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<LRH>Consciousness and Free Action</LRH>

<RRH>Stubborn Moralism and Freedom of the Will</RRH>

<CN>Chapter </CN>

<C!>Stubborn Moralism and Freedom of the Will</C!>

<CA>David A. Pizarro and Erik G. Helzer</CA>

Imagine discovering that yor neigh!or" #hom yo have kno#n $or years" is in $act a

very so%histicated ro!ot that has had all o$ his !ehavior %rogrammed in advance !y a team o$

ro!otics e&%erts. 'his in$ormation might case yo to re(evalate all o$ yor interactions #ith

him. )here yo %reviosly may have !ecome angry #ith him over the slightest o$$ense" yo

may no# $eel the need to remind yorsel$ that he is merely $ollo#ing his %rogramming* he has

no say over his o#n !ehavior. +ike#ise" yo might $ind it nreasona!le to hold him in contem%t

$or having !elie$s that con$lict #ith yor o#n. In short" yo may $ind yorsel$ #anting to

ss%end yor moral evalations a!ot his !elie$s" ,dgments" and !ehaviors across the !oard

!ecase" a$ter all" he did not act $reely.

'his connection !et#een $reedom and moral res%onsi!ility is evident in the long and

storied de!ate over $ree #ill among %hiloso%hers" many o$ #hom have arged that i$ $ree #ill

does not e&ist" then the a!ility to hold individals res%onsi!le is com%romised -e.g." Clarke"

01. 2n this vie#" in order to hold an individal morally res%onsi!le $or an act" the %ossi!ility

mst e&ist that he cold have done other#ise. 'he deterministic %rocesses that give rise to the

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!ehavior o$ the ro!ot neigh!or #old" o$ corse" !e incom%ati!le #ith this re5irement6it is

sim%ly a $act that the ro!ot lacks the a!ility to do anything other than #hat he #as %rogrammed

to do. 7ome have 5estioned this conclsion" arging that even i$ hman !eings are not $ree in

this ltimate sense -and that hmans are all sim%ly very com%le&" organic versions o$ the ro!ot(

neigh!or1" the a!ility to hold others morally res%onsi!le remains logically na$$ected -Pere!oom"

3* 7tra#son" 389:1. ;onetheless" the dee% connection !et#een $reedom and moral

res%onsi!ility remains" as disagreements are generally not over #hether $reedom is necessary $or

moral res%onsi!ility !t rather over the s%eci$ic kind o$ $reedom necessary -Dennett" 38:1.

In an im%ortant sense" these 5estions a!ot $ree #ill and moral res%onsi!ility are !eyond

the sco%e o$ em%irical investigation6an e&%eriment cannot settle the 5estion o$ #hether moral

res%onsi!ility actally re5ires li!ertarian $reedom or #hether determinism and moral

res%onsi!ility can com$orta!ly coe&ist. =t individals entirely nconcerned #ith scholarly

de!ates a!ot $reedom do make ,dgments a!ot moral res%onsi!ility $airly $re5ently" and o$ten

these ,dgments have serios conse5ences -sch as social e&clsion" im%risonment" and even

death1. 'he descri%tive 5estion o$ ho# %eo%le go a!ot making these ,dgments o$ moral

res%onsi!ility has there$ore !een o$ mch interest to %sychologists. Accordingly" a great deal o$

research has !een condcted docmenting the rles individals seem to se #hen determining

#hether or not to hold others morally res%onsi!le. Perha%s nsr%risingly" this research has

sho#n that %eo%le seem to care a!ot #hether an act #as committed nder conditions that seem

to limit an agents $reedom -sch as involntary acts or accidents1. ?ost in$lential theories o$

!lame and res%onsi!ility #ithin %sychology have there$ore characterized $reedom as an

im%ortant %rere5isite $or the attri!tion o$ moral res%onsi!ility" mch like the normative

theories o$ !lame and res%onsi!ility $rom %hiloso%hy and la# that in$lenced them -e.g." 7haver"

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38@* )einer" 388@1. 2n these acconts" #hen individals are $aced #ith a moral in$raction" they

$irst set ot to determine i$ a %erson acted $reely then %roceed to se that in$ormation as in%t

into their ,dgment o$ #hether to hold the %erson res%onsi!le.

)e #ill arge that this vie# is mistaken. ather than serve as a %rere5isite $or moral

res%onsi!ility" ,dgments o$ $reedom o$ten seem to serve the %r%ose o$ ,sti$ying ,dgments o$

res%onsi!ility and !lame. 'his seems tre not ,st $or ,dgments o$ Bltimate meta%hysical

$reedom -i.e." $reedom $rom determinism1" !t also tre $or $reedom in the more local Bagentic

sense that is central to %sychological and legal theories o$ res%onsi!ility -sch as #hether or not

an act #as intentional or controlla!le1.

2ne reason $or this is that %eo%le are $ndamentally motivated to evalate the moral

actions o$ others" to hold them res%onsi!le $or these acts" and to %nish them $or moral violations

6they are Bst!!orn moralists. -Althogh morality can re$er to a very large set o$ !ehaviors

and ,dgments" #hen #e re$er to Bmorality throghot the %a%er" #e are limiting or the

de$inition to these a$orementioned as%ects o$ hman morality6that o$ ,dging acts as morally

right or #rong" and ,dging others as res%onsi!le $or moral violations or virtos acts.1 'his

motivation most likely has its roots in the evoltionary $orces that sha%ed hman morality and

has %sychological %rimacy over more $ine(grained social ,dgments" sch as ,dgments a!ot

#hether or not an act #as committed $reely. As sch" the motivation to seek ot and %nish

#rongdoers can %sh individals in the direction o$ holding %eo%le res%onsi!le even #hen the

#rongdoers do not meet the criteria $or $reedom re5ired !y normative acconts o$

res%onsi!ility. 7im%ly %t" #hen %eo%le say that someone acted $reely" they may !e saying little

more than that the %erson is !lame#orthy. In s%%ort o$ this general argment" #e $irst de$end

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the claim that %eo%le are st!!orn moralists !e$ore revie#ing recent em%irical evidence that this

moralism drives ,dgments o$ $reedom rather than the other #ay arond.

