3rd Briefing Paper- Ireland Arthur Parkinson, Declan Redmond and Mark Scott

1. Introduction

This paper presents the results relating to the Irish case study cities and town from Work Package 3 of the JPI-Cultural Heritage project, ‘A Sustainable Future for the Historic Urban Core’ (SHUC). Work Package 1 examined the impacts of the recent economic and fiscal crisis on historic cores in each of the three participating countries, and Work Package 2 provided knowledge on how approaches, aiming to sustain the historic urban core, are being reformed in this context. On the basis of findings from the first two Work Packages, the 3 rd

Work Package is intended to draw lessons from comparative analysis of policy responses from each of the participating countries about the likely consequences of reform and the potential for meaningful policy transfer. To this end, the principal research questions to be addressed in Work Package 3 are, firstly, to what extent are models and methods of managing the historic urban core transferable between countries and, secondly, what is the scope for effective policy transfer. This paper therefore begins by examining existing and potential policy strengths and weaknesses in each of the three Irish case study locations separately. General existing and potential strengths are outlined, followed by policy and governance strengths. General weaknesses are then outlined, followed by those relating more specifically to policy and governance. This, firstly, enables conclusions to be drawn on what areas of Irish policy might benefit from the adoption of new approaches from elsewhere. It also helps to establish what aspects of the management of the Irish case study locations might hold potential for transfer to the other participating countries. Following this, the findings from Work Packages 1 and 2 are examined to conclude on what policies and management approaches in the UK and the Netherlands offer scope for transfer to Ireland, and the potential to address the deficiencies identified in the Irish case study locations.

2. Case Study Trajectories

Limerick

General existing and potential strengthsLimerick city possesses a historic core of substantial size given its population, within

which a very substantial stock of historic buildings is located. Of particular note in this regard is an intact and attractive Georgian district, built on a strong gridiron layout. Limerick’s historic core is also located adjacent to the River Shannon. While public realm improvements have begun to enhance the riverfront, there is considerable further potential to enhance the relationship between the river and the city core, to the wider benefit and attractiveness of the core as a shopping, leisure and residential location of choice. Related to this, the council recently took advantage of lower land values to purchase the riverfront Opera Centre site, which is strategically sited between the Georgian and medieval quarters, and has potential to

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shift the predominant land use of the historic core from retail towards cultural and educational. Outside the historic core, a pharmaceuticals plant has been established by Regeneron, with the potential for Limerick to benefit in the longer-term from Ireland’s strong, high-skilled pharmaceutical industry, to date, focused on bases in Cork and Dublin (McCafferty and O’Keeffe, 2014). This holds the potential in the longer-term to enhance the spending power of the local population and impact on the strength of the economy of the wider city. An enhanced historic core would complement, and stand to benefit from, this strength.

Strengths in policy and governanceLocal policy and governance are also strong in a number of respects. Aside from the

large number of protected structures (693), and six architectural conservation areas, An Taisce: The National Trust for Ireland has compiled a local register of buildings at risk, highlighting extent of vacancy, dereliction and threat to built heritage, and the need for urgent action. The current Development Plan also identifies a series of distinct cultural quarters, including the Medieval and Georgian Quarters, for potential future promotion and enhancement, capitalising on their heritage assets (Limerick City Council, 2010, p.76). Limerick 2030: An Economic and Spatial Plan for Limerick compliments the Development Plan in this regard, seeking to capitalise on heritage assets for tourism, business, and wider economic benefit. It was published in 2013, and has an emphasis on incentivising private-sector investment (Limerick City Council and Limerick County Council, 2013, p.xviii). The Living City Initiative tax incentive scheme, discussed in greater detail in the Irish Work Package 2 briefing paper, has also recently been approved at European level. As one of the selected pilot cities, Limerick’s city core stands to benefit from the decreased levels of vacancy and increased residential use that this holds the potential to bring.

