IV. SEARCH AND SEIZURE

A. Consti, Art. III, Sections 2 and 3

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in the proceeding.

B. Statutes/Rulesa. RPC Arts. 129-130

Article 129. Search warrants maliciously obtained, and abuse in the service of those illegally obtained. – In addition to the liability attaching to the offender for the commission of any other offense, the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall procure a search warrant without just cause or, having legally procured the same, shall exceed his authority or use unnecessary severity in executing the same.

Article 130. Searching domicile without witnesses. – The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee who, in cases where a search is proper, shall search the domicile, papers, or other belongings of any person, in the absence of the latter, any member of his family, or in their default, without the presence of 2 witnesses residing in the same locality.

b. Tariff and Customs Code, Sections 2201-2212, 2301-2304

TITLE VI. - ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS.

PART 1. - SEARCH, SEIZURE AND ARREST

SEC. 2201. Trespass or Obstruction of Customs Premises. - No person other than those with legitimate business with, or employees of, the port or the Bureau of Customs shall be allowed to enter the customs premises without a written permission of the Collector. No person shall obstruct a customhouse, warehouse, office, wharf, street or other premises under the control of the Bureau of Customs, or in any approaches to that house or premises.

SEC. 2202. Special Surveillance for Protection of Customs Revenue and Prevention of Smuggling. In order to prevent smuggling and to secure the collection of the legal duties, taxes and other charges, the customs service shall exercise surveillance over the coast, beginning when a vessel or aircraft enters Philippine territory an concluding when the article imported therein has been legally passed through the customhouse: Provided, That the function of the Philippine Coast Guard to prevent and suppress illegal entry, smuggling and other customs frauds and violations of the maritime law and its proper surveillance of vessels entering and/or leaving the Philippine territory as provided in section 3 (a) of Republic Act Numbered Fifty -one hundred and seventy -three shall continue to be in force and effect.

PART 2. - ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

SEC. 2301. Warrant for Detention of Property -Cash Bond. - Upon making any, seizure, the Collector shall issue a warrant for the detention of the property; and if the owner or importer desires to secure the release of the property for legitimate use, the Collector shall, with the approval of the Commissioner of Customs, surrender it upon the filing of a cash bond, in an amount to be fixed by him, conditioned upon the payment of the appraised value of the article and/or any fine, expenses and costs which may be adjudged in the case: Provided, That such importation shall not be released under any bond when there is prima facie evidence of fraud in the importation of the article: Provided, further, That articles the importation of which is prohibited by law shall not be released under any circumstance whomsoever, Provided, finally, That nothing in this section shall be construed as relievingthe owner or importer from any criminal liability which may arise from any violation of law committed in connection with the importation of the article (R.A. 7651, June 04, 1993).

SEC. 2302. Report of Seizure to Commissioner and Chairman, Commission on Audit. - When a seizure is made for any cause, the Collector of the district wherein the seizures is effected shall immediately make report thereof to the Commissioner and Chairman of the Commission on Audit.

SEC. 2303. Notification to Owner or Importer. - The Collector shall give the owner or of the property or his agent a written notice of the seizure and shall give him anopportunity to be heard in reference to the delinquency which was the occasion of such seizure.

For the purpose of giving such notice and of all other proceedings in the matter of such seizure, the importer, consignee or person holding the bill of lading shall be deemed to be the "owner" of the article included in the bill.

For the same purpose, "agent" shall be deemed to include not only any agent in fact of the owner of the seized property but also any person having responsible possession of the property at the time of the seizure, if the owner or his agent in fact is unknown or cannot be reached.

SEC. 2304. Notification to Unknown Owner. - Notice to an unknown owner shall be effected by posting for fifteen days in the public corridor of the customhouse of the district in which the seizure was made, and, in the discretion of the Commissioner, by publication in a newspaper or by such other means as he shall consider desirable.

c. RA 6235 (1971), Section 9 – An Act Prohibiting Certain Acts Inimical to Civil Aviation, and for Other Purposes

Section 9. Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air carrier concerned shall contain among others the following condition printed thereon: "Holder hereof and his hand-carried luggage(s) are subject to search for, and seizure of, prohibited materials or substances. Holder refusing to be searched shall not be allowed to board the aircraft," which shall constitute a part of the contract between the passenger and the air carrier.

C. Cases

a. Generally

i. Stonehill vs. Diokno

42 search warrants were issued against Stonehill, et. al.

- Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers)

- Violation of Central Bank laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and the RPC

Why are the search warrants null and void?1. They do not describe with particularity the documents, books, and things to be seized2. Cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized3. The warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them.4. The searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner5. The documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law

Arguments that they are valid:1. The contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law2. The defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners’ consent3. In any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.

What were filed?

1. March 20, 1962 - Original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction.2. March 22- The Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition.3. June 29, 1962 - The writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations mentioned are concerned. The injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents, and things found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.

What are the 2 categories of the things seized?1. Those found and seized in the offices of the corporations —> SC: Petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from

the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be.

- It is well-settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by 3rd parties.

- The right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to corporations.

2. Those found and seized in the residences of petitioners

ISSUES:

1. W/N the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof, are valid — NO

- The Constitutional provision stresses 2 points: — None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants.

a. No warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision

b. The warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

- No specific offense had been alleged in said applications. Thus, it would have been impossible for the judges to have found probable cause.

- The applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by the petitioners.

- To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted—to outlaw the socalled general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine ,what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.

- ROC: A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense.

- The warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights— that the things to be seized be particularly described—as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.

- Moncado v. People: OVERTURNED. This doctrine provides that even if searches and seizures under consideration were unlawful, the documents, papers and things seized are admissible in evidence. Why? Because the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely because the constable has blundered. This is based on the theory that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained.

- Fishing of evidence is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish probable cause.

2. W/N said documents, papers, and things may be used in evidence against petitioners herein — INADMISSIBLE.

SC: We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twentynine (29) places, offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.

CASTRO - CONCURRING AND DISSENTING

- I do not share his reluctance or unwillingness to expressly declare, at this time, the nullity of the search warrants served at places other than the three residences, and the illegality of the searches and seizures conducted under the authority thereof.

- All the search warrants, without exception, in this case are admittedly general, blanket and roving warrants and are therefore admittedly and indisputably outlawed by the Constitution; and the searches and seizures made were therefore unlawful.

- Lack of standing should not affect, alter or otherwise modify the intrinsic nullity of the search warrants and the intrinsic illegality of the searches and seizures made thereunder.

- No inference can be drawn from the words of the Constitution that “legal standing” or the lack of it is a determinant of the nullity or validity of a search warrant or of the lawfulness or illegality of a search or seizure.

- The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the suppression or return of documents, papers and effects which are the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure, may be summarized as follows; (a) ownership of documents, papers and effects gives "standing;" (b) ownership and/or control or possession—actual or constructive—of premises searched gives "standing"; and (c) the "aggrieved person" doctrine where the search warrant and the sworn application for search warrant are "primarily" directed solely and exclusively against the "aggrieved person," gives "standing."

- Petitioners were named personally with the designation of “President and/or General Manager” of the particular corporation.

- Ownership of properties seized alone entitles the petitioners to bring a motion to return and suppress, and gives them standing as persons aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure regardless of their location at the time of seizure.

- A person places himself or his property within a constitutionally protected area. —> Reasonable expectation of privacy.

- Control of premises searched gives “standing” — Independent ownership or other personal interest in the records and documents seized, the petitioners have standing to move for return and suppression by virtue of their proprietary or leasehold interest in may of the premises searched.

- Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant is primarily directed against said person gives “standing”

- Prescinding from the foregoing, this Court, at all events, should order the return to the petitioners all personal and private papers and effects seized, no matter where these were seized, whether from their residences or corporate offices or any other place or places. The uncontradicted sworn statements of the petitioners in their various pleadings submitted to this Court indisputably show that amongst the things seized from the corporate offices and other places were personal and private papers and effects belonging to the petitioners.

- The grouping should be: (1) personal or private papers of the petitioners wherever they were unlawfully seized, be it their family residences, offices, warehouses, and/or premises owned and/or controlled and/or possessed by them as shown in all the search warrants and in the sworn applications filed in securing the void search warrants, and (b) purely corporate papers belonging to corporations.

ii. Burgos vs. COS

Validity of 2 search warrants issued by Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the “Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr., publisher-editor of the “We Forum” newspaper were seized.

Petitioner prays that the respondents be enjoined from using the articles seized as evidence.

July 7, 1983: SolGen: Pending the prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction, the respondents will not use the aforementioned articles as evidence in the case. The preliminary prohibitory injunction was rendered moot and academic.

ARGUMENTS:

1. According to respondents, petition should be dismissed because the petitioners came to court without first seeking the quashal of evidence before the judge. —> SC: This procedural flaw does not negate the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues raised, not to mention the public interest generated by the search of the “We Forum” offices, which was televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies.

— Abad Santos in Odoveza v. Raymundo: It is always in the power of the Court to suspend its rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require it.

2. According to respondents, petition should be dismissed on the ground of laches —> SC: Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

— The extrajudicial efforts exerted by petitioners quite evidently negate the presumption that they had abandoned their right to the possession of the seized property, thereby refuting the charge of laches against them.

3. According to respondents, Burgos is estopped from challenging the validity of the search warrants because he has already used and marked as evidence some of the seized documents. —> SC: These documents lawfully belong to him, and the fact that he has used them as evidence does not and cannot in any way affect the validity or invalidity of the search warrants assailed in this petition.

4. For petitioners: Search Warrants No. 2082[a] and No. 2082[b] were used to search two distinct places: No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, respectively. Objection is interposed to the execution of Search Warrant No. 2082[b] at the latter address on the ground that the two search warrants pinpointed only one place where petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping and concealing the articles listed therein, i.e., No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City.

- In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched with sufficient particularity, it has been held “that the executing officer’s prior knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be especially true where the executing officer is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had issued, and when he knows that the judge who issued the warrant intended the building described in the affidavit. And it has also been said that the exediting officer may look to the affidavit in the official court file to resolve an8 ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be searched.

5. For petitioners: Although the warrants were directed against Burgos Jr alone, articles belonging to Burgos Sr., Bayani Soriano, and J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were also seized.

SC: Section 2, Rule 126 of ROC: A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of the following personal property:[a] Property subject of the offense;[b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and[c] Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.