<H">Stubborn Moralism</H">

?oral ,dgment comes natrally to hman !eings. Peo%le #rite stories a!ot good and

evil" make long lists o$ morally $or!idden acts" and take a keen interest in the moral misste%s o$

com%lete strangers. Peo%le are also very B%romiscos #ith their moral ,dgments6they

readily o$$er moral evalations o$ $ictional characters" animals" and even com%ters. In short"

#hile it may !e tre that s%eci$ic moral !elie$s vary across time and %lace" the !asic !elie$ that

some acts are morally $or!idden" and that %eo%le shold !e held res%onsi!le $or these acts"

a%%ears to !e a common hman trait.

As evidence o$ the strength o$ these moral !elie$s" consider !rie$ly some o$ the %tative

threats that might !e e&%ected to shake con$idence in morality6atheism" relativism -o$ the sort

arising $rom moral diversity1" and determinism. 'he #ide dissemination o$ these ideas does not

seem to have dented the !elie$ that some acts are #rong" and that individals are morally

res%onsi!le $or their actions -oskies" 4* -<>Cha%ter 3</>" this volme1. or

instance" contrary to the !elie$ that morality hinges on the e&istence o$ God -as Dostoevskys

Ivan Faramazov claimed" Bi$ there is no God" everything is %ermitted1" atheists seem to have no

tro!le holding %eo%le morally acconta!le. ;or has the kno#ledge that there is #ide diversity

in many moral !elie$s seemed to ndermine lay%eo%les !elie$ in their o#n ethical systems or

their !elie$ that individals shold !e held res%onsi!le $or moral in$ractions more generally. I$

anything" %eo%le res%ond in a %articlarly harsh manner #hen %resented #ith others #ho hold

moral !elie$s that diverge $rom their o#n -Haidt" osen!erg" Hom" 01. inally" #hat o$ the

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threat o$ determinism I$ it trns ot to !e tre that hmans are all %re%rogrammed atomatons"

doesnt this invalidate the a!ility to hold others res%onsi!le -Greene Cohen" :1 )hile #e

#ill address this concern s%eci$ically a !it later" oskies -41 has arged convincingly that

neither the old threat o$ determinism B$rom a!ove -i.e." theistic determinism6that Gods

$orekno#ledge ndermines hman $reedom1 nor the ne#er threat B$rom !elo# -i.e." scienti$ic

determinism1 a%%ears to have had a #ide in$lence on the !elie$ that some things are #rong" that

most %eo%le are a!le to choose !et#een right and #rong" and that individals deserve to !e

!lamed $or these #rong actions -althogh the threat o$ determinism does a%%ear to in$lence or

o#n moral !ehavior" hinting at the %ossi!ility that di$$erent %rocesses govern or moral sel$(

evalations than or evalation o$ others* =ameister" ?asicam%o" De#all" 8* 7chooler"

<>Cha%ter 3</>" this volme* ohs 7chooler" 1.

'he $act that %eo%le cling tightly to moral !elie$s des%ite cltral and historical shi$ts that

might encorage their a!andonment s%eaks against the once(common vie# that morality is a thin

layer masking hmans dee%ly sel$ish and amoral natre -De)aal" 41. 2n the contrary" the

$act that morality thrives des%ite these $orces sggests that the mechanisms that give rise to

%eo%les !asic moral intitions -sch as the !elie$ that %eo%le shold !e held res%onsi!le $or their

acts1 are too dee%ly entrenched in the hman mind to !e a!andoned easily -Haidt Jose%h"

:1. 'his Bdee% vie# o$ morality has !een increasingly !olstered !y research in game theory"

evoltionary !iology" and economics sho#ing that the %resence o$ !asic moral !ehaviors -e.g."

altristic acts1 and ,dgments -e.g." a %re$erence $or $airness1 is not inconsistent #ith the Bsel$ish

gene a%%roach to evoltion !y natral selection" and that evoltion may actally $avor

individals #ho e&hi!it sch !ehaviors and ,dgments -A&elrod Hamilton" 383* 'rivers"

38931. or instance" the most %lasi!le accont o$ ho# hman altrism emerged relies on the

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dal mechanisms o$ kin selection -a #illingness to act altristically to#ard mem!ers o$ ones

immediate gene %ool1 and reci%rocal altrism -a #illingness to act $or the !ene$it o$ others #hen

there is a chance that the organism #ill !e %aid in kind1. 'ogether" these mechanisms most likely

gave rise to the sorts o$ moral emotions that %ro&imally motivate moral action" sch as em%athy

$or the s$$ering o$ others and anger over !eing cheated -rank" 381. ?ore recently it has even

!een %ro%osed that se&al selection may have %layed a signi$icant role in the %reservation o$

morality !y $avoring the %resence o$ many traits considered to !e morally virtos -?iller"

91. or instance" men #ho acted virtosly -e.g." #ith !ravery and trst#orthiness1 #ere

more likely to !e soght a$ter !y #omen either !ecase sch acts %rovided a direct ce to the

mens $itness -indicating a higher likelihood that they #old stay to hel% rear the o$$s%ring" ths

ensring the s%reading o$ their genes to the ne&t generation1" or !ecase the virtes #ere relia!le

correlates #ith other $itness(related ces. 'his !ridging o$ morality and evoltion re%resents one

o$ the most signi$icant advances in the %sychology o$ morality" as the !elie$ that evoltion cold

only $avor sel$ish organisms im%lies a vie# o$ morality as s%er$icial in the sense that it is

entirely de%endent on cltral transmission and a %ro%er %!ringing -and !y e&tension" that a

change in cltre or %!ringing cold eliminate hman morality in one generation16a %ictre o$

morality that is increasingly vie#ed as ntena!le.

