NICORP vs. De Leon GR No. 176942

FACTS: These consolidated petitions assail the Decision of the CA finding respondent De Leon as a bona fide tenant of the subject property. Respondent filed a complaint praying that petitioners Lim and/or NICORP Management and Dev’t Corp.be ordered to respect her tenancy rights over a parcel of land in Cavite registered to the De Leon sisters, who were likewise impleaded as parties-defendants in the suit. Respondent alleged that she was the actual tiller and cultivator of the land with full knowledge of the owners, who were her sisters-in-law. Petitioner denied that respondent was a tenant of the subject property and alleged that respondent is no longer physically capable of tilling the land. Respondent submitted evidences to prove that she was made a tenant of the land as well as the agricultural activities of respondent and her family. However, a Decision was rendered dismissing the complaint for failure of resp.to prove by substantial evidence all the requisites of an agricultural tenancy relationship. On appeal, the CA reversed the findings of DARAB stating that there was sufficient evidence to prove the elements of an agricultural tenancy relationship. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition from petitioners Lim and NICORP.

ISSUE: WON occupancy and continued possession of the land makes one a de jure tenant.

HELD: NO. The respondent being allowed to cultivate the property without opposition, does not mean that the De Leon sisters impliedly recognized the existence of a leasehold relation with respondent. The principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent. Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land but is a legal relationship. Thus, the intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, and their written agreements, provided these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are more important.

There is a tenancy relationship if the ff.essential elements concur: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) the harvest is shared between landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee.

DAR vs. PCPC GR No. 168787

FACTS: In the late 1990s, respondent sought to convert its 280 hectares of its coconut plantation into a special economic zone. The following year, PCPCI applied for the reclassification of its agricultural lands into mixed residential, commercial and industrial lands. Sometime in 2003, petitioner DAR notified PCPI that a portion of the Polo estate had been placed under the CARP and would be acquired by the government. PCPI filed a petition for certiorari in the CA asserting that the DAR acted with grave abuse of discretion in placing the Polo estate under the CARP. In its Feb. 16, 2005 decision, CA found that Polo estate was no longer agricultural land when the DAR placed it under CARP. The DAR asserts that the reclassification of the Polo estate did not place it beyond the reach of CARP.

ISSUE: WON the DAR acted with grave abuse of discretion in placing the Polo estate under the CARP.

HELD: NO. Protests regarding the implementation of the CARP fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary. He determines whether the tract of land is covered by or exempt from CARP. Likewise, questions regarding the eligibility of CARP beneficiaries must be addressed to him. The DAR Sec.decides to whom lands placed under CARP shall be distributed.

In another decision rendered by the Court, it was held that reclassified agricultural lands must undergo the process of conversion in the DAR before they may be used for other purposes. Since the DAR never approved the conversion of the Polo estate from agricultural to another use, the land was never placed beyond the scope of the CARP. The approval of the DAR of the conversion of agricultural land into an industrial estate is a

condition precedent for its conversion into an ecozone. A proposed ecozone cannot be considered for Presidential Proclamation unless the landowner first submits to PEZA (Phil.Economic Zone Authority) a land use conversion clearance certificate from DAR. This PCPCI failed to do.

Manubay v. Hon. Garilao GR No. 140717

FACTS: Petitioners owned a 124-hectare land in Camarines Sur. In November 1994, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Pili issued a notice of coverage placing the property under the comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP). Petitioners did not protest the notice and filed an application at the DAR for conversion of the property from agricultural to residential. The Sangguniang Bayan of Pili passed a Resolution approving the Pili Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of 1996, reclassifying the subject property from agricultural to highly urbanized intended for mixed residential and commercial use. Thereafter, petitioners requested the DAR Regional Director to set aside the November 1994 notice of coverage, pointing out that the land had been reclassified and the property was no longer suitable for agricultural purposes. The request was denied, on the ground that petitioners had already been given notices of coverage which must have been lifted first either because of retention or exemption. Respondent denied petitioners’ application for conversion, considering that the property had already been placed under the CARP. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari in the CA assailing the denial of their application for conversion, averring that respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion when he denied their application

ISSUE: WON the act of a department secretary may be directly challenged in a petition for certiorari.

HELD: Under the doctrine of qualified political agency, department secretaries are alter egos or assistants of the President and their acts are presumed to be those of the latter unless disapproved or reprobated by him. Thus, as a rule, an aggrieved party affected by the decision of a cabinet secretary need not appeal to the OP and may file a petition for certiorari directly in the Court of Appeals assailing the act of the said secretary.

Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that, for a petition for certiorari to prosper, petitioner must show (1) the public respondent acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and (2) there is no appeal or a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

In a petition for certiorari premised on grave abuse of discretion, it must be shown that public respondent patently and grossly abused his discretion and that such abuse amounted to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. In other words, the public respondent exercised his power arbitrarily and despotically by reason of passion or hostility.

Roxas and Company, Inc. vs. DAMBA-NSFW and DAR

FACTS: Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas. On July 27, 1987, the Congress of the Philippines formally convened and took over legislative power from the President. This Congress passed Republic Act No. 6657, the CARL of 1988. The Act was signed by the President on June 10, 1988 and took effect on June 15, 1988. Before thelaw’s effectively, on May 6, 1988, [Roxas & Co.] filed with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell [VOS] Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under compulsory acquisition by DAR in accordance with the CARL. On August 6, 1992 [Roxas & Co.], through its President, sent a letter to the Secretary of DAR withdrawing its VOS of Hacienda Caylaway. The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu,Batangasallegedly authorized the reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to non-agricultural.As a result, petitioner informed respondent DAR that it was applying for conversion of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to other uses. The petitions nub on the interpretation of Presidential Proclamation (PP) 1520 reads: DECLARING THE MUNICIPALITIES OF MARAGONDON AND TERNATE INCAVITE PROVINCE AND THE MUNICIPALITY OF NASUGBU IN BATANGAS AS A TOURISTZONE, ANDFOR OTHER PURPOSES Essentially, Roxas & Co. filed its application

for conversion of its three haciendas from agricultural to non-agricultural on the assumption that the issuance of PP 1520 which declared Nasugbu,Batangas as a tourism zone, reclassified them to non-agricultural uses. Its pending application notwithstanding, the DAR issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to the farmer-beneficiaries in the three haciendas including CLOA No. 6654 which was issued on October 15, 1993covering 513.983 hectares, the subject of G.R. No. 167505. Roxas & Co. filed with the DAR an application for exemption from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of 1988 on the basis of PP 1520 and of DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 6, Series of 1994 which states that all lands already classified as commercial, industrial, or residential before the effectivity of CARP no longer need conversion clearance from the DAR.

ISSUE:WON PP 1520 reclassified in 1975 all lands in the Maragondon-Ternate-Nasugbu tourism zone to non-agricultural use to exempt Roxas & Co.’s threehaciendas in Nasugbu from CARP coverage.

HELD: PP 1520 did not automatically convert the agricultural lands in the three municipalities including Nasugbu to non-agricultural lands. Roxas & Co. contends that PP 1520 declared the three municipalities as each constituting a tourism zone, reclassified all lands therein to tourism and, therefore, converted their use to non-agricultural purposes. The perambulatory clauses of PP 1520 identified only "certain areas in the sector comprising the [three Municipalities that] have potential tourism value" and mandated the conduct of "necessary studies" and the segregation of "specific geographic areas" to achieve its purpose. Which is why the PP directed the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) to identify what those potential tourism areas are. The DAR, an administrative body of special competence, denied, by Order, the application for CARP exemption of Roxas & Co., it finding that PP 1520 did not automatically reclassify all the lands in the affected municipalities from their original uses. It appears that the PTA had not yet, at that time, identified the "specific geographic areas" for tourism development and had no pending tourism development projects in the areas. Further, report from the Center for Land Use Policy Planning and Implementation (CLUPPI) indicated that the areas were planted with sugar cane and other crops.Relatedly, the DAR, by Memorandum Circular No. 7,Series of 2004,came up with clarificatory guidelines and therein decreed that B. Proclamations declaring general areas such as whole provinces, municipalities, barangays, islands or peninsulas as tourist zones that merely:(1) recognize certain still unidentified areas within the covered provinces, municipalities, barangays, islands, or peninsulas to be with potential tourism value and charge the Philippine Tourism Authority with the task to identify/delineate specific geographic areas within the zone with potential tourism value and to coordinate said areas’ development; or (2) recognize the potential value of identified spots located within the general area declared as tourist zone and direct the Philippine Tourism Authority to coordinate said areas’development; could not be regarded as effecting an automatic reclassification of the entirety of the land area declared as tourist zone. This is so because "reclassification of lands" denotes their allocation into some specific use and "providing for the manner of their utilization and disposition (Sec. 20, Local Government Code) or the "act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, or commercial, as embodied in the land use plan."

