35864557 due process digested cases

7/31/2019 35864557 Due Process Digested Cases

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Buck v. Bell274 U.S. 200FACTS:Carrie Buck is a feeble minded white woman who was committedto the State Colony Epileptics and Feeble Minded. She is thedaughter of a feeble minded mother in the same institution, andthe mother of an illegitimate feeble minded child. She waseighteen years old at the time of the trial of her case in the latterpart of 1924. An Act of Virginia, approved March 20, 1924,recites that the health of the patient and the welfare of societymay be promoted in certain cases by the sterilization of mentaldefectives, under careful safeguard, that the sterilization may be

effected in males by vasectomy and in females bysalpingectomy, without serious pain or substantial danger to life;that the Commonwealth is supporting in various institutionsmany defective persons who, if now discharged, would become amenace, but, if incapable of procreating, might be dischargedwith safety and become self-supporting with benefit tothemselves and to society, and that experience has shown thatheredity plays an important part in the transmission of insanity,imbecility, etc. The statute then enacts that, whenever thesuperintendent of certain institutions, including the above-namedState Colony, shall be of opinion that it is for the best interests ofthe patients and of society that an inmate under his care shouldbe sexually sterilized, he may have the operation performedupon any patient afflicted with hereditary forms of insanity,imbecility, etc., on complying with the very careful provisions bywhich the act protects the patients from possible abuse.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said s tatute authorizing compulsory

sterilization of the mentally retarded denies the due process andequal protection of the laws.

HELD: The procedure can be no doubt had the due process oflaw. Carrie Buck is the probable potential parent of sociallyinadequate offspring, likewise afflicted, the she may be sexuallysterilized without detriment to her general health, and that herwelfare and that of society will be promoted by her sterilization.We have seen more than once that the public welfare may callupon the best citizens for their lives. It is better for all the worldif, instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime orto let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent thosewho are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.

XXXXXXX

Facts of the Case : Carrie Buck was a feeble minded woman whowas committed to a state mental institution. Her condition hadbeen present in her family for the last three generations. AVirginia law allowed for the sexual sterilization of inmates ofinstitutions to promote the "health of the patient and the welfareof society." Before the procedure could be performed, however, ahearing was required to determine whether or not the operationwas a wise thing to do.Question

Did the Virginia statute which authorized sterilization deny Buckthe right to due process of the law and the equal protection ofthe laws as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment?Conclusion

The Court found that the statute did not violate the Constitution.Justice Holmes made clear that Buck's challenge was not uponthe medical procedure involved but on the process of thesubstantive law. Since sterilization could not occur until a properhearing had occurred (at which the patient and a guardian couldbe present) and after the Circuit Court of the County and theSupreme Court of Appeals had reviewed the case, if so requested

by the patient. Only after "months of observation" could theoperation take place. That was enough to satisfy the Court thatthere was no Constitutional violation. Citing the best interests ofthe state, Justice Holmes affirmed the value of a law likeVirginia's in order to prevent the nation from "being swampedwith incompetence . . . Three generations of imbeciles areenough."

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL & MOTEL OPERATORS v. CITYMAYOR OF MANILAG.R. No. L-24693 October 23, 1967

Facts: The petitioners filed a petition for prohibition againstOrdinance No. 4760 for being violative of the due process clause,contending that said ordinance is not only arbitrary,unreasonable or oppressive but also vague, indefinite and

uncertain, and likewise allege the invasion of the right to privacyand the guaranty against self-incrimination.Ordinance No. 4760 proposes to check the clandestine

harboring of transients and guests of these establishments byrequiring these transients and guests to fill up a registrationform, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view atall times, and by introducing several other amendatoryprovisions calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizesthe registration of transients and guests." Moreover, the increasein the licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishmentsof the kind from operating for purpose other than legal" and atthe same time, to increase "the income of the city government."

The lower court ruled in favor of the petitioners. Hence,the appeal.

Issue: Whether or not Ordinance No. 4760 is unconstitutional

Held: No. The mantle of protection associated with the due

process guaranty does not cover petitioners. This particularmanifestation of a police power measure being specifically aimedto safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation ofnullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anythingof substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict andnarrow the scope of police power which has been properlycharacterized as the most essential, insistent and the leastlimitable of powers,4 extending as it does "to all the great publicneeds."

It would be, to paraphrase another leading decdestroy the very purpose of the state if it could be deprallowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promothealth, public morals, public safety and the general Negatively put, police power is that inherent and plenaryin the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurt fucomfort, safety, and welfare of society.

On the legislative organs of the government, wnational or local, primarily rest the exercise of the police which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is the poprescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peacorder, safety and general welfare of the people.

In view of the requirements of due processprotection and other applicable constitutional guhowever, the exercise of such police power insofar as affect the life, liberty or property of any person is sujudicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police power considered as either capricious, whimsical, unjunreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of anapplicable constitutional guaranty may call for correctioncourts.

The Court reversed the judgment of the lower colifted the injuction on the Ordinance in question.

Liberty is a blessing without which life is a miseliberty should not be made to prevail over authority bthen society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authomade to prevail over liberty because then the individual into slavery.

In Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association,

Hon. City Mayor of Manila (1967) upheld the validity a CityOrdinance requiring patrons to fill up a prescribed form stapersonal information such as name, gender, nationality, aaddress and occupation before they could be admitted to motel, hotel or lodging house.

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIAV. CITY OF MANILA 20 SCRA 849

Wednesday, January 21, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic WriteLabels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The principal question in this appeal from a judgthe lower court in an action for prohibition is whether OrdNo. Of the City of Manila is violating of due process clausealleged that Sec. 1 of the challenged ordinaunconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and vidue process insofar as it would impose P6T fee per annfirst class motels and P4,500 for second class motels, thatprohibiting a person less than 18 years from being accesuch hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or communless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly autrepresentative of such establishments to lease any rportion thereof more than twice every 24 hours runs coudue process guaranty for lack of certainty and unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character.
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Issue: Whether or not the ordinance is violative of the dueprocess clause?

Held: A Manila ordinance regulating the operation of hotels,motels and lodging houses is a police measure specifically aimedto safeguards public morals. As such it is immune from anyimputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture andunsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise wouldbe to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power whichhas been properly characterized as the most essential, insistentand the less limitable of powers extending as it does to all great

public needs.p

Much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determiningthe amount of license fees to be imposed for revenue. The merefact that some individuals in the community may be deprived oftheir present business or a particular mode of earning a livingcannot prevent the exercise of police power.

There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. Itfurnishes though a standard to which governmental actionshould conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty orproperty, in each appropriate case, be valid. The standard of dueprocess which must exist both as a procedural and assubstantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or anygovernmental action for that matter, from imputation of legalinfirmity is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason,obedience to the dictates of justice. It would be an affront to

reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meetwhat a municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of ratherserious proportions as an arbitrary and capricious exercise ofauthority. What should be deemed unreasonable and what wouldamount to an abduction of the power to govern is inaction in theface of an admitted deterioration of the state of public morals.

The provision in Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila,making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or dulyauthorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house,tavern or common inn or the like, to lease or rent any room orportion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a provisothat in all cases full payment shall be charged, cannot be viewedas a transgression against the command of due process. Theprohibition is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary, because thereappears a correspondence between the undeniable existence ofan undesirable situation and the legislative attempt atcorrection. Moreover, every regulation of conduct amounts tocurtailment of liberty, which cannot be absolute.

