3 international conference on public policy (icpp3) june 28-30, … · migrant workers (overall 274...

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3rd International Conference

on Public Policy (ICPP3)

June 28-30, 2017 – Singapore

Panel T03P09 Session 2

Authoritarian Deliberation Revisited: What Does It Mean for

Our Understanding of Democratic Governance?

Educational Inequality in China: The Implementation of

China’s ‘New-Type Urbanisation Plan’ to Reduce

Educational Inequality of Migrant Children in Changsha

Zhen Lu

University of Sheffield

United Kingdom

Email: [email protected]

29th June 2017

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Abstract

Sincetheeconomicreformstartedinthelate1970s,Chinahasgreatlyupgraded

itseconomicstructure,andprofoundchangeshavetakenplaceinChina’ssociety.

During the past three decades, more than 200 million rural migrant workers

(nonminggong)havemigratedtocitiesforaliving(NBS,2012).Thislarge-scale,

persistent,internalmigrationphenomenonisoneofthemaindriversofChina’s

economicgrowth. It is alsooneof themainmanifestationsof theurbanisation

processinthiscountry(NBS,2012).However,ruralmigrantworkershavefound

thatsettlingdownandassimilatingtothecitiescanbeverychallengingforthem

(Zhu,2007).Amongall thesocialproblemsthathavebeenbroughtby internal

migration in China and the difficulties migrants have encountered in their

integration process, the problems of rural migrant children to gain access to

education in cities have attracted extensive attention not only from the

government,butalsofromthesocialmedia,scholars,andhaveevenstimulated

public protests in China. Along with the increasing migrant population, the

developmentofcitizenshipandperceptionsof it,afast-developingcivilsociety,

especiallythegrowingcollectiveactionandloudervoiceforbetterconditionsof

migrantworkers,haveemerged.BecausethepositionoftheChineseCommunist

Partyanditsdirectcontroloverkeyareasinthecountryremainsunchallenged,

Chinalookslikeahugemonolithicone-party-statetoanoutsider.Yetthereare

spacesleftfordemocraticactivitieswithinanauthoritariansetting.China’shighly

decentralizedgovernmentsystem,thevariegatedpolicybehaviourofstateactors,

and complicated relationships between governmental and non-governmental

actors,areexamplesofsuchpotentialspacesforthedemocraticactivities.

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Introduction

ThisresearchisabouteducationalinequalityinChina.Theresearchquestionis

howgovernmentsindifferentlevelsdealwitheducationalinequalityexperienced

bymigrantchildreninChina.EducationalinequalityinChinamanifestsitselfas

that nowadaysmanymigrant children have experienced difficulties in gaining

accesstoeducationincitiesinChinaduetotheeducationallaws/policiesinChina

have tied children’s school enrolmentwith their residence, specifying that the

possessionofanaccommodation incertainareas is requiredwhenapplying to

schoolsinrespectivedistricts(StandingCommitteeoftheSixthNationalPeople’s

Congress, 1986). The housing situation ofmigrant families therefore has been

connectedwiththeeducationalproblemsexperiencedbyruralmigrantchildren.

AseducationalinequalityindirectisinconflictwithkeyvaluesofCommuniststate,

theChineseCommunistPartydecidedthatitcannotbetolerated.Also,educational

inequalityhasledtoirruptionofprotestinvariouscities.Inthispaper,Iwilllook

at how local governments in China implement central policies in local level to

addresstheeducationalinequalityexperiencedbymigrantchildren.Thispaper

has following structure: educational inequality in China, education system and

hukou system in China, public reaction to the educational inequality problem

(especially migrant parents), reaction of governments on different level, the

practical situation in the case city, and theanalysisof researchdata. Iwill use

theories of policy implementation to analyse data, adopting an interpretivist

strategy,drawingonsemi-structured interviews,directobservations,reviewof

documentationandarchivalrecords. It isdesignedasacasestudyofChangsha

city. Qualitative interviews, direct observations, review of documentation and

archivalrecordswillbethemainsourcesofevidenceinmystudytosupportthe

researchconclusion.

1. ManifestationofEducationalInequalityinChina

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AsstatedintheAnnualSurveyofMigrantWorkers(2015)conductedbyNational

BureauofStatistics,thenumberofruralmigrantworkers(labourerswitharural

household registration, i.e. hukou, employed in urban workplace. They work

or/andliveincities,yetremainclassifiedasruralmigrantsduetotheinflexibility

ofthehouseholdregistrationsystem)inChinahasclimbedto274millionin2014

(NationalBureauofStatisticsofthePRC,2015).Whentheyareextensivelyneeded

foreconomicdevelopmentinmostmajorcitiesinChina,theydonotenjoyequal

rights with urban residents. Specifically, according to statistics, 234 million

migrant workers (overall 274 million migrant workers in 2014) and their

accompanyingfamilieshavenotbeenabletoenjoyequalbasicpublicservicewith

urban residents on education, employment, medical care, pension, affordable

housingandotheraspects(Centralgovernmentportal,2014).Asadisadvantaged

group in China’s urban society, theway that themigrant population has been

treatedoneducationandresidenceissuehasshowntheexistenceofinjusticein

bothpoliciesandpractices.

SincethefirstversionofTheLawofCompulsoryEducationinthePeople’sRepublic

ofChinawasenactedin1986,theprincipleofEnteringNearbySchoolhasbeen

adopted.Thetargetgroupofthislawarestudentswithinthestageofcompulsory

education (primary education and secondary education). TheEntering Nearby

School principal in the compulsory education law has implied that school

attendance of children in China is strictly restrained by their hukou status,

registeredpermanentresidence,andtheirlivingaddress(TheFourthMeetingof

theSixthNationalPeople’sCongress,1986).Currently,thelocalgovernmentsof

areaswhere thosemigrant childrenwent to accept compulsory education are

responsible for education provision of those migrant children, instead of

governments of areas where those migrant children registered their hukou

initially (The Twentieth Meeting of the Tenth National People’s Congress,

2006). Therigidbindingamongthesethreeaspectshasbeenloosenedbutnot

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eliminated in the second (also the current) version ofThe Law of Compulsory

EducationLawinChina,whichwasissuedin2006,andispartiallyresponsiblefor

theeducationalinequalityexperiencedbymigrantchildren.