- The above rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person against whom the warrant is directed. Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of the property sought to be seized, as petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was alleged to have in relation to the articles and property seized under the warrants. (CONSTRUCTIVE OWNERSHIP CONSIDERED)

6. Petitioners: Real properties were seized under the disputed warrants. —> SC: Machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right. In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. Thus, the property remains movable and not immovable (thus real).

7. Petitoners: No probable cause. —> SC: Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. And when the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the application and/or

its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice.

- The broad statement in Col. Abadilla’s application that petitioner “is in possession or has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were used and are all continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as amended x x x”12 is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause

- Warrants under consideration are constitutionally objectionable because they are in the nature of general warrants (printing equipment, subversive documents, motor vehicles, Toyota Corolla, pick up, delivery truck, Tamaraw, Hi-Luz) —> SC: Too general. The description of the articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in question cannot be characterized differently.

- Pres. Marcos himself denied the request of the military authorities to sequester the property seized from petitioners.

SC: The 2 search warrants were declared null and void.

ABAD SANTOS - CONCURRING

— To satisfy the requirement of probable cause a specific offense must be alleged in the application; abstract averments will not suffice. In the case at bar nothing specifically subversive has been alleged; stated only is the claim that certain objects were being used as instruments and means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under P.D. No. 885, as amended. There is no mention of any specific provision of the decree. In the words of Chief Justice Concepcion, “It would be legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody” of violating the decree without reference to any determinate provision thereof.

— The search warrants are also void for lack of particularity.

iii. People vs. Marti

Court concerned: Special Criminal Court of Manila

Offense: Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article XI and Section 2 (e) (i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act)

August 14, 1987 - Between 10 and 11 a.m., Marti and his wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of Manila Packing and Export Forwarders in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying 4 gift-wrapped packages.

Anita Reyes attended to them. Marti said he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich. Marti refused to have the packages inspected, assuring her that they simply contained books, cigars, gloves, and were gifts to his friend. Anita no longer insisted on inspecting the packages.

Before delivery of appellant’s box to the Bureau of Customs and/ or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened appellant’s box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His curiousity aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. He made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the contents thereof.

Reyes prepared a letter reporting the shipment and requested a laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper.

Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant’s packages were placed and, in the presence of the NBI agents, opened the top flaps, removed the styrofoam and took out the cellophane wrappers from inside the gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to have been contained inside the cellophane wrappers.

The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job Reyes. He discovered that the package contained bricks or cakelike dried marijuana leaves. The package which allegedly contained tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned out that dried marijuana leaves were neatly stocked underneath the cigars (tsn, p. 39, October 6, 1987).

The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents thereof, after signing a “Receipt” acknowledging custody of the said effects (tsn, pp. 23, October 7, 1987).

While claiming his mail at the Central Post Office, the NBI invited him to shed light on the attempted shipment of marijuana.

Thereafter, an information was filed against appellant for violation of the Dangerous Drugs ACt.

ISSUE:

W/N the evidence was procured through illegal search and seizure, therefore inadmissible — NO

- Appellant cited Sections 2 and 3 of Article III of the Constitution.

- In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule and has struck down the admissibility of evidence contained in violation of the constitutional safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures. It must be noted, however, that in all those cases adverted to, the evidence so obtained were invariably procured by the State acting through the medium of its law enforcers or other authorized government agencies. The case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity, and without the intervention and participation of State authorities.

- In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.

— — The constitutional right refers to immunity from interference by government, including his residence, papers, and other possessions.

—— The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the government without the latter transgressing appellant’s rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged.

- Petitioner: NBI agents made an illegal search and seizure of the evidence later on used in prosecuting the case which resulted in his conviction

— — Records of the case clearly indicate that it was Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts.

—— It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box containing the illicit cargo, he took samples of the same to the NBI and later summoned the agents to his place of business. Thereafter, he opened the parcels containing the rest of the shipment and entrusted the care and custody thereof to the NBI agents. Clearly, the NBI agents made no search and seizure, much less an illegal one, contrary to the postulate of accused/appellant.

—— The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search.

——— What is the search meant in the BR?

—Petitioner: Since the provisions of the 1935 Constitution has been modified by the present phraseology found in the 1987 Charter, expressly declaring as inadmissible any evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional prohibition against illegal search and seizure, it matters not whether the evidence was procured by police authorities or private individuals

—— The Constitution, in laying down the principles of the government and fundamental liberties of the people, does not govern relationships between individuals.

- Petitioner: TC erred in convicting him despite the undisputed fact that his rights under the Constitution while under custodial investigation were not observed.

—— The law enforcers testified that accused/ appellant was informed of his constitutional rights. It is presumed that they have regularly performed their duties (Sec. 5(m), Rule 131) and their testimonies should be given full faith and credence, there being no evidence to the contrary. What is clear from the records, on the other hand, is that appellant refused to give any written statement while under investigation as testified by Atty. Lastimoso of the NBI.

——What is more, we have examined the assailed judgment of the trial court and nowhere is there any reference made to the testimony of appellant while under custodial investigation which was utilized in the finding of conviction.

- Petitioner: He was not the owner of the packages, but a certain Michael, a German national, whom he met in a pub along Ermita.

—— It was a testimony that can be easily fabricated. An acquaintance with a complete stranger struck in half an hour could not have pushed a man to entrust the shipment of four (4) parcels and shell out P2,000.00 for the purpose and for appellant to readily accede to comply with the undertaking without first ascertaining its contents. He even failed to explain why he readily agreed to do the errand. Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, deserve no weight in law.

—— Appellant’s bare denial is even made more suspect considering that, as per records of the Interpol, he was previously convicted of possession of hashish by the Kleve Court in the Federal Republic of Germany on January 1, 1982 and that the consignee of the frustrated shipment, Walter Fierz, also a Swiss national, was likewise convicted for drug abuse and is just about an hour’s drive from appellant’s residence in Zurich, Switzerland (TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 66; Original Records, p. 244; Decision, p. 21; Rollo, p. 93).

——Appellant signed the contract as the owner and shipper thereof, giving more weight to the presumption that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him.

iv. People vs. Bangcarawan

Accused: Basher Bongcarawan

Violation: Section 16, Article III of RA 6425, Dangerous Drugs Act— — Had in his possession, custody and control 8 packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), weighing 400 grams, without corresponding license or prescription

Arraignment: Not guilty.

M/V Super Ferry 5 (Manila to Iligan) —> the vessel was about to dock at Iligan City when its security officer, Mark Diesmo, received a complaint from passenger Lorena Canoy about her missing jewelry. Canoy suspected a passenger at cabin no. 106 as the culprit. Security searched for the suspect, identified as herein accused.

With his consent, he was bodily searched, but no jewelry was found. He was then escorted by two (2) security agents back to the economy section to get his baggage. The accused took a Samsonite suitcase and brought this back to the cabin. When requested by the security, the accused opened the suitcase, revealing a brown bag and small plastic packs containing white crystalline substance. Suspecting the substance to be “shabu,” the security personnel immediately reported the matter to the ship captain and took pictures of the accused beside the suitcase and its contents.

When asked about the contraband articles, the accused explained that he was just requested by a certain Alican “Alex” Macapudi to bring the suitcase to the latter’s brother in Iligan City.8 The accused and the seized items were later turned over by the coast guard to the Presidential AntiOrganized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF).

RTC: Guilty

ISSUE:

W/N the evidence confiscated is admissible against accused — YES.

Petitioner: Samsonite suitcase was forcibly opened and searched without his consent, and hence, in violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure. People vs. Marti is not applicable in this case because a vessel security personnel is deemed to perform the duties of a policeman.

- In the absence of governmental interference, liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. The Constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law.

- In the case before us, the baggage of the accusedappellant was searched by the vessel security personnel. It was only after they found “shabu” inside the suitcase that they called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The search and seizure of the suitcase and the contraband items was therefore carried out without government intervention, and hence, the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure does not apply.

- The vessel security officer in the case at bar is a private employee and does not discharge any governmental function. In contrast, police officers are agents of the state tasked with the sovereign function of enforcement of the law. Historically and until now, it is against them and other agents of the state that the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures may be invoked. Just because the vessel security officers are also armed does not mean that they are agents of the State.

Petitioner: He was not owner of the suitcase and he had no knowledge that the same contained shabu.

- Elements of the crime:1. That the accused is in possession of the object identified as a prohibited or a regulated drug.2. That such possession is not authorized by law.3. That the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.

- US vs. Tan Misa: To warrant conviction, the possession of dangerous drugs must be with knowledge of the accused, or that animus possidendi existed together with the possession or control of such articles. It has been ruled, however, that possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of a satisfactory explanation of such possession. Hence, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused to explain the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi.

- Moreover, evidence must be credible in itself to deserve credence and weight in law. In this case, the accusedappellant admits that when he was asked to get his baggage, he knew it would be inspected.28 Why he got the Samsonite suitcase allegedly not owned by him and which had a combination lock known only to the owner remains unclear. He also claims that he did not present his small “maleta” for inspection for fear that its contents consisting of expensive sunglasses and brushes would be confiscated, but he brought the Samsonite suitcase which is not his and also contained expensive sunglasses, and even watches. The things in possession of a person are presumed by law to be owned by him.

- Mere denial of ownership will not suffice especially if, as in the case at bar, it is the keystone of the defense of the accusedappellant. Stories can easily be fabricated. It will take more than barebone allegations to convince this Court that a courier of dangerous drugs is not its owner and has no knowledge or intent to possess the same.

v. US vs. Place – Declared inadmissible not because of the canine sniff, but because the police transgressed the limits of their authority by not informing the accused of how long his baggage will be detained and where it will be brought.

Ruth’s notes:

WN the 4th Amendment prohibits law enforcement authorities from temporarily detaining personal luggage for exposure to a trained narcotics detection dog on the basis of reasonable suspicion that the luggage contains narcotics — NO. But the police in this case exceeded the bounds of a permissive investigative detention of the luggage.

The test is whether those interests are sufficiently “substantial”, not whether they are independent of the interest in investigating crimes effectively and apprehending suspects.

A “canine sniff” by well-trained narcotics detection dog does not require opening the luggage. The sniff discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics. Thus, despite the fact that the sniff tells the authorities something about the contents of the luggage, the information obtained is limited.