'his vie# o$ morality as dee%ly rooted in !asic hman natre $inds additional s%%ort

$rom %sychologists #orking across varios $ields" inclding social %sychology" develo%mental

%sychology" and social/cognitive neroscience. Consistent #ith the vie# that hmans are

Bhard#ired to !e ethical creatres" recent neroimaging stdies have demonstrated that the

!rain systems associated #ith re#ard and distress are involved in a !asic $acet o$ hman morality

6a %re$erence $or $airness -a %re$erence that not only emerges early in develo%ment" !t that

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also seems %resent in hmanitys close evoltionary relatives* =rosnan De)aal" 01. In

these imaging stdies" researchers relied on a common method sed to stdy $airness in a

la!oratory setting in #hich %airs o$ individals %artici%ate in an economic game kno#n as the

Bltimatm game. In this game" one %layer -the Bdonor1 is given a sm o$ money and told that

she may allocate as mch o$ the money as she #old like to a Breci%ient. 'he reci%ient" in trn"

mst then decide #hether to acce%t the o$$er -in #hich case" !oth %layers kee% the money1 or to

re,ect the o$$er -in #hich case" neither %layer kee%s any money1. In order to !e a!le to kee% the

money" the donor mst strategically allocate a 5antity that #ill entice the reci%ient to acce%t the

o$$er. As it trns ot" a ma,ority o$ individals in the role o$ reci%ient #ill re,ect an o$$er that is

s!stantially !elo# the B$air mark o$ @K -des%ite the $act that acce%ting an n$air o$$er al#ays

garantees more money than the re,ection %ayo$$ o$ zero1. ?any economists have sed this

sim%le $inding that individals #ill take a monetary Bhit in order to %nish n$air !ehavior as an

argment $or the %rimacy o$ moral motivation over rational sel$(interest. Indeed" the %o#er o$

this method lies in its a!ility to ca%tre the seemingly irrational reactions to n$airness o!served

in the real #orld -sch as #hen an angry individal s%ends L3 in $el costs in order to drive

!ack to a store that he is convinced cheated him ot o$ L@1. Interestingly" it seems as i$ this moral

motivation shares nerological real estate #ith more !asic hedonic motivational systems. In

stdies tilizing measres o$ !rain activation -$?I1 #hile %artici%ants %lay an ltimatm game"

researchers have sho#n that reci%ients demonstrate increased activation in re#ard centers o$ the

!rain -inclding older strctres" sch as the ventral striatm and amygdala" and the cortical

region o$ the ventromedial %re$rontal corte&" #hich most likely evolved $or reasons nrelated to

hman social cognition1 #hen %resented #ith $air o$$ers as com%ared to #hen %resented #ith

n$air o$$ers -'a!i!nia" 7at%te" +ie!erman" 1. Ho#ever" those e&%osed to n$air o$$ers

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demonstrate increased activation in the !ilateral anterior insla" a region commonly associated

#ith the e&%erience o$ %ain and distress -7an$ey" illing" Aronson" ;ystrom" Cohen" 01.

?oreover" the level o$ activation in !rain regions associated #ith !oth re#ard and distress is not

%redicted !y the degree o$ economic gain or loss reslting $rom the o$$er" sggesting that %eo%le

are sensitive to $airness and n$airness $or reasons other than !asic economic tility. At the

nero!iological level" at least" it is not so mch that $airness trm%s sel$(interest" as it is that the

!rain does little to distingish !et#een the t#o.

)hile research in social and cognitive neroscience contines to %rovide evidence $or the

!iological !asis o$ moral evalations" looking into the !rain is only one sorce o$ evidence that

hmans are $ndamentally %redis%osed to evalate others on a moral dimension. or instance" a

great deal o$ #ork has demonstrated that hmans readily make in$erences a!ot the dis%ositional

traits o$ others given minimal in$ormation -Gil!ert ?alone" 388@* Gil!ert" 3881. ecent #ork

!y 'odorov and colleages has sho#n that this is es%ecially tre $or in$erences regarding

trst#orthiness. Across a nm!er o$ stdies" these researchers have demonstrated that

individals make 5ick and atomatic evalations o$ the trst#orthiness o$ others $rom !rie$

e&%osres to their $acial $eatres -see 'odorov" 7aid" Engell" 2osterho$" " $or a revie#1.

)hile there is mi&ed evidence as to #hether these evalations are correlated #ith actal

trst#orthiness" a strong !ias to#ard evalation along this dimension is evidence o$ its

%sychological %rimacy. ?oreover" a !asic motivation to evalate others on the dimension o$

trst#orthiness may aid overall accracy !y $ocsing individals on other s!se5ent ces that

may !e good %redictors" sch as emotional signals o$ trst#orthiness -rank" 381. 7ch an

a!ility to detect trst#orthy individals #old have %rovided o!vios advantages to hmanitys

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ancestors" $rom allo#ing them to avoid mrderos %sycho%aths to allo#ing them to gain social

ca%ital !y coo%erating #ith trst#orthy individals and avoiding Bcheaters.

airness and trst#orthiness are only a small %art o$ hman morality" and it is likely that

other $acets o$ morality that have received less em%irical attention are ,st as !asic and

hard#ired. Jon Haidt and his colleages" $or instance" have arged that evoltionary %ressres

have %redis%osed s to hold %articlar moral !elie$s regarding in(gro% loyalty" %rity" and

athority -Haidt Jose%h" :1. )hile cltral in$lences certainly %lay an im%ortant role in

the relative im%ortance %laced on these $ondational moral intitions -$or instance" %olitically

conservative individals are more likely to vie# violations o$ in(gro% loyalty" %rity" and

athority as moral violations" #hile li!erals tend to $ocs e&clsively on violations o$ harm and

,stice1" Haidt arges that hmans are heavily !iased to#ard %erceiving all $ive o$ these domains

as morally relevant de to hmanitys %articlar evoltionary heritage.

In sm" the monting evidence that hman morality has its origins in !iological evoltion

and is s%%orted !y a dedicated set o$ cognitive mechanisms is consistent #ith or claim that

hman moral motivation -es%ecially the motivation to evalate other individals on a moral

dimension1 is Bst!!orn and may hold %rimacy over other kinds o$ social ,dgments. It is to the

more s%eci$ic claim that these evalations a%%ear to trm% ,dgments o$ $reedom that #e no#

trn.

<H">What #ind of Freedom$</H">

)e have arged that moral evalations are a $ndamental %art o$ hman %sychologyM

hmans arrive at moral ,dgments 5ite easily" retain con$idence in these moral !elie$s in the

$ace o$ challenges to morality" and are strongly motivated to evalate others on a moral

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dimension. 'his moralism is %articlarly evident in the #illingness and ease #ith #hich

individals !lame and %nish others $or their moral violations rather than sim%ly ignoring them"

even #hen the cost o$ %nishing ot#eighs any !ene$its to the individal -so(called Baltristic

%nishment* ehr GNchter" 1. Ho#ever" %eo%le do not go a!ot making these ,dgments

a!ot !lame and %nishment ha%hazardly. 'here is a large !ody o$ %sychological research

descri!ing the nderlying rles individals se in order to determine #hether or not to !lame

others -e.g." 7haver" 38@* )einer" 388@1. 'hese $indings can !e characterized as con$irming an

intition that is most likely shared !y most individals6that #hen making these ,dgments"

%eo%le care a!ot #hether or not an agent acted $reely. 7%eci$ically" the sort o$ $reedom that

seems to matter most $or res%onsi!ility ,dgments" and that has !een highlighted in

%sychological theories o$ res%onsi!ility" is #hat #e #ill re$er to as Bagentic $reedom -in contrast

to the Bltimate" meta%hysical $reedom arged to e&ist !y li!ertarian %hiloso%hers1.

