4 - ahmad ejaz artical-2_v13no1

7/30/2019 4 - Ahmad Ejaz Artical-2_v13No1

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United States - India Relations: An

expanding strategic partnership

Ahmad Ejaz

At the turn of new century, the United States India relationshad entered a new phase. This new face of U.S.-India engagementhas been persistently deepening and fostering. So far that UnitedStates vividly support Indias rise as a vital component of Asiansecurity and stability. This paper attempts to describe the shift inthe U.S. foreign policy in the beginning of 1990s that set newgoals in post Cold War period. The paper also points out thestrategic importance of India in the American view that can betterprotect the U.S. interests in the area. This paper also reviews theshared interests of U.S. and India that turned up the page of U.S.-India relations and accordingly United States started to classifyIndia as an indispensable partner in the 21st century, in Asia.

The beginning of 1990s brought significant changes in theinternational political and strategic scene. Soviet Union disposedof its political and ideological stance and ended its militaryconfrontation with the United States. Finally with thedisintegration of Soviet Union, the international communismstumbled on its end. The communist regimes in Eastern Europestarted tottering and collapsing. The Warsaw Pact lost its worth.

Berlin Wall fell, East embraced West. The United States emergedas a sole superpower and its victory in the Gulf War in January-February 1991 added new dimension in U.S. supremacy in world.


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United States - India Relations: An expanding strategic partnership 11

Emerging as a unilateral supreme power on world scene, theUnited States introduced a new world order that was to build thepost- Cold War international political, economic and strategicmilieu, on its own terms.1 Main aims supposed to be end resultof the U.S. future global agenda were as:

1. New leadership role for the United States inthe new emerging world.

2. Establishment of the collective securitysystem, emphasizing the multinationalcooperation to deter aggression and achievepeace and prosperity.

3. Prevention of the spread of weapons of massdestruction and the means to deliver them byconcluding and verifying new arms controlagreements and non-proliferation regimes.

4. Promotion of the secular democracy.5. Enhancement of the respect for human

rights.

6. Development of market economies.7. Growth of the U.S. economic potential to

accelerate trade, investment, andimplementation of effective principles ofproportional gains.

8. Protection against international threats ofnarcotics, terrorism and environmentalproblems. 2


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Pakistan Vision Vol. 13 No. 111

The guiding principle for implementation and expansion ofthe new international order triggered the idea of establishment ofa new regional alliance system in different parts of world. It waspresumed that the new regional power centres, likely Israel,Germany, Britain, France, India, South Korea, and Japan, wouldsupport the U.S. foreign policy agenda and play a significant roleon the political, military and economic fronts of internationalscenario in future.3 President George Herbert Walker Bush(1989-93) described the role of new alliance: We can help ensure

future peace and defend our interests through a range of militaryarrangements bilateral alliances, access agreements, andstructures.While we must adjust our force structure to reflectpost Cold War realities, we also must protect our interests andallies.4

The foreign policy aspirations of the Bush Senioradministration, based on the guiding principles of the new world

order, emphasized:

1. Maintaining the international and regionalbalance of power appropriate for the UnitedStates and its allies.

2. Promoting an international trading andmonetary system conducive to American

prosperity.

3. Supporting the democratic political systems.4. Securing the rule of law and human rights.5. Strengthening the frame of international

norms and practices to protect standards of

order, justice and human rights.

6. Safeguarding the core American values andinterests.5


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To promote the U.S. international policy goals, the Americanpolicy makers presented a three- pronged strategy of Shape,Respond and Prepare. This three pronged strategy aimed atshaping up the environment to prevent or deter threats throughdiplomacy, international assistance, arms control programmes,nonproliferation initiatives, and overseas military presence. Thisstrategy retained option to respond across the full spectrum ofpotential crisis, and maintained the ability to meet the newchallenges of tomorrows uncertain future.6This was dominating

approach of United States in dealing with world affairs.Asia-Pacific region: A new arena of power politics

In the post- Cold War world, the balance of power had beentransferred from the Atlantic Ocean to Pacific Ocean.Consequently, Asia-Pacific region, occupying a significantstrategic position at the crossroads of a number of major sea andair routes, took importance for international politics in terms of

Asia-Pacific geo-strategic, economic, and commercial motives. Inthe words of Admiral Joseph W. Prueher, the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command:

The Asia-Pacific, perhaps more than anyother region, represents a confluence of thesecurity, diplomatic, and economic elements ofinternational power. This confluence helps define

the significance of the region to the US and theworld, and drives our strategy of presence andengagement to promote and protect our nationalinterests.7

President Bush also referred Asia-pacific as an importantcontinent for U.S policy in international order and said: We willdeepen our partnership with our Asian friends in building

democracy and freedomIn the area of security, Asia's varietyhas spawned a diverse pattern of political and strategiccooperation. Our custom-made agreements and relationships


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provide a strong foundation for future security.8 During his visitto the Asia-Pacific region in January 1992, President Bushdeclared that America will remain engaged in the Pacific areaeconomically, politically, and militarily. After all, we are a Pacificnation, and we should care about us to build a post-Cold Warworld defined by prosperity and trade, not poverty andisolationism.9 On another occasion, President Bush said that wewill maintain a visible, credible presence in the Asia-Pacific regionwith our forward developed forces and through bilateral defence

arrangements with nations of the region.

10

He further expressedthat the U.S. plan to base a key Pacific navy command inSingapore spells new naval arrangements in the Pacific. Theshift may sound a minor affair but this in fact will be relocation thebase of the US naval operation in South East Asia and the IndianOcean.11

For the Americans, the significance of the Asia-Pacific region

was underlined owing to China, which survived the communistbase with its huge area and size of population and boomingeconomy and strong military structure that the United Statesconsidered as the main rising threat to its national security, andthe second concern for the Americans was the proliferation ofnuclear weapons of mass destruction in the region that hadreached its alarming point with the unrestrained nuclear capabilityof China, North Korea, India, and Pakistan as well. Third

challenge which centralized the U.S. policy in Asia-Pacific regionwas the rise of religious extremism.12

Chinas fast growing economic and military potentials hadposed stern threats to the American interests. In the U.S.perspective, China could happen to play a global role, whichwould eventually lead to a multipolar international system againstthe U.S. aspirations in the world.13 The Shanghai Cooperation

Organization (SCO) was regarded as a move to undercut the U.S.supremacy in economic and strategic fields.14 An executive


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summary of the US Department of Defense annual report (2006)to Congress mentioned:

Chinas rapid rise as a regional political andeconomic power with global aspirations is animportant element in todays strategicenvironment one that has significantimplications for the region and the world. China has the greatest potential to compete

militarily with the United States and fielddisruptive military technologies that could overtime offset traditional U.S. military advantages.15

Hafeez Malik, a renowned American expert on U.S. policytowards South Asia, stated that the Americans wanted Chinese toexist but on U.S. terms, likely:

1. Accept the U.S. -led security architecture inAsia.

2. No endeavors to undermine or disrupt it.3. Undertake military modernization in a

gradual and non-threatening way.

4. Evade from building relations with Russia,Europe, or India in to an anti-Americanalliance, which might alter the balance ofpower in a fundamental manner. 16

Given the security situation in Asia-Pacific region, the U.S.foreign policy experts drew the U.S. core concerns in this region

and recommended the strategy that accentuated on:


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1. Enhance the strategic cooperation with alliesthrough effective diplomacy and jointmilitary ventures.

2. Ensure a strong security structure that wouldhelp reduce intra-regional fears andsuspicions.

3. Build a structure for economic cooperationand growth that could support an open

international trading system.

4. Increase a free and fair trade that couldbenefit United States and countries of area.

5. Promote democracy and human rights.6. Maintain the regional political stability.17

To readjust its policies in the Asia-Pacific region, the UnitedStates sought alliance with the regional countries which had theattribute of success in industry, trade, education, science andtechnology sectors. Consequently, the leading powers of theregion like Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand, Philippinesand Singapore and India were maintained as the centres of power.

Towards a Strategic Partnership with IndiaIn the U.S. perspective, South Asia region, like the cold war

days, remained significant to pursue its new world order.18 Thenew priorities of the Americans in the region were:

1. Halting the nuclear proliferating.2. Preserving the peace and stability.3. Strengthening the secular democracy.


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4. Promoting the respect for human right.5. Pursuit of U.S. interests in trade and

investment.