The canine sniff is sui generis. We are aware of no other investigative procedure that is so limited both in the manner in which the information is obtained and in the content of the information revealed by the procedure. Therefore, we conclude that the particular course of investigation that the agents intended to pursue here -- exposure of respondent's luggage, which was located in a public place, to a trained canine -- did not constitute a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

Although the 90-minute detention of respondent's luggage is sufficient to render the seizure unreasonable, the violation was exacerbated by the failure of the agents to accurately inform respondent of the place to which they were transporting his luggage, of the length of time he might be dispossessed, and of what arrangements would be made for return of the luggage if the investigation dispelled the suspicion. In short, we hold that the detention of respondent's luggage in this case

went beyond the narrow authority possessed by police to detain briefly luggage reasonably suspected to contain narcotics.

From Web:

Brief Fact Summary. DEA agents met the respondent, Raymond Place, on Friday at his destination after questionable behavior at his departing airport. They then proceeded to hold his bags over the weekend and get a search warrant for them Monday morning.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Seizing a person’s luggage for an entire weekend until a warrant may be obtained violates the Fourth Amendment as beyond the scope of a valid Terry stop. Also, a sniff by a well-trained narcotics dog that does not require opening of the luggage is not a search for Fourth Amendment purposes.

Facts. The respondent Raymond Place was met on a Friday by drug enforcement agents on arrival at the airport and he refused to consent to a search of his bags, leading an agent to tell him that they were going to take the bags to a judge to get a search warrant. The agents took the bags to another airport to have the drug detection dogs sniff them, and the dogs reacted positively ninety minutes after seizure of the bags. The agents kept the bags over the weekend, and on Monday they were able to get a search warrant for the bags which yielded cocaine. The trial court convicted the respondent of drug possession, and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, claiming that such a prolonged seizure of the respondent’s baggage amounted to a seizure without probable cause counter to the Fourth Amendment. The government was granted certiorari.

Issue. Does the seizure of a person’s luggage for an entire weekend until a warrant may be procured violate the Fourth Amendment as exceeding the limits of a Terry stop?Is the “canine sniff” of a narcotics dog a search for Fourth Amendment purposes?

Held. Affirm the decision of the Second Circuit.When there is reasonable suspicion that a traveler is carrying narcotics in their luggage, the concepts of Terry allow the officer to detain the luggage temporarily to investigate the circumstances, as long as the investigative detention is appropriately limited in scope. However, the actions here went beyond the scope allowable under Terry since the luggage was held for three days, thus it is in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

The agents’ failure to tell the respondent where the bags were being transported to, how long they may be gone, and how they would be returned if no suspicion of criminal activity remained, made the unreasonableness of their actions under the Fourth Amendment even more clear.

A drug-sniffing dog’s actions are not invasive enough of privacy to constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.

Concurrence. Justice William Brennan stated that the Fourth Amendment was violated as soon as the respondent’s luggage was seized by the officers.

Justice Harry Blackmun expressed the view that the validity of a drug dog sniff under the Fourth Amendment should not even have been opined upon under these facts.

Discussion. This opinion clarifies why courts and law enforcement have such fondness for drug sniffing dogs. The Supreme Court here articulates that governmental conduct like drug dog sniffing that can reveal whether a substance is contraband yet no other private fact compromises no privacy interest, and therefore is not a search subject to the Fourth Amendment. This appears to be settled law, even though Justice Blackmun would argue that it is merely dictum, and that the majority should not have passed an opinion on their validity under these facts.

b. Procedure for Issuance of a Search Warrant

i. Pendon vs. CA

February 4, 1987: Rojas, OIC of the PH Constabulary-Criminal Investigation Service (PC-CIS) in Bacolod City, filed an application for a search warrant. He alleged that he had reason to believe that Kenneth Siao had in his possession NAPOCOR Galvanized blots, grounding motor drive assembly, aluminum wires, and other NAPOCOR tower parts and line accessories.

Constabulary officers stationed in Bacolod City conducted a search of the premises described in the search warrant and seized the following articles:1. 272 kilos of galvanized bolts2. V chuckle and U-bolts3. 3 and 1/2 feet angular bar

The receipt was signed by Digno Mamaril, PC Sergeant and marked “from Kenneth Siao”.

A complaint for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law was filed against Kenneth Siao by NAPOCOR. Siao filed a counter-affidavit alleging that he had previously relinquished all his rights and ownership over the Kener Trading to Erle Pendon.

In a resolution, the City Fiscal ordered the dismissal of the complaint against Siao and the filing of a complaint for the same violation against Pendon.

Before his arraignment, Pendon filed an application for the return of the articles seized on the ground that said search warrant was illegally issued. The application was subsequently amended to an application for quashal of the illegally-issued search warrant and for the return of the articles seized by virtue thereof.

On August 24, 1987, respondent Judge Jocson issued an order impliedly denying the application for the quashal of the search warrant without ruling on the issue of the validity of the issuance thereof.

MR: Denied

CA: Dismissed. Found the existence of a probable cause to justify the issuance of the search warrant.

MR: Denied.

W/N the search warrant was validly issued - NO.

According to petitioner, why did if fail to fulfill the requirements?

1. The joint deposition of the witnesses showed that the questions therein were pretyped, mimeographed and the answers of the witnesses were merely filled-in. No examination of the applicant and of the joint deponents was personally conducted by Judge Magallanes as required by law and the rules.

2. Both the application of Rojas and the joint deposition of Abaya and Reyes show that neither of the affiants had personal knowledge that any specific offense was committed by petitioner or that the articles sought to be seized were stolen or that being so, they were brought to Kenneth Siao.

3. Petitioner also contends that both the application of Rojas and the joint deposition of Abaya and Reyes show that neither of the affiants had personal knowledge that any specific offense was committed by petitioner or that the articles sought to be seized were stolen or that being so, they were brought to Kenneth Siao.

4. Even assuming that the articles belong to Siao, his Constitutional right prevails over that of NAPOCOR.

According to Section 2 of 1987 Consti, the issuance of a search warrant is justified only upon a finding of probable cause. Probable cause for a search has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.

In determining the existence of probable cause, it is required that:

1. The judge or officer must examine the witnesses personally2. The examination must be under oath3. The examination must be reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers.

These requirements are provided under Section 4, Rule 126 of the New Rules of Criminal Procedure which states: “Section 4. Examination of complainant; record. — The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.

The requirement mandated by the law and the rules that the judge must personally examine the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers before issuing the warrant, was not sufficiently complied with. — The applicant himself was not asked any searching question.— The records disclose that the only part played by the applicant, Lt. Rojas, was to subscribe the application before Judge Magallanes.

— The application contained pre-typed questions, none of which stated that applicant had personal knowledge of a robbery or a theft and that the proceeds thereof are in the possession and control of the person against whom the search warrant was sought to be issued. — Roan vs. Gonzales; Mata vs. Bayona: It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be established. the examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application. — The public respondent prosecutor admitted in his memorandum that the questions propounded were pre-typed.

Anti-Fencing —> Punishes the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy or sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should have been known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.

— There was also no statement in the joint deposition that the articles sought to be seized were derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or a theft or that applicants have any knowledge that a robbery or theft was committed and the articles sought to be seized were the proceeds thereof. It was not even shown what connection Kenneth Siao has with Kener Trading or with the premises sought to be searched. By and large, neither the application nor the joint deposition provided facts or circumstance which could lead a prudent man to believe that an offense had been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense, if any, are in the possession of the person named in the application.

Another infirmity of the search warrant is its generality. — The law requires that the articles sought to be seized must be described with particularity. The items listed in the warrant are so general that the searching team can practically take half of the business of Kener Trading, the premises searched. Kener Trading is engaged in the business of buying and selling scrap metals, second hand spare parts and accessories and empty bottles. —Far more important is that the items described in the application do not fall under the list of personal property which may be seized under Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure because neither the application nor the joint deposition alleged that the item/s sought to be seized were: a) the subject of an offense; b) stolen or embezzled property and other proceeds or fruits of an offense; and c) used or intended to be used as a means of committing an offense.— Judge Jocson himself admitted that the “lack of probable cause during the application for search warrant” was cured by the admission of the accused of counsel that at least one of the items seized bore the identifying mark of NAPOCOR.” — No matter how incriminating the articles taken from the petitioner may be, their seizure cannot validate an invalid warrant. — A liberal construction should be given in favor of the individual to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of the rights secured by the Constitution. — The seized articles were described in the receipt as galvanized bolts, V-chuckle, U-bolts and 3 1/2 ft. angular bar. There is no showing that the possession thereof is prohibited by law, hence the return to petitioner of these items is proper. Also, the use in evidence of the articles seized pursuant to an invalid search warrant is enjoined by Section 3(2), Article III of the constitution.

SC: Search warrant is declared null and void, items seized should be returned to petitioner, the items seized may no longer be used as evidence in a criminal case.

ii. Silva vs. Presiding Judge

A search warrant was issued to search the room of Marlon Silva in the residence of Nicomedes Silva for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Applicants of the SW, Sgt. Villamor, Pfc. Alcoran, and Pat. Quindo, believed that there was probable cause that the accused is in possession and control of marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes, and joint.

In the course of the search, the serving officers also seized money belonging to Antonieta Silva in the amount of P1,231.40.

On June 16, 1986, Antonieta Silva filed a motion for the return of the said amount on the grounds that the search warrant only authorized the serving officers to seize marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes and joint, and that said officers failed or refused to make a return of the said search warrant in gross violation of Section 11, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.

Acting on said motion, Judge Ontal held in abeyance the disposition of the amount pending the filing of appropriate charges in connection with the search warrant.

On July 28, 1987, petitioners filed a motion to quash the SW on the following grounds:

1. It was issued on the sole basis of a mimeographed “Application for SW” and “Deposition of Witness”, which were accompolished by merely filling in the blanks 2. The judge failed to personally examine the complainant and witnesses by searching questions and answers in violation of Section 3, Rules 126 of ROC.

RTC: Denied the motion, finding the requisites necessary for the issuance of a valid search warrant duly complied with.

MR: Denied.

ISSUE: W/N the search warrant was validly issued — NOW/N the authorities abused their authority when the seized money — YES

The purpose of the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures is to prevent violations of private security in person and property, and unlawful invasion of the sanctity of the home, by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction, and to give remedy against such usurpations when attempted.

