270 c w i new evidence on the cuban missile crisis: more ... · two cuban missile crisis-related...

270 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

New Evidence on the Cuban Missile Crisis:More Documents from the Russian Archives

by James G. HershbergThe Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 continues to exert an intense fascination on historians, political scientists, journalists, and

the general public, and—as apparently the world’s closest brush to thermonuclear war—is likely to continue to do so. Over the pastdecade, the study of this crisis has expanded to encompass a major influx of new sources and perspectives, primarily stemming from thedeclassification of new U.S. (and British) documents, but also the addition of Soviet and then Cuban archival materials and perspec-tives—a process expedited by international scholarly projects as well as the anti-communist upheavals that led to the (partial) opening ofRussian archives.1

The Cold War International History Project Bulletin has previously reported on various new findings regarding the crisis—knownto Russians as the “Caribbean Crisis” and Cubans as the “October Crisis”—particularly in issue no. 5 (Spring 1995), which featured anextensive compilation of translated documents from the Russian Foreign Ministry archives in Moscow.2

In this issue, the Bulletin presents more translated materials from that repository—the Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation(AVPRF)—documenting various aspects of Soviet policy during the events of the fall of 1962. Most were declassified by Soviet/Russianauthorities in 1991-1992 and provided to NHK Japanese television in connection with a documentary on the Cuban Missile Crisis airedto mark the 30th anniversary of the event in October 1992; Prof. Philip Brenner (American University), one of the consultants to theshow, in turn, subsequently gave copies of the documents to CWIHP and the National Security Archive—a non-governmental researchinstitute and declassified documents repository based at George Washington University—where they are now deposited and available forresearch. That collection also contains photocopies of some of the same documents that were separately obtained from AVPRF byRaymond L. Garthoff (Brookings Institution) with the Archive’s assistance.

The translations into English came primarily from two sources. Many of the AVPRF documents obtained by NHK were translatedby Vladimir Zaemsky of the Russian Foreign Ministry, who granted permission for their use here. For most of the rest of the documents,the Bulletin is grateful to Philip Zelikow, Associate Professor of Public Policy at Harvard University, and Harvard’s Center for Scienceand International Affairs, for commissioning translations from John Henriksen of Harvard. (Prof. Zelikow, the co-author, with CondoleezzaRice, of Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Harvard University Press, 1995), is currently involved withtwo Cuban Missile Crisis-related publication projects, a revision of Graham Allison’s Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban MissileCrisis, originally published in 1970, and, with Prof. Ernest R. May of Harvard, an edited compilation of transcripts of declassified taperecordings of “Excomm” meetings involving President John F. Kennedy and senior advisors during the crisis, which were recentlyreleased by the Kennedy Library in Boston.) In addition, Vladislav M. Zubok, a Russian scholar based at the National Security Archive,translated the records of the two conversations of Soviet Politburo member Anastas Mikoyan (with U Thant and John McCloy) in NewYork on 1 November 1962, and CWIHP Director David Wolff translated a conversation between Mikoyan and Robert Kennedy.

The translations themselves are broken into three sections: 1) before the crisis, 14 September-21 October 1962 (although for Kennedyand his advisors the crisis began on October 16, when the president was informed that a U.S. U-2 spy plane had photographed evidenceof Soviet missile sites under construction in Cuba, for the Soviets the crisis only started on October 22, when Kennedy announced thediscovery and the American blockade of Cuba in a televised address); 2) the crisis itself, 22-28 October 1962 (from Kennedy’s speech toMoscow’s announcement of its agreement to withdraw the missiles under United Nations supervision in exchange for Washington’slifting of the blockade, its pledge not to attack Cuba, and its private assurance that American Jupiter missiles in Turkey would shortly alsobe removed); and 3) the aftermath, 28 October-10 December 1962 (which included a period of wrangling between Washington andMoscow—and between Moscow and Havana—over the crisis’ settlement, especially over the terms of U.N. inspection of the missileremoval and the inclusion of Soviet IL-28 bombers in the weapons to be pulled out, which was not finally nailed down, permitting theblockade to be lifted, until November 20).

For the most part, unfortunately, these materials shed little light on the actual process of decision-making at the highest levels of theKremlin, and minutes or notes of the discussions among Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev and his associates during the crisis have stillnot emerged.3 The Russian Foreign Ministry documents did include top-level correspondence between Khrushchev and Kennedy, andbetween Khrushchev and Castro, but these have already been published elsewhere4 and are omitted from the selection below, as are otherdocuments containing material already available to researchers, such as translations of press reports, correspondence between Khrushchevand U.N. Secretary U Thant (and between Khrushchev and British philosopher Bertrand Russell), and cables to Soviet diplomats circu-lating or reiterating public Soviet positions.

Nevertheless, the Russian archival materials presented here make fascinating reading for anyone interested in the missile crisis, inSoviet or Cuban foreign policy, in crisis politics or diplomacy generally, in some of the leading characters involved in the drama (such asRobert Kennedy, Fidel Castro, Mikoyan, and U Thant), or in reassessing the accuracy and efficacy of American policy and perceptionsduring perhaps the Cold War’s most perilous passages. For the most part, they consist of Soviet cables from three diplomatic venues(with occasional instructions from “the center,” or Moscow):

COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 271

* the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., including reports from the USSR’s newly-arrived ambassador to the United States,Anatoly F. Dobrynin, on the situation in Washington and his meetings with leading personages, and from Soviet Foreign Minister AndreiGromyko on his conversation with Kennedy on October 18;

* the United Nations in New York, from which USSR ambassador Valerian Zorin reported on debates in the Security Council, and oncontacts with other delegates and U.N. officials, and then more senior Soviet officials sent to handle the diplomacy of the settlement, suchas Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily V. Kuznetsov and Mikoyan, reported on their negotiations with U.S. negotiators John J. McCloy andAdlai Stevenson as well as conversations with U Thant;

* and the Soviet Embassy in Havana, from which USSR Ambassador Aleksandr Alekseev reported on Cuban developments, includ-ing the fervor gripping the country when it seemed war might be imminent, the leadership’s angry reaction when Khrushchev acceptedKennedy’s request to withdraw the missiles without advance consultation with Castro, and the difficult conversations which ensued asSoviet officials, in particular Mikoyan, tried to mollify the upset Cubans and at the same time secure Havana’s acquiescence to themeasures Moscow had accepted in order to resolve the crisis.

The fact that almost all of the documents below came from the Foreign Ministry archive should induce some caution among readersseeking an understanding of Soviet policy regarding the crisis. Not surprisingly, for instance, they illuminate diplomatic aspects of theevents far more than, for instance, either military or intelligence aspects. In fact, the Russian Defense Ministry has declassified a substan-tial amount of material on “Operation Anadyr”—the code-name for the Soviet missile deployment to Cuba—and other military actionsrelated to the crisis, and the Bulletin plans to present some of those materials, with translation, annotation, and commentary by MarkKramer (Harvard University), in a future issue.5 As for Soviet intelligence archives, these have not been opened to researchers except ona highly selective basis; however, a book scheduled for publication in 1997 by Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali is expected todraw on these sources. Finally, as noted above, documentation on decision-making at the highest level of the Central Committee of theCommunist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) remains classified, presumably in the Archive of the President, Russian Federation(APRF).

It is not possible to provide a comprehensive commentary on the significance of the documents, both because of space limitationsand also because they may be used by researchers for so many different purposes—not only historians of the Cold War but politicalscientists, specialists in bureaucratic politics, nuclear theory, and “crisis management,” psychologists, specialists in U.S., Soviet, andCuban foreign policy, biographers of key figures, and many others have looked to the Cuban Missile Crisis for answers and illumination.Best read in conjunction with the other Russian documents published in Bulletin 5 and elsewhere, as well as American materials, thedocuments below are offered merely as useful raw primary source material rather than as evidence for any particular interpretation.Nevertheless, some preliminary reactions can be offered on a few issues.

Pre-Crisis U.S. Military and Covert Policies Toward Cuba

One issue of vital importance during the run-up to the crisis on which the documents here (and in Bulletin 5) provide some evidenceis the question of how the Soviets perceived the Kennedy Administration’s policies and actions toward Cuba, particularly Washington’scovert operations against the Castro regime and the likelihood that it would take more direct military action. They clearly show thatMoscow’s representatives noted, and blamed the United States government in general and the Central Intelligence Agency in particularfor, what it called the “piratical raids” by anti-Castro Cuban exile groups being carried out with U.S. support against the island. Althoughone does not find specific references to “Operation Mongoose”—the code-name for the massive CIA covert operation undertaken withthe aim of toppling Castro after the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961—the reports of Ambassador Alekseev in Havana andAmbassador Dobrynin in Washington in September and early October 1962 show that Moscow had no doubt as to who was responsiblefor what the former called the “landing of counter-revolutionary bands of spies and arms” and “constant acts of provocation.”6 Dobrynin’scable of 15 October, for instance, lays out the role of the CIA in supporting actions of the exile group “Alpha 66.”

However, the documents suggest that the Soviets had only a general knowledge of “Operation Mongoose”—although Soviet mili-tary intelligence (GRU) archives might well contain more detailed reports—and Moscow remained uncertain as to the significance of theAmerican support of the harassment operations—i.e., whether they presaged a direct U.S. military intervention to overthrow Castro—right up to the eve of the crisis. As the crisis approached, however, Soviet officials appeared to feel more assured that U.S. military actionagainst Cuba was not imminent (which to those in the know in Moscow signified that the secret deployment of missiles could proceedsafely). In a document published in Bulletin 5, Foreign Minister Gromyko, in fact, cabled Moscow after meeting Kennedy on October 18in the Oval Office—unaware that the American already knew about the Soviet missile bases in Cuba—that “Everything we know aboutthe position of the USA government on the Cuban question allows us to conclude that the overall situation is completely satisfactory...Thereis reason to believe that the USA is not preparing an intervention and has put its money” on economic sanctions.7

The actual Soviet record of the Gromyko-Kennedy conversation, excerpted here, offers readers a chance to follow in detail thisduplicity-filled conversation, in which neither man told the other the most important fact in the situation under discussion. Gromykodutifully criticized Washington for its actions against Cuba, and acknowledged only that Moscow was providing Cuba with “exclusivelydefensive armaments” which could not “represent a threat to anybody.” Kennedy, for his part, with the U-2 photographs of the Sovietmissile bases in Cuba under construction lying in his desk drawer, told Gromyko that the United States “take[s] on trust” Soviet state-ments about the defensive character of the weapons it was shipping to Castro but reiterated his public warnings that “were it otherwise,


the gravest issues would arise.” While stressing that the situation had taken a turn for the worse since July as a result of Moscow’sstepping-up of military aid to Cuba—calling the situation “perhaps the most dangerous since the end of the Second World War”—Kennedy made no mention of the missiles.

After reading the account of the conversation, it is hard to explain Gromyko’s smug assessment that the situation was “completelysatisfactory,” other than as a spectacular case of wishful thinking (or a blase memo to mask a more candid assessment relayed throughother channels). It is clear, from his repeated statements of concern, that Kennedy was trying to caution Moscow to rethink its adventurewithout tipping his cards—and perhaps even signalling a possible way out of the crisis that had (so far as Moscow knew) not even begun.Repeatedly assuring Gromyko that the United States had “no intentions to launch an aggression against Cuba,” Kennedy noted pointedlythat, “If Mr. Khrushchev addressed me on this issue, we could give him corresponding assurances on that score,” and repeated the offertwice later in the conversation. A little more than a week later, of course, after the world had been brought to the brink, precisely such adeclaration from Kennedy would give Khrushchev the fig leaf he needed to swallow his pride and accept the removal of Soviet missilesfrom Cuba.

The Russian documents reveal nothing new on the issue of whether, in fact, the Kennedy Administration had been moving towardtaking military action against Cuba even before it discovered the existence of the Soviet nuclear-capable missiles on the island in mid-October. In a previous publication, the current author presented evidence that the U.S. government and military undertook seriouscontingency planning, and even some preliminary redeployments, in September and the first two weeks of October 1962 toward theobjective of achieving, by October 20, “maximum readiness” for either an air strike against or invasion of Cuba, or both, although thearticle remained agnostic on the issue of whether Kennedy had actually made a decision to attack Cuba or simply wanted the optionavailable.8 Recently, a potentially crucial, yet still problematic, piece of evidence from American archives has surfaced to suggest that,literally on the eve of the crisis, the Kennedy Administration was not on the verge of imminent military action against Cuba.

At issue is a recently declassified purported fragment of notes of a conversation on the afternoon of Monday, 15 October 1962,between Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor. (At thatpoint, the U-2 photographs taken over Cuba the previous day had not yet been identified as revealing Soviet missile sites under construc-tion, a development that would take place only later that afternoon and evening and be reported to the president the following morning,October 16.) During a discussion of contingency plans concerning Cuba, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) minutes—obtained by theNational Security Archive through the Freedom of Information Act—paraphrase McNamara as saying: “President wants no militaryaction within the next three months, but he can’t be sure as he does not control events. For instance, aerial photos made available thismorning show 68 boxes on ships that are not believed to be Il-28s and cannot be identified. However, the probabilities are stronglyagainst military action in the next 30 days.”9 Similarly, a recently-declassified JCS historical report prepared in 1981 evidently relies onthose notes in stating (without citation) that in their meeting on October 15, “the Secretary [McNamara] said that President Kennedywanted, if possible, to avoid military measures against Cuba during the next three months.”10

If accurate, the notes would certainly constitute a strong piece of evidence against the hypothesis that the Kennedy Administrationbelieved it was headed toward, let alone desired, a military confrontation with Cuba in the immediate future, just before news of themissiles. The evidence is problematic, however, due to an unfortunate case of destruction of historical evidence by the JCS that appar-ently makes it impossible to evaluate the context or provenance of McNamara’s reported remarks (see footnote for details).11

Berlin and Cuba

One issue which has long intrigued students of the crisis is the nature of its connection, if any, to the simmering U.S.-Sovietconfrontation over Berlin—which had quieted somewhat since the erection of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 and the Checkpoint Charlieconfrontation between Soviet and U.S. tanks two months later, but remained unfinished business and a potential flashpoint. Given thecentrality of Berlin and Germany to the Cold War in Europe, in fact, some U.S. officials jumped to the conclusion upon the discovery ofSoviet missiles in Cuba that their deployment was actually a Khrushchevian gambit to distract American attention and energy fromBerlin, where Moscow might make its next move. Indeed, during the crisis, a special subcommittee of the White House “Excomm”(Executive Committee) was formed, under the chairmanship of Paul H. Nitze, specifically to assess the situation in Berlin in the eventthat the crisis spread there, perhaps if the Kremlin applied renewed pressure there in response to U.S. threats or use of military forceagainst Cuba.

Some evidence has surfaced to show that at least some Soviet officials did suggest the option of opening up a Berlin front inresponse to Kennedy’s speech announcing the blockade of Cuba on October 22. In a toughly-worded cable the next day, AmbassadorDobrynin cabled an analysis from Washington recommending an “appropriate rebuff” that might include “hinting to Kennedy in nouncertain terms about the possibility of repressions against the Western powers in West Berlin (as a first step, the organization of ablockade of ground routes, leaving out for the time being air routes so as not to give grounds for a quick confrontation).”12 DeputyForeign Minister Vasily Kuznetsov also suggested that Khrushchev respond with a troop build-up around Berlin.13 Years later, in hissmuggled-out memoirs, Khrushchev blustered that during the crisis, “The Americans knew that if Russian blood were shed in Cuba,American blood would be shed in Germany.”14 But in fact Khrushchev acted cautiously with regard to Berlin and rejected suggestionsto mass Soviet forces around the city.

Instead, a different Berlin connection seems to emerge from the Russian documents—that Soviet leaders had, in September and


early October 1962, deliberately floated the idea of an imminent intensive diplomatic effort (or possibly a renewed superpower show-down) on Berlin, to take place in late November after the U.S. Congressional mid-term elections, in order to distract American attentionfrom Cuba long enough to allow Moscow to complete its secret missile deployment. Such is, at any rate, the strategy that AnastasMikoyan privately described to Fidel Castro and the Cuban leadership on 4 November 1962 (published in Bulletin 5) as the one theKremlin had followed in the weeks and months preceding the crisis: “We let the Americans know that we wanted to solve the question ofBerlin in the nearest future. This was done in order to distract their attention away from Cuba. So, we used a diversionary maneuver. Inreality, we had no intention of resolving the Berlin question at that time.”15 In the memorandum of the Gromyko-Kennedy conversationon October 18, one can see the Soviet Foreign Minister dangling the Berlin bait, suggesting that a summit meeting between Kennedy andKhrushchev take place in the United States “in the second half of November”—when Khrushchev would attend a session of the U.N.General Assembly—”in order to discuss the issues that separate [the USA and USSR] and first of all the questions of the German peacetreaty and West Berlin.”16 Gromyko’s message, in turn, came on the heels of a letter from Khrushchev to Kennedy dated 28 September1962 threatening to sign a German peace treaty—the same vow that had triggered the Berlin Crisis in November 1958, for it implied anagreement between Moscow and East Berlin that would cut off Western access to West Berlin—but grandly (and ominously) informingKennedy that in deference to the passions of American domestic politics, “we decided to put the German problem, so to say, on ice untilthe end of the elections” and will “do nothing with regard to West Berlin until the elections ... [afterwards], apparently in the second halfof November, it would be necessary in our opinion to continue the dialogue.”17 “Some sort of crisis relating to Berlin is clearly brewingnow, and we will have to see whether we can surmount it without recourse to military action,” Dobrynin quoted Kennedy as saying in abackground meeting with reporters on October 16 in a cable to Moscow three days later.18 On the same day, with evident satisfaction,Gromyko reported to the CPSU CC after his conversation with Kennedy that in recent days “the sharpness of the anti-Cuban campaign inthe USA has subsided somewhat while the sharpness of the West Berlin question has stood out all the more. Newspapers bleat about theapproaching crisis vis-a-vis West Berlin, the impending in the very near future of a [Soviet treaty] with the GDR, and so on.” Gromykoeven detected a White House-inspired propaganda campaign “to divert public attention from the Cuba issue.”19

Only afterward did Mikoyan, at least, realize that at the October 18 encounter Kennedy had been playing along with Gromyko justas Gromyko had been deceiving him—as soon as they discovered the missiles, he related to Castro, they “began crying about Berlin,” andboth the Soviet Union and United States were talking about the Berlin Crisis but simultaneously knew that the real crisis was about toerupt in Cuba.20

Soviet Perceptions of Washington During the Crisis

While evidence (such as Politburo minutes) necessary to judge the evolution of Kremlin perceptions of Kennedy during the crisis isstill lacking, and intelligence assessments remain off-limits, the reports of USSR Ambassador in Washington Dobrynin between 22 and28 October that have emerged thus far raise some interesting questions about the accuracy and impact of Soviet reporting on its “mainenemy” at a critical moment. How is one to evaluate, for example, a cable sent over Dobrynin’s name on 25 October 1962 relaying gossiparound the bar of the Washington Press Club at 3 o’clock in the morning to the effect that Kennedy had “supposedly taken a decision toinvade Cuba” that night or the next one? Of similarly questionable accuracy was Dobrynin’s “line-up” of hawks and doves within theKennedy Administration as reported (without giving sources) in a cable of 25 October—listing Robert Kennedy, McNamara, NationalSecurity Adviser McGeorge Bundy and the military as the most ardent supporters of an attack on Cuba, and Secretary of State Dean G.Rusk and Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon as holding a more “restrained” and “cautious” position; actually, although almost all mem-bers of the Excomm shifted their positions during the “13 Days” of the crisis, some more than once, Robert Kennedy and McNamara hadbeen among the less militant, preferring a blockade to an immediate airstrike, while Dillon had more frequently sympathized withmilitary action. Perhaps most interesting, though, in this assessment is the Soviet diplomat’s jaundiced view of John F. Kennedy, who isdescribed as a “hot-tempered gambler” who might be tempted into an “adventurist step” because his reputation, political future, and 1964re-election had been put at stake.21

Many other interesting details emerge from Dobrynin’s accounts—above all the evolution of his back-channel relationship withRobert F. Kennedy, the president’s brother and Attorney General (see box)—but perhaps most interesting are the possibilities suchdocuments offer for reassessing with far more precision how nuclear adversaries perceive (and misperceive) each other during crises.

At the United Nations

The documents from the United Nations also permit a much fuller analysis of the difficult U.S.-Soviet negotiations in New York towork out the terms to resolve the crisis, particularly in combination with the large amount of American documents on the talks betweenMcCloy and various Soviet envoys that have been declassified by the State Department in recent years.22 Issues dealt with at lengthinclude the terms of verifying the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba, haggling over which Soviet weapons should be removedunder the rubric of “offensive” weapons, and a good deal of give-and-take over the basic divisions between the United States and Cuba.One dog that did not bark in New York City was that of U.S. withdrawal of Jupiter missiles from Turkey—a subject that was covered ina special understanding reached between Robert Kennedy and Dobrynin in Washington—and one finds (on November 1) a firm instruc-tion from Gromyko in Moscow to “Comrades” Kuznetsov and Zorin “not in any circumstances” to touch on the Turkish issue (despite its


having been raised only days earlier in Khrushchev’s public October 27 letter to Kennedy), “since it is the subject of direct negotiationsbetween Washington and Moscow.”

The documents also permit a far fuller analysis of the role of the United Nations, and particularly Acting Secretary General U Thant,in trying to navigate a delicate neutral role between the superpowers and actively seeking a United Nations role in the resolution of thecrisis. Writing both Khrushchev and Kennedy to propose compromise measures to assuage the crisis, traveling to Cuba to seek Castro’sapproval for UN inspection of the missile removals, negotiating with Mikoyan, Kuznetsov, and Zorin over the mechanisms to concludethe dispute, U Thant emerges as a fuller figure, particularly as the Soviets courted his support (by backing his inspection plan) even at theprice of additional tensions with Havana.

Soviet-Cuban (and Khrushchev-Castro) Tensions

The reports of Soviet envoys’ reports dealing with Cuba, particularly those of USSR ambassador Alekseev in Havana, add to theemerging story of differences between Khrushchev and Castro that has long been known of in general but which became far more vividand concrete with the appearance, first, of the third volume of Khrushchev’s posthumously-published tape-recorded memoirs in 1990,23

followed by the release later that year of the Castro-Khrushchev correspondence at the height of the crisis,24 and finally, in January 1992,with the holding of an oral history conference on the crisis in Havana with Castro’s enthusiastic participation.25

From a peak of ostensible revolutionary solidarity in the early days of the crisis, Soviet-Cuban ties became strained as the crisis woreon by a series of disagreements—from Moscow’s concern that Cuban zeal (reflected in the shooting down of an American U-2 plane onOctober 27) might provoke a U.S. invasion, to Khrushchev’s belief (hotly disputed by Castro) that the Cuban leader had advocated arecourse to nuclear war (if the U.S. attacked Cuba) in his cable to Khrushchev on October 26, to Khrushchev’s failure to consult withCastro before agreeing to Kennedy’s terms for withdrawing the missiles on October 28, to a dispute over whether to permit UN inspec-tion of Soviet ships in Cuban ports to verify the withdrawal of missiles, to a Cuban anger over Moscow’s succumbing to Washington’sdemand to pull out Soviet IL-28 bombers as well as the nuclear missiles.

The alarming reports received by Moscow from its envoy in Havana helped lead Khrushchev to dispatch his trusted trouble-shooter,

MORE ON BOBBY AND THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

by Jim HershbergIn accounts of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Robert F. Kennedy—the Attorney General and brother to President John F.

Kennedy—has occupied a singular place, and not merely because his posthumously-published memoir, Thirteen Days,became a best-selling (and sometimes controversial) account of the crisis as well as a unique portrait of what it felt like tobe a high-level decision-maker looking down the gun barrel of nuclear war.1 RFK also garners special attention for his keyrole at two particular points in the crisis. One came early on, in the secret debates in the White House “Excomm” (Execu-tive Committee) after the missiles were discovered in mid-October, when he ardently opposed a surprise U.S. air strikeagainst the sites under construction in Cuba, likening such an action to Pearl Harbor (“I now know how Tojo felt,” he notedat one point in the debate) and condemning it as morally unworthy; the argument helped turn the tide in the debate awayfrom an air strike and toward a blockade or “quarantine,” which Kennedy announced to the world on October 22. Thesecond key moment came at the climax of the crisis, on Saturday evening, October 27, with Moscow and Washingtonseemingly on a collision course, when Robert Kennedy met secretly with Dobrynin at the Justice Department and the twomen hammered out the terms of a secret arrangement whereby the Attorney General conveyed his brother’s oral pledge thatWashington would quickly pull its Jupiter missiles out of Turkey, as Khrushchev had publicly proposed earlier that day, solong as the Soviets removed their own missiles from Cuba and kept quiet about the Turkish aspect of the deal.2

Recently-released Russian archival documents, published in English translation in the Cold War International HistoryProject Bulletin (the present issue and no. 5, Spring 1995), shed additional light on Robert F. Kennedy’s actions during thecrisis, particularly his back-channel contacts with Soviet ambassador Dobrynin. This article seeks to note briefly some ofthese new findings, and also appends Robert F. Kennedy’s own declassified memorandum of the controversial 27 October1962 encounter with Dobrynin to supplement the Dobrynin’s version (and other accounts) published in the Bulletin in early1995.3 (The Bulletin thanks Prof. Peter Roman of Duquesne University for providing this document.)

First worth noting from Dobrynin’s cables is his initial impression of Robert Kennedy as a hardliner and “hot-head,”driven by political ambition, liable to support impulsive actions, and hardly a character one would predict that Dobryninwould end up collaborating with to resolve the crisis. This is not altogether surprising given the contentiousness of theissues, the combativeness of Robert Kennedy’s personality, and the fact that President Kennedy had used his brother totransmit personally to Dobrynin on 4 September 1962 a strong message of concern regarding Soviet military aid to Cuba.Moreover, in Dobrynin’s cabled report of his first meeting with Robert Kennedy during the crisis, late on the evening ofOctober 23 (the night after the president’s speech), RFK’s deep anger and sense of personal betrayal toward Khrushchev

continued on page 344


Anastas Mikoyan, to smooth the Cubans’ ruffled feathers, and the Soviet records of Mikoyan’s conversations with Cuban leaders in earlyNovember 1962, published in Bulletin 5, dramatically reveal the emotional rift which had emerged between the two communist allies.26

(Cuban authorities subsequently released their own minutes of two of those conversations, which are printed below; see box.)The Alekseev cables printed in the current Bulletin, when read in conjunction with the other sources noted above (particularly the

Castro-Khrushchev correspondence) helps show how these tensions developed. On October 23 and 25, as the crisis mounted, Alekseevsent highly positive reports on the Cuban people’s “calm,” confidence, and preparedness for military confrontation, even noting that theimminent danger had prompted a “special business-like efficiency and energy” that had even dispelled the “ostentation and verbosity thatare characteristic of Cubans.” In the second of the aforementioned cables, however, a glimmer of disagreement appears when Alekseevstates that Castro “approves of our policy of not giving in to provocations, and [avoiding] unnecessary conflicts,” yet at the same time“expressed a belief in the necessity of shooting down one or two piratic American [reconnaissance] planes over Cuban territory.” An-other potential disagreement begins to surface when U Thant explores using Cuban President Oswaldo Dorticos’ proposal to the UNGeneral Assembly of October 8—in which the Cuban said a guaranteed U.S. pledge of non-aggression against Cuba would remove theneed for Cuban military preparations; while Moscow echoed this formulation in Khrushchev’s secret October 26 letter to Kennedy, theCubans were now deeply distrustful that such a promise could be trusted.

By October 27, a new fissure had opened up over Khrushchev’s public letter that day to Kennedy, which for the first time raised thepossibility of a trade of Soviet missiles in Cuba for U.S. Jupiter missiles in Turkey—an idea raised without regard to the sensibilities ofthe Cubans, who thought they had an iron-clad agreement with Moscow to deploy the missiles that could not be “swapped” for Americanmissiles elsewhere in the world. When Gromyko dispatched a message to Castro through the Soviet Embassy in Havana informing himthat it would be “advisable” for him to quickly endorse Khrushchev’s letter to Kennedy, Castro responded via Alekseev complimentingKhrushchev’s “great diplomatic skill” but also noting that it had provoked “symptoms of a certain confusion in various sectors of theCuban population and among some members of the military,” who were asking “whether it constitutes a rejection by the USSR of itsformer obligations.” Castro also defended the downing of the American U-2 that day, brushing aside Alekseev’s admonition not to“aggravate the situation and initiate provocations.”

On the following day, October 28, Cuban anger deepened as Moscow and Washington settled the crisis over their heads, and to addinsult to injury Moscow began pressuring Castro to agree to allow United Nations inspectors to examine the Soviet missile sites on theisland to verify that work had stopped. “Confusion and bewilderment are reigning inside the Cuban leadership” as a result of Khrushchev’sagreement to dismantle the missiles, Dorticos told Alekseev, adding that “under the present conditions of great patriotic enthusiasm of ourpeople this report would be perceived by the infinitely electrified masses as a cold shower.” Alekseev’s excuses that technical problemshad delayed the sending to Havana of an advance copy of Khrushchev’s letter to Kennedy—which had been read out over Moscow Radiobefore Castro (let alone Kennedy) received a copy—made hardly a dent in the “picture of incomprehension” painted by another seniorofficial, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez.

In subsequent days, as Castro and Khrushchev jousted in their correspondence and Cuban forces continued to fire on American U-2 planes, the Soviets implored the Cubans to display “self-restraint” and not take actions that could “give the aggressors a pretext toblame our side,” and vainly reiterated that “we consider it necessary” to satisfy U Thant’s desire to have the UN conduct on-site inspec-tions on Cuban territory—a demand Castro and the Cuban leadership angrily rejected in an open show of defiance.

But it was Khrushchev’s letter of October 30 that sent Castro’s anger to an even higher pitch; in it the Soviet leader acknowl-edged that “some Cubans” wished that he had not declared his willingness to withdraw the nuclear missiles, but that the alternativewould have been to “be carried away by certain passionate sectors of the population and [to have] refused to come to a reasonablesettlement with the U.S. government,” leading to a war in which millions would have died; Khrushchev also said he had viewedCastro’s cable of October 26 “with extreme alarm,” considering “incorrect” its proposal that the Soviet Union “be the first to launch anuclear strike against the territory of the enemy [in response to a non-nuclear U.S. invasion of Cuba] ... Rather than a simple strike, itwould have been the start of thermonuclear war.”27

Reading the letter “attentively,” as described in Alekseev’s report of the meeting (printed below), Castro had only two, terseresponses: there were not merely “some” Cuban comrades who failed to understand Khrushchev’s position, “but the whole Cubanpeople”—and as for the second item, Castro denied proposing that Khrushchev be “the first in delivering a blow against the adversaryterritory,” only in the event that Cuba had been attacked and Cubans and Soviets were dying together; perhaps Khrushchev misunder-stood or the translation was in error. Alekseev, unfazed, not only defended the translation but made it clear that Khrushchev hadunderstood him all too well—”even in this case [of aggression],” the Soviet envoy admonished Castro, “it is hardly possible merely toapproach mechanically such an important issue and to use nuclear arms without looking for other means.” The message: just as WestEuropeans had cause to wonder whether Americans would “trade New York for Hamburg,” linking local to strategic deterrence, theCubans were sadly mistaken if they believed Moscow was ready to undertake global thermonuclear war—with the suicidal conse-quences that entailed—in defense of the Cuban Revolution.

1 Books that have appeared on the crisis in English in recent years incorporating newly-available evidence include: James G. Blight and David A. Welch,

On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. (New York: Noonday, 1990); James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and

David A. Welch, Cuba On the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse (New York: Pantheon, 1993); James A. Nathan, ed., The Cuban

Missile Crisis Revisited (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992); Laurence Chang and Peter Kornbluh, eds., The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A National


Security Archive Documents Reader (New York: New Press, 1992); Robert Smith Thompson, The Missiles of October: The Declassified Story of John F.

Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992); Mary S. McAuliffe, ed., CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis

(Washington, DC: CIA History Staff, October 1992); Gen. Anatoli I. Gribkov and Gen. William Y. Smith, Operation ANADYR: U.S. and Soviet Generals

Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis (Chicago: Edition Q, 1994); and Dino A. Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis,

updated ed. (New York: Random House, 1990, 1991, [1992?]). The volume of Foreign Relations of the United States covering the crisis, previously

scheduled for publication in 1993, had still not appeared as of the end of 1996, but should include additional declassified U.S. documentation when it

appears; mention should be made, however, of a FRUS volume that appeared in 1996 compiling Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence and communica-

tions during the Kennedy Administration: U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol. VI: Kennedy-Khrushchev

Exchanges (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996). The National Security Archive, a non-governmental research institute and declassified

documents repository located at the Gelman Library at George Washington University in Washington, D.C., published a microfiche collection of declas-

sified documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1992 and maintains files of additional documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act that

are available for scholarly research.2 In Cold War International History Project Bulletin 1 (Spring 1992), see Raymond L. Garthoff, “The Havana Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis,”

pp. 2-4; in Cold War International History Project Bulletin 3 (Fall 1993), see Mark Kramer, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Soviet Command Authority, and

the Cuban Missile Crisis,” pp. 40, 42-46; and James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch, “KRAMER VS. KRAMER: Or, How Can You Have

Revisionism in the Absence of Orthodoxy?” pp. 41, 47-50; in Cold War International History Project Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), see Philip Brenner and

James G. Blight, “Cuba, 1962: The Crisis and Cuban-Soviet Relations: Fidel Castro’s Secret 1968 Speech,” pp. 1, 81-85; Alexander Fursenko and Timothy

Naftali, “Using KGB Documents: The Scali-Feklisov Channel in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” pp. 58, 60-62; Raymond L. Garthoff, intro., “Russian Foreign

Ministry Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis,” pp. 58, 63-77; Vladislav M. Zubok, “`Dismayed by the Actions of the Soviet Union’: Mikoyan’s talks

with Fidel Castro and the Cuban leadership, November 1962,” pp. 59, 89-92, 93-109, 159; Mark Kramer, “The `Lessons’ of the Cuban Missile Crisis for

Warsaw Pact Nuclear Operations,” pp. 59, 110, 112-115, 160 (see corrected version in this issue); Jim Hershberg, “Anatomy of a Controversy: Anatoly F.

Dobrynin’s Meeting With Robert F. Kennedy, Saturday, 27 October 1962,” pp. 75, 77-80; and Georgy Shakhnazarov, “Fidel Castro, Glasnost, and the

Caribbean Crisis,” pp. 83, 87-89.3 Although it appears that verbatim records of meetings of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) Politburo may

not exist for this period, the declassification of notes of Kremlin discussions concerning the 1956 Polish and Hungarian Crises, taken by V.M. Malin,

prompts hope that similar materials may soon become available in Moscow. A full report on the Malin notes on the 1956 crises, translated, introduced, and

annotated by Mark Kramer, appears elsewhere in this Bulletin.4 For Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence, see FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. VI: Kennedy-Khrushchev Exchanges, cited above, which includes many ex-

changes during the missile crisis declassified by the U.S. government in 1991 in response to a Freedom of Information Act filed by the National Security

Archive; these were first published in a special Spring 1992 issue of Problems of Communism. Correspondence between Castro and Khrushchev during

the crisis was published in November 1990 in the Cuban Communist Party newspaper Granma; an English translation can be found in an appendix of

Blight, Allyn, and Welch, Cuba On the Brink, 474-491.5 On the Soviet military during the crisis, see Gribkov and Smith, Operation ANADYR, cited above; Soviet military evidence on the crisis was also

presented in a conference in Moscow in September 1994 organized by the then-head of the Russian Archival Service, R. Pikhoia.6 See Alekseev to Foreign Ministry, 7 September 1962, in CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), 63.7 Telegram from Gromyko to Foreign Ministry, 19 October 1962, CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), 66-67.8 James G. Hershberg, “Before `The Missiles of October’: Did Kennedy Plan a Military Strike Against Cuba?” in Nathan, ed., The Cuban Missile Crisis

Revisited, 237-280, a slightly revised version of an article that appeared in Diplomatic History 14 (Spring 1990), 163-198.9 “Notes Taken from Transcripts of Meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, October-November 1962, dealing with the Cuban Missile Crisis (handwritten

notes were made in 1976 and typed in 1993),” released under the Freedom of Information Act, copy made available by National Security Archive.10 Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 1981, “Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Historical Study: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and US

Military Responses to the Threat of Castro’s Cuba,” pp. 11-12; the report, formerly Top Secret, was declassified on 7 May 1996 and released under the

Freedom of Information Act; a copy was made available courtesy of the National Security Archive.11 In correspondence between the JCS and the National Archives in 1993, subsequently obtained and made available to CWIHP by William Burr of the

National Security Archive, the JCS acknowledged that in August 1974, the Secretary, JCS had decided to destroy systematically all transcripts of JCS

meetings between 1947 and 1974, as well as subsequent meetings after a six-month waiting period. (August 1974 was, coincidentally or not, the month

that Richard M. Nixon resigned the presidency in part, many said, due to his failure to destroy the Watergate tapes.) This reason given for this action was

that the transcripts “did not constitute official minutes of the meetings but were merely working papers reflecting the reporter’s version of events.” In

1978, the JCS communication to the National Archives noted, “The practice of recording the meetings terminated in August of 1978 and all materials were

subsequently destroyed.”

The only exception to this destruction of records, it was reported, was that the JCS History Office took “notes (approximately 30 typed pages) from

selected transcripts relating to the Cuban Missile Crisis and various other crises through the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war”—hence the notation on the

top of the Cuban Missile Crisis notes in which the McNamara quotation appears that they were “handwritten notes were made in 1976 and typed in 1993.”

The letter from the JCS to the National Archives reads as follows:

The Joint Staff

Washington, D.C. 20318-0400


January 25, 1993

Mr. James J. Hastings

Director

Records Appraisal and Disposition Division

National Archives

Washington, DC 20408

Dear Mr. Hastings:

This responds to your letter seeking information concerning the destruction of recorded minutes of the meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff referred

to in an article by the Deputy Chief of the Joint Staff History Office which you forwarded me as an enclosure.

The minutes of the meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were recorded in various forms from 1947 to 1978. In August of 1974 the Secretary, Joint

Chiefs of Staff determined that the transcripts generated did not constitute official minutes of the meetings but were merely working papers reflecting the

reporter’s version of events. Accordingly, the Secretary ordered the destruction of virtually all transcripts over six months old after screening for historical

significance. He also directed that all future minutes/transcripts, with minor exceptions, would be destroyed at the six month point. The practice of

recording the meetings terminated in August of 1978 and all materials were subsequently destroyed. However, it should be noted all of these actions were

taken prior to approval of the first Joint Chiefs of Staff records disposition schedule by the Archivists of the United States on 11 December 1980.

The Joint Staff History Office did take notes (approximately 30 typed pages) from selected transcripts relating to the Cuban Missile Crisis and

various other crises through the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war. The Joint Staff concurs with your determination that these notes are records under File

Number 00-1 of JAI 5760.2F and will accession them into the National Archives at the appropriate time.

Any further questions you have regarding this matter may be directed to Mr. Sterling Smith on (703) 697-6906.

Sincerely,

/s/ EDMUND F. McBRIDEChief, Documents Division

Joint Secretariat12 Telegram from Dobrynin to Soviet Foreign Ministry, 23 October 1962, CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), 70-71.13 Interview with Georgy Kornienko, cited in Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev

(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 260, 266.14 Khrushchev Remembers, intro., commentary, and notes by Edward Crankshaw, trans. and ed. by Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970; citation

from New York: Bantam Books paperback ed., 1971), 555.15 Mikoyan-Castro conversation, 4 November 1962, CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), 96; see also the Cuban version printed in this Bulletin.16 See excerpts from Gromyko-Kennedy conversation printed below; the document released by the Russian Foreign Ministry archives omits the section

of the record dealing specifically with the Berlin question, but the American record appears in U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. XV: Berlin

Crisis 1962-1963 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1994), 370-376. On the Berlin-Cuba connection, see Thomas A. Schwartz, “The Berlin

Crisis and the Cold War,” Diplomatic History 21:1 (Winter 1997), 143-144.17 Khrushchev to Kennedy, 28 September 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. VI: Kennedy-Khrushchev Exchanges, 152-161.18 Dobrynin to Foreign Ministry, 19 October 1962, published in this issue.19 Telegram from Gromyko to CC CPSU, 19 October 1962, CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), 66-67.20 Mikoyan-Castro conversation, 4 November 1962, CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), 97.21 For Dobrynin’s own recollections of the crisis, see Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War Presidents

(1962-1986) (New York: Times Books, 1995), 71-95.22 Much of this documentation was declassified as a result of Freedom of Information Act requests filed by the National Security Archive and is available

for research there. Many of the most important documents on the negotiations should appear in forthcoming FRUS volumes dealing with the Cuban

Missile Crisis and U.S.-Soviet relations during the Kennedy Administration23 Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes, trans. and ed. by Jerrold L. Schecter with Vyacheslav V. Luchkov (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co.,

1990), esp. 161-183.24 See fn. 4, above.25 See Blight, Allyn, and Welch, Cuba On the Brink, passim.26 See Zubok, “`Dismayed by the Actions of the Soviet Union’: Mikoyan’s talks with Fidel Castro and the Cuban leadership, November 1962,” CWIHP

Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995). 59, 89-92, 93-109, 159, for records of Mikoyan-Cuban talks on 3-5 November 1962, and Gribkov and Smith, Operation

ANADYR, 189-190, 191-199, for Mikoyan’s conversation with Castro on 12 November 1962.27 Khrushchev to Castro, 30 October 1962, English translation in Blight, Allyn, and Welch, Cuba On the Brink, 485-488.


RUSSIAN DOCUMENTSON THE

CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

I. BEFORE THE CRISIS:14 SEPTEMBER-21 OCTOBER 1962

M. Zakharov and S. P. Ivanov to N.S. Khrushchev, 14 September 1962

Personal memorandum to N. S. Khrushchev

The USA is conducting intensive airand naval patrols around Cuba, giving spe-cial attention to the reconnaissance of So-viet vessels.

The head of the Cuban counterrevolu-tionaries, Juan Manuel Salvat, announcedin a press conference on September 7 thatany vessel sailing under a Communist flagin Cuban territorial waters, regardless of itsnationality, will be considered a military tar-get and subject to attack without warning.

At present, Soviet vessels approachingthe island of Cuba are systematically sub-jected to air-patrols by USA planes. In Sep-tember of this year as many as 50 cases wererecorded of Soviet vessels being air-pa-trolled. The patrols were carried out at criti-cally dangerous altitudes (50-100 meters).

With the aim of ensuring the safety ofour vessels from acts of piracy on the partof Americans and Cuban counterrevolution-aries, we ask to authorize the following:

1. On every transport vessel bound forCuba with personnel and arms for one unit(of a formation), to place for self-defense,above and beyond each ship’s own arma-ments, two 23 mm. anti-aircraft combina-tion gun-mounts with a reserve supply of 2complements (2,400 missiles) for each gun-mount. These gun-mounts are found on thearms of the airborne-landing forces, and theyare a powerful strategic tool both for air tar-gets at distances of up to 2,500 meters atheights of up to 1,500 meters, as well as forlight-armoured naval targets at distances ofup to 2,000 meters. On practice shootingsthe gun-mount has penetrated armour-plat-ing 25 mm. thick. The gun-mount requiresa three-man crew. All in all it is necessaryto arm 34 vessels.

2. To confirm instructions given to thecaptain of the vessel and the head of themilitary echelon regarding the defense oftransport vessels crossing the sea againstacts of piracy committed by airplanes, ships,

and submarines belonging to the USA andto the Cuban counterrevolutionaries.

M. ZakharovS. P. Ivanov

14 September 1962

[Source: Central Archive of the Ministry ofDefense (TsAMO), Moscow; copy providedto CWIHP by R. Pikhoia at September 1994Moscow Conference, and on file at NationalSecurity Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans-lation by John Hendriksen, Harvard Uni-versity.]

Cable from USSR Ambassador to theUSA A.F. Dobrynin to Soviet Foreign

Ministry, 15 October 1962

According to separate confidential re-ports, the piratic raids by the so-called “Al-pha 66” group on the Cuban coast and onseveral vessels near Cuba are being carriedout not from a base on the American main-land, but rather directly from the sea, fromAmerican landing ships carrying the corre-sponding cutters. The crews of these cut-ters are dispatched directly onto these shipsby helicopters in the possession of the Cu-ban members of the group “Alpha 66,” whoare based in Miami, Puerto Rico, and theYucatan.

The American ships carrying these cut-ters maintain a constant readiness for mili-tary action, and meticulously care for thetechnical condition of the cutters, perform-ing repairs in the case of damage. Duringthis time, the American instructors on theseships direct the training, both tactical andotherwise, of the Cuban crews who carryout operations directly on the cutters.

This sort of tactic allows the Ameri-can forces to assert that the cutters belong-ing to the “Alpha 66” group are not actingfrom a base within USA territory, but fromsome “unknown bases.” As far as the Ameri-can vessels carrying the cutters are con-cerned, the Central Intelligence Agency ofthe USA, which to judge from all availableinformation is directing all these operations,is counting on the fact that detecting andidentifying this sort of vessel will not beeasy, since there is a lively traffic of Ameri-can vessels between Florida and the Ameri-can base Guantanamo in Cuba.

15.X.62 A. DOBRYNIN

[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, RussianFederation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy ob-tained by NHK (Japanese Television), pro-vided to CWIHP, and on file at NationalSecurity Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans-lation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univer-sity.]

Cable from USSR Ambassador to theUSA A.F. Dobrynin to Soviet Foreign


At a closed conference taking place on16 October for the editors and leading cor-respondents of the American press, radio,and television, to provide information on theevaluation of the current international situ-ation and the USA’s official position in it,President Kennedy spoke. This speech wasgiven exclusively for the personal edifica-tion of those present, and it was denied allpublication rights.

The content of the President’s speechcame down to the following.

The government’s duty is to seek outglobal solutions to the global problems fac-ing the USA. There was once a time whenwar could be seen as an acceptable exten-sion of politics, but nuclear war in its ex-treme form cannot be seen as such, since itwould lead to huge destruction and the lossof millions of lives in the countries takingpart in it. The USA must learn to acceptand live in the current conditions of directconfrontation between the USA and theUSSR, and between Communism’s strivingsfor expansion and the USA’s strivings tosupport the sort of alignment of forces thatallows the free nations to thrive, and thatallows the USA in particular to safeguardits own interests. In similar situations ear-lier, the result of such confrontation has al-ways been war—but now the question ishow we can get through this period withoutwar and, especially importantly, withoutnuclear war.

Some sort of crisis relating to Berlin isclearly brewing now, and we will have tosee whether we can surmount it without re-course to military action. There are no signsthat the Russians are preparing to soften theirdemands with regard to Berlin; they wantus either to get out of there, or to share withthem our rights in West Berlin. They wouldlike to start a chain reaction that would ulti-mately lead to the elimination of Americanpositions in West Berlin and many other


places. The USA is determined not to let thishappen. It cannot be allowed to occur. TheWest’s presence in Berlin and its access tothe city represent, as before, vitally impor-tant interests, and no concessions with re-gard to them can or will be made to Sovietpressure, whatever form that pressure maytake. The problem now consists of the factthat we both have locked horns [in confron-tation—ed.].

Nuclear war may be an irrational phe-nomenon, but there is more to it than this,since recognizing it as irrational does notnecessarily signify being saved from it. Ifboth sides come to the negotiating table withan absolute certainty that the other side willin no circumstances have recourse to nuclearwar, then that would be one of the surestpaths toward such a war, because one sideor the other could go one step further andapply a pressure beyond what the other sideis able to put up with, and for all intents andpurposes we would be heading for catastro-phe.

In government circles there is a feel-ing that we quite possibly have some diffi-cult weeks and months ahead of us due toBerlin, and that a crisis of the first order mayarise before Christmas.

With Cuba the situation is different.Berlin is a vitally important issue for bothsides, and the fundamental positions of bothsides with regard to it remain inflexible.Latin American is another vitally importantregion. Berlin and Latin America are twodangerous regions. No [U.S.] military ac-tions concerning Cuba could be or shouldbe undertaken until there are signs of overtCuban aggression against the countries ofthe Western hemisphere. Cuba should be andis now under close observation, and the USAhas been kept informed of what is happen-ing there. The USA’s policy consists, as be-fore, in ensuring that the maintenance ofCuba be as expensive as possible both forthe USSR and for Castro’s regime. It ap-pears unlikely that the USSR could affordto invest funds in Cuba that would be suffi-cient to meet Cuba’s actual and long-termneeds. Only the USA alone had a billion-dollar trade with Cuba before the Castrorevolution.

According to the American govern-ment’s calculations, there are currently inCuba around five thousand Russian militaryspecialists. One must suppose that the Rus-sians are sufficiently experienced people to

understand that the military equipmentwhich they are supplying to Cuba, or cansupply in the future, would make little dif-ference if the USA were to consider itselfforced to take military action against it. Theyhave enough experience as well in EastGermany and the Eastern European coun-tries to recognize the limits of their capaci-ties to revitalize and strengthen the Cubaneconomy, especially bearing in mind thedistances involved. Meanwhile the LatinAmerican countries have taken measurestowards isolating Cuba and condemning tofailure the Communists’ attempts to spreadtheir system throughout the other countriesof the Western hemisphere.

There can be no talk of a recognitionby the United States of some Cuban gov-ernment in exile, since that step could freethe current Cuban regime from the obliga-tions fixed by treaty toward Guantanamobase and American citizens in Cuba.

There can be no deal struck with theUSSR regarding its renunciation of basesin Cuba in exchange for the USA’s renun-ciation of bases in other parts of the world(in Turkey, for example). It is necessary totreat Cuba in such a way as to advance ourcause in the general battle into which theUSA has been drawn. The strategy and tac-tics of the USA should be defined by con-siderations of the defense of its vital inter-ests and its security not only in connectionwith the Cuban situation, but also in con-nection with other more serious threats.

The preceding is communicated byway of information.

19.X.62 A. DOBRYNIN


Cable from Soviet Foreign MinisterGromyko on 18 October 1962 meetingwith President Kennedy, 20 October

1962 (excerpts)

During the meeting with PresidentKennedy at the White House on 18 OctoberI transmitted to him, his spouse and othermembers of his family regards from the head

of the Soviet government N.S. Khrushchevand from Nina Petrovna.

Kennedy expressed his gratitude toN.S. Khrushchev for the regards.

Further I said that I would like to givean account of the Soviet government policyon a number of important issues.

[section deleted—trans.]Now I would like to expound the So-

viet government’s position on the Cubanissue and the USSR’s assessment of the ac-tions of the USA.

The Soviet government stands for thepeaceful coexistence of states with differ-ent social systems, against the interferenceof one state into the internal affairs of oth-ers, against the intervention of large statesinto the affairs of small countries. Liter-ally, that is the core of the Soviet Union’sforeign policy.

It is well known to you, Mr. President,the attitude of the Soviet government andpersonally of N.S. Khrushchev toward thedangerous developments connected with theUSA administration position on the issue ofCuba. An unrestrained anti-Cuban cam-paign has been going on in the USA for along time and apparently there is a definiteUSA administration policy behind it. Rightnow the USA are making an attempt toblockade Cuban trade with other states.There is talk about a possibility of actionsof organized policy in this region under theUSA aegis.

But all of this amounts to a path thatcan lead to grave consequences, to a mis-fortune for all mankind, and we are confi-dent that such an outcome is not desired byany people, including the people of the USA.

The USA administration for some rea-son considers that the Cubans must solvetheir domestic affairs not at their discretion,but at the discretion of the USA. But onwhat grounds? Cuba belongs to the Cubanpeople, not to the USA or any other state.And since it is so, then why are the state-ments made in the USA calling for an inva-sion of Cuba? What do the USA need Cubafor?

Who can in earnest believe that Cubarepresents a threat to the USA? If we speakabout dimensions and resources of the twocountries - the USA and Cuba - then it isclear that they are a giant and a baby. Theflagrant groundlessness of such chargesagainst Cuba is obvious.

Cuba does not represent, and cannot


represent, any threat to the countries of LatinAmerica. It is strange to think as if smallCuba can encroach on the independence ofeither this or that country of Latin America.Cuban leaders and personally Fidel Castrohave declared more than once in front ofthe whole world and in a most solemn man-ner that Cuba does not intend to impose theirsystem, that they firmly favor the non-in-terference of states into the internal affairsof each other.

The people who call for an aggressionagainst Cuba allege that, they say, it is notsufficient to have those statements of theCuban government, though those statementsare supported by deeds. But by that what-ever aggressive action or adventure can bejustified. Solutions of almost all the inter-national issues are results, you know, ofstatements, dictums, or negotiations be-tween states, in the course of which corre-sponding governments give an account oftheir positions on either these or those ques-tions, as for example takes place now dur-ing the conversations that we have with theUSA administration. But does the USA ad-ministration not believe the statements ofthe Cuban government? Really, is it notconvincing when the Cuban governmentofficially declares its aspiration to settle alldisputed questions with the USA adminis-tration by means of negotiations? In thisregard may be quoted the well-known state-ment made by Mr. [Oswaldo] Dorticos,President of the Republic of Cuba, duringthe current session of the UN General As-sembly, a statement of which the USA Presi-dent is undoubtedly aware.1

The Cubans want to make secure theirown home, their independence. They ap-peal for reason, for conscience. They callon the USA to renounce encroachmentsupon the independence of Cuba, to estab-lish normal relations with the Cuban state.

The question is: Is it worthwhile towhip up a campaign and organize differentsorts of hostile activity around Cuba and atthe same time inimical actions against thosestates which maintain good relations withCuba, respect its independence, and lendCuba a helping hand at a difficult moment?Is it not a destruction of international law,of the UN principles and purposes?

Is it possible, Mr. President, for theSoviet Union, taking into account all of this,to sit cross-handed and to be a detachedonlooker? You say that you like frankness.

Giving an account of the Soviet governmentposition frankly as well, I would like tostress that nowadays is not the middle ofthe XIX century, is not the time of colonialpartition and not the times when a victim ofaggression could raise its voice only weeksand months after an assault. Americanstatesmen frequently declare that the USAis a great power. This is correct, the USA isa great power, a rich and strong power. Andwhat kind of power is the Soviet Union?

You know that N.S. Khrushchev waspositively impressed by your realistic state-ment during the Vienna meeting about theequality of forces of the two powers—theUSSR and USA. But insofar as it is so, in-asmuch as the USSR is also a great andstrong power it cannot be a mere spectatorwhile there is appearing a threat of unleash-ing a large war either in connection with theCuban issue or [with a] situation in what-ever other region of the world.

You are very well aware of the Sovietgovernment attitude toward such an actionof the USA, as the decision about the draftof 150 thousand reservists.2 The Sovietgovernment is convinced that if both of ourcountries favor a lessening of internationaltension and a solution of unsettled interna-tional problems, then such steps should beavoided because they are intended for sharp-ening the international situation.

If it came to the worst, if a war began,certainly, a mobilization of an additional 150thousand reservists to the USA armed forceswould not have significance. And undoubt-edly you are very well aware of this. Forthe present is not the year 1812 when Na-poleon was setting all his hopes upon thenumber of soldiers, of sabres and cannons.Neither is it 1941, when Hitler was relyingupon his mass armies, automatic rifles, andtanks. Today life and and military equip-ment have made a large step forward.Nowadays the situation is quite different andit would be better not to rely on armamentswhile solving disputed problems.

So far as the aid of the Soviet Union toCuba is concerned, the Soviet governmenthas declared and I have been instructed toreaffirm it once more, our aid pursues ex-clusively the object of rendering Cuba as-sistance to its defensive capacity and devel-opment of its peaceful economy. Neitherindustry nor agriculture in Cuba, neitherland-improvement works nor training of theCuban personnel carried out by the Soviet

specialists to teach them to use some defen-sive types of armaments, can represent athreat to anybody. Had it been otherwise,the Soviet government would never be in-volved in such aid. And such an approachapplies to any country.

The example of Laos convincingly il-lustrates this. If the Soviet Union were con-ducting another policy, not the present one,then the situation in Laos would be differ-ent. For the Soviet Union and its friendsseem to have more possibility to influencethe situation in Laos than the USA. But wewere trying to achieve an agreement becausewe cannot step aside from the main prin-ciples of our foreign policy designed forlessening international tension, for undoingknots of still existing contradictions betweenpowers, for the peaceful solution of un-settled international problems. And in thisregard our policy is unvarying.

Here is the position and views of theSoviet government on the Cuban issue. TheSoviet government calls on you and the USAadministration not to permit whatever stepsare incompatible with the interests of peaceand the lessening of international tension,with the UN principles which have beensolemnly signed both by the USSR and theUSA. We call on you to ensure that in thisissue too the policies of the two largest pow-ers pursue the object of peace and only ofpeace.

Having listened to our statement,Kennedy said that he was glad to hear thereference to the settlement of the Laotianproblem. We believe, he continued, that theSoviet Union really acts precisely in the waywhich you are describing, and just as theUSA the USSR is endeavoring to complywith its commitments.