Within the wider city, the Limerick Regeneration Framework Implementation Plan was published in 2013. This relates to regeneration of disadvantaged residential districts outside historic core, but with potential impact on the vitality of the historic core, and city as a whole, and is of particular importance given Limerick’s social profile, and comparatively high rate of unemployment. With respect to the governance of Limerick’s historic core, the recent merger of Limerick City and County Councils holds the potential for the more coordinated planning and management of the city and county, particularly in decision-making at county level, or relating to peripheral areas that might impact on the vitality of the city core. Resulting from this merger, the new City and County Council have announced their decision to proceed with one City and County Development Plan in future, rather than continuing to pursue separate urban and county-level plans, as to date.

General weaknessesDespite the above strengths, the city also suffers from a substantial number and range

of weaknesses that hamper the attractiveness and vitality of its historic core. Limerick was particularly badly hit by the economic crisis of 2008, with the loss of key manufacturing companies in recent years. The city also suffers from the fact that a high proportion of its

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population are classified as belonging to unskilled and semi-skilled social class groups (approx. one fifth), yet the city lacks adequate job opportunities in lower-qualified positions (McCafferty and O’Keeffe, 2014). The resulting high unemployment rate of 29% (CSO, 2011) has the effect of leading to lower consumer demand. Each of these factors contributes to the attractiveness (or otherwise) of the city as a place to live and visit, evident in its low population growth rate (5.7% between 2002-2011), and with a physical impact on the historic core in terms of its high vacancy level of c. 32% (Indecon, 2013). These factors have been compounded by the extent and manner of development during the boom period, which McCafferty and O’Keeffe (2014) argue did not provide a sound basis for the city’s sustainable development. For example, former tax incentive schemes led to the migration of office uses out of the historic core and into the docklands area.

Weaknesses in policy and governance Two tax relief schemes are of particular note with respect to the historic core of

Limerick city. Firstly, the former Living Over the Shop scheme, which operated on a national basis, suffered from poor levels of uptake in Limerick, and had only minimal impact. Indecon (2013) cite reasons for this as including poor resourcing, management and marketing of the scheme, alongside the perceived disruption to businesses arising from refurbishment and alterations. Secondly, as mentioned above, while the Living City Initiative is an innovative incentive model, and Limerick’s selection as a pilot location is a potential strength, it has been argued (Indecon, 2013) that the level of tax relief on offer is too low given the expense involved in converting and conserving the often large-scale historic buildings at which it is targeted. Furthermore, few individuals have the financial and practical capacity to take on this scale of conservation project.

In terms of governance, despite the recent amalgamation of Limerick City and County Councils, three of the city’s outer suburbs remain outside the new council’s functional area (Shannonbanks, Westbury and Parteen) and, instead, remain the responsibility of Clare County Council. The continuing isolation of these districts holds the potential to complicate planning for housing and retail provision. This is particularly the case given the absorption of the Mid-West Regional Authority into larger Regional Assembly, which McCafferty and O’Keeffe (2014, p.108) argue may lead to the loss of “knowledge capital”, and a lesser focus on collaboration between local authorities. At a more local level, but reflecting trends state-wide, built heritage suffers from poor allocation of resources, evident in the fact that Limerick City Council had no conservation or heritage officers for a number of years. The lack of state investment in heritage continues to be a weakness, particularly when compared with proportionate levels of state investment in the UK and the Netherlands.

