"

'. -,... . _.. 1\.,.,. a:z: -

MORl DoclD: 1451843

)

23J U N197Z

l·JE.klOR.\~lDt.il-f FOR: Executive Director/Co:l:ptrollcr

VIA : Acting Deputy Director for' Plans

SUBJECT ,, Agency Sllpnort to the ti.S, ~ccrct Service'(USSS) for'l,ationai"'!)'c'!'locratic (iO-14 .Jul y1972) and ~;ationa1 Republican: (21-24 :\Uf,u::;t1972) Conventions

1. This ~'1cporl1ndu

c. CIA ~ou1d keep the USSS inforncd Ot a~y eventsin the Caribbean and Latin American ~rcas thnt ~culdhave any !Je.1rin?; on the IlSSS. prorcc t Ive ,"iss:ion dur Inzthe convention Dcriods. This would incl~de briefin~son Cuba and Cuban noLLc i es toward the l!nitet! Sta t e s andon actiVities of c~~an intclli~cncc op~r3tiocs whichcould affect the socurity of the conventions.

00576

~.. .. .-.- ...

. ..... •• • .... M

.. .. vvMORl DoclD: 1451843

,

...,

d. Coverage of Latin Ancrican exile ~roups in theUnited States wauld be tbe responsibility of the rBrsince CIA had c;,ased the extensive coverage for::Jcrlytargeted against thC$C Rroups since it ~a5 now con3iuercd

', .1lP. internal security function.

s.1

6.1 Ihas a r-r anzed the r e nt a L of a s a r e nous oabou t five n i nut e s f r oei convention center ti:licn ~;ill provide asecuro and. n ea rbv f.leC''tin::r s i t e for t!SSS and ~~cncv nc r sc n no L,This safchou$o w~ll be 3~ai13~lc just prior t~ an~ ~urin~ ~otJ)conventions. :\ Headquarters officer ,.,-ill TDY to ~'i.::si nr Lor tothe conventions and rC:;:,J.in until the cOllvention5 adjc~l'n toassist I lin p r ovLdLng the suppor t dc sc'r i.bcd in paru graphfour anave.

7. .Station 1I1V~4ia",i is in daily contact with tho iJSSS ion~lilU.,i. utilizin.:: J:iFi\LCb~1 as a ne e t Lnc site wl~en ncc c s su ry , ';leLnca't Lon of Stntian ''iH!r·:ial!1i (J:'CO::1'"A) has not b e e n r cvca Lcd tothe tiSSS. (J:,;C0l;RA is located s orae distance fro::: J:lJ:.\LCOS.)Additionally. t~e !!iami Security Fiold Office gaintai~s nornall1nis9n wi tll the local liSSS -"liami' unit.

8. Th{ Imder~tand~ tha~ no p!'::rsonn7~ ~ill bo':>rosentat the conVCli

, ,....,

•• •

MORl DoclD: l45l843

..-3-

."f. ...

5Lr·TNt-odore G. Shackley

ChiefWestern Ilc~ispherc Division

At t achmerrt;

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - EXec. Dir/Comptro11er2. - Acting DDP

r/ I_________________________tTYPed 23 June 1972)

•

00578

MORl DoclD: 1451843

. . . .".... ...' .,I,

•

•

\. J .V ...-;. ...

••

•7 APR ut:

•

~lI::NORANDUH FOR: Director of Central Intellir;ence

VIA: Deputy Director for Pla~s

SUBJECT:

...

CIA Support to thc Secrct'Servicefor the Democratic UationalConvention in i·jiami, Fl·oridaJUly 9 - 15. 1972 .'

. :

•

1. This memor-andum describes the support wh Lchthe Sccret Service has r-ecucc t ed rrom CIA ~litll r-cr.ar-dto the Dcnocr-at Lc liationai Convention. It is rec":ommendod that the A::;ency l'urnish the nuppor-t; out linedin paraGr

.1s reques ted. .

2. By memor-andum 1-30-610.53 or 30 i·jarch(attached as rcr~rcncc), toe 5ec~ct S=:~ice b~3requented a GeetinG wi~h ap~ropri~te AGency cflicc~zto discU3~ the A~cncyrs ~upport to the Secret ~~~vic~prior to ann durin.; the Der.;ocratic ;·jational ccnvcntLon ,The Secret Service plans to send an aGent to ;·11':',,11 on11 April to cO~~cnce 9rep~rations for the conven~ionand wishes to have the meeting with AGency Headquartersofficers prior to the agenis depurture lor Ni~~i•

3. : While details rCGardinG the type of GupportWhich the Secret Service will request OL the A~encywill not be known until. there hao been·a ~ee~in5with the Secret Se:ovice.on thiS,;;;.:l;;~er, it is evidentfrom the Secret ;;ervice memor-andum and 1:00m ourexperience in s upp or-tLnr; t ne Secret Service at theRepubLdc an Convention in Nia.'01i in 1968 that theSecret Service desires:

\

'.\\A

\ . \\. \, .\ ',i

\

A) BriefinG3 on Cuba and Cuban policytowards the United Stateu. Counterintelli~enceinformation on Cuban operations asain3t theUnited States Which could affect the securityof the convention.

0579

MORl DoclD: 1451843

B) Bricfin~~ on CUban exile a~~ivitie$in the United 3tate~•

\.., ,(, _.'

. C) Name checks on hotel and conventionemployeell; na,";;e checj~::; on tho:;e peril ens inthe Hiar.:d area l'lhom the Secret Serviceconsiders a threat to its protective mission~

D) ./twatchliot of oer:wns \"Il'iOJ:l the Agencyconsiders a potential threat to the securityor the conVention.

r----='-'~L=i-=a_=i_=:;'_'o""'n~witha dcsisr:ated officerIIfor the Dur~05e of con"u~"~~;J~~=:r--;;C:T.~;-;f::-:f""er:c:~;O-""~-;;~::::~C:;i-=~;-::'~~11 'I f i ) e ~ ',n d I

4. 'Agency SUpport tr the Secret Service 'for theconverl;ion ,;~ill be ':cn4ra~,ized at nc:;~doua!'ter:;'ttl;':wi],], be contl'olleC: by iieau(Juarter:;. [f5hief: '1under the cc:neral Iluoerv!:;lon of '.he@ Sta r:;:s willserve as the Cooroinator of this support.

, ., , .•'. ; .

•"j •

II,I

.J. Attachment

co: DDCI

ames Anr;leto;',Chi:ef'. cr 5~~,lT

,,'

•\

The recor.~endatiJn contained1n paraGraph 1 i~ a~proveG:

~ ~ I I \ •-'-/'''-I'\..A..",\.",-U-l_'LA~\ _trect ~r Central in~e~libenc,5 APR 1971-

'r etlru l'ltl HSf RELEASE .•

..• --~._ .._--- '.:_---~ ..- .

, ..,

, 00580~""''- '- '..-~., I

i . I.·I." ./

1-:30-610.53

o'WASlllNOTO~. 11.0. 20226

.T:-:iE j,-"/drr~,iEi'fr OF TI:E TREi,SU,lY

MORl DoclD: l45l843

•

omC1l cr n." I>IUCTOIl

Central Intelltge~cc Aacncy

AT'J.'N: Mr IL- '-- --.J

9JTJ>IES J. RO;'lLIrr - DIRECTOR

Derr.ocratic ;~ational Convention -Miami, Floridn - JUly 9-15, 1972

In view of our re~!,on5ibilitics rCC;ilrc1ir.

,MORl DocID: 1451843

(

7 May 1973

", .t'l[ , SUBJECT: Request for Information on Sensitive Activities;,'" .-

You will recall that in Fiscal YeaB1971 and 1972,

I believe, Agency funds were made available to th~ FBI.

These funds may still be possibly held in a special

account for that use. This is one of the areas where

TSD has been very much involved. Chuck Briggs would"~. -

have the details as this was handled through the Executive

Director's office and of Course Angleton would have

additional information.

_- I'.' ~.'

. {••~ J._

Edward L. ShermanChief

Missions and Programs Staff

00582

MORl DoclD: 1451843

8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR

SUBJECT

Deputy Director for Operations

. ", "',Areas of Possible Embarrassment

to the Agency

1. Sometime in the spring or early summer of 1971, Mr. JohnDean levied the requirement on the Agency for information relating tothe Investors Overseas Service (lOS). The original request wasnon-specific but it gradually emerged that Dean was concerned with,the possible adverse publicity that might develop regarding thePresident's nephew, who w~s employed by lOs,

2. There were multiple channels from the White House to the

Agency on this subject:

a. Presumably Haldeman and/or Ehrlichman to Director

Helms.

b. Someone (unnamed) in the White House to the DDC1,General Cushman (see attached telephone conversation).Note that Ehrlichman is mentioned, and

I~ .

c. John Dean to the CI Staff. These various channelswere sorted out in time and six reports were passed bythe CI Staff to Mr. Fred Fielding for Mr. John Dean.

3. The telephone call of General Cushman's is of interest sinceit gives the flavor of White Hous e concern. It took several days touncover the fact that the White House interest centered on the involve-ment of the President's nephew with lOS and possible adverse publicity.The reports submitted to Dearis office were routine-in nature and werecoordinated with the DCI. After a few months, interest in this sub-

ject died down and we did not pursue it further.

4. Please return the attachments when they have served your

purpose.

00583 '

MORl DoclD: 1451843

I

5. I also include a short note on the Intelligence EvaluationCommittee and Staff prepared by Richard Ober , The originalmeetings were held in the office of .John Dean at the White Houseand the principal sparkplug for this gr-oup 'activitY'wa-s...t1?e thenAssistant Attorney General for Internal Security, RobertlvIa-1

MORl DoclD: 1451843

(

Telephone conversation of General Cuslunan and someone in White House, 23/7/71"

."'.Bob, how are you.

DDCI: Just fine; I just talked to Jack Sherwood and he suggested I give youa buzz•

......-..-I deeply appreciate" it. 1 asked Jack to call you. I spoke to Rose yesterday,

.and told her "I had a little project here for John Ehrliclunan and I need verydiscreet assistance from the Company, and I should· like to touch base withBob. I met him at Jack Sherwood's. ".

DDCI: That's right.

