2d circuit clapper opinion

1442ACLUv.Clapper

UNITEDSTATESCOURTOFAPPEALSFORTHESECONDCIRCUIT

AugustTerm,2014

(Argued:September2,2014Decided:May7,2015)

DocketNo.1442cv

________________

AMERICANCIVILLIBERTIESUNION,AMERICANCIVILLIBERTIESUNIONFOUNDATION,NEWYORKCIVILLIBERTIESUNION,NEWYORKCIVILLIBERTIESUNION

FOUNDATION,

PlaintiffsAppellants,v.

JAMESR.CLAPPER,inhisofficialcapacityasDirectorofNationalIntelligence,MICHAELS.ROGERS,inhisofficialcapacityasDirectoroftheNationalSecurityAgencyandChiefoftheCentralSecurityService,ASHTONB.CARTER,inhisofficialcapacityasSecretaryofDefense,LORETTAE.LYNCH,inherofficial

capacityasAttorneyGeneraloftheUnitedStates,andJAMESB.COMEY,inhisofficialcapacityasDirectoroftheFederalBureauofInvestigation,

DefendantsAppellees.*

*TheClerkofCourtisrespectfullydirectedtoamendtheofficialcaptioninthiscasetoconformwiththecaptionabove.SeeFed.R.App.P.43(c)(2).

Case 14-42, Document 168-1, 05/07/2015, 1503586, Page1 of 97

CERTIFIED COPY ISSUED ON 05/07/2015

Case 14-42, Document 170, 05/07/2015, 1503607, Page1 of 97

Before:

SACKandLYNCH,CircuitJudges,andBRODERICK,DistrictJudge.**

__________________

PlaintiffsappellantsAmericanCivilLibertiesUnionandAmericanCivil

LibertiesUnionFoundation,andNewYorkCivilLibertiesUnionandNewYork

CivilLibertiesUnionFoundation,appealfromadecisionoftheUnitedStates

DistrictCourtfortheSouthernDistrictofNewYork(WilliamH.Pauley,III,

Judge)grantingdefendantsappelleesmotiontodismissanddenyingplaintiffs

appellantsrequestforapreliminaryinjunction.Thedistrictcourtheldthat215

ofthePATRIOTActimpliedlyprecludesjudicialreview;thatplaintiffs

appellantsstatutoryclaimsregardingthescopeof215wouldinanyeventfail

onthemerits;andthat215doesnotviolatetheFourthorFirstAmendmentsto

theUnitedStatesConstitution.Wedisagreeinpart,andholdthat215andthe

statutoryschemetowhichitrelatesdonotprecludejudicialreview,andthatthe

bulktelephonemetadataprogramisnotauthorizedby215.Wetherefore

**TheHonorableVernonS.Broderick,oftheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheSouthernDistrictofNewYork,sittingbydesignation.

2

Case 14-42, Document 168-1, 05/07/2015, 1503586, Page2 of 97Case 14-42, Document 170, 05/07/2015, 1503607, Page2 of 97

VACATEthejudgmentofthedistrictcourtandREMANDforfurther

proceedingsconsistentwiththisopinion.

VACATEDANDREMANDED.

RobertD.Sack,CircuitJudge,concursintheopinionoftheCourtandfilesaseparateconcurringopinion.

ALEXANDER ABDO, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation(JameelJaffer,PatrickToomey,BrettMaxKaufman,CatherineCrump,American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, New York, NY;ChristopherT.Dunn,ArthurN.Eisenburg,NewYorkCivilLibertiesUnionFoundation,NewYork,NY,on thebrief),NewYork,NY, forPlaintiffsAppellants.

STUART F. DELERY, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division,UnitedStatesDepartmentof Justice (DouglasN.Letter,H.ThomasByronIII,HenryC.Whitaker,AppellateStaff,CivilDivision,UnitedStatesDepartmentofJustice,Washington,DC;PreetBharara,UnitedStatesAttorneyfortheSouthernDistrictofNewYork,NewYork,NY;DavidS.Jones,JohnD.Clopper,EmilyE.Daughtry,AssistantUnitedStatesAttorneys,NewYork,NY,onthebrief),Washington,D.C., forDefendantsAppellees.

LauraK.Donohue,GeorgetownUniversityLawCenter,WashingtonDC,ErwinChemerinsky,UniversityofCalifornia, IrvineSchoolofLaw, Irvine, CA, for Amici Curiae Former Members of the ChurchCommitteeandLawProfessorsinSupportofPlaintiffsAppellants.

CharlesS.Sims,ProskauerRoseLLP,NewYork,NY,forAmiciCuriaeSenatorRonWyden,SenatorMarkUdall,andSenatorMartinHeinrichinSupportofPlaintiffsAppellants.

3


Cindy Cohn, Mark Rumold, Andrew Crocker, Electronic FrontierFoundation,SanFrancisco,CA,forAmiciCuriaeExpertsinComputerandDataScienceinSupportofAppellantsandReversal.

JohnW.Whitehead,DouglasR.McKusick,TheRutherfordInstitute,Charlottesville, Virginia, Daniel L. Ackman, Law Office of DanielAckman,NewYork,NY,forAmicusCuriaeTheRutherfordInstituteinSupportofAppellantsandReversal.

EdwardJ.Davis,LindaSteinman,LacyH.Koonce,III,DavisWrightTremaineLLP,NewYork,NY,forAmicusCuriaePENAmericanCenter,Inc.,inSupportofAppellants.

JohnFrazer,LawOfficeofJohnFrazer,PLLC,Fairfax,VA,forAmicusCuriaeNationalRifleAssociationofAmerica,Inc.,inSupportofPlaintiffsAppellantsandSupportingReversal.

JonathanHafetz,AssociationoftheBaroftheCityofNewYork,GaryD.Sesser,StephenL.Kass,MichaelShapiro,LauraA.Zaccone,CarterLedyard&MilburnLLP,NewYork,NY,forAmicusCuriaeAssociationoftheBaroftheCityofNewYorkSupportingPlaintiffsAppellantsBrief.

GERARDE.LYNCH,CircuitJudge:

Thisappealconcernsthelegalityofthebulktelephonemetadatacollection

program(thetelephonemetadataprogram),underwhichtheNationalSecurity

Agency(NSA)collectsinbulkonanongoingdailybasisthemetadata

associatedwithtelephonecallsmadebyandtoAmericans,andaggregatesthose

metadataintoarepositoryordatabankthatcanlaterbequeried.Appellants

4


challengetheprogramonstatutoryandconstitutionalgrounds.Becausewefind

thattheprogramexceedsthescopeofwhatCongresshasauthorized,wevacate

thedecisionbelowdismissingthecomplaintwithoutreachingappellants

constitutionalarguments.Weaffirmthedistrictcourtsdenialofappellants

requestforapreliminaryinjunction.

BACKGROUND

Intheearly1970s,inaclimatenotaltogetherunliketodays,the

intelligencegatheringandsurveillanceactivitiesoftheNSA,theFBI,andtheCIA

cameunderpublicscrutiny.TheSupremeCourtstruckdowncertainwarrantless

surveillanceproceduresthatthegovernmenthadarguedwerelawfulasan

exerciseofthePresidentspowertoprotectnationalsecurity,remarkingonthe

inherentvaguenessofthedomesticsecurityconcept[and]thenecessarilybroad

andcontinuingnatureofintelligencegathering.UnitedStatesv.U.S.Dist.

CourtfortheE.Dist.ofMich.(Keith),407U.S.297,320(1972).Inresponsetothat

decisionandtoallegationsthatthoseagencieswereabusingtheirpowerinorder

tospyonAmericans,theSenateestablishedtheSelectCommitteetoStudy

GovernmentalOperationswithRespecttoIntelligenceActivities(theChurch

Committee)toinvestigatewhethertheintelligenceagencieshadengagedin

5


unlawfulbehaviorandwhetherlegislationwasnecessarytogoverntheir

activities.TheChurchCommitteeexpressedconcernsthattheprivacyrightsof

U.S.citizenshadbeenviolatedbyactivitiesthathadbeenconductedunderthe

rubricofforeignintelligencecollection.

ThefindingsoftheChurchCommittee,alongwiththeSupremeCourts

decisioninKeithandtheallegationsofabusebytheintelligenceagencies,

promptedCongressin1978toenactcomprehensivelegislationaimedat

curtailingabusesanddelineatingtheprocedurestobeemployedinconducting

surveillanceinforeignintelligenceinvestigations.Thatlegislation,theForeign

IntelligenceSurveillanceActof1978(FISA),Pub.L.No.95511,92Stat.1783

(1978)(codifiedasamendedat50U.S.C.1801etseq.),establishedaspecial

court,theForeignIntelligenceSurveillanceCourt(FISC),toreviewthe

governmentsapplicationsfororderspermittingelectronicsurveillance.See50

U.S.C.1803.UnlikeordinaryArticleIIIcourts,theFISCconductsitsusuallyex

parteproceedingsinsecret;itsdecisionsarenot,intheordinarycourse,

disseminatedpublicly.Id.1803(c).

Wearefacedtodaywithacontroversysimilartothatwhichledtothe

KeithdecisionandtheenactmentofFISA.Wemustconfrontthequestion

6


whetherasurveillanceprogramthatthegovernmenthasputinplacetoprotect

nationalsecurityislawful.Thatprograminvolvesthebulkcollectionbythe

governmentoftelephonemetadatacreatedbytelephonecompaniesinthe

normalcourseoftheirbusinessbutnowexplicitlyrequiredbythegovernmentto

beturnedoverinbulkonanongoingbasis.Asinthe1970s,therevelationofthis

programhasgeneratedconsiderablepublicattentionandconcernaboutthe

intrusionofgovernmentintoprivatematters.Asinthatera,aswell,thenation

facesseriousthreatstonationalsecurity,includingthethreatofforeign

generatedactsofterrorismagainsttheUnitedStates.Now,asthen,Congressis

taskedinthefirstinstancewithachievingtherightbalancebetweentheseoften

competingconcerns.Todoso,CongresshasamendedFISA,mostsignificantly,

aftertheterroristattacksofSeptember11,2001,inthePATRIOTAct.SeeUSA

PATRIOTACTof2001,Pub.L.No.10756,115Stat.272(2001).Thegovernment

arguesthat215ofthatActauthorizesthetelephonemetadataprogram.Seeid.

215,115Stat.at287(codifiedasamendedat50U.S.C.1861).

I. TelephoneMetadata

Beforeproceedingtoexplorethedetailsof215ofthePATRIOTAct,we

pausetodefinetelephonemetadata,inordertoclarifythetypeofinformation

7


thatthegovernmentargues215authorizesittocollectinbulk.Unlikewhatis

gleanedfromthemoretraditionalinvestigativepracticeofwiretapping,

telephonemetadatadonotincludethevoicecontentoftelephoneconversations.

Rather,theyincludedetailsabouttelephonecalls,including,forexample,the

lengthofacall,thephonenumberfromwhichthecallwasmade,andthephone

numbercalled.Metadatacanalsorevealtheuserordevicemakingorreceivinga

callthroughuniqueidentitynumbersassociatedwiththeequipment(although

thegovernmentmaintainsthattheinformationcollecteddoesnotinclude

informationabouttheidentitiesornamesofindividuals),andprovide

informationabouttheroutingofacallthroughthetelephonenetwork,whichcan

sometimes(althoughnotalways)conveyinformationaboutacallersgeneral

location.Accordingtothegovernment,themetadataitcollectsdonotinclude

cellsitelocationalinformation,whichprovidesamorepreciseindicationofa

callerslocationthancallroutinginformationdoes.

