•- 175 -

both as to war establishments and as to units (82).

In accordance with the proposed composition of the Canadian ArmyOverseas~ revised to 15 May 44, this 'manpower sUb-ceiling' wouldtotal 10~,043 all ranks, of which 99,717 represented war estab­lishments and 8326 reinforcements. General Crerar would be per­mitted to form temporary units from reinforcements (similar tothe G.S.D. 602 and the G.S. 778 units). Where such authorizationsshould be approved on a permanent basis (C.G.S. 139 unit), how­ever, the personnel would be counted against the Icontingencyreserve' and transferred to the 'manpower sub-ceiling' for North­West Europe.

392. The only flaw, as General Stuart had pointed outto the Army Commander in an earlier letter of 15 Jun, was that a'contingency reserve' no longer existed to meet urgent operation­al requirements or to follow British changes in organization (83).The special increment of 2100 authorized by the Deputy Ministerin April (see para 305) had been dissipated by 15 May, as had afurther 1100 authorized to cover further commitments. GeneralStuart had then considered it imperative that no further increasesshould be permitted without corresponding decreases to otherestablishments (except those conforming to approved Britishchanges). While the Army Commander could promise nothing, hisreply of 17 Jun had indicated that he did not anticipate any need.for changes and no request would be submitted unless there werethe 11strongest operational reasons" (84).

~93. General Stuart now propo~ed to recreate the 'con-tingency reserve' from the three per cent allowed for non­effectives against the overall 'manpower ceiling'. GeneralsMurchie and Letson in Ottawa were favourably disposed to delet­ing non-effectives from the 'manpower ceiling', since the increas­ing number of battle casualties had made the three per cent allow­ance "unrealistic" (85).

394. On 5 Jul General Stuart's detailed proposals fora changed system of manpower accounting were mailed to N.D.H.Q.~ee

para 311). He considered that the 'manpower ceilin~' now hadserved its purpose and should be replaced by a system of account~

ing which would reflect more readily the manpower requirementsof the Canadian Army Overseas. He recommended that capital (FieldForce establishments, C.M.H.Q. and static units in the UnitedKingdom and miscellaneous units required to administer the FieldForce) and reinforcement requirements (three months at 'intense'rates for capitBI requirements, temporary G.S.D. 602 units anda three per cent reserve for non-effectives in the reinforcementpool for the Field Force only) should be shown separately. Theprovisional increase of 2100 granted by the Deputy Minister on15 Apr (see para 305) had raised the actual 'manpower ceiling' to234,836; acceptance of the current proposals, including allowanceof 3000 for 'contingency reserve', would raise the total to246,877 all ranks. General Stuart added that the Assistant DeputyMinister of National Defence (Mr. J. Pembroke) had been put "thor­oughly in the picture" during his visit to C.M.H.Q.. and was in aposition to supply any further details (86).

395. At this stage General Stuart proceeded to Italy toinvestigate the position of 1st Canadian Corps and the re~uest

made by General Burns for an additional infantry brigade (seeparas 369-371). Following his return from the MediterraneanGeneral Stuart spertpart of a day with the Army Commander inFrance and then flew back to Ottawa to discuss the question ofmanpower accounting.

396. As a result of discussions at N.D.H.Q.. thesubmission made to the Minister of National Defence on 2 Aug

•- 176 -

varied somewhat from General Stuart's previous proposals. Thissubmission called for a new 'manpower ceiling' of 234,500 allranks (increase of 1764) in which the c.pital commitment waS"limited to an extent which will allow for provision within theceiling of a reinforcement pool of three months at the intenserate", These would be utilized as fallows:

(a) Field Force

Canadian Troops, A.A.I.Canadian Troops, 21 Army Group

(b) Canadian Troops, United Kingdom

(c) Contingency Reserve

Total

74938127185

30449

1928

234500

..

Such action was justified since:

According to strength returns as at 30 JQ~ 44as reported to CMH~, the effective overall strengthof the Canadian Army Overseas is in excesS of thenumbers required to meet the resulting proposedcomposition (including a small contingency.,··serve) ~lus an overall reinforcement pool equal tothree months at the intense rate. The situationfollowing the _ rmaticD of the new units Will, inconsequence, still leave our establishments fulland the overall reinforcement pool in a conditionwhich the Chief of Staff CMH~ considers ffiltirelysatisfactory (87).

The system of reinforcing.the Field Force during actual operationsrendered unnecessary the maintenance of a three per cent reserveto offset the number of non-effectives. This saving of 6856 allranks was utilized to form the additional units considered neces­sary (including Dental Companies serving the R.C.N. and R.C.A.F.and the Canadian component of the First Special Service Force) andre-establish a small contingency reserve of 1928 all ranks. Itwas considered, however, that the Chief of Staff, C.M. H.Q. shouldstill possess authority to continue and form temporary units o~

the basis of telegram G.S.D. 602 of 21 Mar 42. Henceforth, howev€~such G.S.D. W:WI11::B' W'Jxld.te manned, so far as possible by men Whowe~e unfit for more active service as reinforcements l8B).

397. On the following day (3 Aug) the Cabinet War Com-mittee approved these recommendations (to raise the 'manpowerceiling' to 234,500 all ranks and add a second infantry brigadeto the 5th Canadian Armoured Division) on the understanding thatthe new requirements could be met Without any change in the pro­jected supply of men from Canada.

398. In putting up the submission for a revised 'man-power ceiling' it had been pointed out that such action was pos­sible because 5000 reinforcements had been shipped from Canadaevery month instead of the 4000 agreed upon (89). There was thefurther fact that the delay in breaking out of the Normandy bridge­head had delayed the commitment of First Canadian Army vnth theresult that casualties were less than had been anticipated (seepara 376). General Stuart wrote:

On 30 Jul 44, after over twelve months fighting inthe Middle East and two months in France we havea reinforcement pool overseas with a s~rength inexcess of three months reinforcement requirementsat intense rates. This is a most satisfactory

•

•- 177 -

situation and will enable my requirements as putforward in two separate memoranda to be met endstill leave at 31 Jul a reinforcement pool over­seas comprising over three months reinforcemc~t

requirements at intense rates.

Estimated casualties for the remaining five montbsin 1944 are about equal to our reinforcement ho)~

ings at ,1 Jul. Our pool at end of nec 44 shoulctherefore comprise reinforcements sent ~om Canadaat previously agreed rates in last five months of1944, plus casualties recovered from hospital der­ing this period. This ehould represent a figureof about 25,000 or ahout one and a half months atintense rates.

A further projection up to the end of Mar 45 givesus an estimated pool of about 17~OOO or over onemoDth~ reinforcements at intense rates.

The above forecasts, as you know, are based. onscales of wastage adjusted in the light of batt)experience and on forecasts of activity pravi'by the War Office. Up to date our casualties hav<'been less than anticipated and although our esti­mates may be exceeded for short periods I do notanticipate an increase of casualties over our as--·timates in any period of six months or over.

I am satisfied therefore, with the general rein­forcement situation. It is in a healthy positiontoday because our casualties have been leDs thanthe number anticipated a~d because the agreed flo-,of reinforcements fro~ Canada has not only beenmaintained but has been exceeded. I congratulatethose responsible and hope that the agreed floVIwill be maintained in future months.

The only part of the reinforcement problem thatis worrying me at the moment is the finding ofreinforcements for our ~rench-Canadian InfantryBattalions. I am withdrawing French-Ganadiansfrom English speaking units overseaS for this pcpose but unless I Can get additional French­Canadian Infantry reinforceIflents from Canada Ishall be faced with the alternative of disbandin~

units to provide reinforcenents. I do not relis~

either alternative and consequently I hope everyeffort will be made to increase the fIr;:" of 'E'renL:_speaking reinforcements (90).

399. In actual fact ali was not well, however, sinceby far the greatest proportion of battle casualties were occur­ring to general duty infantrymen and reinforcements for othercorps were piled up at No. 2 C.B.R.G. Signs, ominous enough formany to read correctly, already had begun to appear. On 14 JulBrigadier Beament told General MOntague that, in his opinion,all wes not well. On the following day he put his views onpaper. Even when the overall picture had been described as sat~~-·

factory to General Montgomery on 16 Mar (see para 29,) there hadbeen deficiencies in some corps (liThe Arm having the greatestdeficiency was Infantry"). Continuing, his letter of 15 Julpointed out that (91):

The recent operations in Normandy prove, beyondall shadow of doubt, that the prediction that th~

proportion of Infantry casualties, vis-a-vis otllf"""

we musthim may

•- 178 -

Corps, would be much greater than indicated byFFC rates was sound. During the five-week period,commencing 6 Jun 44 and ending 10 Jul 44, the ac­tual Canadien battle casualties appear to nave bee~

Offrs ORs

CIC 220 3885All other Arms ill --2..2iTotal 343 4879

The casualties for the same force, for the sameperiod, calculated at FFC rates, work out at:

Offrs ORs

CIC 132 2150All other Arms 120 1211

Total 252 3361

Instead of being 63 per cent of the whole force as estimated,78.6 per cent of the battle casualties actually had been infan­trymen. Even non-battle casualties were . ~£~~~ ~~~g infantry­men, due to the more dangerous conditions under which they lived.Unlike the British Army which was fighting campaigns alloverthe wnrld and could offset deficiencies in one theatre by sur­pluses in another the Canadian Army was fighting only in North­West Europe and Italy. Casualties were so great among generalduty infantrymen that already some hundreds of infantry special­ists (e.g. Drivers, I.C.) were being temporarily employed asgeneral duty reinforcements. Then again, now that the Alliespossessed air superiority little in way of casualties need beexpected among anti-aircraft units and rear area troops: there­for~what in fact were s~rplus reinforcement holdings could beremustered to Infantry.

400. The Chief of Staff bein~ in Italy (see para 371),General Montague sent Brigadier Beamentts letter to the D.C.G.S.with the follOWing covering note:

It goes without saying that we must face the real­ity of which he informs me, namely that the demandsfor GD Infantry prevent sufficient numbers beingkept in the Depot, and we must do everything pos­sible to better the situation. The utmost possi­ble remustering and conversions in all Corps •••is to be ensured. Please give this matter toppriority consideration and action.