That's right and beyond' that I would like to just establisha relationship becausefrom time to time we have a few needs in your area. Let me tell you what weneed to know here. yo';r Agency would be the only one to help. I have checkedwith the Bureau, Bob, and they have nothing on this fellow. Just a mere namecheck but it apparently has some significance, of c our s e. Ray Finkelstein;born in Belgium about 1940; moved to Brazil about age 12 with his family.This mightie helpful. He now is working with one" Gilbert Straub, apparentlyStraub is hooked up with that Kornfeld outfit: lOS. .We have a need to know whatFinkelstein is all about.

DDCI: We will do our. best, of course; we have some counterintelligence fileswhich sometimes turn up people but ordinarily, of course, we don't s'urveilany Americans but this fellow might have come to our notice., ,

He may not. be an American, just a European Jew; ..that is the problem, theBureau has come up with zero.

DDCI: Do you know where he is physically located?

He may be in Geneva; Straub is apparently in Geneva._..~, " " ........

DDCI: Well, let me get on this and I wi.l.Lget 'back to you.

00585

MORl DoclD: 1451843

TIl• .Ttlt"" ..LJ,f,'rJr"lI !il\'Oid rl(,:1I:; that. might.. rr-Ilr-r-l hln brotncr- nul of Irnuble, "I have establlshed, are .... lridl"

I - unfnvru-nhly on the I'rcstrlr-nt, want (0 he sure that Don 'has untrue. . .Pl'r·;jII~1I1 XI,nl' 11M 1'1\'('1} I ." "I

. .. Not onl: iltl,C'I"Wnnf. Dnn.,jl) no drnlln;::J WJLh the federal Ehrltchmon ,,1"0 r.;)\'~ Dr.n-~irlr John Ei,rJlII ,,\:111 n lh-li· I . ." )1' J I" . H'~;)n ,Jlf'Rc-rlm: wllh .lnbn novermncnt," Stud the Proal- II ( ::I non, JOl1illrl Jr. it Jr£". Jf',11ro Jlrr:;III1.11. '0,' 1~:l):l1r:'( In IJiII-.p Itosf nn mnnufnctnrcr or rfrllL "I want to be sure that t.ut:c before the iJOY ~\"':lIl If) ;J:;rr)l the J'rc-511Irl:I:. II P'l'l -s- }l1:1.\·.~' ound equlnment, who Don b never asked t do any- Swltzcr-lnnd bsl summer If) !~Ihh' In-other, Donald, (lIIL »r \\':'IulC'1I the novr-rumcnt to . 0 work for Jnternntlonnl Con-hoi w;l!rr.. cnnshlcr iml;dtinJ: hi~ prml- th~lI(: thot wo~Jd embarr-ass trola. The company has now \

Donald Nixon hns It weak- nets in urban riot nrcns. Hill thts offh-e," transferred young Nlxun toI1r~!'; {m' (;'tllC'nlll~ rocds [lilt! told U~ DOl1:'1Jd merely wantr-rl TIH'J1 the Prc::;hicnl added n.'i the Bnhnmas.C':l}:Y.monC'J'. Itc u-lr-d to ~,1lh;ry 10 he the company's W('!'l:m a O('rlhIJuJ.;i1l: "Don is the' His father, l=lHdn~ 10 a fcwllnlh appl"lIh'$ in the l!1:iOs hy Coast rcnrcscntntive, ilnll did hr.!'l :-ah sman in the I)ixon vjsttors, inchnllnq my i1~.'iUci.llll'hMl'mdnc ~~O;\,onO from hll- not want to put'!n the fix for !;llllily." . George Clifford, con~idcrrrJ lh:alllonalrc Howard Hughes to op- (edernI money. But Eln'llch- The M"rrlof.t~ anrced to Donald. Jr.• was snmcthinq ofcrate it rcstnurrmt chnin, the man quietly vetoed the pro} watch over Donald, and they a disnppnintmcnl to the Jam-BolTIC' or t11(' Nixnnburger, in eel, and the President's have scrupulously kept liirn jJy. He had been 0(£ in tileSouthern Cnllfornla. brother wrote to Hill sJyjn~ away from wnsblngtcn, There mountains associating with hip-

Two months aft('[' the 10:1n he WOlS no longer interested has been only one awkward in- pies before the overseas jODW;l5 made, some oC Hu,::hcs' in the company. crdcnt. Dpnnld Jlcw to Greece was arranged,IClp n~!c fililifilry!.alfon In hJS '·olce. "1I th;tl '~(,l"\\ i1hnul v.l)·ln&" oft important (hrou{!h the gunnlcd White ~O\'(,rJlml'nt is unpopul;lr in around, he's goinJ; to hI'" in ..rrrrlilors. House :::..1('5 to :;cc-· Ehrlich- the U,S .• Tolled out the red lot of trouble. I told him h~

Rut it WAS too)ate. Donald's man. Afterward, a ~poJH'$m;tn eill'pel for the President's WilS to say he \\'fI~ IJ'iinC torc~laur.1nls w('ot bankrupt, for Ryan Aeronnutical e'x~ bl'olhr.-r. Tom P

.._. ... '.-

Ii7J.•!

MORl DoclD: 1451843

......."

'.

IJIS. t"J , ...... ,~ ..:.~":; . \---==-===. :7.";.;":. i-r-, -:-""71,.--;:- --;:;_ ;::=

·".--

MORl DoclD: 1451843

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL1 May 4, 1973 5---

I

i'\'sco Arrest '''arrant!1.)sllecl by Federal Juche'For Grand Jury Inqui;y

Finllnder Husn't Been in fhe U.S.For. )Ionths; His Lawyer FeursPanel '''ill Produce Indictment

I .BY ~ ':-ALL5TRE£~'AL Sttl!J Reporter_ ?\~\~. '\ ORK - Federal JUdo;:e Edmund L.

i P .. l:1m"ll Issued a Warrant {or the arr-est or e: ?:!T!!ed N'ew Jerse.y financier Robert L. V(,h~~: I

!,n ~.-der to b.ring h.lm ~s witness before a grand.• .1.1r ) here In\'eshgatrng his acli\'itil'~ ,\Ir J~ \ r-sco has been out of the U.S. for :~"';rai I, rnombs. ~, 1

I J:io crJmlnal charges have been bmuht Iiagainst ~lr. Vesco. But the U,S. Attorney's ~ff~~e. which reql.:ested the bench warrant, re-\ Iously had asked the judge to lind )£r. V~

"

MORl DoclD: 1451843

7 MAY 1913

SUBJECT: Intelligence Evaluation Committee and Staff

1. Background: Formed Dece~ber 1970. Membership:D~partm~nt of Justice (Chairman); FBI (active staff par-ticipation agreed to only in May 1971); Department ofDefense; Secret Service; National Security Agency~ CIAand any necessary representatives of other Departmentsor Agencies. (Following have pu rt i.c i pa t ed: Treasury,State.) Staff: IES Executive Director John poughertyand later Bernard Wells supplied by Department of Justicewith title of Special Assistant to the Attorney Generalin reporting through the Assistant Attorney General forInternal Security Robert Mardian and later William Olsen.IES has received requirements directly from and deliveredreports directly to John Dean of the White House.

2. CIA Participation': ~~o'ntributions 'on foreignaspects (by memorandum with no*lig'i!ncy Let t e'rh e ad or at-tribution). Contributions occasionally include foreignintelligence provided by FBI and NSA.

3. Special Report: The Unauthorized Disclosureof Classified Information, November 1971. Initiated July1971 by the liffi~te House as a consequence of the Presi-dent's concern about ,the release of the Pentagon Papersby Daniel Ellsberg. Both Robert Nar di.an and G. GordonLiddy initially involved in tasking the IES to producethis evaluation. Drafting d~ne' by IES Staff membersfrom Justice and FBI. Only Agency participation waseditorial review. "

(Table of contents attached).

\

__ _ ..:-....0.- _

00583-,

.-"

Introduction

TABLE OF CONTENTS

MORI DocID: 1451843

i

I

1

Problems Relating to the Disclosureof Classified Information 3

,"

Executive Orders and Related Directives 8 Ir1I

Effectiveness of Existing Security'" ',-

I"'t.:gulations. .....f.-"~w.(-\ 13 I

ILessons of the "Pentagon Papers" 18 i

J

Conclusions and Recommenda tions 31

iII

I ;I'j

,.-'-

, "

00590

MORI DoclD: 1451843

v

--.f,LIII

SUBJECT: Thel£n$:HAOS 'Program

1. The~HAOS program is a.worldwide program forclandestine collection abroad of Lnf'orma t Lon on foreignefforts to support/encourage/exploit/manipulate domesticU.S. extremism, especially by Cuba, Communist China,North Vietnam, the Soviet Union, ~orth Korea and theArah fedayeen.

2. The r;;jilcHAOS program has not and is not conduct-ing efforts ~mestically for internal domestic collectionpurposes. Agency efforts are foreign. Foreign-orientedactivity in the United States has been of two types:

a. Selected FBI domestic ~ources who travelabroad in connection with their extremist activityand/or affiliations to make contact with hostileforeign powers or with for.eign extremist groupshave been briefed and debriefed by Headquartersofficers. The briefing has included appropriateoperational gllid1nce, including defensive advice.

b. Americans with existing extremist creden-tials have been assessed, recruited, tested anddispatched abroad for PCS assignments as contrattagents, primarily sourceS offered for such use bythe FBI. When abroad they collect information re-sponsive toffiBJeHAOS program requirements, as wellas other Agency requirements. They are thus usedprimarily for targeting against Cubans, Chinese Com-munists, the North Vietnamese, etc., as their back-·ground and their particular access permits. Itshould be note~ that the!= .::asp~c~· ?ft~e

~ /proJe!=t of thb ~5C J\ -ia DIVISI0!iJ IS5 1~1I at to the Ltlij}::HAOS PROGRAM. .

:3. I\.s indicated earlier, [fr@:HAOS is a foreign pro-gram, conducted overseas, except for the limited activitydescribed above. The 'program is and has been managed so

, as to achieve the maximum feasible utilization of exist-ing resources of the 0Eerations Directorate •. No assetsn)fUO~ = D° NS)l af! E~E

00591

SE

j

·1I

MORl DoclD: 1451843

have been recfited and ruJ.! eXc1usi~elY for the lBii'cHAOSprogram. Instead, emphasIs has been placed on tfie exploi-tation of new and old Agency assets who have a by-productcapability or a concurrent capability for provision ofinformation responsive to the program's requirements.This has involved the provision of custom-tailored 'cb'llec-tion requirements and operational guidance. this collec-tion program is viewed as an in~gral part of the recruit-ment and collection programs oflJ;,.l

1 I' ,'.

MORl DoclD: 1451843

SJiNSITlVr

5_ frUjcHAOS reporting from abroad relating to theprogram originates in two way s : Individuals Who are notedin contact with Cubans, the Chinese Communists, etc., andwho appear to have extremist connections, interests orbackground are reported upon. Other individuals are re-pqrted upon in response to: specific Headquarters require-ments received from the FBI because such individuals areof active investigatory security interest to the FBI.