6. Assistance to the economic development.19New U.S. policy in South Asia focused on reinvention of the

region as a nuclear free and democratic area. The region was also

underscored for enlargement of the U.S. economic interests, incourse of development of free market economy. 20 New policyorientations reversed the options of past and set new trends indiplomacy. The new adjustments in U.S. South Asia policy werein accordance with the new international strategic order thatchanged the course of U.S. alignment of Cold War period in theSouth Asian region.

India was regarded as a regional power centre.Recommending an Indo-centric policy in South Asia, theAmerican experts underlined that India as a largest democracy anddominant power in the region could play an important role tocheck future challenges.21 Henry Kissinger, former U.S. Secretaryof state, quoted India in his article entitled New World Order,as a dominant power in the South Asian region. He said that theIndian nation has retained a finely-tuned sense for dominationwhich causes it to insist on prominence over all territoriescontrolled from New Delhi at the acme of British rule.22

Indian defence potentials, in particular, were viewed veryimportant. Indian blue- water navy was rated as prompt to meetthe U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean and, Persian Gulf. Indianmilitary strength was also valued as a countervailing power against

China.

The Americans had viewed the rising tide of Islamicextremism in Afghanistan and Central Asian republics as a more


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serious challenge to the new international order. Pakistan hadbeen ranked as a main promoter of Islamic extremism in theregion. India as a secular democracy was considered as effective tocheck the Islamic extremism and terrorism. 23 Under the differentrecommendations by U.S. study groups for evaluation of U.S.-India relations in 21st century, India was assigned a central role innew world order. The U.S. strategic concerns that prompted theU.S. government to form a strategic partnership with India were:

1. Chinas emergence with a huge militarymight in the Asia-Pacific will eventuallychallenge the U.S. predominance in theregion.

2. Russias potential revival will likely alter theinternational security arrangements, insertingnew role for Moscow in the European affairs

but more so in the Asia-Pacific and MiddleEast.

3. Emerging strategic partnership betweenRussia and China, complicate strategicequation on the Western rim of the Pacific.

4. Expanding menace of Islamic terrorism,Afghanistan, Pakistan and some of theCentral Asian Republics, and moreover inGulf create grave challenges for the UnitedStates and West, on whole.

5. US forward military presence in Asia-Pacificneed to make more affective the sea-lanessecurity.

6. Pakistan-sponsored potential Talibanizationin Afghanistan can most possibility mess upthe South West Asia scene.


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7. A politically and economically unstablenuclear Pakistan can be dangerous for worldpeace. Pakistan as a central Islamic state canmost probably supply nuclear material toother Islamic countries.

8. In view of expanding Talibanization, Islamists cantake control of Pakistani nukes24

Looking at the Indian foreign policy in the post Cold Warperiod, it seems that New Delhi also had adopted new tendenciesin relations with other countries and sharing the global concerns.India had prompt inclination towards the United States and movedswiftly to transform its relations with America in a partnership.25

The Indians had realized that strategic partnership with theunipolar world power would carry support in political, military,and economic terms and help build a suitable environment for theextension of Indian hegemonic influence in the region. Thedowngrading of Pakistans image as a promoter of Islamicterrorism and its incredibility in international politics hadprovided a great opportunity to the Indians to win the trust ofUnited States and filled the vacuum left with the end of Pakistan-

United States alliance. Times of Indiawrote:

The end of the Cold War and the beginningof the Gulf war has created unprecedentedopportunities for India to wean the US away fromits traditional ally, Pakistan. The transformationof US-Pak relations is a major security gain forIndia. In fact, Pakistan is not likely to hand over a

nuclear device to fellow Islamic countries, butthe pan-Islamic wave sweeping the region canhardly make the US comfortable on this score.US now sees militant Islam as one of the biggest


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threats (and) Pakistan simply cannot be a credibleUS ally against militant Islam. In sum, India has agolden opportunity to capitalize the US ondowngrading of Pakistan,(and) should not spoilthis by knee-jerk anti-imperialist sentiment.26

Here Mr. Misra, former National Security Advisor of India, isquoted who gave candid advocacy for alliance with America.While addressing at the Council of Foreign Relations, New York,

he said:It is an unquestionable fact that USA is the

pre-eminent power in the world today. TheUS economy is as large as those of Japan,Germany and Britain put together. It wouldmake poor political or economic sense for acountry or a group of countries to set itself

up as an alternate pole in opposition to USA.Most countries advocating a multi-polar worldalso affirm that they attach great importance torelations with USA. In the world order definedby the Cold War, India and US were not reallyallies though, to be fair, nor were they enemies.India-US relations reflected a lack of engagement,coupled with wariness and a periodically

recurring suspicion whenever the shadow of theCold War fell over our region.

In the post-Cold War world (and even in thepost-9/11 world order), the situation isdramatically different. We have shared geo-political interests and economic opportunities,which can bind an enduring partnership. Given

its past history, the Indo-US relationship needs toliberate itself from a number of misconceptionsand prejudices of past years.27


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From the Indian perspective, the factors which derived finallyIndia to prefer to build a strategic partnership with United Stateswere:

1. With its growing stockpile of nuclearweapons and military might, China poses along range security threat to India.

2. Pakistans nuclear capability and its exclusivemissile armory have added horrifyingdimension to South Asian security scenario.

3. The deepening China-Pakistan strategicnexus is likely going to create a securityequation in the area. It is entirely against theIndian interests.

4.

Expanding Islamic militancy, sponsored andlaunched by Pakistan, has engendered theIndian security, externally and internally.India singly cannot handle this threat ofIslamic militancy, therefore it needinternational collaboration.

5. Swiftly developing strategic relationsbetween Russia and China are creating anequilibrium of power to checkmate theUnited States in the Asia-Pacific region.Chinas increasing activism is entirely againstthe Indian interests in the region.28

Islamic extremism, Pakistan s nuclear capability and Chinasnuclear and military dominance were the main concerns whichprovided common ground to the India-United States strategicpartnership. India exploited its non-Islamic and secular credentialsto convince the Americans that in a world swept by Islamic


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fundamentalism, India, a non-Islamic heavy weight, was far morereliable than a Muslim Pakistan.29Newsweekwrote that in the risingstate of Islamic extremism, the United States gazed at India as theregions last outpost of secular democracy.30 Jasjit Singh, anIndian strategist, remarked that "the threat of Islamicfundamentalism and the importance of protecting oil suppliesfrom the gulf" were the new significant common concerns for theAmericans and Indians.31 With regards to China factor, AmitabhMattoo, Associate Professor at School of international Studies,

Jawarlal Nehru University, India, wrote about the commonconcern of the United States and India:

In terms of strategic issues, the rise of Chinaand continuing uncertainty in the Aisa-Pacificregion should be of critical importance andconcern to both New Delhi and Washington..Chinas revival as a great power, after a

century of western humiliation, is alreadytranslating into sporadic acts of aggressiveness.Chinese claims, and the belligerence with whichthey are asserted, over most of the South ChinaSea, particularly the Spartly, the Parcel and theSenkaku islands, are only the most recentexamples.32

During the Gulf War, the new tendency in Indian policyappeared when Indiangovernment provided maximum logisticsupport to the U.S. forces in Indo-Ocean. India providedrefueling facilities to the U.S. aircrafts transiting from the Far Eastto the Gulf through India.33 It was turning point in Indian policytowards the United StatesIndia strategic partnership. The U.S.government hailed the Indian stand on Gulf war. This Indiangesture helped much to bring the two states close. New Delhi also

concluded an agreement with Washington to share valuablemilitary intelligence.34


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In the aftermath of Gulf War, Washington and New Delhiaccelerated their efforts to expand long term cooperation indefense and related matters. Exchange of senior military officialsbecame frequent. The meeting between the Indian DefenseSecretary Sharad Pawar and the U.S. Defense Secretary DickCheney in Washington in April 1992 was very important in thisregard. Both the sides identified the following measures forcooperation:

1. The United States would help India upgradeits defence capability, filling a vacuumcreated as a result of decline of Soviet Union.

2. India would provide port facilities to thevisiting US naval ships, including refueling.35

It can be said that Indo-U.S. military collaboration began in1992. Military cooperation grew so far that an India-U.S. ArmyExecutive Steering Committee was set up. This was followed bythe setting up of the Joint Steering Committee of the twocountries. Subsequently, the two countries Navies carried outtheir first ever joint exercise in May 1992.36

The Clinton administration swiftly worked on agenda for

South Asia that centered on giving a real shape to the strategicengagement with India. Consequently, the new U.S. policytowards South Asia signified that the future ties of U.S. with Indiawould no longer be a prisoner of U.S. relations with Pakistan. Itwas reallocated as:

1. America discarded its policy of being even-handed towards both India and Pakistan- apolicy which equated the two countries.