Lantican v. CA GR No. 97929

FACTS: Marcos de la Peña died leaving behind him his wife, the private respondent , daughter and his common law wife, the petitioner. At the time of his death, he was a tenant on a Riceland owned by one Rufina Lim and was about to be issued a Cert. of Land Transfer. Lim chose the private respondent as the successor to the land to which the petitioners opposed. However, the DAR ruled that private resp.had the sole right to be the beneficiary of the Cert. of Land Transfer. Petitioners filed a motion to set aside the above order on the ground that, not only is it contrary to the actual facts relative to the land in question but it is not supported by the evidence and the applicable law. This motion was dismissed for lack of merit. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that DAR has no jurisdiction over the case. Motion was once again denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON the petitioners having invoked the jurisdiction of the DAR are now stopped from assailing such lack of jurisdiction

HELD: YES. In a case decided by the Court, it was held that once a party to a case submits to the jurisdiction of the Court and participates in the trial on the merits of the case, he cannot thereafter, upon a judgment

unfavorable to his cause, take a total turn about and say that the condition precedent of compliances with PD 1508.

Machete v. CA GR No. 109093

FACTS: Private respondent filed a complaint for collection of back rentals and damages before the RTC of Tagbilaran City against herein petitioners. The alleged facts are: 1) that parties entered into a leasehold agreement regarding private respondent’s landholdings and herein petitioners shall pay a certain amount or percentage of their harvest; 2) that herein petitioners failed to pay their respective rental despite repeated demands of private respondent; and 3) that petitioner moved to the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, arguing that the instant case is an agrarian dispute and therefore within the jurisdiction of DARAB.

ISSUE: WON the RTC has jurisdiction over cases for the collection of black rentals from leasehold tenants.

HELD: The Court held that collection of back rentals from leasehold tenants is within the jurisdiction of DARAB and the SC defined “agrarian dispute” as any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship, or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture , including disputes concerning farm workers’ associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining , changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial agreements.

The SC further averred that failure to pay back rentals to leasehold contract is an issue which is clearly beyond the legal competence of the trial court to resolve. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve the controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.

Sebastian v. Morales GR No. 141116

FACTS: Private respondents are the heirs of the late Guillermo Sarenas, who died intestate on June 27, 1986. During his lifetime, Guillermo owned agricultural landholdings, all located in Samon and Mayapyap Sur, Cabanatuan City. In addition to the foregoing properties, Guillermo was also the registered owner of a parcel of agricultural land located at San Ricardo, Talavera, Nueva Ecija, with a total area of 4.9993 hectares, which was tenanted by Manuel Valentin and Wenceslao Peneyra. The tenants tilling the farm lots had already been issued emancipation patents pursuant to P.D. No. 27. Private respondents filed an application with the DAR Regional Office in San Fernando, Pampanga, for retention of over five hectares of the late Guillermo’s landholdings. Among the lots which private respondents sought to retain under Section 6 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657)On June 6, 1997, the DAR Regional Office in San Fernando, Pampanga granted private respondents’ application. Petitioner Sebastian moved for reconsideration of the foregoing order before the DAR Regional Director. The DAR Regional Director found that the order was contrary to law for violating Section 6 of RA No. 6657 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. He then issued a new order dated October 23, 1997, which instead allowed private respondents to retain a parcel of land with an area of 4.9993 hectares, covered by TCT No. 143564, located at San Ricardo, Talavera, Nueva Ecija. Private respondents then appealed the order of the DAR Secretary. Petitioner Sebastian then filed a motion for reconsideration, but this motion was denied by the DAR Secretary. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of the petition is valid and proper.

HELD: NO. Section 61 of R.A. No. 6657 clearly mandates that judicial review of DAR orders or decisions are governed by the Rules of Court. The Rules direct that it is Rule 43 that governs the procedure for judicial review of decisions, orders, or resolutions of the DAR Secretary. By pursuing a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 rather than the mandatory petition for review under Rule 43, petitioners opted for the wrong mode of appeal. Pursuant to the fourth paragraph of Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90,“an appeal taken to the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed.” Therefore, we hold that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 51288 for failure of petitioners to pursue the proper mode of appeal. Wherefore, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals as well as the resolution of the appellate court dated December 10, 1999, is AFFIRMED.