Thattelephonemetadatadonotdirectlyrevealthecontentoftelephone

calls,however,doesnotvitiatetheprivacyconcernsarisingoutofthe

governmentsbulkcollectionofsuchdata.Appellantsandamicitakepainsto

emphasizethestartlingamountofdetailedinformationmetadatacanreveal

8


informationthatcouldtraditionallyonlybeobtainedbyexaminingthecontents

ofcommunicationsandthatisthereforeoftenaproxyforcontent.Joint

Appx50(DeclarationofProfessorEdwardW.Felten).Forexample,acalltoa

singlepurposetelephonenumbersuchasahotlinemightrevealthatan

individualis:avictimofdomesticviolenceorrape;aveteran;sufferingfroman

addictionofonetypeoranother;contemplatingsuicide;orreportingacrime.

Metadatacanrevealcivil,political,orreligiousaffiliations;theycanalsoreveal

anindividualssocialstatus,orwhetherandwhenheorsheisinvolvedin

intimaterelationships.1

1AreportofarecentstudyinSciencemagazinerevealedhowmuchinformationcanbegleanedfromcreditcardmetadata.Inthestudy,whichusedthreemonthsofanonymouscreditcardrecordsfor1.1millionpeople,scientistswereabletoreidentify90%oftheindividualswheretheyhadonlyfouradditionalspatiotemporalpointsofinformationforexample,informationthatanindividualwenttooneparticularstoreonfourspecificdays.Suchinformationcouldbegatheredfromsourcesasaccessibleasatweetfromthatindividual.YvesAlexandredeMontjoye,LauraRadaelli,VivekKumarSingh,AlexSandyPentland,UniqueintheShoppingMall:OntheReidentifiabilityofCreditCardMetadata,Science,Jan.30,2015,at536.Thestudysauthorsconcludedthat,inthecontextofmostlargescalemetadatasets,itwouldnotbedifficulttoreidentifyindividualsevenifthedatawereanonymized.Id.at539.Whilecreditcarddatadifferinimportantwaysfromtelephonedata,thestudyillustratesthewaysinwhichmetadatacanbeusedbysophisticatedinvestigatorstodeducesignificantprivateinformationaboutindividuals.

9


Werecognizethatmetadataexistinmoretraditionalformats,too,andthat

lawenforcementandothershavealwaysbeenabletoutilizemetadatafor

investigativepurposes.Forexample,justastelephonemetadatamayrevealthe

charitableorganizationsthatanindividualsupports,observationoftheoutside

ofanenvelopesentattheendoftheyearthroughtheUnitedStatesPostalService

tosuchanorganizationmightwellpermitsimilarinferences,withoutrequiring

anexaminationoftheenvelopescontents.Butthestructuredformatof

telephoneandothertechnologyrelatedmetadata,andthevastnewtechnological

capacityforlargescaleandautomatedreviewandanalysis,distinguishthetype

ofmetadataatissueherefrommoretraditionalforms.Themoremetadatathe

governmentcollectsandanalyzes,furthermore,thegreaterthecapacityforsuch

metadatatorevealevermoreprivateandpreviouslyunascertainableinformation

aboutindividuals.Finally,asappellantsandamicipointout,intodays

technologicallybasedworld,itisvirtuallyimpossibleforanordinarycitizento

avoidcreatingmetadataabouthimselfonaregularbasissimplybyconducting

hisordinaryaffairs.

II. Section215

Theoriginalversionof215,whichpredatedthePATRIOTAct,allowed

10


theDirectoroftheFBIorhisdesigneetoobtainordersfromtheFISCauthorizing

commoncarriers,amongothers,toprovidetothegovernmentcertainbusiness

recordsforthepurposeofforeignintelligenceandinternationalterrorism

investigationswherethereexistedspecificandarticulablefactsgivingreasonto

believethatthepersontowhomtherecordspertain[wa]saforeignpoweroran

agentofaforeignpower.Thatprovisionwasenactedin1998asanamendment

toFISA.SeeIntelligenceAuthorizationActforFiscalYear1999,Pub.L.No.105

272,602,112Stat.2396,241011(1998).ThePATRIOTActsubstantiallyrevised

215toprovidefortheproductionnotonlyofbusinessrecordsbutalsoof

anytangiblethings,andtoeliminatetherestrictionsonthetypesofbusinesses

suchorderscanreach.SeeUSAPATRIOTACTof2001,Pub.L.No.10756,215.

AssubsequentlyamendedbysuccessorbillstothePATRIOTAct,thecurrent

versionof215allowstheDirectoroftheFBIorhisdesigneeto

makeanapplicationforanorderrequiringtheproductionofanytangiblethings(includingbooks,records,papers,documents,andotheritems)foraninvestigationtoobtainforeignintelligenceinformationnotconcerningaUnitedStatespersonortoprotectagainstinternationalterrorismorclandestineintelligenceactivities.

11


50U.S.C.1861(a)(1).Initscurrentform,theprovisionrequiressuchan

applicationtoinclude

a statement of facts showing that there are reasonablegrounds to believe that the tangible things sought arerelevanttoanauthorizedinvestigation(otherthanathreatassessment) conducted in accordance with subsection(a)(2) of this section to obtain foreign intelligenceinformationnotconcerningaUnitedStatespersonortoprotect against international terrorism or clandestineintelligenceactivities.

Id.1861(b)(2)(A).Suchanordermayonlyrequiretheproductionofatangible

thingifsuchthingcanbeobtainedwithasubpoenaducestecumissuedbya

courtoftheUnitedStatesinaidofagrandjuryinvestigationorwithanyother

orderissuedbyacourtoftheUnitedStatesdirectingtheproductionofrecordsor

tangiblethings.Id.1861(c)(2)(D).Finally,thestatuterequirestheAttorney

Generaltoadoptspecificminimizationproceduresgoverningtheretentionand

disseminationbythe[FBI]ofanytangiblethings,orinformationtherein,received

bythe[FBI]inresponsetoanorderunderthissubchapter.Id.1861(g)(1).

Because215containedasunsetprovisionfromitsinception,originally

terminatingitsauthorityonDecember31,2005,ithasrequiredsubsequent

renewal.USAPATRIOTActof2001,Pub.L.No.10756,224,115Stat.at295.

12


Congresshasrenewed215seventimes,mostrecentlyin2011,atwhichtimeit

wasamendedtoexpireonJune1,2015.SeePATRIOTSunsetsExtensionActof

2011,Pub.L.No.11214,125Stat.216(2011).

III. TheTelephoneMetadataProgram

Americansfirstlearnedaboutthetelephonemetadataprogramthat

appellantsnowchallengeonJune5,2013,whentheBritishnewspaperThe

GuardianpublishedaFISCorderleakedbyformergovernmentcontractor

EdwardSnowden.TheorderdirectedVerizonBusinessNetworkServices,Inc.

(Verizon),atelephonecompany,toproducetotheNSAonanongoingdaily

basis...allcalldetailrecordsortelephonymetadatacreatedbyVerizonfor

communications(i)betweentheUnitedStatesandabroad;or(ii)whollywithin

theUnitedStates,includinglocaltelephonecalls.InreApplicationoftheFBI

foranOrderRequiringtheProd.ofTangibleThingsFromVerizonBus.Network

Servs.,Inc.,exrel.MCICommcnServs.,Inc.,d/b/aVerizonBus.Servs.(Verizon

SecondaryOrder),No.BR1380,slipop.at2(F.I.S.C.Apr.25,2013).Theorder

thusrequiresVerizontoproducecalldetailrecords,everyday,onalltelephone

callsmadethroughitssystemsorusingitsserviceswhereoneorbothendsofthe

callarelocatedintheUnitedStates.

13


Aftertheorderwaspublished,thegovernmentacknowledgedthatitwas

partofabroaderprogramofbulkcollectionoftelephonemetadatafromother

telecommunicationsproviderscarriedoutpursuantto215.Itisnow

undisputedthatthegovernmenthasbeencollectingtelephonemetadata

informationinbulkunder215sinceatleastMay2006,whentheFISCfirst

authorizedittodosoinaPrimaryOrderdescribingthetangiblethingstobe

producedasallcalldetailrecordsortelephonymetadatacreatedby

[redacted]...,includ[ing]comprehensivecommunicationsroutinginformation,

includingbutnotlimitedtosessionidentifyinginformation(e.g.,originatingand

terminatingtelephonenumber[s],communicationsdeviceidentifier[s],etc.),

trunkidentifier,andtimeanddurationofcall.InreApplicationoftheFBIfor

anOrderRequiringtheProd.ofTangibleThingsFrom[Redacted](2006Primary

Order),No.BR0605,slipop.at2(F.I.S.C.May24,2006),

http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_May%2024%202006%20Order

%20from%20FISC.pdf.

ThatorderspecifiedthattheitemsweretobeproducedtotheNSA;that

therewerereasonablegroundstobelievethetangiblethingssought[were]

relevanttoauthorizedinvestigations...toprotectagainstinternational

14


terrorism;andthattheitemssoughtcouldbeobtainedwithasubpoenaduces

tecumissuedbyacourtoftheUnitedStatesinaidofagrandjuryinvestigation

orwithanyotherorderissuedbyacourtoftheUnitedStatesdirectingthe

productionofrecordsortangiblethings.Id.at3.Theorderrequiredits

recipient,uponreceivingtheappropriatesecondaryorder,2tocontinue

productiononanongoingdailybasis...forthedurationofth[e]orderand

contemplatedcreationofadataarchivethatwouldonlybeaccessedwhen

NSAhasidentifiedaknowntelephonenumberforwhich...therearefacts

givingrisetoareasonable,articulablesuspicionthatthetelephonenumberis

associatedwith[Redacted]presumably,withterroristactivityoraspecific

terroristorganization.Id.at45.TheorderalsostatesthattheNSAexclusively

willoperatethenetworkonwhichthemetadataarestoredandprocessed.Id.at

5.

ThegovernmenthasdisclosedadditionalFISCordersreauthorizingthe

program.FISCordersmustberenewedevery90days,andtheprogramhas

thereforebeenrenewed41timessinceMay2006.Mostrecently,theprogram

2TheorderpublishedinTheGuardianandservedonVerizonwasonesuchSecondaryOrder.

15


wasreauthorizedbytheFISConFebruary26,2015;thatauthorizationexpireson

June1,2015.SeeInreApplicationoftheFBIforanOrderRequiringtheProd.of

TangibleThingsFrom[Redacted],No.BR1524(F.I.S.C.Feb.26,2015),

http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/0311/BR%201524%20Primary%20Order%2

0%20Redacted.pdf.

Thegovernmentdisputesappellantscharacterizationoftheprogramas

collectingvirtuallyalltelephonymetadataassociatedwithcallsmadeor

receivedintheUnitedStates,butdeclinestoelaborateonthescopeofthe

programorspecifyhowtheprogramfallsshortofthatdescription.Itisunclear,

however,inwhatwayappellantscharacterizationoftheprogramcanbefaulted.