Waterford

General existing and potential strengthsAs already established in the Irish briefing paper to Work Package 2, Waterford

possesses both a significant Viking, and Anglo-Norman, history. Though few buildings

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remain from the Viking period, substantial remnants from the Anglo-Norman period (and later) remain, and the city has harnessed this Viking history, and Anglo-Norman and later historic structures, in its core in marketing and regeneration strategies. As an integral element within these strategies, significant public realm improvements have been completed, significantly enhancing the attractiveness of the area around the ‘Viking Triangle’ in particular. However, Waterford’s historic core is also located immediately adjacent to the River Suir, and the Viking Triangle has an even closer relationship with the river than Limerick’s core. This also holds the potential for future enhancement, and considerably further enhancing the attractiveness of the city core. Recent population growth in the suburbs of Waterford (of 123.5% between 2002-2011) also holds the potential to strengthen the historic core as the local retail and leisure destination of choice. With respect to the city’s wider economy, Waterford Institute of Technology possesses research centres in IT, pharmaceuticals, and biotechnology. These offer the potential to enhance the city’s economy in these sectors, and to have broader impacts in the longer-term on employment and the spending power of the local population. Of particular note is the ArcLab Research and Innovation Centre, which seeks to assist entrepreneurs in starting up high-tech businesses (DKM, 2013, p.11). The city also enjoys direct air links to London and Birmingham, which also holds the potential to positively impact on the city’s business prospects.

Strengths in policy and governanceLike Limerick, a large number of buildings in the city are protected structures, though

at 922 structures in total, this represents an even greater level of protection, given Waterford’s relatively smaller size. Waterford also has three designated architectural conservation areas. Also like Limerick, An Taisce: The National Trust for Ireland has compiled a local register of buildings at risk, providing the same benefits. Heritage more broadly is also subject to the detailed, but clear and concise City Heritage Plan (Waterford City Council, 2009a), which explicitly relates specific objectives, actions, and the broad range of agencies and civil society organisations intended to carry them out. It also indicates clear timescales for meeting objectives. Waterford’s City Core Report (Waterford City Council, 2009b) sets out a strong vision for the future physical development of the entire city core. This is complimented by a coordinated tourism strategy, the Waterford Experience, which seeks to capitalise on the city’s physical heritage and association with Waterford Crystal to leverage public and private sector investment in historic core (Waterford City Council, 2011). This comprises, firstly, the ‘Viking Triangle’ initiative, which seeks to use physical heritage assets in city branding and, secondly, the ‘Proposed Waterford Crystal Visitor Centre’. An economic strategy has also been prepared for the city, again setting out a strong vision, proposing a comprehensive setoff actions in 8 key areas, including an emphasis on the potential for heritage-related tourism to create jobs and business opportunities (DKM, 2013).

Like Limerick, Waterford’s City and County Councils were recently merged, offering the potential for more coordinated planning for the city and its hinterland. Waterford, however, does not suffer from the legacy of the historical local administrative boundaries that

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cut some of Limerick’s outer suburbs off from the rest of the local authority’s functional area. Waterford is also a pilot city in the Living City Initiative tax incentive scheme and, as discussed with regard to Limerick’s historic core, above, Waterford also stands to benefit from the decreased levels of vacancy and increased residential use that this holds the potential to bring.

General weaknessesThough larger than Drogheda, Waterford has a smaller population than comparable

cities elsewhere in the country, and “has failed to reach its potential the principal economic driver/centre for the south-east and is weak at a county level” (DKM, 2013, p.12). DKM further argue that the city has been slow to transition from manufacturing to services industries, particularly in IT. Related to this, the city also has a low skill level in this area.

Waterford was particularly badly hit by the 2008 economic crisis, as discussed above with respect to Limerick’s experience. Similarly, therefore, the city suffers from an unemployment rate of 25% (Indecon, 2013), with a corresponding detrimental effect on consumer demand. The city’s social profile is also comparable with that of Limerick, possessing a high proportion of people in unskilled and semi-skilled social class groups (again, approximately one fifth). In Waterford, considerable damage was done to city centre retail prior to 2008 through the development of out-of-town retail, and DKM Economic Consultants (2013, p.12) point out that the city’s retail offer is generally weak.