AccordingtoareportmadebyAll-ChinaWomen’sFederation(2005),therewere

atleast35.81millionruralmigrantchildren(liudongertong)accompanyingtheir

parents (migrant workers) come to cities, but accepting education in cities

remains an intractable problem formost of them.Most ruralmigrantworkers

considertheirchildren’senrollmentintolocalpublicschoolsdifficultforseveral

reasons, such as too complicated procedures of enrollment, demanding

evidentiarymaterialsrequiredformigrationchildrentoenrollintopublicschools

incities,highsponsorshipfeesomeschoolsrequirefrommigrantstudents(The

CentralResearchInstituteofEducationScience,2008).Inaddition,manymigrant

studentshavebeenfoundgettingeducated inschoolswithpoor infrastructure,

incompetent teachers, and poor traffic condition. Somemigrant students have

been reported discriminated by others in local public schools, when their

counterparts in cities are competing for seats in elite schoolswithmuchmore

advancedinfrastructureandteachingresources(ZhouandMa,2015).

2.BasicOverviewofEducationSystemandHukousysteminChina

2.1ComparisonbetweenPublicandPrivateSchools

AccordingtoTheEducationalLawofthePeople’sRepublicofChina, theChinese

education system can be divided into five parts: Pre-school Education, Basic

Education (Elementary Education), Secondary Education, Higher Education or

VocationalandTechnicalEducation,andAdultEducation(MinistryofEducationof

the people’s Republic of China, 1995). Compulsory education stage in China is

consists of primary education and secondary education. They are both free of

charge in public education system (Xinyu, 2009). This researchwill bemainly

limited to the discussion of situation within the compulsory education stage.

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Becausefirstly,theschoolattendancewithinthisstageistiedupwiththehukou

system (household registration system) and residence of students in China.

Secondly, providing basic education to all children within certain scope of

jurisdictionisoneofmostimportantresponsibilitiestolocalgovernmentsonall

levels inChina(MinistryofEducationof thepeople’sRepublicofChina,1995).

Whether government could distribute educational opportunities and allocate

educational resources evenly to all groups of children in society is a key issue

discussedundertheframeworkofsocialjustice(Goodburn,2009;Fan,2010).Itis

through these three conditions, admission age, residence address, and hukou

status,toallocateanddecidewhichprimary/middleschoolastudentcouldattend

withinbasiceducationstage.Enrolmentinhighschoolsanduniversities/colleges,

ontheotherhand,isdecidedthroughexaminationstestingstudents’abilityand

intelligence(Xinyu,2009).

WhenmostschoolsinChinaarepublicschools,thenumberofprivateschoolsis

significantly lower. Public schools in China are supported by the government

financially.IthasbeenstatedinCompulsoryEducationLaw(2006)inChinathat

the compulsory education funds are fully coveredwithin the scopeof national

budget, while local governments at various levels contribute to the national

budget through tuning in revenue to the central government every year.

Specifically,theStateCouncilandlocalgovernmentsinChinaarerequiredtolay

thecompulsoryeducationfundsintotheirbudgetinadvance,andappropriatethe

fundstopublicschoolsinfullandintime.Theamountoffundsisdecidedonthe

basis of standards for teaching and administrative staff arrangement register,

wages, school construction, and average amount of funds per student etc. The

funds fromtheStateCounciland localgovernmentsareusedtoensurenormal

operation of schools, safety of schoolhouse, and the payment of teaching and

administrativestaff’swagesasrequiredbytheCompulsoryEducationLaw.

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Privateschools,however,aresupportedbynon-governmentalorganisationsor

individuals.Asstated inPrivateEducationPromotionLaw (2002) inChina, it is

suggested that the local governments in various levels should take the

developmentofprivateschooleducation into theNationalEconomicandSocial

DevelopmentPlan,while theadministrativedepartmentofeducationunder the

StateCounciltakestheresponsibilityofoverallplanningandmacro-management

of private school education work. On the one hand, there is no compulsory

requirementoffundsfromthegovernmenttosupportprivateschoolsinlaw;on

theotherhand,accordingtothePrivateEducationPromotionLaw(2002),private

schools inChina are entitled to enjoypreferential taxpolicies andpreferential

policiesonlanduse/constructionforpublicutilities.

2.2EmergenceofMigrantSchools

Whenthemigrationpatternformigrantworkershadshiftedfrom‘migratingto

citiesoneself’ to ‘migrating tocitieswithwhole family’ in1980s, theeducation

problem of migrant children firstly emerged in China (Zhou and Ma, 2015).

Initially,duetothenumberofmigrantworkersandmigrantchildrenincitieswere

notasmuchastoday,therewerestillenoughplacesformigrantchildreninpublic

schoolsandprivateschools inurbanarea. In1990s,withincreasingnumberof

migrant children, public and private schools in cities no longer have enough

capacityforallmigrantchildren.Therefore,migrantschools,asonetypeofprivate

schools,hademergedandbeenacceptedlimitedlybythestateinChina(Zhouand

Ma,2015).

Inthefirstplace,migrantschoolsareconstructedbymigrantworkersthemselves,

under the circumstances that public schools in cities refuse to take migrant

children, ormigrant parents cannot afford sponsorship fee required by public

schools(itisanextrafeerequiredfromstudentswhosehukouarenotregistered

withinthesameadministrativedistrictwiththeschoolstheyapply).Themigrant

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schoolhasanothername,‘simpleandeasyschool’,sincemostofthemcannothit

the accreditation criterion set for private schools. Many migrant schools are

actually illegalschoolswithsubstandardsafety,sanitation,dietandotherbasic

schoolconditions.Thesedisapprovedmigrantschools,on theotherhand,have

broughtdifficultiesonmanagementtolocaleducationdepartment(Kwong,2004).

Specifically, asmigrant children are not as stable as local students in termsof

residence(theymightneedtomovetoanotherplacewiththeirmigrantworker

parentsoncetheirparentschangedjoborresidence).Therefore,theyhavehigher

likelihood to transfer toanother school.This temporalityandvarietyof school

choice could disrupt regular order of school management in most cases (The

MinistryofFinancialScienceInstitute,2012).