Immediately upon the return of the C of Sput him in the picture as other action bybe required (92).

401. On 24 Jul Lt-Col E.G. Pullen (S.D. (0) at C.M.H.~.)produced an analysis of the casualty figures, broken down intotwo main groups--battle casualties and sickness and aCCident cas~

He found:

That sickness & accident casualties fluctuatewidely and sometimes are three and four timesthe number of battle casualties.

•- 179 -

That for Infantry, the ratio is usually muchlower than for other arms and services and forthese is higher the farther they are removed frombattle.

That sickness & accident casualties have littleeffect on the number of reinforcement requiredto support the force once it is well establishedin the theatre (93).

Thus, although some ,6,207 casualty returns had been reportedin Italy for the period 1 Jan-30 Jun 44 only 7681 all ranks hadbeen required to replace them, which figure waS close to thetotal battle casualty figure of 8221 for that period. An analy­sis of the sickness and accident casualties for this period (in­cluding several months of inclement weather) indicated that anaverage of five per cent of the officers and seven per cent ofthe other ranks in Italy had come under this heading. Lt-ColPullen deduced, therefore, that:

( a)

(b)

battle casualties reported are the most real­istic indication of reinforcement requlrement~

and

an initial provision of reinforcements, re­preeenting 7 to 8~ of the total strength ofthe force, is required to off-set the build­up of the floating popUlation of sickness &accident casualties. The net loss from thesesickness & accident casualties bein& coveredby FFC rates of wastage, possibly 3/4~ :ormonth.

402.the following

As between corps Lt-Col Pullen's studytrends and requirements:

indicated

( a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Total battle casualties are 65-75~ forecasts.Therefore it is reasonable to assume thatruture casualties will not exceed 75~ of fore­casted casualties.

Infantry OR caeualties are approximately 75~of total battle casualties. Therefore 75~ ofintake should be infeutry.

RCA OR casualties were 34~ of forecast ~r~ArmY Gp and 52~ for AAI. Therefore 60~of forecast should be a reasonable assumptionfor future artillery casualties. This appliedto current forecasts for both theatres meanswe will have apprOXimately 4448 artillerycasualties up to Dec 44, against TIhich wenow have in X4 lists 6,,66 artillery rein­forcements.

CAG 0R casualties were 44~ of forecast for~Army Gp and 3~ for AAI. However C~ hasnot yet had adequate experience under idealtank battle to accept a cut in forecasts,but it may later be possible to reduce thisforecast. Current forecasts are 6,012 againstwhich we have in X4 lists, 6.664 reinforce­ments. Therefore future intakes could bereduced by 5~ and its reinforcement poolmay be susceptible to re-mustering in lightof later experience.

•

(el

- 180 -

RCASC OR casualties were 2~ of forecast forn Army Gp and 131. of AAI. Therefore 201- offorecast should be a reasonable assumptionfor future RCASC casualties. This appliedto current casualty forecasts for both thea­tres means we will have approximately 697RCASC casualties up to Dec 44 against whichwe now have in X4 lists, 4,038 reinforcements.

His recommendation was that 75 per cent of future intake inCanada should be trained as general duty infantrymen and thatup to 25 per cent artillery and 60 per cent R.C.A.S.C. reinforce­ments on the "X-4" list (reinforcements allotted to a theatreof operations) should be remustered to Infantry.

403. Before leaving for Ottawa General Stuart gave hisapproval to the remustering of R.C.A. and R.C.A.S.C. personnelsurplus to the revised holdin~s which were set at six and threeweeks 'intense' respectively (94). (A subsequent revision in­creased R.C.A.S.C. holdings to equal six weeks at the "intense ll

rate of wastage.) C.R.U. could not be used for this remusteringprogramme until certain of its units had moved back to Surrey-­Hampshire (where accommodation had had to be relinquished priorto D-Day), and General Montague decided on 1 Aug that, ratherthan delay the conversion programme, the 13th Brigade* (in York­shire) should be used (95). Apart from 132 all ranks of eachbattalion required for permanent administrative and trainingduties all fit personnel of the Brigade (to which had been at­tached the recently-arrived Regiment de Montmagny) had beenposted to the reinforcement stream in accordance with C.M.H.Q.Administrative Instructions (96), It was 5 Aug, however, beforethe Commander, C.R.D. wes actually ordered to post surplUS R.C.A.and R.C.A.S.C. personnel to Infantry and despatch them to unitsof the 13th Brigade, subject to the following provisos (97):

(a) All personnel must conform to the minimumphysical standards for CIC General Duty,i.e. category "A" or PULHEMS 1111221, maxi­mum age 40.

(bl Personnel ·in receipt of trades pay under pres­ent quotas and confirmed WOs or NCOs will notbe transferred.

(c) Personnel with the necessary aptitude anddesignated for qualification in the followingtrades or Non-TTade Specialties will not betransferred

RCA RCASC

Driver OpsSurveyors

Drivers ICMechanistsMotorcyclistsClerksClerks TMTCooks Hosp

While it was not desired to change the authorized reinforcementholdings for other corps any personnel surplus to the authorizedpool were to be turned into general duty infantrymen, except fortradesmen and those already designated for training in certaintrades,

404. As early as 3 Aug Brigadier Beament at AdvancedCanadian Section, G.H.Q. 1st Echelon, 21st Army Group had been

"See para 337.

•- 181-

notified that suoh remustering would be begun and that the con­version of 5000-6000 such reinforcements might produce 2000-7000general duty infantrymen after six weeks conversion training (~).This letter must have crossed the following telegram despatchedby the Army Commander to General Montague on 4 Aug (99):

Am concerned about Infantry general duty deficien­cies which approximate 1900. Our ability to con­tinue severe fighting or to exploit a break outwould be seriously restricted through lack ofreplacement personnel. After forwarding all avail­able reinforcements from 2 CERG deficiencies ex­ceeding five per cent of unit strength were:

Unit Deficiency Unit Deficiency

RHC 770 S Sask R nR de Mais 245 S D and G HighrsEssex Scots 171 Regina R 72Fus MR 179 Calg Highrs

~~Cemerons of C 100 N Shore RQOR of C 99 RHLI 54R Regt C '1 Toronto Scot (Ml) 52

R de Chaud 47

Other bne have deficiencies but of less than fiveper cent. I consider this the most serious prob­lem of Cdn Army et the moment and to requiremost energetic handling.

405. On the follOWing day (5 Aug) General Montaguereplied thet 15 officers and 656 other ranks were en route toNorth-West Europe; a further 260 officers and 7420 other rankswould be despatched on 10 Aug. Some 2500 Infantry all rankswere completing training and would be ready for despatch toNorth-West Europe by 19 Aug; a further 2000 infantrymen (includ­ing 450 French-speaking personnel) should be ready to join themby the end of the month. An additional 840 infantrymen werethen on their way overseas from Canada. It wes considered thatthese last could be sent forward 7-15 Sep. Reference was againmade to the R.C.A. and R.C.A.S.C. personnel being remustered.It was pointed out that the only way to hasten the despatch ofgeneral duty infantrymen would be to send men who had Dot com­pleted their training: this, it was understood, was not favouredby the Army Commander. Continuing, General Montague's telegramstated:

••• according to operational forecasts 21 ArmyGp for period described total numbers givenabove should be in excess of requirements byapprox 1500 CIC. Thia without taking into ac­count any personnel obtainable from conversiontrg ••• or making any credit allowance for re­coverable casualties which should come in pro­gressively from late September onward. Thisshould indicate favourable margin from which tobalance requirements for both theatres.

Appreciate your concern and assure you everythingbeing done here to expedite trg to accelerateprovision from which to meet your demands. Wouldappreciate c onfirmat ion of policy under which wepropose to withhold despatch of any personnelconsidered insufficiently trained to minimumacceptable standard and we consider 7 to 4 weeks

'after arrival CRU essential to meet this require-ment (100).

•- 182 -

406. General Crerar telegraphed again on 8 Aug thatthe problem was confined to general duty infantrymen and thatthe supply of officers and tradesmen could be ignored for themoment (101). Apart from D-Day itself, General Crerar statedthat wastage for each infantry battalion had been approximatelynine per day up to 31 Jul. For the previous seven days, duringwhich there had been no large scale operations Infantry wastagehad been five per day per battalion throughout the 2nd CanadianCorps. For August he estimated that the wastage of generalduty infantrymen would be 3.000 to 5,000 for 2nd Canadian Corps,with the higher estimate more likely in view of pending opera­tions (breakthrough down the Falaise road). Continuing, histelegrBJ!l read:

It is quite clear that only solution lies invigorous remustering and strenuous conversiontraining. Request careful study of possibilityof shortening conversion training by ~rading onentry and so securing a proportion in four weeks.

Organization changes in LAA Arty ••• will yieldfrom rernustering about 15 Aug approx 500 from EdUnits and other probable changes in near futurefurther approx 800. In meantime renustering inArty and RCASC can be based on uaintaining onlysix weeks intense as total holdings.

In view distinct possibility that operations ofnext four weeks may prove turning point remuster­ing policy should be based on short view. It isvital that our offensive power be maint~ined andlone term futures must be risked to produce ear­ly (102).

407. Once again the uncertainty of the overall stra-tegical picture was complicating the maintenance of the CanadianArmy. After much worry lest the War come to an end beforeCanadian formations might get to grips with the eneny therewas now a "high level"belief that German resistance might cometo an end with eviction from France (103). Temporarily, there­fore, opportunism replaced long-term planning.