Weaknesses in policy and governanceDKM Economic Consultants (2013, p.12) have argued that employment land-use

zoning has been too dispersed around the city environs and other nearby towns, which DKM Economic Consultants (2013, p.12), and that this approach is not sustainable. This is particularly relevant to, and inconsistent with, the current policy emphasis on revitalising the fortunes of the Viking Triangle in the city’s historic centre. Furthermore, policy that tends to emphasise the potential of harnessing the city’s heritage assets for tourism and wider economic benefit puts a considerable level of faith in the capacity of this strategy to deliver significant benefits in the longer-term. The capacity of the Waterford Experience (and Viking Triangle initiative) to deliver a lasting impact in the context of Waterford’s present broader economic weaknesses is not yet clear.

Like both of the other Irish case study locations, Waterford city is situated immediately adjacent to the administrative boundary with another local authority – in this case, that of Co. Kilkenny. Significant housing, retail (Ferrybank), and industrial (ABP Waterford, and Waterford Proteins) development has taken place within the functional area of Co. Kilkenny. This administrative division holds the potential to complicate planning, and to make it more difficult to coordinate development and the provision of services and facilities. The Living Over The Shop scheme suffered similar problems as in Limerick, with poor levels of uptake and limited impact. Like Limerick, the Living City Initiative applies to areas of Waterford’s historic core. The general criticisms of both schemes outlined above in relation to Limerick area also applicable to Waterford.

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Drogheda

General existing and potential strengthsDrogheda’s historic core possesses a substantial and relatively intact stock of historic

buildings, and a very strong sense of legibility due to its undulating topography and striking landmark buildings situated at key points around the town. Furthermore, Drogheda is located on the Dublin-Belfast corridor, providing good access and transport links with both of the two key settlements and economic divers on the island of Ireland, and particularly with Dublin. In addition, the town is also located within the Boyne Valley, one of ten locations around Ireland identified as key tourism destinations. As such, there is the potential to further develop the reputation of Drogheda as an integral part of the Boyne Valley tourism offer.

Aside from its physical and geographical assets, the population living in Drogheda’s environs grew by 204% between 2002-2011. This significant increase provides Drogheda with a much larger population within easy reach of the historic core, and enhances the potential to strengthen Drogheda’s historic core as the principal retail and leisure destination for both the town and its environs.

Strengths in policy and governanceIn terms of built heritage policy, a significant number of structures are protected in the

town (401 in total). There are also a total of 18 Architectural Conservation Areas in Drogheda, 13 of which are located within the Heritage Quarter (see below). The current development plan has also designated nine development opportunity sites, each within the Heritage Quarter, and subject to reduced development contributions. The current development plan for Drogheda has also designated seven character areas within the town, and it is intended to publish a framework plan for each of these. Of these, the Heritage Quarter relates to the town centre, and a detailed Urban Design Framework Plan has been prepared which, amongst other proposals, provides guidance on the potential for new residential to be provided in existing buildings. Guidance is also included on how to achieve a balance between retention of older buildings and plots, and the need to accommodate large-scale uses within the historic core – notably, new retail use. This is significant given that the current Development Plan is unclear on how to resolve this issue (Drogheda Borough Council, 2011, p.52). Current policy also proposes to enhance and capitalise on the town’s heritage assets for tourism benefit, notably the walled historic core as a whole – and the town walls, specifically. More specifically, the “walled town of Drogheda” is recognised in policy as one of a number of sites that comprise the Boyne Valley Tourism Destination, itself one of ten designated world-class tourism destinations across Ireland (Louth County Council, 2014a, pp.28, 190).

In terms of employment, regional policy identifies financial services as the dominant sector in the northeast, and seeks to harness the proximity of Drogheda to Dublin to attract overseas companies wishing to establish a European base, or Dublin firms looking to expand their financial services, thereby potentially creating new employment opportunities.

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Drogheda is specifically identified in policy as a target location in this regard. (BRPA, 2010, p.70).