, 6. All cable and dispatch traffic related to the~n1CHAOS program is sent via 'restricted channels. tit is,not processed by either the-fable Secretariat or the In-formation Services Division~ The control and retriev-ability of information obtained, includin~ informationreceived from the FBI, is the responsibillty of the Spe-cial Operations Group.

7. Information responsive to specific FBI require-ments is disseminated to the FBI via special controlleddissemination channels, i.e., by restricted handling cabletraffic or via special pouch and specially numbered bLi ndmemoranda. '

8. Information of particular significance, when col-lected, has been disseminated by special memorandum overthe signature of the Director of Central Intelligence tothe White House (Dr. Kissinger and John Dean), as well as'to the Attorney General, the Secretary of State and theDirector of the FBI.

~ ..

\

00593

MORI DocID: 1451843

" "

00594

MORl DoclD: 1451843

SFNDER WILL CHECK CctiFICATION TOP AND "SOTTOM

r -bNCLASSIFIED r I CONFIDENTIAL I I SECRETOFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

,

TO NAME AND ADDRESS DATE INITIALS

1 . IIr. Halpern /,-

.'2

t\'l::-w~!.'t·,.. -3"

4 •

5.

6

ACTION OIRECT REPLY PREPARE REPLYAPPROVAL OISPATCH RECOMMENOATIONCOMMENT FILE RETURNCONCURRENCE INFORMATION SIGNATURE

Remarks: "r ."",~". Sam:

Attached are the following:

l-hackground paper on TIC #72-comments on facts and statisti cs3..comments on AID by Mr. ~chlesinger

"~ ."1963 (whI ch Mr. Colby might find

of Lnt.e re s t )

00595.. ".' ,"

.. FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SEN.DER'..'''. FROM: NAME. ADDRESS AA'D PHONE;. NO. DATE:

I I 25/4/73I UNCLASSIFIED I ·f CONFIDENTIAL I SECRET

.. ' (40

MORl DoclD: 1451843

,., ';

00596

\

---------------

, -»

-..~ • ~,~~'_"Ll>t_J

MORl DoclD: 1451843

partici-

tours forsponsored

00597

Counter Intelligence Staff,Police Group Activities

CI/PG maintains Li a i son wi t h the Office of- PublicAgency for International Develop~ent (OPS/AID)training facility, the International Police AcademyCI PG also administers and supervises Project

C; arranging for IpA/OrS/AID briefings andforeign police/securi ty representativesby CIA Area DiViSio~ns

~l:' ,r:r\Jl. 1 _

A. exchange of information on IPA partic1pants, someof whom later attend I Icourses I II '1-,--

B. arranging for inclusion of Agency sponsoredpants in IPA/OPS/AID training programs,

~.la,lORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

1. Counter Intelligence Staff, Police Group (CI/PG)is responsible for Staff coordination within the Officeof the Deputy Director for Operations for activi ties andprograms involving assistance to foreign police/securityforces for the purpose of exploiting such activities andprograms for intelligence purposes.

SUBJECT

•

,, .

LIAISON l'lITH OPS/AI D

CI/PG liaison with OPS/AID and IPA is conducted on adaily basis and consists principally of:

n a 1.t1.on, coor 1.na e

2.Safety,

I"--------iand itsIPA

Central IntelligenceJ,.----,--~eeccn.lnn~l~c:;arr_rnnvv'ee;ss:t:1.i:'go;\ati ons Cours e . CI / PG Provi de s gu1. an ce

i, and counsel to the Area Divisions in matters pertainingto police/security functions and activities. Specificdetails of these functions are as follows:

MORl DoclD: 1451843

00598

las

ln trainin~ forei

. j•• 2~ •

; :

-..

- 2 -

PROJECT

G.

F. coordinating the Agency's participation in the.Tecllnical Investigations Course designed tofamiliari2e the trainees '.ith the techniquerequired to properly investigate terroristactivities wherein explosives have been utilized,

H.

ngage prlnclpa~~~~~~~~h-~~~~,o lce security personnel under

and selling pOlice/sech-rFyv-pe~q~u~l~pun",le~lnlr-~tno"~o~rNe~llg~npo ace security personnel and organizations. I 11!lsoprovides special training programs and briefinnng~s~t~o'foreign police/securit nersonnel of interest to A encyo erating divisions.

acqulre e capa 1 1 Y 0 provlpolice/security personnel in VIPfor Chiefs of State.

*IL- -----:-__

,,..i.i,"'!,1

,,,

MORl DoclD: 1451843

'..- .

Staff

00599

hllgle LOllIrt t e Ll i pen ce

4.

COlUlENT

~does not maintain direct contact or liaisonlqit~w enforcement organization, local or federal, ",at home, or abroad. When the need arises, such Con tact issometimes made on our behalf by

3. In addition to the liaison mentioned in theprevious paragraph, the Agency maintains liaison in varyingdegrees wi t h foreign police/security organizations throughits field stations. The existence and extent thereof,however, is a decision to be made~ Area Division,and is not the responsibility of~

- 3 -

an r oa »e c au s e a e na t u r e of its activities(training of foreign police/security personnel at homeand abroad), and its Public Safety programs around thewo r l d , I Ihas such contacts at home - local andfederal level - hecause its personnel are personallyacquainted with Law enforcement dfficers thro.U:hout theUni ted States. fJemhers of the I _

I 1have, appeare d as guest 'rIl'e'TC-:1L-rurlr1e.-rl"s-"aCTL~S"U=IITI-rll'e'TCl"enI"'a'l"'I'---Inst:lcutions as the U.S. Park Police, IPA", the U.S.Secret Service; and the U. S. Treasury Enforcement Divis-ion.

wi. t uan'-;;;;'lcrltt"r"l"o:;;n~e",,,;r,-;;--;="====~='"ffiC"---TT;u"p"'aiiim"a"rr.o"s"-.--,.\,an !·ii t r i on e ,

an experienced and respected law enforcement officer, wasa bona fide DPS/AID officer assigned to the AID missipnin Uruguay, and was never a CIA employee or agent.

MORl DoclD: 1451843

I

___ ?i>O-7:5 -(~7,./n'1 "'f\~1973

, /2 q ILlcu. c..R-:.

.y •J: ft. ~-

MORl DoclD: 1451843

....•

- 2' •

c. Familiarizing the trainees with the conceptof target analysis and operational planningthat a saboteur or -t.e r ror-Is t must enp Loy ,

00601.

'h'.11CI

f. Conductinr. seVeral investip.atlve fIeldexercises of exnlosive incidents to alertthe trainee to the need for and manner inwhich to colloct, identify, and preservelegally admisable eviJc~ce for prosecutiveaction.

d. Introducing the trainees to booby trappingdevices and techniques g i vinR practfcalexperience wi th I:oth manuf'acturo d andimprovised devices t.h rough actual fabrication.E~phasize the necessity of alertness fordetecting and countering Dooby'traps placedby s ab o tours or terrorists.

c. Conducting several field exercises to giveeach trainee the opportunity for detecting I

. and neutralizing various e xp l os Lve and

. incendiary devices likely to be used byterroris ts or s ab o te ur-s , Lnc LudLna letterbombs, packages, attache cases, etc.

3. The program provides the trainees ~d.th ampLeopportunity to develop basic fa!!liliarity and use proficientlythrough handling, preparin~ and a~?lying the variousexplosive .charges, incendiary D.f:ents, terrorist devicesand s ab o t age techniques. t;SAIO, International PoliceAcademy (IP;\)~las received reports from Foree r fo r e i gn .police/security personnel who participated in the .pr-ogramindicating that they :

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, ...,.. \~

:'

,

t

J ., ',

"

- 3 -

5. Separate end of course reports will be prepared by .USAID and CIA, TSD personnell

James AngletonChief, Counter Intelligence Staff

.,

•

00602

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•.., ......

FACTS k~D STATISTICS't

AID/ors TRAINING

~ID/OPS, International Police Academy sponsors someseven hundred (700) foreign police officers for trainingin the United States each year. These officers are selectedfrom underdeveloped countries. I 1

TRAINING

______10'06-03

During PY 1973r-1sunnorted two of our fieldstations by providi~ni~g in VIP protective secvrityfor I'-- -.J~e rs onnel . "AID/OrS-CIA TRAINING

During FY 1973 two joint USAID/OPS/CIA 'I'echn i cal Inves ti--ga t i ons training programs were conducted for Dforeign "police/security 'personnel representing~countries.Thepurpose of the training is to develop ~idual studenttechnical capability to realistically conduct investigationsinto known or suspected' incidents of sabotage/terroristbombing or other activities.

tra~ns some .L,.,,---=="T~O"T"'i"~-'z"'e.-rr~aO'Fe""a"s----;o,f 1aw en for ce ment .

MORl DoclD: 1451843

Edile4 by

David M. Abshire and Richard V. Allen

,'.

~.. ."-,."

:

00604

NATIONAL SECURITY

Aqrniral Arleigh Burke•. pire'lo~

TIlE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES,

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY"

Political, Military, and Economic

Strategies in the Decade Ahead

pubr;sh~J /0' IbtlHOOVER INSTITUTION ON WAR, REVOLUTION

. AND PEACE

byFREDERICK A. PRA,EGER, Publish~r

New York· London

00605

The analysis' of this' paper rests" on the' assumption. thatAmerican poUcy-inakers should not be so concerned unth: thepurs,,;t of hard-to-obtain ideological objectives that they exhaustthe power potential implicit in trade and aid, relationships.Rather the trade and aid programs should be managed so, as topreserve an environment 'in which pressures can be brought tobear to sert'e the national interest at a later, and perhap« 'morecritical, date. This emphasis on power considerations impliesboth (a) that the assistance prottrani ca-nno! be based pl"imm'ilyon humanitarian 0" idealistic goals, and (b) that economic tieswith other nations should not be severed simply because of onrdisapproval of other social systems, including those based oncommunism. Thouoh. typically public opinion vastly overstatesthe strategic leverage that can be gai,,!ed through economic

, weapons, 'this leverage is still not negligible. One can arguri thatin the past the United States-has failed to take advantage ofthe power potential 'implicit in aid and trade through its failureto develop concepts and mechanisms of dete'''''",ce in ,uays akinto what has been done in the military field. Much of thedif]ic;dty 'may be ascribed. to ,a failure to develop sanctions,,ahich discouraoe actions unfavorable to" olir interests, as wellas incentives, which encourage cooperation, No system ofdeterrence can exclusively stress the carrot and itmore the stick.