Regarding the Cuban issue I [Kennedy]must say that really it became grave onlythis summer. Until then the Cuban ques-tion had been pushed by us to the back-ground. True, Americans had a certain opin-ion about the present Cuban government andrefugees from Cuba were exciting publicopinion against that government. But theUSA administration had no intentions tolaunch an aggression against Cuba. Sud-denly, Mr. Khrushchev, without notifyingme, began to increase at a brisk pace sup-plies of armaments to Cuba, although therewas no threat on our side that could causesuch a necessity. If Mr. Khrushchev ad-dressed me on this issue, we could give him


corresponding assurances on that score. Thebuild-up of the Cuban military might hasbadly impressed the American people andthe USA congress. As President I was try-ing to calm public opinion and I have de-clared that, taking into account the kind ofaid rendered by the Soviet Union to Cuba,we must keep cool and self-controlled. ButI was not able to find a satisfactory expla-nation for those actions of the Soviet Union.

Kennedy said later, that the SovietUnion is aware of the American opinion re-garding the present regime in Cuba. Weconsider that it would be better if there wereanother government. But we do not haveany intentions to attack Cuba.

You are saying that we have establisheda blockade around Cuba, but that is not thecase. We have only taken the decision thatthe ships, after bringing cargo to Cuba, willbe barred entry to the American ports to pickup freight.

The actions of the Soviet Union createa very complicated situation and I don’tknow where the whole thing can bring us.The present situation is, perhaps, the mostdangerous since the end of the Second WorldWar. We, certainly, take on trust statementsof the Soviet Union about the sort of arma-ments supplied by you to Cuba. As Presi-dent I am trying to restrain those people inthe USA who are favoring an invasion ofCuba. For example, last Sunday in one ofmy speeches I declared against one of theAmerican senators, who had previously sup-ported such an invasion.3

I repeat, a very dangerous situation hasnevertheless arisen regarding this issue andI don’t know what can be the outcome.

I answered Kennedy that once therewas an attempt to organize an invasion ofCuba and it is known what was the end ofthe affair.4 From different official statementsand your own statements, Mr. President,everybody know what were the circum-stances and how that invasion was arranged.Everybody knows also that the USA admin-istration needs only to move a finger and noCuban exiles, nor those who support themin the USA and some countries of the Car-ibbean, would dare launch any adventureagainst Cuba.

At this moment Kennedy put in a re-mark that he had already had an exchangeof opinions with N.S. Khrushchev on theissue of the invasion of Cuba in 1961 andhad said that it was a mistake.

I should be glad, Kennedy stressed, togive assurances that an invasion would notbe repeated neither on the part of Cubanrefugees, nor on the part of the USA armedforces.

But the issue is, Kennedy said, that asa result of the USSR government’s actionin July of the current year the situation sud-denly has changed for the worse.

Proceeding with the previous idea, Isaid that for the Cuban government the vi-tal issue is the question what is to be donenext. The question comes to the following:either they will stay unprepared to repulsenew attempts at invasion or they must un-dertake steps to ensure their country fromattack, take care of their defense. We havealready said that the Soviet government hasresponded to the call of Cuba for help onlybecause that appeal had the aim of provid-ing Cubans with bread and removing thethreat hanging over Cuba by strengtheningits defensive capacity. Regarding help, ren-dered by the Soviet Union, in the use ofsome exclusively defensive armaments, byno means can it be seen as a threat to theUSA. If, I repeat, the situation were differ-ent the Soviet government never would havegone along with such an aid.

Kennedy said that, to make things com-pletely clear on this issue, he would like toannounce once more that the USA do nothave any intentions to invade Cuba. Nev-ertheless, intensified armaments supplies toCuba on the part of the Soviet Union, whichbegan in July of the current year, have com-plicated the situation greatly and made itmore dangerous.

My intention, Kennedy stressed, con-sists in preventing any actions that couldlead to war, so long as those actions wouldnot be occasioned by some activty of theSoviet Union or Cuba. In order to confirmthat the USA administration believes thedeclarations of the Soviet government aboutthe defensive character of the armamentssupplied to Cuba, Kennedy read the follow-ing passage from his statement on the Cu-ban issue of 4 September 1962:

“Information has reached this Govern-ment in the last four days from a variety ofsources which established without a doubtthat the Soviets have provided the CubanGovernment with a number of anti-aircraftdefense missiles with a slant range oftwenty-five miles similar to early models ofour “Nike” [missile].

Along with these missiles, the Sovietsare apparently supplying the extensive ra-dar and other electronic equipment whichis required for their operation.

We can also confirm the presence ofseveral Soviet-made motor torpedo boatscarrying ship-to-ship missiles having a rangeof 15 miles.

The number of Soviet military techni-cians now known to be in Cuba or en route—approximately 3,500—is consistent withassistance in setting up and learning to usethis equipment.

As I stated last week, we shall continueto make information available as fast as it isobtained and properly verified.

There is no evidence of any organizedcombat force in Cuba from any Soviet bloccountry; of military base provided to Rus-sia; of a violation of the 1934 treaty relatingto Guantanamo; of the presence of offen-sive ground-to-ground missiles; or of othersignificant offensive capability either inCuban hands or under Soviet direction andguidance.

Were it to be otherwise, the gravest is-sues would arise.”

That is our position on this issue, saidKennedy, and in this way it has been ex-pounded by our Attorney General, RobertKennedy, in his conversation with the So-viet Ambassador.5 From that position I wasproceeding last Sunday when I was voicingthe aforementioned statement. Thus, in allmy actions I proceed with due regard forstatements of the Soviet Union that the ar-maments supplied to Cuba have an exclu-sively defensive character.

I [Gromyko] said in conclusion thatfrom the corresponding statements of theSoviet government, including the statementdelivered to the President today, the USAadministration has a clear view of policy ofthe Soviet Union on the Cuban issue andalso of our assessment of the USA policyand actions regarding Cuba. I had the taskof giving the President an account of all ofit.

[section deleted—trans.]Fourth. After the exchange of opin-

ions on the issue of the [atomic] tests Ibroached the subject of the main principlesof foreign policy of the USSR and the ne-cessity to proceed from the thesis that dif-ference of ideologies need not be an obstacleto peaceful cooperation between the USSRand the USA. According to the instructions,


received before departure, the question of apossible meeting of the heads of the twopowers has been touched upon.

The Soviet government, as before, isbuilding its foreign policy on the recogni-tion of that indisputable concept that differ-ence in ideologies, to which our states ad-here, need not be a barrier to their peacefulcoexistence and cooperation in the interestsof strengthening the peace. You and we, asit was underlined more than once by N.S.Khrushchev, are human beings and you haveyour own ideology, and you are well awareof our attitude towards it. The USSR is asocialist state, and is building communism.We are guided by communist ideology. Whowill gain the victory in the end—this ques-tion must be solved not by the force of ar-maments, but by the way of peaceful com-petition and we, the communists, have urgedthis since the days of Lenin.

We resolutely condemn the calls tosolve ideological disputes by the force ofarmaments. A competition in economics,in satisfying the material and spiritual re-quirements of the peope—that is the fieldwhere in a historic, peaceful “battle,” with-out use of armaments, must be solved thequestion of which ideology would prevailand which one would quit the stage of his-tory. On behalf of the Soviet government Iwould like to reaffirm that [position] oncemore because it is one of the main principlesof the foreign policy of the Soviet Union.

In conclusion I would like to say thefollowing:

The Head of the Soviet governmentN.S. Khrushchev has entrusted me to con-vey to you that his opinion is that it wouldapparently be useful to have a meeting be-tween the Head of the Soviet governmentand the USA President in order to discussthe issues that separate us and first of all thequestions of the German peace treaty andWest Berlin.

If N.S. Khrushchev has the opportu-nity, he will arrive in New York in the sec-ond half of November in order to attend thesession of the UN General Assembly. Thus,we are speaking about a possibility of hisarrival in the USA after the elections to Con-gress. Kennedy said that in the case of N.S.Khrushchev coming to the USA he wouldbe glad to meet him once more. Neverthe-less, he said, it would be erroneous to speakabout the only point of the agenda of thismeeting - to discuss “the Berlin problem and

the signing of the German peace treaty,”because there are others who are also inter-ested in discussing those questions besidesour two countries. If Mr. Khrushchev comesto the General Assembly I would be glad todiscuss with him questions that we are in-terested in without any formal agenda andwithout picking out any concrete issue thatmust be discussed.

I thanked the President for the conver-sation during which we have discussed ques-tions that represent interests for both coun-tries, concerning important aspects of theforeign policies of the USSR and the USA.I also underlined the view of the Soviet gov-ernment that it would be a great historicachievement if the USSR and the USA cometo terms over those questions that divide us.

Kennedy responded that he agrees withthat remark. As I have already told Mr.Khrushchev, the USA is a large and richcountry. The Soviet Union is also a largeand rich country. Each of our countries hasa lot of things to do inside our countries. Asto the outcome of the competition betweenthe, which I hope will be a peaceful one,history will decide it. On Mr. Khrushchev,as the head of the Soviet government, andon me, as the USA President, rests enormousresponsibility and we have no right to al-low any actions that can lead to a collision.

During the last 9 months while I amholding the post of President we were seek-ing by all means to settle relations betweenour two countries. We have reached somesuccess on the Laotian issue. We were as-piring to reach agreements both on Berlinand German problems. Unfortunately wedidn’t manage to do it.

As to Cuba I cannot understand whathas happened in July of this year, particu-larly taking into account statements madeby Mr. Khrushchev that he understands thebasis of the USA approach. In spite of suc-cess achieved on the Laotian question, thesituation around the Cuban issue is becom-ing more and more complicated.

In conclusion Kennedy transmitted hisregards to N.S. Khrushchev and expressedgratitude for receiving the USA Ambassa-dor in Moscow Mr. [Foy] Kohler and sev-eral American representatives who had vis-ited the Soviet Union.

For my part I assured the Presidentonce more that the policy of the SovietUnion always has been and remains directedat strengthening peace and the elimination

of differences in the relations among allcountries, above all in relations between theUSSR and the USA, with whom the SovietUnion wants to live in peace and friendship.

[This policy] also applies to the Cu-ban issue, which was not invented by theSoviet Union, it applies to the question ofsigning the German peace treaty and nor-malization on its basis of the situation inWest Berlin and it applies to all the otherissues that separate our two countries. Ourpolicy is the policy of peace, friendship, thepolicy of removing differences by peacefulmeans.

In conclusion I promised to convey theregards from the President to the Head ofthe Soviet government N.S. Khrushchev andexpressed confidence that he would acceptit with pleasure.

The conversation lasted 2 hours and 20minutes. There were present: on the Ameri-can side - Rusk, Thompson, Hillenbrandtand Akalovsky, on the Soviet side -Semenov, Dobrynin, and Sukhodrev.

A. GROMYKO20/10/1962

[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK,provided to CWIHP, and on file at NationalSecurity Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans-lation by Vladimir Zaemsky.]

II. THE CRISIS: 22-28 OCTOBER 1962

Telegram from Soviet representative tothe United Nations V. A. Zorin to USSR

Foreign Ministry, 22 October 1962

22 October 1962

On the evening of 22 October, duringKennedy’s speech, the United States sentme, as chair of the Security Council, a letterdemanding an urgent convocation of theSecurity Council for a discussion of the “se-rious threat to the security of the Westernhemisphere, and to peace throughout thewhole world, posed by continuing and grow-ing foreign intervention in the Caribbeanbasin.” In oral communication, the Ameri-cans called for a convocation of the Secu-rity Council on 23 October at 10:30 a.m.Eastern Standard Time.

[U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Adlai]Stevenson’s letter reiterated the points madeby Kennedy in his radio and television


speech. Appended to the letter was the draftof a resolution which in its main strategicpart runs as follows:

“The Security Council...1. Demands, as a temporary measure,

in accordance with Article 40 of the Char-ter, the immediate dismantling and removalfrom Cuba of all ballistic missiles and otherarmaments used for offensive purposes.

2. Authorizes and requests the actingsecretary general to dispatch to Cuba a corpsof UN observers to ensure fulfillment of thisresolution and to deliver a report.

3. Demands the cessation of quaran-tine measures directed against military de-liveries to Cuba after the UN has been as-sured of the fulfillment of Point 1.

4. Strongly recommends that theUnited States of America and the Union ofSoviet Socialist Republics immediately dis-cuss the issue of measures to be taken toeliminate the currently existing threat to thesecurity of the Western hemisphere and topeace throughout the world, and to delivera report on this to the Security Council.”

We will forward the text of Stevenson’sletter and the draft of the resolution to theMinistry of Foreign Affairs by teletype.

The United States’ formulation of theimaginary threat posed by Cuba and theUSSR is clearly aimed at concealing andjustifying to public opinion the USA’s uni-laterally imposed military blockade of Cuba,which is an overtly aggressive act. In lightof this, the demand for convening the Secu-rity Council is put forth after the USA hasin fact established a blockade and under-taken a series of other aggressive actionsagainst revolutionary Cuba. Thus the Ameri-cans have presented the Security Council,as they have done in the past, with a faitaccompli.

Before consulting with the other mem-bers of the Security Council on the time forconvening the meeting of the Council, wemet with the Cuban representative and hada preliminary discussion of the possibilityof Cuba’s submitting to Council an exami-nation of the issue of the USA’s aggressiveactions against Cuba.

The Cuban representative is conferringwith his government on this issue.

We will undertake measures towardinitiating the meeting of the Council no ear-lier than 3:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Timeon 23 October, although pressure from theWestern majority of Council members for

its immediate convocation has already beenexerted.

We will provide supplementary infor-mation on our position in the Security Coun-cil.

22.X.62 V. ZORIN

[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK,provided to CWIHP, and on file at NationalSecurity Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans-lation by John Henriksen.]

Telegram from Soviet Ambassador toCuba A.I. Alekseev to USSR Foreign


23 October

Raul Castro has announced that in re-sponse to Kennedy’s threat, the Cuban gov-ernment would make a decision regardingthe mobilization of all subdivisions of thepopular militia.

All in all, 350,000 persons will bemobilized.

The full mobilization of this group willtake 72 hours.

The forces of the military units in thisgroup (105,000 persons) have been broughtto military readiness, and are occupyingdeparture positions.

The mass labor organizations are de-voting all their energy to helping the armyand to replacing workers in businesses.

The mobilization will prove to be a newand heavy burden for the Cuban economy,given that the maintenance of the army willcost the country up to one million pesos perday, not counting losses from reductions inproduction connected with the transfer ofsignificant numbers of workers to the army.

Tomorrow at 12:00 noon, Fidel Castrowill deliver a television and radio addressto the Cuban people.

Commenting on Kennedy’s speech,Raul Castro said that it was undoubtedlyaimed at American voters and at the LatinAmerican governments that still have dip-lomatic ties with Cuba.

Castro thinks that, under this pressure,a whole series of these governments, if notall of them, will break off relations withCuba.

The Cuban government, said Castro,is firmly and resolutely behind the nation’smilitary spirit and the unity of its people inits resistance to the aggressor.

The Cuban leaders are awaiting theSoviet government’s reaction to Kennedy’sannouncement, and are placing their hopeson the wisdom of our decisions.

Castro said that the USSR, which issurrounded by American bases, has strongarguments to marshal in response toKennedy, and may enter negotiations withhim. With regard to the UN observers whoare now being sent to Cuba by the USA, weas a sovereign nation will never admit themonto our soil.

A complete calm and certainty domi-nate Cuba’s leading officials and army com-manders, just as they do the popular masses.

To avoid provocations, the troops havebeen given orders to open fire on enemy air-planes and ships only in cases when the en-emy has initiated attack first.

According to Castro, the Americanshave denied Cuban workers access toGuantanamo base.

All American civilian planes have beenprohibited from flying over Cuba and fromapproaching its shores.

A radio interception has also been re-ceived which prohibits American ships fromconducting negotiations with the bases onopen channels.

All new facts will be immediately com-municated.

23.X.62 ALEKSEEV


Telegram from Soviet delegate to theUnited Nations V. A. Zorin to USSRForeign Ministry, 23 October 1962

23 October 1962

As chairman of the Security Council, Ihave been sent a letter by the Cuban del-egate to the UN, [Mario Garcia-]Inchaustegi, in agreement with his govern-ment, demanding an urgent convocation ofthe Council to discuss the USA’s aggressiveactions and its blockade of Cuba as acts ofwar.

According to Inchaustegi, the Cubanminister of foreign affairs, [Raul] Roa, mayarrive in New York to take part in theCouncil’s examination of this issue. In con-


nection with this we are taking steps to makethe convocation of the Council contingenton Roa’s arrival. Nevertheless it can be ex-pected that the Council meeting will haveto be convened (given the demands of theWestern majority of the Council’s members)on 23 October of this year at 3:00 p.m. East-ern Standard Time.

During the examination of the issue inthe Council, we will declare our objectionsto the misleading American formulation ofit. Bearing in mind the Cubans’ demand forentering on the agenda the issue of USAaggressions that they introduced, it can beexpected that the affair will come down toentering American as well as Cuban state-ments on the Council’s agenda.

In examining the affair in its essence,guided by the Soviet government’s mostrecent announcements on the Cuban ques-tion, we will point out that the USA’s ag-gressions against Cuba cannot be evaluatedas anything other than a provocation push-ing the world to the verge of nuclear war.We will demand a condemnation of the USAaggressions, the immediate cessation of theblockade they have declared and all infrac-tions of maritime freedom; and an immedi-ate end to all forms of intervention in thedomestic affairs of the Republic of Cuba.

We will also propose that the USA gov-ernment immediately enter into direct ne-gotiations with the Cuban government onthe settling of its conflicts with Cuba thoughpeaceful means, as suggested by Dorticosin his speech in the UN General Assembly.In coordination with the Cuban delegation,we will introduce a draft resolution that in-cludes the above-mentioned points.

We will of course vote against theAmerican draft resolution.

We will take action as indicated above,unless we receive other instructions beforethe meeting of the Council begins.

It is not impossible that, when bothdraft resolutions are vetoed, the USA willthen propose that the Council vote on trans-ferring the issue to the General Assembly.

23.X.62 V. ZORIN[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, RussianFederation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy ob-tained by NHK (Japanese Television), pro-vided to CWIHP, and on file at NationalSecurity Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans-lation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univer-sity.]


23 October 1962

On 23 October at 4:00 p.m., under thechairmanship of the USSR delegate, a meet-ing of the Security Council took place, onthe agenda of which was our issue of theviolation of the UN Charter and the threatto peace on the part of the USA.

Attention paid to this meeting wasenormous: the assembly hall was filled tocapacity, and virtually all the representativesof the Anglo-American bloc of the UN werepresent.

On approving the agenda we made adeclaration in which made note of the falsenature of the USA’s address to the SecurityCouncil, which was a clumsy attempt toconceal the USA’s aggressions. We declaredthat, in reality, there were some pressing is-sues to be brought before the Council bythe USSR and Cuba: concerning violationsof the UN Charter and the USA’s threat topeace, and concerning USA aggressionsagainst Cuba.

After that the agenda was approvedwithout objections from the Council mem-bers.

The text of the Soviet government’sdeclaration on Cuba was distributed as anofficial UN document, and also as a pressrelease.

The first to speak was Stevenson (reg-istered on the list of speakers yesterday, atthe time of Kennedy’s radio speech). In hislong speech, which was marked by dema-goguery and hypocrisy, Stevenson tried invarious ways to justify the unprecedentedactions of the USA government, the navalblockade of Cuba imposed by the UnitedStates, and the acts of piracy on the opensea. Unable to adduce any facts with whichto prove the presence of a Cuban threat,Stevenson instead fell into a lengthy descrip-tion of the post-war history of internationalrelations, attempting to depict in a distortedmanner the foreign policy of the SovietUnion and the other socialist states. In con-clusion he formally presented the Americandraft resolution (relayed to the Ministry ofForeign Affairs by teletype on 22 October).We will teletype the full text of Stevenson’sspeech to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The next speaker was the Cuban del-egate Garcia-Inchaustegi, who delivered aclear speech exposing the provocative ac-tions of the USA against Cuba, and declar-ing the the steadfast determination of theCuban people to take up arms, if necessary,to defend their revoluionary achievements.The Cuban delegate demanded the imme-diate revocation of the measures announcedby Kennedy. Characteristically, the Cuban’sspeech was greeted with friendly applausefrom the audience.

We will teletype the full text of theCuban’s speech as well.

After that we gave a speech with a dec-laration in accordance with your number1197, and introduced a draft resolution. Anaccount of the spech was transmitted byTASS. We are teletyping the full text to theMinistry of Foreign Affairs.

The next meeting has been set for to-morrow, 24 October, at 9:00 a.m. EasternStandard Time.

In the course of the day we have hadconversations with a series of delegates fromAfrican and Asian countries, including del-egates from the United Arab Republic,Ghana, Ceylon, Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria,and others. All of these countries share aserious anxiety about the situation createdby the USA’s actions. All of them recognizethe clear illegality of the USA’s actions.They do not yet, however, show sufficientdetermination to take any concrete steps.Thus, for example, the delegate from theUnited Arab Republic initially made muchof the unofficial Council draft resolutioncalling for the respective parties to removethe blockade and to end arms stockpiling inCuba. When we categorically rejected thisproposal because it essentially replicatedone of the USA’s basic ideas—revoking theblockade after the cessation of arms deliv-eries to the Cubans—the neutral parties pre-pared another draft resolution.

This draft makes the following stipu-lations:

1. To call upon all interested parties toabstain from any actions which could di-rectly or indirectly aggravate the situation,and to work towards returning the Carib-bean area to the condition it was in before22 October;

2. To request that the acting SecretaryGeneral immediately discuss with the inter-ested parties direct measures to be taken forremoving the current threat to the general


peace.3. To call upon the interested parties

to carry out this resolution immediately, andto cooperate with the acting Secretary Gen-eral in the fulfillment of this aim.

4. To ask the acting Secretary Generalto report to the Security Council on the ful-fillment of the second point.

We remarked that even this draft is notfully satisfactory, in part because it does noteven indicate (in clear and unambiguousterms) that the USA’s declared blockade ofCuba must be immediately ended.

This evening, after the Security Coun-cil meeting, the delegates from neutral Asianand African countries will hold a meetingto discuss the general policy that it wouldbe most advisable for them to follow withregard to this issue. In the course oftomorrow’s meeting we will decisively de-fend the position laid out in our draft reso-lution, and will exert pressure on the neutralsto do the same.

23.X.62 V. ZORIN


Telegram from Soviet delegate to theUnited Nations V. A. Zorin to USSR

Foreign Ministry, 25 October 1962, onUN Security Council Meeting of

24 October 1962

25 October 1962

On 24 October speeches were deliv-ered in the Security Council by the delegatesfrom Venezuela, England, Rumania, Ireland,France, Chile, the United Arab Republic,Ghana, and also by U Thant.

Comrade [Deputy Foreign MinisterMircea] Malitza, the delegate from Ruma-nia, fully supported the Soviet Union’s for-mulation of the issue of the USA violationof the UN Charter and the USA threat topeace, and supports with equal convictionthe Security Council draft resolution intro-duced by the Soviet Union.

The speech of the English delegate, [SirPatrick] Dean, supported the false accusa-

tions of the Soviet Union’s alleged installa-tion in Cuba of offensive nuclear missileweaponry, the accusations by means ofwhich the USA is trying to justify its ag-gressions against Cuba (we are teletypingthe full text of the speech). Dean assertedthat the only way to restore peace and trustis to remove from Cuban territory the “of-fensive missiles.” It is revealing that Deantried as hard as he could to get around thequestion of the naval blockade imposed bythe USA on Cuba.

Declaring England’s support for theAmerican draft resolution, Dean at the sametime expressed his thoughts on the neces-sity of negotiations between the interestedparties.

The French delegate [Roger] Seydouxalso supported the American draft resolu-tion, representing it as allegedly furtheringthe interests of a peaceful settlement of theconflict. Like Dean, he reiterated the falseassertions by the USA of the allegedly of-fensive nature of the armaments supplied bythe Soviet Union to Cuba (we are teletypingthe full text).

In the speeches by the delegates fromVenezuela and Chile, support was given tothe justification of the resolution, approvedunder pressure from the USA, of the Orga-nization of American States, which is op-posed to Cuba. They asserted, followingUSA crib-notes, that the Soviet arms in Cubaupset the balance of power in the Westernhemisphere, and constitute a threat to thesecurity of the nations of this area. The del-egates from Venezuela and Chile declaredtheir support for the American draft resolu-tion.

The delegate from Ireland, [Ministerfor External Affairs Frank] Aiken, recogniz-ing the right of the Cuban nation to decideits own fate and to take measures to guaran-tee its defense capabilities, expressed regretat the same time concerning the fact that theweaponry installed in Cuba represents hugenuclear forces that threaten the neighboringcountries. Aiken appealed for a peacefulsettlement by means of negotiations. Hedeclined to express his position with regardto both the American and the Soviet draftresolutions.

The delegates from the United ArabRepublic, [Mahmoud] Riad, and fromGhana, [Alex] Quaison-Sackey, pointed outthat they are approaching the issue at handin light of the principles established by the

UN Charter and by the Bandung andBelgrade conferences of nonaligned nations(we are teletyping the full texts of thesespeeches). Proceeding from these principles,the delegates from the United Arab Repub-lic and Ghana defended the right of Cuba tochoose its own political regime, and to carryout the necessary defense measures for safe-guarding its political freedom and territo-rial integrity.

In the speeches of both delegates, doubtwas expressed about the reliability and well-groundedness of the American assertionsabout the allegedly offensive character ofthe weaponry installed in it. Quaison-Sackeyrecalled with regard to this the fabricationby USA intelligence of false informationthat has already been used in the past forjustifying aggressive actions against Cuba.

The delegates from the United ArabRepublic and Ghana declared that they can-not justify the USA actions aimed at estab-lishing a blockade of Cuba. They both em-phasized that these actions by the USA con-stitute a violation of the principle of mari-time freedom, and pose a serious threat topeace and general security. In their speeches,they noted the fact that the USA took itsunilateral actions behind the back of theSecurity Council.

The delegates of the United Arab Re-public and Ghana have appealed to the par-ties involved—the USA, the USSR, andCuba—to resolve the conflict throughpeaceful negotiations, and have jointly in-troduced a draft resolution (transmitted byteletype).

The last to speak at today’s meetingwas the acting Secretary General of the UN,U Thant, who read the text of messages hesent today to Comrade N.S. Khrushchev andto Kennedy. In these messages, U Thant pro-posed that for a period of two to three weeks“all arms provisioning in Cuba be voluntar-ily suspended, and that all quarantine activ-ity be suspended by the opposing party.” UThant expressed his support for the proposalthat the interested parties meet during thisperiod and discuss the situation. He, UThant, is willing to provide all necessaryservices for this purpose, and is at the dis-posal of the parties involved.

Having learned in the afternoon of thecontent of the message to the USSR and theUSA prepared by U Thant, we told him thatwe considered it incorrect and wrong-headed of the acting Secretary General to


place on the same level a party on one handthat has taken provocative actions and im-posed a naval blockade, and on the otherhand parties that have been engaging in nor-mal shipping activity and taking lawfulmeasures for safeguarding their countries’defense. We emphasized that the acting Sec-retary General’s most urgent obligation isto exert necessary pressure on the govern-ment of the USA to make them lift the ille-gal blockade of the Cuban coast, and endtheir acts of piracy that violate maritimefreedom.

Nevertheless, U Thant did not changethe content of his messages. The text of UThant’s message to Comrade N.S.Khrushchev has been teletyped to the Min-istry of Foreign Affairs.

Throughout the entire day, delegationsfrom the neutral countries of Asia and Af-rica worked on a draft resolution for theSecurity Council. We have repeatedly metwith the delegates from the United ArabRepublic, Ghana, and other countries, ex-plaining to them the necessity of includingin the Council resolution a clear demand thatthe USA lift its naval blockade and cease itsother provocative actions against Cuba.

The draft resolution introduced by thedelegates from the United Arab Republicand Ghana (the text of which has beenteletyped) nevertheless does not mentionthis directly. The draft resolution proposesthat the acting General Secretary reach anagreement without delay with the immedi-ately interested parties regarding the stepsthat must urgently be taken to remove thepresent threat to peace and to normalize theCaribbean situation, and it appeals to theinterested parties to “refrain during this pe-riod from any actions which could directlyor indirectly aggravate the present situa-tion.”

Although the formulation of this lastpoint is vague, the interpretation offered inthe United Arab Republic and Ghanaiandelgates’ speeches, and the whole tenor oftheir speeches, nevertheless clearly indicatethat the gist of that formulation is a demandfor the revocation of the measures an-nounced by Kennedy. Despite the shortcom-ings of the draft, it must be noted that, ifapproved, it would significantly limit theUSA’s capacity to carry out the blockade andits other aggressions against Cuba.

We are also taking into account that, ifthe matter is transferred to the Assembly, it

will be difficult to count on the approval ofa better resolution, since at present a major-ity of the Afro-Asian group supports thedraft put forth by the United Arab Republicand Ghana.

Proceeding from this point, and bear-ing in mind the Cuban government’s views,we believe that it is possible, when theUnited Arab Republic and Ghanaian draftresolution is voted on, that we, after issuinga statement of its shortcomings and weak-nesses, might abstain from voting on it if itcan be passed without our votes (that is,without the votes of the delegates from theUSSR and Romania), and vote in favor of itif it fails to win the necessary number ofvotes without our support.

We do not rule out the possibility thatGhana and the United Arab Republic mayalter their draft resolution, reducing it to anappeal to the interested parties to conductimmediate negotiations towards a settlementof the Caribbean crisis that threatens thegeneral peace. In voting on such a resolu-tion we will, having voiced our views on itsshortcomings, take a similar position: inother words, we will abstain from voting ifthe resolution can be approved without ourvotes, and we will vote in favor of it if itwould not pass without the votes of theUSSR and Romania.

In the event that none of the resolu-tions is approved by the Council, then ob-viously an extraordinary special session ofthe Assembly will have to be convened,which we will not object to.

We will act as outlined above unlesswe receive other instructions.

The Council meeting will be held on25 October at 4:00 p.m. local time, whenthe vote on the resolution will also takeplace.

It would be valuable if for this occa-sion we had the text of the official responseto U Thant’s message to N. S. Khrushchev,if such a response has been made by thattime.

According to available information, theUSA will respond to U Thant’s message inthe next few hours.

25.X.62 V. ZORIN

[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, RussianFederation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy ob-tained by NHK (Japanese Television), pro-vided to CWIHP, and on file at NationalSecurity Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans-

lation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univer-sity.]

Cable from Soviet Ambassador to theUSA A. Dobrynin to USSR Foreign


This night (around 3 o’clock in themorning Washington time) our journalist[half-line deleted—ed.] was at the bar of thepress club of Washington where usuallymany correspondents gather.

Barman6 approached him [one linedeleted—ed.] and whispered that he hadoverheard a conversation of two prominentAmerican journalists (Donovan7 and [War-ren] Rogers) that the President had suppos-edly taken a decision to invade Cuba todayor tomorrow night.

Our correspondent also had an oppor-tunity to talk to Rogers, a correspondent ofthe “New York Herald Tribune,” perma-nently accredited to the Pentagon. He con-firmed that report.

[Half-line deleted—ed.] there is infor-mation that an order has been issued to bringthe armed forces into maximum battle readi-ness including readiness to repulse nuclearattack.

We are taking steps to check this in-formation.

25/X/62 A. DOBRYNIN

[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, RussianFederation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy ob-tained by NHK (Japanese Television), pro-vided to CWIHP, and on file at NationalSecurity Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans-lation by Vladimir Zaemsky.]



25 October

The domestic situation in Cuba withregard to the USA provocations continuesto remain calm and confident. The mobili-zation of the popular militia and the station-ing of military units have been successfullycompleted. The industrial and commercialcenters of the country are operating nor-mally.

A special business-like efficiency andenergy can be observed among the Cuban


leaders and people. At meetings and gath-erings there is almost no trace of the osten-tation and verbosity that are characteristicof Cubans. The awareness of an immediatethreat has brought the Cuban people evencloser, and has strengthened their hatred ofAmerican imperialism.

The Soviet Union’s authority hasclimbed to unprecedented heights. The ac-tions of the USSR government in its defenseof Cuba are completely convincing thepeople of the failure of the American provo-cations. The whole country is preparing torebuff the aggressors. Committees for thedefense of the revolution are establishing,in every city neighborhood, in factories, onthe national estates and institutions, first-aid brigades offering immediate help to thewounded. Volunteer brigades are on the alertfor profiteers, and are prohibiting the pur-chase of excessive quantities of goods instores.

Militia observation posts have beenplaced on all streets. There are no signs ofpanic, and no false alarmist rumors are be-ing spread.

The domestic counterrevolution hasfallen completely silent, and has not yetshown any signs of activity.

The nation is anxiously awaiting thefirst clashes between Soviet steamers andthe American ships constituting the block-ade.

The arrival yesterday and today of twoSoviet steamers in Cuban ports without se-rious complications was met with great re-lief.

Secretary General U Thant’s appeal,and Comrade N.S. Khrushchev’s responseto it and to Bertrand Russell, were com-mented upon here as events of the greatestimportance.

Meanwhile the radio and newspapersattribute great significance to [Soviet De-fense Minister] Marshal R.Ya. Malinsky’sspeech.

Moreover, Fidel Castro finds great sig-nificance in the emergence of a movementfor solidarity with Cuba, especially in thecountries of Latin America.

It is his view that the USA’s currentinsane actions against Cuba provide firmground for the further expansion of thismovement, which will be able to force theAmericans to rethink their plans.

He approves of our policy of not giv-ing in to provocations, and of the possibile

avoidance of unnecessary conflicts. Castro,for example, approves of the fact that sev-eral of our vessels have turned back fromtheir courses, and thus have not given occa-sion for any major conflicts.

At the same time Castro, in the courseof conversations with our military experts,has expressed a belief in the necessity ofshooting down one or two piratic Americanplanes over Cuban territory.

Unverifiable information has been re-ceived by us and the Czechs from unverifi-able sources on the possibility of an inter-ventionist landing or a bombing of Cubanmilitary targets on 26-27 October. The lead-ership has taken this information into con-sideration, but is not taking it very seriously.

The situation in the Soviet colony isnormal. All necessary measures have beentaken for a possible exacerbation of the situ-ation.

25.X.62 ALEKSEEV


Cable from Soviet Ambassador to theUSA A. Dobrynin to Soviet Foreign


The situation in Washington remainstense and complicated. At the same time,today in political and diplomatic circles andin the comments of American press, radio,and television, began appearing rays of hopefor a peaceful settlement of the Cuban issueand they are related to the quiet, restrainedbehavior of the Soviet government and itsreadiness for negotiations with the USA (itis necessary to mention that the Embassy isreceiving quite a number of cables and let-ters from ordinary Americans in which theyexpress their gratitude to the Soviet govern-ment and N.S. Khrushchev for their posi-tion in the current situation).

Nevertheless, prevailing here are theexpectations for further mounting of crisisin the relations between the USA and theUSSR over Cuba. In addition to our previ-ous considerations currently we would liketo say the following:

1. It is becoming daily stronger the

opinion that steps undertaken by theKennedy administration regarding Cuba hadbeen dictated by the desire to stop the gen-erally unfavorable for the USA develop-ments in the world and to try to reestablishthe status-quo which had existed at the mo-ment of the meeting between N.S.Khrushchev and Kennedy in Vienna lastyear. Risk, entailed with these steps madeby Kennedy’s administration, is outweighed,in his view, by those unfavorable conse-quences for the USA military-strategic situ-ation, which would appear in the case of theplacing in Cuba of Soviet medium and long-range missiles.

2. Regarding how far the Kennedy ad-ministration is ready to go against Cuba, thefollowing impression has been forming.

Judging from available data, the ad-ministration sets itself, as a minimal aim,the object of not allowing the emplacementin Cuba the aforementioned missile launch-ers. Meanwhile, according to some sources,whose reports still need additional check-ing, the possibility is discussed—in case ofnot achieving that aim by other means—todestroy the missile launchers in Cuba un-der construction by a massive air-raid ofAmerican aviation. It is necessary to men-tion that, according to all reports, the Ameri-cans are not aware of exact numbers andkinds of our missile weapons in Cuba. Thiscircumstance makes them rather nervous.

3. The most militant line in the USAadministration still is held by [AttorneyGeneral] R. Kennedy, [Secretary of DefenseRobert S.] McNamara, [National SecurityAdviser McGeorge] Bundy and militarymen, who insist on a firm approach with thepurpose of destroying the missile bases inCuba, not even stopping at invasion of theisland. [Secretary of State Dean] Rusk and[Secretary of the Treasury Douglas] Dillonare now holding a somewhat restrained andmore cautious position, though they alsofavor continued pressure upon us.

In this regard the course of the discus-sion inside the administration of thePresident’s response to U Thant’s appeal [ofOctober 24; see above] seems significant.According to our information, the first groupwas insisting on a categorical rejection ofthat appeal. Such an answer had been al-ready elaborated and it was even supposedto be transmitted to the largest informationagencies. But at the last moment (around12 o’clock midnight) the President inclined


to the current, more flexible, [version] pre-pared by Rusk.

The President is vacillating right now,but, judging from everything, especially theprincipal direction of USA policy, he isheeding the first group, particularly, hisbrother. A certain danger of the situation isthat the President has largely engaged him-self before the public opinion of Americaand not only America. In essence, he, as ahot-tempered gambler, has put at stake hisreputation as a statesman and politician, andthus his prospects for re-election in 1964,what—being an ambitious man—he pas-sionately seeks. This is why it is not pos-sible to exclude completely the possibilitythat he can, especially taking into consider-ation his circle, undertake such anadventurist step as an invasion of Cuba.

4. Of course, it is difficult to draw afinal conclusion whether there will be suchan invasion or not. In the “war of nerves”,which now is going on, the elements ofdisinformation, for sure, can play a role. Inthis regard it is necessary to mention thatthe USA administration has undertaken un-usual measures of control over the press. Inessence an unofficial censorship has beenintroduced in great measure. Immediate“conducting” [guidance—ed.] of the presson the part of the Kennedy administrationhas been strengthened. For example, ac-cording to confidential data, today Rusk hassummoned the most important Americanjournalists and told [them] that that the ten-dency [that has] just appeared in some pa-pers to show some decrease of tension (inconnection with the first Soviet tanker whichhas passed through the blockade) did notmeet the requirements of the moment andthe real state of affairs. The USA adminis-tration as before is fully resolved to achieveby “whatever means” the liquidation of themissile bases in Cuba,—underscored Rusk.He also refuted several reports about USAreadiness to “exchange” Soviet bases inCuba for American bases in other countries,for example in Turkey (in this regard Ruskcriticized today’s article by [Walter]Lippmann).

5. Apparently, in order to force the at-mosphere, there are transmitted (on radio,TV and through the press) reports from dif-ferent states about bringing to full readinessthe systems of civil defense, antinuclearshelters, about food and emergency pur-chases by the population.

Members of the diplomatic corps whoin these days have visited other parts of thecountry, relate that at the beginning manypeople in those locations, especially in thewestern states, perceived Kennedy’s speechof October 22 as a pre-election maneuver,but now the mood has changed. People,among them those who even not long agowere saying that it was “necessary to dosomething to Castro,” now are badly fright-ened about what may be the outcome.

Noticeably fewer people can be seenon Washington streets. Government officesare working until late at night. Preoccupa-tion over the possibility of a major war issensed in business circles too, and it is re-flected in sharp ups and downs of actionson the New York stock exchange.

African embassies warned their stu-dents at American universities to be readyfor evacuation home.

6. In general it is necessary to say thatdifferent sources in the journalist and dip-lomatic corps in Washington agree that cur-rently the probability of a USA armed in-tervention against Cuba is great. They con-sider that the Kennedy administration needsonly a plausible excuse to “justify” such anaction. In this regard it calls attention to thestrong underlining (in the evening editionpapers and radio transmissions) of the as-sertions as if in Cuba the construction ofmissile sites is rapidly proceeding.

The majority of sources agree that thenearest future days will be most critical, in-sofar as they consider that if the USA findsthemselves [itself] involved in negotiationsor diplomatic discussions of the whole is-sue, then it will be difficult to carry out aninvasion because of political considerations.In this regard, as it is recognized nearly byeverybody here, a very important role isplayed by the self-possessed and construc-tive position of the Soviet government,which is restraining futher broadening of theconflict, restraining the hottest heads inWashington.

25/X/62 A. DOBRYNIN


Telgram from Soviet delegate to theUnited Nations V. A. Zorin to USSRForeign Ministry, 25 October 1962

25 October 1962

We have been informed that U Thanthas declared his intention to meet succes-sively with the Americans, us, and the Cu-bans on 26 October. He has proposed meet-ing with us at 4:30 p.m. Eastern StandardTime; before that he is meeting withStevenson, and after us with Garcia-Inchaustegui. We will agree to this firstmeeting with U Thant.

In our talks with U Thant we will trans-mit Comrade N. S. Khrushchev’s responseto the former’s message, and Khrushchev’sresponse to Kennedy and Russell as well.

We understand Comrade N.S.Khrushchev’s response to U Thant to besaying that the Soviet Union agrees with UThant’s proposal in its goal of holding pre-liminary negotiations— allowing the inter-ested parties to meet for a peaceful settle-ment of the crisis and for a normalization ofthe situation in the Caribbean area. This in-cludes, on the part of the Soviet Union, thevoluntary suspension for 2 to 3 weeks ofarms stockpiling in Cuba, and, on the partof the USA, the voluntary suspension forthe same period of its “quarantine” activity,including the inspection of ships bound forCuba.

To judge from Kennedy’s response, theUSA is attempting to put forth as the basisof its negotiations its demand for the re-moval of “offensive weaponry” from Cuba.

For this reason we should expect thatthe Americans will not agree to the suspen-sion of “quarantine” activity unless this de-mand of theirs is met.

We of course firmly reject any attemptsby the USA to impose stipulations either onus or on Cuba. In this matter we will pro-ceed from the condition that negotiations canonly be conducted on the basis of U Thant’sproposal, that is on the basis of the pointabout suspending arms stockpiling in Cuba,a proposal which the neutral countries sup-port.

The possibility cannot be ruled out thatU Thant, under American influence, is at-tempting to put forth as a primary measurethe proposals made by him in his secondmessage to Comrade N.S. Khrushchev, es-pecially the one stipulating that Soviet ves-


sels bound for Cuba keep away from theinterception area for a certain period of time,and that the USA for the duration of thatsame period avoid immediate encountersbetween their ships and Soviet vessels. Inthis event we will declare that U Thant’sproposal, which is the basis on which all theinterested parties have agreed to conduct ne-gotiations, goes above and beyond the “pri-mary measures” that he put forth in his sec-ond message.

Since the forthcoming meeting with UThant is a preliminary one and raises theissue of further negotiations, including aconclusive normalization of the whole situ-ation in the Caribbean region, we ask to bebriefed on your decision as to the level,form, and direction of further negotiations.

If there are supplementary instructionsfor the first meeting with U Thant, we askyou to take into consideration the meetingtime proposed by U Thant.

25.X.62 V. ZORIN



26 October 1962

The Cuban delegate, Garcia-Inchaustegui, met with U Thant on 26 Oc-tober, at which time U Thant entrusted himto deliver to Havana a message from him toFidel Castro (we are sending this as a sepa-rate telegram).

In the conversation with Garcia-Inchaustegui, U Thant, who had informedhim of the correspondence between U Thantand Comrade N.S. Khrushchev, and Presi-dent Kennedy as well, expressed his ideasfor using Dorticos’s proposal of 8 Octoberin the General Assembly as a way to achievea lasting normalization of the Caribbeanbasin situation. The Cuban reminded UThant that Dorticos in his speech had em-phasized the extenuating circumstance thatthe USA had already declared that it did not

intend to attack Cuba, but that now it hadbroken their promise.

To this U Thant responded that for thisreason it is necessary to specify what guar-antees should be made by the USA to as-sure that it will not take any antagonisticactions against Cuba, and asked Garcia-Inchaustegui to explain the views of theCuban government on this matter.

2. The head of the Brazilian delegation,[Alfonso] Arinos [de Melo Franco], hasworked out a draft resolution on the de-nuclearization of Latin America and Africaunder the observation of a monitoring com-mittee (we will send this as a separate tele-gram). In a conversation with Garcia-Inchaustegui, Arinos expressed his view thatapproving this resolution would allow Cubato “avoid humiliation” if it is forced to re-nounce the construction of missile bases.

According to Garcia-Inchaustegui, thisdraft resolution has received great currencyamong the Latin American countries, andthe delegates from the Latin American con-tingents who met with U Thant this eveningshould discuss the draft with the acting Sec-retary General.

Garcia-Inchaustegui told the Brazilianhimself that, in his personal opinion, itwould be better that the issue of the elimi-nation of all foreign military bases in LatinAmerica be brought up, since then such aformulation would include the base atGuantanamo as well.

26.X.62 V. ZORIN



26 October 1962

I delivered N.S. Khrushchev’s responseto U Thant’s second message (at 13:00 lo-cal time).

U Thant expressed satisfaction with the

fact that once again his proposal had beenapproved. After this, U Thant told us thattonight he had received a response to hissecond message from Kennedy as well, andat our insistence he provided us with the textof that response (after he had submitted thisdisclosure to the approval of the USA lega-tion, and after receiving our consent to hisdisclosing to the USA legation the contentof our own response).

We are communicating the text ofKennedy’s response as a separate telegram.

U Thant presented us with the possi-bility of his immediate publication of bothhis messagees to N.S. Khrushchev and toKennedy, and of both responses given tothose messagees by the USSR and the USA.He led us to understand that a comparisonof both responses would show the worldcommunity that the Soviet Union, unlike theUSA, was continuing to aim for support ofpeace and the prevention of war.

We responded to the effect that we werenot yet authorized to agree to the publica-tion of N.S. Khrushchev’s response, andwould give him an answer later.

We believe it would be expedient togive our consent to the publication of thedocuments mentioned.

Today at 16:00 there will be a meetingbetween Stevenson and U Thant. At 18:00Eastern Standard Time we are once againmeeting with U Thant, and if we do not re-ceive other instructions by that time, we willgive our consent to the publication of N. S.Khrushchev’s second response.

26.X.62 V. ZORIN



26 October 1962

On the evening of 26 October we([Platon] Morozov and I) met with U Thant,in the presence of [UN Under Secretary forSpecial Political Affairs Chakravanthi V.]


Narasiman, [UN official Omar] Loutfi,[Military Advisor to the UN Secretary-Gen-eral Brig.-] General [Indar J.] Rikhye, and,on our request, Comrade [E.D.] Kiselev.After giving our consent to the publicationof N.S. Khrushchev’s response to U Thant’ssecond message, U Thant immediately re-leased for publication both his message andthe responses to them by the Soviet Unionand the USA. In so doing, U Thant againemphasized that now the whole world wouldbe again convinced that the Soviet Union ispositively and constructively working to-wards the peace initiative that it undertook,and he also asked to convey his thanks tothe Soviet government and personally toN.S. Khrushchev for the speedy and posi-tive response to his second message.

U Thant said furthermore thatKennedy’s reponse to his second messagewas not as clear as N.S. Khrushchev’s re-sponse. Nevertheless U Thant noted that, ashe sees it, an agreement has been reached atthe present moment between the SovietUnion and the USA which, although for onlya short period (2 to 5 days, as he put it),ensures the possibility of avoiding danger-ous encounters on the open sea. In this way,a situation will be created in which furthersteps can be taken towards the lessening oftensions.

Stevenson today announced to U Thantthat the USA was prepared to approve UThant’s proposal contained in his first mes-sage (concerning the cessation for 2 to 3weeks of arms stockpiling in Cuba, and theUSA’s simultaneous suspension of block-ade activities), on the proviso that measureswould be taken to guarantee that ships ar-riving in Cuba (Soviet ships, as well asfreight vessels) are not supplying any weap-onry during this this period.

U Thant explained that the satisfactionof this demand, either in this way or in someother fashion, is a very important issue forAmerican public opinion. It would be pos-sible to discuss a particular procedure formaritime traffic, or for particular ports ofcall in Cuba, whereby for example UN del-egates from neutral countries, selected byagreement, or representatives of the Inter-national Red Cross might one way or an-other ascertain that vessels arriving in Cubaare not carrying arms. He implied that theAmericans would apparently be satisfiedwith a simple procedure, and would not de-mand searches or inspections of vessels

bound for, or in the ports of, their destina-tions.

We declared to U Thant that the Ameri-can proposal was at odds with U Thant’sown proposal, and shows that the USA, un-like the Soviet Union, is not ready to agreeto that proposal. We remarked that in giv-ing consent to U Thant’s proposal, the So-viet Union was taking a highly importantstep toward preserving the peace. Wepointed out that the Soviet Union wouldstick to its obligations with unconditionalsteadfastness if an agreemnt was reached onthe basis of U Thant’s own proposal. Nochecks on this are needed, not only becauseof what has been put forth, but also becauseif the arms provisioning continued, it wouldnot be hard to detect anyway. For this rea-son, the Americans’ push for the above-mentioned proposal proves that they arelooking for a pretext for not fulfilling thevery agreement that would facilitate a con-clusive settlement.

We also noted that while the USA isadvancing a new proposal that complicatesmatters, they themselves are continuing toprepare intensively for an invasion of Cuba.If we are to talk about UN observation, thenwe must first of all demand an immediateend to that sort of military preparationagainst Cuba, which threatens the generalpeace.

We noted as well that we cannot enterdiscussions about what actions may be takenon Cuban territory, since that is a matter forthe Cuban government alone to decide. Butthe forms of monitoring proposed wouldconstitute an obvious interference in thedomestic affairs of Cuba.

U Thant said that he understood all thispersonally, and that he firmly believed thatthe Soviet Union would keep its word.Nonetheless it is clear that the USA is act-ing as it is in order to justify before Ameri-can public opinion its refusal to take theappropriate blockade measures that havebeen announced.

We told U Thant that the Soviet Unionhas already approved two of his proposals,proceeding in such a way as to frustrate theAmerican provocation that threatens thepeace, and also that it is now up to U Thant,in his capacity as acting General Secretaryof the UN, to exert the necessary pressureon the USA with the aim of reaching a pro-visional agreement for 2 to 3 weeks, basedon the initial proposal of U Thant himself.

We emphasized that it is necessary toact quickly, since our ships cannot remainon the open sea for an indefinite period oftime, and since the situation cannot be al-lowed to get out of control. U Thant saidthat he would do all he could, although heasks us as well to think of measures thatwould be favorably received by the USA.

At the end of the conversation, U Thantsaid that today he had presented the Cubandelegate to the UN with the message, to beconveyed to Castro, in which he asked thatmissile installation work in Cuba, whichaccording to reports received by him fromthe Americans continues day and night, besuspended for the 2 to 3 week period that isnecessary for negotiations.

In response to our question about whatplans U Thant had concerning the basis uponwhich a conclusive settlement would be at-tainable, U Thant answered that he foundthe key to this in Dorticos’s speech to theGeneral Assembly on 8 October of this year,in which the latter announced that if the USAwere to give effective guarantees that theywill not undertake a military invasion ofCuba, and will not aid its invasion by any-one else, it would not be necessary for Cubato take military measures, or even to main-tain its army.

U Thant said that today he had ex-plained his point of view to Stevenson, andthat the latter had promised to informKennedy about it.

In conclusion, we arranged with UThant that he inform the Americans of ourconversation, and agreed that our forthcom-ing meeting would be contingent upon howevents unfold.

At the next meeting, if we do not re-ceive other instructions, we will continueto push for the provisional agreement on the2 to 3 week period, based on U Thant’s pro-posal that was approved in Comrade N. S.Khrushchev’s response, without the supple-mentary conditions advanced by the USA.

26.X.62 V. ZORIN



Cable from Soviet Foreign MinisterGromyko to USSR Ambassador toCuba Alekseev, 27 October 1962

27 October 1962

You should urgently meet comrade Fi-del Castro and, quoting instructions of theSoviet government, say the following:

“It is considered in Moscow that com-rade Fidel Castro should urgently make astatement in support of the proposals of theSoviet government listed in the messagefrom N.S. Khrushchev to President Kennedyof October 27.

It would be also advisable to give aquick answer to the appeal from U Thantand underline in that response that there areno works in Cuba on construction of mili-tary units - the issue mentioned in the ap-peal by U Thant. In addition, in the letter toU Thant it should be also advisable to voicesupport for the proposals of the Soviet gov-ernment espoused in the aforementionedmessage from N.S. Khrushchev.

Regarding the communication (deliv-ered by comrades Fidel Castro and OswaldoDorticos to comrade Alekseev) that accord-ing to the available data an armed Ameri-can intervention in Cuba is imminent, wewould like to say that our last action of Oc-tober 27 is intended precisely to interruptthe past or present USA preparations, if in-deed your information about the threat ofan invasion was correct.

It is almost impossible for the Ameri-cans to launch an adventurist invasion ofCuba, using their armed forces, in responseto our steps, undertaken in connection withU Thant’s initiative, particularly in reponseto our last action. They know very well thatif under present circumstances they were tostart an intervention it would brand them asaggressors and hold them up to shame asenemies of peace imitating the worst pat-terns of Hitlerian perfidy.”8

You should inform comrade Pavlov [apseudonym for USSR Gen. Issa A. Pliyev,commander of Soviet forces in Cuba] aboutour advice to the Cuban friends.

Wire the report on the fulfillment ofthese instructions.

A. GROMYKO

[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, RussianFederation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy ob-

tained by NHK (Japanese Television), pro-vided to CWIHP, and on file at NationalSecurity Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans-lation by Vladimir Zaemsky.]



27 October

We have met with Fidel Castro andDorticos, and have informed them of whatyou communicated in your telegram.

Castro said that the Cuban leaderswould discuss the form and substance of hisstatement on the issues broached by you, andthat this would be done in the briefest pos-sible time.

The letter to U Thant, they said, hasalready been sent, and for that reason theissue you put forth would be explained inFidel Castro’s speech.

Castro and Dorticos declared that theonly difficult point would be finding an ap-propriate form for the declaration of the pro-hibition on special arms installation projects,since the Americans are following theprogress of those projects with the help ofreconnaissance flights, and know a lot aboutthem.

They said that an appropriate formwould nonetheless be found, and that a likelycondition would be a prohibition on similiarprojects in Guantanamo base as well.

Referring to Comrade N.S. Khrush-chev’s letter to Kennedy of 27 October,Castro said that it had been composed withgreat diplomatic skill, and that it would havea huge influence on global public opinion.

Moreover it puts the USA governmentin a difficult position, and exposes the ille-gality of its actions.

Castro supposes that the USA will notagree to the elimination of bases in Turkey,which will make it easier to justify beforepublic opinion the presence of special weap-onry in Cuba.

Castro said, however, that concise in-formation supplied by the agency and theevening newspaper on the basic content ofthis letter brought about symptoms of a cer-tain confusion in various sectors of the Cu-ban population and among some membersof the military. A number of officers havespoken to him about it, asking whether itconstitutes a rejection by the USSR of its

former obligations.Castro believes that the publication

tomorrow of the full text of the letter willdisperse these doubts, and he will take thefirst opportunity to explain its main contentin a way that is accessible to the public.

After receiving Comrade N.S. Khrush-chev’s letter and your report, Castro beganto assess the situation more calmly and re-alistically, believing that the opportunity hadarrived for a peaceful settlement of the Cu-ban conflict. He nevertheless continues tobelieve that the danger of sudden attack stillexists as before.

Castro told how a U-2 airplane hadbeen shot down from an altitude of 21 kilo-meters, and that the Cuban military powershad collected its fragments and the corpseof its pilot.

Meanwhile it has been announced inthe newspapers that an invading plane ofunkown nationality has been shot down.According to American press reports, USAmilitary forces have acknowledged theplane’s downing, and have brought to a stateof readiness a formation of paratroopersamounting to 14,000 men, which is alleg-edly intended to be launched over Cuba.

Castro said that in the event of such anattack, full fire would be turned against theaggressor, and that he was sure of success.During this conversation I informed Castroand Dorticos in an appropriate way of thecontent of your letter, telling him that in thepresent circumstances it would not be fit-ting to aggravate the situation and initiateprovocations.

Castro said that he understood the cru-cial nature of these actions, but that, con-sidering the rise in the army’s martial spiritand the Americans’ warning, our friendswere compelled to take such a step.

27.X.62 ALEKSEEV




27 October 1962

On 27 October I visited U Thant andgave him Comrade N.S. Khrushchev’s let-ter of 27 October, as well as a copy of themessage to Kennedy of the same date.

U Thant said that he would study thedocuments attentively, and that he hopedthey would prove to be a constructive con-tribution to the resolution of the problem.

U Thant then informed me that aroundnoon today Stevenson had visited him andtold him about N.S. Khrushchev’s messageto Kennedy of 26 October of this year.Stevenson did not leave U Thant the text ofthis message, saying that Kennedy had notauthorized him to do so.

It must however be noted that, asStevenson told U Thant, Kennedy is exam-ining this message in a positive and benevo-lent frame of mind. Stevenson also let amistake pass when giving an account of the26 October message to U Thant, declaringthat this message allegedly says that theSoviet Union is prepared to remove all itsmissiles, missile launch pads, and warheadsfrom Cuba.

We indicated that the message madeno mention of such points, but we declinedto discuss the matter, pleading our lack ofauthorization to do so.

U Thant asked us to convey to him, ifpossible, the text of the above-mentionedmessage of 26 October in order to take itinto account when he examines N.S.Khrushchev’s message of 27 October.