408. Upon his return to London, General Stuart foundthat the reinforcement situation had grown worse. Afte1' readingthe Army Commander's telegrams General Stuart despatched hisD.C.G.S. by air to Army Headquarters on 10 AUR in order toobtainfirst hand information. Brigadier Penhale spent only one daythere but reported on his return that the Army Commander had"stressed the political importance at this time of maintainingunits at full strength, in particular Inf, where shortages areapparent" (104). General Crerar had impressed upon BrigadierPenhale that "the next few weeks represent the most criticalperiod and that, having regard to this, we would be justifiedin taking most energetic and drastic neasures to ensure thatthe operational effectiveness of Canadian units is maintainedto the fullest possible extent". The actual conposition ofreinforcement drafts was discussed with Brigadiers A.W. Beamentand A.E. Walford (D.A. ~ ~.M.G., First Canadian Army). It waSpointed out that certain of the reinforcene~~held in No. 2G.B.R.G. would be transferred to Infantry, after screening atNo. 3 Canadian Reallocation Centre which was just about readyto start work: a number of these, particularly R.C.A. ~einfor~'

ments then might have to be returned to the United Kingdom toundergo conversion training. Existing Infantry deficiencieswithin Canadian units totalled 1651 all ranks. E,en then,General Crerar had told Brigadier Penhale that there had beenfewer casualties during the recent advance down the Falaise Road

•- 183 -

than originally estimated.

409. Following Brigadier Penhalets departure from ArmyHeadquarters the question of accepting Infantry reinforcementswith a lower standard of training was debated. A certain amountof refresher training wes necessary for reinforcements just overfrom Canada (where instruction in the latest weapons and tech~niques could not be given) and it had been the practice to pro­Tide such instruction at the several Reinforcenent Units: nineto 11 weeks for C.A.C., seven weeks for R.C.A., R.C.E. and R.C.Signals and four weeks for others (105). The Army Commanderapproved the recommendation of his staff that no lowering ofstandard should be accepted for general duty infantrymen (106).His wishe. were accepted by C.M.H.~., with the proviso that in­fantrymen who could complete refresher training more quicklywould be despatched in fulfilreent of outstanding demands forreinforcements.

410. In a letter of 16 Aug Brigadier Walford reiter-ated the matters upon which agreement had been reached duringBrigadier Penhale!l visit: .

(a) That when the "float" of approxi=tely 81-of the force strength,oovering illness, ac­cident and other sources of ineffectives,had been built up in the ~eatre, the holdingfor Corps may be reduced to the follo~ing

provision at intense rates of wastage:

(i) RCA (Fd\(ii) RCA (AA

(iii) RCASC

Med, A Tk and Sy - 7 weeks6 weeks5 weeks

(b) That in the case of CAC the present scale ofthree months holdings at intense rete plus3~ for non-effectives, 1s to remain unaltered,but remustering may be done on the basis thatthis is a maximum requirement which may belIsbaded" as a temporary measure, if necessaryto produce the requirements of Infantry Gen­eral Duty by remustering. It is recognizedthat CAG personnel represent the type mosteasily and quickly convertible to Infantry (107).

After deducting the reinforcements despatched to North-WestEurope on 14 Aug, there was the following deficiency of generalduty infantrymen on the morning of 15 Aug:

In 2 Cdn Inf Div.In 3 Cdn Inf Div.In 4 Cdn Armd Div.

Total

16744612Q2

2644

It is again stressed that all available InfantryGeneral Duty, whether returned from hospital orotherwise provided, should be despatched as soonas available. Reinforcing is now on a day to daybasis, and every additional man produced adds tothe "bayonet" strength of some unit during thisdecisive phase of operations.

411. Two days prior to this (14 Aug) a total of 2045other ranks (including 65 French-speaking soldier~ remusteredfrom the several Reinforcement Units in the United Kingdom wereto have commenced infantry training with the 13th Bri~ade in

•- 184 -

Yorkshire, even though only 1923 men* actually turned up (108).A second intake numbering 1077 was due on 25 Au~ and, as Briga­dier Penhale pointed out to General Stuart: "It is our intentionto authorize further intakes from surplus personnel whenever thenumber undergoing this conversion tr~ falls below 3000 either asa result of natural wasta~e or outgoing drafts."(109). [Thiswas the maximum number which could be trained by the 13th Brigadeand even to do this it had been necessary to borrow 100 N.C.O.instructors from Nos. 3 and 4 C.I.R.Us.]

412. In response to a call for additional reinforce-ments (before the "Falaise Gap" was closed) the D.A'cl. at 'l.M.P..I<.instructed C.R.U., on 17 Aug, to send forward as ~eneral dutyinfantry reinforcements all infantry tradesmen not in receiptof trades pay** and non-tradesmen specialists (111). Enemyresistance in the Falaise pocket having been eliminated on 23Aug, after heavy fighting, the Canadian formations immediatelypUshed towards the Seine valley Where they again encounteredheavy opposition. In a telegram of 26 Aug General Stuart en­deavour~d to give General Crerar the impression that everyoneat C.M.H.\(.o was aware of the "vital importance" of the next threeweeks and that all available infantrymen would be sent forwardas quickly as possible: the policy of weekly drafts would beabandoned temporarily in favour of despatching men in lots of100, as soon as that minimum number was collected .(see para 381).He assured General Crerar that the War Office was "playing ball"and would meet any request on 48 hours' notice (112).

413.patched the

Earlier that dal (26 Aug) General Stuart had des­following telegram ** to the C.G.S. in Ottawa:

I We will have the infantry reinforcement situ­ation in a satisfactory condition in from threeweeks to one month's time when remustered per­sonnel will begin to come out of the streamin reasonable numbers. At present time becauseof recent heavy casualties in ~eneral dutyinfantry I em uneble to keep inf units up tostrength in general duty personnel althou~h wehave a considerable ~urDlus of inf tradesmenand inf specialists. At uresent time we showa shorta~€ of about 3000 general duty infantryin our 21 battalions in 21 Armv Group. Byutilizing general duty infantry now under train­ing at CRU for tradesmen and non trad"esmenspecialists plus general duty inf available Ishall be able to find drafts totalling about2000 within the next six days.

*Due to sudden sickness and absenteeism brought on by over­indUlgence in liquor, apprehended crime or compassionate groundsthere generally was a last minute wastage from drafts of soldiersabout to be despatched anywhere. In this instance, it would nothave been possible to remuster sufficient additional men at thelast moment to remedy the deficiency.

**Only those tradesmen actually couhted against the authorizedreinforcement holding, based on three months' wastBl?;e at Itintense"rates," were entitled to receive trades pay. A surplus in sometrades had come about because it was not possible to plen futureneeds exactly (110).

***Later, and following his resignation, Mr. Ralston admittedthat he had initialled this telegram but had not considered itnecessary to take any action (see para 394).

•

•

- 185

II I would like to be able to u3e at ny discretiona proportion of qualified ~nd paid inf trades­nen in a vital and I feel decisive period ofnext three weeks. It is ridiculous to have sur­plus inr tradesnen who are trained also as gen­eral duty infantry available and not be ableto use then sinply because under present regu­lations if we use then as general duty person­nel they will lose their trades pay. I considerwe would be breaking faith with then if we cuttheir trades pay. I recommend therefore thatI be authorized at ny discration and in an~ergency only to use as general duty inr aproportion of infantry tradesmen in receipt oftrades pay and that these nen shall cont inueto receive their forner trades pay. It beingunderstood that these nen will be tag~ed astradesnen and will be absorbed a9 such in theinfantry as and when the supply of generalduty inf pernits. .

III The present situation is not a nanpower prob­lem in the true sense. We have the men. Itis not a problem of general supply. It is aproblem of detailed distribution. We have takenBritish FFC rates as a guide. Experience ofparticular conditions of war in France hasshown that FFC rates for infantry are too lowand for practically all other arcs are toohigh. In addition we did not anticipate thatpractically all inf casualties would be ingeneral duty personnel. We are now goingthrough a period of adjustment. In threeweeks to a month we will be alright [sicl. Ineed assistance to bridge this interveningperiod. My recornnendations in para II representthe only way you can help me to bridge thisgap •••• (11))

414. On the following day concurrence was cabled bythe Adjutant-General who wondered, however, whether it night notbe better to permit a 25 per cent surplus to tradesnen establish­nents rather than settle particular cases on their nerits (114).After informing the funy Commander that authority had been gran­ted to use infantry tradesnen for general duty (115). GeneralStuart replied to the Adjutant-General, setting forth his objec­tions to this suggestion. This telegran of 29 Aug pointed outthat "no increase in cost is involved" and that, as the situationwas temporary in nature, it would oerely be necessary to oakeunposted tradesnen eligible to continue receiving trades payafter being posted to other thQn tradesnen's vacancies in unitestablishments (116). Furthernore, operational demands mightnecessitate large nuobers of trades~en being posted to a unitthat had suffered heavy casualties while other units receivedfew or none. The i~ Cornnander seened satisfied with GeneralStuart's proposal but, in a tele~ran of 31 Aug, enphasized the"urgency" of its adoption (117). since the battalions of the2nd Canadian Infantry Division had been short an Qverage of300 men on the preceding day, chiefly riflenenf'

.' ~

~The diarist of the lOth Canadian Base Reinforcement Battal­ion recorded on )0 Aug that, in addition to sending forward theinfantry reinforcements earmarked for battalions of the 2ndCanadian Infantry Division orders had been received to send 225"unallocated" reinforcements of an incoming draft to that di­vision. Since a good number of these men came from the MaritimeProvinces which were not represented in the infantry of the 2ndCanadian Infantry Division only 173 actually went forward.

•- 186 -

415. The greatest obstacle to reoustering tradesmenfrom other corps to Infantry wes the ments fear of losing tradespay. This point was emphasized in a telegram from 1st CanedianCorps where there had been an Infantry shortage of 52 officersand 4888 other ranks (5 Sep) (118). It was 29 Sep, howeyer, be­fore C.M.H.~. was able to find a solution: acceptance of theBritish practice (A.C.I. 1096 of 10 Aug 44) Whereby trades~enrernustered to Infantry from other corps would be permitted toretain their trades paY* "for a period of not more than sixmonths' (119). Although approval was not forwarded until 6 Novaction had been taken at C.M.H.~. as early as 23 Sep to havetradescen surplus to the revised reinforcement holdings (seepara 418) renustered as general duty infantrynen within C.R.U. (lID).