},fore is being demanded of the aid program than it canreasonably «chiece, Assltming that the primary emphasis of theaid program is to encourage social and economic dcreiopmentrather than to' elicit direct SUpp01't for American foreign policy

687

Strategic

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• • •'~'J ~ .. , ••. ,Leverage Irorn Aid'and.T rade"-JAMES R. SClILESliYGER

Summary

:',': '," - _.._---~. -- ----_.-.---:'-.:--~:.'~~----'-'-'-- --~.J i, f .-,~" ~ ~, 688 JAMES R. SCHLESCNGER!'

. ·1

MORl DocID: 1451843

obj~cU1;e8. it is argued that n-e ehonld aftt"mpt 10 dct'd",) stable~oc;aland paUlital conditions by strm!Jtllrni710 tile "[('gitimacy"of the del'clopi1/U social order in the rUNI of the rrsuectieepublics-rather than attempting to (':rIJDr! tlie trappings 01Amen'can demormcu,

Technological change. the easy f{1'nilabilily o!,.::ub,'lfilllf('s. andthe [l!Ugllly prrioc1 for adjwltllll'nt tw It JJrOlollgrd strlt!Jnlf' lwreall reduced thr impact of th" "supply cljret" J/"Mch 11'(18 at onetime)he lila in wcapon of economic wflrfa)"r. If till' economicwenji61if' 0/: straltOy are to be at all ('fjrcth:" under todny'seonditkms, the "influellce ef!rct" mnst rise corr;.~'Potldinl}ly· inimparlance. This implies that we slumlfl be in a. position tothreaten to do damage to other economies throllgh tlle' curtail-ment 01 access to lVcsffTn markets. In order to kerp tllis threata.'" ever-present onl', tee mustv.luncceer, continue to tredr int:"olu.me with other cOllnt)"i('s, inclltdiflf] Communist ones. Partie-+rlu" in dealing with the tmderdt!vl'loped nations Ihe potential'i'l'lctiveness of such threats may p'·ove to be cotl$iderable.

00606

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One final consideration-it would be unwise to use potentialweapons of this sort for niggling purposes. The balance of pay.ments has been, troublesome. and is properly an object of concernin wasbtngton, but surely it is not a first-order considerationin our relations with the underdeveloped nations. Suggestionshave been bruited about that we should make use of the aidprogram to force recipients to bu~: from us in ways that gobeyond tied aid. Under the best of circumstances, our bargaining-power is limited, and shooting away strategic ammunition for sopaltt')" an economic goal would seem to reflect a poor sense of

-r- _proportion. .

Aid

Within an over-all framework designed to discourage hostileor predatory attitudes toward the West, the aid program mayseek to foster the maximum rate of economic and socinl progress.In the basic policy of AID. the Kennedy Admlnlstration has,explicitly adopted this goal. As. has been indicated there arecosts to this decision. Outsiders are not likely to be much likedeven under the best of circumstances, which hardly apply to theunderdeveloped countries, and their Intervention in whateverdirection will in the long run excite antagonism based on' realor fancied wrongs. Nevertheless, the basic decision has beenmade. Let us examine in what war we may proceed so that thegood effects clearly outweigh the ill effects,

There aretwo initial postulates: (1) our bargaining. powerwill be limited. and (2) American notions of social reform andof equity are neither necessarily applicable in the underdevelopedlands, nor need we assume jthat those whose cooperation wemust win will find them appealing. These postulates are inter-related. Joint1~· they impl)' that we cannot press forward onall fronts to create a society in which a good American democratwill feel at home, but must instead ccncenu-ata our energies onthose social changes which will spur economic growth even irthe immediate results an; more consistent with the culturalgenius of the peoples Involved rather than our own tastes. \Veought not expect them to make the same choices as we would.01", if they make the same choices, to achieve in a ten-year periodwhnt it look us (!if!hl~· real's to achieve. Finally, in "reachingjudgments on social processes in other lands, we cannot apply\};'hat are our own-or, in reality, higher.-=standards of purity.

As outsiders, we will be unable to perceive the social functionof behavior which is "superliciall~' corrupt, and will t~nd to Jump

00607

'I\!.I

SCHLESINGER

-.696

'.

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697

'.

it together with thal which is purely pnrasiilcal. With respectto our Q\\'U history, retrospectivelj- we have come to find meritin what once were r~gal'ded as the disreputable procedures ofan organization like Tammany HaJJ in that it provided a kindof social security and a welcome for the newly arrived. Im-migrant. We are accustomed to "the daily dangling of new postoffices. good committee assignments. and br-idges over creeks inthe outback before wavering Congressmen, and warm approvalis given, for its tine sense of political realism, to whatever ad.ministration is doing the dangling by those who agree with itsgoals. Toward simjlar procedures abroad we are inclined tqtake a simple mucklitk'ing"attitude. We look askance at the"higgling of the political mArket-with a naivete that would docredit both to missionaries and old-style political reformers, Ifwe hope to achieve a fairmeasure of success, '\:e,shalJ have tosharpen our critical fncuIties lind learn to distinguish betweenunappetizing social devices which arc funelional and those whichare simple barriers t~ progress.

The statement of objectives by AID is a very ambitious one.

IIThe purposes of the assistance program include stimulation

.of self-help. encoul"-:,~ement of progressive forces. and achieve-ment of governments based on consent, which recognize thedignity. and worth of individuals who are expected to participatein determinirig the nation's goals.: No doubt, a statement ofaspirations is in large part Window dressing; but the criteriaby which self-help is moving toward social and political progressare more specific: a more ef}uitable distribution 'of Income, amore equitable tax system "'ith Incr-eased yields, expanded wel-fare programs, increased political pm-tlcfpatfon and clvil Hberttes,and so on. Several points-may be made regarding the objectlves rnrst, there are too many; second, they are to some extent in.consistent: and third, they ignore the real resources available.

There is, in -the first place. the long-perceived clash betweeneconomic progress, on the one hand, and the combined goals ofequitable distribution of income, immediate. Improvement inJiving standards, and security 011 the other. This underlyingconflict spiJIs o...er into a tension between rapid economic pro--gress and the introduction of democratic processes, On thisissue there appears to have been a revolution in informedopinion in the Uni~ed States during the past fiv-e years. Duringthe Jate fiCties. it had become almost an axiom that authoritartan,if not totalitarian, governments had innate ndvnntngcs in guld-ing economies toward rapid growth. The prevailing v'jew was

00608

II

00609

based. no doubt, on an assessment of the record of the Sovietregime, and an exaggerated notion of how much the Chinese"Great Leap Forward" would accomplish. Perhaps the earlier"pessimism" regarding the relative performance potential of"free" and "controlled" economies was overdone, but have wenot gone too far in the now prevailing "optimism" that any clashbetween economic progress and the democratic institutions whichInsm-e-ths dominance of the t·o~ populi is minimal?

The average clttaen-c-parttcularly when he is ill-housed," Ill-clothed, ill-fed, and ilI-educated-seems most likely to be in-terested in the here and now, A government which is responsiveto the desires of the public will continually be tempted tomortgage the future for the present. The "abstinence" or"waiting" which classical and neoclassical economics state tolie necessnrv ingredients in economic progress will be hard torequire, as will be the inccntive schemes (and the accompanyingconspicuous consumption) which are likely to strike the a ....eragevoter as inequitable, We rna)' TecNI that the Peron regime was(and still may be"!) the most popular regime in recent LatinAmerican history. Or we may observe the economic consequencesof Brazilian democracy. and have our doubts. The tnfto\\" ofAmerican resources may be able to make showpieces out ofseveral small, recentJ)--demflcrntized nattons like the DominicanRepublic, but we ought nol assume either that demccracyasstatain economic development, or that the Dominican example iswid(>J~' applicable. This is not to sa:r that some judiciousprodding in the direction of democracy may not be a wise policy.but it must be iudiaione, nnri cannot be based on the assumptionthat democracy necessarily fosters the political stability essentialto growth.

One of the criteria by which self-help can be judged as justify.ing additional aid is an improvement in the savings ratio, Somestudents of the aid program Would put major emphasis oncbnngos in the SAYings .l'ntio in tbnt it provides a relatlveb-objective standard b)' which an improvement in economic, per.fOI'Ill:mc:e can be ju(J~eCl.· If we apply an objective standard.complaints about the distribution of aid nnd subjectivity in the

• CharJe5 Wolf, Jr, of RA~D hD.l< been atlempting to drvelop.an eecnc-meldc model which will pro\'ide nn ohjel."ti\'e measure or the performanceof air! recipients in terms or sl,"lf.helll. The criterion is the ~a\'jn,l':'S ratio.In the"rnodel the :Jttt'mpt. is made to t,!limintlte the influence ot other\,::Iria:'lo:,:

MORl DoclD: 1451843

, .

00610.

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(

8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT:

REFERENCE:

Foreign Resources Division Oper-afionaIActivities with Possible Flap Potential

FR Memorandum.I-r-' 1 dated.7 May1973. same subject

1. The answers to your que'stions are as follows:

a. Question: Do we recruit Americans?

Answer: Yes, we recruit Americans to beused asl ~upport assets and access agents ..These Americans. are used for spotting. and assess-ment purposes only and do not perform any recruit-ments.

b. Question: Do we use alias documents onAmericans in course of operations?

Answer.: Yes, we do Use alias documents whenrecruiting American support assets. The greatmajority of these recruitments are done in alias.All recruitments of foreign targets are done in alias.

c. Question: What disciplihary controls do wehave over alias documents? .

Answer: We maintain a current list in FR DivisionHeadquarters offhe alias documents issued to each Base.

~1.00611

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f- - U...... 1 r_ : ttt~t'-,.-

More importantly, each Base Chief is responsiblefor supervising and maintaining control over thealias documents used by the case officers on hisBase.

d. Question: I::J-'A.-cn=Y"'c~Ie"'a=-=r=a~n~c~e~s~o~r~p~r"'o~h~l~b~lTt~lo"'n~s~?-------

Answer: I

2. If you have further questions, please let me know.

Acting ChiefForei-gn Resources Division

0061~

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WIAlu,£ O:ilY o CQH.·;ENHAI:

ROUTING AND R::CO~D SHEET

.I

1 I

,'j

II

I . f!Uk.

intlroduct ry and "closing' paragraphs

EA!DDO

He indicated

Conversation

1.

