2_2006

RomanianRomanianMilitaryMilitary

ThinkingThinkingMilitary Theory and Science Journal

Edited by the Romanian Armed Forces General Staff

Military Theory and Science Journal


Founded in 1864 under the name“Military Romania”

English edition, 2 year~ ~nd



Apr i lJuneApr i lJune

20062

ISSN 1841-4451

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Prince of HOHENZOLLERN-VERINGENLt Gen Sorin IOAN, PhD

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Col Costinel PETRACHE, PhD

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Apr i lJune

20062

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ThinkingThinkingMilitary Theory and Science Magazine






RomanianMilitary

ThinkingMilitary Theory and Science Journal


Military Theory and Science Journal


Apr i lJuneApr i lJune

20062

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Romanian Military ThinkingRomanian Military ThinkingRomanian Military ThinkingRomanian Military ThinkingRomanian Military Thinking Journal

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EditorialEditorialEditorialEditorialEditorial

The LeaderCol Costinel PETRACHE, PhD

RMT DialoguesDialoguesDialoguesDialoguesDialogues

Interview with General Eugen B~D~LAN, PhD, Chief of the RomanianArmed Forces General Staff

Conceptual ProjectionsConceptual ProjectionsConceptual ProjectionsConceptual ProjectionsConceptual ProjectionsTheoretical DevelopmentsTheoretical DevelopmentsTheoretical DevelopmentsTheoretical DevelopmentsTheoretical Developments

The Use of Military Power After the Cold WarMaj Gen Teodor FRUNZETI, PhD

Command and Control System Within Close Air Support MissionsAF Gen Lauren]iu SIMIONESCU, PhD

Asymmetry in WarfareCol Mircea MÎNDRESCU

Human Resources Management in Globalisation EraCol Tache JURUBESCU

Effects-Based Operations. A New Approach to Armed ConflictLt Col Ion VLADMaj Iulian BERDIL~

Romanian Military Thinking ~ 2/2006

4

NATO RealityRealityRealityRealityReality

A New NATO Strategic Concept. Pros and ConsBrig Iordache OLARU

NATO Resources ManagementCol Cristian DORCA

Concepts for Allied Future Joint OperationsBrig Valeriu NICU}

Opinions Opinions Opinions Opinions Opinions ••••• Arguments Arguments Arguments Arguments ArgumentsCertitudes Certitudes Certitudes Certitudes Certitudes ••••• Perspectives Perspectives Perspectives Perspectives Perspectives

A Strategy of Performance SuitabilityCapt Ion DUMITRA{CU

The National Integrated Crisis Management System. Structureand Conceptual MilestonesCol Marian BUCIUMAN, PhDLt Col Viorel RO{

CIMIC ~ Civil-Military Relations at Operational LevelCol Florentin UDREA

Communication in Managing ConflictsSorin Cristian BANU

Towards a Paradigmatic Approach to Security in InternationalRelations2nd Lt Adi MUSTA}~

Remodelling Organisational CultureLumini]a POPESCU, PhD

Geopolitics Geopolitics Geopolitics Geopolitics Geopolitics ••••• GeostrategyGeostrategyGeostrategyGeostrategyGeostrategyInternational SecurityInternational SecurityInternational SecurityInternational SecurityInternational Security

Strategic Reflections: Military Science and its Strategic ImpactBrig (r) Gheorghe V~DUVA, PhD

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Security Dilemmas or What Does the Future Hold for Arms Control ?AF Gen Victor STRÎMBEANU

Active Challenges of GlobalisationMaj Doctor Drago[ POPESCU

RMT DebatesDebatesDebatesDebatesDebates

“The Military and Society. The Armed Forces and Society”.Guests: Lieutenant Colonel George SPIRIDONESCU, Chiefof the Sociological Investigation Section from the General Staff,Major Mihail ANTON, Lecturer, The National Defence University“Carol I” and Radu POPA, Chief of Department, Romanian CommoditiesExchange

National FoundationsNational FoundationsNational FoundationsNational FoundationsNational Foundations

The Romanian Army Campaign Plan in 1916. The “Z” HypothesisBrig (r.) Nicolae CIOBANU, PhD

Military Publications UniverseMilitary Publications UniverseMilitary Publications UniverseMilitary Publications UniverseMilitary Publications Universe

Thinking Differently ...Thinking Differently ...Thinking Differently ...Thinking Differently ...Thinking Differently ...

Editorial EventsEditorial EventsEditorial EventsEditorial EventsEditorial Events

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Le leaderColonel dr. Costinel PETRACHE

DialoguesDialoguesDialoguesDialoguesDialogues RMT

Interview avecle général dr. Eugen B~D~LAN, chefde l ’Etat-major général de l ’ArméeRoumaine

Projections conceptuellesProjections conceptuellesProjections conceptuellesProjections conceptuellesProjections conceptuellesDeveloppements theoriquesDeveloppements theoriquesDeveloppements theoriquesDeveloppements theoriquesDeveloppements theoriques

L’emploi de la pouvoir militaireaprès la Guerre froideGénéral-major dr. Teodor FRUNZETI

Le système de commandementet de contrôle dans les missions d’appuiaérien rapprochéGénéral de flottille aérienne dr. Lauren]iu SIMIONESCU

L’asymétrie dans la guerreColonel Mircea MÎNDRESCU

Le management des ressources humainesdans l’ère de la mondialisationColonel Tache JURUBESCU

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Der LeaderOberst dr. Costinel PETRACHE

RMT Dialoge Dialoge Dialoge Dialoge Dialoge

Befragung mit der Führerdes Generalstaabs der rumänischenArmee, gen. dr. Eugen B~D~LAN

Begriffliche PBegriffliche PBegriffliche PBegriffliche PBegriffliche ProjektirojektirojektirojektirojektiooooonennennennennenTTTTThhhhheoretische Entwicklungeneoretische Entwicklungeneoretische Entwicklungeneoretische Entwicklungeneoretische Entwicklungen

Benutzung der Militärmacht nachdem kalten KriegGen. dr. Teodor FRUNZETI

Das Führung und Kontrollesystemim NahluftunterstützungaufgabenLuftflottegen. dr. Lauren]iu SIMIONESCU

Asymmetrie im KriegOberst Mircea MÎNDRESCU

Verwaltung von Humanressourcenim Zeitalter der GlobalisierungKomandeur Tache JURUBESCU

Contents

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Operations basées sur les effets. Unenouvelle approche du conflict arméLieutenant-colonel Ion VLADCommandant Iulian BERDIL~

Mise à jour de l Mise à jour de l Mise à jour de l Mise à jour de l Mise à jour de l OTAN

Un nouveau concept stratégiquede l’OTAN. Le pro et le contreGénéral de brigade Iordache OLARU

Le management des ressourcesde l’OTANColonel Cristian DORCA

Les concepts pour les futures opérationsinterarmées de l’OTANGénéral de brigade Valeriu NICU}

Opinions Opinions Opinions Opinions Opinions • Arguments Arguments Arguments Arguments ArgumentsCertitudes Certitudes Certitudes Certitudes Certitudes • Perspectives Perspectives Perspectives Perspectives Perspectives

L’opportunité d’une stratégiedes performancesCapitaine de vaisseau Ion DUMITRA{CU

Le système national de managementintégré des crises. Structure et repèresconceptuelsColonel dr. Marian BUCIUMANLieutenant-colonel Viorel RO{

CIMIC ~ les relations civilo-militairesau niveau opérationnelColonel Florentin UDREA

La communication dans le managementdes états conflictuelsSorin Cristian BANU

D’une approche paradigmatiquede la sécurité dans les relationsinternationalesSous-lieutenant Adi MUSTA}~

De nouvelles dimensions de la cultureorganisationnelleChargé de cours dr. Lumini]a POPESCU

’’’’’

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Auf Wirkungen basierten Operationen. Eineneue Anschneidung bewaffneter KonfliktOberstlt. Ion VLADMajor Iulian BERDIL~

NATO WirklichkeitWirklichkeitWirklichkeitWirklichkeitWirklichkeitEin neues strategisches Konzeptder NATO. Argumente pro und gegenBgd. Gen. Iordache OLARU

Die Ressoucenverwaltung der NATOOberst Cristian DORCA

Konzepte für die künftigen versammeltenOperationen der NATOBgd. Gen. Valeriu NICU}

Meinungen Meinungen Meinungen Meinungen Meinungen • Argumente Argumente Argumente Argumente ArgumenteGewissen Gewissen Gewissen Gewissen Gewissen • Perspektiven Perspektiven Perspektiven Perspektiven Perspektiven

Erwägungenbetreffs eine LeistungenstrategieKomandeur Ion DUMITRA{CU

Das nationale System integriertenKrisenmanagements. BegrifflicheKonstruktion und BezugspunkteOberst dr. Marian BUCIUMANOb. Lt. Viorel RO{

CIMIC ~ Ausdruck der Zivilmilitärbeziehungenauf dem operationellen EbeneOberst Florentin UDREA

Die Mitteilung in der Verwaltungder KonfliktständeSorin Cristian BANU

Zu eine pragmatischen Analyse derSicherheit in den internationalenBeziehungenUnterleutenent Adi MUSTA}~

Umgestaltung der organisatorischenKulturLektor dr. Lumini]a POPESCU

8


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Geopolitique Geopolitique Geopolitique Geopolitique Geopolitique ••••• GeostrategieGeostrategieGeostrategieGeostrategieGeostrategieSecurite internationaleSecurite internationaleSecurite internationaleSecurite internationaleSecurite internationale

Réflexions stratégiques: La sciencemilitaire et son impacte stratégiqueGénéral de brigade (en réserve) dr. Gheorghe V~DUVA

Les paradigmes de sécuritéou “qu’est-ce qu’on attenddu futur du contrôle d’armement” ?Général de flottille aérienne Victor STRÎMBEANU

Les défis actifs de la mondialisationCommandant médecin Drago[ POPESCU

Debats Debats Debats Debats Debats RMT“Armée et société. L’armée et lasociété”. Invités: le lieutenant-colonelGeorge SPIRIDONESCU, le chef de laSection Investigations sociologiquesde l’Etat-major général, le commandantchargé de cours Mihail ANTON, l’UniversitéNationale de Défense, et Radu POPA, chefde département, Bourse du CommerceRoumaine

Foundements nationauxFoundements nationauxFoundements nationauxFoundements nationauxFoundements nationauxLe plan de campagne de l’ArmeéRoumaine ~ 1916. L’hypothèse “Z”Général de brigade (en réserve)

dr. Nicolae CIOBANU

Univers militaireUnivers militaireUnivers militaireUnivers militaireUnivers militaire des publications des publications des publications des publications des publications

Penser differemment ...Penser differemment ...Penser differemment ...Penser differemment ...Penser differemment ...

Evenements editoriauxEvenements editoriauxEvenements editoriauxEvenements editoriauxEvenements editoriaux

ResumesResumesResumesResumesResumes

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GeopolitiGeopolitiGeopolitiGeopolitiGeopolitikkkkk ••••• GeostrategieGeostrategieGeostrategieGeostrategieGeostrategieInternationale SicherheitInternationale SicherheitInternationale SicherheitInternationale SicherheitInternationale Sicherheit

Strategische Überlegungen: DieMilitärwissenschaft und ihre strategischeAuswirkungBgd. Gen. (r) dr. Gheorghe V~DUVA

Die Paradigmen der Sicherheit oder derZukunft der Rüstungskontrolle ?Luftflottegen Victor STRÎMBEANU

Die aktiven Herausforderungender GlobalisierungMaj. Arzt Drago[ POPESCU

RMT Debatten Debatten Debatten Debatten Debatten“Armee und Geselschaft.Die Armee und der Geselschaft”Gäste: Kpt. Kdr. George SPIRIDONESCU,Leiter der soziologischen InvestigationenAbteilung der Generalstaabs, Maj.Lektor Mihail ANTON – NationaleVertidigunsuniversität “Carol I”, undRadu POPA – Leiter de Abteilungder rumânische Warenbörse

Nationalen GrundlagenNationalen GrundlagenNationalen GrundlagenNationalen GrundlagenNationalen GrundlagenDer Feldzugsplan der rumänischenArmee ~ 1916. Die Hypothese “Z”Bgd. Gen. (r) dr. Nicolae CIOBANU

UniversumUniversumUniversumUniversumUniversumder Militärveroffentlichungender Militärveroffentlichungender Militärveroffentlichungender Militärveroffentlichungender Militärveroffentlichungen

Anders denken ...Anders denken ...Anders denken ...Anders denken ...Anders denken ...

LeitartiklerereignisseLeitartiklerereignisseLeitartiklerereignisseLeitartiklerereignisseLeitartiklerereignisse

ZusammengefaZusammengefaZusammengefaZusammengefaZusammengefaßßßßßttttt

9

The LeaderThe LeaderThe LeaderThe LeaderThe LeaderWhile always existing in the social

formulae that presuppose the mutualunderstanding of at least twoindividuals, the concept and conditionof being a leader have been essentiallyproved incompatible with theassertion and cultural organisationof a totalitarian society. Exactlyas religion did, at a particular momentin its existence, communism,a lymphatic system, played uponthe exclusivity of the eternal validityof dogma, managing to dully andamorphously survive, by crowningthe gregarious instinct of mobdiscipline and the perniciousexultation of mass reflexes to absolutesin themselves. Against its own natureand being itself caught in the webof the inflexible archetypes of socialannihilation, the quality of a leaderwas suppressed from the areaof human practice and action.The political sacredness of work,the outranking of the gregariousinstincts of mass thinking and theone-person-inspired culture, alongsidewith the conversion of the loyaltyto the party and of social ideals intosupreme values, all excluded thevery idea of leadership as dangerousand destructive, whilst imposingthe one-and-the-only supreme leaderthat could not be confuted, valuewhich was to become part of anundeniable reality. Yet, throughout

Ce sont le concept et la conditiondu leader qui, bien qu’elles existenttoujours en formules sociales quisupposent le fait commun au moinspar deux individus, s’avèrentincompatibles, au fond, avecl’affirmation et la culture de laconstruction totalitaire de la société.Le communisme – ce systèmelymphatique qui a joué, commela religion, l’exclusivité de l’éternelde la dogme, a institué, aplatie t amorphe , s on surv i e surl’établissement de la disciplinegrégaire et sur l’exaltation maladivede réflexes de la collectivité. Contresa propre nature, la conditionde leader, elle-même attrapée dansles modèles rigides de l’annulationsociale, a été supprimée du domainede la pratique et de l’action humaines.La sacralisation politique du travail,la massification de la pensée et de laculture d’unique inspiration, la fidélitépour le parti et les idéaux sociales,toutes exclurent, comme un péril,l’affirmation de la condition de leader,moins laquelle qui venait d’une réalitéinexpugnable du commandant en chef.Mais, au bout d’un certain tempshistorique, nous avons ramenéle leader dans la compréhensiondégagée de l’organisation sociale.Pas du tout comme une expressiondes conjonctures, même comme

Le leaderLe leaderLe leaderLe leaderLe leader


10

the course of an unfinished history,we have eventually managed to bringto life the free comprehensionof the concept of leadership, as partof the organisation of society.Not as an expression of conjuncturesbut as a matter of the necessityof continuity, it is so because,obviously, conjunctures are dueto assert, while continuity only is dueto confirm.

The leader – proof of powerand of the decisive influence of thepersonality involved in the processof leadership; active provider of trust,inspiration and potentiality; centreof the global comprehension of thestage in the development of anorganisation at a particular momentin time and of the imminent challengesits projects and destiny are relatedto – is the rhythmical measure of theaspirations that nourish the vectorialcertainties of the future. Therefore,the condition of being a leader canbe outlined, beyond qualities,responsibilities and experience,exactly as it can be perceived withinthe locus between the mature andobsolete disappointments of dogmaand the conspiring innocenceof audacity. Open-minded pathfinderof hypothetical courage, of the criticalspirit and experimental attitude,the leader, simultaneously detachedof form but totally fulfilled throughthe content, assumes responsibilitiesthat, essentially, reside in the following:the ceaseless improvement of thefunctional relationships betweenhuman beings and their aspirationsconverted to objectives; the discoveryof hidden and yet unexploitedresources that will eventually

une nécessité de la continuité,peut être pour le fait évident queles conjonctures affirment, mais lescontinuités confirment.

Le leader – c’est la preuve de lapuissance et de l’influence décisivede la personnalité impliquée dansl’acte de conduire; un fournisseuractif de confiance, inspirationet du possible; le centre de lac o m p r é h e n s i o n d e l ’ é t a torganisationnelle à un momentparticulier et des défis imminentsauxquels elles rapportent ses projetset son destin –, c’est la mesurerythmique des aspirations quinourrissent les certitudes vectoriellesdu futur. Au-delà des qualités,responsabilités et l’expérience,on peut justement résumer la conditioncapitale du leader, ainsi commeelle peut être percevue entre lesdésorientations matures, épuiséesde la dogme et l’innocence conspirativede la témérité. Un caractère intelligent,qui ouvre lui-même égalementla porte d’un courage hypothétique,de l’esprit critique et de l’attitudeexpérimentale, c’est le leader quiapplique, détaché de forme, maisa c c o m p l i p a r e s s e n c e , s e sresponsabilités qui, essentiellement,peuvent viser: l’amélioration continuede la relation fonctionnelle des genset leurs aspirations convertiesen objectives; la découverte et lemaximum de ressources annulées;un mode d’éviter la transformationdes moyens en buts; la concentrationsimultanément de la commandevers des charges et des gens;le transfère opportun de la productivitéet de l’efficience organisationnelle

Editorial

11

be turned to most effective ones;the attempt to avoid the transformationof means into aims; the simultaneousconcentration of leadership ontasks and people; the appropriatetransmutation of productivity andorganisational efficiency from stateindicators to process ones; the leaderinspires the organisation with anencouraging potential for positiveadaptability, constructive flexibility,ethical and functional immunityand, last but not least, he constantlyoptimises the interactions within thetrinom: the state of the organisation,its condition as a process and theperformance of the organisation asit is the leader’s task to focusnot only on obtaining performanceas such, but especially to developthe capacity of attaining performance,to increase the possibilities to perform.

As far as the leader’s traitsof personality are concerned, theyare both easy and difficult to cramin didactic paradigms. Anyway,presupposition allows for attributingsome qual i t ies to leaders, asfollows: responsibility, materialisedin the leader capacity to assumecapital responsibilities and to blowaway the inhibitions caused byregimentation; unquestionableethics; contagious energy; proactiveflexibility; self-confidence, “tailored”to follow the pattern of invulnerability;unelaborated sociability; detachedwisdom; indubitable morality;operational freedom; decisivei n i t i a t i v e ; t r a n s f o r m i n gprofessionalism. Transformingindeed, as the leader, geometricalspirit of a continuously changing

des indicateurs d’état vers ceuxde processus; il offre à l’organisationun potentiel stimulant pour uneadaptabilité positive, pour uneflexibilité constructive et l’immunitéé th i que e t f onc t i onne l l e e t ,évidemment, au dernier, mais pasmineur, il optimise constammentles interactions du trinôme: l’étatde l’organisation, sa conditionprocessuelle et la performancede l’organisation, sens pour lequelle leader ne veut pas seulementobtenir ainsi la victoire, maisle développement de son capacitéd’obtenir la performance, de lapossibilité d’être performant.

Re l a t i f aux qua l i t é s de l apersonnalité du leader, il est facileet difficile en même temps d’en releverau fond des paradigmes didactiques.Toutefois, la présupposition nouspermet de lui attribuer quelquesqualités: la responsabilité, matérialiséepar la capacité d’assumer desobjectives majeures et d’envoler lesinhibitions d’une certaine affiliation;une éthique indiscutable; une énergiecontagieuse; une flexibilité proactive;la confiance en soi, “coupée”sur le modèle de l’invulnérabilité;une sociabilité visible; une sagessedétachée; une moralité indiscutable;une liberté opérationnelle; unei n i t i a t i v e d é c i s i v e e t u nprofessionnalisme transformateur.Transformateur bien sûr, parceque le leader, cet esprit géométriqued’un monde toujours vivant, il est,il doit être en premier lieu un hommede la transformation, un leaderpour la transformation. C’est cettequalité par laquelle il peut comprendre

world, is, has to be, first and foremost,a man of transformation, a leaderof transformation. It is this qualitythat enables the leader to understandthe cause, depth, sense and the gradualfinality of transformation; to discernwhat the most important activityregarding the particularities of eachsector of a systemic engagement isand to bestow philosophical tonusand conceptual rigour on the strategyfor change; to lead transformationprescribing and managing the therapyfor the divergences and conflictsgenerated by the inevitable resistanceto change.

Moreover, the leader believes inthe existence of chance, he does notexpect it to come but challenges it;he does not discourage the rightto and the exercise in opinion, buthe puts it to work for the benefitof the organisation; he denies himselfso that the ontological power of theorganisation could be consolidated;he proves to have the mentality ofa winner, rejecting failure as fatality;he disseminates the certitude of victoryeven though the viruses of desperationsow the possibility of defeat; he is reallyaware of the fact that crisis situationsdo not form leaders, they only setthem to play a certain role.

To conclude, the leader is a truemeasure of his force and qualitiesespecially when he is in the positionof leading some other leaders.

Colonel Costinel PETRACHE, PhD

Version française par Alina UNGHEANU

la cause, l’essence, le sens et le résultatstagiaire de la transformation;il distingue entre ses actionsparticulières de l’engagementsystémique et imprime une tonalitéphilosophique et une exactitudeconceptuelle à la stratégie pourle changement; il mène le processusde transformation par un prescriptionet un management de la thérapiedes divergences et des conflitsqui sont générés par l’inévitablerésistance de changement.

D’ailleurs, le leader croit enexistence de la chance, mais il nel’attend pas, au contraire, il laprovoque; il ne décourage pas le droitet l’exercice d’opinion, au contraire,il les met constructivement au servicede l’organisation; il renonce à lui-mêmepour consolider la force ontologiquede l’organisation; il offre sans cesseune transparence à son mentalitéd’être gagnant, en refusant l’insuccèscomme fatalité; il offre la certitudede la victoire, quoique les virusde désespoir provoquent la probabilitéd’une défaite; il s’est rend vraimentcompte du fait que c’est ne pas la crisequi produise des chefs. Celle-ciseulement les offre un certain rôle.

Et, pour obtenir un sens, le leaderrévèle effectivement la mesure de saforce surtout alors quand il se trouvedans la situation de mener autreschefs.

12


“We are certain that,by the end of the period

for which we assumethe condition

of transformation,the Romanian Armed Forces

will have been perfectlyaware of the Past that deserves

13

General, the Romanian Armed Forces have experienced,more and more elaborately, the applied condition of transformationand I think I am not wrong stating it, considering the clear perspectiveof desirable prediction. Transformation or reform, a continuous one ?

Transformation ! Unfortunately, the concept of transformation is still mistakenfor that of reform, although they are completely different. It is true that the philosophicalperspective on concepts denotes their applied synonymy, as the references they pointto are common processual and operational elements. As far as we are concerned,under the “pressure” of both its essential determinations and its continuous causality,we pragmatically, organically and functionally assume the condition of transformation.Why not that of reform ? It is simply because reform as such, when applied to a specificdomain of the social system, projects its objectives partially, in a limited way, or structurallyand its historic characteristics denote, unequivocally, its horizons and exhaustion.On the other hand, considering the concept of “transformation”, when applied to the nationalmilitary body, from the institutional point of view of global comprehension and communicationand also from that of the doctrinaire development, it does not represent an offenceaddressed to the term “reform”; on the contrary it is an act of thorough acknowledgementof a radical process of continuous and “on the fly” reconstruction of one of the fundamentalState institutions.

cherishing, will have honoured the Presentwith decency and will have been

able to look into the Future without fear”

Interview with General Eugen B~D~LAN, PhD~ Chief of the Romanian Armed Forces General Staff ~


14

Therefore we have chosen “transformation” as, in the productive semanticsof the process, the structural and super-structural valences of the concept are not onlymore profound but also, inevitably, more complex. Last but not least, we have made ourchoice of the term “transformation”, because the process itself, as far as its componentsand objectives are concerned, is not only a sequence of forms that differ in point of theirquality, but forms that become manifest within the context they denote, and alsothe expression of the development of the system itself, in the diachronic objectiveperspective of the processes that govern it.

General, from the perspective that we have already taken intoconsideration, I suggest that we should talk, at the level of detailsthat play a configurative part, about the strategic concepts relatedto the Romanian Armed Forces transformation, as it has been designed,elaborated and comprehensively assumed by the General Staff.To begin with, what are, in your opinion, the reasons for the necessityof elaborating and operationally engaging a document such as– “Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy” ?

The fact that ensuring Romania’s defence in the Allied context is a continuousand complex process, unconditionally extended over a large spectrum of domains, relationsand interdependencies and meant to promote the society and the citizen interestsand security objectives is already acknowledged and understood, thus the philosophyof national defence is projected and promoted in an indissoluble correlation with NATOand EU specific policies. Therefore, what does the term inter-conditioning refer to ?It refers to the fact that the nature of nationally constitutional responsibilities, as well asthe Alliance exigencies related to coping with any type of threats urge the RomanianArmed Forces to project and develop those capabilities that allow for conducting operations,within the area of NATO responsibilities, in not only the national territory but alsoin an extended strategic environment, permanently influenced by factors that requirechange, in fact changes, which are, many times, unpredictable. Well, in this context,the process of transforming the Romanian Armed Forces is a natural requirement,a requirement determined by both the inner nature of patriotic feelings and the new Alliancestrategic and transformational orientation that allow for broadening the range of objectivesand processes that include forces structuring and training to participate in collective defenceand enhancing the necessary capabilities for crises management and combating terrorismmultinational operations. What does the above brief insight into the issue point to ? It pointsto the fact that “Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy” will be thefoundation on which all the other strategies, concepts, doctrines and action plans will bebuilt, as well as the basis for their implementation in the specific domains of affirmationand operational concentration. Trying to answer your question briefly, I can saythat the “Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy” has been “imposed”by the need to articulate the national military state and capacity of comprehensionwith the predictable future in a credible way; the necessity of establishing a state of trust

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and positive continuity in developing the Romanian military body; the need for havingapplied knowledge of own capabilities correlated with the evolution of the militaryphenomenon.

You have already outlined the teleological and philosophicalcomunion between the process of transformation, initiated by NATOand the one designed and engaged by the General Staff as far asthe Romanian Armed Forces are concerned. I would like you, General,to pinpoint, through an explanatory parallel, the prefigured aimsand goals, as well as their content, in a brief manner.

Mention should be made that, in NATO view and, implicitly and independently,in our own view, military transformation represents a continuous process of developmentand integration of new concepts, strategies, doctrines and capabilities, aiming at enhancingefficiency and forces interoperability and positively and proactively adapting to the newsecurity context, which itself undergoes continuous change, this attitude renderingevident the necessity for re-evaluating, re-considering the military factor as the main sourceof credibility. Well, essentially, the process of transformation presupposes changesat the level of doctrines, forces and capabilities organisation and structure, intelligence,training, education and acquisitions, personnel management and budget planning,all these representing, in fact, the main domains in which transformation should operate.Based on these conceptual premises, the fundamental goal of the Alliancetransformation defines and consists in creating military capabilities that enablethe Allied Forces to conduct operations not only in the area of responsibility but alsooutside it, to accomplish the full range of missions and to maintain the decisionalconsensus within the context of enlargement, as well as establishing a new type of relationswith the European Union, Russia, Ukraine, Central Asia or within the MediterraneanDialogue. In short, NATO military transformation focuses on both conceptualand capabilities domains, aiming at achieving three major objectives: sustainmentand decision superiority, coherent effects and joint deployment andsustainment, as well as meeting the requirements imposed by network centricwarfare and effects-based operations. In connection with it, I hasten to add thatthe Alliance will adapt its current concepts and capabilities concomitantly with enhancingand making military forces planning, generating, deployment, use and sustainment moreeffective. At national level, the major goal of Romanian Armed Forcestransformation is developing new capabilities that enable Romania to credibly meetthe current and future challenges, generated by the security environment. These areconceived so that they could be in accordance with the provisions of Constitution relatedto the issue, Romania commitments to NATO and EU, as well as to regional initiativesand, when it is required, to coalitions. The general objective resides in establishinga modern structure, completely professionalised, more mobile, efficient, flexible,deployable, sustainable, and able to conduct joint operations and to be engaged in a largerspectrum of missions. The general objective materialised content, as it is defined above,is sustained by projects that, as far as concrete actions are concerned, aim at: assuming

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and discharge obligations towards NATO; preparing and participating in EU missions;reshaping command and control and logistic structures; C4I2SR network systemsimplementation and enhancing electronic warfare capabilities; modernising humanresources management; improving personnel life quality; reshaping military educationalsystem; optimising planning, budgeting and evaluating system; reshaping the “intelligence”system; coordinated military equipments modernisation and, last but not least, reshapingthe Armed Forces health care system.

General, would you like to define the stages that configuretransformation time horizons and, as far as possible, to pinpointtheir content ?

We have designed and projected “transformation” until the end of the first quarterof the 21st century, the year 2025, in other words, until the time horizon when the youngestgeneration that is now preparing to have a military career will be able to manage the nationaldestiny of the military institution. We have divided this period into three “sectors” or stages.We are now in the middle of the first one, 2005-2007, that is the stage of finishingbasic re-structuring, when we intend to achieve the short-term goals of the ArmedForces transformation process. Essentially these are the following: restructuringand reorganising leadership system at strategic and operative level; finishing, in broadlines, the process of transforming, reorganising, re-subordination and units dissolving,in accordance with the annual plans approved by the Supreme Council of National Defence;continuing the operationalisation of the units planned for NATO and UE, attaininga level consistent with the provisions of NATO Essential Operational Capabilities– 100% with equipment and fighting technique and 90% with personnel for highly operationalunits, respectively 70% for low operational ones; reorganising the joint logistic systemand the military health care system, as well as implementing voluntary military service.The second stage, between 2008 and 2015, defines and aims at fully operationalNATO and EU integration and the fundamental transformation process medium-termobjectives that have to be fulfilled are the following: operationalisation of developingunits for NATO and UE; continuing the implementation of Task Force Goals; finishing thelogistic system restructuring at strategic and operative level; continuing new equipmentacquisition and the major procurement programmes according to the doctrinal exigencies;reorganising the military educational system according to concepts for reform of the militaryeducational system; expanding the implementation of the Task Force Goals requirementsat the level of non-deployable units to generate the necessary reserve for deployable units;enhancing the value of forces that take part in the NATO Response Force and the contributionwith forces and capabilities to the European Union.

As far as the last stage of the Armed Forces transformation process is concerned,2016-2025, it is the stage in which we intend to achieve the complete NATO and UEtechnical integration, the long-term transformation objectives aiming at: focusing effortsand human and financial resources on achieving all technical capabilities establishedby the Force Goals and fulfilling the responsibilities within NATO and UE; continuingto modernise procurement and achieve full compatibility of forces with NATO and EU

armed forces; creating the conditions for big units and units to be disposed in military baseswith complete facilities for social assistance, accommodation, sheltering military equipmentand training. Without necessarily concluding, we have to emphasise the characteristicsof the manifest intrinsic transformation process: operational continuity and conceptualcoherence; national interests clearly determinant character; flexibility as far as the promoteddoctrinal thinking is concerned; complete correlation with the transformation processundergone by the Alliance; strategic predictability; it contains the premises that canconvincingly be the ground for the strategic continuation of the transformation processin the second quarter of the 21st century and, last but not least, without exaggerating,it can be considered the anti-dogmatic foundation for the National Armed Forcesenduring development throughout the 21st century.

General, would you be so kind to give details regarding the maindomains of transformation process. I would suggest this type of editorialconduct, as they are the very centres of gravity of the process itself.Therefore, what are the important changes in the delicate and liableto stir problems domain of human resources ?

Liable to stir problems, indeed! That is why our attention and preoccupation are,in turn, “sensitised” at maximum when, in a way or another, we get involved in the extremelycomplex problems related to human resources. With regard to this issue, there are twofundamental aspects we focus on: designing and implementing an efficient militarycareer management at the level of and following the structure of all categoriesof personnel and establishing a connexion between the militaries educationand training system and the exigencies of the national educational system,in accordance with the specific evolutions of NATO and EU Member Statesarmed forces. In this domain, transformation is focused on accomplishing some goals.Among them we can mention: implementing the criteria established by the BolognaConvention in the human resources education and training system; implementinga new system for promoting the military career, as a result of reconsidering militarypersonnel recruitment and selection methodological procedures, based on the principleof executive policies separation; developing the system of military personnel professionalmotivation, with this end in view, focussing on rise in the wage rate, life quality improvement,setting up a social protection system similar to those in NATO Member States armedforces, ensuring health care and work capacity recovery conditions for all the personnelin the Armed Forces. As for the technical framework of human resources managementsystem, we focus on reasonable decentralisation of individual career management,combined with unitarily applying the policies that are specific to the domain. I amnot going to exhaust our strategically programmed “intentions” related to this chapter,but I would like to mention the completion of the Armed Forces personnel informationmanagement system; operationalisation of minimum standards for foreign languageslearning, especially for English, devised on different levels, functions and units, as well asimplementation, in accordance with the practices within the Alliance, of policies regardingthe reserve forces, those that are to retreat and the veterans.

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General, what are the applicable perspectives for the RomanianArmed Forces to be engaged in operations, within the period that isstrategically subject to transformation ?

Current evolutions within the geopolitical and geostrategic spectrum, manifesttendencies in the too fast process of globalisation, as well as the general evolutionof the contemporary phenomenon, especially in the last two decades, but also in relationwith the next decades, all lead to the conclusion that future operations will bemultidimensional, mainly dynamic, characterised by a higher level of complexity.Well, it is these dimensions and characteristics military operations should be basedon in their opportune and efficient response to the threats and challenges that mayaffect security. Therefore, from the perspective of these considerations, the RomanianArmed Forces must be capable and it will surely be ! of participating in operationsthat ensure Romania security in peacetime, its defence, in the collective engagementof the country and its allies, promoting regional and global stability, playing its trumpcards and making use of the prerogatives of defence diplomacy, as well as of the supportof State institutions and local authorities in case of civil emergency. As far as the operationsthe Romanian Armed Forces might be engaged in are concerned, they may be high-intensityoperations – within a war or an armed conflict, or low-intensity ones – within stabilitymilitary actions. Thus it is obvious the manner we will take actions in both cases: in caseof a war/high-intensity armed conflict, we will conduct military actions either on the nationalterritory or beyond the territorial confines, based on the principle of collective defenceindivisibility; with regard to stability military actions, actions that can be conductedby NATO, EU, OSCE or UN, we consider that may include both combat and non-combatactions. As for the spectrum of operations Romania may conduct or participate in – we couldmention stability military actions, which are, to some extent, acknowledged and otherpossibly emergent forms of manifestation, specific to the political military phenomenon –,such as: peace-imposing, combating terrorism, non-combats evacuation, demonstrationsof power, organised crime networks annihilation; peace-supporting, humanitarianaid or actions in support to civil authorities in case of emergency. From the presentationof the “pack” of missions our Armed Forces might be engaged in, we can draw the conclusionthat the forces that will take part in the military operations characteristic to future warsmust be capable of conducting the full range of military actions, from humanitariansupport missions to high-intensity combat operations, even if they could be simultaneousand within the same area of operations

It is the first time a document – in this case, the Romanian ArmedForces Transformation Strategy –, has brought major importantclarifications concerning the act of leading armed forces, to be moreprecise, the Romanian military power, at all its levels of exercise.General, I would like you to outline the architecture and the functionalaspects with regard to the process of leading armed forces.

Indeed, the present Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategynot only clarifies, for the first time, for all levels of exercise, the responsibility for leadingthe Armed Forces of the country, but also excludes any ambiguities related to its specific

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application in the different contexts I am going to refer to in what follows. With referenceto political leadership in the national security domain, it will be provided by the NationalCommand Authority – represented by the Parliament, the President of Romania,the Supreme Council of National Defence and the Government of Romania, the Ministryof National Defence is subordinated to, as the unique body specialised in leadingactivities in the national defence domain. An important part of the Romanian ArmedForces Transformation Strategy conceptual unity focuses, and it could not be otherwise,on the problems concerning Romanian Armed Forces leadership transformation,sense in which a short-term plan comprises a balanced reduction of central structures,parallelisms elimination, a clear-cut delimitation of competencies and responsibilitiesand a significant reduction of the time allotted to decisional cycle for the time dedicatedto execution to be more. The already initiated transformational process “aims” at reshapingoperational and administrative leadership structures at strategic, operative and tacticallevel, unequivocally establishing their responsibilities and competencies, as well asthe relations between them, with a view to making the process of armed forces leadershipin peacetime, crisis situations and wartime more efficient, as well as to optimising relationshipswith NATO and EU similar leadership structures. This process of leadership transformation– in which an essential role will be played by setting up and implementing a new setof standard procedures, similar to those in the Alliance and using computer networksin the informing and decision-making process at all levels –, is not an institutional entityseparately being acted upon, without considering the entire process, but it will besimultaneously conducted in conceptual and operational concordance with the processof forces structure transformation and it will be subject to useful reconsiderations. What isimportant, among others, in this transforming engagement, focused on the major problemof leadership ? It is the fact that the prefigured leadership system will be adapted to thespecific security environment, in accordance with the provisions of the Romanian SecurityStrategy and the Alliance Command and Control System transformation process itself.Transformation Strategy brings conceptual and functional clarifications with regardto exercising leadership at strategic level, as well as in the operational and administrativedomain. Thus, Romanian Armed Forces structures military leadership will operateat the strategic, operative and tactical level not only in the operational but alsoin the administrative domain. As for the architecture of the functional responsibilitiesin leadership domain, the Ministry of Defence Central Structures subordinate directorates,offices, services, sections, agencies, specialised institutions and formations, the GeneralStaff subordinating the Staffs of the Armed Forces categories of forces and a seriesof headquarters comprising all combat structures, supporting structures, logistic structures,medical structures, training ones, as well as those intended to special operations, militaryeducation institutions and other structures. Military command at the strategic level,in peacetime and during crises situations, will be fulfilled by the General Staff,both in the operational and administrative field. Operational command, in peacetimeand crises situations, will be exercised by the Chief of the General Staff,through the Strategic Planning and Command Centre – the specialised structureof the General Staff which provides the military actions planning and command. At the levelof Strategic Planning and Command Centre, the National Military Command Centre

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permanently operates, both in peacetime and crises situations, as a structure resultedfrom the reorganisation of the current COCMIL ~ Military Command Operational Centre,which essentially has the role of permanently monitoring the actions of the RomanianArmed Forces and of providing the timely report to decision-making factors. There isonly one situation left, one context to specify: “How do we proceed to set up the stateof siege and at war ?”. Well, in this situation, the General Staff will make surethe National Military Command Centre is established and becomes functional,this being the structure that will draft the Strategic Guideline, on the grounds of which,according to the competencies and responsibilities it is empowered with, it will fulfilthe command of military actions at strategic level and will leave the responsibilityof operative art and tactics to the Joint Operational Headquarters and Division,Brigade and Battalion Headquarters. Hence, by eliminating any kind of explanatorydetails, this is the comprehensive, systemic architecture of what command means withinthe process entailed by the desideratum of transformation.

General, what does “transformation” mean within the domainsof scientific research and procurement ?

It means much, very much ! These are, in fact, the domains that are most “exposed”to the unprecedented technological development specific to the current century,a development to which, let us be honest !, we cannot catch but a glimpse of its immediatelyfollowing steps, at the most, and, by no means, strategic horizons to be reached in thenext 30, 40 or 50 years or more. That is why I reckon that, for the moment, it is importantfor us to develop flexible and convincing strategies so that scientific research couldcontinually integrate the transformations that govern society at global level in the militarydomain. That is why we intend to maintain one of the fundamental scientific researchcomponents, having a strong applicative extension meant to the military technology,in the subordination of the Minister of National Defence, the most important sourceof the Armed Forces scientific consultancy. We intend to focus our attention on fundamentalscientific research being accomplished by specialised military institutions and/or, whenneeded, by those of the civil society and on it being mainly oriented towards the operationallevel, as well as the technical one, being, at the same time, capable to provide expertiseas far as the following are concerned: the nature of the future military conflictsand the physiognomy of the fighting actions that will develop within them; the lessonslearnt and the conclusions drawn from the development of current military conflicts;the manifestation of war and armed fight laws and principles; the implementation of theoutcomes of the revolution in military affairs in projecting and establishing the militarycapabilities; the identification of the full range of missions that are possible to take placein the national defence, the collective defence provided by NATO, as well as within coalitionsand partnerships; the future systems of armament and categories of technique that will bepart of the Armed Forces procurement. On the background of these programmatic matters,identifying and analysing the main phenomena that manifest in the technologicalevolution of military equipment, potential risks and threats, for whosemanagement military instruments will be employed, represent the fundamental


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functional premises for conceiving the Armed Forces procurement programmes.I have created, in my turn, the premise for responding to the second part of your question– transformation in the field of the Armed Forces procurement. The mainobjective, a programmatic one, in the field of the Armed Forces transformationand procurement is represented by the purchase, in sensible agreement withthe available resources, of the systems of armament that comprise adequate moderntechnologies, with the purpose of fulfilling the operational requirements of the militaryforces branches and providing interoperability with allies’ forces. Carrying out the mainintended and, consequently, assumed objective will be accomplished successively,and the major share of acquisitions and procurement of new equipment will be obtainedduring the “Stage of the full technical integration in NATO and EU”. From the above-mentionedperspective, the process of the Romanian Armed Forces modernisation and procurementtakes its strength from the assertion of the following principles: providing the ArmedForces with new effective and intelligent systems of armaments, capable to meet the requirementsregarding precision, mobility, flexibility and interoperability; modernising the available fightingtechnique, the one which is still morally operational, with the purpose of extending the lifeduration of the systems of armament and increasing their performance; establishingthe short and medium term priorities in the field of the procurement of major systemsfrom the intern and foreign providers; co-ordinately updating the procurement programson medium and long term through adopting a flexible way of funding; stimulatingthe capabilities of the national industry with this profile provided that they are adaptedto the long term new necessities and requirements of the Armed Forces; cooperatingwith other countries for producing systems of armament. Concluding the expositionof this response in a direct reaction to your question, I might add that, within the domainsof scientific research and procurement, “transformation” represents the affirmationof our capacity to permanently optimise the relation between possibilities, desiderataand necessities, just like it might mean, and it really does, step by step, the extentto which we understand the essence of the future, the times undergoing a continuous,complex and significant change.

Which are, General, the precepts that govern transformationin the military doctrinaire area and the one of forces training ?

Within the doctrines field we aim at establishing a general efficient and flexibleframework, free from immutable things, be they situational, able to provide the circumstanceswhich are necessary for the assertion of the unitary, but creative thinking in its plenitude,and a way of action integrated in the fields – with a variable geometry, let us sayit plainly – of the military concepts, the operational language, and the proceduresfor planning and development specific to military operations planning and carrying out.Within the forces training field, the centre of gravity of our attention and concernsis focused on adapting the entire training process to the one used within the other armedforces of the Alliance, this nevertheless meaning that adaptation as such will be a mechanicone, lacking horizon or personality; on fulfilling the operational capability of forcesin accordance with the available resources and the already achieved of training level

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and, last but not least, on the predictive development of the fighting qualities specificto the complex forms of development of the war of the future. The exigencies formulatedas such cause the entire architecture of forces training to be shaped on a ground unitarilyoffered by education, training and exercises. I will not go into further details but I onlywish to point out that military education will practically follow the transforming conceptualand actional conduct covered by the national education system during the processof joining NATO and the European Union. During the stages that we will cover, we willidentify, on personnel categories, the real training needs of the human resource, accordingto the national policy but also to the one promoted at the Alliance’s level, and accordingto the intrinsic complexity of military actions as well. By the assumed educational objectives,the system’s organisation and the structures of the military education curricula, we wishto provide the personnel with the possibility of developing their competencies and capabilities,both those necessary for fulfilling the military profession and those directly usefulfor easily integrating in civil life. From the perspective of the same coordinates, we willseek to form and develop the individual’s and military structures’ capacity for actionthrough training, a context in which making use of the systems of modelling-stimulatingwill probably become the most efficient training method. It is precisely for this reasonthat the development of these systems will represent a priority. As far as the third elementthat grounds this architecture, exercises, is concerned, we will seek to develop, throughthem, the collective skills of the command structures and the ones with a prevailing actionalrole, to initiate the evaluation of their operational capability and to support certain rehearsalsbefore the forces are introduced in the theatre of operations.

General, what are the expectations of ... the year 2025 with regardto the logistic state and condition of the Romanian Armed Forces ?

The fundamental requirement of the transformation in this field consistsin creating an integrated logistic system, with great mobility, which shouldallow the fighting units and the one meant to combat support to be fully relieved of anyadministrative tasks, a system which should be capable to provide logistic support wherevernecessary, in the required amount and timely. In this respect, while highlighting thatthe logistic system consists of the production and expenditure logistics, the logisticstructures will be tailored to meet the requirements of the theatre of operations and theassigned fighting mission and will have an increased degree of flexibility, adaptabilityand mobility, so that they could timely modify the organisation and functionality profile,in accordance with the logistics support requirements of the forces they attend.The logistic structures will adapt the way of fulfilling the fighting forces logistic supportto the requirements and the pace entailed by the decisions connected to the militaryactions, by laying a preponderant stress on predicting the requested support. As far asthe national contingents logistics, for contingents that take part in missions abroadis concerned, this will be provided by the Joint Logistics Command. In addition, one maymention the concern regarding the reconsiderations which the military assistancewill be subjected to, which will be mainly improved through reshaping the militaryhealth care system, within the new structural configuration, so that the medical support

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for the forces deployed in the theatre of operations could be provided through operationalmedicine. What will technically happen in this field will only be an issue for the concernof specialists in the field, yet, I would like us to keep in mind that the main objectivesof transformation within the medical assistance field consist in: establishing the militarymedical services in the forces logistics system; fulfilling and applying the medical serviceson three components – primary medical assistance, specialised ambulatory assistanceand hospital medical assistance; integrating the medical-military personnel trainingsystem in the general outlook of the military education and training modernisation;accrediting the military hospitals by the National Commission for Hospital Accreditation.Once more, and not as a conclusion, one can easily notice that the objectivesand responsibilities deriving from all above have an important ... specific share in theimportant equation of the national military establishment transformation.

Which is, General, the “level of ambition” that motivates at presentthe speech and the strategic action of the General Staff and whatwill the architecture of the structure of forces look like in determining“The Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy” ?