Onitsface,theVerizonorderrequirestheproductionofallcalldetailrecordsor

telephonymetadatarelatingtoVerizoncommunicationswithintheUnited

StatesorbetweentheUnitedStatesandabroad.VerizonSecondaryOrder2

(emphasisadded).TheVerizonorderandthePrimaryOrderdescribedabove

revealthatthemetadatacollectedincludecomprehensivecommunications

routinginformation,includingbutnotlimitedtosessionidentifyinginformation

(e.g.,originatingandterminatingtelephonenumber,InternationalMobile

SubscriberIdentity(IMSI)number,InternationalMobilestationEquipment

16


Identity(IMEI)number,etc.),trunkidentifier,3telephonecallingcardnumbers,

andtimeanddurationofcall.VerizonSecondaryOrder2;seealso2006

PrimaryOrder2.ThegovernmentdoesnotsuggestthatVerizonistheonly

telephoneserviceprovidersubjecttosuchanorder;indeed,itdoesnotseriously

disputeappellantscontentionthatallsignificantserviceprovidersintheUnited

Statesaresubjecttosimilarorders.

Thegovernmentexplainsthatitusesthebulkmetadatacollectedpursuant

totheseordersbymakingqueriesusingmetadataidentifiers(alsoreferredto

asselectors),orparticularphonenumbersthatitbelieves,basedon

reasonablearticulablesuspicion,tobeassociatedwithaforeignterrorist

organization.JointAppx264(DeclarationofTeresaH.Shea).Theidentifieris

usedasaseedtosearchacrossthegovernmentsdatabase;thesearchresults

yieldphonenumbers,andthemetadataassociatedwiththem,thathavebeenin

contactwiththeseed.Id.Thatstepisreferredtoasthefirsthop.TheNSA

canthenalsosearchforthenumbers,andassociatedmetadata,thathavebeenin

contactwiththenumbersresultingfromthefirstsearchconductingasecond

3Atrunkidentifierprovidesinformationregardinghowacallisroutedthroughthetelephonenetwork,revealinggeneralinformationaboutthepartieslocations.

17


hop.Id.at265.Untilrecently,theprogramallowedforanotheriterationofthe

process,suchthatathirdhopcouldbeconducted,sweepinginresultsthat

includethemetadataof,essentially,thecontactsofcontactsofcontactsofthe

originalseed.Id.Thegovernmentassertsthatitdoesnotconductanygeneral

browsingofthedata.Id.at26365.

Section215requiresthattheAttorneyGeneraladoptspecific

minimizationproceduresgoverningtheretentionanddisseminationbythe

[government]of[information]received...inresponsetoanorderunderthis

subchapter.50U.S.C.1861(g)(1).Theproceduresthathavebeenadopted

includetherequirementthattheNSAstorethemetadatawithinsecurenetworks;

thatthemetadatanotbeaccessedforanypurposeotherthanwhatisallowed

undertheFISCorder;thattheresultsofqueriesnotbedisseminatedoutsidethe

NSAexceptinaccordancewiththeminimizationanddissemination

requirementsofNSAprocedures;andthattherelevantpersonnelreceive

comprehensivetrainingontheminimizationproceduresandtechnicalcontrols.

JointAppx26769.Andasthegovernmentpointsout,theprogramissubjectto

oversightbytheDepartmentofJustice,theFISC,andCongress.Id.at269.The

minimizationproceduresrequireauditsandreviewsoftheprogrambythe

18


NSAslegalandoversightoffices,theOfficeoftheInspectorGeneral,attorneys

fromtheDepartmentofJusticesNationalSecurityDivision,andtheOfficeofthe

DirectorofNationalIntelligence.Id.TheFISCordersthatcreatedtheprogram

requiretheNSAtoprovideperiodicreportstotheFISC.Id.at141.Intheevent

offailuresofcompliance,reportsmustbemadetotheFISC,and,wherethose

failuresaresignificant,totheIntelligenceandJudiciaryCommitteesofboth

housesofCongress.Id.at269.FISAitselfalsoimposesasystemof

Congressionaloversight,requiringperiodicreportsontheprogramfromthe

AttorneyGeneraltotheHouseandSenateIntelligenceandJudiciary

Committees.See50U.S.C.1862,1871.

Sincetheexistenceofthetelephonemetadataprogrambecamepublic,a

numberofdevelopmentshavealteredthelandscape,atleasttosomedegree,

withinwhichweanalyzetheprogram.Amongthemostnotableare

modificationstothetelephonemetadataprogramannouncedbyPresident

ObamainJanuary2014.PresidentBarackObama,RemarksbythePresidenton

ReviewofSignalsIntelligence(Jan.17,2014),http://www.whitehouse.gov/the

pressoffice/2014/01/17/remarkspresidentreviewsignalsintelligence.Thetwo

immediatemodificationsthatthePresidentordered,whichweresubsequently

19


incorporatedinaFISCordersoughtbygovernmentmotion,(1)limitedthe

numberofhopsthatcanbesearchedtotwo,ratherthanthree,and(2)required

thataFISCjudgefindthatthereasonablearticulablesuspicionstandardhasbeen

satisfiedbeforeaseedcanbequeried,ratherthan(ashadpreviouslybeenthe

case)allowingdesignatedNSAofficialstodetermineforthemselveswhether

suchsuspicionexisted.Id.BothlimitationswereapprovedbytheFISCina

February5,2014FISCorder.InreApplicationoftheFBIforanOrderRequiring

theProd.ofTangibleThings,No.BR1401(F.I.S.C.Feb.5,2014),

http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/br1401order.pdf.These

modificationswerebasedinpartontherecommendationsoftheReviewGroup

onIntelligenceandCommunicationsTechnologiesestablishedbythePresident.

SeePresidentsReviewGrp.onIntelligenceandCommcnsTechs.,Libertyand

SecurityinaChangingWorld:Rep.andRecommendationsofthePresidents

ReviewGrp.onIntelligenceandCommcnsTechs.(Dec.12,2013),

https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/20131212_rg_final_report.

pdf.TheReviewGroupalsorecommendedthatthesystembemodifiedsuch

thatathirdpartyortheprivatecarriers,ratherthanthegovernment,collectand

20


retainthebulkmetadata.Thatrecommendation,however,hassofarnotbeen

adopted.

Inadditiontothatgroup,thePrivacyandCivilLibertiesOversightBoard

(PCLOB)publishedadetailedreportontheprogram.ThePCLOBisa

bipartisanagencywithintheexecutivebranchthatwasestablishedin2007,

pursuanttoarecommendationfromtheNationalCommissiononTerrorist

AttacksUpontheUnitedStates(the9/11Commission,establishedafterthe

September11,2001terroristattackstoprepareanaccountofthecircumstances

surroundingtheattacks),inordertomonitortheactionstakenbythe

governmenttoprotectthenationfromterrorismandtoensurethattheyare

appropriatelybalancedagainsttheneedtoprotectprivacyandcivilliberties.See

ImplementingRecommendationsofthe9/11CommnActof2007,Pub.L.

No.11053,121Stat.266(2007).ThePCLOBconcludedthattheprogramwas

inconsistentwith215,violatedtheElectronicCommunicationsPrivacyAct,and

implicatedprivacyandFirstAmendmentconcerns.SeePrivacyandCivil

LibertiesOversightBoard,Rep.ontheTel.RecordsProgramConductedUnder

Section215oftheUSAPATRIOTActandontheOperationsoftheForeign

IntelligenceSurveillanceCourt(Jan.23,2014)(PCLOBReport),

21


https://www.pclob.gov/library/215Report_on_the_Telephone_Records_Program.

pdf.

Legislationaimedatincorporatingstrongerprotectionsofindividual

libertiesintothetelephonemetadataprograminavarietyofways(oreliminating

italtogether)wasintroducedinboththeHouseandtheSenateduringthe113th

Congress.SeeUSAFREEDOMAct,H.R.3361,113thCong.(2014);USA

FREEDOMAct,S.2685,113thCong.(2014).AmodifiedversionofH.R.3361,

whichlostthebackingofsomeofthebillsoriginalsupportersbecauseitfailedto

endbulkcollection,neverthelesspassedtheHouseinMay2014.USA

FREEDOMAct,H.R.3361,113thCong.(2014).InNovember2014,however,a

motiontoinvokeclotureontheSenatesversionofthebillrelativelymore

robustintermsofprivacyprotectionsfailedbyavoteof5842,thereby

preventingthebillfromcomingupforavoteintheSenatedespitethedesireof

58senatorstoproceedtoavoteonthemeasure.USAFREEDOMAct,S.2685,

113thCong.(2014).ThecurrentCongressislikewiseconsideringbillsaimedat

modifying215;abillthatwouldplacethebulkmetadatacollectedintothe

handsoftelecommunicationsproviders,tobeaccessedbythegovernmentonly

withFISCauthorization,hasbeenintroducedinboththeHouseandtheSenatein

22


recentweeks.SeeUSAFREEDOMActof2015,H.R.2048/S.1123,114thCong.

(2015).OnApril30,2015,thebillpassedtheHouseJudiciaryCommittee.See

USAFREEDOMActof2015,H.R.2048,114thCong.(2015).Avotefromthefull

Houseonthebillisexpectedlaterthismonth.

Finally,theprogramhascomeunderscrutinybyArticleIIIcourtsother

thantheFISC.Inadditiontothiscase,similarcaseshavebeenfiledaroundthe

countrychallengingthegovernmentsbulkcollectionoftelephonemetadata.

See,e.g.,Smithv.Obama,24F.Supp.3d1005(D.Idaho2014),No.1435555(9th

Cir.arguedDec.8,2014);Klaymanv.Obama,957F.Supp.2d1(D.D.C.2013),

No.145004(D.C.Cir.arguedNov.4,2014).

IV. ProceduralHistory

OnJune11,2013,theAmericanCivilLibertiesUnionandAmericanCivil

LibertiesUnionFoundation(collectively,ACLU)andtheNewYorkCivil

LibertiesUnionandNewYorkCivilLibertiesUnionFoundation(collectively,

NYCLU)currentandformerVerizoncustomers,respectivelysuedthe

governmentofficialsresponsibleforadministeringthetelephonemetadata

program,challengingtheprogramonbothstatutoryandconstitutionalgrounds

andseekingdeclaratoryandinjunctiverelief.Thecomplaintasksthecourtto

23


declarethatthetelephonemetadataprogramexceedstheauthoritygrantedby

215,andalsoviolatestheFirstandFourthAmendmentstotheU.S.

Constitution.Itasksthecourttopermanentlyenjoindefendantsfromcontinuing

theprogram,andtoorderdefendantstopurgefromtheirpossessionallofthe

callrecordsof[p]laintiffscommunicationscollectedinaccordancewiththe

program.JointAppx27.

OnAugust26,2013,plaintiffsmovedforapreliminaryinjunctionbarring

defendantsfromcollectingtheircallrecordsundertheprogram,requiring

defendantstoquarantineallofthecallrecordstheyhadalreadycollected,and

prohibitingdefendantsfromusingtheirrecordstoperformqueriesonanyphone

numberorotheridentifierassociatedwithplaintiffs.Onthesamedate,the

governmentmovedtodismissthecomplaint.

OnDecember27,2013,thedistrictcourtgrantedthegovernmentsmotion

todismissanddeniedplaintiffsmotionforapreliminaryinjunction.SeeACLU

v.Clapper,959F.Supp.2d724(S.D.N.Y.2013).Plaintiffsnowappealthat

decision.