416. Since the F.F.C. rates of wastage obviously werenot applicable to conditions within the Canadian forces in eitherItaly or North-West Europe this question had been nade the sub­ject of further study by Lt-Col Pullen (slated to return toN.D.H.~. as Director of Staff Duties) whose earlier memorandum(see para 401) had not stood up to the:realltla3 of the campaignin Nornandy after the first month. Signed by Bri~adier Penbalethis ce~orand~ of 2, Aug advised:

It is obvious that our forecasts of activity(or the way we apply them to all ems and serv­ices) or the FFC rates of wastage (as applied toconparatively snall forces in only two theatres)are out of balance. However, to determine whichis at fault and to what extent would require acooprehensive study of factors, n~~y 9f which arenot available, and would require so nuch time asto nake the infornntion obtained of little usefor present operations (121).

It hed been found possible to meke adjustnents in the F.F.C.rates of wastage so that they would coincide with actual Canadianbattle casualties by corps. It was necessary to enphasise, ho~ever, that such amended rntes would hold good only so long asthe relationship of the total establishment for each arm andservice to the total force in ecch theatre re~ained approximatelyWhat it then was, and the conditions of battle renained similarto those experienced in preceding months (i.e. ,Ulied superior­ity in aircraft, amour and artillery).

417. Lt-Col Pullen's study had been confined to otherranks casualties, since it was here that adherence to the F.F.C.rates had let d own the Canadian Amy badly. General Stuart waSready to accept revised figures provided the~ Connanderwould cgree (122). Therefore, Lt-Col Pullen spent 25-26 Aug atAmy Headquarters and, after certain minor nodifications hadbeen node, agreenent was obtained (123). According to Lt-ColPullents report, however;

•••wasrft

while the ~ethod of calculating the new ratesaccepted nS logical and the resultant reducedholding were acce~ted as a result of experienm,

*On 30 Sep the diarist of the 10th Canadian Base Reinforce­ment Battalion wrote:

Our rfts continue to contain very poor qualitytroops. Many of then, for exanple, badly blis­tered their feet in the 3 1/2 nile march fromDIEPPE. Very large numbers are tradesnen whohave had very little inf training of any kind.

•- 187 -

it is quite clear that the only reason Amy willaccept the risk of reduced holdings in the amsand services is because of the imperative needfor nore Inf. On the other hand, I gethered theinpression that the peak of the losses in Inf ispassed.

I unde it quite clear to Brig Walford that thesenew rates will require careful watching in thelight of subsequent experience and stated thetthis would be done at Of.ffQ (124).

On 29 Aug General Stuart authorized the adoption of these newwastage rates and directed that the task of re~ustering person~

nel surplus to the new rates should ~et under way at once (125).

418. By ,1 Aug revised wastege rates for officers alsohed been calculated and epproved. Thereupon, the following tableof nonthly percenta&es was issued (126):

Intense NormalOfficers ORs Officers ORs

2 ,/4 ,/4

30 1, 1,

1. C.~.C. (incl Reeceand .;rnd Reece Regts)

2. R.C.A. (Fd, Med, .Tkand Svy

}. R.C.h. (.V, and chI

4. R.C.E. (Fd and Svy)

5. R.C.E. (L of C, Tnand MC)

6. R.C. Sigs (Div incll;rnd Bde Sigs)

7. R.C. Sigs (Non-Divend L of C)

8. Inf, S.S., and ParaBas ond i.:my ••irCorps

20

12,9

4

2

45

7

5

1 1/2

3 1/2

2

7 2 1/2

5 2 1/2

2 1

, 1/2 1 1/2

1 1/2 1

!

1 1/2 1 1/2

9. Inf MG, Mot, Sp Bnsand Bde, Div, Corpsand Jcr~ Def Units

10. R.C.A.S.C.

,52

15 8 8

3/4 3/4 3/4

1 1/2 1 1/2

11. RCAMC, CDC, C Ch Sand RCAPC

12. RCOC and RCEME

1,. C. Pro C. (less MilPrisons nnd Det Bks)

14. C. Pro C. (MilPrisons and Det Bks)

15. Pioneer and EnployuentUnits

2

1

5

3/4

,/1

2

5

,/4

3/4

3/4

,/4

3/~

3/4

,/~

3/4

3/4

,/4

3/4

•- 188 -

·16. H.Q. Units8 8Inf Bde 35 15

Armd Bde 20 7 7 2 1/2Inf Div (incl

1/2 3/4 3/4FS Sec) 2 1/2 1Armd Div (incl

1/2 3/4FS Sec) 2 1/2 1 3/4Corps (excl

1/2 1/2 ,/4 3/4Def Coy) 1 1Army (exel Def Coy) 3/4 3/4 3/4 3/4C.M.H.Q. 3/4 3/4 3/4 3/4

17. All C.M.H.Q. Units ,/4 3/4 3/4 3/4

18. Any other Units 3/4 ,/4 3/4 ,/4

("Quiet" rate remained ,/4 per cent throughout.)

It waS officially recognized, moreover, that only 35 per centof the 50 per cent "recoverable lt casualties would be availablefor further operational employment.

419. This information was forwarded to N.D.H.Q. thesame darl with the request that formal approval be granted {seepara 438/. It was pointed out that, for the present, the ArmyCommander did not want remustering carried too far: therefore,a reinforcement pool of approximately four months at the new'intense' rates would be retained for the following corps-­C.A.C., R.C.E., R.C. Signals, R.C.A.S.C., R.C.O.C., R.C.E.M.E.and C. Pro C. (127).

420. Canadian battle casualties for August had been693 officers and 8108 other ranks; although injured or wounded,,9 officers and 225 other ranks of this total had remained onduty. In addition, of course, there had been non-battle casu­alties and other wastage. However, the Army Commander had beenassured by General Stuart on 31 Aug that there would be suffici­ent Infantry reinforcements either at No. 2 C.B.R.G. or in tran­sit by 2 Sep (2205 plus 565 other ranks) to bring Canadian fieldunits "practicallyll up to strength. Furthermore, General Stuarthad confidently ended his telegram with this sentence: flOnceup to strength we'll keep you there." (128).

(iv) Autumn 1944 Losses in Italy

421. The opening days of September 1944 found the 1stCanadian Corps strenuously engaged in Operation 1I0LlVE", bywhich the Eighth Army hoped to break through the Gothic Lineand debouch into the valley of the Po. Once again Canadiansround themselves opposed by the redoubtable 1st German ParachuteDivision. Following the capture of San Fortunato on 20 Sep the1st Canadian Infantry Division was sent into reserve for a threeweeks rest. The 5th Canadian Armoured Division took up theoffensive but premature rains soon turned the offensive into apurely infantry battle, destroying all hope of getting armourinto the valley of the Po.

422. On 20 Sep the Corps Commander had informed GeneralStuart by telegram that battle casualties during the period21 Aug-18 Sep had been 150 officers and 2700 other ranks, notincluding those incapacitated by sickness (129). After makinggood unit deficiencies there were only 18 officers and 688 otherranks left in the Infantry reinforcement pool. With furtherInfantry casualties during this Operation then estimated asbeing 267 officers and 3676 other ranks the middle of Octobermight find 1st Cdn Corps Short Some 219 officers and 2640 other

•- 189 -

ranks of authorized holdings. Reinforcements for other Corpswere still being remustered to Infantry if ooneidered suitableand G.S. 778 unit establishments (see para 282) were beingreduced but General Burns did not expect to gain many generalduty infantrymen by these menns. Furthermore, it was· consideredthat certain of the newly-a9proved wastage rates (see para 418)did not agree with experience in the Italian theatre. BothGeneral Burns and Brigadier Weeks were afraid that the futureemployment of 1st Canadian Corps would be jeopardized unlessa greater number of general duty infantrymen could be despatchedwith the October draft (KJlF 35) from the United Kingdom.

423. Due to the difficulty of meeting the priorityneeds of First Canadian Army it waS not possible, however, toprovide more general duty infantrymen for despatch on KMF 35than the 70 officers and 450 other ranks already authorized.A C.M.H.~. telegram of 22 Ssp informed General Burns, however,that an additional 500 other ranks would be despatched: theywould mainly be R.C.O.C. personnel then surplus to the require­ments of No. 1 Canadian Central Ordnance Depot and would haveto be remustered and trained us general duty infantrymen follow­ing their arrival in Italy. Continuing, this telegram read:

•.• To facilitate such retraining we will sendby bomber mail the standard four week syllabusof remustering training which is designed toproduce general duty inf soldiers trained tominimum standards.

I would request you pay particular attention toweapon trg and range ~rnctices on all platoonwoapons because time will not permit assessmentof this draft in respect of trg before despatchand many may be unfamiliar with so~e platoonweapons or in need of refresher trg~ Hardeningtrg will also need special stress (130).

424. In a further telegram of 24 Sep General Stuartpointed out that Uat present stage of war" it was Itvitally :im-oportent to keep infantry in First Cdn Amy up to strength plussmall reserve even if it ~eons under insurance for you for alimited period" (131). In addition to remustering furtheravailable reinforcements to infantry General Stuart suggestedthat the continuing 2nd and 5th L.A.A. (Light Anti-Aircraft)Regiments, R.C.A. and other less essential units might be furtherreduced in personnel (see para 372): if necessary, and as atemporary expedient only, general duty infantrymen might beremoved from one inf~ntry brigcde of the 5th Canadian ArmouredDivision. He hoped, however, to bring the reinforce~ent pool backto strength with the~ reaching Italy in November on K.M.F. 36.

*In addition to the fact that all soldiers were supposed tohave taken two months basic training, or its eqUivalent, person­nel of R.C.O.C. and other supporting ams in the United Kingdo~had been subjected to a few hours of IImilitary training" everyweek to fit them for a possible all~round defence role againstenemy parachutists or motorized troops (Preliminary OverseasNarrative, Chap XI, para 197). On 12 Dec 44 the war diary ofHeadquarters, No. 1 C.B.R.G. noted that the infantry trainingof the 496 remustered R.C.O.Ce. and R.C.E.M.E. personnel had beencompleted on the previous day. Of this n~ber 30 had been re­boarded as medically unfit for service as infantrymen and afurther 21 would have to repeat the course, having missed toomuch instruction through hospitalization, detention or otherreasons.