“Our level of ambition” outlines the Romanian Armed Forces capabilityto simultaneously provide: the national land defence, through the capability to militarilyrespond to an armed aggression and to support the civil authorities in case of emergencies,natural disasters, NBC events etc. and the fulfilment of the engagements assumedtowards NATO, EU, different regional organisations and coalitions, throughcomplying with the principle of complementarity and implementing the uniquePackage of Capabilities, according to the Commitments assumed at Prague(taking part in NATO Response Force), taking part in EU Battlegroups, multinationaloperations. On the background of this perspective, the Romanian Armed Forces will havea unique package of forces at their disposal, acquired through the transformationof force, a process that will aim at: organising, thus ensuring: the fulfilment of an optimalrelation between the fighting units, the support and logistic support ones; the outlineof a modular, lethal, interchangeable, compatible, deployable force; the basis for forcerotation; the establishment of adequate forces for special missions; the fulfilment of adequatecapabilities for force’s extension and regeneration; equipment and procurement;training; sustainment of the force.

With regard to the second component of the question, we must underline that themain product of the Romanian Armed Forces transformation will be representedby the structure of forces, consisting of: the forces planned for the nationaland common defence, this meaning the deployable forces, listed at NATO throughthe Defence Planning Questionnaire and at the EU, through which they cover theoperational-making process with the purpose of fulfilling the requirements establishedthrough the Task Force Goals applicable at the level of the respective structure; forcesfor generating and regenerating, which represent non-deployable forces, with a lowframing level, which improve and increase the ones of the first category. From and in thisperspective, Force Structure – 2015 will fulfil the required balance between operational

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forces and the structures for generating and regenerating the force and will providethe national defence within the common defence and the Alliance’s intervention in situationsof civil emergency and the complete coverage of the commitments to NATO and EU.The qualities that they must acquire are specific to the structure of forces resultedfrom the transformation of the Romanian Armed Forces, as the forces that will beengaged in the future military conflicts must respond to the following requirementswith organisational nature: joint and modular structure, permanent information support;joint logistics support; integrating the elements for battle preparation; includingthe specialised battle elements; the existence of own or especially organised positioning,training, embarking/disembarking bases; the procurement of transport and supply meansat long distance, with a specific purpose; the establishment of an active reserve of forcesand a functional nature: command elements with increased power; information directlyreceived from the participating nations; direct relations between the task forces dispositionelements; fluidity of the communication between the own command points and the centralcommand point, as well as with the local elements with which they cooperate; providingan increased striking/action potential. As far as their dimensions, dependingon the allocated resources, are concerned, in 2015, the Romanian Armed Forces will have80 000 soldiers at their disposal, their distribution seeking to achieve the establishmentof a balance between the commanding structures and forces, so that the missionscould be fulfilled in the best circumstances.

In percents, the commanding structures will represent up to 4.5% of the entire militarypersonnel, and the forces – 95.5%.

What will the Romanian Armed Forces look like at the end of thefirst quarter of the 21st century ?

The technical and conceptual framework that the questions asked have forcedme to laboriously describe allows me to state that the development of the transformationprocess will result in the establishment of military capabilities characterised by flexibility,an increased speed of action and interoperability, which will provide the military-politicaldecision makers with increased chances for fulfilling the goals sought, obviously,in complete consensus with the substance of the national interest.

We must understand that the Armed Forces transformation by no means representsa purpose in itself, but the adequate, we believe, answer to the general and complexevolution of the security environment, a response assigned, at the same time, to the exigenciesof the North-Atlantic Alliance’s transformation and to the nature of the commitmentsRomania has taken upon her at international level. Still, even if the question does notentail this, I wish to highlight that the Romanian Armed Forces transformation processis not by far an easy one, a path that can be covered anyhow and in any circumstances.For instance, the fulfilment of the objectives of the Armed Forces TransformationStrategy is expected to be influenced by a host of challenges and factors havinga more or less counterproductive role, starting, if you wish, from the necessity for changingthe mentality of the decision-making and execution factors towards the way of approaching


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this process up to providing the financial, human and material resources necessaryfor supporting it.

On the other hand, the success of this unprecedented in the Romanian militaryconstruction Strategy is decisively dependent on the way in which we fulfil the integrationin a unitary system of the objectives representing a priority on short, medium and longterm, at the level of all the components of the Armed Forces. At the same time, timelyidentifying and making the decisions necessary to lessen the negative effect of the constraints,limitations and restrictions of any kind, which might stop up the accomplishment of thepre-established objectives is of utmost importance. In addition, even if one foreseesthat the period 2008-2015 is expected to be characterised by reduced financial pressures,as a result of discharging personnel, certain infrastructure elements and equipment,suppressions, reorganisations and re-subordination of some units and structures,the level of necessary resources will further be at high level. Moreover, the requirementsof the multinational headquarters in which we are part in the field of contributingwith personnel, the raised costs for sustaining the troops in the theatres of operations,the significant differences between the technological level of Alliances developed statesmilitary equipment and our Armed Forces equipment, to which the material constraintsand the ones in the field of preparation, training and education add, are all guidelineswith major importance that we should consider when establishing the priorities of eachstage on the route of the transformation process. It is perhaps for this reason that thecareful management of the transformation process must facilitate the timely establishmentof new objectives and courses of action, encourage the conceptual answers askedfor by the challenges of the security environment undergoing a continuous and unpredictablechange and allow for making the working tools used for fulfilling transformationmore flexible. The stipulation of these possible realities does not confer a pessimisticnote to our state of mind, but, quite to the contrary, a realistic one. However, to highlightthe major points, in accordance with our state of mind, we are certain that, by the endof the period for which we assume the condition of transformation, the Romanian ArmedForces will have been perfectly aware of the Past that deserves cherishing, will havehonoured the Present with decency and will have been able to look into the Futurewithout fear.

Written down by Colonel Costinel PETRACHE, PhD 5 June 2006

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The Cold War was a complex and contradictory

TTTTTHHHHHE USE OF MILITE USE OF MILITE USE OF MILITE USE OF MILITE USE OF MILITARARARARARY POWERY POWERY POWERY POWERY POWERAFTER THE COLD WAFTER THE COLD WAFTER THE COLD WAFTER THE COLD WAFTER THE COLD WARARARARAR

Major General Teodor FRUNZETI, PhD~ Deputy Director

of the Romanian Armed Forces General Staff ~

phenomenon that kept the world in the status quo that was the result of the SecondWorld War. It marked the configuration of the international scene as far as the followingthree aspects are concerned.

Firstly, it shadowed or completely eliminated the conflicts and political rivalriesthat shaped the international politics even before the Second World War. Some of themdisappeared from the international scene, as the colonial empires themselves haddisappeared and, along with them, the rivalries between Great Powers on the groundof the territories they dominated. France and the Federal Republic of Germanywere both members of the group led by the USA and, subsequently, the old historicdivergences were left aside after 1947, not for another reason but the one that the USAhegemony on Western Europe was undeniable, which did not allow Germany to haveany freedom of action.

Surprisingly enough, differently from what had happened in other epochs and wars,the winning powers in the Second World War did not regard the recovery of the newdefeated, Germany and Japan, with suspicion and fear. The explanation for this attituderesides in the USA military capacity to totally control all the defeated states for a longperiod of time after the end of the war.

If, after the First World War, the winners feared that the defeated could recovertheir strength, while the defeated were planning to change the established status quo,after the Second World War, only few Western people were really worried about the factthat Western Germany and Japan spectacularly and in force regained the status of GreatPowers, both being seriously armed, in spite of not having nuclear weapons.

Even the USSR and its allies within the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, althoughdenouncing the threat represented by Germany, with whom they had a recent negativeexperience, did it, especially with propagandistic purposes, although they really feared it.

Moscow did not fear the German armed forces, but NATO forces deployedin Germany. Allied Forces stationed in this country by virtue of the occupation regimeand, despite it, the USSR created the Warsaw Treaty Organisation only after Germanybecame a NATO member, for fear it should disturb the balance of forces.

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Secondly, the Cold War froze the international situation, stabilising what, in essence,was designed to be a temporary situation. This way, alliances lasted even after the warperiod, peace being thus militarised, as it had never been before.

Germany is the most eloquent example: for forty-six years it remained divided intothree sectors: the Western Sector, that became, in 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany,the Middle Sector, that became, in 1954, the German Democratic Republic and theEastern Sector, to the east of the Oder-Neisse line, which the majority of Germans wereeither forced to flee or expelled from and which became a component part of Polandand the USSR.

The end of the Cold War reunited the Western and the Middle Sectors, leavingaside the Eastern Sector, the one detached and isolated from the rest of the RussianFederation, because of the existence of Lithuania as an independent state and not asa part of the USSR, as it used to be between 1940 and 1991. Poland accepted the promisesof the reunited Germany to agree with the borders established in 1945 and then confirmedby the Paris Peace Treaty in 19471.

Stabilisation did not mean peace. It was only in Europe that, the Cold War wasa period in which the armed conflicts ceased. However, the disagreements betweenthe Great Powers were kept under control, for fear they should have been the causeof a war, especially a nuclear one, between the countries that had such arsenals.

Moreover, the combination between using the military power, the political influence,the system of financial subsidies and the internal logic of bipolarity and anti-imperialismitself maintained the division of the World into antagonist blocks relatively stable.

The threat of a nuclear conflagration guaranteed not only the survival of the liberaldemocracies and the Communist states in Europe, but also that of different regionssuch as the absolute monarchies in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. In general, big or smallstates were supported to survive so that the international status quo could not be modified,which was a situation of balance between the two superpowers and their politicaland military alliances in competition.

Thirdly, the Cold War lay at the basis of proliferation of important quantities and typesof armament from the Great Powers to those on the outskirts of the international system.For more than four decades, the Great Powers were engaged in a ceaseless armamentrace, with a view to participating in a war that could burst any moment. During that time,the two superpowers were in competition with each other for the enlargement of theirareas of influence, by making new friends, delivering financial aids, as well as economicones and diversified armament. Especially because they could not directly fight eachother, the superpowers encouraged this type of conflicts in order to create a safetyvalve for the tensions in the system to be allowed to escape.

This way the peripheral wars, stimulated from the outside, perpetuated. Low intensitywars, in which the clients of a superpower were engaged against the ones of the other,continued, nourished both on the local basis and on their own account, opposing eventhose that had stimulated them and then wanted to put an end to them. For example,

1 Cf. Eric Hobsbawm, Secolul extremelor, Bucure[ti, 1999, p. 297.

27

Conceptual Projections • Theoretical Developments


28

UNITA rebels in Angola continued to fight against the government of socialist orientation,although both the Cuban and South-African militaries withdrew from the countryand although both the UN and the USA recognised the legitimacy of the legallyconstituted government.

In Afghanistan, the USA financially and materially supported the anticommunistand anti-Soviet tribal guerrillas. When the Soviets withdrew, the civil war continuedas if nothing had happened. The Mujahideens, benefiting from a serious and diversifiedarsenal of portable armament, started selling it on the international black market, rejectingthe USA offer to buy back the weapons that they themselves had provided the Mujahideenswith, for free2.

The end of the Cold War proved to be not only the end of an international competitionbut also the end of an epoch in which there were not significant changes in the internationalsystem, although the world economy underwent major changes, evolving from the industrialto the informational age and from the national economic systems to global ones. It wasthus necessary for the international system, on the whole, to be reconfigured and adaptedto this trend.

The period after the Cold War was characterised as showing unprecedenteddynamics of the events and incidents related to the international crises, materialised,at times, in armed conflicts.

Using the military instrument of power was more specific and diverse, startingfrom threat and reaching the climax with effectively using it in high intensity fightoperations. Although there were not open conflicts between Great Powers, as theymaintained the tendency to solve the litigious matters between them by meansof negotiations and political solutions, another tendency continued to be manifest,respectively that of resorting to means of coercion, military ones, with a view to promotingthe Great Powers interests as far as their relationships with other actors, be they nicheor secondary powers, were concerned.

The international security and stability evolution used to be and still is a non-linearone, as the unexpected factor has been playing a significant part. However, we considerthe events on September 11th, 2001 represented a fault line, which divided this erain two distinct periods: the first one – before the terrorist attacks, when the predominantfeeling was that of hoping to peacefully solve the disagreements and conflicts and thesecond one – after September 11th, 2001, characterised by incertitude and pessimismat the global level.

During the first period, the political factors in the decision-making process, as well asthe political and military analysts hoped that the use of non-military instruments in managingand solving conflicts could become prevalent, while, during the second period, the useof military instruments has been given much more attention, without leaving asidethe selective use of non-military instruments, which, together with the military ones, cancause enough pressure on the actors involved – state and non-state, thus persuading themto observe the norms and principles of International Law and fundamental Human Rights.

2 Cf. International Herald Tribune, 07.05.1993, p. 24.

29

Conceptual Projections • Theoretical DevelopmentsAfter the Cold War, neither the USA nor the USSR were tempted to compete when

intervening in peripheral wars. The USA formed coalitions whenever they took action,not only in the wars against Iraq, in 1991 and 2003 but also in the one against Afghanistan.Russia, on the other hand, sent military forces in the wars and interventions in Caucasusand Central Asia. Neither took action so that it could obstruct or provoke the otheror encourage an armed intervention against the other.

Lacking the constraints imposed by the existent relationships between the twosuperpowers during the Cold War period and by the reciprocal care not to exacerbatea political and ideological conflict to the limit of transforming it into a military one,the Great Powers of our present world have been less reserved in using military poweraccording to their own interests and objectives, but not against equivalent powers.

The only pre-existent military alliance that has adapted itself to the new strategicconditions is NATO, which has extended not only the range of missions that now includes,for example, crises management missions but also the area of responsibility.

In parallel with these changes, a diversification regarding the forms and proceduresof strategic action used by belligerents occur, procedures of asymmetrical militaryengagement being thus more and more resorted to, which differ from the others in termsof objectives, the types of military and semi-military structures engaged, the temporaland spatial horizon, the types of technologies used and the command and control.These differences, expressed in all the domains mentioned above, are the onesthat create the asymmetry that is particularly specific to the phenomenon genericallycalled “the global war on terrorism”.

The military interventions that take place nowadays, more and more followtwo completely different directions:

• the first direction has in view the coercive military interventions, through which,in general, states aim at imposing their interests and strategic objectives by meansof war actions;

• the second direction aims at crises management and humanitarian interventions,having a reverted objective, that of preserving or inducing peace by engaging a third party,most often than not under the mandate or with the direct participation of internationalorganisations that have vocation for security.

Conflicts management and prevention are influenced by certain phenomenathat currently occur in the world nowadays, which exacerbate latent or open conflicts,such as armament proliferation, especially that of mass destruction weapons and internationalterrorism associated with organised crime.

A characteristic of the current security environment is that, once with the disappearanceof the ideological, political and military competition that was specific to the Cold Warperiod, the incidence of central crises has reduced drastically, tending to zero, because,among the current powers, apart from minor frictions that are inherent to the processof cooperation within the international system, there are no major reasons for conflicts.Currently, there are not only peripheral crises between secondary powers but also crisesin which regional or global powers and actors of second importance, state and non-state,are engaged. The military means they can make use of have significantly diversified


30

as the military instrument of power has changed from an instrument exclusively intendedfor carrying and possibly winning a war to an instrument meant to be used for internationalcrises prevention and management as well as for carrying humanitarian actions.

The states response to the challenges, risks, threats and dangers proper to the thirdmillennium materialises in a process of adapting and reconfiguring their military forces,so that they could be more flexible, agile, endowed with a more rapid capacity of responseand manoeuvrability, able to adapt to a more diversified range of fight actions,others than war itself included. These actions will be intended not only against enemiesof the same kind (states) but also against non-state actors who frequently make useof unconventional and asymmetric procedures, be they of military or terrorist type.This process of adaptation and transformation goes hand in hand with that of strengtheningthe civil control over the armed forces, proper to democratic regimes, process that hasbeen implemented in more and more states, as the democratic regimes have replacedthe authoritarian ones, irrespective of their ideological orientation. At the operationallevel, taking advantage of information technology, command and control has becomemore and more decentralised, decisional prerogatives being thus closer to the tacticallevels of execution. It allows for taking decisions in a real time, due to the possibilityfor the decision making process to be assisted by up to date information systems, whichenable a direct relation between the sensor and the striking means in real time, too.

The omnipresent phenomenon of globalisation more and more obviously intensifiesthe use of the military instrument of power both by states and non-state actors, eachof them having nowadays access to many dual technologies. Thus the informationalrevolution is a basic component of the operations carried by not only the armed forcesof the economically developed states but also by a great part of the non-state actors,such as the terrorist organisations or the cross-border organised crime networks.

Globalisation has an important effect on the way forces are now projected in differentareas of action and conflict, which are, many times, situated at thousands of kilometresfrom their permanent dislocation bases in peacetime. As for the logistics involved, thereare important quantities of materials and equipment of all types that are carried, in themajority of the cases, at intercontinental distances. As far as effective military leadershipis concerned, it can be achieved with the help of satellite systems that allow the leaderto know, in real time, what the situation of forces (own and enemy ones) is, to selecttargets and appropriate striking means, being thus highly effective in neutralisingor destroying the established objectives and reducing collateral losses at minimum.

All these elements have become a permanency within military interventions, takinginto consideration the fact that, more and more often, they are not dictated by nationalinterests but by interests of humanitarian nature, such as those with regard to puttingan end to human rights violation, resolving major humanitarian crises caused by endemicconflicts or those in which the norms of international law and especially those of internationalhumanitarian law are infringed.

Coercive interventions have therefore been less numerous after the end of the ColdWar than humanitarian ones. The latter are usually conducted under the UN or OSCEpatronage, sometimes with the effective participation of a regional security organisation

31

Conceptual Projections • Theoretical Developmentssuch as NATO, or applying the principle of “leading nation”. This way the interventionis much more effective, as the financial, material and human resources are used with a viewto maximising the results in terrain.

Non-military solutions for crises management have been more and more extensivelyused, the system of international organisations with vocation for security covering,in practice, all the domains that are inherent in finding viable solutions, negotiatedand accepted by all the parts involved. Different instruments, such as International Law,armament control, democratisation and integration have been used with positive results,superior to those obtained during the Cold War period, when the main instrument usedwas the balance of power, creation of alliances and, subsidiarily, armament control.

One of the advantages of using non-military means in providing solutions for conflictsis considered to be the capacity to plan and find the necessary resources so that theycould be in agreement with the possibilities of those in charge with providing them,having in view the fact that resources allocation takes into account society generalneeds and is an adequate prioritisation, when, in case of conflicts, resources allocationcan never be in accordance with the initial plan, as military actions gradually extendand last longer than they are initially expected to. That is why, even though the financialresources involved in resolving conflicts using non-military methods may sometimesbe very important, they will represent only a small part of the resources wasted in caseof escalation of conflicts up to the level of an armed conflict.

Mention should be made that most of the resources used for the nationalreconstruction materialise in palpable, concrete effects (infrastructure reconstruction,modernisation of the education system and communications, development of measuresfor good governing), from which the citizens of the respective state benefit, whilethe resources used in armed conflicts can neither regenerate nor entail an increasein the citizens’ general welfare. One of the characteristics of interventions nowadaysis that their major objective is to help creating states with democratic mechanismsand institutions, besides infrastructure projects.

States continue to play an important part in administrating non-military instrumentsand methods used to resolve conflicts, as they have not only the necessary human,technological, material and financial resources but also the necessary expertiseand capabilities for the institutional and public mobilisation to assume and dischargesuch duties. In parallel, an ascending tendency is that of the more and more activeinvolvement of non-state actors such as international organisations, multinationalcorporations, mass-media, humanitarian organisations or private persons that all cancover the domains states pay less attention to, although there are critical moments,in international crises, when they represent necessities to be provided solutions for.These organisations can adjust to such situations more rapidly than state institutions,which are characterised by powerful bureaucratic systems.

The present scientific approach focuses more on the institutions and instrumentsstates and international community can make use of to resolve conflicts by militarymeans and less on the processes generated by these instruments and on the ones


32

that are specific to political evolution nowadays. There is no doubt that democratisationand the principles of the rule of law implementation are, themselves, means meantto ensure the internal stability of different states where they are manifest, as well asto develop stability and security at the sub-regional, regional and global level. All theseprocesses have also objective characteristics, which can be expressed at the level of society,involving thus more other aspects, apart from providing solutions for different crisesand conflicts.

There is something else that should be mentioned with regard to religion which,besides the negative part some fundamentalist streams may play in “heating” differentlatent conflicts and violence escalation, can also play a positive part by implementinga new set of norms and values meant to condemn violence and to evince the fundamentalhuman values. Ecumenical tendencies have a positive role to this effect, as differentchurches and confessions are in search for solutions to harmonise people all overthe world spiritual needs with traditions and with the necessity to ensure stabilityand order at the national and global level.

The civil society (that plays an important role in post-industrial societies and inconsolidated democracies, being in a self-defining and affirmation process in societiesin transition and in developing countries) by taking social responsibilities, in the securitydomain included, and complementary actions, in their relationship with states institutions,can play a fundamental positive role with regard to observing human rights and theprinciples that lie at the basis of resolving disagreements peacefully.

Negotiations and international mediation, humanitarian interventions, diplomacyand international organisations are all relevant and effective instruments used by bothstates, as main actors and subjects of International Law, and, sometimes, by non-stateactors to intervene harmlessly and to provide solutions, based especially on compromise,to resolve disagreements and conflicts of different nature, before they escalate to the intensityof armed conflicts. These are considered to be the most relevant, efficient and effectiveinstruments, prior to any other possible approaches.

Military and non-military complementarity in providing solutions for conflicts isa constant of processes and institutions that are specific to collective security nowadays,not only at the global but also at the regional level. The way in which, according to eachparticular situation, these instruments are made operational is a matter of choice andeffectively managing the situation by each of the actors involved. Convergent or divergentinterests of the actors involved, be they states or non-state entities, influence the interventionsin terms of their effectiveness, their accomplishment in due time, their positive effectson national reconciliation, national reconstruction or the dissolution of different formsof state organisation that correspond to an obsolete international order.

International order and stability is in a state of relatively precarious equilibriumnowadays and to redefine and consolidate it, certain responsibility for the fate of presentand future generations is necessary when taking action.

Romania has constantly acted as a factor for the consolidation of regional,sub-regional and global stability and security. Our country acts not only in the conceptualplane, initiating or contributing to different pragmatic solutions, but also in the practical

33

Conceptual Projections • Theoretical Developmentsapplicable one, contributing with forces to the peacekeeping operations or to the operationsmeant to impose peace, initiated by UN Security Council decisions, in conformitywith the provisions of chapters 6, 7, respectively 8 of the UN Charter. As an ally and reliablepartner, our country has proved credibility and transparency as far as its foreignand military policy is concerned and predictability regarding its actions at the internationallevel. Romania’s actions and position are concordant with its status of a medium country,which has, inevitably, a limited capacity to fulfil its objectives by using the militaryinstrument. This is the main reason for the desire of the country to contribute to thestability and security of the region in which it is situated, respectively in the Balkansand the Black Sea region.

The regional initiatives that Romania has contributed to prove its permanentpreoccupation with the South-East of Europe and the Black Sea region becomingpoles of stability in the European security framework, an important role being thusplayed by the directions of collaboration and cooperation that are generated by theseinitiatives, as they enhance trust and security and maintain the conflicts at the outskirtsof the region in a state of “frozen” conflicts.

The concordance between the objectives of different actors involved, Romaniaincluded and the directions they follow in taking political and military action at the nationaland international level also contribute to the international implementation of certaindemocratic relationships, based on common values and the observance of internationallaw norms and principles, as they are reflected in the contents of the UN Charter.

oint operations, according to their definition, reunite structures belongingto the various task forces that act together, in the same departments,or, sometimes, in neighbouring areas. The close cooperation and

COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMCOMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMCOMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMCOMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMCOMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMWITHIN CLOSE AIRWITHIN CLOSE AIRWITHIN CLOSE AIRWITHIN CLOSE AIRWITHIN CLOSE AIRSUPPORT MISSIONSSUPPORT MISSIONSSUPPORT MISSIONSSUPPORT MISSIONSSUPPORT MISSIONS

Air Flotilla General Lauren]iu SIMIONESCU, PhD~ Commander 90th Airlift Base ~

synchronisation between the actions of the forces taking part in combat are essentialelements for achieving the objectives of operations, avoiding fratricide, ensuringthe connection between armament and targets, as well as for reducing the lossesin their own forces. A structure of command and control capable meet these requirementsrepresents a necessary element for a successful outcome of joint operations.

At operative level, the joint action taking place in land, air and maritime environmentmust be designed, planned, led and sustained as entity. The commander of the operativeechelon must lead and/or control the land, air and maritime forces and, therefore,he must be capable of manoeuvring the resources in order to acquire their concentrationin the point of main effort. The headquarters of this echelon cannot be but joint ones,capable of integrating the land, air and maritime effort in order to fulfil the operationalobjective established by the Strategic Military Command. From this perspective,the coordination of air operation with land and maritime ones becomes a prerequisitefor successful joint operations, and this cannot be achieved unless some liaison teamsare established among joint task forces. The air task force commander will providethe other components with air operation coordination centres, liaison officers, groupsof tactical air control and forward air controllers. The tasks of these structures areto provide: assistance regarding the use of air forces and expertise of the armamentsystems used; preparation of air support requests and air interdiction, and, in somecases, missions assignment for the units established by the air component commander;monitoring the air situation and the due assistance; the interface necessary for the usualinformation transfer.

Command and controlCommand means the authority a commander legally exercises over its subordinates

during military service, in accordance with his job or prerogatives. Command includesauthority and the responsibility for efficiently using the available resources and for planning

J

34

the use of military forces with the purpose of fulfilling the assigned missions. In addition,it also consists of the responsibility for the subordinated personnel health, living conditions,morale and discipline.

As a rule, command consists of activities especially related to identifying the tasksthat must be fulfilled, achieving motivation, allocating means and other resourcesnecessary for achieving the objectives, assigning missions to subordinates. The purposeof command is enforcing the decisions made, as this is the authority assignedto a commander in order to guide, coordinate and control military forces. In a broadersense, we can define command as being a prerogative of commanders and the artof: conceiving the operations; visualising situations; assessing risks and establishingpriorities; setting missions; making decisions; seeing, listening and understanding;anticipating changes; leading, guiding and motivating organisations.

Control represents the authority that may be exercised the commander overa segment of activities of his subordinates or other structures temporarily subordinatedto him, and aims at verifying the way the provisions of the action plan are put intopractice by subordinated echelons.

The main purpose of control is to verify the steps taken for successfully fulfillingthe assigned missions and to assist commanders in preparing the actions and permanentlykeeping a high state of training for subordinated units.

Synthesising, control consists in the capacity to: process data; describe situations;identify variables; set and provide the means necessary for achieving the objectives;draw up specific instructions for general directions; correct misbehaviour; countand evaluate achievements and failures; envisage the necessary corrective.

Control is fulfilled by: analysing the reports sent on the existing linesof communication; studying the document of combat; directly observing the activities;air photographing: using radio-electronic means.

Command and control represent the authority and monitoring exerted by an appointedcommander over the organic and/or temporarily subordinated forces in order to fulfilthe mission.

Command and control are parts of an essential cyclic process by means of whichthe actions of the military forces are planned, led, coordinated and controlled (corrected)in order to fulfil a mission. This process begins with storing information on the evaluatedand analysed situation and the alternative courses of action for changing the situationto the commander’s advantage, which are consequently proposed and elaborated as plans.

Simplified modelof the command and control process

Order

of battle Order

of battleRequest

Action planning

Action organising

Control Action coordination

Action command

Since the development of actions continuouslymodifies the initial situations, the processrestarts. Making decisions and applyingthem in time, both represent the essenceof the process. Maximum responsibilitybelongs to the commander, as he asks for thesupport of the staff regarding: obtainingand securing information, analysing andanticipating the situation, recommendingthe most appropriate courses of fighting

35



36

actions, preparing the plans, orders and provisions the commander consequentlyapproves and decides the dissemination of decisions, supervises and monitors the wayof fulfilling them.

Command and control system, also called C2, mainly consists of the human structuresand the technical means specialised in exerting command and control (the staffof a particular structure), which provide the exercise of command and control basedon the assigned missions, data and information at disposal (directly obtained or fromthe connected data bases).

The communication system consists of technical equipment, methods, proceduresand specialised personnel, meant to provide the technical-functional interconnectionbetween the C4I system components (command, control, communication, computerand information) and the transfer of information between and within the commandand control structures, as well as between the elements of the operative disposition.

Besides the command points of big units and the units of other joint task forces,the structures set up by different echelons of the Air Forces with a view to ensuringthe operative and tactical control in the case of air support missions are:

Air Operations Co-ordination Centre ~ AOCC is the command-control structureof the Air Forces, operationally subordinated to the Air Operations Centre ~ AOCand administratively subordinated to the headquarters it is part of. This will representthe air component commander within the staff of the land component/army corps. Its areaof responsibility will be identical with the one of the land component. AOCC has therole of counselling the commanders of land and naval component regarding the wayof using the aviation resource, the structures and means of air defence, of assistingthem in the air missions coordination with their schemes of forces and means manoeuvre1.

Air Liaison Officer ~ ALO is an officer from the Air Forces attaché at the big tacticalunits of the supported land component and subordinated to AOCC. ALO responsibilitiesespecially regard: counselling the commander of the big land unit on all aspects regardingorganising the air forces, methods and means of action, equipment and ways of action;advising on air targets that might be most effectively fought against by the air means;monitoring the activity of the subordinated tactical air control groups of the forward aircontrollers when directly subordinated; coordinating the close air support missionsand controlling them in the absence of the forward air controller (if he is qualified); reportingthe results of the missions to the commander of the big land units and AOCC.

Tactical Air Control ~ TACP is a command-control structure which can be foundat any echelon, between battalion and corps. TACP consists of an ALO and/or a forwardair controller, as well as the personnel and means of communication and informationtechnology necessary for the control of close air support missions2. The responsibilitiesof TACP personnel are: supporting the land unit commander in integrating the actionsof air means with fire and supported forces manoeuvre; coordinating the flight of the support

1 F.A. 1, Doctrina pentru Opera]ii a For]elor Aeriene, Statul Major al For]elor Aeriene, Bucure[ti,2005, p. 40.

2 Air Power Handbook, 1995, p. II-11.

37

Conceptual Projections • Theoretical Developmentsair means in accordance with the order of air space control; controlling these meansin the points established by ATO/ATM (for instance, initial point, contact points); providingdata regarding the meteorological situation in the area of the targets to be struck.

Forward Air Controller ~ FAC represents an extension of TACP 3. The forwardair controller is the specialist who guides the aircrafts planned to fulfil the forwardclose air support of the land forces. FAC can act from a land or air platform (means).FAC’s responsibilities are: counselling the commander of the supported unit regarding theattack aircrafts/helicopters means of action; coordinating the attack of air attack meanswith the manoeuvre of the supported unit; supporting the identification, by the crews of airattack means, of the position of their own forces subunits; guiding the attack aircrafts/helicopters against the assigned land targets; reporting the results of the attack; providingthe crews with data regarding the meteorological situation in the area of the target.

RLFH* RAFH** RNFH***

Joint Task ForceHeadquarters

(Joint OperationalHeadquarters)

Land

Component

Air

ComponentNaval

Component

Army corps

Air Operation

Coordination

Centres

AOCC

Brigade

TACP/ALO

Battalion

TACP/ALO/FAC

Course

of Action/COA

Air base

Squadron

It can provide/contribute with personnel Operational control

Delegation of operational/tactical control Orders

* Romanian Land Forces Headquarters ** Romanian Air Forces Headquarters

*** Romanian Naval Forces Headquarters

At the same time,the other componentsof the joint forcesp r o v i d e t h e a i rc o m p o n e n theadquarters withliaison teams (liaisono f f i c e r s ) , w h i c h :monitor the situationof the representedc o m p o n e n t a n di n f o r m s t h ecommander of theair component on itsintentions; coordinatesand submits the airsupport requests andthe necessities for aircontrol; provides the

Structures of command-control set up by the air forces with a viewto acquiring operative and tactical control within air support missions

(variant)

necessary interface for the transfer of information and the expertise regarding thesystems of armament used by them.

Close air supportWithin joint operations, the term “support” signifies the action developed by one

or more components for the benefit of another component, all of them belonging to thesame joint force. Thus, for each operation, the commander of the joint force sets down,through the operations order, the status of both the supported commander and thesupporting one.

3 F.A. 1, Doctrina pentru Opera]ii a For]elor Aeriene, Ibid.


38

Close air support ~ CAS, from the perspective of the Air Forces Operations Doctrine,comprises all the air hits carried out by the multi-role combat aircrafts and the attackhelicopters on the targets placed in the proximity of own forces. In a different way,we may say that close air support represents the air action aimed at the targets placedin the proximity of own forces, therefore the detailed coordination of each air missionswith the fire and the manoeuvre of supported forces is necessary4.

In order to avoid the losses on their side, owed to the effect of the aviation ammunitions,and to increase the close air support effectiveness, air strikes must be integrated withthe fire and the manoeuvre of land forces, and this necessitates the detailed coordinationof the operations fulfilled by the big unit, the units and subunits of different arms. Closeair support is an action led at tactical level, which might create and exploit operationalopportunities. This must be planned in order to prepare the circumstances or to amplifythe success of land forces and, implicitly, of joint forces. Close air support can temporarilystop the enemy attacks/advance, help with engendering a gap in his disposition, coverwithdrawals and protect the exposed wings of own forces. In order to be efficient, closeair support must focus on obtaining a maximum effect on the target.

The intrinsic features of aircrafts, speed, manoeuvrability, armament varietyincluded, together with the fact that they act in the third dimension, allow them to attackthe targets that other support weapons are not capable to effectively engage. At thesame time, the improvement of tactics, techniques, procedures, own defence equipment,armaments has increased the ability of aircrafts to provide close air support, both at dayand night time, in the most various meteorological conditions, as well as the capacityto react and change the objectives, depending on the effort and needs of the courseof land actions.

The commander of the joint force sets out, depending on the objectives and thestage in the development of the joint operation, which part of the air effort should providethe close air support objectives fulfilment, and the commander of the air componentreports to the land component commander, through the Air Tasking Order ~ ATOor Air Task Messages ~ ATM, on the number of raids/aircraft which may be providedfor the fulfilment of the requested close air support missions, during each planning cycle5.

The commander of the land component sets out the targets that must be struckwithin the close air support according to a list of identified, examined targets, which areprioritised depending on various criteria. Close air support missions are requestedthrough the liaison officers and the air operations coordination centre and are fulfilledthrough the planned actions method or upon request actions method. The communicationsystems of the two components must provide the rapid delivery of Air Request Messages~ ARM and process them, and confirm the air support through ATO or ATM as well.

The targets identified in time are demanded as planned air support requests.The immediate requests occur during the operation and cannot be identified beforehand,so as to allow for the detailed coordination and planning. Meeting these immediate

4 ATP 27 (C), Air Interdiction and Close Air Support, June 1999, p. 2-1.5 F.A. 1, Doctrina pentru Opera]ii a For]elor Aeriene, Ibid, p. 85.

39

Conceptual Projections • Theoretical Developmentsr e q u e s t s ,a b o v e t h ei n i t i a l l ydistributed/allocated airresource forthe close airsupport, mightinfluence theavailability ofthe air meansf o r o t h e rplanned airoperations6.T h e t i m eavailable forthe air subunitsto respond tothe call mustensure the

Close air support planning process

Land

component

Air

component

Air support

demands

CAS Demand

CoordinationCorps/AOCC

CAS Request

CAS Request

ATO/ATM

ATO/ATM

Brigade

ALO/TACP

ALO/TACP

Battalion

FAC

Objective

Coordination

Guidance

Joint Operational

Headquarters

Resources/targetallocating

recommendations

Approved resources

Target list

Prioritised

target list

Squadrons

Aircrafts/Helicopters

formation

Air support report,

recommendations

COA

Liaison

Officer/Corps

ATO

(ATM)

Air Base

mission’s preparation by crews, aircrafts’ configuration and the establishment of the detailsof execution and cooperation with the other elements of own disposition.

The request for air support, no matter it is planned or immediate, will be hierarchicallysubmitted by any of the echelons of the supported component structure, through thecommand-control structures represented by the air forces at the respective echelons.These structures authorize the requests of the subordinated echelons, concentrate,prioritise and present them at COA through AOCC. The aircrafts or helicopters subunitsassigned to carry out close air support missions will be placed under COA’s operationalcontrol and will fulfil the missions according to the ATO/ATM drawn up by it. The commanderof the joint force can decide, for an established period, that AOCC should be assignedthe operational/tactical control on a/some aircraft or attack helicopters subunit. In thesecircumstances, the requests for planned air support will be included in the ATO drawnup by AOC, since AOC is the only structure qualified to draw up ATO, and ATO includes,during its valability period, all the aircrafts planned to fulfil combat missions. For the immediaterequests, AOCC will draw up the ATM and send it directly to the subunits placed underoperational/tactical control.

The request-response flow in the plannedand upon request air support missionsClose air support missions can be fulfilled under the direct or indirect control

of FAC or without its involvement. When combat aircrafts that carry out close air supportare guided by FAC, it is necessary to know and apply certain common procedures

6 Ibid.


40

in order to coord ina tethe fire and the manoeuvresof the air forces with theones of the land forces.

When CAS is carriedout under FAC ’s directcontrol, this comes in directconnection with the aircraftsmeant to support, informationexchange being made afterthe reciprocal identification.As a consequence of theinformation exchange, whenthe objective is in FAC’s lineof sight, it can ascertain andindicate the armament type,ammunit ion categoriesand quantities that may beused in order to fulfil themission’s objective. Thedirect control is compulsoryin the areas wherein owntroops are in direct contactwith enemy forces. Thismeans that FAC must knowand even be familiar withthe action procedure adoptedin fight, the characteristicsof the ammunition and thecapabilities of the aircraftsassigned with CAS missions,

When aircraft and helicopters subunits are underAOC operational/tactical control:

When aircraft and attack helicopters subunits areunder AOCC operational/tactical control:

Air Support Planning

ALO/TACP

Battalion

ALO/TACP

Brigade

AOCC

Corps

COA

ATO

Liaison Officer/

Corps

Air Base

Squadrons

CAS - ARM Request

ATO (ATM) Confirmation

Execution order - ATO (ATM)

they must have two secure ways of communication and keep them functioning throughoutthe mission and communicate the result of the attack.

The indirect control of CAS by FAC is necessary when the objective is out of FAC’sline of sight, but one has enough detailed information on this that allows for the aircraft’screw to engage the target, precisely and rapidly identify it and efficiently attack it.In this case, FAC notifies the pilots of the aircrafts on the general situation and the onein the neighbouring area of the objective, while giving coordination instructions regardingthe fighting disposition, the fire and the manoeuvres made by own forces.

CAS actions that do not involve FAC will be detailed in ATM, and the liaison officersand Air Operations Coordination Centre will bring those up to date. These missionsare fulfilled at the commander of the formation order, do not necessitate radio air-landconnection and involve assuming responsibility by the commander of the supported unitfor the security of the subordinated forces7.

7 Air Power Handbook, op. cit., p. V-2.

Air Support Planning

Air Support on Demand

ALO/TACP

Battalion

ALO/TACP

Battalion

ALO/TACP

Brigade

ALO/TACP

Brigade

AOCC

Corps

AOCC

Corps

CAS

Planning

ATM

COA

COA

ATO

Liaison Officer/

Corps

Liaison Officer/

Corps

Air Base

Air Base

Squadrons

Squadrons

CAS - ARM Request

CAS - ARM Request

ATO Confirmation

ATM Report

Execution order - ATO

Execution Order - ATM

ATO Inclussion/confirmation

Coordination

41

Conceptual Projections • Theoretical DevelopmentsWith a view to achieving the coordination of the flight on trajectory, the contact

point (CP), initial point (IP), indicators and frequencies of all the command-controlstructures involved in the mission’s fulfilment will be notified. Throughout the entiretrajectory of the fight, the reciprocal identification will be made, and the radio connectionwill be permanently kept so that the ultimate details could be received, in case the planchanges and the missions are cancelled. FAC will maintain the connection with the landforces elements engaged in the fight with the enemy, too, in order to inform them aboutthe air actions that are about to take place, so that the losses among own forces could beeliminated or diminished.

In order to fulfil CAS, the land-air communications are of great importance,as means by which the following will be provided: the local air traffic control, leadingthe air actions for supporting the land forces, receiving reports from the flying aircrafts,specifying the landing areas, parachuting zones, gathering sectors and the contactalignment etc.

In this respect, FAC will be equipped with radio stations with 225-400 MHz range,with antennas of 1,6 m, which will provide the connection at distances of 15-160 km,depending on the aircrafts’ flight altitude (30-6 000 m). In addition, it will have VHFradio stations at its disposal and HF ones, too, when possible, in order to ensure thecommunications within the structure from the disposition wherein it is engaged – usuallywithin the battalion’s combat disposition, near the contact line.

The radio stations on land will be interoperable with the UHF stations on theaircrafts, be they secret or not, with or without frequency hopping, with the possibilityof automatically changing the frequency in case of jamming, resistant to randomperturbations.

The provided working ways are: voice, locating tone in case of damage, 16 kbpsspeed data. Amplitude modulation with two adjacent sidebands will be employed in orderto send secret data and voice.

CAS missions represent a convincing example of joint action, with major effectson the development of fight, but which might prove its effectiveness only followinga successful planning and synchronisation. The complexity of CAS missions representsa process that involves cooperation between numerous structures, being dependenton a multitude of aspects related to both planning and execution.

he first explicit mention of asymmetry appeared in US in 1995, in the JointDoctrine. At that time, the concept, which was focused on definingasymmetric engagements as those between dissimilar forces, specifically

ASYMMETRYIN WARFARE

Colonel Mircea M|NDRESCU~ Advisor, the Defence Section, Romania’s Permanent Delegation to NATO ~

air versus land, air versus sea, and so forth, was assessed as having limited utility andconsequently other attempts followed. In 1995, in US, the National Military Strategyenlarged the concept and listed terrorism, the use of weapon of mass destructionand information warfare among asymmetric challenges. In 1997, the Report of QuadrennialDefence Review (QDR) re-examined the concept and stated: “US dominance in theconventional military arena may encourage adversaries to use…asymmetric meansto attack our forces and interests overseas and Americans at home”.

The doors of debate being open, many attempts have been made in orderto accommodate the concept in defining the challenges of the modern world. A potentialasymmetric challenger has been labelled as being one who would not “fight fair” or whowould use “surprise” or who would attack one’s “weaknesses”.

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that asymmetry is nothing new in the historyof warfare. It will be demonstrated that the achievement of positive asymmetry is thereason for one’s victory.

If asymmetry means the lack of equality or equivalence between the parts, thenasymmetry has been present in the whole history of warfare. Its forms have had manynames: types and number of weapons, number of soldiers and the level of training, strategicculture, military doctrine, morale etc. Never in history have two opponents been equalin military strengths and capabilities, and this difference is proposed to be called standingasymmetry. The acting asymmetry, the other embodiment of the term, is a result of manyfactors that are playing their role into a conflict and, finally, it is the explanation of victory.This is the main relevance of asymmetry in warfare. Asymmetry has not only been presentall the time but also it has been highly desirable. As it will be demonstrated, positivestanding asymmetry does not necessary mean positive acting asymmetry.

In defining asymmetry in the realm of warfare, the first point to be stressed is thatasymmetry is not a fashion that appeared in the 1990s. The roots of asymmetricapproaches are in the existence of asymmetric possibilities. If war, as Clausewitz put it,is “… an act of force to compel the enemy to do our will”, then, nevertheless, the weakerhas had to find ways to achieve his goals in spite of his inferiority, and to act as the enemyexpects is probably the best way to failure.

T

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On the other hand, the asymmetric approach does not belong only to the weak party.The stronger has discovered, in his turn, that acting originally, doing what his enemyexpects less would make his victory less costly and more complete.

In this way, to achieve the necessary degree of superiority, that is to say positiveasymmetry, has been the aim toward which both parties have constantly been acting.The race for better arms, for better doctrine, for better organisational system, for bettertraining etc., is the explanation for the desire to achieve superior asymmetry in orderto have success.

For a better understanding of asymmetry in warfare probably it is worth analysingwhat could be assessed as being symmetric or asymmetric in the realm of warfareand what places these two forms have inside the phenomenon war.

In accordance with the English Dictionary, symmetry is “the quality of being madeup of exactly similar parts facing each other or around an axis; similarity or exactcorrespondence”. Simply speaking, symmetry means similarity.

In the realm of warfare, symmetry is more present in the philosophical aspectsof war. Taking into account the final scope of a war, so to say, the imposition of one’swill upon the adversary, there has always been symmetry, although antagonistic, betweenthe competitors, each at their turn trying to concentrate their action toward achievingtheir aims. Another symmetrical feature would be that no military conflict has been wonwithout respecting the principles of war. When speaking about the Clausewitzianenduring characteristics of war, namely the presence of friction, fog of war, uncertaintyand fear, it is clear that both competitors have symmetrically been subject to the influencesof these factors.

It would be interesting to address the degree of symmetry in the so-called symmetricwars. Probably, those who are advocating the existence of a purely symmetric typeof warfare would say that an army versus army style of waging war, fought onlywith conventional weapons, is a true example of this sort of conflict. Germany’s campaignagainst Poland in 1939 would probably be an example, which would satisfy the supportersof this idea. Provided that there had been no differences between the opposing partsduring that campaign, that both competitors had been symmetrical in capabilitiesand had been using a symmetric type of warfare, it would have been difficult to explainwhy Germany won and Poland lost so quickly. Going to analyse the true reason for whichGermany was given victory, it will be discovered that Germany won because it enjoyedan overall positive asymmetry upon its adversary. So, Germany won not because it wasthe same as Poland but because it was different in a positive way, it had positiveasymmetry compared with its adversary. In turn, Poland was different to Germany butin a negative way. Taking another example, the 1991 Gulf War was fought in an armyversus army style and only with conventional weapons, but was that war symmetric ?Did the opponents have the same capabilities ? Definitely not ! The Iraqi forces wereoutmatched in every aspect and these huge differences were the explanation of thecomplete success of the Coalition’s forces.

From these examples, it is clear that symmetry has not been the reason for the factthat one wins and the other loses, it is compulsory to achieve a overall positive asymmetryin order to succeed.

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44

The explanation given by the English Dictionary to the term asymmetry is thatit means the “lack of equality or equivalence between parts or aspects of something; lackof symmetry”. Simply put, asymmetry means difference.

In the realm of warfare, asymmetry has to be seen as a presence beyond any discussions(two opponents have never been exactly the same) and, through its aspect of positiveasymmetry, as being the core explanation of victory. All the time the balance of successhas been inclined to the part that puts something in addition on its plate in comparisonwith its adversary.