Later we asked what U Thant had ac-complished in the past 24 hours by way ofprogress towards the provisional agreement,for 2 to 3 weeks, based on the proposal ap-proved by the Soviet Union (whereby theUSSR suspends arms stockpiling in Cuba,and the USA suspends its blockade activi-ties).

U Thant responded that he had not yetdiscussed that matter with Stevenson again,and was waiting for Cuba’s response to his26 October message on the suspension ofmissile-base construction. He again reiter-ated that the USA was very concerned thatwork there, including the assembly of bomb-ers, is proceeding day and night. “After re-ceiving the Cuban response,” U Thant said,“I intend to put before Cuba the possibilityof creating some monitoring device (in portsof call) for ascertaining that ships arrivingin Cuba are not carrying arms.”

We again asserted our negative viewof the USA demands that go beyond thebounds of U Thant’s proposal, and we in-sisted that he exert the necessary pressureon the Americans to make them adopt hisplan. In all respects it was clear that in thelast 24 hours U Thant under American pres-sure had not taken the necessary measuresin that direction, and that he intended to winconsent, if only from the Cubans, for estab-lishing a procedure that to some degree atleast could be considered to guarantee thatships arriving in the next 2 to 3 weeks inCuba are not carrying arms. We expressedour dissatisfaction with that course of af-fairs, and stressed the importance of imme-diately winning approval for this procedurein order to avert the threat of armed encoun-ter, after which any further negotiationswould be rendered impossible.

U Thant said that he shared our con-cern, and would take action.

U Thant tried (honoring Stevenson’srequest) to give us the USA legation’s letterto the Soviet government, which containeda description of the blockade area aroundCuba, on the pretext that N.S. Khrushchev’sresponse to U Thant’s second message al-legedly contains an agreement to avoidclashes between Soviet vessels and theAmerican naval ships carrying out theblockade, and because they claim that it isimportant to know which areas are forbid-den. We refused to accept this letter on thegrounds that, as is well known, the Sovietgovernment considers the blockade illegal(in this we were bearing in mind the factthat in Moscow similar notes from the USAwere also returned). U Thant said that hewould give the indicated letter back toStevenson.

(The letter indicated that the blockadearea includes: the region with its center inHavana and with a radius of 500 nauticalmiles, and the region with its center in CapeMaisi on the eastern extremity of Cuba andwith a radius of 500 nautical miles as well.)

U Thant gave us the letter in which heexpresses his sincere thanks to N.S.Khrushchev for his very constructive 26October response to U Thant’s message of25 October of this year.

It should be noted that the UN del-egates from the neutral countries, like theUnited Arab Republic and Ghana, have be-gun to calm down a bit in recent days, sinceSoviet efforts were able to avert dangerous

clashes in the very first days after the Ameri-can provocation. Now they have started tosay that the settlement of the conflict ismainly a concern for the USSR and theUSA, that smaller countries cannot advisegreat powers on what they should do, andso on.

We will continue to exert pressure onU Thant and the UN delegates from the neu-tral countries (in particular, we had a con-versation today to this effect with the del-egate from the United Arab Republic in theSecurity Council) with the aim of persuad-ing them to support the Soviet proposals,and of exerting pressure on the USA and itsallies.

It would be expedient to give U Thantthe text of Comrade N.S. Khrushchev’smessage to Kennedy of 26 October, sinceStevenson has already informed him aboutit, albeit in his own interpretation.

We request your consent.

27.X.62 V. ZORIN


Telegram from USSR Foreign Ministryto Soviet diplomats in Washington,

Havana, and New York,28 October 1962

SOVIET EMBASSY WASHINGTONSOVIET EMBASSY HAVANACopy: New YorkTo Comrades Kuznetsov, Zorin

On 27 October of this year, the USAconsul in Moscow sent a letter to the Minis-try of Foreign Affairs telling of the proce-dure introduced by the USA governmentwith regard to the so-called quarantine, aprocedure that will be carried out abroad byUSA consulate officials, and within theUnited States by customs personnel.

In accordance with this procedure, for-eign ships bound for Cuba or in transit in-side the interception area are required topresent to the USA customs official a “Tran-sit Notification” or a “Certificate of theCompletion of Customs Formalities.”


Samples of the above-mentioned docu-ments were appended to the letter.

On 28 October of this year, the USAembassy forwarded to the Ministry of For-eign Affairs the text of the letter thatStevenson gave U Thant concerning the in-terception areas for vessels.

Both documents have been returned tothe American embassy.

This is conveyed for purposes of intel-ligence and familiarization.

(illegibly signed)


Telegram from Soviet delegate to theUnited Nations Zorin to USSR ForeignMinistry, 28 October 1962, on meetingwith Cuban delegate to the UN Garcia-

Inchaustegui on 27 October 1962

28 October 1962

1. The UN delegate from Cuba, Garcia-Inchaustegui, has conveyed the followinginformation about his meeting with U Thanton 27 October.

U Thant expressed gratitude for theinvitation to visit Cuba that had been ex-tended to him; he valued it as a highly im-portant step, and on 28 October promisedto give a definitive answer.

My visit to Cuba, the presence of UNrepresentatives there, declared U Thant,would help avert American aggressionagainst Cuba, since the USA could not carryout an attack while he was there.

U Thant said that in the event that hedecides to go, he would intend to take sev-eral aides and experts along with him.

U Thant also asked whether the gov-ernment of Cuba (in the event of his group’sjourney to Havana) could, on its own initia-tive, and not because they were official ob-servers, invite U Thant to see first handwhether the construction of missile launchpads and the assembly of bombers had beensuspended.

Before this, U Thant had told Garcia-Inchaustegui that Stevenson today had put

a request before U Thant to organize the visitso that UN representatives could conduct anon-site inspection on the cessation of theconstruction projects mentioned above.

In doing so, said U Thant, Stevensonemphasized in various ways that if theseprojects had not been stopped, then the USAwould take new actions. In response toGarcia-Inchaustegui’s question as to whatthis would mean concretely, Stevenson re-ferred, said U Thant, to the strengtheningof the blockade and to a USA demand forthe convocation of the Security Council.

According to U Thant, Stevenson alsosaid that Kennedy is examining with greatearnestness and urgency the idea put forwardby Dorticos in his 8 October speech beforethe General Assembly as the basis for asettlement.

U Thant then put before the Cubans thematter of the establishing of some proce-dure that would help ascertain that vesselsarriving in Cuba in the next 2 to 3 weeksare not supplying arms.

With regard to the issue of ComradeN.S. Khrushchev’s message of 27 October,U Thant declared that the formulation con-tained in it appears to him a positive one.

2. Garcia-Inchaustegui informed usthat at 20:30 Eastern Standard Time he hearda Cuban radio broadcast from Havana aboutthe downing by Cuban coastal batteries ofan American plane that had invaded Cubanair space.

28.X.62 V. ZORIN


Cable from Soviet Foreign MinisterGromyko to USSR Ambassador toCuba Alekseev, 28 October 1962

28 October 1962

You should meet comrade Fidel Castroand tell him the following:

“In Moscow they have received infor-mation from comrade Zorin regarding UThant’s proposal to the Cuban representa-tive at the UN about the possibility of his

trip to Cuba and granting him [and] accom-panying aides and experts an opportunity tosee themselves that work on creating launch-ers, characterized by Americans as offen-sive weapons, had stopped.

Moscow adheres to the opinion that UThant should be given a positive answer tohis appeal. If the Cuban friends share thisview we shall inform comrade Pavlov[Pliyev] and give him corresponding instruc-tions about access to launchers for U Thantand accompanying persons.

As is generally known, U Thant madea proposal so that representatives of the In-ternational Red Cross (IRC) were allowedto visit Soviet ships going to Cuba in orderto ascertain that there are no weapons, seenby the American administration as offensive.We sent instructions to our representativesto the UN in order to give consent to thatsuggestion, bearing in mind that transpor-tation of the IRC to the Soviet ships willalso be done on Soviet vessels or ships ofneutral countries.

We would like to inform you that shipsgoing to Cuba right now do not carry anyweapons.”

Telegraph the report on the fulfillmentof these instructions.

A. GROMYKO


III. THE AFTERMATH:28 OCTOBER-10 DECEMBER 1962

Cable from USSR Ambassador to CubaAlekseev to Soviet Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, 28 October 1962

28 October 1962

Due to F. Castro’s absence from Ha-vana and according to his instructions, I gaveboth letters to President Dorticos.9 In mypresence Dorticos called Castro and in-formed him in a prearranged form that theletters had been received. Castro promisedto meet me on his return.

Upon several statements and Dorticos’reaction to N.S. Khrushchev’s letter to F.


Castro and to the latest message to Kennedyabout the dismantling of special weaponryit became clear that confusion and bewil-derment are reigning inside the Cuban lead-ership.

Dorticos said that, unfortunately, Cu-ban and Latin American peoples would per-ceive the decision to dismantle the specialweaponry, relying only upon Kennedy’s as-surances, as a defeat for the Soviet govern-ment.

He said that whatever assertionsKennedy made, the Cuban governmentcould not weaken its vigilance.

We understand, declared Dorticos, thatthis decision of the Soviet government isdirected to the preserving of peace and inthe end it will be advantageous for the wholesocialist camp, including Cuba, but underthe present conditions of great patriotic en-thusiasm of our people this report would beperceived by infinitely electrified masses asa cold shower.

He said that for the Cuban leaders themost important thing right now is to pre-serve the Soviet Union’s prestige, which hadbeen raised so high in Cuba.

According to him, the counterrevolu-tion will immediately seize this opportunityand direct all its work to revive distrust to-ward the Soviet Union.

Here, said Dorticos, we must rise to theoccasion in order to explain correctly to ourpeople the meaning of the adopted decisions.

He declared that under the created cir-cumstances the Cubans were obliged to pub-lish a statement, differing in tone from N.S.Khrushchev’s letter, and there was suggesteda preliminary acceptance by the Americansof the five [Cuban] conditions, includingevacuation of the Guantanamo base. (trans-mitted to TASS)

Besides, Dorticos explained, we foundourselves in a difficult situation insofar aswe had officially declared that we would notallow any UN observers on our territory.

Until a certain time we will have tostick to this “maximum program” and seekways of achieving an honorable agreementwhich could be reached only if we receivefrom the USA absolute guarantees of oursecurity.

According to Dorticos, no Kennedystatements could be trusted inasmuch aseven now the piratical flights over Cubanterritory were occurring and this was donenot without Kennedy’s knowledge.

Dorticos considers that the Americans,probably, will not stop at our consent to dis-mantle bases of special weapons and willdemand additional concessions, in particu-lar, the withdrawal of all the [Soviet] mili-tary units.

He also showed concern about possiblesolution of the question of the remaining inCuba of our military specialists and the de-fensive weapons at their disposal, attachedfor the defense of military objectives.

Dorticos didn’t say it openly, but per-mitted me to understand that the Cubanswere not happy with our decision [to removethe missiles under UN inspection] under-taken without previously consulting them.

I told them that the small delay [in pro-viding] the letter [from Khrushchev toKennedy] was due to merely technical rea-sons (enciphering, transmission, translation)and made the assumption that insofar as theCuban comrades had several times informedMoscow about the inevitability of [U.S.]intervention and bombings, probably, somequick and operational actions were needed,so there was no time for coordinations.Dorticos agreed.

After my visit to Dorticos, CarlosRafael Rodriguez came to see me (he wasinformed by Dorticos about the content ofthe letter from N.S. Khrushchev to FidelCastro) and presented a dismal picture ofincomprehension among the Cuban peopleand several leaders of our decision to dis-mantle the special installations.

He said that a lot of people think thatall our specialists and their weapons wouldbe withdrawn and they were taking it hard.

According to C.R. Rodriguez, F. Castrohas also reacted very painfully regarding thisdecision—and not the content of the deci-sion itself because he considered it to beadvantageous for mankind and the Cubanpeople—but the procedure of its adoption—without a previous consultation.

Particularly, he said, Dorticos had apresentiment that Castro’s dissatisfactionwould be caused by the phrase that the textof the response to Kennedy was being trans-mitted by radio.

C.R. Rodriguez explained that F.Castro was defending our decision in con-versations with the Cuban leaders, trying toconvince them that its results would be seenlater, but he had not yet found intelligiblearguments for an electrified people. But themost important [thing] is that he skeptically

regards Kennedy’s assurances and is con-vinced that the Americans will go furtherand put forward new demands.

In my conversations with Dorticos andRodriguez I said that, in my view, the deci-sion on dismantling those installations didnot interfere with Cuban defensive interests.It will not only save universal peace andensure its strengthening, but this decisionof the Soviet Government will eliminate thethreat of invasion to Cuba and make it moredifficult in the future.

Regarding the issue of the incompre-hension of this decision by the politicallyliterate groups of the population, I said thatthis phenomenon had to be very short andthe people itself would understand the wis-dom of the decision and thus raise its politi-cal maturity. We are confident that Dorticos,Rodriguez, F. Castro and the majority of the[Cuban] leaders will understand correctlyour decision and we will find a common lan-guage with them. Indeed, there are diffi-culties to explain it to the people, insofar asit has been excited beyond limits by anti-American propaganda, but we consider thatthere will not be serious consequences andthe nearest future will prove the correctnessof our decision.

28/X/62 A. ALEKSEEV


Memorandum of Conversation betweenSoviet Foreign Ministry A.A. Gromykoand Cuban Ambassador to the USSR

Carlos Olivares Sanchez,29 October 1962

29 October 1962

At the request of Olivares Sanchez [I]received him at 16.00. [4 p.m.]

The Ambassador asked [me] to informhim about our assessment of the interna-tional situation created as a result of the na-val blockade around Cuba, announced bythe USA administration.

[I] Responded to him that we, the So-viet Government, consider to be a good onethe outcome of the recent events in the Car-


ibbean. As a result of the efforts undertakenby the Soviet and Cuban sides there havebeen received guarantees on the part of theUSA administration of non-aggressionagainst the Republic of Cuba, which will beofficially formalized after the end of nego-tiations with the participation of Mr. UThant, Acting UN Secretary General. In ouropinion the result is also a further strength-ening of the international position of theRepublic of Cuba. Nowadays the Cubanpeople is seen even more than before as aheroic people who has convincingly dem-onstrated to the whole world its resolute-ness to defend—arms in hand—the libertyand independence of its motherland.

Olivares asked about our opinion re-garding the statement made by Fidel Castroon October 28 of the current year.

[I] Responded to him that this state-ment has received the full comprehensionand support of the Soviet Government.

Speaking of time limits for the with-drawal from Cuba of the “Soviet weaponsfor strategic defense” the Ambassador askedto be informed if those armaments wouldbe returned to the Soviet Union before theAmericans fulfill the Cuban government’sdemand for liquidation of the USA navybase in Guantanamo.

[I] Responded to him that, in our opin-ion, the solution of the question of the liq-uidation of the Guantanamo base, appar-ently, will require a long time and thereforethe presence of certain types of Soviet ar-maments in Cuba during that period willhardly contribute to solving it positively.

Olivares asked if this meant that theSoviet armaments would be withdrawn fromCuba before the USA administration satis-fies other demands listed by Fidel Castro inhis statement: to end the economic block-ade, subversive activity, piratical actions,and incursions of whatever kind into the airspace or territorial waters of Cuba.

[I] Responded to him that when we arespeaking about the return of Soviet arma-ments from Cuba to the USSR we mean onlya certain kind of armaments, but not arma-ments in general. Regarding the fulfillmentof the above-listed demands of the Cubangovernment, we see it as a process that re-quires a certain time to satisfy all the de-mands mentioned in the cited statement byFidel Castro.

Having made a reference to a note re-ceived from the Embassy of Sudan and other

available data, Olivares informed [me] thata series of neutral countries accuse Cuba ofviolating the Belgrade Declaration, explain-ing their conclusions by the accepted factof the presence of a “Soviet military base”in Cuba.

[I] Told Olivares that such assumptionsdo not have the slightest grounds. Eachcountry can use the right not only for indi-vidual, but also a collective defense againstaggression. It is clear that being the objectof continuous aggressive provocations onthe part of the USA and even having alreadybeen a victim of invasion, Cuba cannot be-come like a frog voluntarily jumping intothe boa’s jaws. Measures undertaken by theCuban government to strengthen its nationaldefenses are in full accordance with inter-national law and do not contradict a singlecommonly accepted international norm.

At the conclusion of the conversationOlivares expressed his desire to broadencontacts between officials of the MFA [Min-istry of Foreign Affairs] of the USSR andthose of the Cuban embassy in such circum-stances. He spoke about his interest to re-ceive from the MFA a more complete infor-mation [report] about the most importantdecisions adopted in Moscow and referringto Soviet-Cuban relations, for his own ori-entation and in order to have the possibilityto inform his government personally.

[I] Responded to him that I do under-stand such an interest, adding that theAmbassador’s desire would certainly betaken into account. [I] Explained that dur-ing the recent events we were obliged, inorder to save time, to use communicationlines of our Embassy in Havana, which en-sure an uninterrupted, secure, and quicktransmission of reports to Cuba. The Am-bassador said that he entirely understandsthis and agrees with this. He gave me tounderstand that from the point of view ofreliability (code) the communicationthrough our Embassy in Havana is a moresuitable method than through the Cubanembassy in Moscow.

In parting Olivares expressed deepgratitude to the peoples of the Soviet Unionand the Soviet Government for continuoussupport of the Cuban people’s struggle forthe independence of their motherland.

[I] Thanked Olivares for these senti-ments.

At the conversation were present: A.Gonzales, Ambassador’s translator, and V.

Chernyshov, Second Secretary of theLatinamerican Department.

A. GROMYKO


Record of Conversation between SovietDeputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov

and U.N. Secretary-General U Thant,29 October 1962

From the diary of V. V. Kuznetsov

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION WITH ACTING U.N. SECRETARY

GENERAL U THANTon 29 October 1962

The meeting took place in the UN Sec-retariat. Present were: on the Soviet side,V.A. Zorin, P.D. Morozov, L.I. Men-delevich, and V.N. Zherebtsov; from the UNSecretariat, U Thant, E.D. Kiselev, O.Loutfi, Narasimhan, and General Rikhye.

At the beginning of the conversation,V.V. Kuznetsov conveyed to U Thant theheartfelt greetings of Comrade N.S.Khrushchev, and the latter’s great apprecia-tion for U Thant’s efforts in a noble en-deavor, the attainment of a speedy settle-ment of the Cuban crisis.

He said that the government of theUSSR had ordered him to arrive in NewYork to aid U Thant in his efforts to elimi-nate the dangerous situation that has arisen.Although the USSR’s position with regardto the crisis in the Caribbean area seems tobe quite familiar to U Thant, V.V. Kuznetsovwould nevertheless like to make use of thisfirst meeting with U Thant first and fore-most emphasize to certain basic features ofthe Soviet Union’s position, and the stepstaken by the USSR government to assurethe fastest possible settlement of the crisisthrough peaceful means, with the goal ofaffirming peace and security, and taking intoaccount the interests of all parties.

V. V. Kuznetsov reminded U Thant thatthe government of the Soviet Union has in-troduced a series of constructive proposalsthat received general recognition, and that


provide a good and fair foundation for re-solving the whole problem. The Soviet gov-ernment, bearing in mind U Thant’s recom-mendation, has undertaken to suspend tem-porarily the traffic of its ships bound forCuba, and to keep them away for a shortperiod of time from the region declared bythe United States as being under quarantine.

The government of the USSR has alsodeclared that on board these ships there arenot, and will not be, any arms that PresidentKennedy and the USA government see as“offensive.”

Later the government of the USSRagreed to dismantle and send back to theSoviet Union the launchers now in Cuba thatare seen by the United States as “offensive.”

In brief, said V.V. Kuznetsov, the gov-ernment of the USSR has undertaken to ap-prove and accept U Thant’s proposal; at thesame time it has declared and still declaresthat for its part it will take any and all mea-sures to prevent an exacerbation of the situa-tion, which could lead to a worsening of theconflict and an unleashing of thermonuclearwar. In its actions the government of theUSSR is bearing in mind the sincere desireof nations to safeguard peace and calmthroughout the globe.

The Soviet government has stressedand continues to stress that the actions ofthe United States, manifested by the impo-sition of the blockade, as well as the wholeUSA policy towards Cuba, are aggressive,and aimed at an exacerbation of the situa-tion rather than a normalization of it. Thereis no need at present to provide a detaileddescription of American actions during thepast week. That has lucidly been done bythe Soviet government’s statement, as wellas by N.S. Khrushchev’s messages to theUSA President Kennedy and to U Thant.

If it were to asess the situation as itexists today, V.V. Kuznetsov continued, theSoviet government would note with satis-faction, as has already been noted in N.S.Khrushchev’s message, that the USA at thepresent moment has taken a position whichmakes it possible to settle the whole Cubanproblem on the basis of the Soviet propos-als. All this has been the result of the effortsmade by the Soviet government, as well asby the United Nations Organization and byU Thant himself. The Soviet Union ac-knowledges the great efforts that were dis-played by U Thant.

President Kennedy’s latest response to

N.S. Khrushchev’s message testifies to thefact that the American government believesit possible to reach an agreement on the ba-sis of the USSR’s proposals. This we con-sider to be a positive factor. With regard tothis it seems to us that the moment has ar-rived for making a transition from generalstatements to concrete matters. The govern-ment of the USSR is ready to do so.

U Thant has expressed his hope thatthe exchange of opinions will be fruitful andpositive, and that it will help eliminate thethreat now present in the Caribbean region.He has also expressed his thanks to N.S.Khrushchev for his greetings and his appre-ciation of his (U Thant’s) efforts to main-tain peace. U Thant has asked V.V.Kuznetsov to convey his sincere gratitudefor all the understanding and cooperation hehas received.

After this U Thant said that he recog-nizes the danger of the existing situation.That danger intensified late Saturday nightand early Sunday morning. At that time therewere indications that the point of no returnhad arrived. U Thant did not sleep that night,conducting endless consultations withNarasimhan and Rikhye. Fortunately noth-ing tragic occurred.

Khrushchev’s response yesterday toKennedy’s message represents a very greatcommitment to the peaceful resolution ofthe Cuban crisis. U Thant emphasized thatthis was not just his personal opinion, butalso the opinion of all his colleagues andthe overwhelming majority of the perma-nent UN delegates with whom he has met.For this fruitful and positive gesture, said UThant, the whole world expressed its grati-tude to N.S. Khrushchev and to the govern-ment of the Soviet Union.

U Thant said that he too was concernedabout the continuing blockade of Cuba onthe part of the United States. He recalledhis own proposals for a voluntary suspen-sion by the Soviet Union of arms stockpil-ing in Cuba for a short period of time in re-turn for the United States’ voluntary suspen-sion of the blockade. After three-day talkson this issue with the Soviet delegate to theUN, V.A. Zorin, and the USA delegate tothe UN Stevenson, U Thant put all his ef-forts, he said, into finding the fastest reso-lution of this issue.

At the present time, U Thant said, af-ter his trip to Cuba had been decided, andafter the conversation taking place between

V.A. Zorin and U Thant on 28 October, heagain addressed a request to the UnitedStates to suspend its blockade. In doing sohe emphasized that the Soviet Union hadundertaken to give orders to its ships to tem-porarily suspend traffic to Cuba, which sig-nals the acceptance by the Soviet Union ofthe preliminary settlement proposed by UThant. U Thant said that he had also declaredto the Americans that a continuation of theblockade is especially undesirable during hisvisit to Cuba. U Thant has still not receiveda response from the Americans, but hopesto have one in the near future, possibly eventoday.

V.V. Kuznetsov thanked U Thant forthe warm words addressed to the USSRgovernment and personally to N.S.Khrushchev, and said that he would imme-diately convey them to their destination.

V.V. Kuznetsov agreed that the time hascome for turning to concrete problems andranking them on the basis of their urgencyand importance. He was happy to note that,in his outlines as in U Thant’s plans, thequarantine issue occupies first place. Thissuggests that our thoughts and desires areheading in the same direction.

In connection with this, V.V. Kuznetsovrecalled that the Soviet government, as N.S.Khrushchev informed U Thant on 25 Octo-ber, had accepted the first proposal of UThant, which stipulated in particular a vol-untary suspension of all arms transfers toCuba for a period of two to three weeks,and the simultaneous temporary cessationof the quarantine activity on the part of theUnited States.

The most recent declarations of theUSSR government have created even morefavorable conditions for carrying out theproposal to end the quarantine. Neverthe-less the quarantine activity still continues.However, as U Thant knows, ship captainshave received instructions to remain on theopen sea, outside the boundaries of the quar-antine activity, for a certain period of time.Such a situation cannot continue for long,since it is depriving Cuba of peaceful goodsthat are necessary to it, it is creating diffi-culties for the fueling of the ships remain-ing on the open sea, and it is incurring lossesbecause of their enforced inactivity. Withregard to this, we welcomed U Thant’sthoughts on the necessity of resolving thiswhole issue in the next one or two days. Butthe imposed quarantine has already been


going on for more than five days, and nowthere are no longer any reasons for not sus-pending the quarantine activity.

The declaration of the quarantine bythe United States is illegal, and is recognizedas such by the whole world. Nevertheless,proceeding from the situation at hand andguided by the interests of peace, the gov-ernment of the USSR at the present momentis set on the issue of suspending the practi-cal operations of the quarantine. It is quitenatural that we would like these operationsto cease immediately. In any case we haveevery right to expect a response from theUnited States in the very near future, per-haps even before U Thant’s departure forCuba.

U Thant again repeated that the daybefore he had addressed this question to theAmericans, and was awaiting an answerfrom them that day.

V.V. Kuznetsov asked U Thant what thebasic difficulties were in settling this issue.

U Thant answered that the Americansare fully aware of the instructions given toSoviet ships to remain for a short period oftime outside the boundaries of the quaran-tine activity. They are also aware that theseinstructions have a definite time limit. Be-fore this they have been trying to avoid di-rect contact between Soviet and Americanvessels. However, the Americans are afraidthat if they allow Soviet ships to approachCuba, those ships may be carrying arms. Forthis reason they are insisting that somemechanism be created for ascertainingwhether or not such ships are conveyingweaponry.

After his talks with V.A. Zorin, U Thantmet with the UN delegate from Cuba,Garcia-Inchaustegui, to whom he declaredthat, since the USSR is not agreeing to thecreation of some verification mechanism forships on the open sea, he, U Thant, proposesto the government of Cuba to examine thepossibility of creating such a mechanism inports of call. In doing so he informed theCuban delegate of the Soviet views on thismatter.

V.V. Kuznetsov thanked U Thant forthe information, and said that he understoodthe latter’s position.

He went on to say that the governmentof the USSR has examined in a spirit of co-operation the ideas expressed by U Thanton the fastest suspension of the quarantine.U Thant proposed three possible ways in

which the issue could be resolved:1) the monitoring of Soviet vessels by

American ships;2) checks on the vessels by certain neu-

tral countries;3) sharing these functions with the In-

ternational Red Cross.The government of the USSR has ex-

amined the issue and has asked to commu-nicate that, if U Thant is not successful inreaching an agreement with the Americanson the temporary suspension of the block-ade with the observation of our vesselsbound for Cuba, then the Soviet governmentis prepared to allow, as a temporary mea-sure, the boarding of Soviet vessels boundfor Cuba by representatives of the Red Crossfor ascertaining that those ships contain nosorts of weapons that concern the Presidentand government of the USA, who refer tothem as “offensive weapons.”

V.V. Kuznetsov emphasized that theUSSR government, in taking this step, isacting on a sincere desire to resolve thisproblem in the interests of peace, taking intofull account the position of the Republic ofCuba.

U Thant expressed his thanks to thegovernment of the Soviet Union for thisimportant decision, made with the purposeof reducing tension and contributing to set-tling the Cuban problem through peacefulmeans. He promised to convey immediatelythe content of this Soviet proposal to theUnited States.

V.V. Kuznetsov noted that, in accept-ing one of U Thant’s ideas, the Soviet gov-ernment had not yet worked out the detailsof the monitoring system, but is raising thepssibility that Red Cross representativescould be conveyed onto the Soviet vesselseither by Soviet ships, or by the ships ofneutral countries. As far as possible cargochecks in the ports of call are concerned,this issue if for the Cuban government todecide, since that is its own territory, andthe Soviet government itself cannot makeany decision on this matter without Cubanconsent.

U Thant thanked V.V. Kuznetsov forhis explanation, and said that he would im-mediately pass this information on to thegovernment of Cuba.

U Thant noted that in the event that theRed Cross takes on the execution of thesefunctions, he himself would determine, ac-cording to existing practices and rules of

procedure, the national composition of theinspectors. He asked V. V. Kuznetsov to givehis opinion on this matter.

V. V. Kuznetsov said again that we hadnot yet given thought to the details, but thatwe would prefer that the groups of RedCross inspectors be made up of citizens ofneutral countries. If U Thant has anythoughts, then they could be discussed, andthe Soviet government’s views on themcould be sought.

U Thant said that, as practice shows,in all cases in which the aid of the Red Crosswas requested, the national make-up of itsrepresentatives was 95% Swiss.

V. V. Kuznetsov asked U Thant that onfuture considerations of this matter he takeinto account our views, as well as the factthat Switzerland is not a memeber of the UN.

Then he asked U Thant to describe thegoal of his trip to Cuba, and any thoughtshe has in connection with this trip.

U Thant said that the problem mostimmediately faced by the Security Councilinvolves three governments: those of theSoviet Union, the USA, and Cuba. For theUSA the most urgent problem is the liftingof the quarantine. For the USSR, it is thematter of arms provisioning, the dismantlingof missile launchers, and the shipping ofthem back to the Soviet Union. The SovietUnion has already given its consent to allthis, and has even agreed to the 2 to 3 weekarms provisioning point. The United Stateshas not fully agreed to U Thant’s proposal.The quarantine continues even now, and theUnited States is demanding the creation ofa mechanism for ascertaining that arms pro-visioning is not continuing.

The Soviet Union’s decision on thepossible use of Red Cross services will inmany ways contribute to the settling of thisproblem.

One of the goals that U Thant is set-ting for himself on his trip to Cuba is get anidea of what is being done or has alreadybeen done with regard to the removal ofmissile launchers from Cuba. He intends togive a report on this to the Security Coun-cil.

U Thant intends moreover to discusswith Castro measures for the safeguardingof the security of Cuba, as well as for theelimination of threats from the USA andcertain other countries of Latin America. UThant emphasized that precise and definiteguarantees were equally important both for


the United States and other Latin Americancountries, and for Cuba. For this reason, UThant intends to propose that United Na-tions observers be placed not only on Cu-ban territory, but also on the territory of theUnited States and several Latin Americancountries neighboring Cuba.

V. V. Kuznetsov said that we now havea clearer idea of the task that U Thant is set-ting for himself during his trip to Cuba. Inconnection with this he expressed some ofthe Soviet views on this matter. First andforemost, Kuznetsov stressed, as is alreadyknown from N. S. Khrushchev’s messages,the missile installations in Cuba are in thehands of Soviet specialists. The Soviet gov-ernment has stated that it is dismantling andremoving these launchers from Cuba.

It is evident from the message sent byN. S. Khrushchev to Kennedy on 27 Octo-ber and from the later message with whichthe American government generally agreed,that the Soviet government has agreed to theimposition of on-site checks after the above-mentioned dismantlings, of course with theconsent of the government of the Republicof Cuba.

V. V. Kuznetsov asked whether theAmericans are not moving away from theposition laid out in Kennedy’s message.

V. V. Kuznetsov expressed his agree-ment with the Soviet Union’s granting ofguarantees on arms provisioning and thedismantling of missile installations, and sotoo the United States should make guaran-tees to the effect that it will not infringe uponthe security and sovereignty of Cuba eitherwith its own armed forces, or through sup-port for other countries, and that it will notpermit or aid the activity on its own terri-tory of subversive sabotage groups. Thesepledges must be firm.

We have made note of Kennedy’s state-ment that the USA will guarantee that noaggression against Cuba will take place.However, on one hand Kennedy declaresthat the Soviet Union’s statements are reas-suring, while on the other hand the USA ismaking new demands that place the twoparties in unfairly different positions.

V. V. Kuznetsov concluded that his ideacomes down to the point that the statementsexisting at the present time are sufficient tolift the quarantine without having to take anymeasures related to the speedy establishmentof checks on the dismantling of missile sitesin Cuba.

With regard to this he recalled N. S.Khrushchev’s message to Kennedy of 28October, which said that the Soviet Unionwas prepared to reach an agreement withthe United States on the possibility of UNrepresentatives monitoring this dismantlingprocess. In doing so, Khrushchev referredto his earlier message of 27 October, whichsaid that agents of the UN Security Councilcould conduct on-site inspections on the ful-fillment of the obligations that have beentaken on. Of course it will be necessary toreceive the permission of the governmentof the Republic of Cuba to allow these au-thorized officials to enter the country.

U Thant declared that he now under-stands better the problem connected withestablishing on-site inspections on the dis-mantling and removal of the missile launch-ers from Cuba. Now, after N. S.Khrushchev’s messages of 27 and 28 Octo-ber, and the explanations offered by V. V.Kuznetsov, he has a clear idea of the Sovietgovernment’s position.

During his stay in Cuba he, U Thant,intends to raise the issue of the dismantlingand removal of missile materials from Cubain his talks with Prime Minister Fidel Castro,and it is possible that the latter will havesomething to say on this matter.

Returning to the question of guaran-tees, U Thant said that such guaranteesshould be bilateral. On his own initiative hedecided to raise the issue of the presence ofUN representatives in all the countries ofthis region. If the government of Cubaagrees to some UN presence, said U Thant,then he intends to propose to the Organiza-tion of American States and the UnitedStates to admit UN representatives onto theterritory of the USA and the Latin Ameri-can countries, in the interests of removingthe threat to peace in this area. In its generaloutlines, U Thant has informed the Ameri-cans of this idea.

V. V. Kuznetsov declared that the So-viet Union has formulated its duties clearlyand concisely, and that there should be nodoubt in anyone’s mind about the fulfillmentof these duties. As far as the USA guaran-tees to Cuba are concerned, they have al-ready been generally laid out in outline form.With regard to this, V. V. Kuznetsov has di-rected U Thant’s attention to the passagefrom N. S. Khrushchev’s message of 27October which refers to what the USAshould do about making guarantees to Cuba,

and especially: the USA government willdeclare in the Security Council that the USAwill respect the inviolability of Cuba’s bor-ders, its sovereignty, and that it pledges notto interfere in its domestic affairs, not toinvade it or let its territory serve as a basefor any invasion of Cuba, and that it willalso restrain those who wish to take aggres-sive action against Cuba either from withinUSA territory, or from the territory of thecountries that neighbor Cuba.

V. V. Kuznetsov remarked that, as canbe inferred from the Soviet Union’s propos-als, the duties of all parties should be for-mulated and represented in the form of jointor individual declarations to the SecurityCouncil that express their positions. In thisway such obligations will have a more defi-nite character. This can be inferred as wellfrom the proposals of U Thant himself.

According to the Soviet Union, in ex-amining the issue of guarantees it is neces-sary to take into consideration the views thathave been expressed on this matter by PrimeMinister Castro of Cuba.

V. V. Kuznetsov again asked about thedesirability of receiving an answer regard-ing the temporary suspension of the quar-antine before U Thant’s departure for Cuba.In doing so he emphasized that the SovietUnion for its part has made many concilia-tory gestures, and that now it is necessaryto persuade the other side to make similarones.

U Thant said that he would immedi-ately communicate information about theSoviet Union’s favorable reaction to his pro-posal about possibly making use of the ser-vices of the Red Cross, and with regard tothis he wanted to clarify certain details. First,in the event that the Red Cross agrees, thepersonnel of the inspection groups can beappointed only by that organization. The UNcannot make recommendations to it on thatmatter. Second, as U Thant understands it,vessels carrying the inspection groups willbe supplied by the Soviet Union or neutralcountries. Third, the Americans in their talkswith U Thant have asked about the vesselschartered by the Soviet Union for carryingits own cargo.

V. V. Kuznetsov said that he was au-thorized, naturally, to speak only about So-viet vessels.

V. A. Zorin added that the Americanscan be sure that Lebanese or Swedish ves-sels, say, are not carrying arms, as these


governments have officially declared.V. V. Kuznetsov noted that if the USA

wanted an agreement, they would havequickly resolved this matter. If they have nosuch desire, they can find a million pretextsand ask a million questions. V. A. Zorin saidthat such an agreement could indeed bereached today, since the positions of all theinterested parties have in general beenclearly presented.

At the conclusion of the meeting it wasagreed that during U Thant’s stay in Cuba,contact with him would be sustained throughNarasimhan.

The conversation was recorded by V.Zherebtsov.


Telegram from Soviet Deputy ForeignMinister Kuznetsov to USSR Foreign


29 October 1962

On 29 October we met with U Thant.We conveyed greetings to U Thant

from Comrade N.S. Khrushchev, as well asthe latter’s wishes for U Thant’s success inaverting a war, strengthening the peace, andsafeguarding the seccurity of all nations. UThant was told that I had been entrusted bythe Soviet government to aid him, U Thant,in his efforts to eliminate the current dan-gerous situation. We then laid out the basicpoints of the USSR’s position in the Cubanaffair, as they were defined in Comrade N.S.Khrushchev’s messages to Kennedy of 26,27, and 28 October 1962. We noted that theUSA had declared the Soviet proposals tobe generally practicable, which allows theCuban problem to be resolved on the basisof those Soviet proposals. We emphasizedthat in view of this, the moment had arrivedfor moving away from general statementsabout the positions of the parties, and to-wards an agreement on concrete steps to betaken. We declared that the Soviet govern-ment is ready to take on this practical work.

U Thant asked us to convey to Com-rade N.S. Khrushchev his sincere gratitude

and best wishes. He remarked that the situ-ation had been extraordinarily serious, es-pecially towards the end of 27 October, al-though Comrade N.S. Khrushchev’s mes-sage of 28 October had relieved the situa-tion. U Thant called that message “a mostconsiderable contribution to peace” andemphasized that this was the general opin-ion in the UN.

U Thant said furthermore that he alsoconsidered it expedient to move towards theworking out of an agreement on concretemeasures for the settlement of the Cubansituation, and precisely for this purpose hehad addressed a request the day before (on28 October) to the Americans to lift theblockade of Cuba immediately (U Thantused the word “blockade”) for a period of 2to 3 weeks, as had been stipulated in UThant’s first message of 25 October. In do-ing so, U Thant emphasized that the USSRhad already done what U Thant had re-quested in that message, suspending armsprovisioning in Cuba, while the USA hadnot yet lifted the blockade. It still cannot besaid that the Americans have done so, UThant continued. For him (U Thant) a verystrange situation could arise if he is in Cuba(he will fly to Havana tomorrow to meetwith Fidel Castro), and the American navyis still continuing the blockade at that time.

We asked U Thant how the Americansare explaining their delay in accepting thedecision about lifting the so-called quaran-tine, even though it is obvious that such alifting is absolutely necessary both politi-cally and practically. With regard to this, wepointed out the urgency of lifting the quar-antine first and foremost because of the ne-cessity of laying a foundation, as U Thanthimself suggested, for negotiating a settle-ment of the Cuban problem. Moreover, be-cause of the continuing blockade, ships car-rying exclusively peace-time goods cannotget these goods to Cuba, where they areneeded, and furthermore the ships are ex-periencing fueling difficulties, and their idle-ness is bringing losses. We emphasized thatthe Soviet Union has agreed to U Thant’sproposal to hold back these vessels boundfor Cuba for several days, but that theAmericans keep prolonging the period.

U Thant answered that the Americansare demanding checks on the Soviet vesselscarrying cargo to Cuba, as one of the condi-tions on their lifting the quarantine. Withregard to this he said that the situation would

be relieved if the Soviet Union agreed tothe carrying out of these checks throughsome “independent agency.”

In accordance with your instructions,we informed U Thant that the Soviet gov-ernment is prepared to give its consent tochecks on Soviet vessels bound for Cuba,as U Thant proposed in one of his earliertalks with Comrade Zorin, by representa-tive of the International Red Cross, if theUSA refuses to lift the blockade unless suchchecks are instituted. I emphasized that thisis of course a temporary measure, for 2 to 3weeks until the settlement of the Cubanproblem.

U Thant received this information withvery great interest, and expressed gratitudeto the Soviet government for this new andimportant step towards settling the Cubanconflict. He said that he would meet todaywith the Americans, and would secure thelifting of the “quarantine.” With regard tothe practical issues connected with our pro-posal for carrying out checks on vessels byrepresentatives of the International RedCross, we explained to U Thant in accor-dance with your instructions that the mainissue here concerns the checks at sea, inwhich Red Cross representatives would beconveyed on board Soviet ships by USSRvessels or by those belonging to neutralcountries. As far as checks in the ports areconcerned, we noted that this falls not withinour own jurisdiction, but that of the Cubangovernment. U Thant came back to this pointseveral times, and it was clear that he pre-fers instituting checks in the Cuban ports.For our part we consider it feasible to agreewith this, as long as our Cuban friends donot object. It is technically possible to carryout checks in ports much faster than on theopen sea, and this would keep the Ameri-cans from delaying any longer the lifting ofthe “quarantine.”

U Thant then asked how we feel aboutthe fact that the Red Cross will use mainlySwiss personnel to carry out the checks. Indoing so he emphasized that, as he knowsfrom past experience, the International RedCross does not accept any recommendationson the make-up of its personnel, and its ownpersonnel is 95% Swiss. I said that we wouldprefer that the personnel of the inspectiongroups consisted of citizens from neutralcountries that are represented in the UN.

U Thant also asked whether we agreedto the Red Cross checks on Soviet ships


only, or also on vessels chartered by theSoviet Union. We said that we cannot speakof any vessels other than Soviet ones, butthat it would be absurd if the Americansstarted suspecting the Soviet Union of con-veying arms that it calls “offensive” on char-tered vessels belonging, for example, toSweden or Lebanon. U Thant agreed thatthis would be an absurdity.

We asked U Thant what his intentionswere with regard to the forthcoming nego-tiations in Cuba. U Thant said that he wantedto exchange views with Fidel Castro prima-rily on how the dismantling of war sites,which is referred to in Comrade N.S.Khrushchev’s message of 28 October, wouldbe carried out.

We told U Thant that the military sitesmentioned there were in the hands of So-viet officers. U Thant answered that he knewthis, and of course would consult with theSoviet Union on this matter.

With regard to this, we reminded UThant that, as noted in Comrade N.S.Khrushchev’s letter of 27 October, thechecks should be carried out after the armsare removed from Cuba. What will have tobe checked is not the weaponry, but the factthat it is no longer in Cuba. U Thant declinedto spell out his own point of view on thismatter. It can be supposed that the Ameri-cans will insist that inspections be carriedout even during the process of dismantling.

U Thant said that he meant to exchangeviews with Fidel Castro as well on the mat-ters connected with the checks on vesselsbound for Cuba.

The goal of his trip to Cuba, U Thantsaid, would also be a discussion with FidelCastro on obtaining guarantees for Cubansecurity, and guarantees for the security ofother countries which maintain that Cubarepresents a threat to them. He said that hewanted to propose to Castro a formulationthat would stipulate a “UN presence” inCuba on the model of the “UN presence” inthe United Arab Republic (Gaza and Aqaba)as a guarantee that nobody will invade Cuba,and that Cuba will not take actions againstanybody else.

We told U Thant that really the pointabout guarantees for Cuban security oughtto constitute the most important part of thefinal settling of the whole problem.Kennedy’s statements on this matter arepositive, but they seem to have a provisionalcharacter, and refer to Cuba’s inviolability

from attack in only a very general way. It isnecessary to concretize these statements,and to confirm the whole settlement of theCuban issue, including guarantees forCuba’s security, through the Security Coun-cil. With regard to this we referred to therelevant point about guarantees on Cubansecurity contained in Comrade N. S.Khrushchev’s message of 27 October. Wealso recalled the guarantees that Fidel Castrodemanded in his statement of 28 October.

U Thant did not show any reaction toany of this, although he did not object ofany of it, but rather returned again to thequestion of a “UN presence” in Cuba. Hesaid that if Fidel Castro approves this pro-posal, he will then address a similarproposeal to the other party regarding the“UN presence” in the USA and certain LatinAmerican countries. We were given to un-derstand that the goal of this “UN presence”would be to avert attacks on Cuba by coun-terrevolutionary Cuban emigres now livingin the USA and certain countries of LatinAmerica.

We did not meanwhile express to UThant our attitude to this proposal of his.We assume that it could be viewed positivelywhen one takes into account that U Thanthas in mind a “UN presence” on the territo-ries of both parties—of Cuba as well as ofthe USA and certain Latin American coun-tries. This would mean that with regard tothis issue the UN would be keeping the samewatch over Cuba as over the USA, which iscertainly advantageous.

In their relations to us, the Americansare remaining passive, and decline to meet.Intending to initiate contact with Stevenson,we suggested to U Thant through Kiselevthat he arrange a breakfast today and invitethe Americans and us. U Thant liked thisidea, and he contacted Stevenson. Steven-son, however, refused to accept his invita-tion, referring to the fact that he had no in-structions from the State Department, andthat without such authorization he could notmeet with Soviet representatives.

29.X.62 V. KUZNETSOV

[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, RussianFederation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy ob-tained by NHK (Japanese Television), pro-vided to CWIHP, and on file at NationalSecurity Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans-lation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univer-

sity.]

Telegram from Soviet Deputy ForeignMinister V. V. Kuznetsov to USSRForeign Ministry, 30 October 1962

30 October 1962

On 29 October I received the perma-nent UN delegate from Cuba, Garcia-Inchaustegui. I welcomed him as represen-tative of the courageous Cuban nation,which is self-sacrificingly standing up forits freedom and independence in its strugglewith a powerful and dangerous enemy—American imperialism.

I said that I considered it necessary tomeet first of all with the Cuban delegate,and I expressed the hope that, in carryingout the task that stands before us both, wewould work in close contact with our Cu-ban comrades, keeping each other informedand consulting with each other.

Garcia-Inchaustegui gratefully ac-knowledged the constant support offered tothe Cuban nation by the Soviet Union, andsaid that the Cuban delegates in New Yorkalso constantly feel support from their So-viet comrades in their joint work in theUnited Nations Organization.

Garcia-Inchaustegui said that he hadhad a meeting with U Thant during whichthey discussed the latter’s trip to Cuba. UThant intends, after the negotiations in Ha-vana, to leave General Rikhye behind inCuba as his representative, along with agroup of workers supposedly for continu-ing the negotiations with the Cuban govern-ment and for sustaining relations with theUN. The issue of leaving General Rikhyein Cuba will in Garcia-Inchaustegui’s opin-ion be the subject of negotiations betweenU Thant and the Cuban government in Ha-vana.

On the question of the most urgentmatters to which, in his view, U Thant’s at-tention should be given, Garcia-Inchaust-egui said that the task of primary importanceis the safeguarding of unhindered passagefor vessels bound for Cuba and the liftingof the blockade. He has already spoken toU Thant about this, as well as with the del-egates from other countries, especially theAfro-Asian countries.

Garcia-Inchaustegui said that the min-ister of foreign affairs Raul Roa would ar-rive in New York at the end of this week.




Telegram from Deputy ForeignMinister V. V. Kuznetsov to the Soviet

Foreign Ministry, 30 October 1962

30 October 1962

On 29 October a second meeting withU Thant was held at his initiative.

1. U Thant informed me that the Ameri-cans have favorably received our agreementto the inspection of Soviet vessels bound forCuba by representatives of the InternationalRed Cross.

U Thant also informed us that he hadcontacted the Red Cross and received a pre-liminary response that the Red Cross wasready to undertake the inspection of vesselsboth on the open sea, and in ports of disem-barkation. U Thant intends to negotiate withFidel Castro on carrying out the inspectionin ports.

In the Red Cross’s preliminary reponsereceived by U Thant, it is indicated that allpersonnel carrying out the inspection of thevessels will consist of Swiss citizens.

2. U Thant explained to Stevenson ourposition on the inspection of thedismantlings and the removal of the so-called “offensive” weaponry from Cuba.The Americans asked U Thant to clarify howlong the dismantling would take. On his owninitiative U Thant put this question to us.We told U Thant that we would ask our gov-ernment, but provisionally the dismantlingwill be expected to take 2 to 3 weeks. (Inprovisionally specifying this time frame, wewere proceeding from the relevant pointsmade in Comrade N.S. Khrushchev’s mes-sage to Kennedy of 27 October.)

We request to be informed about theduration of the dismantling processes in or-der to give an answer to U Thant.

3. According to U Thant, the Ameri-cans are insisting that the monitoring of thedismantling be carried out during the veryprocess of dismantling, and not after its

completion, especially if the dismantling isto take a long time. With regard to this it isadvantageous to accelerate the dismantlings,in order not to show the installations to theinspectors. The Americans prefer that theinspection be carried out by the UN, and forthe composition of the inspection groupsthey propose two variants: representativesof neutral countries, or representatives of theimmediately interested parties—the USA,the USSR, and Cuba. The Americans, how-ever, according to U Thant, have started in-sisting less strongly lately on UN inspec-tion during the dismantling process. Theyare said to declare that if it is not possible toreach an agreement about UN inspections,they will carry out the inspections them-selves, and that they have the necessarymeans to do so.

General Rikhye (U Thant’s militaryadvisor) who was present at the conversa-tion explained that with inspections by theirown forces, the Americans have in mindflights over Cuba by their own planes car-rying photographic equipment, and at lowaltitudes.

U Thant told Stevenson that the UNcan carry out dismantling inspections inCuba only in the event that the Soviet Unionand Cuba agree to it. He asked that there benotification of the Soviet government’s po-sition on inspection by UN forces during thedismantling process.

It appears to us expedient to insist onour present position, in accordance withwhich the appointees of the Security Coun-cil should carry out inspections not of theprocess of dismantling, but of the SovietUnion’s fulfillment of its promise to dis-mantle the installations of weapons whichthe Americans refer to as “offensive.” Thiswould mean that the inspectors would beadmitted to sites where there are installa-tions when they have not yet been fully dis-mantled, and the arms not yet removed. Inregard to this, it is expedient to speed up thedismantling of the installations and the re-moval of the arms. If the dismantling is car-ried out in a short time, then the issue ofinspection during the dismantling processwill not arise at all.

We request that you consider this.4. During the talks with U Thant, his

aides delivered reports to him on Kennedy’sstatement concerning the suspension of the“quarantine” of vessels bound for Cuba dur-ing the period of U Thant’s stay in Cuba on

30 and 31 October. U Thant asked how wefelt about this. We said that such a periodwas too short for even the vessels locatednear the blockade zone to make it to the portsof disembarkation.

U Thant noted in regard to this that hegave very great significance to the require-ment that during his stay in Cuba his people,like Rikhye, be shown at least from a dis-tance that the installations are being dis-mantled. In this case, U Thant said, on hisreturn from New York he would issue astatement that his people have been con-vinced of the Soviet Union’s fulfillment ofits dismantling obligation, and that for thisreason the “quarantine” should not be re-imposed. U Thant asked whether the Sovietgovernment could agree to this.

We propose that it would be appropri-ate to show U Thant himself the disman-tling of certain installations during his stayin Cuba on 30 and 31 October. In such anevent he would take a firmer stance, and itwould be more difficult for the Americansto renew their “quarantine” of Cuba.

If this is recognized as expedient, I re-quest urgently to give corresponding instruc-tions to Havana.



Telegram from Soviet Deputy ForeignMinister Kuznetsov and Ambassador to

the UN Zorin to USSR ForeignMinistry, 30 October 1962

30 October 1962On 30 October Comrade Zorin, in his

capacity as chairman of the Security Coun-cil, the term of which expires tomorrow, heldthe traditional breakfast for members of theCouncil. Present were the heads of the del-egations of all the countries represented bythe Security Council, including Stevenson.From the talks during the breakfast, the fol-lowing is worthy of attention:

1. Stevenson said that the governmentof the USA agrees to our proposal for checkson vessels carried out by representatives of


the International Red Cross, and prefers thatsuch checks be carried out not on the opensea, but in Cuban ports.

Stevenson said furthermore that nowthe USA attributes primary importance toreaching an agreement on the inspection ofthe dismantling of the Soviet military em-placements in Cuba, insisting that such in-spection be carried out during the disman-tling process. The Americans imagine in-spections, as Stevenson said, in the form ofplanes flying over Cuba with inspectiongroups on board.

2. The Irish delegate [Frederick H.]Boland voiced a proposal, clearly not with-out American consent, for convening theSecurity Council immediately after UThant’s return from Cuba, and, without dis-cussing in detail any other matters at thismeeting, to hear U Thant’s report and makea decision about authorizing U Thant to cre-ate an inspection mechanism for thedismantlings in Cuba. As far as the othermatters in the Cuban settlement are con-cerned, including the matter of guaranteesfor Cuban security, Boland believes thatthose matters can be raised in speeches atthe above-mentioned meeting of the Secu-rity Council, but that approving resolutionson them should be left for a later date.

The delegates from the United ArabRepublic (Riad) and Ghana (Quaison-Sackey) voiced objections to Boland’s pro-posal (Riad more firmly, Quaison-Sackeysomewhat evasively). They believe that thefirst priority is resolving the matter of guar-antees for Cuban security.

3. The Ghanaian delegate Quaison-Sackey made several remarks about theCongo. The substance of these remarkscomes down to the fact that the situation inthe Congo is bad, is becoming worse all thetime, and that the recourse at present is theuse of UN forces against [Moise]Tshombe.10

4. Our thoughts on our position and ontactical matters will be sent by separate tele-gram.

30.X.62 V. KUZNETSOV V. ZORIN

[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, RussianFederation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy ob-tained by NHK (Japanese Television), pro-vided to CWIHP, and on file at NationalSecurity Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans-lation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univer-

sity.]

Telegram from Soviet Deputy ForeignMinister Kuznetsov and Ambassador to

the UN Zorin to USSR ForeignMinistry, 30 October 1962

30 October 1962

We are communicating severalthoughts on the situation that has arisenaround the Cuban issue, and on our possibleposition and tactics in the course of futurenegotiations with U Thant and the Ameri-cans.

First. From talks with U Thant, con-versations at the UN, and information fromthe American press, we have received theimpression that the strategy of the USA gov-ernment is at present directed towards thecarrying out of our decision to dismantlemilitary sites in Cuba, rejecting at the sametime the necessity of giving clear and firmguarantees of Cuban security, restricted inthis regard by the statements issued earlierby Kennedy in his messages to ComradeN.S. Khrushchev of 27 and 28 October, orin the last resort by the Security Council’sapproval of those statements.

In this regard it is significant that theAmericans, as is evident from available in-formation, want the future role of the Secu-rity Council and especially of U Thant tocome down basically to organizing and car-rying out inspections on the dismantling ofour missile installations in Cuba.

As far as guarantees of Cuban securityare concerned, the Americans understandthat a clear and concrete resolution of theSecurity Council could in this respect tietheir hands and keep them from proceedingwith their aggressive policy toward Cuba,which it seems they do not intend to re-nounce. On 29 October a UPI press bulletinsaid that Rusk “had assured the Latin Ameri-can envoys that any Soviet-American agree-ment would pursue the goal of the removalof missiles from Cuba, and in no way wouldexclude the possibility of new collectivemeasures against Castro.”

In light of this, there is reason to ex-pect that Kennedy’s statement about theUSA government’s readiness to “give assur-ances that there will be no invasion of Cuba”will be interpreted by the Americans in thenarrow sense, as saying that the USA andthe Latin American countries will not attack

Cuba with their own armed forces. At thesame time they are trying to keep their handsfree not only in relation to the economicblockade of Cuba and subversive operationsagainst it, but also in their support, perhapssomewhat more disguised than earlier, forthe preparation by counterrevolutionaryCuban emigres of military activities againstCuba.

Second. As far as U Thant’s line is con-cerned, he intends, as he told us, to exchangeviews with Fidel Castro primarily on theissue of the verficiation of the dismantlingof Soviet military sites, and also to ascer-tain that this dismantling is actually goingon. On his return he intends to present a re-port to the Security Council precisely onthese issues, after which the Council willface the practical issue of creating a moni-toring apparatus.

It is true that U Thant, taking into ac-count how we put before him the issue ofguarantees for Cuba, is preparing at the sametime to put before Castro the issue of theso-called “UN presence” in Cuba as a guar-antee of its security and a guarantee againstany Cuban actions against the other Latin-American countries. In the event of the Cu-ban government’s consenting to this sort of“UN presence” in Cuba, U Thant intends topose the same question about a “UN pres-ence” on the territory of the USA and cer-tain Latin-American countries. It is howeverevident that the Americans will try to ar-range the Security Council affair in such away as to give priority to the issue of themechanism for inspections on the war-sitedismantling, and not to the issue of guaran-tees for Cuba. Moreover, U Thant’s planswith regard to the guarantees for Cuba arenot yet fully clear.

Third. It appears to us that in theseconditions it would be expedient, in the in-terests of safeguarding guarantees for Cu-ban security, to try to bring together into oneknot the main issues that must be resolvedfor a peaceful settlement of the Cuban cri-sis, most importantly the issues of controlon the dismantling inspections and of guar-antees for Cuba, and to reach a simultaneoussettlement of these issues through the Se-curity Council. We intend to suggest thatsuch a resolution be given the form of a jointdeclaration made in the Security Council bythe governments of the USSR and the USA(or by these two separately) concerning apeaceful settlement of the Cuban crisis, the


Cuban government’s input on this issue, andthe Council’s resolution approving all thesedeclarations and entrusting the acting Sec-retary General of the UN, under the super-vision of the Security Council, to carry outthe necessary measures according to the pro-cedures of the UN apparatus.

