, interfere massively in their internal affairs, negating the principle of a people’s right to self- determination.68

The Nicaraguan ambassador presciently recognized the imminent threat that the

U.S. posed to the people and government of Nicaragua and politely distrusted any U.S.

commitments to nonintervention and international law:

My government asked for the convening of this Council because we considered that the escalation of aggression against Nicaragua on the part of the United States Government was unquestionable proof that the Government was preparing to implement the political decision to overthrow the Sandinist Government in order to restore in Nicaragua a system similar to that of the former admirers, defenders and allies of the Somoza tyranny.69 Today we heard the representative of the United States say that her country does not intend to invade Nicaragua. We thank her very much. But we are not satisfied, since nothing is said about other types of direct aggression or about indirect intervention through other forces, nor is reference being made to covert activities which the Reagan administration has been financing and directing against Nicaragua.70

67 Ibid.

68 Ibid., 9.

69 Ibid., 10.

70 Ibid., 12.

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As events proved, the Nicaraguan ambassador was quite right in doubting the U.S.

avowed intentions toward the people of Nicaragua.

Draft resolution S/16463 of 4 April 1984 states in part that the Security Council,

“noting resolution 38/10 of the General Assembly, in which, inter alia, the States of the

region, as well as other States, are urged to refrain from continuing or initiating military

operations with the objective of exercising political pressure which would aggravate the

situation in the region and hinder the negotiation efforts by the Contadora Group,” and

“noting with great concern the foreign military presence from outside the region, the

carrying out of overt and covert actions, and the use of neighboring territories for

mounting destabilizing actions that have served to heighten tensions in the region and

hinder the peace efforts of the Contadora Group,”

1. Condemns and calls for an immediate end to the mining of the main ports of Nicaragua, which has caused the loss of Nicaraguan lives and injuries to nationals of other countries as well as material damage, serious disruption to its economy and the hampering of free navigation and commerce, thereby violating international law;

2. Affirms the right of free navigation and commerce in international waters and calls on all States to respect this right by refraining from any action which would impede the exercise of this right in the waters of the region;

3. Reaffirms the right of Nicaragua and of all the countries of the region to live in peace and security and to determine their own future free from all foreign interference and intervention;

4. Calls on all States to refrain from carrying out, supporting or promoting any type of military action against any State of the region as well as any other action that hinders the peace objectives of the Contadora Group;

5. Expresses its firm support to the Contadora Group for the efforts it has so far carried out and urges it to intensify these efforts on an immediate basis;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council informed of the development of the situation and of the implementation of the present resolution;

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7. Decides to remain seized of the matter.71

While thirteen members of the Security Council favored the adoption of this mild

draft, which fails to explicitly mention the United States, the United States cast the lone

negative vote, thus vetoing the draft on the dubious grounds:

In voting against this draft resolution we reaffirm our commitment to peace in Central America, to regional negotiations leading to regional settlements, to the demilitarization of the region, to mutual respect for sovereignty and secure borders, the withdrawal of all foreign military personnel, respect for the rule of law and the establishment of democratic institutions based on free and periodic elections.72 Although the ambassador would be hard pressed to provide any evidence to support his

contention, considering that the U.S. was the leading violator of these principles

throughout the world, including Central America, American benevolence and respect for

the aforementioned principles are ingrained assumptions rarely questioned by the media,

and American people. After the Sandinistas publicized their intention to sign the

Contadora treaty, which envisioned a 21-point plan that included demilitarization and

withdrawal of all foreign military personnel, the United States admittedly subverted the

plan as discussed below.

Draft resolution S/18250 of 31 July 1986 states in part that the Security Council,

“recalling resolution 530 (1983) which, inter alia, reaffirms the right of Nicaragua and of

all the other countries of the area to live in peace and security, free from outside

interference,” “recalling resolution 562 (1985) which, inter alia, reaffirms the

sovereignty and inalienable right of Nicaragua and other States freely to decide their own

political, economic and social systems, to develop their international relations according

71 United Nations draft resolution S/16463 of 4 April 1984.

72 United Nations Security Council Official Records, Thirty-Ninth Year: 2529th Meeting,

S/PV.2529, 26.

131

to their people’s interests free from outside interference, subversion, direct or indirect

coercion or threats of any kind,” and “recalling all the relevant principles of the Charter

of the United Nations, particularly the obligation of States to settle their disputes

exclusively by peaceful means, not to resort to the threat or use of force and to respect the

self-determination of peoples and the sovereign independence of all States,”

1. Reaffirms the role of the International Court of Justice as the principle judicial organ of the United Nations and a means for peaceful solution of disputes in the interest of international peace and security; 2. Makes an urgent and solemn call for full compliance with the Judgment of the International Court of Justice of 27 June 1986 in the case of “Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua;”

3. Recalls the obligation of all States to seek a solution to their disputes by peaceful means in accordance with international law;

4. Calls upon all States to refrain from carrying out, supporting or promoting political, economic or military actions of any kind against any State of the region that might impede the peace objectives of the Contadora Group;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council informed of the implementation of the present resolution.73

The International Court of Justice decided in the case “Military and Paramilitary

Activities in and Against Nicaragua” that U.S. military actions, both covert and overt,

against Nicaragua were violations of international law, and therefore the United States

must cease all activities against Nicaragua and make payments of reparations for all

damage.74 The United States cast the lone negative vote, vetoing the draft supported by

73 United Nations Security Council draft resolution S/18250 of 31 July 1986.

74 “Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua,” Nicaragua v. the United States

of America, <www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/icases/inus/inus_isummaries/inus_isummary_19860627.htm>, accessed 5 June 2006.

132

eleven members of the Security Council.75 While the international community called for

U.S. compliance with the Court’s decision as expressed in various General Assembly

resolutions, the U.S. obfuscated because “in the view of the United States, the Court has

asserted jurisdiction and competence over Nicaragua’s claims without any proper

basis.”76 The ambassador argued that “many of the principles asserted by the Court to

constitute customary international law have no basis in authority or reason. We do not

accede to these baseless assertions.”77 Preferring military force to destabilize the

Sandinistas instead of a diplomatic or political settlement that would recognize

Nicaraguan sovereignty and the legitimacy of the Sandinista government, the U.S.

ambassador unilaterally and unfathomably determined against international opinion that

In a word, the United States has voted against this draft resolution because it would have painted an inaccurate picture of the true situation in Central America, because it would not have contributed to a comprehensive and peaceful settlement of the problems in the region, and because it would in fact have done a disservice to the international law and institutions that it purports to uphold.78

Recognizing that empires need external enemies to distract the domestic

population from domestic concerns and control the public through fear-mongering, the

Iranian ambassador presciently observed that “if the United States administration really

cares for the American people, it should see to the dangers inside the United States

instead of trying to divert public attention from the internal filth and misery to other

75 United Nations Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2704th Meeting, S/PV.2704, 54-55.

76 See for example General Assembly resolutions 41/31, 42/18, 43/11, and 44/43 in the Appendix.

After the 1990 Nicaraguan election, in which the Sandinistas were defeated by a public wary of perpetual war with the United States, the U.S.-back government dismissed the Nicaraguan case against the United States; U.S. ambassador quote is found in S/PV.2704, 61.

77 S/PV.2704.

78 Ibid., 61.

133

countries.”79 Dismissing the U.S. ambassador’s unjustifiable assertion that the

International Court’s decision prohibiting the United States from violating international

law and the sovereignty of Nicaragua through military terrorism and subversion is

somehow a “disservice” to international law, the Nicaraguan representative described the

cause of the instability in Central America in the following unambiguous way: “There

are problems of the economy, unjust structures, and a central one--United States

intervention in the internal affairs of Central American countries and the aggression

against my country.”80 It is an unmistakable conclusion that U.S. colonialism and

incessant intervention in Latin America, which served the interests of American

corporations, caused unimaginable suffering for millions of people. As the case of

Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez indicates, the United States government continues to oppose

any Latin American government that places the interests of its people ahead of the

interests of the capitalist elite.

Draft resolution S/18428 of 28 October 1986 states in part that the Security Council,

“aware that, under the Charter of the United Nations, the International Court of Justice is

the principle judicial organ of the United Nations and that each Member undertakes to

comply with the decision of the Court in any case to which it is a party,” and

“emphasizing the obligation of States, under customary international law, not to intervene

in the internal affairs of other States,”

1. Urgently calls for full and immediate compliance with the judgment of the International Court of Justice of 27 June 1986 in the case of “Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua” in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Charter;

79 Ibid., 26.

80 Ibid., 62.

134

2. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council informed on implementation of this resolution.81

The U.S. vetoed this second draft concerning U.S. compliance with the

International Court of Justice decision regarding Nicaragua on the grounds that the Court

has neither the competence nor the jurisdiction to render an opinion.82 The draft

resolution “attempts to portray a false image of this situation as merely a conflict between

Nicaragua and the United States.” The ambassador falsely proclaimed: “The Sandinista

Government is responsible for the crisis. It has waged a conflict with its own people

whose revolution it has betrayed. It has waged a conflict with the Governments of its

neighbors, all of whom it has sought to subvert.”83

The ambassador for Great Britain, always a reliable ally, remarked:

Compliance by the parties with International Court of Justice decisions is a clear Charter obligation, but it is nothing less than presumptuous for the Government of Nicaragua, a regime which neither externally nor internally lives up to its obligations, to call for selective application of the Charter in this case. This is not respect for the Charter, but taking advantage of it for narrow political ends.84

Further reflecting the prevalent U.S. view, the British ambassador continued: “. . . we are

unable to support a draft resolution which fails to take account of the wider political

factors and fails to acknowledge that Nicaragua has largely brought its troubles upon

itself.”85

81 United Nations Security Council draft resolution S/18428 of 28 October 1986.

82 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2718th Meeting,

S/PV.2718, 44-45.

83 Ibid., 44-45.

84 Ibid., 52.

85 Ibid.

135

While illustrating profound regard for international law by ignoring the decision

of the International Court of Justice, the United States provided another example of its

adherence to international norms during the invasion of Panama when the military

violated the diplomatic immunity of the Nicaraguan ambassador.

Draft resolution S/21084 of 16 January 1990 states in part that the Security

Council, “taking note of the letters, dated 4 and 5 January 1990, from the Permanent

Mission of the United States of America to the President of Security Council, regretting

the search of the residence of the Ambassador of Nicaragua in Panama by United States

military forces, and indicating that the United States has taken steps to prevent the

recurrence of such actions,”

1. Declares that the serious events that took place are, as has been acknowledged, a violation of the privileges and immunities recognized under international law and codified in the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations;

2. Expresses its deep concern over any measure or action that restricts free communication and prevents the functioning of diplomatic missions in Panama in accordance with international law, and calls upon those concerned to take the appropriate steps to avoid the recurrence of such measures or actions;

3. Demands the full respect for the rules of international law that guarantee the immunity of diplomatic officers and the inviolability of the premises of diplomatic missions, an essential condition for the normal development of their activities.86

The United States cast the lone negative vote and vetoed the draft mildly criticizing it

for violating the diplomatic immunity of the Nicaraguan ambassador during the invasion

of Panama in December 1989 discussed above.87 The United States representative

deliberately dissembled that the U.S. “. . . is not supplying and will not supply arms to

86 United Nations Security Council draft resolution S/21084 of 16 January 1990.

87 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2905th Meeting,

S/PV.2905, 36.

136

guerillas and paramilitary forces in neighboring countries.”88 If the consequences of U.S.

actions were not so destructive and tragic, the speeches of the U.S. ambassadors to the

United Nations would almost be comic.89 Great Britain, the lone abstainer, again argued

that the dispute between the United States and Nicaragua should be settled by regional

organizations, not the United Nations, which contradicted the U.S. policy concerning Iraq

a few months later.90 As noted above, the United States prevented the League of Arab

States from settling the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait peacefully through a negotiated

settlement, instead favoring and coercing a United Nations approved military

intervention.

In 1927, on the eve of the twelfth U.S. invasion of Nicaragua, President Calvin

Coolidge admitted that U.S. military intervention was necessary to protect American

business interests, a fact, Blum acknowledges, “flaunted more openly in those days than

later.” 91 Coolidge declared:

88 Ibid., 32.

89 The mainstream media oftentimes criticizes foreign leaders for brash or ridiculous statements.

Recently both President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran have been castigated by the press for belligerency, a courtesy not extended to American politicians even given their unsurpassed uncompromising and aggressive rhetoric. Moreover, when Ahmadinejad sent a letter to Bush in an effort to open diplomatic channels with the United States, which have been closed since the overthrow of the Shah in 1979, instead of commenting on the substance of the letter, which among other things exposed the hypocrisy of U.S. policies, especially concerning Israel and its possession of nuclear weapons, and rightly questioned how a man who claims to be a follower of Jesus can be such a warmonger, the media simply repeated incessantly that the letter was rambling, thus incoherent, in an attempt to dismiss any diplomacy or negotiation between the two countries. The media instead are charmed by the extremely inarticulate George W. Bush, who stutters and dissembles and rambles when not properly handled by Karl Rove and company. While most politicians grandstand and obfuscate without substance (Democrat Senator Joe Biden wasted ninety percent of his allotted time to question the right-wing extremist nominee for the Supreme Court, John Roberts, rambling without asking any questions whatsoever), and incessantly provocatively threaten the world, the media compliantly only criticizes official enemies for such effrontery.

90 Ibid., 34.

91 Much of the following discussion is taken from Blum, chapter 49, 290-305. Quote from Ibid.

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I have the most conclusive evidence that arms and munitions in large quantities have been on several occasions . . . shipped to the revolutionists in Nicaragua . . . I am sure it is not the desire of the United States to intervene in the internal affairs of Nicaragua or of any other Central American republic. Nevertheless, it must be said, that we have a very definite and special interest in the maintenance of order and good Government in Nicaragua at the present time. . . . The United States cannot, therefore, fail to view with deep concern any serious threat to stability and constitutional government in Nicaragua tending toward anarchy and jeopardizing American interests, especially if such a state of affairs is contributed to or brought about by outside influence or by any foreign power.92 To ensure Nicaragua’s attractiveness as a business investment opportunity for American

corporations and replace the American military, the tax-payer funded protectors of

American business, the United States established the Nicaraguan National Guard in 1933,

under the direction of Anastasio Somoza. Blum describes that the Guardsmen,

“consistently maintained by the United States, passed their time on martial law, rape,

torture, murder of the opposition, and massacres of peasants, as well as less violent

pursuits such as robbery, extortion, contraband, running brothels and other government

functions . . .,” while “the Somoza clan laid claim to the lion’s share of Nicaragua’s land

and businesses.”93 Thus is the standard fare for American imposed governments. The

obvious contempt for democracy and human rights need not be commented upon. Profit,

clearly, is a higher moral value.

Shortly before Anastasio Somoza II abdicated into exile in Miami with $900

million dollars in July 1979, the head of the U.S. military in Latin America, Lieutenant

General Dennis McAuliffe, informed the dictator that the United States had “no intention

92 New York Times, 11 January 1927, 2 as cited in Blum, 290.

93 Ibid.

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of permitting a settlement which would lead to the destruction of the National Guard.”94

The Carter administration initiated measures to subvert the Sandinistas and strengthen the

opposition, specifically Somoza’s political party and the National Guard. Escalating after

Reagan’s inauguration as president, the U.S. war against Nicaragua targeted civilians in

what can only be described as egregious and barbaric violations of international law,

providing thus another example of U.S. terrorism against innocent people for political

and economic motives. Blum describes the following U.S./Contra targets and methods:

Contra/CIA operations emanating in Honduras also blew up oil pipelines, mined the waters of oil-unloading ports, and threatened to blow up any approaching oil tankers; at least seven foreign ships were damaged by the mines, including a Soviet tanker with five crewmen reported to be badly injured. Nicaragua’s ports were under siege: mortar shelling from high-speed motor launches, aerial bombing and rocket and machine-gun attacks were designed to block Nicaragua’s exports as well as to starve the country of imports by frightening away foreign shipping.95 Agriculture was another prime target. Raids by contras caused extensive damage to crops and demolished tobacco-drying barns, grain silos, irrigation projects, farm houses and machinery; roads, bridges and trucks were destroyed to prevent produce from being moved; numerous state farms and cooperatives were incapacitated and harvesting was prevented; other farms still intact were abandoned because of the danger.96 The contras’ brutality earned them a wide notoriety. They regularly destroyed health centers, schools, agricultural cooperatives, and community centers—symbols of the Sandinistas’ social programs in rural areas. People caught in these assaults were often tortured and killed in the most gruesome ways. One example, reported by The Guardian of London, suffices. In the words of a survivor of a raid in Jinotega province, which borders on Honduras: "Rosa had her breast cut off. Then they cut into her chest and took out her heart. The men had their arms broken, their testicles cut off, and their eyes poked out. They were killed by slitting their throats and pulling the tongue out through the slit."97

94 For Somoza’s wealth, see New York Times, 22 July 1979, III, 1, cited in Ibid.; for McAuliffe

quote, see Shirley Christian, Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family (New York: Random House, 1985), 73-74, cited in Ibid., 291.

95 The Guardian, 8 and 13 October 1983; 9 and 22 March 1984; 9 April 1984, cited in Ibid., 292.

96 The Guardian, 18 May 1983; 6 June 1983; 30 May 1984, cited in Ibid.

97 The Guardian, 15 November 1984 and other sources cited in Ibid.

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Thus operate America’s “freedom fighters” and the “moral equal of our founding

fathers” in Nicaragua and indeed throughout the world, exposing as false the U.S.

commitment to democracy, human rights, freedom, and international law and that U.S.

atrocities are not anomalies but fundamental policy in dealing with those governments

more concerned with their peoples’ welfare than serving Washington’s interests.98

Moreover, considering that the Reagan administration was forced at times by Congress to

illegally fund the Contras through the Iran-Contra affair, we glimpse the almost absolute

power of the presidential office and the executive’s contempt for public opinion and real

democracy. Furthermore, one need not use a great deal of imagination to plausibly

speculate how the U.S. or Israel would respond to such terrorism.

To justify its aggression against Nicaragua, the United States government

articulated various pretexts and explanations, including supposed massive Nicaraguan

arms transfers to El Salvador, the supposed fraudulent election in 1984, and supposed

Nicaraguan obfuscation of the Contadora process. Unsurprisingly, the U.S. pretexts had

no basis in reality, yet the government and mainstream media’s incessant repetition of

these explanations in a domestic propaganda campaign created the false and misleading

perception in the mind of the American public that the accusations against Nicaragua

were veritably true. The Reagan administration claimed that the Sandinistas were arming

the El Salvador rebels, whom Reagan referred to as “murderers and terrorists.”99

Interestingly, the fact that the United States was arming and training the Salvadoran

military junta and that El Salvador was aiding the Contras were never pretexts for a

98 Reagan’s descriptions of the Contras can be found in The Guardian, 3 June 1983, cited in Ibid.,

293.

99 Ibid., 293-294.

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Nicaraguan invasion of either offending country. Moreover, the U.S. right to arm any

country or group was never once questioned; it is only wrong for enemies to aid or arm

targets of U.S. violence. The evidence supporting the U.S. accusation against Nicaragua

proved to be quite slim if not completely nonexistent. According to Blum, in January

1981, a Salvadoran official “announced that Nicaragua was no longer allowing its

territory to be used for arms shipments,”100 perhaps understandably alarmed of U.S.

hostility. Furthermore, the CIA confirmed in March 1981 that the Sandinistas had indeed

terminated any arms supply to the Salvadoran rebels.101 David MacMichael, a CIA

analyst of Central America from 1981 to 1983, later observed that “the Administration

and the CIA have systematically misrepresented Nicaraguan involvement in the supply of

arms to Salvadorean guerillas to justify [their] efforts to overthrow the Nicaraguan

government.”102

Ostensible Nicaraguan obfuscation of the Contadora settlement served as another

pretext for American belligerence. The Contadora group, composed of Mexico, Panama,

Columbia, and Venezuela, formed a 21-point treaty dealing with civil war, foreign

intervention, elections, and human rights. The Reagan administration, although not a

signatory to the treaty, demanded that the Sandinistas sign the document, implying that

failure to do so would perhaps justify Washington’s policy toward Nicaragua. Once

Nicaragua announced its intention to sign the treaty, the United States voiced previously

unheard of criticism of the Contadora Plan. According to Blum: “What alarmed

100 New York Times, 19 January 1981, 11, cited in Ibid., 295.

101 Bob Woodward, VEIL: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981-1987 (New York, 1987), 120, as cited

in Ibid.

102 New York Times, 11 June 1984, B6 as cited in Ibid.

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Washington about the treaty was its provisions for the removal from each country of all

foreign military bases; restrictions on foreign military personnel, armaments, and military

exercises; and a prohibition on aid to insurgent forces seeking to overthrow a

government.”103 Representative Michael Barnes, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs

Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, observed that “the Administration’s

objections to the treaty reinforce my belief that it’s never had any real interest in a

negotiated settlement.”104 State Department officials conceded that Sandinista

willingness to sign the treaty “might undermine the Administration’s efforts to portray

the Sandinistas as the primary source of tension in Central America.”105

The administration proclaimed that the Nicaraguan elections in 1984 were

completely fraudulent, explicitly compared to the recent elections in El Salvador, which

provided the military junta and the U.S with sufficient political capital to continue the

war against the Salvadoran people, and implicitly with the U.S. electoral system.

Interestingly, no foreign country has used fraudulent U.S. presidential elections as a

pretext to invade and install real democracy. As for the supposedly flawed elections,

Blum argues that

On the face of it, by the (flawed) standards of Western elections, the Nicaraguan election cannot be much faulted; by the standards of Latin America, it was a veritable paragon of democracy; the fact that there were no deaths reported in connection with the election, by itself, made it rather unique in Latin America; the appearance of minor parties on the ballot in every department (state) of the nation distinguished it from the typical presidential election in the United States.106

103 Ibid., 297.

104 New York Times, 3 October 1984, 3, cited in Ibid.

105 New York Times, 24 September 1984, 12, cited in Ibid., 297-298.

106 Ibid., 298.

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The elections, observed by 400 foreigners, allowed the Washington Post to report:

Even U.S. diplomats here acknowledge that the Sandinistas have allowed expression of a wide range of political views, including some that were harshly critical of the government. The Sandinistas eased censorship of the sole, opposition newspaper, La

Presna, at the start of the campaign, and the state television and radio channels have given air time—although limited—for the small but vocal opposition parties to make their case.107

As an example of the Orwellian use of history in the United States to manipulate

the public and the mainstream media’s complicity in this propaganda exercise, we need

look no further than the newspaper of record, the New York Times. While initially

informing its readers that the Reagan administration actively sought to de-legitimize the

Nicaraguan election, the Times, relegating its former report to the memory hole, declared

that the election was a complete fraud because Nicaragua prevented opposition

participation. The Times reported two weeks before the election:

The Reagan administration, while publicly criticizing the Nov. 4 elections in Nicaragua as “a sham,” has privately argued against the participation of the leading opposition candidate for fear his involvement would legitimize the electoral process, according to some senior Administration officials. Since May, when American policy toward the election was formed, the Administration has wanted the opposition candidate, Arturo Jose Cruz, either not to enter the race or, if he did, to withdraw before the election, claiming the conditions were unfair, the officials said. “The Administration never contemplated letting Cruz stay in the race,” one official said, “because then the Sandinistas could justifiably claim that the elections were legitimate, making it much harder for the United States to oppose the Nicaraguan government.” Several Administration officials who are familiar with the Administration’s activities in Nicaragua said the Central Intelligence Agency had worked with some of Mr. Cruz’s supporters to insure that they would object to any potential agreement for his participation in the election.108

However, after the election, the New York Times absurdly editorialized, in complete

contradiction to the above article:

107 Washington Post, 4 November 1984, A1, cited in Ibid., 299.

108 New York Times, 21 October 1984, 12, cited in Ibid., 300.

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Only the naïve believe that Sunday’s election in Nicaragua was democratic or legitimizing proof of the Sandinistas’ popularity. . . . The Sandinistas made it easy to dismiss their election as a sham. Their decisive act was to break off negotiations with Arturo Cruz, an opposition democrat whose candidacy could have produced a more credible contest. . . . The opposition . . . was finally shrunk to four small left-wing groups and factions of two traditional parties. Even so, and after five years of unchallenged power, the Sandinistas appear to have won less than two-thirds of the vote.109

Disregarding that in a United States national election the press would consider

that a candidate who collected sixty-five percent of the vote would have won in a

landslide, the New York Times failed to observe after the 2004 presidential election in the

United States that “after four years of unchallenged power, George W. Bush appears to

have won barely fifty-one percent of the vote,” nor that the election was a “sham”

because the two factions of the business party, most notably the Democrats, actively

prevented the independent candidate Ralph Nader and the Green Party candidates from

being put on the ballot in many states. Moreover, only in a country where the

government, media, and economic elite control the historical record presented to the

public at large could such disparate versions of events be presented in the newspaper of

record without virtually any mainstream comment.110

The U.S. placed a great deal of emphasis on Nicaraguan censorship of La Prensa

and the supposed failings of the 1984 election as compared to the “democratic” election

in El Salvador the same year. As for La Prensa, one of the paper’s chief editors during

the 1980s, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, Jr., was “a member of the directorate of a contra

109 New York Times, 7 November 1984, 26, cited in Ibid.

110 See for example, Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman, Manufacturing Consent: The Political

Economy of the Mass Media (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988); Chomsky, Necessary Illusions (Boston: South End Press, 1989); Michael Parenti, Inventing Reality: The Politics of the Mass Media (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986).

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umbrella group, The Nicaraguan Resistance of Washington, D.C.”111 Moreover, the

paper was funded by the CIA and the National Endowment for Democracy, an

organization chartered to “do somewhat overtly what the CIA had been doing covertly

for decades—manipulate the political process in a target country by financing political

parties, labor unions, book publishers, newspapers, etc. . . .”112 One may inquire whether

the United States would allow a foreign enemy to finance an opposition newspaper in the

United States. Furthermore, an honest appraisal of the U.S. government’s policies

severely curtailing civil liberties throughout American history would somewhat dampen

the Reagan administration’s indignation at Nicaraguan censorship of an enemy

publication. For example, John Adams’ Alien and Sedition Act, which limited criticism

of the government; Abraham Lincoln’s suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, which

allowed the president to put critics of the war in prison without due process; Woodrow

Wilson’s Espionage Act, which made it a crime to criticize American involvement in

World War I; and George W. Bush’s Patriot Act, which has limited civil liberties while

increasing the power of the state to spy upon American citizens.

The United States government and media unfavorably compared the Nicaraguan

election in 1984 to the El Salvador elections in 1982 and 1984, which the media critic

Edward Herman considers classic examples of demonstration elections orchestrated by

the United States “to mobilize support back home for the intervention in favor of a

military solution and a ‘death squad democracy.’”113 Vice President Dick Cheney,

111 In These Times, 21-27 October 1987, citing a spokeswoman at the Nicaraguan Resistance, as

cited in Ibid., 303.

112 New York Times, 1 June 1986, and other sources cited in Ibid.

113 Edward Herman, “The Afghan, El Salvador, and Iraq Elections,” Z Magazine, Volume 17, Number 12, December 2004, 32-36. For a more in depth analysis on demonstration elections, see Herman

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referring to the recent Afghani election while under U.S. occupation, stated during the 5

October 2004 vice presidential debate:

Twenty years ago we had a similar situation in El Salvador. We had [a] guerilla insurgency [that] controlled roughly a third of the country, 75,000 people dead, and we held free elections. I was there as an observer on behalf of the Congress. The human drive for freedom, the determination of these people to vote, was unbelievable. The terrorists would come in and shoot up polling places; as soon as they left, the voters would come back and get in line and would not be denied the right to vote.114 Herman relates that not only was there “no shooting up of polling places,” but also an

“UN-sponsored Salvadoran Truth Commission found that over 90 percent of those

75,000 dead were civilians killed by the U.S.-sponsored army and paramilitaries. . . .”115

Furthermore, the contemporary mainstream media emphasized the Salvadoran voter

turnout as a justification for U.S. policies and support of the military junta without

mentioning that voting in the election was legally required, with each person’s ID card,

which the police could demand at any time, marked as verification, and the vote boxes

were transparent allowing the government and military observers to easily examine a

person’s ballot. Cheney, in his recollection, and the contemporary media did not mention

“that the left did not offer candidates and couldn’t do so because all their leaders who had

not been murdered were on a 138 person army death list,” and

the two dissident newspapers in El Salvador had been eliminated by threats, physical destruction of facilities, and outright murder; that intermediate organizations like unions and independent political groupings had been dismantled; that there was no freedom of assembly or speech; and that state terror was rampant and had traumatized the population.116

and Frank Brodhead, Demonstration Elections: U.S.-Staged Elections in the Dominican Republic, Vietnam,

and El Salvador (Boston: South End Press, 1984).

114 Ibid., 32. 115 Ibid.

116 Ibid., 32-33.

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Herman concludes that “in short, not one of the conditions of a free election was met in

El Salvador’s ‘free elections.’”117

Illustrating the use of history as a propaganda weapon, the Kissinger Commission

on Central America asserted that the Sandinistas were worse than Somoza, and Kissinger

himself compared Nicaragua under the Sandinistas to Nazi Germany.118 Similarly,

Reagan compared the Contras’ war against Nicaragua favorably to Great Britain’s

defense against the Nazis in World War II.119 The propaganda campaign directed upon

the American domestic population was orchestrated by an Office of Public Diplomacy,

formed in 1983 as “a huge psychological operation of the kind the military conducts to

influence a population in denied or enemy territory.”120 The OPD’s Deputy Director,

Colonel Daniel Jacobowitz, described the essentials of the propaganda campaign:

“Overall theme: the Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters [the Contras] are fighters for freedom

in the American Tradition, FSLN [Sandinistas] are evil.”121 One example suffices to

describe the transmogrification of history: Secretary of State Alexander Haig proclaimed

a picture of blazing corpses as “atrocious genocidal actions that are being taken by the

Nicaraguan Government” against the Miskito Indians. However, the photo was taken

117 Ibid., 33.

118 International Herald Tribune, 22 January 1984; Blum writes that “both attributions are from a

letter of Eugene Stockwell who testified before the Commission following a visit to Nicaragua with the World Council of Churches,” cited in Blum, 300.

119 The Guardian, 15 March 1986, cited in Ibid.

120 Miami Herald, 19 July 1987, 18A, cited in Ibid., 301.

121 Peter Kornbluh, “Propaganda and Public Diplomacy: Selling Reagan’s Nicaragua Policy,” Extra! (published by Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting), Summer 1989, 20, cited in Ibid.

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during 1978, while Somoza was still in power.122 Blum describes the workings of the

Office of Public Diplomacy in the following way:

Opinion pieces and “news” stories prepared by OPD staffers or contractors were planted in major media outlets under the signatures of contra leaders or ostensibly independent scholars, pretending to offer independent confirmation of White House claims, while other materials were distributed to thousands of university libraries, faculties, editorial writers, and religious organizations. Private sector public relations experts, lobbying groups, and think tanks were also enlisted for the cause and paid large chunks of taxpayer money to promote the OPD agenda. By OPD’s own assessment, its work significantly changed public and congressional opinion, including winning approval in the House of $100 million in contra aid in June 1986.123

Clearly, the U.S. war against Nicaragua, which was an egregious violation of

international law and universal morality, had absolutely nothing to do with freedom or

democracy or human rights or national security (even if the Nicaraguan army could drive

to Texas undetected and invade the United States). The United States obsession with

destroying the Sandinista experiment in Nicaragua, an experiment whereby the

government attempted to provide for the welfare of its people, was adequately described

in the liberal Boston Globe, which reported in February 1986:

Few U.S. officials now believe the contras can drive out the Sandinistas soon. Administration officials said they are content to see the contras debilitate the Sandinistas by forcing them to diver scarce resources toward the war and away from social programs.124 The United States has habitually excused and supported aggression, apartheid, occupation

of foreign lands, military juntas, and dictatorships throughout its history. However, the

political and economic elite have never accepted the formation of a socialist or

122 New York Times, 3 March 1982, 5; Blum writes that “the photograph was first printed in the

right-wing French newspaper Le Figaro, which then admitted its ‘mistake’ after being exposed by other French publications; it appears that Haig did not make any public retraction,” cited in Ibid.

123 Kornbluh, 20-22; Extra!, October/November 1987, 4, citing the example of Prof. John Guilmartin’s op-ed “Nicaragua is Armed for Trouble,” in the Wall Street Journal, 11 March 1985, as cited in Ibid.

124 Boston Globe, 9 February 1986, A20, cited in Ibid., 302.

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communist government, whether it be Cuba, the Soviet Union, Grenada, or Nicaragua.

The greatest threat is the threat of a good example--a government and society which

places the welfare of human beings and the welfare of the earth above the infinite pursuit

of profit that care neither for human welfare or the sustainability of the world.

Blum provides the following pertinent summation of the American war against

another helpless and weak third world country, causing this author to wonder why Ronald

Reagan has been deified as a great American and how his policymaking cabal ever

ascended again to control the Oval Office:

By the time the War in Nicaragua began to slowly atrophy to a tentative conclusion during 1988-89, the Reagan administration’s obsession with the Sandinistas had inspired both the official and unofffical squads to embrace tactics such as the following in order to maintain a steady flow of financing, weaponry and other aid to the Contras: dealings with other middle-eastern and Latin American terrorists, frequent drug smuggling in a variety of imaginative ways, money laundering, embezzlement of U.S. government funds, perjury, obstruction of justice, burglary of the offices of American dissidents, covert propaganda to defeat domestic political foes, violation of the neutrality act, illegal shredding of government documents, plans to suspend the Constitution in the event of widespread internal dissent against government policy . . . and much more, as revealed in the phenomenon known as Iran/Contra . . . all of it to support the band of rapists, torturers and killers known as the contras.125

The above quote by Elliott Abrams, who was a prime mover behind the Iran/Contra

scandal, intimated that history is written by the victors. American history is revised and

rewritten everyday as the enormous machinery of the political and corporate elite is put

into motion to constantly propagandize and educate a public ignorant of history to

patriotically acquiesce to their diktats and unconsciously accept not only the

unquestionable tenets of American benevolence and American freedom, but the status

125 Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters (Washington, D.C., 1993),

Volumes I and II, passim; The National Security Archive, The Chronology (New York, 1987), passim; Jonathan Marshall, Peter Dale Scott, Jane Hunter, The Iran-Contra Connection (Boston, 1987), passim; Jonathan Kwitny, The Crimes of Patriots: A True Tale of Dope, Dirty Money, and the CIA (New York: 1987), see index; Holly Sklar, Washington’s War on Nicaragua (Boston, 1988), see index, as cited in Ibid.

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quo of American hegemony, American militarism, and the inalterability of the capitalist

system, which creates so much economic and social inequality to render democracy

meaningless. If the contras are folk heroes, then we are indeed living in an Orwellian

world where power determines history, justice, and truth and defines the victims of brutal

American military aggression as unworthy of their lives, unworthy of our compassion,

and indeed unworthy of our notice.

The United States oftentimes utilizes overwhelming military force as a first resort

for territorial, economic, or political advantage, the control of resources and markets, and

the maintenance of U.S. hegemony. The George H. W. Bush administration’s righteous

indignation against Iraqi aggression is more an anomaly reserved for designated enemies

rather than a fundamental principle of American foreign policy, as the military

interventions in Grenada, Panama, Libya, and Nicaragua indicate. While enemies are

chastised and punished for violating international law, the United States and its allies and

clients, especially Israel, oftentimes act with impunity knowing that although world

opinion may oppose their policies, no international body has the power to deter and

punish them. Contrary to the U.S. manipulation of the Security Council to adopt

resolutions mandating sanctions and force against Iraq, the United States has habitually

vetoed resolutions critical of Israeli policies. Without U.S. military, political, economic,

and diplomatic support, Israel would not have the power to act as a rogue state, commit

aggression against neighboring Arab states under the pretext of self-defense, violate

dozens of United Nations resolutions, and prevent a political process leading to peace and

security for all inhabitants of the Middle East. Before cataloging Israel’s habitual

noncompliance with Security Council resolutions and the blatant U.S. effort to undermine

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the United Nations and prevent a just Middle East peace based on the international

consensus, it is necessary to examine the origin of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the major

crises and wars between Israel and the Arab states, the massive injustice perpetrated upon

the Palestinian Arabs, and the complete Israeli rejection of Palestinian human rights.

Chapter Four:

Israel: Rogue Ally

[Palestine is] the land without people--for the people [Jews] without a land. Israel Zangwill

Early Zionist, c. 18971 What are Palestinians? When I came here–there were 250,000 non-Jews, mainly Arabs

and Bedouins. It was desert–more than underdeveloped, nothing.

Prime Minister Levi Eshkol February 19692

. . . It was not as though there was a Palestinian people and we came and threw them out

and took their country away from them. They did not exist.

Prime Minister Golda Meir June 19693

There is no such thing as ‘Palestinian people’ . . . there are no Palestinians.

Rabbi Meir Kahane Founder, Jewish Defense League February 19884

1 Quoted in Amos Elon, The Israelis: Founders and Sons (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,

1979), 149 as cited in Findley, Deliberate Deceptions: Facing the Facts about the U.S.-Israeli Relationship

(New York: Lawrence Hill Books, 1993), 6. 2 Newsweek, 17 February 1969, quoted in Edward Said and Christopher Hitchens, eds., Blaming

the Victims (New York: Verso, 1988), 241 as cited in Ibid., 168-169. 3 Sunday Times (London), 15 June 1969, quoted in David Hirst, The Gun and the Olive Branch:

The Roots of Violence in the Middle East (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977), 264 as cited in Ibid., 169.

4 Meir Kahane, “No Jewish Guilt!,” New York Times, 2 February 1988 as cited in Ibid., 169.

According to historian Benny Morris, after World War I, there were 618,000 Muslims, 70,000 Arab Christians, and 59,000 Jews in Palestine; by 1947, there were 1.2 or 1.3 million Arabs and 650,000 Jews. International Relations professor Cheryl Rubenberg cites the post-World War II population as 1,319,434 Arabs and 589,341 Jews. While the Arab population increased naturally, the Jewish population increased largely through immigration. To support the mythology that Palestine was an empty wasteland and justify Jewish settlement and dispossession of Palestinian Arabs land and denial of their right to self-determination, some “scholarship”

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We firmly stand by the historic right of the people of Israel to the entire Land of Israel.

Every hill in Samaria and every valley in Judea [the West Bank] is part of our historic

homeland.

Prime Minister Ehud Olmert January 20065

The David and Goliath conflict between Palestine and Israel, perhaps the

fundamental barrier to peace and justice in the Middle East, essentially begs the question

of whether human rights apply equally to all or if parochial identity concepts centered

upon such exclusionary categories as race, ethnicity, sex, religion, and nationality dictate

a group’s political, economic, and civil rights. To state another way, do the rights of

Jews to a Jewish homeland, to security, to resources, to freedom trump the same rights of

Palestinians and other Arabs to such an extent that Israel can forcibly deny their humanity

has purported to provide demographic proof illustrating that there were no Palestinians, and, in fact, Arabs from neighboring states migrated to Palestine after the Jewish colonizers had developed the land into a paradise. The historian Norman Finkelstein has assiduously endeavored to catalogue the myriad falsifications and expose these hoaxes as scholarship that cannot suffer minimal scrutiny. As a graduate student, Finkelstein exposed Joan Peters’ best-selling and celebrated From Time Immemorial: The Origins

of the Arab-Jewish Conflict over Palestine as a complete fraud. More recently, in Beyond Chutzpah and in a lecture given at the University of Toledo, Finkelstein demonstrated that portions of Alan Dershowitz’s The Case for Israel are essentially a shoddy plagiarism of Peters’ work, perpetuating the misconception that the Jewish colonizers settled on an empty, undeveloped land. The post-World War I figures are in Justin McCarthy, The Population of Palestine: Population History and

Statistics of the Late Ottoman Period and the Mandate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 26, cited in Benny Morris, Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1999 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999), 83; post-World War II figures are in Ibid., 192, and General Monthly Bulletin 12 (December: 1947), 686 (Table I) cited in Janet Abu-Lughod, “The Demographic Transformation of Palestine,” in Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, ed., The Transformation of Palestine: Essays on the Origin and

Development of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1971), 155 as cited in Cheryl Rubenberg, Israel and the American National Interest: A Critical Examination (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986), 26; For Finkelstein’s discussion of Peters see In These Times, Sept. 5-11, 1984, 12-14, Image and Reality of the Israeli-Palestine Conflict, 2nd ed. (New York: Verso, 2003), and for Dershowitz’s plagiarism of Peters see Beyond Chutzpah: On the Misuse of Anti-Semitism and the Abuse

of History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005). Finkelstein spoke at the University of Toledo as part of the Engaged History Lecture series during the Fall 2005 semester.

5 Quoted in Nick Dearden, “Israel’s New Government, Old Policies,” Z Magazine, Vol. 19, No. 6,

June 2006, 4-5. Moreover, Olmert promised that “Israel will maintain control over the security zones, the Jewish settlement blocs, and those places which have supreme national importance to the Jewish people, first and foremost a united Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty.”

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and violate their fundamental human rights? Does international law apply equally to all

persons and nations, or does American, Israeli, German, and Indian exceptionalism allow

some to operate according to self-defined unique standards and rules?

Before embarking on an examination of Israel’s habitual noncompliance with

Security Council resolutions and the blatant U.S. effort to undermine the United Nations

and prevent a just Middle East peace based upon the international consensus, it is

necessary to provide some background information describing the origin of the conflict,

the major crises and wars between Israel and the Arab states, the massive injustice

perpetrated on the Palestinian Arabs, and the complete Israeli rejection of Palestinian

human rights and self-determination. While not a comprehensive history, the necessary

revisionist narrative counters the standard orthodox scholarship within the United States,

thus illustrating the U.S. and Israel’s primacy in preventing a just settlement for Middle

East peace and the context to critically and skeptically examine and understand the U.S.

and Israeli indefensible, minority positions in the United Nations Security Council.

Without U.S. military, political, economic, and diplomatic aid, Israel would not have the

power to act as a rogue state and prevent a political process leading to peace and security

for all inhabitants of the Middle East. As George Marshall presciently observed, “If Jews

follow counsel of these extremists who favor contemptuous policy toward Arabs, any

Jewish state to be set up will be able to survive only with continuous assistance from

Abroad.”6 U.S. support for Israel concomitant with its own policies in the Middle East

explain a great deal of animosity toward and retail terrorism against the U.S, highlighting

further the need to hold the United States and its allies accountable to international law.

6 Secret Telegram “INFOTEL from Secretary of State,” 14 May 1948, as cited in Stephen Green,

Taking Sides: America’s Secret Relations with a Militant Israel (New York: Morrow, 1984), 70-71, found in Paul Findley, Deliberate Deceptions, 13-14.

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On 29 November 1947 the United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution

181 partitioning Palestine into two independent sovereign ethnic states, one Jewish and

the other Palestinian Arab, and designating the Holy City of Jerusalem as a special

international regime under United Nations administration.7 Palestinian historian Walid

Khalidi writes

the partition resolution awarded 55.5 percent of the total area of Palestine to the Jews (most of whom were recent immigrants), who constituted less than a third of the population and who owned less than 7 percent of the land. The Palestinians, on the other hand, who made up over two thirds of population and who owned the vast bulk of the land, were awarded 45.5 percent of the country of which they had enjoyed continuous possession for centuries.8

The United Nations proceeded to violate its Charter and the founding principle of self-

determination when thirty-three nations supported the partition against thirteen negative

votes and ten abstentions, thus validating the Jewish colonizers dispossession and

expulsion of the indigenous Palestinians. Khalidi notes that

the Palestinians failed to see why they should be made to pay for the Holocaust . . . they failed to see why it was not fair for the Jews to be a minority in a unitary Palestinian state, while it was fair for almost half of the Palestinian population--the indigenous majority on its own ancestral soil--to be converted overnight into a minority under alien rule.9

Nahum Goldmann, former president of the World Jewish Congress, admitted the Zionist

demand for a Jewish state “was in full contradiction with all principles of modern history

7 For the full text of the partition resolution and a detailed map of the plan see George J. Tomeh, ed., United Nations Resolutions on Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Volume I: 1947-1974

(Washington D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1975), 4-14. For a map of the Partition Plan, see Appendix II, Map I, 419. The map created by the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA) can be found at <www.passia.org>.

8 Walid Khalidi, “Revisiting the UNGA Partition Resolution,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Autumn 1997, 11, 13, cited in Finkelstein, Beyond Chutzpah, 284.

9 Khalidi, Before Their Diaspora: A Photographic History of the Palestinians, 1876-1948

(Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1991), 305-306, cited in Benny Morris, Righteous

Victims, 186.

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and international law.” Goldmann continued, “If the demand were to serve as precedent,

the Indians of North America could claim for themselves the United States . . . .”10 The

1919 U.S. King-Crane Commission concurred, deciding that a claim “based on an

occupation two thousand years ago can hardly be seriously considered.”11 The historian

Norman Finkelstein asks “is there any example in history of a people voluntarily

relinquishing a fragment, let alone most, of their country to settlers coming from abroad

to colonize it and then drive them out?” Finkelstein concludes that “the embryonic

Jewish state emerging from the British mandate was imposed by force on, and against the

will of, the indigenous Palestinian Arab population. On no generally accepted principle

of morality or law could the flagrant violation of the Palestinian’s right to self-

determination be justified.”12

Finkelstein, in Beyond Chutzpah: On the Misuse of Anti-Semitism and the Abuse

of History, meticulously catalogues the Zionists designs for Palestine and its indigenous

Arab inhabitants revising the standard narrative found in U.S. scholarship. After the

British Balfour Declaration,13 David Ben-Gurion, a Zionist movement leader and future

10 Quotation from Goldmann in Seth P. Tillman, The United States in the Middle East: Interests

and Obstacles (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 53, cited in Rubenberg, 4.

11 Excerpts from the King-Crane Commission report are in Khalidi, From Haven to Conquest:

Readings in Zionism and the Palestine Problem until 1948 (Washington D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1987), 213-218, and Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin, eds., The Israeli-Arab Reader (New York: Penguin, 1987), 34-42, as cited in Findley, Deliberate Deceptions, 4.

12 Finkelstein, Beyond Chutzpah, 284.

13

The British, perhaps recognizing that a Jewish state in the Middle East beholden to and

dependent on Great Britain would be a useful client in a wholly unstable region, provided support to the Zionists through the Balfour Declaration, a letter from the British Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour to Lord Rothschild, president of the British Zionist Federation, on 2 November 1917. The declaration pronounced that “his majesty’s government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use the best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of the object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of

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Prime Minister of Israel, described the Jewish state as including Palestine, Jordan, and

parts of Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt.14 According to Finkelstein, the Israeli Declaration of

Independence, written after the partition, purposefully made no mention of a Palestinian

Arab state: “On November 29, 1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations

adopted a resolution requiring the establishment of a Jewish state in Eretz-Israel.”15

While an official commission predicted that the Jewish state would contain 498,000 Jews

and 407,000 Arabs and others, Finkelstein asserts that the United Nations excluded

90,000 to 105,000 Bedouins from the survey, thus perhaps making the Jews a minority in

the future Jewish state.16 The Zionist leaders Chaim Weizmann and Ben-Gurion

Saw partition as a stepping stone to further expansion and the eventual takeover of the whole of Palestine . . . . [Ben-Gurion] wrote to his son Amos: "[A] Jewish state in part [of Palestine] is not an end, but a beginning . . . . Our possession is important not only for itself . . . through this we increase our power, and every increase in power facilitates getting hold of this country in its entirety. Establishing a [small] state . . . will serve as a very potent lever in our historical efforts to redeem the whole country."17

As for the Palestinian demographic problem, Finkelstein relates that “it was

impossible to carve out a Jewish state in Palestine without a substantial Palestinian Arab

existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.” Ronald Sanders, The High Walls of Jerusalem: A History of the Balfour Declaration and

the Birth of the British Mandate for Palestine (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1983), 612-613 cited in Findley, Deliberate Deceptions, 5.

14 Shabtai Teveth, Ben-Gurion and the Palestine Arabs: From Peace to War (New York: Oxford

University Press, 1985), 34-35, cited in Finkelstein, Beyond Chutzpah, 280.

15 Michael Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion: A Biography (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1978), 162, cited in Finkelstein, Beyond Chutzpah, 286.

16 Michael J. Cohen, Palestine and the Great Powers, 1945-1948 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton

University Press, 1982), 273n31; Avi Shlaim, Collusion across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist

Movement, and the Partition of Palestine (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 117-119; Evan M. Wilson, Decision on Palestine: How the U.S. Came to Recognize Israel (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), 112-113, cited in Finkelstein, Beyond Chutzpah, 283.

17 Morris, Righteous Victims, 138, cited in Finkelstein, Beyond Chutzpah, 280. Moreover, Morris, citing Christopher Sykes, Crossroads to Israel (London: Collins, 1965), 212-213, quotes Ben-Gurion as saying “no Zionist can forgo the smallest portion of the Land of Israel.”

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population and thus–in light of the Zionist goal of creating a demographically “stable”

Jewish state–without massive expulsion.”18 Finkelstein quotes the Israeli historian Benny

Morris:

For many Zionists, beginning with [Theodor] Herzl, the only realistic solution lay in transfer. From 1880 to 1920, some entertained the prospect of Jews and Arabs coexisting in peace. But increasingly after 1920, and more emphatically after 1929, for the vast majority a denouement of conflict appeared inescapable. Following the outbreak of 1936, no mainstream leader was able to conceive of future coexistence and peace without a clear physical separation between the two peoples–achievable only by way of transfer and expulsion.19

Therefore, Morris notes “what happened in 1948 was inevitable.20 If the Jews wanted to

establish a state in Eretz-Israel that would be located on an area a little larger than Tel

18 Finkelstein, Beyond Chutzpah, 283.

19 Morris, Righteous Victims, 139, cited in Finkelstein, Beyond Chutzpah, 259. Moreover, Morris writes that “Ben-Gurion argued in a letter to his son that the Jews’ acceptance of partition–that is, acceptance of only 20 percent or so of their Promised Land–justified the transfer: ‘[W]e never wanted to dispossess the Arabs. But since England is giving part of the country promised to us–for an Arab state, it is only fair that the Arabs in our state be transferred to the Arab area.’” D. Ben-Gurion to A. Ben-Gurion, 27-28, July 1937 cited in Morris, Righteous Victims, 139.

20 Jewish forces began fighting and expanding into designated Palestinian land immediately after

the General Assembly resolution. Several Arab nations entered Palestine to aid Palestinian resistance after the Israeli Declaration of Independence in May 1948; however, as Rubenberg notes “with the sole exception of the Egyptian army of 10,000 men that crossed the Negev Desert (the status of which had not yet been decided),” no Arab army entered into land partitioned to Israel. After the 1948 war, Israel controlled eight thousand square miles or almost eighty percent of Palestine, including the Negev desert, and according to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East [UNRWA], 726,000 Palestinian Arabs became refugees. The U.S. State Department reported in 1949 that seventy-five percent of the Palestinian Arab refugees were a combination of pregnant or nursing mothers, children, the infirm, and the aged. Moreover, the U.S. public “generally is unaware of the Palestinian refugee problem since it has not been hammered away at by the press or radio.” While the United Nations General Assembly resolution 194 iterated that a special international regime would administer Jerusalem and the Palestinian refugees had the right to return to their homes or receive just compensation, as the discussion above indicates, Israel actively sought sole Jewish control over Palestine, ensuring Israel’s rejection of international law and United Nations resolutions demanding that refugees be allowed to return to their homes. Contemporary Knesset member Eliahu Carmeli stated that “. . . I am not willing to take back one Arab, not even one goy [i.e., non-Jew]. I want the Jewish state to be wholly Jewish.” For an extensive history of the first Arab-Israeli war see Morris, Righteous Victims, 161-258; for the Rubenberg quote see Rubenberg, 44; for the UNRWA figure see Rony Gabbay, A Political Study of the Arab-Jewish Conflict: The Arab Refugee Problem (A Case Study) (Geneva: Librairie E. Droz, and Paris: Librairie Minard, 1959) cited in Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949

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Aviv, a removing of population was needed . . . . Without a population expulsion, a

Jewish state could not have been established.”21 Morris writes “what remained was for

the Jews to translate the formal leasehold into concrete possession and statehood, in war–

and for the Palestinians to pay the price,” admitting that “in general, in most cases, the

final and decisive precipitant to [Palestinian Arab] flight was [Israeli] attack or the

inhabitants’ fear of such attack.”22 Ben-Gurion, who declared in 1938 that there was

nothing immoral about the compulsory transfer of Arabs, demanded “in each attack a

decisive blow should be struck, resulting in the destruction of homes and the expulsion of

the population.”23

Cheryl Rubenberg, professor of international relations, argues in Israel and the

American National Interest: A Critical Examination, that “American support for the

creation of the state of Israel was based primarily on domestic political considerations,

not on calculations of U.S. national interest.”24 Rubenberg quotes President Harry

Truman honestly admitting to State Department officials, “I am sorry, gentlemen, but I

have to answer to hundreds of thousands who are anxious for the success of Zionism: I do

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 297; for the Carmeli quote see Labour Party Archives 2-11/1/1, Protocols of the Special Meeting of the Mapai Secretariat and Knesset Faction, 1 August 1949 cited in Ibid., 281 and cited in Findley, Deliberate Deceptions, 22; for the State Department report see FRUS

1949, “Palestine Refugees,” 15 March 1949, 6:828-42 as cited in Findley, Deliberate Deceptions, 20-21; for full text of the General Assembly resolution 194 see Tomeh, 15-17.

21 Meron Rappaport, “Interview with Benny Morris,” Yediot Ahronot (11 November 2001), cited

in Finkelstein, Beyond Chutzpah, 283.

22 Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited (Cambridge, 2004), 294 cited in Finkelstein, Beyond Chutzpah, 265.

23 See Central Zionist Archives S-100/24B, protocol of the joint meeting of the Jewish Agency Executive and the Political Committee of the Zionist Executive, June 12, 1938 as cited in Morris, Righteous

Victims, 253 and Michael Palumbo, The Palestinian Catastrophe: The 1948 Expulsion of a People from

Their Homeland (Boston: Faber and Faber, 1987), 40, cited in Findley, Deliberate Deceptions, 10.