It is to be underlined that, from a dynamic point of view, the asymmetry in warfarehas two aspects. The first one is that asymmetry has a standing aspect, which is sequentialand static. The second one is that asymmetry has an acting aspect, which is overarching,changing, and it is this aspect that decides who will win a war or a battle. The relationbetween the two aspects is probably better described using an example. The fact thata state has a superior number of tanks in his army is a positive standing asymmetryfor it and a negative standing asymmetry for its enemy. The existence of a standingpositive asymmetry does not automatically mean that the respective state will havea positive acting asymmetry and will win. As it was the case in 1940, between the Alliesand Germany on the Western Front or in 1941, between Germany and the Soviet Union,the superior number of Allied or Soviet tanks, so to say the existence of a positive standingasymmetry in the most important weapon of the Land Warfare, was not enoughfor the Allies or the Russians to succeed.

As it can be seen from the 1940 and 1941 examples, a positive standing asymmetry,although desirable, is not sufficient for achieving success; what is important is to havea positive acting asymmetry. Did the fact the Germans were inferior in tanks meanthat they were the weaker party ? If the answer were yes then the fact that the Germanswere successful would not explain their victory, for a weak has never won. Therefore,logically, the answer has to be the Germans were, somehow, the stronger party overalland that only the number, or even the quality of equipment, does not always equalpositive acting asymmetry. The necessary conclusion from this short demonstrationis that for assessing which party enjoys positive asymmetry and which party enjoysa negative one, a constellation of factors has to be taken into account, not onlywith regard to their separate play, but most important, their inter-relations have to be analysed,the ways in which they influence each other positively or negatively have to be takeninto account, because what is important is the overall final result. These results pertainingto both opponents spell the overall final balance between the competitors.

If accepting the explanation provided above, then it becomes unclear why eventuallyGermany lost and the Soviet Union won. There are two main explanations. The first oneis related to the Metz’s classification of asymmetry in long termed and short termedones. The operational positive asymmetry, which was imposed by Germany in the formof Blitzkrieg, is generally a short termed form, due, mainly, to the fact that sooner or latterthe enemy learns. On the other hand, the strategic asymmetry (especially in termsof resources), in which the Soviet Union was superior, is a long termed one. Being inferiorstrategically, the single solution Germany had had, would have been a quick decision.It was not like that, because its positive operational acting asymmetry was not enough.The second explanation regarding the outcome of the struggle between Germany

45

Conceptual Projections • Theoretical Developmentsand the Soviet Union, in close relation with the previous one, is related to the balancebetween standing and acting asymmetry. Making an analogy, the standing asymmetry(troops, weapons etc), which is in close relation with the strategic possibilities, could becompared with the “raw material”. On the other hand, activities regarding war(for example the application of military doctrine) belonging to an opponent could becompared with the “technological process” that enables the “raw material” to betransformed in the final product. The better the quality of the “raw material” one will sendto the “technological process”, the better the result one will obtain. This result is calledacting asymmetry. When the quantity or quality of the “raw material” begins to fall,then the quality of the final product will fall, as well. In a way, it could be said the standingasymmetry “is feeding” the acting asymmetry. By this process, acting asymmetry influencesstanding asymmetry by increasing or decreasing it. That was Germany’s case whenit fought against Russia. After a while, Germany could not provide what it used to,and the quality of results fell accordingly. So, its superior acting asymmetry declinedover time to the point of having a negative value eventually. This is not the general rulethough. As Paul explains, in some particular conditions (external diplomatic support,limited objectives etc) operational superior acting asymmetry could be enough (in a caseof quick victory) for success in spite of strategic negative standing asymmetry, as the caseof Japan’s victory over Russia in 1905 demonstrated.

Metz and Johnson recognise that “at least six forms of asymmetry are relevantin the realm of national security and warfare”. These are: asymmetry of methods,which “entails using different operational concepts or tactical doctrines than the enemy”;asymmetries of technologies; asymmetries of will, with its derivate of asymmetryof morale at the operational and tactical level; asymmetry of organisation; and asymmetryof patience which is conceptually linked to an asymmetry of will, but operates mainlyin “cross-cultural conflicts”.

In their description, Metz and Johnson underline many facets of asymmetrybut they do not organise them in more elaborated forms and do not touch the aspect ofhow they influence each other and how they, together, influence the war as a whole.

Arguably, a more elaborate form of organising the various aspects of asymmetrywould be possible if the concept of Fighting Power were taken into account. It could beseen that Metz and Johnson’s forms of asymmetry are included.

Basically, the Fighting Power (in other words, the ability to fight) has threecomponents: the Physical Component or Combat Power (the means to fight) that includesmanpower, logistics, equipment, training and readiness; the Conceptual Component(the thought process) that pertains to principles of war, military doctrine and development;the Moral Component (the ability to get people to fight) that refers to motivation,leadership and management.

What is important to be underlined, is that the Fighting Power is the result of theinteractions of all components. There is a necessity that all of them are mutuallysupportive. Taking a tank as an example, its physical existence means almost nothing.Its effectiveness depends on: its technical characteristics, the value of its crew in termsof skill and morale, and the way in which it is employed on the battlefield.

A state could enjoy various degrees of positive and negative standing asymmetriesin relation with another state regarding all the components of fighting power. The possession


46

of an overall superior fighting power is the aim of each competitor case of a conflict. If onecompetitor perceives itself as being inferior, so to say has a standing negative asymmetryin relation with its enemy in one or more of the components of fighting power, it will tryto surpass its challenger in the other/others in such a manner so as to achieve a superioracting asymmetry overall, a globally superior fighting power. The more a competitorperceives itself as being inferior in some components or subcomponents of fighting power,the more it will try to outweigh its enemy in the remaining components or subcomponents,so that the overall balance of fighting power is favourable to it. Therefore, it is possibleto say that the primary root of asymmetry is asymmetry itself. There is a continuouscycle, in which the level of asymmetry rises and decreases accordingly to relationsbetween the opponents. This could lead to various degrees of asymmetry that couldend up with the adoption of a totally asymmetric warfare.

The existence of positive asymmetry is the explanation of the success but it isextremely difficult to assess precisely what importance a particular superior aspect wouldhave in the overall picture of achieving superior asymmetry. During the Matabele war,fought by the British 1893-1894, 5 000 Matabele warriors were defeated by 50 Britishsoldiers that were armed with four Maxim guns. In fact, it is said, in respect with the Maximmachineguns, that they “conquered empires”. US Col Boyd provides an astonishingexample of disproportionate influence some aspects may have. During the Korean War,the American pilots achieved an extremely superior rate of killing during air fights withrespect to the communist pilots, in spite of some inferior technical performances of their“Fs” compared with the “Migs”. Boyd discovered that was the case because the Americanpilots were able to complete OODA (Observation, Orientation, Decision, and Action)cycles before their adversaries. Further on, Boyd reached the conclusion that the Americanpilots were able to be faster than their opponents in completing the OODA cycles becausethe design of the cockpit of their airplane enabled them to have a better visibility duringthe fight therefore concluding the Observation phase more rapidly.

Another important and challenging aspect of asymmetry is underlined by Metzwhen he stresses that asymmetry could come up deliberately or by default. In additionto Metz observation, probably another type could be added, namely asymmetry by chance.The deliberate asymmetry is planned and is the result of human thought. Metz’s secondtype is when an opponent recourses to a specific action because that is the only wayhe could act (due to various reasons), and not because he chooses so consciously.The third one, proposed here, is strongly related to chance and accidental happenings.As Clausewitz put it, “No other human activity is so continuously or universally boundby chance. And through the element of chance, guess-work and luck come to play a greatpart in war”. An accidental occurrence could boost the existence of either positive or negativeasymmetry between the opponents. The capturing, by chance, of an enemy operationalplan could be an example of the sort.

Although the concept of asymmetric warfare has been perennial throughout history,the particular forms of it have not. As Clausewitz states in On War, “Every age has its ownkind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions”. As it wasthe case with gunpowder, the airplane, the corps organisational system etc, what todayseems to be asymmetric, tomorrow could be very common. Therefore, to define what formsasymmetry could take and what place it could have in the future are subjective and time

47

Conceptual Projections • Theoretical Developmentsdependent attempts and, therefore, the results could lose their everlasting values. To preventthis, one should concentrate on the core of the concept.

Is the presence of asymmetry a desirable thing ? History has shown that whencontending parties were too similar, as it was the case in WWI, or the 100-year War,the periods of fighting are prolonged and inconclusive. Therefore, the more the asymmetryis present, the shorter a conflict would be.

In conclusion, to draw a firm line between symmetry and asymmetry in warfareis almost impossible. In reality there are not asymmetric or symmetric conflicts, in realitythere are only conflicts in which the opponents are more or less different, doing somethings almost in the same way, and others things in very different ways. To pick up oneparticular feature of a conflict, either one that stresses the symmetry or one that stressesthe asymmetry, and to say that particular feature is the most relevant one is a processdoomed to lack objectivity. Instead, what is to be picked from the history is that the sidewith the overall positive asymmetry has always won and in achieving this positiveasymmetry often originality, the avoidance of the strong points of an adversary and theplaying of one’s own strong features, have proved themselves as being the best solutions.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

• T. V. Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers, Cambridge University Press, 1994.• Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Everyman’s Library, 1993.• Gerard Chaliand, The Art of War in World History, University of California Press, 1994.• Michael I. Handel, Masters of War, Frank Cass, 2000.• Michael I. Handel, Clausewitz and Modern Strategy, Frank Cass, 1986.• Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Shambhala, 1988.• Col Franklin D. Margiotta, Brassery’s Encyclopaedia of Military History and Biography, Brassey’s, 1994.• A. Cordesman, Lessons of Modern War, London, 1989.• N. J. Newman, Asymmetric Threats to British Military Intervention Operation, London, RUSI, 2000.• Lloyd J. Matthews, Challenging the United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically: Can America

Be Defeated ?, US Army College, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.• Reshaping the Military for Asymmetric Warfare, http://www.cdi.org.• US Congressman Ike Skelton, America’s Frontier Wars: Lessons for Asymmetric Conflicts,

http://www-cgsc.army.mil.• Timothy L. Thomas, Asymmetric Warfare, Military Review, Jul/Aug2001, http://ehostvgw18.epnet.com.• Jonathan Tucker, Asymmetric Warfare: An Emerging Threat to US Security, http://www.comw.org.• Robert Worley, Asymmetry and Adaptive Command, http://www.cgsc.army.mil.• Sharon Hobson, The Asymmetric Future, http://intranet/janes.• Timothy L. Thomas, Deciphering Asymmetry’s Word Game, http://www.infowar.com.• Jonathan B. Tucker, Asymmetric Warfare, http://forum.ra.utk.edu.• David L. Grange, Asymmetric Warfare: Old Method, New Concern, http://nationalstrategy.com.• Steven Metz and Douglas V. Johnson II, Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy: Definition,

Background, and Strategic Concepts.• James J. Schneider, A New Form of Warfare, http://www-cgsc.army.mil.• Clark L. Staten, Asymmetric Warfare, the Evolution and Devolution of Terrorism; The Coming

Challenge For Emergency and National Security Forces, http://www.emergency.com/asymetrc.htm.• Clark L. Staten, Asymmetric Warfare, and Other Attacks; Future National Security Implications…

http://www.emergency.com.• Robert H. Allen, Asymmetric Warfare: Is the Army Ready ?, http://www.amsc.belvoir.army.mil.• Richard Norton-Taylor, Asymmetric Warfare, http://www.guardian.co.uk.

One fifth of the European Union (EU) population livewith about 60% of the national median incomes, the thresholdto identify relative poverty in the EU. Poverty rates vary between

HUMAN RESOURCESMANAGEMENT

IN GLOBALISATION ERAColonel Tache JURUBESCU

~ Chief Deputy of the Organisation, Personneland Mobilisation Directorate from the General Staff ~

Is globalisationacceptable ?

11% and 14% and they have not significantly changed during the last period. Some other20 to 40% of the population live just above the poverty limit1. Their incomes do not providea decent living and they can easily become unemployed. Unemployment and especiallylong-term unemployment is considered a decisive factor leading to the so-called “socialexclusion”. From the social exclusion point of view, the elements defining work quality,such as duration, stability, and income, are very important. The way in which governmentsreact to the problems generated by social exclusion represents an essential aspect of eachand every country’s policy in the first years of the new century. The Article 128.2 of theEU Treaty provides the basis for the adoption of the guidelines for the employment policiesfor the Member States, at the Commission proposal. Following a five-year experiencein implementing the Strategy, the Commission together with the Member States performeda thorough analysis and proposed a complex review of the main guidelines regardingthe employment policy2. Therefore, on January 14, 2003, an official statement was issuedexpressing the Commission’s point of view on future European Strategy in the fieldof human resources, as well as the priorities for establishing the new directions.In order to accomplish the three objectives established in Lisbon3, the Member Statesshould consider a number of ten priorities. The tenth is related to supporting occupationaland geographical mobility and improving employees training level to meet the jobrequirements – job matching. For that reason, the Member States should put into practice

1 Paul Brenton, Globalisation and Social Exclusion in the EU: Policy Implications.2 Proposal for a Council Decision on Guidelines for the Employment Policies of the Member States,

Brussels, 08. 04. 2003 COM (2003) 176 final 2003/0068 (CNS).3 The European Council, Lisbon, 23 and 24 March 2000.

48

an Action Plan for mobility and professional abilities, which may lead to the reduction,even elimination of the problems concerning the employment issues at regional leveland large variations of the unemployment tempo by removing the obstacles relatedto geographical mobility, promoting occupational mobility, improving the systemof professional skills acknowledgment, providing the possibility to transfer the socialinsurance (welfare) and pension rights, introducing a new tax and benefit systemto stimulate the potential immigration. Transparent training and employmentopportunities will be made available at European level to achieve a better relationshipbetween job requirements and employee capabilities. Member States, throughspecialised services, will provide a list with all available positions for those whoare interested in finding a job.

In his paper issued in November 2000, as part of a project on Globalisationand Social Exclusion4 developed within a EU economic-social research programme,Paul Brenton, as chief researcher at CEPS (the Centre for European Policy Studies)thoroughly analysed the effects of globalisation over the economic and social policies.The author brings arguments in favour of commercial restrictions as a reaction to theeffects of globalisation. Even though globalisation is a major factor to determine the socialexclusion phenomenon, economic analyses have shown, no doubt about it, that commercialand capital restrictions are not an answer for Europe. In order to ensure redistribution,a better policy should be applied to prevent the loss of the advantages from the commercialand capital exchange. In Europe, people that work in other places benefit from a specialsocial security system. Therefore, the fear that globalisation might undermine the governmentability to collect taxes and increase the income, this way compromising the Europeanpopulation welfare, has no support.

Recent research on the impact of globalisation on labour market in Europe showsthat there is a pretty high degree of uncertainty with respect to the impact commercialand capital flows might have. Some studies suggest an important role of commercein influencing social inequalities, while others see this role as being irrelevant whencompared to the impact generated by technological changes. Nevertheless, even thoughglobalisation may be considered the main factor in generating such inequalities,commercial barriers and long-term restrictions on capital flows are inappropriate answersto the inequality and social exclusion issues. For the last two centuries, for mostof the European countries social expenditures have increased significantly in line withthe continuous augmentation of the tax weight in the GDP value. In most of the Europeancountries, authorities take action to overcome the problems generated by a seriesof distressing factors to gain and maintain welfare. One of these factors, even thoughwith a minor influence, could be globalisation. The issue related to the pressure uponsocial security systems, if the global integration continues, stays open. There is no totalanswer to the question “up to which level the globalisation is acceptable”, but we might

4 Paul Brenton, op.cit.

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50

believe that there will never be a full and perfect integration of the world assets and capitalmarkets and an important number of constraints will limit globalisation widespread.

Often discussed is the fact that commercial exchanges with lots of the developingcountries are unfair due to the fact that these countries do not respect the work standards

as in the EU countries. As a result, the costs are lower than if the fundamental rightsof the employees are respected. If the inequalities in the EU were increasing becauseof the unfair commerce, then an appropriate answer would be to reduce commerce.The researchers though have not established exactly how much these commercial flows

are affected by the lack of basic labour rights.National policy regarding taxes and transfers, including unemployment support,

plays an important part in improving the quality of life for the European countries.Statistics show that in the mid-90s the poverty transfer rate5 for the population

able to work was 23% in Belgium, 25% in France, 14% in Germany, 23% in Swedenand 24% in Great Britain. The effectiveness of the tax and transfer systems in the EUcountries enhanced during the globalisation period and the effect of the redistributionthrough the tax transfer system amplified in the last two decades of the past century.

As a conclusion, Paul Brenton appreciates that if it is impossible to reject the assertionaccording to which globalisation has had a major impact upon the wages and the inequalitiesamong employees in Europe and, consequently, upon social exclusion, then it is possiblethat the commercial security measures and long-term control over the capital flows

may be seen as an inappropriate answer. This does not mean that governments willnot be involved in sustaining the interests of the employees with a low level of training;on the contrary, a more and more efficient policy on redistribution will be implemented.Presently, social security systems in the EU aim at supporting jobless population,

disregarding the cause: either globalisation or technological modernisation. At the sametime, we can state that the size of commercial impact – depending on technologicalmodernisation – is not relevant comparing to the response policies, if we considerthat commerce, as well as technology, brings benefits to an economy whose redistribution

policies aim to consolidate it.As for commercial sanctions, they are thought inappropriate because developing

countries will never respect them. This does not mean that the measures for eradicationof children exploitation, discrimination related to work, freedom of association

and collective negotiations will not be continued. Imposing commercial sanctionsas a reaction to the lack of measures for the implementation of basic labour rightsin different countries will not improve the situation. On the contrary, the quality of lifeof the poor citizens in poor countries will worsen. Industrialised countries should give

up these measures. A positive approach will be to stimulate those countries, whichtry to apply fundamental rights of the employees, but have technical difficulties

5 Proportion of persons in households with less than 50% of median disposable income.

51

Conceptual Projections • Theoretical Developmentsin implementing them. From another angle, a lot more effective will be to develop a policyto improve the educational system in developing countries, including the financial supportof children’s education in order to eliminate their exploitation.

Human resourcespolicies within EU

Starting with the need to create more and better jobsfor the EU citizens, in March 2004, the European Councilpointed out the emergency character of taking action

in this respect. The three major objectives established in 2003 by the EmploymentGuidelines continue the European Strategy line in the field of human resources(EES – European Employment Strategy) in Lisbon. Reforms made by the EU MemberStates have shown their validity in improving the performance of the labour marketconfirmed by raising employment in the first years and their relative stabilityin the recent economic decline. Yet, the progress of Lisbon objective6 to achievea 70% level of employment by 2010, set at just 64.3%, represents a compromise.Not having strong support actions, the objective will not be accomplished. Productivityhas stagnated; the quality of work and the respective labour markets remain importantchallenges for many EU Member States.

For Europe to reach the objectives of 2010 and improve competitivity and economicgrowth7 there is a need to accelerate the level of filling the jobs and increase workproductivity. To ensure the trust and stability of the jobs there should be an appropriatemacro-economic policy. Creating jobs and competitivity on the labour market shouldbe accomplished together with the structural reforms in services, and capital market.Progress in all domains established in Lisbon, completed by the environmental dimensionin Göteborg in the field of research and development8 (R&D), education and training,the development of potential to employ environmental policy, especially in theenvironmental goods and services sectors, as well as the reform of the social securitysystems including pensions must go together. Policies in these domains lead to moreinvestment in business both for human and material capital, which will create conditionsfor new jobs and increase productivity by strengthening the European capabilityto perform the management of change. The four action areas of the European Councilin 2004 are: increase adaptability of employees and factories; attract population towardsthe labour market and change the job into a real option for everyone; effective investmentin human capital; ensure a real implementation of reforms through a better governance.

These four areas, which have become more important after the block accessionof the ten new members, represent the European Council recommendations with regardto human resources to be considered by all members. Since they were introduced

6 The Future of the European Employment Strategy (EES), A Strategy for Employment and Better Jobsfor All, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economicand Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Brussels, 14. 01. 2003 COM (2003) 6 final.

7 More than 20 million new jobs to be created.8 In March 2002 Barcelona European Council set the objective of increasing the investment

for R&D at 3 % of GDP, from which 2/3 to be supported by the private sector.


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for the first time in 2000, the recommendations permitted the partition of different directivesbetween Member States according to their concrete situation and progress in implementingthem. EU will make available considerable financial resources to promote developmentand reforms or structural adjustments for the Member States or the regions remainingbehind. Active actions regarding labour market and public and private investmentsin human capital will be taken in order to correlate some failure on the labour marketand to support the implementation of the employment strategy.

Together with the recommendations for each country, the four commonrecommendations make a strong set. Member Countries will focus actions to eliminatemain obstacles and the government programmes will be more and more harmonisedwith the European Strategy in the field of human resources. EU recommendationscan give a new dynamic to the strategy through a better correlation of the EU financialresources, based on the experience of the Member States. The strategy entailsthe implication of national governments, social partners and other participantsand will be a major component of the Partnership for Change introduced by the EuropeanSocial Partners. All the aspects of the directive should be taken into account by the humanresources policy of the Member Nations in an integrated and comprehensive manner,then included in the National Action Plans every year on the 1st of October. Plans areanalysed and the results are introduced into the Common Report of the European Counciland Commission of European Communities.

At the European Council in Brussels, March 2005, the human resources issue,the integration and social development aspects for the EU were taken into considerationin the Lisbon Strategy implementation context. The Council appealed to the MemberStates so that, in line with their responsibility and according to the European Strategyon the topic of human resources and social inclusion, the following actions have to betaken regarding young people: • monitor supporting policy for the integration of youngpeople on the labour market; • improve the situation of the most vulnerable, especiallythe poor ones with a focus on strengthening the level of graduation of educationalprogrammes; • increase social responsibility of the employees for vocational integrationof the young; • encourage young people to begin own business.

The Council made recommendations regarding the educational and training systemsand the mobility within EU, as well as the reconciliation between work and personal life.

European human resourcesmanagement models

In human resources management(HRM) activities, the economic context playsa very important role with direct influence

on work conditions. European economic development has shown a progress startingwith 1997, after the stagnation at the beginning of the last decade. Economic sectorswith rapid progress are the ones in the field of artificial intelligence, biotechnology,genetics, energy, microelectronics etc. In these sectors productivity has reachedmaximum levels that automatically led to maximising the use of human resources. Labourmarket liberalisation in Europe, together with the EU expansion, has determined

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Conceptual Projections • Theoretical Developmentsan increasing competition and also the “hunting” for skilled human resources, not onlylocally or regionally, but more and more at the European level.

Due to the revolutionary, reformatory events European countries dealt with in the ’90s,Western countries had to react in order to adapt to the new situation. Developed countrieslike France and Germany made great efforts to reduce the salary costs level, counterthe reduced working time and also the creation of a new model for the human resourcesmanagement. German HRM model is based on professionalism and competency, whichsupports professional training, promotion and loyalty towards the employer. If, at thebeginning of the ’90s, the favourable circumstances of the labour market were determinedby the budgetary and economic policy, which stimulates the development, the flowof foreign investment, encouraging salary policy for increased productivity, presently,the competitivity on the European market can essentially change the freedom of actionof the German HRM.

West European Union countries have noticed that the “human resources” functionencompasses all the professional relations established within an organisation. That is why,specialists should fully understand and use the legislative set in the field. Human resourcesfunction had a limited role in the past in the decision-making process related to personnel.Nowadays, this function with strategic, control, and evaluation values plays a fundamentalrole in the decision-making process. The objectives of the function revealed after an analysismade in about 600 organisations in EU countries and Romania, with a different weightfrom country to country, are: create and develop human resources (32% in Germany,23% in France and Great Britain), recruit and retain the human resources (16% in Germanyand Great Britain, 5% in France), social relations (12%), effectiveness, productivityand flexibility of the human resources (7%). In respect of the human resourcesmanagers’ origin, these are not exclusively lawyers like they use to be two decades ago,but lawyers (25%) and also psychologists, sociologists, engineers etc.

Human resources management means implementing employment policy(recruitment, selection, individual career management), salary (individualised salary,flexible anticipation of human resources), training (personal plans), planning the workinghours, communication. Policies determine certain practice such as: evaluationsystems of the personnel potential and performance, professional surveys and careerplans, introducing automated data processing (ADP) systems for keeping humanresources records.

Human resources function is adaptable and flexible to cope with the competitiveenvironment within EU. For instance, limited contracts are used again and also partialunemployment is accepted as a “damper” on labour market. Even though EUrecommendations to the Member States sustain permanent contracts as general typeof contract, currently, the macroeconomic circumstances show the effectiveness of thispractice. Functional flexibility that has developed more and more as a result of the effortsto provide organisations with the necessary human resources is also a characteristic of ourtimes. Within organisations we must consider all employees to participate in specificactivities; rapid adaptation to the external environment with which the organisation interacts;this is a major concern for organisations disregarding the size and activity and involves


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intelligence, initiative, interpersonal and global communication skills, innovationand creativity to counter the rigid environment.

The success of an organisation through performance is the result of better useof available resources and especially human resources. This means not only the quantitativeand physical aspect, but also the qualitative one: the intelligence and creativity of theindividuals that constitute the human resource. Human resources managers havethe responsibility to elaborate and set a new division of work, tasks, responsibilitiesand objectives for human resources to reach success regarding mobilisation, adaptabilityand personalised HRM. This provides information and means necessary to the activity,trains managers, controls social management, and also develops the human resourcessocial audit.

Of course, in the new European competitive context these cannot be accomplishedwithout automated data processing of human resources. Human resources managerhas a complete set of programmes and computerised applications designed to helphim/her to deal with the information available effectively, improve the carrying outof duties and lead to increasing productivity. Besides the calculation of salary, ADPprogrammes can solve all the administrative issues of human resources management.These programmes allow for the analysis of human resources condition, provide a betterunderstanding of the previous situation, as well as of future risks and also help in foreseeingposting management and necessary human resources.

The other European countries develop HRM models not very different from thoseof the western countries. Great Britain9, for example, has a special position: here the“common law” system shows a cultural difference compared to the legislative systemsin other European countries. Human resources function has changed dramaticallyin the past years and has integrated a strategic vision. Due to the fact that big organisationsmanagers retired during the last decade of the last century, the number of people(the so-called “hunting heads”) designated to find appropriate replacements has increased.Therefore, the profile of the function changes accordingly; presently, specialists capableof getting involved in setting strategic visions are needed to define the organisationalstructure, to motivate human resources and to maximise productivity. After a periodin which human resources role was not considered very important in Great Britain,now the human resource has got the role of first strategic resource and most of humanresources managers are involved in defining the organisation general policy. Britishorganisations have projects in human resources area and human resources policy, detailedaction plans, in well-defined term (38% of the organisations – less than a year, 32% – oneto two years, 28% – two to five years). Academically, managerial thinking in generaland especially human resources thinking is highly developed in Great Britain.

In smaller countries like Denmark, Ireland, Belgium and Holland, the modelsof neighbouring countries influence practice in the field of human resources. In Denmark,human resources department participate very little in the strategic process, almost

9 Iulia Chivu, Dimensiunea european` a managementului resurselor umane, Bucure[ti, 2003.

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Conceptual Projections • Theoretical Developmentsas little as in Italy. The degree of participation of human resources managers in steeringcommittees is merely 53%, under the European average level. The weight of the organisationsthat have a strategy in the field of human resources management is 61%. If we considerautomated data conversion of the strategies in the field of human resources management,Scandinavian countries have a lot better situation than countries with tradition in the field(68% in Sweden and 74% in Norway compared to only 20% in Germany, 29% in France,33% in Italy and 45% in Great Britain).

The Netherlands is a moderate case, where, even though 54% of the human resourcesmanagers participate in the strategic decision-making process, only 44% are part of thecommittees and administration. More than a half of the organisations have a strategyin the field of human resources. In this country, the human resources function has evolvedafter 2000, since they transformed the employee interest-based approach and humancharacter-based approach into the managerial efficient-based approach.

In Southern EU countries the evolution of the human resources function was determinedby the favourable economic circumstances characterised by the rapid developmentof labour market. Spain and Portugal, two representatives of a strong economic developmentin the past years, have developed the human resources function as well that have passedfrom an administrative-based approach to a modern concept adapted to the economiccontext. Evaluation manner of the human resources management in Spain is representativefor tailoring the human resources function: evaluation is based on two fundamental criteriasuch as cost control (like Sweden and France) and management of the personnel recruitedby the organisation, specific to Spain that has the majority of the population employedin factories and small to middle organisations.

Italy is a special case, full of contrasts. Even though it has a remarkable dynamism,Italy confronts with a series of structural difficulties, which negatively influenceperformance. The strengths are the investments that led to re-technologising factories,monetary stabilisation, and economic aggression over the East European market,a special quality of human resources management, which pays more attention to people.The weaknesses are the big budgetary shortage (11% of the GDP), unemployment andinflation rate, a poor quality of public services, underground economy (25% of the GDPcompared to only 12% in France), demographic falling (annual birth rate of 0.03%– the lowest in Europe).

*Human resources management systems have evolved a lot, human resources

function receiving and consolidating its role of active participant in the strategic decision-making process. Even though human resources management has a limited role in smalland middle organisations, human resources are more and more important and presentin the organisational strategies. Human resources function has a new role and hasradically renewed. Despite the difficulties faced when developing the human resourcesfunction, especially related to the size of organisations, the rigidity of legislative systemsand the externalisation of human resources, these are currently in the centre of theorganisational strategy attention.

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Human resources management has contributed to the strategic changes in the Europeanorganisations, both at instrumental level, as an exchange means (recruitment and careermanagement plans and procedures, training or payment plans), and at integrated level,as a component of the strategic approach to; recruitment, selection, training decisionsbeing closely connected to one another and simultaneously with those related to productionand even to organisation augmentation, diversification and specialisation.

Integrated approach mostly explains the success of the strategies adopted at theEuropean organisations level. This generated, though, a series of changes in the contentof human resources management. Enhancing the area of activity of human resources,separating the labour market and individualising human resources, changing recruitment,employment and individual career management policy by creating an European labourmarket, as well as decentralising the human resources function, are elements encompassedin human resources management that have undergone changes generated by the needto adapt to the new and diverse socio-economic context of Europe of the 25.

Human resources management is sensitive to the labour market inputs, to maintaincharacteristics specific to strategic management and proceed to increase organisationproductivity. Human resources management renewal is accomplished through lots of actionssuch as: acquiring competency through the externalisation activities, coordinatingsmall organisations and developing contractual relations; moving from a uniform humanresources management to a divided and individualised one; a new type of managementof the employees and responsibilities in order to change the organisation; decentralisingstrategic decisions regarding human resources management.

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In the period following the Cold War, many military systems have analysed and plannedthe implementation of certain doctrinaire or technological changes, as well as changesregarding the approach to military affairs. The USA focuses on the implementationof an emergent concept – achieving military effects, and not only, on different levelsof the war: strategic, operative and tactical. This concept aims at approaching nationalobjectives and effects achievement, the effects that lead to the respective objectivesachievement, in a holistic manner. In essence, Effects-Based Operations ~ EBO representthe adaptive application of the instruments of national power capacities to achieve certainresults in peace and conflict time, at strategic, operative or tactical level. In other words,EBO seeks to defeat the enemy’s will and strategy rather than to achieve its kineticdestruction.

EBO concept is at the stage of an “embryo”, given the fact that research conceptsand emergency always stir up debates and cause challenges, due to the already existentperceptions and stereotypes. There are yet sources for the research and developmentof EBO concept that succeed in presenting and analysing the concept in detail.

Thus, Williamson Murray develops a comparative analysis on three distinctcampaigns with a view to providing a historical basis for the study of EBO concept.In his work, “A Historical Perspective on Effects-Based Operations”, Murray analysesGeneral Ulysses S. Grant campaign in Vicksburg, during the American Civil War,the German forces in 1940 forcing the River Meuse and the offensive of the strategic

EFFECTS-BASEDEFFECTS-BASEDEFFECTS-BASEDEFFECTS-BASEDEFFECTS-BASEDOPERATIONSOPERATIONSOPERATIONSOPERATIONSOPERATIONS

A NEW APPROACH TO ARMED CONFLICTA NEW APPROACH TO ARMED CONFLICTA NEW APPROACH TO ARMED CONFLICTA NEW APPROACH TO ARMED CONFLICTA NEW APPROACH TO ARMED CONFLICT

Lieutenant Colonel Ion VLAD~ Student, Faculty of Command and Staff, the National Defence University “Carol I” ~

Major Iulian BERDIL~~ Personal Assistant to the Romanian CHOD ~

“It is possible to increase the likelihood of success without defeating theenemy’s forces. I refer to operations that have direct political repercussions,that are designed in the first place to disrupt the opposing alliance, paralyseit that gains us new allies, favourably affect the political scene etc. If suchoperations are possible it is obvious that they can greatly improve ourprospects and that they can form a much shorter route to the goal than thedestruction of the opposing armies”.

Carl von Clausewitz


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allied bombardment in the Second World War. Murray defines EBO as a concept witha mental state-focused approach. He identifies EBO as being “operations of assessmentand adaptation to respond to the real conditions before these conditions dramatically change”.

Paul K. Davis, in his work, “Effects-Based Operations. A Grand Challenge to AnalyticalCommunity”, defines EBO as those operations conceived and planned within a systemicframework that considers the full spectrum of direct, indirect and waterfall effects.He highlights that the current operational methods for analysis and modelling are inadequatefor EBO representation. Davis suggests approaching new culture, new theories and methodsif we intend to thoroughly understand EBO concept.

Gary H. Cheek approaches EBO from the terrestrial manoeuvre perspective in hiswork “Effects-Based Operations. The End of Dominant Maneuver”. He states that realEBO engagement can be found at the level of superior echelons. Cheek concludes thatthe analytical nature of effects-based thinking is more appropriate to the strategicdecisional process and less to the tactical levels, where the standard operating rulesand training are real determiners of success.

From the historical point of view, the syntagm “effects-based operations” originatesin the time of the air campaign at the beginning of the “Desert Storm” Operation. MajorGeneral David Deptula argued, during the operation, that the technological progressattained in the field of air power led to EBO concept approach and design. Thus, “stealth”aircrafts capabilities and the precision guided ammunition allowed for this conceptto be applied for the first time. Deptula suggested changing the paradigm regardingdetermining and establishing objectives towards focusing on the desired effects insteadof a destructive approach that implies striking objectives. Experts in strategy considerthe attacks on September 11, 2001 as the moment that causes EBO concept developmentto accelerate. These attacks marked a change in the perception of global security andacted as a catalyst for EBO concept. This change evinces the need for new approacheswith regard to protecting national interests, especially those in the national security domain.

Defining EBODefining EBODefining EBODefining EBODefining EBOEBO concept has stirred many debates within the American military system and

is currently approached at NATO level, too, as it has been promoted by Allied CommandTransformation as a key element for the Alliance transformation. There is also a debateregarding the concept within the Romanian military system, aiming at the implementationof EBO conceptual understanding and at the avoidance of “reciting” some principles.That is why we consider presenting some EBO definitions as useful with a viewto developing the relevant language that is necessary for launching the debates relatedto EBO within the Romanian military system as well. This way, the negative effects relatedto misunderstanding new concepts and to their “raw copying” are avoided, at the same time,allowing for building the fundament for previous assessment and analysis. Moreover,such an approach, as far as the Romanian military system is concerned, claims for a changein the collective mental state and, thus, a change in the military culture with regardto the decision-maker and military organisation mental model. The change in militaryculture is a vast and complex paradigm, tightly connected to approaching new conceptssuch as EBO.

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Conceptual Projections • Theoretical DevelopmentsEBO institutionalisation will not take place without a change in the military culture.

If EBO concept effectiveness is aimed at, it will be developed as a joint and interorganisationalone, without focusing on each category of forces or agency ambitions and premises.The only environment for EBO to become a successful concept is the joint andinterorganisational one. In order to achieve this objective a new and appropriate militaryculture definition and implementation is necessary. An important part of this new militaryculture must be the acceptance of the fact that effects, both lethal and non-lethal, maybe utilised to accomplish the national desideratum. The military system, when designatedto lead to resolving a problem, must accept the support of the other national instrumentsof power. Moreover, the change in the military culture towards a holistic approach,based on EBO concept, will allow for the development of an operational “ADN”, in whichnot only the “genes” of the other instruments of national power but also those of otherrelevant non-military organisations and agencies will be present.

Each definition emphasises one or more aspects of this concept, although none ofthem seems to include all the others, having in view the fact that the debate on EBOconcept is in progress. Some definitions concentrate on the strategic and operative levels,generating the premise that EBO is inexistent at tactical level. Others refer to aspectsrelated to EBO mental state, but they do not address EBO elements of integration.Anyway, we do not intend to present a new definition as a revelation.

• “A set of actions that are planned, executedand assessed from a systemic perspective, whichcreates the necessary effects for the political objectivesachievement by the integrated application of differentinstruments of national power”.

(William T. McDaniel)• “A process for obtaining the desired strategic

outcome or “effect” on the enemy through the cumulative,synergetic and multiplicative application of the fullrange of military and non-military capabilitiesat strategic, operative and tactical level. An effectrepresents the physical, psychological or functionalresult, event or consequence as they resulted fromthe military or non-military actions”. (US JointForces Command)

• “An instrument meant to support the attackon critical objectives to paralyse the enemy’s systemof systems. The desired effect is to control the enemythrough eliminating his capacity to engage forces”.(Major General (r.) David Deptula)

• “A method meant to determine the correctapplication and integration of national powerto achieve certain effects and outcomes, within theacceptable risk ranges. The effects may affect theenemy physically, functionally or psychologically,forcing it to change behaviour and eventuallyachieving desired results”. (Brett T. Williams)

• “Operations conceived and planned withina systemic framework that consider the full range ofdirect, indirect and waterfall effects that may be – withindifferent degrees of probability – achieved throughthe application of military, diplomatic, psychologicaland economic instruments”. (Paul K. Davis)

• “EBO seeks to alter the enemy actions throughaffecting its capabilities and decisional process,at the same time avoiding the undesired effectsand addressing and exploiting the unexpectedeffects”. (Gary H. Cheek)

• “EBO represents the identification andengagement of the enemy strong points andvulnerabilities in a unified and focussed mannerand the use of all available means to produce specificeffects consistent with the commander’s intention”.(Allen W. Batschelet)

• “EBO represents an approach – a wayof thinking – regarding the military operationsplanning, executing and assessment that focusesmore on the military operations outcomes – andon explaining the way those results were achieved– and less on the executed firing missions, on thequantities of ammunition used or on the deployedmaterial resources … EBO final goal is followingand understanding the way the respective actionsinfluence the attackers or the enemy behaviour”.(Marris B. McCrabb)


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Without pretending to exhaust the subject, we consider that EBO essentially consistsin defeating the enemy’s will, which is, in fact, the final goal of any other type of operation,making use of the full range of known methods and especially focussing on the integratedand balanced application of all instruments of power, military and non-military,the permanent actional initiative obtaining and maintaining and, to a lesser extent,on the enemy physical destruction.

Introduction in EBO ThinkingIntroduction in EBO ThinkingIntroduction in EBO ThinkingIntroduction in EBO ThinkingIntroduction in EBO ThinkingOne of the vital aspects related to EBO is represented by the way of thinking.

Williamson Murray states that EBO must be based on an appropriate way of thinking.In other words, it must focus on assessing and, eventually, adapting the operations to correlatethe real conditions and circumstances before they change. EBO should be seen as a solutionto link the final goals achievement and the appropriate means. EBO should not be conceptuallyperceived as one of the standard cognitive stereotypes as, this way, the ability to elaboratecreative and detailed solutions would be restricted. The decision-makers and the Staffpersonnel acquisition of cognitive attitude in understanding the gap between final goalsand means and in articulating these gaps in each level of action represents one of thekey principles of EBO.

The main obstacle the military system must overcome in the process of adoptingand implementing the thought related to EBO is the military culture. The military toooften base on the kinetic and lethal effects because of their experience, education, levelsof comfort and conditioned approach manifest in the process of resolving a military matter.William T. McDaniel supports the development of the military system ability to thinkin broader terms, as a factor that can raise the action level of success.

What are the main points of the argument that is significant for the potentialof EBO concept ? EBO is based on three arguments:

It highlights the enemy comprehensive understanding as a complex and adaptivesystem of systems against which EBO remains essential for final goals achievement.

Not only this understanding but also the informational domain focus on the deterministprocess directed towards identifying events and actions intentions, motivations and causesare intensified by a more efficient reconnaissance, surveillance and information system.

This predictive analysis is made in a collective that collaborates, improves interactionand breaks the stereotypically dogmatic ways, enhances parallel planning, eases the effortsof the decision-makers and of those who plan the access to information, as well asthe access to centres of expertise in real time. This ability to identify the enemy criticalvulnerabilities and to anticipate its reactions allows for identifying a larger and more efficientrange of options to change the enemy behaviour.

EBO is also founded on understanding the enemy through a comprehensiveanalysis, supported and developed by teams of experts on a systemic range of domains(cultural, behavioural, technical, economic and military) that allows for an interrelationalassessment of the enemy. This complex approach does not pretend to eliminatethe “incertitude, chaos and frictions” proper to war, but to enable the decision-makersand commanders to accept them and to learn to successfully overcome them.

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Conceptual Projections • Theoretical DevelopmentsEssentially, EBO presents a new progressive framework for four important

domains: thinking, relationship, integration and adaptation, to produce national solutionsthat are superior and cost-effective. Consequently, the US Joint Forces Commandidentifies some of EBO’s benefits:

• the process of strategy translating into missions and tasks is improved througha much better understanding of the enemy;

• more and much better argued options are presented;• the possible results, be they premeditated or not, are analysed;• the success of the actions at tactical level is measured in comparison with the

contribution they bring to the strategic and operative objectives;• the ability to rapidly adapt is improved during the situations undergoing an explosive

development.As far as the mental state and the effects-based thinking are concerned, Brett T. Williams

states that it is necessary to reduce susceptibility in the complexity of warfare. Commanders’improving their knowledge of EBO will allow for a certain methodology to be used in orderto face the non-linear nature of modern warfare. At the same time, approaching a newholistic political-military outlook is necessary. Helmut Sonnenfeldt states that the militarysystem way of thinking is based on military campaigns and plans, while politicaldecision-makers one is based on options. In order to exploit EBO potential, the developmentof a collaborative process meant to unify the two domains in the decision-making processis necessary. In consequence, the lexicon must be more than a military one.

As to relationship, EBO entails a certain “discipline” for the commanders fromthe strategic and operative levels, asking them to focus on relating the effects from onelevel in order to attain the objectives at the superior level and denying their tendencyto limit at the level of tactical actions. Commanders’ vision will have to develop in orderto provide a holistic approach, larger than simply destroying the enemy objectives.The EBO approach must begin with clearly enumerating and understanding the desirablenational and strategic effects. Conceiving and planning an EBO-based campaign mustbegin with drafting a set of strategic final goals, able to lead to a comprehensive politicaloutcome. On the other hand, the political system must develop in a coherent vision regardingthe strategic outcome towards which the engagement of military forces inclines. US JointForces Command believes that the ability to correlate effects will call for a dedicatedeffort. The explicit analysis and correlation between the strategic objectives and the desiredoutcomes, on the one hand, and the possible tactical actions, on the other hand, are veryimportant for drafting the courses of action and fulfilling the objectives. The relationshipmust also approach the correlation of the instruments of national power actions, in orderto influence the key points and the connexions between the networks and the political,military, economic, social, of infrastructure and information systems.

Integration means the progressive step taken from the traditional approach towardsthe holistic one. The main element is represented by the frame concept EBO providesand which supports the holistic integration of the instruments of national power. The Instituteof Defense Analyses from the United States synthesised the arguments that come to supportthe integrating potential the EBO concept represents:

the correlation between the host of actions (diplomatic, economic, militaryand informational) and the outcomes at strategic and operative levels;


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the planning, analysis and assessment of the actions and operations implications,depending on the effects they had over the enemy;

the analysis of both the desired and undesired effects; the understanding of the implications and consequences effects have in time; the continuous adaptation of plans and actions to the reality of the crisis or conflict.

The fourth main domain of the EBO concept is adaptation. It belongs to the essenceof EBO – assessing and adapting the operations in order to cope with the circumstances,before they change dramatically. Otherwise stated, EBO suggests a fundamentallytransformed approach from the operations based on clear rules or hoping for a successfuloutcome, typical to the traditional manner. EBO is characterised by the beforehandawareness of situation combined with the agility to adapt to unanticipated eventsand the ability to reduce the effects of the mistakes and surprise of big proportions.

All things considered, the ability in adapting to the mentality appropriate to the realconditions and circumstances, differing from the suppositions and rules from the timeof planning the campaign, in order to generate the adequate changes in plans and actionsremains of maximum importance for EBO. Williamson Murray analysed the tendencycommanders and military organisations have towards persisting in grounding the operationson suppositions, premises and pre-conflict doctrinaire rules, in spite of the realitiesthat develop in the operational space and with which they confront. As consequence,the approaches based on premises and rules often led to operations based on “believingin the successful outcome”, with important costs for the contact forces. Gary H. Cheekemphasised though the fact that there were cases when successful commanders madeuse of a process of the military forces analysis, assessment and adaptation and, takinginto account the reality and the pursued effects, fulfilled the operations without lettingthemselves carried away by the illusion of hope and the “belief” in pre-conflict plans.

Objectives versus EffectsObjectives versus EffectsObjectives versus EffectsObjectives versus EffectsObjectives versus EffectsUnderstanding the EBO cycle depends on an important factor: the place effects

hold within the objective-based traditional approach. Objectives-based approach relatesthe objectives clearly defined by the planned actions and then reviews the relationshipin the operational plans, through a process of translating from strategy to missionsand tasks. The United States Air Force Research Laboratory defines the objectives-basedapproach as being one that makes the commander focus on the intended resultsand consequences of the actions and in agreement with his intention. EBO developsthe objective-based approach, allowing for the examination of the causal links and theeffects through which the actions lead to the objective achievement. US Air Forces OperationalCommand states that EBO’s revolutionary step is represented by acknowledging the factthat one action can produce more effects (results, events or consequences).

In order to compare the two approaches from the qualitative point of view,the objectives-based one and the effects-based one, it is necessary to apply certainassessment criteria. Using them may generate conclusions which confirm or infirmthe utility of the approaches for each criterion.

The criteria proposed are:• the clear visualisation – How well does the process facilitate the ability to notice,

orientate, decide and action within the commander’s intention ?;

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Conceptual Projections • Theoretical Developments• the efficient use of resources – Does the process concentrate the resources on

the minimum number of missions/tasks required by the successful outcome ?;• the effective use of resources – Does the process of using the resources concentrate

on the fulfilment of desired results and minimise the counterproductive efforts ?;• synchronisation – Which is the process that sequentially arranges the mission

and actions in time, space and purpose, in order to obtain the desired outcome ?;• the flexible and adaptive execution – Does the process encourage the initiative,

allowing the subordinates to adapt and modify the execution based on the real, continuallychanging situation ?;

• the entire range of the conflict – Can the process be applied within the entire rangeof the conflict, the pre-conflict period, the conflict per se and the post-conflict period ?.