Mississippi ex Rel. Robertson v. Miller, 276 U.S. 174(1928)

Argued January 20, 1928Decided February 20, 1928

1. After services have been rendered by a public officer under alaw specifying his compensation, there arises an implied contractunder which he is entitled to have the amount so fixed. P. 276 U.S. 179.2. The protection of the Contract Clause of the federalConstitution extends to such contracts. Id.3. Relator, while a revenue agent in Mississippi, brought suits forrecovery of past due taxes, and, by the law then in force, wasthereupon entitled to a specified percentage of the taxes,payable upon their collection, and was authorized, upon hisretirement, to prosecute the suits in the name of his successor.An Act passed after his retirement which authorized any suits

brought by an outgoing agent to be conducted in the name of hissuccessor upon petition of the latter showing to the court that hehad investigated its merits and believed that it was just andshould be maintained, and which provided that the commissionsderived from such suits, when the successor had thus joinedtherein, should be shared equally between him and hispredecessor, was construed retroactively by the state court asrequiring that commissions due the relator from the suitsbrought by him should be so shared, albeit the successor hadperformed no services in the matters beyond receiving paymentof the taxes from the taxpayers. Held violative of the relator'srights under the Contract Clause of the Constitution. P.276 U. S.178.144 Miss. 614 reversed.Error to a judgment of the Supreme Court of Mississippi whichaffirmed a judgment giving the relator but one-half of theamount of certain commissions claimed as compensation forservices rendered by him as a revenue agent in investigating

and suing for past due taxes. This suit was against his successorin office, to whom the taxes had been paid.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI.Mr. Stokes V. Robertson, with whom Mr. Thos. H. Johnston was onthe brief, for plaintiff in error.Messrs. Marion W. ReilyandJ.H. Sumrall were on the brief fordefendant in error.

[ 276 U.S. 175 ]

MR. JUSTICE BUTLER delivered the opinion of the Court.The record presents for decision the question whether as applied

in this case, c. 170, Laws 1924, amending 7068 ofHemmingway's Annotated Code of Mississippi contravenes theclause of 10 of Art. 1 of the Constitution which declares that noState shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts.The suit was brought by the State in the Circuit Court of HindsCounty for the use of Robertson, hereinafter called plaintiff, whoin 1923 and prior years had been the state Revenue Agent. It isagainst his immediate successor in office, Miller, whom we shallcall defendant, and the surety on his official bond. The purpose isto recover commissions on certain amounts collected by

defendant on account of past due taxes for which plaintiffin office had brought suits. Plaintiff claims under statutoryprovisions that were in force while he was in office, anddefendant claims under the Act here in question, which wapassed after the expiration of plaintiff's term. Section 705Code authorized the state Revenue Agent to appoint depuand to sue for past due taxes. Section 7066 declared: "Nethe state, nor any county, municipality, or levee board shachargeable with any fees or expenses on account of anyinvestigation or suit made or instituted by the state revenagent; and he shall not receive any salary; but he shall beentitled to retain, as full compensation for his services and

expenses, twenty per centum of all amounts collected andover by him . . .". Section 7068 directed the successor to suits theretofore commenced to be conducted in his nameprovided that "the person who commenced the suit shall pattorney's fees and expenses thereof, and receive thecommissions if any."Acting under these sections, plaintiff appointed deputies tin making collections and agreed to pay them one-half thecommissions allowed by law. He employed

[ 276

an attorney to bring suits and agreed to pay him one-foursuch commissions. There remained a fourth for plaintiff, ficent of the amounts collected. Certain suits which were bby plaintiff to collect past due income taxes and privilegeswere pending when his term expired. He notified defendathe agreements he had made with his deputies and attornSome amounts sued for remained unpaid until after the pof c. 170 on February 29, 1924. That Act amends 7068. 1 authorizes every suit brought by the outgoing agent andpending to be conducted in the name of the successor upmotion and petition of the latter directed to the court showthat he has investigated its merits and believes it is just ashould be maintained; and the section declares that contrthe former agent with his attorneys and employees shall bbinding on the successor. Section 2 provides that "the expof all suits where the successor of the revenue agent has therein as above provided shall be paid by them equally afees and commissions legally derived therefrom shall be sequally between them." After the passage of that Act, thepaid by various taxpayers to the defendant $9,784.07, onaccount of past due taxes claimed in suits brought by plaidoes not appear that defendant took any step to have anythese suits carried on; but, claiming to be entitled to a par

them under c. 170, he refused to pay over the commissiothe use of plaintiff, his deputies and attorney. Then plaintbrought this suit to recover five per cent. of the amount socollected by defendant, that being the portion of thecommissions remaining for him after deducting the amouwhich his deputies and attorney were entitled to have undtheir agreements with him. The Circuit Court gave plaintifjudgment for one-half the amount sued for. He appealed tSupreme Court, and there contended that if applied in this
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[ 276 U.S. 177 ]

c. 170 would impair the contract obligation of the State that hebe paid for services rendered before its enactment, and wouldtherefore violate the contract clause of the Federal Constitution.The court overruled his contention, applied the enactmentretroactively, and affirmed the judgment. 144 Miss. 614.If c. 170 had not been passed, plaintiff, his deputies and attorneywould have been entitled to twenty per cent of the amountscollected by defendant. Under the statutes in force in 1923, thecommissions were earned by the investigation to discover past

due taxes and the institution of suits to coerce delinquenttaxpayers, and such commissions became payable upon thecollection of taxes sued for. In its opinion in this case, theSupreme Court said (p. 623): "It is the law, as contended byappellant, that, where the revenue agent brings a suit for taxesdue the state or any of its political subdivisions, and afterwardsthe taxes are paid by the defendant taxpayer, the revenue agentis entitled to the commissions allowed him by the statute." CitingGarrettv. Robertson, 120 Miss. 731. Robertson v. Shelton, 127Miss. 360. Millerv. Henry, 139 Miss. 651. Millerv.

Johnson, 144Miss. 201. And c. 170 did not operate to take from plaintiff'sdeputies and attorney any part of their shares of thecommissions. Millerv.

Johnson grew out of the suits andcollections that form the basis of this case. Johnson [Johnston]was the attorney who brought plaintiff's suits against taxpayers.He sued Miller, defendant here, and was given judgment for hisfive per cent of the amounts collected. The Supreme Courtdecided that under c. 170 Miller was authorized to prosecute thesuits brought by plaintiff; that the taxes sued for having beenpaid, it must be held that there was merit in the suits and thatthose employed by plaintiff were entitled to compensation undertheir contracts. Cf. Millerv. Hay, 143 Miss. 471.

[ 276 U.S. 178 ]

The state court had to determine whether defendant was entitledto one-half the commissions remaining after deducting theshares of plaintiff's deputies and attorney. Plaintiff wasauthorized under 7068, before amendment, to carry on in thename of his successor the suits he had commenced, and wasrequired to pay all expenses. In the absence of c. 170, defendantwould have had no authority in respect of the suits. Thatenactment authorized the Revenue Agent to look into the meritsof pending suits brought by his predecessor and "submit to thecourts in which the same were pending the question whether

such suits should be prosecuted or not." [144 Miss. 626.] In theinterval between the bringing of the suits by plaintiff andpayments by taxpayers to defendant, the legislature conferredon his successor an authority not theretofore given; and,apparently deeming the contemplated services to be necessaryand valuable, declared that expenses should be borne andcommissions divided equally between the Revenue Agent whobrought the suit and his successor. The Act did not empowerdefendant to do anything upon which plaintiff's right to the

commissions depended. It authorized something notcontemplated by the statute in effect when plaintiff brought thesuits and became entitled to the commissions. As it does notappear that defendant took any step authorized by c. 170,presumably the collections resulted from the bringing of the suitswithout more. See

Johnson v. Miller, supra. Garrettv. Robertson,supra, 743. As applied by the state courts, the new law operatedto take part of the commissions earned by plaintiff and to hand itover to his successor on account of an unexerted authority toapply to the court to have the suits carried on a step neverbefore deemed necessary or contemplated in connection withcollections of such taxes.