3. 000

I /

I " / ......... ~'Cro::;;":i"'I~~1\~RH7~'.f..::.._·..__._._... ... ...c_....-_.~..----. ---- ,~, =, J "'"' -< •• ·u' • ,.

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l FR Div (R-I I5,

1-13,

I·

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3-62

~.

O IHH

7 May 1973

MORl DoclD: 1~51843

____I r-j) () .1'1

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director"fo,,' Operations

SUBJECT: \2roreign Res~urces Divisio-'i})OperationatActivities with Possible Flap Potential

1. At thr risk of stating the obvious, almost,all of the operationalactivities carried on by

MORl DoclD: 1451843

/2/

c. Alias Documentation: Clearly, FR Division doesthe great majority of its operational work by having its caseofficers utilize alias documents. All recruitments are donein alias. Thus, the alias documentation is a prerequisitefor effective operations I IFurthermore,our case officers have btilized fully backstopped alias creditcards for renting automobiles, rrioteI rooms, hotel roomsfor operational rrre etf.ng s , etc. These credit cards are back-stopped by accounts in alias w.hich are promptly paid at theappropriate time. I see no problem in the continued use ofalias documentation ,and moreover, I feel it fs absolutelyessential to continue using alias documentation wherever and

'whenever possible.

d. I

e. I .

,-"", ",C;& .... - .. I;; 1 .-..... '- ..~~.. .. .

, ' " ',', , ".

MORl DoclD: 1451843

/3/

2. Summarizing the above, I believe that all of the activitiesoutlined are clear! within the acce table risk frame.

The'--:o~t"h~e~r=-:a~c=t;:;i;::v:;iC;:t7ie::-:::s-,--:-a'1t;:;hco=u-=g:;:h--:c~l,-=e-=a-=r"l=y"'in=v=o'lv-=··in=-=gC-::-s-=o-=m=-=e-d=e-=g=r-=e-:eO-:o:-ifC=r'i-=s"k-:a:-:r.Je

necessary and valuable and in my opinion should be continued.

Acrtng Ctue tForeign Resources Division

\

_... ,., ..' '""", . \ ..~ -" ."

006i6f3xp'>tf't' (p)(,!)

( b){1/

S E ;.J'E T

DRAFT OUTLINE FOR DDO BRIEFING

T. Statement of Organization and Functions

°11. Official TIO

III .,' Location of Field Units

IV. Cover

V. Targets

VI. Methodology

VII. Budget

VIII. Coordination

A. Internal

B. External

X. Statistics:

A. Recruitments

B. General Support Assets

C. Positive Intel~i~~nce'~eporting

MORl DoclD: 1451843

FOREIGN RESOURCES DIVISION

I. Statement of organization and. Functions

, .

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, ,

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S7 E T

S.E~

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00620

S E~E T

SE~T

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SE~T

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006Z7

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00628

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J ,-:._............ • ..

.' ':F . '(~/

6 JUN 1973

MEMORANDUl\i1 FOR: Director of Central Intelligence •

tI

, ;

THROUGH

SUBJECT

: Executiv.e Secretary. CIA Management Committee

: Alleged CIA Involvement in the Ballou Cas e

,

_. i, I

iJ;I'

'II

I

II

)

1. .By rrrerrior aridurn "dated 25 May 1973. I informed you of theresults of .an int';rview of Mr.1 Iwho reported thatMr., rn employee of the Office of Security. had

,stated dunng a diSCUSSlOn period at Adv-anced Intelligence SeminarNo. 6 in Septeznber 1971 that the Office of Security had been involvedin the "Ballou case. " (The residence of Mr. Ballou. an antique guncollector in Silver Spring. Maryland. was raided oil 7 June 1971 byMontgomery County Police and Federal law enforcement officers.When the offic e r s , 'dressed in civilian clothes. forced their way intothe house. Ballou picked up an antique pistol. The officers opened.fire and seriously wounded Ballou. He was hospitalized for ·severalmonths and was left partially paralyzed. I believe he is now sUingover the incident. l.

2. We inter':'iewed Mr[ Fertain other employee; whoattended the Seminar. arid the DIrector of Security to determine justwhat was said at the Seminar and the extent of any Agency involvementin the Ballou case. We find that partitipants in the Seminar were ..encouraged to discuss the details of their work and ,\ssociated p roblerns ,Mr.1 Fe'ntioned an as~ignmenthe h~d been 0". wi~h. the U: ~' ....Secret SerVl,ce at the 1968 Nahonal Conventions and hIS Ha'i s on acbin.heswith the Montgomery County Police.

3. I Ireports th~t in .disc,ussing the latter, subject he "related a conversanonhe had WIth Inspector ~ 1of the Mont-gomery County pqlice. sometime in June 197 after the Ballou incident

chad been r ep; r ted in the newspapers. According tol.. Ithe 'police inspector had thanked him for some amplifying eqUlprnertt rneAgency had given to the Montgomery CountyPolfce and r ernaz-ked that

00634

-

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r ••U1.G.tet qlo '--..i'~- r

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II,

I1,•

1I

this equipment bad probably saved a police=.an's life. The inspectorcom.mented that the account of the Ballou incident appearing in thepress was not the whole story. With the aid of the equipment the .:IAgency had provided, the police had intercepted a telephone call I,from Ballou to a friend in which Ballou outlined plans to "kill a co!'." I"

'The police then staged a raid to forestall Ballou's plan, and it was . 1dnring this raid that Ballou was shot.

4. I Jsaid that he bas no other lmowledge of th~ Balloucase, except lOr wna: he bas read in the newspapers, and that he hasnot had any other conversations about the case with any members ofthe Montgomery County Police. We learned nothing from our inquiriesthat would indicate any other Agency involve=ent in the Ballou case.

5. The following are related excerpts from the "Family Jewels"submission of the Director of Security on,16 May 1973:

During the period from 1968 to 1973, several items ofPositive audio equipment consisting primarily of clandestine

. transmitters and touch-tone dial recorders were loaned tothe Metropolitan Police Department; Fairfax County. Virginia,Police Deparl.Inent; Montgomery Countv, Maryland, Police. .Department; New York City Police Department; and the Sal).Francisco, California, Police Departrnent.

On 25 July 1968, and at the specific request of theUnited States Secret Service, tbis Office provided two audio .countermeasures technicians to the United States Secret Servicein connection with the Democratic National Convention held in'Chicago, Illinois. Tbis was not an official detail althoughboth rrren were proVided with temporary credentials identifyingthem as being affiliated with the United States Secret Service.

On 15 August 1968, we detailed the same two men to the.' United States Secret Service to cover the Republican National

Convention in Miami, Florida. On both occasions, the teamrnembea-s were debriefed upon their return and it is clear thattheir activities were confined exclusive'ly to sweeping thecandidate,,' and potential candidates' quarters.

William V. BroeInspector General.I

I

..

OIG:II(6 Jane 197'3)DllSt~ ~ •

Orig lot 1 - Addressee _ 2 _1 - ExecSccj CIA M~. .. _ .•. ;- ( .. :'~~_'t-.

\.00635

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(

-', ....

Mr. F. P. Bishop is fOllowing up per para 7of IG memo to DCI dtd 25 May.{ ]

cm/31 May

00636 I-Ii

.~.

(DATE)

v-,. ,

REPLACES fOR~ 10- 101WHICH NAY 9£ US£D.'0 I

MEMORAI JM FOR: The Record

fOR ... HO.I AUG .54

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rr-;>-B mRET'

n UNClASSIFIEDn raut'p'''TIA'

. ,. . ~o UNCll\SSI FI ED .

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT, tOplional)

""""'ON NO.fROM,

Inspector General om25 May 1973

.'TO, (Offiur d.tignalion. room n... mb.-t, and DAlEOffiCER'S COMMENTS (Numb.' eo(h commen' ro .how hom whombuilding)INITIALS l'O whom. Ctaw 0 lin. oClon column oh.r .ach comment.)

RfaMD fORWARDED

1.{I~ :. {/D.' L· -Mr. Wm. E. Colby ..

2.

kLThe Director ~'-I \.--\ i0~~ • ~\.)---::3.

-c \-'l. \l-·Ll c- ", (!,,-(,-\ \ \ ,t Y .4.

L-G ~(.fS. ")

6.

I7.

0 _.-8.

9.

-10:

11.

12.

13.

14.

IS.

00637./

NTERNAL

,-' .

MORl DoclD: 1451843

25 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Mr. William E. Colby

1. On 17 May the narne ofI ~asreferred to this office as having attempted to contact the Directorconcernin "activities outside the Agency." I attempted to contact

on 21 and 22 May, but he was on leave. On 23 May'--

SIA INfEr.:'" "BE SPllY

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("

"'

His case was given much publicity in the Washington Post at thetime. There was additional publicity in the last several monthswhen Ballou instigated a lawsuit against the raiding officers.

____"'-5~ I Identified another student, I I:Iwho was assigned to lAS, as a friend of

~fl"e'--"s·t"a..te-.,.--thatl lalso seemed to know the Speci1lcs of the barloucase.

6. I thankedl rnd told him this was just the typeof information we wanted to receive so that it can be investigatedand appropriate action taken if the information is borne out.

7. This office will follow up on this allegation and advisethe Director concerning our findings.

yyDliam y. 010e

Inspector General

- 2 -

CIA IN+t:llriAt !::leE 8r1lY 0063.9

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• :'.; '... , (

.; .

, .. ~-~,'. • ••~. :..l.. •

'.s" " ... ~ NofedMr [ Icalled the Director on~Bl6'ay at. ~:u:, re "act~vities outside theAgency". I told him Director was out of the

I officeJ

but we would return his call. Mr., called back that day and said he was

g01ng 0 Fubini lecture and would call usba~k. He never did call back. Mr, Colbysa1d to turn over to Mr, Brae .

I.!

00640'~l ';' ", ,""": ••: .. ' -. ~ .- : •...

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-----

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00642

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0, U~(I.ASSIFIED OIt',r ALU. uNLY

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEEr

SUBJECTI (OpliOI'lQI)

FROM,

Inspector Gene ral 0.,.,22 May 1973

COMM..ENTS (Numb.r loch commlnl 10 show from whom'0 whom. Drow 0 line oeton column aFt.r loch comlMnl.)