24 Rubenberg, 48.

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not have hundreds of thousands of Arabs among my constituents.”25 While observing

that Great Britain maintained its position in the Middle East through good Arab relations,

the State Department concluded that American support for Zionism was contrary to

American interests and would allow the Soviet Union to penetrate the Middle East and

develop ties with Arab nations, create a barrier to American access to oil and markets,

and violate the ostensible American support for the principle of self-determination.

Moreover, the State Department perceptively warned that supporting a Jewish state in

Palestine would require force for its implementation and destabilize the Middle East.26

Foreshadowing orthodox U.S. policy toward Israel, especially after 1967, Truman

prevented the implementation of the Bernadotte Plan, designed to end the hostilities

during the 1948 war. Count Folk Bernadotte, the United Nations special envoy to

Palestine, called for an adjustment of the Israel-Palestine partition borders whereby the

Galilee region would become part of Israel and the Negev would become part of the

Palestinian Arab state, formal Arab recognition of Israel, and the right of return for

Palestine refugees.27 The U.S. ambassador to Israel, James G. McDonald, wrote “I am

convinced that neither Ben-Gurion nor [Moshe] Shertok, in their talks with me

exaggerated when they said in substance: ‘On no matter adversely affecting our

independence or our security will we yield to the threat of United Nations sanctions, even

if these are backed by your government, which we know to be our friend. What we have

won in the battlefield, we will not sacrifice at the council table!’”28 Truman, recognizing

25 William Eddy, F.D.R. Meets Ibn Saud (New York: American Friends of the Middle East, 1954), 36-37 cited in Ibid., 31.

26 Ibid., 32-33. 27 Ibid., 43-44.

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Israel’s determination to reject the United Nations’ call for the return of refugees and the

internationalization of Jerusalem--instead declaring it as the capital of the Jewish state--

and succumbing to domestic pressure, failed to encourage and enforce the rights of the

Palestinian Arabs and force the Israelis to forgo acquisition of any territory beyond the

partition.

Rubenberg contends the prevalent but false orthodoxy that the Arab states would

destroy Israel led to U.S. commitment to Israel’s military might which ultimately

encouraged Israeli militarism, provided means for Israeli expansion, and allowed Israeli

rejection for a just Middle East settlement.29 Rubenberg concludes that

it is understandable why Palestinians, who lost their homes and lands and were transformed from a secure, stable existence on a land to which they had profound cultural and historical attachment into destitute refugees cramped into squalid camps, were unaccepting of the “legitimacy” of the Jewish state and the “right” of Jews from all over the world to immigrate there.30

While the Jewish state existed upon a solid foundation backed with formidable

military might after the 1948 war, the situation in the Middle East was precariously

unstable as many nations dealt with the legacy of eroding colonialism, with latent but

growing nationalism competing with the western powers for control of resources and

populations as a new superpower exerted its influence supposedly in the name of freedom

and democracy and justified by anti-communist rhetoric to secure hegemony in the

emerging global capitalist world. However, the old European imperialist powers would

28 Foreign Relations of the U.S., 1948, Vol. 5, The Near East, South Asia and Africa (Washington

D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), 1337-1339, cited in Ibid., 47.

29 Ibid., 51. 30 Ibid., 50.

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haphazardly and weakly attempt to secure their former domains, especially in the oil rich

Middle East, thus instigating the second conflict involving Israel and the Arab states.

According to Rubenberg, a secret arrangement between Israel, France, and Britain

precipitated confrontation with Egypt and the 1956 Sinai-Suez crisis. The arrangement,

following Israeli aggression against Egypt with an incursion into the Gaza Strip and the

Sinai Peninsula, allowed the British and French to gain military control over the Suez

Canal in a move against the burgeoning independent nationalism of Egyptian President

Gamal Abdul Nasser. The General Assembly adopted three resolutions in 1956 (997,

999, 1002) demanding British, French, and Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian territory.31

Moreover, Rubenberg notes that preceding the Israeli invasion, in what is known as the

Lavon affair, Israeli operatives secretly attacked U.S. installations in Egypt to undermine

the developing relationship between the two countries, foreshadowing perhaps the blatant

Israeli attack against the USS Liberty during the Six-Day War.32

Rubenberg, explaining the impetus behind the aggression against Egypt, observes

that Israeli policy makers believed military force against neighboring Arab states would

force them to meet Israel’s political demands. Essentially, Israel sought rewards for

aggression such as formal peace treaties recognizing Israel’s right to exist. While official

policy maintained that Israel would not withdraw from the occupied territories until

certain conditions were obtained, the Eisenhower administration, against Congressional

opposition, demanded unconditional withdrawal preceding negotiations between Egypt

and Israel. Illustrating official policy, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Henry

31 For the text of the General Assembly resolutions calling for British, French, and Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian Territory see Tomeh, 31, 32, 34.

32 See Rubenberg, Chapter three.

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Cabot Lodge, declared that no nation had the right “to seek political gains through the use

of force or to use as a bargaining point a gain achieved by means of force.”33 Former

Congressman Paul Findley, author of Deliberate Deceptions: Facing the Facts about the

U.S.-Israeli Relationship and They Dare to Speak Out: People and Institutions Confront

Israel’s Lobby, quotes Eisenhower’s Undersecretary of State, Herbert Hoover, Jr., who

warned the Israeli representative to the U.S. that the occupation of the Sinai would result

in “termination of all United States government and private aid, United Nations sanctions

and eventual expulsion from the United Nations. . . .”34 Findley notes that Eisenhower

himself stated in a television address to the American people that Israel needed to follow

international law and the United Nations Charter for security: “Should a nation which

attacks and occupies foreign territory in the face of the United Nations disapproval be

allowed to impose conditions on its own withdrawal? If we agreed that armed attack can

properly achieve the purposes of the assailant, then I fear we will have turned back the

clock of international order.”35

During the Sinai-Suez crisis, the Eisenhower administration opposed aggression

as an acceptable means to achieve policy objectives, and Rubenberg argues that as U.S.

aid to Israel continued to increase, especially after 1967, the United States could check

33 United States Policy in the Middle East September 1956–June 1957, Documents, Department of State Publication 6505, Near and Middle East Series 25 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1957), 322-327, cited in Ibid., 83.

34 Donald Neff, Warriors at Suez: Eisenhower Takes America into the Middle East (New York: Linden Press/Simon & Schuster, 1981; Brattleboro, Vt.: Amana, 1988), 416, cited in Findley, Deliberate

Deceptions, 32. 35 Stephen Green, Taking Sides: America’s Secret Relations with a Militant Israel (New York:

Morrow, 1984), cited in Findley, They Dare to Speak Out: People and Institutions Confront Israel’s Lobby (Westport, Conn.: Lawrence Hill and Company, 1985), 119.

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Israeli militarism and expansionism by threatening to withhold American aid and even

enforce United Nations resolutions.

Lest we imagine that Eisenhower’s stance embodied a universal principle guiding

his administration’s policies, we must recognize that U.S. action against France, Britain,

and Israel was a warning that the United States considered the Middle East under its

aegis. The Eisenhower doctrine, drafted during the Suez-Sinai crisis, resolved that “the

United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of

the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East.” Moreover, the U.S. “is

prepared to use armed forces to assist” countries in the Middle East “requesting

assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international

communism.” As freelance investigative journalist William Blum comments, “Nothing

was set forth about non-communist or anti-communist aggression which might endanger

world peace.” Supposedly to combat the ubiquitous international communist menace, the

Eisenhower administration orchestrated the overthrow of the government of Iran in a

coup, placing the Shah in power as dictator; invaded Lebanon with 14,000 troops to

support the pro-American government, although the Americans did not fire a shot and

withdrew after the election of a new government, admittedly less beholden to the U.S.;

and attempted to assassinate the Iraqi nationalist General Abdul Karim Kassem, who

attempted to counter the power of the Western oil monopolies –to name but a few

examples of U.S. intervention in the Middle East counteracting the avowed respect for

international law and the United Nations Charter. The United States, with customary

arrogance, decided it could interfere in the internal politics of Middle Eastern countries

ostensibly to prevent outside, especially Soviet, intervention, but actually to prevent

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nationalist and even socialist governments from controlling their countries’ resources for

domestic benefits, much as Chavez’s Venezuela, thus preventing the United States’

natural right to world hegemony as a Superpower.36

In the months leading to the June 1967 war, Israel openly provoked its Arab

neighbors, threatening to overthrow the Syrian government and boasting that Egypt was

powerless to interfere.37 Rubenberg quotes Israel’s chief of staff General Yitzhak

Rabin’s radio address on 11 May: “The moment is coming when we will march on

Damascus to overthrow the Syrian Government, because it seems that only military

operations can discourage the plans for a people’s war with which they threaten us.”38

Rubenberg argues that the escalation of various Syrian-Israeli conflicts, including the

massive Israeli military reprisals against Syria for allowing Palestinian commando

incursions into Israel and Israel’s annexation and cultivation of the demilitarized zone on

the Syrian-Israeli border, which resulted in a Syrian mortar attack against a single Israeli

tractor and an Israeli incursion of seventy jets into Syria, precipitated the June war.39

Morris observes that Israel’s decision to attack the Golan Heights was predicated on

Syria’s harassment of border settlements “stemming from disagreements about the use of

Jordan River waters and Israeli cultivation of land along the border,” which attracted

various Israeli reprisals, and Israeli settlers’ wish to expand into the Golan. Moreover,

36 For Eisenhower’s Middle East policy see William Blum, Killing Hope: U.S. Military and C.I.A.

Interventions Since World War II (updated edition, Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 2004), 64-72, 89-99.

37 The following discussion borrows heavily from Morris, Righteous Victims, Chapter seven and Rubenberg, Chapter four.

38 See Godfrey Jansen, “New Light on the 1967 War,” Daily Star (Beirut), 15, 22, 26, November 1973, quoted in David Hirst, The Gun and the Olive Branch: The Roots of Violence in the Middle East

(London: Futura Macdonald, 1983), 216 as cited in Rubenberg, 105. 39 Rubenberg, 98-103.

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after the establishment of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in May 1964, Morris

asserts that Palestinian guerillas, operating from various Arab states against Israeli

targets, were “largely armed, trained, and run by the Syrian general staff.” Plausibly, the

settlers’ expansionism provided the impetus and the Syrian and PLO commando raids

provided the justification.40

Reacting to the Israeli threats against Syria, Egypt mobilized troops in the Sinai,

which the U.S. and Israel recognized as a defensive and demonstrative move to appease

the other Arab nations angry with Nasser for not responding to Israeli military strikes

against Syria and Jordan, including an unprovoked Israeli raid on the West Bank which

the United Nations Security Council censured 14-0 as a blatant violation of the Charter.

In what all parties recognized as a provocative move making war almost unavoidable, the

Israelis mobilized and called upon the reserves to concentrate in the Negev bordering

Egyptian territory, causing Nasser to close the Straits of Tiran and request the United

Nations force leave the Sinai, but not the Gaza Strip or Sharm al-Sheik. When the

Secretary-General U Thant inexplicably provided Nasser with an ultimatum that either all

the United Nations forces will maintain their positions or all will evacuate, Nasser, to

save face, requested that all the forces withdraw, further exacerbating the conflict. The

United States and the United Nations attempted to deescalate the situation by requesting

Israel to allow the UN forces to reassemble on the Israeli side of the border. Israel

promptly refused.41

To gain domestic and U.S. support for a military solution to the crisis, Israel

propagandized that Egypt was the aggressor and Israel must defend itself, perhaps with a

40 Morris, Righteous Victims, 303, 325-326. 41 Rubenberg, 106-108.

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preemptive attack, to prevent its destruction. However, the evidence leads to a much

different interpretation. Morris admits that “Israel’s explicit, publicly stated assumption

was that Egypt was intent on attacking the Negev. But captured Egyptian documents

show that Egypt’s army was in fact preparing for a defensive battle, to absorb and repel

an initial IDF blow.”42

Rubenberg cites a General Mattityahu Peled, “one of the architects of the Israeli

victory in 1967” who exposes the true military reality in the Middle East:

“There is no reason,” he said, “to hide the fact that since 1949 no one dared, or more precisely, no one was able to threaten the very existence of Israel. In spite of that, we have continued to foster a sense of our own inferiority, as if we were a weak and insignificant people, which, in the midst of an anguished struggle for its existence, could be exterminated at any moment.” “True,” General Peled went on, Arab leaders may have sounded menacing, “but it is notorious that the Arab leaders themselves, thoroughly aware of their own impotence, did not believe in their own threats. . . . I am sure that our General Staff never told the government that the Egyptian military threat represented any danger to Israel or that we were unable to crush Nasser’s army, which, with unheard-of foolishness, had exposed itself to the devastating might of our army . . . . To claim that the Egyptian forces concentrated on our borders were capable of threatening Israel’s existence not only insults the intelligence of anyone capable of analyzing this kind of situation, but is an insult to Zahal [the Israeli army]."43

Furthermore, other Israeli leaders iterated that Israel was the aggressor. Rabin

observed after the war, “I do not believe that Nasser wanted war. The two divisions he

sent into the Sinai on 14 May would not have been enough to unleash an offensive

against Israel. He knew it and we knew it.”44 In 1982, Prime Minister Menachem Begin

said that “in June 1967, we again had a choice. The Egyptian Army concentrations in the

42 Morris, Righteous Victims, 313.

43 Ma’ariv, 24 March 1972, cited in Hirst, 210-211 as cited in Rubenberg, 104. 44 Le Monde, 29 February 1968, cited in Hirst, 211 as cited in Ibid., 104.

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Sinai approaches did not prove that Nasser was about to attack us. We must be honest

with ourselves. We decided to attack him.”45

As for the Egyptian motives, Nasser declared that “I am not in a position to go to

war; I tell you this frankly, and it is not shameful to say it publicly. To go to war without

having the sufficient means would be to lead the country and the people to disaster.”46

Former Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad admitted that “navigation in the Gulf

of Aqaba was a matter to which a final solution could be secured, either through the

International Court of Justice as was proposed at the time by Senator [William] Fulbright,

or through the redeployment of United Nations forces at Sharm el-Sheikh, once Israeli

threats were eliminated.”47 Quickly accepting United Nations proposals regarding the

Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran, Nasser assured the Secretary-General U Thant

that “we have never at any time intimated that we will attack Israel. It was Israel who has

formally threatened to invade Syria. What we are attempting now is a defensive measure

to prevent such a threat from materializing. You may have my word therefore that we

will never begin an attack.”48

According to Morris, the main objective of the Israeli offensive was the

destruction of the Egyptian army in Sinai. Recognizing that the international community

would demand an immediate ceasefire, “Israel’s diplomatic missions, and particularly its

delegations in Washington and at the UN, were ordered to stall for as long as possible, to

45 New York Times, 21 August 1982, cited in Ibid., 107.

46 Quoted from the Egyptian press in Hisham Sharabi, “Prelude to War: The Crisis of May-June 1967,” in The Arab-Israeli Confrontation of June 1967: An Arab Perspective, Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, ed. (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1970), 53 cited in Ibid., 109.

47 Mahmoud Riad, Struggle for Peace in the Middle East (New York: Quartet Books, 1981), 19-20 cited in Ibid., 109-110.

48 Riad, 20 cited in Ibid., 110.

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allow the IDF to complete its work.”49 Morris concludes that “the Six-Day War was in

all essentials a clockwork war carried out by the IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] against

three relatively passive, ineffective Arab armies: indeed the Israeli offensives in most

areas proceeded more rapidly than the planners had envisioned.”50 During the short war,

the IDF destroyed the Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian air forces, routed the Arab armies,

and gained control over the Sinai, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, and West Bank, including

all of Jerusalem. To explicate Israeli thinking regarding these territories, Morris writes

that “since 1949 Ben-Gurion had been calling Israel’s failure to conquer East Jerusalem

and, by extension, the whole of the West Bank ‘a lamentation for generations.’”51

Shortly before the war, Labor Minister Yigal Allon, who during the war proposed “to

transfer to Egypt the hundreds of thousands of refugees in the Gaza Strip,” stated that “in

. . . a new war, we must avoid the historic mistake of the War of Independence [1948] . . .

and must not cease fighting until we achieve total victory, the territorial fulfillment of the

Land of Israel.”52

Perhaps the understood Israeli policy toward the territories explains why as

Morris writes: “A number of IDF commanders, apparently without cabinet authorization,

though most probably with [Israeli Defense Minister Moshe] Dayan’s approval, tried to

repeat the experience of 1948–to drive Palestinians into exile and demolish their

49 Morris, Righteous Victims, 313.

50 Ibid., 313.

51 Ibid., 321. For a map illustrating the territory Israel acquired during the war, see Appendix II, Map II, 420.

52 Eitan Haber, (Heb.) Today the War Will Break Out (Tel Aviv: Idanim/Yediot Aharonot Press, 1987), 213 and Michael Brecher with Benjamin Geist, Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967 and 1973

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 100 cited in Ibid., 319 and 321 respectively.

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homes.”53 Acknowledging that Israel captured an area three-and-a-half times larger than

Israel itself, Morris indicates that between 200,000 and 300,000 Arabs fled or were

expelled from the West Bank and Gaza Strip and between 80,000 and 90,000 inhabitants

of the Golan Heights experienced a similar fate, joining the over 700,000 refugees from

the 1948 war.54 Morris rationalizes that the military occupation of and the almost

immediate massive settlement building in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, the

Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights was haphazard and seemingly beyond the

government’s control and comprehension as if eventual annexation were not the

understood if not official policy. Even though the international community, including

Israeli and American politicians, understood the settlements as “a major obstacle to

peace,” “by the mid-1990s, the number of settlements in the West Bank alone surpassed a

hundred, with the Jewish population of the territories, including Jerusalem’s satellite

neighborhoods, passing the 150,000 mark.”55

Morris remarked that Dayan and the ruling Labor Party at this time “firmly

opposed such [Palestinian] statehood, deeming it a mortal threat to Israel’s existence.”56

Moreover, Israel invoked a policy to encourage Arab emigration, with Dayan conceding

that “we must understand the motives and causes for the continued emigration of the

Arabs, from both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and not undermine their causes, even

if they are lack of security and lack of employment, because after all, we want to create a

53 Ibid., 327.

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid., 329, 332, 335-336. 56 Ibid., 338.

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new map.”57 Morris identifies that “Israeli thinking was . . . governed by the notion that

the Arabs of the territories, starved of land and resources (primarily water), and denied

the possibility of industrial development, would gradually drift away.”58 As for those

Palestinians who remained in the territories, Morris indicates that “Israel intended to stay

in the West Bank, and its rule would not be overthrown or ended through civil

disobedience and civil resistance, which was easily crushed. The only real option was

armed struggle.”59 The brutal measures to repress any form of resistance to Israeli

occupation included “midnight sweeps and arrests; beatings, sensory deprivation

measures, and simple, old-style torture to extract information and confessions; a system

of military courts which bore no resemblance to the administration of justice in Western

democracies (or, for that matter, in Israel proper); the demolition (or sealing) of suspects’

houses; long periods of administrative detention; and deportations. . . .”60

The United States certainly failed to take appropriate action to prevent the

foreseeable war and in fact provided diplomatic and military support to Israel. Israel, for

its part, lobbied the Johnson administration, propagandizing the imaginary threat Egypt

and the Arab armies posed to Israel’s existence, to prevent a reoccurrence of the Sinai

fiasco and ensure U.S. support for an Israeli offensive and any attendant territorial gains.

As an example of Israel’s success in persuading the American public of its dire situation,

Rubenberg cites a letter from twenty-four members of the House of Representatives

57 Arie Braun, (Heb.) Moshe Dayan and the Six-Day War (Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot, 1997), 170 cited in Ibid., 338.

58 Ibid., 339.

59 Ibid., 341.

60 Ibid., 342.

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pledging “. . . the fullest support to measures which must be taken by the administration

to make our position unmistakably clear to those who are now bent on the destruction of

Israel, that we are now prepared to take whatever action may be necessary to resist

aggression against Israel and to preserve the peace.”61 Furthermore, Rubenberg observes

that “Israel demanded unilateral guarantees from the United States, rejecting both

multilateral diplomacy or [sic] the use of the United Nations as a means for resolving the

conflict.”62 Not only did his administration demand Egyptian concessions without any

Israeli quid pro quo and send an emergency air shipment of military equipment to Israel,

but President Lyndon Johnson ordered the Sixth Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean,

signaling to the Soviet Union that the U.S. would use military force if the Soviet Union

intervened on behalf of its Arab clients. Rubenberg argues that clearly it was not in the

United States’ best interest to protect Israel to such an extent as to risk an overt war with

the Soviet Union.63 Moreover, the U.S. and Israel, in what amounted to a diplomatic

coup in the United Nations, orchestrated the adoption of unconditional ceasefire

resolutions, with the U.S. vetoing the usual demand for withdrawal to pre-conflict lines

and thus allowing Israel to occupy territory it had acquired by force, against the mandates

of the United Nations Charter, exacerbating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which

continues forty years later.64

Perhaps the most intriguing evidence contradicting the orthodoxy that Israel

supports American interests, and in turn the U.S. should blindly support Israel, is the

61 Michael Bar-Zohar, Embassies in Crisis: Diplomats and Demagogues being the Six Day War

(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1970), 85, cited in Rubenberg, 114.

62 Ibid., 109.

63 Ibid., 113, 121. 64 Ibid., 122-123.

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blatant Israeli attack on the USS Liberty, an intelligence gathering ship inexplicably

unescorted in the Mediterranean off the Sinai and Gaza coasts during the Six-Day War.

Morris confines his discussion of the attack to the following two sentences in his forty-

five page chapter on the Six-Day War, which reinforces the traditional account covering

up the truth: “On June 8, off Al-‘Arīsh, Israeli torpedo boats and aircraft attacked and

badly mauled the American spy ship Liberty, which they apparently mistook for an

Egyptian vessel. Thirty-four American servicemen died and seventy-five were

injured.”65

Jeffrey St. Clair, co-editor of Counterpunch, wrote an essay entitled “Israel’s

Attack on the Liberty Revisited,” for a book he edited with Alexander Cockburn called

The Politics of Anti-Semitism.66

St. Clair provides the following narrative of events:

After eight reconnaissance flights during the morning of 8 June, a few waves of Israeli

fighters attacked the ship with rockets, machine guns, and napalm. Following the air

attack, Israeli ships launched two torpedoes at the boat, tearing a hole in the hull and

flooding the lower compartments. The Israeli boats then fired at the life boats which

crew members dropped into the water, thus preventing an evacuation. Before leaving, an

Israeli officer aboard an attacking ship asked over a bullhorn in clear English if the

Americans required any help. The Liberty’s quartermaster responded with a vehement

“fuck you.” Sixteen hours after the attack and six hours after a Soviet destroyer offered

65 Morris, 327.

66 Jeffrey St. Clair, “Israel’s Attack on the Liberty Revisited,” in Alexander Cockburn and Jeffrey

St. Clair, eds., The Politics of Anti-Semitism (Oakland, Calif.: AK Press, 2003). The essay appeared on the online edition Counterpunch at <www.counterpunch.org/stclair1126.html> on 24 October 2003. St. Clair’s essay provides the information for this section, but for further analysis see James M. Ennes, Jr., Assault on

the Liberty: The True Story of the Israeli Attack on an American Intelligence Ship (New York: Random House, 1979).

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assistance, U.S. destroyers reached the scene. Mysteriously, as the 174 wounded were

being evacuated, the men were instructed not to speak with the press. In a matter of

weeks, the U.S. Navy published a report claiming that the accidental attack was aborted

as soon as Israel discovered its egregious mistake and reaffirming the Israeli false

excuses (blaming their victim), including that the U.S. did not notify Israel of any ships in

the area, that the U.S. ship failed to identify itself, and that Israel mistook the U.S. vessel

for an Egyptian tanker.

Contrarily, analyses by U.S. intelligence agencies, which the U.S. government has

suppressed and classified, and James Ennes’ (the officer of the deck during the attack)

Assault on the Liberty provide compelling evidence that Israel purposefully attacked,

knowing that it was a U.S. ship, on the orders of Defense Minister Moshe Dayan. St.

Clair postulates that Israel attacked the Liberty to prevent the U.S. from prematurely

knowing that Israel planned on breaching the ceasefire, invading Syria, and securing the

Golan Heights, which took place on 9 June, to prevent U.S. pressure against an attack so

as not to antagonize the Soviet Union. A second motive perhaps was that Israel planned

to completely destroy the vessel and blame the Egyptians, thus solidifying the U.S. and

Israeli relationship and echoing the Lavan affair during the Suez crisis mentioned above.

St. Clair exposes another possible motive, one that did not come to light until much later:

on the day of the attack, Israeli soldiers massacred over 1,000 Egyptian and Palestinian

POWs in Al-‘Arīsh, committing a war crime that Israel wanted to keep secret.

As for the U.S. motives in classifying the truth, the primary is an obvious cover-

up for Pentagon incompetence, including allowing the defenseless ship to enter a war

zone without an escort, failing to order it to move further into the Mediterranean (as the

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Joint Chiefs instructed Admiral John S. McCain II to do on 6 June), and arriving a full

sixteen hours after the attack to aid the survivors. Moreover, St. Clair posits that the

Johnson administration and the Pentagon were pressuring Congress to overturn a

weapons sales ban against Israel, which supposedly had been in force during the 1960s

against both Israel and Jordan. If the U.S. acknowledged that Israel had indeed

purposefully attacked a U.S. ship, then the profitable military relationship between the

U.S. and Israel, which began in earnest in 1968 with Israel becoming the largest buyer of

American arms, usually with generous U.S. taxpayer financing, would not have

developed. Tellingly, the attack on the Liberty remains the only one on a U.S. ship that

has not been investigated by Congress.

The international response to the Six-Day War was the United Nations Security

Council resolution 242, essentially a statement of principles for a just and lasting peace in

the Middle East. The resolution reads:

The Security Council, Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East, Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security, Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter, 1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles: (i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty and territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force; 2. Affirms further the necessity: (a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area; (b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem; (c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized

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zones; 3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.67

Although Israel’s subsequent actions strengthening its hold on the occupied

territories, including the continuation of settlement building and the annexation of

Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, essentially undermined resolution 242, the United

States maintained that the PLO accept the resolution as a precondition for U.S.

recognition and negotiation. Recognizing that the resolution makes no reference to

Palestinian self-determination and a Palestinian state, the PLO argued that instead of

accepting resolution 242 and recognizing Israel without an Israeli quid pro quo, it would

accept 242 in the context of all resolutions pertaining to Palestine and Israel, specifically

181 allowing for a Palestinian state and 194 demanding the right of return for all

refugees. The U.S. and Israel rejected this compromise, illustrating complete opposition

to Palestinian self-determination, right of return of Palestinian refugees, and Israeli

withdrawal from the occupied territories.68

While certainly not a comprehensive history of the Six-Day War, the necessarily

brief discussion illustrates Israel’s preference for massive military force to solve political

problems and its complete rejection of Palestinian rights. Considering the evidence

Morris provides, Israeli intransigence toward the United Nations and international law

regarding the occupied territories and the Palestinians represents a premeditated

67 Tomeh, 143. 68 Rubenberg, 146.

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aggressive and expansionist policy that has nothing to do with Palestinian “terrorism.”

While Israel ensured that the Palestinians resisting would resort to force, the “terrorism”

rhetoric utilized by the U.S. and Israel placed the blame for the conflict on the Palestinian

victims, allowing Israel to falsely claim victim hood while brutally oppressing the

Palestinians, stall any peace process because there were no partners for peace, and

expropriate Palestinian land and resources in an attempt to change the demographic status

of the territories in favor of the Jewish state.

The October War in 1973 commenced when Egypt and Syria attacked Israel to

illustrate that Israeli military superiority was not an assurance of security and stability in

the region. Only a peace settlement with Israeli withdrawal from the Arab territories

would ensure security for all countries in the Middle East. According to Rubenberg,

“Egyptian and Syrian goals extended only to regaining parts of their territory occupied by

Israel in 1967 and to serving forceful notice on Israel and the United States that the post-

1967 status quo was untenable.”69 After the 1967 Six-Day War, the Israelis based their

claims justifying the occupation of Arab territories on either a pragmatist security or

strategic necessity or a more nationalist and rightist ideology supporting the “Greater

Israel” thesis. Regardless of the justification, the Israelis adamantly and provocatively

rejected a return to the pre-1967 borders, a re-division of Jerusalem, any negotiation with

the PLO, and a Palestinian state.70 With Richard Nixon in the Oval Office and Henry

Kissinger, who saw the world through Cold War glasses and interpreted Arab actions as

Soviet instigated plots, forming foreign policy, the United States tacitly supported Israeli

69 Ibid., 130. 70 Ibid., 131-132.

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rejectionism, regarding that any Israeli concession was somehow an appeasement to the

Soviet Union.71

Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, while initially unwilling to negotiate directly and

bilaterally with Israel from positions of weakness, were amenable to a political solution

designed and guaranteed by the United Nations. Essentially, if the Arab states offered

recognition and peace, then the Israelis must offer something in return--the land occupied

in 1967. Immediately after the June 1967 War, King Hussein declared that Jordan would

recognize Israel’s right to exist in peace and security and end the existing state of

belligerency if Israel would evacuate the newly captured territories. Nasser in 1970 said

that “it will be possible to institute a durable peace between Israel and the Arab states, not

excluding economic and diplomatic relations, if Israel evacuates the occupied territories

and accepts a settlement of the problem of the Palestinian refugees.” After Nasser’s

death, the new Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat, offered Israel a full peace treaty,

including security guarantees, based on pre-June1967 borders. In early 1973, Jordan

once again offered a proposal for direct negotiations, a full peace, recognition of Israel,

and territorial changes conducive for Israeli security.72

However, subsequent its military victory in 1967 over three of its neighboring

Arab states and its seemingly insuperable military power, the Israeli government “felt no

real incentive to reach political agreement with the Arabs based on withdrawal from

occupied territories.”73 Israel rejected Arab offers of peace, even bizarrely claiming that

71 Ibid., 138-142. 72 Ibid., 133-134; for the Nasser quote see Eric Rouleau, Le Monde, 19 February 1970, quoted in

Noam Chomsky, The Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel and the Palestinians (Boston: South End Press, 1983), 64.

73 Morris, 362.

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the Arabs “continued to refuse to meet us or deal with us in any way . . . in 1971 or

1972.”74 Even the U.S. State Department recognized that “Israel will be considered

responsible for the rejection of the best opportunity to achieve peace since the

establishment of the state.”75 Israel, as well as Nixon and Kissinger, rejected the

American peace proposal introduced by Secretary of State William Rogers on the

grounds that Israeli withdrawal from the territories would prejudice Israel’s negotiating

position and threaten its security and the return of refugees would threaten Israel’s

character as a Jewish state.76 Morris admits that “the failure of the UN–and American–

sponsored peace proposals had proved that Israel was not going to give up territory

through negotiation.”77

Thus, the underlying intention for the initiation of another Middle East war was to

break the political impasse, otherwise known as Israeli (and American) rejectionism that

had paralyzed any conciliatory diplomacy and prevented a rapprochement and possible

comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East. Although the war resulted once

again in an Israeli military victory, it forced the Israelis and the Americans to reconsider

the status quo and develop a policy of bilateral agreements between Israel and various

Arab states, rejecting as stridently as possible a comprehensive, multilateral peace

process addressing the Palestinians. Thus, toward the end of the 1970s after numerous

Arab peace offerings and another unnecessary war, the U.S. finagled a peace with Egypt

74 See Golda Meir, My Life (London: Futura, 1976), 334, cited in Ibid., 390.

75 See William Quandt, Peace Process, American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since

1967 (Washington D.C.: University of California Press/Brookings Institution, 1993), 122, cited in Ibid., 389.

76 Rubenberg, 150.

77 Morris, Righteous Victims, 398.

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that ultimately engendered greater freedom for Israel regarding military occupation of the

territories and military action against the PLO, Lebanon, and Syria.78

The war further cemented the relationship between the United States and Israel as

the U.S. politically, economically, and militarily aided Israel during the war--the most

conspicuous examples being a massive resupply of military and maneuvering in the

United Nations to Israel’s advantage, essentially avoiding ceasefires “. . . while the

attacking side was gaining territory, because it would reinforce the tendency to use the

United Nations to ratify the gains of surprise attack.”79 In fact, Rubenberg argues that the

massive U.S. support for Israel during the war jeopardized the American relationship

with NATO allies, Japan, the Soviet Union, OPEC--which initiated an oil embargo as

retaliation to American actions--and the Arab world in general, rendering the U.S. a

dubious neutral proponent of peace in the Middle East. Kissinger justified the resupply

effort, which possibly could have provoked a Soviet resupply of Egypt, escalating the

crisis, as necessary to assuage the Israeli psyche (Prime Minister Golda Meir “. . . may

78 See Rubenberg, Chapters five and six, and Morris, Righteous Victims, Chapters nine and ten, for

a more comprehensive history of the October 1973 war and resulting bilateral Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement.

79 See Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), 471 cited in Rubenberg, 161. The United Nations ceasefire resolution 338 states:

The Security Council, 1. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy; 2. Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 in all its parts; 3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the

parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East. Thus the United States delivered to Israel a resolution that became enshrined with resolution 242 as the official principles for a just Middle East peace. Tellingly, both resolutions are mute concerning Palestinian self-determination, even though that issue is a major component of a just and lasting peace. For resolution 338 see Tudeh, 151.

180

have implicitly threatened to resort to the use of Israel’s nuclear option . . .”80) and

perhaps to moderate Israeli territorial claims and foster flexibility in a political

settlement. However, Kissinger knew otherwise as he wrote: “When I ask Rabin to make

concessions, he says he can’t because Israel is too weak. So I give him arms and he says

he does not need to make concessions because Israel is strong.”81 The Israeli ambassador

to the United States, Simcha Dinitz warned Kissinger that he would “go public” and

“unleash his shock troops” if the U.S. failed to satisfy Israel’s demands for weapons,

raising a few questions on the nature of the relationship between the superpower and its

client.82 Interestingly, the official Israeli opinion of the American resupply maintains that

the U.S. effort was insufficient and late-coming, threatening the existence of Israel.83

After the war, the United States promised to fulfill Israel’s economic, military,

and energy needs and committed itself to ignore and dismiss the PLO unless it recognized

Israel’s right to exist and accepted resolutions 242 and 338, thus requiring the

Palestinians to accept what the Israelis consistently rejected and preventing a

comprehensive just peace.84

80 See Nadav Safran, Israel: The Embattled Ally (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University press, 1978), 482-483 cited in Rubenberg, 165.

81 See Edward R. F. Sheehan, “How Kissinger Did It: Step-by-Step in the Middle East,” Foreign

Policy 27 (Spring 1976), 3-71 cited in Ibid., 165. 82 Sheehan, The Arabs, Israelis, and Kissinger: A Secret History of American Diplomacy in the

Middle East (New York: Reader’s Digest Press, Thomas Y. Crowell, 1976), 34; Matti Golan, The Secret

Conversations of Henry Kissinger: Step by Step Diplomacy in the Middle East (New York: Quadrangle/Times Books, 1976), 51; Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), 464, cited in Ibid., 165.

83 Ibid., 166; Morris, Righteous Victims, 434; for general discussion of U.S. aid see Rubenberg, Chapter five, and Morris, Righteous Victims, Chapter nine.

84 Morris, Righteous Victims, 441.

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During the 1970s, the PLO decidedly moderated its positions, accepting a two-

state solution with the Palestinian state encompassing only the West Bank and Gaza, less

than twenty-three percent of Palestine, as opposed to all of Palestine or even a single

democratic secular state. Furthermore, the leadership endorsed diplomatic and political

struggle for Palestinian self-determination and eschewed an armed one. Ironically,

Rubenberg indicates that Israel used as a pretext to preclude negotiations open dissension

in the PLO, the closest approximation to real democracy in the region.85 In the larger

Arab world, Arab leaders at the Algiers Summit in 1973, set upon liberating the occupied

territories, declared a “willingness to participate in a peace process based on Israeli

withdrawal and the achievement of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.” The summit

determined that the PLO was the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people

in their quest for self-determination and demonstrated a willingness to recognize Israel.86

The Israeli and U.S. policy of rejecting any concessions toward the Palestinians,

however, weakened the moderates and inexorably help create more fundamentalist,

desperate, and violent groups struggling against foreign occupation.87 Further portending

a rejection of a moderate PLO, the right-wing Likud88 coalition gained power in Israel for

85 Rubenberg, 193-194.

86 Ibid., 178. 87 Interestingly, Nixon, despite domestic pressures resulting from his illegal actions, including

spying on American citizens (in his case, the political elite of the opposition party), and the growing opposition to the Vietnam War, due in no small part to the immoral saturation bombing of Laos and Cambodia, that would force his resignation, wrote to Kissinger “we would serve even Israel’s best interests if we now used ‘whatever pressures may be required in order to gain acceptance of a settlement which is reasonable and which we can ask the Soviets to press on the Arabs.’” Moreover, “United States political considerations will have absolutely no, repeat no, influence on our decision in this regard. I want you to know that I am prepared to pressure the Israelis to the extent required, regardless of the domestic political consequences.” However, Kissinger simply ignored the message, preferring to determine policy according to an inflexible and exaggerated Cold War assessment, missing perhaps an opportunity for a comprehensive settlement. See Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 550-551, as cited in Ibid., 168-169.

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the first time in June 1977, with Menachem Begin, a revisionist Zionist favoring a

“Greater Israel” and former leader of the terrorist Irgun gang responsible for the bombing

of the King David Hotel during the British Mandate and the massacre of 250 Palestinians

at Deir Yassin in 1948, assuming the prime minister’s position.89 Referring to a

Palestinian state, future Labor Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin unambiguously stated that

“I repeat firmly, clearly, categorically: it will not be created.”90 Rabin later argued that

Israel would not negotiate with the PLO “even if it accepts all of the conditions of

negotiations on the basis of the Camp David agreements, because the essence of the

willingness to speak with the PLO is the willingness to speak about the establishment of a

Palestinian state, which must be opposed.”91

Morris writes that “throughout Israel’s history . . . the government had

successfully hidden from the public the fact that there were Arab leaders who were

willing to make peace and to make concessions to achieve it.”92 Realizing the futility of

war against Israel, the Arab states pursued peaceful solutions based on return of territory

for guarantees of peace. Mustafa Khalil, the secretary-general of Egypt’s Socialist Party,

admitted: “We know that we have no chance of winning in war, and we also know that

88 The Labor party controlled the Israeli government from the creation of Israel until the election

of Begin in June 1977. Based on my readings, I would posit an imprecise and inexpert, yet useful, distinction between the Labor and Likud by comparing them to the U.S. Democrat and Republican parties respectively. The Israeli parliamentary system differs from the American-style democracy in that usually multiple parties must form coalition governments in order to maintain a majority and govern. Labor and Likud may differ slightly on domestic policies; however, as with the Democrats and Republicans, foreign policy differences are negligible. Both have been militaristic and expansionist, rejecting Arab peace offerings and Palestinian sovereignty, while settling political issues with overwhelming military force.

89 For history on Begin, see Rubenberg, 197-198.

90 Quoted by Amnon Kapeliouk in Le Monde Diplomatique, August 1982, from Ma’ariv, 5 December 1975, cited in Chomsky, Fateful Triangle, 70, cited in Ibid., 199.

91 Davar, 11 November 1982; interview in Trialogue, journal of the Trilateral Commission (Winter, 1983), cited in Chomsky, Fateful Triangle, 112, cited in Ibid., 199.

92 Morris, 455.

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you have the atomic bomb. . . . Egypt has no military solution, and we must seek another

solution.”93 Israel’s overconfidence in military solutions to political problems precluded

political settlements. Thus it was not until the surprise Egyptian and Syrian attack that

the United States and Israel considered meaningful negotiations; however, Israel, with

U.S. acquiescence, continued to hedge on the fundamental issues, including the

Palestinian “problem” and the occupation of Arab territories, preferring to engender

bilateral agreements without providing substantial and necessary concessions. In a bold

gesture, Sadat traveled to Jerusalem in November 1977 to outline before the Knesset a

proposal for peace: Israeli withdrawal from the territories, Palestinian self-determination,

and the “right of all states in the area to live in peace within . . . secure boundaries . . .

[with] appropriate international guarantees.”94 Responding to Sadat, Prime Minister

Begin “recounted the history of Arab aggression aimed at destroying the Jewish state, and

he asserted Israel’s desire to make peace.” Insinuating a rejection of any Israeli

withdrawal from the occupied territories, Begin stated that “we have a different position

regarding the final borders between us and our neighbors.”95

Morris writes that Begin “regarded the continued occupation of and settlement in

the West Bank as [Israel’s] historic, divine mission.” At most, Begin was willing to

concede “autonomy” to the Palestinians with Israel maintaining the settlements and

“retaining military control and overall governmental oversight as well as specific control

93 Ezer Weizman, The Battle for Peace (New York: Bantam Books, 1981), 60-61; Eitan Haber, Ehud Ya’ari, and Ze’ev Schiff, (Heb.) The Year of the Dove (Tel Aviv: Zmora, Bitan, Modan, 1980), 138-140, cited in Ibid., 454.

94 Quandt, Camp David, Peacemaking and Politics (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1986), 345-355, cited in Ibid., 453.

95 Weizman, The Battle for Peace, 136-137, cited in Ibid., 453-454.

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over land and water.”96 Democratic President Jimmy Carter, who succeeded the

Nixon/Ford administration in January 1977, maintained the official U.S. position that

resolution 242 applied to all the territories and Israeli settlements were illegal and

obstacles to peace.97 At the Camp David meetings, Egypt essentially eschewed the

Palestinian issue in favor of a peace agreement with Israel guaranteeing complete

withdrawal from Sinai. Begin unsurprisingly rejected Palestinian self-determination and

any withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza, but further and somewhat surprisingly

argued for Israeli control over air bases and settlements in eastern Sinai. Morris quotes

Begin as saying: “My right eye will fall out, my right hand will fall off, before I ever

agree to the dismantling of a single Jewish settlement.” Rejecting resolution 242 and its

demand for Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, Begin ultimately asserted

Israel’s right to the eastern Sinai so as not to set a precedent for Israeli withdrawal from

other settlements as well as maintain a ready pretext to militarily invade Egyptian

territory to protect the settlers.98 Defense Minister Ezer Weizman later remarked:

If anyone, Arab or American, thought that our evacuation of Sinai was to be taken as a model for the other fronts, he was deluding himself. Neither from the West Bank and Gaza, nor from the Golan Heights would we remove our settlements or fail to maintain a military presence.99

Further rejecting 242, Begin planned and began the construction and expansion of

Israeli settlements in the West Bank and declared that Jerusalem is “one city, indivisible,

96 Ibid., 456.

97 Ibid., 459. 98 Begin quoted in Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security

Advisor 1977-1981 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983), 263, cited in Ibid., 468. Discussion of Camp David in Ibid, Chapter ten, especially 463-477.

99 Moshe Dayan, Breakthrough: A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1981), 228, cited in Rubenberg, 241.

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the Capital of the State of Israel.”100 Soon after the Camp David accords, then

Agricultural Minister Ariel Sharon bluntly told Carter, while in Israel, that “Jordan is

Palestine” and the West Bank was inseparable from Israel.101 Ultimately, given the

concessions of an international force and warning stations in the eastern Sinai, Israel

agreed to a full, yet gradual, withdrawal from the Sinai, which removed Egypt from the

Arab-Israeli conflict and drastically weakened the Palestinian cause, allowing Israel

greater freedom for military expansion as “it was doubtful whether the remaining Arab

states could contemplate war against Israel without Egypt.”102 Morris crowns Israel the

clear victor in the peace process with Egypt as Begin had “warded off all efforts to pin

him down on the Palestinian problem; and he had avoided a commitment to withdraw

from any part of the West Bank and Gaza.”103 Signaling that Begin was simply not

serious about granting the Palestinians any autonomy nor about peace, Israel imposed its

law and administration on East Jerusalem and the Syrian Golan.104 Perhaps the continued

Israeli rejection of 242 by both Labor and Likud governments has caused observers to

wonder why the U.S. and Israel demanded the Palestinians accept the resolution.

With Egypt on the sidelines, Israel maintained its inflexibility regarding the

Palestinians and became emboldened to continue using military aggression for political

gain. Israel bombed the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirik in 1981, radicalizing Saddam

100 Quandt, Camp David, 383-387, cited in Morris, Righteous Victims, 474.

101 Quandt, Peace Process ,317 cited in Ibid., 483.

102 Ibid., 486. 103 Ibid.

104 On 30 July 1980, the Israeli Knesset passed the Jerusalem Law, imposing Israeli law in East

Jerusalem, Ibid., 487; The United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 497 of 17 December 1981 declaring the Israeli decision to impose its laws, administration, and jurisdiction on the Syrian Golan to be illegal. See Regina S. Sharif, ed., United Nations Resolutions on Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict,

Volume II: 1975-1981 (Washington D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1988), 200.

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Hussein to pursue weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, as a deterrent

to Israeli aggression. As an example once again of the U.S. double standard regarding

aggression and nuclear weapons, Israel never complied with Security Council resolution

487 of 19 June 1981 condemning the strike and demanding reparations to Iraq and United

Nations inspection of Israel’s nuclear facilities.105 The massive invasion of Lebanon in

1982 with the objectives of destroying the PLO as a political entity and if possible the

Syrian military, annexing Lebanon south of the Litani River, and creating a Lebanese

Christian government beholden to Israel illustrates the major repercussions of the

bilateral peace with Egypt, instead of a comprehensive settlement for all parties to the

Arab-Israeli conflict. The parallels to the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait are obvious;

however, in this case the United States provided the necessary political, economic, and

military support which allowed Israel to aggressively invade Lebanon on the flimsiest of

pretexts, eschewing international law in favor of committing war crimes resulting in the

killing of almost 20,000 Lebanese and Palestinians, mostly civilians.106

Although the immediate justification for Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982

centered on the PLO’s supposed threat to Israel’s security, Israel had long developed

ambitions regarding annexation of Lebanese territory and resources and the creation of a

105 Rubenberg, 266-267. For text of resolution, see Sharif, 198-199. 106 Rubenberg, citing the Christian Science Monitor of 21 December 1982, writes that between 4

June and 31 August 1982, 19,085 people were killed, 30,302 wounded. Finkelstein, in “Israel and Iraq: A Double Standard,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2, Winter 1991, 43-56, writes that 20,000 people died due to the invasion. Morris claims these numbers are “vast” exaggerations and writes that “Israeli spokesmen usually claimed that Lebanese and Palestinian civilian dead during the war ran into the hundreds rather than the thousands,” Morris, Righteous Victims, 558. To provide one small example of U.S. support for Israel and complicity in aggression, Rubenberg writes: “A more resolute American response would have strengthened moderate elements in the cabinet and would have prevented the two-month shelling of Beirut. Israeli cabinet ministers who were against extending the war to Beirut saw they could not oppose the plans as long as Washington did not come out against them. ‘I cannot show myself to be less of a patriot than the Americans,’ one minister said.” See Schiff, “The Green Light,” Foreign Policy

50, Spring 1983, 83, cited in Rubenberg, 271.

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Christian-dominated government strategically allied with Israel in a sea of hostile Muslim

states. Morris indicates that the prospective Jewish state proposed by the Zionist

Organization at the Versailles peace conference after World War I included southern

Lebanon up to the Litani River.107 In 1954 Ben-Gurion suggested:

Perhaps (there is never certainty in politics) now is the time to bring about the creation of a Christian State in our neighborhood. . . . Without our initiative and our vigorous aid this will not be done. It seems to me that this is the central duty, or at least one of the central duties, of our foreign policy. This means that time, energy and means ought to be invested in it and that we must act in all possible ways to bring about a radical change in Lebanon. . . . If money is necessary, no amount of dollars should be spared . . . . We must concentrate all our efforts on this issue. . . . This is an historic opportunity. Missing it will be unpardonable. . . . Everything should be done, in my opinion, rapidly and at full steam.108 Rubenberg concludes: “Thus, Israel’s interest in fostering exclusive [Christian] Maronite

dominance in Lebanon, in securing jurisdiction over the Litani River, and in annexing

southern Lebanon have long historical precedents.”109

As an example of continued intransigence toward any peace process resulting in

the loss of territory, Israel rejected the Fahd plan. During the summer of 1981, Saudi

Crown Prince Fahd proposed a comprehensive peace settlement calling for Israeli

withdrawal to pre-June 1967 borders (including East Jerusalem) and an attendant removal

of settlements, Palestinian right of return, a Palestinian state, and the right for all nations

to live in peace and security. The Fahd plan was essentially an acceptance of the United

Nations partition plan with land adjustments favorable to Israel, accepting the status quo

after the 1948 war and Israel’s control of almost eighty percent of Palestine. Begin

107 Morris, Righteous Victims, 494.

108 Livia Rokach, Israel’s Sacred Terrorism: A Study Based on Moshe Sharett’s Personal Diaries

and Other Documents, 2d ed. (Belmont, Mass.: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1980), 24-25, cited in Rubenberg, 273.

109 Ibid., 273.

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characterized the plan as a means “to liquidate Israel in stages,” while Foreign Minister

Yitzhak Shamir described it as “a poisoned dagger thrust into the heart of Israel’s

existence.” As with previous Arab offerings, Israel countered in an uncompromising

way, by building more settlements in the West Bank.110 Acceding to Israel’s rejectionist

stance, the Reagan administration personified the PLO as a terrorist proxy of the Soviet

Union, interpreting the Arab-Israeli conflict as a reflection of competition between the

U.S. and Soviet Union, failing intentionally or not to understand the Middle East on its

own terms and recognize that the Palestinians and various Arab states had legitimate

grievances against Israel. Reagan, clearly opposing the Fahd plan, overturned the

supposed U.S. opposition to settlements, declaring unilaterally that they were not illegal,

and precluded any valid compromise by accepting Israel’s continued control over

Jerusalem.111

As a means to prevent any peace process, the Israelis desired to destroy the PLO

political and social infrastructure in Lebanon, expel the surviving Palestinians to crush

Palestinian nationalism, and assert final sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza.

According to Morris, “Israel spent the months between August 1981 and June 1982

seeking a pretext to invade Lebanon.”112 During that year before the major invasion in

110 Quotes are cited in George Rentz, “The Fahd Plan,” Middle East Insight Vol. 2, No. 2, January/February 1982, 21-24, cited in Ibid., 259.

111 Ibid., 258-265.

112 Morris, Righteous Victims, 509. The PLO essentially established a state within the state of Lebanon in the late 1960s and early 1970s after King Hussein, wary of the developing PLO sovereignty in parts of Jordan, instigated a civil war to regain control over the mostly Palestinian population, ultimately forcing the PLO to find a new base of operations. The PLO signed an agreement with Lebanon in 1969, allowing for Palestinian autonomy, and began developing a social, political, and economic infrastructure for the Palestinian refugees. According to Rubenberg, from the middle of 1968 to the middle of 1974 Israel’s air force attacked Lebanese towns and Palestinian refugee camps on at least 44 occasions, killing almost 900 Lebanese and Palestinian civilians. In March 1978, in response to a Palestinian guerilla attack

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June 1982, Israel repeatedly bombed the PLO in southern Lebanon in the hopes of

provoking minor Palestinian retaliation, killing 300 and wounding 800, mostly civilians,

in one air assault on Beirut on 17 July 1981.113 Rubenberg writes that “between 1978 and

1981 PLO rocket and guerilla activity across Israel’s northern border decreased

markedly, and PLO terrorist activity . . . ceased altogether.”114 Morris admits that

“indeed, subsequent Israeli propaganda notwithstanding, the border between July 1981

and June 1982 enjoyed a state of calm unprecedented since 1968.”115

Escalating the hysterical propaganda for domestic and American consumption,

Begin, who often compared Arafat to Hitler, seriously proclaimed: “Believe me, the

alternative to this [attacking the PLO in Lebanon] is Treblinka, and we have decided that

there will not be another Treblinka.”116 Dr. Herzl Rosenblum, editor of the Israeli daily

Yediot Aharonot, ludicrously wrote:

Arafat, were he stronger, would do to us things that Hitler never even dreamed of . . . . Hitler killed us with a measure of restraint. . . . . If Arafat were to reach power, he would not amuse himself with such “small things.” He will cut off our children’s heads with a cry and in broad daylight and will rape our women before tearing them to pieces and will throw us down from all the rooftops and will skin us as do hungry leopards in the jungle . . . without the famous “order” of the Germans. . . . Hitler is a pussycat compared to what Arafat will bring upon us.117

The public Israeli plan was to push the Palestinians forty kilometers from the border so as

to ostensibly protect Israeli citizens in northern Israel from attack. Begin even wrote to

near Tel Aviv, Israel in a disproportionate response invaded Lebanon, conquered territory up to the Litani River, and killed hundreds of Arabs.

113 Morris, Righteous Victims, 507.

114 Rubenberg, 275.

115 Morris, Righteous Victims, 509. 116Arye Naor, (Heb.) Cabinet at War, the Functioning of the Israeli Cabinet During the Lebanon

War (1982) (Israel: Lahav, 1986), 47-48; Tom Segev, (Heb.) The Seventh Million (Tel Aviv: Keter/Domino, n.d.), 274-375, cited in Ibid., 514.

117 Yediot Aharonot, 2 July 1982, cited in Ibid., 514-515.

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Reagan that “Israel would not attack any Syrian forces in Lebanon or Syria unless the

Syrians engaged the Israelis,” and the operation was not “aimed at acquiring any

Lebanese territory.”118 However, Israel attacked Lebanon to destroy the PLO and

Palestinian nationalism, strengthening Israeli control over primarily the West Bank,

create a Christian minority government in Lebanon friendly and beholden to Israel, annex

southern Lebanon, including the Litani River, and possibly strike Syrian positions in

Lebanon, weakening their military capability and the anti-Israel government.119 As

Rubenberg cogently writes:

The intensification of the campaign against the PLO was related to the Begin government’s decision to absorb the West Bank and Gaza (for which Israel needed a compliant Palestinian population). The PLO was first and foremost the symbol of Palestinian national aspirations. Thus Begin and his advisors believed that if the PLO could be destroyed as an organization, the idea of Palestinian nationalism could be suppressed and eliminated, and those Palestinians living under occupation would have to acquiesce in the extension of Israeli sovereignty over all of historic Palestine. Such acquiescence, it was assumed, would then lead to the emigration of the indigenous population, ensuring continued Jewish exclusivity in the state. The nature of this objective made the elimination of the social and political organizations of the PLO even more important than the destruction of its military capability.120

Rubenberg further argues that Israel preferred a militant PLO rather than a

political one so as to justify Israel’s perpetual refusal to negotiate and give up Arab

territories, contrasting with Morris’ incorrect assertion that the Israeli invasion moderated

the PLO when in fact the threat of a moderate PLO caused the invasion.121 Rubenberg

cites Yehoshua Porath, an Israeli academic, who stated:

118 New York Times, 6 June 1982, cited in Rubenberg, 282. Both assurances proved to be false, as Israel destroyed the Syrian anti-aircraft defenses in Lebanon, in the hopes of further educating Syria that it could not militarily fight against Israel, and made it quite clear that an annexation of southern Lebanon was a definite possibility.