•- 190 -

425. In his telegram to the C.G.S. of the same dateGeneral Stuart pointed out that one trouble with the system oftroop convoys to the Mediterranean was that they sailed onlyonce a month: not until the next convoy (K.M.F. 36) was madaup 1n October would the reinforcement situation have improvedsufficiently for a lar6er allocation to be made from the poolin the United Kingdom (132). Therefore he suggested that theC.G.S. approach ~ashington to obtain a direct sailin~ fromNorth America to Italy during October for 1000 general dutyinfantrymen. (General Burns waS advised that this proposalwas being made.)

426. On 30 Sep a negative reoly was despatched fromOttawa. The British Army Staff in Washington considered thatthere was "little possibility" of obtaining shipping spacedirect to Italy: moreover, Canada could send men direct tothe Mediterranean only by reducing the nUI!lbers planned ·ror des­patch to the United Kingdom during October. Furthermore, thistelegram went on to point out that:

In view of difficulties of opening new channelfor administrative and supply purposes considerthat there would be little advantage in changingpresent arrangements and ••• it is unlikely thatany time would be saved.

Proposal considered on staff level only. Youwill appreciate there are other reasons whychange in method of despatch at this stage mightbe considered undesirable (133).

427. Meanwhile information of another colour hadreached C.M.H.~. On 18 Sep Brigadier Weeks had addressed apersonal letter to Brigadier W.H.S. Macklin, newly appointedD.C.G.S. at C.M.H.~.: on 27 Sep the latter passed extracts toGeneral Stuart:

The rft situation out here is causing some con­cern to the Corps Comd, but not to me. Fromwhat Gilbride* told me on his arrival out here,I can see little hope of us getting a consider­able number of C.I.C. rfts from the U.K. Per­sonnally I think we can live off our fat fbr areasonable period. If the present intense fight~

ing extends over a period of two weeks, we willbe in the position of having to rely on rftsfrom those discharged from the ConvalescentDepot. This is not so bad, as personnel areexperienced and can go forward almost immediately.They do require a little freshening, especiallyon the physical side at the Bose Rft Bns.

The tradasmen situation remains a headache, butwe are slowly re-mustering, and keeping the situ­ation well in hand. The tredesmen problem doesnot cause me very much concern, principally be­cause the forward Comnanding Offrs have no ser­ious grouses in this respect. For example, thereis a paper deficiency of Drivers I.C., but allunits succeed in moving their vehicles withoutany difficulty (134).

*Brigadier W.P. Gilbride had returned to Italy to take upthe appointment of D.A. & Q.M.G., 1st Canadian Corps, with ef­fect from 19 Sep 44.

•- 191 -

These views were more in accord with those held by GeneralStuart and may have helped to convine him that all would yet bewell ..

428. The Minister of National Defence did not thinkso, however, as a result of his visit to Italy 26 Sep-, Oct.The Eighth Army Commander had told him that, although it wasnot considered advantageous to attack an enemy without a super­1o~1ty of three to one, in reality the Germans were as strongor stronger than the 15th Army Group (1,5). Thus there wouldbe heavy fighting before the Eighth Army could make any eppreci­able advance. Brigadier Weeks later explained that, should 1stCanadian Corps continue to be actively engaged, all the generalduty infantry reinforcements would be committed by 10 Oct (1,6).Although there was a constant daily flow of 60 to 100 all ranksfrom the convalescent depots back into the reinforcement stremJthe number of daily casualties might run as high as 300 all ran~s

when there was fighting. Moreover, experience had shown thatcasualties from sickness and nccident might equal the numbersof those killed, wounded and missing during the inclement monthsof the year. Therefore, something like 500-600 reinforcementsmight be required deily to maintain 1st Canadian Corps. Itwould seem that the earlier optimism about debouching into thevalley of the Po without further serious fighting had beenwashed away with the coming of the rains.

429. Speaking to the House of Commons considerablylater about this trip to Itely the Minister of National Defencasummarized his findings as follows:

In Italy I visited the reinforcenent unit andmost of the infantry battalions. I talked withthe nen thenselves, and tice and again I got thesame story--about having to go back to the linerepeatedly, or not having leave, or bein~ short­handed, when trained N.R.M.A. men could be madeavailable to give them relief.

At the end of September, just before I left Italy,the pool of trained infantry reinforcements wasdown to between ten and fifteen per cent of Whathad been planned, and infantry reinforcementswere so scarce in the United Kingdom that theonly addition they were getting was the monthlyconvoy to arrive in about two weeks, bringingnot even enough trained infantry men to meet thecasualties which would bave been incurred in thosetwo weeks.

The corps connander in Italy pressed stronglythat the pool be established in the area suffi­ciently strong to relieve the tight situation andensure pronpt replacement of day-tp-day casual­ties (1,7).

4,0. On 11 Oct the 1st Canadian Infantry Division,which had been in reserve since the capture of San Fortunatoon 21 Sep, returned to the line and the Armoured Division re­tired into corps reserve. A slow advance continued acrosswater-laced ground but all initiative had passed to the weatherman and on ~8 Oct the Canadien divisions were withdrawn. Thecasualties suffered by the ad hoc "Porterforce" and the detached1st Canadian Armoured Brigade continued slight and could bereplaced without undue difficulty. The draft arriving in lateNovember on convoy KMF ,6 included 867 English-speakin infantry­men and 316 reinforcements for other corps. No French-speakinggeneral duty infantrymen had been available, however, end the

•- 192 -

problem of reinforcing the under-strength Royal 22e Regimentwas acute, being relieved only slightly by the return of "re­coverable casualties l1 and I:leD fron other sections of the X­List (see para 452).

431. Unlike the British component of the Eighth Armywhich had had to disband the 1st Armoured Division, reduce onebrigade of the 56th (London) Division to a cadre basis and de­crease nll its Infantry battalions from four to three riflecompanies, 1st Canadian Corps was able to continue with unalteredestablishments (138). It next saw action on 2 Dec in the EighthAr~y's unsuccessful attempt to reach the line of the Santernobefore halting for the winter.

(v) Remustering Reinforcements for North-West Europe

432. The opening days of September 1944 saw Canadianarmour joining in the pursuit across France and Belgium whilethe two infantry divisions remained behind to invest the Channelports of Boulogne, Calais and Dunkirk. On 7 Sep Brigadier C.Ll~yd (D.A.G., Rear Headquarters, 21 Army Group) informed Brig­adier Beament that he was worried by the extent of the deficien­cies in the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division. He wished to beinformed of the Canadian situation since, should there be con­tinued heavy casualties, the situation might become acute (139).On the other hand, by ener~etic action it was going to be pos~

sible to bring British infantry units up to establishment: on16 Aug the decision had been taken to disband the 59th InfantryDivision and one brigade of the 49th (West Riding) Divisionand use their personnel as reinforcements (140). ~uring thesame month it had been decided to transfer some 11,000 men fromthe Royal Navy and R.A.F. to the Army, two-thirds of whom wouldbecome infantrymen.) (141)

433. In the reply despatched to Brigadier ~eament

from C.M.H.~. on 15 Sep it was pointed out that there weresufficient Canadian reinforcements then in transit to make upthe First Canadian Army's 3351 Infantry deficiencies as of 12Sep (142). Further reinforce~ents equalling seven weeks wast~

age for all Infentry units at the new 'intense' rates were al­ready in view. SODe adjustnent would have to be made for in­fantry 'specialists' and tradesnen employed as general duty in­fantrymen to be returned to their proper role eventually. Rein­forcements also would have to be sent to Italy. On the otherhand, no allowance waS being ~ade for 'recoverable wounded',

434. On the day following the commencement of Oper-ation "MARKET GARDEN", by which the First Allied Airborne Armyhoped to seize the approaches to the North German plain, GeneralCrerar despatched the follOWing message to General Stuart:

Reinforcement situation as regards general dutyinfantry sho~ no general inprovenent over thatWhich obtained a month ago. Matter concerns megreatly and re~uires your personal and urgentinvestigation (143).

With the failure of the British Second Army to link up with the1st Airborne Division at Arnhem it became obvious that therewould be considerable heavy fightin~ before the '~'ehrmacht wasforced to capitulate.

435. Immediately on receipt of this message GaneralStuart orderad his A.D.A.G.(A) to prepare another statenent.Brigadier Bostock replied that since 16 Aug when the Chief ofStaff had ordered top priority to be given to the despatch of

•- 193 -

Infantry reinforcements (and that infantry tradesmen not in re­ceipt of trades pay and specialists were to be employed on gen­eral duty) some 233 officers and 4779 other ranks had been des­patched to No.2 C.B.R.G. (144). A further Infantry draft of31 officers and 977 other ranks was being prepared for desfatchon 22 Ssp, while 450 infantrymen were earmarked for Italy seepara 422). The fact that the Infantry holdings of No.2 C.B.R.G.on 14 Sep had been listed as 312 officers and 1781 other ranks~gainst a deficiency of 3075 other ranks in field units mightor might not be an adequate picture of the situation, since in­vestigation disclosed that reinforcements remained on the strengthof No. 2 C.B.R.G. during the four or more days travelling byroad to catch up with the forward battalion and the' field un....its (see para 382). As long as transportation difficultiespersisted there always would be delays in getting reinforcementsforward (145). In what started out to be a telegram to the ArmyCommander and finished as a letter on 25 Sep General Stuartpointed out the alleviating factors, as well as saying:

I can assure you that the question of reinforce­ments generally and in particular infantry rein~

forcements has been subject to my Dersonal atten~

tion for some time. I am fairly hard to pleasebut I am satisfied with what has been done thisend. We have a minim~ of 15000 infantry rein­forcements in sight for the balance of 1944, notincluding those returned from hospitals. Thisis practically the equivalent of three monthsat intense rates for your First Cdn Army or twomonths including 1 Cdn Corps. This I am sat is- .fied will be sufficient to look after our in­fantry requirements until the collapse ofGernany (146).

Since North-West Europe was the decisive theatre of operationshe was prepared to let 1st Canadian Corps go short until themiddle of November.

