30. pak china ties, a unique experience

8/14/2019 30. Pak China Ties, A Unique Experience

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have been without a dependable friend like China. The second decision of Liaquat AH

Khan relates to the recognition accorded to the People Republic of China on 20 January

1950.

His third decision is linked with the first, is that he decided to visit Washington in May

1950. It coincided with the time when fighting broke out in Korea and the UN SecurityCouncil had passed its contentious resolution to military intervene in Korea. It took

Liaquat Ali Khan several months of oscillation, pcrplexion and indecision before he

discovered the middle path. Barely two years after his death, and in continuation of thepath explored and chartered by Liaquat Ali Khan, the Government of Pakistan decided to

enter into a multiplicity of bilateral and multilateral security agreements and pacts,

motivated by its desire to obtain economic and military assistance from the USA, and

also from a genuine ideological impose to protect itself from the expanding tide ofcommunism. One of the pacts, SEATO, was clearly designed to contain China and

prevent spread of communism in South East Asia. As expected this arrangement caused

considerable discomfort and questioning in Beijing.

We many identify three principal determinants of China's Foreign Policy. First is its own

painful experience of having been a victim of colonial occupation and exploitation duringthe whole of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century. Second, sensing the emerging threat

of hegemonism from all around its periphery, the People Republic of China vehemently

rejected and stubbornly opposed hegemonism from any quarter and in all its form. Third,

in the world of today, China is the only country with the longest surviving civilisation inthe history of mankind. It drank deeply from the fountainhead of the teachings of Buddha

and Confucius, and showed a remarkable ability to absorb newer thinking without losing

its basic structure of values and its distinctive colour of creativity, patience and wisdom.Thus, China out of genuine convictions decided to play a determined but not aggressive,

helpful but never hegemonic role in international politics, with full adherence to the

principles of sovereign equality and mutual respect for individual national value system,this character of the Chinese -.policy has been a most refreshing experience for Pakistan

hemmed in between an ideologically aggressive and imperialistic Soviet Union in the

north, hegemonically ambitious India in the east, and culturally demanding allies fromthe West.

Despite its close linkage with US policies, Pakistan made a decision of great wisdom, in

that in spite of immense temptation and earnest urging from the Western allies, Pakistandid not send itsEmporium Current Essays

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troops to Korea and Laos. The dominant constraint in this policy decision was respect for

Chinese sensitivities ad recognition of Chinese security compulsions in Korea and Laos.


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This message was not lost on the Chinese whose tone towards Pakistan's presence in

SEATO gradually changed from harsh suspicion to benign interpretation. At one stage,

China is said to have condoled if not fully approved Pakistan's presence n the SEATOforum as a moderating influence against any overtly hostile or adventurous actions of the

Alliance.

However, in the late 50s, Pakistan's strategic perception took a queer and as yet

unexplained somersault. Encouraged by the conclusion of the Indus Basin negotiations in

1959, and having been carried away by the international rhetoric of applause generatedon that occasion, Ayub Khan made a preposterously flawed strategic appreciation, and an

equally ludicrous proposal. On 9 November

1959 he said: "The Subcontinent will be vulnerable to attack within five years. Chinese

occupation of Tibet and road construction activities in Afghanistan pose a serious threatfrom the north. It is a threat that cannot be overlook by wishful thinking." In an

hyperbolic mood, he assigned himself the responsibility of the security of the entire

Subcontinent! Three months later he reiterated this thesis, and proposed "joint defence" to

India, only to receive a laconic rebuff from Nehru: "Against whom?"

However, it must also be said to his credit that he lost no time in rediscovery of his properorientation and strategic interests. In March 1961. Ayub Khan personally highlighted

before China the need to demarcate boundary between China and Pakistan. Despite initial

hesitation from China, Ayub continued to follow this proposal with vigour and

persistence. In the background of the fact that SinoIndian border dispute was thenemerging as an immediate catalyst of deteriorating India-China relations, Ayub Khan's

unilateral initiative thoughtfully and gracefully put Pakistan-China bilateral relations on a

new and firm foundation of mutual trust and confidence. The Boundary Agreement withChina was signed on 2 March 1963.

