233288725 oblicon case digests final compilation

8/18/2019 233288725 Oblicon Case Digests Final Compilation

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1. Director of Lands et.al vs Funtillar et. Al (GR 68533 May 23, 1986)

FACTS: This is a petition to review the decision of the respondent court which affirmed theadjudication by the land registration court of a parcel of land in favour of the privaterespondents. The land was part of the property originally belonging to one Candida Fernandezwhose ownership and possession began sometime during her lifetime and extended until 1936

when she died. Sometime in1940 or 1941, the parcel of land was forfeited in favour of thegovernment for failure to pay real estate taxes. However, the same was redeemed in 1942 byVitaliano Aguirre, one of the three children of Candida Fernandez, who was then theadministrator of the property. A final deed of sale was executed by the Provincial Treasurer infavor of Vitaliano Aguirre. The heirs of Candida Fernandez later partitioned the property amongthemselves. The particular lot now was adjudicated in favor of the applicants-respondents. In1972, private respondents, who were the grandchildren of Fernandez, applied for theregistration of a parcel of land. The Director of Lands and Director of Forest Development filedan opposition alleging that neither applicants nor their predecessor-in-interest possessedsufficient title to the land; that neither applicants, nor their predecessors have been in open,continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land for at least thirty(30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application; and that the land is a portion of

the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents have established possession for at least thirty yearsto entitle them to confirmation of imperfect title and registration under the law

HELD: Yes. Long before Candida’s death in 1936, she already possessed the disputedproperty. This possession must be tacked to the possession of her heirs, through administratorVitaliano Aguirre, and later to the possession of the private respondents themselves, who areCandida's grandchildren. The fact of possession is bolstered by the forfeiture in1940 of the landin favor of the government. It would be rather absurd under the circumstances of this case torule that the government would order the forfeiture of property for non-payment of real estatetaxes if the property is forest land. It is also reasonable to rule that the heirs of CandidaFernandez redeemed the property because they wanted to keep the land of the deceased in thepossession of their family, thus continuing prior possession. From 1936 and earlier up to 1972 ismore than the required period.

2. Arradaza et.al vs CA & Larrazabal (GR 50422 Feb. 8, 1989)

FACTS: The petitioners were the legitimate children of spouses Ignacio Arradaza and MarcelinaQuirino who died on August 31, 1974. In 1941, Ignacio Arradaza and Marcelina Quirinopurchased from spouses Gervacio Villas and Jovita Tabudlong a piece of land. The deed of salewas lost during the war and Original Certificate of Title No.35901 was therefore issued in thename of Gervacio Villas and Jovita Tabudlong but they recognized the vendee spouses as the

real owners of the land. On October 21, 1947, Ignacio Arradaza sold the same land to EstelitaMagalona Bangloy. She took over possession of the land, declared it for taxation purpose andpaid taxes thereon. On February 13, 1963 while the land was still in the name of spouses Villas,Larrazabal purchased the property from Estelita Magalona Bangloywhich was evidenced by a"Deed of Sale of a Parcel of Land" executed in favor of Larrazabal. Original Certificate of TitleNo. 35901 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 4581 was issued in the name ofprivate respondent and the land was declared for taxation purposes. On January 18, 1975,petitioners filed an action against private respondent before the CFI of Leyte to recover theirone-half (1/2) share of the land as heirs of Ignacio Arradaza and Marcelina Quirino, and to


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exercise the right of legal redemption over one-half (1/2) of the property sold by their deceasedfather while he was already a widower on October 21, 1947.Private respondent on the otherhand, maintains that prescription has set in because the predecessors-in-interest of petitionerswere not registered owners protected by Act 496, He asserts that when the transaction occurredon October 21, 1947 the Code of Civil Procedure was still in force. The prescriptive period wasonly ten (10) years irrespective of the good or bad faith of Estelita M. Bangloy. The trial court

rendered a Summary Judgment in favor of the private respondent which was affirmed by theCourt of Appeals. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in the decision

RULING: No, decision of court of appeals is affirmed. Summary judgment procedure is amethod for promptly disposing of action in which there is no genuine issue as to the existence ofany material fact. The Record on Appeal clearly shows that petitioners and respondentssubmitted their respective lists of witnesses and their affidavits, and exhibits during the pre-trial,and memoranda. Private respondent, in particular, submitted among others, exhibits, TransferCertificate of Title No. 4581 in his name and that of his wife dated April 18, 1963, and taxdeclarations in his name and that of his predecessors-in-interests. From these affidavits,

exhibits and other evidence, the trial court rendered its Summary Judgment. An examination ofthe record clearly and readily shows that the statute of limitation has stepped in and that thepetitioners are guilty of laches and that the property has been in possession of privaterespondent who is a purchaser in good faith and for value. There is therefore, no genuine triableissue of fact.

3. David vs Bandin (GR 48322 April 8, 1987)

FACTS: During their lifetime, the spouses Juan Ramos and Fortunate Calibo, were the ownersof two parcels of land; the Talon Property and Laong property. Both spouses died intestate,

leaving as heirs two legitimate children, Candida and Victoriana Ramos, and grand-daughter, Agapita Ramos, daughter of their deceased Sora Anastacio. Candida and Victoriana diedintestate on February 16, 1955 and December 12,1931, respectively. Candida Ramos; herniece, Agapita Ramos; and her nephew, Eulogio Bandin, sold a portion of the Talon property tothe spouses Rufino 0. Miranda and Natividad Guinto. This portion was divided into three lots.Parcel 1 was subsequently sold to Narciso Velasquez and Albino Miranda. Parcels 2 and 3were subsequently sold to Jose Ramirez and Sotero Ramirez, repectively, who registered theseproperties and obtained OCT Nos. 2027 and 2029 in their respective names. The remainingportion of the Talon property was extra judicially partitioned on September17, 1955 among theheirs of Candida Ramos and was subdivided in seven lots. Lot 5 was given to Victoria Martin,who was able to register the land and was issued OCT No. 3706. Lot 6 was given to MaximinaMartin, who also was able to register the land and was issued OCT No. 3707. A portion of these

lots were subsequently sold to Magno de la Cruz who was able to obtain TCT. The Laongproperty was sold by Candida Ramos and her children on December 19, 1943 to HermogenesLucena, husband of Juanita Martin, one of the daughters of Candida. On September 23, 1959,Juanita (then widowed) sold the property to the spouses Gregorio and Mary Venturanza. OnJanuary21, 1965, the Venturanzas, in a deed of sale also signed by Juanita Martin, conveyed aportion of the property to the spouses Felipe and Antonia David. Juanita Martin was able toregister the property in her name and was issued OCT No. 8916 on July 1, 1971.On June 14,1963, respondents, who were the heirs of Victoriana except for Agapita, filed a complaint for therecovery and partition of property. A decision was rendered by the trial court, in favor of the


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plaintiffs,declaring, however, that certain properties could no longer be reconveyed to plaintiffssince they had been transferred to purchasers who bought them in good faith for value. Notsatisfied with the decision, both plaintiffs and defendants appealed to the Court of Appealswhich nullified the transfers made to the defendants who were declared by the trial court aspurchasers in good faith.

ISSUES: Whether or not private respondents' claim is barred by prescription2. Whether or notpetitioners were buyers in good faith

HELD: No. Respondents’ claim is not barred by laches and prescription since it was not shownthat they were guilty of negligence or slept on their rights. They sent a letter of demand to theheirs of Candida Ramos on April 23, 1963, and filed their complaint against them on June 14,1963, or within a period of approximately eight (8) years from Candida's death.

Petitioners Felipe David and Antonia G. David were buyers in bad faith. They bought theproperty when it was still unregistered land. The defense of having purchased the property ingood faith may be availed of only where registered land is involved and the buyer had relied ingood faith on the clear title of the registered owner. One who purchases an unregistered landdoes so at his peril His claim of having bought the land in good faith, i.e. without notice thatsome other person has a right to, or interest in, the property, would not protect him if it turns outthat the seller does not actually own the property.