We will propose in the framework ofthese declarations to stipulate, as a guaran-tee of Cuban security, the final end to allblockade activity against Cuba, and the du-ties of the USA in the capacity proposed byComrade N.S. Khrushchev’s message toKennedy of 27 October, and taking into ac-count Fidel Castro’s statement of 28 Octo-ber.

If the Americans insist, we will con-sider the possibility of approving the explicitmention in the declaration of the Sovietgovernment’s obligation to dismantle theSoviet military sites in Cuba which theAmericans call offensive, and of the Sovietgovernment’s approval of the inspectionsystem that has been worked out.

The Americans will obviously demanda declaration from the Cuban governmentthat contains an expression of consent to theelaborated guarantees of security and of theinspection system, as well as a formulationof Cuba’s non-attack obligations with regardto its neighbors, in accordance with the goalsof the UN Charter. We will consult with theCuban delegation on this issue.

As far as the inspection system on thedismantling is concerned, we propose thatour primary position should be to agree tothe implementation of the inspections afterthe completion of the dismantling process.If the Americans insist on carrying out in-spections during the dismantling process, itmight be possible to agree to this as long aswe had guarantees for a monitoring proce-dure that would of course keep hidden fromthe inspectors anything we did not want toreveal. The monitoring process should takeonly a short time to be carried out— only aperiod necessary for ascertaining that thedismantling has been completed.

With regard to the composition of theinspection apparatus, there are now severalvariants being advanced in UN circles.

According to facts released by the UNsecretariat, U Thant wants to create a moni-toring apparatus composed of representa-tives from a selection of neutral countriesbelonging to the UN—Sweden, Ethiopia,the United Arab Republic, Mexico, Brazil,

[and] Yugoslavia, and also Switzerland.There is also an idea about delegating themonitoring process to eight neutral coun-tries represented in the Committee on Dis-armament (India, Burma, the United ArabRepublic, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Mexico, Bra-zil, Sweden), possibly, with the goal of set-ting a precedent for resolving questions in-volving inspections on full and general dis-armament. The Americans, U Thant has in-formed us, are putting forth a variant inwhich the monitoring groups consist of rep-resentatives from the USA, the USSR, andCuba.

We propose that it would be appropri-ate to stipulate that the monitoring groupsinclude representatives from countries likeIndonesia, Ceylon, the United Arab Repub-lic, and Ghana. In the course of negotiationsit would be possible to agree on a variant inwhich the groups are composed of repre-sentatives from eight neutral countries be-longing to the 18th Committee on Disarma-ment.

Furthermore a question arises aboutfuture UN measures on strengthening peacein the Caribbean region after the comple-tion of the inspections of dismantling, andalso on the inspection (by International RedCross forces) of Soviet vessels bound forCuba.

In our opinion, it would be possible toagree to the presence in Havana (or in sev-eral Cuban commercial ports) of smallgroups of UN representatives (of the samecomposition as the groups verifying mili-tary-site dismantling) with the right to carryout selective inspections on the vessels ofvarious countries arriving in Cuba, with thepurpose of determining whether or not theyare carrying so-called “offensive” sorts ofarmaments. [One could] make this condi-tional upon the requirement that the samegroups of UN representatives be placed inthe USA and the Latin-American countriesneighboring Cuba with the right to makeperiodic inspections of certain regions ofthese countries with the purpose of deter-mining whether preparations are being madefor the invasion of Cuba, either by thesecountries themselves or by Cuban emigres.

It would be possible to propose that thissystem of observation operate for the dura-tion, for example, of one year, after whichthe Security Council would again examinethe issue of whether a continuation of theobservation is needed.

Fourth. Taking into account PresidentKennedy’s desire, communicated throughRobert Kennedy in his conversation withComrade Dobrynin on 27 October (your#1255), we will not raise the issue of theAmerican bases in Turkey in our negotia-tions with U Thant and the Americans inNew York. At the same time it seems to uspossible and expedient to reach an agree-ment with the USA that in the joint Soviet-American declaration in the Security Coun-cil, there be a record of both sides’ inten-tion to enter in the near future negotiationsfor normalizing relations between the NATOcountries and the countries of the WarsawPact, as has already been outlined in the cor-respondence between Comrade N.S.Khrushchev and President Kennedy. In do-ing so it might be possible to include in sucha declaration a reference both to ComradeN.S. Khrushchev’s message of 28 Octoberand Kennedy’s messages of 27 and 28 Oc-tober, as well as to Comrade N.S.Khrushchev’s message of 27 October, inwhich the question about Turkey is raised.

Fifth. Until now, in our official docu-ments and during negotiations here in NewYork, our weaponry now being dismantledin Cuba has been referred to as “weaponryconsidered offensive by the Americans.” Inthe course of future negotiations, and espe-cially during the preparation of the texts ofthe Security Council documents, we willhave to oppose our own concrete formula-tion to the American formulation “offensiveweaponry.” It might be possible in our opin-ion to use, say, the formula “means for con-veying nuclear arms at an operational dis-tance a certain number of kilometers.”

All the issues laid out here will be thesubject of discussions immediately after UThant’s return from Cuba, i.e., after 1 No-vember.

We request your examination.

30.X.62 V. KUZNETSOV V. ZORIN


Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to


the USA A.F. Dobrynin to the USSRForeign Ministry, 30 October 1962

30 October 1962

Today Robert Kennedy invited me tomeet with him. He said that he would liketo talk about N.S. Khrushchev’s letter to thePresident yesterday.11

The President, Robert Kennedy said,confirms the understanding [dogovorion-nost] with N.S. Khrushchev on the elimina-tion of the American missile bases in Tur-key (Robert Kennedy confirmed that onespeaks of an understanding). Correspond-ing measures will be taken towards fulfill-ing this understanding within the period oftime indicated earlier, in confidential obser-vance of NATO guidelines, but of coursewithout any mention that this is connectedto the Cuban events.

We, however, said Robert Kennedy, arenot prepared to formulate such an under-standing in the form of letters, even the mostconfidential letters, between the Presidentand the head of the Soviet government whenit concerns such a highly delicate issue.Speaking in all candor, I myself, for ex-ample, do not want to risk getting involvedin the transmission of this sort of letter, sincewho knows where and when such letters cansurface or be somehow published—not now,but in the future—and any changes in thecourse of events are possible. The appear-ance of such a document could cause irrepa-rable harm to my political career in the fu-ture. This is why we request that you takethis letter back.

It is possible, Robert Kennedy contin-ued, that you do not believe us and throughletters you want to put the understanding inwriting. The issue of Soviet missile basesin Cuba has unfortunately introduced a realelement of uncertainty and suspicion eveninto confidential channels of contact. Wewill however live up to our promise, even ifit is given in this oral form. As you know, itwas in precisely the same oral form that thePresident made his promise to N.S.Khrushchev regarding the removal of a cer-tain number of American soldiers from Thai-land.12 That promise was kept. So too willthis promise be kept.

As a guarantee, Robert Kennedyadded, I can only give you my word. More-over I can tell you that two other peoplebesides the President know about the exist-

ing understanding: they are [Secretary ofState Dean] Rusk and [advisor on Sovietaffairs Llewellyn] Thompson. If you do notbelieve me, discuss it with them, and theywill tell you the same thing. But it is betternot to transfer this understanding into a for-mal, albeit confidential, exchange of letters(as can be noted, the greatest suspicion inthe two Kennedy brothers was elicited bythe part of Khrushchev’s letter which speaksdirectly of a link between the Cuban eventsand the bases in Turkey). We hope that N.S.Khrushchev will understand us correctly. Inregard to this Robert Kennedy insistentlyasked to take the letter back without delay.

I told Robert Kennedy that everythingsaid above I would report to N.S.Khrushchev, emphasizing in doing so thateven the President and he, Robert Kennedy,could be sure of the fact that the Soviet gov-ernment is regarding the understanding thathas been reached as strictly secret and notfor publication. At the same time, in orderto confirm Robert Kennedy’s statementabout the understanding, I asked him againabout whether the President really confirmsthe understanding with N.S. Khrushchev onthe elimination of American missile basesin Turkey. Robert Kennedy said once againthat he confirmed it, and again that he hopedthat their motivations would be properlyunderstood in Moscow. Taking what theyexplained into account, I believed it condi-tionally possible—before receiving any in-structions from Moscow—to take this let-ter [back], since a categorical refusal to doso would, in my opinion, only weaken Rob-ert Kennedy’s firm statements on the under-standing that has been reached. Moreover,leaving the letter with him, after he hadclearly expressed the President’s desire notto exchange letters, could scarcely be in theinterests of doing business [in the future].

In conclusion Robert Kennedy saidthat, in his opinion, the events connectedwith the Cuban issue have been developingquite favorably, and that he hoped thateverthing would eventually be settled. Headded that, on the Turkish issue and otherhighly confidential issues he was preparedto maintain a direct contact with me as ear-lier, emphasizing in doing so that the pointwas the the possible oral considerations ofthe President and the head of the Soviet gov-ernment N.S. Khrushchev on the exchangeof letters on such delicate issues as missilebases in Turkey, or issues which need to be

handled more by the State Department thanby him personally, taking into account thedelicacy of his situation as the President’sbrother and as Attorney General of theUnited States. I do not want, RobertKennedy added, to claim for myself thefunction of the State Department, but my“solitary diplomacy” may be needed sev-eral more times, and we will meeting witheach other periodically.

I answered to Robert Kennedy that Iwas prepared to maintain contact with himon highly important issues in the future,passing over the heads, as he himself sug-gested, of all intermediaries. RobertKennedy confirmed this. From what Rob-ert Kennedy said it was clear that the Presi-dent is trying now to avoid exchanging anydocuments on issues of a highly delicatenature like Turkey which could leave a traceanywhere, but that he favors the continua-tion of a confidential exchange of opinionsbetween the heads of the two governments.

We believe it expedient to visit RobertKennedy once again and to issue a state-ment, in referring to our mission, that theSoviet government and N.S. Khrushchevpersonally are prepared to take into accountthe President’s desire for maintaining thesecrecy of the oral understanding on the re-moval of the American missile bases fromTurkey. It is also expedient to tell of ourwillingness, if the President is also preparedfor this, to continue the confidential ex-change of opinions between the heads of thegovernments on many important unresolvedissues, on whose resolution the lessing ofinternational tension, and of the tension be-tween our two countries in particular, is to avery great degree dependent.

I request instructions.

30.X.62 A.DOBRYNIN


Telegram from USSR Foreign Ministryto Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister V.V.Kuznetsov, New York, 31 October 1962

In the negotiations between the del-


egates of the USSR, the USA, and Cuba withthe participation of the acting SecretaryGeneral of the UN on the normalization ofthe situation that has arisen around Cuba,you should follow the messages of N.S.Khrushchev to President John Kennedy andU Thant, and also by the instructions givenin our dispatches #1254 and #1267.

In the negotiations you should try torecord the agreement deriving from the ex-change of messages between N.S.Khrushchev and John Kennedy in the formof a protocol statement that would be pre-sented to the Security Council for all mea-sures taken in accordance with the UN Char-ter. As a basis for negotiations, after receiv-ing the consent of our Cuban friends, con-vey to the Americans and to U Thant thestatement of protocol, and declare that thisstatement is being introduced jointly by thegovernments of the USSR and Cuba. (Thetext of the statement of protocol is beingcommunicated by separate telegram.)

Since Fidel Castro’s statement of 28October contains a demand concerning theevacuation of the USA naval base inGuantanamo, the protocol statement in-cludes a point concerning the negotiationsof the USA and the Republic of Cuba onthis matter. If however the USA objects tothe inclusion of this point, and this impedesthe reaching of an agreement according tothe whole protocol statement, then with theconsent of the Cuban representative youmay not insist on a separate mention of theGuantanamo base in the protocol statement.In this we proceed from the fact that the pro-tocol statement contains Article 16, whichstipulates the necessity of carrying out ne-gotiations on other issues, including issuesraised in Fidel Castro’s statement of 28 Oc-tober, i.e. in other words, the issue of themilitary base in Guantanamo.

As far as a possible Security Councilresolution with regard to the protocol state-ment is concerned, in negotiations youshould aim for the Council’s approving aresolution that would generally contain thefollowing basic points:

“1. The Security Council welcomeswith satisfaction and expresses its approvalof the agreement reached by the govern-ments of the USSR, the USA, and Cuba withthe participation of the acting SecretaryGeneral of the UN U Thant, on measures tobe taken for normalizing the Caribbean situ-ation, which facilitates the lessening of the

tension that had had arisen in the relationsamong the countries.

2. The Security Council takes into con-sideration the obligations of the govern-ments of the USSR, the USA, and the Re-public of Cuba recorded in the protocol pre-sented to the Security Council, includingprecisely:

(Here the text of all 17 articles of theprotocol statement is given.)

3. The Security Council is proceedingfrom the stipulation that the governmentsof the countries participating in the proto-col statement will strictly carry out the ob-ligations they have taken on, which willcontribute to the strengthening of trustamong the countries and to affirming peacegenerally.

4. In accordance with articles 10 and13 of the protocol statement, the SecurityCouncil requests the governments of [gapin text] countries to share their own del-egates as agents for ascertaining the carry-ing out of the obligations to dismantle andremove the weaponry indicated in articles9 and 12 of the protocol statement.

5. The Security Council asks acting UNSecretary General U Thant to grant thegroup of agents the necessary means andcooperation for carrying out the functionswith which they have been entrusted.”

The text of the protocol statement isnow being submitted to the approval of Fi-del Castro.

On receiving the approval of FidelCastro, we will notify you of the possibilityof forwarding this text to the Americans andU Thant on behalf of the Soviet Union andCuba.

If you have any thoughts pertaining tothe local situation, communicate them.

Confirm reception of this telegram.


Cable from Soviet Foreign MinisterGromyko to USSR Ambassador to

Cuba A.I. Alekseev, 31 October 1962

You should visit F. Castro and, afterreference to these instructions, tell him the

following.Currently there is a lessening in mili-

tary tension created around Cuba. But onthe diplomatic field we have to accomplisha crucial stage in order to consolidate theachieved success and to bind the Ameriansby commitments ensuing from the exchangeof messages between N.S. Khrushchev andKennedy and F. Castro’s statement of 28October.

We consider that under current condi-tions we and you should display self-re-straint in our official declarations and state-ments and also in the press, in order to notto give the aggressors a pretext to blame ourside for irreconciliability and intractability.We must hold to a firm, but constructivestand. We would like it to be taken into ac-count in your statements, too. It would begood if you in your appearances underlineCuba’s readiness to normalize diplomaticand economic relations with the USA andcountries of Latin America. It should alsobe repeated what you have declared morethan once about Cuba’s devotion to the causeof peace, to the UN principles, among themnon-interference of states into the internalaffairs of each other.

All of this is needed, of course, not forthe aggressors’ ears, but for internationalpublic opinion.

Telegraph the implementation of theseinstructions.

31.X.62 A. GROMYKO

{Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, RussianFederation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy ob-tained by NHK (Japanese Television), pro-vided to CWIHP, and on file at NationalSecurity Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans-lation by Vladimir Zaemsky.]

Cable from Soviet Foreign MinisterGromyko to USSR Ambassador to

Cuba A.I. Alekseev, 31 October 1962

Visit Fidel Castro and tell him the fol-lowing:

1. Say, that in Moscow we consider itnecessary to satisfy U Thant’s desire thatthe launchers, which are being dismantled,be shown to him and persons accompany-ing him, among them General Rikhye, evenin the course of dismantling. It is advanta-geous for us, especially taking into account


that U Thant has promised to make a state-ment immediately on his return to the USA,that the Soviet Union had fulfilled its com-mitments.

Inform [Castro] also about our consentto permit U Thant’s representatives, if heraises such a question, to be allowed to visitsites of dismantling even after U Thant’sdeparture from Cuba, in order to check thatthe dismantling has been carried out and tobe sure about the launchers’ withdrawalfrom Cuba.

Immediately inform about these in-structions Pavlov [Pliyev], who has to ful-fill them without delay.

2. Inform Fidel Castro that in Moscowit is considered advantageous U Thant’s pro-posal about creating UN posts on the terri-tory of Cuba, corresponding countries ofLatin America, and in the USA territory inorder to observe compliance with the com-mitments; this proposal corresponds to boththe interests of Cuba and our common in-terests. Implementation of this proposal fora “UN presence,” made by U Thant, wouldmean that the UN equally regard Cuba andthe USA on this issue. That is advantageousfor the party which does not intend to at-tack, i.e. for Cuba, and it is not advantageousfor the party with aggressive intentions, i.e.for the USA and their assistants from theLatin American countries.

Immediately inform Pavlov [Pliyev]about these instructions too.

Express confidence that Fidel Castroand his friends would also accept U Thant’sproposal, which is very important for us.

We proceed from the assumption thatthe Cuban government and comrade Pavlov[Pliyev] would undertake all the necessarymeasures on site.

Cable report on the execution of theseinstructions.

A. GROMYKO


Telegram from Soviet ambassador toCuba A. I. Alekseev to USSR Foreign


31 October

After we learned that the Cubans willnot permit U Thant and his advisors to visitthe dismantling of military sites, and hon-oring Rikhye’s request to meet with the So-viet general, Comrade Pavlov [Pliyev] andI made the decision to engage U Thant intalks with myself and General [Igor D.]Statsenko,13 who would offer him andRikhye detailed information on the issuesraised by them yesterday.

Preliminary to our decision to visit UThant, I informed President Dorticos, whosupported this step.

In our talks with U Thant and Rikhyewe provided the following information:

The dismantling of the weaponry wasbegun on the evening of 28 October, and ina general way has practically already beencompleted by today. By the end of 1 No-vember or at the latest 2 November all weap-onry will have been sent to ports for load-ing onto ships. The arrival times of the shipsmay be known only by Moscow, and werequested that the answer to U Thant on thisissue be sent to New York.

U Thant and Rikhye expressed thanksfor the information, saying that for them itwas the chief result of the trip to Cuba, andprobably the most significant one after Com-rade N.S. Khrushchev’s letter of 28 Octo-ber.

U Thant asked General Statsenkowhether he could refer to the latter in hisreport and mention his family name.

We gave a positive response, sayingthat Comrade Statsenko had been entrustedwith the dismantling of the weaponry, andhe answered these questions responsibly.

U Thant said nothing about his talkswith Fidel Castro. Your instructions werereceived after the talks with U Thant.

31.X.62 ALEKSEEV


Cable from Soviet Ambassador to CubaAlekseev to USSR Foreign Ministry,

31 October 1962

Met Fidel Castro and gave to him let-ter from N.S. Khrushchev.14

Castro read it attentively and, whiledoing so, made two remarks.

1. There are not [merely] some Cubancomrades who do not understand the deci-sion regarding the removal of the specialweapons, but the whole Cuban people.

2. Apparently, N.S. Khrushchev did notunderstand me or the translation was notcorrect since in the cable of 27 [26?] Octo-ber I did not suggest to be the first in deliv-ering a blow against the adversary territoryduring the crisis, but in the case if there werean aggression against Cuba and Sovietpeople would be perishing together with theCubans.15

I told Castro that the translation hadbeen made correctly and, I suppose, thesense of his cable had been understood cor-rectly in Moscow since it was clearly saidthere about the condition of an aggressionagainst Cuba, but even in this case it ishardly possible to approach merely me-chanically such an important issue and touse nuclear arms without looking for othermeans.

Castro didn’t make any additional com-ment on the letter and said that it was nec-essary to read it once more and to think.

Today Castro was more composed andsaid that Da’Cunha, a Brazilian general, hadcome to see him with a personal messagefrom [Brazilian President Joao] Goulart andsuggested the good offices of Brazil in set-tling the conflict with the USA upon receiv-ing from them non-aggression guarantees.Da’Cunha said that Brazil would not breakrelations with Cuba and would continue totrade.

He suggested to begin gradual disar-mament upon receiving guarantees and tocome forward with a statement about Cuba’snon-interference into affairs of the LatinAmerican countries.

Castro said that such an approach is themost correct one and therefore the Cubanshad told Da’Cunha that they had been ac-cepting such a mediation and were ready forthe suggested measures under the conditionthat the USA accept the 5 points of the Cu-ban statement including that of eliminatingthe Guantanamo base. Castro asked whathave we spoken about with U Thant andhimself informed [me] about their conver-sation, what has already been recounted tome by Dorticos.


31/X/62 ALEKSEEV


Telegram from Soviet Foreign Ministryto A.A. Soboleva and A.F. Dobrynin at

the Soviet Embassy in Washington, 31 October 1962

31 October 1962

1. On 28 October the Ministry sent tothe USA embassy a note of protest from theSoviet government to the American govern-ment concerning the flights around the So-viet ship “Simferopol” by American planeson 24 October of this year, and also con-cerning the cannon-fire during these flights.

On 31 October the embassy in areponse note declares that no artillery shotsat the “Simferopol” or near it had been car-ried out, and that the command of the“Simferopol” could have mistaken for gun-fire the use by the plane’s pilot of severalmagnetic photo-illuminating cartridges.

2. On 30 October the embassy sent tothe Ministry of Foreign Affairs a note ofprotest concerning the “obvious inability orrefusal of the Soviet powers responsible forupholding the social order to take measuresin recent days to defend the personnel andthe property of the embassy.”16

The embassy raises the issue of the re-pair of or compensation for damages in-curred by embassy property and personnel,and also “expects appropriate measures tobe taken for averting a repetition of suchcases.” This has been conveyed for infor-mational purposes.


Telegram from Soviet Deputy ForeignMinister V.V. Kuznetsov to USSR

Foreign Ministry, 1 November 1962

1 November 1962

On 31 October U Thant, after his re-turn from Cuba, informed us of the resultsof his trip.

1. According to U Thant, his main taskwas to ask whether Fidel Castro would givehis consent to the establishment in Cuba ofUN groups monitoring the dismantling ofSoviet military installations. Castro’s re-sponse was negative. Castro said that Cubawas a sovereign, independent state, and thatif it allowed UN monitoring on its territory,it would be a humiliation for the Republic.If the Soviet government gives its consentto the monitoring, then such monitoringshould be carried out outside the borders ofCuba’s territorial waters.

2. U Thant then asked Castro whetherhe could leave his own representatives be-hind in Havana for contact with the Cubangovernment. Castro said that it would bebetter to maintain such contact in New Yorkthrough the new Cuban delegate to the UN,C[arlos]. Lechuga (who arrived from Cubawith U Thant) and through the minister offoreign affairs, Roa, who would soon arrivein New York.

3. U Thant met in Cuba with the So-viet ambassador and a Soviet general, whoinformed him that the dismantling of mili-tary installations had begun on 28 Octoberand would be finished by 1 or 2 November.

On his return to New York, U Thantinformed Stevenson of the dismantling, andappealed to him to cease the “quarantine,”for which there seems, even from the Ameri-can point of view, to be no need. Prolong-ing the “quarantine” will put the Cubanpeople in a difficult situation.

4. U Thant addressed a request toCastro to return to the USA the pilot of theU-2 ariplane that had been shot down overCuba, if that pilot was still alive. Castro saidthat the pilot was dead, but that he wouldsend his body back to the USA, if the UNwould take care of the transportation mat-ters. Castro also said that the Cuban gov-ernment would be continuing to act as it hadbeen up to this point with regard to Ameri-can planes violating the air space of Cuba.U Thant has communicated this toStevenson.

5. U Thant asked Castro what he imag-ined the future role of the UN to be in theCuban affair. Castro answered that the Cu-

ban government would carry on negotiationswithin the framework of the UN only on thebasis of the five principles laid out inCastro’s statement of 28 October, and on noother basis. U Thant has communicated thisto Stevenson.

Stevenson told U Thant that he wouldpass all this on to President Kennedy today.

6. We asked U Thant what further stepshe intended to take. U Thant said that onthe next day, 1 November, he would informthe members of the Security Council, eachone separately, of the results of his visit toCuba, but that he was not prepared to call ameeting of the Council before 6 November(the day on which the national elections willbe held in the USA).

U Thant said as well that he consid-ered it expedient to begin the next day towork out the details of the monitoring ofSoviet vessels bound for Cuba by represen-tatives of the International Red Cross. Heasked to select a representative from amongourselves. In response to our question as tohow U Thant envisaged, after his visit toCuba, the monitoring of these vessels, hesaid that such monitoring would have to becarried out not in Cuban ports, but on theopen sea.

1.XI.62 V. KUZNETSOV

[Source: AVP RF, Moscow; copy obtainedby NHK, provided to CWIHP, and on file atNational Security Archive, Washington,D.C.; translation by John Henriksen,Harvard University.]

Telegram from Soviet Ambassador tothe USA A. Dobrynin to USSR ForeignMinistry, forwarding telegram from G.

A. Zhukov, 1 November 1962

We relay a telegram from ComradeZhukov:

“On 31 October I met successivelywith [White House spokesman Pierre]Salinger, Thompson, [Assistant Secretary ofState for Far Eastern Affairs and Averell]Harriman, and Lippmann. The welcome wasdecidedly cordial, and all communicatedtheir warm greetings to N.S. Khrushchev,and expressed gratitude for his wise actionsthat have opened up the way toward a settle-ment of the Cuban problem.

At the same time all the participants


emphasized the necessity of confirming asquickly as possible, by way of inspectionthrough any means (through the Red Cross,neutral observers, or aerial photos), that theSoviet bases are being dismantled and themissiles are being removed. They referredto the growing campaign of right-wing fig-ures who assert that “Kennedy has onceagain become the victim of Soviet decep-tion.” This is especially dangerous forKennedy on the eve of the national elections.For this reason it is extremely urgent for himto receive any available evidence that theagreement with N.S. Khrushchev has beencarried out.

All participants said that settling theCuban crisis would open the way to resolu-tions of other emerging problems: a prohi-bition on nuclear testing, an agreement onthe non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, anagreement between NATO and the WarsawPact members on a series of issues, and soon.

They still consider the prospect of ameeting between N.S. Khrushchev andKennedy to be a distant one, but they assertthat it will become a necessity when theCuban problem is settled, and when appro-priate preparations are made on the level ofthe staff for guaranteeing that constructivedecisions will be made.

I will relay details from New York.Zhukov.”

1.XI.62 A. DOBRYNIN

[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK,provided to CWIHP, and on file at NationalSecurity Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans-lation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univer-sity.]

Cable from Soviet ambassador to theUSA A. F. Dobrynin to Soviet Foreign

Ministry, 1 November 1962

1 November 1962

At one of the receptions I had a con-versation with W. Lippmann. He confirmed,half in jest, that he “caught it hot” for hav-ing published [in a column published on 25October—ed.], in the middle of the Cubancrisis, an article about the possibility of ex-changing Soviet missile bases in Cuba forAmerican missile bases in Turkey, insofaras “a lot of people” here considered that his

article had suggested to N.S. Khrushchevthe idea of raising such a question.Lippmann said that he had been writing thearticle taking into consideration data whichhad previously received from high-rankingofficers of the U.S. Agency for disarma-ment.17 Several officers of this Agencybelieve that the question of bases has be-come rather obsolete and it must be solved.

Lippmann himself proceeds from theassumption that the issues of Americanbases in Turkey and Italy can be solved inthe relatively near future. There is a certainprogress of mood regarding this issue inWashington. Nevertheless, by no means canit be related to the Cuban events. For a num-ber of reasons, Kennedy’s administrationcan’t do that. A corresponding decision canbe formalized as one of the first, partial ac-tions in the framework of disarmament, butnecessarily waiting for a final agreementupon a plan of general and complete disar-mament.

Lippmann also said that during theCuban crisis Thompson played a certainpositive deterrent role at the White House.But in general in the course of the last year,according to Lippmann, Thompson has con-siderably evolved and become closer to [So-viet expert Charles] Bohlen’s point of view,i.e., there is no hope of reaching an agree-ment with the Soviet Union on principal is-sues due to its extreme obstinacy. With sucha pessemistic mood Thompson has returnedfrom the Soviet Union.

Lippmann confirmed that during theCuban conflict the USA had been very closeto war. Even dates for the bombing of theSoviet missile bases in Cuba had beenplanned — October 29 or 30, but N.S.Khrushchev’s response of October 28 toKennedy’s “great relief” drastically alteredthe subsequent course of events.

01/XI/62 A. DOBRYNIN

[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK,provided to CWIHP, and on file at NationalSecurity Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans-lation by Vladimir Zaemsky.]

Telegram from USSR Foreign MinisterA. Gromyko to Deputy Foreign

Minister V.V. Kuznetsov at the SovietMission in New York, 1 November 1962

1 November 1962

It is necessary that you meet with [U.S.negotiator John J.] McCloy. Inform him thatyou have delivered a report on the contentof the conversation with him, as well as onthe statement that the government of theUSA, in an expression of its goodwill, hasagreed that there be no monitoring of So-viet vessels bound for Cuba until the Inter-national Red Cross is involved in such moni-toring. In reponse to this, you have been in-structed by Moscow to inform McCloy thatour view of this goodwill gesture is a sym-pathetic one. It will allow the speedy arrivalof Soviet ships into Cuban ports, and willfacilitate the removal of the dismantled in-stallations from Cuba.

The question of whether to allow ob-servers onto Cuban territory is, of course,an issue that must be decided by Cuba, inits capacity as a sovereign state. The Cu-bans, and only the Cubans, can make deci-sions on questions of that sort.

We would like, however, to reach anagreement with the Americans that will keepthis whole affair under control.

In the next few days, until 7 or 8 or atthe very latest 10 November, we intend toload the dismantled materials onto ships andremove them from Cuba. We have no ob-jections to disclosing photographs of thedismantled and disabled launch pads, as wellas of the loaded missiles, which the Presi-dent and the government of the USA havecalled offensive weaponry.

We also would have no objections toyour ships being shown, at close distance,the missiles loaded on the Soviet ships. Butwe think that there will scarcely be anydoubts in your minds as to the certainty that,once we have announced the dismantling ofthe military installations and the removal ofthe missiles, we will carry out these actionswithin the period indicated by us.

I have been entrusted with the task ofemphasizing that the Soviet party is tryingto settle this whole issue quickly on the ba-sis of compromise, mutual concessions, andon the conditions put forth in statements bythe Chair of the Council of Ministers of theUSSR [Khrushchev] and by the Presidentof the USA.

As far as the flights by American planesover Cuban territory are concerned, theCubans’ categorical objections are fullyunderstood and are believed to be justifi-able, since such flights represent a blatant


violation of the sovereignty of the Republicof Cuba. The Americans should take intoaccount that such actions affect the nationalfeelings of the Cuban people, which canonly complicate the settlement of the diffi-cult issues before us. The Americans wouldhave acted reasonably if they had alreadyceased this sort of flight, as they should havedone given that the condition expressed inthe above-mentioned statements stipulatingthe dismantling of missile installations hasbeen fulfilled, and given that the dismantledmaterials are being brought together forloading onto ships.

In conclusion, tell McCloy that we ex-pect the Americans to lift the quarantineimmediately and completely.

AG


Telegram from Soviet Ambassador tothe USA A. Dobrynin to USSR Foreign


[first page of two-page document is miss-ing from copy obtained by CWIHP—ed.]

[...Dobrynin] expressed the hope, in accor-dance with the letter sent by N.S.Khrushchev, that the USA would renouncethe quarantine without waiting for the in-troduction of a supplementary procedure forinspecting ships, and so on.

Robert Kennedy has said that this is-sue does not represent any difficulties. Theimportant thing for us now (he implied thathe was talking about public opinion, ratherthan the thoughts of the President himself),is to have some confirmation, from the UNfor example, that the Soviet bases are beingdismantled, and that the corresponding mis-sile weaponry is being removed.

We and the USA government have es-sentially two possible courses of actions inthis matter: first, to carry out reconnaissanceflights over Cuba. But this entails the dan-ger that the Cubans (he emphasized theCubans, and not the Russians) may shootdown an American plane, and thus a pos-sible new and highly undesirable chain re-action of events in the Cuban affair would

be unleashed.The second course of action is to get

from the UN some information on the dis-mantling of the bases. The government ofthe USA could then be satisfied with this asa prerequisite for lifting the quarantine.Robert Kennedy emphasized that he was notyet prepared to talk about the details of thiswhole affair, since the President did not yethave any information on the results of UThant’s trip. Within an hour, said RobertKennedy, a government meeting would takeplace in which this issue would be exam-ined. He promised in the event of an emer-gency to get in touch with me directly, or, ifthis occurs during my trip to New York tomeet with [CPSU CC Politburo member]A.I. Mikoyan, through Stevenson andKuznetsov.

Robert Kennedy emphasized that thepoint was not that they do not trust our in-formation on this account, but rather thequestion of how to present this whole affairto the public opinion of the USA in connec-tion with the earlier statements offered bythe President. It was felt that he had beensomewhat worried by how Fidel Castromight hinder the carrying out of the agree-ment that had been reached.

1.XI.62 A. DOBRYNIN


Telegram from USSR Foreign MinisterA. Gromyko to Soviet Ambassador in

Havana, with a copy sent to Kuznetsovin New York, 1 November 1962

1 November 1962

The date for the removal of the dis-mantled special materials from Cuba hasbeen set for 7 or 8 November, but not laterthan 10 November. This has become pos-sible as a result of the fact that the necessityof observing strict secrecy in the transfer ofthe special materials has fallen away. Forthe removal of these materials it is now pos-sible and advisable to use our usual shipslocated in Cuban ports or arriving there inthe coming days, and there is no need to hidesuch materials in the ship holds.

It is necessary that you and ComradePavlov [Pliyev] to be guided by this infor-mation. Similar instructions to ComradePavlov are being given though the Ministryof Defense.

Confirm reception of this telegram.

A.G.


Telegram from USSR Foreign MinisterA. A. Gromyko to the Soviet Mission in

New York, 1 November 1962

To the SOVIET MISSION— COMRADESKUZNETSOV, ZORIN

First. Judging by your reports [severalwords deleted—ed.], the USA and severalother states belonging to the Security Coun-cil may try to complicate the negotiationsunderway now in New York among the rep-resentatives of the USSR, Cuba, and theUSA, by submitting all the issues being dis-cussed in the course of the negotiations tothe consideration of the Security Council.This is visible in the proposal by the Irishdelegate, Boland, that the Security Councilhear U Thant’s report and pass a resolutionfor delegating to U Thant the task of creat-ing a special UN mechanism for monitor-ing the dismantling of the special installa-tions in Cuba. Besides this, his proposal alsostipulates that the other issues of the “Cu-ban settlement” may also be discussed inthe Security Council, although the decisionon it may be postponed somewhat. All thismeans that the USA, along with other coun-tries that support its policy, wants to takeall these issues into its own hands in orderto drag out the resolution of the issues con-cerning the security guarantees for Cuba, aswell as the securing, by way of agreements,of the USA duties that have emerged fromthe exchange of messages between ComradeN.S. Khrushchev and Kennedy.

You should firmly object to such anattempt to replace the trilateral negotiations,in which U Thant is participating, with asubmission of all the issues to the consider-ation of the Security Council, in which itwould be impossible, given its present com-position, to reach resolutions that are advan-


tageous for us. Make a statement about thisin categorical form to U Thant, Stevenson,as well as to the UN delegates of the othernations that will deal with this issue alongwith you. Insist on the necessity of prolong-ing the trilateral negoatiations with UThant’s participation, and on their speedycompletion by securing the results of thenegotiations in a corresponding writtenagreement (a protocol statement).

Second. 1. On the monitoring of thedismantling and the removal of the specialinstallations. Concerning the issue of moni-toring the performance of work towards dis-mantling the special installations in Cuba,you should operate on the assumption thatthe dismantling process will be completedby 2 November, and that the dismantledmaterials will be removed from Cuba by 7or 8 November, or at the very latest 10 No-vember, if our ships arrive without hindrancein Cuban ports.

2. On the composition of the group ofSecurity Council agents. Proceed on the as-sumption that for us it is acceptable that thegroup monitoring the fulfillment of dutiesto dismantle and remove the special missileinstallations from Cuba contain representa-tives from the neutral states proposed by UThant (Sweden, Ethiopia, the United ArabRepublic, Mexico, Brazil, Yugoslavia, Swit-zerland). Also you may not object to theproposal that this group consist of eight rep-resentatives of the neutral nations belong-ing to the Disarmament Committee (India,Burma, the United Arab Republic, Nigeria,Ethiopia, Mexico, Brazil, Sweden), if sucha proposal is introduced. There are also noobjections to including in the group the rep-resentatives of Indonesia, Ceylon, theUnited Arab Republic, and Ghana, as youpropose.

We consider unacceptable the Ameri-cans’ proposal for the creation of monitor-ing groups composed of the USA, theUSSR, and Cuba.

3. On the monitoring of vessels boundfor Cuba, after the lifting of the blockade.You should proceed from the fact that wehave given our consent to the monitoring ofSoviet vessels bound for Cuba by the Inter-national Red Cross. It is envisaged that thismonitoring will be carried out until the endof the so-called “quarantine.” From this itfollows that the monitoring will be short-term. Your proposal that the system formonitoring the vessels be operative for the

duration, for example, of a year, is not ap-propriate.

4. On UN posts. In connection with theissue you proposed of monitoring certainregions of the USA and several Latin Ameri-can countries with the goal of determiningwhether preparations for the invasion ofCuba are underway, follow the instructionsin which we expressed our positive view ofU Thant’s proposal concerning the “UNpresence” in these countries and in Cuba.

You may approve the proposal that thecomposition of the UN posts for carryingout the indicated functions be similar to thecomposition of the groups of agents formonitoring the dismantling and removal ofspecial missile materials from the territoryof Cuba.

5. On American bases in Turkey. Weagree with your opinion. You should not inany circumstance touch on this issue in yournegotiations with U Thant and the USA rep-resentatives in New York, since it is the sub-ject of direct negotiations between Moscowand Washington. On this point we are keep-ing you informed only for your personaledification.

6. On the concept of “offensive weap-onry.” We consider it inexpedient to changethe formula that was used in Comrade N.S.Khrushchev’s messages and in the protocoldraft communicated by you, namely: “weap-onry which the USA government has calledoffensive.”

Your proposal to call this weaponry“means for launching nuclear arms at anoperational distance greater than (so many)kilometers” could allow the discussion ofthis issue to acquire an undesirable charac-ter for us, since the Americans will natu-rally be trying to broaden the scope of theweaponry prohibited from installations inCuba.

Third. Concerning all the main issuesrelevant to the duties of the parties— theUSA, the USSR, and Cuba— and the se-curing of their corresponding pledges, fol-low the text of the protocol statement andthe instructions contained in our memo-randa. Bear in mind, however, that as wehave already informed you, you will be car-rying out these instructions, as well as theinstructions contained in the “second” pointof the present telegram, only on receivingreports from us that our Cuban friends haveagreed to these proposals.

A.G.


Telegram from USSR Foreign MinisterGromyko to Soviet Mission in New

York, for A. I. Mikoyan, 1 November 1962

1 November 1962

Comrade N.S. Khrushchev has en-trusted me with the task of relaying the fol-lowing to you:

1. We have specified here that our in-stallations now being dismantled can beshipped out of Cuba by 7 or 8 or at the lat-est 10 November. This must be your pointof departure in your talks with U Thant,McCloy, and our Cuban friends. Of coursethis is only on the condition that our shipswill be granted safe passage into Cubanports.

2. In the talks with Fidel Castro, de-pending on how these talks unfold, youshould make use of the following points inyour argumentation:

Emphasize that it is the necessity of aspeedy lifting of the so-called quarantinethat, in our opinion, our Cuban friends aremost interested in. They know better thananyone else whether Cuba needs the ship-ments of goods presently on Soviet shipson the open sea. These cargoes cannot re-main on the open sea for long. Among themare perishable cargoes. Moreover, it mustbe taken into account that there is also aneconomic aspect to this issue: we are suf-fering great expenses because the vessels arebeing detained on their courses. A furtherdetainment will only increase these finan-cial losses. Cuba is not concealing theselosses from us. Of course it may be that Cubais ready to bear the burden of these doubledexpenses, in which case it is a different story.We see that you and we have different ap-proaches to how this issue must be resolved.

If our Cuban friends are for some rea-son not willing to facilitate the resolutionof this issue, we will be placed in a situa-tion in which we will have to recall the ships.For at present we are suffering unjustifiedexpenses.

It is impossible not to take into accountthe damages being inflicted on our prestige


because of the present situation in which ourvessels remain immobilized on the open sea.This cannot continue endlessly.

We believe that the missiles haveachieved their effect, and achieved it well.You say that you do not believe the Ameri-cans. We too do not believe them. But weare operating on the assumption that thesocialist states should take the necessarysteps to ensure their security, and to coexistwith the USA. It is possible that I am sim-ply repeating here what I was saying to youbefore your trip, but I think that these con-cerns should be borne in mind when youare presenting our case to Castro. This doesnot mean, of course, that they should beexpressed literally and explicitly. But youmust make him clearly understand that weare worried by the unreasonable position thatour Cuban comrades have been forced totake.

1.XI.62 A. GROMYKO


Cable of V.V. Kuznetsov on 1 November1962 Conversation between CPSU CCPolitburo Member A.I. Mikoyan and

Acting UN Secretary General U Thant,2 November 1962

Ciphered telegramTop Secret

No copying is allowed Copy no. 1

2 November 1962

CC CPSU

Transmitting the record of conversa-tion of com. A.I. Mikoyan

The conversation took place with UThant on 1 November 1962 in the U.N. mis-sion [of the USSR - trans.].

At the start com. Mikoyan passed to UThant regard from com. N.S. Khrushchevas well as on his own behalf. He told U Thantthat N.S. Khrushchev recalls with warmththe conversations that he had with the act-ing Secretary General. Personally N.S.Khrushchev and his colleagues believe that

U Thant took a good initiative with the aimof resolving the Cuban crisis and that in thisregard we are ackowledging his large con-tribution. This raises the authority of UThant himself as well as of the United Na-tions that could express itself in such a dan-gerous situation.

He remarked then that although theimmediate danger of war has ebbed, never-theless there are political and diplomaticdifficulties and they should be resolved ac-cording to the ideas and proposals advancedin the letters of N.S. Khrushchev [and]Kennedy and in the declaration of Castro.He stressed that for its part the Soviet Unionwas ready to continue its efforts to achievefinal resolution of the Cuban issue. He re-marked that the acting Secretary Generalcould exercise a certain influence, using hisauthority, in the process of ultimate settle-ment of the conflict.

He informed that he was heading forCuba to meet with the Cuban friends, anddecided to stop in New York in order to seeU Thant and hear his considerations withregard to his recent trip to Cuba.

U Thant welcomed com. Mikoyan. Hereminded him of their meetings in Yalta inNovember 1955 when U Thant accompa-nied [Burmese leader] U Nu, and then inBurma. U Thant recalled with warmth hismeetings with N.S. Khrushchev in 1955 inYalta as well as during the trip of N.S.Khrushchev to Burma, and also in theUnited Nations in 1960 and again this yearin the Soviet Union. U Thant expressed hissincere gratitude to N.S. Khrushchev for hisencouraging words passed to him in his let-ters to U Thant and also through our repre-sentatives in the UN. He values highly andrejoices at the assessment that the SovietUnion gives to his efforts in the resolutionof the Cuban issue.

U Thant stressed that the position ofthe Soviet government and its head N.S.Khrushchev in the Cuban crisis was grate-fully received by the vast majority of thepeoples of all the world and met with grati-tude by the whole mankind. He remarkedthat the people now see much more clearlythe sincere desire of the Soviet Union tohave the UN as an efficacious instrumentfor maintaining peace and for preventingwar.

After that U Thant turned to his trip toCuba and said the following.

The trip was taken in connection with

the exchange of letters between him andFidel Castro. In his first appeal to Castro, UThant called on him to cooperate with theUN in the name of securing peace. In hisreply, Castro invited U Thant to visit Cubapersonally in his capacity of acting UN Sec-retary General and to discuss with him theissues concerning the attitude of the gov-ernment of Cuba on the question under con-sideration of the Security Council.

U Thant accepted this invitation andvisited Cuba, staying there on 30 and 31October. He held two meetings with PrimeMinister Castro, when the Cuban issue wasdiscussed. In Havana he met some diplo-mats accredited by the government ofCastro. The most useful conversations wereones with the Ambassadors of Brazil, Yu-goslavia, the UAR [United Arab Republic],and the USSR.

One of the issues on U Thant’s agendaduring the trip was to clarify the reaction ofthe Cuban government concerning theagreement of the Soviet Union to allow U.N.observers to check on the fulfillment of thecommitment to dismantle Soviet missilelaunchers in Cuba and to return them to theUSSR.

Castro said in categorical form thatCuba is a sovereign and independent stateand it would not allow any external organi-zation - be it the UN or anything else - tointerfere in the internal affairs of Cuba. Im-position of inspection on the part of the UNwould be considered by the Cuban peopleas an infringement on its sovereign rightsand would be considered as a humiliationof the people of Cuba. Such a step cannotbe accepted by the Cuban government. Ifthe USSR wants to meet the announcedgoals of sending the groups of inspectors,then Castro believes that such inspectionsmight be carried out outside of the territo-rial waters of Cuba.

Castro informed U Thant that on Thurs-day, 1 November, he was going to speak onradio and television with a speech where heintends to mention this issue. U Thant re-portedly advised Castro to postpone thisspeech, since it is very delicate and wouldbe assessed as a declaration of policy withall consequences that flow out of it. Castroresponded to U Thant that he had alreadyput off making of this speech with regard to[U Thant’s] visit in Cuba. If the speech weredelayed one more time, then people wouldnot understand it. Therefore Castro could not


once again postpone his speech.The U Thant asked Castro not to men-

tion in his speech the position of the gov-ernment of Cuba regarding the [issue of] UNinspection, to which he gladly agreed, say-ing that he would remove this paragraphfrom the text he had already prepared.

U Thant asked com. Mikoyan, havingin mind the confidential character of hisconversations with Castro, not to raise thisissue on his own initiative.

As Castro pointed out, in his speechhe planned to lay out the entire foreignpolicy of Cuba and in particularly to em-phasize the five points on the settlement ofthe Cuban crisis he had advanced on 28October. To this U Thant responded that inview of the deliberations on the Cuban is-sue in the Security Council and his ownspeech he could not do it. The SecurityCouncil did not authorize him to discusswith the sides issues of permanent or long-term character of settlement of the conflictin the Caribbean sea.

To this Castro responded that a tempo-rary resolution of immediate problems didnot resolve the Cuban issue as a whole. Theresolution of these immediate questions, inthe opinion of the government of Cuba, hadto be linked to resolution of the longer-termproblems. The Security Council had to dis-cuss also and resolve the issue about a last-ing peace in the area of the Caribbean sea.If the Security Council were preoccupiedwith resolution of only immediate problems,then similar problems would emerge in theforeseeable future again, and they could cre-ate a situation similar to the current one.Therefore the government of Cuba is con-vinced that to ensure lasting and securepeace in the whole world it is necessary thatthe Security Council should preoccupy it-self with the issue of ensuring lasting peacein the Caribbean region. In case the Secu-rity Council would be convened, Castro in-tends to send to the UN Minister of ForeignAffairs Raul Roa so that he would presentthe viewpoint of his government on the en-tire Cuban issue. The delegation of Cubawould address the Security Council with arequest to find a lasting and final solutionto this issue. The government of Cuba isfirmly convinced that such a solution canbe found only on the basis of 5 points ad-vanced on 28 October by Premier Castro.

U Thant told Castro that at that pointhe was not competent to discuss this issue,

although he received with understanding theviewpoint of the Prime Minister of Cuba.

Then in the conversations U Thant andCastro touched on the issue about “the UNpresence” in the region of the Caribbean seaduring the period of the crisis.

U Thant told Castro that in the inter-ests of the government of Cuba and the Cu-ban people themselves it would be useful tohave in Havana UN representatives, and, ifCastro agrees, he was ready to leave 2 to 3of his officials to establish contacts and tofollow-up on their dialogue.

Castro responded that had the govern-ment of Cuba agreed at the present momentto the presence of UN representatives inCuba, it could have been interpreted bypeople as consent to the presence of inspect-ing groups of the United Nations. Whilesaying so, he referred to American radiobroadcasts which affirm on an hourly basisthat the U Thant mission had exactly theinspection goals in mind. Under such termspeople might have misperceived such a step.Castro asked U Thant not to insist on thisproposal.

He then declared that, if the SecurityCouncil accepted some kind of formula toresolve the Cuban issue on a permanent ba-sis, then he, Castro, would be glad to havesome kind of UN presence on the recipro-cal basis. However, this cannot be done inthe present phase.

In conversations with Castro, U Thantraised the question about the return to theUSA on humanitarian grounds of an Ameri-can pilot who, according to press publica-tions, had vanished without a trace in thearea of Cuba. Castro told him that the USAaircraft of the type U-2 had indeed violatedthe aerial space over Cuba in violation ofinternational legislation and the UN Char-ter. It was shot down by the Cubans, the pi-lot died, since he could not bail out. Castrowould have been ready to return the pilot,and alive, but he is dead, therefore he isready to return the body under auspices ofthe UN. (This information U Thant passedto the Americans).

Castro also said that any further viola-tion of the aerial borders of Cuba would bedealt with in a similar way.

The next question that was discussedbetween U Thant and Castro was about avoluntary suspension by the Soviet Unionof its supplies of weapons for Cuba for aperiod of 2 to 3 weeks and the simultaneous

voluntary suspension of the quarantine onthe part of the USA.

U Thant informed Castro about theacceptance on the part of the Soviet Unionof such a voluntary commitment, and alsothat the USA would have also agreed to sus-pend the quarantine for 2-3 weeks, on thecondition that there would be a mechanismfor checking if Soviet ships heading forCuba were not carrying arms.

U Thant informed Castro also that theSoviet Union had agreed that the Red Crossshould deal with inspection of vessels out-side of the boundaries of the territorial wa-ters of Cuba. He said that for the Red Crossit would have been more convenient to in-spect ships in the ports of arrival, and not inthe open sea, if, of course, the governmentof Cuba agreed to that.

Castro said to this, that his governmentwould not allow groups of the Red Cross toinspect Soviet ships on Cuban territory, butif the USSR agreed to the inspection, thenthe UN should start organizing this businesson the open sea.

Responding to the question of U Thantabout a possible time of convocation of anext session of the Security Council on theCuban issue, Castro said that he would havepreferred that the Council convene nosooner than next Wednesday, i.e. after theelections in the United States.

Com. Mikoyan thanked U Thant forinteresting and useful information, stress-ing that this would facilitate his talks withPrime Minister Fidel Castro.

He observed that the Americans werenow trying to focus all attention on the dis-mantling and withdrawal of missile equip-ment, doing nothing on their part concern-ing the guarantees of Cuba’s security.

Therefore Castro is right when hespeaks about the need to solve the Cubanissue on a permanent basis. Now it is im-portant to move from general declarationsto concrete steps for cardinal solution of theentire issue on the basis of the letters ofN.S. Khrushchev [and] Kennedy, and alsothe just and constructive proposals of FidelCastro. Naturally, the Americans will objectto some proposals of Castro, but his pro-posals face in the right direction.

On the time of convening the SecurityCouncil, com. Mikoyan remarked that weunderstand the considerations of Fidel onthis score. We also would like to say thatsince general principles of complete liqui-


dation of the conflict has been adopted anddeclared by the interested sides, and also bythe UN, since the acting Secretary Generalis taking active part in this, then, in our opin-ion, the Security Council should be con-vened at the moment when the current ne-gotiations would approach the phase of anagreed-upon document finalizing this crisis.Until then convening of the Security Coun-cil would hardly assist in this matter.

Com. Mikoyan voiced the idea thatafter the end of talks of the sides, some kindof document might be passed for approvalto the Security Council and on its basis andin following up on it the Council might takea decision on subsequent practical steps.Such a document might have the characterof a protocol which would describe talks thatwould have taken place between the sideswith participation of U Thant on the basisof the letters of N.S. Khrushchev andKennedy, and also the declarations of FidelCastro, and that would inform about theachieved agreement that, thereby, wouldhave been sealed by the Security Council.

[Mikoyan] said to U Thant that welearned with great interest about his initia-tive concerning the practicality of havingobservers in Cuba, in the USA, and in othercountries neighboring Cuba for a durationof some period. He informed [U Thant] thatN.S. Khrushchev was delighted to see thisinitiative of U Thant and considered it to beinteresting and useful. It is good that FidelCastro took it in a positive way. This pro-posal contains in itself the principle of reci-procity, and the USSR is ready to supportsuch a proposal. It could be included into adraft protocol.

He asked U Thant if he had spoken tothe Americans on this subject and if so whatwas their attitude toward this idea.

U Thant said that in conversation withSoviet representatives he advanced severalformulas for solution of the issue in its en-tirety, and the problem of guarantees in par-ticular. At one of these meetings with com.Zorin he indeed proposed that, provided theagreement of the sides, the presence of theUN in the Western hemisphere, in theflashpoints, would be useful. Were it toprove acceptable, then, in the opinion of UThant, such a measure would have facili-tated a settlement of the situation in the Car-ibbean region on the permanent basis.

U Thant discussed this idea with headsof missions of Latin American [countries]

in the UN even before his trip to Cuba andthey seemed interested. Some Latin Ameri-can delegates not only were interested in thisidea but also let U Thant understand thatsuch a measure would be desirable.

The USA so far does not want to openlyexpress its attitude towards this proposal ofU Thant. Its reaction was reduced to the ar-gument that, well, since this arrangementconcerns all the countries of Western hemi-sphere, this issue should be discussed in theOrganization of American States.

Com. Mikoyan asked U Thant abouthis opinion regarding a possible form of thedocument stating the reached agreement.

U Thant said that if the sides agree ingeneral, then the goal will be reachedthrough any such document in the form ofprotocol, joint declaration, separate decla-ration of the sides, agreement and even inthe form of summing-up declaration of thechairman of the Security Council.

Com. Mikoyan asked U Thant also toexpress his personal considerations on thetime of convocation of the Security Coun-cil.

U Thant said that it should be done af-ter the elections in the USA, but everythingdepends on the sides’ agreement. If the sidescome to agreement, the Council can be con-vened at any time.

Then U Thant passed his wish to thankthe Soviet Ambassador in Cuba for his genu-ine and wholehearted cooperation during thetrip of U Thant. In particular, U Thant notedthat our Ambassador in Havana and the So-viet officer informed him without delayabout the time when dismantling of the mis-sile units began, about the time when workwill be finished, and about the fact that shipsare commissioned for withdrawal of theseunits. In this regard U Thant asked as a mat-ter of personal interest about the time of ar-rival of ships to Cuba to pick up the men-tioned materiel.

Com. Mikoyan confirmed what ourAmbassador in Havana had told U Thantabout the time-frame of dismantling. Con-cerning the time-frame of withdrawal hesaid that those ships that are now in Cubawill not suffice. However, with regard to thecontinuing quarantine Soviet ships cannotsail to Cuba. Therefore it is necessary to liftthe quarantine, so that Soviet ships couldenter Cuban ports, unload their cargoes andload on them the dismantled units[ustanovki]. If one does it in speedily, then

perhaps 10-15 days will be required. Hepromised to raise this issue in the forthcom-ing conversation with McCloy.

U Thant said that he addresses theAmericans every day with appeals to sus-pend the blockade. And yesterday, havingreturned from Cuba, he did the same, mak-ing the Americans aware that he was con-vinced that the dismantling had begun andwas under way as it had been promised, andthat it would be finished by the announceddate.

Com. Mikoyan thanked U Thant for hisuseful and exhaustive information. Theyagreed that for the press they will announceabout useful exchange of opinions and thefriendly atmosphere of the conversation.

At the end of the conversation U Thantsaid that if A.I. Mikoyan would come backvia New York, he (U Thant) would be gladto meet again and learn about the results ofthe trip. He would like that time to be a moregenerous host than now and to invite A.I.Mikoyan for lunch and breakfast.

The conversation was recorded bycom. Zherebtsov V.N.


[Source: AVPRF; obtained by NHK, pro-vided to CWIHP, copy on file at NationalSecurity Archive; translation by VladislavM. Zubok (National Security Archive).]

Telegram from Soviet envoy G. Zhukovto CC CPSU, 2 November 1962

2 November 1962

Yesterday, on 1 November (before din-ner with A.I. Mikoyan), McCloy invited meto his residence and said the following:

1. The Americans express their grati-tude for the fact that the American planemaking aerial photos of Cuba today was notsubjected to gunfire. The photos are stillbeing developed, but the Americans hopethat they will confirm the correctness of thestatement made by the Soviet general inCuba, to the effect that the missile disman-tling process has already been started.

2. McCloy offered a detailed accountof how U Thant had informed him of histalks with Castro (the account coincides withwhat U Thant told our delegation). He saidthat he understood the difficulties arisingfrom Castro’s refusal of ground-based in-


spections, and that now it was necessary tofind new methods of monitoring that wouldconfirm that the dismantling and removalof the missiles had begun (in McCloy’s opin-ion, the best solution would be aerial pho-tos along with a check on the ships remov-ing the cargoes from Cuba on the open sea.McCloy underscored that this monitoringshould be formal— without inquiring intothe details of the missiles, which are secret).