119 Ibid., 278; Morris, Righteous Victims, 509.

120 Rubenberg, 277.

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The Government’s hope is that the stricken PLO, lacking a logistic and territorial base will return to its earlier terrorism; it will carry out bombings throughout the world, hijack airplanes and murder many Israelis. In this way, the PLO will lose part of the political legitimacy that it has gained and will mobilize the large majority of the Israeli nation in hatred and disgust against it, undercutting the danger that events will develop among the Palestinians that they might become a legitimate negotiating partner for future political accommodation.122

While Israel initiated a provocation campaign in Lebanon and the Arab territories

under its control in order to precipitate Palestinian retaliation, thus providing the

necessary, yet dubious, pretext for a massive invasion of Lebanon, the PLO essentially

resisted taking the bait. Thus a 3 June 1982 assassination attempt in London on Israel’s

ambassador to Great Britain by Abu Nidal’s anti-PLO faction precipitated an immediate

and massive Israeli invasion of Lebanon and attack on the PLO. The international

community considered Israel’s justifications to be dubious and subsequent attack on

Lebanon to be disproportionate and completely immoral, especially considering that the

PLO immediately disclaimed any responsibility, the assailants were captured within

twenty-four hours, and a hit list found on a suspect named the PLO’s London

representative along with the Israeli ambassador as targets.123 More legitimate options

existed, such as the international legal system, to bring to justice those responsible for

heinous crimes.124 Full-scale warfare punishes thousands upon thousands of innocents,

precipitates more violence and terror, and is often far worse than the original crimes

committed. The Israeli invasion, dubbed with Orwellian military doublespeak the “Peace

121 Ibid., 277; Morris, Righteous Victims, 558.

122 Ha’aretz, 25 June 1982, cited in Rubenberg, 278. 123 Ibid., 279-281; Morris, Righteous Victims, 507-514.

124 The Israeli use of military force in response to a crime parallels the American illegal invasion

against Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks on U.S. soil.

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for Galilee,”125 caused the premature death of almost 20,000 Lebanese and Palestinians,

mainly civilians, and rendered 200,000 Palestinians homeless through the wholesale

destruction of refugee camps.126

The international community called for immediate ceasefire and Israeli

withdrawal from Lebanon. Israel refused, determined that its illegal military aggression

would result in political advantages, including the withdrawal of the PLO from Beirut

and southern Lebanon, a reduction of Syrian forces in Lebanon, and the creation of a

Lebanese government free from Syrian and PLO pressure and instead amenable to Israeli

diktat. The Israeli government justified its Lebanese aggression as an example of its

commitment against Soviet-sponsored “international terrorism.”127

Israel violated various Security Council resolutions and ceasefires with the

Palestinians, massively bombing and laying an almost ten-week siege on Beirut,

curtailing the delivery of electricity, food, water, fuel, and medicine to the entire western

sector of the city (much as the U.S. did to the Iraqi city of Fallujah), in response to PLO

willingness to offer recognition to Israel and withdraw from Beirut under a U.S.

guarantee for the safety of Palestinian civilians.128 Despite the Israeli massive bombing

125 Yehoshafat Harkabi, a former chief of military intelligence, states: “It would have been more honest to call [the Lebanon war] ‘The War to Safeguard the Occupation of the West Bank.’” See Yehoshafat Harkabi, Israel’s Fateful Hour (New York: Harper and Row, 1988), 101, cited in Finkelstein, “Israel and Iraq,” 44.

126 See note 102 above; for refugees see Advisory Committee on Human Rights in Lebanon, Lebanon: Toward Legal Order and Respect for Human Rights (Philadelphia: American Friends Service Committee, 10 August 1983), cited in Rubenberg, 281.

127 Ibid., 286; Similarly, Israel is currently justifying its actions against the Palestinians as part of the U.S. War on Terror.

128 Ibid., 290-293. As for the U.S. guarantee of civilian safety, the Philangist militia, under direct Israeli supervision, massacred between 700 and 1500 women, children, and old men in the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila in September 1982. Due in no small part to U.S. pressure, the United Nations Security Council resolution 521 condemned the massacre but did not call for an investigation or

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of Beirut every time the PLO proposed plans for evacuation, Israeli Foreign Minister

Yitzhak Shamir falsely declared “we prefer a diplomatic solution. . . . But we are

convinced that the PLO will not leave Beirut or Lebanon unless they will be convinced

that they have only one choice before them–to leave by negotiations or other means.”129

The U.S. threat and use of veto ensured that adopted Security Council resolutions were

not too harsh in condemning Israeli aggression and prevented any enforcement of the

United Nations mandate through sanctions or force, an opposite reaction to the Iraqi

invasion of Kuwait. President Reagan deemed resolution 509, the second ceasefire

adopted, irrelevant, arguing that Israel need not withdraw until the Syrian and PLO forces

withdrew, thus rewarding Israel’s aggression by acceding to its objectives, once again in

complete opposition to the American response to Saddam and the adamant refusal to

“reward” aggression.130

The Reagan plan for a comprehensive peace dismissed any role for the PLO in

negotiations and opposed a Palestinian state; however, much to Israel’s dislike, Reagan

opposed Israeli annexation of the West Bank and future settlement building, instead

postulating Jordanian supervision over the West Bank and Gaza and Israeli control over

Jerusalem. Considering the Israelis precipitated the Lebanon war to gain sovereignty over

the territories, Israel rejected the initiative and continued “. . . a vigorous program of

establishing Jewish settlements on the West Bank in order to consolidate Israel’s hold on

the area.” Begin said that “such settlement is a Jewish inalienable right and an integral

action to punish the perpetrators, although the evidence insinuated that the Israeli government and army were complicit in the crime.

129 New York Times, 3 August 1982, cited in Rubenberg, 302. 130 See Rubenberg, 298.

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part of our national security. Therefore, there shall be no settlement freeze.”131 Contrary

to the historical record, Reagan bizarrely blamed the Palestinians for the failure of the

Reagan Plan: “Unless the Palestinian leadership makes ‘a bold and courageous move’ to

break the Middle East deadlock, the Palestinian people will face continued frustration in

meeting their national aspirations.”132

After the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the Arab states unanimously adopted a

comprehensive peace plan based on the Fahd initiative and resolutions 181 and 242,

recognizing the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people,

demanding Israeli withdrawal to the pre-June 1967 borders, and annunciating that all

nations in the Middle East, including a Palestinian state and Israel, had the right to

peace.133 Shamir described the plan as “a renewed declaration of war on Israel” and “a

threat to Israel’s existence. Moreover, the Arab proposal “has no weight, no value . . .

and contains the same hate, the same war against peace, the same coldness.”134

131 For discussion of Reagan Plan, see Rubenberg, 308-314; for Israeli response see Miami Herald,

3 September 1982; New York Times, 3 September 1982, cited in Rubenberg, 309.

132 New York Times, 13 April 1983, cited in Rubenberg, 324. An interesting incident occurred when Reagan declared that unless the Israelis withdrew from Lebanon, the United States possibly would not transfer 75 fighter jets to Israel, scheduled to be delivered almost two years in the future. If the United States were serious about ensuring Israeli withdrawal, surely there were more serious and tangible alternatives than making a dubious threat. However, Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens was encouraged to reply: “It has never happened that an American president has said that the supply of aid to which the United States obligated itself is conditional on concessions on policy. Today Lebanon, tomorrow on another front.” Apparently the United States is obligated to provide enormous economic and military aid, as well as political support to Israel, seemingly without gaining any influence on Israel’s actions or receiving a quid pro quo in return. Moreover, while American troops were stationed in Lebanon, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Robert H. Barrow vehemently stated that “the Israeli troops are deliberately threatening the lives of American military personnel.” For Arens quote see New York Times,

14 April 1983 and Middle East Policy Survey, 8 April 1983, cited in Ibid., 323-323. 133 Ibid., 312.

134 Miami Herald, 11 September 1982; New York Times, 11 September 1982, cited in Ibid., 313.

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The illegal Israeli aggression against Lebanon ultimately failed to produce the

desired political results. Israeli maneuverings to orchestrate a puppet government in

Lebanon and maintain control over southern Lebanon proved futile. After the war, a

mainly indigenous guerilla movement in southern Lebanon developed to force the Israeli

military to withdraw. Israel reacted with “curfews, searches, mass arrests, torture of

suspects, vandalism, looting, and occasional on-the-spot executions.” Morris contends

that “perhaps a harsher policy, with mass executions and expulsions, and the destruction

of whole villages, could have halted the [guerilla] campaign. But given Israel’s

behavioral and democratic norms, this was never an option.”135 Although Israel’s history

somewhat belies Morris’ contention, it is telling that Israel clings to forceful military

methods to compel enemy populations’ acquiescence to Israeli diktat without seemingly

considering political or diplomatic compromise that would possibly foster peaceful

coexistence.

Moreover, the invasion did not bring to fruition the destruction of a political PLO

and the eradication of Palestinian nationalism and dignity. Morris writes: “Over the

decades the security forces detained tens of thousands of inhabitants, holding them for

weeks and months on end, often without trial. Interrogation involved physical and

psychological abuse and, frequently, varying degrees of torture.”136 Responding to

decades of oppression and dire economic straits, the Palestinians in the West Bank and

Gaza erupted in a grassroots resistance to Israeli occupation in December 1987. The

uprising, known as the Intifada, “. . . was not an armed rebellion but a massive persistent

campaign of civil resistance, with strikes and commercial shutdowns, accompanied by

135 Morris, Righteous Victims, 553. 136 Ibid., 568.

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violent (though unarmed) demonstrations against the occupying forces.”137 The Intifada

raised the world’s consciousness on the plight of the Palestinians. Israel, almost

incapable of fathoming a political and just settlement, resorted to force to quell the

Palestinian people. Morris rhetorically queries: “How was Israel to respond [to the

Intifada]? Almost everything was tried: shooting to kill, shooting to injure, beatings,

mass arrests, torture, trials, administrative detention, and economic sanctions.”138

Despite that Israeli contempt for international law and human rights rivals that of the

United States, Morris, in a spout of unjustified praise, believes that “as a democracy

bound by respect for the rule of law and subject to internal and external public scrutiny,

there were measures that Israel could not undertake,” as if those listed above were

acceptable.139 However, if these measures “such as transfer, starvation, and genocide,

were applied,” the Intifada could be suppressed. “But none of these methods is

acceptable to the State of Israel,”140 even though history exposes the ethnic cleansing

policies of the Israeli government and its callous disregard for Arab lives and “one

opinion poll indicated that almost half the electorate looked to some sort of transfer

solution” during the Intifada.141 Illustrating the extent that Israel embodies the ideals of

democracy, human rights, equality, and so on, Morris writes: “But almost all continued to

resist the possibility of talking to the PLO and of a Palestinian state. ‘Transfer’ seemed

137 Ibid., 561.

138 Ibid., 587. 139 Ibid.

140 CGS Dan Shomron interview in Ha’aretz, 17 March 1989, cited in Ibid., 587.

141 Ibid., 598.

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to hold a simply decisive way out, though most acknowledged that the Arab world and

the West would never accede to the idea.”142

At the Algiers Summit in 1988, the Palestinian National Congress proposed the

establishment of a Palestinian state on the basis of resolution 181, a comprehensive

political settlement with Israel, and an international conference based on resolutions 242

and 338. Moreover, the PLO renounced terrorism, but asserted its legitimate right to

struggle against foreign occupation. Morris describes Israeli opposition: “But whatever

the PLO said or did, Shamir, now Prime Minister in a unity government formed by Labor

and Likud, believed that the West Bank and Gaza were an inalienable part of the Jewish

people’s heritage and must not revert to Arab sovereignty.” The Israeli response, the

Shamir plan, asserted an ostensible Israeli commitment to the Camp David accords,

although Israel repeatedly rejected resolution 242, and opposed PLO participation in

negotiations and a Palestinian state. However, Shamir let slip that his plan was “idle

fancy,” a maneuver meant to prolong and stall negotiations in order to establish facts on

the ground, namely Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank. Sharon iterated that Israel

would not give up land and the settlement building would continue apace. Morris argues

unconvincingly that the U.S. “despite its deep commitment to Israel’s security and

future” was a “relatively objective broker” for Middle East peace.143

An article by Virginia Tilley, political science and international relations

professor at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, and author of The One-State Solution: A

142 Ibid., 599. Interestingly, Morris writes that Israel’s 800,000 Arab citizens aspired “to attain political, social, and economic equality with Israel’s Jews.” Yet, this fact did not foster any skepticism on his part regarding Israeli democracy. During the Intifada, Israel maintained a policy of house demolition and massive deportation that were upheld by the Israeli courts even though counter to the conventions and precepts of international law. During the Intifada, 50,000 Palestinians served time in prison, thousands without trial. See Ibid., 602, 592-593, 597.

143 Ibid., 607-611.

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Breakthrough for Peace in the Israeli-Palestinian Deadlock, dissecting recent events in

the Middle East fitfully concludes this background leading into the discussion of United

Nations Security Council resolutions concerning Israel.144 Due essentially to U.S. and

Israeli pressure, the European Union, the Netherlands, and Canada rescinded desperately

needed financial aid to the Palestinian people ostensibly because the recently

democratically elected Hamas government of the Palestinian Authority has not

recognized Israel’s “right to exist” or “renounced violence” as outlined most recently in

the Oslo Road Map, the American initiated peace process implemented after the first

Intifada. On the face of the matter, it is extremely hypocritical and illogical to demand

that the Palestinians accede to the Oslo Accords and recognize Israel’s “right to exist”

while not demanding that Israel cease and reverse its blatant construction of illegal

settlements and the illegal barrier wall in the West Bank, which is in complete opposition

to their Road Map obligations.

On a deeper level, Tilley lays bare the U.S. and Israel’s underlying motives for

demanding the Palestinians accept Israel’s “right to exist.” First and foremost,

international law does not recognize a country’s “right to exist,” only the “fact” of

existence within defined territory. Hamas has the legitimate right to withhold diplomatic

recognition on the grounds that Israel has not designated its official borders. Indeed, the

new Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has declared that perhaps Israel will unilaterally

determine its final borders by 2010, a mere sixty-two years after its creation. Tilley

observes that recognizing Israel’s “right to exist” implies its “right to exist” as a Jewish

144 The following discussion is from Virginia Tilley, “Making (Non) Sense of the Funding Cut-Off: Hamas and Israel’s “Right to Exist,”” Counterpunch, 12 May 2006, <www.counterpunch.org/tilley051206.html>.

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state, maintaining the policies and practices necessary to maintain a Jewish majority

within its boundaries. Essentially the phrase “right to exist” justifies and legitimizes

Israel’s right to pursue a policy of ethnic cleansing, rejecting international law and the

right of return of Palestine refugees and preventing any demographic threat of non-Jewish

citizenship in Israel.145

Tellingly, the international community has not recognized the right of Israel to

exist as a Jewish state. The United Nations’ sole mention of a Jewish state was in the

partition plan’s two-state solution based on ethnic nationalism with gerrymandered

borders to orchestrate a Jewish and an Arab majority in each state. Israel’s immediate

acquisition of designated Palestinian territory and expulsion of the Palestinian Arab

inhabitants rendered the partition plan and a two state solution quite untenable. Ascribed

in the Geneva Conventions, international law requires the right of return for refugees, a

right that Israel prevents the Palestinians from asserting because it would drastically

jeopardize a Jewish majority in Israel. The United Nations, as numerous resolutions

demonstrate, cannot recognize Israel as a Jewish state, legitimately maintaining a Jewish

majority, without opposing international law, especially regarding the right of return for

Palestinian refugees, and the norms regarding human rights, whether political, economic,

145 On 15 May 2006, The Toledo Blade published an Associated Press story reporting on A2 that

the Israeli Supreme Court upheld a racist and discriminatory law that prevents Palestinians from reuniting and living with their Israeli families in Israel proper supposedly on the security grounds that some Arab men who marry Israeli Arab women were terrorists. Without comment, the article states that “[the ruling] centered on two very touchy issues that have faced Israel for decades: balancing security and human rights, and maintaining the state’s Jewish identity while dealing fairly with a large Arab minority.” The law which affects Palestinian women under twenty-five, even though the Israeli government did not mention that women were involved in terror attacks, and men under thirty-five reeks of collective punishment and a disavowal of sincere democratic values. For maps illustrating the current Israeli policy to permanently acquire Jerusalem and land and settlements in the West Bank through the construction of an apartheid Wall, see Appendix II, Maps III, IV, V, VI on pages 421-424. The maps, from the Palestine Land Development Information Systems (PALDIS) and the Grassroots Palestinian Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign, can be found at <www.stopthewall.org>.

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or social, applying equally to all regardless of discriminating characteristics such as race,

ethnicity, religion, or sex.

Tilley argues that the international community insists that the future State of

Palestine “must comprise a stable democracy that secures equal rights for all its citizens

irrespective of religion or race. But if they hold Palestine to this standard, then why are

they not holding Israel to the same standard?” Tilley concludes that “if Israel’s ‘right to

exist’ does not entail sustaining a Jewish majority (which necessitates discriminatory

legislation, ethnic cleansing, land grabs, and social engineering), then the ethnic logic

supporting two states disappears.”146

In the United States large-scale propaganda describes Israel as the only

democracy in the Middle East, a benign and benevolent occupier, intent on peace, yet

surrounded by those seeking its very destruction. The real history of the Arab-Israeli

conflict describes Israel as an expansionistic and militaristic nation more intent on

securing land than peace due in large part to the United States’ military, economic, and

political support. The brief background narrative indicates Israeli and U.S. rejection of

peace, international law, and human rights providing a necessary context explaining U.S.

obstructionism in the United Nations Security Council, which prevents any serious

condemnation of Israel or enforcement of pertinent resolutions on the most flimsy of

pretexts.

146 Further illustrating the complete Israeli rejection of a Palestinian state and the racism

underlying Israeli policies, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert confessed to the U.S. Congress in May 2006 that “I believed, and to this day still believe, in our people’s eternal and historic right to this entire land,” and “Israel must still meet the momentous challenge of guaranteeing the future of Israel as a democratic State with a Jewish majority, within permanent and defensible borders and a united Jerusalem as its capital.” For text of Olmert’s address, see the online edition of the Jerusalem Post, 24 May 2006, at <www.jpost.com/servet/satellite?apage=1&cid=1148482035571&pagename=JPOST%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull>.

Chapter Five:

Vetoing the United Nations

Beginning with its fundamental rejection of the United Nations’ partition plan, the

State of Israel has failed to comply with literally dozens of Security Council and General

Assembly resolutions condemning Israel’s aggressive expansion and occupation of Arab

lands in the Middle East. The United States has habitually used its veto, especially from

1980 through 2004, as a permanent member of the Security Council to prevent the

adoption and enforcement of dozens more resolutions pertaining to Israel. While three

U.S. administrations have cited supposed Iraqi violation of United Nations Security

Council resolutions to justify two military invasions, one extended and present

occupation, numerous bombings, and over a decade of brutal sanctions, not one president,

save Dwight Eisenhower during the Suez crisis, has demanded Israel comply with

relevant United Nations demands and international law. U.S. policy contradicts and

opposes the virtuous rhetoric concerning democracy, the rule of law, peace, and justice

and instead contributes toward a more unstable, unequal, and dangerous world.

During the twenty-five year period from 1980 through 2004, the United States

vetoed thirty-two resolutions criticizing Israeli aggression in the Middle East and the

illegal occupation of Palestinian Arab lands.1 The U.S. and its clients operate on a double

1 During this time period permanent members of the Security Council vetoed sixty-three

resolutions; the United States vetoed fifty-four, forty alone, seven with both France and the United

203

standard, oftentimes eschewing international law as merely applicable to other nations

and peoples. The statements made to the Security Council during the sessions that the

following draft resolutions were voted upon provide a rich documentary record

highlighting not only the U.S. and Israel’s opposition to the international consensus on

the Middle East, but also Israel’s contempt for the United Nations and Palestinian rights

and the U.S.’s tortured explanations justifying veto after veto, preventing the Security

Council from forcing Israel to withdraw from all the occupied territories, including

Jerusalem, allow the return of Palestinian refugees, and end the discriminatory policies

against Arabs which violate international norms and human rights. Although all the draft

resolutions are interrelated, for ease of discussion, the drafts are divided into three

categories: the occupation of Arab territories since 1967, the invasion and occupation of

southern Lebanon, and other acts of Israeli aggression.

The main paragraphs of the Jordanian draft resolution S/14943 of 1 April 1982

state that the Security Council

1. Denounces measures imposed on the Palestinian population such as the dismissal of elected mayors by Israeli authorities, as well as the violation of the liberties and rights of the inhabitants of the occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip which followed the measures taken by Israel with regard to the [Syrian] Golan Heights, and which could only damage the prospects for peace;

2. Calls on Israel, the occupying Power, to rescind its decision disbanding the elected municipal council of El Bireh and its decision to remove from their posts the Mayors of Nablus and Ramallah;

3. Reaffirms that all the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 continue to apply in full to all of the occupied territories;

4. Calls upon Israel to cease forthwith all measures applied in the West Bank, including Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip and the Syrian Golan Heights, which contravene

Kingdom, and seven with only the U.K. The Soviet Union/Russian Federation vetoed seven resolutions and China two.

204

the provisions of the fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949;

5. Calls upon the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council not later than 7 April 1982 on the implementation of this resolution;

6. Decides to remain seized with this item.2

As Rubenberg indicates, the Israeli dismissal of Palestinian mayors in the West

Bank and Gaza was part of the provocation campaign before the Israeli invasion of

Lebanon to elicit a PLO retaliatory response. A second motive was to show the

Palestinians the impotence of the PLO, thus demoralizing the population, which would

create Palestinian acquiescence to Israeli occupation.3 While thirteen members of the

Security Council voted in favor of this resolution, the negative vote of the United States,

a permanent member of the Council, prevented its adoption and enforcement.4 The

United States ambassador claimed that the “draft resolution . . . uses strongly

denunciatory language and does not take into account the complexity of the problem.”5

While the resolution hardly “uses strongly denunciatory language,” the American pretext

to veto the draft seems quite dubious. As for the “complexity of the problem,” the United

Nations merely demands that Israel follow international law, especially the Geneva

Conventions, when orchestrating policies and practices in the occupied territories. The

U.S. ambassador further argued that not only has Israel maintained the Geneva

2 Jody A. Boudreault, ed., United Nations Resolutions on Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict,

Volume IV: 1987-1991 (Washington D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1993), 416-417. 3 Cheryl A. Rubenberg, Israel and the American National Interest: A Critical Examination

(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986), 280. 4 United Nations Security Council Official Records, Thirty-Seventh Year: 2348th Meeting,

S/PV.2348, 2. 5 Ibid., 3.

205

Conventions in the occupied territories but since “there is no provision . . . for the

election of public officials–which Israel none the less permitted in 1972 and 1976,” Israel

has humanely and benevolently surpassed “the requirements of the convention.”6 As for

the election of Palestinian officials, Israel maintained military control over the people,

land, and resources rendering any political Palestinian autonomy negligible. The draft

clearly refers to other Israeli policies that violate the Geneva Conventions, polices that

the Security Council was well aware, which contradicts the American contention that

Israel accedes to the Conventions, let alone surpassing their requirements. The U.S.

claim implicitly justifying the dismissal of elected officials failed to consider that the

Israeli policy was a grave violation of Palestinian human rights warranting condemnation.

Although not a member, the Israeli ambassador addressed and directly accused

the Security Council of being an obstacle to peace, implying that the Israeli occupation of

Arab territories is not the contributing factor to the instability and violence in the region.7

Ignoring or tacitly not admitting that the United States provides enormous diplomatic,

military, and economic aid to Israel, the Israeli ambassador asserted “some Arab

countries have been funneling money through their agents into these areas and organizing

subversion.”8 Israel’s actions in the occupied territories are understandable and

justifiable as self-defense since “Israel will not tolerate terror and subversion in Judea,

Samaria, and the Gaza district.”9 The Israeli government often refers to the West Bank as

Judea and Samaria, intimating that the Arab territory is part of historic Israel. The

6 Ibid. 7 Ibid., 1-2. 8 Ibid., 2.

9 Ibid.

206

Palestinians, needless to say, have no right to resist occupation or fight for self-

determination in their homeland. Just as the United States has absurdly asserted that the

insurgency in Iraq, which developed after the U.S. invasion in 2003, is due mainly to

foreign fighters, the Israeli ambassador in 1982 just as absurdly blamed Palestinian

resistance on foreign subversion.10 While attempting to justify the illegal occupations,

both countries deliberately fail to acknowledge that the inhabitants of Iraq and the

occupied territories have legitimate grievances and the moral duty to resist blatant

American and Israeli foreign subversion and oppression of their homelands.

The remaining fourteen members of the Council denounced Israel’s actions and

repeated the international consensus regarding a peaceful solution to the Middle East

crisis. The French ambassador lamented Israel’s adoption of a law illegally extending its

legislation, jurisdiction and administration to the Syrian Golan, which the United Nations

condemned and deemed invalid in Security Council resolution 497.11 The Irish

ambassador reiterated that resolution 242, which demands Israeli withdrawal from the

occupied territories and full acceptance of the right of all states to live in peace within

secure and recognized boundaries, is insufficient for a total peace because it does not

address the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.12 Japan stated “Israel’s latest

actions clearly violated the relevant Council resolutions as well as the Geneva

Convention Relative to the protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid., 3; for the text of the Security Resolution on the Syrian Golan see Regina S. Sharif, ed.,

United Nations Resolutions on Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Volume II: 1975-1981 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies), 200.

12 Ibid., 4.

207

1949.”13 Poland recognized “these events are the tragic consequences of the expansionist

policy of Israel aimed at breaking the determined resistance of the Arab people.”14 Zaire,

abstaining due to the lack of consensus on the draft owing to the U.S. veto, concluded the

obvious that “there can be no question of settling the complex problem of the Middle

East and Palestine by expedient unilateral solutions, which consist purely and simply of

grabbing the occupied Arab territories.”15

Although not able to vote, the Syrian representative addressed the Council,

accusing the United States of vetoing the self-determination principle of the Charter.16

Moreover, the Palestinian representative declared that “U.S. has opted to be a minority of

one against the rest of the international community. . . . The PLO [Palestine Liberation

Organization] holds the government of the United States to be not only an accomplice but

also an equal partner in the crime committed against our people, in the crime to deprive

our people to a life in its own homeland. The United States is equally responsible for

those crimes.”17

The draft resolution S/14985 of 20 April 1982, concerning an Israeli soldier’s

attack at the al-Haram al-Sharif holy site in Jerusalem, states that the Security Council

“recalling its relevant resolutions pertaining to the status and character of the Holy City

of Jerusalem,” and affirming once more that the Geneva Convention relative to the

13 Ibid., 5.

14 Ibid., 6.

15 Ibid., 7. 16 Ibid., 9. 17 Ibid., 12.

208

Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 is applicable to all

territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem,”

1. Condemns in the strongest terms these appalling acts of sacrilege perpetrated within the precincts of al-Haram al-Sahrif;

2. Deplores any act or encouragement of destruction or profanation of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in Jerusalem as tending to disturb world peace;

3. Calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to observe and apply scrupulously the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention and the principles of international law governing military occupation and to refrain from causing any hindrance to the discharge of the established functions of the Higher Islamic Council in Jerusalem;

4. Requests the Secretary General as he deems appropriate to keep the Security Council fully informed on the implementation of this resolution;

5. Decides to remain seized of this serious matter.18

The United States cast a veto negating the affirmative votes of the remaining

fourteen members of the Security Council and preventing the adoption of the draft

resolution.19 The U.S. ambassador claimed the resolution would create more violence

and vetoed the draft because it “implies that the responsibility for the terrible event lies

not with the individual who was responsible for the incident but with the Israeli

authorities, who have unequivocally denounced the act.”20 While the U.S. interpretation

of the resolution is disputable given the actual wording of the draft, it is necessary to

realize that the U.S. and Israel consistently have blamed the Palestinian leadership,

especially Yasser Arafat and presently the democratically elected Hamas party, for any

Palestinian violence against Israelis, a useful ploy to perpetually forestall political

18 Boudreault, 417.

19 United Nations Security Council Official Records, Thirty-Seventh Year: 2357th Meeting,

S/PV.2357, 9.

20 Ibid., 10.

209

negotiations with the Palestinians until their leadership has renounced and prevented all

violence and resistance to the occupation. Echoing the Israeli ambassador’s referral to

the reunification of Jerusalem in 1967, the U.S. ambassador controversially maintained

that “the final status of Jerusalem can only be determined through negotiations among all

concerned parties,” thus unambiguously supporting the Israeli position contrary to the

1947 partition plan and all relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and Security

Council.21 Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, including Jerusalem, is a

nonnegotiable precondition for any peaceful settlement. Not only is the acquisition of

territory by force illegal in international law, but the partition plan designated Jerusalem

an international city precluding it from falling under the sole jurisdiction and

administration of the separate Jewish or Palestinian Arab state. The United States

essentially declared before the Security Council its rejection of Palestinian self-

determination and a peaceful settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The other participants in the debate opposed the U.S. position and unequivocally

supported the relevant United Nations resolutions and international consensus concerning

the occupied territories. The Uganda ambassador remarked that “it must be emphasized

that the root of the turmoil in the Middle East is the denial of the right to self-

determination of the Palestinian people and the continued illegal occupation of Arab

lands by Israel.”22 The League of Arab States representative stated

the attempt to absolve the occupying power in Jerusalem, ab initio, of its direct responsibility under the Fourth Geneva Convention and under international law is an attempt to create a situation where Jerusalem is not treated as an occupied territory, an attempt to legitimize what the international community has correctly defined as illegal

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid., 5.

210

and illegitimate occupation.23

The ambassador from the Soviet Union reiterated that the U.S. vote signals to the world

that it does not recognize East Jerusalem as occupied territory. Moreover, U.S.

imperialism and Israeli Zionism in the Middle East dismiss the international principle of

non-acquisition of territory by force.24 The Syrian ambassador reminded the council that

Israel annexed Jerusalem in 1967 and declared it the “eternal capital” in 1982 rejecting

world opinion and relevant United Nations resolutions prohibiting such a move. The

United States supported Israel in this regard, even attempting to delete “in Jerusalem”

from the preamble paragraph of this draft resolution referring to the applicability of the

Geneva Convention in the occupied territories.25

The Palestinian representative referred to his comments from a previous meeting

debating this draft resolution, arguing that the United States

is duty-bound to reaffirm that the status of the Holy City of Jerusalem has not been changed and that the United States is committed to upholding the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention, and to reaffirm the applicability of its provisions to occupied Jerusalem. The failure of the United States government to state that in very clear terms can only be interpreted by us Palestinians, Arabs and Muslims all over the world as a clear and unambiguous commitment of the government to support and encourage Israel in its policies and practices.26

After the vote, the understandably frustrated Palestinian representative stated that

the United States has in very clear terms and with no ambiguity chosen to be a minority of one, isolated from the rest of the world and a renegade. The government of the United States of America has rendered the Council and the United Nations–the

23 Ibid., 6.

24 Ibid., 11.

25 Ibid., 12.

26 S/PV.2356 as cited in Ibid., 13.

211

hope of mankind–helpless and ineffective.27 While the Palestinians would continue to acknowledge the Security Council as the

appropriate forum to implement a just peace in the Middle East, their representative

promised that if the United States continued to undermine the United Nations, then the

Palestinians would have no choice but to resist occupation and Israeli military power by

all available means.28

Similarly, the United States cast the sole negative vote against the draft resolution

S/17769/Rev.1 of 30 January 1986, which states in part that the Security Council,

“bearing in mind the specific status of Jerusalem and, in particular, the need to protect

and preserve the unique spiritual and religious dimensions of the Holy Places in the

City,” “strongly deploring the continued refusal of Israel, the occupying Power, to

comply with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council,” and “deeply concerned at

the provocative acts by Israelis, including members of the Knesset, which have violated

the sanctity of the sanctuary of the Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem,”

1. Strong deplores the provocative acts which have violated the sanctity of the sanctuary of the Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem;

2. Affirms that such acts constitute a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, the failure of which could also endanger international peace and security;

3. Determines once more that all measures taken by Israel to change the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure or status of the Palestinian or other Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, or any part thereof, have no legal validity and that the policy and practices of Israel of settling parts of its population and new immigrants in those territories constitute a flagrant violation of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, and also constitute a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East;

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.

212

4. Reiterates that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, the occupying Power, which have altered or purport to alter that character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem and in particular the “basic law”29 on Jerusalem are null and void and must be rescinded forthwith;

5. Calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to observe scrupulously the norms of international law governing military occupation, in particular the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention, and to prevent any hindrance to the discharge of the established functions of the Supreme Islamic Council in Jerusalem, including any cooperation that the Council may desire from countries with predominantly Muslim populations and from Muslim communities in relation to its plans for the maintenance and repair of the Islamic Holy Places;

6. Urgently calls on Israel, the occupying Power, to implement forthwith the provisions of this resolution and the relevant Security Council resolutions;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of the present resolution before 1 May 1986.30

Although members of the Israeli Knesset and government ministers had violated

the sanctity of the Muslim holy site on several occasions, the U.S. ambassador, echoing

the argument above and ignoring the fundamental elements in the resolution, claimed that

the draft unfairly places culpability on the government of Israel instead of the few

individuals responsible for the acts.31 Hence the American veto against thirteen

affirmative votes and one abstention, despite that the draft primarily condemns all Israeli

policies that consolidate and extend Jewish control over the occupied territories,

including Jerusalem, in clear violation of international law.32 The Palestinian

representative exposed the U.S. double standard, arguing that when Palestinians commit

29 The “basic law” on Jerusalem declares a united and completed Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.

30 Boudreault, 423-424. 31 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record, 2650th Meeting, S/PV.2650, 24-

25. 32 Ibid., 31.

213

an act the U.S. and Israel consider terrorist, the United States holds the PLO

responsible.33 The Israeli ambassador, arrogantly claiming victim hood and placing the

onus for violence on the Palestinians, quoted a “leader of Israel” who said “I will forgive

our enemies everything except one thing: that they force our children to learn war.” The

ambassador related that

anyone who has lived in my country knows the terrible price that we have had to pay in our scholars, in our poets, in our men of letters, in our men of science who have been forced to take up the sword so that we may live in our ancient homeland.34

By falsifying the unambiguous historical record and implying that foreign settlers and

colonizers who have forcibly expanded into Arab territory, expelled a large proportion of

the indigenous population, and imposed discriminatory laws and policies favoring those

of Jewish ethnicity have been victims merely attempting to legitimately defend

themselves and their “ancient homeland,” the Israeli ambassador attempted to

dehumanize the Palestinians and de-legitimize their resistance as uncontrollable,

unconscionable, and irrational hatred against Jews. Remembering that Israel is the

aggressor in the Middle East, one should wonder at the “terrible price” that the

Palestinians “have had to pay” in lives and potential under almost forty years of Israeli

occupation.

The draft resolution S/15895 of 1 August 1983, concerning Israeli settlements in

the occupied territories, states in part that the Security Council “affirming that the

situation in the occupied Arab territories remains grave and volatile and that the Israeli

settlement policies and practices constitute a major obstacle to all efforts and initiatives

towards a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East,” and “affirming once

33 Ibid., 42.

34 Ibid., 46.

214

more that the regulations annexed to the Hague Conventions of 1907 and the provisions

of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time or War,

of 12 August 1949, are applicable to the Arab territories occupied by Israel in 1967,

including Jerusalem,”

1. Reaffirms all its relevant resolutions;

2. Determines that the policies and practices of Israel in establishing settlements in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied in 1967, including Jerusalem, have no legal validity, constitute a major and serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East and are in contravention with article 49(b) of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949;

3. Calls once more upon Israel, the occupying Power, to abide scrupulously by the provision of the above-mentioned Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, to rescind its previous measures, to desist from taking any action which would result in changing the legal status and geographical nature and materially affecting the demographic composition of the Arab Territories occupied in 1967 and, in particular, not to transfer parts of its own civilian population into the occupied Arab territories and to force transfers of Arab populations from these territories;

4. Strongly deplores the continuation and persistence of Israel in pursuing those policies and practices and calls upon the Government and people of Israel to rescind those measures, to dismantle the existing settlements, to desist from expanding and enlarging the existing ones and, in particular, to cease on an urgent basis from the planning, construction and establishment of new settlements in the Arab territories occupied in 1967, including Jerusalem;

5. Rejects all Israeli arbitrary and illegal actions, especially those which result in the expulsion, deportation and forcible transfers of Arab populations from the occupied Arab territories;

6. Condemns the recent attacks perpetuated against [the] Arab civilian population in the occupied Arab territories, especially the killing and wounding of students at the Islamic college of the Arab city of Al-Khalil on 26 July 1983;

7. Calls upon all States not to provide Israel with any assistance to be used specifically in connection with settlements in the occupied territories;

8. Reaffirms its determination, in the event of non-compliance by Israel with the present resolution, to examine practical ways and means in accordance with relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations to secure the full implementation of the

215

present resolution;

9. Decides to keep the situation in the occupied Arab territories under constant and close scrutiny;

10. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council within three months on the implementation of this resolution.35

As mentioned above, the General Assembly partitioned Palestine against the

wishes of the majority indigenous population, granting over fifty-five percent of the land

to less than one-third of the people. After the 1948 war and the mass expulsion of the

Arab inhabitants, Israel controlled over seventy-seven percent of Palestine, and after the

Six-Day war in 1967, Israel almost tripled its territory, controlling the West Bank,

including Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula.

Although Israel illegally gained territory during the 1948 hostilities, the international

consensus demands only Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied since 1967,

including Jerusalem, which the General Assembly designated an international city. The

debate on the substance of this draft resolution concerning the Jewish settlements

illustrates that the United States and Israel completely reject the relevant United Nations

resolutions concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict, thus remaining the primary obstacles to a

peaceful and just settlement.

The United States vetoed the draft resolution, protecting Israel and undermining

the will of the Council, because the text implied that Israel has forcibly transferred Arab

populations from the occupied territories. Although the resolution rejects Israeli actions

that result in deportation or expulsion, the stress of the resolution is on the illegal Israeli

settlers and settlements in the occupied territories and the U.S. ambassador explicated

35 Boudreault, 419-420.

216

that the international stance toward Israeli settlements provided the real impetus for the

veto. The United States was against the dismantlement of the settlements in the occupied

territories because “the future of the settlements is precisely one of the key issues which

will need to be addressed in negotiations.” Moreover, “nor can we accept continuing the

sterile argument as to whether the settlements are “legal” or “illegal”. . .” because

apparently the legality of the settlements “fails to address the real problems.” The United

States, rejecting all relevant United Nations resolutions, favored “unconditional

negotiation without prejudgment, with preconditions, precluding no issue. . . .”36 While

international consensus demands unconditional Israeli withdrawal from the occupied

territories as a precondition for a Middle East peace, the United States and Israel continue

to claim that negotiations between the parties, which may not include the Palestinian

representatives, will determine the status of the illegal settlements and Jerusalem, thus

rewarding Israel for aggression and violating the principle of non-acquisition of territory

by force.

In an interesting statement that seemingly opposes and definitely weakens the

mandate of the Security Council the ambassador commented that “the United States, for

its part, rarely tries to enforce decisions which do not arise out of the genuine self-

initiated will of the parties to a conflict or to any form of dispute.”37 The statement seems

completely absurd because of course the United States does not abide by this policy when

it presents resolutions to the Council on Iraq or Iran. Perhaps the ambassador was

implying that the Palestinians and the Arab states are not valid parties to the Arab-Israeli

36 United Nations Security Council Official Records, Thirty-Eighth Year: 2461st Meeting,

S/PV.2461, 23.

37 Ibid., 24.

217

conflict. Perhaps the ambassador thought that all parties to a dispute must wish for

Security Council intervention, and since Israel clearly dismisses the Council, all

resolutions pertaining to it are invalid and unwarranted. Most likely, recognizing that the

Security Council would honor the legitimate rights of the Palestinians to self-

determination, thus infringing on Israel’s territorial expansion, the United States favors a

Middle East peace process wholly outside United Nations jurisdiction.

The Israeli representative to the United Nations displayed his nation’s contempt

for the Security Council and complete rejection of the international consensus for a just

Middle East peace. Israel’s arguments and accusations are disingenuous attempts to

justify occupation and settlement and deserve to be examined closely. The Israeli

ambassador bluntly asserted that the Security Council “has systematically disqualified

itself on matters relating to the Arab-Israeli conflict.”38 Moreover, he maintained that

this foul, abusive and offensive language reflects the inability or unwillingness, or both, of Israel’s enemies to come to terms with the very existence of my country and its right to exist. This has been the root cause of the Arab-Israeli conflict all along, ever since 1948, since the establishment of Israel as an independent state, and before.39 The ambassador’s proof is the University of Illinois professor Fred Gottheil, who testified

before the Congressional Committee on International Relations on 12 September 1977

that

Jewish settlements on the West Bank is [sic] an issue today only because the existence of Israel is an issue. The issue of Jewish settlements in the West Bank today is simply one thin layer that emanates from and partially conceals the core of the conflict, namely the non-recognition by the Arab states of Israel’s right to exist.40

38 Ibid., 8.

39 Ibid., 7.

40 Ibid., 12.

218

Recognition of Israel’s “right to exist” implies Israel’s “right to exist” as a Jewish state

with the right to ethnically cleanse the non-Jewish population in the territory that Israel

deems will be within its final borders, which Israel will unilaterally establish at some

indeterminate point in the future. No entity in the international community recognizes

Israel’s “right to exist,” including the United Nations because that particular type of

recognition would violate international law and the United Nations Charter regarding the

return of refugees, aggression, and acquisition of territory by force. Moreover, various

Arab states including Egypt and Jordan and the PLO actively sought peace treaties with

Israel that recognized Israel’s existence and Israel, recognizing its military supremacy,

rejected many substantial peace offerings. The Israeli ambassador’s argument on this

point is not only invalid, but also disingenuous because it places the blame for Israeli

expansion and settlement on the Palestinian victims.

The ambassador concluded that Jews “may live in Hebron, Nebraska; or in

Bethel, Connecticut; or in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania; or in Jericho, New York. We shall

not accept that Jews qua Jews shall be barred from living in Hebron, Judea; or in

Bethlehem, Judea; or Bethel, Samaria; or Jericho, Samaria,” a complete rejection of the

partition’s demand for a Palestinian Arab state and compelling evidence for Israel’s

overall plan for annexation of portions of the occupied territories.41 The question then

arises, are Palestinians allowed to live in the aforementioned cities in the West Bank?

Tellingly, while Jews are able to live anywhere within Israel’s undefined borders,

Palestinian refugees are not allowed to return to their homes contrary to international law

because that would jeopardize the Jewish majority in Israel. Moreover, in order to

consolidate settlement blocs in the occupied territories, including Jerusalem, a Jewish

41 Ibid.

219

population must immigrate while the Palestinians are encouraged or forced to emigrate,

changing the demographic character of the territories.

Contradicting over thirty years of history and a reality-based assessment, the

ambassador argued that

at the same time it has never been the aim of Israel to exercise control over the lives and activities of the Arab inhabitants there. We have repeatedly stated, and I wish to state it here again, that we seek to live as equals with them, not to replace them. Furthermore, it has been the policy of the government of Israel that no single Palestinian Arab resident of these areas legally holding claim to land should be made homeless by the establishment of these villages. Incidentally, many of the present-day Jewish villages in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district have been established on Jewish-owned land expropriated in 1948 by the Jordanian or Egyptian government. Most of them have been set up on government and public land which have been barren for centuries.42 Notice the use of “villages” as quite an innocuous euphemism for “illegal settlements.”

The ambassador further asserts that “. . . Israel has better title to any territory of the

former Palestine mandate than any other state,” meaning Egypt and Jordan. To

substantiate his claim, the Israeli ambassador quoted Stephen Schwebel, a justice on the

World Court, who said “where the prior holder of territory had seized that territory

unlawfully, the state which subsequently takes that territory in the lawful exercise of self-

defense has, against that prior holder, better title.” Moreover, Israel contended that the

Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12

August 1949, is inapplicable to Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza District since Jordan was

not a legitimate sovereign when Israel, in self-defense, gained control over the territory

during the Six-Day war.43

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid., 13-14.

220

However, the Israeli legal argument is somewhat ingenuous and does not stand

under minimal scrutiny. The sovereignty over the occupied territories belongs to the

Palestinian people, not Jordan, not Egypt, not Israel. Moreover, it is false to claim that

Israel gained control over the territories in self-defense. The ambassador next played the

“security” card declaring that

until 1967 all of Israel’s major towns and cities were within range of medium Arab artillery, and our capital, Jerusalem, was within light mortar range of Arab forces. Villages of the kind we are discussing have proved to be an effective form of early warning system.44 Once again referring to illegal settlements as “villages” and Jerusalem as “our capital,”

the Israeli ambassador, while providing no evidence and contrary to common sense,

claimed that the settlements provided security to Israel. While Israel has made

devastating raids into various Arab countries, including Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, and

Tunisia, and while many Arab cities are within range of Israeli rockets, Israel has the

right to establish buffer zones in foreign territory. The Arab states hardly possess the

same right.

Finally, Israel called for “direct and substantive negotiation between the states

concerned,” leaving out a main party to any negotiations, the Palestinians. Declaring that

“the expression of this unwillingness [to recognize Israel’s existence and its right to exist]

has been a refusal to sit down with us and negotiate without any prior conditions,” Israel

ignores history, indicates its rejection of the international consensus, and exposes its

intent to reap rewards for aggressive and expansionist policies.45

44 Ibid., 14.

45 Ibid., 14-15.

221

The other participants in the debate unambiguously rejected the U.S. and Israel’s

actions preventing a viable peace process. The German Democratic Republic stated that

“nobody can ignore the fact that the present escalation of Israel’s policy of aggression

and occupation is possible only with the unqualified support of the United States.”46 The

Soviet ambassador, observing that twenty Arab nations submitted the draft proposal,

commented that the U.S. veto dismisses the “just demands” of Arab countries, sanctions

Israel’s illegal annexation of territory, and exhibits a pro-Israeli imperialist policy.47 The

Palestinian representative iterated that since 1976 the PLO has called for negotiations

within the Security Council on the basis of the principles of United Nations Charter and

the relevant resolutions.48 The League of Arab States, affirming that the annexed

territories are non-negotiable, argued the settlements are “deliberate attempts to pre-empt

the emergence of any form of a Palestinian identity--any form of Palestinian self-

determination.”49

The debate surrounding the draft resolution S/17459 of 12 September 1985

illustrated more U.S. hypocrisy and Israeli obfuscation of international law. Although

four nations abstained, the United States cast the lone veto, thus shouldering

responsibility for the consequences of further Security Council inaction. The draft

requested that the Security Council, “affirming once again that the Geneva Convention

relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, is

applicable to the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem,”

46 Ibid., 6.

47 Ibid., 23-24.

48 Ibid., 24-25.

49 Ibid., 25-28.

222

1. Deplores the repressive measures taken by Israel since 4 August 1985 against [sic] civilian population in the Israeli occupied territories specially in the West Bank and Gaza and expressed serious concern that the persistence of Israeli authorities in applying such measures would lead to further deterioration of the situation in the occupied territories; 2. Calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to immediately stop all repressive measures including curfews, administrative detentions and forceful deportation and to release all detainees and refrain from further deportations; 3. Further calls upon Israel to abide scrupulously by the provision of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949.50

The Israeli ambassador argued that nothing, not “national liberation,” not fighting

for “legitimate rights,” justified the “deliberate murder of children.”51 However, the

philosopher Michael Neumann counters the noble claims of the imperial oppressor

through a comparison familiar to most Americans. Neumann states

the Indians’ very existence as a people was threatened. More than threatened; their society was doomed without resistance. . . . Moreover, every single white person, down to the children, was an enemy, a being which, allowed to live, would contribute to the destruction of the Indians’ collective existence.52 Obviously, Neumann observes, the Native Americans did not have the conventional

military power to defeat a white population that had no right to travel to the Americas to

50 Boudreault, 422.

51 United Nations Security Council Official Records, Fortieth-Year: 2605th Meeting, S/PV.2605,

15. As for whether these standards apply to Israel itself, recall that the historian Benny Morris observed the Israelis precluded nonviolent forms of Palestinian resistance and this section details the U.S. prevention of Security Council action, leaving Palestinians with few options. As for casualty figures, Finkelstein writes: “From 1947 to the present, the number of Israeli deaths during all its wars and policing operations--1947-1949, 1956, 1967, 1967-1970, 1973, 1982, the first and second intifadas--as well as from all terrorist attacks comes in total to under 22,000, the overwhelming number of them combatants. By comparison, just in the course of Israel’s June-September 1982 invasion of Lebanon, between 18,000 and 20,000 Lebanese and Palestinians were killed, the overwhelming number of them civilians.” See Norman G. Finkelstein, Beyond Chutzpah: On the Misuse of Anti-Semitism and the Abuse of History (Berkeley, University of California Press), 276.

52 Michael Neumann, Counterpunch, 9 April 2002,

<www.counterpunch.org/neumannisrael1.html>.

223

commit genocide against the indigenous peoples, steal their land, and destroy their

cultures. Neumann argues that the Native Americans were justified in utilizing any

means necessary for self-preservation and self-defense and were limited in their

capabilities to attacking soft targets. Similarly, Jewish colonizers, legitimized by the

United Nations, have done nothing less than steal the land and resources and destroy the

culture and population of the indigenous inhabitants of Palestine. Similarly, the

Palestinians struggling for self-preservation lack the conventional capacity to fight a

“legitimate” resistance against a military superpower where every able-bodied adult is at

least an army reservist.53 The Palestinians have the moral duty to resist until Israel

withdraws from their territory and allows Palestinian self-determination and sovereignty

over land and resources, as the Soviet ambassador unambiguously affirmed when he

stated that “we reject any attempt to equate the occupiers with the inhabitants of the

territories who are resisting occupation.”54

An interesting corollary is that the United States and Israel have a monopoly on

language. While those fighting against U.S. occupation in Iraq and Israeli occupation in

Palestine are “terrorists” or “insurgents,” the U.S. supported Contra force in Nicaragua

and Mujahadeen guerillas and warlords in Afghanistan during the 1980s are legitimate

“freedom fighters,” a distinction not lost on much of the world’s population. The Syrian

ambassador noted that the United States has supported diplomatically, economically, and

militarily “the two racist regimes in Pretoria [South Africa] and Tel Aviv [Israel].”55 The

53 Ibid.

54 United Nations Security Council Official Records, Fortieth-Year: 2605th Meeting, S/PV.2605,

18.

55 Ibid., 5.

224

Syrian ambassador continued that the U.S. veto illustrated the “intention to abolish or

destroy international law because it applies to the American aggression against the people

of Nicaragua.”56

Interestingly, the United States ambassador justified its veto of the draft resolution

as an expression of the public will. Interesting because the U.S. population is

disappointingly ignorant of its governments policies and practices in the United Nations,

a dangerous ignorance considering the enormous influence the U.S. wields internationally

due to its economic and military power. While representatives at the debate criticized the

U.S. government for its decision and policy, the affronted and disingenuous ambassador

in an attempt to obfuscate lamented that

it is particularly distressing to listen to rhetoric charging the United States government with the “heinous crimes” of responding to public opinion in determining its foreign and domestic policies, helping to provide Israel with a sense of security and attempting to find a way to bring about a just and lasting peace between Israel and its neighbors.57

The remarks require no comment. The extent of public control over the government’s

policies and the absence of real participatory democracy in the United States is quite

apparent as the citizen’s main participatory functions are to vote periodically for either of

the two parties, Democrat or Republican, and consume endlessly. The historical record

regarding U.S. aggression and obstructionism in the United Nations contradicts avowed

U.S. benevolence and exposes the ambassador’s claims that U.S. encouragement of

perpetual antagonism between Israel and the Arab states and complete rejection of the

international consensus and United Nations decisions on the matter honor commitments

to a just peace. Explicating the reasons behind the veto, the ambassador lectured that

56 Ibid., 21.

57 Ibid., 16.

225

any system of law . . . has as its first rule the equal application of the law. Universality is the very cornerstone of the United Nations. The unfortunate obsession of some several states in the Council debate with the selective application of international conventions is destructive to the quest for world order as envisaged by the Charter. . . . Either these conventions apply to all or they apply to none. Selective application of the Charter or international conventions strikes at the very heart of the institution. My government will continue to oppose such destructive tendencies.58 The U.S. dedication to international law and the United Nations is quite selective at best,

rendering the ambassador’s rhetoric and indignation as hypocritical posturing. While

quick to enforce resolutions and international law against the supposed infractions of

official enemies, the United States and its allies and clients reject the principle of

universality and the applicability of the rule of law to their actions and policies.

Draft resolution S/19466 of 29 January 1988 states in part that the Security

Council, “expressing its grave concern over the increasing sufferings of the Palestinian

people in the occupied Palestinian territories,” and “bearing in mind the inalienable rights

of all people recognized by the Charter of the United Nations and proclaimed by the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights,”

1. Expresses its deep appreciation to the Secretary-General for his report;

2. Calls upon Israel, as the occupying Power and as a High Contracting Party to the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, to accept the de jure applicability of the Convention to the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, and fully to comply with its obligations under that Convention;

3. Recalls the obligation of all the High Contracting Parties, under article 1 of the Convention, to ensure respect for the Convention in all circumstances; 4. Calls again upon Israel to desist forthwith from its policies and practices which violate the human rights of the Palestinian people;

5. Requests Israel to facilitate the task of the International Committee of the Red Cross and of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and requests all Members to give them their full support;

58 Ibid.

226

6. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to monitor the situation in the occupied territories by all means available to him and to make regular and timely reports to the Council;

7. Affirms the urgent need to achieve, under the auspices of the United Nations, a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement of the Arab/Israeli conflict, an integral part of which is the Palestinian problem, and expresses its determination to work towards that end;

8. Requests the Secretary-General to continue his endeavors to promote such a settlement and to keep the Council regularly informed;

9. Decides to keep the situation in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem, under review.59

The vote on this resolution was 14 to 1 with the United States providing the lone

veto “because we believe it is an untimely effort to involve the Security Council on issues

which are, at this time, best dealt with through diplomatic channels.”60 The U.S. stance is

questionable considering the purpose of the Security Council and the United Nations in

general is to solve disputes such as the Arab-Israeli conflict through diplomacy.