2.3HukousysteminEducationalInequality

AsasysteminitiallydesignedforcontrollingtheflowofpopulationinChinasince

1958, it has resulted in many unintended negative consequences in terms of

inequality (Bie, 2013). It has divided citizens into urban population and rural

population,according topeople’sbirthplace,with the imbalanceddevelopment

betweencitiesandruralareas,thehukousystemhascausedhugedisparitiesof

social welfare and rights between urban and rural population (The Central

CommitteeoftheCommunistPartyofChinaLiteratureResearch,1995,citedin

Bie, 2013, p. 80; Cheng and Selden, 1994).Hereafter, socialwelfare, especially

socialsecurityandchildren’seducation,havebecomemoreandmoredependent

onnon-ruralhukou(Bei,2013).Suchhukou-socialwelfaredependentmechanism

has worsened educational inequality formigrant children. It also undermined

socialjusticeinothercrucialwelfare-relatedrightsandschemesbetweenpeople

possessinganurbanhukouandthosewhopossessaruralhukou.

3. HowHastheEducationalInequalityProblemBeenResponded?

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The emergence of large numbers of migrant children has resulted in serious

problemsandchallengesforvariouslevelsoftheeducationaladministrationinin

China’sgovernment(LiangandChen,2007).Asaresult,in2010,nearly61million

childrenhavebeenleftathomeinruralareas,separatedwiththeirparentswho

work in cities, becoming leftover children (The All-ChinaWomen’s Federation,

2013).‘Leftoverchildren’aredefinedaschildrenunder18years’oldwhocannot

follow their parents working in cities and far from home, and are left home,

educatedandtakencarebysubstituteguardiansorthemselves(Liu,2008).The

education problem of ruralmigrant children hereafter has become a pressing

issueattractingextensiveattentionfromthepublicandtheChinesegovernment

(ZaiandYiu,2005).

3.1ReactionofthePublic

The education problem has been considered far from resolved from the

perspective of the public, especially migrant workers. As mentioned earlier,

accessing to local public schools in cities for migrant children faces several

challenges,whileattendingtoprivateschoolsincitiesfinanciallydemandsmore

frommigrantfamilies.Insomeextremecasesreportedbymassmedia,therehave

beenpublicprotestsestablishedbymigrantgroups,asshowninFigure1,Figure

2, and Figure 3. The migrant schools their children enrolled into had been

compulsively demolished by the government few days before starting date

withoutgivinganyannouncementstostudentsandparentsinadvance(Wangyi

News, 2011). The demolition of migrant schools has made migrant parents

considerthemselvesas‘abandonedgroups’(bythesocietyandthegovernment),

asreportedinmassmedia(IFENG,2011).

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Figure1.Migrantparentsprotestingbylyingonthegroundinfrontofthedemolishedmigrantschool

Referencesource:http://news.163.com/photoview/00AP0001/17058.html#p=7BIK52PC00AP0001

Figure2.Migrantparentsfoundnoplacetosafeguardtheirrights

Referencesource:http://news.163.com/photoview/00AP0001/17058.html#p=7BIK5PKB00AP0001

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Figure3.Migrantchildrenstandinginfrontofthedemolishedmigrantschoolhewassupposedtogo.

Referencesource:http://news.163.com/photoview/00AP0001/17058.html#p=7BIK5T5500AP0001

3.2ReactionofGovernments

3.2.1TheCentralGovernmentIssuePolicyonNationalLevel

Sincetheeducationofmigrantchildrenhasbecomeasocialproblemin1980s,it

receivedaseriesofpublicresponses.Thecentralgovernmenthasstartedworking

ontheformationoflawsinguaranteetheeducationalrightsofmigrantchildren

andimprovingeducationalequalityinChina. Thestatepromulgatedaseriesof

policies, regulations, and laws to address this education problem, including

TemporaryMeasuresforFloatingChildrenorAdolescentsinSchooling(1998),The

Decision on the FoundationEducationReformandDevelopment of State Council

(2001),TheSuggestionsonFurtherWorkonEducationofMigrantChildren(2003),

TheNotificationoftheStateCouncilonDeepeningtheReformofRuralCompulsory

Education Funds Safeguard Mechanism (2005), the new version of The

Compulsory-EducationLaw(2006).

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FromtheperspectiveofthestateandpoliticiansworkingingovernmentinChina,

theeducationproblemofmigrantchildrenisnotonlyasocialproblemthatties

withcountlesshouseholdsandindividualsanymore,butalsoapoliticalproblem

associatedwithnationaldevelopmentandsocialharmony(ZhouandMa,2015).

After2006,thestatehasmade‘educationalequality’abasicsocialvalue,madethe

nationalurbanandruralcompulsoryeducationfreeofcharge,andincludedrural

migrantchildreninCompulsoryEducationSysteminChina(ZhouandMa,2015).

After2010,theeducationproblemofmigrantchildrenhasbeenconnectedwith

strategies on national urbanisation and urban-rural integration (Zhou andMa,

2015).Moreover,TheNationalMediumandLong-termPlanforEducationReform

and Development from 2010-2020 (2010) has explicitly raised the education

problemofmigrantchildrentothelevelofnationalcoordinativedevelopment.

Meanwhile, after the Chinese Economic Reform (refers to the programme of

SocialismwithChinesecharacteristics)andOpening-upPolicypromulgatedin1978,

withexpediteddevelopmentofindustrializationinChina,urbanizationinChina

has experienced a fast-developing process from a low beginning point. Sharp

contradictionsandproblemsalsoemergedintheprocessofurbanization(Central

government portal, 2014). It has been noted and concerned by the central

governmentinChinathatthereisalargenumberofruralmigrantpopulationhas

experiencedvariousdifficulties,tryingtointegrateintourbansociety.Educational

inequality is one of pressing problems need to be addressed. Aiming at this

situation, in 16thMarch2014, CPCCentral Committee and the State Council in

Chinahavepromulgatedadocumentthatstrikesupthelargestsocialreformsince

theestablishmentofNewChina,New-TypeUrbanisationPlanfrom2014to2020

(Centralgovernmentportal,2014).

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AsisthefirstplanningprogramreleasedjointlybythePartyCentralCommittee

and the State Council of China. It shows that the state pays high attention to

urbanisation progress along with its problem. In China, ‘urbanisation’ is

consideredasocialprojectthatiscooperatedandparticipatedbyfourmainbodies:

thegovernment,theenterprise,theresident,andthinktank(notsurewhothey

work for). It is believed by the government that the only way of proceeding

urbanisationprocesssmoothlyinChinaistoletthemarketplaysthedecisiverole

inallocatingresources,undertheguideofthegovernment,cooperatingwithother

threemainbodies(Lietal.,2016).