24


DISCUSSION

Wereviewdenovoadistrictcourtsgrantofamotiontodismissunder

FederalRulesofCivilProcedure12(b)(1)and12(b)(6).Klein&Co.Futures,Inc.

v.Bd.ofTradeofCityofNewYork,464F.3d255,259(2dCir.2006);seealso

LotesCo.,Ltd.v.HonHaiPrecisionIndus.Co.,753F.3d395,403(2dCir.2014).

Wereviewadistrictcourtsdenialofapreliminaryinjunctionforabuseof

discretion,seeCent.RabbinicalCong.ofU.S.&Canadav.N.Y.C.DeptofHealth

&MentalHygiene,763F.3d183,192(2dCir.2014),whichoccurswhenthe

courtsdecisioneitherrestsonanerroroflaw...oraclearlyerroneousfactual

finding,or...itsdecisionthoughnotnecessarilytheproductofalegalerroror

aclearlyerroneousfactualfindingcannotbelocatedwithintherangeof

permissibledecisions,Vincentyv.Bloomberg,476F.3d74,83(2dCir.2007).

I. Standing

Thedistrictcourtruledthatappellantshadstandingtobringthiscase.

Clapper,959F.Supp.2dat738.Thegovernmentarguesthatthedistrictcourts

rulingwaserroneous,contendingthatappellantslackstandingbecausethey

havenotdemonstratedthatanyofthemetadataassociatedwiththemhavebeen

orwillbeactuallyreviewedbythegovernment,andhavenototherwise

25


identifiedaninjurythatissufficientlyconcreteorimminenttoconferstanding.

Werecognizethat[n]oprincipleismorefundamentaltothejudiciarysproper

roleinoursystemofgovernmentthantheconstitutionallimitationoffederal

courtjurisdictiontoactualcasesorcontroversies.Clapperv.AmnestyIntl

USA,133S.Ct.1138,1146(2013),quotingDaimlerChryslerCorp.v.Cuno,547

U.S.332,341(2006)(alterationinoriginal).Inordertomeetthatrequirement,

plaintiffsmust,amongotherthings,establishthattheyhavestandingtosue.

Rainesv.Byrd,521U.S.811,818(1997).StandingunderArticleIIIofthe

Constitutionrequiresthataninjurybeconcrete,particularized,andactualor

imminent;fairlytraceabletothechallengedaction;andredressablebya

favorableruling.MonsantoCo.v.GeertsonSeedFarms,561U.S.139,149

(2010);seealsoAmnestyIntl,133S.Ct.at1147(collectingcases).TheSupreme

Courthasrepeatedlyreiteratedthatthreatenedinjurymustbecertainly

impendingtoconstituteinjuryinfact,andthat[a]llegationsofpossiblefuture

injuryarenotsufficient.AmnestyIntl,133S.Ct.at1147,quotingWhitmorev.

Arkansas,495U.S.149,158(1990)(emphasisinoriginal).Weremainmindful

thatthestandinginquiryhasbeenespeciallyrigorouswhenreachingthemerits

of[a]disputewouldforceustodecidewhetheranactiontakenbyoneofthe

26


othertwobranchesoftheFederalGovernmentwasunconstitutionalandin

casesinwhichtheJudiciaryhasbeenrequestedtoreviewactionsofthepolitical

branchesinthefieldsofintelligencegatheringandforeignaffairs.Id.,quoting

Raines,521U.S.at81920.

Appellantsinthiscasehave,despitethosesubstantialhurdles,established

standingtosue,asthedistrictcourtcorrectlyheld.Appellantshereneednot

speculatethatthegovernmenthascollected,ormayinthefuturecollect,theircall

records.Tothecontrary,thegovernmentsownordersdemonstratethat

appellantscallrecordsareindeedamongthosecollectedaspartofthetelephone

metadataprogram.Norhasthegovernmentdisputedthatclaim.Itargues

insteadthatanyallegedinjuriesheredependonthegovernmentsreviewingthe

informationcollected,andthatappellantshavenotshownanythingmorethana

speculativeprospectthattheirtelephonenumberswouldeverbeusedasa

selectortoquery,orbeincludedintheresultsofqueriesof,thetelephony

metadata.AppelleesBr.22.

Butthegovernmentsargumentmisapprehendswhatisrequiredto

establishstandinginacasesuchasthisone.Appellantschallengethetelephone

metadataprogramasawhole,alleginginjuryfromtheverycollectionoftheir

27


telephonemetadata.And,asthedistrictcourtobserved,itisnotdisputedthat

thegovernmentcollectedtelephonemetadataassociatedwiththeappellants

telephonecalls.TheFourthAmendmentprotectsagainstunreasonablesearches

andseizures.Appellantscontendthatthecollectionoftheirmetadataexceedsthe

scopeofwhatisauthorizedby215andconstitutesaFourthAmendment

search.Wethinksuchcollectionismoreappropriatelychallenged,atleastfroma

standingperspective,asaseizureratherthanasasearch.Whetherornotsuch

claimsprevailonthemerits,appellantssurelyhavestandingtoallegeinjury

fromthecollection,andmaintenanceinagovernmentdatabase,ofrecords

relatingtothem.[A]violationofthe[Fourth]Amendmentisfully

accomplishedatthetimeofanunreasonablegovernmentalintrusion.United

Statesv.VerdugoUrquidez,494U.S.259,264(1990)(internalquotationmarks

omitted).Ifthetelephonemetadataprogramisunlawful,appellantshave

sufferedaconcreteandparticularizedinjuryfairlytraceabletothechallenged

programandredressablebyafavorableruling.

AmnestyInternationaldoesnotholdotherwise.There,theSupreme

Court,reversingourdecision,heldthatrespondentshadnotestablishedstanding

becausetheycouldnotshowthatthegovernmentwassurveillingthem,orthat

28


suchsurveillancewascertainlyimpending.131S.Ct.at11481150.Instead,

theSupremeCourtstatedthatrespondentsstandingargumentswerebasedona

speculativechainofpossibilitiesthatrequiredthat:respondentsforeign

contactsbetargetedforsurveillance;thesurveillancebeconductedpursuantto

thestatutechallenged,ratherthanundersomeotherauthority;theFISCapprove

thesurveillance;thegovernmentactuallyinterceptthecommunicationsofthe

foreigncontacts;andamongthoseinterceptedcommunicationsbethose

involvingrespondents.Id.Becauserespondentsinjuryreliedonthatchainof

eventsactuallytranspiring,theCourtheldthattheallegedinjurywasnotfairly

traceabletothestatutebeingchallenged.Id.at1150.Astocostsincurredby

respondentstoavoidsurveillance,theCourtcharacterizedthosecostsasa

productoftheirfearofsurveillanceinsufficienttoconferstanding.Id.at1152.

Here,appellantsallegedinjuryrequiresnospeculationwhatsoeverasto

howeventswillunfoldunder215appellantsrecords(amongthoseof

numerousothers)havebeentargetedforseizurebythegovernment;the

governmenthasusedthechallengedstatutetoeffectthatseizure;theordershave

beenapprovedbytheFISC;andtherecordshavebeencollected.Amnesty

Internationalsspeculativechainofpossibilitiesis,inthiscontext,areality.

29


Thatcaseinnowaysuggestedthatsuchdatawouldneedtobereviewedor

analyzedinorderforrespondentstosufferinjury.

Thegovernmentalsotakesissuewiththedistrictcourtsrelianceon

AmidaxTradingGroupv.S.W.I.F.T.SCRL,671F.3d140(2dCir.2011).In

Amidax,weheldthatplaintiffshadnotestablishedstandingtochallengethe

governmentsacquisitionoffinancialrecordsfromSWIFT,amessagingservice

thatroutesfinancialtransactions,viaadministrativesubpoenasissuedbythe

OfficeofForeignAssetControl.Id.at14849.Becausetherewasinsufficient

supportfortheallegationthatAmidaxsownrecordswereamongthosehanded

overtothegovernment,weheldthatAmidaxhadnotallegedaplausibleinjury

infact.Id.Thatcase,too,differsfromthecaseatbar,whereappellantshave

presentedevidencethattheirdataarebeingcollected.TotheextentAmidax

speakstothecircumstancespresentedbythiscase,itsupports,albeitindictum,

appellantsposition.WenotedinAmidaxthat[t]oestablishaninjuryinfact

andthus,apersonalstakeinthislitigation[Amidax]needonlyestablishthatits

informationwasobtainedbythegovernment.Id.at147(secondalterationin

original).There,too,weviewedthecollectionofthedatainquestion,ifithadin

30


factoccurred,asaninjurysufficienttoconferstanding,withoutconsidering

whethersuchdatawerelikelytobereviewed.

Finally,thegovernmentadmitsthat,whenitqueriesitsdatabase,its

computerssearchallofthematerialstoredinthedatabaseinordertoidentify

recordsthatmatchthesearchterm.Indoingso,itnecessarilysearches

appellantsrecordselectronically,evenifsuchasearchdoesnotreturn

appellantsrecordsforclosereviewbyahumanagent.Thereisnoquestionthat

anequivalentmanualreviewoftherecords,insearchofconnectionstoasuspect

personortelephone,wouldconferstandingevenonthegovernmentsanalysis.

Thatthesearchisconductedbyamachinemightlessentheintrusion,butdoes

notdepriveappellantsofstandingtoobjecttothecollectionandreviewoftheir

data.

AppellantslikewisehavestandingtoassertaFirstAmendmentviolation.

AppellantscontendthattheirFirstAmendmentassociationalrightsarebeing

violated,bothdirectlyandthroughachillingeffectonclientsanddonors.The

SupremeCourthaslongrecognizedthatanorganizationcanassertassociational

privacyrightsonbehalfofitsmembers,statingthat[i]tishardlyanovel

perceptionthatcompelleddisclosureofaffiliationwithgroupsengagedin

31


advocacymayconstitute...arestraintonfreedomofassociation.NAACPv.

Alabama,357U.S.449,462(1958).InNAACP,furthermore,theSupremeCourt

heldthattheorganizationargue[d]...appropriatelytherightsofitsmembers,

andthatitsnexuswiththem[wa]ssufficienttopermitthatitactastheir

representativebeforethisCourt.Id.at45859.Wehavesimilarlystatedthata

unionsstandingtoasserttheFirstandFourteenthAmendmentrightsof

associationandprivacyofitsindividualmembersisbeyonddispute.Local

1814,IntlLongshoremensAssnv.WaterfrontCommnofN.Y.Harbor,667F.2d

267,270(2dCir.1981).Whenthegovernmentcollectsappellantsmetadata,

appellantsmembersinterestsinkeepingtheirassociationsandcontactsprivate

areimplicated,andanypotentialchillingeffectiscreatedatthatpoint.

Appellantshavethereforeallegedaconcrete,fairlytraceable,andredressable

injurysufficienttoconferstandingtoasserttheirFirstAmendmentclaimsas

well.

II. PreclusionandtheAdministrativeProcedureAct

Thegovernmentnextcontendsthatappellantsareimpliedlyprecluded

frombringingsuittochallengethetelephonemetadataprogramonstatutory

grounds.Accordingtothegovernment,thestatutoryschemesetoutby215

32


limitsjudicialreviewof215orderstotheFISCanditsspecializedmechanism

forappellatereview,AppelleesBr.26,andprovidesforchallengestothose

ordersonlybyrecipientsof215orders(thatis,thecommunicationscompanies),

ratherthanthetargetsofsuchorders,therebyimpliedlyprecludingappellants

herefrombringingsuitinfederalcourt.Thegovernmentalsoarguesthat18

U.S.C.2712impliedlyprecludesthereliefappellantsseek,eitherindependently

orinconjunctionwiththelargerstatutoryframeworkestablishedbythetwo

provisions.