Concerning the consensus in favor of an international conference on the Middle East, the

U.S. ambassador declared his opposition, stating that an “agreement on a negotiating

process and the appropriate auspices for negotiations can succeed only through the

consent of the parties directly concerned. It cannot be imposed upon them.”61

The representative from the League of Arab States countered, observing that

the mechanism of a United Nations international conference becomes a commitment to substantive results, while the concept of direct bilateral negotiations becomes a way of

59 Boudreault, 425.

60 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record: 2790th Meeting, S/PV.2790, 41-

42.

61 Ibid., 41; Compare to the current push for Security Council sanctions against Iran. The Bush administration has rejected Iranian offers for direct negotiations between the two countries, favoring to impose a unilateral [military] solution on Iran.

227

dictating the hegemony of Israel and running away from the parameters of a clear cut, genuine, authentic and mutually acceptable outcome.62

As the General Assembly has repeatedly asserted, an international peace conference on

the Middle East is the only viable option to achieve a just settlement. The U.S. and Israel

have consistently opposed such a conference and any preconditions for Israel, like Israeli

withdrawal from the occupied territories. Instead, both countries argue for a peace

process void of international oversight and maintain that the Palestinians must meet

certain impossible preconditions before Israel will consider negotiations, while Israel

continually alters the facts on the ground. The United States has consistently imposed

conditions, often impossible demands, on its opponents in diplomatic disputes, usually as

a means to prevent a negotiated settlement and utilize force to achieve U.S. aims. As its

veto indicates, the United States rejects a viable peace conference and favors continual

violence and conflict in the Middle East.

Reaffirming resolutions 605, 607, 608, the draft resolution S/19780 of 14 April

1988 requires the Security Council, “having been appraised of the deportation by Israel,

the occupying Power, of eight civilian Palestinians on 11 April 1988 and of its decision to

continue the deportation of Palestinian civilians in the occupied territories,” “gravely

concerned and alarmed by the measures adopted by Israel against the civilian Palestinian

people and its persistent policy of taking measures of collective punishment, such as the

recent demolition of homes in the village of Beita,” “also expressing grave concern over

the action taken by the forces of the occupying Power against Sheikh Saad Eddin El-

Alami, Head of the Supreme Islamic Council, who was assaulted and beaten in the

Haram Al Shareef in Jerusalem on 1 April 1988,” “reaffirming once again that the

62 Ibid., 27.

228

Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12

August 1949, is applicable to Palestinian and other Arab territories, occupied by Israel

since 1967, including Jerusalem,” and “recalling in particular the provisions of article 49

of the Fourth Geneva Convention and expressing alarm that Israel has continued to

transfer its civilian population into the territory it occupies and has equipped those

settlers with arms which have been used against the civilian Palestinian people,”

1. Urges Israel, the occupying Power, to abide immediately and scrupulously by the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, and to desist forthwith from its policies and practices that are in violation of the provisions of the Convention;

2. Urges further Israel to rescind the order to deport Palestinian civilians and ensure the safe and immediate return to the occupied Palestinian territories of those already deported;

3. Urges once again Israel to desist forthwith from deporting Palestinian civilians from the occupied territories;

4. Condemns those policies and practices of Israel, the occupying Power, that violate the human rights of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories, and in particular the opening of fire by the Israeli army, resulting in the killing and wounding of defenseless Palestinian civilians;

5. Affirms the urgent need to achieve, under the auspices of the United Nations, a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement of the Arab/Israeli conflict, an integral part of which is the Palestinian problem, and expresses its determination to work toward that end; 6. Requests the Secretary-General to submit periodic reports on the situation in the occupied territories, including those aspects relating to endeavors for ensuring the safety and protection of the Palestinian civilians under Israeli occupation;

7. Decides to keep the situation in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem, under review.63

By vetoing the resolution, the U.S. once again rejected the international

consensus, preventing a settlement and allowing Israel to unabashedly continue its

63 Boudreault, 425-426.

229

policies and violate the United Nations Charter and various resolutions.64 While the

Security Council is “perfectly serviceable as an instrument of American unilateralism”65

essentially as a propaganda mechanism for domestic persuasion and justification of U.S.

aggression, the Security Council was not the proper forum to solve the Middle East

conflict, perhaps because the untenable and immoral U.S. and Israeli position is opposed

by an overwhelming majority of nations. The United States ambassador contended that

the United Nations request for an international peace conference was counterproductive

to the U.S. effort to coax Israel and its neighbors to begin negotiations for a

comprehensive peace settlement.66 The U.S. proposal ostensibly would guarantee the

security of Israel and the other states in the region and the legitimate rights of the

Palestinian people; however, U.S. unilateralism in this endeavor would ultimately prevent

a peaceful resolution on various pretexts, including ubiquitous Palestinian “terrorism”

signifying that Israel, while seeking peace, has no negotiating partner, thus placing the

blame on the Palestinians and other Arabs as Israel aggressively expands, with U.S.

military, economic, and political support, dispossessing Arabs of their land, resources,

and legitimate rights.

The Algerian ambassador observed that the U.S. position “cannot be described as

anything other than an obstacle to a just and lasting settlement” of the Middle East

problem, iterating that the international community recognizes that the Security Council

64 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2806th meeting,

S/PV.2806, 53.

65 Francis Fukuyama, quoted in Mark Curtis, The Ambiguities of Power (Zed, 1985), 183, cited in Noam Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest forGlobal Dominance (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2003), 29. See notes 69 and 70 in Chapter One.

66 Ibid., 56-57.

230

and an international peace conference are the valid forums for a just peace.67 The U.S.

veto was “on the function of the Security Council and its role in order to pave the way for

an initiative undertaken by a global power towards which it is necessary to act with

deference when it comes to its operational diplomacy,” stated the League of Arab States

representative.68 Regarding the U.S. plan, the League of Arab States declared that “any

attempt to circumvent the representative character of the PLO means that there is no

seriousness in proposing negotiations.”69 Moreover, while the U.S. plan “envisages an

interim period and then ultimately discussions and negotiation of the ultimate status of

the territories,” “. . . we believe that the right of the Palestinians to self-determination is

not negotiable, Israel’s withdrawal from the occupied territories is not negotiable.”70 A

just solution can only be achieved through an international conference “fully mandated to

conduct simultaneous discussions and negotiations on all the issues arising from the

Arab-Israeli conflict, on the basis of the jurisprudence that the various relevant

resolutions of the United Nations have clearly spelled out.”71 One may wonder how the

United States, given its enormous support to Israel, could act as an unbiased and fair

mediator in negotiating a settlement. The Palestinian representative, very much aware of

the U.S. position, rhetorically opined that “perhaps the representative of the United States

will tell us what his government has contributed to ease the tension in the occupied

67 Ibid., 61-62.

68 Ibid., 23-25.

69 Ibid., 27.

70 Ibid.

71 Ibid.

231

territories, other than supplying more sophisticated toxic gas and hundreds of millions of

dollars to the occupying Power and giving it all the protection that it needs.”72

Draft resolution S/20463 of 17 February 1989 proposes that the Security Council,

“bearing in mind the inalienable rights of all peoples recognized by the Charter of the

United Nations and proclaimed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, gravely

concerned over the increasing suffering and continued violation of the human rights of

the Palestinian people in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967,

including Jerusalem,” and “gravely concerned in particular over the imposition of new

measures by Israel , the occupying Power, which have led to increased injuries and deaths

of innocent Palestinian civilians, including children,”

1. Strongly deplores Israel’s persistent policies and practices against the Palestinian people in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem, especially the violation of human rights, and in particular the opening of fire that has resulted in injuries and deaths of Palestinian civilians, including children;

2. Strongly deplores also the continuing disregard by Israel, the occupying Power, of the relevant decisions of the Security Council;

3. Confirms once more that the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 is applicable to the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem, and the other occupied Arab territories;

4. Calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to abide by the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, as well as to comply with its obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention and to desist forthwith from its policies and practices that are in violation of the provisions of the Convention;

5. Calls furthermore for the exercise of maximum restraint to contribute towards the establishment of peace;

6. Affirms the urgent need to achieve, under the auspices of the United Nations, a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement of the Middle East conflict, an integral part of which is the Palestinian problem, and expresses its determination to work towards that end;

72 Ibid., 63.

232

7. Requests the Secretary-General to follow the implementation of this resolution, including examining the situation in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem, by all means available to him and to report to the Security Council;

8. Decides to keep the situation in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem, and the other occupied Arab territories, under review.73

The resolution failed to be implemented due to the U.S. veto, which negated the

affirmative votes of the other fourteen members of the Council.74 The U.S. ambassador

claimed that the United States opposed Israel’s policies condemned in the resolution and

has voiced its concern to the Israeli government.75 However, opposition to Israeli

practices has not prevented the United States from protecting Israel in the Security

Council and sending the copious military and economic aid necessary for Israel to

continue its belligerent policies and ignore United Nations resolutions. Justifying Israel’s

behavior and contradicting its avowed opposition, the United States maintained that “as

the occupying Power, Israel has a responsibility recognized under international law to

maintain order and security in the territories.”76 While violating international law and

Security Council resolutions regarding the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, the U.S.

and Israel justify Israel’s deplorable security measures and its illegal occupation of Arab

lands as maintaining law and order.

Similarly, draft resolution S/20677 of 8 June 1989 deplores Israeli human rights

violation in the occupied territories and states that the Security Council, “recalling its

73 Boudreault, 427-428.

74 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2850th meeting,

S/PV.2850, 34.

75 Ibid., 32-33.

76 Ibid., 33.

233

relevant resolutions on the situation in the Palestinian territory occupied by Israel since

1967, including Jerusalem, and in particular its resolutions 446 (1979), 465 (1980), 607

(1988) and 608 (1988),” and “expressing its grave concern and alarm over the increasing

sufferings of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territory,”

1. Strongly deplores those policies and practices of Israel, the Occupying Power, which violate the human rights of the Palestinian people in the occupied territory as well as vigilante attacks Palestinian towns and villages and desecration of the Holy Koran;

2. Calls upon Israel, as the Occupying Power and as a High Contracting Party to the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, to accept the de jure applicability of the Convention to the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, and fully to comply with its obligations under that Convention and in particular its “responsibility for the treatment accorded to the protected persons by its agents;” 3. Recalls the obligations of all the High Contracting Parties, under article 1 of the Convention, to ensure respect for the Convention in all circumstances;

4. Demands that Israel desist forthwith from deporting Palestinian civilians from the occupied territory and ensure the safe and immediate return of those already deported;

5. Expresses great concern about the prolonged closure of schools in parts of the occupied territory, with all its adverse consequences for the education of Palestinian children, and calls upon Israel to permit the immediate reopening of those schools;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to monitor the situation in the occupied Palestinian territory by all means available to him, to make timely reports to the Council, including recommendations on way and mans to ensure respect for the Convention and protection of Palestinian civilians in the occupied territory, including Jerusalem;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to submit the first such report no later than 23 June 1989;

8. Decides to keep the situation in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem, under review.77

77 Boudreault, 428-429.

234

By casting a veto, the United States negated the affirmative votes of the other

fourteen members of the Council.78 As mentioned above, the United States politely

“urges” Israel to abide by international law and refrain from oppressive practices. While

rushing to the Security Council to chastise and punish official enemies for real and

imagined transgressions, the United States fails to take any proactive measures to change

Israeli behavior in the Middle East. In fact, U.S. military and economic aid and continual

support in the United Nations imply positive endorsement for Israeli actions. The U.S.

ambassador argued that “over the years the United States has repeatedly urged that in

addressing the Arab-Israeli problem, the Security Council refrain from unhelpful,

divisive, one-sided rhetoric.”79 Moreover, the draft resolution “is unbalanced in that it

makes sweeping condemnations of Israeli policies and practice without any reference to

any of the serious acts of violence by the other side.”80 Grossly redefining the reality and

rejecting the international consensus regarding the illegal Israeli occupation, the United

States disingenuously and immorally equates Palestinian resistance with Israeli

oppression, Palestinian stones and homemade rockets with Israel’s massive military

power. The U.S. rejection of United Nations resolutions and an international peace

conference forces the Palestinians to resist occupation in the only means available, while

allowing Israel to change the facts on the ground and continue to expropriate Palestinian

land and resources. A telling example of the U.S. position is that, according to the

Palestinian representative, the United States delegation attempted to remove “Jerusalem”

78 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2867th meeting,

S/PV.2867, 31.

79 Ibid., 28.

80 Ibid.

235

from all references in the draft resolution to the territories occupied by Israel since 1967,

exhibiting a completely pro-Israel stance and wholly rejecting the Security Council and

the consensus of the international community as evidenced by various General Assembly

resolutions.81 While rejecting any solution, the U.S. maintains that the Security Council

prevents a just peace by attempting to adopt and enforce resolutions critical of Israel.

Iterating condemnation of Israel’s human rights violations in the occupied

territories, draft resolution S/20945/rev.1 of 6 November 1989 states in part that the

Security Council, “taking into account the immediate need to consider measures for the

impartial and international protection of the Palestinian civilian population under Israeli

occupation,” and “considering that the current policies and practices of Israel, the

occupying Power, in the occupied territory are bound to have grave consequences for the

endeavors to achieve comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East,”

1. Strongly deplores those policies and practices of Israel, the occupying Power, which violate the human rights of the Palestinian people in the occupied territory, and in particular the siege of towns, the ransacking of the homes or inhabitants, as has happened in Beit Sahur, and the illegal and arbitrary confiscation of their property and valuables;

2. Calls upon Israel to desist from committing such practices and actions and lift its siege;

3. Urges that Israel return the illegally and arbitrarily confiscated property to its owners;

4. Reaffirms once again that the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, is applicable to the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem;

5. Calls once more upon Israel, the occupying Power, to abide immediately and scrupulously by the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, and to desist forthwith from those policies and practices which are in violation of provisions of the Convention;

81 Ibid., 36.

236

6. Calls upon all the High Contracting Parties to the fourth Geneva Convention to ensure respect for it, including the obligation of the occupying Power under the Convention to treat the population of the occupied territory humanely at all times and in all circumstances;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to conduct on-site monitoring of the present situation in the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, by all means available to him, and to submit periodic reports thereon, the first such reports as soon as possible.82

The U.S. veto once again negated the fourteen affirmative votes of the Council

favoring adoption of the draft resolution.83 The U.S. ambassador maintained that “such

[one-sided] draft resolutions and the divisive debate that accompanies them do not help to

alleviate conditions in the area.” Indeed, “such resolutions and debates exacerbate

tensions and distract the parties from the critical issues that need to be addressed in the

region.”84 Although the international community agrees that the United Nations has been

addressing the critical issues regarding the conflict, the U.S. unilaterally rejects the

United Nations framework for a peaceful solution in favor of a peace process that

rewards Israel for its continual aggression and expansion and prevents Palestinian self-

determination. The United States opposed a permanent United Nations presence in the

occupied territories to monitor Israeli actions and protect Palestinian civilians. More

generally, the U.S. opposed Security Council debates, resolutions, and intervention on the

pretext that the United States had a constructive dialogue with Israel. Once again, Israeli

illegal occupation of Palestinian land and oppression of Palestinian rights is not the

primary cause exacerbating tensions in the Middle East. Moreover, American

82 Boudreault, 429-430.

83 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2889th meeting,

S/PV.2889, 42.

84 Ibid., 43.

237

obstructionism is not a fundamental problem preventing a just peace. Rather, according

to the logic of the U.S., the international community’s attempts to enforce and implement

Security Council resolutions and the United Nations Charter have prevented a peaceful

settlement.

Draft resolution S/21326 of 31 May 1990 reads in part that the Security Council,

“reaffirming that the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in

Time of War, of 12 August 1949, is applicable to the Palestinian and other Arab

territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem,” and “gravely concerned

and alarmed by the deteriorating situation in the Palestinian territory occupied by Israel

since 1967, including Jerusalem,”

1. Establishes a Commission consisting of three members of the Security Council, to be dispatched immediately to examine the situation relating to the policies and practices of Israel, the occupying Power, in the Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, occupied by Israel since 1967;

2. Requests the Commission to submit its report to the Security Council by 20 June 1990, containing recommendations on ways and means for ensuring the safety and protection of the Palestinian civilians under Israeli occupation; 3. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the Commission with the necessary facilities to enable it to carry out its mission;

4. Decides to keep the situation in the occupied territories under constant and close scrutiny and to reconvene to review the situation in the light of the findings of the Commission.85

The United States, ignoring the affirmative vote of the other fourteen members of

the Council, vetoed the draft resolution on the unfounded pretext that a United Nations

Observer Commission would not help resolve the problems in the Middle East, but add to

85 Boudreault, 430.

238

them.86 Illustrating Israel’s rejection of the Palestinians’ right to self-determination and a

state in Palestine and contempt for the United Nations, the Israeli ambassador contended

that “even if Israel, as some here have claimed, is labeled ‘an occupying Power’ . . . ,”

“Israel is the exclusive and only authority responsible for the restoration of peace and

tranquility in the territories.”87 The League of Arab States representative wondered

aloud, “By what authority, if not as an occupying Power, does Israel claim exclusive

jurisprudence and jurisdiction in the occupied territories?”88 Further denigrating the

United Nations, the Israeli ambassador stated that there was no justification for an

observer force because “stationed in Israel is one of the largest press corps in the world.

Israel is a democracy, and the media have unhampered and free access to all areas.”89

Although the veracity of the statement is quite dubious,90 if Israel had nothing to

hide, why did the ambassador unequivocally make clear that Israel would not accept a

United Nations Commission in the occupied territories?91 The ambassador argues that a

86 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2926th meeting,

S/PV.2926, 36-38.

87 Ibid., 17-18.

88 Ibid., 22.

89 Ibid., 17.

90 How can Israel be a democracy when it claims to be a Jewish state and its non-Jewish citizens are granted second-class status? A recent survey indicated that almost sixty-eight percent of Jewish citizens in Israel would refuse to be neighbors with an Arab, sixty-three percent agreed that “Arabs are a security and demographic threat to the state,” and forty percent believed “the state needs to support the emigration of Arab citizens.” Journalist Gideon Levy wrote, “Only one ambition unites everyone – to get rid of [the Arabs], one way or another. Transfer or wall, ‘disengagement’ or ‘convergance’ – the point is that they should get out of our sight.” Israel’s democracy is comparable to the American form, with both lacking in substantive participatory democracy and economic, social, and political equality. See Eli Ashkenazi and Jack Khouri, “Poll: 68% of Jews Would Refuse to Live in Same Building as an Arab,” Ha’aretz, 22 March 2006, and Gideon Levy, “One Racist Nation,” Ha’aretz, 26 March 2006, as cited in Omar Barghouti, “The Israeli Elections: A Decisive Vote for Apartheid,” Counterpunch, 3 April 2006, <www.counterpunch.org/barghouti04032006.html>.

91 Ibid., 18.

239

double standard exists where Israel is condemned for killing Arabs, but Arabs are

celebrated for killing Jews. While “when a tragic outburst of violence occurs in Israel in

which Arabs are killed by Jews, the condemnation is instant, bitter, unanimous and

unequivocal,” yet “on the other hand, when Jews are killed by Arabs, it is an occasion for

ultranationalist celebrations and hyped up incitement, engulfing the Arab world in a

paroxysm of hate.”92 The ambassador is correct in declaring a double standard,

considering Israel has been unaccountable to international law due to U.S. support. As

far as the U.S. “free press” is concerned, Arab violence against Israel is always

“terrorism,” while Israeli violence is “retaliatory,” or “self-defense.”

In rebuttal to the Israeli assertions, the Pakistani ambassador provided a few

examples of Israelis celebrating Arab deaths. After a former Israeli soldier killed seven

and wounded eleven Palestinians, the Israeli army repressed the demonstrations of

mourning, killing 23 and wounding 900 Palestinians.93 The right-wing extremist Rabbi

Meir Kahane planned to hold a demonstration supporting the former soldier responsible

for the massacre.94 Citing the journalist Alexander Cockburn, the Pakistani ambassador

noted that Rabbi Moshe Levinger, who was sentenced to a harsh five months for killing a

Palestinian shopkeeper, was honored at a celebration by General Yitzhak Mordechai, the

military commander of the West Bank.95 Pakistan declared its support for a United

Nations force to protect Palestinian civilians, immediate Israeli withdrawal from all

occupied territories, including Jerusalem and a Middle East peace conference with the

92 Ibid., 8.

93 The New York Times, 27 May 1990, as cited in Ibid., 4-5.

94 The New York Times, 29 May 1990, as cited in Ibid., 6.

95 Alexander Cockburn, The Wall Street Journal, 24 May 1990, as cited in Ibid.

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five members of the Security Council.96 The Japanese ambassador observed that because

the Security Council did not enforce resolutions against Israel, “. . . the Palestinians in the

occupied territories have been forced to endure conditions of severe political, economic

and social hardship.”97 On a more general note, the brief historical background regarding

the Arab-Israeli conflict, illustrates Israel’s regard for the value of human life, just as an

honest rendering of U.S. history belies the ostensible American support for human rights,

intimating that human beings for the most part have yet to rise above exclusionary and

parochial identity concepts to consider the Golden Rule as moral principle applicable to

all people, not just those born in the same country with the same color skin, professing

the same faith and speaking the same language.

The draft resolution S/1995/394 of 17 May 1995 states in part that the Security

Council, “reaffirming its previous resolutions on the status of Jerusalem, including

resolutions 252 (1968), 267 (1969), 271 (1969), 476 1980), 478 (1980) and 672 (1990),”

and “expressing concern over the recent declaration of Israeli appropriation orders of 53

hectares of land in East Jerusalem,”

1. Confirms that the expropriation of land by Israel, the occupying Power, in East Jerusalem is invalid and in violation of relevant Security Council resolutions and provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949;

2. Calls upon the government of Israel to rescind the expropriation orders and to refrain from such action in the future;

3. Expresses its full support for the Middle East peace process and its achievements, including the Declaration of Principles of 13 September 1993 as well as the following implementation agreements;

4. Urges the parties to adhere to the provisions of the agreements reached and to follow up with the full implementation of those agreements;

96 Ibid., 6-7.

97 Ibid., 21.

241

5. Decides to remain seized of the matter.98

The United States, continuing to apply a unique double standard toward Israeli

transgressions against the United Nations and international law, declared that “the only

path to achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East is direct talk

between the parties.”99 Of course, direct talks will not take place as long as Israel rejects

any Palestinian leadership that asserts legitimate Palestinian rights on the grounds that the

Palestinians do not renounce violence or recognize Israel’s “right to exist,” while the

same standard is not applied to the Israeli government. More telling, U.S. diplomacy

with official enemies such as Saddam Hussein and the current Iranian regime is merely a

propaganda tool to justify a military solution on the pretext that all other options have

been exhausted, while in reality meaningful diplomatic talks are scarcely considered and

even rejected.

The U.S. ambassador continued, arguing that “my government will not agree to a

resolution that prejudges or prejudices the outcome of negotiations over such a sensitive

issue as Jerusalem.”100 Seemingly, Israel’s declaration of a unified Jerusalem as the

eternal capital of Israel in no way prejudices or prejudges the outcome. The U.S. and

Israel therefore reject the General Assembly partition resolution declaring Jerusalem

under an international regime and all other resolutions declaring that the acquisition of

territory by force is invalid and demanding that Israel withdraw from all the occupied

territories, including Jerusalem. An alarming development for international law and

98 United Nations Security Council draft resolution S/1995/394 of 17 May 1995.

99 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 3538th meeting,

S/PV.3538, 6.

100 Ibid., 7.

242

basic morality was that the Palestinians, in a considerable position of weakness,

consented to negotiating the matter of illegal settlements and the status of Jerusalem at

some future point in the peace process. While Israel clearly lacks the right to expropriate

more land from the Palestinians, such continued expropriation intimates at the very least

a lack of good faith in negotiations if not a complete rejection of such a settlement. The

entire peace process must be understood as an American and Israeli victory. The

international consensus, which demanded immediate Israeli withdrawal from the

occupied territories as a precondition for negotiations, has been discarded in favor of a

unilateral American process legitimizing Israeli occupation of Jerusalem, the West Bank

and the Gaza district, rendering a just, lasting and comprehensive peace a remote

possibility.

Draft resolution S/1997/199 of 7 March 1997 reads in part that the Security

Council, “expressing deep concern at the decision of the Government of Israel to initiate

new settlement activities in the Jebal Abu Ghneim area in East Jerusalem, expressing

concern about other recent measures that encourage or facilitate new settlement activities,

stressing that such settlements are illegal and a major obstacle to peace, recalling its

resolutions on Jerusalem and other relevant Security Council resolutions, [and]

confirming that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel

which purport to alter the status of Jerusalem, including expropriation of land and

properties thereon, are invalid and cannot change that status,”

1. Calls upon the Israeli authorities to refrain from all actions or measures, including settlement activities, which alter the facts on the ground, pre-empting the final status negotiations, and have negative implications for the Middle East Peace Process;

2. Calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to abide scrupulously by its legal obligations and responsibilities under the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection

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of Civilians in Time of War of 12 August 1949, which is applicable to all the territories occupied by Israel since 1967;

3. Calls upon all parties to continue, in the interests of peace and security, their negotiations within the Middle East Peace Process on its agreed basis and the timely implementation of the agreements reached;

4. Decides to remain seized of the matter.101

The United States vetoed the fourteen affirmative votes of the other Security

Council members on the pretext that it is inappropriate for the Security Council to

interfere in direct negotiations.102 In other words, the U.S continues to ignore all United

Nations resolutions and unilaterally orchestrates a peace process that protects and

rewards Israel in a negotiating process that at best is between two vastly unequal parties

and at worst is a pretext to justify Israeli occupation and aggression. In what must be

described as arrogance and provocation, the Israeli ambassador stated:

Now that the Security Council has decided not to take any action regarding the decision of the government of Israel to begin construction in her home and in ten predominantly Arab neighborhoods throughout Jerusalem, it is our hope that the sponsors of the proposed resolution will recognize that the Security Council is not the appropriate forum for discussion of outstanding issues between Israel and the Palestinians.103

Disregarding that the Security Council did decide to condemn the settlement

building and demand its immediate cessation but for the American veto, we must

recognize, as the Palestinian representative did, that

the approach proposed by some states seems to suggest that Israel has the right to take unilateral steps and impose new realities on the ground, while at the same time, the Palestinian side should commit itself to resolving through negotiations the problems

101 United Nations Security Council draft resolution S/1997/199 of 7 March 1997.

102 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 3747th meeting,

S/PV.3747, 3-4.

103 Ibid., 6.

244

resulting from those steps.104 In other words, Israel, in a complete rejection of the United Nations Charter and

Security Council resolutions, will continue to build settlements in Arab areas under U.S.

protection and with U.S. funds and then demand that the settlements are perhaps

negotiable. The only recourse beside violence for the Palestinian resistance is the

Security Council, which the United States continues to paralyze and undermine on this

Middle East conflict.

Iterating the demand that Israel cease settlement building in East Jerusalem, draft

resolution S/1997/241 of 21 March 1997 states in part that the Security Council,

“recalling its relevant resolutions, in particular those concerning Jerusalem and Israeli

settlements,”

1. Demands that Israel immediately cease construction of the Jabal Abu Ghneim settlement in East Jerusalem, as well as all other Israeli settlement activities in the occupied territories;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a report on the developments in this regard.105

The United States ambassador, in clarifying its veto, declared that “no

circumstances can justify the resort to violence or terror against innocent civilians.”106

Perhaps the United States should apply this standard to its own actions, specifically the

murderous sanctions imposed on Iraq during this time, and those of its allies, specifically

Israel’s policies and practices toward the Palestinian people which are often violent and

wholly designed to terrorize. Moreover, “the United States does not believe that the

104 Ibid.

105 United Nations Security Council draft resolution S/1997/241 of 21 March 1997.

106 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 3756th meeting,

S/PV.3756, 5.

245

Security Council or the General Assembly should be in the business of inserting

themselves into issues that the negotiating partners have decided will be addressed in

their permanent status talks.”107 Seemingly, the United Nations must recognize that its

true role is to justify U.S. policies, not follow the mandates of the Charter and strive for

peace and justice. By continuing to build settlements, the Israeli government indicates its

contempt for negotiating in good faith. While the U.S. undermines the United Nations,

what options are left for the Palestinians to realize a just peace?

Draft resolution S/2001/270 of 26 March 2001 states in part that the Security

Council, “expressing its grave concern at the continuation of the tragic and violent events

that have taken place since September 2000, resulting in many deaths and injuries, mostly

among Palestinians, reiterating the need for protection of all civilians as expressed in its

resolutions 1265 (1999) and 1296 (2000), expressing its determination to contribute to

ending the violence, protecting Palestinian civilians in the occupied territories and

promoting dialogue between the Israeli and Palestinian sides” and “expressing grave

concern at the dire economic and humanitarian situation as a result of the closures of the

occupied Palestinian territories and towns and villages within them,”

1. Calls for the immediate cessation of all acts of violence, provocation and collective punishment, as well as the return to the positions and arrangements which existed prior to September 2000;

2. Calls upon the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority to implement promptly and without preconditions the understandings reached at the Summit convened at Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, of 17 October 2000; 3. Urges a resumption of negotiations within the Middle East peace process on its agreed basis taking into account the previous positive developments in the negotiations between the two sides and calls on them to reach a final agreement on all issues, on the basis of their previous agreements, with the objective of implementing its resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973);

107 Ibid.

246

4. Expresses grave concern at recent settlement activities, in particular the recent decision to expand the settlement at Jabal Abu Ghneim and calls for full cessation of settlement activities; 5. Calls on the parties to take the following immediate steps: (a) resumption of contacts at all levels on implementation of reciprocal commitments including in the field of security previously made by both sides; (b) an end to the closures of the occupied Palestinian territories to permit resumption of full normal activities of daily life; (c) the transfer by Israel to the Palestinian Authority of all revenues due, in accordance with the Paris Protocol on Economic Relations of 29 April 1994; (d) additional confidence-building measures by both sides including unequivocal public statements in support of all commitments made at Sharm El-Sheikh and of this resolution; 6. Expresses full support for the work of the Fact-Finding Committee established at Sharm El-Sheikh, calls upon all parties to cooperate fully with it, and looks forward to its report; 7. Appeals to the international donor community to extend, as rapidly and as generously as possible, economic and financial assistance to the Palestinian people, and stresses in this regard the importance of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee; 8. Requests the Secretary-General to consult the parties on immediate and substantive steps to implement this resolution and to report to the Council within one month of the adoption of this resolution and expresses the readiness of the Council to act upon receipt of the report to set up an appropriate mechanism to protect Palestinian civilians, including through the establishment of a United Nations observer force; 9. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.108

In justifying another veto, the United States ambassador shows his country’s

contempt for the United Nations when it does not accede to U.S. demands and provides

yet another example of blatant U.S. hypocrisy. The ambassador stated that “some

pretended that the Council could impose a solution, including a protection mechanism for

civilians, in the absence of an agreement between the parties. Instead, the Security

Council, acting on behalf of the international community, should have called on the

108 United Nations Security Council draft resolution S/2001/270 of 26 March 2001.

247

parties to end all violence, to protect civilians and to resume negotiations.”109 In this

case, the United Nations cannot impose or enforce a solution in the Middle East because

it is a regional problem requiring the two parties to work on their own. Thus, the U.S.

argued that the “most basic precept of peacemaking [is] the need to encourage the parties

to find and implement their own lasting solutions,” and “the road to the just and lasting

peace we all seek in the Middle East does not begin in this Council.”110 While the

United States absurdly contends that the United Nations has no right to fulfill its

mandate, the United States saw fit to impose a military solution and enforce United

Nations resolutions on the “regional” conflict between Iraq and Kuwait, precluding a

diplomatic settlement and righteously asserting that blatant aggression is intolerable. Just

as the United States is currently railroading the United Nations to accept the justifications

for the third instance of U.S. aggression since George W. Bush took office, forcing the

Security Council to imposing sanctions against the victim instead of the aggressor, the

U.S. vetoes in the Security Council allow for further Israeli aggression and illegal

occupation of Palestinian lands, preventing necessary enforcement of international law

and United Nations mandates in favor of nebulous negotiations between two unequal

parties which serves only to dismiss the international consensus regarding a just solution.

Clearly, the U.S. record in the United Nations has more to do with policy objectives than

with any universal principles of law or morality.

Draft resolution S/2001/1199 of 14 December 2001 reads in part that the Security

Council, “emphasizing the need for a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the

Middle East based on its resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 and 338

109 United Nations Security Council Provisional Record of the 4305th meeting, S/PV.4305, 5.

110 Ibid., 5-6.

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(1973) of 22 October 1973 and the principle of land for peace, emphasizing further in that

regard the essential role of the Palestinian authority which remains the indispensable and

legitimate party for peace and needs to be preserved fully,” “emphasizing the importance

of the safety and well-being of all civilians in the whole Middle East region, and

condemning in particular all acts of violence and terror resulting in the deaths and injuries

among Palestinian and Israeli civilians,” and “reiterating the need for Israel, the

occupying Power, to abide scrupulously by its legal obligations and responsibilities under

the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of

War of 12 August 1949,”

1. Demands the immediate cessation of all acts of violence, provocation and destruction, as well as the return to the positions and arrangement which existed prior to September 2000; 2. Condemns all acts of terror, in particular those targeting civilians; 3. Condemns all acts of extrajudiciary executions, excessive use of force and wide destruction of properties; 4. Calls on the two sides to start the comprehensive and immediate implementation of the recommendations made in the Report of the Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee (Mitchell Report) in a speedy manner; 5. Encourages all concerned to establish a monitoring mechanism to help the parties implement the recommendations of the Report of the Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee (Mitchell Report) and to help create a better situation in the occupied Palestinian territories; 6. Calls for the resumption of negotiations between the two sides within the Middle East peace process on its agreed basis, taking into consideration developments in previous discussions between the two sides, and urges them to reach a final agreement on all issues, on the basis of their previous agreements, with the objective of implementing its resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973); 7. Decides to remain seized of the matter.111

111 United Nations Security Council draft resolution S/2001/1199 of 14 December 2001.

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The U.S. ambassador in iterating that Yasser Arafat and the PLO must end

terrorism determined that “terrorist organizations such as Hamas and the Palestinian

Islamic Jihad are deliberately–and brutally–seeking to sabotage any potential there may

be for Israelis and Palestinians to conclude a negotiated peace.”112 The British

ambassador concurred, demanding that Palestinians dismantle terrorist networks and

asserting that “Israel has a right to security and is entitled to take steps to protect itself

from terrorist attacks, but it should ensure that its actions remain proportionate and avoid

civilian casualties.”113 The Israeli ambassador, observing that “there is no equivalence

between those who perpetuate terror and those who fight it,” contended that only for

Palestinian terrorists are civilian deaths “deliberate, premeditated, and desired.”114 In

fact, Palestinians are responsible for their own civilian deaths, because terrorists have

used civilians as “human shields.”115 Just as the U.S. bombing of a Baghdad bomb

shelter in 1991 killing hundreds of women and children caused the American government

and media to blame Saddam Hussein, the Israelis too blame the victims for their callous

disregard of human life. The ambassador continued, arguing that “there is no cause so

just, no grievance so severe, no objective so noble that it can justify killing innocent

civilians.”116 Apparently the ambassador is not familiar with Zionist justifications for

securing a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Perhaps the ambassador is unfamiliar with the

historical record cataloging the Israeli government’s disregard for Palestinian lives, and

112 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 4438th meeting,

S/PV.4438, 11.

113 Ibid., 9.

114 Ibid., 18.

115 Ibid.

116 Ibid.

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the “deliberate” and “premeditated” policies designed to expel and oppress the

Palestinian people. According to international law, premeditation is not a prerequisite for

culpability. A person or nation must be aware of all the possible consequences of an

intended course of action. If a person intends to kill an individual, but in the process kills

others, the person is responsible for those deaths even if unintended. Even if the U.S.

military was unaware of the Baghdad bomb shelter, which is a dubious supposition

considering that the Americans had unimpeded reconnaissance flights continually over

Iraq, international law contends that the military commanders ordering the strike must

have been aware of possible consequences including the death of civilians. Therefore,

those commanders are responsible for those deaths, regardless of whether or not it was an

intentional act.

The Israeli ambassador attempted to revise the historical record, declaring: in the Palestinian case, the grievance that is cited is that of occupation, and the objective ascribed to the terrorist murderers is that of liberation. Yet even if one were to accept the ludicrous notion that occupation is a legitimate basis for killing innocent civilians, the Palestinians still would not qualify. The Palestinians have sought to portray Israeli occupation as an outgrowth of a type of colonial quest for power and domination over another people, and yet the historical record demonstrably asserts the contrary. Israel’s presence in the West Bank and Gaza was the result of a war in which Israel’s very existence was threatened by the combined armies of several Arab nations. The hostilities of 1967 were a war imposed upon Israel, not a war undertaken in order to conquer new territory and subjugate its people. The Israeli presence in the West Bank and Gaza is a result not of Israeli aggression, but of Israeli self-defense.117

117 Ibid., 19.

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Moreover, the ambassador argued that the League of Arab States rejected the partition

plan and “launched a war to eliminate the Jewish State.”118 The historical record refutes

the Israeli claims and justifications for its expansionism and militarism.

The Palestinian representative observed that the United States and Israel require

that Palestine end terrorism, while nothing is required of Israel. In fact, Israel continues

to attack the Palestinian Authority and its security apparatus, thus preventing the

Palestinian authorities to apprehend and prosecute perpetrators of violence against Israel.

The Palestinian leadership is caught in a catch-22: Israel demands that the Palestinians

cease terrorism, but Israeli authorities prevent the Palestinian authorities from fulfilling

that demand and negate any peace process because the Palestinians are not fighting

terrorism. The Palestinian Authority reiterated that it does not support or condone acts of

violence; however, it does not accept that legitimate resistance to foreign occupation is

considered terrorism. Furthermore, there are no protected Israeli civilians in the occupied

territories. The illegal settlers, who live in heavily fortified enclaves and are armed and

trained well-enough to be considered paramilitary organizations, are not innocent

civilians, echoing Neumann’s argument above.119

The ambassador from Mauritius described Israeli attempts to undermine Arafat as

legitimizing more militant extremist groups.120 The United Nations Committee on the

Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, calling for the “immediate

and total withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the occupied Palestinian territories and the

immediate cessation of all acts of violence and provocation, together with the deployment

118 Ibid.

119 Ibid., 3-5.

120 Ibid., 8.

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of a protection or observation force in the area,” acknowledged that “the Israeli

government disregards the Palestinian Authority’s efforts to stop the violence and punish

those who perpetuate violent acts.”121 It can be argued convincingly that the Israeli

government actively seeks to destroy any viable political settlement, instead relying on

military power as the only method to fulfill Israeli expansionist goals.

The Iranian representative, recognizing that occupation is a primary cause of the

conflict, observed that “it is very unfortunate that those governments that criticize the

Palestinians and hold them responsible for the ongoing violence in the area ignore the

crimes perpetuated by the Israelis and do nothing to stop them.” Iterating the Palestinian

representative, the ambassador noted that “no link whatsoever can be established between

terrorism and the right of the Palestinian people to resist Israeli aggression and

occupation, considered to be a legitimate right ensured by international law and

conventions.” Moreover, “as to the real intention of the Israeli regime, it is significant

that the Israelis continue to reject the call for a freeze on all settlement construction

activities in the West Bank and Gaza strip.”122

Draft resolution S/2003/891 of 16 September 2003 states in part that the Security

Council, “reiterating its grave concern at the tragic and violent events that have taken

place since September 2000 throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory and in

Israel and the recent dangerous deterioration of the situation, including the escalation in

extrajudicial executions and suicide bombing attacks, all of which have caused enormous

suffering and many innocent victims, reaffirming the illegality of the deportation of any

Palestinian by Israel, the occupying Power, and affirming its opposition to any such

121 Ibid., 21.

122 Ibid., 26-27.

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deportation, reiterating also the need for respect in all circumstances of international

humanitarian law, including the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of

Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949,”

1. Reiterates its demands for the complete cessation of all acts of violence, including all acts of terrorism, provocation, incitement and destruction; 2. Demands that Israel, the occupying Power, desist from any act of deportation and cease any threat to the safety of the elected President of the Palestinian Authority; 3. Expresses its full support for the efforts of the Quartet and calls for increased efforts to ensure the implementation of the road map by the two sides, and underlines, in this regard, the importance of the forthcoming meeting of the Quartet in New York; 4. Decides to remain seized of the matter.123

The American government, arguably the most destructive terrorist organization in

the world, arrogantly asserts that ending terrorism is its highest priority. Of course this is

axiomatically a given if terrorism is defined as non-American sanctioned use of violence.

The acceptable definition of terrorism necessarily does not include enormous American

or Israeli violence. The bombing of Iraq in 1991 rendering the once modern country on

the verge of collapse, the murderous sanctions that prematurely caused the deaths of over

a million people, and the re-bombing of Iraq and current occupation are not terrorist

actions according to Western rationalizations and propaganda even though the U.S.

utilized large-scale violence to achieve political and economic advantages.

Arguing that the Palestinian terrorists are the main threat to peace, the U.S.

ambassador contended that the resolution failed to include a condemnation of terrorism

and the Palestinian groups responsible for such violence. The ambassador further

asserted, “While Mr. Arafat is part of the problem, we believe that this problem is best

123 United Nations Security Council draft resolution S/2003/891 of 16 September 2003.

254

solved through diplomatic isolation.” 124 The Israeli ambassador iterated the American

sentiment, contesting that Palestinian terrorism and acts of murder “lie at the very heart

of the problem,” and continued that the resolution “found its criticism on the victims of

terrorism and on the response to terrorists rather than on terrorism itself.”125 Once again

the position of the United States is in complete opposition to the international consensus.

It is quite clear that the United States and Israel stand in virtual isolation to the

international opinion that Israeli practices and policies are the main and intentional

barrier to peace. Another example of an untenable U.S. position is that the United States

continuously opposed sanctions and diplomatic isolation for the racist government of

South Africa, claiming that the U.S. never endorses sanctions as a enforcement measure,

even though almost every other country in the world, besides the former European

colonial powers, supported sanctions and other measures to end apartheid and South

African aggression against neighboring African states.126 As is obvious, the U.S.

124 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 4828th meeting,

S/PV.4828, 2.

125 Ibid., 6.

126 As the record in the Security Council and General Assembly indicates, the U.S. rejected any

enforceable measures against South Africa for its aggression against other African nations and the racist apartheid regime. From 1980 to 1988, the U.S. vetoed eleven Security Council resolutions condemning South Africa. Contrary to the United States immediate advancement of sanctions against Iraq, the Reagan administration prevented the adoption of measures against South Africa to force its compliance with international law, United Nations resolutions, and natural justice. Although the U.S. claimed the sanctions against Iraq were not against the Iraqi people, the delegation to the United Nations argued that “economic pressure of that magnitude would have the least impact on the South African Government and would mainly harm the very people it was ostensibly intended to help–that is, South Africa’s oppressed black minority” (S/PV.2797). Declaring a hypocritical attitude toward violence, the U.S. ambassador declared that “my government totally rejects the notion that we should eliminate apartheid by provoking the collapse of the South African economy and a subsequent violent revolution. Those who advocate violence as a policy to bring about change in South Africa seem willing to tolerate an enormous loss of life and appear to overlook the fact that such violence might well strengthen rather than weaken oppression. My Government believes that we must pursue every possible avenue leading to the peaceful elimination of apartheid. With this conviction very much in mind, the United States has committed itself to a continuing diplomatic effort to persuade all parties to enter in negotiations” (S/PV.2738). Explaining its veto of four resolutions regarding South African aggression against and occupation of Namibia, the U.S. stated “each of those

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opposition to sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and enforcement of United Nations

resolutions dissipates when the target is an official enemy, obvious given the American

belligerence toward Iraq, Iran, and the Palestinian leadership.

Familiar to students of American history is the concept that the government and

its stenographers in the mainstream press quite exaggeratedly demonize official enemies

to prepare and persuade the public for U.S. military action, covert or overt. For example,

Donald Rumsfeld comparing Hugo Chavez to Adolf Hitler and the George H. W. Bush

administration portraying former ally Saddam Hussein as the new Hitler. As the United

Nations record indicates, not only in the Security Council resolutions and meeting

minutes but also in the General Assembly resolutions, the international community

drafts one way or another relates to sanctions, and therefore represents what we are persuaded is the wrong course towards the achievement of our common goal of independence for Namibia. We do not believe that economic sanctions are an effective means of influencing political policy” (S/PV.2277). Along with the United States, the decedents of the European colonizers, especially Great Britain and France, supported the racist South African regime military, politically, and economically. The British ambassador maintained that the United Kingdom supported the end of apartheid and the cessation of South African aggression, “but it is our firm view that the imposition of comprehensive mandatory sanctions could not fail to hamper efforts to reach a settlement” (S/PV.2277).

However, the international community repeatedly criticized and opposed the U.S. and its NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies for aiding the racist regime and preventing measures meant to end apartheid and South African aggression against neighboring countries. The Cuban ambassador quoted Castro: “If it is true that, as the representative of the United States said, they want to see the end of apartheid, we might wonder why they continue to veto the imposition of comprehensive mandatory sanctions against the South African racists. Why do they try to impede the implementation of the United Nations plan for Namibia with arguments that have been repeatedly rejected by everyone? Why do they continue collaborating with the Pretoria regime in the economic, political and military spheres, including the nuclear sphere, contrary to the wishes of the African peoples to ensure that their continent should be a denuclearized continent?” The South West Africa People’s Organization observed: “Once again the same countries elected to stand in isolation in defense of apartheid, notwithstanding their passionate claims to the contrary, and in opposition to Namibia’s independence” (S/PV.2747). The Soviet ambassador related that “we are all accustomed to the fact that the United States never hesitates to employ political, economic and other sanctions against countries struggling to attain national liberation and independence or against socialist states” (S/PV.2686). The Spanish ambassador remarked: “. . . the persistent refusal of South Africa to comply with the Council’s resolutions with regard to the illegal occupation of the territory of Namibia, its continual delaying tactics and the challenge to the international community constituted by the many acts of aggression perpetrated against neighboring African countries compel us today to take upon ourselves the painful duty of considering those measures that might induce South Africa to reconsider its position on Namibia and ensure respect for international law and the resolutions of the Security Council” (S/PV.2277). For other examples of U.S. votes protecting South Africa against the overwhelming international consensus, see the General Assembly voting records in the appendix.

256

recognizes Israeli and American culpability in preventing and rejecting a just peace

settlement in the Middle East. Yet the U.S. and Israeli statements to the Security Council

and the portrayal of the situation in the American press serve as propaganda for a

compliant and ignorant American public. Labeling the Palestinians as terrorists,

especially in the overall context of the American war on terror, essentially de-legitimizes

Palestinian resistance and positively sanctions Israeli oppression in all its forms,

including the expropriation of Palestinian land and resources, under the guise of Israeli

security at the expense of Palestinian self-determination and security.

Draft resolution S/2003/980 of 14 October 2003 states in part that the Security

Council, “reaffirming the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by

force, reaffirming its vision of a region where two States, Israel and Palestine, live side

by side within secure and recognized borders, condemning all acts of violence, terror and

destruction, stressing the urgency of ending the current violent situation on the ground,

the need to end the occupation that began in 1967 and the need to achieve peace based on

the vision of two States mentioned above, reiterating its call upon Israel, the occupying

Power, to fully and effectively respect the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, reiterating

its opposition to settlement activities in the Occupied Territories and to any activities

involving the confiscation of land, disruption of the livelihood of protected persons and

the de facto annexation of land,”

1. Decides that the construction by Israel, the occupying Power, of a wall in the Occupied Territories departing from the armistice line of 1949 is illegal under relevant provisions of international law and must be ceased and reversed; 2. Requests the Secretary-General to report on the compliance with this resolution periodically, with the first report to be submitted within one month;

257

3. Decides to remain seized of the matter.127

The U.S. ambassador, neglecting the core issue of the resolution, declared the

draft unbalanced. Moreover, according to the United States, the resolution failed to

explicitly condemn terrorism and declare that “ending terrorism must be the highest

priority.”128 The Israeli ambassador noted that Palestinian terrorism is the heart of the

problem and the cause of Israeli defensive measures. The Palestinians must dismantle the

terrorist organizations and fight terrorism in order for Israel to negotiate.129 While the

international community recognizes that the not only is the Israeli wall a land grab, but

also that violence against Israel would disappear if Israel withdrew to the pre-1967

borders and allowed Palestinian self-determination, the United States and Israel continue

to imply that only Palestinian actions constitute terrorism.

Draft resolution S/2004/240 of 25 March 2004 reads in part that the Security

Council, expressing its grave concern at the continued deterioration of the situation on the

ground in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as a result of the

escalation of violence and attacks,”

1. Condemns the most recent extrajudicial execution committed by Israel, the occupying Power, that killed Sheikh Ahmed Yassin along with six other Palestinians outside a mosque in Gaza City and calls for a complete cessation of extrajudicial executions; 2. Condemns also all terrorist attacks against any civilians as well as all acts of violence and destruction; 3. Calls on all sides to immediately undertake an unconditional cessation of acts of violence, including all acts of terrorism, provocation, incitement and destruction;

127 United Nations Security Council draft resolution S/2003/980 of 14 October 2003.

128 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 4842nd meeting,

S/PV.4842, 2.

129 Ibid., 3.

258

4. Calls for the cessation of all illegal measures and practices and for respect for and adherence to international humanitarian law; 5. Calls on both parties to fulfill their obligations under the road map endorsed by Security Council resolution 1515 (2003) and to work with the Quartet to implement it in order to achieve the vision of the two States living side by side in peace and security; 6. Decides to remain seized of the matter.130

The U.S. ambassador justified the American veto by arguing that the draft one-

sidedly condemned Israel.131 The British ambassador reiterated the American statement,

arguing that the resolution “failed to condemn terrorist atrocities against Israel and it

limited its condemnation of terrorist attacks to those against civilians.”132 While the

resolution clearly condemns all terrorism and violence on both sides rendering the

rationale for the American veto and British abstention unconvincing, the second part of

the British ambassador’s statement is somewhat baffling, if not outright self-serving. If

the British ambassador is implying that retail violence against military personnel falls

under the rubric of terrorism, then all resistance to military occupation, in Iraq and in

Palestine, is completely invalid. Thus the British are unilaterally dismissing General

Assembly resolution 42/159 (1987), which reads in part that

Nothing in the present resolution could in anyway prejudice the right to self- determination, freedom, and independence, as derived from the charter of the United Nations, of people forcibly deprived of that right . . . particularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes and foreign occupation.133

130 United Nations Security Council draft resolution S/2004/240 of 25 March 2004.

131 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 4934th meeting,

S/PV.4934, 2.

132 Ibid., 4.

133 General Assembly Resolution 42/159 (1987).

259

The Palestinian representative observed that the attempt to broaden the definition of

terrorism beyond acts against civilians was “bizarre and unacceptable, particularly in a

case involving foreign occupation.”134 The British furthermore maintained that the draft

must have a paragraph condemning the death of hundreds of Israelis, which makes no

sense considering there is not a paragraph condemning Israel for the death of hundreds of

Palestinians.135 While the draft was an immediate response to the Israeli military’s

extrajudicial murder of Sheik Ahmed Yassin and six other Palestinians, the Security

Council clearly condemned all violence.

The historical record indicates that just as the military might of the Palestine

Arabs and Israel is not remotely comparable, the injustice and violence perpetrated

against each other is not comparable. Israel is occupying the Palestinian land beyond the

original partition, including the West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem. On 10 May 2006 the

Prime Minister of Israel declared that unless Hamas accedes to Israeli demands, Israel

will unilaterally draw its borders, which will include Jerusalem and large settlements in

the West Bank to maintain water access, while partitioning Palestine into noncontiguous

open-air prisons reminiscent of South African Bantustans;136 Israel is dispossessing the

Palestinians of their homes, fields, and natural resources; Israel is arbitrarily imprisoning

thousands of Palestinians, including children; Israel’s military operates arbitrary

checkpoints preventing Palestinians from completing everyday normal activities,

including going to work or a hospital; Israel continues to freeze tens of millions of

dollars of Palestinian tax revenue in Israeli banks to starve the people because the Israeli

134 S/PV.4934, 6.

135 Ibid., 4-5.

136 Toledo Blade, 10 May 2006.

260

government wants the world to believe that Hamas is a terrorist government, leaving

Israel without a partner for peace; Israel’s military terrorizes Palestinians every day and

night as shells are continuously fired by air, land, and sea.137

The Israeli ambassador identified Yassin, a leader of Hamas, as “a mass murderer

and the godfather of terrorism,”--as if that justified the extrajudicial murder of the Sheik

and six other bystanders--forgetting the terrorist past of Israel’s Prime Ministers,

including Menachem Begin and Ariel Sharon.138 Whoever controls the past controls the

future, and whoever controls the present, controls the past. History is written by the

victors. While George W. Bush, responsible for tens of thousands if not hundreds of

thousands dead Afghanis and Iraqis, will never be tried for his crimes, the victims, who

dare to resist with any means available, are the terrorists, summarily executed. The

Israeli ambassador, illustrating racist contempt for the Palestinian Arabs, declared that

“there will probably not be peace until the Palestinians learn to love their children more

than they hate us.”139 All victims of large-scale state violence seemingly inherit the gene

that causes them to devalue their lives. The Native Americans, the Filipinos, the

Vietnamese, the Japanese, the Iraqis, the Palestinians, and so on–as the United States and

its allies are committing mass murder against them, they are the ones who do not value

137 See for example, Michael Dickenson, “Sonic Weapons Over Palestine,” Counterpunch, 3

November 2005, <www.counterpunch.org/dickenson11032005>; Alexander Cockburn, “Population Transfers, Land Theft and Bankrupt Ghettos,” Counterpunch, 5 June 2006, <www.counterpunch.org/cockburn06052006>; William Cook, “Israeli Human Rights: Starve the Palestinians,” Counterpunch, 21 March 2006, <www.counterpunch.org/cook03212006>; Jennifer Loewenstein, “Watching the Dissolution of Palestine,” Counterpunch, 24 February 2006, <www.counterpunch.org/loewensteing02242006>; Tanya Reinhart, “A Week of Israeli Restraint,” Counterpunch, 22 June 2006, <www.counterpunch.org/reinhart06222006>; Gideon Levy, “When You Have Breast Cancer in Gaza,” Counterpunch, 30 September 2004, <www.counterpunch.org/levy09302004>; Sonia Nettinin, “Palestinian Health Care Conditions Under Israeli Occupation,” Counterpunch, 11 April 2006, <www.counterpunch.org/nettinin04112006>.

