33 - reply re mtd - jx
TRANSCRIPT
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7/29/2019 33 - Reply re MTD - JX
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DEFENDANTS REPLY IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL
JURISDICTION
LAW OFFICE OF HARTWELL HARRISHartwell Harris (California Bar No. 241695)1809 Idaho AvenueSanta Monica, California 90403Telephone: (310) 497-8858Facsimile: (310) [email protected]
Attorney for DefendantsRAYMOND MOBREZILIANA LLANERASASIA ECONOMIC INSTITUTE, LLC
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
XCENTRIC VENTURES, LLC, anArizona limited liability company,
Plaintiff,
vs.
LISA JEAN BORODKIN, et al.,
Defendants.
CASE NO.: 11-CV-1426-PHX-GMS
DEFENDANTS REPLY IN SUPPORTOF THEIR MOTION TO DISMISS FORLACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTIONPURSUANT TO F.R.C.P. 12(B)2
DEFENDANTS ASIA ECONOMIC COUNCIL INSTITUTE, LLC (AEI),
RAYMOND MOBREZ, and ILLIANA MOBREZ (Defendants) submit this Reply to
address arguments raised by Plaintiff in its Response to Defendants Motion to Dismiss
for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(b)2.
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
Plaintiff defended the underlying matter in California; Plaintiff alleges that
Californias judicial system was abused; Plaintiffs Complaint complains about
Defendants actions that occurred in California; important California law regarding the
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DEFENDANTS REPLY IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL
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admissibility of recorded conversations is at issue; and California has a high interest in
protecting its judicial system. Plus, Plaintiff has not been able to locate and summon
Daniel Blackert, a named defendant in this matter and the lead attorney in the underlying
matter. By Defendants estimate, Plaintiff must locate and serve Mr. Blackert with
summons by November 18, 2011.
I. PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANTS OFFENDSTRADITIONAL NOTIONS OF FAIR PLAY AND SUBSTANTIAL
JUSTICE
Assertion of personal jurisdiction over Defendants in this matter is reasonable only
if it does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). The reasonableness test exists to
protect defendants from unfairly inconvenient litigation. Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). Courts balance seven factors to determine the reasonableness
of exercising jurisdiction. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985). The
most critical factor in this case is the extent of conflict with the sovereignty of the
defendants state. Plaintiff spends three pages of its Response arguing about the
admissibility of recorded conversations it made of Defendant Mobrez without his
knowledge. The fact that the Plaintiff is already posturing about the admissibility of these
tapes proves Defendants pointthat the admissibility of these tapes will be a critical
issue in this case. Since Arizona law regarding recorded conversations is less protective
than Californias law, personal jurisdiction over Defendants conflicts substantially with
the sovereignty of California. California has not only outlawed secretly recording
conversations but has also criminalized it.
The bulk of Plaintiffs case relies on recorded telephone calls. Plaintiff alleges in
its Complaint that Defendants conspired to trap it in some kind of extortion plot and
points to seven telephone calls made by Mobrez. (Complaint (Compl.) at 25-26).
Plaintiff alleges that after the telephone calls, Defendants filed suit. (Compl. at 28).
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DEFENDANTS REPLY IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL
JURISDICTION
These telephone calls were recorded unbeknownst to Defendants. (Compl. at 41).
Plaintiff details how Defendants described the contents of these conversations in
declarations filed with the Central District of California. (Compl. at 32-39). Next
Plaintiff alleges that these recordings show that Defendants lied in their declarations and
that Defendants fabricated allegations against it. (Compl. at 42-43). Plaintiff bases its
abuse of process claims largely on these factual allegations.
These allegations and the admissibility of these recorded conversations are key to
Plaintiffs burden of proof. A California court is more familiar with California law
regarding unlawfully recorded conversations than another forum. Plaintiff relies on an
order in the underlying action to support its contention that the recordings are admissible
under federal law, but the underlying action included federal questions whereas the matter
at hand does not. This case is based solely on diversity and does not include any federal
questions; thus, the laws of the forum govern the admissibility of recorded conversations.
Feldman v. Allstate Insurance Comp., 322 F.3d 660, 666-68 (9th Cir. 2003). InFeldman
the Ninth Circuit held:
The instant case is distinguishable, however, because it is a
diversity action. In diversity cases, a federal court must
conform to state law to the extent mandated by the principles
set forth in the seminal case ofEric R.R. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). Pursuant to
Erie and its progeny, federal courts sitting in diversity apply
state substantive law and federal procedural law. . . . We
hold that California Penal Code 632, like the Nevada law
at issue in Wray, is an exception to the general rule that the
Federal Rules govern the admissibility of evidence in
diversity cases. California Penal Code 632 both makes
taping a confidential conversation a crime and limits theadmissibility of illegally intercepted conversations. CAL.