This programme intends to carry out the hukou system reform, and achieve

equalizationofbasicpublicserviceatthesametime(Centralgovernmentportal,

2014).Inordertohelpmigrantgroupstointegrateintocities;enablethemaccess

tourbanbasicpublicservicesandrights;andcompletecitizenizationofmigrants

in cities by2020, theprogrammehasmadeplans in following aspects (2014):

firstly,differentiatehukousettlingpolicyamongsmalltowns,medium-sizedcity,

andmegacities(itsuggestsrelaxingtheconditionsrequiredforhukousettlingin

middle-large cities; and eliminating the conditions for hukou settling in small

towns.Meanwhile,theunificationofurban-ruralhouseholdregistrationsystemis

considered as an important purpose of hukou system reform. Through

implementing residential certificate system, basic public services that were

dependentonurbanhukoustatusareexpectedbeenbroughttomigrantworkers

without an urban hukou); secondly, guarantee migrant children’s rights of

accepting compulsory education equally with urban local children (it was

suggested that migrant children’s education should be covered in local

governments’ education development plan and financial security. Meanwhile,

when migrant children cannot be enrolled into public schools, government’s

purchaseofservicewillbeadoptedtoassuremigrantchildren’seducationalrights

throughprovidingeducationininclusiveprivateschools);andbroadenchannelof

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housingsecurityformigrants(itwassuggestedthatlivingconditionsofmigrant

workers should be improved through giving them access to low-rent housing,

publicrentinghousing,andrentalsubsidies).

3.2.2LocalGovernmentsImplementNationalPoliciesonLocalLevel

Even though the central governmenthasmost authority and control inpolicy-

formationat thenational level, ithas limited influenceondecision-makingand

policyimplementationonlocallevel.Whilethecentralgovernmenthaveauthority

to command officials in local governments to implement their policies, local

governments still have a certain degree of autonomy tomake regulations, and

implementpoliciesonlocallevelonthebasisoftheirspecificsituation.Streetlevel

servants in local governments have a certain degree of discretion on how to

interpret the policy on local level and adopt specific strategies to cope with

citizens.Theirdiscretion,however, is constrainedbyexternal factors including

laws,policies,regulations,moraletc.,andthelimitsaredifferentiatedaccording

toparticularsituationinChina’scontext.

Theoretically,suggestionsmentionedinNew-TypeUrbanisationPlancouldhelp

reducing educational inequality and injustice in residence problem between

migrant population and local population. Yetwhether or towhat extent these

programme and policies would help address education and housing issues of

migrants;andtowhatextentcouldthisprogrammereduceinequalityineducation

enrolment mechanism for migrant children in practice remain unknown.

Therefore, itmade this implementation study necessary. In the next section, I

wouldliketointroducethecaseinChinausingtheoriesofpolicyimplementation,

borrowing basic concepts in implementation study from scholars like Deleon

(1999),Ferman(1990),MichaelandPeter(2002).

4AnalysisofPolicyImplementationProcessintheCaseCity

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4.1BriefIntroductionofHunanProvince

Beforetheimplementationanalysisofthecasetofindoutwhathappensbetween

policy expectations and perceived policy results (DeLeon, 1999a: 314-15,

paraphrasingFerman,1990:39)inNew-TypeUrbanisationinChangsha,I’dliketo

introduce thecasecity firstbriefly.Myresearch isbasedonChangshacity, the

provincial capital of Hunan province. Hunan province is located at the south

centralChina,whereitseconomicdevelopmentisrelativelyhystereticcompared

withmegacitieslikeBeijing,Shanghaiandcoastalcitiesatsoutheastcoastalareas

of China. Yet it has sufficient labour resources,which enables it export labour

power to other cities out of Hunan province on a large scale, especially to

Guangdong and other southeast coastal cities. However, with it undertaking

industrialgradienttransferfromeasternareasofChina,thespeedofbackflowof

themigrantworkers(itmeansmigrantworkerscomingbacktotheirhometown)

inHunan keeps climbing (Li et al.,2016). The total area of Hunan province is

2,118,000squarekilometres,including13prefecture-levelcities,oneautonomous

prefecture,122 counties,2151villagesand towns,361 sub-districtoffices, and

4152 communities. The total number of people in Hunan province is around

707,900million,with663,893millionpeoplebeingpermanentresidents,354,187

millionpeopleasruralpopulation,and300,00millionruraltransferringlabours

whichisranked7thinChina’sprovinces(Lietal,2016).

4.2BriefIntroductionofChangshaCity

Changsha,asitsprovincialcapital,hastotalareaaround11,800squarekilometres,

with around 7.43 million permanent residents, and permanent resident

urbanizationratebeing74.38%(Changshastatisticyearbook,2015).InHunan’s

rural transferring labours, 70%of themgettingnon-agriculturalwork in other

provinces, concentrating at Pearl River Delta area, Yangtze River Delta area,

Beijing-Tianjinareaandotherareas,while30%ofthemgettingnon-agricultural

workwithinHunanprovince.However,thenumberofruraltransferringlabours

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whostay inHunanprovince isclimbingwhile thenumberof rural transferring

labourswhogotootherprovincesdeclining(Lietal.,2016).

UnderthecontextofNewTypeUrbanisation,from“ruralmigrants”to“agricultural

migratingpopulation”,theconceptof“agriculturalmigratingpopulation”hasbeen

more explicit. Cost Prediction and Sharing Mechanism Research Group about

UrbanisationofAgriculturalMigratingPopulationinChangshahasmadespecific

definition of this group: those rural labours whose primary activities was

agricultural,butgaveupagriculturalactivitiesand live inmulti-business in the

processoftransferringtothesecondaryandthetertiaryindustryduetospecific

needs(e.g. improvinglivingcondition,raisingfamily income,goingandseeking

refugewith friendsorrelativesandsoon).Undercertaincondition, it includes

children ofmigrantworkers or elderly ofmigrantworkers in need of provide.

Therefore, the concept of agricultural migrating population is richer than the

conceptofmigrantworkers.