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2. A new policy was adopted in contrast of pastpolicy to seek the solution of Kashmir disputeon bilateral level through dialogue withreference to Simla agreement

3. A congruent approach appeared among theAmericans over the Indian stand that Pakistanhad been promoting across the borderterrorism in India generally and Kashmirparticularly, and the United States promisedto join hands with India in fight againstterrorism.

4. Furthermore, the US stepped back from itspolicy of advising India on its matters withPakistan, particularly on Kashmir.37

The diplomatic maneuverings recurrently took place forupward march towards a beginning of a new era in India-U.S.relations. The visit of the Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao tothe United States in May 1994 was significant in this regard. Itmarked the start of a new phase of U.S.-India relations. TheIndian and American leaders discussed security related concessionto make the strategic bargain workable and advantageous for bothsides. Both the sides agreed through the MoUs to expand theofficial contacts, advance and improve 1984 understanding onhigh-technology transfer, boost defence cooperation, andcommence the business partnership.38 In mid- January 1995,Defense Secretary William Perry visited India and he concludedan defence agreement with his Indian counterpart and establisheda Defense Policy Forum, to reevaluate the strategic interests ofboth the countries in post- Cold War era, promote links between

officials of both sides and increase steadily the opportunities oftraining and joint exercises. This landmark agreement on militarycooperation was a breakthrough in India- U.S. relations.39 Theagreement provided for consultations between the pentagon and


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Indias Defence Ministry, as well as joint military exercises,military training, defence research, and weapons production.40About the agreement, Willam Parry commented that theagreement would open a new era in our security relations.41Immediately after the William Perrys visit, Secretary ofCommerce, Ron Brown, went to New Delhi where he agreed toestablish a Commerce forum to open new vistas for thepromotion of economic relations between the two countries. 42U.S Secretary of Treasury Robert E Rubin also visited India in

April and signed an agreement for increase in investment inIndia.43 Now, heavy lobbing took palace in Washington for newbroader relationship between India and United States. On August6, 1997, President Clinton, speaking at a White House pressconference, referred to a stronger U.S. presence in South Asia andsaid that the U.S. presence should be heavily felt in South Asiabecause of the long relationship America had with India andbecause of the enormous potential of the region for good if things

go well and for ill if things dont. ... We can be an even betterfriend in the next 50 years and a more constructive supporter ofresolving these difficulties in the near term.44

The diplomatic move between India and United Statesreceived further boost when Indian Prime Minister I.K. Gujralmet President Clinton in New York on September 23, 1997 at theannual session of the UN General Assembly. Both the leaders

agreed to press the strategic discussions to a decisive point byresuming the debate on nuclear proliferation and disarmamentthat had been stalled for the past three years. The U.S. Under-Secretary of State Thomas Pickering arrived in New Delhi inOctober 1997 and initiated the broader-ranging strategic dialogueon the lines elucidated at the Gujral-Clinton meeting.45Pickerings mission was successful in carrying forward the newbeginning in India-United States relations.46 Strategic links

between the two states swiftly expanded with the continuation ofthe various projects and supply of military equipments andtechnologies. In terms of economic plans, the India United States


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strategic partnership also based the joint ventures. India offeredlarge opportunities for the American investors. The U.S.companies including General Motors Corp, Kellogg CO, Du PontCo, and Motorola Inc started projects in India. 47

Over time, the nuclear issue appeared as the central to all thestrategic dialogues for upgrading the India-U.S. partnership. TheU.S. officials started to acknowledge the nuclear capabilities ofIndia. They underlined the option of a grand bargain with India

in nuclear field. The American experts proposed a change in U.S.nuclear non-proliferation policy, emphasizing a stable nuclearrelationship with India that would help India in ending the Indiasnuclear isolation and attaining the legitimacy as a nuclear weaponstate.48 Among these think tanks, Selig S. Harrison, a renownedAmerican expert on South Asian affairs, suggested a nuclear dealwith India. He proposed that the United States should abandon itsroll back policy and evidently reconciled to Indias acquisition

of the nuclear weapons option. The United States should lift banon the sale of nuclear reactors to India and other restrictions onU.S. cooperation with Indias civilian nuclear powerprogramme.49 Sumit Ganguly, a leading American specialist onSouth Asian affairs, suggested that the United States should adopta new approach towards India, conceding India the right to retainand pursue its nuclear option because of extant securityconcerns.50 Consequently, the Clinton administration adopted a

low key approach with regard to India on nuclear proliferation.The rollback approach was replaced by the policy of advancedtechnological cooperation with India. This new policy focused onlocating the nuclear issue in the broader context of the search for acomprehensive strategic deal with India. Sumit Gangulycommented that the nuclear stability with India had been theessential part of U.S.-India strategic partnership, aspiring India asa legitimate nuclear power to create an equilibrium visa-vis

Chinas nuclear dominance.51 The Indian nuclear tests furtherconsolidated the grounds for developing a nuclear understatingbetween Indian and the United States.


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The United States-India strategic dialogue, which expandedover fourteen rounds in 1998-999, was the longest series ofnegotiations on bilateral level between the two countries. Thetalks focused on issues related to security, disarmament, and non-proliferation. They led to create more understanding on securityconcerns amongst the authorities of both sides.52 PresidentClintons visit to India in March 2000 was crucial in process ofstarting a new era in India-U.S. relations in terms framing thestrategic partnership in future. India-U.S. Relations: A Vision for

the 21

st

Century signed by President Clinton and Indian PrimeMinister Vajpayee was a unique groundbreaking agreement thatdefined the agenda of the partnership between the two states inthe 21st century. The statement expressed the shared belief thatthe relationship between the two countries could be a vital factorin shaping international peace, prosperity and democratic freedomand for ensuring strategic stability in Asia and beyond. Itreaffirmed:

In the new century, India and the UnitedStates will be partners in peace, with a commoninterest in a complimentary responsibility forensuring regional and international security. Wewill engage in regular consultations on, and worktogether and with others for strategic stability inAsia and beyond. We will bolster joint efforts to

counter terrorism and meet other challenges toregional peace. We will strengthen theinternational security system, including in theUnited Nations and support the United Nationsin its peacekeeping efforts, we acknowledge thattensions in South Asia can only be resolved by thenations of South Asia.53

The leaders of both sides agreed over various initiatives tospeed up and integrate the process of forwarding the U.S. Indiarelationship in depth. These steps included:54


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1. Regular bilateral summits.2. Constant meetings between the senior

officials of both sides to discuss the mutualconcerns in a broad range related to security,economy and non-proliferation.

3. Regular meetings of the Joint WorkingGroup on Counter-terrorism to intensifycooperation and sharing information.

4. Bilateral economic discourse through a highrank coordinating panel, led by the U.S.Secretary of Treasury and Indian FinanceMinister.

5. Commercial dialogue between the U.S.Secretary of Commerce and India's Minister

of Commerce & Industry.

6. U.S.-India Working Group on Trade wouldboost understanding and cooperation ontrade policy.

7. Joint Consultative Group on Clean Energyand Environment would focus on

collaborative projects, clean energytechnologies, private and public sectorinvestment and cooperation, climate changeand other environmental issues.