<H2>Agentic Freedom.</H2> 'he most in$lential theories o$ res%onsi!ility #ithin

%sychology -descri!ed !rie$ly a!ove1 have generated a great deal o$ research indicating that

#hen making ,dgments o$ res%onsi!ility" %eo%le seem to care a!ot $eatres o$ an action that

%oint to an individals agency -7haver" 38@* )einer" 388@* see ohs" <>Cha%ter @</>"

this volme1. 'hese theories em%hasize the need $or an actor to have %ossessed volitional control

over an action" and re5ire the %resence o$ sch things as intentionality" casality" control" and

$orekno#ledge. I$ all these conditions are met" there is nothing to %revent a ,dgment that the

%erson shold !e held res%onsi!le and !lamed accordingly. 'hese ,dgments a!ot the local

$eatres o$ an agent and his action" #hat #e are re$erring to as Bagentic $reedom" are o$ o!vios

im%ortance $or at least one sim%le reason6they allo# s to %redict the $tre !ehavior o$ an

individal #ith some degree o$ relia!ility -something that shold matter greatly to a social

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s%ecies living in a gro% and involved in re%eated interactions #ith the same individals1. 'ake

the criteria o$ intentionalityM i$ some!ody intends and kno#ingly !rings a!ot a harm$l

otcome" it is a sa$e !et that she might commit a similar violation in the $tre" and assigning

!lame and doling ot %nishment #old serve as an e$$ective social sanction in that it #old not

only discorage her $rom committing sch violations in the $tre" !t it #old also serve as a

signal to others that she shold not !e trsted.

As it trns ot" attri!ting intentionality to actors is something hmans do 5ite readily"

and 5ite o$ten. Intentions seem so central to social ,dgment that %eo%le seem to s%ontaneosly

attri!te intentionality even #hen it is clear that none cold e&ist. or instance" %eo%le have !een

sho#n to attri!te the random movement o$ sha%es on a com%ter screen to the $igres

nderlying intentions and desires -Heider 7immel" 38::1" and even in$ants seem to attri!te

goal(directed motives to sha%es that %er$orm negative and %ositive !ehaviors -sch as Bhel%ing

to %sh another sha%e % a hill or %reventing the %rogress o$ a sha%e as it tries to clim!* Hamlin"

)ynn" =loom" 9* Fhlmeier" )ynn" =loom" 01.

;ote that the %erce%tion o$ casality and intentionality in the acts o$ others most likely

did not evolve in the service o$ attri!ting moral res%onsi!ility !t" rather" evolved !ecase it

allo#ed hmans to %redict the !ehavior o$ %hysical o!,ects and agents they encontered. 'he

detection o$ casality" $or instance" may even !e a !asic $eatre o$ the hman visal system.

Psychologists stdying visal %erce%tion have demonstrated that individals seem to !e

hard#ired to %erceive casality and animacy in the movements o$ sim%le o!,ects -7choll

'remolet" 1. Even chim%anzees demonstrate a !asic nderstanding o$ goal(directed agentic

!ehavior -Premack )oodr$$" 3891" althogh the evidence that they tilize this nderstanding

in the service o$ anything other than their immediate sel$(interest is s%arse at !est -Call

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'omasello" 1. )hile the %erce%tion o$ agency may come easily to s even #hen %resented

#ith the actions o$ o!,ects and nonhmans" it is nonetheless evident that %eo%le are es%ecially

likely to %erceive agency and intentionality in the acts o$ other hman !eings. And i$ these !asic

$eatres o$ agency a%%ear to !e com%letely a!sent" holding someone morally res%onsi!le is mch

less likely to occr. 'ake a very sim%le e&am%leM %eo%le dont sally !lame some!ody #ho

!roght a!ot harm to another in an entirely accidental #ay -e.g." i$ 'om tri%s on a cr! and ends

% $alling on Dennis" it #old seem odd to morally !lame 'om $or the harm he cased Dennis* at

most someone might accse him o$ sim%le clmsiness and avoid #alking too closely to him in

the $tre* )einer" 388@1.

=y many measres" %sychological theories o$ res%onsi!ility that $ocs on the

re5irements o$ agentic $reedom have !een sccess$l6they seem to ca%tre a great deal o$

%eo%les intitions a!ot ho# and #hen res%onsi!ility shold !e attri!ted or attenated" and do

a good ,o! o$ %redicting actal ,dgments o$ res%onsi!ility across a #ide range o$ cases. As

evidence" a great deal o$ research has demonstrated that #hen one or more o$ the criteria that

com%ose agentic $reedom are a!sent" individals tend to e&hi!it a redction in their ,dgments o$

res%onsi!ility and !lame. or instance" relatives o$ individals s$$ering $rom schizo%hrenia

attenate !lame $or actions that #ere %er$ormed as a direct reslt o$ ncontrolla!le hallcinations

and delsions -Provencher incham" 1. +ike#ise" individals are more likely to assign

!lame to AID7 %atients i$ they contracted the disease throgh controlla!le means -licentios

se&al %ractices1 than i$ throgh ncontrolla!le ones -receiving a tainted !lood trans$sion*

)einer" 388@1. )hen it comes to the criterion o$ casality" there is even evidence that %eo%le are

more sensitive than these theories might %redict. or instance" individals seem to not only care

#hether or not an agent cased an otcome" !t #hether he cased it in the s%eci$ic manner that

39



#as intended. I$ an act #as intended and cased" !t cased in a manner other than the one

intended -so(called Bcasally deviant acts* 7earle" 3801" %artici%ants vie# the acts as less

!lame#orthy. or instance" a #oman #ho desires to mrder her hs!and !y %oisoning his