John T. Harris synthesised the results of the comparative analysis of the two approachesbased on the mentioned criteria as follows:

Criterion Objectives-Based Operations Effects-Based Operations

Clear Visualisation

Exaggeratedly focused on tasks, they provide a precarious guidance when the respective task is not relevant anymore.

They provide a better visualisation and guidance, while the process of the subordinates is guided by effects, conditions or results above all and less by tasks.

Efficient use of resources

The unity of the effort is provided by the synchronisation between task and purpose, but undeclared tasks remain and, omitted, they limit the process in achieving the desired effects. The process is mostly linear and sequential, oriented towards indirect attacks and towards influencing the decisive points rather than directly attacking the centre of gravity.

The process minimises the counterproductive tasks and actions by focusing on effects and selecting only those tasks that have causal connections with the desired effects.

Effective use of resources

They group resources in order to fulfil the tasks, but do not contribute to generating the required conditions, circumstances and effects.

An effective use of resources by clearly identifying the actions that have a higher degree of probability in the evolution of the conflict situation towards the final desideratum of the campaign.

Synchronisation Synchronise the tasks in time, space and purpose, but not the effects.

The process facilitates a better synchronisation by taking into account the localisation, timeliness and duration of the effects and not the tasks.

Flexible and adaptive

execution

Being assigned the task and the purpose, subordinates have flexibility only in choosing the execution method. They have minimum possibilities to modify the task, in case it is not relevant anymore.

Much more flexibility and adaptability, by the fact that they allow subordinates to modify the task, purpose and execution method as long as they achieve the required effects.

Employment in conflict’s entire range

A preponderantly reactive process, which takes into consideration a unique connection from the enemy’s action to its reaction, followed by the counteraction of its own troops, but without taking into consideration the impact upon the other elements of the operational space.

A proactive process, which takes into account only the tasks and actions that are able to generate the desired effects. It focuses on the operational space moment, location and type of effect for which the task is fulfilled.

Considering the criteria proposed for comparison, one can easily notice the advantagesof EBO as compared to the objectives-based operations ~ OBO. As any new approach,this one can be amended too, especially, we believe, as far as the level of knowledgenecessary to the human factor involved in this kind of operations is concerned. Yet,the reality of contemporary conflicts more and more strikingly proves that focusing onbreaking the enemy’s will to resist – final and major goal of any operation, more and moremoves from the classical methods, preponderantly “kinetic” towards a different kindof approaches. EBO is significant from this point of view.

We also believe that this vision on operations represents a new challenge for the militaryexperts at all levels.

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EBO’s (Possible) ImplicationsEBO’s (Possible) ImplicationsEBO’s (Possible) ImplicationsEBO’s (Possible) ImplicationsEBO’s (Possible) Implicationsfor the Romanian Military Systemfor the Romanian Military Systemfor the Romanian Military Systemfor the Romanian Military Systemfor the Romanian Military SystemEBO will have to become an imperative for the transformation of the Romanian

military system, since Romania is a NATO member with rights and responsibilities.The Alliance started this process ever since 2005, through the Transformation Strategydrafted by the Allied Command Transformation from Norfolk, USA.

EBO’s institutionalising within the Romanian military system must be an integrantpart in changing the military culture. The difficulty of the process will consist in providingthe successful “triple leap” of the Romanian system: from being part of the Warsaw Pactto the post-Cold War period, then to achieving the quality of a NATO Member State andtowards NATO’s Long-Term Vision and, implicitly, the EBO concept.

Institutionalisation will have to comprise the doctrinaire adaptation to the EBOconcept, seeking answers to questions such as: Where and how will EBO manifestin the Romanian military/non-military structure ? Which structures will be responsiblefor EBO’s planning, execution and assessment and at what levels ?

All in all, we believe that conceiving a new structure of forces based on modularityis opportune and necessary in order to allow for “modelling” the capabilities dependingon the development of the real conditions and circumstances from the time of thecrisis/conflict situation.

Selective Bibliography

• Batschelet, Allen W. LTC, 2002, Effects Based Operations: A New Operational Model, StrategyResearch Project, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

• Clausewitz, Carl von, 1993, On War, translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton,NJ: Princeton University Press.

• Cheek, Gary H., 2002, Effects Based Operations, the End of Dominant Maneuver, Strategy ResearchProject, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

• Davis, Paul K., 2001, Effects Based Operations: A Grand Challenge for the Analytical Community,Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

• Deptula, David A., Effects-Based Operations: Changes in the Nature of War, available at http://www.aef.org/pub/psbook.pdf, accessed at 10th of March 2006.

• Harris, John T., 2004, Effects Based Operations: Tactical Utility, Thesis, Army Commandand General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

• Linde Gwen, Denis J. Gleeson, Kathleen McGrath, Adrienne J. Murphy, Williamson Murray,Tom O’Leary, and Joel B. Resnick, 2001, New Perspectives on Effects Based Operations, Institutefor Defence Analysis.

• McCrabb, Marris, Buster, Dr., 2002, Explaining Effects, US JFCOM.• McDaniel, William T., 2002, Effects Based Operations, US JFCOM.• Murray Williamson, 2001, IDA Paper P-3606, An Historical Perspective on Effects Based Operations,

IDA Joint Warfighting Program, Alexandria, Virginia.• US Air Combat Command, 2002, Effects Based Operations, White Paper, Washington, DC: Government

Printing Office.• US Joint Force Command (JFCOM), 2001, Concept Framework for Effects Based Operations,

Draft White Paper.• Williams Brett T., 2002, Effects-Based Operations: Theory, Applications and the Role of Air Power,

Strategic Studies Institute, US War College, Carlisle Barracks PA.• Wainwright, David, 2003, Should the Australian Army adopt effects based operations ?, Thesis,

Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

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NATO’s strategic concept is believed to be the second in the hierarchy of Alliance’spolitical documents after the North-Atlantic Treaty. The 1999 NATO’s strategic conceptwas complemented by two other relevant documents, the Prague and Istanbul SummitsDeclarations, as well as the communiqués issued after ministerial meetings.

Analysts in the field estimate that the present strategic concept is outdated,considering the fact that it was drafted before the September 11, 2001 catastrophe, beforeNATO’s engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq and previous to the latest seven countries’,Romania included, admission to NATO. Mention should be made that the allies havenot drawn up strategic concepts too frequently, and when they did it, they took into accountthe fact that this step, generated by practical and political necessities, was sensible,complex and difficult.

The 1991strategic concept was set up immediately after the end of the Cold Warand the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. The allies had not set up a strategic conceptsince 1967, when they approved the MC14/3 document, known as the military strategyof “flexible response”. At the same time, the allies adopted the Harmel Report, namedafter the Belgian minister of foreign affairs, who established NATO’s strategic policyregarding its relation with the USSR and the allies of the Warsaw Pact, covering almostthe same aspects of the political and military strategy that were subsequently includedin the 1991 Strategic Concept. Nonetheless, prior to this year the Alliance’s strategicconcepts were secret and tackled the military strategy of deterrence and defence,the force requirements included.

The 1991 and 1999 strategic concepts had the same fundamental features, butthe purpose was broader, namely to inform the population from the allied countries,as well as the unallied governments regarding the Alliance’s political strategy.Since 1991, NATO’s strategic concepts have been declassified, having objectives suchas offering a coherent framework for the Alliance’s activities, providing guidelines for militarypolicy, operations and generating the force, promoting the Alliance’s policies to the publicand communicating NATO’s intentions to potential enemies, as well as informing

A NEW NAA NEW NAA NEW NAA NEW NAA NEW NATOTOTOTOTOSTRASTRASTRASTRASTRATEGIC CONCEPTTEGIC CONCEPTTEGIC CONCEPTTEGIC CONCEPTTEGIC CONCEPT~ PROS AND CONS ~~ PROS AND CONS ~~ PROS AND CONS ~~ PROS AND CONS ~~ PROS AND CONS ~

Brigadier Iordache OLARU~ Deputy Military Representative

of Romania to NATO ~

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the partners as far as the current and future connections and opportunities are concerned.From this perspective, to be useful for the allied governments responsible for implementingthe agreed upon policies, the strategic concepts must open new horizons with regardto the development of events, with adequate prediction and precision.

As far as the present is concerned, one may state that no strategic concept can providethe final solution for the Alliance’s purposes and plans, especially because it is an evolvingcomposite, which becomes more actualised with every communiqué or other documentsapproved by the North-Atlantic Treaty Council.

Any approach with a view to explaining the origins and principles of the 1999 NATO’sStrategic Concept must take into account the substantial changes occurred as far asthe security environment and the activities carried out by the Alliance are concerned,starting with 1991. In addition, during the mentioned timeframe, NATO undertook majoroperations, other than those stipulated by Article 5, and intensified its cooperationwith its former enemies or with other countries from the Euro-Atlantic region. The 1991Strategic Concept included ideas regarding the ethnical risks and territorial conflictsfrom Central and Eastern Europe, but did not stipulate much on the proportionsand expectations concerning the fulfilment of non-Article 5 missions, such as thepeacekeeping and crises management ones. In fact, the authors of the 1991 Conceptdid not anticipate the major operations carried out by NATO in the ’90s (the deliberateair strikes from August-September 1995, the IFOR and SFOR missions in Bosnia,the KFOR missions, the air campaign from March-June 1999 in Serbia) and focusedon the missions stipulated by Article 5: common defence against the aggressionsthat affect the Alliance, non-intervention outside NATO’s area of responsibility.

The way the 1991 Strategic Concept was conceived suggested that NATO did notstipulate the participation in any crises and that the military forces would ensurethe territorial integrity and political independence of Member States, thus ensuringpeace and stability in Europe. The missions in which the Alliance participated in the ‘90s,the establishment of the North Atlantic Coordination Council ~ NACC, the initiationof the Partnership for Peace Programme and the Mediterranean Dialogue, the setting upof the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, which replaced NACC, the initiation of thefirst contacts with Russia and Ukraine, all these proved that the events transcendedthe provisions of the 1991 Strategic Concept, but, at the same time, foreshadowed the linesand hastened the moment of making the decision to draw up the 1999 Strategic concept.

One of the main features of the 1999 Strategic Concept is represented by the redefinitionof the Alliance’s fundamental security missions. The allies removed from the formerconcept the phrase “… the strategic balance within Europe”, which Moscow Consideredto be a pre-offensive and a reminiscence of the Cold War. In fact, three missions remainedunchanged in the 1991 and 1999 strategic concepts, namely: NATO operates as a forumof consultations, provides the collective defence and initiation of the main elementsfor a stable security environment in the Euro-Atlantic area, based on the developmentand consolidation of democratic institutions and the commitment for peaceful settlementof disputes, that is to say no country should intimidate or impose its will by threat or force.With a view to reflecting the Alliance’s activities following 1990, the 1999 Strategic Concept

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NATO Realityincorporates two fundamental security missions: one is connected to crises management,conflict prevention and crises response operations and partnership, and the otherto strengthening the dialogue and cooperation with other nations in the Euro-Atlantic area.The allies finalised the concept without settling the most controversial issue: the legitimacyof using force in non-Article 5 operations in the absence of an explicit mandate comingfrom the UN Security Council. The Alliance reiterates its offer made in Brussels, in 1994,for supporting, from case to case and in accordance with its own procedures, peacekeepingoperations, other than the ones carried out under the authority of UN Security Councilor the responsibility of OSCE, placing the resources and expertise of the Alliance at one’sdisposal included. Given this context, the Alliance restates the ulterior decisions regardingthe crises response operations in the Balkans. In addition, mention is made that theallies used force in Kosovo without receiving an explicit authorisation from the SecurityCouncil. In brief, part of the allies justified the military operation through the humanitariannecessities, while the other part interpreted the resolution of the Security Council,although none of them explicitly stipulated the Alliance’s authorisation for using forcein Kosovo. Basically, the allies agreed they had a legally adequate and sufficient supportin the international laws for using force, but they did not consent on the way of bringingthem into operation. Consequently, the allies were not capable of making a commonstatement on the official legal bases regarding the use of force. Each ally was responsiblefor drawing up its own national reason, and some of the NATO Member States choseto invoke humanitarian necessities and the Security Council resolutions. Some of theallies stated that NATO having used force in the conflict in Kosovo representedan exceptional case, which should not be seen as a precedent, but such a declarationwas not included in the 1999 Strategic Concept.

As far as the efforts made regarding non-proliferation and the discouragementof weapons of mass destruction proliferation are concerned, the 1999 StrategicConcept paid much more attention to these issues than to the previous one, by definingthe characteristics of the allied conventional forces as being flexible, mobile, deployableand sustainable.

The aspects regarding nuclear forces are approached in both concepts in the samemanner, the only difference being that in the 1999 Concept mention is made that NATO’snuclear forces do not aim at a specific country. According to the provisions of the 1999Strategic Concept, “The Alliance seeks to preserve peace and to reinforce Euro-Atlanticsecurity and stability. The Alliance will enhance its political efforts to reduce dangers arisingfrom the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.The principal non-proliferation goal of the Alliance and its members is to prevent proliferationfrom occurring”. Given the provisions of the 1999 Strategic concept and taking into accountthe international circumstances, one question should be raised whether these two aspectsare enough to justify a new strategic concept. It would seem untimely and unnecessary,at least for the moment. We believe these affirmations deserve a much-detailed analysis.

As a result, if the allies prove to be skeptical about beginning to draw up a newstrategic concept, that happens because anything one might undertake in an acceptablehorizon of time can be achieved under the flexible auspices of the present one. The terrorist

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attacks against USA in September 2001 led to the invocation of Article 5 of the Treatyfor the first time in the Alliance’s history. Some of the measures taken then still existtoday, such as the “Active Endeavour” Operation from the Mediterranean Sea. Obviously,if one were to redraft the 1999 Strategic Concept, then one would pay more attentionto terrorist threats than before. Nevertheless, the 1991 Strategic Concept specifiedthat the Alliance’s forces and infrastructure must be protected from terrorist attacks,thus ensuring the starting points for Alliance’s actions in case of terrorist threat.As a proof, the allies have drafted the concept regarding the defence against terrorism.In other words, in spite of a schematic phrase in the strategic concept, one could noticethe developments occurred at different levels in the campaign against terrorism.Moreover, regarding proliferation, in November 2002, in Prague, the allies examinedand created options for the protection of the Alliance’s territory, forces and populatedcentres against missile threat.

The 1999 Strategic Concept tells less of the possible activities beyond the Euro-Atlanticarea than it could be said in the new concept, nevertheless, it is unambiguous as far aspossible options are concerned. In this context, it is emphasised that an enduring peacein Europe might be influenced by crises that could occur in the Euro-Atlantic areaand, as a consequence, by the determination to achieve a security environment ableto enhance peace and stability.

Accordingly, the security of the Alliance must take into account the global context,as the allies security interests might be affected by risks of even bigger proportions,terrorist acts, sabotage, organised crime and malfunctions in supplying with vital rowmaterials. These principles have provided the Alliance with the necessary basis for thesupport and command of ISAF in Kabul and the missions in Afghanistan, as well asother missions, such as training the Iraqi forces. Generally, the principles are sufficientfor other activities beyond the Euro-Atlantic space. One could mention the humanitarianaid missions from Darfur and Pakistan. On the other hand, the Mediterranean Dialogueand the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative might pave the way for redrafting certain partsof the 1999 Strategic Concept.

Carrying on the Alliance’s enlargement process does not offer grounds for reviewingthe 1999 Strategic Concept. This process will further be regulated by the 1995 Studyon NATO Enlargement. Just as adopting, after the Washington Summit, the MembershipAction Plan ~ MAP, as systematic means of providing the adhering candidateswith practical support and assistance leaves no room for a new approach in the newstrategic concept, considering that the existing document is further relevant for the stateswishing to join NATO.

When the Strategic Concept was adopted, in 1999, the European Union had not yetdefined the draft for the European Security and Defence Policy ~ ESDP. For this reason,the phrase from 1999 Strategic Concept refers to the European Security and DefenceIdentity. Nevertheless, the Washington Summit Communiqué states that the alliesapproved the key elements for the development of an effective cooperation betweenNATO and EU. These key elements provide EU with the possibility to have accessto NATO’s capabilities, their planning and using within EU-led operations. All these aspects

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NATO Realityare part of the “Berlin plus” NATO-EU arrangements. The support provided by NATOto EU-led peacekeeping operations to continue the SFOR mission, starting withDecember 2004, stands proof for the fact that these arrangements were useful.

In May 2002, NATO and the Russian Federation agreed on the replacementof the Permanent Joint Council with the NATO-Russia Council, which is based on newdecision-making principles, a new quality of the relations and the identification of somenew domains of mutual interest, given the circumstances in which the 1997 NATO-RussiaFounding Act remained valid. The only field added was search and rescue at sea.In consequence, a new strategic concept would not add more elements not even in thisdomain, except when the NATO-Russia relations would go worse. Even in this situation,within the 1999 Strategic Concept is mentioned that the existence of some powerfulnuclear forces outside the Alliance represents a significant factor that the Alliance shouldtake into account in order to ensure security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.

If the facts mentioned above lead us to believe that a new strategic concept is notnecessary, we will also examine the possibility of considering it inopportune. At present,the allied governments – in general – look at the preparation for a new version of theStrategic Concept as being inopportune and counterproductive, mostly because someof the issues, given the post-Iraq conflict, are difficult to handle. Wounds and controversiesdating back to 2002 and 2003 might reopen, and that would be against the reconciliationof the transatlantic relations that all the allied governments want to carry on. The issuesseparating the allies are connected to the ways of managing risks and threats, thoserelated to terrorism and proliferation of mass-destruction weapons included, and, finally,if and to what extent the governments of the NATO Member Countries should intervenein order to change governments and promote democracy.

These issues are delicate, given the fact that they can re-ignite the disputes thatpreceded the war in Iraq. In fact, some of the governments show a slight interestin reanalysing the debates before the war and, consequently, do not wish to get moreinvolved in transatlantic reconciliation. The issue that might be raised continues to berelevant and concerns the legitimacy and carefulness of the strategies regarding warprevention and the identification of the most efficient means for discouraging the countriesthat seek to possess weapons of mass destruction. Anyway, justifying and legitimatingthreat or use of force are inherently much more controversial than common defence,because none of the allies has been directly attacked. Accordingly, the allies must decideif certain situations really represent threats to their values and interests, thus justifyingthe risks and responsibility of an intervention and if a certain terrorist threat, with weaponsof mass destruction included, might call for intervention or action prevention with priority.In this respect, the last threats are obviously to be found closer to the provisionsof Article 5, but politically speaking it is much harder for democratic countries to initiatemilitary actions than to respond to attacks. In addition, it is difficult to resume the discussionon fundamental principles and there is serious doubt that acquiring much more precisionin the provisions of the Strategic Concept would be constructive, as far as the legitimacyof resorting to force is concerned, than what it stipulates at present.

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Given the continuous commitment of the USA to the principles expressed by the 2002National Security Strategy, some of the allies are preoccupied with the fact that initiatinga new strategic concept might provide the USA with the opportunity for outlining and leadingNATO’s policy on paths that they do no agree with. In fact, a new strategic concept mightforce them to choose between actively resisting to USA’s policy regarding the strategyof the operations carried far from Europe and the political order in Middle East or to acceptthe abstract principles that they see as potentially dangerous for the future dissensionson how a certain situation should be settled. From this perspective, the allies would ratherpostpone the preparation for a new strategic concept, even if the pressure generatedby this review were imminent.

It results from the above that reviewing the Strategic Concept is not necessary.The argument of the political inopportunity may always be invoked, since the discordconnected to this topic has always been present. If one were to wait for a moment of harmony,propitious to change, this might never occur. A powerful argument as far as inopportunityis concerned is the overloaded agenda of the Alliance. If this 1999 strategic concept isadequate for all predictable purposes, initiating its review will divert the Alliance’s interestand preoccupations connected to the improvement of using forces, interoperability,deploying and sustaining allied forces, leading the operations from Afghanistan, Balkansand Iraq and furthering the dialogue with Russia and Ukraine, the countries withinthe Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Initiative. That is why focusing on thementioned topics is of utmost importance, because the necessity of preparing a newstrategic concept, capable to provide a multiannual political framework, must be proved.

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hile seeking to respond to the current and future challengesand threats to its own security and to the Euro-Atlantic stability,nevertheless without modifying its capacity of fulfilling the goals

NATO RESOURCESMANAGEMENT

Colonel Cristian DORCA~ Advisor, the Defence Section, Romania’s Permanent Delegation to NATO ~

and disturbing the development of the means for exerting the new functions,the North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation had to manage its own process of modernisation.For NATO, the challenge was not the attempt to create its own role, but to make surethat its functions, which have already been defined, are not compromised by too manydemands over its resources. The decisions of the Alliance, as they resulted from thereunions at high level that have marked its evolution, laid the foundations for enlargingthe dialogue and cooperation in security issues established by the Member Statesthroughout the years.

NATO is a political-military organisation, responsible for defending the populationand the infrastructure of the allied sovereign nations. Within the organisation, the nationsallot the necessary resources (personnel, money and means) in order to ensurethe daily functioning of the Alliance, and also with a view to engendering the conditionsnecessary to the consultation, adoption of decisions and implementation of politicalstrategy. The financial resources of the Alliance are used for: administratively and financiallysupporting the civil and military command structures; financing its own activities,programmes regarding science, Partnership for Peace, research and development,preparation and training fields included; developing the response to crises operationsand providing the necessary capabilities in order to fulfil the political-military objectivesaccording to the priorities ascertained and unanimously sanctioned by the allied states.

At national level, in the allied states, the planning of strategic activities and defenceresources is implicitly influenced by the Alliance’s policy and strategic objectives,depending on the level of ambition, the missions the forces must fulfil and, last but notleast, on the priorities establishment.

At military level, most of the military forces and resources belonging to the NATOMember States are placed under national command and control, until the moment,some of them, or even all of them, depending on the country possessing them, can beallocated to the Alliance in order to fulfil the specific military missions. These forces are

W

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transferred under NATO authority for a determinedperiod, being trained, equipped, maintained inoperative state and financed by the nations from theirown defence budgets. In order to facilitate theconsultative process and the one of jointly adoptingthe decisions within the Alliance, each country isrepresented at political and military level within thestrategic headquarters and NATO General Headquarters,as well as in the staffs of different NATO agenciesand headquarters. The costs for maintaining andsupporting the personnel within the permanentdelegations and the military missions also representa national responsibility, being financed in keeping withthe accountancy principles and practices of each country.

NATO financial funds are mainly meant to thoseexpenses that correspond to the interests of allmember countries. The common-funded structureis diversified and decentralised. Thus, certainmultinational joint activities in the research-development,defence production and logistic field do not involveall the allied states, only a few of them being includedin some of the cases.

Generally, NATO funding does not cover theexpenses regarding the military forces or the militarytechnique acquisitions, such as vessels, submarines,aircrafts, tanks, artillery or armament systems. The alliedstates are the ones asked to provide the military forcesand means for the Alliance, being at the same timeresponsible for their financial sustainment. Therefore,NATO mainly finances the investments meant to thecommon requirements, such as anti-aircraft defence,command and control structures or the communicationsystems within the Alliance, which cannot be seenas being the responsibility of one country.

The equipment which was procured in this waymust be maintained, repaired and, eventually, replaced,depending on the new operational requirementsand the technological evolutions, the expenses dueto this process representing a significant percentagein NATO funds.

The resources of the Alliance consist of the nationalcontributions allocated by the Member States. At thesame time, more then 95% of NATO Member Nations

APOD ~ Airport of Disembarkation

AWACS ~ Airborne Warning andControl System

BICES ~ Battlefield InformationCollection and Exploitation System

CAX ~ Computer-Assisted Exercise

CEPMA ~ Central Europe PipelineManagement Agency

KAIA ~ Kabul International Airport

MD ~ Missile Defence

NACMA ~ NATO Air Commandand Control System ManagementAgency

NAEW&CC ~ NATO AirborneEarly Warning & Control Capability

NAHEMA ~ NATO HelicopterD&D Production and LogisticsManagement Organisation

NAMEADSMA ~ NATO MediumExtended Air Defence System Designand Development, Production andLogistics Management Agency)

NAMSA ~ NATO Maintenance& Supply Agency

NAPMA ~ NATO AEW&CProgramme Management Agency

NC3A ~ NATO Consultation,Command and Control Agency

NCSA ~ NATO Communicationand Information Systems ServicesAgency

NDC ~ NATO Defence College

NETMA ~ NATO EF 2000 andTornado Development, Production& Logistics Management Agency

NHMO ~ NATO Hawk ManagementOffice

O&M ~ Operation & Maintenance

O&SB ~ Operation & Support Budget

RPOD ~ Railport of Disembarkation

RTA ~ Research and TechnologyAgency

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NATO Realitydefence budgets exclusively remain under nationalcontrol. The forms of multinational cooperationwherein defence resources are allocated representthe exception to the rule. The multinational cooperationoutside the official framework of NATO has variousforms, from students exchange within military academies,arrangements for providing logistic support, procurementthe equipment in common to considering the evolutionsregarding the complex systems of armament.The financial procedures regard the exchangeof products (“barter” arrangements), the salesof military equipment, making payments for servicessupply, procurements with multinational participation,as well as development programmes regarding the costsdistribution. There are no precise estimations of thesums spent for this purpose, but one may considerthat a percent of approximately 5 to 10% of the totalof the allied states national defence budgets is usedfor multinational cooperation outside NATO.

Multinational cooperation within the Alliancetakes into account two very well establishedcomponents: joint/multinational funding and common-funded resources. Besides the ones already mentioned,the Member Nations also cooperate through a morerestrictive form, through ad hoc funding arrangements

SPOD ~ Seaport of Disembarkation

TBMD ~ Theatre Ballistic MissileDefence

Flexibility (the forces capabilityof being flexible) is an essentialcharacteristic of NATO forces thatis connected to the arrangementsregarding the military capabilitiesand their judicious, timely andoptimum employment. Flexibilityrepresents a prerequisite withinthe structure of forces and thec o m m a n d a n d c o n t r o l ( C 2 )arrangements of NATO, so that,by using only one structure, theAlliance to be able to have thecapacity to lead the entire rangeof missions at its disposal.

Deployment (forces deploymentcapability) means the NATOcapability of concentrating theforces and engaging the capabilitiesat the specified place and time.Thus, by taking into account thepossible threats to Alliance’ssecurity, NATO will have to beable to estimate its own risks anddeploy its forces and capabilitiesin time, outside its own territory.

respectively. The arrangements regarding the joint-type funding are structured formsof funding from national resources, given the circumstances of certain procedural termsagreed at NATO level. The participant countries are responsible for identifying the fundingrequirements, priorities and procedures, while NATO, that is the beneficiary in termsof visibility, gives the political and financial endorsement. The joint-type funding proceduresnecessitate, in principle, the creation of a managerial organisation and an agencyfor implementation.

NATO agencies have an important role in promoting interoperability and in supportingthe fulfilment of Alliance’s objective in different fields, such as the production and maintenanceof defence equipment or providing logistic support for NATO’s missions/operations.The following agencies are subjected to the principle of integrated funding: for the domainof aircrafts and helicopters production – NAHEMA (France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands,Portugal) and NETMA (Germany, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom); for the anti-aircraftdefence domain – BICES (all the allied states, except Island and Luxemburg),NAMEADSMA (Germany, Italy, United States) and NAPMA (Belgium, Canada, Denmark,Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain,Turkey, United States); for the logistic domain – CEPMA (Belgium, Canada, Germany,

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France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, United States), NAMSA (all the allied states) andNHMO (France, Italy). In addition, the following agencies are mainly financed fromNATO’s common resources: NACMA, NC3A, NCSA, NSA, RTA and NDC.

The arrangements of common-funded resources include NATO’s military and civilbudget and NATO Security Investment Programme ~ NSIP. Based on these funds, NATOauthorities identify the requirements and establish the Alliance objectives and priorities.At the level of common-funded resources (the military budget and NSIP), the leadingprinciple of eligibility is in accordance with the “Over&Above” rule: “the common-fundedresources will be focused on meeting the requirements which are in the interest of the Allianceand cannot be provided from national resources”.

The activities eligible for the common-funded resources of the Alliance are analysedin NATO committees (Civil Budget Committee, Military Budget Committeeand Infrastructure Committee), the general problems regarding the resources policybeing managed by the Senior Resource Board, which annually elaborates the MediumTerm Resource Plan, thus covering all the requirements regarding military common-fundedresources for the next five years.

The ad hoc funding procedures are adopted within the framework of the cooperationbetween the NATO nations in the activities that do not meet the criteria of eligibilityas established for common-funded resources for operational, political, programmingor organisational reasons. In these cases, the funding arrangements may have variousforms: trust fund, contribution in kind, ad hoc cost sharing arrangements, donations etc.

In this respect, some recent examples are convincing, for instance NATO institutionsgranting assistance for the training of Iraqi security forces ~ ISF; transporting the militaryequipment donated to Iraq; transporting the products and food, as well as the fundingfor reconstruction projects, as in the case of the earthquake response operation in Pakistan;the cooperation within the NATO-Russia Council (for instance, the Cooperative AirspaceInitiative) or the assessment of the possible expenses concerning integrated/common-funded funding activities (for instance, the AGS programme management office – AllianceGround Surveillance System).

“Contribution in kind” means the form of participating in actions or programmesin a different way than the financial one, as follows: by providing its own national facilitiesor capabilities and by contributing to them with personnel and national expertise.

Normally, by adopting these forms of contribution within NATO, the value of the nationalparticipation is quantified in financial terms. The contribution of the United Kingdomand France by providing the fleet made up by the NATO AWACS with their own radarcapabilities is a significant example. “Trust funds” presuppose volunteer financialcontributions for a well-established purpose. These funds are allocated for the benefitof an entity in order to satisfy the requirements, others than those covered by the budgetmeant for that entity with this purpose. This method opens the path towards contributionsfrom the part of NATO Member Nations. An important example in this contextis represented by the “volunteer assistance for transport and subsistence fund”,established within the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I).

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NATO RealityThe Alliance uses a variety of mechanisms and arrangements in order to finance

its own activities. The key to success consists in the establishment of the principlethat will allow for the identification of the best way of funding.

NATO civil budget mainly consists of the funds provided by the ministries of foreignaffairs. It is established under the guidance of the Civil Budget Committee, and the fulfilmentbelongs to the NATO International Secretariat ~ IS. The civil budget of the Alliancecovers the working expenses of IS, the amounts needed to fulfil the civil programmesand activities approved and to build, exploit and maintain facilities, including the personnelexpenses required to carry on conferences, reunions of the committees and subordinatedNATO groups, security services etc.

NATO military budget is made up mainly of the funds provided by the ministriesof defence. It is established and used under the guidance of the Military BudgetCommittee (there are over 50 separated military budgets). The military budget of theAlliance covers operating and maintenance costs, as well as the expenses madefor equipment, connected to NATO Command Structure ~ NCS, except the majorinvestments of construction and system, which are financed by the NATO SecurityInvestment Programme. In all situations, the funding of the military personnel representsa national responsibility.

The NATO Security Investment Programme consists of the funds provided by theministries of defence. It is established under the guidance of the Infrastructure Committeeand exerted through the individual actions of host-nations, as well as by NATO agencies.The programme is meant to the funding of the installation and facilities necessaryto support the roles of NATO strategic command. The investments cover installationsand activities such as: communication and information systems, radars, militaryheadquarters, airdromes, pipelines and fuels storehouses, harbours and navigationinstruments. Just as in the case of the military budget, NSIP also covers the eligiblerequests for Peace Support Operations ~ PSO, including communication and informationsystems, facilities for local headquarters, energetic systems and airdromes, railroadsand highways repairs.

The O&M expenses regarding these activities are a national responsibility.The setting up of the Partnership for Peace in 1994 added a new cooperation dimensionto the programme.

In order to obtain common funding for a certain project, the first step is identifyingand acknowledging the necessary expenses and establishing most assuredly the factthat the responsibility of these expenses cannot reasonably be attributed to only onecountry, since it serves the interests of all the contributing countries. The request mustbe justly generated, declared and certified, and that presupposes a complex interactionof the national and international administrative processes. From the moment of itsdrawing up, the request for expenses must be considered eligible to be funded fromcommon resources by all the Member States, on a well-established scale of values.Establishing eligibility is made through the consensus of the Member States that will haveto sustain these costs.

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As a rule, all the Member Countries participate in the expenses accepted forthe common-funded resources. Thus, all the Member Countries pay their contributionto funding the International Secretariat, the International Military Staff, the agenciesof the Military Committee, as well as the elements of the funding from common resourcesof peace support operations and activities of the Partnership for Peace. Nevertheless,the expenses for the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force ~ NAEW&CForce are divided only between the 14 participant countries. The expenses madewith other elements or entities from NATO Command Structure are divided dependingon the nature of each country’s participation in the new structure of integrated commandof the Alliance.

Conventionally, the solutions for the distribution of the established costs, whichspecify the contributions of each Member Country, must correspond to their “paymentcapacity”. Nevertheless, the basis of this applied rule is both political and economic.

The capabilities of the Alliance represent a part of the integrated system of defenceplanning. The responsibilities regarding identifying the requests, priorities and establishingthe management of integrated resources are centralised at the level of the strategicheadquarters and included in the process of implementing the capabilities initiatives,the Medium Term Resource Plan and NATO audit. The responsibilities regardingbudgetary execution, developing and implementing projects are decentralised at the levelof the credit accountant, the host nation and the agencies.

Regarding the funding of NATO operations/missions (KFOR/ISAF/NTM-I)and the crisis response operations, they are accomplished according to the principle“Costs lie where they fall”: the nations involved cover their own participation expenses(and establish the source of the national funding). The financial expenses of the numerousbilateral-multilateral support arrangements (logistic support, transport, medical support)will be reimbursed or not. Until now, the funding from common resources coversonly the costs that are not specifically ascribed to a single nation, such as: the expensesfor investments and O&M meant to the command elements in the theatre; the costsof covering the deficit regarding the strategic communication equipment; providinga minimum of requirements necessary for the strategic infrastructure elementsin the theatre.

For the activities regarding missions preparation, nations have chosen to cooperatethrough different forms, such as: multinational organisation of the transport; jointlyproviding the logistic support; resorting to arrangements regarding providing certaincapabilities through externalisation. The development of this kind of missions representsa bilateral arrangement of cooperation between nations. Until now, the establishmentof multinational forces, such as NATO Response Force ~ NRF, does not theoreticallychange this approach. NRF is financed by multinational resources through usingthe special arrangements agreed at the level of the nations that participate with forces.

In this context, we estimate that the following aspects represent a challengefor the Alliance:

• difficulties in providing the necessary capabilities for the multinational operationalforce ~ CJSOR;

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NATO Reality• resorting to the method of externalisation in providing certain capabilities;• providing the financial support regarding the integration of support activities: fuel,

medical services, airport facilities (KAIA, for instance), transport;• implementation of the future operations and missions;• NRF deployment.

NATO’s experience regarding the operations carried out, as well as those takingplace now highlights the fact that the special arrangements have been necessaryin order to allow the nations to allocate a sum of operative capabilities at theatre leveland to place them under the operational control of the commander from the theatreof military operations. Therefore, at present, in accordance with adopting the principle“Over&Above”, the common-funded resources of NATO are placed at one’s disposal notonly for the support of the headquarters elements in the theatre in leading NATO operationsbut also in order to provide the minimum requirements of the operative capabilitiesat theatre level, such as: airports (APOD), seaports (SPOD) and railport stations (RPOD);medical facilities Role 2 and 3; intelligence, research and surveillance and air-landsurveillance; engineering support; fuel supply and stock. At the Alliance level, the problemsregarding the possibility the expenses for the strategic transport of the capabilitieswith a short deployment term to be supported from the common-funded resources arestill at issue.

The new arrangements made for the command structure have determinedthe reorientation of the Alliance’s forces. NATO military forces must be flexibleand deployable. The integrated structure is eligible to be funded from common resources(but not for its military effectives). Given the background of these realities, the elementsof the NATO Response Force and the centres of excellence are not in the responsibilityof national or multinational funding. Among the financial difficulties the Alliance confrontswith lay the implications having a budgetary nature and the identification of the personneldemand and the fact the latter are not covered. In order to do so, NATO authoritieshave to resort to a solution of compromise regarding covering operational demansby the method of externalisation.

For NATO’s special partnerships, as well as for PfP, the funding from commonresources for the military forces was strict. The following elements are specific to thesefields: most of PfP’s activities are financed from national resources; providing the basicrequirements for C3, the CJFT concept and the capabilities for CAX are mainly includedin the range of the Alliance requirements; applying the standard principles for Alliance’smilitary requirements.

In order to substantiate these partnerships, NATO considers it necessary thata reassessment of the aspects regarding the participation of nations in CROs, jointexercises and the air space control should be made.

For the new initiatives regarding defence capabilities, the nations have becomeaware of the necessity for jointly settling the common requirements. Thus, one musttake into consideration the following elements: analysing the right balance betweenthe national, multinational, joint funding and the common one; some capabilities

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surpass the means most of the nations have at their disposal; harmonisation withinthe Alliance by distributing the roles, risks and responsibilities; providing the strategiccommand with central capabilities. In this context, from the point of view of providingthe financial resources, the allied systems have in mind the following fields of interest:

The allied system of terrestrial surveillance (ASG: central strategic capabilitypossessed and controlled by NATO, supplemented with interoperable national capabilitiesas part of a system of systems):

• national funding for the national capabilities;• joint funding for the NATO system;• common funding regarding the O&M expenses;• common funding adapted for the NATO Air Command and Control System

(NATO Air C2) and NATO Air C3; antimissile territory, population and forces defence (MD) and theatre ballistic missile

defence (TBMD): feasibility studies financed out of common resources; adjustments regarding the funding from common resources at the level of theNATO Air Command and Control System (NATO Air C2) and NATO Air C3; interception systems financed at national level;

strategic system and refuelling during flight: joint funding; searching for a resource of alternative funding.

As far as the applicability of NATO financial resources is concerned, AEW&CCrepresents a model of combining the funding resources. The procurement of AWACSaircrafts by NATO was possible due to a form of multinational funding, to which “13 nationscontributed”. France and United Kingdom are engaged in this programme by placingtheir own AWACS capabilities at the Alliance’s disposal (“contributions in kind”). Payingthe wages for the operative military effective of the fleet is a national responsibility,and the payments are made by the countries that provide the personnel resource.The Operation & Support Budget (O&SB) is ensured through common funding– “budget split among 14” (with Hungary’s participation, from 2006). The airborne forcecommand (which includes the command, the E-3A and E-3D components) derivesadvantage from the common-funded resources – “budget split among 15” (with the UnitedKingdom’s participation). Specific investments are allocated to the national airdromesas far as NAEW is concerned, by applying the NSIP programme for facilitating the fundingout of common resources by the multinational contribution of 25 countries.

The common financial resources of NATO are a way of complementarity of the nationalactivities and have the role of strengthening the Alliance’s cohesion. In addition, they areused in providing the Alliance with essential capabilities. Providing capabilities dependson the fulfilment of certain requirements, such as: to correspond to the eligibility criteria;to be the object of the arrangements regarding the apportionment of costs and to respondto the funding and acquisition mechanisms.

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NATO RealityMultinational cooperation is developing. The advantage of such cooperation gives

the possibility of complementarily providing the necessary capabilities. Thus, each nationwill be able to participate with the most appropriate structures of forces that it hasat its disposal, without being necessary for only one of them to cover all the “niches”of the operations/mission, as this will be fulfilled through collective efforts. The networkbased capabilities, the interoperability and the forces deployment capability, the multinationalforces, as well as the integrated logistic support are good examples in this instance.Although a great part of the cooperation will continue at multinational level – with NATO,providing most of the planning infrastructure –, the principles and the funding waysfrom NATO common resources will nevertheless have to be developed. The deployableC3 system (command, control, communication) and the recently agreed financialarrangements for crisis response operations are two examples in this respect.

Through the agency of the Allied Command Transformation ~ ACT, NATOcoordinates and harmonises the otherwise challenging actions of the militarytransformation between the Alliance and the Member Nations. The efforts made duringthe military transformation process represent significant guaranties of the Allianceboth at present and in the future. They aim at increasing interoperability (placed at thebasis of the joint allied actions), network facilities, distribution of forces, rapid capacityof making decisions, as well as the domination of the battlespace.


• Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, National Representatives and International Staff,Ottawa, September 19th, 1951.

• Status of Missions and Representatives of Third States to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation,Brussels, September 14th, 1994.

• NATO Handbook.• NATO website – www.nato.int• Partnership for Peace – www.nato.int/pfp.pfp.htm• NAMSA – www.namsa.nato.int• Trust Fund website – www.nato.int/pfp/trust-fund.htm• www.nato.int/education/docs• www.nato.int/multi• www.e3a.nato.int• www.napma.nato.int• www.act.nato.int/organization/hqsact/transsupport.htm• http://home.tiscali.be/jansens.andre/NATOBugetSistem111103.ppt• www.valcartier.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/rtgonifd/background/tor.html

The post Cold War operational experience, in Kosovo and Afghanistan, evincedthe necessity for the Alliance forces to undergo transformation, so that they could acquireoperational coherence, they could become integrated and relevant as far as the new securityenvironment is concerned.

The need for transformation was agreed upon in Prague, reaffirmed in Istanbuland has become the leitmotiv of all NATO’s General Secretary speeches and messages.

Required by the current strategic environment we are part of and take action in,transformation is neither a slogan nor an option. Strategic commanders decisive workon transformation was reflected in the “Strategic Vision” and subsequently materialised,in May 2005, in “Military Committee Memorandum for Commanding Officers RegardingTransformation – MCM 0054”.

Concepts for Allied Future Joint Operations – CAFJO, a legitimate outcomeof the above mentioned Memorandum, on which I will focus in this attempt, representsa bridge between the ample character of Comprehensive Political Guidance, which isstill being worked on, and the concrete, specific character of the concepts. These newconcepts will lead to the development of a correct set of capabilities the Alliance needsto effectively fulfil future missions.

During the development of this document, which has real chances to be adoptedthis year, the “invention” (finding) of a single, all-inclusive concept, regarding the waythe Allied Forces can operate in the future, proves to be neither possible nor usefulfor the activity of transformation. It is the logical follow-up of the fact that the new strategicenvironment is characterised by complexity and multidimensionality.

Concepts for Allied Future Joint Operations find their legitimacy in the present contextof the political-military – both the finished and the unfinished ones – that, in fact,constitute the basis for the development of the Alliance forces and capabilities (figure 1).In other words, the main function of the Political-Military Guidance is representedby the significant influence it may have on the ways NATO generates integratedand coherent forces and capabilities, following the transformational concepts.

CONCEPTSFOR ALLIED FUTUREJOINT OPERATIONS

Brigadier Valeriu NICU}~ Advisor to the Chief of the General Staff ~

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Figure 1: CAFJO Place and Role

Products

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Expeditionary

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on TransformationMCM 0054

Military

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NATOStrategic Concept

Praga & IstanbulDeclarations

Political Guidance

Political

ContextSTRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT + NEW & EMERGING NEEDS

Aim

Extant Authority Means Ends

Concepts for Allied Future Joint Operations “translates” the strategic guidance intoconcepts and, wherever it is possible, into capabilities the forces of the Alliance will needto conduct operations over the next 15 years (figure 2). CAFJO “paves the way”for the introduction of an effect-based approach to operations – Conceptual Frameworkfor Effects-based Approach to Operations ~ EBAO allowing thus for the possibility to haveintimate knowledge of the concepts to capabilities process.

CAFJO also “guides the future activities” within the process of the Alliancetransformation and facilitates the involvement of organisations outside NATObut cooperating with it in this process.

By translating the guidance into concepts and capabilities, CAFJO “will act likea compass” for the process of transformation, allowing for an overall approach to it,practically describing the concepts to capabilities process, which is necessary for itto be successful.

The present strategic environment is dominated by two important traits – complexityand multidimensionality, presented in the second chapter of the document. There aresome important conclusions that rise from the description of the strategic environment,which I consider relevant:

The operational responses to events will include non-military effects and entities.

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NATO Reality

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The Alliance will need capabilities meant to ensure stability, to diluteadversities, to discourage aggression and, if necessary, to defeat the enemyacross the full spectrum of the conflict. The Alliance forces must derive advantage of the use of new technologies,they must be agile, interchangeably and expeditionary.

The third chapter refers to EBAO conceptual framework, highlighting the essentialelements of transformation. It is known that, there are very few cases when militaryactions themselves can solve the complex problems specific to a complex andmultidimensional security environment. Solving these problems requires the integrationof all the Alliance and Member States available instruments of power. This is thefundamental principle that lies at the basis of effects-based approach to operations, whichcan be defined as “the integrated and comprehensive application of the Alliance instrumentsof power, military and non-military, to generate effects that lead to the Alliance final goalachievement”. The name of this concept stresses the importance of identifying the causalrelations between action and effect (figure 3).

To make the actions that are to be conducted easily to understand from theirconceptual point of view, the document introduces both the term – EngagementSpace, which refers to the part of the strategic environment the Alliance wants to engageand that of – Military Mission Domain, which explains that particular part in the engagement

Figure 2: CAFJO Essential links

Extant Authoritative

Guidance

Bi-SC Strategic Vision

CAFJO

Political Guidance Capabilities

on Transformation

Transformational Concepts

New Operational Concepts for:

Transformed Forces & Capabilities

Identificationof long-term requirements

through researchand technology

NATO Strategic Concept

MC 400/2

Forces &Capabilities

DoctrineOrganisationTrainingMaterialLeadershipPersonnelFacilitiesInteroperability

MC 400/2 = CM Guidance on Implementing the Alliance Military Strategy

Current Forces and Capabilities Emerging Forces and Capabilities Future Forces and Capabilities

Hierarchy of Conceptual

ThoughtYear 15 +

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NATO Realityspace where military actions arecarried out.

As a consequence of theStrategic Vision, Chapter Fourthoroughly presents the developingconcepts, as well as the futureassociated capabilities, that will leadto the actual transformationof forces. Taking into accountthe operational capabilities thatare essential for the Alliance to fulfil

END STATE

OBJIECTIVES

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its military missions, their development must focus on an effect-based militaryapproach and highlight the domains in which concepts have to be developed andcapabilities implemented.

Within the current security environment, there are three Transformation Goalsof the Alliance, which are critical in order to have coherent, integrated and relevantforces, respectively achieving: Coherent Effects, Joint Deployment & Sustainmentand Decision Superiority.

Coherent Effects is a state in which Allied military forces are able to integratecapabilities to produce and disseminate information, generate effects, assess resultsand re-engage with decisive speed.

Joint Deployment & Sustainment allows the Alliance to quickly deploy task-tailoredforces wherever needed and conduct sustained, continuous operations until successfulconclusion of the campaign.