This constant dialogue process was given name as DialogueArchitecture, and as a part of this Dialogue Architecture, the

Prime Minister Vajpayee paid a visit to the United States inSeptember 2000. This visit helped to reaffirm the broader visionof relations. Clinton and Vajpayee stressed for the continuation of


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dialogue on security, non-proliferation and disarmament as well ason trade, and energy to open new more doors for cooperation inthese areas. In the view from New Delhi, it happened for the firsttime that Indias security concerns, economic strength, andcapabilities in information technology were recognized at thehighest level in Washington.55

Disjointing from PakistanThe reorientation of the U.S. policy in South Asia renounced

the decades-old Pakistan-United States relations. Pakistan onceaccorded with title of most allied ally and stood as the frontline state in war against Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, had lostits strategic significance for the United States and relationsbetween the states had its lowest point. The downgrading trend inthe U.S.-Pakistan relations reached distressing point when newperception captured the thinking of the U.S. policy makers thatPakistan had been promoting the Islamic extremism and

militancy. The first meeting of the Indo-US Army SteeringCommittee was held in January 1992 to draw up the future coursefor Indo-U.S. strategic cooperation. The committee bracketedPakistan with those countries that sponsored the Islamicfundamentalism.56 Senator Larry Pressler- author of the PresslerAmendment that suspended military and economic aid to Pakistanin October 1990 in a bid to halt Pakistans nuclear programme,also referred Pakistan as a state that backed Islamic

fundamentalism. During this visit to India in early 1992, LarryPressler warned the Indians about the emergence of a newgrouping of Pakistan with Afghanistan, Turkey, Iran and CentralAsian Republics that possessed the nuclear weapons capability.Mr. Pressler said that this alliance of Islamic countries couldprovide the ground for the growth of Islamic extremism.57 Hestressed that this Islamic fundamentalism can travel fromPakistan.58 Similarly in a testimony to the U.S. Senate on April

21, 1993, the CIA Director James Woollsey mentioned thatPakistan had supported the insurgents in waging terror campaignsagainst the Indian Government in the States of Kashmir and


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Punjab.59 This rising perception about Pakistan in Washingtonhad built Pakistans image as a dangerous state. Consequently,Pakistan was threatened in 1992-93 to be declared as a statesponsor of terrorism.60 This new image of Pakistan as a promoterof Islamic extremism and militancy had direct impact onPakistans nuclear option. It was suspected that nuclear capabilityof Pakistan could better serve the causes of the Islamic extremism.

The Islamic militants and their ideologues in Pakistan could use itas ultimate weapon of revenge against the states which they

delineated as their enemy. These suspicions eventually created anew perception of an Islamic atomic bomb prevailed over thethinking of advocates of nuclear non- proliferation. Embarkingheavily on a campaign, to malign Pakistans nuclear programme asa threat to stability of South Asian region, Indian lobbies inAmerica played an effective role to mould the American approachagainst Pakistans nuclear programme.

The U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy in South AsiaThe South Asian nuclear issue is fabricated by the nucleartriangular approach inserted by China, India and Pakistan. Thenuclear pursuit began in South Asia since China had its firstnuclear test in 1964. India perceived a threat from the Chinesenuclearization. Therefore, it finally took route to the nuclearweaponizinig and after ten years it had a nuclear explosion in1974. The Indian nuclear test weakened the Nuclear Non-

Proliferation Treaty (NPT) system in the area. The Indian bombprovoked Pakistan to build up its nuclear capabilities and afterthirteen years Pakistan reached the stage to match Indian nuclearstrength.

A nuclear arms race in South Asia was an unwelcome prospectfor the U.S. policy in the region. The Americans embarked on adrive to check the nuclear programmes of India and Pakistan.

They emphasized the establishment of a NPT regime in SouthAsia. Washington pressed both New Delhi and Islamabad to jointhe NPT but both denied the NPT by underlining their respective


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threat perceptions. India argued over Chinese nuclear might,coupled with the Pakistans nuclear programme based on thePakistan-China nuclear axis.61 Indian security analyst Ashok Kapursaid that China is a wild card in South Asian security questionand issue of nuclear proliferation in South Asia could not be dealtwithout taking into account Chinas attitude and policies.62Withreference to the Pakistan-China nuclear axis, Ashok said that itfurther provoked Indias nuclear ambition. He said that the thingwhich matters considerably is Chinas nuclear presence in

subcontinent as a result of Chinas military relationship withPakistan. The image of Sino-Pak axis impacts negatively on theIndian psyche.63

The Indians called NPT a discriminatory treaty that drew linebetween nuclear haves and haves not. The Indians argued that thepurpose of this treaty was to prevent the non-nuclear weaponsstates from getting the nuclear capability but on the other hand, it

allowed nuclear states to develop further their nuclearprogrammes.

While, in defense of its nuclear programme, Pakistan referredthe growing intensity of nuclear threat from India. Pakistanargued that the Indian nuclear programme was not credible withits claim for peaceful nuclear intentions. Pakistani experts arguedthat Pakistan had no parity with India, in terms of conventional

weapons. Besides its own domestic weapons industry, India hadlarge sources to get weapons from other countries as well.Therefore, Pakistan had right to exercise a credible minimumnuclear deterrence, in order to come at par with India on militarysuperiority and meet the threats to any of its strategicvulnerabilities from India.64 Pakistan linked its joining of NPTwith Indias adherence to it. It was argued that adherence to NPTunilaterally would damage the Pakistans nuclear programme.

Pakistan would be vulnerable to a nuclear blackmail by India. 65


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Nuclear Deal with India

A broader strategic alliance with India could not take acompact shape unless Indias nuclear option was not protected.As a part of the U.S. grand strategy to contain the rising power ofChina, the Americans had depicted Indias nuclear capability as acounter balance to Chinas nuclearization. According to JosephCirincione, Americas best known weapons expert and formerDirector for Non-Proliferation at the Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace, dealing with China in future, India would be

more valuable as a nuclear power, rather than as a non nuclearcountry."66

Eventually, the Americans maintained a high-handed approachtowards the nuclearization in South Asia. Thus, the Americanswillfully kept mum on Indian nuclear programme. They decidedto broaden Indias access to nuclear technology. While, Pakistansnuclear programme comparatively was dealt in a critical and rigid

way and pressure was put on Pakistan to stop its efforts fornuclearization. The U.S. coercive diplomacy against Pakistannuclear programme contained the military and economic sanctionsand restrictions by presidential clearance certificate, aiming athalting the process of developing the nuclear capability. 67

The nuclear tests in 1998 by India and Pakistan tremendouslyshifted the South Asian security environment. In deed after

nuclear tests, the US government immediately imposed sanctionsunder the auspices of the US Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Actof 1994. However, as the U.S. strategy for re-engagement in theAsia-Pacific region had focused on improving bilateral relationswith India, the Americans embarked the policy of developingIndia as a strategic and nuclear partner. The Americans viewedthat the nuclear India could be better option to be an equilibriumvisa-vis Chinas nuclear dominance.68 The strategic dialogue

conducted by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott andForeign Minister of India Jaswant Singh held in 1998-99 led toelaborate and clarify the security perceptions of both states in


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future. Both sides were determined to develop broad-basedbilateral security relations in the 21st century. 69 The Clintonadministration started to treat India as a nuclear democracy.While on the other hand, Pakistan was considered as a dangerousproliferating state. 70According toBruce Riedel, a Senior Fellowat Saban Centre for Middle East Policy, Washington, Pakistansacquisition of nuclear bomb had enhanced the confidence ofterrorists linked with Al Quida and other Islamic terrorist groupswho had been engaged in terrorist activities in India.71 Kargil

conflict provided ground to the Americans. The Kargil Hightsoverlooking the nation highway that connected the Leh withSrinagar in Kargil and Drass sectors along the Line of Control(LOC) were captured by Pakistan-backed militants, in 1999,created a dire situation for Pakistan. Bruce Riedel commentedthat if conflict exceeded so far, there was probability of a use ofnuclear weapons from Pakistani side.72 Kargil crisis staved off byU.S. successful diplomacy raised so much alarm worldwide and it

was perceived as an extension of International Islamic terrorism.Pakistan came under fire for initiating this conflict through asecret military operation in the area with the help of Islamicmilitants, belonging to the Taliban militia and other Islamicmilitant groups fighting in Kashmir.73 The Americans were of theview that Kargil like situation could any time intensify the religionextremism that finally lead to Talibanization of Pakistan.74 Onrequest of Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, as militants

executed the Kargil heights, it exposed the scope and scale ofPakistans engagement with militant groups.75

In view of Pakistans support to Taliban regime in Kabul andfreely mobilization of Islamic militant groups on its soil, Pakistanhad been incredible in the eyes of the international community. Itraised a strong apprehension about the militants access toPakistans nuclear nukes. In an interview with CBS news on

October 16, 2000, the Commander of U.S. Central Command(CENTCOM) General Anthony Zinni expressed this apprehension


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that nuclear weapons in Pakistan could wind up in the hands ofextremists religious leaders.76

The terrorist attacks on United States on September 11,2001, gave more twist to the U.S. Pakistan policy. AfterwardPakistan willfully and unconditionally came on U.S. side to jointhe military campaign against terrorism, and became a front linestate, the U.S. Government removed economic sanctions imposedon Pakistan since nuclear tests and took further initiatives to

support the Pakistans derailing economy by rescheduling $ 3billion in Pakistans debt, launching a five-year $100 million aidprogramme and providing $73 million in equipment and aid tosecure Pakistans border with Afghanistan.77 However, despite allcollaborations with Pakistan in war against terror, the Americanskept up Pakistan as a state sponsored terrorism. Washingtonsupported New Delhis policy of portraying the insurgency in

Jammu and Kashmir as purely a matter of cross-border terrorism

from Pakistan side. Washington constantly exerted pressure onIslamabad to reduce its policy of supporting and backinginfiltration in to the Indian side of Kashmir.78 The terrorist attackson the Srinagar Assembly on October 1, 2001, and on the IndianParliament on December 13, 2001 brought further the Indiansand Americans on same page that these attacks weremasterminded and operated by the Pakistan-based militant groupsfighting in Kashmir.79Despite being partners in war against terror,

Pakistan and United States were deeply divided on issues ofterrorism and nuclearization.80

The Bush administration (2001-2009) further accelerated thetransformation process of India-United States strategicrelationship and enlarged the prospect of nuclear engagement withIndia. Its Indo-centric agenda aimed at:

1. Putting off the pressure on India to rollbackthe nuclear programme or sign CTBT.


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2. Wavering the sanctions and resuming theeconomic interaction with India.

