128

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 85122-24 March 22, 1991

CAGAMPAN, et. al., petitioners, vs.NLRC & ACE MARITIME AGENCIES, INC., respondents.

BRIEF:

Presented before the SC for review is the decision of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission handed down on March 16, 1988 reversing the decision of the Philippine Oversees Employment Administration and correspondingly dismissing the cases for lack of merit. The POEA decision granted overtime pay to petitioners equivalent to 30% of their basic pay.

FACTS:

On April 17 and 18,1985, petitioners, all seamen, entered into separate contracts of employment with the Golden Light Ocean Transport, Ltd., through its local agency, private respondent ACE MARITIME AGENCIES, INC. with their respective ratings and monthly salary rates. Petitioners were deployed on May 7, 1985, and discharged on July 12, 1986. Thereafter, petitioners collectively and/or individually filed complaints for non-payment of overtime pay, vacation pay and terminal pay against private respondent. In addition, they claimed that they were made to sign their contracts in blank; that although they agreed to render services on board the vessel Rio Colorado managed by Golden Light Ocean Transport, Ltd., the vessel they actually boarded was MV "SOIC I" managed by Columbus Navigation; and more so, petitioners de Castro and de Jesus charged that although they were employed as ordinary seamen, they actually performed the work and duties of Able Seamen.

Private respondent was furnished with copies of petitioners' complaints and summons, but it failed to file its answer within the reglementary period. Thus, on January 12, 1987, an Order was issued declaring that private respondent has waived its right to present evidence in its behalf and that the cases are submitted for decision.

On August 5, 1987, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) rendered a Decision DISMISSING petitioners' claim for terminal pay but GRANTED their prayer for leave pay and overtime pay. Private respondent appealed from the POEA's Decision to the NLRC on August 24, 1987. On March 16, 1988, the NLRC promulgated a Decision, REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE and another one entered dismissing the cases for lack of merit.

On May 8, 1988, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the NLRC's Decision but the same was denied by the NLRC for lack of merit in its Resolution dated September 12, 1988. Hence, this appeal from the decision and resolution of the respondent NLRC.

Petitioners allege that respondent Commission, NLRC, gravely abused its discretion or erred in reversing and setting aside the POEA decision and correspondingly dismissing the appeal of petitioners, allegedly in contravention of law and jurisprudence.

Private respondent maritime company disclaims the aforesaid allegations of petitioners. The Solicitor General, arguing for public respondent NLRC, contends that:

The NLRC did not abuse its discretion in the rendition of subject decision because the evidence presented by petitioners in support of their complaint is by itself sufficient to back up the decision. The issue of the disallowance of overtime pay stems from an interpretation of particular provisions of the employment contract.

ISSUE:

WON respondent Commission NLRC gravely abused its discretion or erred in REVERSING the decision of POEA (in granting overtime pay to petitioners equivalent to 30% of their basic pay).

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HELD:

No.

RATIO DECIDENDI:

The NLRC cannot be faulted for disallowing the payment of overtime pay because it merely straightened out the distorted interpretation asserted by petitioners and defined the correct interpretation of the provision on overtime pay embodied in the contract conformably with settled doctrines on the matter. Notably, the NLRC ruling on the disallowance of overtime pay is ably supported by the fact that petitioners never produced any proof of actual performance of overtime work.

Petitioners have conveniently adopted the view that the "guaranteed or fixed overtime pay of 30% of the basic salary per month" embodied in their employment contract should be awarded to them as part of a "package benefit." They have theorized that even without sufficient evidence of actual rendition of overtime work, they would automatically be entitled to overtime pay. Their theory is erroneous for being illogical and unrealistic. Their thinking even runs counter to the intention behind the provision. The contract provision means that the fixed overtime pay of 30% would be the basis for computing the overtime pay if and when overtime work would be rendered. Simply, stated, the rendition of overtime work and the submission of sufficient proof that said work was actually performed are conditions to be satisfied before a seaman could be entitled to overtime pay which should be computed on the basis of 30% of the basic monthly salary. In short, the contract provision guarantees the right to overtime pay but the entitlement to such benefit must first be established. Realistically speaking, a seaman, by the very nature of his job, stays on board a ship or vessel beyond the regular eight-hour work schedule. For the employer to give him overtime pay for the extra hours when he might be sleeping or attending to his personal chores or even just lulling away his time would be extremely unfair and unreasonable.

Reiterated in the case of National Shipyards and Steel Corporation v. CIR (3 SCRA 890), the SC ruled:

We cannot agree with the Court below that respondent Malondras should be paid overtime compensation for every hour in excess of the regular working hours that he was on board his vessel or barge each day, irrespective of whether or not he actually put in work during those hours. Seamen are required to stay on board their vessels by the very nature of their duties, and it is for this reason that, in addition to their regular compensation, they are given free living quarters and subsistence allowances when required to be on board. It could not have been the purpose of our law to require their employers to pay them overtime even when they are not actually working; otherwise, every sailor on board a vessel would be entitled to overtime for sixteen hours each day, even if he spent all those hours resting or sleeping in his bunk, after his regular tour of duty. The correct criterion in determining whether or not sailors are entitled to overtime pay is not, therefore, whether they were on board and cannot leave ship beyond the regular eight working hours a day, but whether they actually rendered service in excess of said number of hours.

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