It is well understood that the contract clause does not limit thepower of a State during the terms of its officers to pass and giveeffect to laws prescribing for the

[ 276 U.S. 179 ]

future the duties to be performed by, or the salaries or othercompensation to be paid to, them. Butlerv. Pennsylvania, 10How. 402. But after services have been rendered by a publicofficer under a law specifying his compensation, there arises animplied contract under which he is entitled to have the amountso fixed. And the constitutional protection extends to suchcontracts just as it does to those specifically expressed. Theselection of plaintiff to be the Revenue Agent amounted to arequest or direction by the State that he exert the authority anddischarge all the duties of that office. In the performance ofservices so required of him plaintiff made the investigations andbrought the suits to discover and collect the delinquent taxes.Under the statutes then in force as construed by the highestcourt of the State, he thereupon became entitled to the specifiedpercentages of the amounts subsequently collected on accountof the taxes sued for. The retroactive application of c. 170 wouldtake from him a part of the amount that he had theretoforeearned. That would impair the obligation of the implied contractunder which he became entitled to the commissions. This case isruled by Fiskv.

Jefferson Police Jury,116 U.S. 131.

G.R. No. L-20387 January 31, 1968

JESUS P. MORFE, plaintiff-appellee,vs.AMELITO R. MUTUC, as Executive Secretary, ET AL.,

defendants-appellants.

RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)MORFE VS. MUTUCFACTS: Morfe was a public official who questioned AO 334 inconnection with Section 7 of RA 3019, which provides that everypublic officer should submit a sworn statement of assets andliabilities (SAL) either within 30 days upon assumption of officeand within the month of January every succeeding year to the

Head of Office. It must be emphasized that RA 3019 was eas a police power of the State to promote morality in publservice. According to Morfe, since such provision bares thefinancial condition of the public officer upon assumption oit is violative of due process as it is an oppressive exercisepolice power and an unlawful invasion of the constitutionato privacy, unreasonable searches and seizures as well asincrimination. The raison d etre of S7 RA 3019 to determiwhether after assuming public position, the public officer accumulated assets grossly disproportionate to his reportincome. Exec. Sec. Mutuc upheld the validity of AO 334 aas RA 3019. When a government official accepts a public

position, he voluntarily opens himself to public scrutiny inhis personal affairs. Private life cannot be segregated fromoffice. CFI held S7 of RA 3019/ periodical submission of Sbe unconstitutional as it is an invasion of liberty protectedprocess clause.

ISSUE: WON periodical submission of sworn SAL is an invaliberty protected by due process clause?

RULING. NO. RA 3019 is valid and constitutional. The reasthe law was enacted was to curtail/minimize opportunitiesofficial corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty ipublic service and to promote morality in the public servicPublic service is a public trust.

To satisfy due process, however, official acts must not oubonds of reason and result in sheer oppression. It must befrom arbitrariness.

It is not within the province of the court to supervise legisand keep it within the bonds of propriety and common sen

Rubi Vs Prov of MindoroG.R. No. L-14078Facts: This is an application for habeas corpus in favor and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro.The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 2states that provincial governor of any province in whicChristian inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) are found is authwhen such a course is deemed necessary in the interesand order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their haon sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by happroved by the provincial board. It is resolved thasection 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares oland in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected afor the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. FMangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reseproviding that said homestead applications are prrecommended by the provincial governor.

Thereafter, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued exorder No. 2, which says that the provincial governor has sa site in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake for the perm
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settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. In that case, pursuant toSection 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code, all theMangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyanseast of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulanganand Rubi's place in Calapan, were ordered to take up theirhabitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that anyMangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall uponconviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordancewith section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code.

Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimedas necessary measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of

Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which theyroam, and to introduce civilized customs among them.

It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have notfixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and areliable to be punished.

It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived oftheir liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi andhis companions are said to be held on the reservationestablished at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and oneDabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincialsheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form thereservation.

Issues:(1) Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Codedeprive a person of his liberty without due process of law.

(2) Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of1917 is constitutional.

Held: The Court held that section 2145 of the AdministrativeCode does not deprive a person of his liberty without dueprocess of law and does not deny to him the equal protection ofthe laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordancewith said section does not constitute slavery and involuntaryservitude. The Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 ofthe Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the policepower, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the UnitedStates. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 isconstitutional.

The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindorowhich set apart the Tigbao reservation, it will be read, assignedas reasons fort the action, the following: (1) The failure of formerattempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the

province; and (2) the only successfully method for educating theManguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanentsettlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) Theprotection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the publicforests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducingcivilized customs among the Manguianes.

Considered purely as an exercise of the police power, the courtscannot fairly say that the Legislature has exceeded its rightful

authority. It is, indeed, an unusual exercise of that power. But agreat malady requires an equally drastic remedy. One cannothold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered withoutwhen the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered.They are restrained for their own good and the general good ofthe Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has notbeen followed.

None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except bydue process of law. To constitute "due process of law," as hasbeen often held, a judicial proceeding is not always necessary. Insome instances, even a hearing and notice are not requisite a

rule which is especially true where much must be left to thediscretion of the administrative officers in applying a law toparticular cases.

The idea of the provision in question is to unify the people of thePhilippines so that they may approach the highest conception ofnationality. The public policy of the Government of the PhilippineIslands is shaped with a view to benefit the Filipino people as awhole. The Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmentalpolicy, must be confined for a time, as we have said, for theirown good and the good of the country.

Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrainedof their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.

** Rubi v Provincial Board of Mindoro 39 PHIL

660 (1919)AO requires Mangyans to live within the reservation

provided for them

Facts: The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolutionNo. 25 wherein non-Christian inhabitants (uncivilizedtribes) will be directed to take up their habitation on siteson unoccupied public lands. It is resolved that under section2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of publicland in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as asite for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes inMindoro. Further, Mangyans may only solicit homesteadson this reservation providing thatsaid homestead applications are previously recommendedby the provincial governor.

In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised

Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in the townships ofNaujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco Riverincluding those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's

place in Calapan, were ordered to take up their habitaon the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that anyMangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order

upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty daaccordance with section 2759 of the revised Adminis

Code.

Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro wclaimed as necessary measures for the protection of t

Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of pforests in which they roam, and to introduce civilizedcustoms among them. It appeared that Rubi and thoseliving in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling wthe reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punishe

It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegallydeprived of their liberty by the provincial officials ofprovince. Rubi and his companions are said to be helthe reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, againtheir will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under thcustody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calahaving run away form the reservation.

Issue: Whether or Not Section 2145 of the AdministCode deprives a person of his liberty pf abode. Thus,

Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 isconstitutional.

Held: The Court held that section 2145 of theAdministrative Code does not deprive a person of hisliberty of abode and does not deny to him the equalprotection of the laws, and that confinement inreservations in accordance with said section does notconstitute slavery and involuntary servitude. The Cou

further of the opinion that section 2145 of theAdministrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the popower. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1constitutional.

Assigned as reasons for the action: (1) attempts for thadvancement of the non-Christian people of the prov


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and (2) the only successfully method for educating theManguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanentsettlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3)

The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of thepublic forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of

introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.

One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is undulyinterfered without when the degree of civilization of the

Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for theirown good and the general good of the Philippines.

Liberty regulated by law": Implied in the term is restraintby law for the good of the individual and for the greatergood of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases.

None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away exceptby due process of law.

Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned orrestrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not

issue.