DATE

I-_~.-_--j OffiCeR'SINITIAlSTO: IOfficl' designation, room numb.t~ ordbuilding)

I.Mr. Wm. E. Colby

2.The Director

J.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

u.

61 0 U~;~Cf·1S R SEERET R EBI/flIlElmAl n INTERNALlice nUlv

0064::

n UHClAS'SJ FJ ED

-. .

MORI DqcID: l451843

-22 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH Mr. William E. COlb~..e---

. Mr. Colby advised me thatl !extensionOhad called the Office of the Director m rme wlth the Directormemorandum to all employees' dated 9 May 1973, requesting allemployees to report activities which might be construed to be out-side the legislative charter of the Agency.

I ls employed as a GS-S clerk in theCable SecreLanat. fie Jomeu t e Agency in September 1967 andworked in the Office, of Security for 3-1/2 years before transferringto the Cable Secretariat in 1970.

While in the Office of Security he was assigned to a suppor:tdesk, SD3. The primary function of this desk was tol0-7__---O- ,.-

During his assignmentL.,,""""l"s"'-'''e'''sOC'-,,-----"s'"'u"'p"'p=o.".r""'e,..--a"'p"'r=oJ"e"c~ enti tie d SRPOINTER- .

I ;-.=;;-r ---'-d_e_s_c_r_ib_e_d_th-,e project as follows. The.'0 had a unit at the JFK Inter-

national Airport th'=a"Lt-p="oLto=g"rc:accp=-e=-m=a"i"'l-c:'going to Soviet Bloc countries.This work was done by Agency staff employees. The mail' was placedin bags by the regular Post Office employees and stacked. Aftertheir departure for the night, the Agency employees would open themail and photograph it. Both incoming and outgoing mail, includingpostcards, were photographed. A watch list was maintained andpriority was given to the names listed, but generally all mail wasprocessed.

The results of the operation were sent to Washington Headquarterswhere they were handled byl ~e would receive a teletypeadvising him of the registry number and the number of items. Hewould check to see if the number of items received was correct androute the material to the appropriate offices. Generally about 1/4 of

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the material was separated into bundles bound with rubber bands.This portion was sent to TSD for technical processing. The remain-ing material was sent to the CI Staff, I I

Aboue twtce a month the GI Staff would add names to or deletenames from the list. I Fould send the changes in the list tothe field office. The watch 11st was made up primarilyofB

I tho were in the United States. WHenlett the UInce 01 l5eeurlty in 1970, the project was still activ

I Iwas in no way emotional or belligerent. Hepresented the facts quickly and clearly and said he had no otherInfor-rnation, He stated he would have come forward with the informa-tion sooner but he had only recently had time to read the Director'srn e rnor-andurrr, The writer thanked him for his interest•

.~/;/fiw{J:~~1am V. Broe

Inspector General

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH

SUBJECT

: Executive Secretary, CIA Management Committee

: Alleged CIA Involvement in the Ballou Case..

1. By memorandum dated 25 May 1973, I informed you of theresults of an interview of Mr.! !who reported thatMr. \ I an employee of the Ulllce of Secur-ity; hadstated during a dISCUSSIon period at Advanced Intelligence SeminarNo. 6 in September 1971 that the Office of Security had been involvedin the "Ballou case. " (The residence of Mr. Ballou, an antique guncollector in Silver Spring, Maryland, was raided on 7 June 1971 byMontgomery County Police and Federal law enforcement officers.When the officer s , dressed in civili';'n clothes, forced their way intothe house, Ballou picked up an antique pistol. The officers openedfire and seriously wounded Ballou. He was hospitalized for severalmonths and was left partially paralyzed. I believe he is now s uingover the incident. )

Z. We "interviewed Mr. 'I Icertain other ~mployee;whoattended the Seminar, and the Director of Security to determine justwhat was said at the Seminar and the extent of any Agency involvementin the Ballou' case. We find that participants y"the Seminar wereerico ura ed to discuss the details of their work and associated pr-oblerns ,

-Mr. mentioned an assignment he had been on with the U. S.Secre e r vi c e at the 1968 National Conventions and his liaison activitieswith the Montgomery County Police•

. '

3. I reports that in discussing the latter subject herelated a conversahon he had with Inspe cto r] pf the Mont-gomery County Police, sometime in June 1971 after the Ballou incidenthad been repc..rted in the newspapers. According tol fhe

I Ihad thanked him for some amplifying equipment theAgency had gIven to the Montgomery County Police and remarked that

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this equipment had probably saved a policeman's life. The inspectorconunented that the account of the Ballou incident appearing mthepress was not' the whole story. With the aid of the equipment theAgency had provided, the police had intercel'ted a telephone callfrom Ballou to a friend in which B~}lR\':,outlined plans to "kill a cop. IIThe police then staged a raid to forestall Ballou's plan, and it wasduring this raid that Ballou was shot.

4./ Isaid that he has no other knowledge of the Balloucase, except for what he has read in the newspapers, and that he hasnot had any other conversations about the case with any members ofthe Montgomery County Police. We learned nothing from our inquiriesthat would indicate any other Agency invo1vem=t in the Ballou case.

5. The following are related excerpts fzorn the "Family Jewels"submission of the Director of Security on 16 May 1973:

During the period from 1968 to 1973, several items ofpositive audio equipment consisting primarily of clandestinetransmitters and touch-tone dial recorders were loaned tothe Metropolitan Police Department; Fairfax County, Virginia,Polic.e Department; Montgomery County, ~rary1and, PoliceDepartment; New York City" Police Department; and the Sal}Francisco, California, Police Department.

On 25 July 1968, and at the specific request of theUnited States Secret Service, this Office provided two audiocountermeasures technicians to the Urrite'd States Secret Servicein connection with the Democratic National Convention held in

'Chicago, Illinois. 'This was not an offiCial detail althoughboth men were provided with temporary credentials identifyingthem as being affiliated with the United States Secret Service.

On 15 August 1968,we detailed thesa.m.e two men to theUnited States Secret Service to cover the Republican NationalConvention in Miami, Florida. On both occasions, the teammembers were debriefed upon their return and it is clear. thattheir activities were confined exclusively to sweeping thecandi.date s I and potential candidates' quarters.

Willia= V. BroeInspector General

OIG~(6 June 197'3)Dis;~ .

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'4 June 1973

Date

Follow-up interview re Mr.LI Irequestxxx to see DCI., --_. -- .

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FROM: FPBishop

I. l"V13.RE'J;'U~N TO:..(¥i1e,on Interviews held on behalf of DCI re Wate r g ate Z.Iewels

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1. On 31 May 1973 I questioned I labout what hehad said at the Advanced Intelligence Seminar No. 6 and the extentand nature of the relations he had had with the Montgomery CountyPolice. He said that he and others had been encouraged to discusstheir work and the problems related thereto with other Seminarmembers and told that what they said would be "non-attributable."In this context he had discussed the Office of Security's relatio,.swith local Police Forces including the Police Force in Mp~tgGmeryCounty. He said he mentioned the "Ballou Case" as an exampleof how the Montgomery County Police had used equipment providedby the Agency in their work, but denied that he had said or impliedthat the Agency was "involved" in the Ballou case. He said that hehad-alae related to the other Seminar members the fact that theAgency had provided assistance to the Secret Service in connectionwith the protection of the,President and Vice President and that heand others had been detailed to work with the Secret Service oncounter-audio activities at the 1968 Democratic National Conventionin Chicago and the Republican National Convention in Miami. I

, . askedI JWhO was on the Chicago detail, if he wasdetailed to protect'e Viceo,President. He said that he was detailedto Tom Kelly, Deputy Chief of the Secret Service and worked ineffect as a member of the Secret Service under Mr. Kelly.

Z. I questionedl Ias to whether his relations with. the Montgomery County Police was training oriented, equipment

orient.ed, or if he had engaged in any operations or activities withthe police. He said his relations with the Police had been entirelyequipment oriented and had 'been limited to the Chief of Police andone or two senior Inspectors. The extent of assistance given con-sisted of the Agency providing the Police w lth surplus technical

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equipment which was of no further use to the Agency" andbriefing them as to its use. He said he would not define thesebriefings as training, but admitted that it might be so construed.

3. I Isaid that his only knowledge of the "BallouCase", except what he had read in the papers, came from onetelephone conver sa.tion he had with Inspector I pf theMontgomery County Police sometime after accounts of the Balloushooting had appeared in the press. He said the Inspector calledto thank him for some amplifying equipment the Agency had giventhe Police and mentioned that it had probably saved the life of apoliceman. He said that the Inspector explained to him that theaccount of the incident appearing in the press was not the wholestory, that with the aid of the equipment the Agency had providedthe Police had been able to intercept a telephone call from Ballouto a friend in which Ballou had outlined plans to "kill a cop' ."The Police had then staged a raid to forestall Ballou's plan and itwas during this raid that Ballou was shot. I Isaidthat he had had no other conversations with the MontgomeryCounty Police on that subject. He said he had mentioned it atthe Seminar as an example of the sensitivity involved in theAgency's dealings with domestic Police Forces. He said herecalled that there was quite a bit of discussion and argumentby the Seminar members about the propriety of the Agency assist-ing local police forces and working with the Secret Se r v icedn the,U.S., but that he did not recall any extensive discussion about theBallou Case and that at no time had he said that the AgenCoasdirect! involved. I jsaid he remembered that

eemed partlcularly concerned about the Agency 0 ve-L,Tmn.;eTn"--"m;;-;~omestic activities and that sometime later, around

January or February 1972, 1 falked to Colonel White about hisconcern and Colonel White in turn talked to the Director of Security.Since that date, he said, he has not had any further direct contactwith the Montgomery County Police, based upon orders of theDirector of Security.

ox • I • DISlIOP

Inspector

Q0650

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31 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with "' 1Office o! Security

1. On 31 May 1973 I questioned I }bout what heb&d said at the Advanced Intelligence Semmar No. b nd the extentand nature of the relations he had had with the Montgomery CountyPollce. He said that he and others had been encouraged to discusstheir work and the problems related thereto with other Seminarmembers and told that what they said would be "non-attributable."In this context he had discussed the Office of Securlty's relationswith local Police Forces including the Police Force in MontgomeryCounty. He s atd he mentioned the "Ballou Case" as an exampleof bow the MontgQmery County Pollee had used equipment providedby the Agency In their work, but denied that he had said or impliedthat the Agency was "involved" in the Ballou case; He said that hehad also related to the other Seminar rnembe r s the fact that theAgency had provided a s s Is t ance to the Secret Service in connectionwith the protection of the President and Vice President and that heand others had been detailed to work with the Secret Service oncounter-audio activities at the 1968 Democratic National Conventionin Cbicago and the Republican National Convention in Miami. Iaskedl rho was on the Chicago de ta il, if he wasdetailed to protect the Vice President. He said that he was detailedto TOITI Kelly, Deputy Chief of the Secret Service and worked Ineffect as a member of the Secret Service under Mr. Kelly.