India's China War of 1962 brought about a whole new power game into South Asia.Hitherto muted Soviet-Chinese split sprang loudly into open when the Soviet Union

openly stepped in with full politico-military support of India. Similarly and

simultaneously, USA, UK and France rushed in with every military hardware theythought India needed in its so-called hour of extreme peril. Nehru saw no contradiction or

inconvenience in this hodgc podge of simultaneous security relations with two opposing

ideological and military blocs. Without any hesitation, he jettisoned the principles of non-alignment in so far as these related to China.

Pakistan was utterly surprised, even appalled, over the indecent haste and monumentalscale with which the Western bloc mounted the aid and support operation which had scant

relationship with the quantum and nature of actual threat. The threat was nonreal, and the

problem was of India's own making, through a quaint and fortuitous combination ofignorance and arrogance. This sudden shift of sympathy in favour of India shattered the

entire edifice of security Pakistan had so carefully and assiduously built over the

preceding ten years.


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During the Sino-India border conflict of 1962 Pakistan had to suffer and withstand

enormous pressure mounted by our Western Allies to support India and condemn China.

This was one of those occasion when Pakistan accustomed to oblige refused to oblige.This was a correct calculation.

And there comes the 1965 War. Without going into many details of the Chinese role inthis War, two points must be recorded for the purpose of this study. Firstly, it can be said

with a reasonable degree of confidence that one reason for India to leave inactivated the

Eastern Front, despite known vulnerability of Pakistan's military capability there,was the close proximity of East Pakistan with the NEFA sector. The Indian were careful

not 10 start any military activity in this sensitive location so soon after their last debacle.

Two, the Chinese factor started coming into play our Western Allies panicked. On

September 19, 1965 the British High Commissioner called on President Ayub, andwarned the president that if the Chinese plunged into the conflict: "the game would then

by played by others, including the nuclear powers .... The nuclear powers would take over

.... A drastic move .... might enlarge the conflict in such a way that there will be no

Kashmir to fight for, nor Pakistan, nor for that matter United Kingdom or any othercountry." After an earlier unpleasant experience of a Soviet threat of nuclear

extermination in 1961, this was the second time Pakistan received such brash and brutethreat of nuclear extinction. For Pakistan it was the "unkindest cut of them all", coming

from our closest allies. With the West estrangement was complete. On the other hand, by

her actions during and after the 1965 War, China succeeded to add a new dimension to

sanitised and structured plane of inter-governmental relations into the hearts and thoughtsof the people of Pakistan.

From 1965 to 1980, is a period of intense co-operation in a wide range of activities out ofwhich, rather erroneously, the ^o-128

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operation in defence procurement and production stands out as the hallmark of our co-

operation. In fact the benefits of economics and development assistance received fromChina are no less significant, The Chinese contribution in the economic sector should be

fulh recognised, and so should be case with the backward flow ol assistance from

Pakistan which stand least documented, bui eloquently and generously recognised

by the Chinese themselves For a long time Pakistan was the only window through whichChins could see the West, and could have access to a range of new an< emerging as well

enormously powerful and expensive technologies o the West. In this particular case the

nexus between Pakistan am China was that of hand and glove. Pakistan was in possessiono technologies but lacked the will, or skill or capability to produce. 0 the other side,

China had perfected reverse engineering into fabulous and awe-inspiring art. This

synergetic relationship was t result in something like instantaneous blossoming of flowersin tli spring.

Until the end of the 80s' all the Chinese military hardwai assistance to Pakistan came in

the form of free aid until end of tl Eighties, and several studies are available which have


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tried monetise the quantum of this assistance. We have not seen ai attempt at

monetisation of the reverse flow of technologies fro Pakistan. We should be glad it has

not been done. How do you put price tag on sincerity, steadfastness and friendship, oron dependable factor of security? Thank God that both the Chine and Pakistanis do not

belong to that category of people 'who kn< the price of everything and value of nothing'.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan created a new set challenges for Pakistan and China,

Pakistan developed a articulated its own response to the Soviet inteuvention and invasi

within twelve hours of its happening, and Pakistan did not cons anyone beforeformulating its response, the Chinese fully endor; it, adopted it* and made it a corner

stone of their dealings with vis-a-vis USSR. The Chinese contribution in rolling back the

So^ invasion is no less significant or critical than of any other suppor of the Afghan cause

and Jihad.

30. pak china ties, a unique experience

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