Sections 3 and 4, Rule 126 - Requisites for the issuance of a search warrant:1. Probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. —> Probable cause must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the complainant and not based on mere hearsay. 2. It should particularly describe the place to be searched and things to be seized. 3 Before issuing the warrant, the judge shall personally examine the complainant and any witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath. 4. Their statements should be attached with any affidavits submitted.

Findings of the Court:

1. The joint “Deposition of Witness” executed by Pfc. Alcoran and Pat. Quindo, which was submitted together with the “Application for Search Warrant” contained, for the most part, suggestive questions answerable by merely placing “yes” or “no” in the blanks provided thereon.2. The questions propounded to the witnesses were in fact, not probing but were merely routinary. The deposition was already mimeogragphed and all that the witnesses had to do was fill in their answers on the blanks provided.

—> A judge’s failure to comply with this requirement constitutes grave abuse of discretion3. The officers implementing the search warrant clearly abused their authority when they seized the money of Antonieta Silva. This is highly irregular considering that Antonieta Silva was not even named as one of the respondents, that the warrant did not indicate the seizure of money but only of marijuana leaves, cigarettes, and joints, and that the search warrant was issued for the seizure of personal propertya. subject of the offenseb. used or intended to be used as means of commiting an offense —> Not for personal property stolen or embezzled or other proceeds of fruits of the offense.

SC: SW is null and void. Money seized should be returned.

iii. People vs. Mamaril

78 sachets of marijuana leaves and 2 bricks of marijuana fruiting tops.

Arraignment: Not guilty.

Pre-trial —> Parties admitted the following facts:

1 Search was made in the house and premises of the accused, where he also lived. It was conducted by members of the PNP. The policemen brought a camera with them. The accused was in the balcony of the house when it was searched.2. The accused was subjected to urine sampling on Feb. 2, 1999.

Facts: A search warrant was obtained authorizing the search for marijuana at the family residence of Benhur Mamaril. SW was approved.

Police officers went to the residence of appellant and implemented SW. When they arrived at appellant’s house, they saw his mother there. They asked her were Benhur was, and she told them that the appellant was upstairs. Upon seeing the policemen, appellant turned back and tried to run towards the back door. The police showed the SW to Benhur and his mother. Appellant did not say anything.

Thereafter, the policemen searched the house. The search was witnessed by 2 members of the barangay council in said area, whom the police brought with them.

The following were confiscated: 1) fifty five (55) heatsealed plastic sachets containing suspected marijuana leaves, which were found in a buri bag (“bayong”) under appellant’s house; (2) three heat-sealed plastic sachets containing suspected marijuana leaves and seeds contained in an eyeglass case; (3) twentytwo (22) heatsealed plastic sachets containing suspected marijuana leaves and seeds taken under a pillow placed on a monobloc chair; and (4) two (2) bricks of suspected marijuana contained inside a white and gray bag found inside the closet of appellant’s room.

One of the policemen took pictures of the confiscated items and prepared a receipt of the property seized. Another prepared a certification that the house was properly searched, which was signed by appellant and the barangay officials who witnessed the search. After the search, the police officers brought appellant and the confiscated articles to the police station and turned them to the desk officers.

The items were brought to a crime laboratory. The appellant was also brought there for a drug test. Everything tested positive.

After the prosecution formally offered its evidence, appellant through his counsel, filed a motion with memorandum contending that the exhibits were inadmissible because the search warrant was illegally issued (because the judge’s examination of the complainant and his 2 witnesses were not in writing) and the search warrant was improperly implemented.

According to the defense: Appellant did not live in his parents’ house. It was his brother and his family who were living with his mother in the house searched by the police. The policemen arrived in civilian clothes, and immediately handcuffed him. He was told to stay in the balcony of the house until the search was finished after more than 30 minutes. He was brought to the clinic, and a medical exam was conducted on him.

Appellant testified that he saw the buri bag, the eye glass case, and the gray and white bag containing suspected marijuana for the first time on the day of the search when he was at the balcony of their house. He also testified that he saw the Receipt of Property Seized for the first time while he was testifying in court. He admitted that the signature on the certification that the house was properly searched was his.

He insinuated that the confiscated items were only planted because he had a misunderstanding with some policemen in Lungayen. However, he admitted that the policemen who searched his parents’ house did not threaten or harm him in any way.

According to the Branch Clerk of Court:1. He only had with him the application for search warrant, supporting affidavits and the return of the search warrant.2. There is no stenographic notes.

TC: Found Benhur guilty.

W/N the SW was validly issued — NO

In determining the existence of probable cause, it is required that:1. The judge must examine the complainant and his witnesses personally.2. The examination must be under oath.3. The examination must be reduced in writing in the form of searching questions and answers.

Atty. Castillo, branch clerk of court, was able to present only the application for search warrant and the supporting affidavits. He could not produce the sworn statements of the complainant and his witnesses showing that the judge examined them in the form of searching questions and answers in writing as required by law.

Based on his testimony, the prosecution failed to prove that Exec Judge Ramos put into writing his examination of the application and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers before issuance of the search warrant. — Mata vs. Bayona: Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or nonexistence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.

The fact remains that there is no evidence that the examination was put into writing as required by law. We find untenable the assertion of the Solicitor General that the subject stenographic notes could not

be found at the time Branch Clerk of Court Enrico Castillo testified before the trial court because of the confused state of the records in the latter’s branch when he assumed office.

SolGen: Appellant is deemed to have waived his right to question the legality of the search because he did not protest against it. — SolGen cited cases that involved a warrantless search.— People vs. Burgos: The fact that the accused failed to object to the entry into his house does not amount to a permission to make a search therein. — In this case, we construe the silence of appellant at the time the policemen showed him the search warrant as a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. Moreover, appellant seasonably objected on constitutional grounds to the admissibility of the evidence seized pursuant to said warrant during the trial of the case, after the prosecution formally offered its evidence. Under the circumstances, no intent to waive his rights can reasonably be inferred from his conduct before or during the trial.

SC: The requirement mandated by the law that the examination of the complainant and his witnesses must be under oath and reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers was not complied with, rendering the search warrant invalid. Thus, the evidence seized pursuant to the said illegal search warrant cannot be used in evidence against appellant in accordance with Section 3 (2), Article III of the Constitution.

iv. Malaloan vs. CA

FACTS:

1. On March 22, 1990, 1st Lt. Absalon V. Salboro of the CAPCOM Northern Sector (now Central Sector) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City an application for search warrant in connection with an alleged violation of P.D. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions) perpetrated at No. 25 Newport St., corner Marlboro St., Fairview, Quezon City.

2. On March 23, 1990, respondent RTC Judge of Kalookan City issued the search warrant. On the same day, at around 2:30 p.m., members of the CAPCOM, armed with subject search warrant, proceeded to the situs of the offense alluded to.

3. The property seized were firearms, explosive materials, and subversive documents.

4. All the sixty-one (61) persons found within the premises searched were brought to Camp Karingal, Quezon City but most of them were later released, with the exception of the herein petitioners, EILER Instructors, who were indicated for violation of P.D. 1866 before Branch 88 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

ISSUE:

WON a court may take cognizance of an application for a search warrant in connection with an offense allegedly committed outside its territorial jurisdiction and to issue a warrant to conduct a search on a place likewise outside its jurisdiction.- YES

RULING: CA decision AFFIRMED.

RATIO:

1. The petitioners claim that the search warrant was filed in a court of improper venue and since venue in criminal actions involves the territorial jurisdiction of the court, such warrant is void for having been issued by a court without jurisdiction to do so. The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the application for and the obtaining of a search warrant with the institution and prosecution of a criminal action in a trial court. It would thus categorize what is only a special criminal process, the power to issue which is inherent in all courts, as equivalent to a criminal action, jurisdiction over which is reposed in specific courts of indicated competence. It ignores the fact that the requisites, procedure and purpose for the issuance of a search warrant are completely different from those for the institution of a criminal action. For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes process.

2. (a) Writs of certiorari, prohibition mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction issued by a regional trial court may be enforced in any part of the region. (b) All other processes, whether issued by a regional trial court or a metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court or municipal circuit trial court may be served anywhere in the Philippines, and, in the last three cases, without a certification by the judge of the regional trial court. (Interim or Transitional Rules and Guidelines).

The rule enumerates the writs and processes which, even if issued by a regional trial court, are enforceable only within its judicial region. In contrast, it unqualifiedly provides that all other writs and

processes, regardless of which court issued the same, shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. As earlier demonstrated, a search warrant is but a judicial process, not a criminal action. No legal provision, statutory or reglementary, expressly or impliedly provides a jurisdictional or territorial limit on its area of enforceability. On the contrary, the above-quoted provision of the interim Rules expressly authorizes its enforcement anywhere in the country, since it is not among the processes specified in paragraph (a) and there is no distinction or exception made regarding the processes contemplated in paragraph (b)

Separate Opinion: Davide, Jr. J:

1. Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed may validly entertain an application for and issue a search warrant in connection with said crime. However, in the National Capital Judicial Region, Administrative Circulars No. 13 of 1 October 1985, and No. 19 of 4 August 1987 must be observed.

2. After the criminal complaint or information is filed with the appropriate court, search warrants in connection with the crime charged may only be issued by said court.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | LUMIBAO | 2D |

v. Groh vs. Ramirez

Ruth’s notes:

Warrant failed to describe the persons or things to be seized. 1. W/N the search violated the 4th amendment?2. W/N petitioner was entitled to qualified immunity, given that a magistrate, relying on an affidavit that particularly described the items in question, found probable cause to conduct the search

A concerned citizen informed petitioner a special agent of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) Jeff Groh that aon a number of visits to Ramirez’s ranch, the visitor had seen a large stock of weaponry, including an automatic rifle, grenades, a grenade launcher and a rocket launcher. Based on that information, Groh prepared an application for a search warrant to search the ranch.

The search was for “any automatic firearms or parts to automatic weapons, destructive devices to include but not limited to grenades, grenade launchers, rocket launches, and any and all receipts pertaining to the purchase or manufacture of automatic weapons or explosive devices or launchers.”

The magistrate signed the warrant form.

The application described the place to be searched and the contraband petitioner expected to find, but the warrant failed to identify any of the items that petitioner intended to seize. In the description of the person or property to be seized, petitioner typed a description of the two-storey house rather than the alleged stockpile of firearms. The magistrate, however, found probable cause and issued the warrant.