Delegation of Powers

Rubi and various other Manguianes in the province of Mindorowere ordered by the provincial governor of Mindoro to removetheir residence from their native habitat and to establishedthemselves on a reservation at Tigbao in the province of Mindoroand to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if theyescaped. Manguianes had been ordered to live in a reservationmade to that end and for purposes of cultivation under certainplans. The Manguianes are a Non-Christian tribe with a very lowculture. These reservations, as appears from the resolution of theProvincial Board, extends over an area of 800 hectares of land,which is approximately 2000 acres, on which about 300Manguianes are confined. One of the Manguianes, Dabalos,escaped from the reservation and was taken in hand by theprovincial sheriff and placed in prison at Calapan, solely becausehe escaped from the reservation. An application for habeascorpus was made on behalf of Rubi and other Manguianes of theprovince, alleging that by virtue of the resolution of theprovincial board of Mindoro creating the reservation, they hadbeen illegally deprived of their liberty. In this case the validity ofsection 2145 of the Administrative Code, reading: "With the priorapproval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of anyprovince in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is

authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in theinterest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take uptheir habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to beselected by him and approved by the provincial board, waschallenged.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said law is constitutional.

HELD: By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained theconstitutionality of this section of the Administrative Code.Among other things, it was held that the term "non-Christian"

should not be given a l iteral meaning or a religious signification,but that it was intended to relate to degrees of civilization. Theterm "non-Christian" it was said, refers not to religious belief, butin a way to geographical area, and more directly to natives of thePhilippine Islands of a low grade of civilization. On the otherhand, none of the provisions of the Philippine Organic Law couldhave had the effect of denying to the Government of thePhilippine Islands, acting through its Legislature, the right toexercise that most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers,the sovereign police power, in the promotion of the generalwelfare and the public interest. when to advance the publicwelfare, the law was found to be a legitimate exertion of thepolice power, And it is unnecessary to add that the promptregistration of titles to land in the Philippines constitutes anadvancement of the public interests, for, besides promotingpeace and good order among landowners in particular and thepeople in general, it helps increase the industries of the country,and makes for the development of the natural resources, with

the consequent progress of the general prosperity. And theseends are pursued in a special manner by the State through theexercise of its police power. The Supreme Court held that theresolution of the provincial board of Mindoro was neitherdiscriminatory nor class legislation, and stated among otherthings: ". . . one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen isunduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of theManguianes is considered. They are restrained for their owngood and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one saythat due process of law has not been followed. To go back to ourdefinition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws,there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforcedaccording to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and itapplies alike to all of a class."

United States vs Luis Toribio22 11 2010

Police PowerSometime in the 1900s, Toribio applied for a license to have his

carabao be slaughtered. His request was denied because hiscarabao is found not to be unfit for work. He nevertheless

slaughtered his carabao without the necessary license. He was

eventually sued and was sentenced by the trial court.counsel in one way

or the other argued that the law mandating that one shacquire a permit to slaughter his carabao is not a valid ex

of police power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said law is valid.

HELD:The SC ruled against Toribio. The SC explained thnot a taking of the property for public use, within the meathe constitution, but is a just and legitimate exercise of th

power of the legislature to regulate and restrain such partuse of the property as would be inconsistent with or injurithe rights of the publics. All property is acquired and held the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure equal rights of others or greatly impair the public rights aninterests of the community.

THE UNITED STATES vs LUIS TORIBIO, G.R. NO. L-50January 26, 1910 (15 Phil 85)

Facts:Appellant in the case at bar was charged for the violation sections 30 & 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating theregistration, branding, and slaughter of large cattle. Evidesustained in the trial court found that appellant slaughterecaused to be slaughtered for human consumption, the cardescribed in the information, without a permit from the mtreasurer of the municipality where it was slaughtered. Apcontends that he applied for a permit to slaughter the animwas not given one because the carabao was not found to unfit for agricultural work which resulted to appellant toslaughter said carabao in a place other than the municipaslaughterhouse. Appellant then assails the validity of a prunder Act No. 1147 which states that only carabaos unfit fagricultural work can be slaughtered.

Held:The extent and limits of what is known as the police powebeen a fruitful subject of discussion in the appellate courtnearly every State in the Union. It is universally concededinclude everything essential to the public safely, health, amorals, and to justify the destruction or abatement, by suproceedings, of whatever may be regarded as a public nuUnder this power it has been held that the State may ordedestruction of a house falling to decay or otherwise endanthe lives of passers by; the demolition of such as are in t

of a conflagration; the slaughter of diseased cattle; thedestruction of decayed or unwholesome food; the prohibitwooden buildings in cities; the regulation of railways and omeans of public conveyance, and of interments in burialgrounds; the restriction of objectionable trades to certainlocalities; the compulsary vaccination of children; theconfinement of the insane or those afficted with contagioudeceases; the restraint of vagrants, beggars, and habituadrunkards; the suppression of obscene publications and hof ill fame; and the prohibition of gambling houses and pla


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where intoxicating liquors are sold. Beyond this, however, theState may interfere wherever the public interests demand it, andin this particular a large discretion is necessarily vested in thelegislature to determine, not only what the interests of the publicrequire, but what measures are necessary for the protection ofsuch interests. (Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U. S., 27; Kidd vs.Pearson, 128 U. S., 1.) To justify the State in thus interposing itsauthority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that theinterests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of aparticular class, require such interference; and, second, that themeans are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of thepurpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Thelegislature may not, under the guise of protecting the publicinterests, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or imposeunusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. Inother words, its determination as to what is a proper exercise ofits police powers is not final or conclusive, but is subject to thesupervision of the court.From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactmentof the provisions of the statute under consideration was requiredby "the interests of the public generally, as distinguished fromthose of a particular class;" and that the prohibition of theslaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as theseanimals are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a"reasonably necessary" limitation on private ownership, toprotect the community from the loss of the services of suchanimals by their slaughter by improvident owners, temptedeither by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy theluxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productivepower of the community may be measurably and dangerously

affected.Chief Justice Redfield, in Thorpe vs. Rutland & Burlington R. R.Co. (27 Vt., 140), said (p. 149) that by this "general police powerof the State, persons and property are subjected to all kinds ofrestraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort,health, and prosperity of the State; of the perfect right in thelegislature to do which no question ever was, or, uponacknowledge and general principles, ever can be made, so far asnatural persons are concerned."

Congress in 1960 enacted the Anti-Graft and CorruptPractices Act 1 to deter public officials and employees

from committing acts of dishonesty and improve the

tone of morality in public service. It was declared to bethe state policy "in line with the principle that a publicoffice is a public trust, to repress certain acts of public

officers and private persons alike which constitute graftor corrupt practices or which may lead thereto." 2Nor

was it the first statute of its kind to deal with such agrave problem in the public service that unfortunately

has afflicted the Philippines in the post-war era. An

earlier statute decrees the forfeiture in favor of the Stateof any property found to have been unlawfully acquired

by any public officer or employee. 3

One of the specific provisions of the Anti-Graft

and Corrupt Practices Act of 1960 is that every publicofficer, either within thirty (30) days after its approval

or after his assumption of office "and within the monthof January of every other year thereafter", as well as

upon the termination of his position, shall prepare andfile with the head of the office to which he belongs, "a

true detailed and sworn statement of assets andliabilities, including a statement of the amounts and

sources of his income, the amounts of his personal andfamily expenses and the amount of income taxes paid

for the next preceding calendar: . . ." 4

In this declaratory relief proceeding, theperiodical submission "within the month of January of

every other year thereafter" of such sworn statement ofassets and liabilities after an officer or employee had

once bared his financial condition upon assumption ofoffice was challenged for being violative of due process

as an oppressive exercise of police power and as anunlawful invasion of the constitutional right to privacy,

implicit in the ban against unreasonable search andseizure construed together with the prohibition against

self-incrimination. The lower court in the decisionappealed from sustained plaintiff, then as well as now,

a judge of repute of a court of first instance. For it, suchrequirement of periodical submission of such sworn

statement of assets and liabilities exceeds thepermissible limit of the police power and is thus

offensive to the due process clause.