4. Gallardo vs Intermediate Appellate Court (GR 67742 October 29, 1987)

FACTS: Petitioners were nephew and niece of the late Pedro Villanueva and first cousin of theprivate respondent Marta Villanueva vda. de Agana, the latter being the daughter of PedroVillanueva. The subject matter of this controversy involves a parcel of land situated in Cavinti,Laguna consisting of 81,300 square meters, more or less, initially covered by an originalCertificate of Title No. 2262, issued on April 2, 1924 owned and registered in the name of the

late Pedro Villanueva. On August 10, 1937, petitioner claimed that the aforestated land was soldto them in a private document, an unnotarized deed of sale written in Tagalog that was allegedlysigned by the late Pedro Villanueva conveying and transferring the property in question in favorof the petitioners. Subsequently, the Original Certificate of Title was cancelled and a newcertificate of title was issued in the name of the petitioners covered by Transfer Certificate ofTitle No. RT- 6293 (No. 23350) on January 4, 1944. On November 17, 1976, defendant MartaVillanueva together with Pedro Villanueva, Jr., and Restituto R.Villanueva executed and filed an

Affidavit of Adverse Claim with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna. When petitionerslearned of this Affidavit of Adverse Claim, attempt was made to settle said controversyamicably, but they failed. So, petitioners instituted court suit against the private respondent andher husband, Dr. Marcelo S. Agana, Sr. by filing a complaint for Quieting of Title and Damageswith the Court of First Instance of Laguna on February 3, 1977. The Court of First Instance of

Laguna rendered its decision declaring the deed of sale of August 10, 1937, as well as thereconstituted transfer certificate of title of petitioners, void ab initio.

Thus, petitioners filed notice of appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court. However, theIntermediate Appellate Court, on May 22, 1984, affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of TitleNo. RT-6293 (No. 23350) issued in the names of petitioners.


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HELD: No. Section 127 of Act 496 which requires, among other things, that the conveyance beexecuted "before the judge of a court of record or clerk of a court of record or a notary public ora justice of the peace, who shall certify such acknowledgment substantially in form nexthereinafter stated‖ was violated.

The action of the Register of Deeds of Laguna in allowing the registration of the private deed of

sale was unauthorized and did not lend a bit of validity to the defective private document of sale.With reference to the special law, Section 127 of the Land Registration Act, Act 496 ―Deeds ofConveyance, affecting lands, whether registered under this act or unregistered shall besufficient in law when made substantially in accordance with the following forms, and shall be aseffective to convey, encumber or bind the lands as though made in accordance with more prolixforms heretofore in use.‖ It is therefore evident that Exhibit "E" in the case at bar is definitely notregisterable under the Land Registration Act. Also, the contention that ownership overregistered property may be acquired by prescription or adverse possession is absolutely withoutmerit. No title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquiredby prescription or adverse possession. Prescription is unavailing not only against the registeredowner but also against his hereditary successors.

5. Narciso Buenaventura and Maria Buenaventura vs CA and Manotok Realty , Inc.(GR 50837 Dec. 28, 1992)

FACTS:

Petitioners' allegation in their complaint filed in the court of origin, that fraud was employed inthe execution of a deed of sale and subsequently, in the issuance of a transfer certificate of title,renders their action for reconveyance susceptible to prescription either within 4 years or 10years. In the present case, even if one bends backwards and considers the circumstancesalleged as having created an implied or constructive trust, such that the action for reconveyance

would prescribed in the longer period of 10 years, still petitioners' action is plainly time-barred.Considering that the deed of sale executed by the Philippine Homesite and Housing Corporationin favor of Lorenzo Caiña and Francisca Caiña-Rivera was executed on November 4, 1965 andon the following day, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 21484 was issued in favor of the vendees(private respondents), the party allegedly defrauded in the transaction, herein petitioners, hadonly 10 years or until September 5, 1975 within which to file the appropriate action. In theinstant case, the action was filed only on December 28, 1976, which was beyond the prescribedperiod set by law. Aggrieved by the rules of the trial court, herein private respondents filed apetitioner with the Court of Appeals which later granted the petitioner and ordered the dismissalof the complaint of then private respondents, now herein petitioners, on the ground that theiraction has already prescribed. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was to no avail.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Court of Appeals erred in the decisionRULING: No, The defendant-appellee purchased the parcel of land in question giving rise to thecomplaint of herein plaintiffs-appellants. The latter delayed the assertion of their supposed rightto annul the sale for a period of over fifteen (15) years despite knowledge or notice of such sale.They had all the opportunity within that period of time to take action to set aside or annul thesale. Defendant-appellee was never apprised of any intention on the part of plaintiffs-appellantsto annul the sale until this action was filed. Finally, the defendant-appellee stands to lose theproperty in question if the suit filed against him by plaintiffs-appellants shall be deemed barred.


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6. Francisco v. CA, 122 SCRA 538 [1983]

FACTS: On February 6, 1966, Dr. Patrocinio Angeles, who was then the Director of the MorongEmergency Hospital, filed a case for intriguing against honor allegedly committed on December

26, 1965 by Dr. Emiliano and Atty. Harry Bernardino. On May 3, 1966, the Provincial Fiscal filedan information against Francisco and Bernardino with the CFI of Rizal of the crime of grave oraldefamation. Later, upon order of the court, the information was amended by adding statementsallegedly uttered by the two accused constituting the crime of slander.

On Feb. 1, 1973, the trial court convicted Francisco and Bernardino of the crime of graveoral defamation and sentenced each of them the penalty of arresto mayor and was made to paythe complainant P10,000. Upon appeal in the Court of Appeals, the trial court's decision wasmodified finding the accused guilty of simple slander. Bernardino passed away while thispetition was instituted in the Supreme Court. Francisco, then argues that since the CA hadfound that the offense committed was the lesser offense of simple slander, which under Art. 90of the RPC, prescribes in two months, the CA should have dismissed the case. Further,Francisco claims that the CA should have acquitted him on the ground that the said crime had

already prescribed as per evidence presented, the alleged defamatory remarks were committedon December 26, 1965, while the information charged against him was filed more than fourmonths later.

The Solicitor General, however, contends that "for the purpose of determining the properprescriptive period, what should be considered is the nature of the offense charged in theinformation which is grave oral defamation, not the crime committed by the accused, as saidcrime was found by the Court to constitute only simple slander". Since the prescription for graveoral defamation is six months, the crime has not yet prescribed when it the information was filed.Moreover, the Solicitor General argues that the filing of the complaint in the Fiscal's officeinterrupts the period of prescription. Only 39 days had passed from the time the offense wasallegedly committed to the day of the filing of the complaint.

ISSUES: Whether or not the crime of simple slander found by the CA to be the offensecommitted by the petitioners has prescribed.

Whether or not the filing of a complaint in the Fiscal's office interrupts the prescription of anoffense.

HELD:1. Yes. An accused cannot be convicted for the lesser offense necessarily included in the crimecharged if at the time of the filing of the information, the lesser offense has already prescribed.To hold otherwise, according to the Court, would be to sanction a circumvention of the law onprescription by the simple expedient of accusing the defendant of the graver offense.2. Yes. Prescription is interrupted with the filing of the case even if the court is without

jurisdiction, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation. Thus,the filing of the complaint in the Fiscal's office interrupts the period of prescription.

7. Quirino Mateo & Matias vs Dorotea diaz et. al (GR 137305 Jan. 17, 2002)

FACTS: The land involved is registered under the Torrens system in the name of petitioners’father Claro Mateo. There is no question raised with respect to the validity of the title.Immediately after petitioners discovered the existence of OCT 206 in 1977 or 1978, they took


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steps to assert their rights thereto. They divided the land between the two of them in anextrajudicial partition. Then petitioners filed the case below to recover ownership andpossession as the only surviving children of original owners, the late Claro Mateo. The RegionalTrial Court (RTC), Bulacan, at Malolos, ruled that prescription and laches are applicable againstpetitioners, that real actions over an immovable prescribe after 30 years, that ownership can beacquired thru possession in good faith and with just title for a period of 10 years, and that

ownership may be acquired thru uninterrupted adverse possession for 30 years without need of just title or of good faith. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed that of the trial court, thus, thispetition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the equitable doctrine of laches may override a provision of the LandRegistration Act on imprescriptibility of title to registered land. Otherwise put, the issue raised iswhether prescription and the equitable principle of laches are applicable in derogation of the titleof the registered owner.

HELD: A party who had filed immediately a case as soon as he discovered that the land inquestion was covered by a transfer certificate in the name of another person is not guilty oflaches.(St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc. v. Cleofas, 92 SCRA 389 [1979]).An action to recoverpossession of a registered land never prescribe in view of the provision of Sec. 44 of Act 496(now Sec. 47 of PD 1529) to the effect that no title to registered land in derogation to that of aregistered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.

The Supreme Court thereupon reverses the CA’s decision. In lieu thereof, the Court remandsthe case to the trial court for determination of the heirs of Claro Mateo in a proper proceeding.

8. Far East Bank & Trust Co. vs Estrella Q. Querimit (GR 148582 Jan. 16, 2002)

FACTS: Respondent deposited her savings with petitioner-bank. She did not withdraw herdeposit even after maturity date of the certificates of deposit (CDs) precisely because shewanted to set it aside for her retirement, relying on the bank’s assurance, as reflected on theface of the instruments themselves, that interest would ―accrue‖ or accumulate annually even after their maturity. Petitioner-bank failed to prove that it had already paid respondent, bearerand lawful holder of subject CDs, petitioner failed to prove that the CDs had been paid out of itsfunds, since evidence by respondent stands unrebutted that subject CDs until now remainunindorsed, undelivered, and unwithdrawn by her.