Groh and a team of law enforcement officers searched the house. Ramirez was not there, but his wife and children were. According to Mrs. Ramirez, the petitioner explained that he was searching for “an explosive device in a box”.

No illegal weapons or explosives were recovered from the area. When the officers left, they gave Mrs. Ramirez a copy of the search warrant but not a copy of its application. No charges were filed against the Ramirezes.

The respondent sued Groh for violation of the 4th amendment. Distriict Court found no violation. The court added that even if a constitutional violation occurred, the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because of the failure of the warrant to describe the objects of the search.

CA affirmed such judgment. They claimed that the warrant was invalid because it did not describe with particularity the place to be searched and the items to be sized, and that oral statements by petitioner during or after the search could not cure the omission.

4th Amendment: No warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

The warrant in this case complied with the first 3 requirements:1. Based on probable cause2. Supported by sworn affidavit3. Particularly described the place of the search.

The 4th warrant was not satisfied —> It was deficient in particularity because it provided no description of the type of evidence sought.

The fact that the application adequately described the things to be seized does not save the warrant from its facial invalidity.

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This warrant did not simply omit a few items from a list of many to be seized, or misdescribe a few of several items. Nor did it make what fairly could be characterized as a mere technical mistake or typographical error. Rather, in the space set aside for a description of the items to be seized, the warrant stated that the items consisted of a “single dwelling residence ... blue in color.” In other words, the warrant did not describe the items to be seized at all. In this respect the warrant was so obviously deficient that we must regard the search as “warrantless” within the meaning of our case law.

GR: A search conducted pursuant to a warrant that fails to conform to the particularity requirement of the 4th amendment is unconstitutional.

Petitioner’s argument: A search conducted pursuant to a warrant lacking particularity should be exempt from the presumption of unreasonableness if the goals served by the particularity requirement are otherwise satisfied. — Purposes of the particularity requirement:1. Prevent general searches.2. Assures the individual of the lawful authority of the executing officer, his need to search, and the limits of his power to search.

Petitioner: He orally described to respondents the items for which he was searching— The posture of the case therefore obliges us to credit Mrs. Ramirez’s account, and we find that petitioner’s description of “ ‘an explosive device in a box’ ” was little better than no guidance at all.

Is Groh entitled to qualified immunity?— Test: Whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted— Given that the particularity requirement is set forth in the text of the Constitution, no reasonable officer could believe that a warrant that plainly did not comply with that requirement was valid. — Moreover, because petitioner himself prepared the invalid warrant, he may not argue that he reasonably relied on the Magistrate’s assurance that the warrant contained an adequate description of the things to be seized and was therefore valid.— In fact, the guidelines of petitioner’s own department placed him on notice that he might be liable for executing a manifestly invalid warrant. An ATF directive in force at the time of this search warned: “Special agents are liable if they exceed their authority while executing a search warrant and must be sure that a search warrant is sufficient on its face even when issued by a magistrate.”—No reasonable officer could claim to be unaware of the basic rule, well established by our cases, that, absent consent or exigency, a warrantless search of the home is presumptively unconstitutional

Qualified Immunity: This grant of immunity is available to state or federal employees performing discretionary functions where their actions, even if later found to be unlawful, did not violate "clearly established law." The defense of qualified immunity was created by the U.S. Supreme Court, replacing a court's inquiry into a defendant's subjective state of mind with an inquiry into the objective reasonableness of the contested action. A government agent's liability in a federal civil rights lawsuit now no longer turns upon whether the defendant acted with "malice," but on whether a hypothetical reasonable person in the defendant's position would have known that his/her actions violated clearly established law.

From web:

CASE SYNOPSIS

Petitioner federal agent sought a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, challenging the decision that a search of respondent individuals' home was unconstitutional and that the federal agent was not entitled to qualified immunity. Certiorari was granted to address the constitutionality of the search and the availability of qualified immunity.

ISSUE

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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | LUMIBAO | 2D |

The issues were whether the search violated the Fourth Amendment, and if so, whether the federal agent was entitled to qualified immunity, given that a magistrate, relying on an affidavit that particularly described the items in question, found probable cause to conduct the search. 

DISCUSSION

The warrant was plainly invalid as it provided no description of the type of evidence sought. 

The fact that the application adequately described the things to be seized did not save the warrant from its facial invalidity because the warrant did not incorporate other documents by reference and neither the affidavit nor the application accompanied the warrant. 

The magistrate's authorization of the search did not render it constitutional because the warrant's obvious deficiency required the court to consider the search warrantless and presumptively unreasonable. 

The federal agent was not entitled to qualified immunity because no reasonable officer could have believed that a warrant that plainly did not comply with the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirements was valid nor been unaware of the basic rule that, absent consent or exigency, a warrantless search was presumptively unconstitutional.

CONCLUSIONThe judgment was affirmed.

vi. Paper Industries vs. Asuncion

Ruth’s notes:

Requisites of a valid SW:1 Probable cause is present.2. Such presence is determined personally by the judge.3. The complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce are personally examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation.4. The applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally known to them.5. The warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized.

Bacolod failed to affirm that none of the firearms seen inside the PICOP compound was licensed. He just assumed that these were unlicensed.

Not allowed to change the place or search other places other than that or those indicated in the warrant.

The firearms, explosives, and other materials were fruits of the poisonous tree.

This Court sympathizes with the police effort to stamp out criminality and to maintain peace and order in the country; however, it reminds the law enforcement authorities that they must do so only upon strict observance of the constitutional and statutory rights of our people. Indeed, there is a right way to do the right thing at the right time for the right reason.

From block digest pool:

FACTS:

1. BG: Some of the suspects in the alleged assassination plot of Congressman Amante (of Agusan Del Norte, I think) were found to be employees of PICOP.

2. On Jan. 25, 1995, Police Chief Inspector Pascua applied for a search warrant stating that the management of PICOP is in possession or has in its control high powered firearms, ammunitions, and explosives in their compound in Bislig, Surigao Del Sur. Attached to the application were the: (1) joint deposition of SPO3 Bacolod

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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | LUMIBAO | 2D |

and SPO2 Morito, (2) summary of the information and the (3) supplementary statements of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno.

3. After questioning SPO3 Bacolod, Judge Asuncion issued a search warrant, stating the presence of probable cause to believe that PICOP is in possession or control of the firearms. Such is in violation of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession) and should be seized and brought before the court.

4. The search warrant was enforced at the PIOP compound and they were able to seize 52 firearms, 416 magazines, 4 hand grenades, and 18 live ammunitions with a total of 8,503 rounds.

5. PICOP filed a Motion to Quash, a Supplemental Pleading and a Motion to Suppress Evidence on the ground that the warrant was invalid and the search was unreasonable

6. The RTC denied the motions and the MR.

ISSUE/S:

1. WON the search warrant was valid – NO.

RULING: Petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED, and Search Warrant No. 799 (95) is declared NULL and VOID.

RATIO: 1. The requisites of a valid search warrant (Rule 126, Sec. 3 and 4 of the ROC) [1] Probable cause in connection with one specific offense; [2] Such presence is determined personally by the judge; [3] The applicant and the witnesses he or she may produce are personally examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation; [4] The applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally known to them; and [5] Warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized.

2. No personal examination of the witnesses: Except for Pascua and Bacolod, none of the witnesses appeared before the trial court. Moreover, Pascua (applicant) merely introduced Bacolod and said nothing more.

3. Mere affidavits are not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce in writing and attach them to the record. Such is necessary in order that the judge may be able to determine properly the existence or non-existence of probable cause. The examination must be probing and exhaustive. The examining judge must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application.

4. Facts not personally known to Bacolod: In his Deposition, he stated that the information was gathered from reliable sources. He testified to having pretended to have some official business with the company in order to go inside the premises and managed to see for himself the firearms. He believed that the PICOP security guards had no license to possess high-powered firearms. He also said that as per the verification at Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) at Camp Crame, they have no license. They were just using the firearms owned by PICOP.

5. First, he failed to affirm that none of the firearms inside PICOP compound was licensed, just the belief that the guards did not have a license. He made a statement of PICOP owning firearms but he did not say they were unlicensed. In addition, they did not attach the certification from FEO that they reported.

6. The evidence of probable cause must be facts and circumstances that could be obtained or secured at the time of the application. If not, the applicant must show a justifiable reason therefor during the examination. Evidence is most especially necessary in cases where the issue is the existence of the negative ingredient of the offense charged (like the absence of a license).

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7. No particular place to be searched: The warrant of arrest only specified one place, the PICOP compound, and did not specify which area. The PICOP compound is made up of 200 buildings, 15 plants, 84 staff houses, 23 warehouses, and more than 800 other structures. Obviously, the warrant gives the police officers unbridled and thus illegal authority to search all the structures inside the compound. Even though they submitted a sketch of the premises to be searched, this was not made part of the search warrant issued by Judge Asuncion.

8. The place to be searched cannot be changed, enlarged or amplified by the police’s personal knowledge of the premises, even if the place not specified was where they really intended to search. Such particularization of the description of the place may only be done by the judge, and cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search.

9. Because the search warrant was procured in violation of the Consti and the ROC, all the firearms, explosives and other materials seized were inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

vii. People vs. Dichoso

Accused: Redentor DichosoViolation: Section 15, Article III and Section 4, Article II of RA 6425.

Informations were filed against him and his wife, Sonia, on March 8, 1991.

Accused Jaime Pagtakhan was charged with illegally possessing a regulated drug (shabu) and, thus, violating Section 16, Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, in an information which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 6710SP(91) in the court a quo.

Accused Sonia Dichoso y Vinerable could not be arrested because, in the words of the trial court, she “cannot be located.”

February 22, 1991: The Narcotics Command of the 4th Regional Unit stationed at Interior M. Paulino St., San Pablo City applied for a search warrant to be issued on the house of spouses Dichoco. After searching questions on the applicant and his deponent, the Court was satisfied that there existed probable cause that they were keeping, selling, and using an undetermined quantity of shabu and marijuana in their residence.