3. Easing the labour and environmentalrestrictions in trade pacts and opening morechannels for trade from traditional goods ofagriculture to the virtual links of E-commerce and a further cut in the tariffs.

4. Improving the cooperation against all formsof cross-border terrorism.81

Washington decided to institutionalize consultations through aNew Framework Dialogue. Consequently, Washington revivedthe U.S.-India Defense Policy Group, which last met in 1997 andremained suspended after Indias 1998 nuclear tests. Theenlarging framework of India- U.S. strategic engagementespecially focused on civil nuclear cooperation, beside civilianspace programs, and high-technology trade. Next Steps inStrategic Partnership (NSSP) Initiative programme initiated in

January 2004 was a major development in the U.S. strategicorientation towards India that led to a full civil nuclearcooperation. The first phase of the NSSP included theimplementation of measures to address proliferation concerns andensure compliance with the U.S. export controls. These effortsenabled the United States to make modifications in U.S. exportlicensing policies that would foster cooperation in commercialspace programs and permit certain exports to power plants atsafeguarded nuclear facilities.82 Further negotiations resulted inremoval and revision of some US export license requirements forcertain dual-use and civil nuclear items.

On June 28, 2005, the United States and India formallysigned a landmark defense agreement named New framework forthe U.S- India Defense Relationship. This agreement signed by


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the U.S. Secretary of Defense and Defense Minister of India was afirst ever document related to the defense ties. The agreementdefined the common security interests of both countries:

1. Maintaining security and stability.2. Defeating terrorism and violent religious

extremism.

3.

Preventing the spread of weapons of massdestruction and associated materials, data,and technologies.

4. Protecting the free flow of commerce vialand, air and sea lanes.83

The agreement spelled out joint actions in pursuit of sharedsecurity goals:

1. Conduct joint and combined exercises andexchanges.

2. Collaborate in multinational operations whenit is in their common interest.

3. Strengthen the capabilities of our militaries topromote security and defeat terrorism.

4. Expand interaction with other nations inways that promote regional and global peaceand stability.

5. Enhance capabilities to combat theproliferation of weapons of massdestruction.84


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The visit of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to the

United States in July 2005 coincided with the completion ofNSSP. Both leaders declared their resolve to transform thisstrategic relationship to a global partnership. In the JointStatement, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Bushunderlined the new significance of India-U.S. partnership andvowed to work together to promote the shared security vision inthe world. Both the leaders expressed satisfaction for the

successful completion of the NSSP that provided base forexpanding bilateral activities and commerce in space, civil nuclearenergy and dual-use technology.85 President Bush declared Indiaas responsible state with advanced nuclear technology, and saidthat India should acquire the same benefits and advantages asother such states. He announced the U.S. commitment to goforward to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation withIndia as it realizes its goals of promoting nuclear power and

achieving energy security. The President assured to seek anagreement from the Congress to adjust US laws and policies, andthat the United States will work with friends and allies to adjustinternational regimes to enable full civil nuclear energycooperation and trade with India. 86 The Indian Prime Ministeron his part declared:

India would reciprocally agree that it wouldbe ready to assume the same responsibilities andpractices and acquire the same benefits andadvantages as other leading countries withadvanced nuclear technology, such as the UnitedStates. These responsibilities and practices consistof identifying and separating civilian and militarynuclear facilities and programs in a phased

manner and filing a declaration regarding itscivilians facilities with the International AtomicEnergy Agency (IAEA); taking a decision to place


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voluntarily its civilian nuclear facilities underIAEA safeguards; signing and adhering to anAdditional Protocol with respect to civiliannuclear facilities; continuing India's unilateralmoratorium on nuclear testing; working with theUnited States for the conclusion of a multilateralFissile Material Cut Off Treaty; refraining fromtransfer of enrichment and reprocessingtechnologies to states that do not have them and

supporting international efforts to limit theirspread; and ensuring that the necessary steps havebeen taken to secure nuclear materials andtechnology through comprehensive exportcontrol legislation and through harmonization andadherence to Missile Technology Control Regime(MTCR) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)guidelines.87

President Bush and Prime Minister Singh for the first timeannounced their intention to enter into a nuclear agreement inWashington. The decision of the two countries to move to obtainfull civil nuclear energy cooperation was a huge step tobroadening the scope of strategic partnership.

The agenda for nuclear cooperation set in the joint statement

of July 18, 2005 was further carried out during the first visit ofPresident Bush to India in March, 2006. President Bush and PrimeMinister Manmohan Singh reached a mutually understanding withregard to implementation of process that was outlined in the July18, 2005 joint statement. The important development took placeduring the President Bushs visit to India was the preparation andacceptance of a separation plan that separated the civilian nuclearprogramme from the military programme.88 Under the Separation

Plan, India agreed to separate its civilian and military nuclearprograms over the next eight years in order to gain US expertiseand nuclear fuel to meet its rapidly rising energy needs. India's


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civilian facilities would be open for the first time to permanentinternational inspections.89 The joint statement of March 2, 2006by President Bush and Prime Minister Singh also hailed thesuccessful preparation and acceptance of Separation Plan anddetermined to move on for the full implementation of thecommitments in the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement on nuclearcooperation.90 The Joint Statement also stated: This historicaccomplishment will permit our countries to move forwardtowards our common objective of full civil nuclear energy

cooperation between India and the United States and betweenIndia and the international community as a whole.91 PresidentBush described understanding on civilian nuclear cooperation as a"necessary" agreement. He commented: "This agreement is inour [American] interest. I am confident I can sell this to ourCongress." 92 After acceptance of a civil-military Separation Planof India, Washington.D.C. sought change in U.S. law through theadoption of Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic

Energy Cooperation Act of 2006that modified the section 123 ofthe U.S. Atomic Power Act for permission for nuclearcooperation with India.93 President Bush signed the bill onDecember 18,2006. Signing the bill, President Bush said: This isan important achievement for the whole world. After 30 yearsoutside the system, India will now operate its civilian nuclearenergy program under internationally accepted guidelines and theworld is going to be safer as a result.94 On August 1, 2008, IAEA

Board of Governors approved a nuclear Safeguard Agreementwith India, calling for application of IAEA safeguards to Indiancivilian nuclear facilities.95 After getting the approval from IAEA,the U.S. government approached the Nuclear Supplier Group(NSG) for granting a waiver to India to commence civilian nucleartrade. Consequently on September 6, 2008, NSG granted aspecial waiver to India which ended the Indias nuclear isolationand granted a unique opportunity to access nuclear technology

and much-needed nuclear fuel from other countries. India is theonly country that is not party to the Non Proliferation Treaty(NPT), but NSG waiver enables it to have nuclear trade with


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other countries. 96 Going through complex stages, the U.S. - Indianuclear deal got final approval from the U.S. House ofRepresentatives on September 28, 2008 and Senate on October 1,2008. The legislation on the India-U.S. nuclear deal, approved bythe U.S. Congress, was finally turned into a law with the signingof the President Bush on October 8, 2008. The new law wascalled United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval andNon-proliferation Enhancement Act. After a three years spansince July 18, 2005 when Presiden Bush and Prime Minister

Manmohan Singh unvailed the agenda for India-U.S. nuclearcooperation agreeement, the nuclear deal reached its final pointon October 10,2008 by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Riceand Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee when theyformally signed the nuclear accord in Washington. This agreementknown as 123 Agreement between India and United Statesoperationalized the deal between the two countries. 97 Aftersigning the agreement, Mr. Pranab Mukherjee said:

India attaches great importance to thisagreement and to civil nuclear commerce withthe international community. The increased shareof nuclear energy in our energy mix will make amajor positive contribution to our sustainabledevelopment and to meeting our objective oferadication of poverty. We, therefore, see this as

a critical development for civil for oureconomic growth and development. Theagreement is also important for global economyand energy security as well as a contribution toglobal efforts to meet the challenge of climatechange.98

Condoleezza Rice recognized that the civil nuclear agreement

"unlocks a new and far broader world of potential for ourstrategic partnership in the 21st century, not just on nuclearcooperation but on every area of national endeavor."99


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The Obama administration fully endorsed the U.S.-India

nuclear deal. President Barak Obama himself recognized India asan important strategic partner and described India-U.S. civilnuclear agreement as a landmark achievement.100

Advancing the Strategic partnershipThe Obama administration has determined to go beyond the

civil nuclear deal to make the U.S.-India strategic partnership

more productive and durable. The Indo-Centric policy of Obamaadministration had focused on:

1. Upgrading the status of India as a globalpower.

2. Expediting the implementation on U.S.-Indianuclear agreement.

3. Expanding the military to military contacts,this will include defense trade and more jointoperations, training and buildingcompatibility between the two militaries.