2. I questioned I rs to whether his relations withthe Montgomery County Pollce was training oriented, equipmontoriented. or if he had engaged in any operation. or activities withthe police. He said his relations with the Police had been entlrolyequipment oriented and had been limited to the Chief of Police andone or two senior Inspectors. The extent of aae iatance given con-.bted of the Agency providing the Police with surplus technical

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equipment which was of no further use to the Agency. andbriefing them as to itll use. He said he would not de!fne thesebrieClngs as training. but admitted that it might be 80 construed.

3.1 !sald that his only knowledge of the "BallouCase", except what he bad read in the papers, came from onetel.ephone conversation he had with Inspector I ff theMontgomery County Police sometime after accounts of the Balloushooting had appeared in the press. He said the Inspector calledto thank him for some amplifying equipment the Agency had g~venthe Police and mentioned that it had probably saved the Ilfe of apoliceman. He s~ld that the Inspector explained to blm that theaccount of the incident appearing in the press was not the wholestory, that with the aid of the equipment the Agency had providedthe Police had been ahle to intercept a telephone call from Ballouto It friend In which Ballou had outlined plans to "kill a cop:."The Police had then staged a raid to fo'restall Ballou's plan and itwas durlrig this raid that Ballou was shot. I Isaidthat he had had no other conversations with the MontgomeryCounty Police on that subject. H" said he had mentioned it atthe Seminar as an example of the sensitivity involved In theAgency's dealings with dorneatte Police Forces. He s aid herecalled that there was quite a bit of discussion and argumentby the Seminar members ,about the propriety of tbe Agency assist-ing local police forces and working with the Secret Service in theU. S., but that he did not recall any extensive discussion about theBallou Case and that at no time bad he said that the Agency wasdirectly involved. I lsaid he remembered that~

reem:d partiCularlY cdncerned about tbe Agencylsuivor've-'-=m=-e=-n=-t...-r£ri=-oar.!omestlc activiliesand tbat aornet lme later. around'January or February 1972, Dtalked to Colonel White about hisconcern and Colonel White in turn talked to tbe Director of Security.Since that dat.., he said, he has not had any further direct contactwitb the Montgomery County Police, based upon orders of theDirector of Security.

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F. P. BishopInspector

00652

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31 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJEC T: Interview withl IFMSAC

1.r Isaid he recalledl . Italkingabout the 0 flee of Secunty's liaison with the Pollee Forces inthe Metropolitan Area and that the Ballou case was mentioned.He also recalled that I Ihad mentioned that the Agencyhad provided assistance to the Secret Service in connection withsurveillance work against radical groups at the 1968 DemocraticNational Convention in Chicago.' He said that he could not re-member exactly whatl Isaid, but he did recall thatthere was considerab e d,Scusslon and debate among the classmembers about the propriety of the Agency engaging in suchactivities.

r- ~~2;.,.~~Later in January or February 1972, at a time whenIwas Chairman of the Management Advisory Group

L-.(TMA~~G~),~J:1-e~s~a~ldhe discussed these matters, and questioned theextent to which the Agency should become involved in domesticintelligence activities, with Colonel White and later with Mr.Colby. The MAG also raised the general problem in a couple oftheir papers, but without citing specific detailed -exampl e s , Hesaid he understood that Colonel White had taken the matter upwith the Director of Security and that some changes had beenmade as a result. . '

Orig - File w jL ~terview

..._ 8Nl'f 00653

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

29 May 1973

SUBJECT: Possible Agency Involvement in Outside Activitieson Basis of Information Provided bvlI' "L.-.---

----

On 29 May 1973 I talked to Mr. whowas a classmate oflland at the AdvancedIntelligence Semina~hel on - ep em er 1971. Mr.!said that each student was asked to describe and talk about his-w=o:-Or"k::-~in the Agency and he recalled that Mr'l ,jhad talked about theOffice of Security's liaison with, and assIStance given to and receivedfrom, the Police Departments in the' Washington Metropolitan area.He said he could not recall specifically what was said. but to the best of,his memory Mr. Iidescribed training given to either the PrinceGeorge's or Mont~Count.yPolice concerning surveillance methodsand electronic techniques. He 'said that he did not recall any discussionof the "Ballou case" and that he had no knowledge of that case otherthan what he had read in the riewspape r s ,

Of. 1"'. DISIlOP

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MORI DocID: 1451843

. ,. 25 May 1973

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Mr. Wl1l1am E. Colby

1. On 17 May the narne ofl }-aareferred to this office as having altempted to contact the Directorconcerning "activities outside the Agency." I attempted to contact

jon 21 and Z2 May, but he wa" on leave. On 23 May .-':hc::e:-:::,,"'ta"'t"e"'drL"h-=e wanted to check a portion of his information and asked

I! he couI'd com" to my office on 24 May.

2. ClUne into the Agency as a JOTin October an" current y sslgnedto the Soviet/EE Section. He has a very s rong personne fUe.

. 3. r ladvlsed that In August 1971 he atteuded theAdvanced Intelligence Seminar. On the first evening of the seminar Cthe students had a "getting acquainted" session where each onegave a brief description of his duties. One of the students1 I

I 1of the Office of Security, however, carried onAltor tne 8eSSIon was over and expanded on the briefing he.had given.He claimed that CIA was cooperating with the Montgomery CountyPollee, stating that the Office of Security gave electronic and othersupport to that organization•

.c. He further indicated that the Office of Security had beenInvolved in the "Ballou case"'J Idescrlbed the Ballou caeeas follows: The residence ofr. Ballou, an antique gun collectorIn Silver Spring, Maryland," was raided on 7 June 1971 by the Mont-gomery County Police and some Federal law enforcement officers.Mter the officers, dressed In civilian clothes, had forced their wayInto the house Ballou picked up an antique pistol. The officersimmediately opened fire and wounded Ballou seriously. He spenta long time in the hospital and is partly paralyzed at the present time.

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aia cue ""a. given much publicity in the Washington Post at thetime. There wa.s additional publicity in the lout sevez-al month.when Ballou insUgated a laW8uit against the rOliding officers.

____"'5CL I ldentIIied another student, r 1:

1 WhO was Rsalgned toO as a friend oil r----"n...c......llrtt-..alCtaR'i'f" thatc=Jals 0 8e emed to know the 8pee un'T!"'c,,-.,--;o"'f..--.-th=e-S=arnlau

case. .

6. t thankedl ~d told him tMa was just the typ

7. Thb office wll1 follow up on this 0 allegation and advisethe Director concernini our finding••

WUllJUn V. BroeInspector General

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A'iiVI\~ ,( INTELLIGENCE SE'/IINAR 'N, ( .;

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Mr. Lloyd Shearer

Editor-at- LargeParade Magazine140 N. Hamilton DriveBeverly P.ills, California 90211

Dear Mr. Shearer:

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5317 Briley Place, N. W.Washingt~n, D. C; 2001629 February 1972 .

Thank you for your letter of February 7, 1972, and itskine! words about rric, As you can Irnagfne, your cha Hcng e setrnc to work to rnc'et it. As a rcsult I can say, under oath ifneed be, that CIA has never carried out a political assassination,nor has it induced, cmployed or suggested one which oc cu rr ed,Whether this fully rri e ets your challenge, I cannot s a y (it t a kestwo to tango), but it is a long way f'r orn the' original s taterncnt inMr. Scott's c o lurnn that CIA "us cs politi ca.l a s s a s s ina ti on as aweapon." Perhaps I am too sensitive, but I would hope yOll couldB,;,t the record straight for your readers. '

Sincerely,

W. E. Colby

00660

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llOYD SHEAREREii'w.... ·1Arl'

Mr. W.E. Colby53.17 Brney Pl.Washington, D.C. 20016

Dear Hr! Colbyi'

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Parade publications, Inc. + OL 3·207J/.40 N.l1olnilton DriveBntT1v mu«, Calif. 90211

February 7, 1972

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Thank you for your kind and inrormative letter or

January 11 concerning Operation Phoenix.

I don't want to get into a running word-batt.le \':ith

you on the subject or political assassination in Indo-Ch~na

or the role or CIA and other or our agencies in Operation

Phoenix.

I am just ~ondering iilr yolt would care to say flatly

that the CIA has never'used political assassination in

Indo-Chinlil- or elsewhere and has nev;er induced, ernp.Loyed , or

s'ltggested to others that such tactics or devices be employed •

Ir you :will make that rlat statement under oath, I 1-:i11

not only apologize, I will tango with Dick Helms in

Garrinckel's largest show ~lindow at 14th and F--providing"

of course, Mrs. Helms gives her permission.

Again, I thank yOlt for your interest and commend you,for the really outstanding service you have rendered the

"country. You are. indeed one of Helms l finest.

~uectffHr '

, C"LJ~'.:.a-P

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. .llOYD SHEARER

Eililor.al.LltTg•

Parade Publications, Inc. .. OL 3-20i3llO N. Hamiltan D,.i,',DUf!TIV Hills. Calif. 90211

April ,30, 1972

Dear General Colby:

(1) Thank you for your article. "Should Lesbians BeAl101~ed To Play Professional Football?" I :found it intriJ:!uinlZ',and we plan to run it in a :future issue under your by-line, o:fcourse.

(2) Thank you :for arran~in", a tan~o with me and DickHelms o:f Her ~raJestyls Tel Aviv Rifles. Even At Williams,Dick was one of the ",reat tan",6-irtists of our time. Garfinkels,!Wood rop-Lathrop, even Hechts---in fact,any place and time ofyour choosin~ is O.K. with me. '

(J) One sad notel Will you tell An~us we cannot usehis ne» car bumper sticker: LICK DICK in "72, because it is,open to misinterpretation. In addition, wa try to remainpolitically neutra~. •

(4) As to your wlllinQness to say under oath tha~ theCIA has ,never been party to political assassination, If o:flate, have been 'travellin~ a ",ood deal. In the course of roytravels r happened to encounter OLe c- Penkovsky--not yourOle~---but Penkovsky, a bartendeIj in Cleveland ,··Ohio.Penkovsky told me tha~ you signe~a secrecy atrreement, For~270, witnessed by Victor L. }~rchetti. Under the terms ofthis atrree;nent you are pledp,ed to eternal. silence COl1cerninrrCIA activities. Unless you have a special Papal dispensatioJl---the kind ~iven Allen Dulles and Lyman Klrkpatric]c, Jr. , it seemsto me you are lip-sealed.