ISSUE: Whether or not it is unjust to allow the doctrine of laches to defeat the right ofrespondent to recover her savings which she deposited with the petitioner?

RULING: Yes, it would be unjust not to allow respondent to recover her savings which shedeposited with petitioner-bank. For one, Petitioner failed to exercise that degree of diligencerequired by the nature of its business. Because the business of banks is impressed with publicinterest, the degree of diligence required of banks is more than that of a good father of thefamily or of an ordinary business firm. The fiduciary nature of their relationship with theirdepositors requires banks to treat accounts of their clients with the highest degree of care.

Respondent is entitled to moral damages because of the mental anguish and humiliation shesuffered as a result of the wrongly refusal of petitioner to pay her even after she had de-livered


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the CDs. (Arts. 2217 and 2219). In addition, petitioner should pay respondent exemplarydamages which the trial court imposed by way of example or correction for the public good (Art.2229). Finally, respondent is entitled to attorney’s fees since petitioner’s act or omissioncompelled her to incur expenses to protect her interest making such award just and equitable.

9. Development Bank of the Philippines vs CA and Carlos Cajes (GR 129471 April 28,2000)

FACTS: Petitioner filed an ejectment suit against private respondent, claiming ownership of aparcel of land covered by a TCT, which included the 19.4 hectares being occupied by the latter.The trial court declared petitioner to be the owner of the land, but the Court of Appeals (CA)reversed the trial court. On appeal, petitioner claimed that its predecessor-in-interest hadbecome the owner of the land by virtue of the decree of registra-tion in his name. The SupremeCourt affirmed the CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner be the owner of the disputed land RULING: Taking into consideration the possession of his predecessor-in-interest, privaterespondent had been in uninterrupted adverse possession of the land for more than 30 yearsprior to the decree of registration issued in favor of petitioner’s predecessor -in-interest. Suchpossession ripened into ownership of the land thru acquisitive prescription a mode of acquiringownership and other real rights over immovable property. A decree of registration cut off orextinguished a right acquired by a person only when such right refers to a lien or encumbranceon the land which was not annotated on the certificate of title issued thereon, but not to the rightof ownership thereof. Registration of land does not create a title nor vest one. Accordingly, the19.4 hectares of land being occupied by private respondent must be reconveyed in his favor.

10. Presidential Ad hoc fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans vs Aniano A.Desierto (GR 130340 Oct. 25, 1999)

FACTS: Behest loans, which are part of the ill-gotten wealth which former President FerdinandE. Marcos and his cronies accumulated and which the Government thru the PresidentialCommission on Good Government (PCGG) seeks to recover, have a prescriptive period to becounted from the discovery of the crimes charged, and not from the date of their commission. Ifthe commission of the crime is known, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the dayit was committed.

ISSUE: Whether or not action may be barred by prescription

RULING: The prosecution of offenses arising from, relating or incident to, or involving ill-gottenwealth contemplated in Sec. 15, Art. XI of the Philippine Constitution of 1987 may be barred byprescription. Said provision applies only in civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, and notto criminal cases.


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11. De Jesus et. al vs CA (GR 57092 Jan. 21, 1993)

FACTS: Reckoned from the time she executed the affidavit of adjudication in 1961, elevenyears after the New Civil Code had taken effect, private respondent’s possession of the

contested lot is far too short of the prescriptive period of 30 years, considering that herpossession is in bad faith. The filing of the petition for recovery of ownership and possession

and quieting of title by petitioners on Apr. 27, 1973 was well below the acquisitive prescriptiveperiod for private respondent, which is 30 years under Art.1141 of the present Civil Code. In thiscase, the statutory period of prescription is deemed to have commenced when petitioners weremade aware of a claim adverse to them, when the affidavit of adjudication was duly registeredwith the Registry of Deeds which, at the earliest may be considered to be in 1974, when privaterespondent was able to secure a tax declaration in her name.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court of appeals erred in the decision in declaring the privaterespondents to be the absolute owner of the land

RULING: Prescription running even after the effectivity of the New Civil Code on August 30,1950, continued to be governed by Sec. 41 of the Old Civil Code. Under the present Civil Code,the prescriptive period required for the acquisition of immovable property is 10 years if thepossession is in good faith, and 30 years if in bad faith. Such open, continuous, exclusive andnotorious occupation of the disputed property for 30 years must be conclusively established.

12. G.R. No. L-28616 January 22, 1980

TOMAS RODIL and the deceased spouse CATALINA CRUZ, substituted by her heirs,namely: VIVENCIO RODIL married to ZUEKO MATSUO CONSOLACION RODIL married toFRANCISCO HEMEDES DOMICIANO RODIL married to VIRGINIA MARALIT, CLARITARODIL married to JUAN ALGIER NATALIA RODIL married to SILVINIANO ATIENZA,LYDIA RODIL married to CARLOS HORILLENO VEDASTO RODIL married to TESSIEMANGUBAT and CELIA RODIL married to MACARIO TIU JR., petitioners,vs.HON. JUDGE MARIANO V. BENEDICTO as Judge of the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OFNUEVA ECIJA, BRANCH V-GAPAN and the heirs of ALEJANDRO ABES, namely: ALEJOABES, BIENVENIDO ABES, ROSITA ABES, married to MATEO MALLARI, FIDELA ABES,married to PONCIANO ATENIDO, DAVID ABES, MARCELO ABES, NICANOR ABES,SEVERINO ABES, JOVITA ABES, married to GIL CABRETA EUFROCINA ABES, married

to ROMULO BOTE; LOURDES ABES, married to ALIPIO TAGNIPIS LUZ ABES, TEODORAABES, EMITERIO ABES, JR., GREGORIO ABES, ERLINDA ABES, married to LUIS TAAL,RENATO ABES, ESTRELLITA TALPLACIDO REYNALDO ABES, TERESITA ABES,CAROLINA ABES, and FERNANDO ABES; the latter four who are minors are representedby their mother CRISPINA DOMINGO, respondents.

FACTS:


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Cadastre were claimed and applied for by the Spouse Tomas Rodil and Catalina Cruz. Theclaim was not contested. Afterwards, the cadastral court adjudicated the lots in favor of theapplicant and the Original Certificate was issued also in favor of them. However, the heirs of

Alejandro Abes filed a petition with the court for the review of the registration decree upon theground that they are the true owner and in actual possession of the land and that the spouse-

claimant was secured such land thru fraud. The cadastral court denied the petition for reviewthat the heirs of Alejandro Abes failed to overcome the evidence of the above stated petitioner.The spouse filed a petition for the issuance of writ of possession asking that they be placed inpossession of the lots and the private respondents be evicted.

The heirs of Alejandro Abes also filed a Motion for Reconsideration contending that the petitionfor the writ of possession was filed out of time and that there was no allegation in the petitionand neither was it proved that the respondent were defeated in the registration proceeding. Therespondent judge set aside the decision and ordered the dissolution of the writ of possession.The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the filing of the petitioner for the petition of the issuance of writ of possessionwas filed out of time.

RULING

No. the decision in the land registration case has become final; it may not be enforced after thelapse of a period of 10 years, except by another proceeding to enforce the judgment or decision.This is derived from the provision of the Ruled of Court and refers to civil actions and is notapplicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration case.

In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land registrationproceedings, the ownership by a person or a parcel of land is sought to be established. After theownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding toenforce said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been inpossession of the land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.

13. G.R. No. 97332 October 10, 1991

SPOUSES JULIO D. VILLAMOR AND MARINA VILLAMOR, petitioners,vs.THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES MACARIA LABINGISA REYES ANDROBERTO REYES,respondents.


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FACTS

Private respondent was the owner of a 600-square meter lot and she sold a portion of 300square meter of the said lot to the Spouses Villamor which is the petitioners. PrivateRespondent executed a ―Deed of Option‖ in favor of the Villamor in which the remaining 300

square meter portion would be sold to the petitioners under the conditions stated in the deed. Inthe deed, it stated that the private respondent and her husband agreed to sell and convey theremaining one-half portion whenever the need for that sale arises either on the part of theprivate respondents or the petitioners at the same price of 70.00 per square meter. However,after the husband of private respondent retired, they offered to repurchase the lot sold to thepetitioners but they had refused and reminded about the deed of option. On the other hand, thepetitioner’s contention that they had express their desire to the private respondent to purchasethe remaining half portion of the lot but they are being ignored by the latter.