4. Enhancing counter-terrorism cooperation.Sharing a common commitment to stability

in Afghanistan that important for combatingterrorism and enhancing regional stability andprosperity.

5. Sustaining economic relations. Opening upmarkets. Expanding bilateral economicengagement including two way trade andinvestment. Working more cooperatively in

World Trade Organization. Intensifyingcollaboration on multilateral trade issue.


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6. Expanding partnership in education,agriculture and public health. 101

The U.S. Officials has been strongly arguing case fordeepening the strategic partnership with India. Notably asSecretary of State Hillary Clinton, speaking to the Senate ForeignRelations Committee on January 13, 2009, vowing to constructthe economic and political partnership with India, said: We willbuild on our economic and political partnership with India, theworlds most populous democracy and a nation with growinginfluence in the world.102 Similarly she declared in Senate ForeignRelations Committee on April 22, 2009: The US is advancing itsrelationship with India as part of a wide-ranging diplomatic agendato meet todays daunting challenges topped by the situation inPakistan and Afghanistan. She said that the relationship with Indiawas essential because It is the worlds largest democracy, it is an

important ally in so many efforts.

103

Likewise, Admiral MikeMullen, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff said in histestimony before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee onDefence on June 9, 2009 that "India has emerged as anincreasingly important strategic partner. We seek to maturethis partnership and address common security challenges globallyas well as within the region."104

The U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clintons four - dayexclusive visit to India on July 17 -20, 2009 was a very significantstep of Obamas administration to strengthening and deepeningthe U.S.- India strategic partnership. Prior to Hillary Clintonsvisit, CIA Chief Leon Panetta and National Security AdviserGeneral Jim Jones also toured to New Delhi in March and Junerespectively. Their visits to India were part of the groundwork foraccomplishments which the Hillarys tour scored.105 Hillarys four

day visit to India contained a broad based agenda of holdingwide-ranging bilateral strategic dialogue on issues of mutualconcerns related to foreign policy, strategic challenges liketerrorism, climate change, homeland security, and recession and


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non-proliferation. Agenda was also designed to broaden anddeepen partnership in spheres of health, education, agriculture,trade and economy.106 Hillary Clintons visit undoubtedlycontinued the promising trend in Indo-U.S. relations. It was toreset the U.S.-India relations at a higher plan. She concluded threehi-tech agreements in New Delhi. These three agreements: EndUse Monitoring Agreement, Technology Safeguards Agreement,and Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement expandedthe emerging scope of strategic partnership.

End Use Monitoring Agreement cleared the way for supply ofU.S. nuclear and military technology to India on a large scalelevel. This agreement allowed the U.S. to monitor the end use ofthe arms and sensitive technologies sold to India and ensured thatthey were not diverted to other countries. Technical SafeguardsAgreement permitted the launch of civil or non-commercialsatellites containing U.S. components on Indian space launch

vehicles. Science and Technology Agreement would be for jointlycreating $ 30-million science endowment to be used for researchand development, innovation, entrepreneurial, andcommercialization activities in science and technology.107 The twogovernments also agreed to establish an India-U.S. StrategicDialogue that would meet annually and focus on five main pillarsof bilateral relations likely strategic cooperation; energy andclimate change; education and development; economics, trade

and agriculture; science and technology, health and innovation.Both governments agreed on the formation of a sound structure ofjoint working groups, which would address a wide range ofbilateral, global, and regional issues of shared interest andcommon concern, continuing programmes currently underimplementation and taking mutually beneficial initiatives thatcomplement Indian and U.S. development, security and economicinterests.108The structure of different working groups that would

deal with five main areas, as:


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1. Strategic Cooperation working groups willaddress counter-terrorism, defensecooperation carrying forward the CivilNuclear Agreement and High Technology

Trade.

2. Energy and Climate Change working groupswill continue the energy dialogue and alsoinitiate discussions on climate change.

3. Education and Development working groupswill deepen partnership in education andcarryout discussions on womensempowerment.

4. Economics, Trade and Agriculture workinggroups will strengthen discussions onbusiness, trade and agricultural cooperation.

5. Science and Technology, Health andInnovation working groups will explore newareas for cooperation in leading technologiesand in addressing global health challenges.109

Discussing about the results of Hillarys visit to India, The

Christian Science Monitorcalled it atangible accomplishment. 110Hillary Clintons itinerary aimed at resetting the U.S.-Indiarelations at a larger plan. It deliberately left out Pakistan andturned all out focus on India only. The visit was significant forseveral reasons. It undoubtedly continued the promising trend inU.S.-India relations. Teresita C. Schaffer, writes that the primeobjective of the Hillarys visit to India was to give the Obamaadministration and the newly elected Indian government

ownership of a relationship that both consider vitally important.She certainly did that. She hit all the high points that she haddefined as pillars of the relationship.111


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Both countries engaged in strategic dialogue. The firststrategic dialogue was held on June 1-4, 2010 in Washington. TheAmerican and Indian delegates led by Ms. Hillary Clinton and S.M. Krishna respectively held eighteen individual dialogues, inaddition to address the global security and stability. The dialoguediscussions covered sub-dialogues across the full range of therelationship, for strengthening cooperation in trade andinvestment, science and technology, energy security, climatechange, education, health, agriculture etc. Both sides pledged to

push on their shared goals of advancing security and stabilityacross Asia, in particular, through the emergence of an open,balanced, and inclusive architecture of cooperation in theregion.112 The Joint statement at the end of the dialoguedescribed that Ms. Clinton welcomed Indias leadership role inhelping to shape the rise of a stable, peaceful and prosperous Asia.

They shared their perspectives on South and Central Asia, Eastand Southeast Asia, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean regions

and pledged to expand regular high-level exchanges on regionalissues of mutual concern.113 The second round of the StrategicDialogue was held in New Delhi on July 18-20, 2011. Thepurpose of Strategic Dialogue series was to review the progress incooperation in the areas of partnership and set guidelines toenhance cooperation and propose new areas of partnership.Commenting on the initiative of the Strategic Dialogue, The Hinduwrote that the Strategic Dialogue had led India and United States

to expand significantly the breath of their collaboration across arange of areas.114

Obama administrations National Security Strategy 2010,upheld the U.S. India relationship important for global peace andstability. The National Security Strategy document affirming thedetermination of Obama administration to maintain militarysuperiority and defeat the challenges to international security

through collaboration with its allies, placed India among21centuary centers of influence in Asia and pledged to deepencooperation with it.115The document said: The United States and


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India are building a strategic partnership that is underpinned byour shared interests, our shared values as the worlds two largestdemocracies, and close connections among our people. Indiasresponsible advancement serves as a positive example fordeveloping nations, and provides an opportunity for increasedeconomic, scientific environmental, and security partnership.Working together through our Strategic Dialogue and high-levelvisits, we seek a broad-based relationship in which Indiacontributes to global counterterrorism efforts, nonproliferation,

and helps promote poverty-reduction, education, health, andsustainable agriculture. We value Indias growing leadership on awide array of global issues, through groups such as the G-20, andwill seek to work with India to promote stability in South Asia andelsewhere in the world.116