138 S/PV.4934, 7.

139 Ibid.

261

life. Perhaps, we should quote David Ben-Gurion, who in December 1938, stated: “If I

knew it was possible to save all the [Jewish] children of Germany by their transfer to

England and only half of them by transferring them to Eretz-Yisrael, I would choose the

latter–because we are faced not only with the accounting of these children but also with

the historical accounting of the Jewish people.”140

The Israeli ambassador argued that “there is no difference between Palestinian

terror and international terror, as there is no difference between Hamas and al Qaeda.” 141

Obfuscating and falsely revising Middle East history, the ambassador states that the

Palestinians must “. . . decide to choose the path of peace and reconciliation – as has been

offered to them by Israel time and time again and as has been rejected by them time and

time again.”142

The Palestinian representative responded in length:

The real problem is that the Council has long tolerated and allowed illegal Israeli actions; it has tolerated and allowed foreign occupation for more than thirty-six years– occupation that has been transformed into blatant colonialism: colonizing Palestine land, destroying the lives of a whole people and preventing the realization of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including our right to exercise our sovereignty in our State, Palestine.143

He continued:

We object to the . . . immoral attempts to link illegal Israeli practices and policies with the international fight against terrorism. Israel is not a passive, peaceful country that is subject to attacks from outside. Israel is a terrible occupying Power that has never stopped violating all aspects of international law and international humanitarian law in particular. Israeli policies are not part of the battle against international terrorism; they

140 Benny Morris, Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-199 (New

York: Alfred A. Knopf, 199), 162.

141 S/PV.4934, 8.

142 Ibid.

143 Ibid., 7.

262

are part of the problem of creating terrorism.144

The American and Israeli position implied of course that massive state terrorism

and violence, which dwarfs the retail international terrorism exponentially, is legitimate,

while the violence perpetrated by the victims of state terrorism against its perpetrators is

always assumed illegitimate terrorism, violence without cause or context.

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982, undertaken on the false pretext of

self-defense, was predicated on the Israeli government’s determination to eliminate the

PLO as a viable political entity and therefore prevent a political settlement to the Arab-

Israeli conflict so as to gain permanent control over the occupied territories. The United

States provided the necessary military, economic, and political support for the invasion

and prevented the adoption of any Security Council resolutions which would possibly

lead to sanctions or other measures to force Israeli compliance with the United Nations

demands. Furthermore, in a policy completely opposing the Bush administration’s stance

toward Iraq and Saddam Hussein in 1990, the U.S. supported the Israeli position that it

would not withdraw from Lebanon until certain conditions were met, violating the

Security Council’s repeated demand for unconditional and complete withdrawal.

The draft resolution S/15185 of 8 June 1982, referring to the Israeli invasion of

Lebanon, requests that the Security Council,

1. Condemns the non-compliance with resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982) by Israel;

2. Urges the parties to comply strictly with the regulations attached to the Hague Convention of 1907;

144 Ibid.

263

3. Reiterates its demand that Israel withdraw all its military forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally recognized borders of Lebanon; 4. Reiterates also its demand that all parties observe strictly the terms of paragraphs 1 of resolution 508 (1982) which called on them to cease immediately and simultaneously all military activities with Lebanon and across the Lebanese-Israeli border; 5. Demands that within six hours all hostilities must be stopped in compliance with Security Council resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982) and decides, in the event of non-compliance, to meet again to consider practical ways and means in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.145

The resolution was drafted in response to Israel’s continued noncompliance with

the previous resolutions calling for immediate ceasefire and withdrawal from Lebanon

during the summer of 1982. The fundamental difference, leading to a U.S. veto, is that

this resolution called for practical methods to enforce the resolutions upon further Israeli

intransigence. The Spanish delegation, which submitted the draft to the Council, argued

that Israel could not use the recent assassination attempt against the Israeli ambassador to

Great Britain to justify its aggression against Lebanon:

It is difficult for the representative of Israel, in an equivocal attempt to turn the accused into the accuser, to convince the Council by citing a long list of acts of violence, when the most serious violence is that of depriving a people of the right to its homeland, its territory and to a free life. 146

Moreover, recognizing a crime of aggression, the ambassador states that “this grave act

of belligerency represents a regrettable breach of the peace and a violation of the most

fundamental principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.”147

145 Boudreault, 417-418. 146 United Nations Security Council Official Records, Thirty- Seventh Year: 2377th meeting,

S/PV.2377, 2.

147 Ibid.

264

The United States cast the lone negative vote, vetoing the resolution supported by

the other fourteen members of the Council on the dubious grounds that “unfortunately,

the resolution now before us is not sufficiently balanced to accomplish the objectives of

ending the cycle of violence and establishing the conditions for a just and lasting peace in

Lebanon.”148 Since Israel was the only party refusing to accept the previous resolutions,

it is only logical that the Security Council focused on Israel noncompliance. As

mentioned above, the United States, complicity abetting Israel’s illegal aggression,

undertook to prevent any resolution that would force Israeli compliance or undermine

Israeli objectives.

The Irish ambassador drew attention to the fact that Israel, the aggressor, would

only withdraw on certain conditions. Although Lebanon and the PLO accepted the

previous ceasefires, since the resolutions demand unconditional withdrawal, it was

obvious that Israel would not comply.149 The Soviet ambassador argued that Israel was

attempting to coerce the Arabs “to renounce their legitimate rights and to submit to the

military, strategic plans of imperialism in the Middle East. . . .”150

The PLO representative asserted that “once again the United States has chosen to

be in a minority of one in support of aggression, mass murder, the invasion of territory

and a campaign of annihilation of a people.” Drawing attention to the massive American

support for Israel, the representative said: “We would think that the United States

government is party to the invasion of Lebanon and to the criminal acts committed

against the Lebanese people and the Palestinians in Lebanon.” The representative quoted

148 Ibid., 3.

149 Ibid.

150 Ibid., 5.

265

the U.S. State Department spokesman Alan Romberg, who, while assuring Israel of the

delivery of $1 billion in armaments, stated, “Israel could hardly have been in the dark

about what our attitudes are about an invasion.” The State Department further asserted,

contrary to the facts, that “the United States has been doing its very best, not only in

recent days, but also as far back as last year, to forestall the terrible tragedy that is now

unfolding,” implicitly implying American knowledge of the Israeli plans. Illustrating

U.S. identification with Israeli interests, the Palestinian representative quoted Secretary

of State, Alexander Haig, who let slip: “We [meaning Israel] not only lost an aircraft and

a helicopter yesterday. There is a claim a second aircraft has been shot down, a second

helicopter and a number of army vehicles.”151

Challenging the American and Israeli interpretation of Middle East history and

the fundamental origin of the Palestinian and Israeli conflict, the Palestinian

representative stated:

There is no cycle of violence. There is an escalation of violence with a starting point, and the starting point is the invasion of Palestine, the expulsion of the Palestinian people, the methods, including the brutality, used to prevent and prohibit the Palestinians from returning to their homes and living in peace in their homes.152

The Israeli ambassador chose to ignore the substance of the debate and attack a

straw man, in this case the Soviet Union:

The respect of his country for international law and for the rights of other nations is common knowledge. That respect has been abundantly demonstrated over the years throughout the world, more particularly in recent years through the ongoing Soviet genocide of the people of Afghanistan.153

151 Ibid.

152 Ibid., 6.

153 Ibid., 7-8.

266

Israel elucidated a strong contempt for the international community, international law,

and the principles of the United Nations Charter by vehemently asserting to the Security

Council that “no amount of bullying . . . will intimidate the people of Israel.”154

Implicitly asserting its exceptionalism regarding enlightened values, the ambassador

claimed that Israel is sensitive “to the loss of every human life.”155 However, just as with

the case of the United States, the historical record fails to support his claim.

Draft resolution S/15347/Rev.1 of 6 August 1982 states in part that the Security

Council is “deeply indignant at the refusal of Israel to comply with the decisions of the

Security Council aimed at terminating the bloodshed in Beirut” and

1. Strongly condemns Israel for not implementing resolutions 516 (1982) and 517 (1982);

2. Demands that Israel immediately implement these resolutions fully; 3. Decides that, in order to carry out the above-mentioned decisions of the Security Council, all the States Members of the United Nations should refrain from supplying Israel with any weapons and from providing it with any military aid until the full withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Lebanese territory.156

The United States claimed it was unilaterally working for a negotiated solution

which would “secure the withdrawal from Lebanon of all foreign forces. . . .” The

ambassador noted: “We voted against the draft resolution because it called for sanctions

154 Ibid., 8.

155 Ibid.

156 Boudreault, 419.

267

against Israel and because it was unbalanced and would not have contributed to our goal

of achieving, through negotiation, a peaceful settlement.”157

The Israel ambassador claimed support for the restoration of Lebanese

sovereignty “free from any foreign intervention.” The ambassador moreover argued that

“Israel supports the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanese territory,” and “. . .

Israel has no territorial ambitions whatsoever in Lebanon.”158 Contrary to the historical

record discussed above describing Israel as the main terrorist aggressor across the

Lebanese border as the PLO restrained retaliation against Israeli large-scale provocations,

the ambassador attempted to justify Israeli aggression and argued for conditions

satisfactory to Israel, in essence rewards for aggression:

We are entitled to demand that proper arrangements be made to prevent Lebanese territory from being used against us in the future as a staging ground for hostile activities and terrorist acts against Israel and its population.159

Recall that Israel had repeatedly violated Lebanon’s sovereignty and territorial integrity

and massively assaulted southern Lebanon and Beirut. Moreover, Israel attempted to

provoke the PLO into retaliation as a pretext for invasion. While for a year before the

war, the PLO showed a strong resistance to Israeli provocation, Israel’s ambassador is

quite off the mark. The ambassador once again maintained that Israel was held to a

double standard; however, the double standard is Israel’s exceptionalism and amnesty

from international law and the United Nations Security Council, luxuries inapplicable to

other nations as the U.S. and international community’s response to the Iraqi invasion of

157 United Nations Security Council Official Records, Thirty-Seventh Year: 2391st meeting,

S/PV.2391, 5.

158 Ibid., 6.

159 Ibid.

268

Kuwait illustrates. Bizarrely, in a flourish that requires no comment, the ambassador

contended that Israel was not an imperialistic country because the state of Israel was very

small.160

The Lebanese ambassador, referring to the Israeli conditions for withdrawal

mentioned above, argued:

We cannot conceive of Israeli withdrawal being contingent on the withdrawal of others, nor can we conceive of the withdrawal of other, non-Lebanese forces as being contingent on Israeli withdrawal.161

The French ambassador, commenting upon Israel’s repeated obfuscation in the Security

Council, stated that “it is deplorable that lies, invective and intimidation have become

common rhetorical devices in the Council, thanks precisely to that representative [from

Israel.]”162 The resolution, supported by eleven members of the Council, failed due to

the U.S. veto, leading the PLO representative to declare:

We shall hold the Council--or, to be more precise, the permanent member that obstructed the functions of the Council today--responsible for any military action by Israel, in particular in or around Beirut, in pursuing its criminal acts of aggression and in resuming its barbarous attacks against Beirut.163 As the history of the Lebanese invasion intimates, for its complicity in abetting the Israeli

crime, the U.S. deserves some of the blame for further denigrating international law and

promoting a world ruled by the law of force.

160 Ibid., 13.

161 Ibid., 2.

162 Ibid., 9.

163 Ibid., 10.

269

Draft resolution S/16732 of 6 September 1984 states in part that the Security

Council, reaffirming all resolutions relating to the situation in Lebanon, and “recalling

the relevant provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and stressing the

humanitarian principles of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 and the

obligations arising from the regulations annexed to the Hague Convention of 1907,”

1. Reiterates its call for strict respect for the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

2. Affirms that the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 apply to the territories occupied by Israel in southern Lebanon, the western Bekaa and the Rashaya district, and that the occupying Power is duty bound to respect and uphold the provisions of the said Convention and of other norms of international law;

3. Calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to respect strictly the rights of the civilian population in the areas under its occupation in southern Lebanon, the western Bekaa and the Rashaya district, and to comply strictly with the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949;

4. Demands that Israel immediately lift all restrictions and obstacles to the restoration of normal conditions in the areas under its occupation in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, particularly concerning the closing of roads and crossings, the limitation of freedom of movement of individuals and the normal flow of persons and goods between those areas and the rest of Lebanon, and the obstruction to the normal conduct of Lebanese Government institutions and personnel;

5. Urges all States parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention of to 1949 to make every effort to ensure respect for and compliance with the provisions thereof in southern Lebanon, the western Bekaa and the Rashaya district; 6. Decides to remain seized of the question.164

The United States, casting the only negative vote, vetoed the resolution supported

by the other fourteen members of the Council.165 While Israel continued to falsely assert

that it justly invaded Lebanon to destroy the PLO terrorists threatening Israeli citizens

164 Boudreault, 420-421. 165 United Nations Security Council Official Records, Thirty-Ninth Year: 2556th meeting, 5.

270

and blame others for abrogating ceasefires justifying its continued but reluctant

occupation of southern Lebanon, the U.S. ambassador claimed that Israel has upheld the

Geneva Conventions and that “Israel has repeatedly expressed its willingness and desire

to leave southern Lebanon.”166 Once again the United States and Israel claim

preconditions for its withdrawal, while the international community demanded immediate

and unconditional Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, refusing to reward an aggressor.

Commenting on the U.S. veto, the Syrian ambassador stated: “. . . the United States has

prevented the Council from adopting a draft resolution that merely stresses the Fourth

Geneva Conventions. . . .” 167

The draft resolution S/17000 of 11 March 1985 states in part that the Security

Council, reaffirming all its relevant resolutions regarding Lebanon, and “having heard

the statement of the representative of Lebanon, and noting with great concern the

deterioration of the situation in the area occupied by Israel in southern Lebanon, the

western Bekaa and the Rashaya district as a result of the Israeli practices,”

1. Condemns the Israeli practices and measures against the civilian population in southern Lebanon, the western Bekaa and the Rashaya district which are in violation of the rules and principles of international law, in particular the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949;

2. Reaffirms the urgent need to implement the provisions of the Security Council resolutions on Lebanon, and in particular resolutions 425 (1978), 508 (1982), and 509 (1982), which demand that Israel withdraw all its military forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally recognized boundaries of Lebanon; 3. Reiterates its call for strict respect for the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

166 Ibid., 6-8.

167 Ibid., 10.

271

4. Affirms that the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 apply to the territories occupied by Israel in southern Lebanon, the western Bekaa and the Rashaya district and that the occupying Power is duty bound to respect and uphold the provisions of the said Convention and of other norms of international law; 5. Demands that the Government of Israel, the occupying Power, desist forthwith from its practices against the civilian population in southern Lebanon, the western Bekaa and the Rashaya district and immediately lift all restrictions and obstacles to the restoration of normal conditions in the areas under its occupation in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and other norms of international law; 6. Requests the Secretary-General to establish a fact-finding mission to report to the Council on these Israeli practices and measures in southern Lebanon, the western Bekaa and the Rashays district. 7. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the situation under review, to consult with the Government of Lebanon and to report to the Council on the implementation of and compliance with this resolution as soon as possible.168

The United States vetoed the resolution, supported by eleven members of the

Council, on the grounds that the Security Council was holding Israel, the aggressor, to a

double standard, requiring its unconditional withdrawal, instead of securing the

withdrawal of all the foreign forces from Lebanon.169 The United States long-standing

position that the U.S. and its allies may use military force for political gain is quite

evident in the American obstruction in the Security Council. The ambassador argued that

the U.S. has worked diligently to secure Israeli withdrawal, even though U.S. efforts to

secure Israeli objectives as preconditions for withdrawal have opposed the mandates of

the international community.170

Israel continued to justify its actions on the false pretext that the PLO incessantly

attacked Israeli civilians in northern Israel from bases in Lebanon, blaming Lebanon for

168 Boudreault, 421-422.

169 United Nations Security Council Official Records, 2573rd meeting: S/PV.2573, 18-19.

170 Ibid.

272

preventing any attack from its soil: “As for attacks on Israel and its citizens, we shall hold

Lebanon responsible for failing to live up to its international obligations.”171 No further

comment is necessary regarding Israel’s failure to honor its international obligations.

The Polish ambassador stated: “The Israelis’ attempts to vindicate the actions of

their occupying force boils down to trying to justify a policy based on the use of force

and claim the legitimacy of a threat to the territorial integrity, independence and

sovereignty of another state.”172 The Syrian ambassador recognized that “for Israel, the

right of self-defense has come to mean the right to wage pre-emptive wars . . .,” and

noted that, due to the United States, Israel, as aggressor, believes in its right to determine

the terms of Israeli withdrawal, thus illustrating the true double standard in international

relations.173

Draft resolution S/17730/Rev.2 of 17 January 1986 states that the Security

Council,

1. Strongly deplores the Israeli acts of violence as well as abusive practices and measures against the civilian population in southern Lebanon, which are in violation of the rules and principles of international law, in particular the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949;

2. Reaffirms the urgent need to implement the provisions of the Security Council resolutions on Lebanon, and in particular resolutions 425 (1978), 508 (1982), and 509 (1982), which demand that Israel withdraw all its military forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally recognized borders of Lebanon;

3. Reiterates its call for strict respect for the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

171 Ibid., 13. 172 Ibid., 5. 173 Ibid., 14-16.

273

4. Demands that Israel desist forthwith from its practices and measures against the civilian population in southern Lebanon, which impede the restoration of normal conditions in the area and threaten the reconciliation efforts towards restoring peace and security in the whole country;

5. Decides to keep the situation under review and requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council as appropriate.174

While casting another veto and preventing Security Council action regarding the

Israeli occupation of Lebanon, the United States ambassador dissembled that “the United

States has demonstrated repeatedly its unwavering commitment to the restoration of

Lebanon’s unity, sovereignty, and independence.” Strangely, “it is precisely our

attachment to the cause of peace in Lebanon that compels us to cast a negative vote on

the draft resolution now before us” because “the text fails to deal in a fair and balanced

manner with the security problems of southern Lebanon, including the security of the

Lebanon-Israeli border.”175 Once again no comment is necessary to illustrate that it is

Lebanon’s security from Israeli invasion that needs dealt with by the Security Council,

not as the Americans and Israelis suppose, the relatively minor violent acts perpetuated

against Israel threatening its security. The ambassador contended that “negative, one-

sided draft resolutions such as this one only serve those who wish to prevent progress

towards peace in the region,” attempting to obfuscate that the U.S. and Israel are

preventing any peace settlement in the Middle East.176 The Israeli ambassador, declaring

the proceedings in the Security Council “ridiculous,” maintained that Lebanese instability

precipitated the Israeli invasion in 1982, while refraining from recognizing that the

174 Boudreault, 422-423.

175 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2642nd meeting,

S/PV.2642, 37-38.

176 Ibid., 38.

274

numerous invasions of Lebanon, violations of sovereignty, and massive bombing of

Beirut helped create that instability.177

The British delegation presciently observed that Israel invaded Lebanon, yet “the

Council has sought to assist in providing a response to both the Israeli and the Lebanese

concerns.” Furthermore, Israel complains of Lebanese instability, when Israeli actions

have created that instability, and Israel complains that the Lebanese government cannot

control the southern region, when in fact Israel prevents the United Nations force and the

Lebanese government to assert that control.178 The Chinese ambassador stated that

“international opinion unanimously holds that the root-cause of the tense situation in

southern Lebanon lies in the invasion and occupation by Israel.” Moreover, Israel

justified the invasion on the pretexts of “ensuring the security of their own civilians” and

“preventing terrorist attacks,” and the “hypocrisy of these pretexts has long been laid bare

by the Israeli authorities’ own words and deeds.” Furthermore, “we cannot accept the

confusion between acts in self-defense and terrorism, nor can we tolerate aggression

against other countries under the pretext of opposing “terrorism.”179

Draft resolution S/19434 of 15 January 1988 states that the Security Council,

“Deeply concerned with the encroachment of land and setting up of fences effecting the

internationally recognized boundaries, as described in the Secretary-General’s note

(S/19318, annex) of 4 December 1987,”

1. Strongly deplores the repeated Israeli attacks against Lebanese territory and all

177 Ibid., 21-23.

178 Ibid., 11-12.

179 Ibid., 26-27.

275

other measures and practices against the civilian population;

2. Strongly requests that Israel cease all acts of encroachment of land, destruction of roads and setting up of fences that violate the border, and any attempts to occupy or change the status of Lebanese territory or to impede the return of the effective authority of the Government of Lebanon in sovereign Lebanese territory;

3. Reaffirms its calls for strict respect for the sovereignty of Lebanon, its independence, unity and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized boundaries;

4. Reaffirms the urgent need to implement the provisions of the Security Council resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978), and resolution 509 (1982), which demands that Israel withdraw all its military forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally recognized boundaries;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned in the implementation of resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 508 (1982) and 509 (1982) and to report thereon to the Security Council;

6. Decides to keep the situation in southern Lebanon under review.180

While thirteen members of the Council supported the resolution the United States

used its right of veto to prevent its implementation.181 Illustrating its complete

identification with Israeli interests, the United States threatened that “continuing a review

of the situation in southern Lebanon, without an attendant concern for the security of

northern Israel will have no consequences.”182 The Yugoslavia representative argued that

“we reject any pretext whatsoever, invoked by whatever country, to justify the threat to

the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty, as well as the lives of civilians, of

180 Boudreult, 424-425.

181 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2784th meeting,

S/PV.2784, 49-50.

182 Ibid., 51.

276

another country.”183 While obviously immediate security concerns had little bearing on

the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and would not justify it in any case, it is interesting that

the United States and Israel continually assert the false pretexts, despite the substantial

evidence leading to the conclusion that Israel committed an unfounded and unjustifiable

act of aggression against international law and the Charter of the United Nations.

Draft resolution S/19868 of 6 May 1988 states in part that the Security Council,

“noting with grave concern the deterioration of the situation in southern Lebanon as a

result of the recent invasion by Israeli forces,” and “deeply concerned also by the recent

action of those forces causing heavy casualties, displacement of civilian population, the

destruction of houses and property, and in particular the devastation of the entire village

of Meidoun,”

1. Condemns the recent invasion by Israeli forces of southern Lebanon;

2. Repeats its call for the immediate withdrawal of all Israeli forces from Lebanese territory and calls for the cessation of all acts that violate the sovereignty of Lebanon and the security of its civilian population;

3. Reaffirms its calls for strict respect for the sovereignty of Lebanon, its independence, unity and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized boundaries;

4. Reaffirms the urgent need to restore international peace and security through the implementation of the provisions of the Security Council resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978), and resolution 509 (1982) which in particular demands that Israel withdraw all its military forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally recognized boundaries; 5. Requests the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned in the implementation of resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 508 (1982) and 509 (1982), and to report thereon to the Security Council;

183 Ibid., 6.

277

6. Decides to keep the situation in southern Lebanon under review.184

While the other fourteen members supported the resolution, the United States

vetoed the draft ostensibly because it “fail[ed] to recognize the attacks and reprisals

originating on both sides of the Israeli-Lebanese border.”185 The Kuwaiti representative

queried “what kind of security is this that gives [Israel] the right to violate the security of

others?”186 The Palestinian representative, quoting Israeli authorities, illustrated the

historical precedents informing and supporting Israeli policy. According to the

representative, Defense Minister Yitzhak General Rabin proposed

routine operations as part of the policy of routine security measures in south Lebanon . . . to transmit a clear message to the local population that they should not cooperate with those circles which aid the terrorists against us from any type of organization.187

Moreover, “the maintenance of the security zone is not sufficient without preventative

actions against terrorist targets, whether deep in Lebanon or in the zone and its immediate

environs.”188 The ambassador cited Ben-Gurion, who wrote:

The Moslem rule in Lebanon is artificial and easily undermined. A Christian state ought to be set up whose southern border would be the Litani River. Then we’ll form an alliance with it.189 The League of Arab States representative noted a prevalent phenomenon, especially in

the United States as Finkelstein, Findlay, and Rubenberg have documented in the cited

184 Boudreault, 426-427.

185 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2814th meeting,

S/PV.2814, 58-60.

186 Ibid., 11-12.

187 Ibid., 18.

188 Ibid.

189 Ibid., 22.

278

works, that any criticism of Israeli policy is oftentimes immediately branded anti-

Semitism, to prevent any substantive debate:

Or is it that the Israeli representative, as well as others, are going to interpret, through a form of political and intellectual terrorism, that any dissent from their official policy, and questioning of their aggressive designs, any criticism of their oppressive measures, any reference to their documented conference of Zionism, is going to be treated as anti-Semitic in order to pre-empt any form of criticism, condemnation or skepticism about their ideas and policies.190 Tellingly, the Israeli delegations to the United Nations have often attempted to obfuscate

the real issues and undermine any sort of debate by declaring any criticism of Israeli

policies as latent anti-Semitism or extreme Arab hatred of Jews, an intellectually

dishonest tact to prevent Israeli concessions to the United Nations resolutions regarding a

just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

Draft resolution S/20322 of 14 December 1988 states in part that the Security

Council, “deeply concerned with the recent Israeli attack against Lebanese territory by

Israeli naval, air and land forces on 9 December 1988,”

1. Strongly deplores the recent Israeli attack against Lebanese territory by Israeli naval, air and land forces on 9 December 1988;

2. Strongly requests that Israel cease immediately all attacks against Lebanese territory;

3. Reaffirms its call for strict respect for the sovereignty of Lebanon, its independence, unity and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized boundaries;

4. Reaffirms the urgent need to implement the provisions of the Security Council resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978), and resolution 509 (1982), which demands that Israel withdraw all its military forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally recognized boundaries;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned with implementation of resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 508 (1982) and 509 (1982) and to report to the Security Council;

190 Ibid., 37.

279

6. Decides to keep the situation in Lebanon under review.191

The United States cast the lone negative vote, vetoing the draft on the dubious

grounds that “in requesting that Israel cease all attacks against Lebanese territory

regardless of provocation, this draft resolution would deny to Israel its inherent right to

defend itself.”192 In an attempt to frame the debate, the ambassador, assuming that Israeli

violence never falls under the rubric of terrorism, declared that “what is needed are

practical measures to curb terrorist activities, not more unbalanced resolutions that

achieve nothing.”193 The Lebanese representative pleaded that the Security Council must

implement and enforce the resolutions requiring an Israeli ceasefire and withdrawal from

Lebanon.194 The ambassador from Senegal cogently observed:

By adopting the draft resolution the Security Council would once again express the international community’s refusal to go along with the use of force and policies of aggression as a means of ensuring the security of any state whatsoever.195 Unfortunately, the United States continued to support Israel in egregious violations of

international law and the United Nations Charter, illustrating a double standard where the

U.S. and its allies utilize force for political, economic, territorial, or diplomatic gains due

to enormous military power, while holding other nations accountable to the letter of

international law and brutally punishing those which do not accede to their diktats.

191 Boudreault, 427.

192 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2832nd meeting,

S/PV.2832, 28-29.

193 Ibid., 29.

194 Ibid., 8-10.

195 Ibid., 22-23.

280

In addition to the resolutions regarding the Israeli occupation of Palestinian

territory and invasion of Lebanon, the Security Council attempted to address other Israeli

acts violating international law between 1980 and 2004, including the killing of United

Nations employees in the occupied territories in 2002 and the forcible interception and

diversion of a Libyan civilian airliner in international airspace in 1986. Applying a

unique double standard to the Israeli violations of international law, the United States,

through the use of its veto, unjustifiably prevented the international community from

adequately responding to the Israeli actions in order to force Israel into compliance with

United Nations demands.

Draft resolution S/2002/1385 of 20 December 2002 states in part that the Security

Council, “expressing grave concern at the killing by the Israeli occupying forces of

several United Nations employees, including the recent killing of one international staff

member in the Jenin refugee camp,” and “expressing deep concern at the deliberate

destruction by the Israeli occupying forces of a United Nations World Food Programme

warehouse in Beit Lahiya in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, in which 537 metric tons

of donated food supplies intended for distribution to needy Palestinians had been stored,”

1. Condemns the above-mentioned killings and destruction;

2. Demands that Israel, the occupying Power, comply fully with its obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, and refrain from the excessive and disproportionate use of force in the Occupied Palestinian Territory;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to inform the Council on any developments in this regard.196

196 United Nations Security Council draft resolution S/2002/1385 of 20 December 2002.

281

The United States ambassador to the United Nations vetoed the resolution,

declaring that “the proponents of the resolution appear more intent on condemning Israeli

occupation than on ensuring the safety of UN personnel. Mixing these two issues is

inappropriate. . . .”197 The American position regarding an egregious breach of

international norms requires no comment.

Draft resolution S/17796/Rev.1 of 6 February 1986 states in part that the Security

Council, “considering that this act by the Israeli airforce constitutes a serious interference

with international civil aviation, and a threat to security and stability in the region,”

1. Condemns Israel for its forcible interception and diversion of the Libyan civilian aircraft in international airspace, and its subsequent detention of the said aircraft;

2. Considers that this act by Israel constitutes a serious violation of the principles of international law, and in particular the relevant provisions of the international conventions on civil aviation;

3. Calls on the International Civil Aviation Organization to take due account of this resolution when considering adequate measures to safeguard international civil aviation against such acts; 4. Calls on Israel to desist forthwith from any and all acts endangering the safety of international civil aviation and solemnly warns Israel that, if such acts are repeated, the Council will consider taking adequate measures to enforce its resolutions.198

As a precursor to the debate on this issue, recall that the Soviet Union shot down a

Korean civilian airliner, which had intruded deeply into sensitive Soviet air space, on 1

September 1983. The United States, Japan, Canada, and South Korea quickly drafted a

197 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 4681st meeting,

S/PV.4681, 2.

198 Boudreault, 424.

282

resolution for the Security Council condemning the Soviet Union.199 Although the

Council’s vote was 9-2-4, the measure was not adopted due to the Soviet veto. The

British ambassador tellingly stated that “the Soviet Union, by vetoing the draft resolution

before us, has shown that it is impervious to the strength of opinion round the world on

this issue.”200 The United States ambassador, chastising an official enemy for qualities

the U.S. exemplifies, asserted:

In its determined defense of this indefensible act, the Soviet Union has demonstrated an attitude that is as contemptuous of the truth as it is callous towards human life, an attitude underscored by its veto of the draft resolution before us today.201

Interestingly, the ambassador claimed that “We do not believe that the protection of the

sovereignty of any nation gives that nation a right to shoot down any plane in peacetime,

flying any place over its territory,” exhibiting a double standard for the actions of the

U.S. and its allies and clients as opposed to the acceptable behavior of official enemies.202

The United States government and media quickly capitalized on the event to

demonize the Soviet Union. President Ronald Reagan determined that the downing of

the airliner was “an act of barbarism, born of a society that wantonly disregards

individual rights and the value of human life.”203 The United States Congress absurdly

and unanimously adopted a measure describing the Soviet action as “one of the most

infamous and reprehensible acts in history.” CBS anchorperson Dan Rather referred to

199 United Nations Security Council draft resolution S/15996/Rev.1 of 12 September 1983.

200 United Nations Security Council Official Records, Thirty-Eighth Year: 2476th meeting,

S/PV.2476, 12.

201 Ibid., 14.

202 Ibid., 16; The Soviet defense of its actions given in Ibid., 6-9.

203 R.W. Johnson, “KAL 007: Unanswered Questions,” World Press Review March 1984, 23-26, cited in Michael Parenti, Inventing Reality: The Politics of the Mass Media (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986), 156.

283

the event as “the barbaric act,” while the New York Times, which devotes seven full pages

to the event in its index in September 1982 alone, opined that “the Soviet Union is

different-call it tougher, more brutal or even uncivilized–than the rest of the world.”204

Subsequent investigation determined that the United States willfully provoked the

Soviet Union, callously disregarding the lives of the civilian passengers of that plane.

The political scientist Michael Parenti writes that “the belated revelations demolishing

the official version of the incident never undid the cascade of disinformation and

manipulated outrage that had initially inundated the public.”205 For example, contrary to

the U.S. government’s position, the Soviet planes had frequently attempted radio contact

with the Koran airliner, which had turned off its automatic identification system and

attempted evasive maneuvers, and fired warning shots before shooting it down.

Moreover, referring to the Korean plane’s immediate and subsequently large discrepancy

from its original flight plan into a known dangerous area, Captain Thomas Ashwood,

Vice-President of the Airline Pilots Association at the time, called the chances of such a

navigational error “astronomical.” Five weeks after the event, U.S. intelligence experts

admitted there was no evidence that Soviet air defense personnel had known that the

plane was a civilian airliner and had probably mistaken it for a U.S. spy plane. Two

former intelligence specialists revealed that U.S. spy planes monitor the military-sensitive

area of the Soviet Union constantly (more than twenty-five have been shot down since

the 1950s), and, therefore, “the entire sweep of events . . . was meticulously monitored

204 Ibid.; The reference to the New York Times index in Noam Chomsky, “1984: Orwell’s and

Ours,” The Thoreau Quarterly Vol. 16, cited in Ibid., 160.

205 Ibid., 159.

284

and analyzed instantaneously by U.S. intelligence,” begging the question of why the

United States never attempted to deescalate the situation. 206

Illustrating the lack of media attention in other instances, including the CIA-

backed terrorist bombing of a Cuban airliner in 1976, killing 73 civilians, and the Israeli

downing of a civilian plane over the Suez Canal in 1973, killing 110, the media critic

Noam Chomsky writes:

In the midst of the furor, UNITA, the “freedom fighters” supported by the U.S. and South Africa, took credit for downing an Angolan jet with 126 killed. There was no ambiguity; the plane was not off course flying over sensitive installations. . . . It was simply premeditated murder. The incident received 100 words in the NY Times and no comment any where in the media.207

“None of these incidents demonstrate ‘barbarism,’” and indeed, the New York Times

commented after the Israeli downing of the civilian plane in 1973 that “no useful purpose

is served by an acrimonious debate over the assignment of blame.”208

As Chomsky indicates, the American response to the Soviet downing of a Korean

airliner contrasts with the U.S. position in similar instances when the perpetrators are

U.S. allies and clients, thus foreshadowing the U.S. vetoing of the draft resolution and the

protection of Israeli actions as justified self-defense.

During the debate surrounding the vote on the draft resolution condemning the

interception and diversion of the Libyan civilian airliner, the United Arab Emirates

ambassador quoted the former Israeli Prime Minister Moshe Sharett, who remarked after

Israel hijacked a Syrian civilian airliner on 12 December 1954 that “what shocks and

206 Ibid., 157-159.

207 Chomsky, cited in Ibid., 160.

208 Ibid.

285

worries me is the narrow-mindedness and the short-sightedness of our military leaders.

They seem to presume that the state of Israel may--or even must--behave in the realm of

international relations according to the laws of the jungle.”209 As a contrast, the UAE

ambassador recalled the words of the Israeli ambassador at a debate a couple days before

the vote on the resolution: the Israeli ambassador “arrogated to his country the right to

intercept any civilian airliner if Israel believed some of the passengers on board were

what he called terrorists or enemies of Israel.”210 The Ghana representative asserted that

“the statement of [Israel’s] representative indicated quite clearly that it knew the action

contravened international conventions and law but felt that it should be excused under the

special circumstances that it adduced.”211 Moreover, “it would be a certain prescription

for anarchy if the Council should give any member states, least of all Israel--which,

sadly, has a belligerent record--the assurance that it can use force in its relations with

other member states and then seek retroactive endorsement of its wrongful ways from the

Council.”212

The Indian ambassador blamed Israeli defiance of the international community as

the primary factor preventing a just and lasting peace.213 The Democratic Republic of

Germany maintained that the “prerequisite for [peace in the Middle East] is the total and

unconditional withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab territories occupied since 1967,

implementation of the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine, including its right

209 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2655th meeting,

S/PV.2655, 7-10.

210 Ibid., 11.

211 Ibid., 26.

212 Ibid., 27.

213 Ibid., 44-45.

286

to self-determination and to the establishment of an independent state of its own, as well

as implementation of the right of all states of the region to independent existence and

development.”214 The Iranian ambassador strongly recommended that the United States

support the international consensus in condemning Israel’s actions, instead of supporting

“a lawless, criminal entity” and “destroying the Council’s credibility.” The ambassador

noted that “the United States is supposed to be a permanent member, not a permanent

problem, in this Council.”215 Once again, an Arab member state argued that the

Council’s failure to solve the Middle East problem and enforce the legitimate rights of

the Arab peoples forces the Palestinians to resist by any means available. The Iranian

ambassador warned: “Let us remember, that the slothful attitude of this Council--thanks

again to the irresponsible position of certain permanent members will automatically force

the people in the region to rely only on whatever measures are available to them,

conventional or unconventional, acceptable--in terms of your norms--or unacceptable.

You members of the Council give them no choice but to do whatever is possible,

whatever is available in order to get rid of the enemy and of the occupation of their

land.”216

The Israeli ambassador, while absurdly and immorally claiming that Israel was

not responsible for the massacres at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Lebanon in

1982, declares that Israel is a victim with the courage to resist terrorism.217 The

ambassador asserts that the Palestine Liberation Organization is the world’s chief terrorist

214 Ibid., 53-55.

215 Ibid., 66.

216 Ibid., 69.

217 Ibid., 88-90, 96.

287

organization. Continuing, he stated “if those [Arab] regimes were to confine those

attacks to themselves, that would be a tragic thing for the people of those regimes but a

minor concern to the international community,” implying perhaps that if Arabs killed

other Arabs, what he defines as terrorism would not be an international problem.218 The

racist remark intimates that the lives of white Europeans, Americans, and Israelis are

worth more than those with darker skin, who invariably do not value life as much as we

do anyway. Those with the atomic bombs, the depleted uranium, the air forces, the

navies, the napalm, and the death squads value life. Those responsible for the genocide

of Native Americans, the death of perhaps three million Vietnamese and two million

Iraqis, and the murder and maiming of millions more throughout the world, value life.

Invariably, their victims do not value life and that is why we kill them.

The United States, casting the lone veto and thus preventing the adoption of the

resolution, recognized the right to intercept civilian airliners as self-defense. The

ambassador argued that “the United States recognizes and strongly supports the principle

that a state whose territory or citizens are subject to continuing terrorist attacks may

respond with appropriate use of force to defend itself against further attacks.”219

Moreover, “we must be clear that terrorist violence, not the response to terrorist violence,

is the cause of the cycle of violence which increasingly and tragically mars the Middle

East and the entire world.”220 The United States categorically accepts the principle of

preventative attack, aggression disguised as self-defense against a future indeterminate

attack, a concept completely at odds with international law and the United Nations

218 Ibid., 93.

219 Ibid., 112.

220 Ibid.

288

Charter. A fundamental point is that terrorism is not applicable to U.S. actions

throughout the world. By definition, terrorism applies only to enemies of the United

States regardless of motives, context, or history. Therefore, while the U.S. aggression

against Iraq is not considered terrorism, the actions of those Iraqis resisting occupation

are characterized as such. Additionally, the concept of preventative attack only applies to

the United States and its allies and clients. Those nations not possessing military might

on par with the United States could not possibly fathom attempting an attack on the

United States, even if those nations are “subject to continuing terrorist attacks” by the

U.S. and its clients. While the United States raged with apoplectic indignation at the

Soviet Union for downing the Korean flight, as a useful propaganda device against the

“Evil Empire,” the U.S. affords to itself and its clients the same course of action as self-

defense.

Conclusion

According to President George W. Bush, the terrorists who attacked the United

States on September 11, 2001 hate our freedom. In a society where the U.S.

government’s mainstream media stenographers are quick to focus on the deficiencies and

double standards of official enemies instead of thoroughly examining U.S. policies and

providing historical context so that a knowledgeable citizenry could enact change,

perhaps many Americans still believe that there was no logic behind the 9/11 attacks. By

branding the attackers as mindless fanatical fundamentalists, the president has provided

justification for endless war--the terrorists will not stop until they are all killed. An

understood implication of this policy is that the more people the United States military

kills, the more people will oppose the U.S. and by definition become terrorists.

The five chapters demonstrated that the United States is not the benevolent,

virtuous, and righteous nation as it claims. However, the American people are

indoctrinated by the media, government, and educational system to believe that the

United States is an especially virtuous nation. In her examination of American history

textbooks, Frances Fitzgerald wrote:

290

According to these books, the United States had been a kind of Salvation Army to the rest of the world: throughout history, it had done little but dispense benefits to poor, ignorant, and diseased countries. . . . The United States always acted in a disinterested fashion, always from the highest of motives; it gave, never took.1

However, democracy, freedom, justice, and human rights are not the principles guiding

domestic and foreign policies. Instead, the United States government acts as a rogue state

with the impunity of an imperial superpower, utilizing massive military and technological

force to impose and maintain world hegemony through the control of resources and

markets.

The first chapter examined the foreign policy of the current George W. Bush

administration as outlined in the 2002 National Security Strategy, including the illegal

aggression against Afghanistan beginning immediately after the attacks against the

United States in September 2001 and Iraq beginning in March 2003 and the aggressive

belligerency toward Venezuela and Iran. The National Security Strategy elucidates

American contempt for the United Nations Charter and international law and explicitly

asserts the principles of U.S. unilateralism and exceptionalism, which only contribute to a

more dangerous and unjust world, where force and the law of the jungle trump

international law and ideals of real economic, political, and social democracy.

The second chapter examined the George H. W. Bush administration’s immediate

righteous and indignant reaction to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the underlying

motives which led to large-scale U.S. military intervention and the destruction of Iraqi

military capability and civilization. The Iraqi aggression allowed the United States an

1 Frances Fitzgerald, America Revised (New York, 1980), 129, 139, as cited in William Blum,

Freeing the World to Death: Essays on the American Empire (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 2005), 1.

291

opportunity to manipulate the United Nations into violating its mandate as embodied in

the Charter to support essentially unilateral American force and massive state terrorism,

exposing the American righteous rhetoric against aggression and the use of force as false,

in order to justify the continuation of the massive military budget after the cessation of

the Cold War, assert U.S. hegemony, acquire a more permanent presence in the vital

Middle East region, convince the American public of the efficacy of direct U.S. military

intervention, and destroy a perceived threat to Israel.

The third chapter described unprovoked U.S. aggression against the essentially

defenseless nations of Grenada, Libya, Panama, and Nicaragua during the 1980s to

further elucidate that the U.S. government does not principally oppose aggression or

egregious violations of international law. Moreover, the aggression demonstrates the

U.S. government’s contempt for real democracy, human rights, and justice. Although the

international community condemned the U.S. military interventions, the United Nations

could not force American compliance with international law and decisions of the

international court and affect the behavior of the U.S. government to prevent future

American aggression, illustrating the military might trumps international law. The

historical evidence indicates that the United States will continue to rely on military force

against weak, poor, defenseless nations as a first resort for territorial, economic, or

political advantage, the control of resources and markets, and the maintenance of U.S.

hegemony.

The two remaining chapters highlighted the habitual U.S. support for Israeli

aggression, violations of international law, and noncompliance with United Nations

resolutions. Although the United States immediately sought enforceable Security

292

Council resolutions against Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait in order to force Iraq’s

withdrawal through sanctions and military intervention and although the George W. Bush

administration is attempting to coerce a Security Council resolution to prevent Iran from

developing nuclear technology as is its inalienable right,2 various U.S. administrations

have prevented any condemnation of Israel for its aggression against neighboring Arab

states, its occupation of Palestinian territory since 1967, and various violations of

international law. Chapter four provided a revisionist history (for an American audience)

describing the origin of the Israeli-Arab conflict, the major crises and wars between Israel

and the Arab states, the massive injustice perpetrated on the Palestinian Arabs, and the

complete Israeli rejection of Palestinian human rights and self-determination to

demonstrate, contrary to government and media propaganda, that the U.S. and Israel have

habitually rejected a just political settlement for Middle East peace. Chapter five

catalogued Israel’s habitual noncompliance with Security Council resolutions and the

blatant U.S. effort to undermine the United Nations and prevent a just Middle East peace

based upon the international consensus through the unjustifiable use of its veto. Israel

clearly maintains its illegal policies in violation of international law and United Nations

resolutions only because of the political, economic, and military support of the United

States.

United Nations General Assembly resolutions, discussed in the appendix, provide

a rich documentary record of the disparity between the U.S. rhetoric and policy and

2 Thus the United States policy violates the United Nations Charter and international law by

placing the Security Council in the difficult position of punishing a nation for completely legal actions. Unlike the United States nuclear program, Iran’s nuclear program complies with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and is under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency. See David Peterson, “Iran: A Manufactured Crisis,” Counterpunch, 1 June 2006, <www.counterpunch.org/peterson06012006.html>.

293

elucidate the heinous double standard that the U.S. applies to the world because of its

massive military might. As the hidden history indicates, the United States, standing

virtually alone against international opinion, opposes resolutions iterated every session

promoting peace, disarmament, and social, political, and economic justice.

In a democracy, the government is the people, and thus the American people have

the ability and the responsibility to influence and direct the domestic and foreign policies

of the government. In a world marred by war, inequality, massive poverty, and inhumane

injustice, the American people must struggle for economic, social, and political equality,

the preconditions for real participatory democracy in order to develop the policies and the

conditions necessary for a more just, equal, and viable world. The history of the

twentieth century painfully indicated that militant nationalism and patriotism, supported

by the inherent ideologies of racism and exceptionalism, and manifested through massive

military intervention, undermine international law, the idealism of the United Nations

Charter, and the progress of humankind. Thus far, the policies and actions of the George

W. Bush administration, based upon the perpetuation of the interests of the elite through

military force, at the beginning of the twenty-first century represents an all too dangerous

continuation and repetition of the twentieth century policies and ideologies that caused

unparalleled and perhaps irreparable destruction to the world. All peoples and nations

may realize hope for a more just, equitable, and peaceful world only when international

law granting political and economic democracy is applied equally to all instead of the law

of the jungle and might makes right. The American people must struggle and oppose its

rogue government and establish a system that truly embodies the values of democracy,

human rights, and political, social, and economic justice for all humankind.

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Appendix I:

The U.S. against the World in the United Nations General Assembly

The American public is woefully ignorant of the United Nations General

Assembly, the world body’s participatory democracy experiment comprising 191 nations.

The U.S. government and mainstream media virtually ignore the United Nations except

to applaud the Security Council when it succumbs to U.S. demands or lament the

democratic excess or radicalism of third world nationalists when the U.S. is in the

minority against world opinion. While the U.S. government has much more power to

manipulate the Security Council through coercion and its veto as a permanent member,

along with China, Russia, France and the United Kingdom, its influence in the more

democratic General Assembly, while considerable, is not as great to incessantly prevent

or weaken all undesirable resolutions.1 Although in the current structure of the United

Nations, U.S. political and financial support is ultimately necessary for serious

implementation of resolutions, the U.S voting record in the General Assembly provides

essential evidence that illustrates the true U.S. policy on human rights, peace, and justice

1 Recall that the neoconservative Francis Fukuyama asserted that the United Nations is “perfectly

serviceable as an instrument of American unilateralism,” quoted in Mark Curtis, The Ambiguities of Power

(Zed, 1985), 183, cited in Noam Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2003), 29. The George W. Bush administration’s attempted manipulation of the Security Council to dismiss the UN Charter and sanction the war on Iraq in 2003 and its pressing of the Security Council to punish Iran and North Korea during the summer of 2006 are recent examples.

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issues which conflicts with the lofty rhetoric emanating from various administrations and

characterizes the U.S. as a rogue state often opposing the opinion of the world.2

However, the lack of coverage in the U.S. press concerning United Nations resolutions

renders the domestic consequences for American votes negligible.

According to the United Nations Charter, the General Assembly performs duties

relating to the promotion of international cooperation, the maintenance of international

peace and security and the social, political, and economic progress of humankind. Article

11 states that the General Assembly

may consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both.3

Article 13 empowers the Assembly to make recommendations “encouraging the

progressive development of international law and its codification” and “assisting in the

realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to

race, sex, language, or religion.”4

The political scientist Michael Parenti asserts that “a nation’s greatness can be

measured by its ability to create a society free of poverty, racism, and sexism and free of

2 President George H. W. Bush repeatedly remarked during the buildup toward the Gulf War that

“this is not a matter between Iraq and the United States of American. It is between Iraq and the entire world community.” As the General Assembly voting records indicates, the U.S. opposes the world on many vital issues including disarmament, nuclear weapons, the Israeli occupation of Palestine, and unilateral economic, political, and military coercion against weaker states. Bush quoted in the New York

Times, 23 August 1990, as cited in Norman Finkelstein, “Israel and Iraq: A Double Standard,” Journal of

Palestine Studies Vol. 20, No. 2, Winter 1991, 50).

3 United Nations Charter

4 Ibid.

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domestic and overseas exploitation and social and environmental devastation.”5 The

progressive sentiment applies to the United Nations General Assembly, which exists to

create such a world society through international cooperation. However, the ideals are

not always supported by practice. The Constitutional scholar J. Allen Smith argues that

while checks in the U.S. Constitution prevented majority rule, the people’s possession of

voting rights propagated the misconception that the majority’s opinion was “a controlling

factor in national politics.”6 Similarly, due to the power dynamics of the United Nations,

world opinion as expressed through large majorities in General Assembly resolutions

may not translate into practical action. The U.S. government, in its quest for stability-a

world free from change-opposes progressive political, social, and economic policies that

conflict with the status quo and the property and economic rights of the world’s elite.

The following tables and accompanying brief discussion on the U.S. voting record in the

United Nations General Assembly is intended for an apathetic American public that has

claimed ignorance of and abdicated responsibility for its government’s role in the world.

A knowledgeable and aware public is vital for a democratic government to function.

Real liberty is the power to actively influence and control government decision-making

and policy to enact the necessary changes for the well-being of humankind and the planet

which we inhabit.

This chapter serves as a complimentary discussion of the General Assembly

voting records tables that follow. The tables cover the period from the 40th session of the

5 Michael Parenti, Democracy for the Few (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1977), 8.

6 J. Allen Smith, The Spirit of American Government: A Study of the Constitution: Its Origin,

Influence and Relation to Democracy (Chautauqua, New York: The Chautauqua Press, 1911), vi.

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General Assembly (September 24, 1985 to December 18, 1985) through the current 60th

session (September 16, 2005 to December 23, 2005).7 The tables provide detailed

information for all General Assembly resolutions adopted with a vote during the period,

recording the U.S. vote and oftentimes listing the nations that cast a negative vote or

abstained on various topics. The study encompasses four U.S. administrations, that of

Presidents Ronald Regan, George H.W. Bush, William Clinton, and George W. Bush,

highlighting remarkable consistency in American foreign policy and elucidating the

fundamental underlying principles and values informing that policy. It is unmistakably

evident that the United States is often in opposition to world opinion regarding human

rights, economic, social, and political progress, peace, justice, security, and the illegality

and immorality of militarization and aggression. The U.S. record in the General

Assembly intimates an obvious conclusion that its rhetoric concerning freedom,

democracy, and human rights is empty and hypocritical. Moreover, an honest history of

its practices and policies exposes a rogue state relying preponderantly on large-scale

military force to solve international disputes and provide economic or political gain while

condemning official enemies and targets for violations of international law and retail

violence. Due to its military and economic strength, the United States shuns the principle

of universality and international law and demands that weak nations succumb to its

dictates or suffer the consequences. The General Assembly voting record provides strong

7 I have culled the data found in the tables from the United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld Library. General Assembly resolutions for the period are found at <www.un.org/documents/resga.htm> and the voting records are accessed at <www.unbisnet.un.org>. The Institute for Palestine Studies multivolume compilation entitled United Nations Resolutions on Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict provides additional information. At the time of this writing, the 60th session had not yet adjourned.

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documentary evidence illustrating how U.S. policies oppose meaningful rights and

security for all peoples while exacerbating very real threats to human existence.

During the twenty-one sessions examined, the United Nations General Assembly

introduced, discussed, and passed approximately 6,755 resolutions encompassing human

rights, disarmament, social, political, and economic progress, apartheid, and the Israeli

occupation of Palestine. The assembly voted on 1,823 of those resolutions with the U.S.

voting in the negative (1,112) or abstaining (361) a remarkable eighty-one percent of the

time. The U.S. voted with the majority on only eighteen percent of the votes (326).8 The

assembly reiterates virtually all resolutions every session, suggesting a lack of progress in

implementing recommendations. As mentioned above, the United Nations has the power

to enforce resolutions only with the acquiescence and political and economic support of

the more powerful nations, especially the United States.

While the voting record tables need no extraneous comment, it is illustrative to

catalog some of the resolutions adopted with a vote in the General Assembly during the

two sessions encompassing the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. As the first chapter indicated,

the Bush administration reacted with indignant righteousness toward Iraqi aggression.

An examination of the General Assembly voting records highlights once again the

enormous disconnect between U.S. rhetoric, which implies an almost surreal American

idealism and benevolence, and U.S. policy, which ignores human rights and progressive

8 Additionally, accounting for the remaining one percent of U.S. votes, the U.S. did not record a

vote on twenty-three occasions, most dealing with the question of Antarctica, and the assembly did not record its vote on one resolution during the 43rd session–43/62 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 42/25 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) which passed 149-0-5 (on this resolution during other sessions, the U.S. voted in the affirmative).