The petitioners filed a complaint for specific performance against the private respondent whichwas rendered by the trial court in favor of them and ordered the private respondent to sell unto

them the lot. Not satisfied by the decision, the private respondent appealed to the Court ofappeals which reversed the trial court’s decision on finding that the Deed of Option is void forlack of consideration.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Deed of Option is valid

RULING

No. A contract of sale is, under Article 1475 of the Civil Code, "perfected at the moment there isa meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price. From

that moment, the parties may reciprocally demand perform of contracts." Since there was,between the parties, a meeting of minds upon the object and the price, there was already aperfected contract of sale. What was, however, left to be done was for either party to demandfrom the other their respective undertakings under the contract. It may be demanded at any timeeither by the private respondents, who may compel the petitioners to pay for the property or thepetitioners, who may compel the private respondents to deliver the property.

However, the Deed of Option did not provide for the period within which the parties maydemand the performance of their respective undertakings in the instrument. The parties couldnot have contemplated that the delivery of the property and the payment thereof could be madeindefinitely and render uncertain the status of the land. The failure of either parties to demandperformance of the obligation of the other for an unreasonable length of time renders the

contract ineffective.

14. G.R. No. 139776 August 1, 2002

PHILIPPINE AMERICAN LIFE AND GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, petitioner,vs.JUDGE LORE R. VALENCIA-BAGALACSA, Regional Trial Court of Libmanan, Camarines


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Sur, Branch 56, and EDUARDO Z. LUMANIOG, CELSO Z. LUMANIOG and RUBEN Z.LUMANIOG, respondents

FACTS

Faustino Lumaniog was insured by the petitioner under Life Insurance Policy with the face value

of P50, 000.00 and he died of ―coronary thrombosis‖. His heirs, the private respondent which ishis legitimate children filed before the RTC a complaint for the recovery of sum of moneyagainst the petitioner alleging that they continuously claimed for all the proceeds and interestunder the life insurance policy and despite the repeated demands for payment and/ forsettlement of the claim due for the petitioner, they finally refused or disallowed said claim afterseveral years later. However, the petitioner counterclaim that the cause of action of privaterespondent had prescribed and they are guilty of laches, which the ground of concealment onthe part of the deceased when he asserted in his application for insurance coverage that he hadnot been treated for indication of ―chest pain and other illness, well in fact he was known

hypertensive. The RTC upholds the Order the claim of private respondents’ counsel that the

running of the 10-year period was ―stopped‖ and when petitioner finally decided to deny theirclaim that the 10-year period it was only begun to run. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari inCourt of Appeals but it affirmed the decision of the RTC, stating that the 10-year period shouldinstead be counted from the date of rejection by the insurer since this is the time when thecause of action accrues.

ISSUE

1. Whether or not the 10-year period will start after the cause of action accrues.2. Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in its order that the 10-year

period had not yet lapsed.

RULING

1. Yes. The 10-year period will be counted from the date of rejection by the insurer. Thecause of action did not accrue until the claim was finally rejected by the insurancecompany. This is because, before such final rejection, there was no real necessity forbringing the suit. However, in this case, the denial of the claim had already been madeby the petitioner through a letter and the private respondent did not gave rise the cause

of action.2. Yes. The RTC arbitrarily ruled in its Order that the 10-year period had not yet lapsed

because it is based on the finding on mere explanation of the private respondents’

counsel and not the evidence presented by the parties as to the date when to reckon theprescriptive period. The ruling of the RTC that the cause of action of private respondenthad not prescribed is arbitrarily and patently erroneous for not being founded byevidence on record and therefore, the same is void.


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15. G.R. No. L-45277 August 5, 1985

AUGUSTO BASA, petitioner,vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Solicitor General, and JudgeGUILLERMO F. VILLASOR, Branch XV, Court of First Instance of Manila, respondent.

FACTS

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed against the petitioners’ deficiency income

taxes. The deficiencies were based on the taxpayer’s failure to report in full his capital gains on

the sales of land. This result to justify the imposition of 50% surcharge, in which the taxpayer didnot contest the assessment in the Tax Court. On the assumption that the assessment had finaland incontestable, the Commissioner sued the taxpayer in Manila Court of First Instance for thecollection of the amount which rendered their decision against the petitioner and ordered him to

pay the surcharge. The petitioner then appealed to the Court of Appeals and did not perfectedhis appeal within the reglementary period.

ISSUE

Whether or not petitioners’ cause of action has prescribed.

RULING

Yes. The issue of prescription raised by him is baseless. The assessments were predicated onthe fact that his income tax returns, if not fraudulent, were false because he under declared hisincome. In such a case, the deficiency assessments may be made within ten years after thediscovery of the falsity or omission. The court action should be instituted within five years afterthe assessment but this period is suspended during the time that the Commission is prohibitedfrom instituting a court action.

16. G.R. No. L-46893 November 12, 1985

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,vs.FRANCISCO RICARTE, defendant-appellee.

FACTS


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Francisco Ricarte filed his income tax return and the Office of the Collector of Internal Revenuemade corresponding assessment and fixed at P222.00 the defendant’s income tax liability

pursuant to the express provision of Section 51 (a) of the National Internal Revenue Code, thenin effect. The defendant paid his income tax in two equal installment of P111.00. The R.A. 2343took effect amending the old law which includes the Section 51(a). Under its amendatory, the

taxpayer assess himself, files his return and pays the tax as shown in his return upon filingthereof. After investigation, it was found out that the defendant had a deficiency of P1, 136.87 inhis income tax and a notice was issued and together with corresponding audit sheet and letterof demand, was emailed to the defendant. For the failure of the defendant to pay his deficiencyin income tax liability, the petitioner filed a complaint for collection of taxes before the City Courtof Cebu. After hearing and trial, the city court dismissed the case on the ground of prescriptionof action. The case was filed only more than the prescriptive period of five years. The issue wasupheld to the Court of First Instance of Cebu which rendered their decision dismissing theappellant’s complaint on the ground that the basis for the assessment are made under theprovisions of a new law, R.A. 2343 which was not yet in effect at the time of the filing of thedefendant’s income tax return and the action against the defendant had already prescribed.

ISSUE

Whether or not the cause of action had already been prescribed.

RULING

Yes. The lower court that the present action was filed after the prescriptive period of five (5)years provided for in Section 332(c) of the National Internal Revenue Code which reads:

(c) Where the assessment of any internal revenue tax has been made within theperiod of limitation above described such tax may be collected by distrait or levyor by a proceeding in court, but only if begun (1) within five years after theassessment of the tax,

Appellant asseverates that the present action was filed within the five-year prescriptive periodprovided for under the above quoted provision of the tax code; that the subsequent notice ofassessment was made and appellee notified; that from January 19, 1961 up to the date thiscase was filed in court on January 14, 1966, only four years, eleven months and twenty-fivedays had elapsed.

Thus, the prescriptive period provided for in Section 332(c) of the tax code should be countedfrom April 6, 1959, the date when the Bureau of Internal Revenue assessed the income tax

return of the appellant. From said date until the filing of this case on January 14, 1966, six yearsand nine months had elapsed. Verily, the action had already prescribed.

17. G.R. No. L-57493 January 7, 1987

BALIWAG TRANSIT, INC., petitioner,vs.THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND ROMAN MARTINEZ, respondents.


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FACTS

Two passenger bus lines with similar buses and similar routes were being operated by firmnames ―Baliwag Transit‖ and ―Baliwag Transit, Inc‖ (BTI) in which the petitioner of this case. The

former was owned by Pascual Tuazon who continued to operate it until his death while the latterwas owned by Mrs. Victoria Vda. de Tengco, the niece of Mr. Tuazon which exist until thepresent time. Both bus lines operate under different grants of franchise by the Public ServiceCommission but were issued only one ID Number by the SSS. Private respondent claiming tobe an employee of both bus lines with one ID Number filed a petition by the Social SecurityCommission to compel BTI to remit to SS private respondent’s SSS Premium contributions. He

alleged that he was employed by petitioner as conductor and later as inspector withcorresponding salary increases and the petitioner deducted from his salaries, premiumcontributions but was remitted to the SSS a lesser amount. On the contention of the petitioner,they denied having employed private respondent Ramon Martinez, the truth being the heemployed by Pascual Tuazon who owned and operated buses which were separate and distinctfrom the buses of the petitioner. The employment of private respondent lasted until when his

employer Pascual Tuazon became bankrupt. It was the moment when the deduction from theprivate respondent contributions for the years in question. Moreover, there were witnessespresent which stated that the two buses has granted separate franchises to operate public utilitybuses, both operating between Manila and Baliuag routes. It was also being question that theprivate respondent brought the action which was already prescribed.

ISSUE

Whether or not the cause of action had already prescribed.

RULING

Yes. Private respondent having allowed seventeen (17) years to elapse before filing the petitionwith the SSS has undoubtedly slept on his rights and his cause of action has already prescribedunder Article 1144 (2) of the Civil Code which states that ―The following action must be brought

within ten-year period from the time the right of action accrues:

(2.) Upon and obligation created by law.