With respect to retail, current policy for Drogheda is set in the context of considerable growth in out of town retail provision in the last ten or so years. However, alongside this, retail offer in Drogheda’s town centre has deteriorated, and vacancy increased. As a result, recent and current policy documents recognise the potential for new retail outside the town centre to damage that within the town centre, and the preferred location for new retail development is now within existing town centres, or in the form of more limited development within designated district and neighbourhood centres (Louth County Council, 2014b).

General weaknessesAs in Limerick and Waterford, Drogheda has experienced increased levels of

unemployment through closure of key local businesses. However, in Drogheda, this process was well-established prior to the 2008 crash (Drogheda Borough Council, 2005, p.57), with the sustained loss of traditional industries in addition to more recent jobs losses (Redmond et al., 2014). As acknowledged in the above discussion of strengths in current retail policy for Drogheda, town centre retail has suffered from the development of out-of-town retail. It is notable that some of the larger retail developments on Drogheda’s periphery are outside Drogheda Borough District (the functional area of the former Drogheda Borough Council). While policy is now attempting to address this, the town has been left with a legacy of high and increasing levels of retail vacancy and dereliction in the town centre, particularly at the west end of the retail core (Drogheda Borough Council, 2011, p.51).

With respect to the town’s physical heritage assets, though the local authority has invested directly in key heritage sites in historic core (notably including the Tholsel, and Highlanes Gallery), the sum invested is low, particularly when compared with levels of direct state investment in historic buildings in the Netherlands. Furthermore, built heritage in the town centre has suffered from long-term neglect and lack of basic maintenance. For example, though public money was invested in conservation works to Butter Gate in 2006 (a surviving remnant of the town’s walled circuit), maintenance has been inadequate, and the site has quickly fallen into a dangerous state once again. The remains of the Old Abbey, at Old Abbey Lane – and the lane, itself – are similarly neglected.

Weaknesses in policy and governanceCompared with the other two case study settlements, and with other larger urban

settlements in Ireland, Drogheda’s civil society / voluntary sector is now well established. For example, there is no local An Taisce association, these is no local An Taisce buildings at risk database, and the Drogheda Civic Trust was only established as recently as 2010. As discussed above, a substantial extent Drogheda’s historic core is subject to a comparatively large number of ACAs for a settlement of its size, and a strong level of protection of this kind is a policy strength. However, the fact that there are as many as 18 discrete and relatively small ACAs within the town holds the potential for the conservation of the heritage townscape inside each of these areas, and within Drogheda’s historic core as a whole, to

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become disjointed, piecemeal, and inconsistent. Though design guidance has become much stronger recently, particularly with the publication of the Urban Framework Plan for Drogheda’s Heritage Quarter, current policy and guidance are not clear as to how priority objective actions (e.g. redevelopment of Old Abbey area; re-use of Tholsel) will be implemented in practice (i.e. funding strategy, and the specific role of key actors named in guidance). Furthermore, although Drogheda has not been selected for implementation of the Living City Initiative at this stage, the high levels of vacancy and under-used historic properties in the Heritage Quarter suggests that it could benefit considerably from such an initiative. Related to this, and despite the strong retail policy to emerge following the 2008 economic and fiscal crisis (discussed above), further out-of-town retail provision is currently zoned for, and permissions granted, suggesting a certain level of path-dependency in this regard.

In terms of the wider town’s governance, Drogheda and its environs until recently fell within the functional areas of three local authorities. This led to a number of sometimes overlapping plans and strategies, making planning for the town and its environs more complex, and potentially leading to poor coordination, for example in relation to retail provision. However, recent policy has stressed the importance of close coordination between each local planning authority (RPS, 2007, p.15). Furthermore, Drogheda Borough Council was amalgamated with Louth County Council in 2014, potentially leading to better coordination in planning for the town. However, this has also meant that Drogheda has lost its status as the seat of the local authority, which is based in the neighbouring town of Dundalk, and the town’s southern environs remain within the separate functional area of the neighbouring Meath County Council. This is in contrast with Limerick and Waterford, where the local authorities are still present within the case study towns.