February 23: The Narcom Unit organized a team to serve the search warrant. Upon approaching said residence, the team met an old man and Evangelista introduced himself and his companions as Narcom agents duly armed with a search warrant. Evangelista asked for Redentor and Sonia and the old man opened the gate into the Dichoso compound for the Narcom agents. The old man led them to the nipa house where inside Redentor, Jaime Pagtakhan and 2 other persons were sitting near a table with suspected shabu and paraphernalia on top. Evangelista told them that they were Narcom agents, and that they should not make any move and they had with them a search warrant to serve. He then asked Sgt. Tila, a team member, to fetch for the brgy chairman. In the meantime Evangelista served a copy of the search warrant to Redentor. After about 15 to 20 minutes Chairman Francisco Calabia arrived and was met by Evangelista who forthwith showed him a copy of the said warrant. Calabia read the search warrant and explained the contents thereof to Redentor.

Thereafter, the search ensued inside the nipa house. Evangelista discovered 200 grams more or less of suspected marijuana wrapped in plastic inside a cabinet which was standing on the right side upon entering the door of the nipa house. Likewise discovered by him inside the cabinet are six (6) decks of suspected shabu wrapped in an aluminum foil and the ‘Golden Gate’ notebook (Exhibit F) containing the list of suspected customers of dangerous and regulated drugs together with the corresponding quantity and prices. From Pagtakhan’s right hand, Evangelista recovered a small quantity of suspected shabu.

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The search was shifted to the main house of Dichoso, but the search produced negative results.

Evangelista instructed Besinio to collect the confiscated items recovered at the nipa house of the Dichosos. Besinio separately wrapped the items whereupon he and Gapiangao made markings on the same. Besinio also put the names of Redentor and Sonia inside some of the pages of Exhibit “F”. The team then got from the main house a plastic bag where all the confiscated items were put. Besinio sat in a corner of the nipa house and prepared in his own handwriting the PAGPAPATUNAY (Exhibit “B”) attesting to the result of the search conducted by the NARCOM team listing thereon the different confiscated items, another PAGPAPATUNAY (Exhibit “C”) attesting to the lawful manner the search was conducted, and the Receipt (Exhibit “D”), all dated February 23, 1991. Said exhibits were alternately given to Calabia who read the contents thereof before voluntarily affixing his signatures thereon. Then, he explained to Redentor and Pagtakhan the contents of said exhibits. Afterwhich, Redentor likewise voluntarily affixed his signatures thereon. Pagtakhan also affixed his signatures on Exhibit “B” and “D” opposite the items confiscated in his possession by Evangelista. A certain Angelito Ancot affixed his signature on Exhibits B and C also as witness. Redentor was then given a copy each of Exhibits B, C and D.

TC: Pagtakhan and Redentor found guilty.

Only Dichoso appealed.

1. Search warrant was a general warrant as it was issued for violation of RA 6425 and did not specify the particular offense which he violated under the said law. It was issued for possible illegal possession of marijuana/shabu/opium. - NO, it is not a general warrant.

While it is for “Violation of RA 6425 known as the ‘Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended’”, the body thereof, which is controlling, particularizes the place to be searched and the things to be seized, and specifies the offens involved. These are evident from the clause, “are illegally in possession of undetermined quantity/ amount of dried marijuana leaves and methampetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) and sets of paraphernalias stored inside the nipa hut within the compound of their residence at Farconville Sub., Phase II, San Pablo City.”

Appellant engaged in semantic juggling. The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with dangerous drugs which are subsumed into “prohibited” and “regulated” drugs and defines and penalizes categories of offenses which are closely related or which belong to the same class or species. Accordingly, one (1) search warrant may thus be validly issued for the said violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

Since the search warrant is valid, the articles seized by virtue of its execution may be admitted in evidence.

2. He was framed by the police officers. A certain Jun planted the deck of shabu found on the table where he and his companions were gathered. He cites the testimony of the brgy captain who said that the search was conducted even before his arrival, and that when he arrived, the seized articles were already on the table. - NO.

Applicant failed to rebut the presumption that law enforcement officials conduct their performance regularly. He did even attempt to prove that the NARCOM agents who obtained the search warrant, conducted the search and recovered the prohibited drugs had motives other than to enforce the law and stem the menace of drug addiction and trafficking which has already reached an alarming level and has spawned a network of incorrigible, cunning, and dangerous operations.

Appellant’s claim of a frame-up concerns only the deck of shabu allegedly taken out of one Jun who asked for and was readily permitted by appellant to use shabu on that occasion.

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3. The exhibits that he signed (receipt of the property, attestation to the result of the items confiscated and attestation to the lawful manner of the search) were inadmissible because he signed them while under police custody without have been accorded his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel. — YES

A clearer examination thereof shows that C1C Rolando Bisenio, who prepared them, deliberately wrote, in bold letters below the name REDENTOR D. DICHOSO (over which the appellant was made to sign) the words “MAYARI” in Exhibit “B” and “MAY-ARI BAHAY’ in Exhibit “C,” while the word “OWNER” is printed below the subheading “COPY OF THE RECEIPT RECEIVED” in Exhibit “D.” By such descriptive words, appellant was in fact made to admit that he is the owner of the articles seized (Exhibit “B”), the house searched (Exhibit “C”) and the articles inventoried in the receipt (Exhibit “D”)

There was no need of requiring the appellant to sign documents similar to Exhibits “B” and “C.” As to Exhibit “D,” which is the receipt for property seized, it is a document required by Section 10, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court to be given by the seizing officer to the lawful occupant of the premises in whose presence the search and seizure were made.

As correctly stated by the appellee, these exhibits were not appreciated by the trial court as extrajudicial confessions but merely as proof that the articles therein enumerated were obtained during the search which, by the way, was sufficiently established by the testimonies of the NARCOM agents independently of the said exhibits.

4. He was not caught in flagrante. Only the overt acts of unlawfully selling, delivering, dispensing, transporting and distributing prohibited and regulated drugs are punishable.

5. The nipa hut where the articles were found did not belong to him but to his brother. Thus, the search was unconstitutional. — NO.

It is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is issued; it is sufficient that the property is under his control or possession. It was established, even by the defense’s own evidence, that the appellant and his spouse have been using the said nipa house. He admitted that the nipa house is actually part of and adjacent to the big or main house in the Dichoso residential compound, and that he and his family have been using the nipa house as a resting place even before the search

Any doubt as to the appellant’s control over the nipa house where the seized articles were recovered is wiped out by the testimony of the defense’s own witness, Francisco Calabia, who affirmed that the appellant and his wife Sonia Dichoso actually reside therein while Redentor’s parents and brother reside in the big house.

SC: After a careful review and evaluation of the evidence on record, this Court finds that the evidence of the prosecution is insufficient to sustain a conviction for unlawful sale of shabu in Criminal Case No. 6711SP(91) and for unlawful sale of marijuana in Criminal Case No. 6712SP(91). There is, however, overwhelming evidence which establishes with moral certainty the guilt of the appellant for illegal possession of shabu and marijuana under Section 16, Article III and Section 8, Article II, respectively, of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.

viii. People vs. Salanguit

Ruth’s notes:

The warrant authorized the seizure of “undetermined quantity of shabu and drug paraphernalia”.

No drug paraphernalia were taken by virtue of the search warant issued.

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People vs. Dichoso: The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with dangerous drugs which are subsumed into “prohibited” and “regulated” drugs and defines and penalizes categories of offenses which are closely related or which belong to the same class or species. Accordingly, one (1) search warrant may thus be validly issued for the said violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

The description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched.

Plain view doctrine - Unlawful objects within the “plain view” of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented in evidence. Requisites:1. Prior justification2. Inadvertent discovery of the evidence3. Immediate apparent illegality of the evidence before the police.—> Once the valid portion of the search warrant has been executed, the “plain view doctrine” can no longer provide any basis for admitting the other items subsequently found.

What the plain view cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The plain view doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.

A search incident to a lawful arrest is limited to the person of the one arrested and the premises within his immediate control. —> To prevent the person arrested from obtaining a weapon to commit violence or to reach for incriminatory evidence and destroy it.

No presumption of regularity may be invoked by an officer in the aid of the process when he undertakes to justify an encroachment of rights secured by the Constitution.

Forcible entry was justified —> Rule 126, Section 7 —> The police knocked on the door several times but were refused entry.

From block digest pool:

FACTS:1. On Dec. 26, 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant in Dasamarinas, Cavite RTC to search the residence of Salanguit. His witness was SPO1 Badua who testified that as a poseur buyer, he was able to purchase shabu from Salanguit. Since the sale took place in Salanguit’s room, he saw that the accused took the shabu from his cabinet. Application was granted and issued by Judge Dolores Espanol.2. At 10 pm on the same day, 10 policemen with one informer went to the house of the accused to serve the warrant. Operatives knocked on the door, but nobody opened. The police forcibly opened the door upon hearing people alreadypanicking inside.

3. After showing the warrant to occupants of the home, they begin searching the house. They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags with white crystalline substance, a paper clip box containing the same substance, and 2 bricks of dried leaves wrapped in newsprint. They took the accused to Station 10, Kamuning, QC.

4. Upon laboratory examination, the white substance turned out to be shabu while the dried leaves were marijuana.

ISSUE/S:

1. WON there was probable cause to search for drug paraphernalia? IMMATERIAL2. WON the search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense? YES but still valid

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3. WON the place searched was described with sufficient particularity (only the street and the brgy name were provided)? YES

RULING: RTC decision as to possession of shabu AFFIRMED but REVERSED as to possession of marijuana. Confiscation of both marijuana and shabu AFFIRMED.

RATIO:

1. Issue would only be material if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. If at all, the search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but valid as to seizure of shabu as to which evidence was presented to show probable cause.

2. The Dangrous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with dangerous drugs subsumed into “prohibited” and “regulated” drugs and defines and penalizes categories of offenses closely related or which belong to the same class orspecies. Accordingly, one search warrant may be validly issued for said violations. (People vs Dischoso)

3. The Court reiterated the observation of the Solicitor General that the records of the search warrant contained several documents which identified the premises to be searched: (1) complete address, (2) specific description of the house and (3) pencil sketch of its location. The Court also noted that aside from the fact that the team leader of the operation lives in the same street, the team even ascertained through their informant that the accused was inside his house before initiating the operation.

ADDITIONAL INFO:The Court held that the marijuana was inadmissible as evidence for violating the plain view doctrine. The Court also held that no undue and unnecessary force wasemployed by the police in effecting the raid.

ix. Kho vs. Macalintal

NBI agents recovered various high-powered firearms and hundreds of rounds of ammunition as a result of the service of a search warrant against Benjamin Kho.