436. After outlining the steps taken to alleviate theshortage of general duty infantrymen, in a letter of 20 Sep toOttawa, General Stuart proposed that, for the time being, thetraining of infantry reinforcements in Canada might be termln~

ated at the end of the 13 1/2 weeks co~on-to-arms trainingsyll~bus, apart from six per cent who should receive additionaltraining as Drivers, I.C. (M.V.). By extending the existingbasic refresher-training course in the United Kingdom from t~o

to three weeks (for a total of five weeks training) it wouldbe possible to cover the instruction eliminated in Canada.This would save time and oerroit more infantry reinforcementsto be sent overseas (including instructional personnel madesurplus) at an earlier date (147),

437. In 0 telegram of 4 Oct the C.G.S. replied thatthis proposal had been turned down, since it would be "undesiI'-­able to despatch reinforcements froM Canada with less than 4months service in Armyll (148). He doubted Whether the proposedthree weeks training in the United Kingdom would both make upfor the month's collective training at No.1 Training BrigadeGroup (Debert) and provide adequate refresher training to menwhose training had deteriorated whilst in transit. Consideringthat the result would be the earlier despatch of reinforcementsinto battle with e correspondingly lower standard of training,he continued:

It ispresentstage.

questionable whether any reduction intraining time should be accepted at thisPresent program in Canada with not less

•- 194 -

than two weeks refresher in UKminimum requirenent to produceand efficient infantry soldier

is consideredphysically fit••••

As period of training is important question ofpolicy suggest you discuss with Minister inforo­ing him of our views •••• (149)

438. The C.G.S. already (23 Sep) hed telegraphed con­currence in the revised wastage rates issued by C.M.H.Q. on 31Aug (see para 418). However, he stipulated that they shouldbe UDder constant review and appropriately revised from time totime as necessary in the light of future experience of battlecasualties and changes in the composition of the Army. Thattelegran also had stated:

We note thnt an initial infantry pool based onthree nonths intense at the proposed rates wouldhave been a~proximately 27400 instead of 17800.We assune that these will be available by yourcontinuing remustering of surplus in other corp:;{"~.Qj

now overseae who are surplus under your propos-als (150).

Claiming N.D.H.~. had anticipated thF~the F.F.C. wastage rateswere too low for Infantry the C.G.S. pointed out that sincemid-April some 68 per cent of the intake into the TrainingCentres had been allocated to that Arm. It was now proposedto increase this to 75 per cent, although it would not be easyto maintain the desired qualtity. Furthermore, rather than con­vert personnel then completing corps training in Canada intoinfantrymen, it was suggested that they be despatched overseas'for remustering and conversion training. This would make forspeed. Men undergoing basic training or still in the earlyweeks of corps training would, however, be sent from Canadaonly as trained infantrymen. The following provision wasadded:

You will appreciate that your proposed new rateswill not be used to apply to Forces whose co~

position by corps differs from that of our Forcesnow in Europe as the basis of calculation isonly upon the ratio which the casualties of eachcorps bear to the total battle casualties of ourForces as now constituted (151).

439. My balief in Ottawa that remustering overseas.would produce the difference of 9600 infantrymen between threemonths 'intense' wastage at the new Canadian and the olderF.F.C. rates was doomed to disappointment. AS of 15 Sep some4720 had been converted to Infantry and another 500 (fromR.C.O.C.) despatched to Italy but the opinion was held within'A' Branch at C.M.H.Q. that 7850 was the max~~ n~be~ of nenwho might be remustered to Infantry befo~e the end of theyear (152). In a memorandum passed to D.C.G.S. on 27 SepBrigadier Bostock wrote that:

Bearin in mind that the surpluses in the rftholdings of other corps created by these newrates were not all personnel physically fi~ forGen Duty Inf, and that certain types could notbe remustered to Inf but to other corps wheretrades etc shortages still eXisted, this figureof 7500 is, I consider\ a very creditable achieve­ment by AAG (Req) (153 •

440. The transfer of surplus reinforcement officers

•- 195 -

to Infantry had been discussed at C.M.H.~. during Au~ust andit had been decided that valuable time would be saved by solie­iting ?olunteers rather than workin~ through the lists of R.C.A.,i.e.X. and R.C.k.S.C. officers, where the chief surpluseseXisted, and selecting potential candidates (154). Since itdid not prove possible to obtain 140 R.C.A. officers for thesecond six weeks conversion courSe scheduled to open at theCanadian Training School on 16 Sep approval was given for thecompulsory transfer of that number (155).

441. In addition to continuing the remustering ofofficers Canada was asked to supply 100 "aggressive" youngsubalterns in each of October and November to offset a deficien­cy of 450 English-speaking and 10 French-speaking Infantry offi­cers (156). kn N.D.H.~. telegram of 13 Oct stated that 90 In­fantry reinforcement officers could be despatched during October,100 during November and 100 in December (157). Since this wouldnot completely meet requirements, however, authority was soughtto continue remustering overseas (1,8). It was 20 Oct, however,before authority was granted to effect the compulsory transferof further surplus C.A.C. and R.C.A. officers (159). Subsequent­ly it was decided that the surplus of officers in technicalcorps was too snall to bother with and that a disproportionatelylarge numb6r of the surplus R.C.A.S.C. were over-age for serv­ice with Infantry units (160). Moreover, from early Novemberon officers from Canada would require most of the vacancies onthe C.T.S. courses (161). The final C.M.H.~. ruling on compul­

'sory transfer appears to have been issued on 24 Nov:

rrDtil further instruction. surplus rft officersof RCA and CAC will be remustered, either volun­tarily or compulsorily as necessary, to completethe normal intake of 105 candidates Der courseat No.3 Wing CTS. -

The numbers so remustered will be dictated bythe requirements for course vacancies of 13CITB~ It is understood that the number of Infrft officers directed to this Course by 13 CITSwill be kept to the minimum required by the stateof training of officers arriving in the UK fromCanada as assessed by Os. C. CITRs (162).

442. Beginning in Septenber only five overseas can~

didates were accepted monthly for commissions in the R.C.A. andC.A.C., and ODe in Royal Canadian Signals; other O.C.T.U. can­didates would have to transfer to Infantry if they wished tobecome officers. iffi Officers Survey and Classification Boardwas established, under the chairmanship of the President ofthe O.G.T.U. Selection Board, to determine whether useful em­p~oyment could be found for existing officers who were surplusto existing needs due to a~eJ medlca~ category or teoperament.h second such Board conmenced hearin s on 23 Oct (C.M.H.~.

Report 156).

(vi) Shortage of French-Speaking Infantrymen

443. Although the internal composition of units isbound to change over a period as the result of illDess, acc~dent,

*During early November Infantry refresher training was con­centrated in a new l}th Canadien Infantry Training Brigade andthe Infantry Reinforcement Units disappeared as a trainin6 or­ganization. The new formation cooprised four (later five) Train­ing Regiments, each consisting of one depot and two trainingbattalions (C.M.H.~. Report 133).

•- 196 -

death, transfer and promotion the following units were stillclassified as French-speaking during the spring of 1944 (163):

First Canadian Army

4th Medium Regiment, R.C.A.No. , Battalion, R.C.E.4th Medium Regiment Signal SectionLes Fusiliers Mont-RoyalLe Regiment de MaisonneuveLe Regiment de la Chaudiere4th Canadian Infantry Brigade Company, R.C.A.S.C.4th Medium Regi~ent Platoon, R.C.A.S.C.No.6 Field Dressing Station, R.C.A.M.C.No. 18 Field Ambulance, R.C.A.M.C.No. 104 Light Aid DetaChment, R.C.E.M.E.

Cenadlan Troops, A.A.I.

82nd Anti-tank Battery, R.C.A.Royal 22e RegimentNo.5 Field Hygiene Section, R.C.A.M.C.No.1 Convalescent Depot, R.C.A.M.C.

C.M.H.Q.. Units

No. 17 General Hospital, R.C.A.M.C.No. 9 Canadian Provost Company.

Naturally enough, it WaS considered most important that the fourInfentrl battalions with total establishments of 136 officersand 3148 other ranks should remain French-speaking. A memoran­dum of 13 Apr 44 noted, however, that there were 201 officersbut only 348 other ranks agaiast French-speaking Infantry rein­forcement requirements of 90 officers and 1563 other ranks (164).Furthermore~ there were current deonnds for six officers and 124other ranks for the Royal 22e Regiment's share of the reinforce­ment pool in Italy and for 11 officers and 327 other ranks forLe Regiment de la Chaudiere which would be participating in theD-Day assault.

444. On the following day General Stuart directed thatthe reinforcements requested for the Royal 22e Regiment (thesenior French-speaking unit) should be despatched to Italy andthat C.R.U. should be searched for French-speaking personnelsuitable for remustering to Infantry (165). Brigadier deLalannequeried N.D.H.Q.. by telegram as to what might be expected in theway of French-speaking general duty infantrymen (166) and wasadvised of the action being takan in Pacific and Atlantic Com­mands to enlist the N.R.M.A. personnel of French-speaking per­sonnel for overseas service with their own battalions (see paras328-340) •

445. Personnel Selection Officers at C.M.H.g,. reportc~

a total of 3601 (2653 general duty and 948 drivers) French­speaking Canadians serving with English-speaking units (167).Many of these were of too low intelligence to post away fromexisting employment, however, while some 800 were serving asinfantrymen in English-speaking units. Regarding these letter,Brigadier Bostock uttered the followin~ caution:

With regard to the remustering of French­speaking personnel, it will be more difficultthan the normal remustering of General Dutyfrom one arm to another, as eXgerience hasshown that French-speaking individuals inEnglish-speaking units are very loth to leave

•- 197 -

the English units and transfer to a French­speaking unit. Therefore, if the remusteringprogramce is to be put into effect. specialcare will have to be tokan that the individualsare approached by their C.Os. end that it isexplained to theo that it is their duty to ac­cept this remustering for the good of the Armyas a whole. If tpis is not done, I am afraidthe results of the renustering will not be sat­isfactory (168).