$avorite dish at a restarant" !t #ho scceeds in casing his death only !ecase the %oison made

the dish taste !ad" #hich led to him ordering a ne# dish to #hich he #as -n!ekno#nst to all1

deathly allergic" does not receive the same !lame as i$ the death #ere cased !y the %oison

directly -Pizarro" Ohlmann" =loom" 01. It seems as i$ %eo%le are 5ite ca%a!le o$ %aying

close attention to the $eatres o$ an action in ,st the manner %redicted !y traditional acconts o$

res%onsi!ility. In this sense" it is $air to conclde that there is a great deal o$ evidence that agency

$ndamentally matters #hen arriving at ,dgments o$ res%onsi!ility.

et des%ite the o!vios sccess o$ these models in %redicting a #ide range o$

res%onsi!ility ,dgments" a nm!er o$ recent $indings have emerged that" taken together" %oint to

the conclsion that ,dgments o$ agentic $reedom are o$ten the reslt o$ res%onsi!ility ,dgments

rather than their case. Des%ite the evidence that hmans are ca%a!le o$ making $ine(grained

,dgments a!ot intentions" casality" and control" these distinctions may not actally serve as

in%t #hen %eo%le are strongly motivated to hold another %erson res%onsi!le6the !asic

mechanisms that give rise to an initial moral evalation may overshado# the a!ility or desire to

engage in a care$l attri!tional analysis o$ the sort %redicted !y these theories. Im%ortantly" the

sitations that call $or making a ,dgment o$ res%onsi!ility in everyday li$e may !e ones in #hich

%eo%le are es%ecially motivated to hold an agent !lame#orthy" either !ecase o$ the natre o$ the

violation or !ecase o$ an initial negative evalation o$ an agent.

Even i$ the %sychological %rocesses involved in attri!tions o$ agency and those involved

in ,dgments o$ moral !lame are inde%endent" it may still seem odd that ,dgments o$ agentic

390



$reedom cold !e distorted to serve the %r%ose o$ holding others res%onsi!le. Ho#ever" the

criteria sed to arrive at a ,dgment o$ agency -sch as intentionality and control1 actally

%rovide a great deal o$ $le&i!ility and may there$ore !e es%ecially %rone to the in$lence o$

motivational !iases. In the social domain" the tendency to attri!te the case o$ others !ehavior

to nderlying intentions o$ten comes at the cost o$ ignoring cases that are e&ternal to the actor

-Gil!ert ?alone" 388@* Jones Harris" 38491. 'he conse5ence o$ this attri!tional !ias is

that other %eo%les acts are %erceived as intentional even i$ they #ere not" and any motivation to

!lame an individal may e&acer!ate the %erce%tion that an act #as intentional. +ike#ise" the

other criteria $or agentic $reedom" sch as %ossessing control over an otcome" can also !e $airly

am!igos6$or any given action" there is rarely an easily identi$ia!le" o!,ective ans#er a!ot

ho# mch control an individal trly %ossessed.

A nm!er o$ recent $indings seem to s%%ort the vie# that ,dgments o$ agentic $reedom

are driven !y moral evalations. ?ost o$ this #ork has $ocsed on the criteria o$ casality"

control" and intentionality and has demonstrated that s%ontaneos negative evalations o$ an act

or an agent are enogh to change these ,dgments o$ agency in a manner consistent #ith the

motivation to !lame an agent. or instance" most theories o$ res%onsi!ility %osit that %ossessing

casal control over an otcome is an im%ortant determinant $or the attri!tion o$ !lame6the less

control" the less res%onsi!ility -)einer" 388@1. =t the relationshi% !et#een control and

res%onsi!ility a%%ears $ar less straight$or#ard. In some cases" individals im%te more control

over an act to individals #ho seem %articlarly nlikea!le than to other individals #ho

%er$ormed an identical action. esearch !y Alicke and colleages" $or instance" has sho#n that

individals make di$$erential ,dgments a!ot ho# mch control a %erson had over an otcome

i$ they have reason to think o$ him as a !ad %erson. In one e&am%le" #hen %artici%ants are told

39:



that a man #as s%eeding home in a rainstorm and gets in an accident -in,ring others1" they are

more likely to say that he had control over the car i$ he #as s%eeding home to hide cocaine $rom

his %arents than i$ he #as s%eeding home to hide an anniversary gi$t des%ite the $act that the

$actors that led to the accident #ere identical across !oth scenarios -Alicke" 388" 1.

According to Alicke" the desire to !lame the ne$arios Bcocaine driver leads individals to

distort the criteria o$ controlla!ility in a $ashion that validates this !lame. or Alicke" the

s%ontaneos and atomatic ,dgments o$ !lame %rovide a ready sorce o$ motivation to distort

any in$ormation that might !e re5ired to ,sti$y this !lame.

'his a%%ears to !e tre $or the intentionality criterion as #ell. A gro#ing !ody o$ research

!y Fno!e and his colleages has sho#n that %eo%le are more inclined to say that a !ehavior #as

%er$ormed intentionally #hen they regard that !ehavior as morally #rong -+eslie" Fno!e"

Cohen" 4* see Fno!e" 4" $or a revie#1. or instance" #hen given a scenario in #hich a

$oreseea!le side e$$ect reslts in a negative otcome" individals are more likely to say that the

side e$$ect #as !roght a!ot intentionally. In the most common e&am%le" the CE2 o$ a

com%any is told that im%lementing a ne# %olicy #ill have the side e$$ect o$ either harming or

hel%ing the environment. In !oth cases" the CE2 e&%licitly states that he only cares a!ot

increasing %ro$its" not a!ot the incidental side e$$ect o$ harming or hel%ing the environment

-e.g." BI dont care at all a!ot harming the environment. I ,st #ant to make as mch %ro$it as I

can1. ;onetheless" %artici%ants %erceive that the side e$$ect o$ harming the environment #as

intentional6!t not the side e$$ect o$ hel%ing the environment. 'his %attern o$ $indings -#ith

sim%ler scenarios1 is evident in children as yong as 4 and 9 years old -+eslie" Fno!e" Cohen"

41. Althogh the mechanism nderlying these $indings that morally !ad actions are %erceived

as more intentional have !een hotly de!ated" the $indings are consistent #ith the vie# #e are

39@



de$ending here6that the motivation arising $rom a desire to !lame leads %eo%le to make

,dgments o$ $reedom that are consistent #ith this !lame.