Obamas three- day visit to India on November 7-9, 2010added tremendous real content to the US-India partnership. This

visit was called significantly successful. This visit was to reassureIndia that the Obama administration valued the partnership andintended to build a genuine strategic alliance on the progress madeduring the Bush years. He called the U.S.-India alliance as one ofthe defining and dispensable partnerships of the 21st centaury.117He welcomed Indias emergence as a major regional and worldpower and said that the United States will work with it topromote peace and stability and to set the rules of interaction with

other nations.118

The contributions of Obamas tour to U.S.-India strategicpartnership, included the U.S. assurances for U.S. support toIndias bid for a permanent seat in U.N. Security Council,announcement for relaxation of controls on export of hightechnology items to India, pledge for expanding and upgrading theU.S. India civil nuclear deal, cooperation in the space, and

defense sectors.119President Obama fully backed Indias fuss aboutterrorism, stemming from Pakistani side in particular. He said:


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We will continue to insist to Pakistan's leaders that terrorist safe-havens within their borders are unacceptable.120

The strategic dialogue enhanced the operation of partnership.The two agreements with regard to counterterrorism cooperationand nuclear civil cooperation signed in July 2010 furtherexpanded the venue of cooperation in sectors of counterterrorismand civil nuclear cooperation. The Counterterrorism CooperationInitiative signed on July 23, 2010 by U.S. Ambassador to India

Timothy J. Roemer and Indian Home Affairs Secretary G.K.Pallai was to enhance cooperation in counter-terrorism,information-sharing, and capacity-building. The agreement was tobuild and expand the joint efficient network against terrorism thatwould redouble the collective efforts to deal effectively withterrorism. The agreement was to provide opportunities to bothpartners to operate jointly in areas like border security, moneylaundering, counterfeit currency and terrorist financing,

maritime, transportation security, cyber security and mega-citypolicing.121 The other agreement about the nuclear civilcooperation was signed on July 30, 2010 by the U.S. UnderSecretary of State for Political Affairs Bill Burns and IndianAmbassador to the United States Meera Shankar, in Washington.

The document was extension of the agreement between India andU.S. on nuclear cooperation, and formally known as theArrangements and Procedures Pursuant to Article 6(iii) of the

Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Peaceful Uses of NuclearEnergy. This agreement facilitated India to reprocess U.S.-obligated nuclear material at its civilian reprocessing facilities. Itwas argued that this agreement would ease the participation of theU.S. firms in Indias growing civil nuclear energy sector. Itreflected the strong commitment of the U.S. Administration tobuilding successfully on the landmark U.S.-India Civil NuclearCooperation Initiative and is a prerequisite for U.S. nuclear fuel

suppliers to conduct business with India.122

Augmented by President Obamas visit to India, the U.S.-India strategic alliance had been more potential. The second


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meeting of strategic dialogue held in New Delhi in July 2011, veryimportant in its character, committed to further broaden anddeepen the U.S.-India global strategic partnership. U.S. Secretaryof State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Indias Minister of ExternalAffairs S. M. Krishna leading the dialogue, reviewed the progressin different areas of relationship and encouraged further measuresin advancing the cooperation to achieve the shared interests. Withregard to global stability and prosperity, Secretary of State HillaryRodham Clinton and Minister of External Affairs S. M. Krishna

acknowledged the United States and Indias shared interests inpromoting stability and prosperity across Asia. They intended toexpand cooperation in the Asia- Pacific region, including inmultilateral forums such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF),East Asia Summit (EAS), and the ASEAN Defence Ministers'Meeting Plus (ADMM+). Both sides also reaffirmed theirsupport for a balanced and inclusive regional architecture and lookforward to holding the recently announced trilateral dialogue

between Japan, India, and the United States, which theyunderlined as a important forum to thrash out issues of mutualconcern. It was argued that the strategic relationship between theUnited States and India in the Asia Pacific region is markedfeature of the overall partnership and one which will increasinglydefine it in the 21st century.123

The leaders of U.S. and India also intended to expand scope of

strategic consultations and work more closely with regard toregional and global issues. They decided to expand strategicconsultations to other regions, including Central Asia, west Asia,Latin America and Caribbean. They also appreciated the bilateraltalks on United Nations matters launched in March 2011 andHillary Clinton reiterated the U.S. pledge about insertion of Indiaas permanent member of U.N. 124 The issue of homeland securityand counter-terrorism was given a special emphasis, and both

sides went over their commitment to further strengthencooperation to eliminate terrorism in all shapes. The jointstatement at the end of the second meeting of Strategic Dialogueprovided that both leaders expressed their shared concern that


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success in Afghanistan and regional and global security requireselimination of safe havens and infrastructure for terrorism andviolent extremism in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The two sidesconfirmed that all terrorist networks must be defeated and calledfor Pakistan to move expeditiously in prosecuting those involvedin the November 2008 Mumbai terror attack.125 In case ofstability and prosperity in Afghanistan, the United States and Indiahad immense consultations and both had made progress to carryout joint development projects in Afghanistan. The United States

had encouraged Indias larger role in Afghanistan to ensure asuccessful military and economic transition in the country. 126

Talking about civil nuclear cooperation, the officials of bothsides reaffirmed their commitment to erect tangible U.S.-Indiacivil nuclear energy cooperation through the participation of U.S.nuclear energy firms in India on the basis of mutually acceptabletechnical and commercial terms and conditions that enable a

viable tariff regime for electricity generated. They stressed theneed to resolve remaining issues over civil nuclear cooperation.127

The Strategic Dialogue is a vital part of drive to widen the US-India partnership. The 2nd meeting of strategic dialogue held inNew Delhi, notably enhanced the level and scope of the U.S.-India strategic partnership, comprising an implicit U.S.commitment to support the Indian bid for permanent membership

in the UN Security Council in a reformed UN, and approval of thepresent Indian role in Afghanistan, which the Americans hadtermed as vital and constructive.128 As the U.S. Officials areconvinced that India can play a significant role in ensuring peaceand stability in Afghanistan, therefore, Obama administrationactively consulted with India during drawing the AFPAK policy.AFPAK policy is heavily dominated by India-U.S. strategiccooperation. Both countries have determined to work together to

achieve AFPAK goals. The U.S. has regarded India as a keypartner in Afghanistan.129 The U.S. special envoy RichardHolbrook for Afghanistan and Pakistan, had declared that we


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cannot settle issues like Afghanistan and many other issues withoutIndias full involvement and its own expression of views.130

The 2nd round of Strategic Dialogue also brought moreimperative outcome when Ms. Hillary Clinton bracketed India asan important actor on the world stage. She pushed India to play asignificant role in the region by exercising political influence inconsonance with its growing economic weight.131 She asked Indiato lead for shaping the future of Asia-Pacific. She said: It is time

(for India) to lead. It has to do more to integrate economicallywith neighbors, Afghanistan and Pakistan and take a moreassertive role across the Asia-pacific.132She added:

This is a time to leadWe are betting onIndias futurethat the opening of Indiasmarkets to world will produce a moreprosperous India and South Asia. We are betting

that Indias vibrant pluralistic society will inspireothers to follow a similar path of tolerance. Weare making this bet not out of blind faith butbecause we have watched your progress withgreat admiration.133

Ms. Clinton statement was meant to push up India to expandits hegemonic role in the region. It created huge disparagement in

China and Pakistan. The Indian Expresscommented that the US callto India to expand its influence across the Asia-pacific was meantto create a counterweight to increasing power of China. It wrote:A weakening U.S. is looking for partnership in sharing not justsome of its global security burden but also maintaining politicaland economic stability in the region.134 China had taken seriousnote of Hillarys statement. China had been closely monitoringthe India-U.S. strategic development. It had underlined the U.S.-

India dialogue a way to put more pressure on China. 135TheChina Postcommented that Clinton urged India to expand itsinfluence eastward, towards Chinas backyard in Southeast Asia


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and the Pacific Rim, as well as engagement in Central Asia, onChinas western flank. She said that the U.S. and India sharedvalues that made them powerful partners in promoting security,democracy and development in areas in which China has made apush for dominance.136 In Chinas view, the fostering U.S.-Indiasecurity alliance would yield immense impact on China securityenvironment. Both countries had been seeking a joint approach tocurb the emergence of China on world map as a global power.One Chinese scholar Zhang Guihong said that both U.S. and

Indian had seen China as a threat to their regional and globalinterests. H said that the U.S. strategy of containment of Chinahad been increasingly developed as a factor influencing AmericasAsia-Pacific strategy. He further commented that as the antiterror policy had occupied a central place in U.S. strategy, theAmericans would not hesitate to use this military strategy in theAsia-Pacific region. This U.S. military strategy in Asia-Pacificregion would have targets like securing influence and location in