Another search was conducted at the house at No. 326 McDivitt St., by another team of NBI agents. This yielded several high-powered firearms with explosives and more than a thousand rounds of ammunition. The simultaneous searches also resulted in the confiscation of various radio and telecommunication equipment, two units of motor vehicles (LiteAce vans) and one motorcycle. Upon verification with the Firearms and Explosives Unit in Camp Crame, the NBI agents found out that no license has ever been issued to any person or entity for the confiscated firearms in question. Likewise, the radio transceivers recovered and motor vehicles seized turned out to be unlicensed and unregistered per records of the government agencies concerned.

The NBI agents filed a motion to the judge requesting that the confiscated items remain in the custody of NBI. Petitioners filed a motion to quash said warrants.

1. Petitioners contend that the surveillance and investigation conducted by NBI agents within the premises involved were not sufficient to vest in the applicants personal knowledge of facts and circumstances showing or indicating the commission of a crime by them.

SC: NBI agents testified unequivocably that they saw guns being carried to and unloaded at the 2 houses searched, and motor vehicles and spare parts were stored therein. It is decisively clear that the application for the questioned search warrants was based on the personal knowledge of the applicants and their witnesses.— Central Bank vs. Morfe: The question of w/n a probable cause exists is one which must be determined in light of the conditions obtaining in given situations.— Luna vs. Plaza: Existence of PC depends to a large extent upon the finding or opinion of the judge who conducted the required examination of the applicants and the witnesses.

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2. Petitioner faults the Judge for allegedly failing to ask specific questions they deem particularly important during the examination of the applicants and their witnesses.

SC: Nothing improper is perceived in the manner the judge conducted the examination of subject applicants for search warrants and their witnesses. He personally examined them under oath, and asked them searching questions on the facts and circumstances personally known to them, in compliance with prescribed procedure and legal requirements.

3. Petitioner claims that the SWs were general warrants proscribed by the Constitution.

SC: Records on hand indicate that the search warrants under scrutiny specifically describe the items to be seized. The use of the phrase “and the like” is of no moment. The same did not make the search warrants in question general warrants. In Oca v. Maiquez (14 SCRA 735), the Court upheld the warrant although it described the things to be seized as “books of accounts and allied papers.”

The law does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute detail as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities. Otherwise, it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things they are looking for. Since the element of time is very crucial in criminal cases, the effort and time spent in researching on the details to be embodied in the warrant would render the purpose of the search nugatory.

Retired Justice Ricardo Francisco: “A description of the property to be seized need not be technically accurate nor necessarily precise; and its nature will necessarily vary according to whether the identity of the property, or its character, is the matter of concern. Further, the description is required to be specific only so far as the circumstances will ordinarily allow. x x x”

The surveillance conducted could not give the NBI agents a close view of the weapons being transported or brought to the premises to be searched. Thus, they could not be expected to know the detailed particulars of the objects to be seized. Consequently, the list submitted in the applications for subject search warrants should be adjudged in substantial compliance with the requirements of law.

4. Petitioners assert that the searching agents grossly violated the procedure in enforcing the search warrants in question. Before breaking into the premises, the NBI agents failed to properly identify themselves, did not furnish search warrants, and did not give ample time to the occupants to voluntarily allow the raiders entry into the place. The team entered the premises by climbing the fence and by forcing open the main door of the house.

SC: The question of whether there was abuse in the enforcement of the challenged search warrants is not within the scope of a Motion to Quash. In a Motion to Quash, what is assailed is the validity of the issuance of the warrant. The manner of serving the warrant and of effecting the search are not an issue to be resolved here. Petitioners have remedies under pertinent penal, civil and administrative laws for their problem at hand, which cannot be solved by their present motion to quash.

4. Petitioners claim that the place searched was government property, which belonged to the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau.

SC: Whether the places searched and objects seized are government properties are questions of fact outside the scope of the petition under consideration. The Court does not see its way clear to rule on such issues lest it preempts the disposition of the cases filed by the respondent NBI against the herein petitioners.

x. WWW vs. People

FACTS:

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1. The PNP filed applications for warrants to search the premises of Worlwide Web Corporation and Planet Internet Corporation, because of allegations that petitioners were conducting illegal toll bypass operations (It is a method of routing and completing international long distance calls using lines, cables, etc. which connect directly to the local exchance facilities of the country where the call is originated, but evating payment to PLDT of access, termination, or by-pass charges.), which amounted to theft.

2. In the hearing for the applications, employees of PLDT testified that petitioners used equipment that routed the international calls and bypassed PLDT’s international gateway facilities (IGFs), and that PLDT lost P764,718.09 monthly in revenues. The applications for warrants were subsequently granted.

3. Over a hundred items were seized, and petitioners alleged that it included equipment not devoted to transmission of international calls. Thus, they filed their respective motions to quash. The RTC granted the motions on the ground that the warrants were in the nature of general warrants. The CA reversed and declared the warrants valid and effective.

ISSUE/S:

1. WON the assailed search warrants were issued upon probable cause – YES 2. WON the assailed search warrants were general warrants – NO RULING: Petitions are DENIED.

RATIO:

1. In the issuance of a search warrant, probable cause requires “such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be searched.”

2. The transcript of stenographic notes shows that the trial Judge Lopez asked searching questions and particular clarification on the alleged illegal toll bypass operations. Thus, the Court will no longer disturb the finding of probable cause by the trial judge.

3. Petitioners also argue that the determination of the existence of probable cause necessitates prior determination of whether a crime was committed; and that, in this case, there is no law punishing toll bypassing. The Court held, however, that the act constituted theft of PLDT’s international long distance call business.

4. A general warrant is a search or arrest warrant that is not particular as to the person to be arrested or property to be seized. It allows the seizure of one thing describing another, and gives the executing offer the discretion over which items to take.

5. The things to be seized must be described with particularity. A search warrant fulfills the requirement of particularity in the description of the things to be seized when the things described are limited to those that bear a direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.

6. In this case, PLDT was able to establish the connection between the items to be searched as identified in the warrants and the crime of theft of its telephone services. Rivera, one of the employees who testified, conducted ocular inspections in petitioners’ premises and confirmed that the latter used different equipment consisting of computers, cables, antennas, modems, etc. to support the illegal toll bypass operations.

c. Warrantless Searches

i. Moving Vehicles

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1. Carroll vs. US

The National Prohibition Act, also known as the Volstead Act, was passed by Congress in 1919 and prohibited the manufacturing, transportation, and sale of alcoholic beverages. On January 16, 1920, the Volstead Act came into force as the Eighteenth Amendment, later repealed in 1933 by the Twenty-first Amendment.

George Carroll and John Kiro were indicted and convicted for transporting intoxicating spirituous liquor in an automobile in the amount of 68 quarts of whiskey and gin in violation of the National Prohibition Act. Carroll and Kiro contended that the search of their automobile and the discovery of the alcohol was the product of an illegal search and seizure in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights.

On September 21, 1921, three men, Carroll, Kiro, and Kruska entered an apartment in Grand Rapids, Michigan, and met three undercover federal prohibition agents, Cronewett, Scully, and Thayer. Cronewett, using an alias, was introduced to Carroll and Kiro, and stated he wanted to buy three cases of whiskey. Carroll and Kiro stated that they had to go east of Grand Rapids to obtain the alcohol and would be back in about an hour. After the time had passed, Kruska returned in an Oldsmobile roadster, the registration number of which Cronewett noted, and stated they could not get the alcohol that night but would return the following day to deliver it. The sellers never returned.

Cronewett and his colleagues maintained patrol on the road between Grand Rapids and Detroit, looking for violators of the National Prohibition Act as part of their regular duties. On October 6, 1921, Carroll and Kiro passed Cronewett and Scully, who were breaking for lunch, in the same Oldsmobile Roadster the agents had noticed a month prior. The agents engaged in a pursuit, but lost the men in East Lansing. More than two months later, on December 15, 1921, Carroll and Kiro again passed the agents. This time the agents were able to catch the two men east of Grand Rapids. Upon stopping them, the agents searched the roadster and found 68 bottles of liquor behind the upholstery of the seats. The two men were arrested.

The question before the Supreme Court was whether the search and seizure of the alcohol in this case violated Carroll and Kiro’s Fourth Amendment rights. Chief Justice Taft delivered the opinion of the Court, including an extensive review of statutory and case law. These references demonstrated that the guaranty of the Fourth Amendment right against illegal search and seizures had long recognized a distinction between the search of a home or structure and that of a vehicle or ship. The distinction is based on the practicability of obtaining a search warrant. The Court demonstrated that it was easier to obtain a warrant for a structure, whereas it was not practicable to secure a warrant for a moveable object like a vehicle, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.

Next the Court determined under what circumstances a warrantless search of a vehicle might be made. The majority stated that it would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition agent were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor, and thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search. Those entitled to use the public highways have a right to free passage without interruption or search unless probable cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal merchandise is known to a competent official who is authorized to make searches. In this case, the agents had probable cause or reasonable basis to believe that Caroll and Kiro were transporting alcohol. They appeared in the same vehicle that they had used in October; were followed into a neighborhood notorious for

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manufacturing and importing illegal spirits; and, had been seen on different occasions making the trip between Detroit and Grand Rapids. It was clear, according to the Court, that in this case the officers had justification for the search and seizure. The facts and circumstances within their knowledge and the trustworthy information were sufficient in themselves to establish a reasonable belief that liquor was being transported in the automobile which they had stopped and searched. Therefore, in this case, Carroll and Kiro’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. The search and seizure of the vehicle were warranted by the inherent mobility of the vehicle and by the probable cause the officers had that the two men were transporting alcohol.

2. People vs. Que

General Rule: There should be a warrant, upon finding of probable cause, for a search to be considered legal, and the seized evidence to be admissible in evidence.

Exception: Moving vehicles. But only when the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.

Accused: Wilson B. QueViolation: Section 68, PD 705 as amended by EO 277.

The facts show that two weeks before March 8, 1994, SPO1 Dexter Corpuz, a member of the Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging, received an information that a tenwheeler truck bearing plate number PAD548 loaded with illegally cut lumber will pass through Ilocos Norte. Acting on said information, members of the Provincial Task Force went on patrol several times within the vicinity of General Segundo Avenue in Laoag City.

When they saw the 10-wheeler truck pass by, they followed it and apprehended it at the Marcos Bridge.