4.3DifferentInterestsUndertheCommonGoal

IntheimplementationprocessofNew-TypeUrbanisationPlaninChangsha,there

areactorsinvolved:thecentralgovernmentisactingaspolicyformulator(officials

in the central government as decision-maker), while local governments (and

streetlevelservants/officialsinlocalgovernments),localpublic/migrantschools,

realestatedevelopers,migrantparents/childrenaspolicy implementers.While

theyshareacommongoal,implementingtheNew-TypeUrbanisationPlaninorder

to reduce educational inequality experiencedbymigrant children, each actor’s

interestsandvaluesarecompletelydifferentinthiscase.Thecentralgovernment

needstoguaranteeeducationalaccessibilityofmigrantchildren,becauseitcould

improveintegrationofruralmigrants,whichgeneratesbettersocialmanagement;

contributes to constructionofharmonious community; enhances social justice;

boostsdevelopmentofurbanization; andmaintain stable reignofCCP. In local

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governments’case,theguaranteeofeducationalaccessibilityofmigrantchildren

would bring greater pressure on financial expenditure to provide education

services and to purchase more lands for educational use, especially for local

governmentsofmigrantchildren-receivingareas. It is important torealizethat

thedistributionofresponsibilityandcooperationbetweenlocalgovernmentsof

migrant-outflow areas (wheremigrants come from) and local governments of

migrant-inflow areas (wheremigrants come to) is still unclear. In local public

schools’ interests, increasing migrant children would bring overwhelming

pressure on their receiving capacity. Inmigrant workers and children’smind,

betteraccessibilitytoqualityeducationincitieswouldmakeintegrationprocess

intocitieseasier;whenthevaluesofrealestatedevelopersremainunknown.But

howdotheycooperate?

4.4TheShareMechanismofCostinChangshaCity

According to Cost Prediction and Sharing Mechanism Research Group about

UrbanisationofAgriculturalMigratingPopulationinChangsha(2016),buildingthe

sharemechanismofcostofurbanisationofagriculturaltransferringpopulationis

thekeytocompletetheworkofNewTypeUrbanisationforChangsha’sgovernment.

Thecostofurbanisationofagriculturalmigratingpopulationrepresentseconomic

inputneededforagriculturalmigratinglabourstogetemployedandsettledown

withequalpublicservicesandrespectivewelfare,includingeducationservicesin

cities in Changsha. The costs are shared by three main bodies, the central

government and local governments, enterprises, and individuals (agricultural

migratingpopulation).Dividedbysource, thewholecost isconsistingofpublic

cost (governmentalcost),enterprisecostandpersonalcost.Categorizedbythe

purpose,thecostofurbanisationofagriculturalmigratingpopulationisdivided

into six types: compulsory education cost, social security cost, employment

servicecost,basichousingsecuritycost,publicserviceandpublicfacilitiescost,

and living cost, as showed in Table.1 (Cost Prediction and SharingMechanism

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Research Group about Urbanisation of Agricultural Migrating Population in

Changsha,2016).Itcouldbefoundinthetablethattheeducationalcostofmigrant

childrenwithincompulsoryeducationstagearebeardbygovernmentsonly.Yet

we do not know how the cost on this part has been shared between central

governmentandlocalgovernmentinChina.

Table1.TheIndexSystemofUrbanizationofAgriculturalMigrating

PopulationinChangsha

First-tierIndex

Second-tierIndex DetailedMeaningSubjectofCostSharing

GovernmentalCost

CompulsoryEducationCost

Costonprovidingcompulsoryeducationtomigrantchildren

TheCentralGovernmentandLocal

Governments

SocialSecurityCostCostonprovidingsocialsecuritytoagriculturaltransferringpopulation

EmploymentServiceCost

Costonprovidingemploymentservicetoagriculturaltransferringpopulation

BasicHousingSecurityCost

Costonprovidinghousingsecuritytoagriculturaltransferringpopulation

CostonPublicServicesandPublicFacilities

Localgovernmentsprovidecostonnormalpublicservices,publicsafetyandbuildinginfrastructuretonewagriculturaltransferringpopulation

EnterpriseCost

CostonSocialSecurityEnterprises‘costonpayingsocialinsuranceforagriculturaltransferring

Enterprises

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population

Costonhousing

Enterprises‘costonparticipatinginbuildingindemnificatory/securityhousing

PersonalCost

LivingCostTheextracostneededtotransferdailylifefromruralareatourbancities

IndividualsinAgriculturalmigratingpopulation

HousingCost

Housingcostundertookbyindividualsintheprocessofurbanisationofagriculturaltransferringpopulation

SocialSecurityCost

Socialsecuritycostundertookbyindividualsintheprocessofurbanisationofagriculturaltransferringpopulation

Source:CostPredictionandSharingMechanismResearchGroupaboutUrbanisationofAgriculturalMigrating

PopulationinChangsha.

From2015to2020,theaverageannualeducationalfundscostofmigrantchildren

inChangshawasexpectedaround710,480,000yuan(around82,901,200pounds

whentherateis8.5:1),whilethetotalcostinfiveyearsisaround3,552,400,000

yuan(around410,500,000pounds)asstatedinTable2.Statisticsaboutcostof

constructingschoolbuilding formigrantstudentswithincompulsoryeducation

stagecouldbefoundinTable3.Thecostspendsondifferentprojectsinvolvedin

compulsory education is showed as Table 4. It could be found thatmore new

primary schools areneeded thanmiddle schools inChangsha, and the cost for

buildingschoolsforprimarymigrantstudentsalmostdoubledthecostofschool

buildingforsecondarymigrantstudents,whichpotentiallyimpliedthatthelack

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ofschoolpositionsphenomenoninChangshawithincompulsoryeducationstage

mainly concentrated at primary schools. Most cost of providing compulsory

educationtomigrantchildrenhasbeenspentoneducationalappropriation(takes

up around 47% in overall cost) and purchasing lands for constructing school

building(takesuparound43%inoverall cost),while theconstructionworkof

schoolbuildingonlytakesuparound10%oftheoverallcost.

Table.2CostCalculationonEducationFundsofChildrenofAgricultural

MigratingPopulation

StudentType

OriginofChildrenofAgriculturalTransferrin

gPopulation

EducationSubsidies(yuan/person)

Totalnumberofnewchildren

ofagricult-ural

migrate-ng

populati-on

Thenumberofnewlyarrivedchildren

ofagricultu-ral

transferr-ing

populati-on

YearlySubsidie

s(10,000yuan)

Educationcostof5years(10,000yuan)

Elementa-rySchoolStudents

othercities&otherprovinces

13500

43,000

36,378 49,110

355,240

Changshacity(HunanProvince)

4350 6622 2,880

Secondar-ySchoolStudents

othercities&otherprovinces

19000

11,600

9814 18,647

Changshacity(HunanProvince)