A. Section215andImpliedPreclusion

TheAdministrativeProcedureAct(APA)waivessovereignimmunity

forsuitsagainsttheUnitedStatesforreliefotherthanmoneydamages.Under

theAPA,[a]personsufferinglegalwrongbecauseofagencyaction,or

adverselyaffectedoraggrievedbyagencyactionwithinthemeaningofa

relevantstatute,isentitledtojudicialreviewthereof,andcanbringsuitinan

actioninacourtoftheUnitedStatesseekingreliefotherthanmoneydamages.

5U.S.C.702.TheAPAthusestablishesabroadrightofjudicialreviewof

administrativeaction.TheAPAdoesnot,however,applywherestatutes

precludejudicialreview.Id.701.

33


Indeterminingwhetherjudicialreviewisprecludedunderaparticular

statute,wemustbeginwiththestrongpresumptionthatCongressintends

judicialreviewofadministrativeaction.Fromthebeginningourcases[have

established]thatjudicialreviewofafinalagencyactionbyanaggrievedperson

willnotbecutoffunlessthereispersuasivereasontobelievethatsuchwasthe

purposeofCongress.Bowenv.Mich.Acad.ofFamilyPhysicians,476U.S.667,

670(1986),quotingAbbottLabs.v.Gardner,387U.S.136,140(1967)(alterations

inoriginal).[O]nly...ashowingofclearandconvincingevidenceofa

contrarylegislativeintentcanrebutthepresumptionthatCongressintended

thatanactionbesubjecttojudicialreview.Bowen,476U.S.at672,quoting

AbbottLabs.,387U.S.at141.TheSupremeCourthasemphasizedthatthereisa

heavyburdenonapartythatattemptstoovercomethispresumption.Id.

(internalquotationmarksomitted).

Thatburdenis,ofcourse,notinsurmountable,andmaybeovercomeby

specificlanguageorspecificlegislativehistorythatisareliableindicatorof

congressionalintent.Blockv.Cmty.NutritionInst.,467U.S.340,349(1984).

Suchanintentmustbefairlydiscernibleinthestatutoryscheme,id.at351

(internalquotationmarksomitted),lookingtotheschemesstructure...,its

34


objectives,itslegislativehistory,andthenatureoftheadministrativeaction

involved,id.at345.Importantly,wheresubstantialdoubtaboutthe

congressionalintentexists,thegeneralpresumptionfavoringjudicialreviewof

administrativeactioniscontrolling.NRDCv.Johnson,461F.3d164,172(2d

Cir.2006),quotingBlock,467U.S.at351.Impliedpreclusionofreviewisthus

disfavored.

Thegovernmentpointstonolanguagein215,orinFISAorthePATRIOT

Actmoregenerally,thatexcludesactionstakenbyexecutiveoradministrative

officialspursuanttoitstermsfromthepresumptionofjudicialreviewestablished

bytheAPA.Rather,itarguesthattheprovisionofonemechanismforjudicial

review,atthebehestofpartiesotherthanthosewhoseprivacymaybe

compromisedbytheseizure,impliedlyprecludesreviewpursuanttotheAPAby

partiesthusaggrieved.Tounderstandthatargument,webeginbydescribingthe

provisionforjudicialreviewonwhichthegovernmentrelies.

Arecipientofa215ordermaychallengeitslegalitybyfilingapetition

withthepoolofFISCjudgesestablishedbythestatute.50U.S.C.

1861(f)(2)(A)(i).ThatdecisioncanthenbeappealedtotheFISACourtof

Review.Id.1861(f)(3).Thestatutealsoprovidesthat[a]nyproductionor

35


nondisclosureordernotexplicitlymodifiedorsetasideconsistentwiththis

subsectionshallremaininfulleffect.Id.1861(f)(2)(D).

Accordingtothegovernment,thoseprovisionsestablishalimitedand

detailedframeworkthatevincesCongressionalintenttolimitjudicialreviewto

themethodspecified.Boththegovernmentandthedistrictcourtpointtothe

SupremeCourtslanguageinBlockthatwhenastatuteprovidesadetailed

mechanismforjudicialconsiderationofparticularissuesatthebehestof

particularpersons,judicialreviewofthoseissuesatthebehestofotherpersons

maybefoundtobeimpliedlyprecluded.Block,467U.S.at349.

Butthatisnotalwaysthecase.TheSupremeCourthasalsonotedthatif

theexpressprovisionofjudicialreviewinonesectionofalongandcomplicated

statutewerealoneenoughtoovercometheAPAspresumptionofreviewability

forallfinalagencyaction,itwouldnotbemuchofapresumptionatall.Sackett

v.EPA,132S.Ct.1367,1373(2012).Thequestionremainswhetherthe

governmenthasdemonstratedbyclearandconvincingordiscernibleevidence

thatCongressintendedtoprecludereviewintheseparticularcircumstances.

36


(1) Secrecy

Thegovernmentsprimaryargumentinsupportofpreclusionisbasedon

thevarioussecrecyprovisionsthatattachto215orders.Forexample,215

statesthat[n]opersonshalldisclosetoanyotherpersonthattheFederalBureau

ofInvestigationhassoughtorobtainedtangiblethingspursuanttoanorder

underthissectionunlessdisclosureisnecessarytocomplywiththeorder;the

disclosureismadetoanattorneyforadviceorassistanceinconnectionwiththe

order;orthedisclosureismadetoothersaspermittedbytheFBIDirectororhis

designee.50U.S.C.1861(d)(1).Andthestatuteexplicitlylaysoutvarious

supplementalsecrecyproceduresaccompanyingthereviewprocess,including

therequirementsthattherecordsofanysuchproceedingsbemaintainedunder

securitymeasuresestablishedbytheChiefJusticeoftheUnitedStates,in

consultationwiththeAttorneyGeneralandtheDirectorofNational

Intelligence,id.1861(f)(4);that[a]llpetitions...befiledunderseal,

id.1861(f)(5);andthat,inthecaseofanygovernmentsubmissionthatmay

containclassifiedinformation,thecourtreviewitexparteandincamera,id.

Thesesecrecymeasures,thegovernmentargues,areevidencethatCongressdid

37


notintendthat215ordersbereviewableinfederalcourtuponsuitbyan

individualwhosemetadataarecollected.

Uponcloseranalysis,however,thatargumentfails.Thegovernmenthas

pointedtonoaffirmativeevidence,whetherclearandconvincingorfairly

discernible,thatsuggeststhatCongressintendedtoprecludejudicialreview.

Indeed,thegovernmentsargumentfromsecrecysuggeststhatCongressdidnot

contemplateasituationinwhichtargetsof215orderswouldbecomeawareof

thoseordersonanythingresemblingthescalethattheynowhave.That

revelation,ofcourse,cametopassonlybecauseofanunprecedentedleakof

classifiedinformation.ThatCongressmaynothaveanticipatedthatindividuals

likeappellants,whosecommunicationsweretargetedby215orders,would

becomeawareoftheorders,andthusbeinapositiontoseekjudicialreview,is

notevidencethatCongressaffirmativelydecidedtorevoketherighttojudicial

reviewotherwiseprovidedbytheAPAintheeventtheorderswerepublicly

revealed.

Thegovernmentsargumentalsoignoresthefactthat,incertain(albeit

limited)instances,thestatutedoesindeedcontemplatedisclosure.Ifajudge

findsthatthereisnoreasontobelievethatdisclosuremayendangerthe

38


nationalsecurityoftheUnitedStates,interferewithacriminal,counterterrorism,

orcounterintelligenceinvestigation,interferewithdiplomaticrelations,or

endangerthelifeorphysicalsafetyofanyperson,hemaygrantapetitionto

modifyorsetasideanondisclosureorder.50U.S.C.1861(f)(2)(C)(i).Sucha

petitioncouldpresumablyonlybebroughtbya215orderrecipient,because

onlytherecipient,notthetarget,wouldknowoftheorderbeforesuchdisclosure.

ButthisprovisionindicatesthatCongressdidnotexpectthatall215orders

wouldremainsecretindefinitelyandthat,byprovidingforsuchsecrecy,

Congressdidnotintendtoprecludetargetsof215orders,shouldtheyhappen

tolearnofthem,frombringingsuit.

(2) StatutoryScheme

ThegovernmentalsoreliesheavilyonBlockinarguingthatthestatutory

schemeasawholeimpliedlyprecludesjudicialreview.InBlock,theSupreme

Courtconsideredwhetherconsumersofmilkcouldobtainjudicialreviewofmilk

marketorders,whichareissuedbytheSecretaryofAgriculturepursuanttothe

AgriculturalMarketingAgreementActof1937(AMAA),codifiedasamended

at7U.S.C.601etseq.Thoseorderssettheminimumpricesthatmilk

processors(alsoknownashandlers)mustpaytomilkproducers.TheCourt

39


heldthat,inthecontextofthatstatute,thestatutessilenceastotheabilityof

milkconsumerstochallengemilkmarketorderswassufficienttoimplythat

Congressintendedthattheybeprecludedfromdoingso.467U.S.at347.The

governmentwouldhaveusview215asasimilarlycomplexadministrative

schemethatwouldclearlybedisruptedshouldtargetsoftheordersbepermitted

judicialreviewofthem.

ButtheAMAAandtheCourtsdecisioninBlockaredistinguishablefrom

thiscase.First,theCourtinBlock,andinitsdecisionssinceBlock,hasmade

muchofwhetherastatutehasadministrativereviewrequirementsthatwouldbe

endruniftheAPAprovidedforordinaryjudicialreview.InBlock,forexample,

theCourtnotedthat,foramilkmarketordertobecomeeffective,theAMAA

requiresthat:(1)theSecretaryofAgricultureconductarulemakingproceeding

beforeissuingamilkmarketorder;(2)thepublicbenotifiedoftheproceeding

andgivenanopportunityforcomment;(3)apublichearingbeheld,inwhich

(4)theevidenceofferedshowsthattheorderwillfurtherthestatutespolicy;and

(5)certainpercentagesofmilkhandlersandproducersvoteinfavorofthe

orders.Seeid.at342.

40


Suchaschemeisafarcryfromwhatiscontemplatedby215.Section215

containsnoadministrativereviewrequirementsthatwouldbeendrunif

targetsoftheorderswereallowedtoobtainjudicialreviewthereof.Indeed,the

onlyexpressmechanismforanyreviewatallof215ordersisviajudicialreview

albeitbytheFISC,ratherthanafederaldistrictcourt.

UnliketheAMAA,215innowaycontemplatesacooperativeventure

thatprecedestheissuanceoforders.Id.at346.InBlock,theCourtpointedout

thatthestatuteprovidedformilkhandlersandproducersandnotconsumers

toparticipateintheadoptionofthemarketorders.Seeid.Thoseparties,

accordingtotheCourt,weretheoneswhocouldobtainreviewoftheorders,not

theconsumers,whomCongresshadexcludedfromtheentireprocess.Section

215,incontrast,doesnotcontemplateexantecooperationbetween,forexample,

telephonecompaniesandthegovernmentindecidinghowproductionorders

shouldbecraftedandwhethertheyshouldbeapproved.Tothecontrary,under

215,thegovernmentunilaterallycraftsordersthatmaythenbeapprovedornot

bytheFISC.UnlikeinthecaseoftheAMAA,thereisnoindicationthat

Congress,indrafting215,intendedthatthephonecompaniesbetheonlyparty

41


entitledtoobtainjudicialreviewoftheordersbyprovidingforthemtootherwise

participateintheorderissuingprocess.