We do not view the matter thus and accordinglyreverse the lower court.

1. The reversal could be predicated on the

absence of evidence to rebut the presumption ofvalidity. For in this action for declaratory relief fil

with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan onJanuary 31, 1962, plaintiff, after asserting his beli

"that it was a reasonable requirement for employmthat a public officer make of record his assets and

liabilities upon assumption of office and thereby m

it possible thereafter to determine whether, afterassuming his position in the public service, he

accumulated assets grossly disproportionate to hisreported incomes, the herein plaintiff [having] file

within the period of time fixed in the aforesaidAdministrative Order No. 334 the prescribed swo

statement of financial condition, assets, income anliabilities, . . ." 5 maintained that the provision on t

"periodical filing of sworn statement of financialcondition, assets, income and liabilities after an o

or employee had once bared his financial conditioupon assumption of office, is oppressive and

unconstitutional."6

As earlier noted, both the protection of dueprocess and the assurance of the privacy of the

individual as may be inferred from the prohibitionagainst unreasonable search and seizure and self-

incrimination were relied upon. There was also thallegation that the above requirement amounts to

insult to the personal integrity and official dignitypublic officials, premised as it is "on the unwarran

and derogatory assumption" that they are "corruptheart" and unless thus restrained by this periodica

submission of the statements of "their financialcondition, income, and expenses, they cannot be t

to desist from committing the corrupt practices de. . ." 7 It was further asserted that there was no nee

such a provision as "the income tax law and the tacensus law also require statements which can serv


7/19

determine whether an officer or employee in this

Republic has enriched himself out of proportion to hisreported income." 8

Then on February 14, 1962, came an Answer ofthe then Executive Secretary and the then Secretary of

Justice as defendants, where after practically admittingthe facts alleged, they denied the erroneous conclusion

of law and as one of the special affirmative defenses setforth: "1. That when a government official, like

plaintiff, accepts a public position, he is deemed tohave voluntarily assumed the obligation to give

information about his personal affair, not only at thetime of his assumption of office but during the time he

continues to discharge public trust. The private life ofan employee cannot be segregated from his public life. .

. ." 9 The answer likewise denied that there was aviolation of his constitutional rights against self-

incrimination as well as unreasonable search andseizure and maintained that "the provision of law in

question cannot be attacked on the ground that itimpairs plaintiff's normal and legitimate enjoyment of

his life and liberty because said provision merely seeksto adopt a reasonable measure of insuring the interest or

general welfare in honest and clean public service andis therefore a legitimate exercise of the police power."10

On February 27, 1962, plaintiff filed a Motionfor judgment on the pleadings as in his opinion all his

material allegations were admitted. Then on March 10,1962, an order was issued giving the parties thirty days

within which to submit memoranda, but with or withoutthem, the case was deemed submitted for decision the

lower court being of the belief that "there is no questionof facts, . . . the defendants [having admitted] all the

material allegations of the complaint." 11

The decision, now on appeal, came on July 19,

1962, the lower court declaring "unconstitutional, nulland void Section 7, Republic Act No. 3019, insofar as it

required periodical submittal of sworn statements offinancial conditions, assets and liabilities of an official

or employee of the government after he had oncesubmitted such a sworn statement upon assuming

office; . . . ." 12

InErmita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators

Association v. The Mayor of Manila, 13 it was theholding of this Court that in the absence of a factual

foundation, the lower court deciding the matter purely"on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the

presumption of validity must prevail." In the presentcase likewise there was no factual foundation on which

the nullification of this section of the statute could bebased. Hence as noted the decision of the lower court

could be reversed on that ground.

A more extended consideration is notinappropriate however, for as likewise made clear in

the above Ermita-Malate Hotel case: "What cannot bestressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were

freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for thevalidity of governmental acts is much more rigorous

and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects atthe most rights of property, the permissible scope of

regulatory measure is wider."

Moreover, in the Resolution denying the Motionfor Reconsideration in the above case, we expressly

affirmed: "This is not to discount the possibility of asituation where the nullity of a statute, executive order,

or ordinance may not be readily apparent but the threatto constitutional rights, especially those involving the

freedom of the mind, present and ominous." 14 In suchan event therefore, "there should not be a rigid

insistence on the requirement that evidence be

presented." Also, in the same Resolution, ProfessFreund was quoted thus: "In short, when freedom

mind is imperiled by law, it is freedom that comma momentum of respect; when property is imperil

is the lawmakers' judgment that commands respecThis dual standard may not precisely reverse the

presumption of constitutionality in civil liberties

but obviously it does set up a hierarchy of values the due process clause. 15

2. We inquire first whether or not by virtue

above requirement for a periodical submission of statement of assets and liabilities, there is an inva

of liberty protected by the due process clause.

Under the Anti-Graft Act of 1960, after thestatement of policy, 16 and definition of terms, 17 th

an enumeration of corrupt practices declared unlain addition to acts or omissions of public officers

already penalized by existing law. They includepersuading, inducing, or influencing another publ

officer to perform an act constituting a violation orules and regulations duly promulgated by compe

authority or an offense in connection with the offiduties of the latter, or allowing himself to be persu

induced, or influenced to commit such violation ooffense; requesting or receiving directly or indire

any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, forhimself, or for any other person, in connection wi

contract or transaction between the government another party, wherein the public officer in his offici

capacity, has to intervene under the law; requestinreceiving directly or indirectly any gift, present, o

other pecuniary or material benefit, for himself oranother, from any person for whom the public off

in any manner or capacity, has secured or obtainewill secure or obtain, any Government permit or


8/19

license, in consideration for the help given or to be

given; accepting or having any member of his familyaccept employment in a private enterprise which has

pending official business with him during the pendencythereof or within one year after its termination; causing

any undue injury to any party, including theGovernment, or giving any private party any

unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the

discharge of his official administrative or judicialfunctions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith

or gross inexcusable negligence; neglecting or refusing,after due demand or request, without sufficient

justification, to act within a reasonable time on anymatter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining,

directly or indirectly, from any person interested in thematter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage,

or for the purpose of favoring his own interest or givingundue advantage in favor of or discriminating against

any other interested party; entering, on behalf of theGovernment, into any contract or transaction manifestly

and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether ornot the public officer profited or will profit thereby;

having directly or indirectly financial or pecuniaryinterest in any business, contract or transaction in

connection with which he intervenes or takes part in hisofficial capacity or in which he is prohibited by the

Constitution or by any law from having any interests;becoming interested directly or indirectly, for personal

gain, or having a material interest in any transaction oract requiring the approval of a board, panel or group of

which he is a member, and which exercises discretionin such approval, even if he votes against the same or

does not participate in such action; approving orgranting knowingly any license, permit, privilege or

benefit in favor of any person not qualified for or notlegally entitled to such license, permit, privilege or

advantage, or of a mere representative or dummy of onewho is not so qualified or entitled and divulging

valuable information of a confidential character,

acquired by his office or by him on account of hisofficial position to unauthorized persons, or releasing

such information in advance of its authorized releasedate. 18

After which come the prohibition on privateindividuals, 19prohibition on certain relatives, 20 and

prohibition on Members of Congress.21

Then there isthis requirement of a statement of assets and liabilities,

that portion requiring periodical submission beingchallenged here. 22 The other sections of the Act deal

with dismissal due to unexplained wealth, referencebeing made to the previous statute, 23penalties for

violation, 24 the vesting of original jurisdiction in theCourt of First Instance as the competent court, 25 the

prescription of offenses, 26 the prohibition against anyresignation or retirement pending investigation,

criminal or administrative or pending a prosecution, 27

suspension and loss of benefits, 28 exception of

unsolicited gifts or presents of small or insignificantvalue as well as recognition of legitimate practice of

one's profession or trade or occupation, 29 theseparability clause, 30 and its effectivity. 31

Nothing can be clearer therefore than that the

Anti-Graft Act of 1960 like the earlier statute 32 wasprecisely aimed at curtailing and minimizing the

opportunities for official corruption and maintaining astandard of honesty in the public service. It is intended

to further promote morality in public administration. Apublic office must indeed be a public trust. Nobody can

cavil at its objective; the goal to be pursued commandsthe assent of all. The conditions then prevailing called

for norms of such character. The times demanded sucha remedial device.