Comparison and Contrast

This section of the paper compiles the findings in the above sections and summarises them together, with the intention of identifying key ways in which Ireland may benefit from the contrasting perspective and approaches adopted in the UK and the Netherlands. This informs the subsequent and final section of the paper which seeks to identify specific approaches from the other counties that may be of benefit in Ireland.

Existing environmentEach of the Irish case study locations has substantial heritage assets, but each case

study settlement also suffers from under-use and dereliction of significant numbers of historic structures. With the exception of a number of notable local authority investments, particularly in more recent years, many historic buildings are suffering from long-term neglect, and key landmark structures lack basic ongoing care and maintenance, in some cases making them dangerous to the public, and jeopardising their survival in the short-term. In this context, it is clear that, at least until relatively recent years, the three case study settlements have not utilised their built heritage assets to their full potential. The potential of natural heritage

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assets (e.g. riverfront locations) has also been neglected. At this point in time, it is too early to ascertain the extent to which Ireland’s increased policy emphasis on heritage as an economic driver will have a significant or lasting impact. However, where the private sector is unable or unwilling to intervene, there is a strong case for a greater level of public sector intervention to prevent the loss of key heritage assets. Approaches in the UK and the Netherlands in this regard may be of interest in developing approaches in Ireland.

Built heritage and design policy and guidanceIn general, guidance relating to the management of historic cores, and urban design

guidance in particular, has much improved since the 2008 crisis. However implementation of proposals is sometimes insufficiently detailed or developed (e.g. funding strategies, roles of different actors), and the impact of this new guidance is as yet untested. Again, approaches adopted in the UK and the Netherlands may be of interest in developing approaches in the Irish context.

The longer established Architectural Conservation Area mechanism of statutory heritage protection in Ireland is being implemented somewhat inconsistently, with relatively modest numbers designated in Limerick and Waterford (six and three, respectively), yet 18 designated in the smallest of the three case study settlements, Drogheda. Particularly in the context of Drogheda, where the character of substantial areas of its historic core is under immediate threat of loss through vacancy and under-use, there is a need for further clarification of the role of ACAs as a mechanism for the preservation of the character of urban areas, and consideration of the possibility of consolidation through designation of fewer, larger areas. Approaches to the statutory protection of urban areas in the UK and the Netherlands should be further investigated to determine whether there are different perspectives from which the Irish system can benefit.

Inter-related economic and tourism policy/strategyIt is also of note that local authorities and other state actors are presently committed to

pursuing a strategy that seeks to capitalise on heritage assets in historic cores for tourism and wider economic benefit. Though state actors are engaged in other initiatives to regenerate the wider economy of each case study settlement, significant economic and social weaknesses remain in each location. It is too early to conclude on the extent of the long-term impact of heritage-led strategies in this wider context. Where other participating countries have had similar experiences, these may be useful in the development of these kinds of strategies in the Irish context.

Retail policyThere is a need to maintain the new-found recognition of the importance of city cores

as the principal retail centres in cities, and to protect this as the key determinant factor guiding the scale and location of new retail developments. This will become particularly important as Ireland emerges from an extended period of austerity, and experiences renewed development pressure, particularly in suburban locations in the rural-urban fringe. In parallel with this, there is also a need to find ways of encouraging and accommodating the provision

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of larger retail units in historic urban cores where possible. While recent design guidance is strong in this regard, this needs the support of all relevant actors in order to succeed. Despite these changes in approach, a level of path dependency remains in relation to out-of-town retail. Large-scale out-of-town retail developments that were granted permission and constructed prior to 2008 remain, and in some cases suffer from low occupancy levels. These hold the potential to continue to detract from the sustainable development of retail in historic cores. Should town centre retail continue to struggle, new and creative approaches may need to be considered to find ways of reversing town centre decline.