3. McCloy spoke a lot about the futureprospects of an American-Soviet collabora-tion which would open up as a result of thesettling of the Cuban crisis. In his view, it isnecessary in the first place to reach an agree-ment on the cessation of nuclear testing,which would make a huge impression onpublic opinion. It would be good if thisagreement could be signed by Kennedy andKhrushchev. Such a meeting wouldstrengthen public faith that their personalcontacts can be fruitful.

McCloy also believes it expedient toconclude an agreement concerning a renun-ciation of the military use of outer space,and to sign a treaty on at least one bilateralagreement concerning the colonizing ofouter space (for example, the launching ofa Soviet-American rocket aimed at Venus).

McCloy also reiterated several ideasexpressed earlier by Salinger and Thomp-son (concerning in particular the issue ofbases in Turkey—it may be possible, in hisview, to eliminate them in the course of “thefirst stage of disarmament”—by way of “re-distr ibution”).

4. McCloy implied that he would playthe role of an unofficial intermediary in thepreparation of a meeting between Kennedyand Khrushchev, which in his view couldtake place within a few months, if resolu-tions of the issues enumerated above havebeen completed by that time.

5. McCloy asked us to pass on hiswarm greetings to N. S. Khrushchev and themembers of his family, from himself and hisown family.

2.XI.62 G. ZHUKOV


A.I. Mikoyan to CC CPSU re 1November 1962 Meeting with

Stevenson, 2 November 1962

[...] We raised the question that it wasnecessary to write down in the form of aprotocol the important provisions that arecontained in the exchange of messages be-tween N.S. Khrushchev and Kennedy tak-ing into account the statement by FidelCastro. The Americans by all means wereevading discussion of this question and try-ing to bring the whole matter to the organi-zation of control over the dismantling andwithdrawal from Cuba of the Soviet mis-siles. Nevertheless, in the course of con-versation they were obliged to answer ourquestions relating to the settlement of theCuban problem in general and disclosedsome of their positions that seem interest-ing for further negotiations. To save spacein this cable we omit our remarks duringthe conversation. You may learn them fromthe transcript of the conversation which isbeing sent separately.

1. Though reluctantly, the Americansagreed with the need to fix in documentsthe corresponding commitments, includingthe non-aggression commitment againstCuba. In their opinion, these documentsmust include: a statement by the SovietUnion on the completion of the missiles’evacuation; a USA statement saying they areconvinced of the withdrawal and giving cor-responding non-aggression guarantees toCuba; possibly also a statement by U Thant.

The statement by the Soviet govern-ment must be the first.

The texts of these statements will becoordinated in advance.

It is foreseen that a corresponding state-ment will be made by the Government ofCuba. All these statements must be pre-sented to the Security Council.

The unwillingness of the Americans tosign a protocol, apparently, can be explainedin addition by the following thing: they donot want to put their signature side by sidewith the Cubans’.

The Americans underlined their readi-ness to include in their statement provisionsbased on corresponding wording fromKennedy’s messages regarding the issue ofnon-aggression guarantees for Cuba.

When we mentioned that in the Ameri-can press there has appeared a statement byD. Rusk to the effect that Kennedy’s state-ment is not a non-aggression guarantee toCuba, Stevenson assured us that D. Rusk

had not said it, but that the press gave anerroneous interpretation of his speech.

Stevenson and McCloy confirmed thatthe USA are [is] ready to give a non-aggres-sion guarantee to Cuba as it was mentionedin Kennedy’s letter, if an inspection in someform confirms that the Soviet “offensive”armament is really removed from Cuba.

Stevenson and McCloy affirmed thatthe encampments where the Cuban exileshad been training for an invasion of Cubawere currently closed.

2. During the conversation we reso-lutely demanded the removal of the so-called “quarantine,” underlining that its con-tinuation in no way can help to create a suit-able atmosphere for the solution of the Cu-ban problem and may only complicate thesituation. In this regard we noted that theSoviet Union had complied with the requestfrom U Thant for a temporary suspensionof armaments’ supplies to Cuba, but that theUSA had not stopped their “quarantine” forat least some time, as it had been suggestedby U Thant.

McCloy and Stevenson evaded a clearanswer to the question of ending the “quar-antine,” having limited themselves to a ref-erence that to the Soviet vessels going toCuba would be applied the same procedureas it was on October 25 regarding the tanker“Bucharest,” without an inspection onboard, but with the help of a hailing-requestby radio.

It is illustrative that in response to ourstatement that in the event of dropping thepractice of “quarantine” and giving our ves-sels the possibility to visit Cuba without anyobstacles some 10-15 days will be neededto dispatch [from Cuba] all the armamentscalled offensive by the Americans, McCloyand Stevenson said that in their opinion it ishardly possible from the technical stand-point to carry out the mentioned volume ofwork in such a short period of time. Accord-ing to McCloy, at least a month would beneeded for that.

3. There has been a detailed discussionof methods for control of the dismantlingand removal of missiles.

Apparently, feeling the weakness oftheir position and taking into account ob-jections on the part of Fidel Castro to per-mit verification on Cuban territory, McCloyand Stevenson declared in the course of dis-cussion that the American side would beready not to insist on verification methods


foreseen in the message to N.S. Khrushchevand was ready to look for some new meth-ods that would in essence give the Ameri-cans the possibility to be certain of theimplementation of our commitment to with-draw the weapons.

To our specific question what newmethods was he referring to, McCloy said:the USA could limit [itself] to the continua-tion of their flights which give them confi-dence that there has not resumed in Cubaan installation of the dangerous for themtypes of armaments.

If Castro is against a ground verifica-tion, continued McCloy, another thing couldbe done - a transfer of the lists of armamentswithdrawn from Cuba, when they would beremoved, and of the corresponding informa-tion, which however would not discloseSoviet technological secrets. We do knowroughly how many missiles currently aresituated in Cuba. In this case we could man-age without ground verification. We areglad, - said McCloy, - that today our planehad not come under fire when it had beenflying over Cuba. As far as we know theanti-aircraft missiles in Cuba are in the handsof your people, not the Cubans, although it’spossible that there are some Cuban person-nel.

McCloy received a very firm responsethat the USA [has] no right to overfly Cubaand nobody can guarantee the security ofsuch illegal flights.

4. We raised the question of normaliz-ing relations between the USA [and] theirLatin American allies, and Cuba. We alsoasked what is their attitude to U Thant’s planfor a UN presence in the Caribbean. TheAmericans flatly rejected any inspection oftheir territory whatsoever and declared:“You will have to trust our word.”

At the same time, Stevenson said thatthe USA aspires to normalize the situationin the Caribbean, but under the condition ofCastro’s cooperation. We could in someform elaborate mutual guarantees, accept-able to Castro and his neighbors. If Castrois afraid of them, they are afraid of him, too.I consider, said Stevenson, that after theCuban crisis is settled the tension in this re-gion would be lessened.

In this regard we put the question inthis way:

“Castro may ask me if the USA [is]going to re-establish diplomatic and eco-nomic relations with Cuba? Maybe you in-

tend to do so not immediately, but some timelater?”

Stevenson said that he was not able togive an answer to that question insofar as itis part of the competence of the OAS [Or-ganization of American States]. But perhapswe can consider the possibility of organiz-ing corresponding regional arrangements,giving the necessary confidence to the coun-tries of the Caribbean. I hope that steadilywe will succeed in eliminating antagonismbetween Cuba and its neighbors.

At the same time Stevenson made theobservation that currently the “antagonism”between Cuba and its neighbors is instigatedby “subversive actions in this region, per-haps undertaken mutually.” McCloy notedthat “Cuba is the breeding ground of infec-tion and Venezuela an example.”

It was clear that in the immediate fu-ture the USA [is] not going to re-establishdiplomatic and economic ties with Cuba.

5. Stevenson and McCloy stated thatthe USA refuse[s] point-blank to discuss thequestion of liquidating the American baseat Guantanamo.

6. In the course of the conversationMcCloy attempted to broach the subject ofan eventual evacuation from Cuba of theSoviet “ground-air” anti-aircraft missiles.We have resolutely warded off this probing,declaring that such a question could not beraised and that we had sold these weaponsto a number of countries, including theUnited Arab Republic and Indonesia.McCloy made the observation that “they aregood machines against attacks from air-space.”

7. McCloy and Stevenson agreed thatit would be good for Soviet and Americandelegations to try to reach preliminary agree-ments over the issues to be discussed by theSecurity Council.

8. McCloy and Stevenson expressedsatisfaction over the exchange of opinionsand Stevenson underlined that the USSR andUSA positions “are not so far from eachother.” Both of them were inquiring whetherI would stop on my way back [from Cuba].

I said in response that for the momentI had no plans to do so but if necessary Iassumed it would be possible.

2.XI.62 A. MIKOYAN

[Source: AVPRF; trans. V. Zaemsky; copyon file at National Security Archive.]

Soviet Record of 1 November 1962Dinner Conversation between CPSUCC Politburo Member A.I. Mikoyan

and White House envoy John McCloyand U.S. Ambassador to the United

Nations Adlai Stevenson

Secret. Copy no. 24

RECORD OF CONVERSATION OFcom. A.I. MIKOYAN

WITH JOHN MCCLOY AND ADLAISTEVENSON AT A DINNER IN THE

SOVIET MISSION AT THE U.N.1 November 1962

At the outset of the conversation A.I.Mikoyan poses a question about the liftingof the American blockade on the surround-ings of Cuba for the period of negotiations,as it was proposed by U Thant in his firstmissive to com. N.S. Khrushchev and toPresident Kennedy on 24 October this year.

A.I. Mikoyan says that the USSR ac-cepted recommendation of the acting Gen-eral Secretary of the U.N., and the UnitedStates did not. On 24 October U Thant pro-posed that the Soviet Union would stop de-livery of weapons to Cuba for the durationof talks (2 to 3 weeks), and the United Statesduring the same period would suspend theblockade. The Soviet Union fulfilled the rec-ommendations of U Thant, but the UnitedStates did not.

McCloy remarks that U Thant seeks tostart as soon as possible to check up Sovietvessels sailing to Cuba, by the forces of theInternational Red Cross.

Stevenson says that the United Stateshoped that by the end of next week observ-ers of the International Red Cross would beable to begin their work in Cuba. Here ap-parently some sort of misunderstandingemerges. It was understood that the suspen-sion of the “quarantine” would be condi-tioned on the simultaneous introduction ofinspection.

A.I. Mikoyan objects that no such un-derstanding took place.

McCloy remarks that perhaps U Thantdid introduce the proposal mentioned by A.I.Mikoyan, but the United States accepted nothis proposal, but the proposal of ChairmanKhrushchev in his letter to PresidentKennedy.


Stevenson says that in fact the issueabout immediate suspension of the “quar-antine” is purely academic. Soviet ships willprobably not reach Cuba until next week,and meanwhile he hopes that the inspectionof the Red Cross will be already in force,and then, naturally, there will be no needfor the “quarantine.”

A.I. Mikoyan reiterates that N.S.Khrushchev accepted the proposal of UThant and the Americans did not accept it.

Stevenson. We believe that a certainunderstanding was achieved in the letters ofN.S. Khrushchev and J. Kennedy.

A.I. Mikoyan. This is correct. Whatwas envisaged in the letters must be imple-mented and will be implemented. However,had the United States adopted the same rea-sonable approach, permeated with goodwill, as was adopted by the Soviet Union,then they would have accepted the proposalof U Thant and would have lifted the block-ade immediately.

McCloy. Would you make a stop onthe way back [from Cuba] in New York?

A.I. Mikoyan. I have no definite planson this score, but I would not exclude sucha stop-over.

McCloy (in a jocular tone). But wouldCastro let you out?

A.I. Mikoyan. He and I are specialfriends and will work it out somehow

Stevenson. Perhaps you will bring himalong over here?

A.I. Mikoyan. You showed such a poorhospitality to him, that he can hardly be con-vinced to come to New York again. Such agreat power as the United States should beashamed to mistreat such a small country.When Stevenson had not yet been the USArepresentative [in the United Nations -trans.], he had good understanding of ev-erything, but now apparently his officialposition makes him speak and act in a dif-ferent way.

Stevenson. We learn in governmentoffice, but we forget nothing. We immedi-ately accepted the proposal on inspection bythe Red Cross. I do not know how manySoviet ships are approaching Cuba, but Iwould prefer that there will be more of them,so that they would sooner take away yourmissiles. I must tell you that we were veryfavorably impressed by the speed withwhich Soviet officers dismantle the missiles.

McCloy. I am struck by the speed ofassembling as well as disassembling [of the

missiles - trans.].A.I. Mikoyan. Those who can assemble

fast, can also disassemble fast. Our militaryare men of discipline, they punctually ful-fill the order of N.S. Khrushchev. But thereare not enough ships around Cuba to carryaway the equipment which is the subject ofthe understanding, so in addition other shipswill be necessary. And your blockade standsin their way to Cuba and, consequently,hampers the withdrawal of missiles. In otherwords, the “quarantine” turns itself againstyour own interests.

McCloy. We would gladly let yourships pass in both directions, if they carryall your missiles away. I would like to be onthe ship that would transport the last mis-siles from Cuba, added McCloy in jest.

A.I. Mikoyan (in a jocular way). So liftthe “quarantine” and then everything willbe in order. Stevenson will become the onehe had used to be before he was nominated[to his position] in the UN.

Stevenson. When do your ships arrivein Cuba?

A.I. Mikoyan. But you have not yetlifted the blockade. Our ships are now inthe open sea, about 4-5 days away fromCuba. They should reach Cuba, disembarktheir load, then load themselves and leave.This would, of course, require a certain time,no less than 10-15 days.

Stevenson. We could agree on a sched-ule. Next week one might agree on an in-spection of the Red Cross; then the “quar-antine” might be lifted.

A.I. Mikoyan. I would like to know if[the leadership of] the United States think[s]that we should work out an agreement thatwould seal what has been said in the ex-change of letters between Kennedy andKhrushchev? Or you are interested only inthe dismantling and withdrawal of missiles?Would you think that we should agree onother issues touched upon in the exchangeof missives, and confirm the achieved un-derstanding in a written document?

Stevenson. First of all we want to reachunderstanding on the withdrawal of missileequipment from Cuba and we do not wantto tolerate that until the establishment ofinspection by the Red Cross there would bean uncontrolled flow of armaments intoCuba.

McCloy. There is already too mucharmament there. We cannot tolerate its build-up.

A.I.Mikoyan. It is correct that there issufficient amount of armament in Cuba, butwe already stopped sending it there.

McCloy. Yes, but we cannot risk, whenit may happen that some arms are beingwithdrawn and other arms are being shippedin. When the missile equipment will beshipped off, the political atmosphere willameliorate and it will be easier to agree. Youpreferred U.N. inspections to an inspectionof the Red Cross. We agreed to that. We areinterested in your ships reaching Cuba soon,and we will not obstruct their way.

A.I. Mikoyan. Arms were not providedto Cuba to attack the United States, but as ameans of containment [sderzhivaiyuchego],so that there was no aggression againstCuba. But since in his answer to the letterof N.S. Khrushchev J. Kennedy gave theassurance that neither the United States, norits Latin American allies would attack Cuba,we declared our readiness to pull out sometypes of armaments from Cuba.

Stevenson. I do not think there is anydisagreement on the issue that Soviet shipsshould enter the ports of Cuba. It is onlythat the “quarantine” should be preserveduntil the establishment of the Red Crossinspection. We are interested to see that therewill be no new shipments of arms, and wehope you will understand us.

A.I. Mikoyan. We agreed with the pro-posals of U Thant and declared that wewould not bring armaments to Cuba pend-ing the talks. Those ships that are now atsea carrying no weapons at all. I must saythat Stevenson is a good diplomat: I ampushing him in one direction of the talk, buthe veers off.

Then for some time the conversationwas focused on the issues of protocol na-ture.

In the second half of the conversationthe discussion of business resumes.

A.I. Mikoyan. Yet I would like to posethe following question. Would the USA gov-ernment think to come to an agreementwhere all that was said in the exchange ofwell-known letters would be fixed? I havein mind the kind of document that wouldformulate the settlement of the crisis. Wethink it is preferable to work out such a docu-ment.

V.V. Kuznetsov. The need in workingout such a document stems from the under-standing achieved between the sides aboutthe settlement of the crisis.


Stevenson. In our opinion, the soleproblem that confronts us - it is to work outconditions for inspection that should be car-ried out by representatives of the Red Circle.This is relatively easy task. One could setup two check-points at the approaches toCuba’s ports, in the South and in the North,where two ships of the Red Cross could belocated. These might be ships of neutralcountries or any other ships, perhaps evensailing hospitals. On board there could beRed Cross inspectors who could check onships going for Cuba, so that the characterof this check-up would be via radio - inquir-ing on the ship’s origins, where it goes andwith what cargo. Inspectors would not boardships. I think that such [a form of] inspec-tion should not create problems. We wouldbe glad to hear from you which ships, inyour opinion, must be utilized for theseaims. I would like to repeat that one couldeasily reach understanding on this issue.

There is, however, one problem: mea-sures to check the fulfillment of obligationson dismantling and withdrawal of missileequipment from Cuba. As I understood fromU Thant, Castro did not agree to UN inspec-tions stipulated in the exchange of lettersbetween J. Kennedy and N.S. Khrushchev.We hope that you will discuss this issue onceagain in Havana.

McCloy. I must emphasize that we donot accept the 5 conditions of Castro as theconditions for fulfillment of what had beensaid in the letter of Mr. Khrushchev.

Stevenson. The problem that concernsus most is that an inspection should be car-ried out before you report to the SecurityCouncil about the completion of withdrawalof missile equipment. Naturally, thereshould be a check-up of how this undertak-ing is implemented. I think that such acheck-up need not be difficult to carry out.

In addition to that, of course, there isthe issue of the form of USA assurance thatCuba will not be subjected to invasion. Thisalso need not present any difficulties.

McCloy. And to a certain extent this isan answer to the question previously posedby Mr. Mikoyan.

A.I. Mikoyan. You keep focusing allattention only on the issue of withdrawal ofarmaments from Cuba and on inspection.However, the first-order question is to grantto Cuba guarantees of non-interventionagainst it on the part of other countries ofthe Western hemisphere, recognition of the

sovereignty and territorial integrity of theCuban Republic, observation of its territo-rial inviolability, non-interference into itsdomestic affairs. Castro demands it, and youapparently do not want to give such assur-ances.

Castro puts forward also a demand toliquidate the U.S. base in Guantanamo. Whyare you refusing to discuss this issue? Whilepressing your demands, you do not want tohear the legitimate demands of the otherside. Of course, this is an issue of Ameri-can-Cuban relations, but in any case this is-sue must be discussed with Castro.

The exchange of letters between N.S.Khrushchev and Kennedy - this is in essencealready an agreement. But by itself the ex-change of letters cannot be considered as afinal document. One must carry out nego-tiations to work out such a final documenton the basis of the exchange of letters, sincethis issue has acquired a bilateral interna-tional character.

We suggest to conduct negotiations onthis basis and believe that the United States,the Soviet Union, and Cuba should sign aprotocol, with participation of U Thant. Sucha protocol might fix all the basic premisescontained in the letters of N.S. Khrushchevand J. Kennedy.

I repeat, we think that you should con-sider the proposals advanced by Castro.They are legitimate ones. You should alsoconsider the issue of the base inGuantanamo. I see that you disagree withCastro’s demand, but it does not mean thatyou should turn down any discussion of hisdemands. One cannot turn such a discussiondown, when one wants to normalize the situ-ation.

I would touch on an interesting planadvanced by U Thant; after an agreementamong the parties involved, which could beapproved by the Security Council, one mightagree on the presence of UN inspectors inthe area of the Caribbean Sea, includingCuba, and on the South-East coast of theUnited States and the neighboring LatinAmerican countries. These inspectors couldwatch over implementation of the under-standing on mutual non-interference be-tween the United States and Cuba. This is avery important proposal and its implemen-tation would give a change to fully settlethe conflict. One should take into accountthat Cuba is an independent state. It is im-possible to demand that some kind of in-

spection would cover only its territory, ifthere were no analogous inspection cover-ing the territory of the other side, on the basisof reciprocity.

I must emphasize that if the letter of J.Kennedy had not told of guarantees of non-intervention against Cuba, we would nothave agreed to dismantle and withdraw mis-sile equipment from Cuba. But now it comesout as follows: we are withdrawing weap-ons, and you are back-pedaling on yourcommitments. Castro does not have trust inyour word and he has a right [not to], sincethe territory of Cuba has already been in-vaded. It would be a different matter if therewould be an official document enforced,containing appropriate guarantees for Cubaand approved by the Security Castro.

I would like to know your opinionabout the guarantees. What can I tell Castrowhen I meet him? We stem from the factthat the letter from Kennedy already con-tains a basis for an agreement on grantingto Cuba the guarantees of non-intervention.This is a bilateral problem and both sidesmust resolve it and fix it in an agreement.

McCloy. In our opinion, the most im-portant [thing] is to withdraw appropriate[offensive - trans.] types of armaments fromCuba as soon as possible. If it is not done,the situation will worsen very much. Onecan speak about the assurances of Kennedyconcerning non-intervention against Cuba,but Castro must not set new conditions onwithdrawal of missile equipment. Mean-while, Castro told U Thant that he wouldnot tolerate UN inspections. The SovietUnion and Cuba must agree between eachother on what would be the form of inspec-tion. It is a matter of your relationship. Wehave only one interest: that the armamentson which we have achieved the understand-ing would be shipped away and that wewould be convinced that they are reallyshipped away.

I do not think that there would be anyproblems on the question of the access ofships and on the withdrawal of missileequipment from Cuba. The main thing is toremove missile equipment.

As to the question on granting the guar-antees of non-intervention to Cuba, if youthink that what the President said is notenough, one could talk about some kind ofappropriate commitment [obiazatelstve].

You are posing a question about thepossible presence of UN observers on USA


territory, so that there would be no invasionof Cuba. I must say that if you keep insist-ing on that, there will be additional compli-cations.

A.I. Mikoyan. U Thant expressed thisidea.

McCloy. No, he did not suggest it. Irepeat: nothing will come out of it.

A.I. Mikoyan. Today in conversationwith me U Thant reiterated this idea and saidthat this issue should be discussed at theOrganization of American States.

Stevenson. We believe that the ex-change of letters between Kennedy andKhrushchev contains concrete and clear for-mulas. I think that there is no need for anynew understanding, except for resolution ofthe issue about the inspection method. If wefail to carry out ground inspection, let usseek other means which would assure us thatthe armaments are withdrawn. Otherwise thedanger of conflict will be reborn. I hope that,when the atmosphere will clear up and themissile equipment will be withdrawn fromCuba, it will be easier to agree on other is-sues. Kennedy has already given appropri-ate assurances concerning non-interventionagainst Cuba, and we can confirm it.

We would like to say clearly that anydiscussion of the issue about liquidation ofour base in Guantanamo is out of question.It was given up [ustuplena] to us by the gov-ernment of Cuba on a legal basis, and theAmerican people will under no circum-stances renounce it.

A.I.Mikoyan. But the government ofCuba puts forward this question, so it shouldbe discussed.

V.V.Kuznetsov. The government ofCuba has put this question even earlier.

McCloy. We will not concede on this.The position of Castro represents an obstacleon the way to fulfilling commitments for-mulated in the letter of Mr. Khrushchev.

A.I.Mikoyan. Castro is not and will notbe an obstacle to fulfillment of these com-mitments. The armaments we are talkingabout is Soviet weaponry and it will beevacuated. As for Castro, he has declaredthat he would assist the evacuation of thesearmaments.

McCloy. But he has 145 thousand sol-diers against 10 thousand Russians. He canobstruct the dismantling [of missiles--trans.]. Moreover, I think he is already ob-structing it.

A.I.Mikoyan. The government of Cuba

has the right of sovereignty and one mustseek its agreement on any kind of inspec-tion on Cuban territory. It put forward fiveconditions, including the demand about liq-uidation of the American base inGuantanamo. However, beside the issue ofthe base, there are four more points inCastro’s program, and these points are in fullagreement with what Kennedy wrote in hisletter to Khrushchev. Why don’t you wantto accept them?

Stevenson. There is only one issuebetween the Soviet Union and the USA:about full withdrawal from Cuba of certaintypes of armaments under conditions of in-spection and in the presence of the under-standing that the supplies of this weaponrywill not be resumed. Under these conditionsthe guarantees of Cuba’s security on the partof the United States will be ensured.

Castro raised a number of other issues,but they have nothing to do with Soviet-American relations. In our negotiations weshould begin to consider the issues that arewithin the realm of Soviet-American rela-tions, in the framework of the understand-ing between Khrushchev and Kennedy.

A.I.Mikoyan. Speaking about the ex-change of letters between N.S. Khrushchevand J. Kennedy, you blow up only one as-pect and maintain silence on the other. Youdodge such issues as lifting of the block-ade, granting the guarantees of indepen-dence to Cuba. We believe that all thisshould be fixed [zafiksirovano] in the docu-ment where certain formulas should be re-iterated and specified. We believe that ournegotiations should result in a documentregistered in the United Nations and ap-proved by the Security Council. Otherwise,what is happening? The ink has not yet driedup on the letter, but Rusk is already declar-ing that the United States has not guaran-teed the independence of Cuba. It was pub-lished in your newspapers, and I read aboutit on my way to New York.

Stevenson. Rusk said nothing to dis-avow the guarantees that have been grantedin Kennedy’s letter. The press gave a wronginterpretation to his declaration.

A.I.Mikoyan. We are proposing to youto prepare jointly an appropriate documentand introduce it jointly to the Security Coun-cil, then there will be no other interpreta-tions.

Stevenson. I would like to say a fewwords about the procedure. U Thant believes

that the operation could be finalized in twostatements: the Soviet Union could makeannouncement about the end of withdrawalof the certain types of weapons from Cuba,and the United States would make an an-nouncement that we made sure that theseweapons are withdrawn from Cuba. Earlierit was supposed that the appropriate check-up should be done by the forces of the UN,but after Castro’s refusal to let UN repre-sentatives into Cuba, the question emergedabout the method of inspection.

After the withdrawal of the certaintypes of weapons from Cuba will be con-firmed, the USA will declare the abolitionof the “quarantine” and that it guaranteesnon-intervention of Cuba. I see no reasonfor any other treaties and documents. If theSoviet side has some draft proposals, it isdesirable to obtain them, and the Americanside then will do the same thing.

A.I. Mikoyan. There is no time to con-sider this issue in detail. It seems to me weshould think how to continue the talks.

V.V.Kuznetsov. If the American sideagrees, we will discuss this issue.

A.I.Mikoyan. On our side we prefer tohave a protocol.

Stevenson. The Soviet Union can andmust ensure the withdrawal of the certaintypes of armaments and a verification thatwould satisfy the USA and Latin Americancountries.

The question, however, emerges onwhat form of inspection is feasible undercurrent circumstances. Four days have al-ready elapsed, and there is no inspection insight. Therefore, now we should discusspossible forms of inspection. We do notwant to constrain you by those formulas thatwere advanced concerning international in-spection. If Castro does not want such aninspection, one can think of different formsof control.

McCloy. We should look at what isacceptable and feasible, but in any case theinspection should be introduced. Thereforewe should adapt ourselves to the new situa-tion.

In the first order, of course, we should,as they say, remove the pistol from the ne-gotiating table, in other words to dismantleand withdraw the missiles.

Stevenson. I do not think that somekind of protocol will be necessary, besidesthe declarations that will be made in theSecurity Council.


A.I.Mikoyan. Normalization would becomplete if the Soviet Union, the USA andCuba signed a joint document together withthe UN Secretary General on the basis ofthe exchange of letters between N.S.Khrushchev and J. Kennedy. In any case,this issue cannot be resolved without Cuba.A decision in which Cuba is not a party willnot be binding for her. Cuba must have guar-antees of non-intervention.

I would like to know: do you have anyideas about forms of control? If you havethem - discuss them in the next few dayswith V.V. Kuznetsov.

Stevenson. As to the territorial integ-rity of Cuba, the formulas in the letter ofKennedy are simple and clear: after certaintypes of weapons will be removed fromCuba, the USA will make an announcementabout the guarantee against any kind of in-vasion of Cuba.

McCloy. As to the forms of verifica-tion, the ideal form in my mind would beregular overflights by planes doing aerialphoto-reconnaissance, and ground inspec-tion. I hope that the Soviet Union would bearon Castro so that he will agree to the con-duct of such inspection as was stipulated inthe letter of N.S.Khrushchev. However, ifCastro refuses to accept such inspection, weshould look for another form. The USAmight continue overflights by its planes giv-ing us confidence that one does not resumein Cuba assembly of types of weapons thatrepresent danger for us. But in this case wewould like to have assurances that our planswill not be downed. One could also consideryet another possibility. Could you pass tous the lists of armament that is being with-drawn from Cuba? We know approximatelyhow many missiles you now have in Cuba.If you could pass to us the lists of what youwill transport on your ships (of course, Iunderstand that these documents will notcontain specifications of these armaments),then through comparison of this data withthe data about the presence of armamentsin Cuba, that is in our disposal, we wouldfollow the process of evacuation of arma-ments that are of danger for us. I believethat this would be enough. In this case wewould get on along ground inspection.

The system of passing of the lists ofcargo removed from Cuba would not touchon your security interests. As to overflights,you, as we understand, cannot guarantee thatthe Cubans would not shoot at our planes.

But we are glad that when today our planeflew over Cuba, it was not shot at. As far aswe know, the anti-aircraft missiles deployedin Cuba are not in the hands of the Cubans,but in the hands of your people. Today weintercepted radio-commands and conversa-tions of the anti-aircraft units deployed inCuba and that confirmed us again in ourconclusion. I must say that we are glad thatthese anti-aircraft missiles are in the handsof the Russians whose hands are not itchinglike the hands of the Cubans.

In passing, I would like to say that al-though we do not include anti-aircraft mis-siles into the category of offensive weap-ons, we would very much like that you with-draw these missiles as well.

A.I.Mikoyan. As I see, your sense ofhumor has completely disappeared.

Stevenson. In your conversations inHavana you could cite good arguments infavor of ground inspection: on one side, itwould assure us that you are fulfilling yourobligations, on the other hand, Castro wouldobtain confidence that no invasion of Cubawould take place: since U.N. observerswould be around.

A.I.Mikoyan. I believe that in thecourse of today’s conversation we laid theground for upcoming negotiations. I thinkthat we should not now go into detail. Youshould reflect on what we have spoken abouthere. We will prepare our drafts as well. Itseems to me that until the election day itwould be hard for you to take any decisions,but, on the other hand, one should not pro-crastinate with liquidation of the Cuban cri-sis.

Stevenson. We could agree even tomor-row in all details with a plan of inspectionof ships by the forces of the Red Cross ifboth sides approve of the proposal of UThant. We should not put off resolution ofthis issue. What flag would be on these twoinspection ships is of no significance to us.

As to the oversight of the territory ofCuba, if Castro refuses to agree on groundinspection, we could limit ourselves to uni-lateral conduct of aerial reconnaissance. Forthis we would only need your assurance thatour planes will not be shot at.

McCloy. It seems that it would take not10-15 days, but probably a month for re-moval of your missiles.

A.I.Mikoyan. All these are [mere] de-tails. We brought with us military experts -a general and colonel, who could discuss all

these technical issues with you. I would liketo speak on another, more important ques-tion. It is out of question that we agree withyou now on overflights of your plans overCuba: it is sovereign Cuban territory. But ifthe USA agreed to the inspection over thearea of Miami, it would be a good thing.Then, possibly. the Cubans would agree tosuch inspection over their territory. One can-not not carry out unilateral inspection - nomatter which, ground or aerial. The Cubanswould have full reason to be offended, ifyou were granted the right of regular andpermanent overflight over their territory, ina unilateral way.

As for inspections which must ensurea verification of the dismantling and with-drawal of our missiles, here we stand on thesame position that was expressed in the let-ters of N.S. Khrushchev.

Stevenson. As to ground inspection, itwas U Thant, not us, who came up with aproposal about the presence of UN inspec-tors during the dismantling and withdrawalof the missiles. Incidentally, he had in mindpermanent inspection till the end of disman-tling of the missiles. This would serve theinterests of both sides. I understand thatCuba is an independent country, but if itagrees with this, then there would be no needto seek other forms of check-up.

A.I.Mikoyan. We agree to conductground inspection, as the letter of N.S.Khrushchev stated, but it is necessary tohave some kind of element of reciprocityso that this understanding does not affectthe national feelings of the Cubans. This alsoflows from my conversation with U Thant.

I would like to know if McCloy andStevenson consider today’s exchange ofopinion useful?

Stevenson. The conversation was use-ful and I became persuaded that our posi-tions stay not too far apart.

A.I.Mikoyan. There is misunderstand-ing [nedoponimaniie] as far as the issue ofreciprocity of inspections is concerned. UThant said that Castro is concerned with thepresence on the USA of camps where Cu-ban emigres prepare themselves for inva-sion similar to one that took place last year.

McCloy. I must assure you that thesecamps no longer exist, they are closed ev-erywhere.

A.I.Mikoyan. You mean that they donot exist in Latin American countries aswell?


THE MIKOYAN-CASTROTALKS, 4-5 NOVEMBER 1962:

THE CUBAN VERSION

[Editor’s Note: While a large, al-beit incomplete, complex of Russiandocuments on the Cuban Missile Crisishas become available to researcherssince 1991—as exemplified by theselction of translated materials in thisand past Bulletins—documents on theevents of the fall of 1962 are still onlybeginning to trickle out of Cuban ar-chives. The two documents below,translated from Spanish, represent a rareand encouraging sign (as does PieroGleijeses’ article on Cuban policy inAfrica elsewhere in this issue) that pros-pects for historical research in Cubanarchives may improve.

The Cuban records concern thetense conversations between FidelCastro (and other members of the Cu-ban leadership) and senior Soviet en-voy Anastas I. Mikoyan on 4-5 Novem-ber 1962, in the immediate aftermathof USSR Premier Nikita Khrushchev’sacceptance on October 28 of U.S. Presi-dent John F. Kennedy’s demand that hewithdraw Soviet nuclear missiles fromCuba. They were apparently released

in response to the publication in theBulletin in 1995 of lengthy Sovietrecords of the same conversations.1 Thematerials were obtained from the Insti-tute of History in Cuba by Prof. PhilipBrenner (American University), whoprovided them to CWIHP, and trans-lated from Spanish by Carlos Osorio(National Security Archive).

While the Cuban documents them-selves do not offer any startling infor-mation or insights not present in the farmore detailed Soviet records of thesame conversations—a quick compari-son of the two versions of the identicalconversations finds them broadly com-patible—they are presented as a sym-bol of what historians can hope will bea thorough process of eventually recon-structing Soviet-Cuban relations on thebasis of solid archival evidence fromboth sides, which can then be comparedand cross-checked. Given the amountof passion and controversy that has sur-rounded this question during the ColdWar, and which continues to infuseU.S.-Cuban relations (as Fidel Castroremains in charge nearly four decadesafter the revolution that brought him topower), the availability of scholarly per-spectives and contemporaneous docu-

mentary evidence from Cuban, Russian,and American sources, as well as a con-tinuation of the oral history process thathas begun to involve senior Cuban of-ficials in international explorations ofsuch key events as the Bay of Pigs andCuban Missile Crisis,2 is clearly a pre-condition for a serious and comprehen-sive analysis.

Unfortunately, little information isavailable at present on the provenanceof the Cuban documents provided be-low, including their precise archival lo-cation or who took the notes that arepresented; the Bulletin hopes to supplyadditional information, as well as fur-ther evidence from Cuban archivesshould it emerge, in future issues.]

[Translator’s Note: The transla-tions at times read awkwardly, for theSpanish documents themselves are oc-casionally confusing, mixing tenses,subjects and objects in the same phrase.Mikoyan, a Soviet national, appears tobe speaking a Castillian Spanish, as heoften uses the auxiliary “haber” for thepast tense. The note-taker is presumablya Cuban national, so he sometimes skipstranscribing the past tense as was used

continued on page 339

McCloy. The camps are closed every-where. Perhaps there is something some-where, but in any case the USA does notsupport this business.

A.I.Mikoyan. But you count Cubanemigres among your own military forces?

McCloy. We are not training them forinvasion of Cuba. We allow volunteers ofany nationality to be enlisted in our mili-tary forces, even Russians can do it. In anycase, I assure you that there are no morecamps in the USA where Cuban emigres aretrained, prepared for invasion of Cuba.

However I would like to tell youfrankly, that any inspection on USA terri-tory is out of question. You have to trust inour word.

Stevenson. I want to say that the USAis trying to normalize the situation in thearea of the Caribbean sea, but on conditionof Castro’s cooperation. We might work outsome form of mutual guarantees acceptablefor Castro and his neighbors. If Castro isafraid of them, they, too, are afraid of him. Ibelieve that after the settlement of the Cu-ban crisis the situation in this region will

become more relaxed.A.I.Mikoyan. It is very important what

you are saying. Castro might ask me: is theUSA going to restore diplomatic and eco-nomic relations with Cuba or this questionis not on the agenda? Perhaps you have inmind not to do it right away, but after sometime? I would like to know what I can tellCastro.

Stevenson. You understand that I can-not answer this question. It is within thecompetence of the Organization of Ameri-can States. We cannot conduct business withCastro without its involvement. But onecould think of certain regional arrangementsproviding confidence to the countries of theCaribbean sea. I hope that we would be ablegradually to liquidate the antagonism be-tween Cuba and her neighbors. Now thisantagonism is being heated by subversiveactivities which, perhaps, reciprocate eachother in this region.

McCloy. I would say that Cuba is thesource of infection, and the recent events inVenezuela provide an example. But I wouldnot like to dwell now on this issue. I am

satisfied with today’s exchange of opinions.I would be glad to meet you and follow upon this conversation, on your way back fromCuba.

The conversation lasted for 3 hours 40minutes. Those present were com. V.V. Kuz-netsov, A.F. Dobrynin, M.A. Menshikov,G.A. Zhukov; from the American side par-ticipated J. McCloy, A. Stevenson, A.Akalovsky.

Note-takers:G.ZhukovYu.Vinogradov.

[Source: AVP RF; obtained by NHK, pro-vided to CWIHP, copy on file at NationalSecurity Archive; translation by VladislavM. Zubok (National Security Archive).]



2 November 1962


We will inform Fidel Castro of the con-tent of the documents [not further identified--ed.]. He has entrusted me to convey a trans-lation of the draft to President Dorticos, andto reach an agreement with him on all points.

Dorticos, having read through thedocument, said that in principle the docu-ment serves the interests of Cuba, and thatit would be approved.

Separate remarks will be introducedafter the discussion of our proposals withFidel Castro and the other leaders, and alsoafter their talks with Comrade A. I. Mikoyan,which are slated for today.

2.XI.62 ALEKSEEV


Telegram from A.I. Mikoyan in NewYork to CC CPSU, 2 November 1962

2 November 1962

From the following telegram you willlearn the details of the important statementmade by McCloy in the talks on monitoringthe dismantling of the “offensive weaponry.”He declared that in view of Castro’s refusalto agree to a ground-based monitoring, theAmericans were willing not to insist [onthat], knowing the forms and methods ofmonitoring put forth in Khrushchev’s mes-sage, [but] that it was necessary to find othermethods for convincing the Americans thatthe dismantling process had been completedand that everything had been removed.

In response to my question aboutwhether there was some concrete proposalas to how this should be done, he said thefollowing: to allow them the possibility offlights over Cuba for inspections from theair, without ground-based monitoring; thiswas the first point. The second was that theSoviets provide the Americans with infor-mation about how much of the weaponryhas been dismantled and removed, andwhen. The important part of this is not toimpart secret military information that re-veals the nature and capacities of this weap-onry.

I rejected here the possibility of flightsover Cuba, since that would affect the sov-ereignty of Cuba itself. The proposal about

information from our side, I said, should bediscussed with our military specialists, whoarrived with me to aid Kuznetsov.

McCloy reported with great satisfac-tion that on 1 November their plane hadflown over Cuba without being fired at, andhad made photos. He attributed this to thepresence of Soviet specialists at the anti-air-craft missile installations.

I conclude that if our agreement withCastro not to shoot down American planesretains its force, then when they fly one ortwo more times it will mean that inspectionson the dismantling have been carried out.There remains the issue of inspections onthe removal of the dismantled weaponry,which could be resolved through means sug-gested by McCloy.

In view of this, Castro’s position, whichrejects the possibility of on-site inspections,will cease to be an obstacle to settling withthe Americans the issue of monitoring thedismantling and removal of the weaponry.

I consider all this to be expedient.In my talks with Castro I will fully ex-

plain our position on the issue of monitor-ing in accordance with Khrushchev’s mes-sage, I will show him its correctness andacceptability, from our point of view, forCuba.

In connection with the Americans’ pro-posal laid out earlier, and taking into accountthe Cubans’ arrogance, I consider it expedi-ent not to insist or ensure that they rejecttheir position on not allowing observers ontotheir territory to check on the dismantlingand removal process, the position whichthey have made clear to U Thant and havepublished several times in the press.

In truth, in Castro’s speech yesterdaythis position was made to seem somewhatmore flexible.

I await instructions concerning thismatter in Havana.

2.XI.62 A. MIKOYAN


Telegram from A.I Mikoyan in NewYork to CC CPSU, 2 November 1962

2 November 1962

Yesterday in the hour-long discussionwith McCloy and Stevenson, the positionsof the parties on all issues connected withthe Cuban conflict were explained, as wellas the American position in the form inwhich the Americans consider it necessaryto define it.

We will be sending to you a short ex-position of the most important points of thediscussion within 2 or 3 hours, and today, 2November and 1:00 in the afternoon I willbe flying to Cuba. Our comrades will com-pose a detailed record of the conversation,and will send it after I am gone. The con-versation was important, and you shouldbecome familiarized with that detailedrecord of it.

McCloy has declared that with the aimof speeding up the removal of the missiles,before the fine-tuning of the observationsystem by the Red Cross has been reached,they agree to and are interested in allowingSoviet vessels bound for Cuba entry intoCuban ports without inspection, by way ofa hail like the one that was given to thetanker “Bucharest.”

We are introducing a proposal to giveinstructions to all our vessels bound forCuba to proceed to their destinations.

2.XI.62 A. MIKOYAN


Telegram from USSR Foreign MinisterA. Gromyko to unidentified recipient, 2

November 1962

2 November 1962

The head of the American delegationat the negotiations in New York, McCloy,has informed Comrade Kuznetsov on 31October that Washington has decided thatuntil the Red Cross has begun its monitor-ing of the vessels bound for Cuba, it wouldnot carry out inspections on these vessels,but to apply to them the same procedure thatwas applied to the tanker “Bucharest.” Dur-ing this time the “quarantine” will be offi-cially continued.

As is well known, the tanker“Bucharest” passed through a region underAmerican “quarantine” without hindrance.


Six Soviet vessels now on the open sea be-yond the announced limits of the “quaran-tine” have received orders to proceed intothe Cuban ports, and at present they are nowon their way toward Cuba.

A. G.


Telegram from Soviet Deputy ForeignMinister V. V. Kuznetsov and Ambassa-

dor to the UN V.A. Zorin to USSRForeign Ministry, 3 November 1962

3 November 1962

On 3 November Morozov, Mendel-evich, and Timerbaev had a meeting withNarasimhan and Loutfi (replacing U Thant)for the examination of technical issues con-nected with the sending of observers fromthe International Red Cross Committee toascertain that on the Soviet vessels boundfor Cuba there is no weaponry consideredoffensive by the USA.

Narasimhan said that the the secretariatof the UN in New York had not yet receivedthe definitive consent of the InternationalRed Cross to its participation in the organi-zation of the monitoring. An answer fromthe Red Cross could be received today, 3November.

Narasimhan also laid out the thoughtsof the Americans, as he understood them,regarding the Red Cross’s monitoring pro-cedure.

The USA considers it expedient to de-ploy two vessels with observers from theInternational Red Cross on the open sea nearthe Cuban coast—one 8 to 10 miles off Ha-vana, and another in the strait between Cubaand Haiti. The vessels should have radiocontact with the UN. On each vessel thereshould be two groups of International RedCross observers. Each group should containeight observers. In this way, 32 observerswill be needed in all.

In response to our question about howto manage such a large number of observ-ers, especially when bearing in mind thatStevenson in his talks with us on 1 Novem-ber of this year had expressed his view thatthe International Red Cross inspections

could be reduced to radio interrogations ofpassing ships, Narasimhan answered that inmany cases it will be precisely that, but thatthe International Red Cross observers shouldhave the right to carry out inspections (tocheck documents, to inspect ship holds, andso on), if such a necessity should arise.

Our representatives remarked that sucha proposal from Narasimhan concerning theconferral to the International Red Crossgroups of inspection rights contradicts theviews expressed earlier by Stevenson. Wewill continue to insist that the inspectionsbe limited to interrogations by radio.

The USA, Narasimhan continued, isprepared to provide its own transportationfor the International Red Cross inspectors.This may be ordinary transportation for theconveyance of troops, even though theywould be unarmed and would contain onboard civilian passengers.

We told Narasimhan that the SovietUnion, as had already been declared to UThant, had given its consent to the convey-ance of the International Red Cross observ-ers either by Soviet or by neutral vessels.Narasimhan responded that he knew aboutthis, but all the same considered it possibleto inform the Soviet Union of this proposalby the USA, which, Narasimhan said, workstowards the interests of a speedy organiza-tion of the inspections. The USA, in hiswords, has no objections to the use of So-viet ships. Narasimhan asked us to explain,if possible by 5 November, how soon theSoviet Union could prepare its ships for theInternational Red Cross observers. For hispart, Narasimhan will make inquiries by thistime about the possibility of chartering neu-tral vessels located near Cuba.

Narasimhan raised the issue of reim-bursing the costs of chartering the vesselsand constituting the International Red Crossgroups. In response to the question of howthe USA imagines covering the costs asso-ciated with the carrying out of inspectionsby the International Red Cross, Narasimhansaid that it was proposing two possible vari-ants—either through the UN (that is, accord-ing to their pay scale), or to divide the costsequally between the USSR and the USA.

Our representatives answered that theUSA had illegally imposed the so-called“quarantine,” that they were now pushingfor inspections on vessels bound for Cuba,and that it was completely clear that it isthey who should covers the expenses for the

carrying out of such inspections. In futurenegotiations we should proceed from theassumption that the Soviet Union will as-sume expenses only for the maintenance ofSoviet vessels. As far as the maintenance ofthe International Red Cross vessels is con-cerned, we will push for the USA or the UNbearing the burden of these expenses. (It isnot out of the question that the InternationalRed Cross will itself pay the expenses forthe upkeep of the groups.)

On the issue of how long the inspec-tion procedure by the International RedCross would be continued, Narasimhan saidthat it should be carried out for a period ofthree to four weeks. But it is possible thatthe duration could be shorter. Everything de-pends on how long the removal of weap-onry from Cuba would continue. As soonas all the weaponry is removed, the inspec-tions, it seems, should cease.

We emphasized that the inspections onvessels by the International Red Crossshould be of a short-term nature, as wasdeclared by U Thant in his provisional pro-posal concerning this issue, which was ap-proved by the Soviet Union. In the future,with regard to time limits we will proceedwith aim of imposing the shortest possiblelimits. We will aim for ceasing the inspec-tions immediately after the removal of thedismantled installations, and the approvalby the Security Council of correspondingresolutions for the conclusive settlement ofthe Cuban crisis.

If our approval of the conveyance ofthe International Red Cross representativeson Soviet ships is still valid, we ask that youinform us immediately of which vessels inparticular are being selected for this purpose,and when they can arrive in the CaribbeanSea area.

Since the Cubans will evidently notagree to admit the International Red Crossobservers onto the territory of Cuba in or-der to then admit them onto Soviet ships,we ask that you inform us what would themost appropriate port in the Caribbean Seaarea in which to take on board these Inter-national Red Cross observers.

The next meeting with Narasimhan isslated for the morning of 5 November.

3.XI.62 V. KUZNETSOV V. ZORIN

[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK,


provided to CWIHP, and on file at NationalSecurity Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans-lation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univer-sity.]



4 November 1962

Today talks were conducted betweenA.I. Mikoyan and Comrades Fidel Castro,O. Dorticos, R. Castro, E. Guevara, E.Aragonez, and C.R. Rodriguez, as well asmyself.

Comrade Mikoyan conveyed warm,fraternal greetings from the Presidium of theCC CPSU and N.S. Khrushchev to the Cu-ban leaders. He expressed a lofty apprecia-tion of the Cuban revolution, and supportfor the rebuff to the interventionists; hespoke about our support for Cuba; and heremarked that the Central Committee of theCommunist Party of the Soviet Union wasdelighted by the courage and fearlessnessdisplayed by the leaders of Cuba’s revolu-tion in these perilous days, and the readi-ness of the Cuban people to hold firm. ThenComrade Mikoyan said that when the Cen-tral Committee learned of the misunder-standing arising in Cuba of several issuesand decisions made by us, they came to theconclusion that it would be impossible toclarify these issues by way of mere corre-spondence. The Central Committee madethe decision to send Comrade Mikoyan toCuba to clarify to our friends our position,and to inform them of issues that are of in-terest to them. Comrade Mikoyan remarkedthat he naturally did not have any intentionof exerting pressure; his task was simply toexplain our position.

Knowing our Cuban friends, A.I.Mikoyan said, I am sure that they too willagree with this. It could of course turn outsuch that even after the explanations therewill be certain points on which our pointsof view will remain different.

Fidel Castro declared that he has al-ready informed the Cuban comrades presentat the talks of the issues raised by him yes-terday before Comrade Mikoyan, and madea short resume of these issues.

A.I. Mikoyan remarked that FidelCastro spoke yesterday in detail and withsincerity, and asked whether the other com-

rades wanted to add anything to this,whether they had other remarks to make.

O. Dorticos asked for an explanationof why N.S. Khrushchev approved the pro-posal made by Kennedy to declare that therewould be no attack on Cuba on the condi-tion of the removal of Soviet missiles fromCuba, even though the Cuban governmenthad not yet at this time expressed its ownopinion on this proposal.

C.R. Rodriguez put a question to Com-rade Mikoyan— where does the Soviet lead-ership see the essence of victory, does itconsist in military success or in diplomaticsuccess? We believed, Rodriguez noted, thatwe could not yet talk about victory, sincethe guarantees from the USA were ephem-eral.

Then A.I. Mikoyan, developing argu-ments made in N.S. Khrushchev’s letters toFidel Castro, and also from the discussionof the issue in the Central Committee of theCommunist Party of the Soviet Union, of-fered additional arguments with the aim ofdriving away any doubts from the minds ofour Cuban comrades. He spoke moreoverof the main points of his talks with U Thant,McCloy, and Stevenson.

We will send a full record of the con-versation to Moscow via diplomatic mail.Further information on certain new pointstouched on in Mikoyan’s explanations willbe provided by separate telegram.

The talks lasted seven hours, more thanfive hours of which were taken up by Com-rade Mikoyan’s explanations. Our Cubancomrades listened with attentiveness to A.I.Mikoyan, were interested in details, andsustained the general feeling of cordialityand trust.

We agreed to continue the talks in thesame composition tomorrow, on 5 Novem-ber, at 2:00 in the afternoon local time.

4.XI.62 ALEKSEEV


Telegram from USSR Foreign MinisterGromyko to Deputy Foreign MinisterKuznetsov and Ambassador to the UNZorin in New York, 4 November 1962

4 November 1962

Your thoughts on the statement thatStevenson should make in connection withhis letter and memorandum do not provokeany objections.

In addition it is necessary for you tosay the following:

Since when have the planes named byStevenson [IL-28 bombers—ed.] becomeoffensive weaponry[?] After all, these planesare of a type considered outmoded both inits altitude ceilings and in its speed. Theputting forth of such a demand constitutesan intentional seeking out of issues that en-courage discord and a continuation of thetense state of our relations.

The planes mentioned by Stevensonare associated with coastal defense weap-onry. Such a plane cannot appear in condi-tions of war over enemy territory, since itdoes not possess the capacity for attainingthe necessary altitude and speed. It can ap-pear over such territory only with an air es-cort. Virtually any military expert wouldrecognize that these planes cannot be placedin the category of offensive weaponry at thepresent time.

If the USA honestly gave assurancesthat it would not invade Cuba, then the pos-session of these planes by the Cubans shouldnot elicit any concern.

We understood the concerns of theAmericans when talk began to turn to a defi-nite sort of missile weaponry. Missiles areindeed an uninterceptable and instanta-neously effective sort of weapon. There isno reason to put outdated weaponry in theoffensive category. Such weaponry willhave a defensive, auxiliary function.

As far as photo reconnaissance and re-connaissance in general are concerned, usedas they are by all countries, experienceshows that it does not always reflect the ac-tual situation.

All this provides the grounds for con-cluding that the most important issues heremust be talked about. We must mutuallyfulfill the obligations assumed by all par-ties, and then the issue will be exhausted.

A. Gromyko



Telegram (No.4448) from the Ministerof the USSR Merchant Fleet to Captainof Ship “Amata” via Soviet ambassadorin Havana (Alekseev), 5 November 1962

5 November 1962

I ask that you transmit information onthe location of the ship “Amata.” Your shiphas been selected for use by the Organiza-tion of the United Nations for the convey-ance of a group of representatives from theInternational Red Cross consisting of 16people. Your location, after you take thisgroup on board, should be near the port ofHavana, but beyond the 12-mile zone ofCuba’s territorial waters. The vessel chosenfor these operations should arrive in Havanaon 6 November. If you have cargo in yourholds leave it in the holds, since the deckshould be free. Your ship’s number has al-ready been communicated to the UN, as wellas the fact that you will be operating at afrequency of 500 kilohertz; beginning on 6November they will be able to contact youfrom the UN radio station. On your arrivalin Havana, immediately contact our envoy.Bring the vessel into complete order, tem-porarily move your equipment and crew intotighter quarters, and prepare room for thecomfortable accommodation of the repre-sentatives of the Red Cross. It is assumedthat this group will be with you until 12November of this year. You will have tocome to an agreement with the head of thisgroup concerning food-related matters. Youshould have ready for operation the ship’smotor boat, on which the representativeswill be able to travel out onto the arrivingvessels. You should follow all the instruc-tions of the group. Report on your carryingout of these instructions, and keep us regu-larly informed, through closed communica-tion, of your operations.

BAKAEV


Telegram from USSR Foreign MinisterGromyko to Deputy Foreign MinisterKuznetsov and Ambassador to the UN

Zorin in New York, 5 November 1962

You must adhere to the following po-sition in your negotiations on the lifting ofthe blockade, elimination of tension, andnormalization of the situation in the Carib-bean Sea.

The negotiations are being conductedwith the aim of eliminating the tense situa-tion which has been threatening to explodeinto thermonuclear war.

The basis of these negotiations is theagreement reached through an exchange ofmessages between Comrade N.S.Khrushchev and President Kennedy. Theessence of this agreement is as follows.

The USA is giving assurances that noinvasion will be inflicted on Cuba, not onlyon the part of the United States, but also onthe part of their allies— the other countriesof the Western hemisphere. The SovietUnion for its part will remove from the Cubathe missile weaponry that the President ofthe USA has called offensive, and will notinstall such types of weaponry in Cubaagain.

Such is the basis of the agreement, andwe are adhering to it, because it is the onlypossible basis now for eliminating the tensesituation that has been created. The agree-ment is the result of a compromise reachedthrough mutual concessions, and it satisfiedboth parties.

In accordance with this agreement theSoviets undertook on 28 October the dis-mantling of the missiles. The dismantlingwas completed on 2 November, and the dis-mantled missiles have been transported toports for shipping. As you have already beeninformed, these missiles will be removedfrom Cuba on 7 or 8 or at the latest 10 No-vember of this year.

Tell the Americans that if they wish toraise other issues, then they will find manysuch issues on our side as well, issues whichreally affect the vital interests of our coun-try and which create concerns about our se-curity. But we are not raising any of theseissues at present, because they are too broad,and their resolution will take a great amountof time; moreover, these issues affect notonly our two states, but the large circle ofstates, i. e. they belong to the category ofglobal problems.

If the USA representatives say thatPresident Kennedy, in his speech on 22 Oc-tober speaking about offensive weaponry,

mentioned bombers in this category, thensay the following:

In Cuba there are none of our bomberswhich could be put in the category of offen-sive weaponry. They do so with the IL-28bomber. But this machine is 15 years old.The American military figures surely knowvery well that this was the first Soviet planewith a turboreactive engine. Fifteen yearsago they indeed were rather cutting-edgemachines. But now technology has made somany steps ahead that we have not only re-moved these machines from the arsenal ofour army, but have even refused to use themas targets for the training of anti-aircraftunits in the Soviet Union. These machinesare soon going to be scrapped, and if wesold them to some country, it would only befor using them as training machines for pi-lot instruction, and to some extent as defen-sive means— for the coastal defense of aterritory with the escort of anti-aircraft ma-chines, and nothing more. These planes areso far from answering the currents needs forspeed and altitude that their use for otherpurposes would mean sending people tocertain death. We are sure that the Ameri-can military and USA intelligence under-stands this well.

Indicate that if the representatives ofthe USA insist on their demand concerningthe IL-28 planes, then by doing so they willonly put the USA in a position in which thewhole world will see that the United Statesis not keeping its word, and is imposingunacceptable conditions that create the pos-sibility of a prolongation of the conflict. Atthat time the whole world will understandthat this is precisely the purpose behind theimposition of such conditions.