18. G.R. No. L-41427 June 10, 1988


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CONSTANCIA C. TOLENTINO, petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and CONSUELO DAVID, respondents

FACTS

The petitioner is the present legal wife of Arturo Tolentino, while Respondent Consuelo Davidwas legally married to Arturo Tolentino on February 8, 1931. Their marriage likewise producedchildren. The marriage was dissolved and terminated pursuant to the law during the Japaneseoccupation by a decree of absolute divorce granted by the Court of First Instance of Manila onthe ground of desertion and abandonment by the wife. The trial court granted the divorce on itsfinding that Arturo Tolentino was abandoned by Consuelo David for at least three (3) continuousyears.

Thereafter, Arturo Tolentino married a certain Pilar Adorable, who however, died soon after theirmarriage. Tolentino subsequently married Constancia. Consuelo David, on the other hand,continued using the surname Tolentino after the divorce and up to the time of the filing of this

complaint. There was theissue raised that the petitioner’s cause of action had been prescribed

because she then filed a complaint not upon knowing of the fact that private respondent areusing the surname of Tolentino.

ISSUE

Whether or not the petitioner's cause of action has already prescribed

RULING

Yes. The respondent Court of Appeals, on the other hand, is of the opinion that the period ofprescription should be four (4) years, since it appears to be an action based on quasi-delict . —

hatever the period, it cannot be denied that the action has long prescribed whether the causeaccrued on April 21, 1945 when the petitioner and Arturo Tolentino got married, or on August30, 1950, when the present Civil Code took effect, or in 1951 when Constancia Tolentino cameto know of the fact that Consuelo David was still using the surname Tolentino. It is the legalpossibility of bringing the action which determines the starting point for the computation of theperiod of prescription.

The petitioner should have brought legal action immediately against the private respondent aftershe gained knowledge of the use by the private respondent of the surname of her formerhusband. As it is, action was brought only on November 23, 1971 with only verbal demands inbetween and an action to reconstitute the divorce case. The petitioner should have filed her

complaint at once when it became evident that the private respondent would not accede to herdemands instead of waiting for twenty (20) years.


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FACTS

The cargo subject of the instant case was discharged in Dadiangas unto the custody of theconsignee. The corresponding claim for damages sustained by the cargo was filed by thepetitioner with the respondent vessel. The petitioner brought an action with three (3) causes ofaction involving three separate and different shipments. The third cause is the main issue of thecase. The RTC dismissed the complaint since there was already settlement and compromisehappened but the third issue is not part of the compromise or settlement. The petitionerinstituted the present complaint and the RTC granted moved for preliminary hearing but therespondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription. The RTC dismissed thecomplaint and denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner.

ISSUE

Whether or not the petitioner cause of action had already prescribed.

RULING

YES. No different result would obtain even if the Court were to accept the proposition that awritten extrajudicial demand does toll prescription under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. Thedemand in this instance would be the claim for damage-filed by Dole with Maritime. The effect ofthat demand would have been to renew the one- year prescriptive period from the date of itsmaking. Unfortunately, Dole let the new period lapse without filing action. It instituted an actionfor the new civil case more than one month after that period has expired and its right of actionhad prescribed. Well within the one-year prescriptive period in Sec. 3(6) of the Carriage ofGoods by Sea Act." equates tolling with indefinite suspension. It is clearly fallacious and meritsno consideration.

21. G.R. No. L-44338 April 15, 1988

ROSARIO C. BUCCAT, plaintiff-appellee,vs.LIBRADA ROSALES DISPO, Assisted by Her Husband PROCESO DISPO, defendants-appellants.

FACTS

The petitioner Rosario Buccat and respondent Librada Dispo entered into a contract of lease,the expiration date of which was August 31, 1967, over the former's 542-square meter lot

situated at Bo. Catbangen, San Fernando, La Union. By virtue of the said contract, therespondent constructed the National Business Institute, a small vocational school on the parcelof land subject of the lease agreement. Afterwards, nine years before the expiration of thecontract, the parties entered into another lease agreement over the same parcel of landsubstantially modifying the duration of the lease that the lease contract shall remain in full forceand effect as long as the land will serve the purpose for which it is intended as a school site ofthe National Business Institute but the rentals now stipulated shall be subject to review everyafter ten (10) years by mutual agreement of the parties.


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However, eight months after the supposed expiration date of the first contract, the petitionerfiled a complaint for Unlawful Detainer against respondent, the basis of which was the expirationof the first lease contract, as the second agreement, according to petitioner, was null and voidfor being simulated and for want of consideration. The second contract was allegedly executedonly after "respondent approached the petitioner and revealed to the latter their problems anddifficulty in securing the official recognition by the government of the National Business

Institute". The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription.

ISSUE

Whether or not the petitioner has the right of action in fixing the period of lease.

RULING

Yes. The cause of action for the fixing of the period of lease accrued. This is as it should bebecause prior to that, the validity of the second contract of lease was being challenged. Thecase for unlawful detainer filed by the petitioner became in fact a case questioning the validity ofthe second contract on the grounds that the said contract was simulated and that there was noconsideration. The petitioner could not have been expected to file an action for the fixing of theperiod of the lease before the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision because she was notyet aware that the said paragraph of the second contract was a provision that called for anindefinite period. For the reason that the very existence, and subsequently, the interpretation ofthe second contract of lease, particularly par. 3 thereof, were put in issue in the unlawfuldetainer case, the court trying the case was required to interpret the provisions of, andconsequently, rule on the validity of the said contract. The remedy or the cause of action for the

filing of a case for the fixing of a period in the contract, therefore, only accrued when the courtfinally declared the second contract valid but that the provision as to the period was indefiniteand hence, an action for the fixing of the period of the contract had to be filed.

22. [G.R. No. 73198. September 2, 1992.]

PRIVATE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner , v. THEINTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND ERNESTO C. DEL ROSARIO, Respondents .

FACTS

Davao Timber Corporation, DATICOR for brevity, and the Private Development Corporation(PDCP) entered into a loan agreement 3 whereby PDCP extended to DATICOR a loan inforeign currency for the purpose of establishing a kiln drying and woodworking plant in Mati,Davao Oriental. It was stipulated in the loan agreement that the foreign currency loan was to bepaid with an interest rate commencing on the several dates on which disbursements of theproceeds of the loans were made.

DATICOR likewise executed a Deed of Chattel Mortgage 8 on the machineries and equipments


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attached to the land in Davao Oriental as added security for said loans. PDCP asked DATICORto pay a service fee of one (1%) per cent per annum on the outstanding balance of the pesoloan to cover the cost of administering DATICOR’s account and supervision of the project.PDCP initiated extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings 12 against the parcel of land owned by DelRosario in Manila and the five (5) parcels of land owned by DATICOR in Davao Oriental.DATICOR filed case in the Court of First Instance of Davao Oriental seeking a writ of injunction

to prevent PDCP from foreclosing its properties in Davao, and likewise praying for theannulment of the loan contract as it is in violation of the Usury Law and damages. Theyrendered decision dismissing the complaint. However, the Intermediate Appellate Courtreversed the decision and rendered that the loan agreement is declaring void and no effect ofstipulations of interest.

ISSUE

Whether or not the cause of action had prescribed

RULING

NO. With regard to the first contention, Article 1957 of the Civil Code

". . . contracts and stipulations, under any cloak or device whatever, intended to circumvent thelaw against usury shall be void."

Furthermore, Article 1410 provides:

"The action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe."

The aforesaid articles therefore state that all usurious stipulations are void and as such, anaction to annul such usurious stipulations does not prescribe. The aforesaid articles thereforestate that all usurious stipulations are void and as such, an action to annul such usuriousstipulations does not prescribe.

23. Mataas na Lupa Tenants Association vs Carlos Dimayuga and Juliana Diego Vda.De Gabriel (L-32049, June 25, 1984)

FACTS:

Petitioners filed a complaint for the exercise of preferential rights with the then Court ofFirst Instance of Manila, Branch IV alleging that the Contract of Sale executed by Juliana Diez

Vda. De Gabriel with Carlos Dimayuga is expressly prohibited by law as it is mandated for therespondent to execute such sale to petitioners. Therefore said contract should be declared nulland void. The lower court ruled in favour of the respondents, ordering the dismissal of the caseon the ground that petitioners failed to state a cause of action. Thus petitioners resorted to thepetition of certiorari for the review of the said order before the SC.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the contract of sale is null and void


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2. Whether or not the petitioners may invoke their preferential rights as tenants

HELD/RULING:

1. Yes. The R.A. 1162 as amended by R.A. 2342 and 3516 set forth the followingconditions that of offering first the sale of the land to petitioners and the latter's

renunciation in a public instrument-were not met when the land was sold torespondent Dimayuga. Evidently, said sale is illegal and therefore void. The 1973Const itut ion section 6, arti cle II emphasizes the stewardship concept that such privateproperty is supposed to be held by the individual only as trustee for the people in general, whoare its real owners. As a mere steward, the individual must exercise his right to the property notfor his own exclusive and selfish benefit but for the good of the entire community. P.D. 1157―Proclaiming Urban Land Reform in the Philippines and providing for the ImplementingMachinery thereof.‖ superseded R.A. 1152, 2342, 3516.