2300 1786 411


21


Table.3CostCalculationonBuildingSchoolsforChildrenofAgricultural

MigratingPopulation

StudentType

SchoolBuildingConstructionAreaperStudent

（m2/student）

NewSchoolBuildingAreaNeeded（m2）

ConstructionUnitPricefor

SchoolBuilding

（yuan/m2）

Construct-ionCost（10,000yuan）

OverallConstructionCostforSchoolBuilding（10,000yuan）

PrimaryStudent

8.34 191,820

2500

47,955

76,027Seconda-ry

Student9.68 112,288 28,072



Table.4CalculationCostonCompulsoryEducationofAgriculturalMigrating

Population

CostofCompulsoryEducation

ProjectIndicatorsAverageCost

（yuan）

OverallCost（10,000yuan）

CostofEducationalAppropriation

1438.22 355,240

CostofSchoolBuildingConstruction

307.80 76,027

LandOpportunityCost 1337.30 330,312

Overall 3083.32 761,564Source:CostPredictionandSharingMechanismResearchGroupaboutUrbanisationofAgriculturalMigrating


22

5AnalysisofInterviewData

5.1LookingthroughEducationBureau’sEyes

FrominterviewswithofficersinChangshaEducationBureau,itisclearthatthis

institutioncooperatesmainlywithConstructionCommitteeandHumanResource

and Social Security Bureau to implement their policies about education

arrangementofmigrantchildren.ConstructionCommitteeisresponsibletoprove

thelivingstatusofmigrantchildrenandmigrantparents,whileHumanResource

and Social Security Bureau is responsible to verify migrant parents’ social

insurance records. Within all agencies cooperating together in policy

implementationprocess,sometimesoneparticularagency/departmentwouldbe

designated as the main responsible body (such as Development and Reform

Committee in many cases) to coordinate job among different departments,

monitoringprogress,actingascoordinator.

AccordingtointerviewswithgovernmentalofficersworkinChangshaEducation

Bureau,asapartofgovernmentsystem,ChangshaEducationBureauonmunicipal

level has showed optimistic opinion towards the effectiveness of their policy

targeting at differences in education quality of different groups of students,

particularlybetweenlocalurbanstudentsandmigrantstudents.Thelocalurban

studentrepresentsthosewhoseparentsarelocalresidentsinChangshawithan

urban hukou, while the migrant student represents those whose parents are

migrantscomingfromotherplaceswitharuralhukouorhukouregisteredinother

cities,yetworkand/orlive inChangshacity.Thesetwostudentgroupsarethe

twomain categories of students identified by the ChangshaEducationBureau.

EventhoughtheChangshaEducationBureauhasadmittedpressureinproviding

enough school positions to migrant children in certain districts, like Yu Hua

Qu/District,showedinFigure4),theyhaveshowedconfidenceinthe‘fact’that

they have created an education environment that basically achieved no

discriminationordisparatetreatmenttowardsmigrantchildren,notonlyinterms

23

ofpolicy-makingandimplementationtowardseducationopportunity,butalsoin

termsofeducationresourceallocationtowardsthesetwogroupsofstudents.

Figure4.ChangshaFiveDistricts

Source:http://www.chinanon-stop.com/2012/11/changsha-five-districts.html

5.2LookingthroughMigrantParents’Eyes

However,therearedifferentperspectivesfrommigrantparents,whichshowed

conflictswiththisoptimistic‘fact’believedbytheEducationBureau.Duringthe

interviews, migrant parents group have showed a certain degree of sense of

approvaltotheimplementationofEnteringNearbySchoolpolicy.Becausetheir

childrenwouldatleasthaveaschooltoattendto,ifnottheidealone,underthe

protection of this policy. Enrolling into local public schools is much more

challenging beforewhenmigrant parents get school position in cities through

theirsocialtiesorpayingalargeamountofsponsorshipfee.

24

Migrant Mother: …Since last year, as long as you got a job and social

insurance,yourchildwillbearrangedintoalocalschoolnomatterwhat.

Butthisisn’tthecasefortheyearbeforelastyear.Itonlybecomelikethis

since last year. (The entering nearby school policy) basically has been

implementedin2016,notin2015,that’sthechange.WhatdoIthinkofthe

policy,isthattheycomeouttightabit,thenlooseabit,thenbecometight

again,andthengolooseagain,tightthenlooseanyway…Parents(usedto)

queueupthroughoutthenighttosignuptoschoolfortheirkids.Butnomore

ofthatsincelastyear.

Yet because of the ‘entering nearby school’ policy, it’s not easy or normal for

migrantparentstogettheirchildrenenrollintopublicschoolswithrelativehigh

teaching quality and better teaching resources. According to interviews with

migrant parents, schools located in their district are normally equipped with

substitute teachers who just graduated from Education Colleges instead of

experiencedteachersinthoseeliteschools,whichmakesteachingqualityoftheir

schoolsonthebottomofallschoolsinChangsha.

Migrant Mother: …and those students graduating from teachers college,

aren’ttheygototheseschoolsfirst?Whenyourlevel’srisingup,youtransfer

to better schools. Anyway, it’s principal’s employment now, right? I don’t

know if those substitute teachers are in the establishment. They can get

establishment through passing exams. It’s ok to teach in schoolswithout

getting establishmentwhen they firstarrive schools.Theynormally leave

thoseschoolsaftertheygetintotheestablishment.Theyarenotstayingin

thoseschools.

Those young substitute teachers normally do not stay long in those migrant-

children-concentrated schools. Migrant children concentrated schools are like

25

steppingstonesoftheirteachingcareer.Manyofthemleavetheschoolinseveral

years,afterobtainingenoughteachingexperiencesandgettinginsidetheteacher

establishment.Schoolteachergroupsseemsnotsoworriedabouttheeducation

situation of migrant children, and some of them have experienced the lower

performance of migrant student in schools. Teacher’s quality in schools is

different,while the schoolswithmoremigrant students get inexperiencedand

substituteteachers.Itindicatesunstableteachingresourcesinmigrantchildren

concentratedschools.

Except what mentioned above, the controversy over the existence of migrant

schools in Changsha is also one of examples of the policy struggle targeted at

reducing educational inequality between and providing non-discrimination

treatmenttobothlocalurbanchildrenandmigrantchildren.Ininterviewswith

governmentofficersinChangshaEducationBureau,theyhavedeniedthatthere

aremigrantschoolsinChangsha,whilesomemigrantparentssayingtheopposite.