In Stevenson’s letter of 3 November,another issue is raised—it asserts that ac-cording to the reports of American intelli-gence in Cuba, the assembling of IL-28bombers is still going on. In response to this,say that such assertions are an invention ofAmerican intelligence, because it is impos-sible to see what is not there. Moreover,American photos do not corroborate this. Itis clear that this false information is pursu-ing the aim of avoiding a settlement of theconflict and a normalization of our relations,and indeed a tightening of tensions.

As far as other sorts of weaponry areconcerned which the American representa-tives are now trying to put in the offensivecategory, tell the Americans that it is neces-


sary to rigorously proceed from the agree-ment reached through the exchange of let-ters, that it is necessary for the Americansto hold to the statement of their own Presi-dent. He said that he was against offensiveweaponry, but in favor of the right of eachside to possess defensive weaponry.

Say that in general we are not presentlyauthorized to carry on negotiations on pointsthat directly concern the defense interestsof the Republic of Cuba. We have not beenauthorized by Cuba to carry on such nego-tiations. For this reason, if the Americansinsist on this, it will only complicate thesettlement.

If the Americans take as their goal areturn to an incendiary situation, it willscarcely be in the interests of either the USAor the USSR, or in the interests of the world.We propose to choose reasonable positions,and to proceed in the negotiations from theagreement that has been reached. We havealready fulfilled our obligations, have dis-mantled our missiles, have loaded them ontoships, and in the coming days, that is, notlater than 10 November, all these materialswill be removed from Cuba. The other side,the United States, should also carry out itsobligations, and lift the blockade that hasbeen called a “quarantine.” Let us formal-ize this in documents with the aim that eachside affirm its statements in documents, thatis, let us formalize this agreement on thebasis of which this dangerous moment inthe history of our countries, which reallycould erupt in a catastrophic thermonuclearwar, can be eliminated.

Say that we believe that the elimina-tion of this especially difficult situation, andthe formalization of this in documents,would serve as a good beginning in the reso-lution of issues that our states and indeedthe whole world faces. This is the issue ofdisarmament, the issue of the eliminationof bases, the prohibition of thermonucleararms testing, the signing of agreements onnon-agression between Warsaw Pact andNATO countries.

Emphasize that if the USA intends toinsist on discussing the issues it has raised,because the President spoke about them andbecause they allegedly also relate to the con-ditions of the agreement, then it is fitting toremind them that N.S. Khrushchev alsoraised other issues in his messages. Both weand the Americans know that USA missilebases are distributed throughout many coun-

tries around the Soviet Union.For this reason, if the parties talk about

what was mentioned in the course of thepolemic, and it was indeed a polemic, andif each side insists on having things its ownway, then it will render impossible an agree-ment and the elimination of the tense situa-tion— in other words, we will return to thesame incendiary situation that existed be-fore, and that was escaped with such diffi-culty.

For this reason it is necessary to showunderstanding and respect for the sover-eignty of each state, and to recognize theequal rights of all countries to self-defense.

5.XI A. G.




5 November

In connection with our explanations toFidel Castro of how the decisive momentfor us did not allow time for consultationwith him on the issue of dismantling, hedrew his own conclusions from the ex-change of messages betwen N.S.Khrushchev and Kennedy, and doubts creptinto his mind as to whether we had famil-iarized him with all the letters.

In particular, he says that it followsfrom Kennedy’s open message of 27 Octo-ber that our decision regarding the disman-tling had been communicated to Kennedyeven before that date.

Before 27 October, I passed on toCastro two confidential letters from N.S.Khrushchev to President Kennedy: of 23 and26 October.

On the basis of the correspondence Ihave come to the opinion that Kennedy didnot yet have a basis in the message of 27October for drawing the conclusion that wegave our consent for the dismantling beforethat date, and it is necessary somehow toexplain this to Castro. Comrade Mikoyanhas entrusted me with the task of lookinginto the issue raised by Castro.

In view of the necessity of sending this

telegram immediately, I have not had timeto submit it to the approval of ComradeMikoyan. The talks with Castro will takeplace on 5 November at 14:00 local time.

5.XI.62 ALEKSEEV

[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK,provided to CWIHP, and on file at NationalSecurity Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans-lation by J. Henriksen.]

Telegram from USSR Foreign MinisterGromyko to Mikoyan and Alekseev in

Havana, 5 November 1962

5 November 1962

In response to the telegram from Com-rade Alekseev. In the event that it is neces-sary, you should explain to Fidel Castro thatthe readiness to dismantle the installationsof the so-called “offensive weaponry” wasfirst mentioned only in N.S. Khrushchev’smessage to Kennedy of 27 October.

It is obvious that some misunderstand-ing could arise from the fact that Kennedy’smessage to N.S. Khrushchev of 27 Octoberspoke (with reference to N.S. Khrushchev’smessage of 26 October) of the “removal”of the weaponry from Cuba; but that washis, Kennedy’s, interpretation of the issue.As N.S. Khrushchev’s message of 26 Octo-ber makes clearly evident, it made abso-lutely no reference to an agreement aboutthe “removal” of our weaponry from Cuba.

Since N.S. Khrushchev and Kennedydid not exchange any other messages orstatements in those days, besides the onesfamiliar to our Cuban friends, Fidel Castro’sdoubts about whether we might have givenour consent to the dismantling of the weap-onry and its removal from Cuba before 27October should disappear completely.

A. G.

[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK ,provided to CWIHP, and on file at NationalSecurity Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans-lation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univer-sity.]

Telegram from Soviet Ambassador tothe USA Dobrynin to USSR Foreign



5 November 1962

Today the “Washington Post” pub-lished an article by [columnist Joseph] Alsopunder the title “The Soviet Plan for Decep-tion.” The article talks about RobertKennedy’s connection with [Georgi]Bolshakov19 (the latter was not named di-rectly), and also declared in dramatic toneshow that connection was used “for the de-ception” of the President in the issue of theSoviet missile bases in Cuba. It mentions inparticular Bolshakov’s reception by N. S.Khrushchev in the summer of this year, andthe oral message for the President conveyedthrough him.

This and several other details areknown in Washington only by RobertKennedy, whom Bolshakov met with afterhis return from vacation (the article alsomentions this meeting). For this reason it isclearly obvious that the article was preparedwith the knowledge of, or even by ordersfrom, Robert Kennedy, who is a close friend,as is the President, of Alsop.

After his first meeting with RobertKennedy, immediately after his return fromvacation, Bolshakov no longer met withhim. Robert Kennedy promised him to setup a meeting with the President for passingon to him the oral message, but yet did notorganize such a meeting.

5.XI.62 A. DOBRYNIN


Telegram from Soviet Ambassador tothe USA Dobrynin to USSR Foreign


Having familiarized himself with thetext of N.S. Khrushchev’s confidential let-ter,20 Robert Kennedy said that he wouldpass it on to the President immediately.

Then, assuming a somewhat suprisedair, he tried to represent the affair as if theSoviets, having given their consent in prin-ciple to withdraw from Cuba the arms thatthe Americans call offensive, thereby alleg-edly came close to adopting the Americanpoint of view that had been laid out in theform of the list of weaponry mentioned bythe American statement about the “quaran-

tine.” This, he said, was how Stevenson had“understood” V.V. Kuznetsov during theirfirst meeting.

I answered that this interpretation ofthe Soviet position did not correspond toreality. A reference to the declaration can-not have for us the force of an obligation,since it is a document publicized by the USAgovernment in a highly unilateral fashion.It is well known that the Soviets have re-fused to recognize this document, and thusalso the list of weaponry it contains, and towhich R. Kennedy is referring. For the So-viet Union, only the written agreementreached between N.S. Khrushchev and thePresident has the force of law, and we willfulfill the terms of that agreement if theAmericans also fulfill their own obligations.

V.V. Kuznetsov also spoken about thisto Stevenson. And A.I. Mikoyan spoke aboutit to Stevenson and McCloy during his re-cent talks with them, at which I was presentmyself.

R. Kennedy did not go any further intothe details of the list itself, saying, however,that besides the missiles being removed byus, the Americans place great importanceas well on the removal from Cuba of theSoviet IL-28 bombers. “We are not insist-ing on the recall of fighter planes, but bomb-ers with a significant radius of action areanother matter entirely.” He refused to makeany further statements on this subject, say-ing only that he would immediately pass onN.S. Khrushchev’s letter to the President,who was supposed to be flying soon to thecity of Boston, where he will vote in theUSA congressional elections.

R. Kennedy answered that any addi-tional demands, like the list of weaponryindicated above, render the lessening of thetensions arising around Cuba significantlymore difficult to attain, and could only seri-ously complicate the situation.

Before R. Kennedy’s departure, he ex-pressed concern about the Cubans’ firing atAmerican planes carrying out observationalflights over Cuba on the dismantling of theSoviet missiles. Such gunfire can elicithighly serious consequences, he added.

R. Kennedy was told that the flightsby the American planes are a direct viola-tion of the sovereignty of Cuba, and that thiswhole issue should, in all fairness, be raisednot by the Americans but by the Cubans.Every sovereign state has every legal rightto defend the inviolability of its borders. And

we are not authorized to carry on the dis-cussion of this sort of issue on behalf ofCuba. Let us rather fulfill the agreementreached in the exchange of messages be-tween the government leaders of both coun-tries, said I to R. Kennedy. Then the situa-tion around Cuba may be normalized. Weare keeping our promise, and hope that theUSA too does not renege on its own prom-ises and impose unacceptable conditions thatcreate the possibility of a continuation ofthe conflict.

R. Kennedy limited himself to the re-mark that they were really seriously wor-ried by the possible consequences of the fir-ing at American planes, and that he person-ally considered it necessary to say so. Wethen once again laid out for him our posi-tion with regard to the flights of Americanplanes over Cuba.

With this the talks were ended, sinceR. Kennedy was hurrying to the WhiteHouse to meet with the President.

5.XI.62 A. DOBRYNIN


Telegram from V.V. Kuznetsov to USSRForeign Ministry, 6 November 1962

First. On 5 November we met with UThant. We informed him of the exchange ofviews which had been taking place in re-cent days with the Americans. We informedhim in particular of our proposals, commu-nicated yesterday to McCloy, regarding themonitoring of the weaponry being removedfrom Cuba (the numerical data on the quan-tity of launch pads and missiles which wascommunicated to McCloy was not passedon to U Thant). We lingered in detail overthe fact that the USA is asking questionswhich can only complicate the resolution ofthe whole problem, such as, for example,their attempts the broaden their definitionof the weapons considered offensive by theAmericans (the IL-28 bombers, and so on).We noted as well the USA refusal with re-gard to guarantees of the security of Cuba,explaining meanwhile, on the basis of ourprotocol draft, how we approximately imag-ine the USA obligations in this matter. Wenoted the negative reaction of the USA rep-


resentatives to U Thant’s proposal for a “UNpresence” in the area of the Caribbean Sea,including on USA territory, as a measureseeking to guarantee a lasting peace in thisregion. We emphasized that the stubbornrefusal of the USA to lift the “quarantine”does not at all contribute to the creation of apositive atmosphere for the resolution of theCuban problem.

Second. U Thant asked a fine-tuningquestion with regard to our information onthe USA attempts to broaden their demandsfor the removal of our weaponry from Cuba.He asked in whose hands—ours or the Cu-bans’—the IL-28 bombers can presently befound, as well as the torpedo cutters of the“Mosquito” class and the missiles on boardthem, missiles of the “air-surface” class, andmissiles of the “surface-surface” class, of asmall operational radius.

We answered U Thant that we cannotnow provide information on this issue. UThant asked us to make inquiries to Mos-cow, and to give him an answer “for his ownpersonal information.”

We ask that you provide us with infor-mation on this issue.

We assume that in examining this is-sue it would be appropriate to bear in mindthat Fidel Castro, in his speech of 1 Novem-ber, declared not only that Cuba possessedthe “strategic weaponry” which now “theSoviet Union had decided to seize,” but alsothat all other weaponry “is our property.”

Third. U Thant asked whether therecould be a disclosure, through first-handobservation, of the missiles on the vesselsthat will remove them from Cuba, orwhether instead they would be kept in con-tainers. General Rikhye, who was presentat the talks, said, not waiting for our answer,that he had proposed that they be packed ina way appropriate for long-distance over-seas shipping, with a view for the preven-tion of corrosion, but that they could beviewed in their outline forms from beneaththe packing.

U Thant was also interested in whetherall the missiles would be removed by onetrip of each of the ships used for this pur-pose, or whether the ships would insteadremove only a part of the missiles at once,returning them to Soviet ports and then sail-ing back to retrieve the rest. We said that allthe missiles would be loaded onto the shipsand ready for shipping no later than 10 No-vember, and that consequently the issue of

a gradual removal through several tripswould not arise.

Fourth. U Thant, emphasizing that hewas speaking for himself personally andwould not contact the Americans with re-gard to this issue, asked whether it wouldnot be possible—unless, after we approvethe American proposal for monitoring com-municated yesterday by McCloy, the Ameri-cans accept the agreement—to entrust themonitoring to representatives of the Inter-national Red Cross, the same ones who willbe conducting inspections, as is now pro-posed, on the Soviet vessels bound for Cuba.

We told U Thant that we would pro-vide information on his proposal to Mos-cow, but that we supposed that the Sovietgovernment had already introduced to theAmericans such liberal proposals on the in-spection process that they are offering thefull possibility for settling the whole issue,if the other side earnestly wants such a settle-ment.

It appears to us that it is expedient toseek an agreement on the basis of the con-sent we have already given to the Americanproposals on the inspection process. If it isnot possible to reach an agreement on thisbasis, examine U Thant’s proposal. In sucha case it may be possible, in our opinion, toagree that the International Red Cross rep-resentatives carry out inspections on vesselsleaving Cuba with missiles in the same waythat it has been proposed that they conductinspections on the vessels bound for Cuba.

Fifth. U Thant stated that at each meet-ing with the Americans (his last meetingwith them took place on 2 November) hehas asked them questions about guaranteesfor Cuba’s security and about the lifting ofthe “quarantine,” and that he intends to con-tinue to do so.

U Thant reacted with great interest toour information on the exchange of viewswith the Americans on the subject of the“UN presence” in the Caribbean Sea area.It was clear that this issue is important tohim, and that he wants to reach a positivesettlement of it. He asked us in particularwhether we considered McCloy’s negativeresponse with regard to UN posts on USAterritory to be “conclusive,” or whether itwas just an “initial reaction.” We said that itwas difficult for us to make judgments onthis, but that it seemed that it was only an“initial reaction.”

U Thant informed us that on 2 Novem-

ber he discussed the issue of the “UN pres-ence” with delegates from Venezuela andChile, as well as with representatives fromthe United Arab Republic, and that their re-action was generally positive.

Sixth. U Thant told us, evidently hav-ing in mind information published in today’sAmerican newspapers on a seemingly im-minent meeting of the Security Council, thathe considered it necessary and possible toconvene the Council only after all issueshave been resolved at the negotiations be-ing conducted now.

We fully agreed with U Thant’s pointof view, and emphasized the inexpediencyand even undesirability of convening the Se-curity Council before the conclusion of thenegotiations.

Seventh. U Thant asked whether Com-rade A.I. Mikoyan intended to stop for a timein New York on his way back from Cuba,and agreed that if so he would like to meetwith Comrade Mikoyan to get informationon the results of his negotiations with FidelCastro.

We answered that it was not yet clearto us whether Comrade Mikoyan would stopby New York on his way back from Cuba.


[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK ,provided to CWIHP, and on file at NationalSecurity Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans-lation by John Henriksen.]

Telegram from Soviet envoys in NewYork V.V. Kuznetsov and V.A. Zorin to

USSR Foreign Ministry,6 November 1962

6 November 1962TOP SECRET

On 5 November we had a meeting withStevenson and McCloy at the American ini-tiative. The Americans came to the meetingwith the clear intention of exerting pressureto get further concessions from the Soviets.Throughout the duration of the whole dis-cussion, which lasted more than three hours,they tried to represent the affair as if theSoviets had still not displayed any willing-ness to fulfill the obligations stipulated inthe correspondence between Comrade N.S.Khrushchev and President Kennedy, nota-bly with regard to IL-28 planes and nuclear


warheads and bombs. At the same time theAmericans kept shying away from a discus-sion of the issues concerning the Americans’fulfillment of their own obligations. Thediscussion at times became pointed, and thiswas an effect created largely by Stevensonand McCloy.

1. More than half the discussion wasdevoted to an exchange of opinions on theissue of the IL-28 planes located in Cuba.Stevenson and McCloy stated that the agree-ment between Comrade N.S. Khrushchevand Kennedy stipulated the removal of allthese planes from Cuba, and their return tothe Soviet Union. The essence ofStevenson’s and McCloy’s argument on thisissue can be reduced to the following:

Kennedy’s statement of 22 October andhis proclamation of 23 October placed jetbombers in the category of the so-called“offensive” Soviet weaponry in Cuba.Kennedy’s message of 27 October referredto the “offensive missile bases,” as well asto “all armament systems that can be usedfor offensive purposes,” apparently includ-ing jet bombers in this category. ComradeN.S. Khrushchev indicated in his messageof 28 October that the Soviet governmenthad issued instructions to dismantle and re-turn to the Soviet Union the arms that “youcall offensive.” The Americans call bothmissiles as well as jet bombers offensiveweaponry.

McCloy and Stevenson came backmany times in the course of the talks to thesearguments, interpreting them in such a wayas to make it seem as though the SovietUnion had committed itself to dismantle andreturn to the Soviet Union from Cuba notonly missiles, but also bombers.

We explained our position in detail toMcCloy and Stevenson, in accordance withyour instructions. We emphasized in particu-lar that at the present time there is only onebasis for an agreement, the one establishedby the exchange of messages between Com-rades N.S. Khrushchev and Kennedy. As faras Soviet obligations are concerned, thatagreement stipulates that the Soviet Unionwill remove from Cuba the missile weap-onry that the President of the USA has called“offensive,” and that it will never in the fu-ture supply such weaponry to Cuba. TheUSA in its turn committed itself not to in-vade Cuba, and not to allow any invasionby the other states of the Western hemi-sphere. The Soviets are fulfilling to the let-

ter this agreement, which is the result ofcompromise and mutual concessions. On 28October the dismantling of the missiles wasbegun, this dismantling was completed on2 November, and the dismantled missileshave been broughts to the ports for shipping,and will be removed no later than 10 No-vember.

We directed the attention of the Ameri-cans to the fact that, if they want to raisenew issues, then we have many issues thatwe will want to raise too, for example con-cerning the American military bases on for-eign territories, but that we are not doingthis because we do not want to complicatethe negotiations.

We adduced concrete facts concerningthe IL-28 bombers, showing that thisbomber is a purely defensive weapon, longago outmoded, and that it can be used onlyfor coastal defense when escorted by anti-aircraft units. We said with regard to thisthat if the USA representatives insist on theirown demands concerning the IL-28 planes,then in doing so they will only place theUSA in a position in which the whole worldwill see that the United States are renegingon their promise, and imposing unaccept-able conditions that create the possibility ofa continuation of the conflict.

We said that Stevenson’s assertion inhis letter of 3 November, that according tothe reports of American intelligence therewas evidence that IL-28 bombers are stillbeing assembled in Cuba, is a fabricationby American intelligence that clearly aimsto avoid the settlement of the conflict andthe normalization of our relations, and thatindeed tightens the tensions. If the UnitedStates take as their goal a return to the in-cendiary situation of earlier, then this isscarcely in the interests of the USA or theUSSR, or in the interests of peace. We pro-pose to select reasonable positions, and toproceed in our negotiations from the agree-ment that has already been reached.

The Americans contested our views ofthe purely defensive character of the IL-28bombers. McCloy and Stevenson assertedthat “in Castro’s hands” these bombers couldbe offensive weapons, and that for the LatinAmerican region they represent a threaten-ing weapon which the other Latin Ameri-can countries do not possess.

In response to our statement, in accor-dance with your instructions, that one can-not always rely on the facts produced by

intelligence reconnaissance and that, withregard to the IL-28 bombers, the Americanintelligence information on the continuingassembly in Cuba of these planes is incor-rect, McCloy asserted that in the photostaken by an American reconnaissance planeover the area where IL-28 planes were be-ing stored, it was obvious that there weremore of them in recent days, and that newcontainers of parts for these planes werebeing unpacked. In a half-joking toneMcCloy stated that once Soviet representa-tives had also denied even the Americanintelligence photos of missile bases in Cuba.McCloy said that he himself had seen thephotos of recent days in which IL-28 bomb-ers were visible, and that he believed thesephotos.

We answered McCloy and Stevensonby saying that their formulation of the issueof IL-28 bombers, which were outmodedand which have been removed from the ar-senal of our army, is clearly aimed at com-plicating the whole affair, at slowing thecompletion of the negotiation work, and atputting into doubt everything positive thathad already been achieved at these negotia-tions. We returned to these opinions manytimes in the course of the talks. Stevensonand McCloy stated that without resolvingthe issue of removing the IL-28 bombersfrom Cuba, it would be impossible to reachany agreement.

At the end of this part of the talks,Stevenson asked whether it should be un-derstood that the Soviets are refusing to re-move the IL-28 planes from Cuba. If so, hesaid, then our position in the negotiationshas reached “a very serious impasse.” Werepeated that these planes are not offensive,and that the Soviets will proceed from thisfact in their actions. Isn’t Mr. Stevenson al-ready thinking of presenting us with an ul-timatum on this issue and blaming the So-viets for the situation created at these nego-tiations?, we asked in response. He imme-diately said no, there was no ultimatum atall.

Stevenson said that perhaps the Sovi-ets would think over this issue again, andthat the next day or the day after that theycould discuss it again. We said that we werewilling to discuss any issue in these nego-tiations, but that as far as the issue of theIL-28 bombers was concerned, it is theAmericans who should think it over, sincetheir position on it was complicating the


negotiations.2. Then Stevenson and McCloy asked

one more question— about the nuclear war-heads on the missiles, and about nuclearbombs. They asked how we proposed to givethe Americans the possibility of ascertain-ing that our nuclear warheads and bombshad been removed from Cuba in conditionsin which ground-based inspection in Cubawas impossible. We stated that the Ameri-cans’ formulation of still another issue couldonly complicate the situation. We empha-sized that the Soviets would fulfill to theletter all the obligations, stipulated in Com-rade N.S. Khrushchev’s messages, for re-turning from Cuba to the Soviet Union thewhole complex of weaponry that the Ameri-cans have called “offensive.” McCloy statedin response to this that the USA did not wantto allow “nuclear warheads to be found inCastro’s hands,” and wanted to be sure thatthere was no such weaponry in Cuba.

McCloy said moreover that, sinceground-based inspection in Cuba was im-possible, the Americans would want to beallowed the same possibility for checkingon the removal from Cuba of the nuclearwarheads that they had been allowed forchecking on the removal of the missiles.“Tell us how many nuclear warheads youhave in Cuba,” McCloy said, “and allow usthe possibility to ascertain that they have allbeen loaded onto your vessels.”

We repeated that none of this was be-ing put forth by the Americans in order suc-cessfully to complete the negotiations, andthat the Soviets would fully and preciselyfulfill their obligation to remove from Cubathe “offensive” missiles, along with every-thing associated with them. We have everyright to expect a similarly sincere fulfillmentof the American’s obligations, instead of theadvancement of more and more issues thatcomplicate and delay the resolution of thisurgent problem.

3. We have informed the Americanswith regard to your instruction No. 2389 onthe schedule of departures from Cuba of theships carrying the missiles on 6 and 7 No-vember. They have made no comment onthis information, and have asked no ques-tions.

4. We informed Stevenson and McCloyof our progress with regard to the establish-ing of inspections on the Soviet vesselsbound for Cuba by representatives of theInternational Red Cross, about which we

also informed Narasimhan today. In spiteof the fact that McCloy, in talks at his coun-try house yesterday, was still talking aboutthe USA’s lack of objections to the use ofSoviet ships for the Red Cross inspections,he stated today that he had doubts about theacceptability for the USA government of ourproposal to use the Soviet freight vessel“Amata” for carrying out this inspection bythe Red Cross representatives.

At this time McCloy asserted that,since the Soviets had refused to approve theuse of American ships for this purpose, theAmericans could scarcely agree to the useof a Soviet ship, and that it would be betterto charter vessels from neutral states, suchas Sweden, for example, for this purpose.Answering our questions, McCloy said thatthis still did not constitute a definitive re-sponse from the Americans, and that hewould inform his government of our pro-posal.

We expressed our surprise with regardto such a change of the USA position on theissue of using Soviet vessels for the RedCross inspections. McCloy was somewhatembarrassed by this, and repeated severaltimes that yesterday, in talking about thelikelihood of American approval for thatproposal, he had been expressing only hisown personal assumptions.

5. In the course of the talks, we triedseveral times to lead the Americans towardthe issues of guarantees of Cuban securityand the lifting of the “quarantine.” McCloyand Stevenson did not enter into any realdiscussion of these issues, even less thanthey had before at the earlier meetings.

6. At the end of the talks, Stevensonsaid, as if summing things up, that for themthere were still several questions, in his view,which remained either undecided or open-ended; these included questions about theremoval from Cuba of the IL-28 bombers,about the granting of the possibility for theUSA to be sure of the removal from Cubaof nuclear warheads and nuclear bombs, andabout the search for vessels of neutral coun-tries that would be acceptable to both par-ties for the Red Cross inspection of Sovietships bound for Cuba.

McCloy told me that the day before hehad told President Kennedy by telephoneabout our talks at McCloy’s country house,that the President had given a positive evalu-ation of the results of the talks, and that thisevaluation had been confirmed the next

morning by a telegram from Washington.In McCloy’s words, President Kennedy wascounting on continued progress at the ne-gotiating table. And he added that theyhoped that the Soviets would make an at-tentive examination of the issues that hadbeen put forth at today’s talks.

In response to McCloy and Stevenson,we said that we did not think that the ques-tions referred to by Stevenson were open-ended any longer. Those issues are perfectlyclear, and it is only the USA position that ishindering forward movement. We appealedto the Americans to operate in future nego-tiations on the basis of the spirit of compro-mise and the desire to guarantee thestrengthening of peace that was displayedin the correspondence between N. S.Khrushchev and Kennedy, and to be guidedby precisely that spirit when attentively re-viewing the considerations we had ex-pressed.

We ask that you inform us on the issueof the warheads.

6.XI.62 V. KUZNETSOV V. ZORIN

[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK ,provided to CWIHP, and on file at NationalSecurity Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans-lation by John Henriksen.]

Telegram from Soviet envoy in NewYork V. Kuznetsov to USSR Foreign


On 6 November we had a meeting withthe Americans, with the participation ontheir side of Stevenson, the Deputy Minis-ter [Secretary] of Defense [Roswell]Gilpatrick, and Ambassador [Charles] Yost(Stevenson’s deputy).

The Americans asked a series of ques-tions connected with the procedure govern-ing the first-hand observation from theirships of our ships’ removal of the missiles.They proposed the following procedure forthat observation activity:

The American ships will come up closeto the Soviet vessels in order to see and pho-tograph the missiles being shipped. If con-ditions at sea do not permit their ships toapproach so close to the Soviet vessels, thenunarmed helicopters will be sent from theAmerican ships, and the photographing willbe done from them.


In order to be convinced that it is pre-cisely missiles that are being shipped out,rather than something else, the Americansare requesting that the covers or casings beremoved from certain missiles during theobservation. The desire was expressed thatthe missiles be shipped on the decks of theships. Gilpatrick emphasized that they didnot have in mind the sort of unveiling of themissiles that would allow a disclosure oftheir technical characteristics.

The Americans emphasized that theyconsidered it important to become con-vinced that the entire quantity of missilesthat they had been informed of was beingremoved from Cuba.

The question was raised as to how andwhere a meeting could be arranged betweenthe American ships with the Soviet vesselscarrying the missiles. The Americans pro-posed that we inform them of the ship’snumbers of all our vessels which are headedout of Cuba bearing missiles, so that thecaptains of the American ships from whichthe observations will be conducted can beable to make contact with the captains ofour ships, and arrange a meeting-place withthem without disturbing the itineraries of theSoviet vessels. We said that in that case itwould be necessary for the captains of ourvessels to have the ship’s numbers of theAmerican ships as well, in order to find outwhether they should get in contact withthose particular ships. Gilpatrick agreed, andproposed that the ship’s numbers of the So-viet and American vessels be exchanged.

The Americans also requested to beinformed of the departure schedules of theother ships carrying missiles out of Cubaafter 7 November.

We believe that the American propos-als for carrying out an observation of theremoval of Soviet missiles from Cuba areacceptable. In the event that they are ap-proved, we ask to be immediately informedof the ship’s numbers of the Soviet vessels,and of the departure schedules of the shipscarrying missiles out of Cuba after 7 No-vember, unless all the missiles will havebeen removed by 6 or 7 November.


[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK,provided to CWIHP, and on file at NationalSecurity Archive; translation by JohnHenriksen.]

From the Journal of V.V. Kuznetsov:Record of Conversation with the CubanRepresentative to the UN, C. Lechuga,

7 November 1962

On 7 November 1962 a meeting tookplace with the permanent Cuban represen-tative to the UN, Lechuga.

V. V. Kuznetsov informed him that inrecent days we had been discussing with theAmericans a series of problems derivingfrom the exchange of letters between theChairman of the Council of Ministers of theUSSR, N.S. Khrushchev, and PresidentKennedy, including the issue of assurancesand guarantees that Cuba would not be at-tacked by the USA or by the other countriesneighboring Cuba.

At the present stage of the discussion,we have not yet gone so far as to work outany documents or the details of the agree-ment. The Americans are now trying to findpretexts for avoiding definite and concretestatements. All in all, they have not beendisplaying any spirit of cooperation at thenegotiating table.

In the American press there are fre-quent statements about how the USA hasapparently won a triumph in the Cuban cri-sis. But it is clear to anyone who is able so-berly to assess the events that, thanks to thefirm and peaceful policies of the SovietUnion and the peace-loving actions it hastaken in the crisis period, what has reallytriumphed is the cause of peace, what hastriumphed is reason.

Now that the first stage is over and themissiles are being shipped out of Cuba, weconsider it necessary to take the followingsteps in the negotiations with the Americans,steps that should show whether or not theAmericans really want to put an end to thecrisis and to prevent a repetition of this dan-gerous military situation. We intend to putbefore the Americans the issue of how theywill fulfill their obligations regarding theguarantee against an attack on Cuba.

Lechuga said that Cuba supports theSoviet Union’s peace-loving policies, andthat the misunderstanding which had arisenin Cuba after the first steps taken by theSoviet Union had now been completelyeradicated. We knew, Lechuga said, that theSoviet government was defending the inter-ests of peace, we were in full agreement withthe goals it was pursuing, but we were not

in agreement on the formulations that hadbeen used to do so. It must be borne in mindthat the Cubans are a young nation, passion-ate in character. When the crisis began, theCubans were full of determination to fight,and for this reason when the events took adifferent turn, the feeling arose in them thatthey had experienced a failure. At the sametime that this crisis represented a globalproblem, for Cuba it was also her own prob-lem, one which roused the whole nation, andfrom that communal feeling came the fa-mous five points appearing in Fidel Castro’sstatement. Now, however, the Soviet gov-ernment can be sure that the uncertaintywhich arose in the first moments of the cri-sis has been dispelled, and that the Cubannation is delighted by the firmness andpeace-loving actions of the Soviet Union.

Lechuga also said that he had had ameeting with the Red Cross representatives,who had raised the issue of their inspectionon the open sea of the vessels entering andsailing from Cuba. They made no mentionof the establishing of an inspection proce-dure in Cuban territory. Lechuga said thathe had answered the Red Cross representa-tives, in provisional fashion, that it did notseem that the Cuban government would of-fer any objections to that, since the issue athand did not concern Cuban territory, butrather the open sea, and since this wholeaffair more directly concerns the USSR andthe USA.

The Red Cross representatives said thatthey intended to carry out their inspectionoperations under the aegis of the UN, andto select the inspection personnel from thecitizenry of neutral countries rather thanfrom those of the interested countries.

Lechuga stated that in the talks withthe Deputy Secretary General of the UNLoutfi, the latter had told him that the pe-riod of five days, proposed by the SovietUnion as the maximum period in which theinspection of vessels could be conducted,was insufficient, since within this period theRed Cross representatives would not evenbe able to prepare their ships or send theminto the inspection zone. Loutfi also men-tioned that the USA had raised the questionof the IL-28 bombers located in Cuba, andthat he was interested in whether thesebombers were manned by Soviet or Cubanpilots.

V.V. Kuznetsov said that our positionwith regard to the Red Cross inspections was


based on the correspondence between N.S.Khrushchev and Kennedy. We are generallyopposed to the carrying out of any inspec-tions at all. The Soviet Union agreed to thepossibility of using Red Cross observers forthe duration of a very short time only to giveassurances that the missiles had been re-moved from Cuba. Since the USA maintainsthat the reason for the current crisis is theexistence of missiles in Cuba, then it fol-lows that with the removal of these missiles,the reasons adduced by the USA for theiractions against Cuba are also removed.

In the negotiations with the UN Secre-tary General, we said that it was clear thatwe consider all the actions taken by the USAand leading to the current crisis to be un-lawful. It is from precisely that same pointof view that we are now conducting nego-tiations. With the resolution of this problem,there should not be any infringement at allon the sovereignty of Cuba or its legal rights.

In response to the question as towhether vessels could now proceed unhin-dered to Cuba, Lechuga answered in the af-firmative.

With regard to the “IL-28” bombers,V.V. Kuznetsov told Lechuga that the Ameri-cans had asked this question during the ne-gotiations with us, but that we had answeredthat it goes beyond the negotiation param-eters defined in N.S. Khrushchev’s andKennedy’s letters.

The Americans also raised the issue ofthe continuation of reconnaissance flightsover Cuba, to which we responded that weconsidered such flights to be a blatant vio-lation of the sovereignty of Cuba, the normsof international law, and the principles ofthe UN Charter. The continuation of suchflights would lead to a prolongation of ten-sions, and any measures taken by the Cu-ban government in connection with this willbe justified, and all responsibility for anyconsequences will lie on the shoulders ofthe United States.

At the upcoming conference we intendto exert pressure on them with regard to theguarantees of non-aggression against Cuba.And as far as the five points put forth in Fi-del Castro’s statement are concerned, wesupport them, including the point aboutGuantanamo, and we are taking this intoaccount in the negotiations with the Ameri-cans.

In conclusion V.V. Kuznetsov said thatan analysis of the events and of the steps

that we took in the crisis period shows thatdefinite positive results have been attained,that we have definite assurances of non-agression against Cuba, and that the issuenow is how the USA will fulfill its obliga-tions. It is impossible to forget that the wholeworld is currently watching how the eventsconnected with the Cuban crisis are unfold-ing.

[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK ,provided to CWIHP, and on file at NationalSecurity Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans-lation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univer-sity.]

Telegram from USSR Foreign MinisterA. Gromyko to A.I. Mikoyan via the

Soviet Embassy in Havana,10 November 1962

First. Inform our Cuban friends thatMoscow agrees with their remarks on theProtocol draft on the elimination of tensionsassociated with Cuba. The text of the Pro-tocol statement, including the remarks byour Cuban comrades contained in it, hasbeen sent by us to Comrade Kuznetsov inNew York for him to relay to the Cubanrepresentative, the USA representatives, andU Thant.

Second. We agree with the thoughtsyou expressed to our Cuban comrades re-garding the inexpediency of making a spe-cial statement on the refusal of inspectionsin Cuban territory of the dismantling andremoval of “offensive weaponry.” We arealso in agreement on your explanations con-cerning the Cubans’ second proposal—onthe UN presence in the countries of the Car-ibbean.

We understand that our Cuban com-rades have agreed with these ideas of yours.

Third. With regard to the fact thatMcCloy and Stevenson, in the talks with youin New York, referred to possible difficul-ties they might have in signing the Protocolstatement, and that they expressed supportfor fixing the obligations that have beenundertaken in the form of separate state-ments, the following instructions are givento Comrade Kuznetsov:

“If the Americans declare that the sign-ing of the protocol statement is difficult forthem because of the fact that the USA andCuba are supposed to be signing the samedocument, then you may tell the Americans

that we allow the possibility that the the pro-tocol statement be not formally signed, butaffirmed by special separate statements bythe governments of the three countries—theUSSR, the USA, and Cuba. All these docu-ments in their collectivity will constitute anagreement.

As a last resort you may even go so faras to propose that the document not be for-mally called a protocol statement, but rathera declaration, which would be affirmed byspecial separate statements from the threegovernments.

We will inform you of final instructionsconcerning the form of the document afterthis issue has been submitted to the approvalof our Cuban friends. Meanwhile, you andthe Cuban representative will introcuce itas a protocol draft.”

In the next meeting with our Cubancomrades, you should clarify their views onthis proposal of ours. We request that youinform us immediately of what you find out,so that we can give corresponding instruc-tions to Comrade Kuznetsov.

10.XI A. G.


Telegram from Soviet Ambassador tothe USA A. F. Dobrynin to USSR


Your instructions have been carriedout. Robert Kennedy has familiarized him-self attentively with the content of N.S.Khrushchev’s confidential oral message tothe President. When he got to the place thatspoke of Nixon’s defeat in the elections,21

he immediately grinned, saying: “Yourchairman is a real master of colorful expres-sion that expressed the true essence of theissue. Yes, we are quite satisfied withNixon’s defeat, and in general we are notcomplaining about the results of the elec-tion.” It was felt that this portion of the mes-sage was received with definite satisfaction.

When Robert Kennedy had familiar-ized himself with the whole message, he saidthat for the President, for domestic policyconsiderations, it was very important to re-ceive the Soviet Union’s firm agreement tothe removal of the IL-28 planes, especially


now that there were essentially no inspec-tions being conducted in Cuba itself. Thecorrespondence between N.S. Khrushchevand President Kennedy of 27 and 28 Octo-ber implied that an agreement between ourcountries had been reached. But we under-stand the difficulties in this area that havenow arisen because of Premier FidelCastro’s position, and we are not insistingon this as an unalterable and fundamentalcondition. But the removal of the IL-28planes—in an atmosphere of growing criti-cism within the USA—is a matter of greatconcern to the President. Let us reach anagreement, continued Robert Kennedy, onthe following points: that the Soviet Unionwill remove its IL-28 planes by a definitedate announced in advance, and that on thatsame day the USA will officially lift its quar-antine. All this may be announced immedi-ately.

I answered Robert Kennedy that hisproposal is entirely unacceptable for theSoviet side. I then demonstrated theunacceptability of of this proposal by usingthe argument contained in N.S.Khrushchev’s oral message that had beenpassed on to him. In conclusion I expressedmy certainty that conveying his proposal toMoscow would prove fruitless.

Thinking a moment, Robert Kennedysaid that he would like to confer with hisbrother the President, after which he wouldagain contact me later the same day. Iagreed.

After an hour and a half (all this hap-pened in the evening), Robert Kennedycame to my residence. He said that now,after speaking with the President, he couldformulate the American proposal in the fol-lowing way:

N.S. Khrushchev and the Presidentwould reach an essential agreement that theIL-28 planes would be removed by a defi-nite date. After such an agreement has beenreached, the USA would, as early as the nextday, lift any quarantine even before the re-moval of the planes had been completed.The Americans would of course prefer thatthe date agreed upon for the removal of theIL-28 planes be publicized. However, if theSoviets have any objections to the publicdisclosure of that date, then the Presidentwould not insist on it. For him a promisefrom N.S. Khrushchev would be entirelysufficient. As far as the date is concerned, itwould be good if the planes were removed,

let us say, within 30 days. We ask that N.S.Khrushchev be informed of this whole pro-posal.

Robert Kennedy was told that thePresident’s proposal would of course becommunicated to N.S. Khrushchev. As apersonal opinion, however, I noted that itwas unlikely that such an imminent datecould be acceptable to us, all the more sosince the fundamental USA obligations—guarantees of non-aggression against Cuba,and other obligations—remain, as before,unfulfilled; moreover, they themselves arepushing everything later and later. And thisis happening in circumstances in which theSoviet government is sincerely fulfilling,and essentially has already fulfilled, its ownobligations for the removal of the missiles.It is now the Americans’ turn.

Robert Kennedy said that the time-frame he had referred to—30 days—is notin any way definitive. That time-frame hadbeen “given to him,” but he though that therewas room for negotiation here as long asthe period was not too great, and as long asN. S. Khrushchev generally found thePresident’s proposal acceptable. I want nowto make note of one more condition, RobertKennedy continued. After such an agree-ment has been reached, especially if it is notpublicized, it would be important for us that,even if the end of the agreed-upon periodfor the removal of the IL-28 planes has notyet been reached, at least some planes willhave been disassembled by this time, or ifthey have just been taken out of containers,that a portion of them be returned to theircontainers. We need all of this, RobertKennedy remarked, so that we can satisfyour domestic public opinion by reportingthat there has been some progress in the re-moval of the IL-28 planes. This is neces-sary, since even [West German ChancellorKonrad] Adenauer is starting now to criti-cize us publicly for trusting the word of theSoviet Union without inspections in Cubanterritory—not to mention the Cuban emi-gres in certain republics [states—ed.] whoare making similar accusations. But thePresident, Robert Kennedy emphasized, hasfaith in N. S. Khrushchev’s word, and iswilling to lift the quarantine immediately ifthe agreement mentioned above can bereached, even though we really do not haveany guarantees with regard to inspectionsin Cuban territory.

I answered Robert Kennedy that it

would be much better if Adenauer kept hisnose out of everyone else’s business, and ifthe USA government told him so directly(here Robert Kennedy energetically noddedhis head in a gesture of agreement). I thensaid that in the proposal that he had ad-vanced, the issue is once again raised of afull elimination of all the tension that hasexisted, that is, beyond the immediate lift-ing of the blockade, the obligations of allthe parties should be fixed in appropriateUN documents, and non-aggression againstCuba and a strict observation of its sover-eignty should be guaranteed; there wouldalso be UN posts established in the coun-tries of the Caribbean region as guaranteesagainst unexpected actions harming anotherstate.

Robert Kennedy said that he believedthat an agreement could be reached on allthis points. It is important, from the point ofview of American public opinion, to havesome inspection conducted in Cuba, evenin the form of several UN posts. Castro willscarcely go for this unless a similar proce-dure is imposed on the other countries ofthe Caribbean basin. But is possible to re-solve this too. Robert Kennedy mentioned,as an alternative to this, the plan put forthby Brazil, but then he immediately said thatthis aspect of the issue was being studiedby Stevenson, and that he, Robert Kennedy,could not go into details with regard to it. Ican however repeat the firm assurances ofthe President not to invade Cuba. He autho-rized me once again to say this now. He wasgrateful to N.S. Khrushchev for the latter’sclarification that the IL-28 planes aremanned by Soviet rather than Cuban pilots,but nevertheless the issue of the removal ofthese planes remains a very important onefor the President, and he asks that we con-sider his proposal.

Further discussion came down to a re-iteration of the positions of the parties. Rob-ert Kennedy said in conclusion that he wasflying now to New York on personal busi-ness, and that he would be willing to meetwith me at any time.

When he left, he glimpsed a crowd ofdancing couples in the embassy’s parlor.Realizing that this was a friendly welcomeparty arranged by the embassy communityfor the Bolshoi Theater troupe that had justarrived in Washington, he said that he wouldlike to meet with the troupe. Mingling withand greeting almost all the members of the


troupe, he delivered a welcome speech inwhich he said that the President was pre-paring to attend their premier the followingevening. At the end, he kissed MayaPlisetskaya when he found out that he andshe had been born in the same year, month,and day, and said they would celebrate theirbirthdays in a week. None of this needs tobe mentioned especially, but all in all thebehavior of Robert Kennedy, who is ordi-narily quite a reserved and glum man, re-flects to some degree the calmer and morenormal mood in the White House after thetense days that shook Washington, eventhough this fact is concealed in various waysby American propaganda.

12.XI.62 A. DOBRYNIN

[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK,provided to CWIHP, and on file at NationalSecurity Archive; trans. J. Henriksen.]

Telegram from Soviet Ambassador tothe USA A.F. Dobrynin to USSR


Having familiarized himself with ourresponse, Robert Kennedy said that hewould pass it on to the President today.Then, saying that he would like to express alittle of his own views provisionally, Rob-ert Kennedy stated the following.

The President—he, Robert Kennedy,expects—will be disappointed by the answerwhen he receives it. The President’s pro-posal was very simple: the USA would im-mediately and officially lift the blockade inexchange for assurances—public or not—that before some definite date the IL-28planes would be removed. The Presidentbelieves that this proposal of his serves theinterests of both countries, and opens theway towards a resolution of the remainingaspects of the Cuban problem, creating asignificantly less tense situation than the onethat would arise if his proposal was ap-proved by the Soviets. The President intendsto fulfill his obligations, which were stipu-lated by the correspondence between theheads of the two governments. But for thisthere must be a certain time in which all thedetails of the future agreement can beworked out. The President’s proposal re-ferred to above could be carried out imme-diately, without any delay. The insistenceof the USA government in this matter of the

IL-28 planes has been provoked by thegrowing pressure that has been brought tobear on the President by representatives ofCongress, the press, and so on. It is impor-tant that this aspect be properly understoodin Moscow, since the President himself hasgreat difficulties in dealing with this issue(Robert Kennedy twice emphasized the “dif-ficulties for the President”).

I carried on the discussion with Rob-ert Kennedy of these difficulties using thearguments advanced by N.S. Khrushchev’sresponse. It was especially emphasized thatwe have removed from Cuba the missilesand warheads, in other words that we havefulfilled the obligations we assumed, whilethe USA is not fulfilling its own obligations;for this reason, in order to conduct assur-ance inspections after the missiles and war-heads have been removed, the quarantineshould have already been lifted by now, theflights by American planes over the terri-tory of Cuba should have already ceased,and the mutual obligations assumed by theparties should have been formalized in ap-propriate documents under the auspices ofthe UN.

Robert Kennedy stated that the USAgovernment would not cease its flights overCuba in circumstances in which he had noother guarantees that the government ofCuba would carry out its end of the agree-ment. Mr. Mikoyan’s long stay in Cubashows—or at least this conviction has beencreated in us—that Premier Castro does notwant to approve the agreement reached be-tween the President and the head of the So-viet government on such guarantees. Weunderstand the circumstances that have beencreated, but this does not relieve the diffi-culties of our position, said Robert Kennedy.The issue of UN guarantees, in the form ofUN posts or something like them, wouldrequire a significant amount of time beforeconcrete approval of the agreement couldbe reached. Let us take for example the is-sue of UN posts in the area of the Carib-bean basin. Here Robert Kennedy asked,would the Soviet Union itself really agreeto some foreign posts on its own territory?As far as we know, in every such case it hascategorically rejected, and still rejects, theidea of observational posts within its bor-ders.

Robert Kennedy was immediately toldthat evidently he had not been sufficientlyfamiliarized with N.S. Khrushchev’s re-

sponse, which spoke, as did his precedingmessage to the President, of how it seemsthat our countries must in the first placecome back in their disarmament negotia-tions to the Soviet proposals that stipulatedposts in airports, in the major ports, at rail-road hubs, and on motorways in order toguarantee for all countries of the world thatno country can assemble troops and preparefor attack on or invasion of another coun-try.

Robert Kennedy corrected himself,confirming that such a proposal was indeedto be found in N.S. Khrushchev’s responses.By the way, the remark I made has no directconnection to the subject presently underdiscussion, the subject from which I di-gressed, he continued. As far as I am aware,there are no unsurmountable obstacles onthis point, although for us it seems a highlycomplicated issue to organize UN posts inthe parts of the USA bordering the Carib-bean Sea, if that agreement with Cuba isindeed reached. However, just yesterday ata White House meeting I heard that far fromall the countries of this area would agree toparticipate in such an agreement. Thus if youinsist on all the countries of the Caribbeanarea, the whole affair might be delayed evenlonger. I am saying all this, Robert Kennedyconcluded, not in order to discuss the de-tails of this issues—I do not know themmyself, since they are the responsibility ofStevenson and Kuznetsov—but rather toshow that time is needed for all this, andthat it would scarcely be expedient or rea-sonable to wait for it before lifting the quar-antine and removing the IL-28 planes. ThePresident has put forth a proposal that hebelieves serves the interests of both parties,but that proposal is being rejected now bythe Soviets, which can lead only to an ex-tension, or perhaps even a complication, ofthe present situation which clearly does notsatisfy us or, we believe, you. Both partiesare equally uninterested in that. We hopenonetheless that Chairman N.S. Khrushchevwill be able to approve the proposal put forthby the President, who himself had great con-fidence in it when he sent it to Khrushchev.

I told Robert Kennedy that the posi-tion of the Soviet government has beenclearly laid out in today’s response by N.S.Khrushchev. The Soviet Union has fulfilledits obligations. Now it is simply the USAgovernment’s turn to do the same, so thatthe situation of tension that has been cre-


ated in the Caribbean Sea can be eased. Forthis it is necessary: to lift the quarantinewithout delay, to cease all flights by USAplanes over Cuba, and to fix the mutual ob-ligations deriving from the correspondencebetween the heads of both governments on27 and 28 October. If corresponding instruc-tions were given by the President to McCloyand Stevenson on the issue of UN posts inthe Caribbean Sea area and the parts of theUSA that border it— and the Soviet repre-sentatives already have such instructions—and if they could reach an agreement, thenof course the issue of the time-frame for theremoval of the IL-28 planes would not beany complex problem.

Since Robert Kennedy, who often re-fers to the President’s opinion, has beenstubbornly continuing to assert the neces-sity of first resolving the issue of the IL-28planes’ removal, connecting the lifting of thequarantine with that removal, he was di-rectly asked, after mutually reiterating ourarguments to each other, whether this meantthat the President had already authorizedhim to give an answer, and that such an an-swer should be communicated to Moscow?

Robert Kennedy immediately an-swered that the views he had been express-ing, although based on the opinions of thePresident, with whom he had just thatevening discussed all these issues, are none-theless exclusively his own, RobertKennedy’s, personal thoughts, and that therewould be an answer to N.S. Khrushchev’saddress today from the President himself.Robert Kennedy promised to provide infor-mation on that answer immediately.

Towards the end, the conversationstarted to have a formalized and official airconnected with the President’s invitation,passed on to me via Robert Kennedy, to visitthe White House on the following day alongwith the Bolshoi Theater troupe.

14.XI.62 A. DOBRYNIN


Telegram from Soviet Foreign MinisterA. Gromyko to A.I. Mikoyan,

15 November 1962

In connection with the last paragraph

of Comrade Kuznetsov’s telegram (relayedby you separately), which says that theAmericans are insisting that their guaran-tees of non-aggression against Cuba bemade simultaneously with the SovietUnion’s promise not to bring any more “of-fensive” weaponry into Cuba, we have sentthe following instructions to ComradeKuznetsov:

In your memorandum you said that thatthe Americans are persistently pushing forthe simultaneous granting of USA guaran-tees for non-aggression against Cuba and ofSoviet guarantees not to bring “offensive”weaponry into Cuba any longer.

From such a formulation of this issueon the part of the USA it can be deducedthat they are trying to impose on the SovietUnion and Cuba additional obligationswhich would basically mean that, besidesthe sorts of weaponry agreed upon by thecorrespondence between Comrade N. S.Khrushchev and President Kennedy, Cubawould be deprived of the right to possessany other sorts of weaponry that the USAmight call “offensive.” The acceptance ofsuch obligations would discriminate againstCuba, since in that case it would be singledout from among the other countries of LatinAmerica that do not bear such obligations.This cannot be acceptable.

Another matter concerns the talk ofconcluding the agreement through the UN,for example by way of the approval of anappropriate UN resolution stipulating thatthe territory of all Latin American countriesbe declared a zone that is free from nucleararms. Of course the design behind this is toput Cuba on equal footing with the othercountries of Latin America; and also theUSA, as far as Guantanamo and its otherbases in Latin America are concerned, wouldtake onto its shoulders the obligation not toallow any provisioning of nuclear weaponsonto the territories of any Latin Americancountry. This would establish an equitablebasis for an agreement, and would be ac-ceptable.

With such a formulation of this issue,there would be no discrimination with re-gard to any participants in the agreement,in this case with regard to Cuba; that is, theissue would be resolved differently than asproposed in the draft resolution put beforethe UN General Assembly by Brazil, Bo-livia, and Chile.

If the Americans continue to insist that

there be simultaneous guarantees by themfor non-aggression against Cuba, referredto in Kennedy’s messages of 27 and 28 Oc-tober, and guarantees by us no longer tobring “offensive” weaponry into Cuba, youmust proceed from the point that we arewilling to make a guarantee not to bring intoCuba the sort of weapons that we agreed toremove from Cuba following the agreementreached by correspondence between theheads of our two governments. In accor-dance with this, Article 8 of the draft Proto-col may be supplemented with the follow-ing paragraph:

“At the same time the Soviet govern-ment states that it will not bring such weap-onry onto the territory of the Republic ofCuba.”

This formulation, which refers to “suchweaponry,”does not give the Americans thechance to broadly and arbitrarily interpretthe term “offensive” weaponry to includeother sorts of weaponry (including nucleararms) that the Americans might classify asoffensive.

You must submit the position laid outabove to the approval of the UN delegatefrom Cuba. In this we are proceeding fromthe assumption that out point of view willbe acceptable for Cuba, since it derives fromthe position jointly held by the Soviet Unionand Cuba on this matter.

Telegraph upon completion.

A.G.

[Source: AVP RF, Moscow; copy obtainedby NHK, provided to CWIHP, and on file atNational Security Archive, Washington,D.C.; translation by John Henriksen,Harvard University.]

Telegram from Soviet Foreign MinisterA.A. Gromyko to A.I. Mikoyan,

18 November 1962

I am transmitting instructions from theAuthorities.

If our Cuban friends address you inreference to their decision on firing atAmerican planes, then they should be toldthe following:

In view of the fact that decision on fir-ing at American planes was not submittedto our approval, we do not consider it pos-sible to take part in this. For this reason, wehave given instructions to our military men


not to open fire on American planes.

A. GROMYKO


Memorandum from the Head of theUSSR Merchant Fleet to the CC CPSU,

20 November 1962

I am reporting on the situation on theUSSR-Cuban sea lanes.

At the present time, there are 20 dry-cargo ships and 4 oil-carriers on their wayto Cuba from Soviet ports on the Baltic, theBlack Sea, and in the Far East, carrying in-dustrial and agricultural equipment, automo-biles, metal, grain, flour, conserves, sulfates,oil, gas, ammonia, and other loads. Besidesthis, the tanker the “Tukmus” is nearingCuba, sailing out of the Canadian port ofMontreal with a cargo of animal fat. Fourof the vessels mentioned are passing throughthe zone of the blockade imposed by theUSA. The others will reach this zone be-tween 20 and 30 November.

There are 13 dry-cargo vessels and 7tankers en route from Cuba to Soviet ports.They have all successfully passed throughthe blockade zone.

The Soviet vessels bound for Cuba arebeing subjected to overhead flights by USANavy airplanes during their whole passageacross the Atlantic Ocean. Within the block-ade zone these flights occur more frequently,aerial photos are taken, American shipscome up close to them, inquiring what cargois being carried and where, and then theyfollow close behind the Soviet ships untilthey reach the territorial waters of Cuba.Demands concerning the stopping of theships or the carrying out of inspections byAmerican naval ships are not forthcoming.

The Minister of the Merchant Fleet(V. BAKAEV)

[Source: Center for the Storage of Contem-porary Documentation (TsKhSD), Moscow;copy provided to CWIHP by R. Pikhoia andon file at National Security Archive, Wash-ington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen,Harvard University.]

Cable from Mikoyan to CC CPSU,23 November 1962

CC CPSU

During yesterday’s conversation withFidel Castro and others, when I spoke of thesignificance of the new success in liquidat-ing the crisis and of the cancellation of bothour and the American measures of extraor-dinary preparedness, Fidel Castro said, thatthey are, moreover, also preparing to carryout demobilization.

23.XI.62 A. MIKOYAN

[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK,provided to CWIHP, and on file at NationalSecurity Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans-lation by David Wolff, CWIHP.]

A.I. Mikoyan, Memorandum ofConversation with Robert F. Kennedy,

30 November 1962

[...] On the evening of 30 November,A.I. Mikoyan was present at a dinner inhonor of the American Secretary of the In-terior [Stewart] Udall. The guests includedR. Kennedy, Deputy Secretary of State[George] Ball, the chairman of thePresident’s Council of Economic Advisors[Walter] Heller, the chairman of the Boardof Directors of the “New York Times”[Orville] Dryfoos, and the Soviet Ambas-sador Dobrynin.

All the American guests were with theirwives, except for Robert Kennedy whocame with his eldest daughter, age 13. Hehas seven children in all. He said that hiswife, together with the other six [children],who had the flu, had gone to Florida to bringthem up to [good] condition.

Before dinner, Robert Kennedy, afterconversations of a protocol-like nature in thepresence of all, asked A.I. Mikoyan to stepinto another room, where one on one(Dobrynin) [they] first touched on the mat-ter of one Zaslavskii (a Soviet citizen), whomarried an American tourist, but our courtannulled the marriage. He [Kennedy] saidthat he is embarrassed to present this matterofficially, since it has no bearing on the re-lations between our governments. But forthe Minister of Justice [Attorney General]the resolution of this question is important.

The question is small, but delicate, and itsresolution would be greeted with satisfac-tion.