2. Yes. This decree is firmly based on sec. 6 of art. II of the 1973 constitutionundoubtedly adopts and crystallizes the greater number of people criterion when it speaks oftenants and residents in declared urban land reform zones or areas without mention of the landarea covered by such zones. The focus therefore, is on people who would benefitand not on the size of the land involved. Under section 6 of which also states that tenant-families have been vested the right of first refusal to purchase of the land with in areasonable time and reasonable price subject to the rules and regulations of theMinistry of Human Settlements. It is further supported by PD 1967 which evidentlyinclude Mataas na Lupa, the land in controversy within the Urban Land Reform Zone.

24. Leonides Pengson vs CA (GR L-65622 June 29, 1984)

FACTS:

The defendant Pacific Merchandising Corporation is the owner of shares in the Aluminum Products (Alpro) to the extent of 96% of its capital (share) holdings. PMC wasindebted to defendant Reynolds Philippines Corporation, in the sum of more than P800,000.00,because of which indebtedness its shares in the Alpro were pledged with Reynolds as acollateral of its loan. Because PMC needed some money, it decided to sell its shares with the

Alpro to the herein plaintiff Leonides C. Pengson', the deed of sale being evidenced by Exhibit A. Among other things, the plaintiff assumed the obligation of PMC to Reynolds, which amounthowever was reduced from more than P800,000.00 to only P500,000.00. Since the certificatescovering the shares were then held by Reynolds in pledge as security for PMC obligation, theformer's consent to the sale with assumption had to be obtained. As a security for the paymentto Reynolds of the aforesaid P500,000.00 in five (5) annual installments, the first installmentbeing P125,000.00. Pengson mortgaged to Reynolds a parcel of land. While Pengson paid thefirst installment in the sum of P125,000.00 in three (3) installments and a bit late, the next ininstallments which fell due were not paid for in spite of demands. Consequently, Reynoldsforeclosed by considering an unpaid installments due and demandable.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Reynolds Phil. Corporation is entitled to surrender the said certificates ofstocks to Leonidas Pengson.


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HELD/RULING:

No. Reynolds was not a party to the contract of sale between PMC and the hereinplaintiff. This being so, it had no obligation whatsoever on the strength of the contract ii favor ofthe plain. Plaintiff, by the terms of the contract, however, since plaintiff undertook to pay PMCobligation to Reynolds, plaintiff was under obligation with the PMC on account of the saidundertaking. Otherwise, there is absolutely no reciprocal obligation between the herein plaintiffand the appellant Reynolds. Otherwise said, the new debtor of Reynolds was the plaintiff and nolonger PMC To argue now, as the plaintiff contends, that Reynolds was under an obligation toreturn the certificates of stocks pledged to it by PMC is to put the plaintiff in a better footing thanPMC was with Reynolds. There is absolutely no agreement by Reynolds to that effect in theconsent it gave to the sale by PMC of the said shares in favor of the plaintiff.

25. Phil. National Bank vs CA (SCAD, 1996)

FACTS:

Respondent Carmelo H. Flores purchased from petitioner at its Manila PavilionHotel unit, two (2) manager’s checks worth P500,000.00 each, paying a total of P1,000,040.00,including the service charge. A receipt for said amount was issued by the petitioner.

Flores presented these checks at the Baguio Hyatt Casino unit of petitioner. Petitionerrefused to encash the checks but after a lengthy discussion, it agreed to encash one (1) of thechecks. However, it deferred the payment of the other check until after Flores agreed that it bebroken down to five (5) manager’s checks of P 100,000.00 each. Petitioner refused to encashone of the five checks until after it is cleared by the Manila Pavilion Hotel unit. Having no otheroption, Flores agreed to such an arrangement. However, upon his return to Manila, he maderepresentations to petitioner through its Malate Branch so that the check may be encashed butto no avail. Flores, thereafter, wrote a letter to his counsel informing the latter of theaforementioned events. A Formal Demand was made by private respondent’s counsel but

petitioner persisted in its refusal to honor the check. Flores filed a case with the Regional TrialCourt of Quezon City, Branch 100.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in law holding that the best evidence to show whether Mr.Flores paid the unit is the issuance of receipt worth P1, 000, 040

HELD/RULING:

No. A ―receipt‖ is defined as ―A written and signed acknowledgment that money hasbeen paid or goods have been delivered‖. A receipt is merely presumptive evidence and is not

conclusive. A written acknowledgment that money or a thing of value has been received. Sincea receipt is a mere acknowledgment of payment, it may be subject to explanation orcontradiction. A receipt may be used as evidence against one just as any other declaration oradmission. A simple receipt not under seal is presumptive evidence only and may be rebutted orexplained by other evidence of mistake in giving it, or of non-payment or of the circumstancesunder which it was given. A local bank, while acting as local correspondent bank, does not havethe right to intercept funds being coursed thru it by its foreign counterpart for transmittal anddeposit to the account of an individual with another local bank, and thereafter apply the saidfunds to certain obligations owed to it by the said individual.


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26.Heirs of Luis Bacus et. al vs CA and Spouses Faustino and Victoriana Duray (GR127695 Dec. 3, 2001)

FACTS:

On 1984 Luis Bacus leased to Faustino Duray a parcel of agricultural land with total landarea of 3,002 of square meters, in Cebu. The lease was for six years ending in 1990, thecontract contained an option to buy clause. Under the said option, the lessee had the exclusiveand irrevocable right to buy 2,000 square meters 5 years from a year after the effectivity of thecontract, at P200 per square meter. That rate shall be proportionately adjusted depending onthe peso rate against the US dollar, which at the time of the execution of the contract was 14pesos. Close to the expiration of the contract Luis Bacus died on 1989, after Duray informed theheirs of Bacus that they are willing and ready to purchase the property under the option to buyclause. The heirs refused to sell, thus Duray filed a complaint for specific performance againstthe heirs of Bacus. He showed that he is ready and able to meet his obligations under the

contract with Bacus. The RTC ruled in favor of the Durays and the CA later affirmed thedecision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the heirs of Luis Bacus be compelled to sell the portion of the lot underthe option to buy clause.

HELD/RULING:

Yes, Obligations under an option to buy are reciprocal obligations. The performance ofone obligation is conditioned on the simultaneous fulfilment of the other obligation. In otherwords, in an option to buy, the payment of the purchase price by the creditor is contingent uponthe execution and delivery of the deed of sale by the debtor.When the Duray’s exercised their option to buy the property their obligation was to advise theBacus’ of their decision and readiness to pay the price, they were not yet obliged to make the

payment. Only upon the Bacus’ actual execution and delivery of the deed of sale were they

required to pay. The Durays did not incur in delay when they did not yet deliver the payment normake a consignation before the expiration of the contract. In reciprocal obligations, neither partyincurs in delay if the other party does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper mannerwith what is incumbent upon him. Only from the moment one of the parties fulfills his obligation,does delay by the other begin.

27. Canonizado vs Benitez (L-49315, L-60966 Feb. 20, 1984)

FACTS:


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The petitioner filed an action for support against her estranged husband, the privaterespondent in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila. The trial court granted theclaim but denied similar support for the petitioner on the ground that she was gainfullyemployed. The petitioner questioned this decision in a petition for certiorari with this Court.When the corresponding writ of execution was issued, the respondent filed an action in theCourt of First Instance to restrain the sale by public auction of certain properties over which he

claimed to have lost ownership. An alias writ of execution was issued but was not satisfiedbecause of an order of the court. A decision on the merits was promulgated by the Juvenile andDomestic Relations Court awarding arrearages in support pendente lite to both the petitionerand her daughter, this decision was affirmed on appeal, with modification. This became finaland executor.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the implementation of Writ of Execution is valid.

HELD/RULING:

Yes, the implementation is valid. The writ of execution ordered is not affected by thatmotion. Such support has already become due and has acquired the character of vested rightsaccruing to the petitioner and the daughter Christina.

The other possible reason for the respondent judge's delay in implementing the writ of executionis a second pending motion this time to restrain levy on the ground that the properties sought tobe taken are the same properties declared exempt in the order of May 20, 1963. The courtnoted, though, that as worded the alias writ of execution issued by the respondent judgecovers other properties of the private respondent that can answer for the payment of the supportin arrears. While mandamus is not available to control discretion, it may nevertheless issue to

compel the performance of a ministerial act, as in this case. The writ of execution having beenauthorized and directed by this Court, the only task of the respondent judge is to issue andenforce it. As the properties exempt from execution have already been determined, therespondent judge should now order the enforcement of the writ against the other properties ofthe private respondent not exempt from execution. That is a ministerial act that can be, as it ishereby, compelled.