The statute was framed with that end in view

is comprehensive in character, sufficiently detaileexplicit to make clear to all and sundry what prac

were prohibited and penalized. More than that, anwas made, so evident from even a cursory perusal

thereof, to avoid evasions and plug loopholes. Onfeature is the challenged section. Thereby it becom

much more difficult by those disposed to take

advantage of their positions to commit acts of gracorruption.

While in the attainment of such public good

infringement of constitutional rights is permissiblthere must be a showing, clear, categorical, and

undeniable, that what the Constitution condemns,statute allows. More specifically, since that is the

question raised, is that portion of the statute requiperiodical submission of assets and liabilities, afte

officer or employee had previously done so uponassuming office, so infected with infirmity that it

cannot be upheld as valid?

Or, in traditional terminology, is this requira valid exercise of the police power? In the afores

Ermita-Malate Hotel decision, 33 there is a reaffirmof its nature and scope as embracing the power to

prescribe regulations to promote the health, moraeducation, good order, safety, or the general welfa

the people. It has been negatively put forth by JusMalcolm as "that inherent and plenary power in th

state which enables it to prohibit all things hurtfulcomfort, safety and welfare of society." 34

Earlier Philippine cases refer to police pow

the power to promote the general welfare and pubinterest;35 to enact such laws in relation to persons

property as may promote public health, public mopublic safety and the general welfare of each inha


9/19

36 to preserve public order and to prevent offenses

against the state and to establish for the intercourse ofcitizen with citizen those rules of good manners and

good neighborhood calculated to prevent conflict ofrights. 37 In his work on due process, Mott 38 stated that

the term police powerwas first used by Chief JusticeMarshall. 39

As currently in use both in Philippine andAmerican decisions then, police power legislation

usually has reference to regulatory measures restrainingeither the rights to property or liberty of private

individuals. It is undeniable however that one of itsearliest definitions, valid then as well as now, given by

Marshall's successor, Chief Justice Taney does not limitits scope to curtailment of rights whether of liberty or

property of private individuals. Thus: "But what are thepolice powers of a State? They are nothing more or less

than the powers of government inherent in everysovereignty to the extent of its dominions. And whether

a State passes a quarantine law, or a law to punishoffenses, or to establish courts of justice, or requiring

certain instruments to be recorded, or to regulatecommerce within its own limits, in every case it

exercises the same power; that is to say, the power ofsovereignty, the power to govern men and things within

the limits of its domain." 40 Text writers like Cooley andBurdick were of a similar mind. 41

What is under consideration is a statute enacted

under the police power of the state to promote moralityin public service necessarily limited in scope to

officialdom. May a public official claiming to beadversely affected rely on the due process clause to

annul such statute or any portion thereof? The answermust be in the affirmative. If the police power extends

to regulatory action affecting persons in public orprivate life, then anyone with an alleged grievance can

invoke the protection of due process which permits

deprivation of property or liberty as long as suchrequirement is observed.

While the soundness of the assertion that a publicoffice is a public trust and as such not amounting to

property in its usual sense cannot be denied, there canbe no disputing the proposition that from the standpoint

of the security of tenure guaranteed by the Constitutionthe mantle of protection afforded by due process could

rightfully be invoked. It was so implicitly held inLacson v. Romero, 42 in line with the then pertinent

statutory provisions 43 that procedural due process in theform of an investigation at which he must be given a

fair hearing and an opportunity to defend himself mustbe observed before a civil service officer or employee

may be removed. There was a reaffirmation of the viewin even stronger language when this Court through

Justice Tuason inLacson v. Roque44 declared that evenwithout express provision of law, "it is established by

the great weight of authority that the power of removalor suspension for cause can not, except by clear

statutory authority, be exercised without notice andhearing." Such is likewise the import of a statement

from the then Justice, now Chief Justice, Concepcion,speaking for the Court inMeneses v. Lacson; 45 "At any

rate, the reinstatement directed in the decision appealedfrom does not bar such appropriate administrative

action as the behaviour of petitioners herein maywarrant, upon compliance with the requirements of due

process."

To the same effect is the holding of this Courtextending the mantle of the security of tenure provision

to employees of government-owned or controlledcorporations entrusted with governmental functions

when through Justice Padilla in Tabora v. Montelibano,46 it stressed: "That safeguard, guarantee, or feeling of

security that they would hold their office or

employment during good behavior and would notdismissed without justifiable cause to be determin

an investigation, where an opportunity to be hearddefend themselves in person or by counsel is affo

them, would bring about such a desirable conditioReference was there made to promoting honesty a

efficiency through an assurance of stability in the

employment relation. It was to be expected then tthrough Justice Labrador in Unabia v. City Mayorthis Court could categorically affirm: "As the remof petitioner was made without investigation and

without cause, said removal is null and void. . . ."

It was but logical therefore to expect an expholding of the applicability of due process guaran

be forthcoming. It did in Cammayo v. Via, 48 wheopinion of Justice Endencia for the Court containe

following unmistakable language: "Evidently, havthese facts in view, it cannot be pretended that the

constitutional provision of due process of law for removal of the petitioner has not been complied w

Then came this restatement of the principle

the pen of Justice J.B.L. Reyes "We are thus compto conclude that the positions formerly held by

appellees were not primarily confidential in natureto make their terms of office co-terminal with the

confidence reposed in them. The inevitable corollthat respondents-appellees, Leon Piero, et al., we

subject to dismissal or removal, except for causespecified by law and within due process. . . ." 49 In

later decision,Abaya v. Subido,50

this Court, throJustice Sanchez, emphasized "that the vitality of t

constitutional principle of due process cannot beallowed to weaken by sanctioning cancellation" o

employee's eligibility or "of his dismissal from se without hearing upon a doubtful assumptio


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he has admitted his guilt for an offense against Civil

Service rules." Equally emphatic is this observationfrom the same case: "A civil service employee should

be heard before he is condemned. Jurisprudence hasclung to this rule with such unrelenting grasp that by

now it would appear trite to make citations thereof."

If as is so clearly and unequivocally held by this

Court, due process may be relied upon by publicofficial to protect the security of tenure which in that

limited sense is analogous to property, could he notlikewise avail himself of such constitutional guarantee

to strike down what he considers to be an infringementof his liberty? Both on principle, reason and authority,

the answer must be in the affirmative. Even a publicofficial has certain rights to freedom the government

must respect. To the extent then, that there is acurtailment thereof, it could only be permissible if the

due process mandate is not disregarded.