Decision Superiority is a state in which the Allied Commander not only possessesinformation superior to that of the adversary and is able to make more effective decisions,but is also able to make and execute such decisions in a timeframe too rapid to allowa considered reaction by the adversary1.

To achieve these three transformation goals and to ensure appropriate capabilitiesdevelopment, seven focus areas were developed, called Transformation ObjectiveAreas ~ TOAs, respectively Information Superiority ~ IS; NATO Network-EnabledCapability ~ NNEC; Effective Engagement ~ EE; Joint Manoeuvre ~ JM; EnhancedCIMIC ~ EC; Expeditionary Operations ~ EO; Integrated Logistics ~ IL.

The Chapter describes the transformation goals, their domains, the relationshipof TOAs to the goals, all necessary for the development of NATO capable forces, througha NATO Defence Capability Management System, within EBAO context (figure 4).

While other transformation goals support physical actions in conducting an operation,coherent effects represent the main force in the application of the elements meantto resolve a crisis. In other words, coherent effects are the state in which the Alliance

Figure 3: Effects-Based Approach to Operations

1 In Gândirea Militar` Româneasc` Journal, no. 2/2006, document În]elegerea transform`rii militarea NATO, punctul 14, pag. 35, translation and expertise Brigadier Valeriu Nicu].

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forces have the possibilityt o i n t e g r a t e t h e i rcapabilities with thoseof other instruments ofpower. To attain thisstate, the concepts andcapabilities comprisedin effective engagement,j o i n t m a n o e u v r e a n denhanced CIMIC areindispensable.

Effective Engagementis, in short, effect-basedapproach to operations.J o i n t M a n o e u v r epresupposes the Alliance

NATO Defence Capability Management System

NATO Defence Planning

Capable Future NATO Forces

AchievingJoint

Deployment

Effective Engagement

and Joint ManoeuvreInformationSuperiorityand NATONetwork

Enabled Capability

Expeditionary

Operations

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TG = Transformational Goal

TGTGTG

AchievingDecision

Superiority

AchievingCoherent

Effects

EBOA

Figure 4: NATO Capabilities Management System

conducting rapid, precise and continuous military and non-military actions. These generalconcepts are supported by specialised ones such as: joint surveillance and reconnaissance,rapid deployment, joint aerospace defence, operations in urban areas, protection of forcesagainst asymmetric threats, CBRN events management etc. Therefore, differently sizedexpeditionary forces rapid deployment and logistic support, to have advantages as far asthe distribution in terrain and the timeframe are concerned, are key factors for currentand future operations. Enhanced CIMIC refers to civil-military relationships, others thanthe ones we are already accustomed to. Future CIMIC will be characterised by permanentofficial relations with civil actors, a detailed understanding of the civil environmentand a greater ability to operate together with civil entities. Enhanced CIMIC advantageswill not be restricted to the tactical level. Expeditionary Operations means continuouslydeploying forces, wherever necessary, task-tailored, as number and structure, capableto conduct the entire spectrum of the Alliance missions. These forces will be supportedby an integrated, multinational logistic system, more efficient than it used to bein the past.

As a consequence of the new strategic environment, presented in Chapter Two,the Alliance has to adapt its military posture so that it could provide a rapid, precise andflexible response to the new threats, derive maximum benefit from the new technologiesand preserve the technical and operational advantage. It presupposes the ability to makedecisions rapidly, at all command levels (politic, strategic, operational and tactical), usingintegrated systems, which provide the decision makers with early alarm systems andallow for planning and conducting operations with reduced risks and collateral damages.Information Superiority refers to the ability of collecting, using and disseminatinginformation whenever and wherever needed. NATO Network Enabled Capability – NNEChelps the Alliance to provide, access and properly disseminate information, accordingto the situation.

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NATO RealityTo be able to develop capable transformed forces, necessary for future operations,

intellectual work is needed, work that sometimes transcends the framework of conceptsespecially designed to achieve transformation goals.

These “additional concepts” describe the way the Alliance will conduct operationssuch as stabilisation or/and reconstruction, security assistance to individual NATO states,or as high intensity combat operations. CAFJO promotes adaptive command and controlstructures, flexible Headquarters structures, means of changing mentalities and strategicdeterrence.

NATO has to evolve and this is the way for its forces to transform. Each MemberState perception and determination is, of course, different. However, in the future,all members have to come to the same denominator. It is only then we can talk aboutdeconflicting all categories of forces – land, air, maritime and special, about theircoordination and the associated concepts, as well as about putting their specificitiestogether, about the integration of the components of categories of forces and the specificelements in the culture of each Member Nation – see NATO Response Force and thenecessary, sometimes ad hoc, interaction with non-military entities and about thecoherence of a force based on effects, collaborative, network-enabled and interdependentwith institutionalised relations, with non-military entities with a view to creating a commoneffort area (figure 5). It is important to notice the place of non-military entities outside

Air

ForcesAir

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ForcesMaritime

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Joint Forces

Integrate CapabilitiesCoordinate Capabilities

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the Categories

of Forces

Effects-Based,Collaborative, Agile,

Network-enabled,Multilateral,

Interdependent

GOs

GOs

IOsIOs

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NGOs

Unity of Effort

Past Current Future

Coherence

Transition period

Figure 5: Deconflicting, Coordination, Integration, Coherence

NATO Joint Force, as it is shown in the figure. As a small part of the Alliance Joint Forces,NATO Response Force is the transformation avant-garde, as it facilitates an ampletransformation of the Allied Military Forces and, subsequently, the transformationof each Member State.

Chapter Five describes the concepts to capabilities process. Effects-based operationsrequire a consolidated, integrated and coherent capabilities-based approach to the Alliance

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Defence Planning. Moreover, CAFJO must provide the basis for the Alliance CapabilitiesManagement System, as it results from the effects-based approach to operations,so that the Alliance future forces could have the required capabilities.

Capabilities-based planning changes the centre of gravity from a fixed, stableposture and from threat-based planning to one more flexible and reactive. This newapproach recognises the fact that the Alliance cannot exactly know which nation,combination of nations or non-state actors will threaten its vital interests in the future.Capabilities-based planning is thus incertitude planning (figure 6). It does not mean

Concepts Capabilities

Political and Political Military Guidance

Inputs from extant system (Long Term Capability Requirements,

Defence Requirements Review, leasons learned etc.)

Strategic Vision

CAFJO

Follow on Concepts

(a framework)CD&ER&T Validation

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Development

of Capabilities

• Doctrine

• Organisation

• Training

• Material

• Leadership&Education

• Personnel

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(A Hierarchy)Endorsement

Dream Degree of abstraction and forward look Reality

Capability Development Process

Ne

ed Process

CD&E

Proposed

SolutionsApproval Implementation

Capabilities

ACT-led NATO Community

that capabilities-based planning ignores threats. To create a more flexible and adaptiveplanning process it is necessary that the presupposition of well-known enemies, as well asthe associated concepts should be eliminated.

The activity of transforming concepts is led, mainly, by the Allied CommandTransformation – ACT, through “lessons learnt”, academic and technologicimpact, as well as through the advantages offered by experimentation. Once a possiblesolution to an operational requirement is formulated, associated capabilitiesdevelopment occurs within the enlarged NATO community, after it is approvedby Member Nations.

NATO Joint Force must be an effective combination between recently developedessential capabilities and the previous ones, which prove to be still viable. The essentialelement, common for all the Alliance capabilities, will be their contribution to the forcestransformation so that they could successfully conduct future operations. In figure 7 it isshown the way the specific activity of transformation will be introduced in the strategicguidance and the existent associated processes.

Figure 6: Concepts to Capabilities Process

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NATO Reality

Transformational concepts are hierarchised so that they could “nourish” new ideasand requirements regarding the existent forces development processes.

Although expressed in a concise manner, my opinion is that the above mentionedthings will contribute, to some extent, to a better understanding with regard to Conceptsfor Allied Future Joint Operations, which are still debated within the North Atlantic Alliance.

Extant Authoritative

Guidance

Strategic Vision

CAFJO

Political Guidance

on Transformation

Transformational Concepts

New Operational Concepts

Transformated Forces & Capabilities

NATO Strategic Concept

MC 400/2

Forcesand Capabilities

DoctrineOrganisationTrainingMaterialLeadership -DevelopmentPersonnelFacilitiesInteroperability

Current Forces and Capability Emerging Forces and Capability

Hierarchy of Conceptual

Thought

MC Guidance to SCs

on Transformation

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Figure 7: Military Transformation Process

As complex forms of socialisation, organisations have a tendency to associate higherand higher performance criteria in order to gain the best possible place in the competitionrequested by the market economy. The military organisations, even though non-profit,are “predestined”, due to the specific responsibilities extracted from their very existence,to follow the same path. The first duty of the military leader, and maybe his most complexmission, is to lead the organisation towards success. Success in combat cannot be comparedwith the great accomplishment of a civilian business, mainly because of the different natureand effects generated by their actions. It can be reached by the integrated applicationof a set of theoretical acquisitions (principles, knowledge, habits, experience) on themultiplying frame of the top technological achievements, added to human intelligenceand ingenuity, embodied by leaders’ charisma. Success in combat is, in fact, the finalelement from a series of preparing actions, the goal and the target, the reason to beof the military organisation. This cannot be anticipated though, if the organisation doesnot have the necessary potential to achieve it.

Performance as a needPerformance as a needPerformance as a needPerformance as a needPerformance as a needWe build military structures according to the missions we have to fulfil, to the available

support, the objectives we wish to reach, and last but not least, to our skill and abilityto foresee the future. Once these structures defined, we establish the required measuresfor these to function, i.e. we define rules, we create training and procurement programs,we imagine sophisticated battle scenarios with possible enemies, thus obtaining, at theend of the cycle, the desired results. Can anyone guarantee that this whole edifice, builton the known rules, is the best or with the highest chances to succeed ? Is this system,made of institutions, people and relations, built to be competitive, and if so, which arethe judging criteria and the ways to establish and evaluate the actual performance ?

Unlike civilian business structures, military institutions are not “compelled” by themarket to sell their products, to fight for survival and eventually, to be at all timesunder the growing pressure of demand and offer. This does not automatically place

A STRATEGYOF PERFORMANCE

SUITABILITY Captain Ion DUMITRA{CU

~ EU Military Deputy Representative ~

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them in a comfortable spot, in which, except for the wars and some small conflicts,nothing happens. The growing requirements, associated with the budget cuts, forcethe military organisations to rethink the rules they should obey, adjusting their waymore and more towards efficiency and performance. The contemporary military leaders,as co-responsible for providing national security, are confronted with a double problem,issued, on the one hand, from the higher complexity of the assigned mission, on theother hand, from the rather low adaptation ability of the systems they lead. In fact,it is all about the constant need for change, expressed as an external requirementof the system and its internal inertia, promoted by the human element.

Has the military leader enough motivation, strength and determination to “push”the system forward, knowing very well that one of its characteristics is stability, hencepreserving the existent relations and status ? What are the weapons at hand for himto prevail against inertia, conservationism, bureaucracy, sometimes self-sufficiencyor even incompetence, elements for which status quo is the very reason to be ? Do his“power” instruments have to limit themselves to his natural or educated qualitiesand abilities or do they need anything else to add ? Those who believe in the leader’sexclusive ability to boost and channel his energy and resources in the right directionhave enough elements to prove it. The opponents of the absolute role of the leader arealso right when they state the fact that the very system, through its own mechanisms,has to support at all times the leader in his decisions. We stand here in an equationin which the two elements – leader and system – boost each other, in the way that oneimproves the system, and the other helps him “rule”.

To what extent and how can the military leader adapt or transform the systemso that this can respond to the social need for which it was created and not to his ownambition ? Do the necessary correction levers exist, in order to, on the one hand, offerenough freedom of action and, on the other hand, keep the system within the boundariesestablished by the political decision, and therefore, by the national interest ? And finally,the question to be put regards the correct set of a leading strategy in which resources,goals and ways to accomplish the former two have to be in a synergic relationship.

About a possible definitionof command strategyThe term “strategy” used in the past, mainly in the military language, has lately

migrated towards the civilian fields, being more associated today with politicsand economy rather than with the military field. Nowadays we talk about political strategiesfor governing, integration in different structures, or about firms’ strategies to promotetheir products or to take over a market. In a broad sense, the strategy defines a setof measures and actions integrated in a single conception, which need to be takenin order to reach the desired goal.

In the military we talk about traditional military strategies, and, following the civilianpattern, about transforming, forces’ operationalising, modernising strategies etc.Command strategies are less visible and known as they are, even though in a formor another they manifest themselves after the new leader assumes command.

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Opinions • Arguments • Certitudes • Perspectives


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The existence of a command strategy becomes more and more an essential conditionto put this in practice; without it, the organisation takes a risk to go on a winding path,never being able to really find the vocation for which it was conceived.

Formulating the command strategy stands only for the first step in a complex processwhose final goal is to implement that strategy. “The ability to implement a strategyis more important than its actual elaboration” admitted Norton and Kaplan, two famousbusiness scientists, in a study dedicated to economic organisations’ strategies1.In the same study are mentioned the results of a survey, according to which 90% of thebuilt strategies fail in their implementation. This percentage draws, in fact, attentionto the difficulties faced by a theoretical construction (the strategy) in the processof its integration in the organisation. The identification of the elements which facilitatethe transfer of the elements established by the strategy into action, measurable and orientedtowards reaching the final goals, remains a matter that depends on the culture of everyorganisation and on its ability to respond to these requirements.

The command strategy, materialised in implementation plans, has to be simplyformulated, at the level of common grasping meaning, because it addresses to theorganisation in its entirety. Therefore, its message must not be limited to the levelof the main associates, but has to be forwarded to all levels, wherever an act of commandis being done (a team, a platoon, an office or a service). The contents of commandstrategy has to express the ways in which the commanding officer intends to achievethe established goals, respectively his approach on the way in which the organisationhas to function in order to be a successful one, using his professional abilities and theorganisation resources. In this category, an almost unlimited resource for the systemis the human one.

Defining the performances is strictly attached to the way in which the human resourceis made aware of, mobilised, available and oriented to a particular target. A systemperformance is, above all, a matter of culture.

Towards a culture of performanceCommand strategy is, without doubt, an action of the commanding officer supported

by the organisation, to the extent to which it manages to combine the general interestsof the institution with the personal expectations of its members. Consequently, commandstrategy does not have to be conceived, nor perceived as a simple action plan, but ratheras a dynamic process that allows one to look in the future, usually on a medium term(2 to 4 years). Within this process one should have in view the purpose of the organisation(the mission), the requirements, the way it should look like to be able to fulfil the mission(the vision), and the actual steps to be made in order to reach the desired results(the goals). In this triad – mission, vision, goals – performance represents the mechanismby which the energies and creative potential of the organisation is triggered and madevaluable through human action.

1 Robert S. Kaplan, David P. Norton, The Balanced Score Card: Translating Strategy into Action.

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Opinions • Arguments • Certitudes • PerspectivesEvaluation (measurement) of performances is possible with the help of performance

indicators. These are quantity and quality expressions of the results in a process thatengulfs the entry elements, the internal mechanisms and the final products. Establishingthe performance indicators is a part of the organisational management and stands basefor any efficient measurement system. The performance indicators have to be quantifiableand measurable, relevant for the field they refer to, easy to understand, substantial fromthe point of view of the value they express, measurable in time, comparable and trustworthy.

The measurement of performance helps us to transfer the organisation’s mission,its vision and strategy into tangible goals. The levers by which the commanding officerpursues the implementation of his command strategy, respectively the fulfilmentof the goals of his strategic plan, are closely related to the evaluation and measurementof the performances of the systems he leads. The relationship between the two elements,i.e. between the establishment of a strategic command plan and a performancemeasurement system is the key to the efficient functioning of the whole edifice.The existence of a performance measurement system, without a strategic planningin the above defined sense, will provide information about how fast we are going,but not about the fact that we are going in the right direction or not, as well as a goodplanning without a performance measurement system will help us to go in the rightdirection, without knowing when we will reach our goals.

Talking about the need of a performance culture in the military field meansreconsidering competition, the honest spirit of competition, as well as building the teamto represent and to be represented by. The performance culture can be a part of thetransformation process. If we accept that this process has to start with ourselves,we have to start from the beginning, that is with reconsidering the values we subscribeto and of the landmarks which guide our steps in the military.

Within this type of philosophy, the approach of performances as part of daily militaryactions command strategy can only put next to each other the institution we serveand the dynamic and successful elements of society, connecting it, through the presentday, to the challenges of the future.

eyond being the century of the most powerful empires of the worldand their sudden extinction, the century of the only two World Warshumankind has been confronted with so far and the most extraordinary

THE NATIONAL INTEGRATEDTHE NATIONAL INTEGRATEDTHE NATIONAL INTEGRATEDTHE NATIONAL INTEGRATEDTHE NATIONAL INTEGRATEDCRISIS MANAGEMENT SYSTEMCRISIS MANAGEMENT SYSTEMCRISIS MANAGEMENT SYSTEMCRISIS MANAGEMENT SYSTEMCRISIS MANAGEMENT SYSTEMStructure and Conceptual MilestonesStructure and Conceptual MilestonesStructure and Conceptual MilestonesStructure and Conceptual MilestonesStructure and Conceptual Milestones~~~~~ ~~~~~

Colonel Marian BUCIUMAN, PhD~ Chief of the Operational Centre for Military Command ~

Lieutenant Colonel Viorel RO{~ Staff Officer, the Operational Centre for Military Command ~

discoveries, the 20th century is the one when the crisis phenomenon was conceptualiseddue to the huge number of such kind of events and their global effects. Now, the crisis,as well as the war, has become a universal notion, as a consequence of the large spectrumof hazards and threats within the international security environment, which could generatea variety of subsequent crises.

Crisis and crisis management conceptCrisis and crisis management conceptCrisis and crisis management conceptCrisis and crisis management conceptCrisis and crisis management conceptwithin the contemporary security strategieswithin the contemporary security strategieswithin the contemporary security strategieswithin the contemporary security strategieswithin the contemporary security strategiesAlthough the crisis phenomenon is present in all international organisations

(UN, NATO, EU or OSCE) security strategies, a consensus regarding the definitionof the term has not been reached yet, as it is a very complex phenomenon with a verylarge spectrum of manifestation.

We appreciate that crisis may be defined as “a special and abnormal situation,at national or international level, which represents a threat to the fundamental values,the political, economical and social balance and stability of the country, the fundamentalrights and freedom of the citizens, the material and spiritual values, the environment,the interests and the objectives of Romania as state, as well as the accomplishmentof the international obligations of the country, for which the adoption of special measuresis necessary, through unitary action of the appropriate national systems”.

Each crisis is unique and it is necessary to solve it in a specific way, accordingto its particularities, and the crisis management represents the planned activities ensembleto solve critical events/situations, to come back to normal status.

At first sight, crisis management is, by definition, a reactive concept, meant to eliminateor diminish the effects of a critical situation. But, the main challenge of crisis management

B

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is to anticipate those critical situations that can become crises and to take gradual preventivemeasures to stop this evolution, which gives this process a preventive character.

For this reason, crisis management should not be seen as a process that startswith a crisis, it is a permanent process, even when the situation is a normal one, as it hascomponents regarding security environment monitoring, identification of the signs thatforeshadow a crisis, warning of the response system and use of preventive measures.

The significant increase of asymmetric threats in the international securityenvironment has caused crisis management to become an essential componentof international organisations security strategies – UN, NATO, EU, OSCE etc.Particularly, both NATO and EU identify this field as fundamental mission whichinfluences the entire transformation process – at NATO level, and to realise – to EU,the command and forces structure, as well as draft agreements to increase theseorganisations capability to face the new asymmetric threats.

In this context, NATO Crisis Response System ~ NCRS which entered into forcein September 2005, was conceived so that it could ensure training, operationalityand functionality at optimal level for all NATO command and execution structures,and, at the same time, provide a set of options and measures to ensure a unitaryand rapid reaction, under a strict political control, to respond in short time to the all crisissituations spectrum, including those that are subsequent to Article 5 of Washington Treaty.

The main experimental projects, developed now in NATO, are to optimisethe informational-decisional process, to enhance the Alliance reaction, to face every crisiswhich can affect the organisation security. Crisis Management Fusion Centre and NATOCommon Strategic Picture are two examples in this field.

NATO Crisis Management Fusion Centre ~ CMFC is a tool to decision supportat high strategic level – NATO General Headquarters, having as goal the developmentof better training and better reactions in crisis situations. The Centre will representa systemic capability, personnel, structures, methods and infrastructures ensemblenecessary to obtain and disseminate information and other knowledge necessaryto develop the crisis management process and to allow the political – military decision-making factors at Alliance strategic level to take better and faster decisions than a potentialenemy. This centre will have the role to centralise all information related to internationalsecurity environment, which can be involved in crisis evolution, to integrate this informationin a comprehensible unitary set of knowledge specific to the dynamic of each crisis.

NATO Common Strategic Picture will represent the data and information from securityenvironment ensemble that represents the basis for the achievement and, subsequently,maintaining at strategic allied level, the permanent situational awareness of the possiblebreak out of crisis in NATO area of interest or the development of some present crisis.The picture will include information on the most important events, forces status, warningand status indicators, immediate decision elements, geo-spatial information, graphicanalyses on the relevant fields regarding crisis development – political, military,economic, civil, infrastructure etc., all integrated and shown in real time, in a clear,recognised and relevant format for all users, but, at same time, flexible and adaptableto the established requirements of decision-makers.

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Both programs were already experimented during the last NATO crisis managementexercise, CMX 06, between 1-7. 03. 2006, proving its utility and we consider that it will beimplemented in the strategic decisional structure at allied level in a relatively short time.

Crisis management at national levelCrisis management at national levelCrisis management at national levelCrisis management at national levelCrisis management at national levelAccording to foreign policy objectives and engagements assumed under treaties

and agreements, as well as to promote Romania’s position as promoter of internationalsecurity and stability, our country has to be ready to prepare, develop and sustainthe participation of some military and civilian forces and means at a large spectrumof multinational operations, to solve some crisis situations which can affect nationalor international interests.

The main types of threats, which are at the basis of the new Romanian SecurityStrategy, as international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction proliferation, totalitarianregimes which support terrorism, the crisis situations in the proximity of the countrydraw the developing directions of national defence and security capabilities.

Now, at national level, solving crisis is based on stipulation of actual laws, whichestablish the measures taken on national territory in special situations when severethreats to national defence or security, to constitutional democracy occur, to preventor limit disasters or for disaster relief. These measures are, primarily, non-militaryones, which include political, diplomatic, legal, economic, informative-educativeand moral-ideological measures and last, the military measures, applied separatelyor combined, to prevent and solve crisis when they occur, respectively to stop theirre-apparition and recrudescence.

Despite it, there is not a unique national system for crisis management in Romania.Present laws are insufficient and do not cover all spectrum of crises and, at national level,there is not a unitary action strategy against the entire crises spectrum. From a structuraland legal point of view only the aspects concerning emergency situations or preventingand fighting terrorism are regulated.

In the emergency field, seen as a form of crisis, the National System for the Managementof Emergency Situations has been already established and designed to work underthe coordination of the Ministry of Administration and Interior, mainly consistingof emergency situations committees and operative/operational centres, set up at nationallevel, as well as at the level of ministries and other central public institutions or thosefrom Bucharest, other counties and cities.

The Ministry of National Defence, together with all the other componentsof the National System for the Management of Emergency Situations, takes partin the actions for limiting and removing the consequences of emergency situations,ensuring the accomplishment of 12 support functions assigned to it.

Within this framework, at the level of the Ministry of National Defence,the Ministerial Committee for Emergency Situations was created, as deliberative structure,for the management support, meant to assist the decision-making process of the Ministerof National Defence, as well as to endorse, plan, guide and control the military forcesand means taking part in preventing and managing certain emergency situations.

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Opinions • Arguments • Certitudes • PerspectivesDuring the participation in missions of intervening in emergency or civil protection

situations, the operational command of forces and means belonging to the Ministryof National Defence is fulfilled by the General Staff, through the agency of the MilitaryCommand Operative Centre, namely its Operative Centre for Emergency Situations.

In the field of countering terrorism, the Terrorism Preventing and Fighting NationalSystem was created, under the coordination of the Romanian Intelligence Service, which isresponsible for intervening with forces and means in order to neutralise the terrorist actionson the national territory, through the Terrorist Actions Coordination Operational Centre.

The Ministry of National Defence has the obligation to cooperate with the RomanianIntelligence Service and the other public institutions with prerogatives in the field of thenational security for preventing and fighting terrorist actions, the latter having directresponsibility for managing the crisis situations generated by the actions of the terroristgroups upon military objectives. In this respect, the Antiterrorist Actions and SpecialOperations Service functions at the General Staff.

As far as engaging in the settlement of certain international crises that affect thenational interests and those of the international community is concerned, one may noticethat the Romanian Armed Forces must be capable to make ready, deploy and sustainmilitary contingents, having different sizes and structures, in different theatres of operationsin the structures of the international forces taking part in peace support multinationaljoint operations, within NATO or other coalitions of states.

The modified text of the Constitution of Romania stipulates (Article 118)the dimensions in which national defence and security must be approached. The SupremeCouncil of National Defence acquires enlarged prerogatives for unitarily organisingand coordinating the activities regarding national defence and security and those concerning“taking part in maintaining international security and common defence in the militaryalliance systems, as well as in actions for peacekeeping or peace re-enforcement”.

Romania’s engagements, as NATO state and future EU Member State, as well asthe necessity to adapt the national security strategy to the new types of confrontationshave represented important elements for analysing the legal frame and the existingcapabilities at national level, thus resulting the necessity for redesigning and harmonisingthe domestic laws and tools for implementing political and political-military decisionsat national level, through which crisis response measures to be adapted and becomecompatible with both international organisations requirements, procedures and structures.

At the same time, taking into account that, according to our opinion, the multinationaloperations will be the main ways for intervening in future conflicts, we believe thatRomania’s taking part in these operations should be seen as a problem concerning thepromotion of national interests, considering that one cannot seek to obtain securityguaranties in the future security architecture without actively taking part in its creation.

National Integrated Crisis Management SystemNational Integrated Crisis Management SystemNational Integrated Crisis Management SystemNational Integrated Crisis Management SystemNational Integrated Crisis Management SystemThe inherent complexity of crisis situations in the last years, be they internal

or international, as well as the participation in CMX-type NATO crisis response exerciseshave reconfirmed the necessity for the existence of a host of specialised actions,which should be based on a unique conception in the field of planning and organising,


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as well as the necessary procedures and measures that must be put into effect at political,diplomatic, economic, military, social, religious, ecologic etc. level in order to eliminatethe effects of crisis situations and come back to normal. In this context, it is necessaryfor domestic laws to be complemented and a unitary legal and for institutional frameto be established, capable to integrate in a unique system, at national level, the structureswith responsibilities in the crisis management field and to coherently and flexibly providethe management of the entire range of crisis situations – from civil emergency situationsto crises having a military nature.

Basically, the National Integrated Crisis Management System ~ NICMS, which wasproposed through the draft of the law with the same name, has to be developed so that,through operationalisation, it could ensure compatibility with NATO principles and existingprocedures and interoperability with Alliance similar specific structures and, at the sametime, it could have the necessary flexibility to consequently adapt to EU crisis managementmechanisms. In addition, it must be capable to respond to a large range of crisis situations,at national level, and to provide circumstances for actively taking part in internationalcrisis management, since Romania is member of international organisationsand in accordance with the agreements it is part of.

NICMS must provide: civil emergencies management, riot control, terrorist crisismanagement, weapons of mass destruction proliferation crisis management, participationin crisis response operations, other than common defence: peace support, searchand rescue, humanitarian operations, maritime sanctions and embargo, participationin self defence and common defence.

In order to efficiently respond to the challenges of the security environment,we reckon that NICMS has to accomplish the following requirements: to be establishedand work as an integrated crisis management system, capable to respond to the entirespectrum of crises at national or Alliance level; to provide the necessary political control,both at national and Alliance level for applying crisis response measures; to increasethe interaction between civil and military structures with responsibilities in the field; to becapable to efficiently respond to warnings sent by the Intelligence and Warning NationalSystem or by the warning systems that are specific to the international organisationsinter-connected with NICMS (i.e. NATO Intelligence and Warning System ~ NIWS);to ensure the celerity of the decision-making process and shorten the time for response;to provide the autonomy, complementarily and interoperability of the system components.

The NICMS represents an integrated and flexible ensemble of civil and militarycrisis management structures, mechanisms and procedures. The systems withresponsibilities in managing the various domains of manifestation of the already existingcrises – emergencies, fighting terrorism will be functionally integrated in NICMS,as its components, but with autonomy, so that they could become operational and reactaccording to the nature, intensity and dimension of the crisis. At the same time,the possibility for NGOs and other juridical personnel to be able to cooperate with NICMSin the actions meant to eliminate the effects of crises must be provided, on conditionthey comply with the provisions of the national management plans for these situations.

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Opinions • Arguments • Certitudes • PerspectivesThe NICMS organising framework proposed by the draft law is based on the

conception according to which crisis management is an integrant part of the nationalsecurity field and is gradually achieved according to the crisis nature, dimension, complexityand intensity, the integrated coordination of the measures for preventing, eliminatingor limiting being exercised, according to the law, by the Parliament, the Presidentof Romania, the Supreme Council of National Defence or the Government. These authoritiesestablish the structure directly responsible for the operational command of the crisismanagement process, according to the crisis’ nature, dimension, complexity and intensity.

In this respect, the NICMS is organised according to the “system of systems”concept, having three major functional components – command, execution and support.

The architecture of the system’s command structures is configured on three levelsof competences, as follows:

• integrated political coordination, meaning exerting the political will and controlover national reaction – fulfilled by the national authorities, according to the constitutionalprovisions of the law in force;

• operational command at national level, which expresses the integrality of thecommand and coordination measures adopted by the political factor – through operativeand operational centres, as well as other structures existing at the level of the publicinstitutions appointed by law (the Ministry of Administration and Interior, the Ministryof National Defence, the Romanian Intelligence Service), as permanent technical bodiesfor supporting the political-military decision at strategic level;

• sectorial operational command, at the level of the other central or local structureslevel with crisis management responsibilities, the operative and operational centres,as technical specialised structures level, which will become operational, accordingto the crisis type.

Basically, the coordination of crisis management such as civil emergenciesand public order control, at national level, is fulfilled by the Ministry of Administrationand Interior, the security crisis in the defence field being under the responsibility of theMinistry of National Defence and those in the antiterrorist field, of the RomanianIntelligence Service. In complex crisis situations, which cover at least two of the domainspresented above, that being, in fact, the characteristic of most of the security crises,the authorities of the state will decide which organisation will take charge of the responsibilityfor the integrated management of the respective crisis.

The NICMS’s execution component consists of the range of structures, humanresources and specialised means available for the public organisations and authoritieswith responsibilities in crisis management and other structures or emergency professionalor voluntary constructions, stipulated by law.

The support component consists of: The Intelligence and Warning System, comprising a host of structures, procedures

and equipment necessary for discovering and monitoring the signs of an internalor international potential crisis emerging and its evolution;

The Communication and Informatics System, which encompassesthe communication and IT resources and services provided by central and local public


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authorities, as well as by public operators and authorised contractors for resourcesand communication services and IT;

The Public Communication System, which includes the specialised structures,resources and means available for the authorities and public institutions with responsibilitiesin crisis management.

NICMS must provide the timely and coherent development of crisis managementprocess, which, basically, is structured and organised on five distinct phases, draftedfor crisis of utmost complexity, according to the principle which states that, if thisdesideratum is to be fulfilled, the system will be able to settle a low intensity crisisas well:

• Phase 1 – Identifying and warningon a potential or current crisis is the phaseof transition from normality to the crisis status,in which the Intelligence and Warning Systemis the main element, able to provide the signsfor the emergence of a crisis which can affectnational security.

• Phase 2 – The situation assessment, duringwhich the crisis effects assessment process starts– in the political, military, civil emergency etc.fields, is meant to provide the state authorities witha comprehensive technical picture on the crisischaracteristics and the existing or potentialimplications, based on which the decisionon a course of action for settling the crisis is taken.

• In contrast with the previous phases,which are descriptive in their essence, Phase 3– The development of response options, seeksto develop the crisis response strategy. The finalgoal of this phase is to draft the Initiating Directiveof Integrated Response and to start, if necessary,the operational planning and/or activating the civilemergencies planning arrangements, if the crisis

was not settled during this phase. The InitiatingDirective must set the strategic objectives,the status of the desired outcome, the responseoptions, the missions, as well as the existingpremises and limitations.

• Phase 4 – The integrated crisis responseplanning and development is the most importantphase of the entire crisis management process.The Initiating Directive will be effected throughthe concept for operation (CONOPS), followedby the operation plan (OPLAN), during thesecurity crisis occurred in the defence field or theone of fighting terrorist acts. For non-militaryoperations, other specific steps will be executedas well, such as putting into effect the agreementsin the domain of civil emergency, public ordercontrol etc.

• Phase 5 – Come back to stability – representsthe phase of reassessing the situation and,depending on its evolution and goals achievement,ends with the redeployment of forces and meansthat took part in the crisis settlement.

One should notice that passing through the 2 to 4 phases is not mandatory.Depending on the efficiency of employing preventive options and certain responsemeasures during the first stages of a crisis, it is possible for it not to degenerateand for the return to stability to be made without the phases 3 and 4. Nevertheless,the entire process must be seen as a cyclic development, so that, depending on thedevelopment of new course of action, the process could be restarted in order to developa new course of action, no matter it means an escalation or a de-escalation of the crisis.Moreover, crisis management must be seen in close connection with the operationalplanning process, both being complementary as far as applying the crisis responsemeasures and elaborating/implementing the operation plans are concerned.

Another important aspect is represented by the fact that, for these crises responsemeasures to be functional, it is necessary that a structure of forces ready to interveneto permanently exist, in the domains crises manifest, such as civil protection forces,gendarmes, operationalised military units etc.

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Opinions • Arguments • Certitudes • PerspectivesAlthough, in the predictable future, no major danger of a classic military type

can be foreseen in the geopolitical and geostrategic area of Romania, nevertheless,we reckon that the increasing classic risks and threats, among which we can mentionterrorism, organised crime and the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction,can generate different system crisis, especially in the security field.

Mention should be made, in this respect, that the thorough changes causedby passing from the “common defence” philosophy to the “common security” one mustbring improvements not only from the conceptual point of view but also from the structuralone that of forces construction, namely the response strategies, whose putting into practicemore and more strikingly prefigure the need for using specialised military forces in thecrises management process.

The establishment of National Integrated Crisis Management System seeks to fulfilthe basic requirements of the informational-decisional process at strategic level, so thatRomania could adequately respond to the new typology of asymmetric risks and threatsboth on national territory and during crisis response operations everywhere in the worldthrough: informational superiority, decisional supremacy, decisional act celerity, shortertime to react.

The presented quartet processualy manifests, each of its element inter-conditioning,the celerity of the decisional act and decisional supremacy being based on acquiringinformational superiority. Finally, these first three objectives of the strategic commandcontribute to reducing the reaction times of the entire response system, this representingthe main characteristic of a rapid, efficient and coordinated response in crises situations.

We consider that providing the functionality of NICMS during a crisis will beconditioned by the existence, even in peace time, of certain operative response structures,with specific functions and framing the selected personnel on positions and providingits stability. The necessity for training at peacetime is called for as well, through differentforms of instruction, both of the system in its whole and its components specialisedin the management of different types of crises.

In order to provide an increased viability and efficiency to the National IntegratedCrisis Management System and a rapid and efficient reaction, one is required to draftand adopt a series of “Stand by” normative acts, able to cover the entire spectrumof crises, such as contracts for renting and providing services etc., which must beactivated depending on the type of the crisis.

Considering that an important factor of the efficiency of the crisis managementprocess is given by the quality of the information flow from the civil and militarystructures, with major implications on a timely response reaction, it is necessary to integrateall these institutions in an adequate analytic assessment system and to completea communication matrix at institutional-governmental level, in accordance with NATO’ssecurity requirements.

The capabilities meant to settling a crisis situation must be grounded on the existingresources and the laws elaborated in advance. One must take into account the necessityof correlating the deployment of human, material and financial resources in the theatresof operation, at the Alliance’s request, with the possibility of concomitantly providingthe necessary capabilities to manage a new crisis situation.

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In conclusion, we reckon that Romania must redesign and adapt the informational-decisional structure, the force and means structure, as well as the host of trainingstrategies of the two already mentioned components, so that it could efficientlyand timely respond to the entire spectrum of crises on national territory and activelytake part in the entire range of missions specific to the crisis response operationsat international level, in keeping with the agreements it has been part of.

Selective bibliography

*** Constitu]ia României, Bucure[ti, 2003.*** Strategia de securitate na]ional` a României. Garantarea democra]iei [i a libert`]ilor fundamentale,

dezvoltare economic` [i social` sus]inut` [i durabil`, aderarea la NATO [i integrarea în UniuneaEuropean`, Bucure[ti, 2001.

*** Strategia militar` a României, proiect, Bucure[ti, 2004.*** Ordonan]a de urgen]` nr. 21/2004 din 15/04/2004, Monitorul Oficial, Partea I, nr. 361

din 26/04/2004 privind Sistemul Na]ional de Management al Situa]iilor de Urgen]`.• Locotenent-comandor ing. Gelu Alexandrescu, c`pitan-comandor Gabriel-Florin Moisescu,

Aspecte privind gestionarea crizelor, Buletinul Universit`]ii Na]ionale de Ap`rare, nr. 1/2004.• Maior Ioan-Constantin Stan, Situa]iile de criz` [i gestionarea acestora, Buletinul Universit`]ii

Na]ionale de Ap`rare, nr. 2/2004.

*** NATO Crisis Response System Manual.

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In the early 1990s both civilians and the military realised what they had “to do”,but few knew how “to do” it. In a relatively short term, the basic constitutional proceduresand the primary institutional capacities were established for the development of democraticcivil-military relations1.

Civil-military relations generally refer to the interactions between armed forcesas institutions and the sections of the society they belong to. In terms of a generaldefinition, the democratic civil-military relations stand for the efficient managementof security, based on the principles of democracy, as well as of the governmental agenciesassociated with the above-mentioned field.

Generally, civil-military relations focus on the relative distribution of power betweenthe government and the military forces of a country. They imply a process in which civilcontrol is measured and assessed weighing “the military’s and the civil officials’ influenceon making state decisions on war, domestic security, defence and military policy (that is,the way, dimension and operating procedures of the armed forces)”.

As far as we are concerned it is considered that “Romania has been a model of civil-military relations since the very Middle Ages. Since a 10,000 people armed forces woulddefeat a 500,000 soldiers, belonging to the Ottoman Empire, it becomes obvious that we wouldhave been rapidly destroyed unless civilians had cooperated with the military”2.

Taking another example from the recent history of our country, one can assertthe fact that, undoubtedly, the relations between civilians and the military duringthe Revolution of December 1989, in addition to being an actual need, worked reallyefficiently, it is true, on an informal background.

Lately, following conflicts, beginning with Somalia and ending with the interventionsin Afghanistan and Iraq, the urging problems have occurred since the armed forces’retreat or the beginning of their retreat, while the reconstruction and the management

C I M I CCivil-Military Relations

at Operational Level ~~

Colonel Florentin UDREA~ Chief of the Civil-Military Cooperation Office ~

1 Ionel Nicu Sava, Civil-Military Relations, Western Assistance & Democracy in South Eastern Europe,Conflict Studies Research Centre, 2003, p. 3.

2 HSH Prince Radu of Hohenzollern-Veringen, Impactul rela]iilor civil-militare asupra securit`]ii,Adev`rul, nr. 4831, 18 January 2006.


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of the given areas were requiring a co-operation framework among all the actors in thearea: central (local) public administration authorities, military forces, IOs and NGOs,civil populace etc.

For this purpose the establishment and operationalisation of an adequate capability,represented by the civil-military cooperation ~ CIMIC, was necessary in order to establishrelations between the above-mentioned actors.

In this kind of situations, CIMIC, as a means of putting into practice civil-militaryrelations, does not do anything but reproduce with high fidelity, at operational and tacticallevels, what civil-military relations define at strategic level. CIMIC has actual influenceat strategic level, and it contains elements of military strategy, but its actions are confinedmerely to the above-mentioned levels.

The relativity and circumspection with which civil-military cooperation, as a distinctactivity, is derived not from the lack of definitions but from the lack of strategies thatharmonise all non-military phenomena contributing to the military success. Paradoxically,if we tried a purely random enumeration we would see that the non-military elementsthat contribute to the military success overwhelmingly outnumber those within the force3.

The difference of values between armed forces and society, determined by thevery cultural difference between these two systems is a well-known fact. In this case,the role of civil-military relations and implicitly that of civil-military cooperation is to fillthis “gap”.

CIMIC comes not only to “fill a gap” but also to essentialise those military-civil concernswhich should harmonise interests as well as means, methods and mainly the resourcesnecessary to achieve the final objective: the successful completion of the mission.

For instance there are serious disputes regarding the negative influence of PSOtype operations – Peace Support Operations/CIMIC on the strictly military skills of thearmed forces. In other words, these kinds of missions would alter to a certain extent theirwarlike spirit and their combat readiness in a conventional warfare. This remindsus of the use of tanks or submarines operating in World War I. It was then that the decision-makers complained again about the shifting of the war from its knightly aspect to thetechnical one. At present, the same decision-maker factors (not necessarily military)complain about the shifting of war from its technical aspect to the asymmetrical one4.

This very cooperation between civilians and the military, at both tactical and operationallevels but mainly at the strategic level of the defence policy, is the key element of success,be it the assurance of national security or the successful completion of the military operation.

Actually, the civil-military relations can be a valuable indicator. At strategic level,they indicate, among others, the level of democracy in the given country, while at operationallevel they indicate the efficiency of the military operation.

In 1989 the American William S. Lind – Gary Hart senator’s adviser at that time –together with four active duty and reserve officers, was outlining the picture of imminent

3 HSH Prince Radu of Hohenzollern-Veringen, Impactul rela]iilor civil-militare asupra securit`]ii,Opening lecture of NATO Operational CIMIC course, 15 November 2005, National Defence UniversityCarol I, Bucharest.

4 Conference “Transforming Post-Communist Militaries” – JSCSC 26-29, April 2001.

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Opinions • Arguments • Certitudes • Perspectivesfundamental changes in the art of warfare. Their study was aiming at bringing the conceptof “the fourth generation warfare” into attention and actually into the military culture.

The new conflicts had to be defined by a few basic ideas as follows: “the fourth generationbattlefield is likely to include the whole of the enemy’s society; decreasing dependenceon centralised logistics; a high degree of ability to live off the land and the enemy; small,highly manoeuvrable, agile forces will tend to dominate; the goal will be to collapsethe enemy internally rather than physically destroy him; targets will include such thingsas the population’s support for the war and the enemy’s culture; the distinction between warand peace will be blurred to the vanishing point, possibly to the point of having no definablebattlefields or fronts; the distinction between «civilian» and «military» may disappear”5.

CIMIC and Civil Affairs ~ conceptual delimitationCivil-military cooperation is the expression of civil-military relations at operational

level. While civil-military relations are established at strategic level and, as we havealready seen, they represent a political-military concept, the civil-military cooperation isa military concept that puts into practice a sector of the civil-military relations, namelythat of the collaboration and cooperation of the military with public administrationauthorities, civil organisations and civil populace in order to achieve common goals.

CIMIC is a NATO concept that was used initially and as a rule, during PeaceSupport Operations and which has gained popularity in the last few years. Governments,non-governmental organisations, international organisations and Armed Forcescooperate during operations in order to build new and stable societies or to provideassistance during crisis (civil emergency) situations.

It would not be right to consider CIMIC just a contemporary form of military activity.The idea of cooperation between military and civil authorities in this kind of operationsis not a new one.

It should be mentioned that the term used initially was that of “Civil Affairs” andit has been used since World War II, when American troops were present in almost alltheatres of operations, dealing with various problems generated by the interferencewith the local civil populace and the multitude of cultures representing them. Immediatelyafter the end of the world war the concept was revised and improved, while the firstlarge scale “Civil Affairs” project was Marshall Plan, whose remarkable results are felteven nowadays.

The term “Civil Affairs” is used by the US Armed Forces but the forces that perform“Civil Affairs” activities belong to those, which conduct “Special Operations”. One mustdistinguish between the NATO – CIMIC concept and the American “Civil Affairs” concept.While CIMIC refers especially to the cooperation between NATO commanders on one handand the civil institutions on the other hand, “Civil Affairs” imply a larger scale of activitiesof which the civil-military cooperation is only a part.

5 William S. Lind, Col Keith Nightengale, Capt John F. Schmitt, Col Joseph W. Sutton, Lt Col(r) Gary I. Wilson, “The changing face of war: into the fourth generation”, Marine Corps Gazette,October 1989.


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The idea of civil-military cooperation can be also found in concepts like “Nation Building”and “Hearts and Minds”. They imply the prevalence of military forces in a peace enforcementoperation, which can imply the change of the political structure of the occupied nation6.The “Hearts and Minds” campaigns are initiated in order to gain the support of the localpopulace to a military operation and finally to the government that initiated the campaign.

“Civil Affairs” activities enhance the relationship between military forces and civilauthorities in areas where military forces are present, and involve the applicationof Civil Affairs functional specialty skills, in areas which are normally the responsibilityof the civil government, to enhance the conduct of CMO. Civil-military operations (CMO),in turn, are “the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploitrelations between military forces, governmental and non-governmental civilianorganisations and authorities, and the civilian populace, in a friendly, neutral, or hostileoperational area7.

One of the features of the “Civil Affairs” is the profound regional orientation in settingmissions, which implies more than maintaining a linguistic expertise, up to the efficiencyof communication, having deep knowledge of culture and customs as well as of thenon-verbal communication subtleties, which sometimes go unnoticed at first sight.This aspect resulted in establishing units and subunits specialised for different areasof the world.

According to some authors8, “the distinction between the two concepts is more thansemantic, even if the two American concepts of Civil Affairs and Civil-Military Operations(CMO) include tasks common with those performed by CIMIC and the US accepts NATO’sCIMIC doctrine”. This approach creates problems for the US military in a humanitarianintervention, beyond those faced by other NATO nations9.

However, between CIMIC and Civil Affairs there are actually no big differences,while they have the same purpose. Lately there has been a special concern for movingaway the Civil Affairs and PSYOPS structures from the Special Operations Command~ SOCOM. The majority of US Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS)forces are to be shifted from US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) to theconventional US Army – senior military officials have said. The move was orderedby Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld10.

The CIMIC concept was brought together during the Cold War and it began to takeshape only after the fall of the Iron Curtain and the involvement of massive multinationalforces in the theatres of operations, mainly after the “lessons learned” from the Gulfin the early ’90s.