I$ the motivation arising $rom a ,dgment o$ moral !adness leads to a magni$ication o$

intentionality ,dgments" then it shold !e the case that individals #ho $ind a certain act

%articlarly !ad shold ,dge these acts as more intentional than individals #ho are indi$$erent

a!ot the morality o$ the act. In a series o$ stdies" 'annen!am" Ditto" and Pizarro -81

demonstrated that this is indeed the case. Across a nm!er o$ stdies" individals #ho di$$ered in

their initial assessment o$ ho# immoral an act #as demonstrated di$$ering ,dgments o$

intentionality. or instance" sing the scenario develo%ed !y Fno!e and colleages descri!ed

a!ove" individals #ho re%orted a strong moral motivation to %rotect the environment #ere more

likely to re%ort that the damage to the environment !roght a!ot as a side e$$ect o$ the CE2s

decision #as intentional than those #ho held no sch moral vales a!ot the environment.

7imilarly" #hen %resented #ith a case in #hich military leaders ordered an attack on an enemy

that #old have the $oreseen -yet nintended1 conse5ence o$ casing the death o$ innocent

civilians" %olitical conservatives and li!erals rated the action as intentional #hen it ran contrary

to their %olitics. )hen the case involved Ira5i insrgents attacking American troo%s #ith the side

e$$ect o$ American civilian deaths" %olitical conservatives #ere more likely to ,dge the killings

as intentional than li!erals. 'he converse #as tre #hen the case #as descri!ed as American

troo%s killing Ira5i civilians as a conse5ence o$ attacking Ira5i insrgents.

In another stdy" %artici%ants #ere given one o$ t#o e&am%les in #hich the %rinci%le o$

harm redction #as sed to ,sti$y the distri!tion o$ $ree condoms in order to %revent the

incidence o$ %regnancy and the s%read o$ disease. Partici%ants #ere all s!se5ently asked

#hether the distri!tion o$ condoms intentionally %romoted se&al !ehavior. ?oral motivation

394



#as mani%lated !y changing the intended reci%ients o$ the $ree condomsM one set o$ %artici%ants

read a!ot local school !oard mem!ers #ho decided to distri!te condoms to stdents !ecase

they #ere a#are that middle(school and high(school stdents #ere engaging in risky se&al

!ehavior" #hile another set read that %olicy makers #ho #ere a#are that soldiers stationed in

$oreign contries #ere engaging in acts o$ se&al aggression -i.e." ra%e1 against local #omen

decided to distri!te condoms to the soldiers in order to cr! the s%read o$ n#anted diseases. In

!oth cases it #as e&%licitly stated that the gro% o$ individals making the decision to distri!te

condoms did not condone the se&al !ehavior o$ the intended reci%ients !t merely #anted to

redce the harm associated #ith these actions.

As %redicted" %artici%ants #ho read a!ot the distri!tion o$ condoms to yong teens

re%orted that the %olicy makers #ere not intentionally %romoting teen se&" #hile %artici%ants

reading a!ot $oreign soldiers re%orted that %olicy makers had intentionally %romoted ra%e. 'he

o!vios di$$erence in the moral stats o$ %remarital teen se& and ra%e seemed to !e driving

,dgments o$ intentionality. ?ore interestingly" these di$$erences in the moral stats o$ the t#o

acts may have acconted $or an ne&%ected gender di$$erence in these ratings o$ intentionality6

#omen #ere mch more likely to re%ort that the %olicy makers had intentionally %romoted ra%e

in the military case !t had not intentionally %romoted se& in the case o$ yong teens. ?en

,dged the t#o scenarios nearly identically. 2ne inter%retation o$ this $inding is that the

motivation to condemn ra%e #as stronger in $emale %artici%ants" es%ecially since the se&al

aggression in the scenario targeted #omen" and that this increased motivation drove

intentionality ,dgments.

Consistent #ith the vie# that a motivation to hold an individal !lame#orthy can lead to

a distortion o$ the criteria $or agentic $reedom" it a%%ears as i$ !lame can even in$lence memory

399



$or the severity o$ a moral in$raction. In one stdy" Pizarro and colleages %resented individals

#ith scenarios in #hich a man #alked ot o$ a restarant #ithot %aying $or his meal. )ithin the

descri%tion o$ this action" %artici%ants #ere given detailed in$ormation a!ot the %rice o$ the

dinner. esearchers mani%lated the degree o$ !lame#orthiness $or this in$raction !y telling one

set o$ %artici%ants that the individal had $ailed to %ay $or his meal !ecase he had received a call

noti$ying him that his daghter had !een in a car accident" #hile another set o$ %artici%ants #ere

told that the individal sim%ly desired to get a#ay #ithot having to %ay. )hen asked to recall

the events a%%ro&imately one #eek later" %artici%ants #ho had read that the man $ailed to %ay

sim%ly to get a#ay #ith it recalled the %rice o$ the dinner as signi$icantly higher than those #ho

had read that the man had le$t !ecase o$ his daghters accident -#hose memory $or the %rice

#as accrate1. Across conditions" the degree o$ moral !lame %artici%ants re%orted a$ter reading

the story #as a signi$icant %redictor o$ the memory distortion one #eek later -Pizarro" +aney"

?orris" +o$ts" 41.

<H2>“Ultimate” Freedom.</H2> 'he agentic $reedom that seems im%ortant $or lay

attri!tions o$ moral res%onsi!ility is conce%tally inde%endent $rom the Bltimate"

meta%hysical $reedom that many %hiloso%hers have arged is necessary $or attri!ting moral

res%onsi!ility -e.g." li!ertarian $reedom" or the $reedom to Bhave done other#ise1. A dee%

concern es%osed !y many is that the casal determinism that has !een a relia!le gide in

scienti$ic research may also threaten the ltimate $reedom that seems necessary to !e held

morally acconta!le. I$ thoghts and $eelings are entirely cased !y %hysical %rocesses in the

!rain" and i$ the la#s that govern these %rocesses are no di$$erent than the la#s governing the

motion o$ !illiard !alls and atomo!iles" then %erha%s a %erson is no more accrate in the !elie$

that she $reely decided to get % in the morning than that a !illiard !all $reely chose to roll across

39



the ta!le. 7ome have arged that the increased dissemination o$ %sychological research

highlighting the deterministic %rocesses that give rise to hman thoght and action may radically

change %eo%les notions o$ $reedom and %nishment -Greene Cohen" :1. et #hile

%sychologists have condcted a great deal o$ research on the criteria o$ agentic $reedom" only

recently have %sychologists and e&%erimental %hiloso%hers trned their attention to the 5estion

o$ #hether this ltimate $reedom is treated !y individals as a %rere5isite $or the ascri%tion o$

moral res%onsi!ility in the manner many %hiloso%hers have arged.