PENAL CODE 632(a), (d). The statute thereby embodies a
state substantive interest in the privacy of California citizens
from exposure of their confidential conversations to third
parties. We also note that the California Constitution
expressly guarantees a right to privacy, and that having
ones personal conversations secretly recorded [and
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DEFENDANTS REPLY IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL
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replayed] may well infringe upon the right to privacy
guaranteed by the California Constitution. [citation omitted]
For these reasons, we hold that Penal Code 632 is an
integral component of Californias substantive state policy of
protecting the privacy of its citizens, and is properly
characterized as substantive law within the meaning ofErie.Id. at 667-68. The Ninth Circuit inFeldman recognizes that Californias law regarding
the admissibility of recorded conversations is important to California law and thus its
sovereignty. California has aggressively protected its citizens from an unlawful intrusion
into their privacy by criminalizing secretly recording conversations.
II. PLAINTIFF NEEDS TO ALLEGE SOMETHING MORE TO MAKE APRIMA FACIE CASE OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
The Ninth Circuit said inBancroft, that a foreign act with foreseeable effects in a
foreign forum does not always give rise to specific jurisdiction. Bancroft & Masters, Inc.
v. Augusta Nat. Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 2000); accord Bils v. Bils, 22 P.3d 38,
41 (2001) (Ariz.) (en banc) (We reject the argument . . . that an intentional tort that
causes harm to an Arizona resident will always be sufficient to conferin personam
jurisdiction on the Arizona courts. Under the Constitution of the United States, that is
where the analysis begins, but is not where it ends.). Personal jurisdiction requires
something more. The Ninth Circuit describes something more as express aiming at
the forum state, which is a concept that in the jurisdictional context hardly defines itself.
Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1088. The Ninth Circuit then goes on to say that this express aiming
requirement is met when the defendant is alleged to have engaged in wrongful conduct
targeted at a plaintiff whom the defendant knows to be a resident of the forum state. Id.
Importantly, the Ninth Circuit arrived at this decision by analyzing the available
cases at that time. Bancroftwas an intellectual property case. This case is a malicious
prosecution case. Malicious prosecution and/or abuse of process cases are different than
other types of cases, even other types of tort cases, because not only is the plaintiff an
alleged victim but so is the judicial system that was allegedly abused. This should be an
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DEFENDANTS REPLY IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL
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important consideration when determining personal jurisdiction in malicious prosecution
cases. Based on Plaintiffs reasoning, any time a plaintiff sues an out-of-state defendant,
plaintiff subjects himself to specific jurisdiction of that partys home state. The concept
of personal jurisdiction is more complex than this. Moreover, because Californias
judicial system was allegedly abused, it has a critical interest in hosting any abuse of
process claims allegedly committed against it.
III. WHITNEY DOES NOT APPLY IN THIS CASE.Plaintiff argues that this Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants like it did
in another malicious prosecution case Plaintiff filed in this Court,Magedson v. Whitney
Information Network, Inc., Case No. 2:08-cv-01715-DGC (Campbell, J.). Plaintiff knows
that Whitney is not controlling but still encourages this Court to follow it because Whitney
involved identical arguments, identical points of law, virtually identical facts, and at least
one identical party. (Plaintiffs Response at p. 3, lines 21-23). In fact, the two cases are
not identical nor are the legal arguments. In Whitney, there was no dispute over the
admissibility of recorded conversations based on diametrically opposing evidentiary rules.
Thus, in Whitney, the sovereignty of the laws of Florida, the forum of the underlying
action, were not threatened.
IV. CONCLUSIONThis Court should decline to assert personal jurisdiction over Defendants and
dismiss this action.
DATE: Oct. 19, 2011 LAW OFFICES OF HARTWELL HARRIS
By /s/ Hartwell HarrisHartwell HarrisAttorney for Raymond Mobrez, Iliana Llaneras,and Asia Economic Institute, LLC.
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DEFENDANTS REPLY IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL
JURISDICTION
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on October 19, 2011 I electronically transmitted the attached
document to the Clerks Office using the CM/ECF System for filing, and for transmittal of
a Notice of Electronic Filing to the following:
David Gingras
Gingras Law Office, PLLC
3941 E. Chandler Blvd., #106-243
Phoenix, AZ 85048
David Edward Funkhouser, III
Quarles & Brady LLP
1 Renaissance Sq.
2 N Central Ave
Phoenix, AZ 85004-2391
And a courtesy copy of the foregoing delivered to:
HONORABLE G. MURRAY SNOW
United States District Court Sandra Day OConnor U.S. Courthouse
Suite 622 401 West Washington Street, SPC
80 Phoenix, AZ 85003
__/s/ Hartwell Harris_________
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Case 2:11-cv-01426-GMS Document 33 Filed 10/19/11 Page 7 of 7