Actually it was possible to transfer 233 such soldiers from unitsof First Canadien iJmY and 256 from within C.R.U. by 24 Jun.the latter going to Le Regiment de la Chaudi~re which was theonly French-speaking unit participatin~ in the Normandy assallt0b9).Some of those reported had been posted elsewhere While othersturned out not to be French-speaking at all (even though theymay have possessed a French name*).

446.serious issueArmy Group he

Meanwhile, Brigadier Beament had raised a morein a letter of 8 ~~y. From GHQ 1st Echelon 21stwrote General Stuart as f~llows:

I do not need to dilate on the extremely serioussituation which exists regarding reinforcementsfor French speaking infantry units. It has al­ways been difficult to maintain the Royal 22eRegiment in the Italian theatre and this has beendone at the expense of reserves behind the othertree French speaking infantry battalions. Atthe present time the available reserves behindthe Regiment de la Chaudiere are inadequate tomeet the demands of the first eight days for aninfantry battalion in an assault role, and it ismy impression that every available French speak­ing Canadian has been diverted to this battalion,thus leaving the two French speaking battalionsof the 2 Canadian Division without any reserveswhatsoever.

Several possible alternatives present themselves,such as:

(a) Cannibalization.

(tr) An extension of the re-mustering policy.

(c) Reinforcing French Canadian units withEnglish speaking personnel.

All these courses have obvious disadvantagesand strong political implications. The matter,however, is of such pressing urgency that Irequest that I be furnished at the earliestpossible date with a directive regarding thepolicy to be followed in reinforcing theseunits (170).

447. On 12 May Brigadier Bostock visited FirstCanadien Army Headquarters and discussed the problem withBrigadier Walford (D.A. & Q.M.G.). On 21 May General Crerar

*Just as there were English-speaking personnel who had in­herited French names there were French-speaking personnelnamed Robinson and Macdonald.. To confuse Records personnelstill more the name Martin might denote either an English­speaking or French-speaking Canadian.

•

instructed that French-speaking infantryman be withdrawn fromEnglish-speaking Infantry battalions of the 2nd Canadian Infan­try Division and the 4th Canadian Armoured Division. A suffici­ent number of French-speaking reinforcements should then beobtained from other sources to provide the unfilled balance of60 days wastage; at "intensell rates, for the three Q,uebecInfantry battalions of the 21st Army Group (171). On 23 MayBriagdier Bostock was able to tell General Stuart that, fromremustered personnel (including the 120 French-speaking A.A.gunners previously allotted to the 4th Canadian Medium Regiment)and arrivals expected from Canada that month, it would be pos­sible to produce 1221 reinforcements: slightly better thanthe 1126 required to provide 60 days reinforcements fur the twoFrench-speaking battalions of the 2nd Canadien Infantry Divisionand replace the casualties expected by Le Regiment de la Chaudierein the first 17 days of fighting (172). Although this prOVidedfor the immediate future there was no reserve in the UnitedKingdom for the Royal 22e Regiment. Actually a further month'swastage for each of the Royal 22e Regiment, Le Regiment deMaisonneuve Bod Les Fusl11ers Hont-Royal and two months' wastagefor Le Regiment de 1a Cheud~--tota11ing157G--shou1d be pro­vided. Some 1290 French-speaking reinforcements were expectedfrom Canada before the end of July but Brigadier Bostock con­sidered it wise to add a caution:

••• although we may be able to make up the immed­iate requirements, the situation re~arding French­speaking Inf rfts is by no means secure, and ifany of the four bos should suffer unexpected cas­ualties, it will be essential to adopt eitherthe system of reinforcing with EngliSh-speakingpersonnel, or of cannibalization (173),

On the following day the Army Commander was advised of the stepsbeing taken, together with the decision that French-speaking urnwwithin 21st ArmT Group othor than Infentry would haTC to acgcptEnglish-speaking reinforcements and lose their distinct identity,if no French-speeking personnel of the right category and tredewere available (174).

448. In a secret and personal letter of 29 May GeneralStuart advised the Army Commander that there was no guaranteethat the flow of French-speaking general duty infantrymen fromCanada could be maintained in sufficient numbers to make goodcontinuing wastage. General Stuart suggested that the onlycourse might be the cannibalization of one or more French­speaking units to r61n~orc~ the others, and replacement withother units (175).

449. On 4 Jun General Crerar replied that the serious­ness of the problem depended upon the actual casualties sufferedby Le Regiment de 1a Chaudiere up to D plus 18. He conSidered[rightly as it turned out] that the estimated casualties weretoo high: if so, the situation would not beco~e acute for somemonths, probably 1 Oct (176). In the event that cannibalizationshould then become necessary the Army Commander favoured re­placement by an Eng1ish-speakinR battalion of the 13th Brigade,strengthened by a proportion of battle experienced Officersand N.C.Os.

450. The summer passed without incident, even thoughGeneral Stuart did include a note of warning during the courseof his visit to Ottawa to obtain changes in the 'manpower cei~

ingl(see paras 395-7). His appreciation of the reinforcementsituation, dated 2 Aug, concluded as follows:

The only part of the reinforcement problem that

•- 199 -

is worrying me at the moment is the finding ofreinforcements for our French-Canadian InfantryBattalions. I am withdrawing French-Canadiansfrom English speaking units overseas for thispurpose but unless I can get additional French­Canadian Infantry reinforcements from Canada Ishall be faced with the alternative of disband­ing units to provide reinforcements or reinforcewith English speaking personnel. I do not relisheither alternative and consequently I hope everyeffort will be mcde to increase the flow of French­speaking Infantry reinforcements (177),

451. General Stuart's fears were realized. ApparentlyLa R~giment de Maisonneuve and Les Fusillers Mont-Royal of the2nd Canadian Infantry Division had never been at full strengthsince the first day they went into action (12 Jul) and by 1 Septhey were deficient 276 and 333 other ranks respectively (178),From 1 Sep to 8 Oct the least number of deficiencies was 148 .other ranks for Le Regiment de Maisonneuve on 27 Sep and 202other ranks for Les Fusiliers Mont-Roral on 8 Oct. On that lastdate Le Regiment de Maisonneuve had 38 officers and 600 otherranks (75 per cent) and Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal had 38 officersand 585 other ranks (72 per cent). Since casualties were con­centrated in the rifle companies this meant that the fightingstrength was reduced by 50 per cent. Before taking up thematter with the acting Corps Commander (Maj-Gen C. Foulkes)on 8 Oct the acting Divisional Commander~rigadierR.H. Keefler)secured agreement from the two battalion commanders that Engllsh­speaking companies might be added to their units. In fact,Brigadier Kestler had gone ahead and ordered that one such com­pany should be formed from the reinforcements Which had arrivedfor the division.

452. The seriousness of the situation had been real-ized at C.M.H.~., where it was pointed out that on 23 Sep LeRegiment de la Chaudiere had been short two officers and 86other ranks and the Royal 22e Regiment two officers and 102other ranks, althOUgh there were believed to be French-speakingholding of 21 officers and 270 other ranks for the latter inItaly. Brigadier Bostock considered that the Royal 22e Regimentshould have priority, if any of the French-speaking battalions.were to be maintained at full strength, and reconmended on 9 Octthat authority be given the Canadian Section, G.H.~. 1st Echelon21st Amy Group to post English-speaking personnel to its threeInfantry battalions from the province of ~uebec (179). GeneralStuart replied that the immediate problem was to despatch asaany French-speaki~g infantrymen as possible on the next draftto North-West Europe (180). Brigadier Bostock then managed toincrease this draft (UKhG 11) to eight officers and 126 otherranks. By lIgreatest endeavours of re-training, and replacingfits with unfits" it was hoped to provide the following rein­forcements from Le Regiment de Hull (Le Regiment de Montmagnyhad been disbanded) and No. 6 Canadian Infantry ReinforcementUnit (181) I

Officers Other Ranks

20 Oct 44 25 14227 Oct 44 14

l~~3 Nov 44 .?2.68 419

However, only a further 178 French-speaking general duty in­fantrymen were expect~d to arrive from Canada in time for des­patch to an operational theatre during 1944.

•- 200 -

453. In reply to a C.M.H.Q. query, the Canadian Sectionat 1st Echelon, 21st Army Group replied on 21 Oct that existingfacilities did not permit conversion training being carried onin North-West Europe: furthermore:.

Rft situation will not permit withdr~wal Frenchspeaking soldiers from English speaking Inf Bns.Numbers French speaking soldiers in non CIC unitsphysicall~ fit and suitable for emp in Inf Bnsnegligible (182).

The situation regarding French-speaking Infantry officers wasnot serious, lliowever, and despatches would be required only inaccordance with weekly demands submitted.

454. General Stuart was in Ottawa and the Acting ArmyCommander's (Lt-Gen G.G. Simonds) letter of 23 Oct went toGeneral Crerar (in hospital at Taplow) and General Montague(M.G.A.). With inclement weather about to boost the sicknessrate General Simonds estimated that the deficiency of French­speaking general duty infantrymen would increase from the pre­sent (20 Oct) 340 other ranks to 605 by 1 Dec. The previouslymentioned letters, written by Brigadier Kesfler and GeneralFoulkes were attached (see para 451) and General Simonds wenton to suggest:

,. The reinforcing of French speaking regimentshas been a problem for some time and it wouldappear that one of the following courses isopen:

(a) That sufficient French speaking infantryreinforcenents be made available to naln­tain the required fighting strengths.

(b) That one of the regiments be absorbed bythe other and that the surplUS personnelbe used as reinforcements. This wouldrequire the fornation of an English speak­ing unit to take the place of the regimentso absorbed.

(c) That English speaking reinforcements beused in French speaking reginents in whichcase complete companies could be sentinto the line with English speaking of­ficers and non-co~issioned officers.

Of the above courses it is obvious for nanyreasons that (b) would not be acceptable. Itwould appeAr therefore that if (a) is notpossible then (c) is the course to adopt andthis is strongly reco!TlI!lended.·

"4. It has been found necessary already to ~ive

special battle tasks to these reginents be­cause of their dwindling strengths. Theundesiraoility of having to follow this courseof action is obvious. Failure to bear a fullshare of the battle will become increasinglynoticeable to other units and formations andresentment will develop against the regimentsconcerned. This in turn will prejudice thenational interest.