Then he touched on the major ques-tions for which they had left the company -the significance of yesterday’s conversationswith President Kennedy and the need forcontacts between Khrushchev and Kennedyand mutual actions.

The President, said R. Kennedy, con-siders yesterday’s conversation extremelyuseful, promoting further mutual compre-hension between our governments and theirheads. In this respect, this meeting can becharacterized as definite progress. Such isthe opinion of the president himself.

What is most important now?, contin-ued R. Kennedy. The most important, evenmore important than the fates of my chil-dren and your grandchildren, although they,of course, are the nearest and dearest to us,is the question of mutual understanding be-tween Chairman Khrushchev and PresidentKennedy. Indeed, it now decides the fate ofthe world. One must admit that in the courseof the recent crisis, their personal relationsand mutual trust underwent serious trials,as a result of which, frankly speaking, dam-age was sustained. Therefore, it is very im-portant to do everything to restore fully thetrust on which so much depends. We our-selves understand the need for this, for wemust look ahead. We, concluded R.Kennedy, sincerely hope that the develop-ment of our relations can follow a happiercourse than in the past.

A.I. Mikoyan replied to R. Kennedythat he fully agrees with the idea of the im-portance for preserving peace and for thebasic improvement of relations between ourcountries of good personal relations betweenN.S. Khrushchev and president Kennedy,their mutual understanding and trust of oneanother. As one of N.S. Khrushchev’s com-rades-in-arms [soratnik], said A.I. Mikoyan,I can assure you that exactly these thoughtsdefine his approach to his relations with theUSA president. N.S. Khrushchev values thepersonal quality of these relations. The So-viet government renders its due to the self-possession [otdaet dolzhnoe vyderzhke] ex-hibited by the president in the most danger-ous moment, when the world stood at theedge of thermonuclear war, but by mutualconcessions and compromises, succeeded inaverting this war.

Moscow, continued A.I. Mikoyan, no-


ticed the positive role you, the president’sbrother, played during the confidential ne-gotiations between the president and thehead of the Soviet state. Of course, we un-derstand, that you did this, as did we, in theinterests of one’s own country, one’s ownpeople. It was important, however, that youunderstood correctly, in the critical moment,what those interests were. Let us now com-plete the outlined resolution to the Cubanquestion, without complicating it with trivialformal cavils [melochnaia pridirka], or evenworse, some deviation from the agreementon the final settlement of this question. In-deed, if one speaks the truth, there’s notmuch left to do; it is only necessary to putin writing or to finalize, without excessiveprocrastination that which the American sideobligated itself to do during the exchangeof messages between N.S. Khrushchev andthe president.

R. Kennedy noted that he agreed thatlittle of essence remained to be done - in-deed, “it’s 90 percent done,” although thereare still difficulties that must be overcome.But he, R. Kennedy, did not intend to ana-lyze these difficulties. They were the sub-ject of detailed discussion in New York. Heonly wanted to emphasize briefly that withwhich he began: the importance of furtherdeveloping mutual understanding betweenthe president and N.S. Khrushchev. This willdetermine to a large extent the success andsolution of other questions that still awaitsettlement.

A.I. Mikoyan agreed with this. Return-ing to his conversation with the president,A.I. Mikoyan said, that although in its coursethere were a few sharp [ostryi] moments,on the whole he agrees with R. Kennedy’sevaluation of the conversation with thepresident.

To all appearances, this was reflectedin the ensuing conversation with Rusk,which took place in a business-like andfriendly atmosphere, clearly, not without theinfluence of the president. R. Kennedysmiled, but he didn’t say anything.

In concluding the conversation, R.Kennedy asked [Mikoyan] to give greetingsto N.S. Khrushchev. In his turn A.I. Mikoyansent greetings to the president.

Robert Kennedy showed interest invisiting the Soviet Union and expressed thisdesire.

A.I. Mikoyan said that this was a goodidea and completely realizable. If the de-

crease in tension between [our] countriescontinues further and the political atmo-sphere warms up, then this trip would notonly be interesting but useful for him.

After our return to the other room,Udall made the first toast to the leaders ofthe two great nations - N.S. Khrushchev andJ. Kennedy - “people of strength and peace.”One theme of the toasts and remarks of theAmerican representatives during the mealwas to express satisfaction over the fact thatour two countries have succeeded in avoid-ing a clash in the Cuban crisis and [to sup-port] the need to search for ways of avoid-ing the repetition of similar crises in the fu-ture. Note the following pronouncements.

Udall emphasized the pleasant impres-sions from his trip to the Soviet Union andfrom his meeting with N.S. Khrushchev andother Soviet leaders. He said that his feel-ings of sympathy for the Soviet people grewstronger, and he said so despite criticism ofthese statements in the USA, still in Sep-tember. He asked [me] to transmit his invi-tation to visit the United States to the Chair-man of the Council of Ministers, ComradeNovikov, and to the Energy and Electrifica-tion Minister, Comrade Neporozhnyi, not-ing in jest that he was ready to show “somesecrets,” as was done during his visit to theSoviet side.

A.I. Mikoyan pronounced a toast to thehost, Secretary Udall, his wife and children,who were presented to A.I. Mikoyan by theirparents. Udall has 6 children.

A.I. Mikoyan joked that althoughKhrushchev’s acquaintance with Udall wasbrief, and Mikoyan’s acquaintance withUdall at the time even briefer, Udall imme-diately won over Khrushchev and thenMikoyan. Khrushchev said to Mikoyan:What a simpatico [simpatichnyi] and goodman is Mr. Udall!

When I met him at dinner, saidMikoyan, he made such an impression onme. There are some people, whom you knowfor years, but actually don’t know, and sud-denly after decades you see the real face ofthe man. And there are also those, who afterseveral hours, you can tell what kind of manthey are. Udall belongs to this category.When he returned to his homeland after vis-iting the Soviet Union he landed in an at-mosphere of anti-Soviet hysteria. The agentsof monopolies, the press and radio tried toget anti-Soviet statements out of him,counter to those he had made in the Soviet

Union. Udall’s conscientiousness [dobros-ovestnost’] was confirmed and he did notgive in to this pressure and said what hethought, that is, he repeated in the USA whathe had said in the Soviet Union.

A.I. Mikoyan transmitted greetingsfrom N.S. Khrushchev and offered a toastto [Khrushchev’s] health.

Ball underlined that the necessary con-dition for greater trust between the USSRand USA was our renunciation of “the prac-tices [of] a closed society,” stating, in par-ticular, that this should be demonstratedconcretely by the broadening of exchangesand in our agreement to the sale of bourgoisnewspapers on the streets of Moscow.

Replying to Ball, A.I. Mikoyan said,that so long as the arms race continues, it isimpossible and unrealistic to demand theopen society of which Ball spoke. You alsodo not have an open society. You have moreadvertising [reklam], but society is closed,but in its own way. When the arms race iseliminated and disarmament takes place, wewill then open many places in which thepresence today of foreigners is forbidden.Then we will have open exchanges and con-tacts.

Wishing to draw Heller, the Chairmanof the President’s Council of EconomicAdvisers, into the conversation (he appearspleasant, a relatively young professor, forthe most part silent), A.I. Mikoyan askedHeller how he would explain the fact that,in particular, the USA has more steel pro-ducing potential than the USSR, but theUSSR in the third quarter of this year pro-duced more steel than the USA. “If you didnot need so much steel, why build so manyfactories and remove huge amounts of capi-tal from circulation, including the livingwork force [that has become] unemployed.In general, what measures are you taking toremove such disproportions and are theyremovable at all in a free enterprise system?”

Heller avoided answering by changingthe topic of conversation, not wishing toenter an argument where he felt himselfweak. A.I. Mikoyan in the context of thedinner did not insist on an answer.

Heller promptly supported Mikoyan’sstatement on the appropriateness of trans-ferring power and means freed up by theend of the arms race toward raising the stan-dard of living of the people from underde-veloped countries and of the people of thestates participating in the arms race.


A.I. Mikoyan invited Heller to visit theSoviet Union.

Those present asked Mikoyan if, in hisopinion, Castro is interested in normalizingrelations and about Castro himself as theruler of Cuba.

A.I. Mikoyan in his statements abouthis trip to Cuba underlined Cuba’s intrest inhaving the chance to build a [word illeg-ible] life in a peaceful setting, and the lackof any serious signs of readiness on the partof the USA to normalize [relations] withCuba.

Dobrynin and Bubnov transcribed theconversation.

[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK,provided to CWIHP, and on file at NationalSecurity Archive; translated by David Wolff,CWIHP.]

Memorandum from the Head of theUSSR Merchant Fleet to the CC CPSU,

7 December 1962

I am reporting on the removal of 42IL-28 planes from Cuba.

1. The ship “Okhotsk,” carrying 12 IL-28 airplanes, left the port at Nuevita on 4December at 23:00 Moscow time.

After the departure of the “Okhotsk”from the port, American planes began fly-ing back and forth over the ship, taking pho-tos. We recorded the identification numbersof the planes.

On 6 December at 9:00, the USA war-ship number 943 appeared near the stern ofthe “Okhotsk,” and informed the captain ofour vessel that it would be following the“Okhotsk” all night, and asked that the boxescontaining the IL-28 planes be opened forphotographing. The captain gave his con-sent, and towards dawn on 7 December theUSA destroyer carried out an inspection ofthe Soviet ship.

2. The “Kasimov” left the port ofMariel at 14:45 on 5 December, carrying onboard 15 IL-28 planes.

The “Kasimov” was also subjected toconstant overhead flights by USA warplanes whose identification numbers we re-corded.

A bomber of the “Neptune” class, withthe number 6-145922, asked us to open thepacking of our deck cargo for photograph-ing. This request was fulfilled by the cap-tain of the “Kasimov.” After this, the plane

circled over the vessel six times and thenflew away.

3. The ship “Krasnograd” left from theport of Mariel on 6 December at 7:30, car-rying on board 15 IL-28 planes.

This vessels was also constantly sub-jected to overhead flights by Americanplanes whose numbers were recorded by us.One plane of the “Orion” class, number5605-BF-505, and two planes of the “Nep-tune” class, numbers LK-131499 and JP-22,asked the captain how many IL-28 planeshe was carrying. The captain answered thatthere were 15 “IL-28” planes on board.

The flights over vessels carrying IL-28’s continue. The vessels are proceedingnormally.

All the planes, 42 units, have been re-moved. According to the Ministry of De-fense, a forty-third plane (an instructionalmodel) was wrongly registered, and hadnever been received by Cuba.

The Minister of the Merchant FleetV. BAKAEV

[Source: Russian State Economic Archives,Moscow; copy provided to CWIHP by R.Pikhoia and on file at National SecurityArchive, Washington, D.C.; translation byJohn Henriksen, Harvard University.]

Official note from the US embassy inMoscow to USSR Foreign Ministry,

10 December 1962

Received by mail10 December 1962

Translated from the EnglishNo. 478

The Embassy of the United States ofAmerica is expressing its respect to the Min-ister of Foreign Affairs of the Union of So-viet Socialist Republics, and has the honorof quoting from the Embassy’s note No. 348of 24 October 1962. The Embassy has beenentrusted by its government hereby to bringto the attention of the Ministry the opera-tional portion of the Proclamation, issuedby the President of the United States ofAmerica on 21 November 1962, on the lift-ing of the quarantine announced on 23 Oc-tober 1962.

“I, John F. Kennedy, President of theUnited States of America, acting with the

authority given to me by the Constitutionand the laws of the United States, herebydeclare that at 23 hours 00 minutes Green-wich time on 20 November 1962, I re-scinded the powers given to the DefenseDepartment by Proclamation No. 3504 of23 October 1962, and cancelled the ordersit contained to the armed forces under mycommand.”

The Embassy of the United States ofAmerica

Moscow, 10 December 1962Translated by Ju. Sokolikov

[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK(Japanese Television), provided to CWIHP,and on file at National Security Archive,Washington, D.C.; translation by JohnHenriksen, Harvard University.]

EDITOR’S NOTES

1 Gromyko here evidently refers to Dorticos’

speech to the U.N. General Assembly of 8 Octo-

ber 1962. Dorticos stated: “Were the Untied States

able to give us proof, by word and deed, that it

would not carry out aggression against our coun-

try, then, we declare solemnly before you here

and now, our weapons would be unnecessary and

our army redundant.” New York Times, 9 Octo-

ber 1962.2 Kennedy had asked Congress to approve the

call-up of 150,000 reservists on 7 September

1962.3 Not further identified.4 An obvious allusion to the failed attack on Cuba

in April 1961 at the Bay of Pigs by CIA-supported

anti-Castro Cuban exiles.5 The date of this conversation is not specified in

the text, but Kennedy appears to be referring to

the meeting between Robert Kennedy and Soviet

Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin on the same

day as the 4 September 1962 statement to under-

line the President’s concerns about Soviet mili-

tary aid to Cuba.6 The Russian text is unclear as to whether it re-

fers to a “bar-man” (barkeeper) or a last name

such as “Berman,” “Barman,” or “Burman.”7 Possibly a reference to journalist Robert J.

Donovan.8 It is noteworthy that the Soviet message strongly

implies that a U.S. invasion of Cuba would not

trigger a military response from the USSR, but

only political condemnation. This hinted at a

brewing disagreement between Moscow and Ha-


vana, for Castro’s message to Khrushchev on 26

October 1962—in which he called on the Soviet

leader to authorize a “harsh and terrible” attack

on the United States should it invade Cuba—

clearly reflected the Cuban’s belief that Moscow

was (or should be) willing to go to war on Cuba’s

behalf. For an English translation of Castro’s let-

ter, which first appeared in the Cuban newspaper

Granma in November 1990, see James G. Blight,

Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch, Cuba on the

Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet

Collapse (New York: Pantheon, 1993), 481-482.9 Presumably a reference to Khrushchev’s letters

on that day to both Kennedy (accepting his pro-

posal to resolve the crisis) and Castro (explain-

ing his decision); for the texts of both letters, see

Laurence Chang and Peter Kornbluh, eds., The

Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A National Security

Archive Documents Reader (New York: The New

Press, 1993), 226-229, 239.10 A seccessionist rebel leader from Katanga

(later Shaba) Province in the Congo (later Zaire)

against whom the UN was considering the use of

military force, which it later used to quash the

resistance.11 For an English translation of the letter, which

emerged publicly only three decades later when

it was released by Soviet officials, see Problems

of Communism—Special Edition (Spring 1992),

60-62; also U.S. State Department, Foreign Re-

lations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. VI:

Kennedy-Khrushchev Exchanges (Washington,

D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996), 189-

90.12 A reference to Kennedy’s agreement to with-

draw the approximately 5,000 U.S. troops sent to

Thailand in May 1962 in response to an attack by

the pro-communist Pathet Lao in Laos.

Kennedy’s decision followed a private appeal in

Khrushchev’s name conveyed through Robert

Kennedy in mid-June by Bolshakov. See Memo-

randum from Attorney General Kennedy to

President’s Special Assistant for National Secu-

rity Affairs (Bundy), 11 July 1962 (regarding

meetings apparently held on 18 and 19 June

1962), in U.S. State Department, Foreign Rela-

tions of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. XXIII:

Southeast Asia (Washington, D.C.: Government

Printing Office, 1994), 950.13 Igor D. Statsenko was the commander of a

Soviet missile division deployed to western Cuba.14 Alekseev evidently refers to Khrushchev’s let-

ter to Castro dated 30 October 1962; an English

translation can be found in an appendix to Blight,

Allyn, and Welch, Cuba on the Brink, 485-488.15 Castro here refers to his message to

Khrushchev dated 26 October 1962, an English

translation of which appears in an appendix to

Blight, Allyn, and Welch, Cuba on the Brink, 481-

482.16 A reference to anti-U.S. protests held outside

the embassy in Moscow during the crisis.17 Evidently a reference to the U.S. Arms Con-

trol and Disarmament Agency, which Kennedy

created.18 For English translations of the Russian records

of conversations in Havana between Mikoyan and

Castro and the Cuban leadership on 3-5 Novem-

ber 1962, see Vladislav Zubok, “`Dismayed by

the Actions of the Soviet Union’: Mikoyan’s talks

with Fidel Castro and the Cuban leadership, No-

vember 1962" (plus accompanying documents),

CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), 59, 89-92 and

109, 159.19 Until the missile crisis, Georgi Bolshakov, a

Soviet official based at the USSR Embassy in

Washington, had been used as a back-channel go-

beteen to deliver messages between Khrushchev

and the Kennedys, meeting frequently with Rob-

ert Kennedy. As the document indicates, this

channel ended after the Kennedys concluded that

Bolshakov had been used to mislead them by

transmitting false reassurances in the summer and

early autumn of 1962 that Khrushchev would not

send offensive weapons to Cuba or take any dis-

ruptive action prior to the Congressional elections

in November. Instead, beginning with the mis-

sile crisis, a new channel was set up between

Robert Kennedy and Ambassador Dobrynin.20 For Khrushchev’s 4 November 1962 letter to

Kennedy, see Chang and Kornbluh, eds., The

Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, 264.21 Nixon had been defeated by his Democratic

rival in the California gubernatorial elections,

upon which he announced his retirement from

politics. The relevant passage in Khrushchev’s

12 November 1962 message read: “Now the elec-

tions in your country, Mr. President, are over. You

made a statement that you were very pleased with

the results of these elections. They, the elections,

indeed, were in your favor. The success does not

upset us either—though that is of course your

internal affair. You managed to pin your politi-

cal rival, Mr. Nixon, to the mat. This did not draw

tears from our eyes either....” See James A.

Nathan, ed., The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisted

(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 290.

STATE DEPARTMENT, RUSSIANARCHIVES COOPERATE ON

KHRUSHCHEV-KENNEDYFRUS VOLUME

In an unprecedented example of cooperation

between the State Department Historian’s Office

and the Russian Foreign Ministry archives, a vol-

ume of Foreign Relations of the United States,

the official published record of U.S. foreign

policy, has appeared with Russian archival docu-

ments.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-

1963, Volume VI: Kennedy-Khrushchev Ex-

changes (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government

Printing Office, 1996), contains several Russian

documents among the correspondence, oral mes-

sages, back-channel exchanges, and other records

concerning direct communications between U.S.

President John F. Kennedy and Soviet leader

Nikita S. Khrushchev, including exchanges be-

tween the two concerning the Cuban Missile Cri-

sis in Oct.-Nov. 1962 that were declassified by

Russian authorities five years ago and published

in Spring 1992 in Problems of Communism.

One newly-available document from the Rus-

sian archives contained in the volume is a trans-

lation of a long (approximately 25 type-written

pages) 1 April 1963 “talking paper” from

Khrushchev to Kennedy. Upon reading through

the message when it was presented to him by So-

viet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin, the

president’s brother, Attorney General Robert F.

Kennedy, handed it back on the grounds that it

was “so insulting and rude to the President and to

the United States that I would neither accept it

nor transmit its message.” Robert Kennedy told

his brother that he had informed an “obviously

embarrassed” Dobrynin that a message of that

sort, if Khrushchev insisted on sending it, should

go through normal State Department channels

rather than the confidential back-channel

Dobrynin and Robert Kennedy had established

during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Thus, no copy

of the communication reached the U.S. archives.

FRUS editors called the cooperation with the

archives of an ex-Cold War adversary “without

precedent in the history of the Foreign Relations

series,” and expressed thanks to Igor V. Lebedev,

Director of the Department of History and

Records, Russian Foreign Ministry. The

Kennedy-Khrushchev volume (320 pp.), prepared

by the Office of the Historian, Department of

State, is ISBN 0-16-04018-0 and can be ordered

from the U.S. Government Printing Office, Su-

perintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP,

Washington, DC 20402-9328.


MIKOYAN-CASTRO TALKScontinued from page 320

by the Russian and transcribes themeaning of the phrase into the simplepast tense. Both documents are evi-dently transcriptions of memo notestaken during a speech and do not seemto have been corrected. Their overalltone is colloquial. When the meaningwas clear enough, I changed the punc-tuation and divided very long sentencesinto shorter ones. I did not shorten thephrases whose meaning was unclear. Inthis latter case, I tried to be as literalas possible; translating word by word.Editor’s and translator’s insertions ap-pear in brackets, as opposed to paren-thetical phrases in the original docu-ment. The translation preserves someapparent errors in the originals regard-ing parentheses and quotation marks,where the punctuation marks are notclosed. In general, however, the senseof both documents is understandableeven to a reader who is unfamiliar withthe events.—Carlos Osorio (NationalSecurity Archive).]

Document I:Cuban Record of Conversation,

Mikoyan and Cuban Leadership,Havana, 4 November 1962

MEETING OF THE SECRETARIAT OFTHE CRI WITH MIKOYAN AT THE

NATIONAL PALACE,SUNDAY, 4 NOVEMBER 1962.

Preamble by Mikoyan:He says he has come to Cuba to dis-

cuss their differences with the CubanCompaneros [comrades] and not to [discuss]what has been stated by the imperialists.They trust us as much as they trust them-selves. He is willing to discuss for as longas it takes to solve the differences. The in-terests of the Soviet Union are common toours in the defense of the principles of Marx-ism-Leninism and in all the other interests.

FIDEL: Summarizes our differences interms of the procedures used to deal withthis crisis.

DORTICOS: Asks whether Mikoyan con-siders that they have obtained the guaran-tees that president Kennedy offered.

CARLOS: Asks whether the victory men-tioned by the Soviets has been attained.

MIKOYAN: Says he will respond to thequestions, and asks to be excused for he willspeak for a long time. He says he will startwith the doubts expressed by Fidel in orderto explain them.

He thinks that the main problem con-sists in explaining why they have sent troopsand strategic weapons. If this is not under-stood, it is very difficult to understand thewhole situation. He did not think we haddoubts about this. He said that “the fate ofthe Cuban revolution is a permanent preoc-cupation of ours, especially since its social-ist character was declared. When the impe-rialists were defeated in Giron [Beach at theBay of Pigs—ed.], we congratulated our-selves, but we also worried. The yanquis[Yankees, i.e., North Americans—ed.] dida stupid thing but we knew they would con-tinue harassing because Cuba is an examplethat they could not tolerate. Our assessmentwas that they had two parallel plans; the firstone consisted of the economic strangulationof Cuba in order to bring down the regimewithout a military intervention. The secondone consisted of an intervention organizedby Latin American governments and theirsupport, as an alternative to the other plan.

We consider the victory of the Cubanrevolution as an enormous contribution toMarxism-Leninism. Its defeat would be anirreparable damage to Marxism and to otherrevolutionary movements in other countries.Such a defeat would mean the preponder-ance of imperialism over socialism in theworld. Such a defeat would mean a terribleblow against the world revolution. It wouldbreak the correlation of forces. It is our dutyto do everything possible to defend Cuba.

“Our comrades told us that the eco-nomic situation in Cuba had worsened dueto the yanquis’ pressure and the enormousmilitary expenses. This worried us for itcoincided with the plans of the yanquis. Wehad a discussion about the economic declineand we have helped without you requestingit. You are very modest in your requests andwe try to help you. We decided to give youweapons for free and donated equipment for100,000 men. In addition, in our commer-cial negotiations, we have looked at all thepossibilities and we have tried to provideeverything you needed without payments in

kind. We have given you 180 million roublesin order to help you. This is a second phaseof help because before that there were com-mercial and credit agreements but these lastdeliveries have been in aid.

When Khrushchev visited Bulgaria [on14-20 May 1962—ed.] he expressed manythings to us, he said “although I was in Bul-garia, I was always thinking of Cuba. I fearthe yanquis will attack Cuba, directly or in-directly, and imagine of the effect on us ofthe defeat of the Cuban revolution. We can-not allow this to happen. Although the planis very risky for us, it is a big responsibilityfor it exposes us to a war. Cuba must besaved[.] “They thought it over for three daysand later all the members of the CentralCommittee expressed their opinions. Wehave to think a lot about this action in orderto save Cuba and not to provoke a nuclearwar. He ordered the military to develop thePlan and to consult with the Cubans. He toldus that the main condition was to carry outthe Plan secretly. Our military told us thatfour months were needed for the prepara-tions. We thought the enemy would learnabout it right in the middle of the plan andwe anticipated what to do. We thought theplan would not be carried out to the end,but this was an advantage, for the troopswould already be in the Island. We foresawthat, in order not to provoke a war, we coulduse the UNO [United Nations Organization]and the public opinion. We thought the Planwould not provoke a war but a blockadeagainst weapons and fuel instead. How tosolve this - your lack of fuel? Consideringthe geographic situation of the Island, it hasbeen very difficult to avoid the blockade. Ifyou were closer we could have used our AirForce and our Fleet, but we could not. Theyanquis do have bases surrounding us inTurkey and blocking the Black Sea. Giventhe situation, we cannot strike back.Okinawa is too far away too. The only pos-sibility was to cut the communications withWest Berlin. In Berlin this is possible.

We have not thought of building a So-viet Base on the Island to operate againstthe North Americans. In general, we con-sider that the policy of bases is not a correctone. We only have bases in [East] Germany,first because of the right we have as an in-vading country, and after that due to theWarsaw Treaty. (Stalin did have basesabroad). In the past, we have had them inFinland and in China too (Port Arthur) -


those bases we have abandoned. We onlyhave troops in Hungary and Poland, to pro-tect the troops in Germany and the commu-nications with Austria.

We do not need bases to destroy theUnited States because we can attack withthe missiles deployed in our territory. Wedo not have a plan to conquer NorthAmerica. The only thing we need to do is tolaunch a counter strike, but that will serveto destroy them without having to send inour troops.

We have sent the troops and strategicmissiles only to protect the Island’s defense.It was a plan of containment [contension]so that the yanquis could not provoke anexplosion in Cuba. If the missiles are wellcamouflaged and the yanquis do not knowwhere they are deployed, then they can helpto contain them. The military told us thatthey could be well hidden in the palm for-ests of Cuba. The yanquis were not goingto locate them. They could not destroy them.During July and August, they did not findanything, it was not until October that theyhave been found. We were surprised thatKennedy only made reference to techniciansand not to our troops. At first, it seems thatthat is what he thought. Later we learnedthat he knew more than he was saying, buthe was not revealing it not to hinder the elec-toral campaign. We let the yanquis know thatwe were going to solve the Berlin problem,in order to distract their attention from theother problem. We did not intend to act onBerlin. I can explain this later.

It was known through diplomatic chan-nels that Kennedy did not want to makematters more serious and asked us not tomove on the issue of Berlin before the elec-tions. We told him that we agreed to this.We would please him and we would solveit later. We thought it was convenient toplease him. In addition, we had not thoughtof bringing up this problem. When the NorthAmericans learned about the transports toCuba, they also concentrated their campaignon Berlin. Both sides had their principal in-terest in Cuba, but appeared as if concen-trated on Berlin. In the middle of October,they [the North Americans—ed.] learnedabout it through Cuba, via the West Ger-many information service who passed it tothe CIA,3 they first learned about the mis-siles. They took aerial pictures and locatedthem. Khrushchev ordered that the missilesbe laid down during the day and that they

be raised only during the night. Evidently,this order was never carried out. Kennedydid not want to talk about the missiles untilthe end of the elections. But two Republi-can Senators learned the news and they hadno alternative but to act. We did not knowwhat Kennedy would do and we worriedabout the preparations or maneuvers of Vieti- an operation named after Castro but back-wards.4 When Kennedy talked about theblockade, we did not have data showingwhether it was a maneuver or a preparationfor aggression. On the morning of the 28thwe received the news confirming that it wasan aggression. Although it was announcedthat the maneuvers were suspended due toa storm, the storm was over and the maneu-vers were not carried out. In the meantime,the concentration continued. Khrushchevhas strongly criticized Kennedy’s wordsabout the blockade. They did notapprove of the kind of weapons that Cubashould own and thus they organized a di-rect aggression. Their plan consisted of twoparts: using missiles with conventional loadsto destroy the nuclear missiles and then land-ing and destroying the resistance.

In case of the latter, we would be forcedto respond because it is an attack againstCuba and against us too - because our troopswere here and this was the unleashing ofthe World War. We would destroy NorthAmerica. They would inflict huge loses onus; but they would make every effort to de-stroy Cuba completely. All the measures wetook were taken to protect Cuba. Whatwould have been the result if the plan of theyanquis was carried out? Lose Cuba, inflictenormous damages upon the Socialist coun-tries with a nuclear war? While we were inthe midst of our discussions, we received acable from Fidel that coincided with otherinformation in the same vein. After that, tento twelve hours were left. Given that such ashort time was left, we used diplomaticchannels. Because when policy-makerswant to avoid a war, they have to use diplo-matic means. It’s important to underscorethat Kennedy says now that he was notagainst the presence of troops here and thathe accepts ground-to-air missiles. But onceknown, the strategic weapons, were not use-ful anymore...(paragraph missing) [notationin original—ed.]

The withdrawal of the missiles, was aconcession on our part. But Kennedy alsomakes a concession by permitting the So-

viet weapons [to remain in Cuba], in addi-tion, declaring that they will not attack Cubanor permit that it be attacked. In assessingthe outcome, we have gained, because theywill not attack Cuba and there will be nowar.

In normal conditions, it would be natu-ral that we send you a project [draft—ed.]for you to study and you could then publishit. But that can be done only in normal con-ditions. An invasion was expected within thenext 24 hours. When Fidel sent his cable,there were only ten to twelve hours left. If acable was sent it had to been crypted, thatwould take more than 10 to 12 hours. Con-sultations would have been appropriate, butCuba would not exist and the world wouldbe enveloped in a war. After the attack, theywould have never accepted a truce, due tothe warmongers of the Pentagon. Our atti-tude has produced difficulties, but in mak-ing an overall evaluation, in spite of the psy-chological defects, we can see that the ad-vantages are undeniable.

Com[panero]. Dorticos asks: Whatguarantees offered by Kennedy have reallybeen obtained? We consider that all agree-ments cannot be rejected in a nihilistic fash-ion. Although agreements can be breached,they are important for they are useful for acertain period of time.

In addition, a problem arose with theTurkey issue. [Mikoyan said:] Why did weinclude the problem of Turkey and thebases? We did not have in our plans to dis-cuss Turkey; but while we were discussingthat issue, we received an article from [U.S.journalist Walter] Lip[p]man[n] saying thatthe Russians will discuss that, [and] that iswhy we included it. The bases in Turkey areof no importance because in case of war theywould be destroyed. There are also bases inEngland that could damage all the basesanywhere in the world.

Fidel asks whether there were in facttwo letters [from Khrushchev to Kennedy],one that mentioned the issue of Turkey,which was broadcast on Radio Moscow, andanother in which the issue was not men-tioned. [Mikoyan replied:] We sent two let-ters, one on the 26th that was not published,and another one on the 27th. The issue ofTurkey was not included at the beginning,we included it later. But we can describe allthat in more detail through a reviewing of


the documents. We have had discussionsabout your question whether the dismantlingof the base at Guantanamo is better. Thatwould be better for Cuba, but from a mili-tary point of view of the interest of Cuba, itis not possible. If we decided to withdrawall the weapons from Cuba, then we coulddemand the withdrawal from Guantanamo,Guantanamo has no importance in militaryterms. That would be more dangerous, andthat is important from a political perspec-tive. Concerning the inspection: if we saidwe reject any inspection, the enemy couldinterpret that as an attempt to trick them.All it is about is seeing the sites, where theweapons were and their shipping for a fewdays. Cuba is in the hands of the Cubans.But because we were the owners of thoseweapons... (paragraph missing). [notation inoriginal-ed.] We thought that you, after theconsultations, you would accept the inspec-tion. But we never thought of deciding any-thing for you. Why did we think that wecould accept a verification of the disman-tling by neutrals, without infringement ofthe Cuban sovereignty? It was understoodthat no State would accept an infringementof your sovereignty. In very particular cases,a State can... [ellipsis in document—ed.] itsacts, by agreement and not due to pressuresfrom abroad - the territory of the Embassywithin a sovereign State for example. Whendiscussing the problem of Indochina andVietnam in Geneva [in 1954], an agreementwas reached to create an International Con-trol Commission.

————

We spoke about the problem of dis-mantling with [U.S. negotiator John J.]McCloy in New York. He said that “giventhat Cuba is opposed to the North Ameri-can inspection, he did not insist on this for-mula - for them to verify that the weaponswill not be kept hidden in the forest. [noclose quotation marks in original—ed.]

I talked to them about the aerial pho-tographic inspection, but I responded thatCuba has the right to its air space. I told themthat their planes have flown over Cuba andthey were convinced that the dismantling isbeen carried out. They admitted that, butpointed that not everything is finished. Wetold them that this is nearly completed andhe did not talk further about it. [McCloysaid:] We have to be sure that they are not

going to hide them in the forest. We do notwant data pertaining to your military secrets;but we need assurances that the missiles willgo.

We can provide the pictures of the dis-mantled weapons and how they are loaded.Nor we will oppose that you observe theships on the high seas, at a particular dis-tance. They (or you) will see something onthe decks. I did not tell them that, but that isour opinion and we will provide them withthe materials to convince them that we havewithdrawn the missiles. So we will not con-tradict your [Cuban] declaration, against theinspection or the aerial verification. Theyfeared that the Cubans would not allow usto withdraw the missiles, given that theyhave 140,000 and you only have 10,000men. I did not talk about these numbers. Hesaid that the U-2 that was shot down here,was shot at with Russian missiles and prob-ably operated by Russians. Although theythink there may be Cubans who are able tooperate those weapons. We kept on insist-ing that they lift the quarantine immediately.I told them that if they wanted the missileswithdrawn faster, they should lift the block-ade. Because the ships that are now in Cubaare not able to take those missiles out. [un-derlined in original]. I told them they shouldissue instructions so that the inspection ofthe ships be carried out without anybodyboarding the ships. It would rather be car-ried out in a symbolic manner, asking byradio, as it was done with the tankerBucharest.

Stevenson said they will accept the pro-posals of U Thant. We reproached him thathe proposed not to bring weapons to Cubaand to lift the blockade. We have compliedwith this and they continue.

We have loses because the ships waiton the high seas. The losses are consider-able, that is why we have allowed the con-trol of the Red Cross. The Red Cross is bet-ter because it is not a political institution,nor a governmental institution. U Thant pro-posed two inspections, one at the shippingharbors and another on the high seas. Notwanting to hurt his feelings, we respondedthat we accept the inspection on the highseas and not at the shipping harbors.

U Thant, when returning from Cuba,told me that you did not agree, although thisverification is easier at the harbors. U Thantis ready, he is choosing the personnel andhas already two ships. I do not know more

about it, for it is [Soviet Deputy ForeignMinister V.V.] Kuznetsov who deals withthis issue.

In this situation, Thant has played agood role. You cannot ask more, given hissituation, he even seems to have a little sym-pathy for our position. While in Moscow,we received a plan of guarantees. Wethought this plan seemed interesting anduseful for Cuba.

Why: If the inspection of Cuba, the south-ern coast of the U.S. and other countries inthe Caribbean will be approved (CentralAmerica[)] because this way you deprive theaggressor of the possibility to carry out itsgoals. Of course, this can be circumvented,however. I have been interested in this vari-ant from another point of view. There is anOAS [Organization of American States], andit is the U.S. who profits from it instead ofusing the UN. But if this plan is approved,it is the UNO that will deal with this part ofthe American Continent, this constitutes ablow to the Monroe Doctrine. U Thant saidthat the representatives from Latin Ameri-can countries agree with this plan, the NorthAmericans avoid responding to it. I askedMc Cloy and he said at the beginning (asdid Stevenson) that the U Thant Plan doesnot exist. But afterward they discarded theU.S. inspection and they said they can givetheir word that in Latin America all thecamps [of anti-Castro Cuban exiles—ed.]are liquidated. I asked him if all were, andhe avoided the question. They said that Cubawas a revolutionary infection, he said thatthe Latin American countries fear Cuba. Aformula can be searched in which Cuba willabandon the clandestine work in exchangefor their not attacking.

Fidel was right when he said that it’seasier for the USSR to maneuver and main-tain a flexible policy than it is for Cuba, allthe more as the yanqui radio reaches Cubaeasily. It is not just to say that we are moreliberal. The Cuban revolution cannot be lost.You have to maneuver to save the Revolu-tion by being flexible.

In retrospect the question that arises iswhether it was a mistake to send the mis-siles and then withdraw them from the Is-land. Our Central Committee says that thisis not a mistake. We consider that the mis-siles did their job by making Cuba the fo-cus of the world diplomacy. After they werecaptured in photos, they cannot accomplish


their role of containment.In Latin America no country has the

power that Cuba has. No Latin Americanbloc can defeat Cuba.

In order to understand on what victoryrests, you may compare the situation ofCuba now and four months ago (in July).The first advantage is that the North Ameri-cans stopped talking about the Monroe Doc-trine and before, the whole basis for theirpolicy toward Latin America was that doc-trine.

Before, they declared they would nottolerate the existence of a Marxist-Leninistregime in Latin America, now they declarethat they will not attack Cuba. Before theydid not tolerate a country from abroad inthe Caribbean and now they know of theexistence of Soviet specialists and do notsay a thing.

Before, you could not have any actionof the UN in favor of Cuba and now it isworking in that sense, all the peoples aremobilized.

The prestige of the Socialist Camp hasgrown because it defended peace. Althoughthe United States brought the world to thebrink of a war, the USSR, by pacific means,was able to save Cuba and the [world] peace.

Peace has been secured for severalyears and Cuba must be consolidated for itto continue building socialism and continuebeing the Light-house for Latin America.

The prestige of Cuba has grown as aconsequence of these events.

_________________****________________

Fidel asks whether he [Mikoyan] willspeak about the Soviet policy in Berlin.Mikoyan agrees to do so in a later interview.

Document II:Mikoyan and Cuban leadership,

Havana, 5 November 1962

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THESECRETARIAT AND MIKOYAN ONMONDAY, 5 NOVEMBER AT THREE

IN THE AFTERNOON.

After hearing Mikoyan, Fidel says:

We consider that the intentions of the So-viet Government cannot be determined onlyby the analysis of what happened in face of

an unforeseen situation. Instead, they shouldbe analyzed taking into account the set ofagreements we have reached - the weaponswere brought under those precepts. One ofthem is the military agreement that was tobe published once all the weapons werebrought in and once the Elections were heldin the United States. These agreements rep-resent a firm desire of the Soviet Union.5

That is why this has to be analyzedunder the light of what we intended to doand not under the light of what happened.

If all the steps were carried out, wehave no doubt that they would have servedas a containment to the plans of the NorthAmericans to attack our country. And theobjectives of the Soviet Government andCuba would have been attained.

At the same time, we knew that thedeployment of missiles in Cuba had in sightthe defense of the Socialist Camp. Theywere important not only in military terms,but also from a psychological and politicalpoint of view. Besides serving the interestsof Cuba, they served the interests of theSocialist Camp as a whole, and we evidentlyagreed with that. That is how we have un-derstood the step taken, and we also under-stand it was a step in the right direction. Wealso agree with the need that a war beavoided and we do not oppose that. In thiscase, all the measures oriented to attain thetwo objectives were undertaken. We are inabsolute agreement with the goals soughtby the Soviet Union, the misunderstandingsarise as a result of the way they were at-tained. We also understand that the circum-stances were compelling. They were not onehundred percent normal.

In assessing how the events occurred,we think they could have been dealt withdifferently. For instance, one thing discussedis the impact that my letter had on the So-viet Government’s decision of the [October]28th. And it is evident that my letter hadnothing to do with the course of the events -given the messages that were exchanged be-tween the Soviet and North American Gov-ernments on the 26 and 27. My letter’s onlygoal was to inform the Soviet Governmentof the imminent attack, and it did not con-tain any hesitation on our part. Furthermore,we expressed that we did not expect an in-vasion. We expressed that the invasion waspossible, but we understood that it was theleast probable variant. The most probableevent was an aerial attack to destroy the stra-

tegic weapons.The Soviet Government’s decision on

the 28, is based on the letter to Kennedy andthe response on the 27. The real basis forthe 28 decision lies within these two docu-ments. Kennedy’s letter on the 28 was anagreement to the proposals Khrushchev senton the 26 - in the sense that he [Krushchev]was willing to resolve the issue of all theweapons if the U.S. ceased the aggression.The aggression was the only reason for themilitary strengthening of Cuba.

Once Kennedy accepted this proposal- which we did not know of - the conditionswere set to carry it out starting with a decla-ration by the Soviets stating that their sidewas on board and that they would proceedto discuss it with the Cuban Government.

I think that such a declaration, insteadof communicating an order to withdraw theStrategic Weapons, would have decreasedthe tension and would have allowed to carrythe discussions in better terms.

But this is a mere analysis of what hap-pened, it does not matter now. What mat-ters now is simply to know what to do andhow to attain the main goals that are to stopthe aggression and to secure the peace atthe same time. If a true and effective peaceare attained in the near future, then - underthe light of the recent events - we will beable to judge better the steps taken. The fu-ture outcome - for which we need to struggle- will either credit or discredit the value ofthe acts of the present. It is evident that at-taining that outcome does not depend somuch on us. We are very grateful for all theexplanations given and of the effort madefor us to understand the things that occurred.We know they happened in abnormal cir-cumstances. There is no question in ourminds about the respect of the Soviet Uniontoward us, the respect of the Soviet Unionfor our sovereignty, and, the help of the So-viet Union. That is why what is importantto discuss is what are the steps to take in thefuture. We want to reaffirm our trust in theSoviet Union.

COMMENTS OF MIKOYAN (transcribedby Dorticos)

Carlos Rafael: It is my understanding thatcompanero Mikoyan talked about the in-spection of the Soviet ships as a MinimumMinimorum. But that inspection would takeplace in a Cuban harbor. They could well


then request the inspection of other sites inCuba - the forests for instance. They canclaim that the missiles could have been di-verted from their route between the base andthe ships.

FIDEL: How would the inspection they pro-pose take place?

Mikoyan: (transcribed by Dorticos)

FIDEL: Couldn’t they do the same on thehigh seas? What is the difference?

Mikoyan: (transcribed by Dorticos)

FIDEL: Tell companero Mikoyan that I un-derstand very well the interest of keeping UThant on our side, but for us, that is a criti-cal issue. It would have a disastrous effecton our people. The North Americans say thatthe inspection is inferred from the letter fromKhrushchev to Kennedy on the 28 (Fidel ismaking reference to the letter of Khrushchevon the 27 where he accepts the inspectionof the Missiles Bases by officials of theUNO Security Council, but making refer-ence to Cuba and Turkey agreeing to it).[note in original—ed.]

Just because of this phrase ofKhrushchev, they cannot take this as a con-cession of the Soviet Union. CompaneroMikoyan says to hell with imperialists ifthey demand more. But on the 23 we re-ceived a letter [from Khrushchev] saying,to hell with the imperialists...(he reads para-graphs from the letter). Besides, on one oc-casion we heard of the proposal of U Thantabout the inspection in Cuba, the UnitedStates, Guatemala, etc., we understand, thatconcessions should be made, but we havealready made too many. The [U.S.] airplanesare taking pictures because the Soviet Unionasked so. We have to find a way to provideevidence without inspection. WE DO NOTTHINK OF ALLOWING THE INSPEC-TION, BUT WE DO NOT WANT TO EN-DANGER WORLD PEACE, NOR THESOVIET FORCES THAT ARE IN CUBA.WE WOULD RATHER FREE THE SO-VIET UNION OF THE COMMITMENTSIT HAS [MADE] WITH US AND RESISTWITH OUR OWN FORCES WHATEVERTHE FUTURE BRINGS. WE HAVE NORIGHT TO ENDANGER THE PEACE OFTHE WORLD, BUT WE HAVE THERIGHT TO RESIST AGGRESSION. [capi-

tals in original-ed.]

DORTICOS: What has been expressed bycompanero Fidel does not require a later dis-cussion among us, for we all agree on thiscriteria (the companeros respond affirma-tively)

MIKOYAN (Transcribed by Dorticos)

FIDEL: From our conversation yesterday,we had concluded that the Soviet Govern-ment understood the reasons we had to re-ject the inspection. That was a fundamentalissue. That should have been the commonground to talk about common actions. If wedo not agree on this, it is difficult to talkabout future plans. That is the fundamentalpolitical issue. The North Americans per-sist in obtaining a political victory. The is-sue of the inspection is to affront the CubanRevolution. They know there are no mis-siles. The verification on the high seas hasthe same effect as in the harbors. The onlydifference is the humiliating imposition thatthe U.S. Government wants to carry out forpolitical reasons.

MIKOYAN: (transcribed by Dorticos)

[Source: Institute of History, Cuba, obtainedand provided by Philip Brenner (AmericanUniversity); translation from Spanish byCarlos Osorio (National Security Archive).]

EDITOR’S NOTES

1 See Vladislav M. Zubok, “`Dismayed by the

Actions of the Soviet Union’: Mikoyan’s talks

with Fidel Castro and the Cuban leadership, No-

vember 1962,” CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995),

59, 89-92, and “Mikoyan’s Mission to Havana:

Cuban-Soviet Negotiations, November 1962,”

ibid., 93-109, 159; for the November 4 conversa-

tion, see 94-101, and for the November 5 (after-

noon) conversation, see 101-4.2 Cuban officials took part in several oral history

conferences on the Cuban Missile Crisis which

also involved former U.S. and Soviet

policymakers, including a conference in Moscow

in January 1989 and a gathering in Havana ex-

actly three years later in which Fidel Castro played

an active role. The principal organizer of the con-

ferences was James G. Blight, Thomas J. Watson

Institute of International Studies, Brown Univer-

sity. For more on Cuban participation in such

gatherings, see James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn,

and David A. Welch, Cuba on the Brink: Castro,

the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse (New

York: Pantheon, 1993), passim. Blight and the

Watson Institute, in cooperation with the National

Security Archive, a non-governmental research

institute and declassified documents repository

based at George Washington University in Wash-

ington, D.C., are also involved in organizing oral

history conferences on the Bay of Pigs events of

1961, as well as efforts to obtain Cuban sources

on such events as the U.S.-Cuban negotiations

on normalization of 1975 and Cuban interven-

tions in Africa in the 1970s.3 The reference to the West German role in re-

vealing the existence of the missiles to the U.S.

administration is obscure, as no such link is

present in most historical accounts of the Ameri-

can discovery. Soviet officials may have been

inferring a West German role from the presence

in Washington on October 16-17 of the Federal

Republic of Germany’s foreign minister, Dr.

Gerhard Schroeder, for meetings with senior

American officials, though there is no indication

that he brought any intelligence data concerning

Soviet missiles in Cuba. See, e.g., Dino A.

Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of

the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Random

House, rev. ed. [1992?]), 206, 252.4 A reference to U.S. Marine exercises, code-

named PHIBRIGLEX-62, scheduled to begin on

15 October 1962, practicing amphibious landings

of 7,500 Marines on the Caribbean island of

Viecques to overthrow a mythical dictator known

as “Ortsac”—a fact which was leaked to the press

in an obvious psychological warfare tactic. The

exercises themselves were also planned to mask

preparations for a possible U.S. Navy blockade

of Cuba. See citations in James G. Hershberg,

“Before ̀ The Missiles of October’: Did Kennedy

Plan a Military Strike Against Cuba?” in James

A. Nathan, ed., The Cuban Missile Crisis Revis-

ited (New York: St. Martin’s, 1992), 254-5, 275-

6 (fns 87, 88).5 For the text of the draft agreement, translated

from a copy in the Russian archives, see Gen.

Anatoli I. Gribkov and Gen. William Y. Smith,

Operation ANADYR: U.S. and Soviet Generals

Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis (Chicago: edi-

tion q, inc., 1994), 185-8.

FOR IMPORTANTSUBSCRIBER

INFORMATION,SEE PAGE 421


BOBBY AND THE CRISIScontinued from page 274

shine through clearly, obviously alsorepresenting that of his brother. “ThePresident felt himself deceived, anddeceived intentionally,” Dobryninquoted Robert Kennedy as saying, not-ing that he had arrived at the RussianEmbassy in “in an obviously excitedcondition” (although he later “cooleddown a bit and spoke in calmer tones”).In general, while Dobrynin resolutelydefended Moscow against RobertKennedy’s accusations, the lengthy ac-count of the meeting that he transmit-ted to the Foreign Ministry must cer-tainly have alerted the Kremlin leader-ship to just how personally affronted theKennedy brothers were, and to theirapparent determination to confront So-viet ships heading for the blockade linearound Cuba.4

Quite aside from the substance ofthe meeting, in terms of subsequentdevelopments it is worth notingDobrynin’s own astute bureaucratic re-flex in promoting his own stature in thenegotiations—forging this new directpath to the president via his brother(side-stepping normal State Department

channels), the Soviet envoy concludedby recommending that he could meetagain with Robert Kennedy to pass “inconfidential form N.S. Khrushchev’sthoughts on this matter, concerning notonly the issues which R. Kennedy hadtouched on, but a wider circle of issuesin light of the events which are goingon now.” Dobrynin may have sensedan opening in the fact that the previousSoviet Embassy official who had servedas Khrushchev’s back-channel to Rob-ert Kennedy and thence his brother,Georgi Bolshakov (ostensibly a pressattache, presumably an intelligence of-ficer), was evidently in acute disfavorin the White House for having beenused to deliver a personal assurancefrom the Soviet leader that only defen-sive weapons were being shipped toCuba. (And, in fact, Dobrynin wouldreport shortly after the crisis that a Jo-seph Alsop column in the WashingtonPost exposing Bolshakov’s role in de-ceiving the president must have beeninstigated by Robert Kennedy, for itcontained details known “only” by him:“For this reason it is clearly obvious thatthe article was prepared with the knowl-edge of, or even by orders from, Rob-ert Kennedy, who is a close friend, as is

the President, of Alsop.”5)Before stepping more deeply into

Bolshakov’s shoes with his October 27meeting with Robert Kennedy,Dobrynin hinted at his view of thepresident’s brother in a cable of Octo-ber 25 lumping him, along with Secre-tary of Defense Robert S. McNamara,National Security Adviser McGeorgeBundy, and “military men” as taking the“most militant line” in discussions at theWhite House in favor of attacking Cuba,not only destroying the Soviet missilesites but also invading the island. (Sup-posedly taking a more moderate line,the envoy reported, were Secretary ofState Dean Rusk and Treasury Secre-tary Douglas C. Dillon.) While RobertKennedy at the very outset of the crisishad made some belligerent statements(even floating the idea of staging aprovocation at Guantanamo to justifyU.S. military action6), and would laterjoin those harshly criticizing U.S. Am-bassador to the U.N. Adlai Stevensonfor suggesting the idea of giving upAmerican bases in Turkey andGuantanamo to convince the Soviets toremove their missiles, for most of thecrisis he consistently, and at times pas-sionately, argued against precipitousmilitary action: “Robert Kennedy wasa dove from the start,” wrote Arthur M.Schlesinger, Jr., citing in particular thenotes of the October 18 ExComm meet-ing, which paraphrase RFK’s use of thePearl Harbor analogy: “...He thought itwould be very, very difficult indeed forthe President if the decision were to befor an air strike, with all the memory ofPearl Harbor and with all the implica-tions this would have for us in what-ever world there would be afterward.For 175 years we had not been that kindof country. A sneak attack was not inour traditions. Thousands of Cubanswould be killed without warning, and alot of Russians too....” Robert Kennedyadvocated “action,” but also leavingMoscow “some room for maneuver topull back from their overextended po-sition in Cuba.”7 As of October 25,however, Dobrynin not only groupedRobert Kennedy with the hawks on theExComm, he judged that the president,“vacillating right now” and “heedingthe [militant] group, particularly, his

JFK LIBRARY RELEASESREMAINING TAPES FROMCUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

The John F. Kennedy Library in Bos-ton announced in October 1996 that ithad completed the declassification of,and was releasing, the remaining tapesof the White House “Excomm” (Execu-tive Committee) discussions that tookplace in the Oval Office and CabinetRoom during the Cuban Missile Crisisbetween 18 and 29 October 1962.While extracts of ExComm discussionson the first and last days of the crisis(16 and 27 October 1962) had been de-classified and released in the mid-late1980s, the bulk of the tapes had re-mained inaccessible until now, althoughsome limited releases of other tape-re-corded Excomm materials related to thecrisis took place in 1994. The newly-released tapes total 15hours and 19 minutes (27 minutes re-mained classified), making it the larg-

est single release of tape-recorded ma-terials from the Kennedy Administra-tion. In most cases, the Library releasedonly tapes rather than transcripts of thediscussions; however, a project is un-derway at Harvard University to pro-duce transcripts of the tape recordings,after sound enhancement, leading to thepublication of a collection (entitled TheKennedy Tapes), to be co-edited byProfs. Ernest R. May and PhilipZelikow. In addition, the Library simulta-neously announced the release of20,000 declassified pages of Cuba-re-lated documents from the National Se-curity Files of the Kennedy Adminis-tration. For further information of allthe above materials, contact StephanieFawcett, Kennedy Library, ColumbiaPoint, Boston, MA 02125; (617) 929-4500 (tel.); (617) 929-4538 (fax);[email protected] (e-mail).


brother,” might “undertake such anadventurist step as an invasion ofCuba.”

Dobrynin’s rather negative view ofRobert Kennedy—even in retrospect,the jaunty Soviet diplomat recalled himas as “far from being a sociable personand lack[ing] a proper senes ofhumor...[m]oreover, he was impulsiveand excitable”8—make all the more re-markable the meeting of minds thatmanaged to take place on the eveningof October 27. It is not necessary todwell on that conversation given thescrutiny it has received (and the publi-cation of Dobrynin’s record in a previ-ous Bulletin), other than to note thatKennedy’s own contemporaneous draftmemorandum of the meeting, printedbelow, offers additional evidence as tohow sensitive the agreement on theTurkish Jupiters was considered. Evenin this “top secret” memo to Secretaryof State Rusk, Kennedy appears to havepenciled out a sentence noting that “per[Rusk’s] instructions” he had toldDobrynin that the Turkish missile issue“could be resolved satisfactorily” in“four or five months.” Instead, in a bla-tant falsification of the historical record,the revised memo would leave unmodi-fied the assertion that RFK had affirmedthat it was “completely impossible forNATO to take such a step under thepresent threatening position of the So-viet Union” and “there could be no dealof any kind” regarding the Jupiters.

Robert Kennedy’s abhorrence ofthe idea of leaving a written trace of theunder-the-table “understanding” on theTurkish missiles emerges even moreclearly from Dobrynin’s account,printed in this Bulletin, of his 30 Octo-ber 1962 meeting at which the Attor-ney General insisted on handing backto Dobrynin a letter from Khrushchevto Kennedy which had explicitly af-firmed the private deal.9 RobertKennedy, for his part, had no compunc-tions about confirming, repeatedly, thata private oral “understanding” existedbetween the Soviet and U.S. leadershipson the dismantling of the Jupiter mis-siles in Turkey “within the period oftime indicated earlier,” i.e., 4-5 months.However, he added, such a sensitiveunderstanding could not be put down

on paper, even in confidential corre-spondence between heads of state:“Speaking in all candor, I myself, forexample, do not want to risk gettinginvolved in the transmission of this sortof letter, since who knows where andwhen such letters can surface or besomehow published—not now, but inthe future—and any changes in thecourse of events are possible. The ap-pearance of such a document couldcause irreparable harm to my politicalcareer in the future. This is why we re-quest that you take this letter back.”(Sensing how crucial the matter was tothe Americans, Dobrynin accepted theletter back, even without orders fromMoscow.)

Dobrynin’s cable lends contempo-raneous corroboration to the assertionin his 1995 memoirs that RobertKennedy, even in 1962, had linked hisactions in the missile crisis to his ownpolitical future in keeping secret thearrangement on the Jupiters.10 (Ofcourse, after the assassination of hisbrother in 1963, Robert F. Kennedywould indeed run for president, chal-lenging incumbent President Lyndon B.Johnson (and then Vice-PresidentHubert Humphrey) for the Democraticnomination in 1968, but he, too, wouldfall victim to an assassin, killed thatJune on the night of his victory in theCalifornia primary.)

Several additional Dobrynin re-ports of conversations with RobertKennedy after the crisis appear in thisBulletin, mostly dealing with disagree-ments and details concerning the termsof the final settlement: which Sovietweapons would have to be withdrawn,the timetable for the lifting of the U.S.blockade, disputes over inspection andU.S. overlights, etc. But a few humantouches also lighten the diplomatic dis-course, and hint at the developing rap-port between these two men who prob-ably felt that they had had the fate ofthe world in their hands.

A meeting at the Russian Embassyon the evening of November 12, forexample, began with Dobrynin’s hand-ing over a confidential oral messagefrom Khrushchev to President Kennedythat included a congratulatory note onthe results of the Congressional elec-

tions, with special reference to the de-feat of Kennedy’s erstwhile presiden-tial rival, former Vice-President Rich-ard M. Nixon, in the California guber-natorial contest.11 “When [RobertKennedy] got to the place that spoke ofNixon’s defeat in the elections,”Dobrynin reported, “he immediatelygrinned, saying: `Your chairman is areal master of colorful expression thatexpressed the true essence of the issue.Yes, we are quite satisfied with Nixon’sdefeat, and in general we are not com-plaining about the results of the elec-tion.’ It was felt that this portion of themessage was received with definite sat-isfaction.”