As it trns ot" the dee% concerns that determinism threatens moral res%onsi!ility may !e

n$onded. In the $irst %lace" it is nclear #hether the lack o$ ltimate $reedom is o$ mch

concern $or individals #hen making ,dgments o$ res%onsi!ility6in some cases" des%ite

e&%licit in$ormation that ndermines the %resence o$ ltimate $reedom" %eo%le still seem #illing

to hold others morally acconta!le. et even in cases in #hich %artici%ants a%%ear to endorse the

vie# that ltimate $reedom is a necessary %rere5isite $or the attri!tion o$ moral res%onsi!ility"

the motivation to hold others morally acconta!le seems to lead individals to selectively ignore

this in$ormation. or instance" in a recent stdy !y ;ichols and Fno!e -91" individals #ere

%resented #ith a descri%tion o$ a #orld that #as descri!ed as entirely deterministic in the manner

that is incom%ati!le #ith ltimate" meta%hysical $reedom. )hen %artici%ants #ere asked i$" in

general" mrderers in this deterministic #orld shold !e held morally res%onsi!le" most

%artici%ants said no. =t #hen %resented #ith a s%eci$ic individal #ho mrdered his entire

$amily" individals #ere more than #illing to attri!te !lame6even #hen it #as clear $rom the

descri%tion o$ the #orld that he cold not have acted other#ise. It a%%ears as i$ the vivid"

emotional natre o$ the s%eci$ic crime -and the likely motivation to hold an individal ca%a!le o$

sch a crime given its vividness1 led individals to either ignore the in$ormation a!ot ltimate

398



$reedom or ad,st their meta%hysical !elie$s a!ot #hether determinism is trly incom%ati!le

#ith moral res%onsi!ility.

In s%%ort o$ this latter vie#" )ool$olk" Doris" and Darley -41 descri!ed a scenario to

%artici%ants in #hich a man #as nder a clear sitational constraint that $orced him to mrder a

%assenger on an air%lane -he #as $orced !y hi,ackers to kill the %erson or else he and 3 others

#old !e killed1. )hile the man a%%eared to %ossess agentic $reedom" he #as clearly constrained

!y the sitation in terms o$ his a!ility to have acted other#ise. Des%ite this constraint"

%artici%ants nonetheless held the man more res%onsi!le $or the mrder i$ it #as something he

#anted to do any#ay -i$ he Bidenti$ied #ith the act1. Consistent #ith the com%ati!ilist a%%roach

es%osed !y rank$rt -38931 and others" the mans ina!ility to do other#ise6his lack o$

ltimate $reedom6did not seem to distr! %artici%ants a!ility to hold him morally acconta!le.

As a $inal e&am%le o$ ho# nderlying motivation to hold an individal acconta!le can shi$t

,dgments o$ $reedom" #e recently asked %artici%ants to recont a !ad deed that #as either

committed !y a good $riend or !y an enemy -Helzer Pizarro" 81. Given the di$$ering

motivations at %lay in their ,dgments o$ res%onsi!ility $or a liked verss a disliked individal"

#e #ere interested in ho# individals #old ,dge the $reedom o$ the %erson #ho had

committed the moral in$raction !y asking %artici%ants to ,dge to #hat e&tent they thoght the

%ersons !ehavior #as intentional as #ell as #hether they thoght the %ersons !ehavior #as

$reely chosen. As e&%ected" %eo%le $ond the !ad deed %er$ormed !y an enemy as more

!lame#orthy than the one %er$ormed !y a $riend -this #as tre a$ter controlling $or the severity

o$ the act" as #ell as #hen limiting or analyses to ,dgments o$ identical acts committed !y a

$riend or an enemy" sch as se&al in$idelity1. ?ore im%ortantly" the mani%lation o$ motivation

-$riend vs. enemy1 a$$ected %artici%ants ,dgments o$ $reedom as assessed !y their res%onses to

3



!oth 5estionsM relative to the immoral deeds o$ their $riends" %artici%ants attri!ted the misdeeds

o$ their enemies to their enemys nderlying intentions and #ere more likely to re%ort that the act

#as $reely chosen.

)hat these stdies seem to sho# is that #hile many %hiloso%hers %erceive determinism

to !e a threat to $reedom -and !y e&tension" to moral res%onsi!ility1" the %sychology o$ moral

res%onsi!ility is sch that %eo%le are $airly #illing to hold others morally acconta!le even in the

%resence o$ strong determinism -see also ;ahmias" ?orris" ;adelho$$er" 'rner" 4" $or

evidence sggesting that $or lay%ersons" determinism doesnt even threaten $reedom o$ the

li!ertarian variety1.

<H">Conclusion</H">

)e have tried to de$end a nm!er o$ s%eci$ic claims a!ot the lay conce%t o$ $reedom

and ho# individals se in$ormation a!ot $reedom #hen making ,dgments o$ moral

res%onsi!ility. 7%eci$ically" #e have arged that individals are highly motivated to hold others

acconta!le $or moral in$ractions" and that the %rimacy o$ this motivation o$ten in$lences

,dgments a!ot $reedom" rather than the other #ay arond. 'his seems tre $or ,dgments

regarding agentic $reedom -sch as #hether an act #as intended" cased" and controlled1" as #ell

as $or ,dgments o$ ltimate" or meta%hysical $reedom -the a!ility to have done other#ise1. 2ne

%shot o$ these $indings is that the classic incom%ati!ilist vie# that determinism %oses a threat to

morality and res%onsi!ility" #hile seemingly intitive" may %ose a threat only to individals #ho

do things like read !ooks a!ot $ree #ill. 'he %sychological link !et#een ltimate $reedom and

res%onsi!ility a%%ears less strong than many have sggested. Indeed" to the e&tent that

individals %ossess the intition that there is a link !et#een $reedom and res%onsi!ility" they

33



seem to se sch a link %rimarily as a strategy to de$end their moral ,dgments. ree #ill is

im%ortant" !t not $or the reason many might think.