Frommyperspective,therearetwopossiblereasonsbehindEducationBureau’s

denialofexistenceofmigrantschools.Firstly,admittingtheexistenceofmigrant

schoolstocertainextentsequalsadmittingthediscriminatorytreatmenttowards

migrantchildren,astheexistenceofmigrantschoolsisconsideredaproofofgaps

existingbetweenlocalgovernment’scommitmenttomigrantworkersabouttheir

children’seducation,andtherealitiesofcapacityinlocalpublicschools.Because

thecapacitiesof localpublicschoolsare limited, localgovernments inmigrant-

receivingareasfindtakingthefullresponsibilityofeducationalrightsofmigrant

children difficult. However, except building new schools, expanding the old

schoolhouses, and integrating old schools, there are few suggestionsmade on

developing capacities of public schools. The local governments need certain

number of migrant schools to share the responsibility of migrant children’s

education.Thishasputlocalgovernmentsthemselvesindilemma.Inaddition,it

involvesthedefinitionof‘migrantschool’fromtheperspectiveofgovernmental

26

officials.Itwasfirstlydefinedaspublicorprivateschoolsopenedbymigrants(or

privateorganizations)toaddresstheeducationproblemofmigrantchildren in

cities, whichmainly pass the quality certification of Education Bureau (Baike,

2017).According toagovernmentofficer inChangshaEducationBureau, there

were migrant schools which their names includes ‘migrant (student)’, and

only/mainlyacceptmigrantchildren.Whenthenameofthoseschoolschanged,

deleting‘migrant(student)’outoftheschoolname,andwhentheywereopened

bygovernments,acceptingnotonlymigrantchildren,theybecomenormalschools

insteadofmigrantschoolsbydefinitioninthemindofEducationBureau.However,

because there are certain districts in Changsha wheremigrants (also migrant

children) are concentrated more than in other districts (such as Yu Hua

Qu/District), schools in thosemigrants/migrant children-concentrateddistricts

naturallyhavemoremigrantstudentsthanschoolsinotherdistrictswherelocal

residents/local urban students concentrated. From perspectives of migrant

parents, those schools with much more migrant students are still considered

migrantschoolsintermsofitsstudentcomposition.

5.3LimitedChannelforCitizenstoMakeVoices

5.3.1VoicethroughAppealing

DivisionofComplaintsandAppealdepartmentinallgovernmentinstitutionsbear

themainjobofcommunicatinganddealingwithcitizens’problemsanddifficulties.

Normally,whencitizenscometoDivisionofComplaintsandAppealdepartment

inagovernmentalinstitution,forexample,ConstructionCommittee,officerswork

inthisdivisionareresponsibletodealingwithlettersfrompetitioners,respond

within15workingdays.Sometimestheyarealsoresponsibletothereceptionof

petitionerswhentheycometothedivisioninperson.Officerswouldmeetwith

petitioners, listen to their problems and experiences, give advice, and if the

problemsdiscussedareconsiderednotinaccordancewithpolicies,theycannot

always help with the difficulties citizens encountered. Instead, they would

27

proceed to report to Division of Complaints and Appeal department in higher

levels,orpasson/assignto/informotherrespectivedepartmentsaccordingtothe

types of problem. Therefore, the real possibility for appeal is quite limited by

policyandpetitioningprocedures.

5.3.2VoicethroughCollectiveAction

“Civic/collective action” has been an important factor contribute to China’s

political development. There are various forms of collective action in different

countriesandsituation.I’dliketonarrowthediscussionofcollectiveactioninmy

researchtothoseaimedmainlyatchallengingandchangingsomeaspectofthe

sociopoliticalorderthatshowsinequalityinpracticeinChina(Jacka,Kipnis,and

Sargeson,2013).Since1980s,therehavebeensignificantshiftsresultedfromlaws

enactedbythestatethatincreasedpoliticalopportunitiesforcollectiveactionin

China,suchastheLaborLaw(enactedin1995)andthePropertyLaw(enactedin

2007).Whentheyhavenotcontributedmuchinprotectingcitizensandtheirlegal

rights,theyhavenurturedanewunderstandinginChinesecitizens’mind:citizens

inChinahavelegalrightsthatandtherightstoprotestagainstthebehaviorthat

violates their rights. Laws enacted have also provided both legitimacy to and

avenuesforcertaintypesofcollectiveactioninChina(Jacka,Kipnis,andSargeson,

2013).

AsreportedbymanyChinaobservers,nowadaystheChinesegovernmentattach

great importanceatmaintainingstability(King,Pan,andRoberts,2013).When

collectiveactionpotentialtoacertaindegreeisevenequalwithfactionalismand

ultimately chaos and disorder from the perspective of Chinese government,

collectiveaction,especiallyintheformofprotestsarepreventedonallcostsby

governments in different levels in China (King, Pan, andRoberts, 2013). These

findingshavereappearedininterviewstookinmycase.Accordingtointerviews

28

withDivisionofComplaintsandAppealdepartment,streetlevelbureaucrats,as

well as other governmental institutions, governments on different levels have

showedastrongintentionofcontrollingcollectiveaction,throughfollowingand

monitoring‘dangerouscitizens’.Inthiscase,‘dangerouscitizens’referstothose

residents/citizenswhohavethepossibilitytocomplainandappeal(whichmeans

theyhaveencounteredsomeproblemsordifficultiesthathaven’tbeenresolved)

orthosewhofrequentlygopetitioning.Fromwhatgovernmentalofficersshared

in interviews, it is fair to say that petitioning that bypasses the immediate

leadership is prevented from happening, via the joint efforts of street level

bureaucrats, community, and governments on district andmunicipal levels, as

showedinfollowingquotationfromaninterviewwithgovernmentofficialworks

inChangshalocalgovernment.

Government official: the community, the neighbourhood

committee…maintainingstability,they(staffworkincommunitycommittee

andneighbourhoodcommunity)havenootherchoices…theyaretiredtoo,

theyneedtowatchoverthesedangerouscitizens(meansthosepeoplewho

trytopetition)andnotletthemslipaway,whenthereisNPC&CPPCCor

whenthereisimportanteventgoingoninthecountry…maintainingstability,

(they)havetokeeptheireyesuponthesepetitionpeople,sendstaffandtake

turnstowatchover…Ifthereisshortofstaff(tohelpwithwatchover),then

the neighbourhood committee coordinate the job, if the neighbourhood

committeecouldn’t coordinate thisout,district (respectiveadministrative

institution)helpcoordinate(todothisjob).

.