28. Serrano vs Central Bank (L-30511 Feb. 14, 1980)

FACTS:

Manuel Serrano made a time deposit, for one year with 6%interest of One Hundred FiftyThousand pesos with the respondent Overseas Bank of Manila.Concepcion Maneja also made a time deposit, for one year with 6-1/2% interest, of TwoHundred Thousand Pesos on the same respondent Overseas Bank of Manila. ConcepcionManeja, the married, assigned and conveyed to petitioner Manuel Serrano, her time deposit ofPhp 200, 000. Notwithstanding series of demands for encashment of theaforementioned timedeposit from the respondent Overseas Bank of Manila, not a single one of the time depositcertificates was honored by respondent Overseas Bank of Manila. Respondent Central Bankdissolved and liquidated the Overseas Bank of Manila. The former denied that it is


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a guarantor of thepermanent solvency of any banking institution as claimed by thepetitioner.Respondent Central Bank avers no knowledge of petitioners claim that the properties given bythe respondent Overseas Bank of Manila as additional collaterals to the respondent CentralBank of The Philippines for the former’s overdrafts and emergency loans were acquired fromthe depositor’s money including the time deposits of the petitioner. The Philippines for theformer’s overdrafts and emergency loan were acquired from the depositor’s money including the

time deposits of th e pe t it io ne r .

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondents are jointly and solidary liable for damages due to breachof trust.

HELD/RULING:

No. Both parties overlooked the fundamental principle in the nature of bankdepos i ts when the pet i t ioner c la i med that ther e s hould be created aconstructive trust in his favor when the respondent Overseas Bank of Manila increased the

collaterals in favour of the respondentC e n t r a l B a n k o f t h e P h i l i p p i n e s f o r t h e f o r m e r ’ s o v e r d r a f t s a n d emer gency loans, since these collaterals were acquired by the use of depositor’s money. Bankdeposits are in nature of irregular deposits. They are really loans because they earn interest. Allkinds of bank deposits, whether fixed, savings or current are to be treated asloans and are to be covered by the loans. Current and savings deposits are loans to abank because it can use the same. The petitioner here in the making time depositsthat earn interests with respondent Overseas Bank of Manila was in reality a creditor of therespondent bank and not a depositor . The respondent bank was in turn a debtorof petitioner. Failure of the respondent bank to honor the time deposit is failure to pay obligationas a debtor and not a breach of trust arising from depository’s failure to return the subject matterof the deposit.

29. Santos vs CA (L-60210 March 27, 1984)

FACTS:

This is an Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the then Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.No. SP-13056, affirming the one rendered by the then Court of First Instance of Manila, BranchXVI. Herein private respondent Aurora Gutierrez instituted an unlawful detainer case in the thenCity Court of Manila against herein petitioners Arturo P. Santos and Adelina Y. Santos ongrounds that she needs the premises for her personal use and the necessity of repairs thereon,and that the petitioners were delinquent in the payment of rentals.

In their Answer with Counterclaim, Petitioners, among others, admitted that they are "thelegitimate tenants and/or lessees of the subject apartment with the present rental rate ofP250.00 a month on a month-to-month contract of lease."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the decision of the lower court.

HELD/RULING:


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No. Paragraph 1 of Article 1673 of the Civil Code is an exception to Section 4 of PresidentialDecree No. 20. Said Section 1 of Article 1673 provides that" The lessor may judicially eject the lessee for any of the following causes‖ :(1) When the periodagreed upon, or that which is fixed for the duration of lease under article 1682 and 1687, hasexpired;"

Thus, judicial ejectment lies when the lease is for a definite period or when the fixed ordefinite period agreed upon has expired. The lease in the case at bar having a definite period, itfollows that private respondent’s right to judicially eject petitioners from the premises may beenforced. As aptly stated by respondent Court of Appeals, If both land and the building belongto the lessor, the right referred to hereinabove does not apply."

30. Gonzales vs PNB (GR 33320 May 30, 1983)

FACTS:

Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales instituted in the erstwhile Court of First Instance of Manilaa special civil action for mandamus against the herein respondent praying that the latter beordered to allow him to look into the books and records of the respondent bank in order tosatisfy himself as to the truth of the published reports that the respondent has guaranteed theobligation of Southern Negros Development Corporation in the purchase of a US$ 23 millionsugar-mill to be financed by Japanese suppliers and financiers; that the respondent is financingthe construction of the P 21 million Cebu-Mactan Bridge to be constructed by V.C. Ponce, Inc.,and the construction of Passi Sugar Mill at Iloilo by the Honiron Philippines, Inc., as well as toinquire into the validity of Id transactions. The petitioner has alleged hat his written request forsuch examination was denied by the respondent. The trial court having dismissed the petitionfor mandamus, the instant appeal to review the said dismissal was filed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a stockholder of PNB can insist on the inspection of its books.

HELD/RULING:

No. The court a quo denied the prayer of the petitioner that he be allowed to examineand inspect the books and records of the respondent bank regarding the transactionsmentioned on the grounds that the right of a stockholder to inspect the record of the businesstransactions of a corporation granted under Section 51 of the former Corporation Law is notabsolute, but is limited to purposes reasonably related to the interest of the stockholder, must beasked for in good faith for a specific and honest purpose and not gratify curiosity or for

speculative or vicious purposes; that such examination would violate the confidentiality of therecords of the respondent bank as provided in Section 16 of its charter, Republic Act No. 1300,as amended; and that the petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies.

31. Hilario Javarata vs Sandiganbayan (L-56170 Jan. 31, 1984)

FACTS:


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That on or about the period from April 30, 1979 to May 25, 1979, in the Municipality ofTubao, Province of La Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, theabovenamed accused, being then the Assistant Principal of the Leones Tubao, La UnionBarangay High School and with the use of his influence as such public official and takingadvantage of his moral and official ascendancy over his classroom teachers, with deliberateintent did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously made demand and actually received

payments from other classroom teachers, ROMEO DACAYANAN, DOMINGO LOPEZ,MARCELA BAUTISTA, and FRANCISCO DULAY various sums of money, namely: P118.00,P100.00, P50.00 and P70.00 out of their salary differentials, in consideration of accused havingofficially intervened in the release of the salary differentials of the six classroom teachers, to theprejudice and damage of the said classroom teachers, in the total amount of THREEHUNDRED THIRTY EIGHT (P338.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Jaravata violated the Anti Graft and Corrupt practices Act.

HELD/RULING:

No. There is no law which invests the petitioner with the power to intervene in thepayment of the salary differentials of the complainants or anyone for that matter. Far fromexercising any power, the petitioner played the humble role of a supplicant whose mission wasto expedite payment of the salary differentials. In his official capacity as assistant principal he isnot required by law to intervene in the payment of the salary differentials. Accordingly, hecannot be said to have violated the law afore-cited although he exerted efforts to facilitate thepayment of the salary differentials.

32. Ganzon vs Judge Sancho (GR 56450 July 23, 1983)

FACTS:

On August 28, 1979, petitioner Rodolfo Ganzon initiated proceedings to extra-judiciallyforeclose a real estate mortgage executed by the private respondents in his favor. Themortgage covered a parcel of residential land of the subdivision plan located in the District ofMolo, Iloilo City Thereafter, petitioner Gregorio Lira served personal notice of the foreclosureproceedings on the private respondents. A day before the scheduled public auction, the privaterespondents filed a civil action for specific performance, damages, and prohibition withpreliminary injunction against the petitioners with the respondent court. The private respondentsasked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the petitioners fromproceeding with the foreclosure and public auction sale. Acting on the urgent ex-parte motion ofprivate respondents, the trial court issued an order enjoining the provincial sheriff from

proceeding with the scheduled auction sale on September 28, 1979.Private respondents filed an amended complaint. On March 28, 1980 the petitioners filed

their answer to the amended complaint; they further maintained that the extra-judicialforeclosure proceedings would be in accordance with the terms and conditions of the saidmortgage. After the issues had been joined but before actual trial, the private respondents fileda "Motion For Release Of Real Estate And For The Clerk Of Court To Accept Bond Or Cash InLieu Thereof," to which the petitioners interposed an Opposition. The respondent court grantedthe respondents' motion. The petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration Of the


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Order and Opposition To The Approval of Surety Bond. The respondent court in its order deniedthe aforesaid motion

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court may order the cancellation of a mortgage lien annotated ina Torrens Certificate of Title to secure the payment of a promissory note and substitute suchmortgage lien with a surety bond approved by the same court to secure the payment of thepromissory note.