In moments o$ re$lection" then" individals may realize that they shold ss%end their

moral evalations o$ the ro!ot neigh!or descri!ed in the introdction -!ecase he does not

%ossess Bltimate $reedom1. ;onetheless" #hen he %lays his msic lodly" $ails to mo# his

la#n" and lets his dog se their yard as a !athroom" they #ill have no %ro!lem attri!ting all the

$reedom needed to in order to !lame him $or his rde !ehavior.

3



<D7C(3>Discssion #ith David A. Pizarro</D7C(3>

<DSC>Are there differences beteen beliefs abo!t free ill in the abstract and beliefs abo!t

free ill in concrete cases"

=ertrand ?alle condcted several stdies in #hich he asked %eo%le a!stract 5estions

a!ot %eo%les intitions a!ot intentionality" and reslts seemed to indicate that %eo%le !elieve

that a %erson has to intend to do a thing in order to do it intentionally. In contrast" Josha Fno!e

gave %artici%ants a concrete scenario $eatring a CE2 and asked them to make determinations

a!ot #hether his actions #ere done intentionally. eslts indicated that one need not intend to

do something in order to do it intentionally. 'hs" there seems to !e a distinction !et#een

a!stract !elie$s and the concrete case $or the 5estion o$ intentionality. ?ight there !e a similar

distinction $or $ree #ill

Indeed" %eo%le do seem to res%ond di$$erently to 5estions a!ot $ree #ill in the a!stract

as com%ared to concrete cases. In %articlar" %eo%le generally !elieve !oth that determinism

ndermines $ree #ill in the a!stract. et" $or s%eci$ic cases" %eo%le generally !elieve that

individals are not to !e e&csed $rom #rongdoing !ecase o$ determinism. 'his seeming

con$lict likely is !ecase %eo%le have a strong rge to see intentionality" in order to hold others

res%onsi!le. 7aid di$$erently" %eo%le seem to alter #hat they mean !y intentionality" or the

re5irement o$ $ree #ill in esta!lishing intentionality" in order to !lame. It #old !e nsal to

hear a ,dge say B=ecase o$ meta%hysical determinism" yo shold get a redced sentence.

'hat is" a!stract !elie$s a!ot $ree #ill may con$lict #ith the desire to assign !lame in concrete

cases.

30



#s the $!estion of free ill related to %!dgments of moral res&onsibilit'"

'he consenss vie# is that the t#o are dee%ly ent#ined. Ho#ever" an alternative vie# is

that $ree #ill and moral res%onsi!ility are entirely orthogonal" sch that determined !ad !ehavior

re5ires %nishment ,st as ndetermined !ad !ehavior does. or instance" i$ a %arent has one

child #ho is tem%eramentally -and navoida!ly1 agreea!le" and one that is tem%eramentally -and

navoida!ly1 disagreea!le" the %arent #ill srely increase the %nishment on the disagreea!le

child" des%ite the $act that it is tem%eramental and not chosen. Indeed" greater %nishment may

!e necessary to alter the disagreea!le childs !ehavior. 2n this vie#" there is no real relationshi%

!et#een $reedom and res%onsi!ility.

A second alternative to the vie# that $ree #ill and moral res%onsi!ility are closely related

is that they are %eri%herally related. 2n this vie#" the 5estion o$ $ree #ill is so mch more

im%ortant than that o$ moral res%onsi!ility that moral res%onsi!ility is incidental. Consider the

$ollo#ing e&am%le. Imagine a %erson #ho is totally amoral. 'his %erson makes no moral

,dgments a!ot others or a!ot the sel$. 7ch a %erson may e&%erience inter%ersonal %ro!lems"

!t he or she can $nction in society and order $rom a men. In contrast" one cannot $nction

#ithot a sense o$ $ree #ill. A %erson convinced o$ the trth o$ determinism cannot go to a

restarant" sit do#n and say BEverything is determined" so Ill ,st #ait and see #hat I order. In

other #ords" %eo%le cannot $nction #ithot the assm%tion o$ $ree #ill" !t they can $nction

#ithot the conce%t o$ moral res%onsi!ility. 'hs" moral res%onsi!ility may !e considered a

%eri%heral 5estion to that o$ $ree #ill.

+ay%ersons" ho#ever" seem to react strongly and viscerally to the %ossi!ility o$ an

a!sence o$ moral res%onsi!ility" #hile they vie# the %ossi!ility o$ determinism #ith less

3:



reactance. 'hs" among lay%ersons" the 5estion o$ moral res%onsi!ility seems %reeminent

relative to the 5estion o$ $ree #ill.

#s moral res&onsibilit' !ni$!e among h!mans"

2ne o$ the distingishing $eatres o$ hman !eings is sel$(reglation. In most nonhman

animals" !ehavior is nder social control. Ho#ever" certain %atterns o$ instinctal !ehavior are

ada%tively necessary $or the srvival o$ the s%ecies. 'he #ay that individal nonhman animals

are controlled is !y ho# their !ehavior a$$ects the gro%. 'his is social control. 'he interesting

thing a!ot ,dicial decisions is that they are %artly a system o$ social control and %artly a system

that has ta%%ed into the notion o$ sel$(reglation and moral res%onsi!ility. In a sense those are

con$onded roles. 'he distinction !et#een the kind o$ social control $ond in nonhman animals

and the kind o$ social control $ond in hmans is that an additional amont o$ social control is

$ond in hmans.</D7C>

3@



<R%">References</R%">

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04Q09.

Alicke" ?. D. -1. Cl%a!le control and the %sychology o$ !lame. )s'chological -!lletin*

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A&elrod" ." Hamilton" ). D. -3831. 'he evoltion o$ coo%eration. Science" 33" 308Q3084.

=ameister" . ." ?asicam%o" E. J." De)all" C. ;. -81. Prosocial !ene$its o$ $eeling $reeM

Dis!elie$ in $ree #ill increases aggression and redces hel%$lness. )ersonalit' and

Social )s'cholog' -!lletin* ,* 4(4.

=rosnan" 7. ." de)aal" . =. ?. -01. ?onkeys re,ect n$air %ay. 0at!re* 12" 89(88.

Call" J. 'omasello" ?. -1. Does the chim%anzee have a theory o$ mind 0 years later.

rends in Cogniti3e Science* 2" 39(38.

Clarke" ." -01. 4ibertarian acco!nts of free ill . ;e# orkM 2&$ord Oniversity Press.

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