Finance and IncentivesAs outlined in the papers to work packages 1 and 2, the level of state investment in

built heritage has fallen significantly since 2008, though was at a low level in Ireland prior to the economic crisis. In the interviews, support was voiced for the possibility that emerging economic recovery may enable greater levels of state investment in heritage. However, it is ironic that built heritage – intended in policy to be a driver of economic recovery – may only receive significant increases in state investment following economic recovery. There is also a danger that current incentive-based initiatives will not attract adequate interest from the private sector. In this context, these may deliver insufficient benefits to historic cores to make a substantial difference to their long-term vibrancy and sustainability.

GovernanceThough consolidation of local government in all three case study locations in 2014 is

likely to lead to better coordination in planning for the historic cores and their hinterlands, the continued administrative isolation of peripheral areas of all three case study locations holds the potential to complicate planning. Co-ordination between local authorities is essential in this context. The local government reorganisation of 2014 also holds the potential to lead to neglect in Drogheda where the principal administrative presence, formerly in the historic core, has been relocated to another town. This change has the effect of moving local democracy further away from the town, a situation that is exacerbated by Drogheda’s weak voluntary sector. Though civil society is comparatively weak in Ireland generally, including in all three case study locations, it is particularly so in Drogheda. There is therefore considerable scope for development of the voluntary sector and enhancement of its role in the management of historic cores.

EmploymentIn all three case study locations, key industries have been lost, leading to high

unemployment levels, and a negative impact on consumer demand. In turn, the resultant lower spending power of the local population has had a knock-on effect on the vitality of city and town cores. With regard to future employment, there is a need to capitalise on the local strengths identified in existing plans and strategies. More specifically, job creation should be related to these strengths, and must be more sustainable in the longer-term – and resilient to economic shifts. For example, in addition to the emphasis on heritage and tourism evident in current policy, this might involve the development of a local long-term pharmaceutical

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industry in Limerick, or the attraction of the financial services sector to Drogheda. However, due to the high proportion of lower social class groups and low proportion of high social class groups (related to occupation) in the three case study locations, there is a need for a range of job opportunities in the shorter term – and not just longer-term jobs in high-skilled areas.

3. Potential for policy transfer

In the context of the above identified weaknesses, and drawing on the individual country briefing papers, and synthesis papers, from work packages 1 and 2, the potential for policy transfer to Ireland has been considered. Relevant approaches in the UK and the Netherlands have been narrowed to three broad themes, as follows. Firstly, planning and conservation legislation; secondly, approaches to the role of the state, voluntary and private sectors in the governance of historic urban cores; and thirdly, contrasting approaches to financial incentives and funding. These are discussed below, and comment made on their relevance to policy transfer to Ireland.

Planning and conservation legislationThough a detailed review of UK and Netherlands legislation has not been conducted

as part of this paper, three key aspects of legislation stand out against that in Ireland. Firstly, within the UK, every listed building is assigned a ‘grade’ relating to the level of heritage interest, providing a basic level of differentiation between buildings. Though this does not relate to what parts of a building are protected, it can provide a guide to policymakers and building owners in relation to allocation of funding.

Recalibration of the role of state, voluntary, and private sectors in governance of historic urban cores

In the UK, the role of state, voluntary and private sectors was balanced differently before the 2008 economic crisis, but has also evolved since 2008. In particular, local communities, amenity societies, and private companies have an enhanced role in legislation and policy relating to the management of the historic environment. This contrasts with the Irish context, where the state tends to be dominant in regulation, and the private sector is often the primary source of finance. More specifically, civic amenity organisations have a formal role in the regeneration, management, and marketing of historic cities and districts (e.g. Norwich Heart). This includes the monitoring of planning applications. Furthermore, civic amenity organisations are also provided with the opportunity to long-lease and manage local authority-owned buildings.

Private-sector actors are also more active in the management of historic properties in the UK than in Ireland, for example in York, where they have acquired ownership of a portfolio of historic properties, notably including for use as social housing. These various non-state actors, with a more active and substantive role (whether formal or informal) in the management of the historic environment, are able to exploit cocktail public-sector funding. Though individual sources of funding are small, it is secured from multiple sources, and in a

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co-ordinated manner, and is therefore of more tangible benefit than would otherwise be possible.