Perhaps this does not apply to heaz-t nc-s beforethe Senate Forei"n Relations Co~mittee or the prestiaiousCouncil 0:' Foz-et c-n ReLatn ons , lf this is so, please let meknow; and we wilL take it from there.

(5) .r will be in Washin~ton shortly stayin

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Mr. Lloyd Shearer'Editor-at-LargeParade Magazine140 N. Hamilton DriveBeverly Hills, California 90211

Dear Mr. Sheaxexr

5317 Briley Place, N. W.Washington, D. C. 2001629 February 1912

Thank you for your letter of February 7, 1912, and itakind words about me. As you can imagine, your challenge setme to work to rneet it. As a result f can say, under oath ifneed be, that CIA haa never carried out a political assassination,nor has it induced, employed or .suggested one which occurred.Whether this fully meets your challenge, I cannot say (it tnkuntwo to tango), but it is a long way from the original statement inMr. Scott'o column that CI,A "us es political a a sas a lnat lon a s aweapon." Perhaps I am too sensitive, but I would hope you couldaet the record straight Ior your readers.

Sincerely,

!~i~ w., .E, J:;olby,

W. E. Colby

VH •.\5

00665

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LLOYD SHEAREREtliJ~·d.Large.

Mr. W.E. Colby5317 Briley Pl.Washington. D.C. 20016

Dear Hr. Colby~

Parade Publications. Inc. + OL J-2013l~O N.HamilCon DriveBl'DtTlll Hills, Calif. soen

February 7, 1972

Thank you for your kind and informative letter of

'January 11 concerning Operation Phoenix.

I don't want to get into a running word-battle 1'1ith,

you on the SUbject of political assassination in Indo-China

or the role of CIA and other of our agencies in Operation

Phoenix.

I am just ~ondering ~f you would care to say flatly

that the CIA has never used political assassination in

Indo-China or elsewhere and has never induced', employed, or

suggested to others that such tactics or devices be employed.

If you ~lill make that flat statement under oath, I will

not only apologize, I wi11 tango ~Ii th Dick HeIms in ',-

Garfinckel's largest show window at 14th and F--providing,

of course, Nrs. Helms gives her permission.

AgE in. I thank you for your i~terest and cqmmend you

for the really outstanding service you have rendered 'the

country. You are indeed one of Helms' finest. "

00666

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Mr. Lloyd ShearerEditor at LargeParade Magazine733 Third A venUeNew York, New York 10017

Dear Mr. Shearor:

• •5317 Briley PlaceWashington, D. C.Januarr 11, 197Z

20016

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In your iaBue of Jiinuary 9th, one of Walter Scott's Per60nallty Parader eapons e s ntated that CUI. "\1$e8 political assassination ao a weapon" andthat Operation Phoonix "run by the CIA e etab Hahod a new high for U. S.political assasoinationc in Vietnam. IJ Since I bave held responsible pos itfonsin CIA for many yeau and was a Is o (during detached service from CUll re-s ponalble for U. s. support to Operation Phoenix, I believe I arn uniquely'qualified to testify (a s I have in public session under oath to Senate and HouseCommittees) that: '

a. CIA does net nnd bas not used political a s ea s s Inatf on as a.weapon.

b. Operation Phoenix Was run not by tho CIA but by the Govern-ment of Vietnam, with the suppozt o! the CORDS clement of the U. S.Military Assistance Command in coordination with severnl U. S.agenctee Includtng CIA.' .

c. Opexatfon Phoenix in not and was not a p rogr arn of ac aa s s lna ;tfon, It countered the Viet Cong apparatus attempting to overthrowthe Governmeut of Victnazn by targettlng its Iea.dez-e , Wherever pos-sible, t he ae were apprehended or invited to defect, but a c ubs tant la Inumber were killed in firefighta during Inilitary operations or rc-dating capture. There is a vast diHercncc in kind. not merely in.degree, between t hca e combat ca auaIt i ea (even including the fewabus ee which occurred) and the victims of the Viet Cong's syntemattccarnpaIgn of terroris,ID to which Mr. Scott quite accurately referred.

In order to c.~!'ify this Important queBti{.·.l to the millions of concernedAmericana who read P"rade, I should appreclate your publishing thin,letter.

Sinceroly,

WEC:blp• Distribution:

Ori" - Addrp.RRPn t - E1:1tI - William Sullivan of Stafe

lsi w. E. Colby

W. E. Colby

006671 - ExDtr 1 - Mr. Tnue...ma.,-

(via SAVA - 12 Janl I - Colonel Farnham !()sn/rS,!'

-MORI DoclD: 1451843

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5317 Briley PlaceWashington, D, C. 20016January 11, 1972.

Mr. Lloyd ShearerEditor a,t LargeParade Magazine733 Third AvenueNew York, New York 10017

" Dear Mr', Shearer:

In your issue of January 9th, one of Walter Scott's Personality Paraderesponses stated that ClA "uses political assassination as a weapon" andthat Operation Phoenix "run by the CIA established a new high for U. S.political assassinations in Vietnam." Since I have held .r es pon sfbIepositfonein CIA for many years and was also (during detached s e r vic e f'r orrr CIA) re-sponsible for U.S, s uppo r-t to Operation Phoenix, I believe I am uniquelyqualified to testify (as I have in public s ea s i on under oath to Senate and Houn eCommitte es ] that:

a. CIA doe s not and ha s not used political a as a s e Inatf on a s aweapou,

b. Operation Phoenix WaB run not by the ClA but by the Govern-ment of Vietnam. with the support of the CORDS clement of the U, S.Military Aa afs tanc o Comrna nd in coordination with ee ve r-aI U. S.a g encf e e including CIA.

e. Operation Phoenix is not and wa s not a program of assasBina-tion. It countered the Viet Cong apparatus attempting to overthrowthe Government of Vietnam by targetting its Jeade r s , Wherever pos-sible, thc e e were apprehended or invited to defect, but a substantialnumber Were killed in firefightB during military operations or re-sisting capture. There is a vast difference in kind, not merely indegree, between these combat casualties (even including the fewabu aes which occurred) and the victims of the Viet Cong' s systematicea:mpaign of terrorism to which Mr. Scott quite accurately referred.

In order to clarify t his i:mportant question to the millions of concerncaAxnericans who read Parade, I should appreciate your publishing t his letter.

.... -,

Sincerely,

rA)jW. E. Colby

00668

MORl DoclD: 1451843

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publbbcr, WARUN J. RfYNOLDS 0

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AaOR [RN[ST DORGNINE WITH HIS fOURTH wns,

Q. Does Richard Nixonhave his m':"n privale gollcourse at Key Biscayne-l-Emma R,cynolds, Orlando,Fla.A. Not at Key Biscayne. He'owns a six-hole pitch-and-putt course on his SanClemente, Calif... estate.

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Q. How long docs il rake.radioactive fallout from

. Chincse nuclear tests toreach the US.I-M.1fkCbeseboto, sarsrow, Cali/.A. Approximately threedays depending on theWind.

Q. How many tjmcs hilS aclor ErnesiBorgnine beenmarried, and is he a wile·bealer?-E.T.R., Springfield,Mass. . , 'A. Borgnlnc has been married four limes. His last'wife, Donna, has charged him with beating her, Jsseeking a divorce.

/I loo'It..'lvt.:u It I.'''''''::' PC,...,IJ' .... n:vuc.:»,

IQ. Is rhere any agency o/lhe U.S. Covemmcn! whi;;h

, has been aulhorizct!lo include polHical assassinationin its practices?-M. 'A'ilso.n, Au.slin, Tex. ~

~ A:The one U.S. agency which uses political assassi-nation as: a weapon is the Central IntelligenceAgency, Many of its men 'in Vic-toam have assassf-natcd civilian Communists in an effort 10 destroy theVietcong infrastructure. Operation Phoenix run bythe CIA e",bli,hed a new hlgh (or U.S. polilicalassassfnatlons in Vietnam, larscly in response 10enemy terrorist tactics which also include assassina-tion, kidnapping, terrorism of all sorts,

!Jape and doc, he ,rill 1001Chicago, 1/1. .n in Eliham, England. on July~ hi' zest (or living it up.

,an is one with whom you on·k.," Who said' thall-louiseif.~'ery.

'nod.lt" editors, lINo.A GUlSTON, HERO(RT KUPHRBERG, MARTIN ....V.R.CUUES, JOHN c.. ROGERS) 'F. MllKUHN atl ;iUsociOlIC', At TaO'A.NII.ulsl.nll, MARY HODOROWSlI, SUZANNE CURLEY.DORIS SCHOPTMAN .3, OEMI:TJUA 1J.YlO~ fOOion. VIRGINIA POPE cartoon educr, tA\;"'R[NCf lARIAJt

• BWMfr.HItAL, OP/.l GINN

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Q. Iour yC',1rs: "'1:0 .1C"C~S. \ HC'dy l:un.lIr hold a m.m, I ii,1nwdnomldllly/I. j.ikd

(or itttl'lJJpt('tI r.lpc. lIec1.1imC'd .11 Ille lime ,hiftIkdy Iwl invited Mm 10sI,mr h"r "ed. Wl",l

MORl DoclD: 1451843

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5317 Briley PlaceWashington, D. C. 20016January 11, 1972

Mr. Lloyd ShearerEditor at LargeParade Magazine733 Third AvenueNew York, New York 10017

Dear :Mr. Shearer:

In your issue of January 9th, one of Walter Scott's Personality Paraderesponses stated that CIA Ji us e s political assassination as a 'weapo~' andthat Operation Phoenix "run by the CIA established a new high for U. S.political assassinations in Vietnam." Since 1 have held respon'sible positionsin CIA for many years and was also (d.uring detached service from CIA) re-sponsible for U. S. support to Operation Phoenix, I. b c ldc ve I am uniquely.qualified to testify (as I have in public session under oath to Senate and HouseCorrunittees) that:

-,

a. CIA does n