BlockisfurtherdistinguishablebecausetheCourtthereemphasizedthe

factthat[h]andlersha[d]interestssimilartothoseofconsumersandcould

thereforebeexpectedtochallengeunlawfulagencyaction.Id.at352.Here,in

contrast,theinterestsandincentivesoftherecipientsof215ordersarequite

differentfromthoseoftheorderstargets.Asappellantspointout,

telecommunicationscompanieshavelittleincentivetochallenge215orders

first,becausetheyareunlikelytowanttoantagonizethegovernment,and

second,becausethestatuteshieldsthemfromanyliabilityarisingfromtheir

compliancewitha215order.See50U.S.C.1861(e).Anyintereststhatthey

dohavearedistinctfromthoseoftheircustomers.Thetelephoneservice

providersprimaryinterestwouldbetheexpenseorburdenofcomplyingwith

theorders;onlythecustomershaveadirectinterestintheprivacyofinformation

revealedintheirtelephonerecords.

Indeed,courtssinceBlockhaveinterpretedthisfactorwhetherCongress

hasextendedacauseofactiontoapartywhoseinterestsarealignedwiththose

ofapartyseekingtosueascriticaltotheheavilyfactboundBlockdecision.

42


TheD.C.CircuithasnotedthatsomediscussioninBlock...sweep[s]broadly

buthasconcludedthat,forexample,theAMAAdoesnotprecludemilkproducers

(asopposedtoconsumers)fromobtainingjudicialreviewofmarketorders,inpart

because[u]nliketheconsumerswhoseinterestswerecoextensivewiththoseof

handlersinBlock,theproducersaretheonlypartywithaninterestinensuring

thatthepricepaidthemisnotreducedbytoolargea[namount]paidto

handlers.Ark.DairyCoop.Assnv.U.S.DeptofAgric.,573F.3d815,823(D.C.

Cir.2009)(internalcitationomitted).Inotherwords,whetherapartywith

alignedinterestscanobtainjudicialreviewisanimportantconsiderationin

interpretingandapplyingBlock.

(3) LegislativeHistory

Finally,thelegislativehistoryoftheprovisionforchallenging215orders

furthersupportsappellantsargumentthatCongressdidnotintendtopreclude

targetsoftheordersfrombringingsuit.Appellantspointoutthatthe

amendmentto215thatprovidedforjudicialreviewof215ordersintheFISC

waspassedinresponsetoDoev.Ashcroft,334F.Supp.2d471(S.D.N.Y.2004),

vacatedinpartsubnom.Doev.Gonzales,449F.3d415(2dCir.2006).Atthe

sametimeitaddedthejudicialreviewprovisionin215,Congresspasseda

43


provisionforjudicialreviewinthecontextofNationalSecurityLetters(NSLs)

aformofadministrativesubpoenasusedtogathercommunicationsand

recordsinnationalsecuritymatters.Thatsubsectionwasaddedtoaddressthe

courtsconcernsinDoethat18U.S.C.2709,pursuanttowhichNSLsareissued,

effectivelybar[red]orsubstantiallydeter[red]anyjudicialchallengetothe

proprietyofanNSLrequest.Doe,334F.Supp.2dat475.Congresssprimary

purposeinadoptingbothoftheseprovisionswasapparentlytoclarifythat

judicialreviewwasavailabletorecipientsofNSLsand215ordersnotto

precludereviewatthebehestofthetargetsoforders.Infact,inDoe,the

governmentarguedthattheNSLstatutealreadyimplicitlyprovidedforjudicial

review.Seeid.at49293.Theamendment,therefore,onlyclarif[ied]thataFISA

215ordermaybechallengedandthatarecipientofa215ordermayconsultwith

thelawyerandtheappropriatepeoplenecessarytorespondtotheorder,H.R.

Rep.No.109174,pt.1,at106(statementofChairmanSensenbrenner)both

concernsraisedbythedistrictcourtinDoewithrespecttoNSLs.The

amendmentwasaclarificationofthejudicialreviewprovisionthatalready

implicitlyexisted;inthusclarifying,itdidnotaffirmativelytakeawayarightto

judicialreviewfromanothercategoryofindividualsnotmentionedinthestatute.

44


ThegovernmentarguesthatCongressspecificallyconsidered,and

rejected,anamendmentthatwouldhaveallowedSection215orderstobe

challengednotonlyintheFISC,butalsoindistrictcourt.AppelleesBr.29.But

thatisanoversimplificationofthesequenceofeventsrelatingtoanamendment

proposedbyRepresentativeNadler.First,theproposedamendment

encompassedmorethantheissueofjudicialreview.Theamendmentprimarily

proposedamorerigorousstandardforobtainingordersunder215thanexisted

atthetime,andthebulkofthedebateontheamendmentconcernedwhatdegree

ofsuspicionshouldberequiredforissuanceofa215order.SeeH.R.Rep.No.

109174,pt.1,at12832,135(2005).Second,theamendmentproposedjudicial

reviewinadistrictcourtbytherecipientsof215ordersacategoryofpersons

alreadygrantedanavenueofreviewunder215,throughtheFISCprocess.Id.

at128,134.Itdidnotaddressagain,presumablybecauseCongressdidnot

havereasontoconsiderthequestionatthatpointwhetherapersonwhose

recordswereseizedasaresultofsuchanorderwouldbeable,uponlearningof

theorder,tochallengeitindistrictcourt.Indeed,RepresentativeNadler

specificallynotedthathisamendmentdidnotgrantjudicialreviewatthebehest

ofthetargetofa215orderbecausesuchatargetdoesntknowaboutthe

45


order.Seeid.at128(statementofRep.Nadler)(Itdoesntgivethetargetofthe

ordertheabilitytogotocourt.Hedoesntknowaboutit.);id.at134(statement

ofRep.Nadler)([T]hefactisthat...thetargetoftheinvestigationneverhears

aboutthis.).

AsJusticeScaliahasremindedus,moreover,weshouldexercisecautionin

relyingonthistypeoflegislativehistoryinattemptingtodiscernCongresss

intent,becauseitissooftenimpossibletodiscernwhattheMembersof

Congressintendedexcepttotheextentthatintentismanifestedintheonly

remnantofhistorythatbearstheunanimousendorsementofthemajorityin

eachHouse:thetextoftheenrolledbillthatbecamelaw.GrahamCountySoil

&WaterConservationDist.v.UnitedStatesexrel.Wilson,559U.S.280,302

(2010)(Scalia,J.,concurring)(emphasisinoriginal).Congresssrejectionofthe

Nadleramendmentcannotreliablybeinterpretedasaspecificrejectionofthe

opportunityfora215targettoobtainjudicialreview,undertheAPAor

otherwise.

Finally,thegovernmentarguesthatCongressmusthaveintendedto

precludejudicialreviewof215orders,becauseifanycustomerofacompany

thatreceivesa215ordermaychallengesuchanorder,lawsuitscouldbefiled

46


byavastnumberofpotentialplaintiffs,thusseverelydisrupt[ing]...the

sensitivefieldofintelligencegatheringforcounterterrorismefforts.Appellees

Br.30(internalquotationmarksomitted).

Thatargument,however,dependsonthegovernmentsargumentonthe

meritsthatbulkmetadatacollectionwascontemplatedbyCongressand

authorizedby215.Theriskofmassivenumbersoflawsuitschallengingthe

sameorders,andthusriskinginconsistentoutcomesandconfusionaboutthe

legalityoftheprogram,occursonlyinconnectionwiththeexistenceoforders

authorizingthecollectionofdatafrommillionsofpeople.Orderstargeting

limitednumbersofpersonsunderinvestigationcouldbechallengedonlybythe

individualstargetedwho,itwasexpected,wouldneverlearnoftheordersin

thefirstplace.Itisonlyinconnectionwiththegovernmentsexpansiveuseof

215(which,aswillbeseenbelow,wasnotcontemplatedbyCongress)that

theseriskswouldcreateconcern.

Inanyevent,restrictingjudicialreviewofthelegalityof215ordersunder

thestatuteitselfwoulddolittletoeliminatethespecterofduplicativelawsuits

challengingordersliketheoneatissuehere.Thegovernmentdoesnotcontend

thatthosewhoserecordsarecollectedpursuantto215,assumingtheyhave

47


establishedstanding,aresomehowprecludedfrombringingconstitutional

challengestothoseorders.ThegovernmentwouldthusattributetoCongressa

preclusionofstatutorychallengesthatwouldnoteliminatethesupposeddangers

ofmultiplicativelawsuits,whilechannelingthoselawsuitstowardconstitutional

issues.

Suchanoutcomewouldbeanomalous.Itwouldflyinthefaceofthe

doctrineofconstitutionalavoidance,whichallowscourtstoavoidthedecisionof

constitutionalquestionsbyprovidingatoolforchoosingbetweencompeting

plausibleinterpretationsofastatutorytext,restingonthereasonable

presumptionthatCongressdidnotintendthealternativewhichraisesserious

constitutionaldoubts.Clarkv.Martinez,543U.S.371,381(2005)(emphasisin

original).Incontrast,theapproachprofferedbythegovernmentwouldpreclude

lawsuitschallengingthelegalityof215onstatutorygrounds,whileleaving

openthepathtoreviewof215undertheConstitution.Whileconstitutional

avoidanceisajudicialdoctrine,theprincipleshouldhaveconsiderableappealto

Congress:itwouldseemoddthatCongresswouldprecludechallengesto

executiveactionsthatallegedlyviolateCongresssowncommands,andthereby

channelthecomplaintsofthoseaggrievedbysuchactionsintoconstitutional

48


challengesthatthreatenCongresssownauthority.Theremaybeargumentsin

favorofsuchanunlikelyscheme,butitcannotbesaidthatanysuchreasonsare

sopatentandindisputablethatCongresscanbeassumed,inthefaceofthe

strongpresumptioninfavorofAPAreview,tohaveadoptedthemwithout

havingsaidawordaboutthem.

B. Section2712andImpliedPreclusion

TheotherpotentiallyrelevantexceptiontotheAPAswaiverofsovereign

immunitylookstowhetheranyotherstatutethatgrantsconsenttosuitexpressly

orimpliedlyforbidsthereliefwhichissought.5U.S.C.702(emphasisadded).

Thegovernmenturgesthat18U.S.C.2712,passedinthesamestatutethat

contained215,isjustsuchastatute,grantingasitdoesaprivaterightofaction

formoneydamagesagainsttheUnitedStatesforviolationsoftheWiretapAct,

theStoredCommunicationsAct,andthreeparticularFISAprovisionsthat

concernelectronicsurveillance,physicalsearches,andpenregistersortrapand

tracedevices(butnot215).See18U.S.C.2712(a);seealso50U.S.C.1806(a),

1825(a),1845(a).Section2712withdrewthegeneralrighttosuetheUnitedStates

undertheWiretapActandtheStoredCommunicationsActatthesametimeit

addedarightofactionformoneydamages.Importantly,italsostatedthat

49


[a]nyactionagainsttheUnitedStatesunderthissubsectionshallbethe

exclusiveremedyagainsttheUnitedStatesforanyclaimswithinthepurviewof

thissection.18U.S.C.2712(d).Accordingtothegovernment,suchprovisions

demonstratethat,whereCongressdidintendtoallowaprivaterightofactionfor

violationsofFISA,itdidsoexpressly.