Since under the constitutional scheme, liberty isthe rule and restraint the exception, the question raised

cannot just be brushed aside. In a leading Philippinecase,Rubi v. Provincial Board, 51 liberty as guaranteed

by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm toinclude "the right to exist and the right to be free from

arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. The termcannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical

restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed toembrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with

which he has been endowed by his Creator, subjectonly to such restraint as are necessary for the common

welfare." In accordance with this case therefore, therights of the citizens to be free to use his faculties in all

lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn hislivelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any

avocation, are all deemed embraced in the concept ofliberty. This Court in the same case, however, gave the

warning that liberty as understood in democracies, is

not license. Implied in the term is restraint by law forthe good of the individual and for the greater good, the

peace and order of society and the general well-being.No one can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must

renounce unbridled license. In the words of Mabini asquoted by Justice Malcolm, "liberty is freedom to do

right and never wrong; it is ever guided by reason and

the upright and honorable conscience of theindividual."

The liberty to be safeguarded is, as pointed out

by Chief Justice Hughes, liberty in a socialorganization, 52 implying the absence of arbitrary

restraint not immunity from reasonable regulations andprohibitions imposed in the interest of the community.53 It was Linton's view that "to belong to a society is tosacrifice some measure of individual liberty, no matter

how slight the restraints which the society consciouslyimposes." 54 The above statement from Linton however,

should be understood in the sense that liberty, in theinterest of public health, public order or safety, of

general welfare, in other words through the properexercise of the police power, may be regulated. The

individual thought, as Justice Cardozo pointed out, hasstill left a "domain of free activity that cannot be

touched by government or law at all, whether thecommand is specially against him or generally against

him and others." 55

Is this provision for a periodical submission ofsworn statement of assets and liabilities after he had

filed one upon assumption of office beyond the powerof government to impose? Admittedly without the

challenged provision, a public officer would be freefrom such a requirement. To the extent then that there

is a compulsion to act in a certain way, his liberty isaffected. It cannot be denied however that under the

Constitution, such a restriction is allowable as lon

due process is observed.

The more crucial question therefore is whet

there is an observance of due process. That leads uan inquiry into its significance. "There is no contr

and precise definition of due process. It furnishesthough a standard to which governmental action s

conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty oproperty, in each appropriate case, be valid. What

is the standard of due process which must exist boa procedural and as substantive requisite to free th

challenged ordinance, or any action for that mattefrom the imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to

its doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy oreason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negat

put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoidTo satisfy the due process requirement, official ac

to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the boundreason and result in sheer oppression. Due proces

thus hostile to any official action marred by lack oreasonableness. Correctly has it been identified as

freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment osporting idea of fair play. It exacts fealty 'to those

strivings for justice' and judges the act of officialdwhatever branch 'in the light of reason drawn from

considerations of fairness that reflect [democratictraditions of legal and political thought.' It is not a

narrow or 'technical conception with fixed contenunrelated to time, place and circumstances,' decis

based on such a clause requiring a 'close and percinquiry into fundamental principles of our society

Questions of due process are not to be treated naror pedantically in slavery to form or phrases." 56

It would be to dwell in the realm of abstrac

and to ignore the harsh and compelling realities opublic service with its ever-present temptation to


11/19

the call of greed and avarice to condemn as arbitrary

and oppressive a requirement as that imposed on publicofficials and employees to file such sworn statement of

assets and liabilities every two years after having doneso upon assuming office. The due process clause is not

susceptible to such a reproach. There was therefore nounconstitutional exercise of police power.

4. The due process question touching on analleged deprivation of liberty as thus resolved goes a

long way in disposing of the objections raised byplaintiff that the provision on the periodical submission

of a sworn statement of assets and liabilities is violativeof the constitutional right to privacy. There is much to

be said for this view of Justice Douglas: "Liberty in theconstitutional sense must mean more than freedom

from unlawful governmental restraint; it must includeprivacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom.

The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of allfreedom." 57 As a matter of fact, this right to be let alone

is, to quote from Mr. Justice Brandeis "the mostcomprehensive of rights and the right most valued by

civilized men." 58

The concept of liberty would be emasculated if itdoes not likewise compel respect for his personality as

a unique individual whose claim to privacy andinterference demands respect. As Laski so very aptly

stated: "Man is one among many, obstinately refusingreduction to unity. His separateness, his isolation, are

indefeasible; indeed, they are so fundamental that theyare the basis on which his civic obligations are built. He

cannot abandon the consequences of his isolation,which are, broadly speaking, that his experience is

private, and the will built out of that experiencepersonal to himself. If he surrenders his will to others,

he surrenders his personality. If his will is set by thewill of others, he ceases to be master of himself. I

cannot believe that a man no longer master of himself is

in any real sense free." 59

Nonetheless, in view of the fact that there is an

express recognition of privacy, specifically that ofcommunication and correspondence which "shall be

inviolable except upon lawful order of Court or whenpublic safety and order" 60 may otherwise require, and

implicitly in the search and seizure clause,

61

and theliberty of abode 62 the alleged repugnancy of such

statutory requirement of further periodical submissionof a sworn statement of assets and liabilities deserves to

be further looked into.

In that respect the question is one of firstimpression, no previous decision having been rendered

by this Court. It is not so in the United States where, inthe leading case of Griswold v. Connecticut, 63 Justice

Douglas, speaking for five members of the Court,stated: "Various guarantees create zones of privacy.

The right of association contained in the penumbra ofthe First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The

Third Amendment in its prohibition against thequartering of soldiers 'in any house' in time of peace

without the consent of the owner is another facet of thatprivacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the

'right of the people to be secure in their persons,houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable

searches and seizures.' The Fifth Amendment in itsSelf-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a

zone of privacy which government may not force himto surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment

provides: 'The enumeration in the Constitution, ofcertain rights, shall not be construed to deny or

disparage others retained by the people." After referringto various American Supreme Court decisions, 64 Justice

Douglas continued: "These cases bear witness that the

right of privacy which presses for recognition is a

legitimate one."

The Griswold case invalidated a Connecticu

statute which made the use of contraceptives a crioffense on the ground of its amounting to an

unconstitutional invasion of the right of privacy omarried persons; rightfully it stressed "a relationsh

lying within the zone of privacy created by severafundamental constitutional guarantees." 65 It has w

implications though. The constitutional right to prhas come into its own.1wph1.t

So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The righ

privacy as such is accorded recognition independeof its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully

deserving of constitutional protection. The languaProf. Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept of

limited government has always included the idea governmental powers stop short of certain intrusio

into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeedof the basic distinctions between absolute and lim

government. Ultimate and pervasive control of thindividual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark

the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limitedgovernment, safeguards a private sector, which be

to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from thepublic sector, which the state can control. Protect

this private sector protection, in other words, odignity and integrity of the individual has beco

increasingly important as modern society hasdeveloped. All the forces of a technological age

industrialization, urbanization, and organization operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitat

intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity tomaintain and support this enclave of private life m

the difference between a democratic and a totalitasociety." 66


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Even with due recognition of such a view, it

cannot be said that the challenged statutory provisioncalls for disclosure of information which infringes on

the right of a person to privacy. It cannot be denied thatthe rational relationship such a requirement possesses

with the objective of a valid statute goes very far inprecluding assent to an objection of such character.

This is not to say that a public officer, by virtue of a

position he holds, is bereft of constitutional protection;it is only to emphasize that in subjecting him to such a

further compulsory revelation of his assets andliabilities, including the statement of the amounts and

sources of income, the amounts of personal and familyexpenses, and the amount of income taxes paid for the

next preceding calendar year, there is nounconstitutional intrusion into what otherwise would be

a private sphere.

5. Could it be said, however, as plaintiffcontends, that insofar as the challenged provision

requires the periodical filing of a sworn statement offinancial condition, it would be violative of the

guarantees against unreasonable search and seizure andagainst self-incrimination?

