2.6: nuclear weapons - stanford university · india (potential1) pak (potential) nkorea (potential)...
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2.6: Nuclear Weapons
Alex Montgomery
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2.6: Nuclear Weapons• Definitions and concepts• Nuclear optimists• Nuclear pessimists• Cases• Discussion
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Definitions• Coercion/Compellence: A threat to punish the enemy
or deny the enemy’s military objectives if the enemydoes not change its behavior
• Deterrence: A threat to punish the enemy if the enemychanges its behavior
• Defense: A threat to deny the enemy’s militaryobjectives if the enemy changes its behavior
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Nuclear Buzzwords• Triad: Bombers, ICBMs, SLBMs• First-Strike: Ability to eliminate an enemy’s nuclear
forces w/o retaliation• Secure Second-Strike: Ability to inflict sufficient
damage on an enemy after absorbing a first strike• Preventive First-Strike: Striking an enemy’s forces
before they develop a secure second-strike capability.
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Requirements for Nuclear Deterrence• Prevention of preventive
war during transitions• Development of survivable
second-strike forces• Avoidance of accidental
nuclear war
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Nuclear Optimists
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Van Evera• When technology favors
defense, wars less frequent• Nuclear weapons favor
deterrence, not defense, butsame logic applies
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Pape• Conventional
– Punishment: not effective– Risk: even less effective– Denial: sometimes effective– Takes time
• Nuclear– Punishment: not effective– Risk: can be successful– Denial: not useful– Requires superiority
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Waltz• Preventive/preemptive
strikes difficult, rare• States have strong incentives
to make nukes safe & secure– Nuclear accidents are rare– Second-strike Nuclear
deterrence is cheap and easyto ensure
• Wars will be less frequentand more limited
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Nuclear Pessimists
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Sagan• Military organizations are
likely to lead to deterrencefailures, insecure secondstrikes, and deliberate oraccidental war, due to their:– common biases– inflexible routines– parochial interests
• Wars may be more likely:– Stability/Instability Paradox
• Wars may be worse:– Accidental escalation
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Paul• States believe that other
states will not use nuclearweapons in marginalconflicts– Moral revulsion– Desire not to escalate– Historical precedent– Disproportionate response
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Cases• Difficult to determine how affects start of wars• Deterrence is difficult to measure• Best case (Cold War) had other variables
– Bipolarity– No land border
• Even more difficult to measure how affects war– Not clear when nuclear threats worked
• Japan 1945, Korea 1952-3, Suez 1956, Cuban Missile Crisis 1962– Look instead at cases of non-nuclear power attacks
• Korea 1950-3, Suez 1956, Algeria 1954-62, Vietnam 1965-73,Yom Kippur 1973, Sino-Vietnamese 1979, Afghan 1979-1989,Falklands 1982, Lebanon 1983, Gulf War 1990
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Requirements for Nuclear Deterrence• Prevention of preventive
war during transitions• Development of survivable
second-strike forces• Avoidance of accidental
nuclear war
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India/Pakistan:Militaries start preventive wars
Pakistan: Kargil 1999India: Brasstacks 1986
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India/Pakistan:Survivability undermined by SOPs
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India/Pakistan: Accidents rather frequent
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1973 Yom Kippur War• “To President Sadat and his
advisors, a limited attackconfined to the occupiedSinai would preclude the useof nuclear weapons byIsrael.” (707)
• Limited-aims strategy: CrossSuez, hold first line of Israelifortifications, dig in.
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1982 Falklands War• “The Argentine calculations
prior to the war rested onthe premise that Britainwould not use nuclearweapons to protect a far-away island group with littledirect economic or strategicvalue.” (709)
• Limited-aims strategy:occupy islands, pursuenegotiations.
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Discussion• Brian Head • John Panfil