As Kennedy was leaving the Em-bassy after a tough hour-and-a-half dis-cussion, mostly consumed by hagglingover the U.S. demand that the Sovietstake their IL-28 bombers out of Cuba,

he glimpsed a crowd of dancing couplesin the embassy’s parlor. Realizing thatthis was a friendly welcome party ar-ranged by the embassy community forthe Bolshoi Theater troupe that had justarrived in Washington, he said that hewould like to meet with the troupe. Min-gling with and greeting almost all themembers of the troupe, he delivered awelcome speech in which he said thatthe President was preparing to attendtheir premier the following evening. Atthe end, he kissed Maya Plisetskayawhen he found out that he and she hadbeen born in the same year, month, andday, and said they would celebrate theirbirthdays in a week. None of this needsto be mentioned especially, but all in allthe behavior of Robert Kennedy, whois ordinarily quite a reserved and glumman, reflects to some degree the calmerand more normal mood in the WhiteHouse after the tense days that shookWashington, even though this fact isconcealed in various ways by Americanpropaganda.12

That an appreciation of the newprominence of the president’s brotherextended to Dobrynin’s bosses in theKremlin became evident in a privateconversation between Robert Kennedyand special Soviet envoy Anastas I.Mikoyan, a veteran member of the


CPSU Central Committee, at a dinnerparty at the home of Interior SecretaryStewart Udall on the evening of No-vember 30—an occasion one Americanpresent described as a “strange, seem-ingly unreal evening” as enemies whohad nearly engaged in thermonuclearwar only weeks war wiled away thehours in drinking, toasts, and (some-times forced) convivial conversation.13

A wily diplomatic trouble-shooter sincethe Stalin era, Mikoyan was passingthrough Washington after three weeksof difficult negotiations in Cuba withFidel Castro over the outcome of thecrisis and a day before the Udall affairhad met with President Kennedy at theWhite House.

Before the meal was served (asMikoyan related in a cable printed inthis Bulletin), Robert Kennedy invitedMikoyan into a separate room for a tete-a-tete in which he underlined the im-portance above all (“even more impor-tant than the fates of my children andyour grandchildren”) of restoring per-sonal trust between his brother andKhrushchev. Mikoyan not only agreedand assured Robert Kennedy thatKhrushchev felt the same way, but saidthat the Soviet government applaudedthe president’s “self-possession” andwillingness to compromise at “the mostdangerous moment, when the worldstood at the edge of thermonuclear war.”

Moscow, moreover, Mikoyanadded, had “noticed the positive rolethat you, the president’s brother, playedduring the confidential negotiations”between the U.S. and Soviet leadershipsduring the crisis. Robert Kennedy ex-pressed an interest in visiting the USSR,an idea which Mikoyan warmly en-dorsed, especially should relations be-tween the two rivals improve after sur-viving (and resolving) the rough Cubanpassage.

Those relations did in fact improvesomewhat in the succeeding months,leading to, among other events, John F.Kennedy’s conciliatory American Uni-versity speech in April 1963 and thesigning of U.S.-Soviet pacts on a lim-ited nuclear test ban and a hot line be-tween Washington and Moscow. Butthe post-Cuban Missile Crisis openingfor a continued rapprochement between

both Kennedy brothers andKhrushchev—a prospect the Americansthought would last through a secondKennedy Administration—ended withthe U.S. president’s assassination inDallas in November 1963 andKhrushchev’s toppling less than a yearlater.

*****

Robert F. Kennedy, Memorandumfor Dean Rusk on Meeting with

Anatoly F. Dobrynin on27 October 1962

TOP SECRETOffice of the Attorney GeneralWashington, D.C.October 30, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THESECRETARY OF STATE FROMTHE ATTORNEY GENERAL

At the request of Secretary Rusk, Itelephoned Ambassador Dobrynin atapproximately 7:15 p.m. on Saturday,October 27th. I asked him if he wouldcome to the Justice Department at aquarter of eight.

We met in my office. I told himfirst that we understood that the workwas continuing on the Soviet missilebases in Cuba. Further, I explained tohim that in the last two hours we hadfound that our planes flying over Cubahad been fired upon and that one of ourU-2’s had been shot down and the pilotkilled. I said these men were flying un-armed planes.

I told him that this was an ex-tremely serious turn in events. Wewould have to make certain decisionswithin the next 12 or possibly 24 hours.There was a very little time left. If theCubans were shooting at our planes,then we were going to shoot back. Thiscould not help but bring on further in-cidents and that he had better under-stand the full implications of this mat-ter.

He raised the point that the argu-ment the Cubans were making was thatwe were violating Cuban air space. Ireplied that if we had not been violat-ing Cuban air space then we would still

be believing what he and Khrushchevhad said—that there were no long-rangemissiles in Cuba. In any case I said thatthis matter was far more serious thanthe air space over Cuba and involvedpeoples all over the world.

I said that he had better understandthe situation and he had better commu-nicate that understanding to Mr.Khrushchev. Mr. Khrushchev and hehad misled us. The Soviet Union hadsecretly established missile bases inCuba while at the same time proclaim-ing, privately and publicly, that thiswould never be done. I said those mis-sile bases had to go and they had to goright away. We had to have a commit-ment by at least tomorrow that thosebases would be removed. This was notan ultimatum, I said, but just a state-ment of fact. He should understand thatif they did not remove those bases thenwe would remove them. His countrymight take retaliatory actions but heshould understand that before this wasover, while there might be dead Ameri-cans there would also be dead Russians.

He then asked me what offer wewere making. I said a letter had justbeen transmitted to the Soviet Embassywhich stated in substance that the mis-sile bases should be dismantled and alloffensive weapons should be removedfrom Cuba. In return, if Cuba andCastro and the Communists ended theirsubversive activities in other Centraland Latin-American countries, wewould agree to keep peace in the Car-ibbean and not permit an invasion fromAmerican soil.

He then asked me aboutKhrushchev’s other proposal dealingwith the removal of the missiles fromTurkey. I replied that there could be noquid pro quo — no deal of this kindcould be made. This was a matter thathad to be considered by NATO and thatit was up to NATO to make the deci-sion. I said it was completely impos-sible for NATO to take such a step un-der the present threatening position ofthe Soviet Union. If some time elapsed— and per your instructions, I men-tioned four or five months — I said Iwas sure that these matters could beresolved satisfactorily. [crossed out byhand—ed.]


Per your instructions I repeated thatthere could be no deal of any kind andthat any steps toward easing tensionsin other parts of the world largely de-pended on the Soviet Union and Mr.Khrushchev taking action in Cuba andtaking it immediately.

I repeated to him that this mattercould not wait and that he had bettercontact Mr. Khrushchev and have acommitment from him by the next dayto withdraw the missile bases underUnited Nations supervision for other-wise, I said, there would be drastic con-sequences.

RFK: amn

[Source: John F. Kennedy Library, Bos-ton, MA; provided to CWIHP by Prof.Peter Roman, Duquesne University,Pittsburgh, PA.]

1 Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir

of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Norton,

1969; citations from Mentor/New American Li-

brary paperback edition, 1969). Questions about

the book’s reliability deepened after another

former Kennedy aide, speechwriter Theodore

Sorensen, acknowledged that, as an uncredited

editor of the manuscript, he taken it upon himself

to delete “explicit” references to the arrangement

he and Soviet ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin

reached on the evening of 27 October 1962 re-

garding the removal of U.S. Jupiter missiles from

Turkey as part of the settlement of the crisis. Also

problematic is the fact that Robert Kennedy’s

original diary, on which the book is based, has

not been opened to researchers. Sorensen made

his confession upon being challenged by

Dobrynin at a January 1989 oral history confer-

ence on the crisis held in Moscow. See Barton J.

Bernstein, “Reconsidering the Missile Crisis:

Dealing with the Problems of the American

Jupiters in Turkey,” in James A. Nathan, ed., The

Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited (New York: St.

Martin’s 1992), 55-129, esp. 56-57, 94-96, 125-

126 fn 183.2 The most detailed account of Robert F.

Kennedy’s part in the missile crisis, and his life

generally, can be found in Arthur M. Schlesinger,

Jr., Robert F. Kennedy and His Times (Boston:

Houghton Mifflin, 1978; citations from Futura

Publications paperback edition, 1979).3 See Jim Hershberg, “Anatomy of a Controversy:

Anatoly F. Dobrynin’s Meeting with Robert F.

Kennedy, Saturday, 27 October 1962,” CWIHP

Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), 75, 77-80.4 Dobrynin’s cabled report (dated 24 October

1962) of the October 23 meeting with RFK can

be found in CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), 71-

73; see also Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days,

65-66, and Schlesinger, Jr., Robert F. Kennedy

and His Times, 553-554, which cites RFK’s un-

published memorandum of the meeting. Neither

of those accounts note RFK’s agitated state, which

Dobrynin highlighted. Dobrynin’s cable clearly

served as a principal source for the account pub-

lished in Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence:

Moscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War

Presidents (New York: Times Books, 1995), 81-

82. Dobrynin notes that he deliberately did not

sugarcoat Robert Kennedy’s critical comments

about the Kremlin leadership in order to get across

the seriousness of the situation.]5 See Dobrynin cable of 5 November 1962 in this

Bulletin.6 See transcript of 16 October 1962 ExComm

meeting, 6:30-7:55 p.m., John F. Kennedy Li-

brary, Boston, MA. The transcript quotes RFK

as wondering “...whether there is some other way

we can get involved in this through, uh,

Guantanamo Bay, or something, er, or whether

there’s some ship that, you know, sink the Maine

again or something.”7 See Schlesinger, Robert F. Kennedy and His

Times, 546, 548-49.8 Dobrynin, In Confidence, 82-83.9 See Dobrynin cable of 30 October 1962 printed

in this Bulletin. Although Robert Kennedy’s notes

for this meeting and a memorandum to Rusk have

been cited from the RFK papers by his biogra-

pher—see Schlesinger, Jr., Robert F. Kennedy and

Hist Times, 563-564—State Department histori-

ans have been unable to locate a U.S. record of

this meeting: see U.S. Department of State, For-

eign Relations of the United States [FRUS], 1961-

1963, Vol. VI: Kennedy-Khrushchev Exchanges

(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,

1996), source note on p. 189. The letter Robert

Kennedy handed back, from Khrushchev to John

F. Kennedy dated 28 October 1962, was first pub-

lished in the Spring 1992 issue of Problems of

Communism, 60-62, and also appears in FRUS,

1961-1963, Vol. VI, pp. 189—190.10 See Dobrynin, In Confidence, pp. 90-91.11 Nixon had been defeated by his Democratic

rival in the California gubernatorial elections,

upon which he announced his retirement from

politics. The relevant passage in Khrushchev’s

12 November 1962 message read: “Now the elec-

tions in your country, Mr. President, are over. You

made a statement that you were very pleased with

the results of these elections. They, the elections,

indeed, were in your favor. The success does not

upset us either—though that is of course your

internal affair. You managed to pin your politi-

cal rival, Mr. Nixon, to the mat. This did not draw

tears from our eyes either....” See James A.

Nathan, ed., The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisted

(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 290.12 See Dobrynin cable of 12 November 1962,

printed in this Bulletin, and also Schlesinger,

Robert F. Kennedy and His Times, 567-568.13 See Mikoyan report on the Udall dinner, 30

November 1962, in this Bulletin; the American

account of the party is from George Ball, The Past

Has Another Pattern: Memoirs (New York:

Norton, 1982), 308-309.

For theElectronic Bulletinand more on the lat-est findings on ColdWar history from thecommunist archives,come visit CWIHP’s

site on the WorldWide Web:

http://www.seas.gwu/nsarchive/cwihp

—and to learn aboutthe National SecurityArchive, the leadinguser of the Freedomof Information Act toobtain the declassifi-cation of Americandocuments, visit:

http://www.seas.gwu/nsarchive


by Mark Kramer

The role of the Warsaw Pact in theCuban missile crisis was negligible. Allevidence suggests that the Soviet Unionneither consulted nor even informed itsEast European allies about the installa-tion of medium-range and tacticalnuclear missiles in Cuba before the de-ployment of the former was revealed bythe U.S. government.1 Nor did the So-viet leadership consult its Warsaw Pactallies about the removal of the missiles.Although the Pact declared a joint mili-tary alert on 23 October 1962 (the dayafter President John F. Kennedy’s tele-vised revelation of the Soviet missiledeployments), the alert had no morethan a symbolic impact and was carriedout solely at Moscow’s behest.2 Thejoint alert was formally cancelled on 21November 1962, the same day that theSoviet Union ended its own unilateralalert (and a day after the U.S. navalblockade of Cuba was lifted).3 So pe-ripheral was the alliance to the SovietUnion’s handling of the crisis that it wasnot until long after the matter had beenresolved that the Soviet Prime Minis-ter, Anastas Mikoyan, bothered to in-form the East European governmentsabout the Soviet Union’s motives for de-ploying and withdrawing the missiles.4

The marginal significance of theWarsaw Pact during the Cuban missilecrisis hardly comes as a great surprise.In 1962 the Pact was still little morethan a paper organization and had notyet acquired a meaningful role in So-viet military strategy.5 Moreover, thecrisis was far outside the European the-ater, and East European leaders had re-sisted Soviet efforts to extend thealliance’s purview beyond the conti-nent. Despite fears that the showdownover Cuba might spark a NATO-War-saw Pact confrontation in Berlin, thesituation in Germany remained calmthroughout the crisis.6 Hence, thestandoff in the Caribbean was a matter

for the Soviet Union to handle on itsown, not a matter for the Warsaw Pact.

Despite the near-irrelevance of theWarsaw Pact during the crisis, theevents of October 1962 did have im-portant effects on the alliance, particu-larly on the nuclear command-and-con-trol arrangements that were establishedin the mid-1960s. This article will drawon recent disclosures from the East Ger-man, Czechoslovak, Polish, and Hun-garian archives to show how the Cubanmissile crisis influenced Warsaw Pactnuclear operations. No definitive judg-ments about this matter are yet possiblebecause the most crucial documents areall in Moscow, and the archival situa-tion in Russia is still highly unsatisfac-tory.7 Nevertheless, enough evidencehas emerged from East-Central Europeto permit several tentative conclusions.

The article will begin by briefly re-viewing the “lessons” that the Cubanmissile crisis offered for Soviet nuclearweapons deployments abroad. It willthen delineate the command-and-con-trol arrangements that were set up in themid-1960s for Warsaw Pact nuclearoperations, and examine the East Eu-ropean states’ unsuccessful efforts toalter those arrangements. The articlewill conclude with some observationsabout the legacy of the Cuban missilecrisis for Warsaw Pact nuclear opera-tions, a legacy that endured until thePact itself collapsed in 1990-91.

“Lessons” from the Missile Crisis

Several features of the Cuban mis-sile crisis were of direct relevance toSoviet nuclear deployments in EasternEurope later on. The “lessons” thatSoviet officials derived from the crisiswere of course not the only factor (oreven the most important factor) shap-ing the Warsaw Pact’s nuclear com-mand structure, but they seem to havebeen of considerable influence, at leastimplicitly. Although Soviet leaders had

been concerned well before the Cubanmissile crisis about the difficulty of re-taining secure control over nuclearweapons and about the danger of unau-thorized actions, the crisis put theserisks into a whole new light.8 By un-derscoring how easily control could belost, the crisis inevitably bolsteredMoscow’s determination to ensure strictcentralized command over all nuclearoperations, including nuclear operationsconducted by the Warsaw Pact.

One of the most disconcerting les-sons of the Cuban missile crisis fromthe Soviet perspective was the poten-tial for nuclear weapons to be misusedif the aims of local actors were not iden-tical to Soviet goals. It is now knownthat at the height of the crisis FidelCastro sent a top-secret cable to Mos-cow urging the Soviet Union to launcha nuclear strike against the United Statesif U.S. forces invaded Cuba.9 Castroapparently had been led to believe thatthe Soviet Union would be willing togo to war—and risk its own destruc-tion—in defense of Cuba. NikitaKhrushchev’s response to Castro’s pleaindicates that the Soviet leader had nointention of ordering the use of nuclearweapons, regardless of what happenedto Cuba.10

For Khrushchev, this episode wasespecially unnerving because he ini-tially had given serious considerationto providing Castro with direct com-mand over Soviet forces in Cuba, in-cluding the nuclear-capable Frog(“Luna”) missiles and Il-28 aircraft.11

(Only the medium-range SS-4 and SS-5 missiles would have been left underMoscow’s command.) As it turned out,Khrushchev decided not to give Castroany direct jurisdiction over Soviet tac-tical nuclear forces; indeed, the drafttreaty on military cooperation betweenthe Soviet Union and Cuba, which wasdue to take effect once the presence ofthe Soviet missiles in Cuba was pub-licly announced by Moscow and Ha-

“Lessons” of the Cuban Missile Crisis forWarsaw Pact Nuclear Operations


vana later that fall, would have left the“military units of the two states underthe command of their respective gov-ernments.”12 Even so, the Cubanleader’s message on 26 October stillstruck a raw nerve in Moscow.13 It wasa vivid reminder of the dangers thatmight have resulted if the Soviet Unionhad delegated any responsibility fornuclear operations.

A related lesson about the dangersposed by local actors pertained to therole of the commander of Soviet forcesin Cuba, Army-General Issa Pliev, whowas chosen for the post because of hislong-standing and very close friendshipwith both Khrushchev and the SovietDefense Minister, Marshal RodionMalinovskii.14 At no time during thecrisis did Pliev have authority to orderthe use of either medium-range or tac-tical nuclear missiles, but it is nowknown that several weeks before thecrisis—in the late summer of 1962—Malinovskii had considered the possi-bility of giving Pliev pre-delegated au-thority to order the use of tactical mis-siles against invading U.S. troops ifPliev’s lines of communication withMoscow were severed and all othermeans of defense against an invasionhad proven insufficient. A written or-der to this effect was prepared on 8 Sep-tember 1962, but in the end Malinovskiideclined to sign it.15 Thus, at the timeof the crisis Pliev had no independentauthority to order the use of nuclearweapons or even to order that nuclearwarheads, which were stored separatelyfrom the missiles, be released for pos-sible employment. The limitations onPliev’s scope of action during the crisiswere reinforced by two cables transmit-ted by Malinovskii on 22 and 25 Octo-ber, which “categorically” prohibitedany use of nuclear weapons under anycircumstances without explicit autho-rization from Moscow.16

The strictures imposed by the So-viet leadership held up well during thecrisis, as the procedural safeguards fornuclear operations proved sufficient toforestall any untoward incidents.17 Forthe most part, Khrushchev’s andMalinovskii’s faith in Pliev was well-founded. Nevertheless, it is clear thatPliev wanted to ease some of the pro-

cedural restrictions—at least for tacti-cal missiles—even after he received thetwo telegrams that “categorically” for-bade him to order the issuance or useof nuclear weapons without express au-thorization. On 26 October he sent acable to Moscow in which he apparentlymentioned that Castro wanted him toprepare for a nuclear strike and that, asa result, he had decided it was time tomove nuclear warheads closer to themissiles (though without actually issu-ing them to the missile units). Pliev thenrequested that his decision be approvedand that he be given due authority toorder the preparation of tactical missilesfor launch if, as appeared imminent,U.S. troops invaded the island.18 So-viet leaders immediately turned downboth of his requests and reemphasizedthat no actions involving nuclear weap-ons were to be undertaken without di-rect authorization from Moscow.19

Still, the very fact that Pliev soughtto have the restrictions lifted, and hisseeming willingness to use tacticalnuclear weapons if necessary, provideda sobering indication of the risks en-tailed in giving discretion to local com-manders. The risks would have beenespecially acute in this instance becausethere were no technical safeguards onthe nuclear weapons in Cuba to serveas a fallback in case Pliev (or someoneelse) attempted to circumvent the pro-cedural safeguards.20 This is not to saythat it would have been easy for Plievto evade the procedural limits—to doso he would have had to obtain coop-eration from troops all along the chainof command—but there was no techni-cal barrier per se to unauthorized ac-tions.

Thus, one of the clear lessons ofthe crisis was the need not only to main-tain stringent procedural safeguards forall Soviet nuclear forces, but also toequip those forces with elaborate tech-nical devices that would prevent un-authorized or accidental launches. Thisapplied above all to nuclear weaponsdeployed abroad, where the lines ofcommunication were more vulnerableto being severed or disrupted.21

One further lesson from the Cubanmissile crisis, which reinforced the per-ceived need for strict, centralized con-

trol over all nuclear operations, was therole that accidents played. The mostconspicuous instance came on 27 Oc-tober when an American U-2 reconnais-sance aircraft was shot down overCuba.22 The rules of engagement forSoviet troops in Cuba did not permit thedowning of American planes exceptthose carrying out an attack.23 Whenthe U-2 was shot down, no one in Mos-cow was quite sure what had hap-pened—Khrushchev and most othersmistakenly thought that Castro had or-dered Soviet troops to fire at the plane—but everyone was certain that furtherincidents of this sort might cause thecrisis to spin out of control.24 The risksposed by accidents would have beenespecially great if the local commander(i.e., Pliev) had been given independentauthority to order the use of nuclearweapons. After all, Pliev and other of-ficers based in Cuba, whose lives weredirectly at risk during the crisis, werenaturally inclined to overreact to unin-tended “provocations” from the oppos-ing side. To the extent that such over-reactions could not be avoided in fu-ture crises, it was essential that the con-sequences be minimized and that fur-ther escalation be prevented. Obvi-ously, it would be vastly more difficultto regain any semblance of control iflocal actors “accidentally” resorted tothe use of nuclear weapons.

Hence, the accidents that occurredduring the Cuban missile crisis under-scored the need for rigid safeguards,both procedural and technical, to pre-clude the use of Soviet nuclear weap-ons except in the most dire emergency.This lesson, like the others thatKhrushchev and his colleagues derivedfrom the crisis, survived the change ofleadership in Moscow in October 1964.Although Leonid Brezhnev alteredmany aspects of Khrushchev’s militarypolicies, he was just as determined ashis predecessor to retain stringent po-litical control over Soviet nuclearforces.

Nuclear Operations andthe Warsaw Pact

Nuclear weapons first became anissue for the Warsaw Pact in mid-1958


when, allegedly in response to deploy-ments by NATO, Khrushchev warnedthat the Pact would be “compelled byforce of circumstance to consider sta-tioning [tactical nuclear] missiles in theGerman Democratic Republic, Poland,and Czechoslovakia.”25 Shortly there-after, the Czechoslovak, East German,and Polish armed forces began receiv-ing nuclear-capable aircraft and surface-to-surface missiles from the SovietUnion.26 The Bulgarian and Hungar-ian armies also soon obtained nuclear-capable aircraft and missiles from Mos-cow; and even the Romanian militarywas eventually supplied with nuclear-capable Frog-7 and Scud-B missiles. Inall cases, the deployment of these de-livery vehicles was well under way bythe time of the Cuban missile crisis.

The wartime command-and-con-trol arrangements for the new East Eu-ropean weapons were still in flux in1962, and a variety of options were un-der consideration. One such option hadbeen alluded to in 1959 by the EastGerman government, which announcedthat it would “request its allies to place[nuclear] missile weapons at its dis-posal” if the West German governmentgained a role in NATO’s nuclear opera-tions.27 At the time, Soviet officialshad reacted warily to this proposal, buthad not dismissed it out of hand.Moscow’s stance changed, however, inthe aftermath of the Cuban missile cri-sis. From then on, all wartime com-mand-and-control arrangements for al-lied nuclear operations were made to fita single pattern. The East Europeancountries’ weapons were still officiallydescribed as components of the “War-saw Pact’s joint nuclear forces” andwere used for simulated nuclear strikesduring Pact exercises, but all nuclearwarheads for the delivery systems re-mained under exclusive Soviet control,and the delivery vehicles themselveswould have come under direct Sovietcommand if they had ever beenequipped with nuclear warheads duringa crisis. Moreover, the thousands oftactical nuclear weapons deployed bySoviet forces on East European terri-tory were not subject to any sort of“dual-key” arrangement along the linesthat NATO established in the mid-

1960s. Whenever Warsaw Pact exer-cises included combat techniques fornuclear warfare (as they routinely didfrom early 1962 on), the decision onwhen to “go nuclear” was left entirelyto the Soviet High Command and po-litical leadership.28 In every respect,then, the East European governmentswere denied any say in the use of thePact’s “joint” nuclear arsenal.

The exclusivity of Soviet com-mand was reinforced by secret agree-ments that the Soviet Union concludedin the early to mid-1960s with Czecho-slovakia, East Germany, Hungary, andPoland regarding the storage of nuclearwarheads in those countries. Althoughall the agreements were bilateral, theywere described as coming “within theframework of the Warsaw Pact.” Thefirst such agreements were signed withEast Germany and Czechoslovakia be-fore the Cuban missile crisis. The So-viet-East German agreements, signed atvarious intervals in the early 1960s,covered some 16 storage sites, all ofwhich were controlled exclusively byspecial troops assigned to the Group ofSoviet Forces in Germany.29 The EastGerman authorities had no say at all inthe location or maintenance of thesefacilities, not to mention the use of themunitions stored there.

Soviet agreements with Czechoslo-vakia were somewhat more compli-cated because no Soviet troops had beenpresent on Czechoslovak territory sincethe end of 1945. Two preliminaryagreements were signed in August 1961and February 1962 entitling the SovietUnion to dispatch nuclear warheadsimmediately to Czechoslovakia in theevent of an emergency.30 After theCuban missile crisis, those two agree-ments were supplanted by a much morefar-reaching “Treaty Between the Gov-ernments of the USSR and CSSR onMeasures to Increase the CombatReadiness of Missile Forces,” whichwas signed by Malinovskii and hisCzechoslovak counterpart, Army-Gen-eral Bohumir Lomsky, in December1965.31 The treaty provided for thepermanent stationing of Soviet nuclearwarheads at three sites in westernCzechoslovakia.

This third agreement with Czecho-

slovakia was concluded just after theSoviet Union had worked out a similararrangement with Hungary.32 The So-viet-Hungarian agreement was signedby Brezhnev and the Hungarian leader,Janos Kadar, and was kept secret fromalmost all other Hungarian officials.Much the same was true of an agree-ment that the Soviet Union concludedwith Poland in early 1967.33 Only afew top Polish officials were permittedto find out about the document.

The Soviet agreements with allfour countries covered nuclear war-heads slated for use on delivery vehiclesbelonging to Soviet troops stationed inthose countries. Some of the warheadswere also intended for weapons de-ployed by the local armies, but in thatcase the delivery vehicles would havebeen transferred to direct Soviet com-mand. Under the new agreements EastEuropean officials had no role in the useof the Pact’s “joint” nuclear arsenal, norany control over the reinforced storagebunkers for nuclear warheads (or eventhe housing for elite units assigned toguard the bunkers). A senior East Eu-ropean military official later confirmedthat “the procedures for the defense andprotection of these special-purpose stor-age centers for nuclear warheads weresuch that no one from our side had per-mission to enter, and even Soviet offi-cials who were not directly responsiblefor guarding and operating the build-ings were not allowed in.”34

Thus, by the late 1960s the Sovietand East European governments hadforged a nuclear command-and-controlstructure for the Warsaw Pact that gaveexclusive say to the Soviet Union. Evenbefore the Cuban missile crisis, Sovietleaders had been inclined to move inthis direction, but the crisis greatly ac-celerated the trend and effectively ruledout anything less than complete controlin Moscow.

Intra-Pact Debate on Nuclear“Sharing”

The effects of the Cuban missilecrisis could also be felt, if only implic-itly, when the Soviet Union had to dealwith complaints from its allies about theWarsaw Pact’s nuclear arrangements.


The lack of East European input provedunsatisfactory to several of the alliedgovernments, who urged that they begiven some kind of role in nuclear-re-lease authorization. Their concernswere prompted in part by changes inSoviet military doctrine in the mid-1960s, which seemed to open the wayfor a nuclear or conventional war con-fined to Europe. Under Khrushchev,Soviet military doctrine had long beenpredicated on the assumption that anywar in Europe would rapidly escalateto an all-out nuclear exchange betweenthe superpowers; but by the timeKhrushchev was ousted in October1964, Soviet military theorists had al-ready begun to imply that a Europeanconflict need not escalate to the levelof strategic nuclear war.35 UnderBrezhnev, Soviet military analyses oflimited warfare in Europe, including theselective use of tactical nuclear weap-ons, grew far more explicit and elabo-rate.36 Although this doctrinal shiftmade sense from the Soviet perspective,it stirred unease among East Europeanleaders, who feared that their countriesmight be used as tactical nuclear battle-grounds without their having the slight-est say in it.

The issue became a source of con-tention at the January 1965 meeting ofthe Warsaw Pact’s Political Consulta-tive Committee (PCC), where the as-sembled leaders discussed NATO’splans to create a Multi-Lateral Force(MLF) that would supposedly give WestGermany access to nuclear-armed mis-siles. The PCC warned that if an MLFwere formed and the West Germanswere included, the Warsaw Pact wouldhave to resort to “defensive measuresand corresponding steps.”37 The na-ture of these “corresponding steps” wasnever specified, but Romanian andCzechoslovak officials at the meetingmaintained that the obvious solutionwas for the Soviet Union to grant itsWarsaw Pact allies a direct say in theuse of nuclear weapons stationed onEast European soil.38 The Romanianswere especially insistent on having re-sponsibility shared for all Warsaw Pactnuclear systems, including those de-ployed with the various Groups of So-viet Forces. Brezhnev and his col-

leagues, however, were averse to anysteps that would even marginally erodethe Soviet Union’s exclusive authorityto order nuclear strikes, and it soon be-came clear during the meeting that So-viet views on such matters would pre-vail. As a result, the PCC communiquesimply called for both German states toforswear nuclear weapons, proposed thecreation of a nuclear-free zone in cen-tral Europe, and advocated a freeze onall nuclear stockpiles.39 The implica-tion was that arrangements within theWarsaw Pact were best left unchanged.

That stance was reaffirmed over thenext few months in a series of conspicu-ous Soviet declarations that “the War-saw Pact is dependent on the Soviet stra-tegic missile forces” and that “the se-curity of all socialist countries is reli-ably guaranteed by the nuclear missilestrength of the Soviet Union.”40 (Ital-ics added by the author.) The samemessage was conveyed later in the yearby the joint “October Storm” militaryexercises in East Germany, which fea-tured simulated nuclear strikes autho-rized solely by the USSR.41 In themeantime, the Soviet monopoly overallied nuclear weapons procedures wasbeing reinforced by the series of agree-ments signed with Czechoslovakia, EastGermany, Hungary, and Poland, as dis-cussed above. The codification of ex-clusive Soviet control over nuclearweapons deployed in the other WarsawPact countries all but eliminated anybasis for the East European govern-ments to seek a role in the alliance’snuclear command structure.

Yet even after the Soviet Uniontried to put the matter to rest, contro-versy persisted within the Warsaw Pactabout the allocation of responsibility fortactical nuclear weapons. At a closedmeeting of Pact leaders in East Berlinin February 1966, Romania againpressed for greater East European par-ticipation in all aspects of allied mili-tary planning, and was again re-buffed.42 A few months later, theCzechoslovak Defense Minister, Army-General Bohumir Lomsky, publiclydeclared that the East European statesshould be given increased responsibil-ity for the full range of issues confront-ing the Warsaw Pact.43 That same

week, a detailed Romanian proposal formodifications to the alliance was leakedto the French Communist newspaper,L’Humanite; the document called for,among other things, an East Europeanrole in any decisions involving the po-tential use of nuclear weapons.44 Sub-sequently, at the July 1966 session ofthe PCC in Bucharest, officials fromRomania, Czechoslovakia, and Hun-gary renewed their bid for “greaterrights of co-determination in planningand implementing common coalitionmatters,” including (by implication) theuse of nuclear weapons.45

As on previous occasions, how-ever, the Soviet Union resisted what-ever pressure was exerted for the shar-ing of nuclear-release authority. In Sep-tember 1966, a few months after theBucharest conference, the Warsaw Pactconducted huge “Vltava” exercises,which included simulated nuclearstrikes under exclusive Soviet con-trol.46 The same arrangement was pre-served in all subsequent Pact maneu-vers involving simulated nuclear ex-changes. Thus, well before the signingof the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treatyput a symbolic end to the whole nuclear-sharing debate, the Soviet Union hadfirmly established its exclusive, central-ized control over the Warsaw Pact’s“joint” nuclear forces and operations.

The Lessons of the Crisis andAllied Nuclear Arrangements

The legacy of the Cuban missilecrisis helped ensure that the intra-War-saw Pact debate in the mid-1960s didnot bring about any change in thealliance’s nuclear command-and-con-trol structure. Had it not been for thedangers that were so clearly revealedby the events of October 1962, Sovietleaders might have been willing to con-sider an arrangement for the WarsawPact similar to the “dual-key” systemthat NATO adopted. When Operation“Anadyr” was first being planned in thelate spring of 1962, Khrushchev hadflirted with the idea of giving FidelCastro broad command over Soviet tac-tical nuclear weapons in Cuba as wellas over all non-nuclear forces on theisland. Ultimately, Khrushchev decided


not to share or delegate any responsi-bility for the nuclear-capable weaponsbased in Cuba, but the very fact that theissue was considered at all suggests thatif the Cuban missile crisis had not in-tervened, the Soviet Union might havebeen receptive to some form of nuclear“sharing” with its East European allies.Indeed, a “dual-key” arrangement forthe Warsaw Pact, which would not haveprovided any independent authority tothe East European countries, could eas-ily have been justified as a response toNATO’s policy and as a useful meansof strengthening allied cohesion. Butafter October 1962, when Soviet lead-ers evidently drew a number of lessonsabout the risks of even sharing, muchless delegating, nuclear authority, theprospects of adopting a “dual-key” sys-tem for the Warsaw Pact essentiallyvanished.

Although Moscow’s willingness toshare control over the Warsaw Pact’s“joint” nuclear arsenal would have beensharply constrained even before Octo-ber 1962 by the lack of permissive-ac-tion links (PALs) and other use-denialmechanisms on Soviet nuclear weap-ons, that factor alone would not havebeen decisive if the Cuban missile cri-sis had not occurred. After all, whenSoviet officials seriously contemplatedallotting partial nuclear authority toCastro in 1962, that was long beforeSoviet tactical weapons were equippedwith PALs. The physical separation ofwarheads from delivery vehicles, as hadbeen planned for the missiles based inCuba, was regarded at the time as a suf-ficient (if cumbersome) barrier againstunauthorized actions. That approachhad long been used for tactical weap-ons deployed by Soviet forces in East-ern Europe, and it would have been justas efficacious if a “dual-key” systemhad been adopted—that is, if the EastEuropean armies had been given con-trol over the Pact’s nuclear-capable de-livery vehicles. After the Cuban mis-sile crisis, however, the option of rely-ing solely on the physical separation ofwarheads and delivery vehicles wasdeemed inadequate. In the latter halfof the 1960s, the Soviet Union beganincorporating electronic use-denial fea-tures into its strategic missiles, and the

same was true of Soviet tactical weap-ons by the early to mid-1970s.47 Con-cerns in Moscow about the physicalsecurity of nuclear weapons were hardlynegligible before October 1962—in partbecause of the possibility that requisiteprocedures might not be followed—butit was not until after the Cuban missilecrisis that Soviet leaders fully appreci-ated the magnitude of this risk.

The Cuban missile crisis alsoheightened Soviet concerns about theparticular dangers posed by crises. Tobe sure, Soviet leaders were hardlycomplacent before October 1962 aboutthe need to maintain tight political con-trol over nuclear operations; indeed, thestringent centralization of nuclear com-mand was a consistent theme in Sovietmilitary planning.48 Even so, it wasnot until after the Cuban missile crisis—and especially in light of the unexpectedinterventions by Fidel Castro—that thisfactor became a paramount reason todeny any share of nuclear-release au-thorization to the East European gov-ernments. Although East European of-ficials could not have ordered the useof nuclear weapons on their own, theymight have inadvertently (or deliber-ately) taken steps in a crisis that wouldhave caused NATO governments to be-lieve that a Warsaw Pact nuclear strikewas forthcoming, regardless of whatactual Soviet intentions were. That, inturn, might have triggered a preemptivenuclear attack by NATO. Only by ex-cluding the East European states alto-gether from the nuclear-release processcould the Soviet Union avoid the unin-tended escalation of a crisis.

The risks posed by a “dual-key”arrangement could have been mitigatedif the Soviet Union had built in extraprocedural and technical safeguards, butthis in turn would have created opera-tional problems for Soviet troops whomight one day have been ordered to usethe weapons. If a future conflict hadbecome so dire that Soviet leaders haddecided to authorize the employment oftactical nuclear weapons, they wouldhave wanted their orders to be carriedout as fast as possible, before the situa-tion on the battlefield had changed.49

By contrast, East European political andmilitary officials might have been hesi-

tant about ordering the nuclear destruc-tion of a site in Western Europe, notleast because the launch of nuclearweapons against West European targetsmight well have provoked retaliatorystrikes by NATO against East Europeansites. The problem would have beenespecially salient in the case of EastGerman officials who would have beenasked to go along with nuclear strikesagainst targets in West Germany. Thus,even though Soviet officials could havedeveloped a hedge against the risks thatemerged during the Cuban missile cri-sis, the safeguards needed for this pur-pose would have been extremely bur-densome, depriving the Pact of the abil-ity to respond in a timely manner. Fromthe Soviet perspective, it made far moresense to circumvent the problem en-tirely by eschewing any form of sharedauthority.

It is ironic that the Cuban missilecrisis, which barely involved the War-saw Pact at all, would have had such animportant long-term effect on the alli-ance. It is also ironic that the actions ofa third party, Fidel Castro, posed oneof the greatest dangers during an eventthat has traditionally been depicted as abilateral U.S.-Soviet confrontation. Notonly must the Cuban missile crisis bethought of as a “triangular” showdown;its repercussions can now be seen tohave been at least as great for Sovietallies, notably Cuba and Eastern Eu-rope, as for the Soviet Union itself.

1 This statement is based on a perusal of docu-ments from the East German, Czechoslovak, andPolish archives. See, e.g., “Odvolanie opatreni vzavislosti s usnesenim VKO UV KSC, 25.10.62(Karibska krize),” 25 October 1962 (Top Secret),in Vojensky Historicky Archiv (VHA) Praha,Fond (F.) Ministerstvo Narodni Obrany (MNO)CSSR, 1962, Operacni sprava Generalniho stabucs. armady (GS/OS), 8/25.2 “V shtabe Ob”edinennykh Vooruzhenykh Silstran Varshavskogo Dogovora,” Pravda (Mos-cow), 23 October 1962, p. 1. For the effects ofthe alert from 27 October through 23 November,see the series of top-secret memoranda to theCPSU CC Presidium from Soviet Defense Min-ister Rodion Malinovskii and the Chief of theSoviet General Staff, Mikhail Zakharov, 5 No-vember 1962, 17 November 1962, and 24 No-vember 1962, in Tsentr Khraneniya SovremennoiDokumentatsii (TsKhSD), Moscow, F. 89, Opis’(Op.) 28, Delo (D.) 14, Listy (Ll.) 1-8.3 “V shtabe Ob”edinennykh vooruzhenykh silstran Varshavskogo Dogovora,” Krasnaya zvezda


(Moscow), 22 November 1962, p. 1.4 See the account by the Hungarian charged’affaires in Washington, D.C. in October 1962(who later defected), Janos Radvanyi, Hungaryand the Superpowers: The 1956 Revolution andRealpolitik (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press,1972), p. 137. China, too, was not informed inadvance about either the placement or the with-drawal of the missiles in Cuba. This point wasnoted by Chinese leaders during the bitter Sino-Soviet polemics in 1963. See, for example, theexchanges in “On the Statement of the Commu-nist Party of the USA,” Peking Review (Beijing),15 March 1963, pp. 11-13; “Otkrytoe pis’moTsentral’nogo Komiteta KommunisticheskoiPartii Sovetskogo Soyuza partiinymorganizatsiyam i vsem kommunistam SovetskogoSoyuza,” Pravda (Moscow), 14 July 1963, p.1;and “Statement by the Spokesman of the ChineseGovernment: A Comment on the SovietGovernment’s Statement of August 21,” PekingReview (Beijing), 6 September 1963, pp. 7-11.See also the article by M.Y. Prozumenschikov inthis issue of the Bulletin.5 “Razvitie voennogo iskusstva v usloviyakhvedeniya raketno-yadernoi voiny posovremennym predstavleniyam,” Report No.24762s (TOP SECRET) from Col.-General P.Ivashutin, chief of the Soviet General Staff’s MainIntelligence Directorate, to Marshal M. V.Zakharov, head of the General Staff MilitaryAcademy, 28 August 1964, in Tsentral’nyi arkhivMinisterstva oborony (TsAMO), Delo (D.) 158,esp. Listy (L.) 352-3, 411-2, 423, and 400. I amgrateful to Matthew Evangelista for providing mewith a copy of this document.6 This point is stressed in the top-secret cablesadduced in note 2 supra.7 On the state of the Russian archives, see MarkKramer, “Archival Research in Moscow:Progress and Pitfalls,” Cold War InternationalHistory Bulletin, No. 3 (Fall 1993), pp. 1, 14-37.8 “Razvitie voennogo iskusstva v usloviyakhvedeniya raketno-yadernoi voiny posovremennym predstavleniyam,” pp. 332-3.9 “Obmen poslaniyami mezhdu N. S.Khrushchevym i F. Kastro v dni Karibskogokrizisa 1962 goda,” Vestnik Ministerstvainostrannykh del SSSR (Moscow), No. 24 (31December 1990), pp. 67-80, esp. pp. 71-73. Thiscorrespondence was first released in November1990 by the Cuban, not Soviet, government. Fi-del Castro was seeking to rebut a claim made in aportion of Nikita Khrushchev’s memoirs that ap-peared in English for the first time in 1990.Khrushchev had recalled that Castro was urginghim to launch a preemptive nuclear attack againstthe United States, whereas Castro insisted (cor-rectly) that he had called for an all-out Sovietnuclear attack against the United States only ifU.S. troops invaded Cuba. Soon after this corre-spondence was published in Spanish in the 23November 1990 issue of the Havana dailyGranma (and in English in the weekly edition ofGranma), the Soviet government realized it hadnothing to gain by keeping the Russian versionsecret any longer. Hence, the full correspondencewas published in the Soviet Foreign Ministry’sin-house journal, as cited here. [Ed. note: ForKhrushchev’s version, see Khrushchev Remem-bers: The Glasnost Tapes, trans. and ed. by Jerrold

L. Schecter with Vyacheslav V. Luchkov (Bos-ton: Little, Brown, and Co., 1990), pp. 170-83,esp. pp. 177, 183; for an English translation ofthe correspondence and an accompanying com-mentary in Granma, see Appendix 2 of James G.Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch (withthe assistance of David Lewis), Cuba on theBrink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the SovietCollapse (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993), pp.474-91; the key letter, of Castro to Khrushchevon 26 October 1962, is on pp. 481-2.]10 “Obmen poslaniyami mezhdu N. S.Khrushchevym i F. Kastro v dni Karibskogokrizisa 1962 goda,” pp. 73-5. This point was re-emphasized to Castro by Prime Minister Mikoyanduring their conversations in November 1962.See “Zapis’ besedy A. I. Mikoyana s prem’er-ministrom revolyutsionnogo pravitel’stva KubyF. Kastro,” 12 November 1962 (Top Secret) and“O besedakh A. I. Mikoyana s F. Kastro,” 20November 1962 (Top Secret), both published inMezhdunarodnaya zhizn’ (Moscow), Nos. 11-12(November-December 1992), pp. 143-7 and 147-50, respectively. See esp. p. 149.11 It should be noted, however, that a decision tosend 901-A4 nuclear warheads and 407-N6bombs to Cuba for the Frogs and Il-28s was notfinalized until 8 September 1962, by which timeKhrushchev may already have changed his mindabout the command-and-control arrangements.See “Nachal’niku 12 glavnogo upravleniyaMinisterstva oborony,” 8 September 1962 (TopSecret), Memorandum from Defense Minister R.Malinovskii and Chief of the General Staff M.Zakharov, in TsAMO, “Dokumenty pomeropriyatiyu ‘Anadyr’,” F. 16, Op. 3753. It iseminently possible that the nuclear-capable weap-ons would not have been equipped with nuclearwarheads if they had been placed under Castro’scommand.12 “Dogovor mezhdu pravitel’stvom RespublikiKuby i pravitel’stvom Soyuza SovetskikhSotsialisticheskikh Respublik o voennomsotrudnichestve i vzaimnoi oborone,” undated,Article 10.13 See Nikita S. Khrushchev, Vospominaniya(Moscow: typescript, 1966-1970), Vol. IV,“Karibskii krizis,” esp. p. 12. I am grateful toKhrushchev’s son, Sergei, for providing me witha copy of the 3,600-page transcript of his father’smemoirs. For an English translation of most ofthe account about the Cuban missile crisis, seeKhrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes,trans. and ed. by Jerrold L. Schecter andVyacheslav V. Luchkov (Boston: Little, Brownand Company, 1990), pp. 170-83.14 Maj.-General (ret.) V. Makarevskii, “Oprem’ere N. S. Khrushcheve, marshale G. K.Zhukove i generale I. A. Plieve,” Mirovayaekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya (Mos-cow), Nos. 8-9 (August-September 1994), p. 197.Makarevskii served for many years under Pliev’scommand. Pliev’s close friendship withKhrushchev and Malinovskii is overlooked in thejaundiced assessment offered by General AnatoliiGribkov in Operation ANADYR: U.S. and So-viet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis(Chicago: Edition Q, 1994), pp. 25-6.15 “Komanduyushchemu gruppoi sovetskikhvoisk na o. Kuba,” 8 September 1962 (Top Se-cret), in TsAMO, “Dokumenty po meropriyatiyu

‘Anadyr’,” GSU GSh, F. 16, Op. 3753; repro-duced in Operation ANADYR, p. 183. For a dis-cussion of this matter and relevant citations, seeMark Kramer, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons, So-viet Command Authority, and the Cuban MissileCrisis,” Cold War International History Bulletin,No. 3 (Fall 1993), pp. 40-46, esp. 42-3, 46.16 “Trostnik — tovarishchu Pavlovu,” No. 4/389(Top Secret) from R. Malinovskii (Direktor), 22October 1962, reproduced in Operation ANADYR,p. 181. See also Sergei Pavlenko, “Bezymyannyemotostrelki otpravlyalis’ na Kubu ‘stoyat’nasmert’,” Krasnaya zvezda (Moscow), 29 De-cember 1994, p. 4. For further discussion andrelevant citations, see Kramer, “Tactical NuclearWeapons, Soviet Command Authority, and theCuban Missile Crisis,” pp. 45-6.17 In early 1994, General Anatolii Gribkovclaimed that Pliev not only wanted to move sev-eral nuclear warheads out of storage on 26 Octo-ber 1962, but had actually issued orders to thateffect without authorization from Moscow. SeeOperation ANADYR, p. 63. Gribkov also elabo-rated on this assertion in a seminar organized bythe Cold War International History Project andheld at the Woodrow Wilson International Cen-ter for Scholars on 5 April 1994. However, heproduced no evidence to back up his assertionthat warheads were actually moved out, and in alengthy interview in Moscow on 29 September1994 he said he could not be certain that Plievhad given such an order. Gribkov’s initial claimhad already been contradicted by the Soviet of-ficer who was in charge of the “central nuclearbase” (i.e., the storage site for all nuclear war-heads) in Cuba during the crisis, Colonel NikolaiBeloborodov, who testified in late 1992 that“nuclear weapons could have been used only ifthe missile officers had received orders via theirown chain-of-command from the General Staff,and only if we, the officers responsible for stor-ing and operating warheads, had received our ownspecial codes. At no point did I receive any sig-nals to issue warheads for either the medium-range missiles or the tactical weapons.” SeeLieut.-Colonel Anatolii Dokuchaev, “100-dnevnyi yadernyi kruiz,” Krasnaya zvezda (Mos-cow), 6 November 1992, p. 2. Beloborodov re-emphasized this point several times during an in-terview in Moscow on 28 September 1994: “Nonuclear munitions of any type, whether for themedium-range or the tactical weapons, were evermoved (byly dostavleny) out of storage during thecrisis. Nor could they have been moved withoutmy knowledge.” Beloborodov’s account wasendorsed by General Leonid Garbuz, the deputycommander of Soviet forces in Cuba in 1962, inan interview that same day in Moscow.18 The exact contents of Pliev’s telegram on the26th are unknown, but the numbering of telegramsthat are available makes clear that he sent at leasttwo that day, the second of which is the one inquestion. (The first of his telegrams on the 26th,which was declassified in October 1992, pertainedonly to air defense operations against possibleU.S. air strikes.) The text of the Sovietleadership’s response to Pliev’s second cable isavailable (see next note), and, combined with ret-rospective comments by ex-Soviet officials, itsuggests that Pliev referred to Castro’s efforts andrequested authority to move the warheads (though


not yet authority for actual use). For greater de-tail about this issue, see Mark Kramer, “The Cu-ban Missile Crisis and Nuclear Proliferation,”Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Autumn 1995),pp. 171-9.19 “Trostnik — tovarishchu Pavlovu,” No. 76639(Top Secret), 27 October 1962, reproduced inOperation ANADYR, p. 182. See also Kramer,“Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Soviet CommandAuthority, and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” p. 46;and Pavlenko, “Bezymyannye motostrelkiotpravlyalis’ na Kubu,” p. 4.20 Marshal V. F. Tolubko, “Glavnaya raketnayasila strany,” Krasnaya zvezda (Moscow), 19 No-vember 1963, p. 1.21 See Khrushchev’s comments on this point inVospominaniya, Vol. IV, “Karibskii krizis,” p. 18.22 Army-General Yu. P. Maksimov et al., eds.,Raketnye voiska strategicheskogo naznacheniya:Voenno-istoricheskii trud (Moscow: Nauka,1992), pp. 109-10. Detailed first-hand accountsby high-ranking Soviet air defense personnel whotook part in the shootdown are available in “Voinaozhidalas’ s rassvetom,” Krasnaya zvezda (Mos-cow), 13 May 1993, p. 2.23 The rules of engagement are spelled out brieflyin the cable from Malinovskii to Pliev, as cited inDokuchaev, “100-dnevnyi yadernyi kruiz,” p. 2.More elaborate rules are specified in documentsnow stored in the Russian General Staff archive;see “Dokumenty po meropriyatiyu ‘Anadyr’,” inGSU GSh, F. 16, Op. 3753, D. 1, Korebka 3573.24 Khrushchev, Vospominaniya, Vol. IV,“Karibskii krizis,” pp. 17-8.25 “Vystuplenie glavy Sovetskoi delegatsiiPredsedatelya Soveta Ministrov SSSR N. S.Khrushcheva na Soveshchanii PoliticheskogoKonsul’tativnogo Komiteta gosudarstv-uchast-nikov Varshavskogo Dogovora 24 maya 1958goda,” Pravda (Moscow), 27 May 1958, p. 3.26 Thomas Wolfe, Soviet Power in Europe, 1945-1970 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UniversityPress, 1970), pp. 150-1, 487-9.27 “Was ist der westdeutsche Militarismus?”Neues Deutschland (East Berlin), 26 January1959, pp. 1-2. See also “Wortlaut der Rede WalterUlbrichts auf dem XXI. Parteitag der KPdSU,”Neues Deutschland (East Berlin), 30 January1959, p. 1.28 Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung,Militarische Planungen des Warschauer Paktesin Zentraleuropa: Eine Studie, February 1992,p. 5. [Ed. note: For an English translation of thereport, see Mark Kramer, trans. and annot., “War-saw Pact Military Planning in Central Europe:Revelations From the East German Archives,”CWIHP Bulletin 2 (Fall 1992), pp. 1, 13-19.]29 Militarisches Zwischenarchiv (Potsdam), VA-Strausberg/29555/Box 155.30 “Dohoda CSSR-ZSSR o vzajemnychdodavkach vyzbroje a voj. techniky v rr. 1963-1965,” in VHA Praha, F. Sekretariat MNO, 1960-1962, OS/GS, 26/2.31 “Dogovor mezhdu pravitel’stvami SSSR iChSSR o merakh povysheniya boegotovnostiraketnykh voisk,” 15 December 1965, in VHAPraha, F. Sekretariat MNO, 1960-1962, OS/GS,2/16.32 See the reports on “Hungary: USSR NuclearWeapons Formerly Stored in Country,” translatedin U.S. Joint Publications Research Service,

Nuclear Proliferation, JPRS-TND-91-007, 20May 1991, pp. 14-16.33 “O przedsiewzieciu majacym na celupodwyzszenie gotowosci bojowej wojska,” 25February 1967, in Centralne ArchiwumWojskowe, Paczka 6, Tom 234.34 Interview with chief of the Czechoslovak Gen-eral Staff, Major-General Karel Pezl, in Jan Bauer,“Jaderna munice: Asi tady byla,” Ceske amoravskoslezske zemedelske noviny (Prague), 4July 1991, p. 1.35 See, e.g., Col.-General I. Glebov, “Razvitieoperativnogo iskusstva,” Krasnaya zvezda (Mos-cow), 2 April 1964, pp. 2-3; and Col.-General S.M. Shtemenko, “Sukhoputnye voiska vsovremennoi voine i ikh boevaya podgotovka,”Krasnaya zvezda (Moscow), 3 January 1963, pp.2-3. See also Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii et al.,Voennaya strategiya, 2nd ed. (Moscow:Voenizdat, 1963), pp. 373-4. This theme is alsoevident in “Razvitie voennogo iskusstva vusloviyakh vedeniya raketno-yadernoi voiny posovremennym predstavleniyam,” passim.36 See, e.g., Col.-General N. Lomov, “VliyanieSovetskoi voennoi doktriny na razvitie voennogoiskusstva,” Kommunist vooruzhenykh sil (Mos-cow), No. 21 (November 1965), pp. 16-24.37 Cited in “Rech’ tovarishcha L. I. Brezhneva,”Pravda (Moscow), 25 September 1965, p. 2 (em-phasis added).38 “Stenografische Niederschrift der Konferenzder kommunistischen und Arbeiterparteien dieStaaten des Warschauer Vertrages,” January 1965(Top Secret), in Stiftung Archiv der Parteien undMassenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv(SAPMDB), Zentrales Parteiarchiv (ZPA) derSED, J IV, 2/202/130.39 “O zasedanii Politicheskogo konsul’tativnogokomiteta gosudarstv-uchastnikov VarshavskogoDogovora o druzhbe, sotrudnichestve i vzaimnoipomoshchi,” Krasnaya zvezda (Moscow), 21January 1965, p. 1. See also Colonel V. F.Samoilenko, Osnova boevogo soyuza:Internatsionalizm kak faktor oboronnoi moshchisotsialisticheskogo sodruzhestva (Moscow:Voenizdat, 1981), p. 259.40 See, e.g., Marshal R. Ya. Malinovskii,“Moguchii strazh bezopasnosti narodov,”Krasnaya zvezda (Moscow), 13 May 1965, p. 3;Marshal A. A. Grechko, “Nadezhnyi shchit mirai bezopasnosti narodov,” Kommunistvooruzhenykh sil (Moscow), No. 9 (May 1965),p. 13; and Marshal A. A. Grechko, “Boevoi soyuzbratskikh narodov,” Pravda (Moscow), 13 May1965, p. 1.41 “Informacna sprava o vysledkach cvicenia‘Oktobrova Burka’,” 16-22 October 1965 (TopSecret), in VHA Praha, F. Hlavna Politicka Sprava(HPS), 1965, HPS 1/2.42 “Konferenz der kommunistischen undArbeiterparteien die Staaten des WarschauerVertrages: Stenografische Niederschrift,” Feb-ruary 1966 (Top Secret), in SAPMDB, ZPA, IV27/208/85.43 “Oplot mira i sotsializma,” Krasnaya zvezda(Moscow), 14 May 1966, p. 5.44 “La Roumanie n’a formule aucune demandeen ce qui concerne le Pacte de Varsovie: Mise auPoint du ministere des Affaires etrangeres aBucarest,” L’Humanite (Paris), 19 May 1966, p.3.

45 “Stenografische Niederschrift des Treffensfuhrender Reprasentanten der Bruderstaaten desWarschauer Vertrages,” July 1966 (Top Secret),in SAPMDB, ZPA, IV 2/202/431.46 “Komplexny material: Cvicenie ‘VLTAVA’,”in VHA Praha, F. HPS, 1966, HPS 30/2; and“Vyhodnotenie cvicenia ‘VLTAVA’.” VHA Praha,F. Sekretariat MNO, 1966, OS/GS, 4/2.47 Maksimov et al., eds., Raketnye voiskastrategicheskogo naznacheniya, pp. 125-126.48 See, e.g., ibid., pp. 125-6. See also “Razvitievoennogo iskusstva v usloviyakh vedeniyaraketno-yadernoi voiny po sovremennympredstavleniyam,” pp. 325-34.49 See ibid., pp. 330-36 and passim.

Mark Kramer, a researcher based at theDavis Center for Russian Studies (for-merly the Russian Research Center) atHarvard University, is a frequent con-tributor to the CWIHP Bulletin. Theabove article was originally presentedas a paper at a conference on the Cu-ban Missile Crisis in Moscow in Sep-tember 1994. It supersedes an earlierversion which appeared in CWIHP Bul-letin 5 (Spring 1995), pp. 59, 110, 112-115, 160, and, due to technical produc-tion errors, contained errors in the plac-ing and numbering of footnotes. TheBulletin reprints the article, with apolo-gies to readers and the author (andslight revisions by the latter), in this is-sue.