His complaint cited on this point Davis v. United

States. 67 In that case, petitioner Davis was convictedunder an information charging him with unlawfully

having in his possession a number of gasoline rationcoupons representing so many gallons of gasoline, an

offense penalized under a 1940 statute. 68 He wasconvicted both in the lower court and in the Circuit

Court of Appeals over the objection that there was anunlawful search which resulted in the seizure of the

coupons and that their use at the trial was in violationof Supreme Court decisions. 69 In the District Court,

there was a finding that he consented to the search andseizure. The Circuit Court of Appeals did not disturb

that finding although expressed doubt concerning it,

affirming however under the view that such seizedcoupons were properly introduced in evidence, the

search and seizure being incidental to an arrest, andtherefore reasonable regardless of petitioner's consent.

In affirming the conviction the United StatesSupreme Court, through Justice Douglas emphasized

that the Court was dealing in this case "not with privatepapers or documents, but with gasoline ration coupons

which never became the private property of the holderbut remained at all times the property of the

government and subject to inspection and recall by it."70 He made it clear that the opinion was not to be

understood as suggesting "that officers seeking toreclaim government property may proceed lawlessly

and subject to no restraints. Nor [does it] suggest thatthe right to inspect under the regulations subjects a

dealer to a general search of his papers for the purposeof learning whether he has any coupons subject to

inspection and seizure. The nature of the coupons isimportant here merely as indicating that the officers did

not exceed the permissible limits of persuasion inobtaining them." 71

True, there was a strong dissenting opinion by

Justice Frankfurter in which Justice Murphy joined,critical of what it considered "a process of devitalizing

interpretation" which in this particular case gaveapproval "to what was done by arresting officers" and

expressing the regret that the Court might be "in dangerof forgetting what the Bill of Rights reflects experience

with police excesses."

Even this opinion, however, concerned that theconstitutional guarantee against unreasonable search

and seizure "does not give freedom from testimonialcompulsion. Subject to familiar qualifications every

man is under obligation to give testimony. But tha

obligation can be exacted only under judicial sancwhich are deemed precious to Anglo-American

civilization. Merely because there may be the dutymake documents available for litigation does not m

that police officers may forcibly or fraudulently othem. This protection of the right to be let alone e

under responsible judicial compulsion is precisely

the Fourth Amendment meant to express and tosafeguard." 72

It would appear then that a reliance on that

for an allegation that this statutory provision offenagainst the unreasonable search and seizure clause

would be futile and unavailing. This is the more sthe light of the latest decision of this Court in Ston

v. Diokno, 73 where this Court, through Chief JustConcepcion, after stressing that the constitutional

requirements must be strictly complied with, and would be "a legal heresy of the highest order" to

convict anybody of a violation of certain statuteswithout reference to any of its determinate provis

delimited its scope as "one of the most fundamentrights guaranteed in our Constitution," safeguardi

"the sanctity, of the domicile and the privacy ofcommunication and correspondence. . . ." Such is

precisely the evil sought to be remedied by theconstitutional provision above quoted to outlaw

so-called general warrants.

It thus appears clear that no violation of theguarantee against unreasonable search and seizure

been shown to exist by such requirement of furtheperiodical submission of one's financial condition

forth in the Anti-Graft Act of 1960.

Nor does the contention of plaintiff gain grplausibility, much less elicit acceptance, by his


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invocation of the non-incrimination clause. According

to the Constitution: "No person shall be compelled tobe a witness against himself." 74 This constitutional

provision gives the accused immunity from any attemptby the prosecution to make easier its task by coercing

or intimidating him to furnish the evidence necessary toconvict. He may confess, but only if he voluntarily

wills it. He may admit certain facts but only if he freely

chooses to.

75

Or he could remain silent, and theprosecution is powerless to compel him to talk. 76 Proof

is not solely testimonial in character. It may bedocumentary. Neither then could the accused be

ordered to write, when what comes from his pen mayconstitute evidence of guilt or innocence. 77 Moreover,

there can be no search or seizure of his house, papers oreffects for the purpose of locating incriminatory matter.78

In a declaratory action proceeding then, theobjection based on the guaranty against self-

incrimination is far from decisive. It is well to notewhat Justice Tuason stated: "What the above inhibition

seeks to [prevent] is compulsory disclosure ofincriminating facts." 79Necessarily then, the protection

it affords will have to await, in the language of JusticeJ. B. L. Reyes, the existence of actual cases, "be they

criminal, civil or administrative." 80 Prior to such astage, there is no pressing need to pass upon the

validity of the fear sincerely voiced that there is aninfringement of the non-incrimination clause. What was

said in an American State decision is of relevance. Inthat case, a statutory provision requiring any person

operating a motor vehicle, who knows that injury hasbeen caused a person or property, to stop and give his

name, residence, and his license number to the injuredparty or to a police officer was sustained against the

contention that the information thus exacted may beused as evidence to establish his connection with the

injury and therefore compels him to incriminate

himself. As was stated in the opinion: "If the law whichexacts this information is invalid, because such

information, although in itself no evidence of guilt,might possibly lead to a charge of crime against the

informant, then all police regulations which involveidentification may be questioned on the same ground.

We are not aware of any constitutional provision

designed to protect a man's conduct from judicialinquiry or aid him in fleeing from justice. But, even if a

constitutional right be involved, it is not necessary toinvalidate the statute to secure its protection. If, in this

particular case, the constitutional privilege justified therefusal to give the information exacted by the statute,

that question can be raised in the defense to the pendingprosecution. Whether it would avail, we are not called

upon to decide in this proceeding." 81

6. Nor could such a provision be nullified on theallegation that it constitutes "an insult to the personal

integrity and official dignity" of public officials. On itsface, it cannot thus be stigmatized. As to its being

unnecessary, it is well to remember that this Court, inthe language of Justice Laurel, "does not pass upon

questions of wisdom, justice or expediency oflegislation." 82 As expressed by Justice Tuason: "It is

not the province of the courts to supervise legislationand keep it within the bounds of propriety and common

sense. That is primarily and exclusively a legislativeconcern." 83 There can be no possible objection then to

the observation of Justice Montemayor: "As long aslaws do not violate any Constitutional provision, the

Courts merely interpret and apply them regardless ofwhether or not they are wise or salutary." 84 For they,

according to Justice Labrador, "are not supposed tooverride legitimate policy and . . . never inquire into the

wisdom of the law." 85

It is thus settled, to paraphrase Chief Justice

Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on Electithat only congressional power or competence, not

wisdom of the action taken may be the basis fordeclaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be

principle of separation of powers has in the main allocated the respective authority of each departm

and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. The

would then be intrusion not allowable under theConstitution if on a matter left to the discretion of

coordinate branch, the judiciary would substitute own. If there be adherence to the rule of law, as th

ought to be, the last offender should be courts ofjustice, to which rightly litigants submit their

controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired thesupremacy of legal norms and prescriptions. The

on the validity of the challenged provision likewiinsofar as there may be objections, even if valid a

cogent on its wisdom cannot be sustained.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower coJuly 19, 1962 "declaring unconstitutional, null an

Section 7, Republic Act No. 3019, insofar as it reperiodical submittal of sworn statements of finan

conditions, assets and liabilities of an official oremployee of the government after he had once

submitted such a sworn statement . . . is reversed.Without costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zand Angeles, JJ., concur.Sanchez, J., reserves his vote.438 SCRA 343

FACTS:

Tecson was hired by Glaxo as a medical representative on24, 1995. Contract of employment signed by Tecson s tipuamong others, that he agrees to study and abide by theexisting company rules; to disclose to management any efuture relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees

35864557 due process digested cases

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