Central Asia; the limiting of Western Asias development; and areturn to South East Asia. Within this context, India and theIndian Ocean constitute the bridge for the United States in itsregional military strategy.137

Pakistan also showed serious concern on Hillary Clintonsstatement. Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani said that Pakistanwould not accept hegemony of any state in the region.138

Pakistan Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar commented thatbilateral ties, but not a one-sided relation with the U.S. wasrequired. She added that Pakistan would not accept anyoneshegemony in the region.We have to have a reality-based andpragmatic approach and no one downplays Pakistans currentstrategic significance or importance, not the U.S. or evenIndia.139The Nationin its editorial wrote that Hillarys statementfor pushing India to play a leading role in the region undoubtedly

gave an unmistakable indication that Islamabad did not have muchof a place in the U.S. scheme of things. The editorial further saidthat our decision makers had failed to make out the significance


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of the fairly good glimpses of Washingtons intention that it hadbeen giving since long or they simply overlooked these signs tokeep themselves in the seat of power, regardless of nationalinterests and public opinion. It added that Pakistan needed tocheck out a policy that benefits an independent nation. Ouractive association in the war on terror has done us immeasurablyharm, to the law and order situation, the economy, the peopleswelfare, in fact, every field. The editorial communicated thatPakistan must realize the realities of time. We must not remain

in doubt about Washingtons plans of building up new Delhi atour cost.140

Since the inaugural of the Strategic Dialogue in 2010, theU.S.-India partnership has been advancing steadfastly in nearlyevery area of cooperation. Both countries have been expandingtheir strategic consultations on all major issues of all regions of theworld. The strategic relations which includes defence

cooperation, counter terrorism cooperation, intelligence sharing,and nuclear cooperation have been tremendously increasing.

ConclusionGiven the facts, it is evident that India-U.S. strategic

relationship has taken a concrete shape and its effects areexecution in fields of defense, nuclear and anti terror efforts.Choosing India as a potential partner in the Asian security affairs,

Washington has been betting on Indias growing stature. TheAmericans counts on Indias rise as a leading power that wouldplay prominent role in Asia-Pacific affairs. They believe thatIndias role as a main player in the Asia-Pacific would bringstability in the area. South Asia region would be stable under theleadership of India, as it has been following the policy ofdeveloping joint development plans to improve infrastructure andcapacity in Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka and the Maldives, and it

also determines to reengage with Pakistan through normalize andstabilize the trade contacts. The U.S policy makers areappreciating Indias determination to contribute in rebuilding of


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Afghanistan with huge amount of multibillion dollars. They hopethat it would be defining for future political and economic setupin Afghanistan.141 The U.S. has been convinced also that India,besides Japan and Australia, has all potentials to protect the U.S.interests in Asia-Pacific region in particular which is main domainof U.S. global strategy aiming at containment of the increasingmilitary and economic might of China. Both countries havelaunched a strategic dialogue on the Asia-Pacific, in order toexpand cooperation in different areas.

As Japan has been accepting wider responsibilities in Asia-Pacific region, India is attempting to foster strategic relations with

Japan. U.S.- Japan and India also have been making joint strive todeal with the regional security issues. For this purpose they hadheld their first trilateral dialogue in December 19, 2011 inWashington. The meeting covered international issues includingIrans nuclear policy and the going on situation in Afghanistan.

The meeting also discussed the possibilities and opportunities fordeepening of strategic ties between three countries. The Indiansources revealed that the talks marked the start a series ofconsultations among the three governments, which sharedcommon values and interests across the Asia-Pacific and the globe.All sides appreciated the frank and comprehensive character of thedialogue, and agreed that the discussions would help advance theirshared values and interests.142 In view of the experts, it was an

very important meeting between the U.S.- Japan and India whoserelations have been in a transformational stage." This firsttrilateral meeting provided them an opportunity to begin theprocess of operationalzing Indo-Pacific cooperation as a seamlessconstruct in areas such as maritime security cooperation, counter-terrorism, counter-piracy, counter-proliferation, disaster reliefand humanitarian assistance." 143

Chinas reaction to the meeting was very cautious. ChineseForeign Ministrys spokesman said in a warning tone, in a mediabriefing, that "US, Japan and India are countries with greatinfluence in the Asia-Pacific region. We hope the trilateral


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meeting will be conducive to regional peace and stability."144Though U.S. State Department affirmed that there was nodiscussions about Chinas expanding influence in Asia-Pacific,145Media expressed that the meeting aimed at strategy to containChina. The Times of Indiawrote that the meeting raised eyebrowsin Beijing as it came against the backdrop of disputes betweenChina and its neighbours like Vietnam, Malaysia, Philippines, andBrunei over the resource-rich South China Sea.146China Dailyalsowrote with reference of theWall Street Journalthat though this

meeting agenda had not mentioned China, it discussed securitymatters of Asia-Pacific region in the wake of expanding power ofchina. The Journal wrote: "Security of sea lanes ofcommunication, coordination of humanitarian assistance andglobal terrorism were the focus. But China was the unspokensubtext."147

Presently Afghanistan situation is a test case for the U.S.-India

strategic partnership. The successful transition in Afghanistan,within the U.S. strategy, is considered by the American andIndians as a important area where their shared interests areplaying. Both countries actively consult on AFPAK policy, and aredetermined to work together for success of AFPAK policy.148Explaining the shared interests of Unites States and India inAfghanistan, the U.S. Ambassador to India Timothy J. Roemerunderlined: Our core goal in Afghanistan and Pakistan to

disrupt, dismantle and defeat terrorist network is an aspirationwe share with India. India is a key global partner of UnitedStates and we value the positive role India continues to play in theregion, including its significant humanitarian contributions toAfghanistan.149

India and Afghanistan signed a strategic partnershipagreement on October 4, 2011 that aimed at creating an

institutional framework for the future cooperation in the fields ofpolitical and security cooperation, trade and economiccooperation, capacity building and education, and social, cultural,


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civil society and people to people contacts. Both sides also signedMOUs for cooperation in the field of mining and hydrocarbons.150 Dawn, commented that this agreement was meant tosecure guarantee to the security of Afghanistan, as internationaltroops begin withdrawing from the war-torn country.151 Indiaparticipated in two international conferences on the future ofAfghanistan, held in Istanbul and Bonn in November andDecember 2011. India was the only country in the conferenceswith which Afghanistan has signed a security agreement. The US

welcomed the India Afghanistan strategic deal and called it aroute for India to participate in the new Silk Road initiative.152

Pakistans condemnationThe India-United States strategic partnership has

tremendously deteriorated Pakistans relations with United Statesto unprecedented depths. Once titled as most allied ally of UnitedStates in mid 20th century, Pakistan has been facing huge strategic

reversals in beginning of 21st

century, entailed by India-U.S.strategic alliance. There is a heavy disillusionment on Pakistanside. Pakistan has delivered a very sharp response to U.S. Indiastrategic partnership. Pakistan has called this partnership adestabilizing factor in strategic balance in South Asia. Pakistansformer Foreign Minister Agha Shahi said that the United Stateshad ignored the imperatives of a strategic balance in South Asia.Indias strategic partnership with United States will enable India to

project power in area.153

Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Pakistani experton South Asian security affairs, commented that the US-Indiadeal has not just destroyed the non-proliferation regime at theglobal level but has also created a new category of nuclear weaponstate. It has allowed India to enjoy all the benefits withoutadhering to the NPT.154 He further said that the U.S. relationswith India at the cost of Pakistans legitimate interests andregional stability had created adverse situation for Pakistan. The

government in Pakistan is likely to be subjected to intensepressures to re-evaluate its regional and global policy pursuits.155Similarly, another Pakistani political scientist Dr. Nasrullah Mirza


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commented that the US objective of making India global orregional military power impinges upon security interests of otherregional countries, especially Pakistan. The Indo-US nuclear dealposes grave repercussions on the deterrence stability in SouthAsia.156 He further said that In such a strategic environment, itwould be prudent for Pakistan to reevaluate its policy of credibleminimum deterrence to counter the Indian threat and maintaindeterrence stability in South Asia.157

However, the Pakistanis are convinced that, given the India-U.S. deals in

defense and nuclear areas, Islamabad has right to carry on its nuclearprogramme. So that, a strategic balance vis--vis India must be maintained.Despite Pakistans valued contributions in war against terrorism, Pakistan hasnot been succeeded to shed its international stature as a bree

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