There were three persons on board the truck: driver Wilfredo Cacao, accusedappellant Wilson Que, and an unnamed person. The driver identified accusedappellant as the owner of the truck and the cargo.

SPO1 Corpuz found coconut slabs in the cargo. Que told him that there were sawn lumber inserted in between the coconut slabs.

SPO1 asked for the following documents:1. Certificate of lumber origin2. Certificate of transport agreement3. Auxiliary invoice4. Receipt from DENR5. Certification from the forest ranger regarding the origin of the coconut slabs.

Que failed to present any of the documents requested by SPO1. All he could show was the certification from the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office that he legally acquired the coconut slabs. The certification was issued facilitate transport of the slabs from Cagayan to Pangasinan.

SPO1 Corpus brought accusedappellant to the office of the Provincial Task Force at the provincial capitol. Again, accusedappellant admitted to the members of the Provincial Task Force that there were sawn lumber under the coconut slabs.

Provincial Task Force also investigated the articles.

RTC: Convicted Que of violation of Section 68, PD 705.

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Que denied the charge and claimed that he lawfully acquired the lumber. He presented the private land timber permits issued by DENR. The PLTP authorizes its holder to cut, gather and dispose timber from the forest area covered by the permit. He alleged that the tanguile lumber came from the forest area covered by the PLTPs of Cayosa and Sabal and that they were given to him as payment for his hauling services.

1. Petitioner argued that he cannot be convicted for violation of PD 705 because EO 277 which amended Section 68 of the PD to penalize the possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents did not indicate the particular documents necessary to make the possession legal. Neither did the other forest laws and regulations existing at the time of its enactment.

SC: “Existing forest laws and regulations” —> The phrase should be construed to refer to laws and regulations existing at the time of possession of timber or other forest products. DENR Administrative Order No. 59 series of 1993 specifies the documents required for the transport of timber and other forest products.

According to Section 3 of the AO, the following documents are required:1. Certificates of origin, issued by DENR officials. 2. CLO must be supported by the company tally sheet or delivery receipt. In case of sale, there should be a lumber sales invoice.

The certification presented by Que showed that DENR allowed him to transport one truckload of coconut slabs only between March 7 to 11. He was apprehended on March 8, 1994, which was loaded not only with coconut slabs but with chainsaw lumber as well. The lumber were placed in the middle and not visible unless the coconut slabs which were placed on the top, sides and rear of the truck were removed.

Under these circumstances, the Court has no doubt that the accused was very much aware that he needed documents to possess and transport the lumber (b)ut could not secure one and, therefore, concealed the lumber by placing the same in such a manner that they could not be seen by police authorities by merely looking at the cargo.

We also reject appellant's argument that the law only penalizes possession of illegal forest products and that the possessor cannot be held liable if he proves that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removal of such forest products is legal.

There are 2 separate offenses punished under PD 705, Section 68: (1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority; and(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under existing forest laws and regulations.

2. W/N the seized lumber are inadmissible in evidence for being “fruits of a poisonous tree”. — NO

People vs. Bagista: When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched. —> A member of the Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging received a reliable information that a tenwheeler truck bearing plate number PAD548 loaded with illegal lumber would pass through Ilocos Norte. Two weeks later, while members of the Provincial Task Force were patrolling along General Segundo Avenue, they saw the tenwheeler truck described by the informant. When they apprehended it at the Marcos Bridge, accusedappellant, the

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owner of the truck and the cargo, admitted that there were sawn lumber in between the coconut slabs. When the police officers asked for the lumber's supporting documents, accusedappellants could not present any. The foregoing circumstances are sufficient to prove the existence of probable cause which justified the extensive search of appellant's truck even without a warrant. Thus, the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber were lawfully seized and were thus properly admitted as evidence to prove the guilt of accused-appellant.

3. Caballes vs. CA

FACTS:

1. Rudy Caballes was spotted and stopped by police officers Noceja and de Castro for the jeepney being “unusually” covered by kakawati leaves. The officers suspected that the vehicle contained smuggled items.

2. The officers found aluminum/galvanized conductor wires owned by National Power Corporation (NPC) inside the cargo of the vehicle. The wires were brought to the police station. The petitioner was detained for 7 days..

3. The petitioner interposed an alibi that a certain Resty Fernandez requested him to transport the wires.

4. The trial court convicted the petitioner of theft which was affirmed by the CA.

5. The petitioner now contends that the search of his vehicle was made on mere suspicion and that there was no probable cause for the said warrantless search. Hence, the evidence resulting from the said search was inadmissible.

ISSUE/S: 1. WON the evidence taken from the warrantless search is admissible against the appellant – NO

RULING: CA decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the accused is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

RATIO:

1. On Search of a Moving Vehicle - the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity. Thus, the rules governing search and seizure have been liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge — a requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle. Also, a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.

2. Requirement of Probable Cause - the mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if made within the interior of the territory and in the absence of probable cause. Still and all, the important thing is that there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless search, which must still be present.

3. Example of Warrantless Search of moving vehicle - "stop-and-search" without warrant at military or police checkpoints has been declared to be not

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illegal per se for as long as warranted by the exigencies of public order and conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists. A checkpoint may either be a mere routine inspection or it may involve an extensive search.

4. Not a Routine Inspection - Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable search. The search which is normally permissible is limited to the ff: (1) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds; (2) simply looks into a vehicle; (3) flashes a light therein without opening the car's doors; (4) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search; (5) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual inspection; and (6) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area. In this case, the police officers did not merely conduct a visual search or visual inspection of herein petitioner's vehicle. They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks before they were able to see the cable wires. It cannot be considered a simple routine check.

5. Extensive Search is without Probable Cause - when a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law-offender or they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in the vehicle to be searched. In this case, the vehicle was flagged down because the police officers who were on routine patrol became suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle was covered with kakawati leaves, which, according to them, was unusual and uncommon. The fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not common for such to be covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute "probable cause" as would justify the conduct of a search without a warrant. In addition, the police authorities do not claim to have received any confidential report or tipped information that petitioner was carrying stolen cable wires in his vehicle which could otherwise have sustained their suspicion.

6. On Plain View Doctrine - an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The cable wires were not exposed to sight because they were placed in sacks and covered with leaves. (doctrine not applicable)

7. On Consented Search - consent must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. The question whether consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given.

In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it is fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. In the case, the evidence is lacking that the petitioner intentionally surrendered his right against unreasonable searches. The officers were imposing upon herein petitioner that they will search his vehicle. The "consent" given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty. The statements of the police officers were not asking for his consent; they were declaring that they will look inside his vehicle. In addition, the officers never testified that they asked the petitioner for permission to conduct the search. (no consented search)

4. US vs. Chadwick

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Brief Fact Summary. One and a half hours after arresting the Respondents, Chadwick, Machado, and Leary (Respondents), federal narcotics agents opened a footlocker confiscated during the arrest. The agents had not obtained a warrant to open the footlocker.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Once property cannot be accessed by an arrestee, it cannot be searched without a warrant.

Facts. The Respondents were arrested by federal narcotics agents as they were lifting a footlocker into the trunk of a car. The agents confiscated the footlocker and moved the Respondents, footlocker, and car to the Federal Building in Boston. An hour and a half after the arrest, the agents unlocked the footlocker without a warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances. Large amounts of marijuana were found in the footlocker.

Issue. Is a search warrant required to open a locked footlocker that was seized during arrest, when there is probable cause to believe that the footlocker contains contraband?

Held. Yes. Personal effects that have been confiscated by the police incident to an arrest cannot be searched without a warrant, unless exigent circumstances exist.

Discussion. The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. Because people have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their personal effects, a warrant is required to search confiscated luggage.

5. People vs. Mariacos

FACTS:

1. San Gabriel Police conducted a checkpoint to intercept a suspected transportation of marijuana. When checkpoint did not yield any suspect or marijuana, PO2 Pallayoc was instructed to conduct surveillance operation.

2. PO2 Pallayoc met with a Barangay Intelligence Network secrent agent. Agent informed him that a baggage of marijuana had been loaded on a passenger jeep about to leave. Agent described a backpack with “O.K.” marking.

3. Pallayoc boarded jeepney, positioned himself on top. He found the “O.K. backpack”, peeked inside, and saw bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper. (He asked passengers for owner of bag, but no one knew)

4. Upon alighting, Pallayoc saw that 2 women carried the bags. When Pallayoc introduced himself, one of the women ran away. Only Mariacos was brought to police station.

5. Police investigators contacted Mayor to witness opening opening of bags. Marijuana wrapped in newspaper found.

6. Mariacos claimed that neighbor Bennie Lao-ang requested her to carry bags (Lao-ang ran away after giving bags to appellants), that she was not the owner of the bags, and had no knowledge of what these contained.

6. RTC found Mariacos guilty of violating Art. 2, Sec. 5 of RA 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) 8. Mariacos appealed to CA claiming: (1) her right against unreasonable search was flagrantly violated, (2) no probable cause for her arrest, (3) prosecution failed to prove corpus delicti of crime and chain of custody

ISSUE/S: 1. WON the warrantless search was valid - YES

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2. WON the warrantless arrest was valid – YES 3. WON accused’s defense of non-ownership is tenable – NO 4. WON prosection did not comply to Sec. 21 of RA 9165’s IRR, hence failed to prove corpus delicti of crime – NOT FATAL

RULING: CA decision AFFIRMED, appeal DISMISSED

RATIO:

1. Search of a moving vehicle, as in this case, is one of the doctrinally accepted exceptions to the “no unreasonable search and seizure” mandate, hence VALID. - People vs Bagista: “when a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the instrumentality/evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched” - When grounds of suspicion reasonable: when, in the absence of actual belief of officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offence is based on actual facts. In this case, the night before Mariacos’ arrest, police received tip re: marijuana transport, hence there was probable cause. - Requirement to get warrant from judge is impossible as vehicles are used to transport contraband from one place to another with impunity.

2. Given that the search was also valid, the arrest based on that search was also valid - Basis: Sec. 5, Rule 113 (“Arrest without warrant; when lawful”

3. Ownership is immaterial, as these are not exempting circumstances where the crime charged, as in here, is malum prohibitum. Mere possession of a prohibited drug, without legal authority, is punishable under the RA 9165. - Plus, Mariacos didn’t rebut disputable presumption of ownership

4. Non-compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165’s IRR is not fatal and will not render an accused’s arrest illegal or make items seized inadmissible

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