6 R. Janssens, G. Teitler, CIMIC since 1945. Historical, Political and Operational Contexts in NetherlandsAnnual Review of Military Studies, 2002, p. 6.

7 Joint Publication 3-57.1: Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs, Washington, Department of Defense, 2003.8 Dr. Thomas R. Mockaitis, Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Operations: The Case of Kosovo, 2004,

Strategic Studies Institute, USA. Dr. Thomas R. Mockaitis is Professor of History at DePaul University – USand was member of to the experts team of Civil-Military Relations Centre beside the Naval PostgraduateSchool – Monterey, that participated in 2002, in the elaboration of Romanian Armed Forces CIMIC Manual.

9 Ibid.10 Joshua Kucera – JDW Staff Reporter, Washington, DC, “Civil affairs, psyops shift away from

SOCOM”, in Jane’s Defence, volume 43, issue 12, 22 March 2006.

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Opinions • Arguments • Certitudes • PerspectivesDuring the Cold War, CIMIC used to acquire different meanings, closer to the idea

of Host Nation Support. During the Cold War, CIMIC within NATO was directed to hugeconflicts in Europe likely to happen between East and West. Under these circumstancesthe civil authorities were to support the military mission. The CIMIC key factor duringthe Cold War was the support provided by civil authorities to military commanders.Harbour facilities, railways and roads were used by militaries, enabling the transfer of militaryequipment to areas of operation. The CIMIC concept had a meaning almost oppositeto the present one. Now CIMIC represents a military activity that is part of an operationand that provides support to the central (local) public administration authorities.

Changing this way the meaning of CIMIC into its opposite, that is from civil supportto a military operation into the military operation which aims at supporting civilians – isa natural result of the new type of military operations carried on immediately after theend of the Cold War.

Deployed in Crisis Response Operations, NATO has taken over both humanitarianand reconstruction activities, either to prevent unacceptable human suffering or asa consequence of the fact that empowered civil organisations and authorities, IOs, NGOsor local authorities were not ready to deal with the requirements, or simply for both reasons.

Facing a series of highly complex humanitarian emergencies in Croatia, Bosniaand Kosovo, the Alliance felt the need to develop clear procedures, capable to facilitatethe cooperation between own military structures and the humanitarian organisations,which were providing support. In this respect, NATO defines CIMIC as “the coordinationand cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civilactors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international,national and non-governmental organisations and agencies”11.

The dual aspect of CIMIC activity – the support provided to the civil environmentand concomitantly to the “force” and the operation carried on by it – may surpriseor confuse; however the relation is as clear as possible and simple enough. While thesupport of the “force” is the central objective, the support given to the civil communityis the means by which CIMIC accomplishes this objective.

It is clear that the objective of being an active and efficient “interface” between thetwo systems, can be achieved by a constant contact with the local populace in the theatreof operations, with its representatives, be they local, central, transition authorities or adinterim ones. The essence of this relationship derives from the constant need to haveinformation exchange. In order that the military body can participate along with otheractive actors present in the area in aid actions, which are so useful for a populace undergoingcrisis situations, it has to get in touch with all these people, to gather the necessaryinformation on society, on the way it functions and to learn how to better know each otherin order to cooperate.

Though CIMIC followed the pattern of Civil Affairs, it has developed as a less preventiveand less proactive one in terms of methods, not so exclusive, as it supports the operationsof the coalition forces as a whole and therefore it does not work on the principle of Civil

11 NATO CIMIC Doctrine, AJP-9, 2003.


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Affairs, which supports the success of the operations carried out by the American forcesin the first place. This is why we can say that CIMIC, though theoretically owes a commonNATO doctrine (AJP-9), it is applied in different manners by different countries, whichapproach it according to different schools and patterns.

One of the features of CIMIC is the lack of political involvement. The militarypersonnel are used to help restore economy or institutions like hospitals or schools.Changing the local political structure or the balance of forces in the area of operationsis not part of CIMIC projects.

Though it has never been officially asserted, it seems that NATO’s requirementto have European CIMIC forces is an American initiative. When the United StatesGovernment decided to diminish its contribution to SFOR, European NATO partnerswere also asked to participate in CIMIC activities. Around this time NATO requestedthree European nations, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands to establishtheir own CIMIC capacity12.

At the end of the last century approaches of CIMIC activities outside NATO weredeveloped as for instance the EU CIMIC Doctrine. The CIMIC project is defined by EUas follows: “Specific tasks or activities developed by EU Forces, isolated or within a partnershipwith one or more civil bodies, always in support of the commander”.

In its turn UN suggests the following definition, in which CIMIC represents “mutualsupport relations, joint planning and a constant information exchange at all levels, betweenmilitary structures and humanitarian organisations/agencies, which take action in orderto fulfil common objectives, as a reaction to humanitarian emergency situations” – UK MODcivil-military cooperation philosophy.

The American Armed Forces Manual – FM 41-10, “Civil Affairs Operations”, as ofFebruary 14, 2000, gives the following definition: “CIMIC includes all activities andmeasures taken by UN, NATO, and national commands or headquarters and HN civilauthorities during peace, crisis, or conflict. It also includes the relationship between alliedforces and the government authorities of the respective nations on whose territory armedforces are stationed and will be employed. CIMIC stems from the need to uphold and respectthe sovereignty of the NATO nations and from constraints in the forward basing of unitsfrom the United States and other countries. CIMIC missions vary according to the locationof forces. In NATO, logistics remain a national responsibility. During war, the acquisitionof HNS under CIMIC consists of two types of support-preplanned and ad hoc. PreplannedHNS is negotiated during peace and culminates in a formal, signed document”.

We adopted the CIMIC definition in accordance with the provisions of the NATOCIMIC Doctrine (AJP-9) which we have already introduced in the CIMIC Doctrineand in the national CIMIC Manual.

Therefore the two concepts – CIMIC, respectively Civil Affairs refer to the samefield of activity but from a conceptual perspective they slightly differ. CIMIC forcessupport missions carried on in any theatre, in peace and in wartime, throughout the wholespectrum of military operations. These forces multiply the combat force of any commanderin all spheres of conflict.

12 R. Janssens, G. Teitler, op. cit., p. 13

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Opinions • Arguments • Certitudes • PerspectivesAs one can notice, in any military operation CIMIC forces are used as well; lately

we have witnessed the enhancement of CIMIC activity. As a matter of fact EnhancedCivil-Military Cooperation is one of the seven objectives of transformation in the viewof NATO-ACT (Allied Command Transformation).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

• Doctrina pentru cooperarea civili-militari, SMG/PF-5.2.• NATO CIMIC Doctrine, AJP-9, 2003.• Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2002, Civil-Military Cooperation, A Marriage

of Reason.• HSH Prince Radu of Hohenzollern-Veringen, Impactul rela]iilor civil-militare asupra securit`]ii,

Adev`rul, nr. 4831, 18 January 2006.• Prof. univ. dr. Alexandru Babo[, Florentin Udrea, Curs rela]ii civil-militare, Universitatea

“Lucian Blaga”, Sibiu, 2006.• Dr. Thomas R. Mockaitis, Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Operations: The Case of Kosovo, 2004,

Strategic Studies Institute, USA.• XXX, Globalisation of civil-military relations: democratisation, reform and security, Enciclopedica

Publishing House, Bucharest, 2002.

Translated by Aura TUJON�

he concept of conflict refers not only to the conflicts that have negativeeffects (unproductive ones) but also to the positive ones (productive),which have positive effects on the individual, group or organisation.

COMMUNICATIONIN MANAGING CONFLICTS

Sorin Cristian BANU~ Director, Regional Customs Directorate, Bucharest ~

Positive conflicts can test different ideas, stimulate the generation of alternativeconcerning decisions, prevent the decision-making process from being too fast, raisethe level of understanding problems, increase group members involvement, stimulateinterest and interactions, creative thinking and, therefore, the quality of decisionsand adherence to their implementation.

Conflicts are inevitable in the life of an organisation or group and in any professionalactivity. On the one hand, they may result in prejudicing productivity and, on the otherhand, they may be synonymous with dynamism and progress.

As it is almost impossible to eliminate the sources of conflict within an organisation,it is the manager who has to be capable to identify these sources, to understand theirnature and then, considering both the organisation and the individual goals, to takeaction so that the negative effects could be reduced, while taking advantage of the positiveones. Negotiation is thus the specific form of communication when aiming at conciliatingopposed points of view.

There are intrapersonal, interpersonal, inter-group, intra-organisation or environmentalconflicts. They may occur among individuals/groups that are connected in a way,but either have mutually inconsistent aims, values, interests, or have consistent goalsbut different or competing manners to reach them.

The inter-correlation conflict-communication is determined by the fact thatthe process of communication itself can generate conflicts, may be a symptom of conflictsor lead to conflict resolution. Any type of communication behaviour is, in fact, a wayof externalisation and any communication affects behaviour. As communicationis interaction, it is, therefore, an instrument of interinfluence.

Referring to the characteristics of interpersonal conflicts, Watkins states two axioms,as follows: 1. Conflict can be solved or generated only by means of communicationprocess (using verbal and nonverbal communication), as people can interact and exchangemessages only by communicating. 2. Conflict is generated by the fact that the two “partiesinvolved in conflict” have mutually inconsistent goals. These goals are due to either concretefacts or different systems of values.

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We can mention the following conclusions: It is only communication that helpsparties in conflict to find a solution that is mutually acceptable, in accordance withboth parties objectives; it is possible for incertitude and ambiguous information,generated by defective communication, to lead to perceiving goals as mutually inconsistent;

as different value systems induce different perceptions, they may be considereda source of conflict; appealing to positive communication, emphatic listening,self-exposition can lead to finding a common basis for discussions, common interests,sharing common values; precise communication reduces differences in perceptionsand thus the possibility for a conflict to occur decreases.

Intrapersonal conflict occurs when the correlated cognitive elements are incompatibleor inconsistent, resulting in the individual affected capacity of foreseeing and self-controlling.Inconsistency, perceived as threatening the validity of the individual referential framework,results in incertitude. Once inconsistency is perceived, intracommunication is usedto reduce incertitude but not necessarily inconsistency. Individuals can maintaininconsistency, while trying to reduce the associated tensions.

The most effective method to reduce incertitude is self-explaining (by intrapersonalcommunication) inconsistency: we bring ourselves plausible arguments to understandthe discrepancy; we try to understand the less clear aspects; we ask ourselves questionsand try to answer them. Interpersonal conflict, at group, organisation, or environmentallevel, can have many sources, such as: the functional structure, the division in subunitsand the way activities are grouped; the process of assessing performance; competitionfor limited resources; competition for power and influence; inconsistency betweenindividual perceptions regarding the role each worker has at the working place, differentpersonalities, needs and expectations; desire to be psychically and physicallyautonomous; personal problems originate from outside the organisation.

Conflictual Process DynamicsIn general, there are five interrelated steps in the evolution of conflict: • occurrence

of the conflict generating the source and the shape of latent conflict; • perceivingthe conflict, on different channels and in different ways (the perceived conflict stage – “thereis something wrong”); • clear externalisation of signs characteristic to conflictual situations(conflict comes to be felt – “the boss did not tell me I had to attend the meeting”); • openactions meant to resolve the conflict become manifest( the manifest conflict stage– “many times, the boss has not told me that I have to attend the meeting”); • conflictand taken actions consequences appear (“the boss does not want me to participatein the decision making process, therefore I will sabotage their implementation”).

Latent conflict is the first step in a conflict, characterised by the fact that, under theinfluence of the source of conflict, a specific set of attitudes and sentiments is generated.It can either remain in this stage or degenerate into a irremediably critical situation.

Perceived conflicts may take many forms: latent conflict, yet unperceived; existentlatent conflict, yet unperceived; inexistent latent conflict, yet perceived as existent.The situation can take the form of a perceived conflict, although there has not beenany latent conflict.

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The perceived conflict stage is characterised by the occurrence of an emotionalcomponent, thus those involved can feel hostile, tense, anxious or, on the contrary,when the conflict is a positive one, enthusiastic, more ambitious, ready to take action.

Felt conflict is a “personalised” conflict, having characteristics that are typicalof the individual and, many times, among its manifestations, we can mention defensiveor aggressive communication. There is gossip and news spread around the subject andinformation tends to be distorted. Spirits are low and much time is wasted in unproductiveactions. Group discussions, interpersonal ones and meetings can be, at this stage,a “safety valve”.

Manifest conflict is the observable behaviour, nourished by latent perceptionsand feelings and it can follow either the path of open “fight”, which will generate a winnerand a looser, or that of trying to establish common goals. There are three important formsof intervention in situations of manifest conflicts: negotiation, mediation and arbitration.

Negotiation is the process of communication that aims at reaching agreement.The two parties involved work together in an attempt to craft outcomes that servetheir mutual interests. If it is not possible, mediation is resorted to.

Mediation is the form of intervention that promotes reconciliation or explanation,interpretation of standpoints so that they could be clearly understood by the two parties.It is, in fact, bargaining for a compromise between standpoints, needs and hostileor incompatible attitudes. Mediation generally presupposes the assistance of a third neutralparty in finding resolution to the problems. This person attempts to help the two partiesin conflict to reach a mutual satisfactory decision. In case mediation does not provehelpful, arbitration is resorted to.

Arbitration consists in hearing and defining the conflictual problem by a person whois skilled or authorised in doing it. The arbitrator acts like a judge and has decisional power.

Conflict Management ApproachThe specialised literature on the issue suggests the fact that, according to the extent

the manager tends to be preoccupied with the success of the organisation or the relationshipswith subordinates, five types of approaches are outlined. Therefore, in case of withdrawalfrom conflict, the manager sees the conflict as having no chance of resolution, triesto avoid the frustration and stress that inevitably accompany the conflict, withdrawingor pretending the conflict is inexistent.

There are different ways of withdrawing from conflict, such as: changing the topic,ignoring some statements, “pushing” responsibilities towards another area, delayingdecision, in hope that the conflictual situation will disappear without intervention. It ischaracteristic to managers who are not self-confident and do not want to be in the positionof facing a manifest conflict, many times because conflict resolution implies communicativeskills the respective manager does not have.

The disadvantage of this approach resides in the fact that it ignores the very conditionsthat have generated the conflict and this does not simply disappear but turns intoa latent conflict. One of the consequences of ignoring the conflict is the communication

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Opinions • Arguments • Certitudes • Perspectivesblockage at all levels, which worsens things. This type of approach is advantageousonly if the conflict does not have any importance.

Accommodation is characterised by the manager’s attempt to approach the conflictso that everyone could be satisfied. He overevaluates the importance of maintaininga good relationship with the subordinates while underevaluating the importance of reachingthe goal. As the manager wants to be approved and accepted by those around him,he will perceive any confrontation as destructive and he will give up when his interestsare in conflict with those of the others around. Accommodation is achieved, for instance,by resorting to humour or by changing the topic when the situation becomes too tensional.The manager tries to provide explanations and to make the others understand.

This type of approach can reduce the felt conflict and can be sometimes effective,on short term. However, the fact that the negative effects of the conflict are not feltat that moment does not mean that the sources of conflict have been eliminated.Accommodation generates a camouflage that can any time disappear; it can also generatebarriers to progress. It is preferred especially in case of low-performance organisationsand it can result in lack of open communication from the top to the bottom and, in thesubordinates’ lack of involvement and refusal to assume responsibilities, which are veryserious problems. Conflict Accommodation may be useful when the problem is notimportant at all, or when it is impossible for the parties involved to reach an agreement.

Power-based approach to conflict is resorted to when the manager attemptsat achieving the goals related to productivity at any cost, without considering the othersopinions, needs, feelings or agreement. He will appeal to imposing constraint, usingdifferent financial, intellectual or ethical means at hand due to the power and authorityguaranteed by his position.

The manager is not able to resort to appropriate communication resources to resolvethe conflict and, instead, makes use of the power conferred by position: the languageused is typical, abounding in words like “opposition”, “fight”, “conquest”, “force”, “constraint”,“destruction” etc. This kind of language generates, through the associated emotionalimplications, negative feelings, frustrations and humiliations. Resorting to force can solvethe dispute for the moment, but, on long term, graver conflicts may occur. Applied withinthe context of a climate of cooperation, only occasionally, when the time is limitedor the situation is on the point of becoming critical, this type of approach may be appropriate.However, if repeated without justification, it triggers about the already mentionednegative effects.

Compromise is situated between the “power-based” approach and “accommodation”and consists in resolving conflictual situations by reciprocal concessions, resulting in mutualpartly satisfaction. It is often used in case of negotiations.

Confrontation is a constructive type of approach to conflicts, as, considering the needfor both productivity and cooperation, it is the only one capable of leading to definitelyresolving the conflict.

Research shows that the most efficient managers approach the conflict in differentstyles following the order below: they start with confrontation, continue with accommodation,


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compromise, power-based approach and, in the worst of cases, withdrawal from conflict.The less competent managers avoid confrontation, as they prefer the power-basedapproach, although they immediately resort to withdrawal, accomodation and compromise.

Conflict Management StrategiesStudying the problems of groups in conflict, A.C. Filley describes three types of outcomes

to conflict: win-lose; lose-lose and win-win.The first two strategies are, mainly, directed towards achieving results, neglecting

long or short time relationships. The general atmosphere is unproductive, each of the partiesfocusing on own interests, points of view or problems. The parties have own opinionsregarding conflict resolution and there is no interest in identifying common interests,shared values or goals, interests that are behind the positions adopted. The conflictis thus extensively personalised.

The win-lose strategy is typical of the following situations: when the “boss syndrome”is present (it is the position for imposing a solution); when the vote is resorted to andthe majority decides; when ideas that contradict the own ones are not supportedany more or are even sabotaged.

The win–win strategy is the optimal form of conflict resolution. It can be appliedif we are not under the time pressure. The parties involved focus their energy on“defeating” the problem, not the people. Both parties agree upon a solution that mutuallyserves their interests. The key of implementing such a strategy is the manager’s attitude,his competency in communication and the existence of a climate of cooperation. In thiscontext, the conflict is accepted by the parties as something normal and useful in solvingthe problems optimally and not as a source of stress.

This strategy can be successful on condition the group manager ensures minimalconditions such as: eliminate the feeling of time pressure; the possibility for direct,open interactions between parties; sharing information; agreeing upon the equal validityand importance of both parties goals; reciprocal trust; all group members are aware ofthe fact that their opinions and work are important for the group; the long term “costs”of different solutions are understood by everyone; group members are used to givingdescriptive and specific feedback; the focus is on common aims and goals, on exhaustivelytrying to provide alternative solutions to different problems, on quality and involvement;different standpoints are tolerated; questions are accepted and asked; leadership is flexible.

Any conflict must have an optimal and mutually accepted resolution. It does notmean that both parties will gain the same thing, but that different goals can be achievedin manners that are acceptable for both parties.

Different points of view can and must exist, as they lead to new points of view thatcan stimulate creativity. We have to sincerely accept the others’ opinions. In this context,it is important that we should minimise hierarchical differences interfering, as theyautomatically place us in the opposing team, inhibiting the optimal conflict resolution.

We have to trust our partner of conflict, not to distort, willingly or not, the processof communication by hiding information, filtering information due to perceptions, fearingto uncover ourselves, which can lead to vulnerability.

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Opinions • Arguments • Certitudes • PerspectivesThe attitude of trust triggers about confidence, while that of mistrust in one party’s

actions promotes a similar attitude in the other. Let us start with trusting until it provesfalse and not vice versa.

Cooperation is preferable to competition, and different opinions play an importantpart in cooperation. Only an incompetent manager, who lacks self-confidence, feels asif in continuous competition.

Conflict resolution is made possible only by an appropriate communication in bothsenses. To be able to implement a win – win-type strategy, it is recommended that thefollowing rules should be observed: using neutral, not emotional language; avoidingabsolute statements, which do not leave room for reconsidering some aspects or changingthe point of view; existence of open questions, especially when there are hierarchicaldifferences, to encourage the interlocutor to express his point of view; avoidingguiding questions, meant to determine the interlocutor to verbally agree with what we state;

applying this rule is more important especially when we are hierarchically superiorto our interlocutor; paraphrasing important ideas to be sure we talk about the same issues;distortions of perceptual nature will be thus reduced; making use of appropriatecommunication style and language (terms known by the interlocutor) to deliver clearmessages; this way, a conflict generated by semantic or emotional distortions is avoided;

not interrupting the speaking person who has the floor, which would nourish the conflict; that person should be let talk as, this way, communication is not importantly distorted; it is many times useful to ask questions, to understand what the source of conflict is; using interactive listening method to be sure that we understand the interlocutors’

feelings and perceptions correctly; appropriate use of nonverbal language; a certainfacial expression or position of the body that suggests challenge may increase the perceivedconflict; paralanguage, especially voice, is extremely important in a conflictual discussion,especially when the emotional state begins to occur; in case of delicate situations it isadvisable that we should use face-to-face communication, not telephone or writing,so that we could appeal to nonverbal language; the physical and psychological contextof communication must be considered; agreeing with some of the interlocutor’s pointsof view may substantially reduce conflict intensity. Total denial will lead the interlocutorto look for new arguments, to try to impose if not by means of consistent arguments,at least through the intensity of his voice.


• General de divizie (r.) dr. Gheorghe Ar`d`voaice, Managementul organiza]iei [i ac]iunii militare,Editura Sylvi, 1998.

• Robert French, Russ Vince, Rela]ii de grup, management [i organizare, Chi[in`u, EdituraTehnico-Info, 2004.

• Ovidiu Nicolescu, Sisteme, metode [i tehnici manageriale ale organiza]iei, Editura Economic`, 2000.• xxx – Colectiv, Managementul schimb`rii organiza]ionale, Editura Economic`, 2000.

he process of questioning people’s social existence has fascinatedand intrigued even the ones with the highest degree of expertisein the field. Besides the beauty of the show offered by some of the subtlest

TOWTOWTOWTOWTOWARDS A PARADIGMAARDS A PARADIGMAARDS A PARADIGMAARDS A PARADIGMAARDS A PARADIGMATICTICTICTICTICAPPROACH TO SECURITYAPPROACH TO SECURITYAPPROACH TO SECURITYAPPROACH TO SECURITYAPPROACH TO SECURITY

IN INTERNAIN INTERNAIN INTERNAIN INTERNAIN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONAL RELATIONAL RELATIONAL RELATIONAL RELATIONSTIONSTIONSTIONSTIONS2nd Lieutenant Adi MUSTA}~

~ Logistics Planning Officer, 811th Battalion Dej ~

minds trying to provide for and against arguments, it still remains the image of the inabilityto come to the same denominator when cooperation should be a guideline. States’ policieswith regard to security are based, in most of the cases, on concepts that outline theircreators’ different positions, which are contrary or even contradictory.

In his article entitled “The Contested Concept of Security”1, Steve Smith arguesthat the concept of security itself is not only difficult to explain but also complex enoughto allow for outlining a neuter, generally viable significance. The above-mentioned authorborrows W. B. Gallie’s interpretations regarding some concepts proper to social sciencesthat cannot be but contested (“essentially contested concepts”). Among them we couldmention “arts”, “democracy”, “religion” and “social justice”. The latter states a seriesof criteria2 that can be used to identify such concepts:

they are liable to be used while formulating good-evil-type appreciations; they denote complex activities; they can be described in different ways and it is likely that their users shouldgive different importance to the component parts of the respective activities; their significance changes in time and these changes are difficult to predict; each party to a dispute recognises that the own interpretation is contested by theother parties. Using such a concept means using it against the other parties; such concepts derive from others whose authority is recognised by all parties; using such concepts requires the possibility or the plausibility for “root concepts”to be improved, as a result of competition.

Following Gallie’s direction, we verify, in our turn, the plausibility of labelling theconcept of security as “contestable”: it is a good thing for us to enjoy security; ensuringstate security is a very complex activity; a brief insight into the main trends in thought

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1 www.ntu.edu2 www.bmjjournals.com

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related to the respective concept allows for better noticing the diversity of approaches,the concept’s alterability, the confrontations, the root concept and its improvements.

Therefore: The Copenhagen School: its main representatives are Barry Buzan and Ole Waever.

In essence, this school of thought pleads for broadening the spectrum of preoccupationin the security domain beyond its military sector, so that five new sectors should beincluded: the political, economic, social and environmental ones. For Buzan the mainbeneficiary of security is the individual, but the object of analysis for a specialist in internationalrelations must be the state as main actor at the sub-state, state or international level.At the beginning of the ’90s, Buzan introduces the concept of “social securitisation”in the interpretation of security equation, through which, beyond state sovereignty,preservation of certain national identity is sought.

In their most recent work, “Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security”,Buzan and Waever abandon state-centrism and focus on developing a regional approachto global security. This attitude is justified by the authors through the Great Powersdeclining tendency to intervene in regions in the world, others than those in their proximity,regions being thus more autonomous and, implicitly, more important.

The Neo-Realist Perspective is state-centric and global. The distribution of materialpower in the world is the one that dictates the international security system configuration.Since there is no bipolarity any more, there will be unipolarity or multipolarity, if nota hybrid of the two. The supporters of this movement main preoccupation is to identifythose processes that cause the change of power poles in the world.

The Globalisation Perspective is especially outlined in the works dedicatedto enhancing cultural and economic interdependencies at global level. Global politicsdeterritorialisation is the most prominent theme in the security domain, tendency which,in more radical approaches, turns state into a powerless actor, as far as internationalrelations are concerned and, in the moderate variant, confers it power that is diminishedby non-state trans-national actors intervention. State is often considered a player in theemergent network of interdependencies, but not necessarily a dominant actor. From a liberalperspective the binomial developed countries-developing countries is favourable to bothparties, so globalisation cannot be a source of insecurity. There are also more pessimisticopinions that draw attention to the danger represented by the expansion of the gapbetween rich and poor, to the contradiction between the liberal ideals of growth and thefinite character of the planet resources, to the danger represented by the Western cultureaggressiveness towards other cultures.

The Constructivist Perspective interprets security as a state that can be attainedthrough communion rather than through power. Security can thus be constructedwhile insecurity is not a per se attribute of international relations (“Security is what statesmake of it.”). Knowledge is, in this context, the main resource when trying to peacefullyshape international relations.

The Critical Security Perspective emerges as a reaction to the classical securitystudies impossibility to treat subjects that are really relevant for the security domainin the post Cold War period. In principle, it militates for defocusing from the militaryaspect and taking into account aspects such as the security of the individual, community

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or his identity. A second critical thinking trend focuses on human emancipation(not in the sense of behaving like being Western) as the sole viable project for humankindsecurity. Human emancipation would mean, according to this interpretation, peoplebeing freed from all humane or material constraints that could prevent them from actingin conformity with what they have chosen to do.

The Feminist Perspective on security draws attention upon women being ignoredalthough, in reality, they are deeply involved in international relations (80-90% victimsof wars are civilians and the majority is represented by women, more than 80% fromthe refugees at global level are women and children, domestic violence is higherin militarised societies). Broadening the spectrum of preoccupation in the security domaintowards the economic or ecological aspects of social life emphasises the necessity thatwomen should be considered active factors both in society and in international relations.The way state is conceived today, does not guarantee every citizen’s security.

The Post-structuralist Perspective interprets the language used in internationalrelations (threats, dangers, fears) as a tool, which, in fact, by identifying, producingand reproducing threats, justifies state existence. Without external threats, the legitimacyof state existence as a security guarantor, as it is today, would be seriously doubted.On the whole, the Post-structuralist contribution to questioning international relationsresides in interpreting political contradictions not as obstacles but as inherent stagesof the process of providing solutions, which prove to be always perfectible.

The brief characterisation of some of the schools of thought related to the issueof security allows us to notice the diversity of standpoints (we have mentioned at leastseven), their confrontation (some movements are shaped as reaction to others)and transformations (the approach to security from the state level to the global one,then laying emphasis on the regional or the individual level) undergone by the conceptsrelated to the ways people can create that particular situation which gives the feelingof safety (the root concept). As a follow-up to the interrogative attempts mentioned,attention is drawn to the importance of considering the “soft” aspects of security,the language used by analysts included.

Following verificationist logic we come to the conclusion that S. Smith’s interpretationis correct. However, the different concepts mentioned do not cumulatively lie on thefoundation represented by the root concept. On the contrary, they remain separate,or even in relations of contrariety or contradiction. The inevitable consequenceon the international relations practice is the lack of a denominator and, implicitly,difficulties as far as establishing a really constructive dialogue between the actors involvedis concerned.

Abandoning the hypothesis of the cumulative character of knowledge can openanother cone of possibilities to humankind, a more promising one, as it is shown bythe current stage of investigations.

Th. Kuhn is the first researcher who, after studying the symbolic transformationswithin communities of researchers, formulates the hypothesis of the discontinuouscharacter of the interpretations people make. Knowledge cannot advance gradually,cumulating new and old knowledge, but by revolutionary leaps that deny previousacquisition. Paradigm shifts, in Kuhn’s terms, refer to replacing old ontological models

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Opinions • Arguments • Certitudes • Perspectivesand the corresponding ways of investigating them with new ones, which are moreeffective. The paradigmatic stage is one denoting the maturity of a subject and, as far aswe are concerned, the study of the security concept seems to rather be describedas follows: “An important stage in the evolution of a subject is, according to Kuhn, thepre-paradigmatic one, previous to the subject being really mature. This stage is characterised,in the absence of “a standard set of methods”, a dominant and unifying paradigm, by:

complementarity of approaches, which, in turn, have absolute “metaphysical” justifications; permanent reconsidering fundamental issues; doubling the dialogue with nature

by a dialogue with the members of others schools or orientations; the existence of seriouscontroversies on methods, problems and criteria, which, most of the time, do not end withan agreement but with a more exact delimitation of different positions; the non-systemic,chaotic character of empirical research”3.

Therefore, as long as the interpretations on security refer to disparate aspects,we can state that they are in the pre-paradigmatic stage. It is thus necessary that researchshould be placed in a global, coherent and unifying theoretical framework that allowsfor naturally considering not only the different aspects mentioned above but also others,which have not been identified so far.

As follows, we will analyse the interpretative possibles as they emerge from adoptingthe framework interpretation of the processual-organic theory in questioning securityissues in international relations.

Here are the fundamental premises of the processual paradigm, which the authorconsiders sufficient for outlining a paradigmatic approach on security:

P1. A priori accepting the info energetic character of existence, in the processual-organicparadigm, people are interpreted as “resultants and expressions of possible connectionsbetween bio processors and their interpreters”4.

P2. By bio processors, we understand those processors of information, which arespecific to human beings, integrating them in the mega-biotic organisation. Bio processorsare complexities, structures, which, by their specific nature, tend to equilibrium.

P3. As a result of the superior capacities to store, connect and deliver information,which are specific to neocortex, interpreters are considered to be bio processors extensions.To encode and process the information provided by bio processors, signs, rules accordingto which signs are processed and associated memories are used by this new capacity.Interpreters are processualities, structures, which, due to their characteristics, tendto change their rules of functioning, re-producing themselves.

P4. Human interactions, after being interpreted and processed, result in establishingand accepting rules that make the common objectives and actions coherent, socialorganisations being thus established. These social organisations may be private or public,depending on the types of necessities they have to face and the emergent interactions.

3 Cited from L. Culda, Dimensiunea epistemologic` a interog`rii existen]ei sociale a oamenilor, EdituraLicorna, Bucure[ti, 2000, p.50.

4 L. Culda, Poten]ele fiin]ei umane, Bucure[ti, Editura Licorna, 2003, p. 22.


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P5. Organisations are those specific social structures that have built up the capacityto coordinate part of the processes that are conditions for their performancesand functioning. The more numerous organisations are, the more complicatedthe networks of the relations between them are, which result in the necessity for neworganisations to appear, to regulate these relations. Nowadays, for instance, we can talkabout companies that must obey the rules imposed by markets, trade unions or employersconfederations and even different thought that include many schools of thought (systemicways of thinking, for instance). The social organisations established this way becomespecialised and thus, in time, useful. To regulate the relations between the latter ones,organisations that have managerial aims are established, meant to generate both socialnorms and public administrations. At the same time, through the networks of connectionsestablished between derived social organisations, the conditions for establishing socialorganisations with integrating aims, such as nations, are created.

P6. The evolutions in international relations nowadays support the hypothesisaccording to which the integration process at regional, or even at continental levelshould continue.

Interpreting the existents as info-energetic organisations helps us to overcomethe false dichotomy between the materialist approaches and those based on processinginformation. To be sheltered from dangers, human beings and social structures neednot only energy but also favourable information.

The distinction between complexities and processualities urges us to be moreprecise: the security of a complexity refers to preserving its functionality, while, in caseof a processuality, its functioning must be analysed in connection with the processof evolution of the respective organisation. In case of social structures (those supportedby social interpreters), insecurity would refer to unfavourable evolution or to lackof evolution. The latter aspect becomes evident once we take into account examplesof organisations that “cannot keep the pace”. Enduring development is a conceptthat naturally finds its place in the framework of processual interpretation and, moreover,expands its significance by considering the necessity of information resourcesmanagement. The soft resources should not be used at random or so that they couldserve only to narrow circles of interests. Instead, those modalities, which ensure a secureevolution for the entire mankind, as its soft potential is not undermined, should be found.

Making the connections established in the social, both horizontally and vertically,from the top to the bottom and vice versa, more explicit determines us to consider security,irrespective of the level it is analysed at, as part of a whole. Man and the social structureshe generates become thus parts of the equation.

All the levels, be they national, regional or global become levels of interest. The briefontology above draws attention towards the connexions between different aspectsof people’s social life (economic, cultural, confessional etc.).

National identity can be an issue of interest when questioning security, but, in theprocessual variant, it is correct that we should talk about “identity in evolution” and aboutthe awareness of this identity as a coagulant factor of different social structures.

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Opinions • Arguments • Certitudes • PerspectivesInformation processing is, in my opinion, the corner stone of establishing securityon the entire planet. To this purpose, organising and disorganising processes, functionaland dysfunctional ones, should be carefully moulded. Knowledge evolution and,implicitly, that of social structures is not cumulative, but marked by discontinuities,by “revolutions”. Different cultural spaces are at different levels of evolution, as far astheir capacities to interpret things are concerned (mythical, mystical, empiric,philosophical, scientific-causal, interactionist or systemic). Belonging to a level or another,as far as the capacity of processing is concerned, implies making use of specificinterpretations that have non-equivalent consequences.

To enjoy living in a better world, in which people are sheltered from the dangersrepresented by other people aggressions, we need to make our information processorscompatible and to direct them towards solving problems by cooperating and notconfronting. Cooperation, however, needs to be supported by highly effectiveinterpretations, so paradigms prove to be the most viable options in this case.

As long as we take action in ideological horizons, it is evident that opinions areheterogeneous and divergent. Not even the scientific approaches, which are in thepre-paradigmatic stage, can provide viable solutions, able to ensure security.

Normal research, subsequent to the paradigm consolidation, requires thecooperation of experts in different domains, time and consistency in pursuing the idealof a better world.


• L. Culda, Organiza]iile, Bucure[ti, Editura Licorna, 2002.• Th. Kuhn, Structura revolu]iilor [tiin]ifice, Bucure[ti, Editura {tiin]ific` [i Enciclopedic`, 1976.

rganisational culture is specific to each organisation in part, springsfrom its history and experience and determines the way the associations’members react when they are confronted with certain situations. It also

REMODELLINGREMODELLINGREMODELLINGREMODELLINGREMODELLINGORGANISATIONAL CULTUREORGANISATIONAL CULTUREORGANISATIONAL CULTUREORGANISATIONAL CULTUREORGANISATIONAL CULTURE

Lumini]a Popescu, PhD~ Lecturer, University of Craiova ~

“leads the fashion” of the individuals’ actions, behaviours and perceptions. The waymanagers do their jobs results in a certain type of organisational culture, and, in turn,the organisational culture generates a certain type of management and action.

O

Taboos, beliefs and values

Anecdotes, myths and symbols

Statutes, parts

and behaviour norms

Traditions, rituals and ceremonies

Employees’ perceptions

and representations

“Typical products”: clothes,

buildings, offices etc.

ORGANISATIONAL

CULTURE

Organisational culture building is a process whichrequires time and intense efforts of accumulationand learning. Once installed, the organisational cultureis rather a combination of processing elements, thana structure in the classic sense of the concept (figure 1).

The essence of the organisational culture consistsof what is shared by the groups of people who formin organisation, the way in which they understandand interpret the world. So, we can state that it isa combination of conscious and unconscious human beings,rational and irrational, of group and individual, amongwhich there are interdependences and has a major influenceover the organisation functionality and performances.

There may be more cultures (subcultures) in anorganisation, owing to the real differences betweendepartments or professional and training differences.In other words, typical forms of manifestation of organisation culture may appear,not only at the level of the organisation organisational subdivisions but also at the oneof different professional groups existing within it.

Irrespective of the particular form of manifestation of the organisational culture(at the level of organisational subdivisions or at the level of the groups having the sameprofession) there are common items that give unity to the organisation as a whole.If conflicts due to the organisational culture forms of manifestation occur, the managementmust achieve convergence between them and must try to develop an organisationalculture as homogenous as possible at the level of the whole organisation.

Figure 1: Organisational Culture Components

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The main role in forming and shaping organisational culture is played by the superiormanagement that can be achieved through: promoting certain values within the organisation,establishing the main directions regarding the approach to the current processes withinthe organisation and establishing models of behaviour for the employees in differentsituations generated inside or outside the organisation.

Currently, the main purpose of organisations is to have a strong organisationalculture, quality-oriented, that supposes the existence of certain values, beliefs, perceptionsand representations based on quality, as follows: • the necessity for the whole personnelto be aware of what “quality” means; • the consistent application of the quality managementprinciples, within the whole organisation, irrespective of the hierarchic level; • the promotionof those values and behavioural norms that support the idea of “quality”, respectivelythe idea that no matter what the purpose of the organisation might be, it can be attainedonly by a constant preoccupation with satisfying the persons who are interested in theorganisation achievements.

In order for the attempt to remodel organisational culture to be a success, it is necessaryfor human resources specialists to start by investigating the current content of it. Researchin the field has emphasised three essential aspects that must be analysed:

organisational culture as norms, beliefs, values; organisational culture as myths, stories, manifestation of language; organisational culture as ceremonial and ritual manifestation forms.

The analysis of the organisational culture regarding the norms, values, beliefs thatexist within an organisation and of the way in which they directly influence the successof the organisation is one of the most important matters for analysis. In addition, this isthe field that can be assimilated by employees both by means of some formal strategiesand by means of different informational materials within the organisation.

Most of the successful organisations have a rich tradition of values, beliefsand norms that come from experience, from testing what might be useful or not in theexistent environment. On the other hand, the standards and beliefs within the organisationare decisively influenced by the persons having well-shaped individuality. These valuesmust be made known and emphasised in as many situations as possible and the negativebehaviour deviations must be punished in order to avoid further similar situations.

Moreover, mention should be made that even if the values and beliefs are knownand shared by the employees this does not necessarily mean that they have reachedan agreement unanimously accepted with regard to all issues but only the factthat they have a minimum of accepted common understanding. It might be possiblefor the employees to agree upon following the beliefs and values of the organisationthey are part of only to keep their position within it.

The second important matter for analysis of the organisational culture is representedby stories, myths, and the organisation specific language that represents items assimilatedin a longer period of time that are not part of a formal program. Most of the times,they reflect tensions, conflicts and aspects related to the workplace security or insecurity,or the desire to control events. Research needs to be made within the organisationso that the management could be aware of the way employees perceive these issues,

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otherwise they can result in a degradation of both the climate and the organisationalbehaviour as well as in diminished performances. This has to be made in due time to allowfor adopting the necessary corrective steps which should minimise or eliminate the possiblenegative effects.

The third field of analysis is represented by organisational culture seen as ceremonialand ritual forms of manifestation. These have the purpose to mix the different culturalforms brought by each individual inside the organisation, to unify performancesand to orient some events within the organisation towards a certain aim. The consequencesceremonials and rituals may have upon the organisation are the following: they showhow certain things are made within organisation; they help with establishingthe organisational identity; they facilitate the people’s work by establishing certainaction rules.

The typology of rituals within organisations according to Trice and Beyer is thefollowing:

• the passing rituals which show the alteration of a status once the person is acceptedwithin an organisation and its replacement with a new one;

• the degradation rituals are included in the socialisation process of a person who isnew within an organisation, especially if that person has previously had a higherstatus than the positions he or she is going to hold;

• the rituals of professional promotion are those that emphasise the new statusand the newly obtained identity by a member of the organisation;

• the rituals of change have the role of emphasising the existence of an organisedstructure and they improve its functioning;

• the rituals of diminution of conflicts are developed as a consequence of thenecessity to solve the conflicts that occur inevitably between people or groups;

• the rituals of integration are those extending the degree of interaction betweenthe divergent groups within the organisation development, after performingvaried actions, the feeling of union and of commitment towards the company.

The employee can become aware of these rituals either by certain socialisationprograms or by direct contact to the work place. Moreover, the knowledge of theorganisational culture, at general level, can be achieved by two ways: at formal level(when the employee reads official documents – for instance the Internal Regulations)and at informal level (by knowing the organisation myths, stories, ceremonialsand rituals).

After analysing the organisational culture with the purpose to reshape it in orderto obtain quality, the following stages need to be followed:

the higher management must establish the general directions to be followedthrough the culture reshaping (for instance to be more client-oriented, to developthe team spirit, to approach the activities more pragmatically, to focus on improvingquality by preventive steps);

to establish exactly what the specific objectives to be attained are in the processof remodelling the organisational culture and to establish the organisational structure

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Opinions • Arguments • Certitudes • Perspectivesthat shall take part directly in the project, the methods of communication betweendifferent groups and the methods of reporting the obtained results;

to establish the main stages of the organisational culture remodelling: creating the general framework for the analysis of the organisational cultureby which the members of the team that shall become the main pawnsof the cultural change are established, team members instructing and training,identifying the necessary data for the culture audit and for the methodsof gathering and processing the mentioned data; the culture audit and formulating the first recommendations by which the dataare gathered (with the help of interviews, questionnaires and direct observations),the data are analysed and preliminary conclusions are formulated and also,the first recommendations are formulated; implementing the actions meant to change the organisational culture whichsupposes: establishing the reshaping program of the organizational culture,instructing and training the personnel involved, putting into practiceand monitoring the planned actions; evaluating the cultural changes, which suppose establishing the organisationalculture components, components that shall be evaluated, gatheringand processing the data, identifying the organisational culture reinforcementitems and establishing the corrective steps that are required if, comparingto the initial objectives, differences occur.

Considering the fact that within an organisation the organisational cultureis the one that influences all the other components as well as the organisation seenas a whole, it is necessary to pay special attention to its reshaping with a view to obtaininga better quality.

The military organisation, as part of society, is submitted, in broad lines, to the samevalues and norms. The organisation specific functions, the fact that it is an organisationwith a strong hierarchy, the members’ commitment to their roles as protectorsand defenders of civilians and of the rule of law, all cause this organisation to have someparticularities regarding the norms and values, myths and beliefs, the system of metaphors,the symbols, ceremonials and rituals as follows: • the predominant values are patriotism,responsibility, courage, lucidity in action, desire to achieve the ordered, self-imposedassumed and internalised tasks, spirit of combat, sense of sacrifice, solidarity,cooperation, military discipline; • norms that are clearly expressed and a little bit stricterthan in case of other organisations; • myths and beliefs that are consistent with theorganisation long history and prestige; • system of metaphors well-established withinthe framework of the highly specialised language and the acronyms used; • symbols,ceremonials and rituals better represented than in case of other organisations, due to,again, the history of this organisation, the large number of members and the importancethe organisation attaches to them.

It is natural for the organisational culture to change in time, to meet the challengesand requirements generated by exogenous factors, so that the organisation could have

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a highly qualitative level, capable of ensuring its adaptability and efficiency, in one word,its evolution. The military organisation is, in turn, subjected to this natural evolution.

As far as the Romanian military organisation, which finds its expression in theRomanian Armed Forces is concerned, being confronted with the challenges generatedby the rapid changes in the social, geopolitical and geostrategic environment, especiallyafter 1989, it undergoes itself a process of transformation, meant to enhance its adaptability,quality and efficiency. Even more important is the fact that the process is managedby the General Staff, which has conceived and devised the Romanian Armed Forcestransformation as a process that is to subsume all the strategies, doctrines, action plansand their implementation until 2025. The guiding document in this sense, unprecedentedin the history of Romania, is named the Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategyand is conceived in accordance with the Constitution and Romania’s commitmentsto NATO and UE, as well as with the regional initiatives. An important part of this strategyaims at components that are related to organisational culture and refers, mainly, to effectiveleadership, professionalisation, and human resources management, all meant to remodelthe organisational culture towards quality, adaptability and efficiency.

REFERENCES

• P. Burloiu, Managementul resurselor umane, Bucure[ti, Editura Lumina Lex, 1997.• A. Manolescu, Managementul resurselor umane, Bucure[ti, Editura RAI, 1998.• R. L. Mathis, P. C. Nica, C. Rusu, Managementul resurselor umane, Bucure[ti, Editura Economic`, 1997.• G. Pâni[oar`, I. Pâni[oar`, Managementul resurselor umane, Ia[i, Editura Polirom, 2004.• www.clubafaceri.ro/info_article/article/1236/

• www.ele.ro/articol_1174_p2.html.

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MILITARY SCIENCEAND

ITS STRATEGICIMPACT

Brigadier (r.) Gheorghe V~DUVA, PhD~ Senior Researcher at the Centre for Defence

and Security Strategic Studies within the National Defence University ~

connexion and the resistance structure of each system and process fostered outof knowledge. Nothing is possible, nothing can be enduring without science. Not evenmilitary science. So much the more military strategy, which cumulates in its domain thetheory, practice and strategic art related to the war phenomenon.

WholenessScience is storing knowledge, system of values, network of pieces of information,

logic and method in the human action alike. Human being is more and more a homoscientificus. The society of the future will be more than an information society, it will bea knowledge society, more precisely a scientific knowledge society, an epistemological society.

The science of human thinking is logics. The science of the human soul is psychology.The science of life is biology. The sciences of existence and human being are, at thesame time, the knowledge sciences – mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, history,politology, psychology etc. – and the nature knowledge sciences – geography,geomorphology, meteorology, cosmology, astronomy etc. –, but all these have relevanceonly in the process of knowledge and human action. Moreover, human action requiresat least four components, which influence each other through a network philosophyand physiognomy: conception, planning, organising, development. These four elementsderive advantage from the network effect, and not only from the feedback. The networkeffect defines and maintains the procedures of the systems, its life and its dynamics.

All sciences find themselves, one way or the other, in the military science, too,which loses its quality of being a particular science, an individual one and becomesa synthesis, an integrating one and, at the same time, a utilising science, a scienceof action, which massively uses the other sciences.

The society of the future will be a society one hundred percent dependent uponscience, a scientific society.