Thattheprovisionextendingarightofactionmakesnomentionof215,

however,supportsappellantsargument,notthegovernments.Tobesure,

[w]henCongresshasdealtinparticularitywithaclaimand[has]intendeda

specifiedremedy...tobeexclusive,thatistheendofthematter;theAPAdoes

notundothejudgment.MatchEBeNashSheWishBandofPottawatomi

Indiansv.Patchak,132S.Ct.2199,2205(2012)(secondalterationinoriginal)

(internalquotationmarksomitted).But2712doesnotdealinparticularity

with215.Instead,thegovernmentwouldhaveusconcludethatin

authorizingonepersontobringonekindofsuitseekingoneformofrelief,

Congressbarredanotherpersonfrombringinganotherkindofsuitseeking

anotherformofrelief.Id.at2209.Section2712makesnomentionwhatsoever

ofclaimsunder215,eithertopermitthemortoprecludethem,and,asthe

SupremeCourtstatedinPatchak,[w]ehaveneverheld,andseenocauseto

50


holdhere,thatsomegeneralsimilarityofsubjectmattercanalonetriggera

remedialstatutespreclusiveeffect.Id.Theexclusiveremedyprovision

appliesonlytoclaimswithinthepurviewoftheremedialsection,whichdoesnot

coverallofFISAbutratherspecifiesthoseFISAprovisionstowhichitapplies.

HadCongressintended2712sexclusiverightofaction(anditspreclusionof

otherremedies)toextendto215,itisfairtoassumethatitwouldhavealso

enumeratedthatsectionparticularlyconsideringthefactthatbothprovisions

werepassedinthesamestatute.

Section2712,moreover,explicitlywithdrawstherighttochallengethe

specificgovernmentactionstakenunderspecificauthorization,inconnection

withextendinganexplicitcauseofactionformonetarydamagesinconnection

withsuchactions.First,2712showsthattheCongressthatenactedthe

PATRIOTActunderstoodverywellhowtowithdrawtherighttosueunderthe

APA,andtocreateanexclusiveremedy,whenitwishedtodoso.Second,2712

manifestlydoesnotcreateacauseofactionfordamagesforviolationsof215,as

itdoeswithrespecttothosestatutesofwhichitdoesprecludereviewunderthe

APA.

51


Section2712,therefore,doesnotprecludeappellantssuithere.Nordothe

twostatutes,whenviewedincombination,evinceanintentofCongressto

precludesuitsbytargetsof215orders.

C. Summary

Inshort,thegovernmentreliesonbitsandshardsofinapplicablestatutes,

inconclusivelegislativehistory,andinferencesfromsilenceinanefforttofindan

impliedrevocationoftheAPAsauthorizationofchallengestogovernment

actions.Thatisnotenoughtoovercomethestrongpresumptionofthegeneral

commandoftheAPAagainstsuchimpliedpreclusion.Congress,ofcourse,has

theabilitytolimittheremediesavailableundertheAPA;ithasonlytosayso.

Butithassaidnosuchthinghere.Weshouldbecautiousininferringlegislative

actionfromlegislativeinaction,orinferringaCongressionalcommandfrom

Congressionalsilence.Atmost,theevidencecitedbythegovernmentsuggests

thatCongressassumed,inlightoftheexpectationofsecrecy,thatpersonswhose

informationwastargetedbya215orderwouldrarelyevenknowofsuch

orders,andthereforethatjudicialreviewatthebehestofsuchpersonswasanon

issue.Butsuchanassumptionisafarcryfromanunexpressedintentionto

52


withdrawrightsgrantedinagenerallyapplicable,explicitstatutesuchasthe

APA.

Accordingly,wedisagreewiththedistrictcourtinsofarasitheldthat

appellantshereareprecludedfrombringingsuitagainstthegovernment,and

holdthatappellantshavearightofactionundertheAPA.Wethereforeproceed

tothemeritsofthecase.

III. StatutoryAuthorization

Althoughappellantsvigorouslyarguethatthetelephonemetadata

programviolatestheirrightsundertheFourthAmendmenttotheConstitution,

andthereforecannotbeauthorizedbyeithertheExecutiveortheLegislative

Branchofgovernment,orbybothactingtogether,theirinitialargumentisthat

theprogramsimplyhasnotbeenauthorizedbythelegislationonwhichthe

governmentreliesfortheissuanceoftheorderstoserviceproviderstocollect

andturnoverthemetadataatissue.Wenaturallyturnfirsttothatargument.

Section215clearlysweepsbroadlyinanefforttoprovidethegovernment

withessentialtoolstoinvestigateandforestallactsofterrorism.Thestatute

permitsthegovernmenttoapplyforanorderrequiringtheproductionofany

tangiblethings...foraninvestigation...toprotectagainstinternational

53


terrorismorclandestineintelligenceactivities.50U.S.C.1861(a)(1)(emphasis

added).A215ordermayrequiretheproductionofanythingthatcanbe

obtainedwithasubpoenaducestecumissuedbyacourtoftheUnitedStatesin

aidofagrandjuryinvestigationoranyothercourtorder.Id.1861(c)(2)(D).

Whilethetypesoftangiblethingssubjecttosuchanorderwouldappear

essentiallyunlimited,suchthingsmayonlybeproduceduponaspecified

factualshowingbythegovernment.Toobtaina215order,thegovernment

mustprovidetheFISCwithastatementoffactsshowingthatthereare

reasonablegroundstobelievethatthetangiblethingssoughtarerelevanttoan

authorizedinvestigation(otherthanathreatassessment)conducted[under

guidelinesapprovedbytheAttorneyGeneral].Id.1861(b)(2)(A);seeid.

1861(a)(2)(requiringthatinvestigationsmakinguseofsuchordersbe

conductedunderguidelinesapprovedbytheAttorneyGeneral).Thebasic

requirementsformetadatacollectionunder215,then,aresimplythatthe

recordsberelevanttoanauthorizedinvestigation(otherthanathreatassessment).

Forallthecomplexityofthestatutoryframework,thepartiesrespective

positionsarerelativelysimpleandstraightforward.Thegovernmentemphasizes

thatrelevanceisanextremelygenerousstandard,particularlyinthecontextof

54


thegrandjuryinvestigationstowhichthestatuteanalogizesordersunder215.

Appellantsarguethatrelevanceisnotanunlimitedconcept,andthatthe

governmentsownuse(ornonuse)oftherecordsobtaineddemonstratesthat

mostoftherecordssoughtarenotrelevanttoanyparticularinvestigation;the

governmentdoesnotseektherecords,asisusualinagrandjuryinvestigation,

soastoreviewtheminsearchofevidencebearingonaparticularsubject,but

ratherseekstherecordstocreateavastdatabank,tobekeptinreserveand

queriedifandwhensomeparticularsetofrecordsmightberelevanttoa

particularinvestigation.

Echoingthedistrictcourtsstatementthat[r]elevancehasabroadlegal

meaning,959F.Supp.2dat746,thegovernmentarguesthatthetelephone

metadataprogramcomfortablymeetstherequisitestandard.Thegovernment

likenstherelevancestandardintendedbyCongresstothestandardofrelevance

forgrandjuryandadministrativesubpoenas,and,tosomeextent,forcivil

discovery.

Boththelanguageofthestatuteandthelegislativehistorysupportthe

grandjuryanalogy.Duringthe2006reauthorizationdebate,SenatorKylrecalled

that,inpassingthePATRIOTActshortlyafterSeptember11,Congresshad

55


realizedthatitwastimetoapplytoterrorismmanyofthesamekindsof

techniquesinlawenforcementauthoritiesthatwealreadydeemedveryusefulin

investigatingotherkindsofcrimes.Ourideawas,ifitisgoodenoughto

investigatemoneylaunderingordrugdealing,forexample,wesureoughttouse

thosesamekindsoftechniquestofightterrorists.152Cong.Rec.S1607(daily

ed.Mar.2,2006)(statementofSen.Kyl).Healsoremarkedthat[r]elevanceisa

simpleandwellestablishedstandardoflaw.Indeed,itisthestandardfor

obtainingeveryotherkindofsubpoena,includingadministrativesubpoenas,

grandjurysubpoenas,andcivildiscoveryorders.Id.atS1606.Anditiswell

establishedthatwhereCongressborrowstermsofart...,itpresumablyknows

andadoptstheclusterofideasthatwereattachedtoeachborrowedwordinthe

bodyoflearningfromwhichitwastakenandthemeaningitsusewillconveyto

thejudicialmindunlessotherwiseinstructed.Morissettev.UnitedStates,342

U.S.246,250(1952).

Somuch,indeed,seemstousunexceptionable.Inadopting215,

Congressintendedtogivethegovernment,ontheapprovaloftheFISC,broad

ranginginvestigativepowersanalogoustothosetraditionallyusedinconnection

withgrandjuryinvestigationsintopossiblecriminalbehavior.

56


Thegovernmentthenpointsoutthat,undertheacceptedstandardof

relevanceinthecontextofgrandjurysubpoenas,courtshaveauthorized

discoveryoflargevolumesofinformationwheretherequesterseekstoidentify

withinthatvolumesmalleramountsofinformationthatcoulddirectlybearon

thematter.AppelleesBr.31.Thegovernmentasksustoconcludethatitis

eminentlyreasonabletobelievethatSection215bulktelephonymetadatais

relevanttocounterterrorisminvestigations.Id.at32.Appellants,however,

disputethatmetadatafromeveryphonecallwithapartyintheUnitedStates,

overaperiodofyearsandyears,canbeconsideredrelevanttoanauthorized

investigation,byanydefinitionoftheterm.

Theverytermsinwhichthislitigationhasbeenconductedbybothsides

suggestthatthematterisnotasroutineasthegovernmentsargumentsuggests.

Normally,thequestionofwhetherrecordsdemandedbyasubpoenaorother

courtorderarerelevanttoaproceedingisraisedinthecontextofamotionto

quashasubpoena.Thegrandjuryundertakestoinvestigateaparticularsubject

mattertodeterminewhetherthereisprobablecausetobelievecrimeshavebeen

committed,andseeksbysubpoenarecordsthatmightcontainevidencethatwill

57


helpinmakingthatdetermination.4Giventhewideinvestigativescopeofa

grandjury,thestandardiseasytomeet,butthedeterminationofrelevanceis

constrainedbythesubjectoftheinvestigation.Inresolvingamotiontoquash,a

courtcomparestherecordsdemandedbytheparticularsubpoenawiththe

subjectmatteroftheinvestigation,howeverbroadlydefined.

Here,however,thepartieshavenotundertakentodebatewhetherthe

recordsrequiredbytheordersinquestionarerelevanttoanyparticularinquiry.

Therecordsdemandedareallencompassing;thegovernmentdoesnoteven

suggestthatalloftherecordssought,orevennecessarilyanyofthem,are

relevanttoanyspecificdefinedinquiry.Rather,thepartiesasktheCourtto

decidewhether215authorizesthecreationofahistoricalrepositoryof

informationthatbulkaggregationofthemetadataallows,AppelleesBr.32,

becausebulkcollectiontocreatesucharepositoryisnecessarytotheapplication

4Althoughsubpoenasmaybeusedinaidofothercourtproceedings,wetakethegrandjuryasourexamplebecausethepowersofthegrandjuryareparticularlywideranging,andthestandardofrelevanceormaterialityofinformationsoughtismuchmorerelaxedthan,forexample,inatrial,wheretoberelevantevidencemusttendtomakeafactofconsequenceindeterminingtheaction,Fed.R.Evid.401(b),moreorlessprobablethanitwouldbewithouttheevidence,id.401(a).