With respect to the Netherlands, it is clear that local authorities are evolving to have a consultative rather than a leadership role, and local business groups are taking more of a leading role in planning decision-making in historic cores. In principle, this is comparable with approaches being adopted in the UK, but with perhaps less emphasis on the role of civil society organisations.

Although at present the voluntary sector in Ireland tends to be less directly involved in decision-making, the general principal of the contrasting UK approaches outlined here might address some key weaknesses in current Irish case study locations, including high levels of vacancy, and a lack of clarity in the practical implementation of proposals in design policy and guidelines. Further, the more leading role played by the private sector in regulation and decision-making in the Netherlands, though within the bounds of regulations still defined by local authorities, holds the potential to be explored in the Irish context, with a view to addressing the current high level of threat to heritage assets.

Financial incentives and fundingIn the UK, multiple funding sources include grants for low carbon refurbishment of

buildings, sustainable mobility, city branding and tourism promotion, as well as UK National Lottery funding of up to £375 million per annum dedicated to heritage initiatives (physical conservation, promotional, and educational). In the Netherlands, funding sources include a job creation scheme similar in nature to the Built Heritage Jobs Leverage Scheme in Ireland, provision of low-interest loans to owners of key historic properties for conservation alongside energy upgrade works, as well as direct state and/or local authority funding of heritage assets, rather than the greater reliance on tax incentives more traditionally and currently seen in Ireland. Perhaps what most distinguishes the Netherlands out from Ireland is the consistent high level of state finance for historic buildings that exists alongside these other initiatives.

The method of harnessing of the above alternative and/or multiple funding sources in both the UK and the Netherlands is closely related to the changing role of different actors described above. While multiple grant funding streams have been available in Ireland in the past, albeit at a much lower level in the heritage sector, and to a further reduced level at present, the structures and management approaches that have emerged post-crisis in the UK and the Netherlands enable both civil society organisations, and the private sector, to harness this funding more effectively and in a more coordinated and strategic manner. The more consistent funding (from a range of sources) and multiple actors with a substantive role and stake in the management of historic cores in both the UK and the Netherlands contrasts with the varied and more limited approach in Ireland, and offers the potential for consideration of the development of new approaches, comparable in principle, at both national and local levels, within the Irish context.

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4. Conclusions

This briefing paper has shown that the economic crisis has had significant negative impacts on the historic cores of the three case study areas. Poor economic conditions have led to lack of private investment in built heritage, while the perilous condition of public finances has meant that the state has not been in a position to invest in the built environment either. Underlying this have been longer term trends such as the movement of population and housing from the historic core to the suburbs and beyond, with the development of out-of-town retail space compounding the issue. Taken together, this has led to underuse and dereliction in the historic core, to that extent that in some of the case study areas, some built heritage is at risk. On the positive side, however, the cores still retain substantial built heritage assets which can be used in interesting and innovative ways. So, there are good examples of local authorities, despite economic conditions, being pro-active in terms of policy and practice. The example of Waterford using the Viking Triangle as a means of generating tourism and name recognition is encouraging as is the example of Limerick investing in property in the inner core in an attempt to develop key sites. These are examples of good local leadership by local authorities. Nationally, the economy has started to recover from the depths of recession, with employment increasing and the public finances improving. However, so far much of this recovering is confined to the Dublin region and the case study areas have not experienced the same level of recovery, so that repairing the urban core will be a long term task. There are lessons from the UK and the Netherlands as to how this might be done, as discussed in section 3, but policy transfer is a complex process, so it remains to be seen the degree to which transfer of polices and practice happens.

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References

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CSO (Central Statistics Office) (2011) Area profile for Drogheda legal town and its environs co. Louth/Meath. Dublin: CSO.

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