Trackingandmonitoringpetitioningofcitizensnormallyhappenswhenthereis

importanteventorduringnationalconferencetime.Forexample,staffthathave

been sent out to domonitoring or following ‘dangerous citizens’would follow

29

theirdesignated‘dangerouscitizen’.Therearemanycaseswheretwostaffwork

ingovernmentsareresponsible foroneparticular ‘dangerouscitizen’andtheir

goalisavoidlettingpetitionersgotoBeijingtoappeal.Iftherewerestillcitizens

managed to petition in Beijing, especially during national conference time, it

wouldbeconsideredthattheleaderofrespectivedistricthasfailedhis/herjob,

therefore the prevalence of collective action is officially a part of the formal

evaluationcriteriaforlocalofficialsinChina.

5.4StreetBureaucratsinCommunity

Asanactorthatdirectlydealswithcitizens,migrants,thestreet-levelbureaucrat

plays an important role in interpreting and implementing policies from

governments. According to interviews with them, street-level bureaucrats in

communityontheonehandconsidertheirmaintasktoserveresidents’needs,on

theotherhand,theyfeelunwillinglyforcedtodoso,whenencounteringpressure

from upper level governmental institutions. They act as an intermediate role

betweenlocalgovernmentandcitizens.Itisimportanttomentionthatwhenthere

isconflictbetweentheinterestsofcitizensandgovernments,theydonotexercise

theiradministrativediscretionforthebenefitofcitizens,includingbothmigrants

andlocalresidentsintheircommunities.Exceptdealingwithinspectionoflocal

governments in termsof community appearance, sanitation situationetc., they

haveputgreatefforts topreventpetitioningofcitizensandpotentialcollective

action.

5.5WorldofMigrantsandTheirIntegrationProcess

MigrantparentsgroupconcentratedinYuHuaDistrictinChangsha,whereithas

themost complex urban construction and poorer facilities compared to other

districtsinChangsha.ThelivingcircumstancesofruralmigrantsinYuHuaDistrict

isknownforitscrowdedstreetsandpoorfacilities.Itisadistrictwhichshares

borderwithcountrysidearea.Logisticsindustrywaslocatedinthatdistrict,and

30

resulted in severe traffic jam. High-speed rail way station of Changsha is also

located in that district that makes population flow around that area quite

complicated. Most of migrant parents rent small apartments (normally one

bedroomonelivingroomtype)astheirhomeinsteadofpurchasingpropertiesin

Changsha directly. The public rental housing and low-rent housing is not

accessibletomigrantswithoutlocalhukouaccordingtolocalpolicies.

At the same time, a large part ofmigrantsworks in unstable/low-salaries and

labour-requiringprecarious job, suchashelp sellinggoods inGrandMarketor

help with selling motor parts in Motor Parts Town (Factory that sells/makes

motor/car’sparts).Inaddition,manymigrantmothersgaveupjobbecauseofthe

needtolookafterchildren.Itisimportanttomentionthatmanymigrantworkers

findblendingintocitylifeinChangshadifficult.Notonlybecauseofthelimited

opportunity to interact with local urban residents, as residents living in their

communitiesaremainlymigrantworkers(notmanylocalresidents live inthat

district),butalsothediscriminationfromasmallpartoflocalpeopleasfollowing

quotation from interviewwith amigrant parent shows. Different lifestyle and

habitshavealsodecreasedtheirchancestointegrateintothecity.Forexample,

migrantsnormallyhavedifferenteatinghabitswithlocalpeopleintermsoffood

typestheychooseandwaysofeatingfood,whichisdifficulttochangecompletely.

Migrant:Anyway,thecontactwithlocalpeopleis…it’slikethereisadozens

ofhouses,andonlytwoofthemarelocalpeople.Howmanychancesdoyou

thinkwehavetomakecontactwiththem?Right?It’sthesameforthem,they

don’twantto…Somelocalpeoplewholivehereareok,butsomerichlocal

people are not willing to make contact with migrants. How do I put

this…hmm,maybetheyhaverelativelystrongerdefencemode,right?

31

Inthiscase,migrantworkersinthiscity,especiallyinYuHuaDistrict,havebeen

separatedandmarginalisedbothsociallyandspatially.Theyhave formedtheir

socialnetworksmainlywithmigrantgroupsinsteadoflocalresidents.According

toChenandWang(2015),socialnetworksareacrucialaspectthatinfluencesthe

chanceofmigrantstointegrateintocities,lackofinteractionbetweenmigrants

and local people in Changsha could impair the integration process ofmigrant

groupsinthiscity.

6Conclusion

From analysis in earlier discussion, it could be concluded that various actors

involved in the policy implementation process are grasping the limited

opportunitytocopewiththepolicyonnationallevelinanauthoritariancontext

inChina,butnotalloftheircopingstrategieshashelpedwithreducingeducational

inequalityexperiencedbymigrantchildren.Specifically,therearespacesleftfor

threemain types of deliberative activities during the process of implementing

New-TypeUrbanisationPlaninurbanChina.Categorizedbythesubjectofactivity,

the first type of deliberative activity is exercised by governments in different

levels.Inthiscase,localgovernmentsinChangshacityareallowedtoimplement

thenationalpolicythroughtheirownways(forexample,buildsharemechanism

of cost).Theyaregivencertaindegreeof autonomy tomake localpoliciesand

addresstheeducationalinequalityproblemonthebasisofpracticalsituationon

theground.ThistypeofdeliberationhasincreasedtheflexibilityoftheNew-Type

UrbanisationPlaninitsimplementationprocessinlocallevel.Thesecondtypeof

deliberativeactivityisexercisedbystreet-levelbureaucrats.Theyhaveacertain

degree of administrative discretion when interpreting policies on the ground,

putting policies into practice. However, their intermediate role between

governmentsandcitizenshasnotbeenusedto interpretpoliciestoprotectthe

rights of disadvantaged groups in society, includingmigrants, especiallywhen

thereisconflictbetweencitizens’needsandgovernments’interests.Hencetheir

32

deliberation does not play an effective role in reducing educational inequality

experienced by migrant children. The third type of deliberative activities is

exercised bymigrant groups. Under the poor living circumstances, they enjoy

limitedappealingandpetitionopportunity,littleavenuetomakingvoices,while

theyfacethepossibilityofbeingmarkedas‘dangerouscitizen’anddiscrimination

onbothinstitutionalandindividuallevel.Theirdeliberationtoacquiretheirrights

ascitizensandtheirchildren’seducationalrightsinurbanChinaseemshavelong

way to go in terms of reducing educational inequality experienced bymigrant

children.

33

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