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principles and relies on the threat or use of force. The U.S. politicians and the

mainstream media completely ignore and dismiss the General Assembly, which seems

rather odd for a country that renders democracy as its gift to the world considering the

assembly is the democratic international body representing the world’s nations and

peoples. The U.S. voting record in the General Assembly is beyond deplorable for a

nation that pretends to value democracy, freedom, justice, peace, and human rights. In

the words of Edward Herman, it is beyond hypocrisy.

The General Assembly recorded a vote on 116 of the 336 resolutions adopted

during its 44th session from 28 September 1989 to 17 September 1990. The U.S. sided

with the majority on ten occasions and dissented on 104 resolutions through 74 negative

votes and 30 abstentions.9 The U.S. dissented against resolutions relating to cooperation

between the United Nations and the League of Arab States (44/7), the law of the sea

(44/26), international solidarity with the liberation struggle in South Africa (44/27A),

international financial pressures on the apartheid economy of South Africa (44/47E), an

oil embargo against South Africa (44/27H), concerted international action for the

elimination of apartheid (44/27K), the peaceful settlement of disputes between States

(44/31), the judgment of the International Court of Justice concerning military and

paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua (44/43), the prevention of an arms race in

outer space (44/112), the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use

of radiological weapons (44/116A), the non-use of nuclear weapons and the prevention of

nuclear war (44/119B), the human rights situation in Chile (44/166), the trade embargo

9 The U.S. did not vote on resolutions 44/124A and 44/124B concerning the question of

Antarctica, which passed by votes of 114 to 0 with 7 abstentions and 101 to 0 with 8 abstentions respectively.

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against Nicaragua (44/217), and the effects of military intervention by the United States

in Panama on the situation in Central America (44/240). Additionally, the U.S. opposed

initiatives regarding the uprising (intifadah) of the Palestinian people (44/2), the

inalienable rights of the Palestinian people (44/40A), the illegality of Israeli

administration of Jerusalem (44/40C), an International Middle East Peace Conference

(44/42) the resumption of the ration distribution to Palestine refugees (44/47F), the return

of the population and refugees displaced since 1967 (44/47E), the protection of Palestine

refugees (44/47I), Israel’s illegal polices in the occupied territories (44/48C), Israel’s

failure to comply with United Nations resolutions (44/48E), Israeli nuclear armament

(44/121), the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied territory

(44/174), and assistance to the Palestinian people (4/235).

The assembly voted upon 68 of the 343 resolutions adopted during its 45th

sessions from 18 September 1990 to 27 August 1991. The U.S. sided with the majority

on thirteen occasions and dissented on seventy-one resolutions through fifty-five negative

votes and sixteen abstentions.10 The U.S. failed to support initiatives regarding the

question of Guam (45/32), a zone of peace and cooperation of the South Atlantic (45/36),

the cessation of all nuclear-test explosions (45/49), the prevention of an arms race in

outer space (45/55A), the nuclear capability of South Africa (45/56B), cooperation

between the United Nations and the League of Arab States (45/82), the adverse

consequences for the enjoyment of human rights of political, military, economic, and

other forms of assistance given to the racist and colonialist regime of South Africa

10 The U.S. did not record a vote on resolutions 45/78A and 45/78B concerning the question of

Antarctica, which passed with a vote of 98 to 0 with seven abstentions and 107 to 0 with 7 abstentions respectively.

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(45/84), the world social situation (45/87), the law of the sea (45/145), concerted and

effective measures aimed at eradicating apartheid (45/176B), and military collaboration

with South Africa (45/176C). Moreover, the U.S. opposed resolutions regarding Israeli

nuclear armament (45/63), an international peace conference on the Middle East (45/68),

the uprising (intifadah) of the Palestinian people (45/69), the return of the population and

refugees displaced since 1967 (45/73G), the University of Jerusalem “Al Quds” for

Palestine refugees (45/73J), the protection of Palestine students and educational

institutions and safeguarding of the security of the facilities of the United Nations Relief

and Works Agency in the Occupied Palestinian territory (45/73K), Israel’s

noncompliance with United Nations resolutions (45/74E), Israel’s illegal occupation of

the Syrian Golan (45/74F), and assistance to the Palestinian people (45/183).

While the United States opposed Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, it aggressively

invaded Panama, instigated and supplied the terrorist Contra effort to overthrow the

legitimate Nicaraguan government, and supported economically, militarily, and political

the continued illegal Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory. While the United States

condemned Iraqi human rights violations during Iraq’s invasion and occupation of

Kuwait, it supported the racist apartheid policies in South Africa, trained and supplied the

military juntas throughout Latin America that waged war on their domestic populations,

encouraged the Contras to attack soft civilian targets in Nicaragua, and funded Israel’s

brutal dispossession and ethnic cleansing of the Palestinians in the occupied territories.

While the United States demanded Iraq’s demilitarization, it opposed all efforts to make

the world safer through the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, the

denuclearization of Israel and South Africa, and the prevention of an arms race in outer

308

space. While the United States vehemently and somewhat unilaterally enforced

resolutions against Iraq, it prevented the United Nations from implementing resolutions

concerning the United States, South Africa, and Israeli illegal aggression.

The brief discussion and the accompanying voting record of United Nations

General Assembly resolutions illustrate that U.S. policy, which has been remarkably

consistent regardless of the political party occupying the White House, contradicts

ostensible U.S. principles such as democracy, freedom, equality, and justice. The U.S.

votes in any session of the General Assembly are not an anomaly easily rectified by the

American electoral system. The study of the resolutions is fundamental to understanding

the underlying principles of the American policymakers, whose decisions have a great

effect on the security and well-being of the world’s people. Only by recognizing that

American foreign policy goals and actions are logical consequences of a system designed

to protect the opulent minority from the majority can progressive social movements

challenge the lofty, but dubious, political rhetoric with substantial contradictory evidence

and work for universal political, economic, and social justice.

TABLE I

40th Session of the United Nations General Assembly

September 24, 1985 – December 18, 1985

Res Topic Vote

y-n-a US Others

40/5 Cooperation between the United Nations and the League of Arab States

133-2-2

N N: Israel; A: Grenada, Ethiopia

40/6 Armed Israeli aggression against the Iraqi nuclear installations and its grave consequences for the established international system concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and international peace and security

88-13-39

N

40/7 The situation in Kampuchea 114-21-16

Y

40/11 Right of peoples to peace 109-0-29

A

40/12 The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security

122-19-12

Y

40/18 Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations 76-0-12

A

40/19 Return or restitution of cultural property to the countries of origin

123-0-15

A

40/21 Question of the Falkland Islands 107-4-41

Y N: Belize, Oman, Solomon Islands, UK

40/23 National experience in achieving far-reaching social and economic changes for the purpose of social progress

133-1-11

N

40/25 Importance of the universal realization of the right of peoples to self-determination and of the speedy granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples for the effective guarantee and observance of human rights

118-17-9

N

40/27 Status of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid

120-1-24

N

40/28 Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination

136-1-9

N A: Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Grenada, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, UK

40/50 Question of Western Sahara 96-7-39

A N: Central African Republic, Guinea, Gabon, Guatemala, Morocco, Philippines, Democratic Republic of the Congo

40/51 Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under article 73 e of the Charter of the

149-0-3

A A: France, UK

310

United Nations 40/52 Activities of foreign economic and other interests

which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Namibia and in all other Territories under colonial domination and efforts to eliminate colonialism, apartheid and racial discrimination in southern Africa

125-9-16

N N: Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, UK

40/53 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations

126-3-22

N N: Israel, UK

40/56 Twenty-fifth anniversary of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

139-0-13

A

40/57 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

141-3-7

N N: Israel, UK; A: Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, Canada, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Malawi

40/59A Financing of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force

96-2-13

Y N: Albania, Syria

40/59B Financing of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force

93-10-6

Y N: Afghanistan, Albania, Bulgaria, Belarus, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Republic of Germany, Hungary, Syria, Russia; A: Algeria, Benin, Iraq, Morocco, Romania, Yemen

40/62 Question of the Comorian island of Mayotte 117-1-22

A N: France

40/63 Law of the sea 140-2-5

N N: Turkey; A: Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Peru, UK, Venezuela

40/64A Comprehensive sanctions against the racist regime of South Africa

122-18-14

N

40/64B Situation in South Africa and assistance to the liberation movements

128-8-18

N N: Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, UK

40/64C World Conference on Sanctions against Racist South Africa

137-6-10

N N: Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Portugal, UK; A: Austria, Belize, Canada, France, Grenada, Israel, Luxembourg, Malawi, Netherlands, Spain

40/64D Public information and public action against apartheid

150-0-5

A A: Grenada, Israel, Malawi, UK

40/64E

Relations between Israel and South Africa 102-20-30

N

40/64F Program of work of the Special Committee against 141- N N: UK

311

Apartheid 2-12 40/64G International Convention against Apartheid in

Sports 125-0-24

A

40/64I Concerted international action for the elimination of apartheid

149-2-4

N N: UK; A: Federal Republic of Germany, Grenada, Israel, Malawi

40/67 Progressive development of the principles and norms of international law relating to the new international economic order

125-0-19

A

40/70 Report of the Special Committee on Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Non-Use of Force in International Relations

119-14-12

N

40/79 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 39/51 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

139-0-7

Y A: Argentina, Central African Republic, Cuba, France, Guyana, Cote D'Ivoire, Mali

40/80A Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons 124-3-21

N N: France, UK

40/80B Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons 131-3-24

N N: France, UK

40/81 Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty

116-4-29

N N: France, Grenada, UK

40/83 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia

104-3-41

Y N: Bhutan, India, Mauritius

40/85 Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

101-19-25

N

40/86 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

142-0-6

A A: Argentina, Brazil, Grenada, India, St Kitts and Nevis

40/87 Prevention of an arms race in outer space 151-0-2

A A: Grenada

40/88 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 36/60 on the immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests

120-3-29

N N: France, UK

40/89A Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa

148-0-6

A A: Belgium, France, Israel, Malawi, UK

40/89B Nuclear capability of South Africa 135-4-14

N N: France, Israel, UK

40/90 Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons

128-1-21

N

40/91B Reduction of military budgets 113-13-15

Y

40/92A Prohibition of Chemical and biological weapons 93-15-41

N

40/92C Chemical and biological weapons 112-16-22

Y

40/93 Israeli nuclear armament 101-2-47

N N: Israel

40/94A Conventional disarmament on a regional scale 128-0-8

Y A: Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Uganda,

312

Vietnam 40/94F General and complete disarmament: study on the

naval arms race 146-1-3

N A: Grenada, India, St Kitts and Nevis

40/94G General and complete disarmament: prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes

145-1-7

A N: France A: Argentina, Brazil, China, India, St. Kitts and Nevis, UK

40/94H General and complete disarmament: nuclear weapon freeze

120-17-10

N

40/94I General and complete disarmament: curbing the naval arms race

71-19-59

N

40/94M General and complete disarmament: 3rd Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

138-0-11

Y

40/94N General and complete disarmament: disarmament and the maintenance of international peace and security

99-0-53

A

40/96A Question of Palestine 128-2-22

N N: Israel

40/96B Question of Palestine 129-3-20

N N: Canada, Israel

40/96C Question of Palestine 131-3-18

N N: Canada, Israel

40/96D Question of Palestine 107-3-41

N N: Canada, Israel

40/97A Question of Namibia: situation in Namibia resulting from the illegal occupation of the territory by South Africa

131-0-23

A

40/97B Question of Namibia: implementation of Security Council resolution 435

130-0-25

A

40/97C Question of Namibia: program of work of the UN Council for Namibia

147-0-6

A A: Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, UK

40/97D Question of Namibia: dissemination of information and mobilization of international public opinion in support of Namibia

132-0-23

A

40/97E Question of Namibia: UN Fund for Namibia 148-0-6

A A: Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, UK

40/97F Question of Namibia: special session of the General Assembly

148-0-6

A A: Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Malawi, UK

40/100 World social situation 127-1-24

N

40/111 Human rights and use of scientific and technological developments

127-9-16

N N: Belgium, Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, UK

40/112 Human rights and scientific and technological developments

131-0-22

A

40/114 Indivisibility and interdependence of economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights

134-1-19

N

40/124 Alternative approaches and ways and means within the United Nations System for improving the effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms

130-1-22

N

313

40/137 Question of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Afghanistan

80-22-40

Y

40/139 Situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms in El Salvador

100-2-42

A N: Chile, Guatemala

40/140 Situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Guatemala

91-8-47

A N: Bangladesh, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Indonesia, Morocco, Pakistan, Paraguay

40/141 Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran

53-30-45

Y

40/145 Situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Chile

88-11-47

N

40/148 Measures to be taken against Nazi, Fascist and neo-Fascist activities and all other forms of totalitarian ideologies and practices based on racial intolerance, hatred and terror

106-19-13

N

40/150 Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security

139-1-7

N A: Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Grenada, Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK

40/151A Disarmament and international security 123-1-23

N

40/151B World disarmament campaign 139-0-11

A

40/151C Nuclear-arms freeze 131-10-8

N N: Belgium, Canada, France, Israel, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Turkey, UK; A: Bahamas, China, Federal Republic of Germany, Grenada, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain

40/151D World disarmament campaign: actions and activities

114-0-34

A

40/151E Freeze on nuclear weapons 126-12-10

N

40/151F Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

126-17-8

N

40/151H UN programs of fellowship on disarmament 148-1-1

N A: Grenada

40/152A Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war

123-19-7

N

40/152B Bilateral nuclear-arms and space-arms negotiations 107-0-40

Y

40/152E Disarmament week 129-0-22

A

40/152G Climatic effects of nuclear war, including nuclear winter

141-1-10

N A: Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Grenada, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Turkey, UK

40/152H Prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon 70-11-65

N

314

40/152I International cooperation for disarmament 109-19-17

N

40/152J Implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the 10th special session

128-0-20

A

40/152M Report of the Conference on Disarmament 133-2-18

N N: France

40/152N Implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the 10th special session

135-13-5

N

40/152P Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament

131-16-6

N

40/156A Question of Antarctica 96-0-11

Did Not Vote

40/156B Question of Antarctica 92-0-14

Did Not Vote

40/156C Question of Antarctica 100-0-12

Did Not Vote

40/158 Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security

127-0-26

A

40/159 Implementation of the collective security provisions of the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security

114-21-16

N

40/161A Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories

95-2-37

N N: Israel

40/161B Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories

137-1-6

A N: Israel; A: Cameroon, Cote D'Ivoire, Liberia, Malawi, Democratic Republic of the Congo

40/161C Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories

138-1-6

A N: Israel; A: Costa Rica, Grenada, Cote D'Ivoire, Malawi, St. Lucia

40/161D Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories

109-2-34

N N: Israel

40/161E Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories

126-1-19

A N: Israel

40/161F Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories

136-1-10

A N: Israel

40/161G Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories

112-2-32

N N: Israel

40/164A Questions relating to information 121-19-8

N

40/164B Questions relating to information 122-16-9

N

40/165A United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

149-0-1

Y A: Israel

40/165D Offers by Member States of grants and scholarships for higher education, including vocational training, for Palestine refugees

147-0-1

Y A: Israel

40/165E Palestine refugees in the Gaza Strip 146- N N: Israel; A: Grenada,

315

2-2 Democratic Republic of the Congo

40/165F Resumption of the ration distribution to Palestine refugees

127-20-4

N

40/165G Population and refugees displaced since 1967 127-2-23

N N: Israel

40/165H Revenues derived from Palestine refugees properties

122-2-26

N N: Israel

40/165I Protection of Palestine refugees 116-2-33

N N: Israel

40/165J Palestine refugees in the West Bank 146-2-2

N N: Israel; A: Grenada, Malawi

40/165K University of Jerusalem "Al Quds" for Palestine refugees

149-2-1

N N: Israel; A: Grenada

40/167 Israel's decision to build a canal linking the Mediterranean Sea to the Dead Sea

150-1-0

Y N: Israel

40/168A The situation in the Middle East 98-19-31

N

40/168B The situation in the Middle East 86-23-37

N

40/168C The situation in the Middle East 137-2-10

A N: Costa Rica, Israel; A: Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Guatemala, Liberia, Malawi, Paraguay, Swaziland, Democratic Republic of the Congo

40/169 Economic development projects in the occupied Palestinian territories

138-2-7

N N: Israel; A: Australia, Canada, Finland, Grenada, Iceland, Norway, Sweden

40/170 Assistance to the Palestinian people 145-2-1

N N: Israel; A: Grenada

40/173 International economic security 96-19-28

N

40/182 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 134-1-19

N

40/183 Specific action related to the particular needs and problems of land-locked developing countries

152-0-1

A

40/185 Economic measures as a means of political and economic coercion against developing countries

128-19-7

N

40/188 Ending trade embargo against Nicaragua 91-6-49

N N: Gambia, Grenada, Israel, St. Kitts and Nevis, Sierra Leone

40/191 Reverse transfer of technology 152-1-0

N

40/197 Remnants of war 132-0-23

A

40/200 International cooperation in the field of the environment

149-0-6

A A: France, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Portugal, UK

40/201 Living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territories

153-2-1

N N: Israel; A: Grenada

40/207 Long-term trends in economic development 141-1-13

N

40/239 Program budget for the biennium 1984-1985 125- N

316

12-10 40/241B Financial emergency of the United Nations 132-

12-2 N

40/246A Financing of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

124-15-4

Y

40/246B Financing of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

122-14-5

Y

40/247 Review of the rates of reimbursement to the Governments of troop-contributing States

120-14-7

Y

40/248 Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations

109-15-27

N

40/253A Program budget for the biennium 1986-1987 127-10-11

N N: Belarus, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Republic of Germany, Hungary, Israel, Poland, Ukraine, USSR

40/253B Income estimates for the biennium 1986-1987 137-10-0

N N: Belarus, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Republic of Germany, Hungary, Israel, Poland, Ukraine, USSR

40/253C Financing of appropriations for 1986 126-11-11

N

40/254 Unforeseen and extraordinary expenses for the biennium 1986-1987

139-8-0

Y N: Belarus, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Republic of Germany, Hungary, Poland, Ukraine, USSR

40/255 Working Capital Fund for the biennium 1986-1987 124-11-3

N

40/257 Emoluments, pension scheme and conditions of service for the members of the International Court of Justice

121-11-15

N

317

TABLE II

41st Session of the United Nations General Assembly

October 10, 1986 – December 19, 1986

Res Topic Vote y-n-a

US Others

41/4 Co-operation between the United Nations and the League of Arab States

106-2-1

N N: Israel; A: Cyprus

41/6 The situation in Kampuchea 115-21-13

Y

41/10 Right of peoples to peace 104-0-33

A

41/11 Declaration of a zone of peace and co-operation of the South Atlantic

124-1-8

N A: Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal

41/12 Armed Israeli aggression against the Iraqi nuclear installations and its grave consequences for the established international system concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and international peace and security

86-5-55

N N: El Salvador, Honduras, Israel, St Kitts and Nevis

41/13 Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations

149-0-3

A A: France, UK

41/14 Activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Namibia and in all other Territories under colonial domination and efforts to eliminate colonialism, apartheid and racial discrimination in southern Africa

125-11-15

N

41/15 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations

123-4-27

N N: Israel, Malawi, UK

41/16 Question of Western Sahara 98-0-44

A

41/30 Question of the Comorian island of Mayotte 122-1-22

A N: France

41/31 Judgment of the International Court of Justice of 27 June 1986 concerning military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua

94-3-47

N N: El Salvador, Israel

41/33 The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security

122-20-11

Y

41/34 Law of the sea 145-2-5

N N: Turkey; A: Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Peru, UK, Venezuela

41/35A Situation in South Africa and assistance to the 130- N N; Belgium, France,

318

liberation movements 8-18 Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, UK

41/35B Comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against the racist regime of South Africa

126-16-13

N

41/35C Relations between Israel and South Africa 102-29-26

N

41/35D Program of work of the Special Committee against Apartheid

142-2-10

N N: UK; A: Belgium, Cote D’Ivoire, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Malawi, Netherlands, Portugal

41/35E Statue of the International Convention against Apartheid in Sports

131-0-24

A

41/35F Oil embargo against South Africa 136-5-15

N N: France, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, UK

41/35H Concerted international action for the elimination of apartheid

149-2-5

N N: UK; A: Cote D’Ivoire, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Lesotho, Malawi

41/38 Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity on the aerial and naval military attack against the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya by the present United States Administration in April 1986

79-28-33

N

41/39A Situation in Namibia resulting from the illegal occupation of the Territory by South Africa

130-0-26

A

41/39B Namibia: implementation of Security Council resolution 435

133-0-25

A

41/39C Program of work for the UN Council of Namibia 151-0-7

A A: Canada, Fiji, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, UK

41/39D Dissemination of information and mobilization of international public opinion in support of the immediate independence of Namibia

135-0-23

A

41/39E UN Fund for Namibia 152-0-6

A A: Canada, Fiji, France, Federal Republic of Germany, UK

41/40 Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) 116-4-34

Y N: Belize, Oman, Sri Lanka, UK

41/41A Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

89-24-34

A

41/41B Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

144-3-9

N N: France, UK; A: Belgium, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Malawi, Netherlands, Portugal

41/42 Dissemination of information on decolonization 148-2-7

N N: UK; A: Belgium, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg,

319

Netherlands 41/43A Question of Palestine 121-

2-21 N N: Israel

41/43B Question of Palestine 125-3-18

N N: Canada, Israel

41/43C Question of Palestine 124-3-19

N N: Canada, Israel

41/43D Question of Palestine 123-3-19

N N: Antigua and Barbuda, Israel

41/44A Financing of the UN Disengagement Observer Force

110-3-21

Y N: Albania, Comoros, Syria

41/44B Financing of the UN Disengagement Observer Force

115-1-22

Y N: Albania

41/45 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 40/79 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

145-0-7

Y A: Argentina, Central African Republic, Cote D’Ivoire, Cuba, France, Guyana, Mali

41/46A Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions 135-3-14

N N: France, UK

41/46B Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions 127-3-21

N N: France, UK

41/47 Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty

137-1-15

A N: France

41/49 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia

107-3-41

Y N: Bhutan, India, Mauritius

41/51 Conclusion of effective international arrangements on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

105-18-25

N

41/52 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

149-0-4

A A: Argentina, Brazil, India

41/53 Prevention of an arms race in outer space 154-0-1

A

41/54 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 40/88 on the immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests

123-3-26

N N: France, UK

41/55A Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa

150-0-5

A A: France, Israel, Malawi, UK

41/55B Nuclear capability of South Africa 139-4-13

N N: France, Israel, UK

41/56 Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons

128-1-25

N

41/58B Prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons 100-11-43

N

41/58C Chemical and bacteriological weapons 137-0-14

Y

41/59B Objective information on military matters 116-0-26

Y

41/59D Contribution of the specialized agencies and other organizations and programs of the UN system to the cause of arms limitation and disarmament

117-16-19

N

41/59E Confidence-building and security-building measures and conventional disarmament

129-0-21

Y

320

41/59G Conventional disarmament 150-0-2

Y A: India, Libya

41/59H Comprehensive study on the military use of research and development

137-1-17

N

41/59I Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, and use of radiological weapons

111-3-38

N N: France, Israel

41/59K Naval armaments and disarmament 153-1-0

N

41/59L Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes

148-1-6

A N: Israel; A: Argentina, Brazil, China, India, UK

41/59M Conventional disarmament on a regional basis 137-0-7

A A: Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, Ghana, Iraq, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Vietnam

41/59N Notification of nuclear tests 130-1-22

A N: France

41/60A World Disarmament Campaign: actions and activities

114-3-36

N N: France, UK

41/60B World Disarmament Campaign 144-0-9

A A: Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Turkey, UK

41/60E Freeze on nuclear weapons 136-12-5

N

41/60F Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

132-17-4

N

41/60H UN program of fellowships on disarmament 154-1-0

N

41/60I Implementation of General Assembly resolution 40/151C on a nuclear arms freeze

139-12-4

N

41/63A Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories

108-2-34

N N: Israel

41/63B Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories

145-1-6

A N: Israel; A: Costa Rica, Cote D’Ivoire, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Liberia

41/63C Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories

145-1-5

A N: Israel; A: Costa Rica, Cote D’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, St Lucia

41/63D Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories

114-2-36

N N: Israel

41/63E Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories

131-1-21

A N: Israel

41/63F Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories

142-1-11

A N: Israel

41/63G Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories

119-2-32

N N: Israel

41/68A Questions relating to information 148- N A: Canada, Israel,

321

1-4 Malawi, UK 41/68B Questions relating to information 143-

2-7 N N: UK; A: Canada,

Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Netherlands

41/68E Questions relating to information 134-10-9

N N: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Japan, Netherlands, UK; A: Austria, Finland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sweden

41/69A Assistance to Palestine refugees 150-0-1

Y A: Israel

41/69D Grants and scholarships for Palestine refugees 153-0-1

Y A: Israel

41/69E Palestine refugees in the Gaza strip 146-2-5

N N: Israel; A: Cameroon, Costa Rica, Liberia, Malawi, Democratic Republic of the Congo

41/69F Resumption of the ration distribution to Palestine refugees

130-20-4

N

41/69G Population and refugees displaced since 1967 126-2-25

N N: Israel

41/69H Revenues derived from Palestine refugees properties 124-2-28

N N: Israel

41/69I Protection of Palestine refugees 121-2-29

N N: Israel

41/69J Palestine refugees in the West Bank 145-2-6

N N: Israel; A: Costa Rica, Cote D’Ivoire, El Salvador, Liberia, Malawi, Democratic Republic of the Congo

41/69K University of Jerusalem “Al Quds” 152-2-0

N N: Israel

41/71 Observer status of national liberation movements recognized by the Organization of African Unity and/or by the League of Arab States

125-10-17

N N: Belgium, Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK

41/73 Progressive development of the principles and norms of international law relating to the new international economic order

131-0-23

A

41/75 Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind

141-5-8

N N: France, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, UK; A: Belgium, Canada, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Turkey

41/86A Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations 88-0-56

Y

322

41/86B Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war

118-17-10

N

41/86D Disarmament week 123-1-23

N

41/86F Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament

130-15-5

N

41/86G Prevention of nuclear war 134-3-14

N N: France, UK

41/86H Climatic effects of nuclear war, including nuclear winter

140-1-10

N A: Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Turkey, UK

41/86I Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its 11th Special Session : resolution

138-1-11

N

41/86J Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its 11th Special Session : resolution

128-0-18

A

41/86K International cooperation for disarmament 118-19-9

N

41/86M Report of the Conference on Disarmament 133-3-17

N N: France, UK

41/86N Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations 140-0-13

A

41/86O Implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the 10th Special Session

135-13-5

N

41/86P Report of the Conference on Disarmament 101-0-50

Y

41/88A Question of Antarctica 94-0-12

Did Not Vote

41/88B Question of Antarctica 96-0-12

Did Not Vote

41/88C Question of Antarctica 119-0-8

Did Not Vote

A: Austria, Canada, Fiji, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Solomon Islands, Turkey

41/90 Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security

126-1-24

N

41/91 Need for result-oriented political dialogue to improve the international situation

117-1-33

N

41/92 Establishment of a comprehensive system of international peace and security

102-2-46

N N: France

41/93 Israeli nuclear armament 95-2-56

N N: Israel

41/95 Adverse consequences for the enjoyment of human rights of political, military, economic and other forms of assistance given to the racist and colonialist regime of South Africa

126-10-17

N N: Belgium, Cameroon, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK

41/101 Importance of the universal realization of the right 126- N

323

of peoples to self-determination and of the speedy granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples for the effective guarantee and observance of human rights

18-12

41/102 Use of mercenaries as a means to violate human rights and to impede the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination

120-11-23

N

41/103 Status of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid

128-1-27

N

41/113 Human rights and use of scientific and technological developments

129-10-15

N N: Belgium, Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, UK

41/115 Human rights and scientific and technological developments

131-0-24

A

41/117 Indivisibility and interdependence of economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights

129-1-25

N

41/123 Measures of assistance provided to South African and Namibian refugee women and children

147-1-8

N A: Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK

41/128 Declaration on the Right to Development 146-1-8

N A: Denmark, Finland, Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Sweden, UK

41/131 Alternative approaches and ways and means within the United Nations system for improving the effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms

134-1-21

N

41/132 Respect for the right of everyone to own property alone as well as in association with others and its contribution to the economic and social development of Member States

109-0-41

Y

41/133 Right to development 133-11-12

N

41/141 Assistance to displaced persons in Ethiopia 150-1-1

N A: Israel

41/143 Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities

135-1-19

N

41/146 Realization of the right to adequate housing 153-0-2

A A: Israel

41/151 Measures to improve the situation and ensure the human rights and dignity of all migrant workers

148-1-4

N A: Belgium, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, UK

41/155 Strengthening of international co-operation in the field of human rights

154-0-1

A

41/156 Situation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms in Guatemala

134-0-21

Y

41/157 Situation of human rights in El Salvador 110-0-40

Y

41/158 Question of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Afghanistan

89-24-36

Y

41/159 Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of 61- Y

324

Iran 32-42 41/161 Situation of human rights and fundamental

freedoms in Chile 94-5-52

N N: Chile, Indonesia, Lebanon, Paraguay

41/162A The situation in the Middle East 104-19-32

N

41/162B The situation in the Middle East 90-29-34

N

41/162C The situation in the Middle East 141-3-11

A N: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Israel

41/164 Trade embargo against Nicaragua 83-2-44

N N: Israel

41/165 Economic measures as a means of political and economic coercion against developing countries

115-23-3

N

41/179A Financing of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

125-2-9

Y N: Albania, Syria; A: Angola, Cuba, Iraq, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Libya, Maldives, Poland, Vietnam, Yemen

41/179B Financing of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

116-2-19

Y N: Albania, Syria

41/180 Net transfer of resources from developing to developed countries

125-10-10

N N: Australia, Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, UK; A: Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Spain, Sweden

41/181 Assistance to the Palestinian people 142-2-1

N N: Israel; A: Costa Rica

41/184 Report of the Secretary-General in implementation of General Assembly resolution 40/173 (International economic security)

117-16-11

A

41/187 Proclamation of the World Decade for Cultural Development

146-1-2

N A: Israel, UK

41/195 Assistance to Uganda 150-1-0

N

41/197 Assistance to Mozambique 152-1-0

N

41/199 Special assistance to front-line states 152-0-1

A

41/200 Assistance to Benin, the Central African Republic, the Comoros, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, the Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Madagascar, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone and Vanuatu

152-0-1

A

41/209C UN budget: Health insurance 132-10-3

N N: Bulgaria, Belarus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Republic of Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Ukraine, USSR; A: Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, UK

325

41/209E New service of the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs

124-11-10

N

41/209F Loan to UN Industrial Development Organization 124-13-9

N

41/209H Judgment of the UN Administrative Tribunal 135-10-1

Y N: Bulgaria, Belarus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Republic of Germany, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Ukraine, USSR; A: Singapore

41/209I Job classification 101-19-24

N

41/211A Program budget for the biennium 1986-1987: revised budget appropriations

122-13-10

N

41/211B Revised income estimates 132-11-2

N

41/211C Financing of appropriations for the year 1987 123-14-9

N

41/212B UN Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

119-0-28

A

326

TABLE III

42nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly

October 7, 1987 – August 17, 1998

Res Topic Vote y-n-a

US Others

42/3 The situation in Kampuchea 117-21-16

Y

42/5 Co-operation between the United Nations and the League of Arab States

153-2-0

N N: Israel

42/7 Return or restitution of cultural property to the countries of origin

103-0-15

A

42/14A Situation in Namibia resulting from the illegal occupation of the Territory by South Africa

131-0-24

A

42/14B Question of Namibia: implementation of Security Council resolution 435

130-0-24

A

42/14C Program of work of the UN Council for Namibia 149-0-6

A A: Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Netherlands, UK

42/14D Dissemination of information and mobilization of international public opinion in support of the immediate independence of Namibia

133-0-22

A

42/14E UN Fund for Namibia 149-0-5

A A: Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, UK

42/15 The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security

123-19-11

Y

42/16 Zone of peace and co-operation of the South Atlantic

122-1-8

N A: Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal

42/17 Question of the Comorian island of Mayotte 128-1-22

A N: France

42/18 Judgment of the International Court of Justice of 27 June 1986 concerning military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua

94-2-48

N N: Israel

42/19 Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) 114-5-36

Y N: Belize, Gambia, Oman, Sri Lanka, UK

42/20 Law of the sea 142-2-6

N N: Turkey; A: Ecuador, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Peru, UK, Venezuela

42/23A International solidarity with the liberation struggle in South Africa

129-3-22

N N: Portugal, UK

42/23B Application of coordinated and strictly monitored measures to South Africa

128-3-24

N N: Federal Republic of Germany, UK

42/23C Comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against the racist regime of South Africa

126-11-17

N

42/23D Relations between Israel and South Africa 103- N

327

29-23 42/23E Program of work of the Special Committee against

Apartheid 145-1-10

N A: Belgium, Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, UK

42/23F Oil embargo against South Africa 138-4-12

N N: France, Federal Republic of Germany, UK

42/23G Concerted international action for the elimination of apartheid

149-2-4

N N: UK; A: Cote D'Ivoire, Federal Republic of Germany, Lesotho, Malawi

42/25 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 41/45 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

147-0-7

Y A: Argentina, Central African Republic, Cote D'Ivoire, Cuba, France, Guinea, Guyana

42/26A Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions 137-3-14

N N: France, UK

42/26B Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions 128-3-22

N N: France, UK

42/27 Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty

143-2-8

N N: France; A: Angola, Argentina, Brazil, China, Cuba, India, Israel, UK

42/29 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia

114-3-36

Y N: Bhutan, India, Mauritius

42/31 Conclusion of effective international arrangements on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

112-18-20

N

42/32 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

151-0-3

A A: Brazil, India

42/33 Prevention of an arms race in outer space 154-1-0

N

42/34A Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa

151-0-4

A A: France, Israel, UK

42/34B Nuclear capability of South Africa 140-4-13

N N: France, Israel, UK

42/35 Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons

135-1-18

N

42/38A Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations 115-0-39

Y

42/38C Notification of nuclear tests 147-1-8

A N: France; A: Angola, Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Nicaragua, UK

42/38D Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations 143-0-13

A

42/38F Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons

119-2-32

N N: Israel

42/38I Objective information on military matters 133-0-12

Y

42/38J Implementation of General Assembly resolutions in 128- N N: Israel

328

the field of disarmament 2-24 42/38K Naval armaments and disarmament 154-

1-2 N A: Grenada, India

42/38L Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes

149-1-6

A N: France; A: Argentina, Brazil, China, India, UK

42/39A Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the 12th Special Session of the General Assembly

129-1-23

N

42/39B Freeze on nuclear weapons 139-12-4

N

42/39C Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

135-17-4

N

42/39G World Disarmament Campaign 146-1-9

N A: Belgium, Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, UK

42/39H Implementation of General Assembly resolution 41/60I on a nuclear-arms freeze

140-13-2

N

42/39I UN program of fellowships on disarmament 156-1-0

N

42/42A Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war

125-17-12

N

42/42B Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its 10th special session

137-1-14

A N: Iran

42/42C Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament

137-13-7

N

42/42D Prevention of nuclear war 140-3-14

N N: France, UK

42/42E International cooperation for disarmament 118-18-14

N

42/42H Disarmament Week 133-0-21

A

42/42K Report of the Conference on Disarmament 127-0-28

A

42/42L Report of the Conference on Disarmament 135-5-15

N N: Belgium, France, Portugal, UK

42/42M Implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its 10th special session

142-12-3

N

42/42N Rationalization of the work of the 1st Committee 134-0-20

Y

42/44 Israeli nuclear armament 97-2-52

N N: Israel

42/46A Question of Antarctica 122-0-9

Did Not Vote

A: Canada, Cote D'Ivoire, Ireland, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malta, Mauritius, Portugal

42/46B Question of Antarctica 100-0-10

Did Not Vote

A: Antigua and Barbuda, Canada, China, Fiji, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Solomon Islands, Turkey,

329

Venezuela 42/50 National experience in achieving far-reaching social

and economic changes for the purpose of social progress

144-1-10

N A: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, UK

42/52 Efforts and measures for securing the implementation by States and the enjoyment by youth of human rights in conditions of peace, particularly the right to education and to work

156-1-0

N

42/56 Status of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid

128-1-27

N

42/66A Question of Palestine 131-2-22

N N: Israel

42/66B Question of Palestine 133-2-20

N N: Israel

42/66C Question of Palestine 133-3-18

N N: Canada, Israel

42/66D Question of Palestine 129-2-24

N N: Israel

42/69A Assistance to Palestine refugees 153-0-1

Y A: Israel

42/69D Offers by Member States of grants and scholarships for higher education, including vocational training, for Palestine refugees

154-0-1

Y A: Israel

42/69E Palestine refugees in the Gaza Strip 150-2-3

N N: Israel; A: Costa Rica, Liberia, Democratic Republic of the Congo

42/69F Resumption of the ration distribution to Palestine refugees

131-20-4

N

42/69G Population and refugees displaced since 1967 125-2-27

N N: Israel

42/69H Revenues derived from Palestine refugee properties 123-2-28

N N: Israel

42/69I Protection of Palestine refugees 124-2-27

N N: Israel

42/69J Palestine refugees in the West Bank 145-2-7

N N: Israel; A: Central African Republic, Costa Rica, Cote D'Ivoire, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, Democratic Republic of the Congo

42/69K University of Jerusalem "Al Quds" for Palestine refugees

151-2-1

N N: Israel; A: Equatorial Guinea

42/70 Financing of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force

94-3-5

Y N: Albania, Libya, Syria; A: Afghanistan, Algeria, Cuba, Iraq, Maldives,

42/71 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

131-2-7

N N: UK; A: Belgium, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg,

330

Netherlands 42/72 Dissemination of information on decolonization 135-

2-6 N N: UK; A: Belgium,

Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands

42/73 Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations

154-0-3

A A: France, UK

42/74 Activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Namibia and in all other Territories under colonial domination and efforts to eliminate colonialism, apartheid and racial discrimination in southern Africa

133-10-12

N N: Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, UK

42/75 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations

130-3-23

N N: Israel, UK

42/78 Question of Western Sahara 93-0-50

A

42/79 Question of New Caledonia 69-29-47

A

42/91 Implementation of the Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace

128-0-24

A

42/92 Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security

131-1-23

N

42/93 Comprehensive system of international peace and security

76-12-63

N

42/95 Importance of the universal realization of the right of peoples to self-determination and of the speedy granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples for the effective guarantee and observance of human rights

126-17-10

N

42/96 Use of mercenaries as a means to violate human rights and to impede the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination

125-10-19

N N: Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, UK

42/99 Human rights and use of scientific and technological developments

129-9-15

N N: Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, UK

42/100 Human rights and scientific and technological developments

131-0-24

A

42/101 Question of a Convention on the Rights of the Child 154-0-1

A

42/102 Indivisibility and interdependence of economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights

129-1-22

N

42/115 The impact of property on the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms

124-24-2

N

42/119 Alternative approaches and ways and means within 129- N

331

the United Nations System for improving the effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms

1-24

42/134 Need to enhance international co-operation in the field of the protection of and assistance for the family

145-2-8

N N: Israel; A: Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden

42/135 Question of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Afghanistan

94-22-31

Y

42/136 Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran

64-22-45

Y

42/139 Assistance to displaced persons in Ethiopia 153-0-2

A A: Malaysia

42/140 Measures to improve the situation and ensure the human rights and dignity of all migrant workers

150-1-3

N A: Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, UK

42/145 Improvement of social life 129-17-8

N

42/146 Realization of the right to adequate housing 156-0-1

A

42/147 Situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Chile

93-5-53

A N: Chile, Indonesia, Lebanon, Paraguay, Thailand

42/149 Progressive development of the principles and norms of international law relating to the new international economic order

131-0-24

A

42/150 Peaceful settlement of disputes between States 136-0-20

A

42/151 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind

136-5-14

N N: France, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, UK

42/153 Draft Convention on International Bills of Exchange and International Promissory Notes

114-0-40

A

42/158 Development and strengthening of good-neighborliness between States

133-0-22

A

42/159 Measures to prevent international terrorism which endangers or takes innocent human lives or jeopardizes fundamental freedoms and study of the underlying causes of those forms of terrorism and acts of violence which lie in misery, frustration, grievance and despair and which cause some people to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an attempt to effect radical changes

153-2-1

N N: Israel; A: Honduras

42/160A Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories

111-2-36

N N: Israel

42/160B Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories

142-1-8

A N: Israel; A: Belize, Central African Republic, Costa Rica, Cote D’Ivoire, El Salvador, Liberia, Democratic Republic of the Congo

42/160C Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories

143-1-8

A N: Israel; A: Belize, Central African Republic, Costa Rica,

332

Cote D’Ivoire, El Salvador, Liberia, Democratic Republic of the Congo

42/160D Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories

112-3-38

N N: Costa Rica, Israel

42/160E Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories

130-1-23

A N: Israel

42/160F Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories

143-1-10

A N: Israel; A: Belize, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Costa Rica, Cote D’Ivoire, El Salvador, Liberia, Malawi, Democratic Republic of the Congo

42/160G Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories

137-2-14

N N: Israel

40/162A Question relating to information 136-1-15

N

40/162B Question relating to information 140-1-11

N

42/165 International economic security 119-10-20

N N: Belgium, France, Israel, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, UK

42/166 Assistance to the Palestinian people 152-2-0

N N: Israel

42/173 Economic measures as a means of political and economic coercion against developing countries

128-21-5

N

42/174 Specific action related to the particular needs and problems of land-locked developing countries

152-1-0

N

42/176 Trade embargo against Nicaragua 94-2-48

N N: Israel

42/184 International co-operation in the field of the environment

149-1-0

Y N: Israel

42/190 Living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territories

151-1-1

N A: Togo

42/198 Furthering international co-operation regarding the external debt problems

154-1-0

N

42/199 Assistance for reconstruction and development of Lebanon

152-1-0

N

42/200 Special economic assistance to Chad 150-0-1

A

42/201 Special assistance to front-line States 154-0-1

A

42/202 Special assistance to Maldives for disaster relief and the strengthening of its coastal defenses

153-0-1

A

42/203 Assistance to El Salvador 154-0-1

A

42/204 Special economic assistance to Central America 154-0-1

A

42/205 Assistance to Benin, the Central African Republic, 154- N

333

Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Ecuador, the Gambia, Madagascar, Nicaragua and Vanuatu

1-0

42/209A The situation in the Middle East 124-3-22

N N: Honduras, Israel

42/209B The situation in the Middle East 99-19-33

N

42/209C The situation in the Middle East 82-23-43

N

42/209D The situation in the Middle East 140-3-7

A N: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Israel; A: Cameroon, Cote D’Ivoire, Haiti, Honduras, Liberia, Malawi

42/210B Report of the Committee on Relations with the Host Country

145-1-0

Did Not Vote

N: Israel

42/223 Financing of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

133-3-9

Y N: Albania, Iran, Syria; A: Angola, Cuba, Democratic Yemen, Iraq, Libya, Maldives, Poland, Vietnam, Yemen

42/224 Review of the rates of reimbursement to the Governments of troop-contributing States

133-3-10

Y N: Albania, Iran, Syria; A: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Cuba, Democratic Yemen, Iraq, Libya, Maldives, Vietnam, Yemen

42/226A Program budget for the biennium 1988-1989 146-1-3

A N: Israel; A: Australia, Japan

42/229A Report of the Committee on Relations with the Host Country

143-1-0

Did Not Vote

N: Israel

42/230 Report of the Committee on Relations with the Host Country

148-2-0

N N: Israel

42/232 Report of the Committee on Relations with the Host Country

136-2-0

N N: Israel

334

TABLE IV

43rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly

October 17, 1988 – April 20, 1989

Res Topic Vote y-n-a

US Others

43/3 Co-operation between the United Nations and the League of Arab States

146-2-0

N N: Israel

43/11 Judgment of the International Court of Justice of 27 June 1986 concerning military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua

89-2-48

N N: Israel

43/12 Co-operation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity

140-1-0

N

43/13 Pretoria's racial "municipal elections" 146-0-2

A A: UK

43/14 Question of the Comorian island of Mayotte 127-1-25

A N: France

43/18 Law of the sea 135-2-6

N N: Turkey; A: Ecuador, Federal Republic of Germany, Guatemala, Peru, UK, Venezuela

43/19 The situation in Kampuchea 122-19-13

Y

43/21 The uprising (intifadah) of the Palestinian people 130-2-16

N N: Israel

43/22 Right of peoples to peace 118-0-29

A

43/23 Zone of peace and co-operation of the South Atlantic

144-1-7

N A: Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands

43/25 Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) 109-5-37

Y N: Belize, Gambia, Oman, Sri Lanka, UK

43/26A The situation in Namibia resulting from illegal occupation of the territory by South Africa

130-0-23

A

43/26B Question of Namibia: implementation of Security Council resolution 435

140-0-13

A

43/26C Program of work of the UN Council for Namibia 147-0-6

A A: Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Netherlands, UK

43/26D Dissemination of information and mobilization of international public opinion in support of the immediate independence of Namibia

129-0-23

A

43/26E UN Fund for Namibia 148-0-5

A A: Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, UK

43/28 Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations

154-0-2

A A: UK

335

43/29 Activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Namibia and in all other Territories under colonial domination and efforts to eliminate colonialism, apartheid and racial discrimination in southern Africa

133-9-14

N N: Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, UK

43/30 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations

124-4-27

N N: Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, UK

43/33 Question of Western Sahara 86-0-53

A

43/45 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

147-2-7

N N: UK; A: Belgium, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands

43/46 Dissemination of information on decolonization 149-2-5

N N: UK; A: Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Netherlands

43/47 International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism

135-1-20

N

43/48 Report of the Committee on Relations with the Host Country

151-2-1

N N: Israel; A: UK

43/49 Report of the Committee on Relations with the Host Country

154-2-1

N N: Israel; A: UK

43/50A International solidarity with the liberation struggle in South Africa

131-3-21

N N: Portugal, UK

43/50B Military collaboration with South Africa 123-2-29

N N: Israel

43/50C Comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against the racist regime of South Africa

123-12-19

N

43/50D Imposition, coordination, and strict monitoring of measures against racist South Africa

136-4-14

N N: Federal Republic of Germany, Portugal, UK

43/50E Relations between South Africa and Israel 106-23-26

N

43/50F Program of work of the Special Committee against Apartheid

144-1-9

N A: Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, UK

43/50H Dissemination of information against the policies of apartheid of the regime of racist South Africa

132-1-21

N

43/50J Oil embargo against South Africa 138-2-14

N N: UK

43/50K Concerted international action for the elimination of apartheid

149-2-2

N N: UK; A: Federal Republic of Germany, Portugal

43/54A The situation in the Middle East 103-18-30

N

43/54B The situation in the Middle East 83-21-45

N

336

43/54C The situation in the Middle East 143-2-7

A N: El Salvador, Israel; A: Antigua and Barbuda, Cameroon, Honduras, Liberia, Malawi, St Kitts and Nevis

43/57A Assistance to Palestine refugees 152-0-1

Y A: Israel

43/57D Offers by Member States of grants and scholarships for higher education, including vocational training, for Palestine refugees

153-0-1

Y

A: Israel

43/57E Palestine refugees in territory occupied by Israel since 1967

152-2-0

N N: Israel

43/57F Resumption of the ration distribution to Palestine refugees

130-20-3

N

43/57G Return of population and refugees displaced since 1967

129-2-23

N N: Israel

43/57H Revenues derived from Palestine refugee properties 151-2-1

N N: Israel; A: UK

43/57I Protection of Palestine refugees 151-2-1

N N: Israel; A: Democratic Republic of the Congo

43/57J University of Jerusalem "Al Quds" for Palestine refugees

152-2-0

N N: Israel

43/58A Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories

106-2-43

N N: Israel

43/58B Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories

148-1-4

A N: Israel; A: Cote D'Ivoire, Liberia, Democratic Republic of the Congo

43/58C Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories

149-1-2

A N: Israel; A: Liberia

43/58D Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories

150-2-0

N N: Israel

43/58E Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories

152-1-1

A N: Israel

43/58F Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories

149-1-3

A N: Israel; A: Liberia, Democratic Republic of the Congo

43/58G Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories

147-2-3

N N: Israel; A: Chile, Liberia, Democratic Republic of the Congo

43/60A Questions relating to information 128-8-16

N N: Belgium, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Japan, Netherlands, UK

43/60B Questions relating to information 141-1-11

N

43/62 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 42/25 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

149-0-5

NON RECORDED VOTE

43/63A Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions 136- N N: France, UK, Yemen

337

4-13 43/63B Cessation of all nuclear -test explosions 127-

3-21 N N: France, UK

43/64 Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty

146-2-6

N N: France; A: Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Israel, UK

43/66 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia

116-3-34

Y N: Bhutan, India, Mauritius

43/68 Conclusion of effective international arrangements on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

117-17-16

N

43/69 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

152-0-3

A A: Brazil, India

43/70 Prevention of an arms race in outer space 154-1-0

N

43/71A Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa

151-0-4

A A: France, Israel, UK

43/71B Nuclear capability of South Africa 138-4-12

N N: France, Israel, UK

43/72 Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons

152-0-2

A A: Israel

43/75A Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations 141-0-12

A

43/75G Objective information on military matters 130-0-10

Y A: Algeria, Bahrain, Brazil, Cuba, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates

43/75H Implementation of General Assembly resolutions in the field of disarmament

131-2-20

N N: Israel

43/75I International arms transfers 110-1-38

A N: Djibouti

43/75J Prohibition of the development , production, stockpiling, and use of radiological weapons

116-2-29

N N: Israel

43/75K Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes

144-1-7

A N: France; A: Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Luxembourg, UK

43/75L Naval armaments and disarmament 152-1-1

N A: Israel

43/75N Comprehensive UN study on nuclear weapons 141-1-9

N A: Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, UK

43/75O Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations 103-0-46

Y

43/75Q Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes for hostile purposes

129-1-10

Y N: Togo; A: Angola, Bahamas, Barbados, Burkina Faso, Congo, Mali, Niger, Tanzania, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zambia

338

43/75S Conventional disarmament on a regional scale 125-0-23

A

43/75T Dumping of radioactive wastes 141-0-13

A

43/76A Disarmament and international security 129-1-21

N

43/76B Nuclear arms freeze 135-12-3

N

43/76C World disarmament campaign 144-0-10

A A: Belgium, Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, UK

43/76E Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

133-17-4

N

43/77A Scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security

129-7-14

N N: France, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Spain, UK

43/77B Third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament

152-0-2

A A: UK

43/78B Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war

127-17-6

N

43/78C International cooperation for disarmament 136-1-13

N

43/78D Climatic effects of nuclear war, including nuclear winter

145-0-9

A A: Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Turkey, UK

43/78E Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament

135-13-5

N

43/78F Prevention of nuclear war 136-3-14

N N: France, UK

43/78I Report of the Conference on Disarmament 96-0-53

A

43/78J Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security

143-1-9

N A: Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, UK

43/78M Report of the Conference on Disarmament 136-3-14

N N: France, UK

43/80 Israeli nuclear armament 99-2-51

N N: Israel

43/81B Study of the role of the UN in the field of verification

150-1-0

N

43/82 Implementation of the conclusions of the 3rd Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and establishment of a Preparatory Committee for the 4th Review Conference

137-0-11

Y

43/83A Question of Antarctica 100-0-6

Did Not Vote

A: China, Fiji, Ireland, Portugal, Turkey, Venezuela

339

43/83B Question of Antarctica 111-0-10

Did Not Vote

A: Botswana, Cote D'Ivoire, Ireland, Lesotho, Malawi, Malta, Mauritius, Paraguay, Portugal, Swaziland

43/86 Need for a result-oriented political dialogue to improve the international situation

127-1-24

N

43/87 Tenth anniversary of the adoption of the Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace

128-0-24

A

43/88 Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security

128-1-22

N

43/89 Comprehensive approach to strengthening international peace and security in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations

97-3-45

N N: Israel, Japan

43/92 Adverse consequences for the enjoyment of human rights of political, military, economic and other forms of assistance given to the racist and colonialist regime of South Africa

129-10-17

N N: Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, UK

43/97 Status of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid

128-1-26

N

43/106 Importance of the universal realization of the right of peoples to self-determination and of the speedy granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples for the effective guarantee and observance of human rights

124-15-15

N

43/107 Use of mercenaries as a means to violate human rights and to impede the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination

125-10-21

N N: Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, UK

43/110 Human rights and scientific and technological developments

133-0-24

A

43/113 Indivisibility and interdependence of economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights

132-1-23

N

43/124 The impact of property on the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms

129-24-1

N

43/125 Alternative approaches and ways and means within the United Nations System for improving the effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms

130-1-25

N

43/126 Alternative approaches and ways and means within the United Nations System for improving the effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms

135-8-14

Did Not Vote

N: Belgium, Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK

43/137 Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran

61-25-44

Y

43/146 Measures to improve the situation and ensure the human rights and dignity of all migrant workers

154-1-2

N A: Federal Republic of Germany, UK

43/156 Improvement of social life 130-16-9

N

43/158 Situation of human rights and fundamental 97-1- A N: Chile

340

freedoms in Chile 55 43/160A Observer status of national liberation movements

recognized by the Organization of African Unity and/or the League of Arab States

117-2-31

N N: Israel

43/160B Observer status of national liberation movements recognized by the Organization of African Unity and/or the League of Arab States

124-9-18

N N: Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK

43/162 Progressive development of the principles and norms of international law relating to the new international economic order

129-0-24

A

43/163 Peaceful settlement of disputes between States 132-0-22

A

43/164 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind

137-5-13

N N: France, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, UK

43/171A Development and strengthening of good-neighborliness between States

67-9-65

Y

N: Bulgaria, Cameroon, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Mongolia, Philippines, Romania, Sudan, Vietnam

43/171B Development and strengthening of good-neighborliness between States

124-8-22

N N: Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, UK

43/175A Question of Palestine 123-2-20

N N: Israel

43/175B Question of Palestine 123-2-20

N N: Israel

43/175C Question of Palestine 127-2-17

N N: Israel

43/176 Question of Palestine 138-2-2

N N: Israel; A: Canada, Costa Rica

43/177 Question of Palestine 104-2-36

N N: Israel

43/178 Assistance to the Palestinian people 118-14-13

N

43/182 Preparation for an International Development Strategy for the 4th United Nations Development Decade