HELD/RULING:

Yes, the court may order the cancellation of a mortgage lien. At the pre-trial, what the

parties admitted were the existence and due execution of the documents, including the absolutedeed of sale of realty and the subject real estate mortgage. In connection with the documents,the issues per the pre-trial order were "... whether or not the documents express the trueintention of the parties, and whether or not they complied with the provisions of the document.Hence, at that stage of the case, the trial court's order dated November 20, 1980 had no factualbasis. Even on the assumption that the factual bases of the trial court's questioned orders were

justified by evidence in the records the same would still not be proper. A mortgage is but anaccessory contract. "The consideration of the mortgage is the same consideration of theprincipal contract without which it cannot exist as an independent contract."

33. Molave Motor Sales, Inc. vs Laron and Geminiano (L-65377 May 28, 1984)

FACTS:

Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the sale and repair of motor vehicles in DagupanCity. Private respondent in the case below, was, or is, the sales manager of Petitioner. Allegingthat the respondent was a former employee, Petitioner had sued him for payment of accountspleaded as that during his incumbency as such the defendant caused and without authority fromthe plaintiff incurred accounts with the remaining balances in the total sum of P33,890.38excluding interests, arising from the purchases of vehicles and parts, repair jobs of his personalcars and cash advances, faithful reproductions of the Vehicle Invoice, Debit Memos, Deed of

Absolute Sale, Repair Orders, Charge Invoices, Vouchers, Promissory Notes, Acknowledgement Letter and Statement of Account. In his Answer, The Respondent denied.He further alleged in a counterclaim that he should still be considered an employee of Petitionerinasmuch as there has been no application for clearance in regards to his separation. At thepre-trial conference, the Respondent raised the question of jurisdiction of the Court stating thatPetitioner’s complaint arose out of employer -employee relationship, and he subsequentlymoved for dismissal. It was then when respondent Judge dismissed the case finding that thesum of money and damages sued upon arose from employer-employee relationship and that

jurisdiction belonged to the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.


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ISSUE:

Whether or not the Civil Code is the governing statute in the instant case.

HELD/RULING:

Yes, the Civil Code is the governing statute. It is obvious from the complaint that theplaintiffs have not alleged any unfair labor practice. Theirs is a simple action for damages fortortious acts allegedly committed by the defendants. Such being the case, the governing statuteis the Civil Code and not the Labor Code. It results that the orders under review are based on awrong premise. In the case below, Petitioner had sued for monies loaned to Respondent, thecost of repair jobs made on his personal cars, and for the purchase price of vehicles and partssold to him. Those accounts have no relevance to the Labor Code. The cause of action was oneunder the civil laws, and it does not breach any provision of the Labor Code or the contract ofemployment of Respondent. Hence, the civil courts, not the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC,should have jurisdiction.

34. Borcena et. al vs IAC (GR 70099 Jan. 7, 1987)

FACTS:

On July 6, 1981, the petitioners engaged the legal services of respondent Gil P. deGuzman, hereby retaining and employing the services of e Guzman’s Legal office towards itsprosecution. On this same date, respondent de Guzman filed a complaint for damages againstthe Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System, Nam Kwang, Socea Bonna and Chun BaeKim. Atty. de Guzman filed a motion for preliminary attachment praying that an order be issuedattaching properties of the defendants thereof representing attorney's fees, or a total of P852,000.00. The motion was granted upon plaintiffs' posting a bond of P852, 000.00 issued by abonding company acceptable to the court. The motion was denied. The court directed theMWSS to turn over the P852,000.00 to the deputy sheriff and for the latter to deposit the samewith the Sta. Maria Municipal Treasurer. De Guzman filed a manifestation questioning therestriction on the checks that the same be deposited only with the Municipal Treasurer of Sta.Maria, Bulacan as uncalled for and contrary to the court's order. Atty. Perpetuo L. B. Alonzoentered his appearance as new counsel for the petitioners. Atty. de Guzman filed an oppositionto Gimeno's ex-parte motion to transfer deposit of garnished amount. Atty. de Guzman filed anattorney's lien on the garnished amount of P852,000.00 pursuant to Section 26 of Rule 138. Thepetitioners filed a manifestation. The lower court denied the petitioners' motion forreconsideration and opposition to the motion for execution pending appeal, and granted themotion for execution pending appeal. The Intermediate Appellate Court denied due course tothe petition questioning the execution pending appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Gil de Guzman is entitled for his legal services to the petitioners

HELD/RULING:


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Yes. Contracts for attorney's services in this jurisdiction stand upon an entirely differentfooting from contracts for the payment of compensation for any other services. By expressprovision of section 29 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an attorney is not entitled in the absenceof express contract to recover more than a reasonable compensation for his services; and evenwhen an express contract is made the court can ignore it and limit the recovery to reasonablecompensation if the amount of the stipulated fee is found by the court to be unreasonable. This

is a very different rule from that announced in section 1091 of the Civil Code with reference tothe obligation of contracts in general where it is said that such obligation has the force of lawbetween the contracting parties.

35. [G.R. No. 119231. April 18, 1996]

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, p eti t ioner, vs. HON. PRES. JUDGE BENITO C. SE, JR.,RTC, BR. 45, MANILA; NOAH’S ARK SUGAR REFINERY; ALBERTO T. LOOYUKO, JIMMYT. GO and WILSON T. GO, respondents

Facts:

Noah’s Ark Sugar Refinery issued a receipt to RNS Merchandising (Rosa Ng Sy); (c) and

Receipt No. 18081, covering sugar deposited by St. Therese.it was later negotiated toCresencia K. Zoleta and Luis T. Ramos.the quedans were used as security loan for the amountof P15.6 million and the other for P23.5 million from the PNB.ramos and zoleta failded to paythe loan and request Noah’s Ark Sugar Refinery for the delivery of the sugar stocks coveredby the quedans endorsed by Zoleta and Ramos.the refusal of Noah ark sugar refinery to deliverthe said sugar stocks prompted the PNB to file a case demanding the delivery of the said sugarstock.THE RTC denied the petition and was brought up to the CA and was affirmed by theSupreme court.the respondent file an Omnibus Motion seeking deferment of the proceedingsuntil private respondents are heard on their claim for warehouseman’s lien. On the other the

Philippine National Bank filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution and anOpposition to the Omnibus Motion filed by private respondents.

Issue:whether or not the Noah’s Ark Sugar Refinery is subject for payment of storage feein sugar stocks.

Ruling:

Warehouse Receipts provision pursuant to Sections 27 and 31 of the Warehouse Receipts Law (R.A. 2137)that the respondent rivate respondents cannot legally be deprived of their right to enforce theirclaim for warehouseman’s lien, for reasonable storage f ees and preservation expenses. casewas dismissed fro lack of merit

36. G.R. No. L-60151 June 24, 1983

SALVADOR L. BUDLONG, in his capacity as Acting Third Assistant City Fiscal, City ofTagbilaran, petitioner,vs.HONORABLE AQUILES T. APALISOK, in his capacity as Acting City Judge, City Court,Branch II, City of Tagbilaran, and CAMILIO PUYO Y GALAGAR, respondents.


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Facts:

The private respondent was charged with physical injuries and pleaded guilty before thecourt and the respondent judge for the said crime and was convicted without sayinganything about the civil liability of the said private respondent.private respondent appliedfor probation there after. Petitioner herein filed a separate civil case but respondent denythe motion with reason that the case was already close and terminated. Hence, thispetion for grave abuse of discretion against the respondent judge.

Issue: whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion indenying the motion to hear the civil case of the petitioner contending that the case hadbeen terminated and closed.

Ruling:

The respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to trythe civil case by the petitioner contending that the conviction of the private respondent

from criminal case does not include civil liability as stated in art 113 of the revised penalcode.

37. G.R. No. L-39999 May 31, 1984

ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO and JOSE FARLEYBEDENIA, petitioners,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

Facts:

Petioners herein where charged of grave coercion where they were convicted in the CFIbut the court of appeals reversed the decision and acquitted them of the criminalcharged on the ground of reasonable doubt but directing them to pay jointly andseverally the amount of P9,600.00 to the complainants as actual damages.Hence, thispetion for certiorari contending that they acquittal in the criminal case should also acquitthem in their civil liabilities.

Issue: whether or not the acquittal of the petitioner also extinguishes their civil liabilities.

Ruling:

The decision of the Court of appeals is affirmed contending that the acquittal of thepetitioner in the criminal case did not extinguish their civil liabilities in Section 3 (c) ofRule 111 and Article 29 of the Civil Code does not require proof beyond reasonable doubtfor the conviction in civil case.


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38. G.R. No. L-49781 TO L-49791 June 24, 1983

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, peti

233288725 oblicon case digests final compilation

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