S


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Brig (r.) Gheorghe V~DUVA, PhD

All that belongs to this space of knowledge and of theone of action has science, knowledge as ground as well asstructure of resistance.

The term science is a generalising, a generic one.Science is eminently an outcome of knowledge and a stimulusof knowledge. Human society is based on science, it isdependent on science. Human being cannot live outsidescience. Everything he does – from construction to destruction,from collaboration to confrontation and war – is basedon science. Each activity has its science, namely its principles,rules, concepts and methodology and, at the same time,uses the integrating effect of the other sciences. Each strategyhas and must have a scientific support, a scientific source, which provides it with consistencyand stability. Strategy without science is improvisation and adventure. Or not even thismuch. Because, frankly speaking, there can be no strategy without science.

There are numerous sciences of peace, but also numerous sciences of war. War,no matter how irrational it may be – as far as the numerous destructive results andimplications hard to control and manage are concerned –, cannot be placed outsidescience. Quite on the contrary, it is the war itself that stimulated scientific research,science throughout years. It has always been like this and, unfortunately, it seemsto it will be the same in the future, even if, in the new Age – that we have agreed to namethe Network Centric Warfare Age –, it seems that war, as it becomes more and morea business, acquires new connotations and determinations, especially economic ratherthan traditional ones. It takes its means from not only the military science and technologybut also from those which are not directly military, but which massively influencethe military field and even tend to replace what we call military science.

It is only an appearance, which is sometimes excessively promoted, especiallyin order to move the war phenomenon away from a certain science of war, a certain strategyof war (since it turns into business) and to get it close to the non-bellicose, non-militarysciences. In fact, war keeps its science almost untouched, but we must make mentionthat this kind of science does not resort to the direct principles of the immediate trainingof military forces, means and actions and their development anymore, but appealsto everything that exists today on the planet and can be used at war. This matteris accomplished through policies and strategies to the same extent. Actually, war hasextended its range of coverage outside the military confrontation, campaigns and battles.

Not even this ascertained fact is very new. More than two millenniums and a half ago,the Indian Kautilya, in the 15 books of Arthashastra1, out of which 10 are meant

1 Kautilya (313-289) was contemporary to Alexander the Great. The 15 books of the monumentalwork Arthashastra [translated as Handbook of Profit or The Science of Wealth and Welfare] are: I. ConcerningDiscipline, II. The Duties of Government Superintendents, III. Concerning Law, IV. The Removal of Thorns,V. The Conduct of Courtiers, VI. The Source of Sovereign States, VII. The End of the Six-Fold Policy,VIII. Concerning Vices and Calamities, IX. The Work of an Invader, X. Relating to War, XI. The Conductof Corporations, XII. Concerning a Powerful Enemy, XIII. Strategic Means to Capture a Fortress,XIV. Secret Means, XV. The Plan of a Treatise.

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Geopolitics • Geostrategy • International Securityto diplomacy, economy and war, evinced the true purposes and dimensions of warfare.He wrote: “«That keeping the agreement of peace, I can undertake productive worksof considerable importance and destroy at the same time those of my enemy; or apart fromenjoying the results of my own works, I shall also enjoy those of my enemy in virtue of theagreement of peace»; «or I can destroy the works of my enemy by employing spies and othersecret means»; «or by holding out such inducements as a happy dwelling, rewards, remissionof taxes, little work and large profits and wages, I can empty my enemy’s country of itspopulation, with which he has been able to carry his own works»”2.

Also, Sun Tzu wrote in his famous work “The Art of War”: “Generally in warfare, keepinga nation intact is best, destroying a nation second best; secure the peacefulness of yournation’s cities; the rule is not to besiege walled cities if it can possibly be avoided; your firstduty is to protect the allied states against any kind of insult; laying siege to a city is only donewhen other options are not available; the houses and villages of your peasants must not beexposed to any danger; bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy”3.

War has always resorted to everything that was the most developed on the planetin order to use it in the military confrontation, but this “everything” belonged almostentirely to it. Today, this “everything” – namely everything that means science,technology, nanotechnology etc., scientific research in the respective fields included –is disseminated in the entire society and on the entire planet.

Therefore, military science can no longer remain very pure, but becomes moreand more an integrating science, which monopolises and organises in a system, attractsand captures, stimulates and uses. This matter may probably be one of the reasonsfor which, at the level of the alliances and coalitions, the stress is not so much laidon the rather isolated, privileged study of the military science or sciences, but one resortsto integrating, operational methods, in which it is aimed not so much at the causal links,but at the development of the effects. Therefore, the effect goes to the forefront.After all, the very effect matters. Therefore, the military science becomes more and morea sort of a “black box”, since it is not it that matters, it is not it that goes to the foreground,but the very effects attained. Not even this statement is brand new. The war has alwaysbeen based on effects. The effect has been put in front of campaigns and battles.The predictable effect. The expected effect. The desired effect. But the effect usedto have a limited character during the earlier ages. Today, it tends to become unlimitedand even to get out of control.

That is why nowadays, more than in the previous ages, it is the very effect thatmust be placed under control. Military science, even if it is only a “black box” (meaningnot everybody may gain access to its concepts and means, but only the specialists),must find an answer to the sharp questions that are asked regarding the managementof the effect.

2 General dr. Mihail Popescu, general-locotenent dr. (r.) Valentin Arsenie, general de brigad`dr. (r.) Gheorghe V`duva, Arta militar` de-a lungul mileniilor, vol. I, Bucure[ti, Editura CEPTA, 2004, p. 23.

3 Ibid., p. 273.


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This assertion maycome down to a verysimple scheme:

What ? When ? Withwhat ? With what costs ?With what effects ?

T h e r e i s o n equestion missing fromt h i s equation: How ?

Emergence of the need(Objective and subjective determinations)

Compared analysis

of determination

Establishing

the objective(What ?)

Establishing

the time(When ?)

Establishing the quantum

of forces and means(With what ?)

Costs(With what

costs ?)

EFFECTS(With what effects ?)

To this question responds, to a great extent, the military science. It provides a flexiblesystem of laws, principles, norms and regulations, theories and values that lie at the basisof an effective actional architecture on which the necessary strategies of passing fromdecision to effect are built. Military science does not remain in its ivory tower (it hasnever had something like that), but remains directly connected with action, with life.We might say that it is an operational science, which generates actional concepts.

The fundamental characteristics of the current military science and, so much the more,in the future refer to: escaping from strict categories; wholeness; interdisciplinarity;digitising; the shift towards technology; an increasing operational dimension; effectiveness.

TopicalityMilitary science had and still has its own object of study: the military component

of human action and, mainly, war, not only war in itself, in its dimension of armed conflict,but also the strategy of generating the forces, means and actions required by preparingand leading the war, by clearing its consequences and getting ready for the one to come.Nevertheless, studying the war as a complex social system – polemology – remains oneof the most important components of the military science. Yet, one must take into accountthe new architecture of war, conditioned by:

• the complex determinations of the age we are in;• the restrictions and limits that direct this complex social phenomenon on coordinates

unknown so far, such as the information, the cosmic ones, those of the wave field,the mediatic, geophysical and terrorist ones;

• the new discoveries made regarding the development, in time and space, of socialand military processes;

• the dynamics of hypotheses, experiences and lessons learnt etc.It is for that reason that military science cannot be replaced, but only supplemented,

that is to say taken out of a certain isolation, a relative isolation integrated in the systemof general scientific knowledge, in an epistemology of the action.

In fact, we are dealing with a new stage in the military art, which complexlyrevolutionises the military domain, the so-called revolution in military affairs ~ RMA.

Military science was and still is understood, in general, as being a “cluster of knowledgeregarding the warfare (armed conflict) field, mostly the armed fight prepared and ledwithin it”4.

4 Colonel dr. Constantin Oni[or, Teoria strategiei militare, Bucure[ti, Editura Academiei de ÎnalteStudii Militare, 1999, p. 25.

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Geopolitics • Geostrategy • International SecurityStill, warfare becomes an increasingly complex notion. It cannot be reduced

to the violent dimension of the confrontation, to the armed conflict. War has alwaysbeen a political solution or option, in other words a means of politics, namely its meansof force, its violent one. When all the other means (dialogue, diplomacy, pressure,discouragement, warning, threat etc.) exhausted, one resorted to the last and morerisky of the solutions: war. Nevertheless, although it is seen as a means or as an instrumentof politics, and namely of the policy of force, war is much more than this kind of policy.War cannot be reduced to a maximum of politics, nor to an in extremis policy or a politicalextremism, since this phenomenon has many determinations, some of them placedat intervals in time, other defined on the characteristics of the human being, communityand human activity, on the relationships between humans and human entities.

Thus, warfare is a very complex phenomenon, which cannot be reduced to a battle,to one or many campaigns and not even to a closed interval, defined on a host of violentconfrontations. Warfare is part of the life of human beings and human communitiesand, even if it should not be taken as a fatality, it has a lot of objective determinations,some of them placed in well-individualised systems, others in chaotic processes, in whichthe rule or the law of the variation of initial conditions plays an essential part5.

The relationships established between individuals and especially between humanentities that, in their essence, are political (meaning they are related to an ensembleof interests), are experiencing a permanent setting up, they are dynamic and complex.Their range of coverage is broad and mostly fluid. There are relations of collaboration,partnership, alliance, coalition but also relations of competition, confrontation, someof them with solutions in the political, economic, financial etc. dialogue, others characterisedby conflict from one end to the other. These relations are not immutable, they are not final.Neither the partnerships, nor the collaborations are forever. Neither confrontations arepermanent. It is possible for the intentions of competition or confrontation to be hiddenwithin each partnership and relation of collaboration. In addition, it is very likely that,in certain circumstances, confrontation and conflict would have the collaborationor partnership as solution of temporary or long duration way out. Depending on manyfactors, the relations of partnership, collaboration or confrontation between humanbeings and human entities transform one into another.

These realities, as well as certain statistics regarding the ratio between the timesof peace and the times of confrontation and war have made certain people state that waris permanent, with tempestuous transitions from phases of expectation (quiet, activeor alarming) towards a tense attitude and, in the last phase, towards a violent confrontation,and peace is relative, being defined on the interval of expectation or the one precedingthe expectation. Alongside the tensed attitude, the state of peace becomes doubtful,the differences are increasingly stressed, they become oppositions, and opposition turnsinto conflict. Starting from this point, it would mean that the purpose of peace would be

5 General dr. Mircea Mure[an, general de brigad` dr. (r.) Gheorghe V`duva, R`zboiul viitorului,viitorul r`zboiului, Bucure[ti, Editura Universit`]ii Na]ionale de Ap`rare, 2004, pp. 21-70.


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the recovery following a violent confrontation and the preparation for the next one.This statement is not a simple metaphor, but a reality confirmed by the entire historyof humankind, wherein the periods of peace alternate with those of violent armedconfrontation, confrontation being identified with what we call war.

In fact, the violent armed confrontation, always ended with human losses and damages,represents nothing but the very maximum of war, the peak of trajectory, a seism,a discharge of the energies gathered in time. Yet, war must not be reduced to this peakof trajectory, because it would mean that it would lack its support (the peak is a stageor a point during an evolution), namely what generates and maintains it. War must beanalysed and understood in all its complexity, as a sequence of dynamic states,of transitions more or less sudden from one state to another, so it is not linearand predictable, but non-linear and very hard to anticipate. All we know about waris that it exists, that it is part of humans’ life. Regarding the causes that generate it,the configuration, philosophy and physiognomy, the probability for war to break out,the trajectory it will have, one cannot know many things for sure. What we know refersespecially to past wars.

The analysis of war is usually made afterwards. The purpose of any analysis is,at first, providing the emergence of certain premises for understanding and preparingthe future war, namely the part which is the most dynamic and dramatic in the confrontation,the peak of trajectory (the armed confrontation) of the war.

Military science is nothing else but that branch of science which deals with identifying,locating, defining and knowing this trajectory, namely the causes and laws of the warphenomenon, the military action in general, the circumstances which favour it, determineor impose the military action, the conditions that generate it, the moments that makeit break out and in which it breaks out, more precisely, which determine the stageor the stages of violent armed confrontation, the effects and implications.

“Theory has no practical finality: it does not supply «recipes», it is compulsorily mediatisedthrough doctrine” 6. But military science is placed, as support, in all the componentsof the military art: history of military art; military geography; geostrategy; military medicine;military logistics; military technology; strategy; operative domain; tactics; military action;civil-military action.

In other words, military science is not only military theory, but becomes moreand more a system of systems, namely a meta-system that integrates within the samespace the three great components of the military dynamic systems: military theory;military practice; art of warfare and armed fight.

In addition, military science is present at all the levels of military art: strategic;operative; tactical.

Military science, not only on its whole, but also as far as its components areconcerned, is interdisciplinary. We find in it, at the same time, the traditional sciences– mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, biophysics etc. –, as well as the new sciencesof micro-systems, macro-systems and processes.

6 www.stratisc.org, Hervé Coutau Bégarie, Bréviaire stratégique, prg. 64.

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Geopolitics • Geostrategy • International SecurityScience is no longer a simple instrument. It becomes a factotum, being omnipresent

and omnipotent. It is asked to solve millions of problems from the area of militaryprevention, discouragement and confrontation, not only military, and this is notat everybody’s hand anymore. All militaries (obviously, the ones trained as such) canoperate in a network centric warfare, but few of them understand the extremely complexand complicated architecture of the structures and infrastructures of this kind warfare.In this case, militaries – the ones that effectively operate – and not only, since the warand the action in the confrontation area have already extended to the civil-militaryconcept, know and are able to know everything that they are interested in for fulfillingthe missions, namely they have access to all the data bases needed for that certainaction. However, they will never be able to know everything about this complicatedarchitecture of network centric warfare.

With a view to preparing or preventing the war, all nations adopt the measures theybelieve to be necessary and adequate. One of them refers to establishing internationalorganisations, structures and alliances. International organisations and structures arerestrictive, alliances are active, preventive and dissuasive. Their functioning principleshave a political essence, but the structuring, organisation, definition of competencies,complex actional systems presuppose a remarkable scientific dimension and generativestrategies to the same extent. The science of alliances’ and coalitions’ establishment,consolidation and functioning is, undoubtedly, one of synthesis, with significantreferences to politology, sociology, economy, finance, management, exact sciences,technology, nanotechnology, polemology and military art, especially in the dimensionof the lessons learnt.

An alliance is much more than an enlarged partnership, it is an entity, a constructionwith a complicated architecture and a variable geometry but which does not leaveits initially agreed parameters. In order to be enduring and effective, an alliance needsa very solid structure of resistance, and this structure – political, in its essence, meaningbased on interests – absolutely needs an integrating political concept, as well as a scientificdimension of system and method (of strategy) in order to effectively achieve therespective architecture. It is the very case of the North-Atlantic Alliance.

ModernityMilitary science can no longer be reduced to the fields or the components of military

art. Without excluding this traditional classification, we must turn to the object of militaryscience – studying the laws and principles of warfare, of military action in general –and insert them in the domain of this definition. Military science prolongs more and morein the military action, it passes, as Frenchmen say, from savoir (knowing) to savoir-faire(to have the ability to make) and from savoir-faire to savoir comment le faire (to knowhow to do it).

All the NATO member countries, as well as those that are not part of the Alliance,study the history of military art, military geography, geostrategy, strategy, operativeart, tactics, logistics, military management etc. Some of them have specific connotations,are closely linked to a patrimony, to a certain experience, to certain systems of values


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of great importance at national level. They confer identity and force and cannot missfrom one nation’s system of training for difficult situations, limit situations, war included.In the United States of America, for instance, military history is studied, the battles fromthe American territory are reproduced at 1/1 scale etc. It is also here where the mostdeveloped scientific research in the field of strategy, operative art and tactics, of armamentsand systems of lethal, non-lethal and unconventional weapons, management of crisesand armed conflicts etc. exist. In all European countries, in Russia, China, India, a greatdeal of attention is paid to the study of the history of military art, as well as to the verymodern sciences, with applications in the military field.

As far as the influence of technology upon military art is concerned, we believea distinction between the change (revolutionising) of principles and the fast adaptationof structures (strategy of forces and strategy of means) and actions (operational strategy)to the new possibilities should be made. For instance, during the Second World War,Germany relied on a strategy of fast reactions, based especially on a very well preparedsystem of communications and a strategic concept to the same extent (blitzkrieg).In this way, she managed to impose in front of the French armed forces, which werehanging on to the philosophy of positional warfare, thus neglecting the role of movement,namely the armoured vehicles and aircraft, even if they had enough of this kind of vehiclesto counteract the action of Nazi forces. The delay in the technologic impact over the Frenchmilitary art, especially in the field of the strategy of forces and the one of operationalstrategy, meant defeat and humiliation for the glorious armed forces of this country,at the beginning of the Second World War.

When referring to this painful episode, the Frenchmen trenchantly state that “the biggestinferiority of the French armed forces lies in the brains of their generals. The Headquartersbreviary, the Instruction regarding the tactical use of big units designedly stipulate that thewar of the future will represent the continuation of the precedent war”7. Thus, it is notso much for the German technological superiority to have caused the defeatof the French armed forces, as for the strategic inflexibility of the latter, for the factthat it did not adapt the concepts to the technological requirements, to the evolutionof military science.

The Americans are among the first that have rapidly learned from the experienceof the military confrontations, especially following the war in Vietnam. They haveperfectly understood that the new technologies create the possibility of striking at longdistance, and that has led to the configuration of a few new ways of engaging the forcesand, correspondingly, to some types of wars in which it is believed that they might beinvolved: the low intensity war, the medium intensity war, the high intensity warand, for the last years, the war on terrorism. After the dramatic experience in Vietnam,the American armed forces, as well as the economy and infrastructure, have shiftedtowards applying a new concept of training the forces. According to the strategic visionof the ‘80s, the Americans had to be prepared to wage a war and a half, even two wars,

7 La seconde guerre mondial, vol. 1, Larousse, Paris-Match, p. 47.

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Geopolitics • Geostrategy • International Securityin different regions of the world, wherever their interests would have called for that.As far as the East-West confrontation is concerned, the Americans created, at that time,a rigorous system of action and reaction, based on a concept that has evolved from thedoctrine of massive response to the “Airland Battle 2000”, all of them being subjectedto a policy of damming up the Soviet Union. After the end of the Cold War, this concepthas somehow remained without subject. Yet, technology has further developed, bothin the field of creating some effective systems of research intelligence, information,surveillance, and strike and in the field of conceiving and fulfilling some systems of systems.

Nevertheless, the concept immediately found a new object, a new space of application.Operation “Desert Storm”, for instance, was led not in accordance with a strategy,but in keeping with the strategic concept regarding the airland battle.

The complex social processes – crises and wars included – are analysed by frequentlyresorting to chaos theory. More precisely, the non-linear equations. “By introducingdifferent values in non-linear equations – Gleick wrote – the scientists who study the theoryof systems have managed to represent the effects that different policies and strategies mighthave on the evolution of cities, development of a society or the functioning of an economy.With the help of non-linear patterns, it is possible that in this kind of systems critical pointsto be localised and the slightest change at their level might have a disproportionate impact”8 .

This disproportionate effect represents, in fact, the essence of chaos theory.Scientists have needed a long time in order to reach to a series of equations – verycomplicated, in fact – through which this disproportionate effect is evaluated. Still, equationsdo not completely solve the problem, they only explain it or, at least, they try to defineits parameters and discuss the possible solutions. If chaos theory – which is only at thebeginning – were to offer solutions to complex situations, which are subjected to theconditioned probabilities, events such as those from December 1989, from Bucharest,and the ones from September 11, 2001, from the United States of America, would beat least predictable. For the time being, this is impossible.

This first conclusion regarding the stochastic character of social processes, namelythe role of detail, of little facts, in the ulterior evolution, generally not wholly controllable,of economic, social, political, information, military etc. processes, is extremely importantin the theory of crisis, war and armed conflict. It results that the transition from normalitytowards abnormality, from abnormality towards crisis and from crisis towards war or armedconflict is very hard to notice and identify. That is why the thorough analysis of the stateindicators might offer an area in which the sensible points, which generate perturbationsand malfunctioning, can be noticed and consequently supervised.

In order to understand that, one resorted to a mathematical construction in an abstract,multidimensional area, which was named the “area of phases”. The curve resulted– says Gleick – pointed to a disorder of the pure state (no point or group of pointsappeared twice) and an unexpected order (the curve described a sort of spiral in twodimensions, resembling to the wings of a butterfly) at the same time. This double spiralhas become widely known under the name of “Lorenz attractor”.

8 Gleick, La Théorie du chaos, Glossaire.htm.


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In the theory of crisis, armed conflict and war, the “area of phases” is extremelyimportant, since it modulates the universe of possibilities, causes and effects alike.And even if this kind of pattern does not always offer an optimistic perspective, sincechaos theory proves it precisely (that there are no connected causes or the connectionof the causes has different dimensions from those with which we have been accustomedto due to the mechanistic determinism), it is important as it draws attention towardsa very hard to understand and manage reality.

ApplicabilityStrategy is, in its essence, a way – scientific (theoretical), practical (operational)

and even artistic (creative, intuitive, ingenious), at the same time – of putting into practicea political decision. From here results especially the actional, operational character of thestrategy. It is the very reason for which the strategic concept of the Alliance, adoptedat the Rome Summit in 1991 and improved at the Washington Summit in 1999, the Pragueone, in 2002, and the Istanbul one, in 2004, is an operational concept, with particularreference to the new competences and the new range of action of the Alliance and notnecessarily to their scientific support.

At the 1991 Rome Summit, NATO drafted and adopted a new strategic conceptfor that period, which aimed, among others, to the reconfiguration of the Alliancephilosophy, so that NATO should be able to deal with the new challenges concerningcrises management, humanitarian assistance, ensuring and keeping peace etc. Thetransition from a philosophy of nuclear or classic massive, tempestuous, gradual, flexibleetc. ripostes to a philosophy of crises management, the challenges and threats of thecyber-information environment included, of peace maintaining, ensuring and evenimposing, of humanitarian aid and of support towards the new European democracieshas gradually occured. Within this entire very complex process, in which all the componentsof political art, military science and, obviously, military art are involved, neitherthe contradictions, pessimistic visions nor the feeling of uselessness of the Allianceor the one of fear for the proliferation of a new type of escalation missed. Many peoplespoke of the uselessness or desuetude of the Alliance, especially for the European area,where it seemed that no threat would occur, and which radically changed followingthe Cold War, of the necessity of establishing certain new structures for consolidatingthe already existing political and security structures and of the renunciation of the onesof force. In a way, even the anti-globalisation demonstrations were against a new NATO.

Lord Robertson explained, in detail, in an article published in NATO Review,the new philosophy of the Alliance, its new path. NATO not only resisted to these pressuresbut also transformed and keeps transforming. This transformation has not ended yetand will not end soon. Because NATO has become a much more dynamic Alliance,being more and more put in the service of certain very actual common Euro-Atlanticvalues and interests. This process is possible, this logic is possible, since, as we all know,NATO was established on a system of values.

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Geopolitics • Geostrategy • International SecurityNATO’s strategic concept is guiding and generating-centred at the same time.

It comes out of a political consensus and responds to an environment whose hostilityis fluid and asymmetric. Given these circumstances, NATO philosophy does not simplymove from old to new rigours, or from one type of ontology to another – the ontologyof NATO remains the same –, but from a functionality of political and military response(massive, gradual, flexible, nuclear, classical, informational etc.) to one of the securitystrategic environment management, of the area of conflict prevention and control,of discouragement of any type of conflict, of the consolidation of democracy and optimisationof the relations between the great entities of the world. Hence, the evolution of a broadconcept, of strategic partnerships, in all the fields, the one regarding the controlof resources and the big routes towards them.

This entire metamorphosis, even if it especially aims at the operationality and makingoperational, is based on a very large scientific expertise, on a thorough analysis of thedeterminations and, undoubtedly, on the reappraisal of the process and the variationrules of the initial conditions.

The NATO strategic concept is the expression of this new philosophy of the Alliance.It deserves a complex and enlarged analysis, since it is the most conclusive resultand the most direct form of what NATO is and what it will be for the Euro-Atlantic areaand the entire world. From it, all the other concepts derive, the ones with strategicvalue included, among which the most important is the one referring to the structureof forces. As we all know, this kind of structure is about to be fulfilled and consistsin providing certain components of fast response and headquarters to the same extent.These headquarters will cover all the levels of NATO headquarters structure, the generalheadquarters of the Joint Multinational Groups of Forces included. At Prague it wasstipulated a firm calendar regarding their achievement.

The re-examination of the structure of forces was determined by the new challenges.It belongs to both NATO’s general policy and the strategy of forces and involves at leastthree essential dimensions, some of them already fulfilled, others able to be fulfilled:

The enlargement of the area of the Alliance through the full integration of thenew members, namely the seven countries accepted at the last enlargement. The improvement of a structure of forces, especially a NRF of 21 000 soldiers,so that it could be capable to respond to the new challenges and even to preventand discourage the proliferation of certain threats and tensions. The modernisation of support capabilities.

Through enlarging and leaving the doors open, NATO becomes somethingdifferent of what it used to be. At first, it becomes a Euro-Atlantic organisation, and notjust a North-Atlantic one. However, the most interesting evolution in the area of conceptsand their implications seems to be the one referring to NATO’s Defence CapabilitiesInitiative. As we all know, this concept was launched in April 1999, at the Summitin Washington, and was long discussed in the European environment. It presupposesthat the Alliance should identify the new security challenges of the 21st century, configurethe board of the new threats and be able to efficiently react to crises such as the one


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in Kosovo, while keeping its capacity of assuming its fundamental responsibilitiesfor the collective defence of its members.

The concept that we have in view was re-approached in Prague, under the formof a new Capabilities Initiative. This new initiative must focus on a smaller numberof capabilities essential for the full range of missions of the Alliance, especially on thoseregarding NATO’s ability to defend against terrorism, chemical, biological, radiologicaland nuclear attacks, while guaranteeing the superiority of the protected systems of headquarters,communications and information, the interoperability of the deployed forces and the importantaspects regarding the effectiveness during combat, as well as providing the rapid deploymentand maintaining the power of the combat forces.

This concept involves many actions, re-dimensioning and re-orientating the budgetsincluded, so that, for instance, if necessary, the level of forces would be reduced and the resourceswould be oriented towards modernising the material. Unlike the old measures, a new conceptis now introduced, referring to the common military capabilities, an appropriate specialisationof the roles, the acquisition of different materials through cooperation (of course, systemsof arms) and even common and multinational financing. It is a new concept, a very importantone, since it puts into practice a different philosophy regarding the new structure of forces– common forces –, with an increased degree of interoperability, of roles specialisationand even of integration, especially as far as the NBC defence, the fast action and the fastresponse and the integrated systems of command and control are concerned.

In addition, the new defence capabilities initiative aims at fulfilling and putting intopractice an anti-missile defence system in the theatre, which derives from the finalisationof a study of feasibility of the Alliance regarding the defence against ballistic missiles in thetheatre. The initiative consists of almost all the aspects concerning the concepts with regardto the strategy of forces, means and especially the operational strategy: mobility; logisticsupport; survival (the capacity of self-protection); the capacity of surprising the enemyand striking him on sides; the command, control and information systems; the fastand effective deployment in order to manage a crisis on long term.

In Europe (the Euro-Atlantic area, in fact), the security environment has becomemuch more dynamic than during the Cold War. The more plausible threats to securitycome from the conflicts on the outskirts of Europe, such as the one from the formerYugoslavia or from the proliferation of the weapons of mass-destruction. Therefore,NATO must be capable to deploy forces outside the borders of its territory in order to respondto crises, while being ready to defend itself against a deliberate aggression. This represents,in fact, the essence of the new NATO strategic concept.

In addition, the new Defence Capabilities Initiative, as it was formulated in Prague,aims at consolidating the Alliance’s capability in five fields: mobility and deploymentcapability; sustainment capability; the effectiveness of striking the enemy on sides; the survival(self-protection) capability; interoperability in communications.

As well, as far as the strategy of means is concerned, the new initiative regardingNATO defence has stressed the need for a further modernisation of armament, accordingto certain relatively familiar horizons which depend on increasing the precision of striking

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Geopolitics • Geostrategy • International Securityand reducing the collateral losses, especially through developing the day/night systemsof arms and the ammunitions with precision guiding, through improving the systemsof reconnaissance and surveillance, the air defence systems and the systems for neutralisingthe weapons of mass-destruction.

In reference to what is called narrowing the gaps between the United Statesand Europe regarding the systems of arms, information technology and the capabilityof force protection, James Appathurai, in an article named “Closing the Capabilities Gap”,tackles the risks of a separation, because the ally across the ocean provides all thesophisticated technology, logistics, air and maritime transport, information and air power,while the others will be more and more confronted with the situation of offeringonly manpower, namely with fulfilling peacekeeping tasks on long term.

The new initiative comes to solve this kind of issue, too, and to reduce this gapbetween the USA and Europe. If is known that the Europeans already have been workingon the A 400 M strategic military transport aircraft, the Eurofighter multi-role aircraft,the Tiger helicopter, the modern communications systems, these programmes beingable to pay their contribution to increasing the European rapid response capabilityby setting up a Rapid Reaction Force ~ RRF of EU and equipping it with effective means.The European RRF is complementary to NRF. We could say that it will materialise,in a certain way, the concept of European Security and Defence Identity ~ ESDI, launchedand supported by the USA.

Edgar Buckley, while referring to the realism of the European objective, showsthat the new initiative regarding defence capabilities, launched by NATO at Prague,differs from the previous one in three respects: it re-established the national engagementmore rigorously, it emphasised the stress that should be laid on multinational cooperationthat would materialise in the mutual consolidation of the development efforts of EU’smilitary capabilities. In this respect, there are four main centres of interests of the newinitiative regarding the defence capabilities:

defending against the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear attacks; providing superiority at the level of headquarters and information; improving the interoperability of the deployed forces and the essential elementsregarding fighting effectiveness; providing rapid deployment and sustainment of forces.

These are only a few of the aspects marking out the evolution of the post-Praguestrategic concepts. This kind of tendency will be manifest in each of the Member States,in the new states invited, as well. The Romanian Armed Forces, General Staff has alreadydrawn up, as drafts, a series of documents, doctrines and manuals – Joint OperationsDoctrine, Special Forces Doctrine, Strategic Military Headquarters Handbook etc.,which add to the old ones, the doctrines of the armed forces category of forces – by meansof which the evolution of strategic concepts is materialised.

This process will go on and increase in the following period, because, withoutany doubt, we are experiencing one of the crucial moments of the reconstruction of theworld, Euro-Atlantic, European and national security environment.

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Thus, military science, far from being only a scholastic projection and an analyticaljustification of certain concepts and theories, becomes more and more a sort of “black box”,namely an extremely sophisticated operational support for the effective military action.Its first effect is a strategic impact of great force, which consists of the proliferation, harmonisationand optimisation of the crises and conflicts management strategies. Nevertheless, militaryscience is no longer at everybody’s hand, but, since it resorts to theories of complex dynamicsystems and processes, chaos theory and nano and super-technologies, it becomes, throughits sphere and content, interdisciplinary, integrating and predictive, a field of certain expertsof high value, indispensable in the military action, of the same kind with the type of expertsand wise men used in Antiquity by the Chinese headquarters for preparing and waging wars.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

• Carl von Clausewitz, Despre r`zboi, Bucure[ti, Editura Militar`, 1982.• General Valentin Arsenie, Actualitatea strategiei, Bucure[ti, Editura AÎSM.• Statul Major General al Armatei României, Academia Oamenilor de [tiin]`, Sec]ia de {tiin]` Militar`,

Tratat de [tiin]` militar`, volumele I, II [i III, Bucure[ti, Editura Universit`]ii Na]ionale de Ap`rare, 2004.• Bruno Colson, La culture stratégique américaine, FEDN, Economica, 1993.• http://www.stratisc.org/traite_tdm.htm.• http://www.cdsar.af.mil/battle.bftoc.html, The Battlefield of the Future – 21st Century Warfare Issues,

Air University.• Commission des sciences et des technologies, La Revolution dans les affaires militaires, Rapport

Special, M. Lothar Ibrügger (Allemagne).• Gordon R. Sullivan, James M. Dubik, Land Warfare in the 21st Century, Strategic Studies Institute.

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Security ParadigmsSecurity ParadigmsSecurity ParadigmsSecurity ParadigmsSecurity ParadigmsArms control has a very long evolution alongside mankind history, accompanying

in a more or less salient form the armed conflict since the very beginning. Accordingto Thucydides for instance in “The Peloponnesian War”1, some 2500 years ago, “the Spartansproposed that not only should Athens refrain from building her own fortifications, but thatshe should join them in pulling down all the fortifications which still existed”. But almostat the same time with this first attempt to have a kind of control over arms, includingdisarmament, subsequent tendencies to cheat appeared, hence the necessityfor verification, because, according to the same source, for instance, “simultaneouslyto negotiations … the Spartans built their fortifications high enough to be able to defend”2.However, despite this early start and its long tradition, the real arms control hasnot come into force until much more recently, during the last century to be more exact,after the immense destructive potential accumulated, due on one hand to scientificand technological progress and on the other hand to ideological competition, reacheda global dimension threatening not only the existence of peoples but even the life per seon this planet. Even the most, recognised, aggressive political regime (the communistone) became aware of the global danger and commenced to worry about the possibilityof self – mutual destruction. Andrei Kozirev, one of the ministers of foreign affairsof the former Soviet Union, in his report to the Symposium held on October, 21 – 23, 1987,at Mc Gill University3, pointed out that “the Earth is a unique space ship in the Universe,too fragile for nuclear wars, indeed for any war or arms race”.

SECURITY DILEMMASor

What Does the Future Hold

for Arms Control ?

Air Flotilla General Victor STRÎMBEANU~ Commander 86th Airlift Base ~

1 Cited by Lt Col Walter K. Schweiser, SO1 OPS MO4, The Role of Arms Control, Arrangementsfor National and International Security, on 16 January 2001, RMCS/Cranfield University, GlobalSecurity MSc.

2 Idem.3 Space Surveillance for Arms Control and Verification: Options, Montreal, 1987, edited by Centre

for Research of Air and Space Law, after the Symposium held on October 21-23, 1987 at McGillUniversity, p. 93.


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So far, we already introduced three new concepts: arms control, disarmamentand verification. Since from now on they will be often used, a clarification of their meaningis required:

Arms control represents in Joseph S. Mye’s4 view “the efforts to limit the numbers,types or disposition of weapons”. Others tried to further develop this definition; for instance,Hedley Bull5 saw arms control as “those acts of military policy in which antagonistic statesco-operate in the pursuit of common interests, even while they are struggling in the pursuitof conflict ones”.

Disarmament is a concept representing the actual process of reduction, conversion,destruction etc., and by comparison with the above-defined concept, disarmamenthas a slightly narrower meaning, actually being encompassed in the overall arms control;

Verification is generally accepted as “the process of verifying procedures laid downin weapons agreements”6 and I would classify it as a feedback method of deterringthe violations by making the costs and risks of evasion unacceptably high as comparedto the conceivable gain7.

Having defined the necessary tools to operate with, a brief retrospective and analyticlook is recommended for a better understanding of the most contentious issues generatedby the accumulation of weapons and by its implicit control upon which those interestedin studying international conflicts are endlessly arguing and debating. In Frederic Pearson’sview8 these contentious issues around arms control, took the form of an entire seriesof dilemmas. First of them, termed as “security dilemma”, starts from the assertion thatarms races and the consequent accumulation of weapons were generated by the needof security but, paradoxically ended up in a more insecure global environment. As a personalview over this dilemma, I agree that militarisation of a nation might be accepted as a factorincreasing the security of that particular nation, but at a certain moment in the developmentof this process, the balance is disrupted and the global insecurity becomes predominant.

The second dilemma in Pearson’s view, the so-called “dilemma of causation”, is highlyadvocated by the opponents of arms control, especially in the United States, assertingthat “guns don’t kill people; people kill people”9 and if fire arms would be eliminated, humans,in whose nature violence is intrinsic and constant, will find other ways to kill each other.

One counter argument in my view is that this way could be indeed the case but onlyfor small arms and only at individual level. Another counter argument is provided by thestatistics according to which casualties rates are higher in American cities where gunsare available to public access than in the Canadian cities for instance where they are prohibited.

4 Cited by Lt Col Walter K. Schweiser, SO1 OPS MO4, op. cit.5 Idem.6 The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English, Oxford, 1990, p.1557.7 F. Calogero, M.L. Goldberg, S.P. Kapita, Verification – Monitoring Disarmament, San Francisco,

1990, p. 2.8 Frederic S. Pearson – “The Global Spread of Arms”, San Francisco, 1994, p. 5.9 Idem, p. 2.

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Geopolitics • Geostrategy • International SecurityThe third issue approached by the author in the referenced work is the dilemma

of access consisting in the possibility for those more violent and more interested in banneditems to find illicit ways to procure them and consequently “if guns are outlawed, onlythe outlaws will have guns”10, leading to an uncomfortable situation where a small minoritythreatens the security of the majority. In support of the fourth dilemma, that of alternatives,is brought under discussion the example of humanistic Czech president Václav Havelwho promised to eliminate the arms sales but faced with the risk of economic ruin11 andnational disintegration, decided to continue selling guns and tanks to foreign markets(even so he failed to prevent the split of former Czechoslovakia into two different states).

Czechoslovakia was not the only state for which the arms trade represented a vitalincome, and the opponents of arms control have here a strong argument. Deriving fromthe security dilemma earlier mentioned, on the general debate is brought the “adequacydilemma” comprising the question: “How much armament is enough for a nation to feelsecure ?” This particular question proved to be a major impediment in the developmentof arms control and disarming process. It still generates endless debates, but it does notmatch the purpose of this essay to detail it deeper. Neither does it the “equity dilemma”,deriving from the access one. I only want to mention the “political dilemma”12 whichin my view is eventually outranked by the economic factor (see dilemma of access).This particular dilemma is based on the fact that the armament in international relationsis not related only to security or economy but to politics as well, because the latter is partof the debate since arms represent an important means to political power13.

Important and unexpected progress in arms control and disarmament has been madebut as shown in the brief retrospective of the main contentious aspects, the disarmamentprocess bears a high complexity and plenty of controversial facets which are expectedto impede and delay the future of arms control.

Nuclear Arms ControlRelatively soon after the first atomic bombardment on Hiroshima (and Nagasaki)

marking the conclusion of Second World War and the beginning of a new, atomic, era,four more states achieved nuclear capability but the main competition was held betweenthe two exponents, (United States and Soviet Union), of the politically and ideologicallyopposed regimes. In a certain extent some of their adjacent satellites, encompassedwithin two opposed military blocks (NATO and Warsaw Treaty Organisation), have beeninvolved. With the images of the horrifying effects of the atomic bombing over Japanstill fresh in their memory, the world leaders understood from the very beginningthe exponentially increased danger for the entire world, posed by the achievement

10 Ibid.11 According to World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, issued by US Arms Control

and Disarmament Agency, Czech Republic ranked the 8th in arms exports (after USA, UK, Russia,China, France, Germany, Israel) with an income of 300 000 000 $.

12 Frederic S. Pearson, op. cit., p. 4.13 Carl von Clausewitz, Despre r`zboi, Bucure[ti, Editura Militar`, 1982, pp. 59-60.


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of the new capability. The only reasons for further competitive development of nuclearrace resided in fear and mutual distrust14 they had with respect to each other.Consequently, in parallel with arms race, attempts to alleviate it have been madenot later than fifteen years after the beginning of the nuclear age. These eventuallyled to the conclusion of the Partial Test Ban Treaty ~ PTB in 1963, according to whichparties to the treaty agreed to conduct nuclear weapons tests, or any other nuclearexplosion, only underground15. Since in the meantime mankind entered the space era,a new specific treaty, The Outer Space Treaty16 entered into force in 1967 to expandthe provisions of PTB over outer space by prohibiting placement on orbit around Earth,installing on the Moon or on any other celestial body, or otherwise stationing in outerspace, nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction.

The danger now moved into the area of proliferation and large spread of nuclearweapons as more nations could afford technologically to develop nuclear capabilityunder the cover of peaceful use of it. Next step indeed important was the Non Proliferationof Nuclear Weapons Treaty ~ NPT opened for signature in 1968 and entering into forcein 1970. The treaty represents a landmark international key one designed to preventthe spread of nuclear weapons technology while promoting nuclear disarmamentand the peaceful use of nuclear energy17. The progress resides in the entanglementof nuclear disarmament, which was supposed not only to stop further developmentof nuclear weapons but also to enforce measures to decrease the already existing nucleararsenal. At the same time, NPT allows the peaceful use of nuclear energy and equalaccess to this technology for all states parties. To prevent the eventual shift from peacefulpurposes to aggressive ones, the treaty establishes a safeguard system underthe responsibility of International Atomic Energy Agency ~ IAIA designed as an instrumentto verify compliance with the treaty through inspections conducted by it. Another positiveaspect of the treaty is given by its provisions, particularly in Article VIII, paragraph 3,envisaging revisions at every five years18. As a result, following the revision on May 1995,the treaty was extended unconditionally from an initial duration of 25 years to indefinitely.By January 2000, a total of 187 states ratified the treaty, this making it the largest adheredarms linked and disarmament agreement.

Resuming the chronological development of arms control, in 1971 The Seabed Treatyprohibited the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destructionon the seabed of the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof. In 1972 entered into forceSALT I Interim Agreement between USA and USSR on certain measures with respectto the limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, which froze the existing aggregatelevels of American and Soviet strategic nuclear missile launchers and submarines

14 Frederic S. Pearson, op. cit., p. 4.15 Key Arms Control Treaties and Agreements (1963-2000), NATO compilation presented by Lt Col

Walter K. Schweiser, SO1 Ops MO4.16 Idem.17 http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/WMD/treaty/index.html, p. 1.18 Idem, pp. 4-5 and H. Muller and R. Kokovski, The Non-Proliferation Treaty – Political and

Technological Prospects and Dangers in 1990, a SIPRI Research Report , Stockholm, 1990, pp. 46-47.

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Geopolitics • Geostrategy • International Securityuntil a “future agreement” on more comprehensive measures could be reached.Unfortunately the “future agreement” concretised in the provisions of SALT II concludedin 1979, never entered into force and was eventually superseded by START I in 1991after the radical change in Soviet politics, promoted by Mikhail Gorbachev. The ABMTreaty ~ Anti-Ballistic Missile entered into force in 1972 and limited the deploymentof USA and Soviet ABM systems. Its additional Protocol on the Limitation of Anti-BallisticMissile Systems, four years later (1976), further limited each party to a single ABM systemdeployment area. Eleven years after PTB (banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere andunder water) came out the Threshold Test Ban Treaty ~ TTBT to prohibit undergroundnuclear weapons tests of more than 150 kilotons. Similar somehow to SALT II Treaty,and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (signed in 1976 and entered into force in 1990),TTBT entered into force 14 years later, in 1990. This latent, non-productive period coincidesby and large with the protracted mandate of Leonid Brejnev and the series of old Sovietleaders succeeding after him, before Gorbachev, on the one side, and with Nixon, Ford,Carter, Reagan on the other side. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty ~ INF,signed in 1987 and fully implemented in 1991, marking the new stage in Soviet politicsand in international relations as well, is focused mainly on the vectors of nuclear warheads,and banned all US and Soviet ground launched short and medium range missiles(between 500 km and 5 000 km); although the main players were the Americansand the Russians, this treaty is particularly important for Europeans because, giventhe range of the vectors eliminated in pursuit of it, they were most likely to be usedin European Theatre of Operations. In support of this assertion I would bring Reagan’sdoctrine of “limited nuclear war in Europe”19, this being a very serious, in my opinion,warning for Europeans with respect to American politics towards Europe and to the easinessto sacrifice it for their own interests.

The series of STARTs (first in 1991, applied in 1994, and the second signed in 1993,ratified in 1996) marked an important step in the development of nuclear arms controlthrough significantly reducing the ICBMs, submarine launched ballistic missiles,launchers and warheads, heavy bombers and their armaments including long-rangenuclear air launched cruise missiles. Part of overall arms control development, althoughnot very relevant for global security, the 1994 Trilateral Nuclear Agreement between USA,Russia and Ukraine details the procedures to transfer Ukrainian nuclear warheads(inherited after dissolution of Soviet Union) to Russia and establishes associatedcompensation and security assurance for Ukraine. But the most important of all, an excellentexample to be followed in pursuit of disarmament for other categories of weapons,is the so-called “Option Zero”, concretised in Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty ~ CTBTfrom September 1996. The United Nations General Assembly adopted it withan overwhelming majority, 147 states have already signed it (nuclear power statesamong them). The treaty prohibits any nuclear weapons test explosion or any other nuclearexplosion irrespective the yield size. Unfortunately CTBT, more than ten years afterits adoption, has not really entered into force, since major players considered they havenot finished their nuclear tests programme.

19 Frederic S. Pearson, op. cit., p. 4.


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Undoubtedly an important progress has beenrecorded in the development of nuclear arms control

process. The legal basis, first stage in my view, has been settled. The second stage,the implementation, is in the same extent difficult to achieve if not even more. Both stagesshould be based on mutual confidence and trust since there is no international forceto apply the legal provisions. As previously shown, the excellent “Option Zero” is blockedfor already ten years because key states are reticent in ratifying the CTBT, which wouldeventually oblige them to stop their nuclear programmes. Furthermore, certain statesseem not likely to renounce to the significant economic output resulting from exportof nuclear technology and even weapons. In the SIPRI Report20 from April 1990 USA ismentioned as subsidising Israel with three billions dollars in fiscal year 1990 for foreignmilitary sales without which, according to the cited source, Israel would be bankrupt.Similarly, USA supported Pakistan militarily, including 60 F-16 fighter-bombers capableof delivering nuclear bombs after refit. Also, the breach of president Zia’s commitmentnot to enrich uranium above 5% was not considered by American side as a “sufficientreason to cancel military aid and would not play a role in the further US – Pakistanirelationship”21. Europe with some exceptions, which will be further examined,proved to be committed to a higher extent to the assumed legal obligations and, in 1986for instance, The European Council resolved not to enter any new nuclear supplycontracts with South Africa. But again, on the other side of the Atlantic it has beendiscovered that USA Department of Energy had, through lax security standards, giveninformation on detonators, explosives and firing sites with possible nuclear applicationsto Argentina, India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, South Africa, South Korea and Taiwan.

On the other hand, the dissolution of Soviet Union opened large possibilitiesfor access to nuclear technology, including experts, and it is hard to believe that facedwith economic ruin and territorial split, the remnant entities of the former Soviet Unionwill commit themselves to the obligations assumed by another political structureand they will not take advantage of their nuclear inheritance.