151-0-1

A

43/185 Trade embargo against Nicaragua 89-2-50

N N: Israel

43/187 International Conference on Money and Finance 127-19-5

N

43/195 International co-operation for the eradication of poverty in developing countries

128-1-21

N

43/197 Fulfillment of the target for official development assistance

148-0-1

A

43/198 External debt crisis and development 150-1-1

N A: Japan

43/209 Special assistance to front-line States 152-0-1

A

43/222B Status of Committee on Conferences 129- N N: Federal Republic of

341

4-14 Germany, Israel, UK 43/228 Financing of the United Nations Disengagement

Observer Force 133-2-8

Y N: Libya, Syria; A: Algeria, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Maldives, Sudan, Vietnam, Yemen

43/229 Financing of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

134-1-8

Y N: Syria; A: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Maldives, Poland, Vietnam, Yemen

43/233 Question of Palestine 129-2-1

N N: Israel; A: Liberia

342

TABLE V

44th Session of the United Nations General Assembly

September 28, 1989 – September 17, 1990

Res Topic Vote y-n-a

US Others

44/1 Death sentence passed on a South African patriot 149-0-2

A A: UK

44/2 The uprising (intifadah) of the Palestinian People 140-2-6

N N: Israel; A: Antigua and Barbuda, El Salvador, Grenada, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Uruguay, Democratic Republic of the Congo

44/7 Co-operation between the United Nations and the League of Arab States

143-2-0

N N: Israel

44/9 Question of the Comorian island of Mayotte 128-1-24

A N: France

44/18 Return or restitution of cultural property to the countries of origin

139-0-16

A

44/20 Zone of peace and co-operation of the South Atlantic

146-1-2

N A: Canada, Japan

44/22 The situation in Kampuchea 124-17-12

Y

44/24 African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programs for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation

137-1-0

N

44/26 Law of the sea 138-2-6

N N: Turkey; A: Ecuador, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Peru, UK, Venezuela

44/27A International solidarity with the liberation struggle in South Africa

129-4-21

N N: Israel, Portugal, UK

44/27C Comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against the racist regime of South Africa

118-11-22

N

44/27D Imposition, co-ordination and strict monitory of measures against racist South Africa

135-3-15

N N: Portugal, UK

44/27E International financial pressures on the apartheid economy of South Africa

140-4-11

N N: Federal Republic of Germany, Netherlands, UK

44/27F Relations between South Africa and Israel 114-22-18

N

44/27G Program of work of the Special Committee against Apartheid

145-0-10

A A: Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, UK

44/27H Oil embargo against South Africa 139-2-14

N N: UK

343

44/27I Military collaboration with South Africa 106-17-26

N

44/27K Concerted international action for elimination of apartheid

151-2-3

N N: UK; A: Federal Republic of Germany, Lesotho, Portugal

44/27L Support for the work of the Commission against Apartheid in Sports

127-1-23

N

44/30 Progressive development of the principles and norms of international law relating to the new international economic order

126-1-24

A N: Luxembourg

44/31 Peaceful settlement of disputes between States 131-0-21

A

44/32 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind

133-5-14

N N: France, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, UK

44/40A The situation in the Middle East 109-18-31

N

44/40B The situation in the Middle East 84-22-49

N

44/40C The situation in the Middle East 147-2-8

A N: Costa Rica, Israel; A: Belize, Dominica, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Honduras, Kenya, Malawi

44/41A Question of Palestine 132-3-21

N N: Dominica, Israel

44/41B Question of Palestine 133-3-20

N N: Dominica, Israel

44/41C Question of Palestine 136-3-17

N N: Dominica, Israel

44/42 Question of Palestine 151-3-1

N N: Dominica, Israel; A: Belize

44/43 Judgment of the International Court of Justice of 27 June 1986 concerning military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua

91-2-41

N N: Israel

44/47A Assistance to Palestine refugees 134-0-1

Y A: Israel

44/47D Offers by Member States of grants and scholarships for higher education for Palestine refugees

141-0-1

Y A: Israel

44/47E Palestine refugees in the Palestinian territory occupied by Israel since 1967

140-2-1

N N: Israel; A: Dominica

44/47F Resumption of the ration distribution to Palestine refugees

121-20-3

N

44/47G Return of the population and refugees displaced since 1967

126-2-19

N N: Israel

44/47H Revenues derived from Palestine refugees properties

125-2-21

N N: Israel

44/47I Protection of Palestine refugees 146-2-1

N N: Israel; A: Dominica

44/47J University of Jerusalem “Al Quds” for Palestine refugees

147-2-1

N N: Israel; A: Dominica

44/47K Protection of Palestinian students and educational institutions and safeguarding of the security of the facilities of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East in the

146-2-1

N N: Israel; A: Dominica

344

occupied Palestinian territory 44/48A Report of the Special Committee to Investigate

Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories

107-2-41

N N: Israel

44/48B Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories

149-1-2

A N: Israel; A: Dominica

44/48C Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories

146-1-3

A N: Israel; A: Dominica, Kenya

44/48D Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories

145-2-2

N N: Israel; A: Dominica, Kenya

44/48E Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories

150-1-2

A N: Israel; A: Dominica

44/48F Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories

148-1-4

A N: Israel; A: Costa, Rica, Dominica, Kenya

44/48G Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories

150-2-1

N N: Israel; A: Dominica

44/50 Questions relating to information 127-2-21

N N: Israel

44/56 World social situation 131-1-23

N

44/63 Alternative approaches and ways and means within the United Nations system for improving the effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms

129-1-25

N

44/69 Status of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid

124-1-27

N

44/79 Importance of the universal realization of the right of peoples to self-determination and of the speedy granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples for the effective guarantee and observance of human rights

123-15-16

N

44/81 Use of mercenaries as a means to violate human rights and to impede the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination

125-10-21

N N: Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, UK

44/83 Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations

150-0-3

A A: France, UK

44/84 Activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Namibia and in all other Territories under colonial domination and efforts to eliminate colonialism, apartheid and racial discrimination in southern Africa

125-10-17

N N: Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, UK

44/85 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and

142-2-10

N N: UK; A: Australia, Belgium, France,

345

Peoples by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations

Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan,, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal

44/100 Program of activities in observance of the 30th anniversary of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

137-2-14

N N: UK

44/101 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

142-2-8

N N: UK; A: Belgium, Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands

44/102 Dissemination of information on decolonization 143-2-7

N N: UK; A: Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands

44/104 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 43/62 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

147-0-3

Y A: Argentina, Cuba, France

44/105 Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions 136-3-13

N N: France, UK

44/106 Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water

127-2-22

N N: UK

44/107 Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty

145-2-6

N N: France; A: Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Israel, UK

44/109 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia

116-3-32

Y N: Bhutan, India, Mauritius

44/110 Conclusion of effective international arrangements on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

131-0-21

A

44/111 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

151-0-3

A A: Brazil, India

44/112 Prevention of an arms race in outer space 153-1-0

N

44/113A Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa

147-0-4

A A: France, Israel, UK

44/113B Nuclear capability of South Africa 137-4-10

N N: France, Israel, UK; A: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain

44/114A Reduction of military budgets 116-10-19

N N: Belgium, Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany,

346

Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, UK

44/114B Military budgets 127-0-15

Y

44/116A Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons

124-2-26

N N: Israel

44/116B Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations 91-0-61

Y

44/116E Objective information on military matters 132-0-13

Y

44/116G Implementation of resolutions in the field of disarmament

129-1-25

N

44/116H Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes

147-1-6

A N: France; A: Argentina, Brazil, China, India, UK

44/116J Conversion of military resources 153-0-1

A

44/116K Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations 134-0-18

A

44/116M Naval armaments and disarmament 154-1-0

N

44/116N International arms transfers 143-0-12

Y

44/116P Defensive security concepts and policies 131-0-19

A

44/116R Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes 150-0-4

Y A: Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy

44/116S Conventional disarmament on a regional scale 119-1-31

N

44/117A World disarmament campaign 144-0-10

A A: Belgium, Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, UK

44/117C Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

134-17-4

N

44/117D Nuclear-arms freeze 136-13-5

N

44/117F UN regional centers for peace and disarmament in Africa and Asia and the UN Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean

153-1-1

N A: UK

44/118A Scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security

137-3-14

N N: France, UK

44/118B Science and technology for disarmament 154-0-1

A

44/119A Comprehensive program of disarmament 154-0-1

A

44/119B Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war

129-17-7

N

44/119D Report of the Conference on Disarmament 138-8-9

N N: Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg,

347

Netherlands, UK; A: Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey

44/119E Cessation of nuclear-arms race and prevention of nuclear war

138-11-6

N

44/119F South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty 151-0-4

A A: France, UK, Vanuatu

44/120 Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace

137-4-14

N N: France, Japan, UK

44/121 Israeli nuclear armament 104-2-43

N N: Israel

44/123 Education for disarmament 149-0-5

A A: France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, UK

44/124A Question of Antarctica 114-0-7

Did Not Vote

A: Botswana, Ireland, Luxembourg,, Malta, Mauritius, Portugal, Swaziland

44/124B Question of Antarctica 101-0-8

Did Not Vote

A: China, Fiji, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Swaziland, Turkey

44/126 Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security

128-1-24

N

44/128 Elaboration of a 2nd Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty

59-26-48

N

44/130 Indivisibility and interdependence of economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights

124-0-23

A

44/147 Respect for the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of States in their electoral processes

113-23-11

N

44/166 Situation of human rights in Chile 84-2-60

A N: Chile, Morocco

44/167 Enlargement of the Commission on Human Rights and the further promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms

151-2-2

N N: Israel; A: Japan, Democratic Republic of the Congo

44/168 International assistance for the economic rehabilitation of Angola

150-0-2

A A: Israel

44/170 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 131-1-23

N

44/174 Living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territory

146-2-8

N N: Israel; A: Canada, Dominica, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Federal Republic of Germany, Grenada, Netherlands, UK

44/181 Special assistance to the front-line States 154-0-1

A

44/205 Towards a durable solution of external debt problems

139-1-0

N

44/214 Specific action related to the particular needs and problems of land-locked developing countries

144-0-5

A A: Angola, India, Iran, Pakistan

348

44/215 Economic measures as a means of political and economic coercion against developing countries

118-23-2

N

44/217 Trade embargo against Nicaragua 82-2-47

N N: Israel

44/218 Commodities 146-0-2

A A: UK

44/232 Trends in the transfer of resources to and from the developing countries and their impact on the economic growth and sustained development of those countries

147-1-0

N

44/235 Assistance to the Palestinian people 146-2-1

N N: Israel; A: Canada

44/240 Effects of the military intervention by the United States of America in Panama on the situation in Central America

75-20-40

N

349

TABLE VI

45th Session of the United Nations General Assembly

September 18, 1990 – August 27, 1991

Res Topic Vote y-n-a

US Others

45/11 Question of the Comorian Island of Mayotte 118-1-30

A N: France

45/16 Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations

145-0-3

A A: France, UK

45/17 Activities of foreign and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Territories under colonial domination and efforts to eliminate colonialism, apartheid and racial discrimination in southern Africa

113-11-24

N

45/18 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations

115-12-20

N

45/32 Question of Guam 110-3-31

N N: Israel, Vanuatu

45/33 Thirtieth anniversary of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

124-2-21

N N: UK

45/34 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

131-2-15

N N: UK

45/35 Dissemination of information on decolonization 133-2-14

N N: UK

45/36 Zone of peace and co-operation of the South Atlantic

150-1-1

N A: Japan

45/37 Observer status of national liberation movements recognized by the Organization of African Unity and/or by the League of Arab States

116-9-26

N N: Belgium, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK

45/39 Consideration of effective measures to enhance the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives

148-1-0

Y N: Iraq

45/44 Report of the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization

147-0-1

Y A: Libya

45/45 Rationalization of existing United Nations procedures

149-0-1

Y A: Cuba

45/48 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 44/104 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

141-0-3

Y A: Argentina, Cuba, France

350

and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 45/49 Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions 127-

3-17 N N: France, UK

45/50 Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water

116-2-28

N N: UK

45/51 Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty

140-2-6

N N: France; A: Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Israel, UK

45/53 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia

114-3-28

Y N: Bhutan, India, Mauritius

45/54 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

145-0-3

A A: France, UK

45/55A Prevention of an arms race in outer space 149-0-1

A

45/55B Confidence-building measures in outer space 149-0-1

A

45/56A Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa

145-0-4

A A: France, Israel, UK

45/56B Nuclear capability of South Africa 118-4-27

N N: France, Israel, UK

45/58B Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations 131-0-22

A

45/58H Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations 99-0-50

Y

45/58J Prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities 141-1-11

N

45/58K Prohibition of dumping radioactive wastes 144-0-9

A A: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK

45/58L Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes

146-1-6

A N: France; A: Argentina, Cameroon, China, India, UK

45/58N Charting potential uses of resources allocated to military activities for civilian endeavors to protect the environment

138-3-12

N N: France, UK

45/58O Defensive security concepts and policies 148-0-5

A A: France, Israel, Japan, UK

45/58P Regional disarmament 142-0-10

Y A: Afghanistan, Argentina, Bhutan, Brazil, Cuba, Ethiopia, India, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Mauritius, Vietnam

45/59B Convention on the Prevention of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

125-17-10

N

49/59D Nuclear-arms freeze 126-14-12

N

45/60 Scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security

133-3-16

N N: France, UK

45/62C Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear war

132-12-19

N

45/62D Report of the Conference on Disarmament 128- N N: Belgium, France,

351

8-16 Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK

45/62E Comprehensive program on disarmament 123-6-22

N N: Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK

45/63 Israeli nuclear armament 98-2-50

N N: Israel

45/67A Question of Palestine 122-2-23

N N: Israel

45/67B Question of Palestine 121-2-22

N N: Israel

45/67C Question of Palestine 124-2-20

N N: Israel

45/68 International Peace Conference on the Middle East 144-2-0

N N: Israel

45/69 The uprising (intifadah) of the Palestinian people 141-2-3

N N: Israel; A: Costa Rica, Dominica, Honduras

45/73A Assistance to Palestine refugees 146-0-1

Y A: Israel

45/73D Offers by Member States of grants and scholarships for higher education, including vocational training, for Palestine refugees

146-0-1

Y A: Israel

45/73E Palestine refugees in the Palestinian territory occupied by Israel since 1967

145-2-0

N N: Israel

45/73F Resumption of the ration distribution to Palestine refugees

118-20-9

N

45/73G Return of the population and refugees displaced since 1967

121-2-24

N N: Israel

45/73H Revenues derived from Palestine refugees’ properties

120-2-25

N N: Israel

45/73I Protection of Palestine refugees 145-2-0

N N: Israel

45/73J University of Jerusalem “Al Quds” for Palestine refugees

145-2-0

N N: Israel

45/73K Protection of Palestine students and educational institutions and safeguarding of the security of the facilities of the United Nations Relief and Works agency in the occupied Palestinian territory

145-2-0

N N: Israel

45/74A Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

101-2-43

N N: Israel

45/74B Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

145-1-1

A N: Israel

45/74C Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

144-1-1

A N: Israel

45/74D Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

144-2-0

N N: Israel

45/74E Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 145- A N: Israel

352

Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

1-1

45/74F Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

144-1-2

A N: Israel; A: Malawi

45/74G Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

145-2-0

N N: Israel

45/77 Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace

128-4-17

N N: France, Japan, UK

45/78A Question of Antarctica 98-0-7

Did Not Vote

A: Fiji, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Malta, Portugal, Turkey, Ukraine

45/78B Question of Antarctica 107-0-7

Did Not Vote

A: Ireland, Liechtenstein, Malawi, Malta, Mauritius, Portugal, Ukraine

45/80 Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security

123-1-29

N

45/82 Co-operation between the United Nations and the League of Arab States

147-2-1

N N: Israel; A: Dominica

45/83A The situation in the Middle East 99-19-27

N

45/83B The situation in the Middle East 84-23-41

N

45/83C The situation in the Middle East 145-1-4

A N: Israel; A: Costa Rica, Dominica, Malawi

45/84 Adverse consequences for the enjoyment of human rights of political, military, economic and other forms of assistance given to the racist and colonialist regime of South Africa

120-9-22

N N: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, UK

45/87 World social situation 146-1-4

N A: Germany, Israel, Japan, UK

45/90 Status of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid

120-1-30

N

45/96 Alternative approaches and ways and means within the United Nations system for improving the effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms

121-1-29

N

45/130 Importance of the universal realization of the right of peoples to self-determination and of the speedy granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples for the effective guarantee and observance of human rights

113-15-23

N

45/132 Use of mercenaries as a means to violate human rights and to impede the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination

121-10-21

N N: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, UK

45/145 Law of the sea 140- N N: Turkey; A: Ecuador,

353

2-6 Germany, Israel, Peru, UK, Venezuela

45/150 Enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections

129-8-9

Y N: Angola, China, Columbia, Cuba, Iran, Myanmar, Sudan, Vietnam; A: Burkina Faso, Burundi, Ecuador, Ghana, India, Mali, Mexico, Peru, Syria

45/151 Respect for the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of States in their electoral processes

111-29-11

N

45/164 International Year for the World's Indigenous People

150-0-4

Y A: Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana

45/170 The situation of human rights in occupied Kuwait 144-1-0

Y N: Iraq

45/176B Concerted and effective measures aimed at eradicating apartheid

115-11-19

N

45/176C Military collaboration with South Africa 116-2-29

N N: UK

45/176D Relations between South Africa and Israel 99-28-19

N

45/176E Program of work of the Special Committee against Apartheid

133-0-14

A

45/176F Oil embargo against South Africa 125-2-19

N N: UK

45/176G Support for the work of the Commission against Apartheid in Sports

113-1-26

N

45/183 Assistance to the Palestinian people 135-2-0

N N: Israel

45/188 Entrepreneurship 138-1-0

Y N: Cuba

354

TABLE VII

46th Session of the United Nations General Assembly

September 17, 1991 – August 25, 1992

Res Topic Vote y-n-a

US Others

46/9 Question of the Comorian Island of Mayotte 115-1-34

A N: France

46/10 Return or restitution of cultural property to the countries of origin

134-0-23

A

46/16 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 141-0-9

Y A: Algeria, Cuba, Ghana, Haiti, Iraq, Jordan, Malaysia, Sudan, Yemen

46/19 Zone of peace and cooperation of the South Atlantic

141-1-0

N

46/24 Cooperation between the United Nations and the League of Arab States

140-2-0

N N: Israel

46/28 Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water

110-2-35

N N: UK

46/29 Comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty 147-2-4

N N: France; A: China, Israel, Micronesia, UK

46/31 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia

121-3-26

Y N: Bhutan, India, Mauritius

46/32 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

152-0-2

A A: UK

46/33 Prevention of an arms race in outer space 155-0-1

A

46/34A Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa: nuclear capacity of South Africa

108-1-47

A N: Israel

46/36D Production of fissionable material for weapon purposes

152-2-3

N N: France; A: China, India, UK

46/36I Regional disarmament 154-0-4

Y A: Bhutan, Cuba, India, Lao People's Democratic Republic

46/36J Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations 130-0-26

A

46/36L Transparency in armaments 150-0-2

Y A: Cuba, Iraq

46/37C Nuclear-arms freeze 119-18-23

N

46/37D Convention on Prohibition on Use of Nuclear Weapons

122-16-22

N

46/37F UN Regional Centers for Peace and Disarmament 160-1-1

N A: UK

46/38B Comprehensive Program of Disarmament 123-6-32

N N: Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands, UK

46/38C Report of the Conference on Disarmament 131- N N: Belgium, France,

355

8-23 Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK

46/39 Israeli nuclear armament 76-3-75

N N: Israel, Romania

46/41A Question of Antarctica 101-0-7

Did Not Vote

A: Fiji, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Malta, Portugal, Turkey, Ukraine

46/41B Question of Antarctica 107-0-6

Did Not Vote

A: Ireland, Liechtenstein, Malta, Mauritius, Portugal, Ukraine

46/46A Assistance to Palestine refugees 137-0-1

Y A: Israel

46/46D Offers by Member States of grants and scholarships for higher education for Palestine refugees

147-0-1

Y A: Israel

46/46E Palestine refugees in Palestinian territory occupied by Israel since 1967

143-2-0

N N: Israel

46/46F Resumption of ration distribution to Palestine refugees

115-21-13

N

46/46G Return of the population and refugees displaced since 1967

115-2-32

N N: Israel

46/46H Revenues derived from Palestine refugees' properties

114-2-33

N N: Israel

46/46I Protection of Palestine refugees 147-2-2

N N: Israel; A: Cote D'Ivoire, Russia

46/46J University of Jerusalem "Al Quds" 146-2-2

N N: Israel; A: Cote D'Ivoire, Russia

46/46K Protection of Palestinian students and educational institutions and safeguarding of the security of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency in the occupied Palestinian territory

151-2-0

N N: Israel

46/47A Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

96-5-52

N N: Israel, Latvia, Romania, Uruguay

46/47B Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

153-1-3

A N: Israel; A: Dominica, USSR

46/47C Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

153-1-3

A N: Israel; A: Dominica, USSR

46/47D Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

153-2-2

N N: Israel; A: Dominica, USSR

46/47E Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

153-1-3

A N: Israel; A: Dominica, USSR

46/47F Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

152-1-4

A N: Israel; A: Cote D'Ivoire, Dominica, USSR

356

46/47G Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

150-2-4

N N: Israel; A: Canada, Cote D'Ivoire, Dominica, USSR

46/49 Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace

127-4-30

N N: France, Japan, UK

46/52 Progressive development of the principles and norms of international law relating to the new international economic order

117-20-17

N

46/63 Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations

157-0-3

A A: France, UK

46/64 Activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Territories under colonial domination and efforts to eliminate colonialism, apartheid and racial discrimination in southern Africa

109-34-16

N

46/65 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations

115-28-17

N

46/71 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

137-2-22

N N: UK

46/72 Dissemination of information on decolonization 143-2-16

N N: UK

46/74A Question of Palestine 121-2-28

N N: Israel

46/74B Question of Palestine 121-2-28

N N: Israel

47/74C Question of Palestine 125-2-23

N N: Israel

46/75 International Peace Conference on the Middle East 104-2-43

N N: Israel

46/76 The uprising (intifadah) of the Palestinian people 142-2-5

N N: Israel; A: Bahamas, Costa Rica, Panama, USSR, Uruguay

46/78 Law of the sea 140-1-7

A N: Turkey; A: Ecuador, Germany, Israel, Peru, UK, Venezuela

46/79B Program of work of the Special Committee against Apartheid

143-0-16

A

46/79C Military and other collaboration with South Africa 121-2-34

N N: UK

46/79D Relations between South Africa and Israel 93-31-30

N

46/79E Oil embargo against South Africa 127-3-28

N N: Swaziland, UK

46/82A The situation in the Middle East 93-27-37

N

46/82B The situation in the Middle East 152-1-4

N N: Israel; A: Barbados, Dominica, Dominican Republic

46/84 Status of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of

118-1-39

N

357

Apartheid 46/86 Elimination of racism and racial discrimination 111-

25-13 Y

46/87 Importance of the universal realization of the right of peoples to self-determination and of the speedy granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples for the effective guarantee and observance of human rights

113-22-24

N

46/89 Use of mercenaries as a means to violate human rights and to impede the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination

122-11-28

N

46/95 World social situation 157-1-5

N A: Belgium, Germany, Israel, Japan, UK

46/117 Alternative approaches and ways and means within the United Nations System for improving the effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms

123-2-34

N N: Israel

46/130 Respect for the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of States in their electoral processes

102-40-13

N

46/134 Situation of human rights in Iraq 129-1-17

Y N: Iraq

46/135 Situation of human rights in Kuwait under Iraqi occupation

155-1-0

Y N: Iraq

46/137 Enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections

134-4-13

Y N: Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Kenya, Namibia

46/153 United Nations African Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders

108-0-37

A

46/162 Living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territory

135-2-5

N N: Israel; A: Belarus, Canada, Cote D'Ivoire, Dominica, USSR

46/199 Adverse economic effects of Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and other Arab territories occupied since 1967

125-2-9

N N: Israel; A: Bulgaria, Canada, Cote D'Ivoire, Germany, Kenya, Netherlands, Romania, UK, Uruguay

46/201 Assistance to the Palestinian people 137-2-0

N N: Israel

46/210 Economic measures as a means of political and economic coercion against developing countries

97-30-9

N

46/216 International cooperation to mitigate the environmental consequences on Kuwait and other countries in the region resulting from the situation between Iraq and Kuwait

135-0-1

Did Not Vote

A: Iraq

46/242 The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina 136-1-5

Y N: Yugoslavia; A: Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Russia

358

TABLE VIII

47th Session of the United Nations General Assembly

September 22, 1992 – September 14, 1993

Res Topic Vote y-n-a

US Others

47/1 Recommendation of the Security Council of 19 September 1992

127-6-26

Y N: Kenya, Swaziland, Tanzania, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe

47/8 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 146-0-5

Y A: Cuba, Iraq, Jordan, Sudan, Yemen

47/9 Question of the Comorian Island of Mayotte 126-1-40

A N: France

47/12 Cooperation between the United Nations and the League of Arab States

119-2-1

N N: Israel; A: San Marino

47/14 Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations

142-0-3

A A: France, UK

47/15 Activities of those foreign economic and other interests which impede the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Territories under colonial domination and efforts to eliminate colonialism, apartheid and racial discrimination in southern Africa

95-34-12

N

47/16 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations

100-30-19

N

47/19 Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba

59-3-71

N N: Israel; Romania

47/23 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

127-2-22

N N: UK

47/24 Dissemination of information on decolonization 132-2-17

N N: UK

47/29 Observer status of national liberation movements recognized by the Organization of African Unity and/or by the League of Arab States

100-9-34

N N: Belgium, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK

47/43 Scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security

128-3-30

N N: France, UK

47/46 Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water

118-2-41

N N: UK

47/47 Comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty 159-1-4

N A: China, France, Israel, UK

47/49 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia

144-3-13

Y N: Bhutan, India, Mauritius

359

47/50 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

162-0-2

A A: UK

47/51 Prevention of an arms race in outer space 164-0-2

A A: Micronesia

47/52C Prohibition of production of fissionable material 164-0-3

A A: India, UK

47/52J Regional disarmament 168-0-1

Y A: India

47/53C Convention on Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

126-21-21

N

47/53E Nuclear-arms freeze 121-19-27

N

47/53F Regional confidence-building measures 159-1-1

N A: UK

47/55 Israeli nuclear armament 64-3-90

N N: Israel, Romania

47/57 Question of Antarctica 96-1-9

Did Not Vote

N: Argentina; A: Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Malta Portugal, San Marino, Turkey, Venezuela

47/59 Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace

129-3-35

N N: France, UK

47/60A Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security

122-1-43

N

47/60B Maintenance of international security 79-0-84

Y

47/63A The situation in the Middle East 72-3-70

N N: Israel, Micronesia

47/63B The situation in the Middle East 140-1-5

A N: Israel; A: Croatia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Togo

47/64A Question of Palestine 115-3-40

N N: Israel, Micronesia

47/64B Question of Palestine 119-2-37

N N: Israel

47/64C Question of Palestine 152-2-3

N N: Israel; A: Dominican Republic, Marshall Islands, Micronesia

47/64D Question of Palestine 93-4-60

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia

47/64E Question of Palestine 146-3-10

N N: Israel, Micronesia; A: Bolivia, Costa Rica, Cote D'Ivoire, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Malawi, Marshall Islands, Russia, Togo, Uruguay

47/65 Law of the sea 135-1-9

A N: Turkey; A: Azerbaijan, Ecuador, Germany, Israel, Panama, Peru, UK, Venezuela

47/69A Assistance to Palestine refugees 136- Y A: Dominica, Israel

360

0-2 47/69D Grants and scholarships for Palestine refugees 139-

0-1 Y A: Israel

47/69E Palestine refugees in territory occupied since 1967 138-2-0

N N: Israel

47/69F Resumption of ration distribution to Palestine refugees

103-24-14

N

47/69G Return of population and refugees displaced since 1967

103-2-37

N N: Israel

47/69H Revenues derived from Palestine refugees' properties

100-2-39

N N: Israel

47/69I Protection of Palestine refugees 138-2-1

N N: Israel; A: Russia

47/69J University of Jerusalem "Al Quds" 139-2-1

N N: Israel; A: Russia

47/69K Protection of Palestinian educational institutions and United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees in the Near East

141-2-0

N N: Israel

47/70A Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

83-5-55

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Romania, Uruguay

47/70B Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

141-1-4

A N: Israel; A: Cote D'Ivoire, Micronesia, Russia

47/70C Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

143-1-3

A N: Israel; A: Micronesia, Russia

47/70D Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

142-2-2

N N: Israel; A: Micronesia, Russia

47/70E Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

143-1-3

A N: Israel; A: Micronesia, Russia

47/70F Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

142-1-4

A N: Israel; A: Cote D'Ivoire, Micronesia, Russia

47/70G Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

143-2-4

N N: Israel; A: Canada, Cote D'Ivoire, Micronesia, Russia

47/74 Zone of peace and cooperation of the South Atlantic

144-1-0

N

47/81 Status of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid

113-2-44

N N: Latvia

47/82 Importance of the universal realization of the right of peoples to self-determination and of the speedy granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples for the effective guarantee and observance of human rights

107-22-33

N

361

47/84 Use of mercenaries as a means to violate human rights and to impede the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination

118-10-36

N N: Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, UK

47/89 United Nations African Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders

121-1-45

N

47/116D Oil embargo against South Africa 111-1-44

N

47/116E Military and other collaboration with South Africa 106-2-47

N N: UK

47/116F Relations between South Africa and Israel 93-39-23

N

47/116G Support for work of Commission against Apartheid in Sports

121-0-39

A

47/121 The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina 102-0-57

Y

47/130 Respect for the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of States in their electoral processes

99-45-16

N

47/137 Alternative approaches and ways and means within the United Nations System for improving the effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms

115-0-48

A

47/138 Enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections

141-0-20

Y

47/139 Situation of human rights in Cuba 69-18-64

Y

47/142 The situation in the Sudan 104-8-33

Y N: China, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Myanmar, Sudan, Syria

47/145 Situation of human rights in Iraq 126-2-26

Y N: Iraq, Sudan

47/146 Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran

86-16-38

Y

47/151 International cooperation to mitigate the environmental consequences on Kuwait and other countries in the region resulting from the situation between Iraq and Kuwait

159-0-2

Y A: Iraq, Sudan

47/170 Assistance to the Palestinian people 155-2-3

N N: Israel; A: Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Samoa

47/172 Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli settlements on the Palestinian people in the Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, occupied since 1967, and on the Arab population of the Syrian Golan

150-3-5

N N: Israel, Micronesia; A: Croatia, Marshall Islands, Russia, Samoa, Uruguay

362

TABLE IX

48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly

October 8, 1993 – September 19, 1994

Res Topic Vote y-n-a

US Others

48/14 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 140-1-9

Y N: Democratic People's Republic of Korea; A: Angola, China, Cuba, Ghana, Guinea, Iraq, Mali, Senegal, Vietnam

48/15 Return or restitution of cultural property to the countries of origin

106-0-25

A

48/16 Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba

88-4-57

N N: Albania, Israel, Paraguay

48/23 Zone of peace and cooperation of the South Atlantic

103-1-1

N A: Bahamas

48/28 Law of the sea 144-1-11

A N: Turkey

48/40A Assistance to Palestine refugees 159-0-2

A A: Israel

48/40D Offers by Member States of grants and scholarships for higher education, including vocational training, for Palestine refugees

161-0-1

Y A: Israel

48/40E Palestine refugees in the Palestinian territory occupied by Israel since 1967

157-2-0

N N: Israel

48/40F Return of population and refugees displaced since 1967

152-2-5

N N: Israel; A: Central African Republic, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nigeria, Russia

48/40G Revenues derived from Palestine refugee's properties

114-2-44

N N: Israel

48/40H Protection of Palestine refugees 153-2-6

N N: Israel; A: Canada, Central African Republic, Georgia, Kenya, New Zealand, Russia

48/40I University of Jerusalem "Al Quds" for Palestine refugees

156-2-2

N N: Israel; A: Central African Republic, Russia

48/40J Protection of Palestinian students and educational institutions and safeguarding of the security of the facilities of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees

159-2-0

N N: Israel

48/41A Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

93-2-65

N N: Israel

48/41B Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of

152-1-6

A N: Israel; A: Central African Republic,

363

the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Russia, Samoa

48/41C Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

106-2-48

N N: Israel

48/41D Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

85-1-68

A N: Israel

48/45 Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations

159-0-3

A A: France, UK

48/46 Activities of foreign economic and other interests which impede the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Territories under colonial domination

111-43-3

N

48/47 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations

113-5-43

N N: France, Netherlands, Russia, UK

48/52 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

139-2-19

N N: UK

48/53 Dissemination of information on decolonization 141-2-18

N N: UK

48/56 Question of the Comorian Island of Mayotte 91-2-36

A N: France, Monaco

48/58 Middle East peace process 155-3-1

Y N: Iran, Lebanon, Syria; A: Libya

48/59A The situation in the Middle East: Jerusalem 141-1-11

A N: Israel

48/59B The situation in the Middle East: Syrian Golan 65-2-83

N N: Israel

48/66 Scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security

126-4-35

A N: France, Israel, Monaco, UK

48/67 The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields

161-0-5

A A: Andorra, France, Monaco, UK

48/68 Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification

145-0-22

A

48/69 Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water

118-3-45

N N: Israel, UK

48/72 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia

153-3-12

Y N: Bhutan, India, Mauritius

48/73 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

166-0-4

A A: France, Monaco, UK

48/74A Prevention of an arms race in outer space 169-0-1

A

48/75C General and complete disarmament 114-6-45

N N: France, Israel, Monaco, Russia, UK

364

48/75H Measures to curb illicit transfer and use of conventional arms

146-0-22

A

48/75I Regional disarmament 170-0-1

Y A: India

48/75J Conventional arms control at regional and subregional levels

156-0-11

Y

48/76A Review and implementation of the concluding document of the 12th special session of the General Assembly

168-1-2

N A: Georgia, UK

48/76B Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

120-23-24

N

48/78 Israeli nuclear armament 53-45-65

N

48/79 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects

162-0-3

A A: Georgia, Russia

48/80 Question of Antarctica 96-0-7

Did Not Vote

A: Gabon, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Malta, Portugal, Turkey, Venezuela

48/82 Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace

130-4-36

N N: France, Monaco, UK

48/83 Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security

122-1-45

N

48/84A Maintenance of international security 84-0-83

Y

48/88 The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina 109-0-57

Y

48/89 Status of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid

119-1-48

N

48/92 Use of mercenaries as a means to violate human rights and to impede the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination

108-14-39

N

48/94 Importance of the universal realization of the right of peoples to self-determination and of the speedy granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples for the effective guarantee and observance of human rights

101-26-37

N

48/101 United Nations African Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders

119-1-49

N

48/123 Alternative approaches and ways and means within the United Nations System for improving the effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms

115-34-21

N

48/124 Respect for the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of States in their electoral processes

101-51-17

N

48/131 Enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections

153-0-13

Y

48/142 Situation of human rights in Cuba 74-20-61

Y

48/144 Situation of human rights in Iraq 116-2-43

Y N: Iraq, Sudan

48/145 Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic 74- Y

365

of Iran 23-51 48/147 Situation of human rights in the Sudan 111-

13-30 Y

48/158A Question of Palestine: Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People

106-3-40

N N: Dominican Republic, Israel

48/158B Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat 107-2-41

N N: Israel

48/158C Department of Public Information of the Secretariat

147-2-2

N N: Israel; A: Georgia, Russia

48/158D Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine 92-5-51

N N: Dominican Republic, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia

48/168 Economic measures as a means of political and economic coercion against developing countries

116-32-16

N

48/182 Enhanced international cooperation towards a durable solution to the external debt problems of developing countries

164-1-0

N

48/212 Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli settlements on the Palestinian people in the Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, occupied since 1967, and on the Arab population of the Syrian Golan

143-3-13

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands

48/263 Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982

121-0-7

Y A: Columbia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Russia, Thailand, Venezuela

366

TABLE X

49th Session of the United Nations General Assembly

October 17, 1994 – September 14, 1995

Res Topic Vote y-n-a

US Others

49/9 Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba

101-2-48

N N: Israel

49/18 Question of the Comorian Island of Mayotte 87-2-38

A N: France, Monaco

49/28 Law of the sea 130-1-7

Y N: Turkey; A: Ecuador, Kazakhstan, Peru, Russia, Tajikistan, Thailand, Venezuela

49/33 Enlargement of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space

165-1-0

N

49/35A Assistance to Palestine refugees 164-0-2

A A: Israel

49/35C Persons replaced as a result of the June 1967 and subsequent hostilities

160-2-4

N N: Israel; A: Japan, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Samoa

49/35D Offers by Member States of grants and scholarships for high education, including vocational training, for Palestine refugees

165-0-1

Y A: Israel

49/35E Operations of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

162-2-3

N N: Israel; A: Japan, Micronesia, Russia

49/35F Revenues derived from Palestine refugees properties

113-2-51

N N: Israel

49/35G University of Jerusalem "Al Quds" resolution 161-2-2

N N: Israel; A: Japan, Russia

49/36A Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

85-2-75

N N: Israel

49/36B Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

155-3-5

N N: Gambia, Israel; A: Gabon, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Russia, Samoa

49/36C Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

145-2-17

N N: Israel

49/36D Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

145-1-15

A N: Israel

49/40 Activities of foreign economic and other interests which impede the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Territories under

113-44-6

N

367

colonial domination 49/41 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting

of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations

119-1-48

N

49/43 The situation in the occupied territories of Croatia 142-0-18

Y

49/52 Draft articles on the law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses

143-0-8

Y A: Benin, India, Iran, Lesotho, Niger, Qatar, Sudan, Swaziland

49/58 Report of the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization

155-0-1

Y A: Democratic People's Republic of Korea

49/62A Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People

103-2-40

N N: Israel

49/62B Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat 105-2-40

N N: Israel

49/62C Question of Palestine : Department of Public Information of the Secretariat

142-2-3

N N: Israel; A: Georgia, Russia, Tajikistan

49/62D Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine 136-2-7

N N: Israel; A: Belarus, Georgia, Marshall Islands, Russia, Tajikistan, Uruguay, Uzbekistan

49/65 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 161-1-6

Y N: Democratic People's Republic of Korea; A: China, Cuba, Ghana, Iran, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Vietnam

49/67 Scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security

118-4-47

N N: France, Israel, UK

49/68 The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields

166-0-5

A A: Democratic People's Republic of Korea, France, Iran, UK

49/69 Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water

116-4-49

N N: Israel, Russia, UK

49/72 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia

156-3-10

Y N: Bhutan, India, Mauritius; A: Algeria, Brazil, Cuba, Cyprus, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Myanmar, Vanuatu, Vietnam

49/73 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

168-0-3

A A: France, UK

49/74 Prevention of an arms race in outer space 170-0-1

A

49/75B Review of the Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade

139-3-26

N N: France, UK

49/75C Transparency in armaments 150-0-19

Y

49/75E Step-by-step reduction of nuclear threat 111-24-33

N

368

49/75F 1995 Review and Extension Conference of States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

103-40-25

N

49/75G Assistance to States for curbing illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them

169-0-1

A

49/75H Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons

163-0-8

A A: Brazil, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, France, India, Israel, UK

49/75K Request for an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons

78-43-38

N

49/75N Regional disarmament 171-0-1

Y A: India

49/75O Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels

164-0-7

Y A: Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, India, Mexico, Singapore, Venezuela

49/75P Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament

171-0-1

Y A: India

49/76E Convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons

115-24-31

N

49/77D Implementation of the guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures

158-0-11

Y

49/78 The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East 60-4-100

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia

49/82 Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace

131-3-35

N N: France, UK

49/84 The South Atlantic region as a nuclear-weapon-free zone

161-3-3

N N: France, UK; A: Andorra, Canada, Italy

49/87A The situation in the Middle East: Jerusalem 138-2-7

A N: Costa Rica, Israel; A: Antigua and Barbuda, Cote D'Ivoire, Fiji, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Zambia

49/87B The situation in the Middle East: The Syrian Golan 77-2-70

N N: Israel

49/88 Middle East peace process 149-4-2

Y N: Iran, Lebanon, Libya, Syria; A: Antigua and Barbuda, Sudan

49/90 Dissemination of information on decolonization 130-2-24

N N: UK

49/132 Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli settlements on the Palestinian people in the Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, occupied since 1967, and on the Arab population of the Syrian Golan

133-2-23

N N: Israel

49/149 The right of the Palestinian people to self-determination

147-2-19

N N: Israel

49/150 Use of mercenaries as a means to violate human rights and to impede the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination

118-19-33

N

49/151 Importance of the universal realization of the right of peoples to self-determination and of the speedy granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples for the effective guarantee and observance of human rights

113-5-51

N N: France, Israel, Monaco, UK

369

49/180 Respect for the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of States in their electoral process

97-57-14

N

49/182 Respect for the universal freedom of travel and the vital importance of family reunification

88-5-70

N N: Australia, Israel, Japan, UK

49/186 Alternative approaches and ways and means within the United Nations System for improving the effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms

110-35-24

N

49/190 Strengthening the role of the United Nations in enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections and the promotion of democratization

155-1-12

Y N: Iran

49/196 Situation of human rights in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)

150-0-14

Y

49/198 Situation of human rights in the Sudan 101-13-49

Y

49/200 Situation of human rights in Cuba 65-23-70

Y

49/202 Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran

74-25-55

Y

49/203 Situation of human rights in Iraq 114-3-47

Y N: Iraq, Libya, Sudan

49/204 Situation of human rights in Kosovo 114-2-40

Y N: India, Russia

49/243 Accreditation of non-governmental organizations to the 4th World Conference on Women

86-0-1

Y A: China

370

TABLE XI

50th Session of the United Nations General Assembly

October 12, 1995 – September 17, 1996

Res Topic Vote y-n-a

US Others

50/9 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 144-1-8

Y N: Democratic People's Republic of Korea; A: China, Cuba, Ghana, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Sudan, Syria, Tanzania, Vietnam

50/10 Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba

117-3-38

N N: Israel, Uzbekistan

50/11 Multilingualism 100-35-29

N

50/18 Zone of peace and cooperation of the South Atlantic

124-0-1

A

50/21 Middle East Peace Process 148-4-1

Y N: Iran, Lebanon, Libya, Syria; A: Sudan

50/22A Jerusalem resolution 133-1-13

A N: Israel

50/22B The Syrian Golan 66-2-79

N N: Israel

50/22C The situation in the Middle East 64-2-65

N N: Israel

50/23 Law of the sea 132-1-3

Y N: Turkey; A: Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela

50/28A Assistance to Palestine refugees 145-1-1

A N: Israel

50/28C Persons displaced as a result of the June 1967 and subsequent hostilities

147-2-0

N N: Israel

50/28D Offers by Member States of grants and scholarships for higher education, including vocational training, for Palestine refugees

150-0-1

Y A: Israel

50/28E Operations of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees

146-2-3

N N: Israel; A: Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Russia

50/28F Revenues derived from Palestine refugees' properties

98-2-48

N N: Israel

50/28G University of Jerusalem "Al Quds" for Palestine refugees

148-2-2

N N: Israel; A: Russia, Swaziland

50/29A Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

69-2-80

N N: Israel

50/29B Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

147-2-4

N N: Israel; A: Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nicaragua, Russia

50/29C Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 144- N N: Israel; A: Argentina,

371

Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

2-7 Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nicaragua, Panama, Russia, Uruguay

50/29D Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

139-1-13

A N: Israel

50/32 Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations

153-0-4

A A: France, Guinea-Bissau, UK

50/33 Activities of foreign economic and other interests which impede the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Territories under colonial domination

93-51-3

N

50/34 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations

107-0-50

A

50/38A Questions of American Samoa, Anguilla, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Guam, Montserrat, Pitcairn, St. Helena, Tokelau, the Turks and Caicos Islands and the United States Virgin Islands

146-4-3

N N: Georgia, Israel, UK; A: Argentina, Belgium, France

50/38B Questions of American Samoa, Anguilla, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Guam, Montserrat, Pitcairn, St. Helena, Tokelau, the Turks and Caicos Islands and the United States Virgin Islands

146-4-3

N N: Georgia, Israel, UK; A: Argentina, Belgium, France

50/39 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

130-4-25

N N: Israel, Russia, UK

50/40 Dissemination of information on decolonization 133-3-25

N N: Israel, UK

50/52 Report of the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization

155-0-3

Y A: Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Libya

50/56 Return to restitution of cultural property to the countries of origin

124-0-24

A

50/61 Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification

157-1-6

N A: Democratic People's Republic of Korea, France, Georgia, Israel, Monaco, UK

50/62 The role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament

104-6-53

N N: France, Israel, Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK

50/63 The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields

157-0-9

A A: Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, France, India, Iran, Japan, Pakistan, UK

50/64 Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water

110-4-45

N N: Israel, Russia, UK

50/67 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia

154-3-9

Y N: Bhutan, India, Mauritius; A: Algeria,

372

Cuba, Cyprus, Indonesia, Israel, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Myanmar, Syria, Vietnam

50/68 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

122-0-44

A

50/69 Prevention of an arms race in outer space 121-0-46

A

50/70A Nuclear testing 85-18-43

A

50/70B Small arms 140-0-19

Y

50/70C Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons

154-0-10

Y A: Algeria, Brazil, China, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, India, Iran, Israel, Myanmar, Pakistan

50/70D Transparency in armaments 149-0-15

Y

50/70F Convening of the 4th special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament

111-2-49

N N: Israel

50/70I Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament

150-0-14

Y

50/70K Regional disarmament 165-0-1

Y A: India

50/70L Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels

158-0-7

Y A: Brazil, Cuba, India, Libya, Mexico, Nigeria, Venezuela

50/70M Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control

157-4-2

N N: France, Israel, UK; A: Canada, Japan

50/70N Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament

105-37-20

N

50/70P Nuclear disarmament 106-39-17

N

50/70Q 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

161-0-2

Y A: India, Israel

50/71E Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

108-27-28

N

50/73 The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East 56-2-100

N N: Israel

50/76 Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace

123-3-39

N N: France, UK

50/84A Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People

95-2-52

N N: Israel

50/84B Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat 96-2-53

N N: Israel

50/84C Department of Public Information of the Secretariat

142-2-7

N N: Israel; A: Cote D'Ivoire, Ecuador, Grenada, Lesotho, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Russia

373

50/84D Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine 143-3-3

N N: Israel, Micronesia; A: Costa Rica, Marshall Islands, Russia

50/89B Financing of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

104-2-2

N N: Israel; A: Iran, Syria

50/96 Economic measures as a means of political and economic coercion against developing countries

100-30-22

N

50/129 Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli settlements on the Palestinian people in the Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, occupied since 1967, and on the Arab population of the occupied Syrian Golan

126-2-28

N N: Israel

50/138 Use of mercenaries as a means to violate human rights and to impede the exercise of the right of people to self-determination

106-18-31

N

50/140 The right of the Palestinian people to self-determination

145-2-9

N N: Israel; A: Argentina, Georgia, Lithuania, Micronesia, Norway, Republic of Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan

50/172 Respect for the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of States in their electoral processes

91-57-21

N

50/175 Respect for the right to universal freedom of travel and the vital importance of family reunification

86-4-80

N N: Canada, Israel, Japan

50/185 Strengthening the role of the United Nations in enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections and the promotion of democratization

156-0-15

Y

50/188 Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran

78-27-58

Y

50/190 Situation of human rights in Kosovo 115-2-43

Y N: India, Russia

50/191 Situation of human rights in Iraq 111-3-53

Y N: Libya, Nigeria, Sudan

50/193 Situation of human rights in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)

144-1-20

Y N: Russia

50/197 Situation of human rights in the Sudan 94-15-54

Y

50/198 Situation of human rights in Cuba 66-22-78

Y

50/199 Situation of human rights in Nigeria 101-14-27

Y

50/245 Comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty 158-3-5

Y N: Bhutan, India, Libya; A: Cuba, Lebanon, Mauritius, Syria, Tanzania

374

TABLE XII

51st Session of the United Nations General Assembly

October 15, 1996 – September 15, 1997

Res Topic Vote y-n-a

US Others

51/10 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 141-2-8

Y N: Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Lebanon; A: China, Cuba, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Micronesia, Sudan, Syria, Vanuatu, Vietnam

51/17 Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba

137-3-25

N N: Israel, Uzbekistan

51/19 Zone of peace and cooperation of the South Atlantic

117-0-1

A

51/22 Elimination of coercive economic measures as a means of political and economic compulsion

56-4-76

N N: Israel, Micronesia, Uzbekistan

51/23 Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People

104-2-46

N N: Israel

51/24 Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat 107-2-46

N N: Israel

51/25 Special information program on the question of Palestine of the Department of Public Information of the Secretariat

157-2-3

N N: Israel; A: Fiji, Marshall Islands, Micronesia

51/26 Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine 152-2-4

N N: Israel; A: Costa Rica, Fiji, Marshall Islands, Micronesia

51/27 Jerusalem 148-1-13

A N: Israel

51/28 The Syrian Golan 84-2-71

N N: Israel

51/29 The Middle East Peace Process 159-3-2

Y N: Iran, Lebanon, Syria; A: Sudan, Libya

51/30I Emergency assistance to the Sudan 103-34-15

N

51/34 Law of the sea 138-1-4

Y N: Turkey; A: Ecuador, Peru, Tajikistan, Venezuela

51/39 The role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament

105-39-24

N

51/40 The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields

161-0-8

A A: Democratic People's Republic of Korea, India, Iran, Japan, Micronesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka

51/42 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia

156-3-8

Y N: Bhutan, India, Mauritius; A: Afghanistan, Algeria,

375

Cuba, Cyprus, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Vietnam

51/43 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

125-0-45

A

51/44 Prevention of an arms race in outer space 126-0-44

A

51/45A Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

167-0-2

Y A: India, Israel

51/45B The nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas

129-3-38

N N: France, UK

51/45C Convening of the 4th special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament

163-2-5

N N: Israel; A: Denmark, Latvia, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan

51/45E Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control

137-4-27

N N: France, Israel, UK

51/45G Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons

159-0-11

Y

51/45H Transparency in armaments 154-0-15

Y

51/45I Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament

107-37-24

N

51/45K Regional disarmament 170-0-1

Y A: India

51/45M Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons

115-22-32

N

51/45O Nuclear disarmament 110-39-20

N

51/45P Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol

165-0-7

A A: Belarus, Israel, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Russia, Tajikistan

51/45Q Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels

164-1-2

Y N: India; A: Cuba, Libya

51/45R Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament

160-0-11

Y

51/45S An international agreement to ban anti-personnel landmines

155-0-10

Y A: Belarus, China, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Israel, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Russia, Syria, Turkey

51/46D Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the 12th Special Session of the General Assembly

114-31-27

N

51/47A Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its 10th special session

171-0-2

A A: Turkey

51/48 The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East 129-3-32

N N: Israel, Micronesia

51/51 Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace

131-3-37

N N: France, UK

376

51/55 The maintenance of international security 162-0-8

Y A: Algeria, Armenia, China, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico, Pakistan, Tanzania

51/57 Cooperation between the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

158-0-4

Y A: Armenia, Micronesia, Nepal, Papua New Guinea

51/82 The right of the Palestinian people to self-determination

159-3-12

N N: Israel, Palau

51/83 Use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination

117-17-39

N

51/89 Respect for the right to universal freedom of travel and the vital importance of family reunification

89-4-76

N N: Canada, Israel, Japan

51/100 Enhancement of international cooperation in the field of human rights

114-42-16

N

51/103 Human rights and unilateral coercive measures 57-45-59

N

51/106 Situation of human rights in Iraq 103-3-59

Y N: Libya, Sudan, Turkmenistan

51/107 Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran

79-30-54

Y

51/109 Situation of human rights in Nigeria 92-19-55

Y

51/111 Situation of human rights in Kosovo 114-2-48

Y N: India, Russia

51/112 Situation of human rights in the Sudan 100-16-50

Y

51/113 Situation of human rights in Cuba 62-25-84

Y

51/116 Situation of human rights in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)

136-1-28

Y N: Russia

51/124 Assistance to Palestine refugees 159-1-2

A N: Israel; A: Micronesia

51/126 Persons displaced as a result of the June 1967 and subsequent hostilities

157-2-1

N N: Israel; A: Micronesia

51/127 Offers by Member States of grants and scholarships for higher education, including vocational training for Palestine refugees

163-0-1

Y A: Israel

51/128 Operations of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

159-2-2

N N: Israel; A: Marshall Islands, Micronesia

51/129 Palestine refugees' properties and their revenues 152-2-6

N N: Israel; A: Fiji, Guatemala, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Turkey, Uzbekistan

51/130 University of Jerusalem "Al-Quds" for Palestine refugees

159-3-1

N N: Israel, Palau; A: Micronesia

51/131 Work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

79-2-76

N N: Israel

51/132 Applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,

156-2-3

N N: Israel; A: Marshall Islands, Micronesia,

377

of 12 August 1949, to the occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and the other occupied Arab territories

Palau

51/133 Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan

152-2-6

N N: Israel; A: Guatemala, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau, Swaziland, Uruguay

51/134 Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem

149-2-8

N N: Israel; A: Argentina, Guatemala, Kenya, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau, Swaziland, Uruguay

51/135 The occupied Syrian Golan 153-1-9

A N: Israel; A: Guatemala, Kenya, Liberia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau, Swaziland, Uruguay

51/139 Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations

162-0-7

A A: France, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau, UK

51/140 Activities of foreign economic and other interests which impede the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Territories under colonial domination

107-49-4

N

51/141 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations

115-0-51

A

51/146 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

143-2-19

N N: UK

51/147 Dissemination of information on decolonization 154-3-8

N N: Israel, UK; A: Belgium, Finland, France, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Romania, Russia

51/190 Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources

133-3-21

N N: Israel, Vanuatu

51/193 Report of the Security Council 111-4-41

N N: France, Russia, UK

51/203 The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina 149-0-2

Y A: Belarus, Russia

51/205 Proclamation of 21 November as World Television Day

141-0-11

A

51/217 United Nations pension system 102-1-12

Y N: Ukraine

51/223 Israeli settlement activities in the occupied Palestinian territory, in particular in occupied East Jerusalem