5. In conclusion it is recommended that a policybe adopted of accepting one complete English

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speaking rifle company to eech battalion. Thisin turn will allow the French speeking portionof the unit to be kept up to strength if thersinforcenents indicated ; .. arrive in thetheatre (183).

After considering every angle General Crerar decided that, un­less adequate French-speaking Infantry reinforcements wereforthcoming very shortly, it would be necessary to concur inGeneral Simonds' recommendation. This information waS forwardedto Generel Stuart in Ottawa on 28 Oct by Brigadier Macklin(D.C.G.S., C.M.H.~.). who pointed out that if casualties con­tinued at the same rate it might be necessary to form two English­speaking rifle companies for each of the French-speaking Infantrybattalions (184 )'.

455. During the following days General Stuart resignedover the "conscription ll issue (see paras 458-545) and wassucceeded by General Montague. General Crerar resumed co~dof First Canadian Army and raised the special problem of Frenm­speaking Infantry reinforcements in a letter of 12 Nov. Presentdeficiencies and anticipated further wastage until 31 Dec waS1242 other ranks, against which there would be 794 replacements.He informed General Montague that one of the three courses ad­vocated by General Sioonds in his letter of 23 Oct was necessary:this was a "catter of national iI!lportance and ... the decisionmust be made at National Defence Headquarters after the fullestinvestigation and discussion of the problem and traated as amatter of urgency" (185).

456. Le Regiment de la Chaudi~re was not in quite asbad a condition as theottBr French-speaking Infantry battalionssince its initial Ttrecoverable" casualties already were return­ing. November was forecast as a "quiet" I:lonth but flintense"activity was expected during December and Brigadier Bostockadmitted to General Montague on 14 Nov that "on the presentestimates we cannot maintain these bns up to strength to 31Dec 44" (186). Furthermore, the discussion to date had ignoredthe existence of the Iby8l 22e Reguent: although up to strength,a draft would have to be prOVided in December for its futuremaintenance. This info~ation was passed back to the C.G.S.in Ottawe, by telegran on 15 Nov (157).

457. By this time the "conscription" issue waS epproach-ing its crisis in Ottawa and no answer was possible until theoverall problem had been settled. Once that decision had beenreached the probl~ of despatching overseaS sufficient French~

speaking general duty infantrymen seemed possible of solution

•- 202 -

PART V - CONSCRIPTION CRISIS

(l) Mr Ralston's Resignation

458. The Minister of National Defence had beenshaken as a result of his visit to Canadian troops in Italy (seeparas 428-9). Following his return to London he instructedthat projections should be made, showing the existing andestimated future, manpower situation within the Canadian ArmyOverseas and information obtained from Canada as to the nambersthat could be made availa~le as reinforcements (1). On 4 Oct apreliminary study of the situation overseas was presented tohim, althOUgh Brigadier Bostock later found it necessary toqualify certain of his conclusions (2). That same day l~

Ralston visited General Crerar at No. 7 Canadian General Hos­pital, Taplow, where the lffiter was a patient (3).

459. On 8 Oct the Minister of National Defence flewto Brussels and went on by road to visit the Acting Army Com­mander (Lt.-Gen. G.G. Simond~ and Brigadier Beament. GeneralSimonds stressed the desirability of having sufficient replace­ments so that casualties could be replaced promptly and unitsnot allowed to run down so that they had to be refilled withlarge numbers of "green" reinforcements. The fact that therifle strength of an Infantry battalion was only about 60 percent of the unit establishment did much to conceal the factthat a large proportion of the fighting component might belost in a single engagement (Appendix "L") even though casual­ties might have been only a small prop~rtion of the totalstrength. Mr Ralston later told the House of Commons:

I found that· on account of the heavy infantrycasualties, the infantry reinforcement poolwhich had been established in France on D-Dayhad been completely exhausted, and that at onetime there had been aggregate shortages in theunits themselves of over 3,000. This had beengradually overcooe in aggregate Duobers, butnot in individual units, by vigorous efforts toretrain men from other units ns infantry. No.pool had been built up. The week I was there,there would be sufficient infantry in aggregatenumbers available in the area to bring the unitsup to strength. To do so would leave only aboutten per cent of what should have been on hand toprovide the pool for which the acting army com­mander had asked. Some people have the idea thatstriving to keep units up to strength means try~

ing to achieve e~ ideal condition. They thinkof experience in the last war when units heldthe line with strength substnntially reduced.Experience in the last war is no guide. Inthe last war bettles were short, the objectiveswere limited and long static periods intervened.In this war a battle is a series of continuous

. offensive operations, or, to put it the otherway, a battle is 8 continuous series of offen­sive operations. That makes it most necessarythat uuits, While they are in the battle, bereinforced on the nove to keep up the ~oment~

of the operation and each unit's fighting ef­ficiency. That does not mean that units arekept in the line a longer time than they shouldbe. They are ~ithdrawn and replaced constantlyby other units. It only neans that, wbile theyare there, the nctivity is nore intense, andto support nEn nnd the succe3S of the 0peration

-383 -17503

•- 203 -

the ranks should be fJllcd up promptJ.y (4).

Mr Ralston also saw Field Marshal ~ontgomery. During the nexttwo days he visited No.2 C.B.R.G., two general 30spitals andthe headquarters of other Ca~adian formations. He flew toParis for an interview with General ~isenhower and returned toLondon on 12 Oct (5).

460. By then Brigadier Bostock had a more comprehen-sive manpower projection ready for his inspection. BQsed onthe actual situation of 23 Sep Brigadier Bostock's memorandumof 11 Oct presented the reinforcement ~osition as follows (6):

:':nfc"i:.- ..'-,' Other Ar.D.s '.l'otalDetail Offrs. O.Es. Offrs. O.Rs. Offrs. O.Rs.

Authorizedholding at3 mos IntRates 2039 28424 1487 13999 3526 39·~23

Availablenn 23 Sepafterallowingfor de­ficiencyin Fd unitsex UK ...2)]. 1>07 2432 142li. 51:1:2. g192Q.

Surplus ordeficiency -1328-21017

The N.D.H.~. undertaking to despatcr. 4000 reinfo~"ements permonth during 1944 had been more than fulfillcd--42,313 in thefirst nine months of the year fo~ a ~on~~ly averoge of approxi­mately 4700, with greater ~umbers dC30atched after April. FUrther~ ~Mlhals from Canada b~:ore t~e end of 1944 were esti­mated as 6197 infantrymen and "312 for ct'IH corps.

461. Brigadier Bostock tben ~otelled the number ofall ranks which it was estimateu ~'lou].d be Bvail:!ble in eacheperational theatre, inc~uding "re~overa!>l~ casualties", andset these against the genero'ls nllov!:l"1cC for casueltien duringthe balance of the year:

InfantI"JOffrs. O.Rs.

Other ArMoffrs...:., o.p~~

~l'o·(,al

Offrs. O.R'

1207 7401Casual tiesall theatres 1404 18?75

Rftsavailableall s ources :1"-31,,,,8~1,-,71.00:=2.L3_-!.2,-";,",2",8,---=-21:.5~2",3c-__3l.:8,,-7L!c6?22,,,8L.<;4~6

Surplus ordeficiency -n6 -1?52 1351 14122 1265 12170

In other words, there was an overall surplQs of npprcxumately1}000 all ronks but a deficiency of some 2000 infGDtrynen.Actually the situation would be even less favourab:e, however!since the men despatched fron Canada during Deceuber wouldrequire a period of refresher trainin ~n the United Kingdom;a proportion of the recoverable casualtiss would not be suf­ficiently hnrdened by 31 Dec; distance ,··ould "ot pemi'. anymen dee patched to Italy afte~ 30 Kov ~etGin~ j~t~ acti_~ before

•/

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the end of the year.

462. According to &rigadier &ostock's memorandum,the 34,000 casualties suffered to the end of September and thisgenerous estimate of 29,000 further casualties for the balanceof the year presented a pessimistic total of 63,000, insteadof the 40,000 originally estimated. If this should turn outto be true then the Canadian Army Overseas WDuld have eateninto its "income" to the extent of 23,000 and reduced itsreinforcement pool by that EllCh. His conclusion wus that

••• we can on a basls of available reinforce­ments now in sight maintain the present CdnArmy to 31 Dec. In about 2 months time theposition for the future will need reassessmentin the light of circumstances.

463. After perusing Brigadier Bostock's figures of15 Oct* the D.C.G.S. estimated that the end of the year wouldfind the Infantry reinforcement pool exhausted (7). Restoringit to the level of approximately two monthe' wastage at -in­tense; rates would require the bulk provision of 15,000 generalduty infantrymen before 31 Dec 44. As a basis of calculationhe had taken the activity forecast and battle wastage for thefirst six months of 1945 to be:

Other Ranks

3 months "intense ft

~ months ·normal"1 month II quiet"

Total

284248212

23236875

for hoth theatres, although not neoessarily in that order.Subtracting an estimated 11,000 men recovered from hospitalduring that period it would be necessary to provide a further25,875 men from Canada, on an average of 4313 per month tocontinue the reinforcement pool.

464. After digesting the memorandum of 11 Oct MrRalston had indicated his apprehensions in a telegram to thePrime Minister. This telegram of 13 O~t stated that he wasreturning to Canada almost ct once. On 14 Oct Mr Ralston hadanother talk with General Crerar, who was still receivingmedical treatment and then, after examining further manpowerprojections, left for Canada on 16 Oct (by air), taking GeneralStuart with him. Arriving in Ottawa on 18 Oct Mr Ralston hada preliminary discussion with the Prime Minister that even-ing (8).

465.the press had

During the time Mr Ralston had been overSeascapitalized on an earlier (18 Sep) statement from

*Due to the changing situation, misconceptions and minorinaccuracies, and the desire of the Minister of National Defencefor up-to-date information, slightly diffsrent figures wereproduced almost daily during this period.