58


ofcertainanalytictechniques,AppellantsBr.23.Thatisnotthelanguagein

whichgrandjurysubpoenasaretraditionallydiscussed.

Thus,thegovernmenttakesthepositionthatthemetadatacollecteda

vastamountofwhichdoesnotcontaindirectlyrelevantinformation,asthe

governmentconcedesareneverthelessrelevantbecausetheymayallowthe

NSA,atsomeunknowntimeinthefuture,utilizingitsabilitytosiftthroughthe

troveofirrelevantdataithascollecteduptothatpoint,toidentifyinformation

thatisrelevant.5Weagreewithappellantsthatsuchanexpansiveconceptof

relevanceisunprecedentedandunwarranted.

Thestatutestowhichthegovernmentpointshaveneverbeeninterpreted

toauthorizeanythingapproachingthebreadthofthesweepingsurveillanceat

issuehere.6Thegovernmentadmittedbelowthatthecaselawinanalogous

5Section215liststhreefactorsthatwouldrenderatangiblethingsoughtpresumptivelyrelevanttoanauthorizedinvestigation,see50U.S.C.1861(b)(2)(A),buttherecordsofordinarytelephonecompanycustomersphonecallsdonotfallwithinanyofthosedescriptions.6Arecentlydisclosed,nowdiscontinuedprogramunderwhichtheDrugEnforcementAdministrationutilizedadministrativesubpoenasobtainedpursuantto21U.S.C.876tocollectandmaintainatelephonemetadatadatabasemayhavedemandedaninterpretationapproachingthebreadthofthegovernmentsinterpretationofsimilarlanguagehere.SeeECFNo.159(AppellantsFed.R.App.P.28(j)letter);ECFNo.161(AppelleesFed.R.App.P.

59


contextsd[id]notinvolvedataacquisitiononthescaleofthetelephony

metadatacollection.ACLUv.Clapper,No.13Civ.3994(S.D.N.Y.Aug.26,

2013),ECFNo.33(Mem.ofLawofDefs.inSupp.ofMot.toDismiss)at24.That

concessioniswelltaken.Asnotedabove,iftheorderschallengedbyappellants

donotrequirethecollectionofmetadataregardingeverytelephonecallmadeor

receivedintheUnitedStates(apointassertedbyappellantsandatleast

nominallycontestedbythegovernment),theyappeartocomeveryclosetodoing

so.Thesheervolumeofinformationsoughtisstaggering;whilesearchwarrants

andsubpoenasforbusinessrecordsmayencompasslargevolumesofpaper

documentsorelectronicdata,themostexpansiveofsuchevidentiarydemands

aredwarfedbythevolumeofrecordsobtainedpursuanttotheordersinquestion

here.

Moreover,thedistinctionisnotmerelyoneofquantityhowevervastthe

quantitativedifferencebutalsoofquality.Searchwarrantsanddocument

subpoenastypicallyseektherecordsofaparticularindividualorcorporation

28(j)letter).Thatprogram,which,accordingtobothparties,hasbeendiscontinued,isnotbeingchallengedhere,andwethereforeneednotopineastowhetherthelanguageofthestatutepursuanttowhichthemetadatawerecollectedauthorizedthatprogram.

60


underinvestigation,andcoverparticulartimeperiodswhentheeventsunder

investigationoccurred.Theordersatissueherecontainnosuchlimits.The

metadataconcerningeverytelephonecallmadeorreceivedintheUnitedStates

usingtheservicesoftherecipientserviceprovideraredemanded,foran

indefiniteperiodextendingintothefuture.Therecordsdemandedarenotthose

ofsuspectsunderinvestigation,orofpeopleorbusinessesthathavecontactwith

suchsubjects,orofpeopleorbusinessesthathavecontactwithotherswhoarein

contactwiththesubjectstheyextendtoeveryrecordthatexists,andindeedto

recordsthatdonotyetexist,astheyimposeacontinuingobligationonthe

recipientofthesubpoenatoprovidesuchrecordsonanongoingbasisastheyare

created.Thegovernmentcanpointtonograndjurysubpoenathatisremotely

comparabletotherealtimedatacollectionundertakenunderthisprogram.

Nevertheless,thegovernmentemphasizesthepermissivestandards

appliedtosubpoenas,notingthat,atleastinthecontextofgrandjurysubpoenas,

motionstoquashonrelevancygroundsaredeniedunlessthedistrictcourt

determinesthatthereisnoreasonablepossibilitythatthecategoryofmaterials

theGovernmentseekswillproduceinformationrelevanttothegeneralsubjectof

thegrandjurysinvestigation.UnitedStatesv.R.Enters.,Inc.,498U.S.292,301

61


(1991).Thatisbecausesuchsubpoenasarecustomarilyemployedtogather

informationandmakeitavailabletotheinvestigativeteamofagentsand

prosecutorssothatitcanbedigestedandsiftedforpertinentmatterandare

thereforeoftendrawnbroadly,sweepingupbothdocumentsthatmayprove

decisiveanddocumentsthatturnoutnottobe.UnitedStatesv.Triumph

CapitalGrp.,544F.3d149,168(2dCir.2008).

Inthatvein,thegovernmentpointstocasesinwhichcourtshaveupheld

subpoenasforbroadcategoriesofinformationandforlargescalecollection[]of

information.AppelleesBr.33(internalquotationmarksomitted).Forexample,

inInreGrandJuryProceedings:SubpoenasDucesTecum,827F.2d301(8thCir.

1987),theEighthCircuitdeniedWesternUnionsmotiontoquashasubpoena

thatrequestedproductionbyWesternUnionsprimarywireserviceagentin

KansasCityofallmoneyorderapplicationsforamountsover$1,000overamore

thantwoyearperiod,andofareportsummarizingallwiretransactionsit

conductedoveranapproximateoneyearperiod.DespiteWesternUnions

argumentthatthesubpoenawouldsweepinrecordsinvolvinghundredsof

innocentpeople,thecourtstatedthatgrandjuriesarenotnecessarilyprohibited

fromengagingindragnetoperation[s].Id.at305(internalquotationmarks

62


omitted).InInreSubpoenaDucesTecum,228F.3d341(4thCir.2000),the

FourthCircuitalsodeniedamotiontoquashasubpoenaissuedtoadoctor

requiringproductionof,interalia,allpatientrecordsanddocumentation

concerningpatientswhoseserviceswerebilledtoMedicare,Medicaid,anda

numberofinsurancecompanies,includingthepatientscompletemedicalfiles,

theirbillingrecords,officeappointmentbooks,signinsheets,andtelephone

messages,overaperiodofatleastsevenyears.Thatcourtheldthatthe

subpoenadidnotsweeptoobroadly,despitethehighvolumeofdocumentsit

demanded,inpartbecauseofthescopeofthefraudbeinginvestigatedandthe

sizeofthedoctorspractice.Id.at35051;seealsoOkla.PressPublgCo.v.

Walling,327U.S.186,209(1946)([R]elevancyandadequacyorexcessinthe

breadthofthesubpoenaaremattersvariableinrelationtothenature,purposes

andscopeoftheinquiry.).

Butbroadasthosesubpoenaswere,thecasescitedbythegovernmentonly

highlightthedifferencebetweentheinvestigativedemandsatissueinthosecases

andtheonesatissuehere.Bothofthoseexamples,andallexamplesofwhichwe

areaware,areboundedeitherbythefactsoftheinvestigationorbyafinitetime

limitation.Thetelephonemetadataprogramrequiresthatthephonecompanies

63


turnoverrecordsonanongoingdailybasiswithnoforeseeableendpoint,no

requirementofrelevancetoanyparticularsetoffacts,andnolimitationsasto

subjectmatterorindividualscovered.7EvenintheEighthCircuitcasethatthe

governmentcites,moreover,althoughitupheldthesubpoenaatissue,theEighth

Circuitsuggestedthatthedistrictcourtconsidertheextenttowhichthe

governmentwouldbeabletoidentifyinadvance...patternsorcharacteristics

thatwouldraisesuspicion...designedtofocusonillegalactivitywithouttaking

inanunnecessaryamountofirrelevantmaterial.InreGrandJuryProceedings:

SubpoenasDucesTecum,827F.2dat30506.Courtshavetypicallylookedto

constrainevengrandjurysubpoenastoastandardofreasonablenessrelatedtoa

definedinvestigativescope;wehavefoundexcessivelybroadasubpoena

requiringproductionofallofanaccountantsfileswithinamerethreefiling

7Drawingananalogyagaintothecontextofadministrativesubpoenas,wenotetoothatcourtsaremorereluctanttoenforcesubpoenaswhenagencieshavesoughtrecordsofthirdpartieswhowerenottargetsoftheagencysinvestigation.InreMcVane,44F.3d1127,1137(2dCir.1995).Theoverwhelmingbulkofthemetadatacollectedbythetelephonemetadataprogram,asthegovernmentitselfconcedes,concernsthirdpartiesinthatsenseofthewordindividualswhoarenottargetsofaninvestigationorsuspectedofengaginginanycrimewhatsoever,andwhoarenotevensuspectedofhavinganycontactswithanysuchtargetsorsuspects.Theirrecordsaresoughtsolelytobuildarepositoryforthefutureapplicationoftheinvestigativetechniquesuponwhichtheprogramrelies.

64


cabinets,withoutanyattempttodefineclassesofpotentiallyrelevant

documentsoranylimitationsastosubjectmatterortimeperiod,becauseit

sweptinpapersthattherewasnoreasontobelievewererelevant.Inre

Horowitz,482F.2d72,79(2dCir.1973).Wethereforelimitedthesubpoenas

timeperiodabsentthegovernmentsmakingaminimalshowingofrelevance.

Id.at7980.

Totheextentthat215wasintendedtogivethegovernment,asSenator

Kylproposed,thesamekindsoftechniquestofightterroriststhatithas

availabletofightordinarycrimessuchasmoneylaunderingordrugdealing,

152Cong.Rec.S1607(dailyed.Mar.2,2006)(statementofSen.Kyl),theanalogy

isnothelpfultothegovernmentspositionhere.Thetechniquestraditionally

usedtocombatsuchordinarycrimeshavenotincludedthecollection,viagrand

jurysubpoena,ofavasttroveofrecordsofmetadataconcerningthefinancial

transactionsortelephonecallsofordinaryAmericanstobeheldinreserveina

databank,tobesearchedifandwhenatsomehypotheticalfuturetimethe

recordsmightbecomerelevanttoacriminalinvestigation.

Thegovernmentsemphasisonthepotentialbreadthoftheterm

relevant,moreover,ignoresotherportionsofthetextof215.Relevance

65


doesnotexistintheabstract;somethingisrelevantornotinrelationtoa

particularsubject.Thus,anitemrelevanttoagrandjuryinvestigationmaynot

berelevantattrial.Inkeepingwiththisusage,215doesnotpermitan

investigativedemandforanyinformationrelevanttofightingthewaronterror,

oranythingrelevanttowhateverthegovernmentmightwanttoknow.It

permitsdemandsfordocumentsrelevanttoanauthorizedinvestigation.The

governmenthasnotatte

2d circuit clapper opinion

Documents