130-2-2

N N: Israel; A: Marshall Islands, Micronesia

51/229 Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses

103-3-27

Y N: Burundi, China, Turkey

378

51/233 Financing of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

127-2-1

N N: Israel; A: Russia

379

TABLE XIII

52nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly

October 15, 1997 - September 8, 1998

Res Topic Vote

y-n-a

US Others

52/10 Embargo by the United States of America against Cuba 143-3-17

N N: Israel, Uzbekistan

52/11 International Atomic Energy Agency Report 151-1-5

Y N: Democratic People's Republic of Korea; A: China, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Syria, Vietnam

52/14 Zone of peace and cooperation of the South Atlantic 157-0-1

A

52/22 Cooperation between the UN and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

126-0-1

Y A: Armenia

52/24 Return or restitution of cultural property to the countries of origin

87-0-23

A

52/26 Oceans and the law of the sea 138-1-4

Y N: Turkey; A: Ecuador, El Salvador, Peru, Venezuela

52/33 Science and technology in connection with security and disarmament

103-43-19

N

52/35 Nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia 153-3-8

Y N: Bhutan, India Mauritius; A: Afghanistan, Algeria, Cuba, Cyprus, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Vietnam

52/36 Assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use of nuclear weapons

116-0-51

A

52/37 Prevention of an arms race in outer space 128-0-39

A

52/38A Anti-personnel mines convention 142-0-18

A

52/38B Transparency in armaments 98-45-13

N

52/38E Environmental norms in drafting disarmament agreements

160-0-6

A A: France, Israel, Japan, Monaco, UK

380

52/38H Banning anti-personnel landmines 147-0-15

Y

52/38J Small arms 158-0-6

Y A: Bahamas, Israel, Oman, Russia, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates

52/38K Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons

156-0-10

Y A: Algeria, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, India, Iran, Israel, Mauritius, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan

52/38L Nuclear disarmament 109-39-18

N

52/38M Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament

161-0-8

Y A: Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, India, Iran, Lebanon, Libya, Syria, Tanzania

52/38N Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere 131-3-34

N N: France, UK

52/38O International Court of Justice advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons

116-26-24

N

52/38Q Conventional arms control at regional and subregional levels

164-1-2

Y N: India; A: Cuba, Libya

52/38R Transparency in armaments 155-0-11

Y

52/39C Nuclear weapons prohibition convention 109-30-27

Y

52/40C Role of the UN in disarmament 111-41-12

N

52/41 Nuclear proliferation risk in the Middle East 147-2-14

N N: Israel

52/44 Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace 125-3-40

N N: France, UK

52/49 Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People

115-2-45

N N: Israel

52/50 Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat 113-2-47

N N: Israel

52/51 Special information program on the question of Palestine 158-2-4

N N: Israel; A: Bulgaria, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Rwanda

52/52 Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine 155-2-3

N N: Israel; A: Bulgaria, Marshall Islands, Micronesia

52/53 Jerusalem 148-1-9

A N: Israel; A: Costa Rica, Fiji, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Papua

381

New Guinea, Samoa, Swaziland, Zambia

52/54 The Syrian Golan 92-2-65

N N: Israel

52/57 Assistance to Palestine refugees 159-1-2

A N: Israel; A: Micronesia

52/59 Persons displaced as a result of the June 1967 and subsequent hostilities

159-2-1

N N: Israel; A: Micronesia

52/60 Education and training grants and scholarships for Palestine refugees

163-0-1

Y A: Israel

52/61 Operations of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees

158-2-3

N N: Israel; A: Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Zambia

52/62 Palestine refugees' properties and their revenues 158-2-3

N N: Israel; A: Liberia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia

52/63 University of Jerusalem "Al-Quds" for Palestine refugees 158-2-3

A N: Israel; A: Liberia, Micronesia, Zambia

52/64 Work of the Special Committee to investigate Israeli practices in the occupied territories

83-2-72

N N: Israel

52/65 Applicability of the Geneva Convention of 12 Aug. 1949 relative to the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories

156-2-3

N N: Israel; A: Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Swaziland

52/66 Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan

149-2-7

N N: Israel; A: Bulgaria, Liberia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nicaragua, Swaziland, Uruguay

52/67 Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem

151-2-7

N N: Israel; A: Democratic People's Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nicaragua, Swaziland, Zambia

52/68 The occupied Syrian Golan 152-1-7

A N: Israel; A: Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nicaragua, Swaziland, Uruguay, Zambia

52/71 Non-Self-Governing Territories 161-0-4

A A: France, Israel, UK

52/72 Economic and other activities affecting the interests of the peoples of Non-Self-Governing territories

156-3-5

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands; A: Bulgaria, Equatorial Guinea,

382

France, Micronesia, UK

52/73 Implementation of the decolonization declaration by the specialized agencies and international institutions associated with the UN

117-0-50

A

52/78 Implementation of the decolonization declaration 139-2-23

N N: UK

52/79 Dissemination of information on decolonization 159-3-3

N N: Israel, UK; A: France, Micronesia, Russia

52/112 Use of mercenaries to violate human rights 113-18-41

N

52/114 Right of the Palestinian people to self-determination 160-2-6

N N: Israel; A: Dominican Republic, Georgia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Norway, Uruguay,

52/119 Respect for the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of States in their electoral processes

96-58-12

N

52/120 Human rights and unilateral coercive measures 91-46-26

N

52/121 Right to universal freedom of travel and the importance of family reunification

94-1-73

N

52/129 UN role in enhancing elections and promoting democratization

157-0-15

Y

52/131 UN promotion of human rights through international cooperation and the importance of non-selectivity, impartiality and objectivity

116-2-50

N N: Israel

52/133 Human rights and terrorism 115-0-57

A

52/136 Right to development 129-12-32

N

52/139 Human rights situation in Kosovo 102-2-56

Y N: India, Russia

52/140 Human rights situation in the Sudan 93-16-58

Y

52/141 Human rights situation in Iraq 99-3-60

Y N: Libya, Nigeria, Sudan

52/142 Human rights situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran 74-32-56

Y

52/143 Human rights situation in Cuba 64-29-75

Y

52/144 Human rights situation in Nigeria 81-18-64

Y

52/147 Human rights situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)

133-2-27

Y N: Belarus, Russia

52/169F Emergency Assistance to the Sudan 95-38-13

N

52/181 Unilateral economic measures as a means of political and economic coercion against developing countries

109-1-50

N

52/207 Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people over their natural resources

137-2-14

N N: Israel

52/237 Financing of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon 109- N N: Israel

383

2-0 52/250 Participation of Palestine in the work of the UN 124-

4-10 N N: Israel, Marshall

Islands, Micronesia; A: Bulgaria, Democratic People's Republic of the Congo, Honduras, Liberia, Malawi, Paraguay, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Zambia

384

TABLE XIV

53rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly

October 1, 1998 - September 13, 1999

Res Topic Vote y-n-a

US Others

53/4 Embargo against Cuba 157-2-12

N N: Israel

53/10 Elimination of coercive economic measures as a means of political and economic compulsion

80-2-67

N N: Israel

53/21 International Atomic Energy Agency Report 113-1-8

Y N: Democratic People's Republic of Korea; A: Bhutan, Botswana, China, India, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Pakistan, Syria, Vietnam

53/32 Oceans and Law of the Sea 134-1-6

Y N: Turkey; A: Columbia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Iceland, Peru, Venezuela

53/34 Zone of peace and cooperation of the South Atlantic

126-0-1

A

53/37 Jerusalem 149-1-7

A N: Israel; A: Costa Rica, Marshall Islands, Samoa, Swaziland, Uzbekistan, Zambia

53/38 The Syrian Golan 97-2-58

N N: Israel

53/39 Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People

110-2-48

N N: Israel

53/40 Division for Palestinian Rights 111-2-48

N N: Israel

53/41 Department of Public Information Program on Palestine

156-2-2

N N: Israel; A: Marshall Islands, Uzbekistan

53/42 Peaceful settlement of the Palestine question 154-2-3

N N: Israel; A: Marshall Islands, Nicaragua, Uzbekistan

53/46 Assistance to Palestine refugees 157-1-2

A N: Israel; A: Micronesia

53/48 Displaced persons since the June 1967 and subsequent hostilities

156-2-1

N N: Israel; A: Micronesia

53/49 Education aid for Palestine refugees 160-0-1

Y A: Israel

53/50 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees

157-2-2

N N: Israel; A: Micronesia, Zambia

53/51 Properties and revenues of Palestine refugees 156-2-1

N N: Israel; A: Micronesia

53/52 University of Jerusalem "Al Quds" 156-2-2

N N: Israel; A: Micronesia, Zambia

53/53 Special Committee to investigate Israeli practices in the occupied territories

86-2-67

N N: Israel

385

53/54 Applicability of Geneva Convention of 12 Aug. 1949 to the occupied Palestinian and other territories, including Jerusalem

155-2-2

N N: Israel; A: Marshall Islands, Micronesia,

53/55 Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian and other territories

150-3-2

N N: Israel, Micronesia; A: Marshall Islands, Swaziland

53/56 Israeli practices affecting the human rights of Palestinians in the occupied territories

151-2-4

N N: Israel; A: Cameroon, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Zambia

53/57 The occupied Syrian Golan 150-1-6

A N: Israel; A: Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Swaziland, Uruguay, Zambia

53/60 Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories 156-0-5

A A: France, Israel, Monaco, UK

53/61 Economic and other activities affecting peoples of Non-Self-Governing Territories

154-2-5

N N: Israel; A: France, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Monaco, UK

53/62 Decolonization declaration 112-0-51

A

53/68 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

144-2-18

N N: UK

53/69 Dissemination of information on decolonization 156-3-3

N N: Israel, UK; A: France, Micronesia, Russia

53/71 Violent disintegration of States: prevention 156-0-6

Y A: Armenia, Chile, China, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Pakistan

53/73 Disarmament: role of science and technology 99-45-23

N

53/75 Use of nuclear arms against non-nuclear-weapon States

117-0-52

A

53/76 Arms race prevention in outer space 165-0-4

A A: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia

53/77E Small arms 169-0-1

Y A: Russia

53/77F Reducing nuclear danger 108-45-17

N

53/77G Nuclear testing 118-9-33

Y N: Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bhutan, India, Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Zimbabwe

53/77H Regional disarmament 63-44-47

N

53/77J Agreements on disarmament and arms control: environmental norms

170-0-4

A A: France, Israel, UK

53/77L Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol

168-0-5

A A: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Republic of Korea

53/77N Anti-personnel Mines Convention 147-0-21

A

53/77P Conventional arms control at regional and subregional levels

164-1-2

Y N: India; A: Bhutan, Cuba

53/77Q Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas

154-3-10

N N: France, UK; A: Bhutan, Estonia, Gabon

386

Georgia, India, Israel, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Micronesia, Russia

53/77S Transparency in armaments (further development of Register of Conventional Arms)

104-46-17

N

53/77U Ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons 160-0-11

Y

53/77V Transparency in armaments (participation in the Register of Conventional Arms)

159-0-12

Y

53/77W International Court of Justice advisory opinion on the legality (threat or use) of nuclear weapons: follow-up

123-25-25

N

53/77X Nuclear disarmament 110-41-18

N

53/77Y Nuclear-weapon-free world: need for a new agenda 114-18-38

N

53/77Z Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations 166-0-8

Y A: Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, India, Iran, Lebanon, Pakistan, Syria, Tanzania

53/78D Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Convention 111-39-22

N

53/80 Middle East Nuclear Proliferation 158-2-11

N N: Israel

53/85 Cooperation between the UN and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

143-0-2

Y A: Armenia, China

53/135 Use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination

115-18-35

N

53/136 Right of the Palestinian people to self-determination

162-2-6

N N: Israel; A: Fiji, Georgia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Uruguay, Uzbekistan

53/141 Human rights and unilateral coercive measures 110-45-10

N

53/143 Freedom of travel and family reunification 103-2-66

N N: Angola

53/155 Right to development 125-1-42

N

53/157 Human rights in Iraq 103-3-56

Y N: Libya, Nigeria, Sudan

53/158 Human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran 64-41-56

Y

53/163 Human rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of Croatia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)

141-0-21

Y

53/164 Human rights in Kosovo 122-3-34

Y N: Belarus, India, Russia

53/196 Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories over their natural resources

144-2-12

N N: Israel

53/227 Financing of UN Interim Force in Lebanon 119-2-1

N N: Israel; A: Iran

387

TABLE XV

54th Session of the United Nations General Assembly

September 14, 1999 – September 5, 2000

Res Topic Vote y-n-a

US Others

54/21 Embargo against Cuba 155-2-8

N N: Israel; A: Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Micronesia, Morocco, Nicaragua, Senegal, Uzbekistan

54/26 International Atomic Energy Agency Report 122-1-6

Y N: Democratic People's Republic of Korea; A: Benin, Laos, Lebanon, Syria, Tanzania, Vietnam

54/31 Oceans and the law of the sea 129-1-4

Y N: Turkey; A: Columbia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela

54/35 Zone of peace: South Atlantic 97-0-1

A

54/37 Jerusalem 139-1-3

A N: Israel; A: Swaziland, Uzbekistan

54/38 Syrian Golan 92-2-53

N N: Israel

54/39 Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People

105-3-48

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands

54/40 Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat 107-3-47

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands

54/41 Special information program on the question of Palestine of the Department of Public Information

151-3-2

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands; A: Micronesia, Uzbekistan

54/42 Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine 149-3-2

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands; A: Micronesia, Uzbekistan

54/47 Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace

120-3-41

N N: France, UK

54/50 Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament

98-46-19

N

54/52 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

111-0-53

A

54/53 Prevention of an arms race in outer space 160-0-2

A A: Israel

54/54A Preservation of and compliance with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems

80-4-68

N N: Albania, Israel, Micronesia

54/54B Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction

139-1-20

A N: Lebanon

54/54D Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons

153-0-12

Y

54/54F Missiles 94-0- A

388

65 54/54G Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for

a new agenda 111-13-39

N

54/54I Transparency in armaments 97-48-15

N

54/54K Reducing nuclear danger 104-43-14

N

54/54L Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas

157-3-4

N N: France, UK; A: India, Israel, Micronesia, Russia

54/54M Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels

159-1-1

Y N: India; A: Bhutan

54/54O Transparency in armaments 150-0-12

Y

54/54P Nuclear disarmament 104-41-17

N

54/54Q Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons

114-28-22

N

54/54S Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control

159-0-4

A A: France, Israel, UK

54/54V Small arms 119-0-2

Y A: Lebanon, Russia

54/55D Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

104-42-17

N

54/57 The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East 148-3-9

N N: Israel, Micronesia; A: Barbados, Cameroon, Canada, India, Kenya, Marshall Islands, Norway, Singapore, Trinidad and Tobago

54/62 Maintenance of international security-stability and development of South-Eastern Europe

155-0-2

Y A: Belarus, China

54/63 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 158-0-6

Y A: Bhutan, India, Lebanon, Mauritius, Syria, Tanzania

54/69 Assistance to Palestine refugees 155-1-2

A N: Israel; A: Micronesia

54/71 Persons displaced as a result of the June 1967 and subsequent hostilities

154-2-2

N N: Israel; A: Marshall Islands, Micronesia

54/72 Offers by Member States of grants and scholarships for higher education, including vocational training, for Palestine refugees

158-0-1

Y A: Israel

54/73 Operations of UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees in the Near East

154-2-1

N N: Israel; A: Micronesia

54/74 Palestine refugees' properties and their revenues 154-2-2

N N: Israel; A: Marshall Islands, Micronesia

54/75 University of Jerusalem "Al-Quds" for Palestine refugees

155-2-1

N N: Israel; A: Micronesia

54/76 Work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

84-2-67

N N: Israel

54/77 Applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,

154-2-1

N N: Israel; A: Micronesia

389

to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, and the other occupied Arab territories

54/78 Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan

149-3-3

N N: Israel, Micronesia; A: Marshall Islands, Swaziland, Uruguay

54/79 Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem

150-2-3

N N: Israel; A: Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Swaziland

54/80 The occupied Syrian Golan 150-1-5

A N: Israel; N: Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Swaziland, Uruguay

54/83 Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73e of the Charter of the United Nations

155-0-6

A A: France, Israel, Micronesia, Monaco, UK

54/84 Economic and other activities which affect the interests of the peoples of the Non-Self-Governing Territories

153-2-5

N N: Israel; A: France, Georgia, Micronesia, Monaco, UK

54/85 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations

101-0-52

A

54/91 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

141-2-14

N N: UK

54/92 Dissemination of information on decolonization 149-2-3

N N: UK; A: France, Israel, Monaco

54/110 Measures to eliminate international terrorism 149-0-2

Y A: Lebanon, Syria

54/117 Cooperation between UN and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

124-0-2

Y A: Armenia, China

54/151 Use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination

100-16-35

N

54/152 The right of the Palestinian people to self-determination

156-2-1

N N: Israel; A: Georgia

54/164 Human rights and terrorism 106-0-58

A

54/165 Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment of all human rights

99-2-64

N N: Togo

54/168 Respect for the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of States in their electoral processes

91-59-10

N

54/169 Respect for the right to universal freedom of travel and the vital importance of family reunification

95-1-66

N

54/172 Human rights and unilateral coercive measures 109-48-7

N

54/173 Strengthening the role of the UN in enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections and the promotion of democratization

153-0-11

N

54/175 The right of development 119-10-38

N N: Canada, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Japan, Liechtenstein, Netherlands, Sweden

54/177 Human rights situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran

61-47-51

Y

390

54/178 Human rights situation in Iraq 100-3-53

Y N: Iran, Libya, Sudan

54/179 Situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

91-10-54

Y N: Angola, Burkina-Faso, Chad, Chile, China, Cuba, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Myanmar, Sudan, Zimbabwe

54/182 Situation of human rights in the Sudan 89-30-39

A

54/183 Situation of human rights in Kosovo 108-4-45

Y N: Belarus, India, Iran, Russia

54/184 Situation of human rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)

123-2-34

Y N: Belarus, Russia

54/197 Towards a stable international financial system, responsive to the challenges of development, especially in the developing countries

155-1-0

N

54/200 Unilateral economic measures as a means of political and economic coercion against developing countries

94-2-43

N N: Marshall Islands

54/230 Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territory and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources

145-3-6

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands; A: Australia, Cameroon, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Zambia

54/267 Financing of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon 110-2-0

N N: Israel

391

TABLE XVI

55th Session of the United Nations General Assembly

September 5, 2000 – September 7, 2001

Res Topic Vote

y-n-a US Others

55/6 Elimination of coercive economic measures as a means of political and economic compulsion

136-2-10

N N: Israel; A: Albania, Australia, Canada, Dominican Republic, Kyrgyzstan, Nauru, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Tonga, Uruguay,

55/7 Oceans and law of the sea 143-2-4

Y N: St Kitts and Nevis, Turkey; A: Columbia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela

55/8 Large-scale pelagic drift-net fishing 103-0-44

Y

55/20 Embargo against Cuba 167-3-4

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands; A: El Salvador, Latvia, Morocco, Nicaragua

55/29 Role of science and technology 97-46-21

N

55/31 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

111-0-54

A

55/33A Missiles 97-0-65

A

55/33B Preservation of and compliance with the Treaty on the Limitation of ABMS

88-5-66

N N: Albania, Honduras, Israel, Micronesia

55/33C Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda

154-3-8

Y N: India, Israel, Pakistan; A: Bhutan, France, Kyrgyzstan, Mauritius, Monaco, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan

55/33D 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

163-1-3

Y N: India; A: Cuba, Israel, Pakistan

55/33I Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas

159-4-5

N N: France, Monaco, UK; A: Andorra, India, Israel, Russia, Spain

55/33J Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol

163-0-5

A A: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Republic of Korea

55/33K Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control

165-0-4

A A: France, Israel, UK

55/33N Reducing nuclear danger 110-45-14

N

55/33P Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels

163-1-1

Y N: India; A: Bhutan

392

55/33R A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons 155-1-12

Y N: India

55/33T Nuclear disarmament 109-39-20

N

55/33U Transparency in armaments 149-0-16

Y

55/33V Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction

143-0-22

A

55/33X Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the ICJ on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons

119-28-22

N

55/34G Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

109-43-16

N

55/36 The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East 157-3-8

N N: Israel, Micronesia; A: Australia, Canada, Ethiopia, India, Marshall Islands, Singapore, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago

55/41 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 161-0-6

Y A: Bhutan, India, Libya, Mauritius, Syria, Tanzania

55/49 Zone of peace: South Atlantic 119-0-1

A

55/50 Jerusalem 145-1-5

A N: Israel; A: Angola, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru

55/51 Syrian Golan 96-2-55

N N: Israel

55/52 Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People

106-2-48

N N: Israel

55/53 Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat 107-2-48

N N: Israel

55/54 Special information program on the question of Palestine of Department of Public Information

151-2-2

N N: Israel; A: Marshall Islands, Micronesia

55/55 Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine 149-2-3

N N: Israel; A: Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru

55/66 Elimination of crimes against women committed in the name of honor

146-1-26

Y N: Lesotho

55/86 Use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination

119-19-35

N

55/87 The right of the Palestinian people to self-determination

170-2-5

N N: Israel; A: Canada, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau, Tonga

55/92 Protection of migrants 165-0-8

A A: India, Israel, Malaysia, Micronesia, Myanmar, Palau, Singapore

55/96 Promoting and consolidating democracy 157-0-16

Y

55/100 Respect for the right to universal freedom of travel and the vital importance of family reunification

106-1-67

N

55/101 Respect for the purposes and principles contained in 104- N

393

the Charter of the UN to achieve international cooperation in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights

52-15

55/102 Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment of all human rights

112-46-15

N

55/107 Promotion of a democratic and equitable international order

109-52-7

N

55/110 Human rights and unilateral coercive measures 117-49-6

N

55/114 Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran

67-54-46

Y

55/115 Human rights situation in Iraq 102-3-60

Y N: Libya, Mauritania, Sudan

55/116 Situation of human rights in the Sudan 85-32-49

A

55/117 Situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

102-2-63

Y N: Rwanda, Uganda

55/123 Assistance to Palestine refugees 156-1-3

A N: Israel; A: Marshall Islands, Micronesia

55/125 Persons displaced as a result of the June 1967 and subsequent hostilities

156-2-2

N N: Israel; A: Marshall Islands, Micronesia

55/126 Offers by Member States of grants and scholarships for higher education, including vocational training, for Palestine refugees

160-0-1

Y A: Israel

55/127 Operation of UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees

157-2-2

N N: Israel; A: Marshall Islands, Micronesia

55/128 Palestine refugees’ properties and their revenues 156-2-2

N N: Israel; A: Marshall Islands, Micronesia

55/129 University of Jerusalem "Al-Quds" for Palestine refugees

156-2-2

N N: Israel; A: Marshall Islands, Nauru

55/130 Work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

91-2-61

N N: Israel

55/131 Applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, to the occupied Palestinian territory, including Arab territories

152-2-2

N N: Israel; A: Marshall Islands, Micronesia

55/132 Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan

152-4-0

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia

55/133 Israeli Practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem

150-3-1

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands; A: Micronesia

55/134 The occupied Syrian Golan 150-1-4

A N: Israel; A: Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru

55/137 Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73e of the Charter of the UN

153-0-5

A A: France, Israel, Micronesia, UK

55/138 Economic and other activities which affect the interest of the peoples of the Non-Self-Governing Territories

151-2-5

N N: Israel; A: Croatia, France, Georgia, Micronesia, UK

55/139 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the specialized agencies and the international

109-0-50

A

394

institutions associated with the UN 55/145 Dissemination of information on decolonization 153-

2-3 N N: UK; A: France, Israel,

Micronesia 55/146 2nd International Decade for the Eradication of

Colonialism 125-2-30

N N: UK

55/147 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

138-2-18

N N: UK

55/158 Measures to eliminate international terrorism 151-0-2

Y A: Lebanon, Syria

55/179 Cooperation between UN and OSCE 147-1-0

Y N: Armenia

55/180A Financing of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon 140-3-0

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands

55/180B Financing of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon 115-3-0

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands

55/209 Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources

147-2-3

N N: Israel; A: Fiji, Marshall Islands, Nauru

395

TABLE XVII

56th Session of the United Nations General Assembly

September 15, 2001 – September 9, 2002 Res Topic Vote

y-n-a US Others

56/7 Zone of peace and cooperation of the South Atlantic 93-0-1

A

56/9 Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba

167-3-3

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands; A: Latvia, Micronesia, Nicaragua

56/12 Oceans and the law of the sea 121-1-4

Y N: Turkey; A: Columbia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela

56/16 Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace

110-3-41

N N: France, UK

56/20 Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament

92-46-17

N

56/22 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

105-0-54

A

56/23 Prevention of an arms race in outer space 156-0-4

A A: Georgia, Israel, Micronesia

56/24A Preservation of and compliance with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems

82-5-62

N N: Albania, Benin, Israel, Micronesia

56/24B Missiles 98-0-58

A

56/24C Reducing nuclear danger 98-45-14

N

56/24F Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control

154-0-5

A A: France, Israel, Micronesia, UK

56/24G Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas

148-4-4

N N: France, Monaco, UK; A: Israel, India, Russia, Spain

56/24I Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels

151-1-1

Y N: India; A: Bhutan

56/24M Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction

138-0-19

A

56/24N A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons 139-3-19

N N: India, Micronesia

56/24O 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its Preparatory Committee

156-1-3

Y N: India; A: Cuba, Israel, Pakistan

55/24Q Transparency in armaments 135-0-23

Y

56/24R Nuclear disarmament 103-41-17

N

56/24S Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the 111- N

396

International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons

29-21

56/25B Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

104-46-11

N

56/27 The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East 153-3-6

N N: Israel, Micronesia; A: Australia, Canada, Ethiopia, India, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago

56/31 Jerusalem 130-2-10

A N: Israel, Nauru

56/32 The Syrian Golan 90-5-54

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Tuvalu

56/33 Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People

106-5-48

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Tuvalu

56/34 Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat 107-5-47

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Tuvalu

56/35 Special information program on the question of Palestine of the Department of Public Information of the Secretariat

153-4-3

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia; A: Nauru, Tuvalu, Vanuatu

56/36 Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine 131-6-20

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Tuvalu

56/49 Cooperation between the UN and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization

134-1-2

N A: India, Pakistan

56/52 Assistance to Palestine Refugees 151-2-2

A N: Israel, Marshall Islands; A: Micronesia

56/54 Persons displaced as a result of the June 1967 and subsequent hostilities

151-3-1

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands; A: Micronesia

56/55 Offers by Member States of grants and scholarships for higher education, including vocational training, for Palestinian refugees

154-0-1

Y A: Israel

56/56 Operations of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

151-3-1

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands; A: Micronesia

56/57 Palestine refugees’ properties and their revenues 150-3-1

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands; A: Micronesia

56/58 University of Jerusalem "Al-Quds" for Palestine refugees

151-3-1

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands; A: Micronesia

56/59 Work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

83-4-58

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia

56/60 Applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, and the other occupied Arab territories

148-4-2

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia; A: Angola, Nicaragua

56/61 Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan

145-4-3

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia; A: Nicaragua, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands

56/62 Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian

145-4-2

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia; A:

397

Territory, including Jerusalem Nicaragua, Papua New Guinea

56/63 The occupied Syrian Golan 147-2-3

A N: Israel, Marshall Islands; A: Micronesia, Nicaragua

56/65 Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73e of the Charter of the UN

149-0-6

A A: France, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, UK

56/66 Economic and other activities which affect the interests of the peoples of the Non-Self-Governing Territories

147-2-5

N N: Israel; A: France, Georgia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, UK

56/67 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the UN

106-0-50

A

56/73 Dissemination of information on decolonization 147-2-4

N N: UK; A: France, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia

56/74 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

132-2-21

N N: UK

56/94 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 150-1-2

Y N: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; A: Cote D’Ivoire, Lao People’s Democratic Republic

56/142 The right of Palestinian people to self-determination 161-3-1

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands; A: Micronesia

56/146 Equitable geographical distribution of the membership of the human rights treaty bodies

113-47-5

N

56/148 Human rights and unilateral coercive measures 114-51-2

N

56/150 The right to development 123-4-44

N N: Denmark, Israel, Japan

56/151 Promotion of a democratic and equitable international order

109-53-6

N

56/152 Respect for the purposes and principles contained in the Charter of the UN to achieve international cooperation in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms and in solving international problems of a humanitarian character

100-54-15

N

56/154 Respect for the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of States in electoral processes as an important element for the promotion and protection of human rights

99-10-59

N

56/155 The right to food 169-2-2

N N: Israel; A: Australia, New Zealand

56/159 Strengthening the role of the UN in enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections and promotion of democratization

162-0-8

Y A: Brunei Darussalem, China, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Libya, Myanmar, Syria, Vietnam

56/160 Human rights and terrorism 102-0-69

A

56/165 Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment of all human rights

116-46-9

N

398

56/171 Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran

72-49-46

Y

56/173 Situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

90-3-69

Y

56/174 Situation of human rights in Iraq 100-2-63

Y N: Libya, Sudan

56/175 Situation of human rights in the Sudan 79-37-48

A

56/179 Unilateral economic measures as a means of political and economic coercion against developing countries

100-1-46

N

56/204 Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources

148-4-4

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia; A: Cameroon, Fiji, Nicaragua, Papua New Guinea

56/214A Financing of the UN interim force in Lebanon 123-2-2

N N: Israel; A: Papua New Guinea, Tuvalu

56/214B Financing of the UN interim force in Lebanon 121-2-0

N N: Israel

56/216 Cooperation between the UN and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

123-0-4

Y A: Armenia, Belarus, South Africa, Tanzania

56/232 Use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination

77-20-20

N

56/266 Comprehensive implementation of and follow-up to the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance

134-2-2

N N: Israel; A: Australia, Canada

399

TABLE XVIII

57th Session of the United Nations General Assembly

September 10, 2002 – September 15, 2003

Res Topic Vote

y-n-a US

Others

57/5 Elimination of unilateral extraterritorial coercive economic measures as a means of political and economic compulsion

133-2-2

N N: Israel; A: Australia, Latvia

57/9 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 138-1-2

Y N: Democratic People's Republic of Korea; A: Angola, Vietnam

57/11 Necessity of ending the economic, commercial, and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba

173-3-4

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands; A: Ethiopia, Malawi, Nicaragua, Uzbekistan

57/49 Cooperation between the United Nations and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization

128-1-3

N A: Cambodia, Ghana, Pakistan

57/54 Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament

90-48-21

N

57/56 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons

106-0-55

A

57/57 Prevention of an arms race in outer space 159-0-3

A A: Israel, Micronesia

57/58 Reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons 120-3-42

N N: France, UK

57/59 Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda

125-6-36

N N: France, India, Israel, Pakistan, UK

57/62 Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol

164-0-3

A A: Israel, Micronesia

57/63 Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation

105-12-44

N

57/64 Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control

163-0-5

A A: France, Israel, Micronesia, UK

57/65 Relationship between disarmament and development

160-1-4

N A: France, Israel, Micronesia, UK

57/71 Missiles 104-3-60

N N: Israel, Micronesia

57/73 Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas

160-3-5

N N: France, UK; A: India, Israel, Micronesia, Russia, Spain

57/74 Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction

143-0-23

A

57/75 Transparency in armaments 143-0-23

Y

57/77 Conventional arms control at the regional and 165- Y N: India; A: Bhutan

400

subregional levels 1-1 57/78 A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons 156-

2-13 N N: India

57/79 Nuclear disarmament 107-41-21

N

57/84 Reducing nuclear danger 107-46-17

N

57/85 Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons

117-30-24

N

57/94 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

110-45-12

N

57/97 The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East 158-3-8

N N: Israel, Micronesia; A: Australia, Cameroon, Canada, Ethiopia, India, Papua New Guinea, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago

57/100 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 164-1-5

N A: Columbia, India, Lebanon, Mauritius, Syria

57/107 Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People

109-4-56

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia

57/108 Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat 108-4-56

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia

57/109 Special information program on the question Palestine of the Department of Public Information of the Secretariat

159-5-0

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru

57/110 Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine 160-4-3

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia; A: Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Tuvalu

57/111 Jerusalem 154-5-6

N N: Costa Rica, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia; A: Albania, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Vanuatu

57/112 The Syrian Golan 109-4-57

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia

57/117 Assistance to Palestine refugees 158-1-5

A N: Israel; A: Honduras, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau

57/119 Persons displaced as a result of the June 1967 and subsequent hostilities

155-5-3

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau; A: Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands

57/120 Offers by Member States of grants and scholarships for higher education, including vocational training, for Palestine refugees

164-0-1

Y A: Israel

57/121 Operations of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees in the Near East

155-5-4

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau; A: Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu

401

57/122 Palestine refugees ' properties and their revenues 159-5-2

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau; A: Nauru, Solomon Islands

57/123 University of Jerusalem "Al-Quds" for Palestine refugees

155-5-4

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau; A: Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu

57/124 Work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

86-6-66

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau

57/125 Applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, to the Occupied Palestinian Territory , including East Jerusalem, and the other occupied Arab territories

155-6-3

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau; A: Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu

57/126 Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan

154-6-3

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau; A: Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu

57/127 Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem

148-6-6

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau; A: Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu

57/128 The occupied Syrian Golan 155-1-9

A N: Israel; A: Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu

57/131 Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations

156-0-8

A A: France, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Monaco, Palau, UK

57/132 Economic and other activities which affect the interests of the peoples of the Non-Self-Governing Territories

156-3-3

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands; A: France, Micronesia, UK

57/133 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the specialized agencies and institutions associated with the United Nations

111-0-51

A

57/139 Dissemination of information on decolonization 154-4-2

N N: Israel, Micronesia, UK; A: France, Netherlands

57/140 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

139-3-19

N N: Micronesia, UK

57/141 Oceans and the law of the sea 132-1-2

Y N: Turkey; A: Columbia, Venezuela

57/156 Cooperation between the United Nations and the Council of Europe

92-0-65

A

57/175 Future operation of the International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women

136-7-29

N N: Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan,

402

Netherlands, Republic of Korea

57/188 Situation of and assistance to Palestinian children 108-5-60

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau

57/190 Rights of the child 175-2-0

N N: Marshall Islands

57/195 The fight against racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance and the comprehensive implementation of and follow-up to the Durban Declaration and Program of Action

173-3-2

N N: Israel, Palau; A: Australia, Canada

57/196 Use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination

124-31-34

N

57/198 The right of the Palestinian people to self-determination

172-4-3

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Palau; A: Micronesia, Tonga, Vanuatu

57/199 Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

127-4-42

N N: Marshall Islands, Nigeria, Palau

57/205 Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment of all human rights

124-52-5

N

57/213 Promotion of a democratic and equitable international order

116-55-7

N

57/214 Extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions 130-0-49

Y

57/216 Promotion of the right of peoples to peace 116-53-14

N

57/217 Respect for the purposes and principles contained in the Charter of the United Nations to achieve international cooperation in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms and in solving international problems of a humanitarian character

114-54-15

N

57/222 Human rights and unilateral coercive measures 122-55-1

N

57/223 The right to development 133-4-47

N N: Australia, Marshall Islands, Palau

57/226 The right to food 176-1-7

N A: Australia, Canada, Fiji, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau

57/227 Respect for the right to universal freedom of travel and the vital importance of family reunification

109-3-71

N N: Israel, Palau

57/228A Khmer Rouge trials 150-0-30

Y

57/230 Situation of human rights in the Sudan 80-62-33

Y

57/232 Situation of human rights in Iraq 97-3-77

Y N: Libya, Sudan, Syria

57/233 Situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

92-2-81

Y N: Rwanda, Uganda

57/269 Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the

155-4-4

N N: Israel, Micronesia, Palau; A: Madagascar, Nauru, Papua New

403

occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources Guinea, Tuvalu 57/298 Cooperation between the United Nations and the

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

147-0-3

Y A: Armenia, Belarus, Madagascar

57/325 Financing of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

135-2-0

N N: Israel

404

TABLE XIX

58th Session of the United Nations General Assembly

October 16, 2003 – September 2004

Res Topic Vote y-n-a

US Others

58/7 Necessity of ending the economic, commercial, and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba

179-3-2

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands; A: Micronesia, Morocco

58/8 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 129-1-0

Y N: Democratic People's Republic of Korea

58/18 Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People

97-7-60

N N: Australia, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau

58/19 Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat 98-6-63

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau

58/20 Special information program on the question of Palestine of the Department of Public Information of the Secretariat

159-6-6

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau

58/21 Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine 160-6-5

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau, Uganda

58/22 Jerusalem 155-8-7

N N: Costa Rica, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Uganda

58/23 The Syrian Golan 104-5-61

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau

58/29 Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace

130-3-42

N N: France, UK

58/33 Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament

106-49-19

N

58/35 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

119-0-58

A

58/36 Prevention of an arms race in outer space 174-0-4

A A: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia

58/37 Missiles 113-3-57

N N: Israel, Micronesia

58/39 Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels

172-1-1

Y N: India; A: Bhutan

58/43 Confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context

73-48-46

N

58/44 Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation

118-12-46

N

58/45 Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control

173-1-4

N A: France, Israel, UK, Micronesia

58/46 Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the

124-29-22

N

405

Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 58/47 Reducing nuclear danger 114-

47-17 N

58/49 Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas

168-3-8

N N: France, UK

58/50 Reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons 128-4-43

N N: France, Russia, UK

58/51 Towards a nuclear weapon-free world: a new agenda

133-6-38

N France, India, Israel, Pakistan, UK

58/53 Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction

153-0-23

A

58/54 Transparency in armaments 150-0-27

Y

58/56 Nuclear disarmament 112-45-20

N

58/59 A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons 164-2-14

N N: India

58/64 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

118-46-13

N

58/68 The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East 162-4-10

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia

58/71 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 173-1-4

N A: Syria, Mauritius, India, Columbia

58/91 Assistance to Palestine refugees 167-1-8

A N: Israel; A: Cameroon, Honduras, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau, Papa New Guinea, Tuvalu

58/92 Persons displaced as a result of the June 1967 and subsequent hostilities

168-5-3

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau; A: Rwanda, Honduras, Papua New Guinea

58/93 Operations of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

162-5-8

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau

58/94 Palestine refugees' properties and their revenues 164-5-4

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau; A: Cameroon, Honduras, Papa New Guinea, Rwanda

58/95 Assistance to Palestine refugees and support for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

133-0-35

Y

58/96 Work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian Peoples and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

87-7-78

N N: Australia, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau,

58/97 Applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, to the Occupied Palestinian Territory , including East Jerusalem, and the other occupied Arab territories

164-6-4

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau; A: Cameroon, Papua New Guinea, Honduras, Rwanda

406

58/98 Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem and the occupied Syrian Golan

156-6-13

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau,

58/99 Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem

150-6-19

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau,

58/100 The occupied Syrian Golan 163-1-11

A N: Israel

58/102 Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Articles 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations

163-0-6

A A: Angola, France, Israel, Micronesia, UK

58/103 Economic and other activities which affect the interests of the peoples of the Non-Self-Governing Territories

164-2-3

N N: Israel; A: France, Micronesia, UK

58/104 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations

116-0-55

A

58/110 Dissemination of information on decolonization 162-3-0

N N: Israel, UK

58/111 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

154-2-8

N N: UK; A: Albania, Estonia, Belgium, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Israel, Micronesia

58/113 Assistance to the Palestinian people 170-0-2

Y A: Israel, Kenya

58/123 Special assistance for the economic recovery and reconstruction of the Democratic Republic of the Congo

169-1-0

Y N: Rwanda

58/155 Situation of and assistance to Palestinian children 106-5-65

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau,

58/157 Rights of the child 179-1-0

N

58/160 Global efforts for the total elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance and the comprehensive implementation and follow-up to the Durban Declaration and Program of Action

174-2-2

N N: Israel; A: Australia, Canada

58/161 Universal realization of the rights of peoples to self-determination

109-3-61

A N: Bhutan, India, Mauritius

58/162 Use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination

125-26-29

N

58/163 The right of the Palestinian people to self-determination

169-5-0

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau,

58/171 Human rights and unilateral coercive measures 125-53-0

N

58/172 The right to development 173-3-5

N N: Israel, Palau; A: Australia, Canada, Georgia, Japan, Sweden

58/173 The right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health

174-2-4

N N: Marshall Islands; A: Australia, Czech Republic, Sweden, UK

407

58/174 Human rights and terrorism 120-42-18

N

58/179 Access to medication in the context of pandemics such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria

181-1-0

N

59/180 Strengthening the role of the United Nations in enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections and the promotion of democratization

169-0-8

Y A: Brunei Darussalam, China, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Libya, Myanmar, Syria, Vietnam

58/184 Elimination of all forms of religious intolerance 179-0-1

Y A: Israel

58/186 The right to food 176-1-2

N A: Israel, Marshall Islands

58/187 Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism

181-0-1

Y A: India

58/188 Respect for the purposes and principles contained in the Charter of the United Nations to achieve international cooperation in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms and in solving international problems of a humanitarian character

106-55-19

N

58/189 Respect for the principles of national sovereignty and diversity of democratic systems in electoral processes as important element for the promotion and protection of human rights

111-10-55

N N: Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Israel, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Sudan

58/192 Promotion of peace as a vital requirement for the full enjoyment of all human rights by all

119-50-9

N

58/193 Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment of all human rights

123-51-4

N

58/194 Situation of human rights in Turkmenistan 73-40-56

Y

58/195 Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran

68-54-51

Y

58/196 Situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

81-2-91

Y N: Rwanda, Uganda

58/198 Unilateral economic measures as a means of political and economic coercion against developing countries

125-1-37

N

58/229 Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources

157-4-10

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia

58/240 Oceans and the law of the sea 156-1-2

Y N: Turkey; A: Columbia, Venezuela

58/244 Future operation of the International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women

126-5-30

N N: Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand

58/245 Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict

115-20-28

N

58/292 Status of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem

140-6-11

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau,

58/307 Financing of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

131-2-0

N N: Israel

58/317 Reaffirming the central role of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security and the promotion of international

93-2-47

N N: Israel

408

cooperation

409

TABLE XX

59th Session of the United Nations General Assembly

October 2004 – September 13, 2005

Res Topic Vote y-n-a

US Others

59/6 Cooperation between the United Nations and the Preparatory Mission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization

104-1-0

N

59/11 Necessity of ending the economic, commercial, and financial embargo imposed by the United States of American against Cuba

179-4-1

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Palau; A: Micronesia

59/18 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 123-1-0

Y N: Democratic People's Republic of Korea

59/24 Oceans and the law of the sea 141-1-2

Y N: Turkey; A: Columbia, Venezuela

59/28 Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People

104-7-63

N N: Australia, Canada, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau

59/29 Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat 103-8-64

N N: Australia, Grenada, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau

59/30 Special information program on the question of Palestine of the Department of Public Information of the Secretariat

162-7-9

N N: Grenada, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau

59/31 Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine 167-7-10

N N: Australia, Grenada, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau

59/32 Jerusalem 155-7-15

N N: Costa Rica, Grenada, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau

59/33 The Syrian Golan 111-6-60

N N: Grenada, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau

59/62 Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament

106-48-21

N

59/64 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

118-0-63

A

59/65 Prevention of an arms race in outer space 178-0-4

A A: Haiti, Israel, Palau

59/67 Missiles 119-4-60

N N: Israel, Micronesia, Palau

59/68 Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control

175-2-3

N N: Palau; A: France, Israel, UK

59/69 Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation

125-9-49

N N: Albania, Israel, Latvia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau, Poland, UK

59/70 Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol

179-0-5

A A: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia,

410

Palau 59/75 Acceleration the implementation of nuclear

disarmament commitments 151-6-24

N N: France, Israel, Latvia, Palau, UK

59/76 A Path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons 165-3-16

N N: India, Palau

59/77 Nuclear disarmament 117-43-21

N

59/78 Relationship between disarmament and development

180-2-2

N N: Palau; A: France, Israel

59/79 Reducing nuclear danger 116-46-18

N

59/81 To negotiate a nondiscriminatory, multilateral, and international effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices

179-2-2

N N: Palau; A: Israel, UK

59/83 Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons

132-29-24

N

59/84 Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-personnel mines and on Their Destruction

157-0-22

A

59/85 Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas

171-4-8

N N: France, Palau, UK

59/88 Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels

178-1-1

Y N: India; A: Bhutan

59/91 The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation

161-2-15

Y N: Iran, Egypt

59/102 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

125-48-12

N

59/106 The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East 170-5-9

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau

59/109 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 177-2-4

N N: Palau; A: Columbia, India, Mauritius, Syria

59/117 Assistance to Palestine refugees 167-1-11

A N: Israel

59/118 Persons displaced as a result of the June 1967 and subsequent hostilities

162-6-9

N N: Grenada, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau

56/119 Operations of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

163-6-7

N N: Grenada, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau

59/120 Palestine refugees' properties and their revenues 161-6-9

N N: Grenada, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau

59/121 Work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

84-9-80

N N: Australia, Canada, Grenada, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau

59/122 Applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, to the Occupied Palestinian Territory including East Jerusalem, and the other occupied Arab territories

160-7-11

N N: Grenada, Israel, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Micronesia, Palau

59/123 Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian 155- N N: Australia, Grenada,

411

Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan

8-15 Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau

59/124 Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem

149-7-22

N N: Australia, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau

59/125 The occupied Syrian Golan 160-2-15

A N: Israel, Palau

59/127 Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations

172-0-6

A A: France, Israel, Micronesia, Palau, UK

59/128 Economic and other activities which affect the interests of the people of the Non-Self-Governing Territories

173-3-3

N N: Israel, Palau; A: France, Haiti, UK

59/129 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations

121-0-57

A

59/131 Question of Western Sahara 50-0-100

A

59/135 Dissemination of information on decolonization 170-3-1

N N: UK, Israel; A: France

59/136 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

167-2-4

N N: UK; A: Belgium, France, Germany, Israel

59/173 The situation of and assistance to Palestinian children

117-5-62

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau

59/177 Global efforts for the total elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance and the comprehensive implementation of and follow-up to the Durban Declaration and Program of Action

183-3-2

N N: Israel, Palau; A: Australia, Canada

59/178 Use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination

129-46-13

N

59/179 The right of the Palestinian people to self-determination

179-5-3

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau; A: Australia, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu

59/181 Equitable geographical distribution in the membership of the human rights treaty bodies

128-52-4

N

59/184 Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment of all human rights

129-53-4

N

59/185 The right to development 181-2-4

N N: Israel; A: Australia, Canada, Japan, Sweden

59/188 Human rights and unilateral coercive measures 132-53-0

N

59/193 Promotion of a democratic and equitable international order

125-55-6

N

59/195 Human rights and terrorism 127-50-8

N

59/197 Extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions 142-0-43

Y

59/201 Enhancing the role of regional, subregional, and other organizations and arrangements in promoting and consolidating democracy

172-0-15

Y

412

59/202 The right to food 182-3-0

N N: Israel, Palau

59/203 Respect for the right to universal freedom of travel and the vital importance of family unification

122-3-61

N N: Israel, Palau

59/204 Respect for the purposes and principles contained in the Charter of the United Nations to achieve international cooperation in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms and in solving international problems of a humanitarian character

118-55-13

N

59/205 Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran

71-54-55

Y

59/206 Situation of human rights in Turkmenistan 69-47-63

Y

59/207 Situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

76-2-100

Y N: Rwanda, Uganda

59/221 International trade and development 166-2-6

N N: Palau; A: Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea

59/251 Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestine Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources

156-5-11

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau

59/260 Future Operation of the International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women

125-10-30

N N: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Japan, Latvia, New Zealand, Sweden, UK

59/261 Rights of the child 166-2-1

N N: Marshall Islands; A: India

59/280 United Nations Declaration on Human Cloning 84-34-37

Y

59/307 Financing of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

126-2-1

N N: Israel; A: Tonga

413

TABLE XXI

60th Session of the United Nations General Assembly

September 16, 2005 – July 7, 2006

Res Topic Vote y-n-a

US Others

60/6 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 137-1-0

Y N: North Korea

60/12 Necessity of ending the economic, commercial, and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba

182-4-1

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Palau; A: Micronesia

60/30 Oceans and the law of the sea 141-1-4

Y N: Turkey; A: Libya, Venezuela, Ecuador, Columbia

60/36 Committee on the exercise of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people

106-8-59

N N: Canada, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Australia

60/37 Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat 105-8-59

N N: Australia, Canada, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau

60/38 Special information program on the question of Palestine of the Department of Public Information of the Secretariat

160-7-6

N N: Australia, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau

60/39 Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine 156-6-9

N N: Australia, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau

60/40 The Syrian Golan 106-6-62

N N: Canada, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau

60/41 Jerusalem 153-7-12

N N: Costa Rica, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau

60/45 Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security

177-1-0

N

60/46 Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament

180-1-1

N A: Israel

60/48 Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace

132-3-46

N N: United Kingdom, France

60/51 Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament

110-53-17

N

60/53 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

120-0-59

A

60/54 Prevention of an arms race in outer space 180-2-0

N N: Israel

60/55 Compliance with non-proliferation, arms limitation, and disarmament agreements

163-0-10

Y A: Cuba, Egypt, Russia, Venezuela, Iran, Indonesia, South Africa,

414

Barbados, Belarus, Jamaica

60/56 Towards a nuclear-weapon free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments

153-5-20

N N: UK, Israel, India, France

60/58 Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas

167-3-8

N N: UK, France

60/59 Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation

122-8-50

N N: UK, Israel, France, Albania, Latvia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia

60/60 Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control

176-1-4

N A: UK, Israel, France, Palau

60/61 Relationship between disarmament and development

177-1-2

N A: France, Israel

60/62 The Hague Code of Conduct against ballistic missile proliferation

158-1-11

Y N: Iran

60/65 Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons

168-2-7

N N: India; A: Israel, Pakistan, N. Korea, China, Bhutan, Myanmar, Cuba

60/66 Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities

178-1-1

N A: Israel

60/68 Addressing the negative humanitarian and development impact of the illicit manufacture, transfer, and circulation of small arms and light weapons and their excessive accumulation

177-1-0

N

60/70 Nuclear disarmament 113-45-20

N

60/72 Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

87-56-26

N

60/75 Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels

174-1-1

Y N: India; A: Bhutan

60/76 Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons

126-29-24

N

60/79 Reducing nuclear danger 115-49-15

N

60/80 Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction

158-0-17

A

60/88 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

111-49-13

N

60/92 The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East 164-5-5

N N: Palau, Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Israel; A: Australia, India, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Tonga

60/95 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 172-1-4

N A: Mauritius, Syria, India, Columbia

60/100 Assistance to Palestine refugees 161-1-11

A N: Israel

415

60/101 Persons displaced as a result of the June 1967 and subsequent hostilities

161-6-5

N N: Israel, Palau, Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Grenada

60/102 Operations of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees in the Near East

159-6-3

N N: Grenada, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau

60/103 Palestine refugees' properties and their revenues 160-6-3

N N: Grenada, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau

60/104 Work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

86-10-74

N N: Australia, Canada, Grenada, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Tuvalu

60/105 Applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of August 12, 1949, to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the other Occupied Arab territories

158-6-7

N N: Israel, Grenada, Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Palau

60/106 Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem and the occupied Syrian Golan

153-7-10

N N: Israel, Palau, Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Australia, Grenada

60/107 Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem

148-7-17

N N: Israel, Palau, Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Australia, Grenada

60/108 The occupied Syrian Golan 156-1-15

A N: Israel

60/110 Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations

169-0-5

A A: Albania, UK, Israel, France

60/111 Economic and other activities which affect the interests of the peoples of the Non-Self-Governing territories

169-1-3

N A: Albania, UK, France

60/112 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the Specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations

123-0-50

Did not vote

60/118 Dissemination of information on decolonization 167-3-2

N N: UK, Israel; A: France, Albania

60/119 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

166-3-4

N N: Israel, UK; A: Albania, Belgium, France, Germany

60/120 Second International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism

133-3-36

N N: Israel, UK

60/143 Inadmissibility of certain practices that contribute to fueling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance

114-4-57

N N: Japan, Marshall Islands, Micronesia

60/144 Global efforts for the total elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance and the comprehensive implementation of an follow-up to the Durban Declaration and Program of Action

172-3-4

N N: Marshall Islands, Israel

60/146 The right of the Palestinian people to self-determination

170-5-1

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau; A: Australia

416

60/150 Combating defamation of religions 101-53-20

N

60/152 Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment of all human rights

121-53-4

N

60/155 Human rights and unilateral coercive measures 125-53-0

N

60/157 The right to development 172-2-5

N N: Marshall Islands; A: Australia, Israel, Canada, Japan, Palau

60/162 Strengthening the role of the United Nations in enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections and the promotion of democratization

173-0-1

Y Tuvalu

60/163 Promotion of peace as a vital requirement for the full enjoyment of all human rights by all

116-53-8

N

60/164 Respect for the principles of national sovereignty and diversity of democratic systems in electoral processes as an important element for the promotion and protection of human rights

110-6-61

N N: Australia, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau

60/165 The right to food 176-1-1

N A: Israel

60/170 Situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

102-3-67

Y N: Egypt, Rwanda, Uganda

60/171 Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran

75-50-43

Y

60/172 Situation of human rights in Turkmenistan 71-35-60

Y

60/173 Situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

88-21-60

Y

60/174 Situation of human rights in Uzbekistan 74-39-56

Y

60/183 Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources

156-6-8

N N: Palau, Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Israel, Australia

60/184 International trade and development 121-1-51

N

60/185 Unilateral economic measures as a means of political and economic coercion against developing countries

120-1-50

N

60/200 International year of Deserts and Desertification, 2006

120-1-47

A N: Syria

60/226 Transparency in armaments 99-0-22

Y

60/229 Future operation of the International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women

95-10-25

N N: UK, Sweden, New Zealand, Netherlands, Japan, Finland, Canada, Denmark, Australia

60/230 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women

127-1-0

N

60/231 Rights of the Child 130-1-0

N

60/251 Human Rights Council 170-4-3

N N: Israel, Marshall Islands, Palau; A: Belarus, Iran, Venezuela

60/260 Investing in the United Nations: for a stronger 121- N

417

Organization worldwide 50-2 60/278 Financing of the United Nations Interim Force in

Lebanon 150-3-1

N N: Israel, Palau; A: Austrailia

418