To conclude this chapter, the nuclear arms control should hold for followingdirections:

• enhance confidence-building measures as a mandatory basis for next stepsto be taken;

• enforcement of the treaties, agreements and other legal bindings, already ratified;• urgentation of ratification of CTBT by the key states still reticent;• prevention of spread of nuclear technology, especially from former Soviet Union,

and again especially towards states likely to use it as terrorist means;• enhance verification efficiency, to provide compliance with legal obligation;

on site inspection proved to be one of the most efficient tool of arms control;

Future Developments

20 H. Muller and R. Kokoski, op. cit., p. 12.21 Idem.

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Geopolitics • Geostrategy • International Security

Biological Arms ControlBiological weapons ~ BW are living, self-replicating micro-organisms which are

intended to be intentionally spread in aerosols, food or water to cause disease or deathin man, animals or plants; in the same category are included some of the toxinsand non-living poisons deriving from biological sources, which have incapacitatingor lethal effects22. Infectious diseases were used deliberately as weapons well beforethey were known to be caused by microbes, or being recognised as weapons per se.The potential of different diseases, as possible weapons, may have been discoveredaccidentally as a result of naturally contracted ones during war when elementary rulesof basic hygiene could not be respected. Caribbean and South African wars are goodexamples in this sense23. Infected corpses were catapulted into besieged fortresses,wells were poisoned with putrefying bodies, blankets from smallpox patients wereintentionally distributed among American Indians etc., but the real possibility to developbiological weapons did not come out until Koch discovered in 1876 some pathogenicbacteria (attaching his name to them thereafter) and replicated them artificially.During First World War, the Germans used anthrax-contaminated food to kill enemyhorses; in 1930, the Japanese may have been used biological weapons during their warwith China. Anthrax bacilli, Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus, botulinum toxinsand staphylococcus enterotoxins B, were stockpiled for use as BW during Second WorldWar and its aftermath24.

According to American sources25, ten nations are engaged in development of BWprogrammes. These nations are reticent in recognising such facts. Russia, for instance,did not admit officially the development of BW until the so-called “Sverdlovsk incident”26.United Nations inspections have identified evidences that Iraq was operating BWprogramme, at least at research level.

Until after WW II, four main agents were used as BW. Two of them, anthraxand Venezuelan enquine encephalitis, from living, self-replicating class (usually bacteriaand viruses) and the other two, botulinum toxin and staphylococcus enterotoxins B,from non-living poison of biological origin class. Today more than twenty agents27 areunder consideration, some of them genetically manipulated, which make them evenmore efficient and dangerous.

22 Scientific Aspects of Control of Biological Weapons, Report of a Royal Society Study Group,London, 1994, p. VII.

23 Malik I., Biological Weapon, London, 1968, pp. 48-61, cited in Report of Royal Society StudyGroup, London, 1994, p. 5.

24 Idem. p. 22.25 S.J. Lundin, Chemical and Biological Warfare and Arms Control Development in 1991, The SIPRI

Yearbook 1992. World Armaments and Disarmament, pp. 147-182, cited in Report of Royal SocietyStudy Group, London, 1994, p. VII.

26 In Sverdlovsk, near a Soviet biological facility, a large outbreak of anthrax erupted.27 For a comprehensive list, on classes, see op. cit. at pt. 22, pp. 16-17.


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The military do not agree, by and large, the use of BW, from certain well-argumentedreasons, such as: delayed effects, non-selectivity, dependence on environmentalconditions, risk of self contamination or fear of retaliation from the opposite sidewith a similar weapon. Given their largely devastating and perfidious effects, BW havebeen under the consideration of Hague conventions of 1899 and 1907 which prohibitedinter alia the use of poison and pathogenic agents; the Geneva Protocol of 1925,on a Polish proposal, included “bacteriological methods of warfare”28. The Protocolhas been signed by 115 parties but some of them retained the right to use BW in retaliationfor first use by others. There was another initiative in 1968 to discuss the prohibitionof both chemical weapons (CW) and BW but a generally accepted agreement couldnot be reached as to address both categories of weapons all together. Following an USAinitiative, the United Nations General Assembly agreed to consider a BW treatyand in 1972 the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpilingof Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction29 (further BWC)was opened for signature, eventually entering into force in 1975. The Conventionprohibits, through its provisions of Article I, the development, production, stockpilingand acquisition of microbial or other biological agents or toxins, for other than peacefulpurposes as well as the weapons or other means of delivering such agents. Article II,goes even further, obliging the states parties to destroy or to divert to peaceful purposesall subsequent agents, toxins or delivering weapons and equipment, no later than ninemonths after entering into force. And this happened, as mentioned above in 1975; it hasbeen revised in 1980, 1986 and 1991. If the provisions of BWC would have been fullyapplied, the world would be totally safe from BW threat and this chapter of the essaywould turn futile, but I have serious doubts that this is indeed the case.

Future ConcernsFor BW Control

There are reasons to believe that states parties to BWCfailed to comply with the obligations assumed. While veryexact and comprehensive enough with respect to specific

matters, BWC failed to implement an effective means of control and verification.Even after successive revisions, the set of confidence building measures (totally seven)30,are supposed to be voluntarily undertaken by parties. Since the response to the sevenCBMs, formulated after 1980 and 1986 revisions, remain poor, the 1991 review establishedthe set up of a Verification Group of Governmental Experts ~ VEREX to perform off siteand on-site inspections on the suspected objectives. But the shortcoming of non-compulsory

28 G.B. Carter, The Microbiological Research Establishment and its Precursor at Porton Down; 1940-1979, pp. 1, 8-10, cited in Scientific Aspects of Control of Biological Weapons, Report of a Royal SocietyStudy Group, London, 1994, p. VII.

29 For the background of BWC see http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/WMD/page6.html and for fulltext of BWC see http://domino.un.org/Treaty…/FFA7842E7FD1D0078525688F0070B82D?Opendocument.

30 For details on CBMs related to BWC, see Scientific Aspects of Control of Biological Weapons,Report of a Royal Society Study Group, London, 1994, p. 19.

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Geopolitics • Geostrategy • International SecurityCBMs remained. Even under these circumstances, to improve the BW control, experts(from VEREX) considered that BWC can be operational and made some recommendations31

in this direction, to be applied as soon as possible, such as:• establishment of an administrative office to send out and chase in the reply forms

and to analyse them for verification purposes;• the reply forms should be made more simply so they are more easily completed

by developing countries;• methods of detection of BW facilities, from short and long distance (air, space),

should be applied;But they conclude their recommendations for future improvement of BW control

with the most relevant (in my opinion) one: “if these improvements in the voluntary systemdo not succeed, the replies should be made mandatory”32.

Before conclusion of this chapter, a particular aspect of BW must be mentioned: thatof the threat of use of BW by the terrorist groups due to the considerable advantageof easiness to transport them in small quantities and eventually undetected, and especiallydue to the delayed effects which allow the aggressor to get safely out of the target area.This is in my opinion, one of the key points with respect to BW, where experts shouldconcentrate their efforts, beside enhancement of enforcement procedure which remain,somehow similarly to nuclear weapons case, the weakest side of BW control.

Chemical Arms ControlChemical weapons ~ CW represent any chemical toxins and their precursors which

through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitationor permanent harm to humans or animals, as well as any munitions, devices and equipmentused for delivery of active agents (toxins)33 . This definition was intentionally broadenedto include the means of obtaining the active agents, for the purpose of Chemical WeaponsConvention ~ CWC. The “precursors” for instance, may not produce per se any harmon human or animals, but they are essential for getting the final product. They aredefined as chemical reactants that take part at any stage in the production by whatevermethod of a toxic chemical34, and they are particularly important for the purposeof verification of CW.

CW have a longer history than biological weapons for instance, and at least doublethan nuclear ones. They have been acquired and stockpiled by several countriesand have been intermittently used in war during last century, despite international effortsto outlaw their use. They were used not only during the two worldwide conflagrations,but in their aftermath as well. Egypt for instance made use of them in the civil warin Yemen in the early ’60s. Soviet occupation forces used CW against insurgents

31 Scientific Aspects of Control of Biological Weapons – cited report, pp. 19-40.32 Idem, p. VIII.33 The complete official name of Oslo Final Document is: Final Document of the Extraordinary

Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty of Conventional Forces in Europe.34 Idem, p. 3.


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and civilians in Afghanistan. Vietnamese forces used toxins in the course of their invasionof Kampuchea35. During Gulf War chemical threat hovered over allied troops and it seemsthan only the fear for nuclear retaliation prevented Saddam Hussein to make use of them.

CW effects on living beings are horrible and chemical way to wage a war is oneof the most terrible. Mustard gas victims die slowly due to asphyxiation as their lungsare destroyed, after suffering extreme painful burns on their skin. Phosgene victimsalso die slowly as their lungs fill with fluid causing further the asphyxiation. Victimsof nerve gas poisoning may die quickly in case of inhaling a large dose or may hoverbetween life and death after a small dose36. From strictly military perspective, CW,in a certain extent similar to BW, are non-selective, impersonal, remote, dependenton ambient conditions and somehow cowardly.

These are the main reasons leading to, more than one century long internationalefforts to prevent production, stockpiling and especially their use in battle. Some of theseefforts resulted in international agreements, conventions, such as, 1899 HagueDeclaration 2 Concerning Asphyxiating Gases, 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibitionof the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous and Other Gases (and of BacteriologicalMethods of Warfare)37 etc. First efforts aimed to make war more human, trying to limitor prohibit the use of CW in wartime and only recently, in 1992, after a decade of longand painstaking negotiations, an almost comprehensive convention has been agreed,prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weaponsbut establishing also the destruction of the existing ones and the implicit verificationprocedures*. The CWC was signed by 130 states since 1993 and entered into forcein April 1997. Through its Article III, CWC obliges states parties, inter alia, to declarewhether they own or possess any chemical weapons, specify the precise location,aggregate quantity and detailed inventory, provide a plan for destruction of chemicalweapons and production facilities they own, or possess, and specify actions to be takenfor closure or temporary conversion of any CW production facilities. The verificationprocess is established through an especially dedicated annex (Verification Annex).The implementation of CWC and CW Control, by and large, is the responsibilityof Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons ~ OPCW.

35 R.W. Jones and S.A. Hildreth, op. cit. p. 72.36 H. D. Crone, Banning Chemical Weapons – The Scientific Background, Cambridge, 1992, p. 89.37 A. Roberts and R. Guelff, Documents on the Laws of War, Oxford, 2000, p. 59 and 155.* The complete official name is: Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,

Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, further CWC.

The legal basis is settled and the inherent responsibilitiesassigned. By difference with BW case, for CW a verification

system (procedures and agency – OPCW) is established. It remains still a lot of difficultieswith respect to detection of eventually hidden or disguised CW facilities, technical detailsfor on-site or off-site inspections, and not in the last extent with respect to accessinto suspected states and suspected areas.

Future Concerns

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Geopolitics • Geostrategy • International SecurityIn my view, for the future CW Control should be concentrated not on the chemical

weapons per se, but on the production facilities and on the access to eventually remainingsources of the active agents. As in the case of BW, there is a growing tendency for CWto be used by terrorist groups. Until the implementation of CWC, there was a threatto security from the Third World countries, but I do not think that the concept of “poorpeople bomb” has serious potential as a threat to security. However the possibility to beused by terrorists still remains due to the obvious advantages CW have with respectto the way terrorists act pursuing their goals (easy to produce, transport, remote, delayedeffects – offering the vital time for the “launcher” to put a safe distance between targetand him). Unfortunately, due to their discretion, CW proved attractive not only for terroristsbut for, let say “legal” secret agents, as well *38 . But there are serious doubts that thisparticular breach of CWC, besides many other national and international laws, can beever controlled.

Conventional Arms ControlWith no claim of formulating an academic definition, I would include into

the Conventional Arms concept, what would remain from arms concept, by and large,after extracting nuclear, biological and chemical ones, although it is arguable indeedwhether some of the newest warfare achievements (such as information warfare, militarysatellites, space combat assets, robotics, and not very far in the future – genetic “human”mutants designed for combat only) can possibly be included under conventional meaning.But for the purpose of this essay, conventional arms encompasses, let say, classical meansof warfare (aircraft, ships, artillery pieces, small arms, etc.). Furthermore, conventionalarms control includes also (by difference with nuclear, biological and chemical armscontrol) the forces, meaning the human combatants, designed to handle the conventionalarms. While most concerns were related to the most deadly weapons (nuclear, chemical,biological), the conventional ones have been somehow neglected although they graduallytransformed Europe into the heaviest armed continent of the world and one of the mostdangerous places to live in. That is why efforts to approach conventional arms controlstarted relatively late, at the beginning of ’70s, (actually in 1973) with the proposalsfor Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions ~ MBFR, which “successfully” failed becausenone of the sides involved (East and West) aimed neither mutual, nor balanced reductions.Warsaw Pact aimed to maintain the territorial status quo in Europe, with existingforces providing them the superiority (at least quantitative) on the European Theatreof Operations. NATO, on the other hand, sought an asymmetric reduction in force levelsto eliminate Warsaw Pact’s numerical superiority39. It was not until December 1988,

“ See Umbrella Case -- when a Bulgarian émigré, Georgi Markov, was killed by a Bulgarian agentusing a mini bullet (1.53 in diameter) containing 0.5 mg of ricin, sent into the body of the victim verydiscretely, with a modified umbrella, hence the name of the case.

38 H.D. Crone – op. cit., p. 41.39 S. Croft, The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty – The Cold War Endgame, Dartmouth

Pbl. Co. Ltd. 1994, pp 42-43.


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when Mikhail Gorbachev engaged Soviet Union in unilateral drastic reductionsof its forces (500 000 men, 10 000 tanks, 8 500 artillery systems and 800 aircraft within24 months40), that the conventional arms control had real chances to start and develop.That announcement, in front of United Nation General Assembly, marked actuallythe end of Cold War and the commencement of a new international era. Unfortunately,Washington responded more than three years later and not in the same radical extent(withdrawal of land and sea-based tactical nuclear weapons, halt day-to-day alert statusof strategic bombers (of whose eventual activation is a matter of hours !) stand downall ICBMs scheduled for deactivation under START (pending on START it is no moreunilateral initiative), cancel new production of ICBM and short range attack cruisemissiles (they should have been already cancelled under the provisions of 1987 INF Treaty,entered into force in 1988 ?!) and limit the production of B-2 bomber41. Moscow respondedat its turn declaring nuclear test moratorium and reducing strategic nuclear warheadsbelow the limitations imposed under START I. It is highly arguable that Russians becamesuddenly peace lovers; sooner, Gorbachev understood that Soviet Union can no longersupport such a high level of military expenditures and they needed those resourcesto rebuild their economy. Officially he explained these cuts in terms of “reasonablesufficiency” thus introducing a new doctrinal concept bearing an important rolein increasing security: “we shall maintain our country’s defence capability at a levelof reasonable and reliable sufficiency so that no one might be tempted to encroachon the security of the USSR and our allies”42.

No matter which was the motivation, these were decisive steps for arms controland disarmament and I would not have this particular fragment of East-West dialoghighlighted, unless I would be convinced that the main impediment in the pursuitof arms control still remains the lack of mutual trust and confidence, hence the needfor confidence building measures, and the non-negotiated arms reduction is an excellentexample of CBMs. These procedures led to the foundation of the Treaty on ConventionalForces in Europe ~ CFET setting limits from the Atlantic to the Urals on key armamentsessential for conducting surprise attacks and large scale offensive operations. It was signedby a total of 22 states parties both from NATO and Warsaw Pact in 1990 and enteredinto force in 1992. The reduction period lasted until 1995, when a verification wasscheduled for the elimination of 50 000 pieces of equipment. The treaty was criticisedfor both underestimating the scale of disarmament that would take place in Europeand for overestimating the ability of some states to apply the disarmament measuresat the speed required by the Treaty43. The eventual outdateness of CFET due to highpace of disarmament and changes in Europe have been avoided through some updatedadditional documents, such as Oslo Final Document44, enabling the implementation

40 B. Ramberg, Arms Control Without Negotiation: from the Cold War to the New World Order,London, 1993, p. 1.

41 Ibid.42 Krasnaya Zvezda, 8 December 1988, cited in S. Croft, op. cit., p. 47.43 S. Croft, op. cit., p. 1.44 The Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe – Final Act, Oslo.

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Geopolitics • Geostrategy • International Securityof CFET in the new international situation following dissolution of Warsaw Treatyand of Soviet Union, and the Istanbul Agreement45, 1999, that replaced the block to blockstructure of the initial treaty, with a system of national and territorial ceilings. IstanbulAgreement also added an inspection regime for temporary deployments and possibleaccession to CFET of other states.

Without entering into details of the treaty and despite mentioned criticism, CFETwill remain one of the most remarkable in the history. It allows great intrusion into nationalsovereignty of the states parties, but it seems that this is the only (or at least the mostefficient) way to build confidence and if national sovereignty has to suffer for security,so be it; after all, security should be the ultimate goal of all nations.

However, CFET has a major missing element: naval forces. Despite “Easterners”(mainly Russians) insistence, the “Westerners” (mainly Americans) refused to includeaircraft carriers, surface ships, and submarines, on the plight of the treaty. This missinglink laid the premises for maintaining, or even developing, a world superpower: UnitedStates of America, which surrounded by oceans, obviously need naval forces to projectits power in the areas of its own interest. So far, a bipolar balance, albeit very riskingand oscillating, managed to maintain an acceptable level of security for more than halfof a century. But what does it mean for global security a world dominated by a singlesuper power, we do not know.

The Particular CaseOf Aircraft

Aircraft are tactical, operational and strategic assetsin the same time. They can be nuclear, chemical, biologicalas well as conventional vectors. They had and still have

an essential role in data collection, more or less authorised (as history proved), airreconnaissance, before, during and after the actual combat operation etc. The importanceof aircraft is proved (if it was still needed) by the fact that aircraft’s issue has blockedCFET negotiations because West side refused until May 1989 to include them intonegotiated list (similar to naval forces). It was only after 30 May 1989, when NATO headsof government announced a dramatic change of policy46, that negotiations went furtherand included these air assets of particular importance for global security into the processof arms control.

It still remains the contentious issue of aircraft from aircraft carriers. To keepthem out of the provisions of CFET, they have been considered as belonging to the navalforces, but they can leave carriers any time and enforce the regular Air Force as an organicpart. It is true also that aircraft which can operate from carriers are per se tactical or operational,(at their maximum range capabilities) but the carrier can project them in any part of theworld, so they cover in fact all levels, including strategic one. And again due to theirhigh level of versatility, they can turn into nuclear, chemical, biological (besidesconventional) vectors and change mission character very fast.

45 Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, 19 Nov. 1999.46 Declaration of Heads of State and Governments after the North Atlantic Council Meeting, NATO

Press Service Communiqué M.I. (89) 20, Brussels, 30 May 1989, para 17, cited in S. Croft, op. cit. p .136.


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Accordingly, the aircraft carriers should be also considered one of the key pointsfor future development of conventional (and not only conventional) arms control.

The Open Skies Treaty ~ OST has quite a long history.The idea dates back to 1955 when president Eisenhower madea proposal envisaging a regime of unarmed observation flights

over territories of state parties to promote confidence, predictability and stability47.Despite the declared intentions, both sides saw the OS initiative as a military intelligencemeasure of the highest importance, especially beneficent for US which at that timeexperienced a weakness in this direction. Accordingly, for Soviet Union it was unacceptable,for this reason48. The chronic mutual distrust made impossible such a daring endeavouruntil 1990, when following a Canadian-Hungarian initiative a dedicated meetingwas held in February 1990, and two years later (1992) the OST was signed. The statusof mutual confidence is very clearly demonstrated by the fact that after eight years fromsignature, it did not entered into force because key states (Belarus, Russia Federationand Ukraine) have not ratified the treaty. However the states that ratified it, so far,already started the programme of reciprocal flights and its main result is not the collectionof data on different area of interests, but a salient increase of mutual trust and confidence.Mixed aircrew, from armies which until recently were on the edge of possible conflict,sharing ideas, impressions, have really broken the ice of miss trust, while the effectson intelligence plan are of little relevance (if they are at all) due to the imposed conditions(selection of area, routes, inspection of aircraft scheduled to execute the flight etc.).

So, the main outcome of an initially designed as a data collection plan is theenhancement of mutual trust and build of confidence and this is the reason I wantedto bring this issue under attention. To conclude this particular subchapter, in orderto increase the efficiency of the arms control, by and large, for the future, based on theconfidence and mutual trust the entrance into force of OST should be considered a keydirection. Sooner or later the countries still to ratify it will do so, even if for this somediplomatic efforts are required; and it will have chances to be successful. If the futurewill confirm my supposition, then the next step could be Open Seas (something similarto OST, with mixed crews visiting naval bases and performing missions in common);and then why not “Open Space” ?!

*At lower levels and on a case by case analyse, the conclusions have been drawn in

detail at the end of each chapter. What do they have in common (besides the vital needfor confidence and mutual trust – of whose lack leads to the failure of ratificationor enforcement) is the increasing threat of access to nuclear, biological and chemicalweapons by terrorist organisations; with respect to conventional forces, the next stepto be taken is the inclusion of naval forces including aircraft carriers through the extensionof the actual agreements, or through the creation of a new one.

«Open Skies»’Example

47 http://sun00781.dn.net/nuke/control/os/48 S. Koulik and R. Kokovski, op. cit., p. 158.

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Geopolitics • Geostrategy • International SecurityAt a higher level it is clear that an unprecedented progress has been recorded

in arms control and disarmament. The legal basis has been settled and a continuousprocess of revisions and optimisation is ongoing on all four main categories of weaponsand forces (except for the naval forces under the conventional arms category). The maintop treaties and conventions (1996 – Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 1972 – BiologicalWeapon Convention, 1993 – Chemical Weapons Convention, 1990 – Treaty on ConventionalArmed Forces in Europe, as well as other additional, parallel or secondary documents49)are not ideal but they offer the premises for a good start towards final goal, a safer worldwith no threat to security, which is still very far in the future.

But all these achievements vitally depend on one basic condition: confidenceand mutual trust. The lack of confidence is the main reason for not ratifying for years,different documents, or for not complying with the assumed responsibilities. The besttreaty worth nothing and can be ruined by failure of trust and confidence; a good examplein support of this idea is the sinuous evolution of American – Russian relations: at a certainmoment Russia has stopped its plans of military cuts and reduction of military forcesin response to the Bush administration’s decision to press ahead with the “son of star wars”,(National Defence System)50.

Consequently, building confidence and mutual trust is the key point for the futurein arms control and the only chance in the same time for implementation and enforcementof excellent legal basis, which has already been settled.

49 1975 – Helsinki Final Act, 1986 – Stockholm Document, series of Vienna Documents of 1990, 1992,1994, 1999; Budapest Document 1994; United Nation Register of Conventional Arms Transfer;1997 – Anti personnel Landmines Treaty etc.

50 Russia halts military cuts as hawks take over in US, in Defence News from 18 January 2001,copied from The Guardian.

ery briefly defined, globalisation is a phenomenon characterised by theinterdependence of economies, the interrelation between the productionsystems being illustrated by an increased competition on markets

ACTIVE CHALLENGESACTIVE CHALLENGESACTIVE CHALLENGESACTIVE CHALLENGESACTIVE CHALLENGESOF GLOBALISAOF GLOBALISAOF GLOBALISAOF GLOBALISAOF GLOBALISATIONTIONTIONTIONTION

Major Drago[ POPESCU~ Doctor, The National Institute

of Aerospace Medicine, Bucharest ~

and a bigger international mobility of the production factors (capital and work).As a paradigm of the socio-spatial development, globalisation is usually placed

in opposition with individualisation. It is a phenomenon that has drawn more and moreattention during the latest years. One has become aware of its existence especiallyin the last decade, as, after the end of the Cold War, “globalisation has replaced itas a defining trait of the international framework”. According to Friedman’s opinion,the present era of globalisation is an international system, just as the bipolarity of theCold War was, with its own attributes, which nevertheless are in obvious contrastwith the ones of the previous system.

The occurrence of globalisation is generally believed to be a phenomenon that becameobvious at the end of the ‘80s and the beginning of the ‘90s, caused by (or simultaneouswith) three major changes in the contemporary world, changes occurred in the waywe communicate, invest and see the world.

The first type of changes, named by Friedman the democratisation of technology,is the result of a series of innovations concentrated in the ‘80s, which includedcomputerisation, telecommunications, data miniaturising and digitalisation. For instance,the progress made in microchips technology has led, during the past 30 years, to anaverage doubling the calculation capability every 18 months, while the progress madein the data compression technology evinces that the volume of data that can be storedon a square centimetre on the surface of the disk has been of an average of 60% annually,starting with 1991.

The democratisation of technology also means that the potential of richnessengendering is much more spread, geographically speaking, by offering the chanceof having access to knowledge to many categories of people, which lack the possibilityof being connected.

V

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The democratisation of technology has definitely contributed to the stimulationof the second major change that impels globalisation, namely the change occurredin the investment conduct. Friedman named it “the democratisation of finance”.

The democratisation of finance started at the end of the ‘60s, with the developmentof the “commercial paper” market. These were bonds that corporations issued directlyon the market in order to raise their capital. Engendering these markets led to certainpluralism in the world of finance and eliminated banks monopoly. This was followed,in the ‘70s, by the securitisation of home mortgages companies, when the entire portfolioof mortgages was bought and it was divided into small value bonds that could be boughtby everyone.

The third change that has made globalisation possible is the change occurredin the way we see the world, named by Th. Friedman “the democratisation of information”:“Thanks to satellite dishes, the Internet and television, we can now see through, hear throughand look through almost every conceivable wall”.

This breakthrough started with the globalisation of television. Throughout almostthe entire Cold War era, television and radio broadcasts were present in a small proportion,since the spectrum of technologies for transmission were limited. Governments eitherdirectly led most of the television broadcasts or strictly regulated their activity. All thisended first in the USA, when the cable television, which was able to broadcast much morechannels than the traditional network appeared.

If television and satellite dishes were important for the democratisation of information,the spread of the Internet has already overtaken them. The Internet is the peak of thedemocratisation of information.

The globalisation system is a very complex one. In order to be understood and explained,the world today must be looked at from a multidimensional perspective: namely the sixdimensions that the same author evinces. Today, more than ever, the traditional bordersbetween politics, culture, technology, economy and finance, national security and ecologydisappear. Together, these six dimensions offer us a picture of the world, which mightnever be obtained if the things were looked at from only one perspective. In a worldwherein everything interconnects, the capacity of tracing links and connect variouspoints is the only one that can provide the contemporary individual with a global visionover the world he lives in.

The first two dimensions are somehow obvious. Politics and culture have alwaysdefined themselves in interconnection. Huntington brought almost to the extremethe idea that states’ politics is determined by the civilisation and the culture the respectivestate belongs to – “The Clash of Civilisations”.

National security, the balance of forces, is an essential dimension of globalisation.Here is comprised the entire connection of themes that gravitate around armamentcontrol, competition of superpowers, alliances’ politics and geopolitics of powers.

Financial markets represent the fourth dimension, by means of which we can identifythe causal connections that would not be noticed otherwise. Financial markets representreal invisible hands, able to handle leaders and nations.

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In addition, what really determines the development and force of markets,what gives a new shape to the way nations and individuals interact, in other words,what really represents the core of globalisation is the recent progress made in technology,starting from the Internet to satellite communications.

Finally, the sixth dimension of the globalisation process is the ecologic one.The globalisation system in action has unleashed devastating forces from the ecologicpoint of view. As a consequence, the perspective on the surrounding environmentis one of the major forces that can limit development, by developing a strong resistanceto globalisation.

In conclusion, this new globalisation system – in which the walls between countries,markets and social domains are more and more cleared out – represents a newfundamental stage of the problems. The defining trait of the present international relationsis represented by the unprecedented increase of the interdependencies between actions,on the one hand, and the actions and their actors, on the other hand.

This globalisation phenomenon involves new challenges, too. They are mainlyconnected to a few great fields: economic security, a field correlated with the oneof the socio-political stability; military security; ecology and culture.

• The globalisation process means more than working together, than the integrationof the economies of many countries. The qualitative characteristics of these economieschange, transforming from closed systems into elements of a new world system.The notion of “national economy” itself changes. The cross-border corporation becomesthe basic economic institution, places its factories and sells its products whereverconvenient, without taking into account the existence of borders. This is why the processof international division of labour deepens, and the “double economy”, “blooming enclaves”,“donor regions versus credited regions” occur within a state, be it a developed one.Entire regions turn into raw material providers and commodity markets for the cross-bordercorporations, without developing their own production.

The deepening process of the division of labour engenders serious social-politicalissues. During the discussions on globalisation the notion of “the vanquished” appearsmore and more: they are certain social strata or even whole nations that have foundthemselves outside the economic development, without any chance of coming out of thisextremely difficult situation by themselves. Unfortunately, it is a real fact that the gapbetween the rich and the poor countries is continuously deepending.

• The increasing interdependence in the international relations, generatedby globalisation, brings about new aspects of the notion of “national and internationalsecurity”. Even the number of the extern factors that influence the steady functioningof the society increases. Therefore, maintaining stability at global level, providingassistance in the creation of those kind of international mechanisms that could ensurethe enduring and balanced development will become a priority and one of the mainproblems for the regional communities.

• The ecologic catastrophes are, in their turn, among the dangers having a regionalor even planetary character that the globalisation phenomenon involves. There are entireareas threatened by degradation, and the way in which ecosystems are influencedby globalisation has repercussions over the globalisation process.

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Geopolitics • Geostrategy • International Security• Last, but not least, mention should be made that the globalisation phenomenon

has been accused of the uncontrolled spread of certain cultural models of a doubtfulquality, to the detriment of the national and cultural traditions of the nations, threateningtheir originality.

The only institution having a global competency that is qualified at presentto respond to these new challenges seems to be the United Nations. Establishedon the 26th of June 1945 and mirroring the equation of power that was created at the endof the Second World War, the UN subsequently fitted in an international situationthat ended once with the Cold War.

More precisely, the groups of winners, and of the losers respectively, at the endof the Second World War, are not the same today, and the UN functioning has becomemore difficult because the current international situation differs from the one whichexisted at the end of the war. For instance, Germany and Japan, countries defeatedin 1945, are today among the most strongly industrialised countries in the world,while Russia, the successor of USSR, has drifted in the opposite direction: from a countryhaving the status of superpower, it has the tendency of withdrawing in the shadowof the USA, this situation being concretely exemplified by her rather isolated positionin the G 7+1 group, which meanwhile became G8.

The question raised is what the UN can offer during the crisis situations occurredas a consequence of the specified challenges. If we were to analyse the challengeson every domain, we would notice that the role of the UN is most of the time outrunby the new developments in the events. The main UN bodies are indicated withinthe Article 7 of the Charter: the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council,the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, the Secretariat.

Within the economic security field, the Economic and Social Council, accordingto the duties settled by the Charter of the UN, may “make or initiate studies and reportswith respect to international economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and relatedmatters and may make recommendations with respect to any such matters to the GeneralAssembly to the Members of the United Nations, and to the specialised agencies concerned”(Article 62, the Charter of the UN). One should notice that the resolutions of the GeneralAssembly have a recommendatory nature. It is very easy to notice that the “key factor”for regulating the economic phenomena of the contemporary world, which is in UN’shands, is as if it did not exist, as it was limited to “recommendations” lacking a concreteactional content.

All the other international organisations significant for the economic-social field– United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ~ UNHCR; United Nations Children’sFund ~ UNICEF; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; InternationalBank for Reconstruction and Development ~ IBRD; Food and Agriculture Organisationof the United Nations ~ FAO; International Monetary Fund ~ IMF; World TradeOrganisation ~ WTO (the former GATT) – are not capable to manage global issuesor, even worse, some of them make nothing else but complicate them, just as in the caseof the IMF.

In the field of military security, “the Security Council shall determine the existenceof any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall makerecommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken […] to maintain or restoreinternational peace and security” (Article 39, the Charter of the United Nations). Evenif the duties of the Security Council are more concrete and have a bigger applicability,the procedure consented at the middle of the 20th century is much too difficult, now,at the dawn of the third millennium, when it is obvious in what way the UN recommendationscan be avoided or ignored. On the one hand, the way the Security Council is structuredproves, the clearest possible, the anachronism of this body. The simplest argumentis that countries such as Germany, Japan, India, Mexico, Brazil are not amongthe permanent members of this council. On the other hand, the emergence of super-stateactors such as NATO and the European Defence Initiative is obvious, and they will probablyclaim access to the global decision-making mechanisms.

In the cultural and especially the economic domain, the UN’s duties are almostnull. This type of issues has a much too recent origin, and only the nongovernmentalorganisations fight, for instance, against the ecologic catastrophes of any type.

We may conclude that there is an obvious asymmetry between challengesand institutions and, from this perspective, the United Nations, the sole organisationhaving a global competency, must be reformed. A question is raised though: who shouldreform it and according to what criteria ? This issue must be approached as soon aspossible, in my opinion, since modernisation is, at present, a process that is not heldunder control (not in the meaning of giving it a direction – which is not possible –,but in the idea of managing crises) – an objective that should represent a priorityon the agenda of the present powers political elite.

A possible way of settlement could be G8, a body that, paradoxically, gathersthe winners and the losers of not only the Second World War, but also of the Cold War,USA, Russia, Germany, Italy, France, United Kingdom, Japan and Canada. In addition,the first non-state actor occurs – The European Union, represented by the presidentof the European Commission and the president of the country that has the presidencyof the European Council.

It is also true that the other great Asian actors – China, India or the Latin Americans– Brazil, Mexico do not find themselves in this structure.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

• Simion Boncu, Securitatea european` în schimbare. Provoc`ri [i solu]ii, Bucure[ti, EdituraAmco Press, 1995.

• Teodor Frunzeti, Organiza]iile interna]ionale în era globaliz`rii, Sibiu, Editura AÎSM, 2000.• S. Huntington, Ciocnirea civiliza]iilor [i refacerea ordinii mondiale, Oradea, Editura Antet, 1998.• Alvin Toffler, Powershift. Puterea în mi[care, Oradea, Editura Antet, 1995.

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Debates

159159

Colonel Costinel PETRACHE, PhD: The military and society.To begin with, I would like to outline, from the perspective of causalinterdependencies, resorting, if possible, to the principle of graduallydefining the conceptual nature of “the military”, as it is exactlyprefigured, beginning with modern affirmation certitude and, fromthe same historical perspective, the evolution of the social commandof society, related to its military force, to the armed forces, eventually.

THE MILITARYTHE MILITARYTHE MILITARYTHE MILITARYTHE MILITARYAND SOCIETYAND SOCIETYAND SOCIETYAND SOCIETYAND SOCIETY

THE ARMED FORCESTHE ARMED FORCESTHE ARMED FORCESTHE ARMED FORCESTHE ARMED FORCESAND SOCIETYAND SOCIETYAND SOCIETYAND SOCIETYAND SOCIETY

Guests: Lieutenant Colonel George SPIRIDONESCU, Chief of the Sociological InvestigationSection from the General Staff, Major Mihail ANTON, Lecturer, The National Defence University“Carol I”, and Radu POPA, Chief of Department, Romanian Commodities Exchange

Lieutenant Colonel George SPIRIDONESCU: Speakingabout the military supposes a two-level reflection. Firstly, it isabout the military institutional organisation at national level,which is the active principle, the determining and unifyingforce, the synthesising force of state security. Secondly,the military has its own history, which we resort to wheneverwe evoke events and the soldier virtues, heroism, as well ashis availability when it comes to the supreme sacrifice.

We have thus the military perceived as being “the nationitself”, idea that is present, in the period around 1848,in Nicolae B`lcescu’s works on history and is given an expressiononce the colonel Alexandru Ioan Cuza is elected the ruler of the country. Another conceptrepresenting the perception of the military is that of “people’s armed hand” or “steel fist”,as Nicolae Iorga used to like calling it. Moreover, there is the concept of “all the peoplearmed force”, which used to be, until 1989, a very useful institution, although it had a toogeneral function. Nowadays, the basic concept is that of completely professionalisationof the armed forces.

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Therefore, in time, the military is differently perceived, at different conceptual levels,according to the historical events and the political formulae specific to different periods.When understanding the military as “the nation itself”, the national awareness is emphasised,right in the middle of the “century of nationalities”, the second concept symbolicallysynthesises people’s force, while the third abolishes the idea of the military itself.

Major Mihail ANTON, Lecturer: I would like to specify,from the very beginning, that all the ideas expressed in mydiscourse within the debate are personal and they do notnecessarily express the official position of the educationalinstitution I am a member of. In other words, I feel boundto tell you that, if you are interested in the official point of view,it is the institution of the speaker of the university (rector) thatis in charge of expressing the university official position.I am sure that, in case of addressing this institution, you couldreceive more elaborate answers, although you risk, this way,being the receptor of a biased and ideological message, compulsorily expressed so thatit could promote the institution interests. You should not draw the conclusion that I amnot preoccupied with the institution interests but we should distinguish the discoursespecific to PR (Public Relation) from the sociological approach.

In my opinion, the military and the society are recurrent themes, as far as militarysociology is concerned. Many times, this theme can be found in western literature underthe name “civil-military relations”. Thus, this issue comes into the military researchers’area of interest, whenever some changes at the level of organisations result in perturbingthis relationship. An example for the Romanian case is represented by the new situationcreated by the military service abolishment. An objective analysis of the situation mayemphasise both the advantages and disadvantages of voluntary service. Consideringonly the advantages derived from this change means narrowing down to what is knownas the theory of rationalising our existence, in the sense of identifying only the argumentsin favour to justify or make a conjuncture positive. Let us remember that, neither at themoment this decision was made, nor at present, the public opinion is favourable,in its majority, to this change. It is true that the ideological discourse “voluntary militaryservice = military forces professionalisation” may cause, or has already caused, in time,a change in attitude, in the sense of accepting the virtues of voluntarism to the detrimentof the relationship we analyse.

The issue may also raise interest at a larger scale, when the relation is questionedat the level of society, when the military becomes the main actor of certain social events.The fact that an issue like the Romanian Armed Forces involvement in the Revolutionin 1989 has been a recurrent theme of debate in Romanian society may be an examplein this sense. The subject involves prosecutors, historians, politologists, journalists etc.The fierce debates with regard to this issue are no longer fuelled today. However,the problem of its legality has not been solved yet. At world level, an event that causeddisturbances in the populace sense of security has led to reconsidering the role of thearmy in a society that is psychically traumatised by Islamic terrorism.

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RMT DebatesThe prototype of the military-society relations, as a subject for study, is ensured

by the case of the USA. In this framework, the relation is analysed as far as the followingthree aspects are concerned: convergent/divergent civil and military culturesand experiences, military personnel neutrality vs. political activism and the qualityof civil democratic control on the military.

The first wave of the American studies in the field began soon after the SecondWorld War and lasted until the compulsory military service was abolished (1973), beingrepresented by the classical polemics between Samuel P. Huntington and Morris Janowitz.In his work published in 1957, The Soldier and the State, Huntington tried to reconcilethe American society hostility towards an army that demanded more and more money,within the context of the Cold War. Huntington identifies the existence of a problematicrelationship between the military and society, based on an ideological difference betweenofficer corps, who is conservative, as a rule, and civil society – liberal and individualistic.A solution to the problem would be for civil society to become more tolerant, if notto internalise the conservative values proper to the military culture. Other partisansof this solution support the idea according to which officers should be educated to integratepolitical preoccupations in their strategic training and, reciprocally, civil leaders shouldbe better informed on the problems related to military culture so that they could makeappropriate political decisions.

Morris Janowitz, although does not agree upon the military and civil culture gap,considers that, in order to bridge this gap and to be effective, the armed forces shouldconform to the civil leaders needs and decisions. In case the gap cannot be bridged,the military would be less tolerant with regard to civil control and civilians could thusgive up ensuring the support necessary for the military to be effective.

The Vietnam War traumas (second wave) reborn the public interest in this studydomain and the animosities between the civil and military elites amplified. At the sametime, abolishing compulsory military service resulted in demographical changes withinthe military: it became an auto selective organisation, which allowed for deepeningthe divergences towards society; the military profession came to have similaritieswith civilian jobs; the vocational character of the military profession attenuated.

The end of the Cold War and the derived changes in the field of the USA foreignand security policy represents the third important moment in the evolution of this studydomain. The classical debate between the two great orientations, Huntington – Janowitz,comes to be of great interest again. The partisans of Janowitz’s theory consider the armedforces exclusively consisting of volunteers has isolated itself from society, fact that posesproblems as far as the civil control exercised on the military is concerned. Their mainassertions are the following: the military has ideologically evolved outside society, while,within it predominant options for the right wing and associations with the RepublicanParty policy become manifest; the military is confronted with a process of alienationfrom society and even becomes hostile to it; the armed forces are resistant to social changes;particularly, it is about women and homosexuals integration in the armed forces and theprevalence of missions, others than war; the civil control and the armed forces efficiencywill be affected if the military, trying to expand its autonomy over society and to avoidcivil expertise in the military domain, loses the respective society respect and support.

On the contrary, the partisans of Huntington’s ideas state that civil society hasgone so far from traditional values that it would affect military effectiveness if triedto change the military that is seen as an exemplary representative of an Americandecadent society moral health. They also suspect the social and political elites of beingignorant regarding military affairs or even hostile towards the military; civil leaders arecritical of the “warlike” culture and conduct promoted by the military and, at the sametime, despise the aspects related to civil control, as they consider the military hasthe principle of submission so deep-inculcated that military commanders excessivelyrespect government control. Having in view the public opinion high level of trust in thearmed forces and considering both institutional trust and the military profession socialprestige, the issue of the gap between civil and military values is inconsistent. In otherwords, the partisans of Huntington’s theory distinguish between the nature of the militaryand social elites differences, on the one hand, and the nature of the military and the largepublic differences, on the other hand.

Radu POPA: Within the framework of conceptualcomplementarities and, moreover, of the pre-conceptual ones,I would like the previous speakers to accept some thematicadds-on to the already mentioned problems. Therefore, it isa truism to state that the military organisation is a particularreflection of war technology, fact that has caused the historyof military-type organisation and profession to be, in general,the expression of the changes armament systems haveundergone. From this perspective, the extremely fast socialand political changes that occurred after the Second World Warseem to outline two theoretical premises of the way a war canbe carried out, which have had major consequences on the evolution of the militaryorganisation, the armed forces themselves, as a national institution. Firstly, I havein view the fact that the impact of technology and of the new mass-destruction weaponshas significantly changed the pattern of international relations and have outlinedthe threat of a war with general character. Against the background of this reality, whilepromoting a policy of reciprocal discouragement, the main nuclear powers had to facethe severe limitation mass destruction instruments exercised over traditionalmanagement of diplomacy and international relations. As far as specialised educationis concerned, the military profession, as it developed during the 19th century, startedfrom the fundamental premise that the outbreak of a total war was inevitable, inevitabilitythat was considered, by the theorists of the time, to have its origin in human natureitself, in the specifics of international relations evolution, as well as in the logical consequencesof the armament race. Secondly, the limited war was not appreciated as purely traditionalanymore, becoming less a dispute between the legitimate governments of two countriesand more a violent contestation within a nation, on the part of groups that contested theexistent regime. At the same time, an idea laboriously developed by Amos Perlmutter,one of the main important characteristics of the contemporary national state is that allits citizens form a unique political community, governed by a unique regime, which controls

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a clearly defined territory and whose administration is exercised by a centralisedadministration and political order. Well, it is known that this type of public authorityorganisation has made possible for the military establishment to elude this authorityand act by isolating from the political system, attitude possible for the military in the epochof modern development of society, as well as within the historical context of political imperial,patrimonial or feudal systems. However, entering the organic consistency of the relationsbetween the military and society evolution, I reiterate the thesis according to which thereis a profound and complex correlation between the type of national state and the typeof military organisation. Why do we consider the national state as a reference point ?Because the historical sense of the question aims at the military institution conceptualdevelopment starting with this period and because the national state is, let us say,the most successful political form. As an organisation that dates back centuries, the statehas a rational, legal-type administration system at its disposal, variables that denotethe modern national state effectiveness in using rational administrative procedureswith a view to having legitimate authority, one of its instruments of power being the armedforces. Therefore, implicitly, political regimes are rationally oriented and embodiedby the national state, all the relations outside the national state territorial frontiersinvolving authority and the regime legitimacy. From the perspective of this preliminarydigression, examples cannot be but relevant. For instance, the Prussian model in the19th century, with its characteristic bureaucracy, militarism and autocracy, denotes,in fact, the consistent and stable relationship between the modern national state, the politicalregime and the way administration is exercised. In line with it, the 19th century Franceillustrates a similar set of autocratic monarchical relations. At the same time, the modernnational state is under the authority of a political regime, considering thus, deductively,that, through the regime agency, the rational and legitimate use of force is permittedto maintain the control over population and to exclusively exercise jurisdiction over a certainterritory, prerogatives exercised, principally, through assuming and applying militarypower. As a conclusion of my first intervention, I consider we may appreciate that the evolutionof the military conceptual nature goes hand in hand with the evolution of society,the military body development projects pointing out, in turn, the evolution of a societysocial command related to its military force, to the military power as a state instrument.

Colonel Costinel PETRACHE, PhD: In line with the sameproblems: How have the relationships between the military and society,between society and the military evolved ?

Major Mihail ANTON, Lecturer: I do not know where to start. If we were to goback in times we did not live in, but we found out about reading textbooks on historyof civilisation, we should refer to the old tribal communities in which the incipient formsof social organisation overlapped the army itself. Historical evolution led, in time, to thedivision of social responsibilities and violence specialisation. Talking today about certainrelationships between the military and society means forcing the debate overthe relationship between a social ensemble and one of its component elements. It isas if you asked me what the relationship between the handle and the door is. You could

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retort though: “What if a sloping house, would I need a handle ?The door would stay close without it. ... Modern models aresliding ones that open at a simple (self) command, usinginfrared …”. It is true we have become familiar with somesyntagms, as we do not need elucidating their content.To contradict myself, I feel bound to tell you that I have myselfanalysed the relationships between the military and society,the cultural differences between them, to be more precise.In this case, to speak about an evolution regardingthe relationships, we should be in possession of a set of data,older, as well as more recent ones, to identify certain tendencies. So, as you alreadyknow, sociological research is now conducted in the absence of a medium or long-termstrategy, meeting thus only momentary, situational needs. A “funny” thing relatedto this aspect has happened recently, when someone scolded me for my insistenceto revise an opinion questionnaire for sociological research: “What are you doing, Sir ?Are you coming again with the same issue ? You came with it last year, or two years ago,didn’t you ? Take the last year data and analyse them !”. I spent some energy to persuadethe respective person that, in fact, it was a process that underwent analysis, thus it couldnot be emphasised other ways but by identifying the tendencies in its evolution. I am notsure he is convinced. But this is another problem …To come back to our theme, let usconclude that we have identified the cultural differences between the military and societyas normal. Making some institutions still founded on traditional cultural values compatiblewith the present society represents a characteristic of the above-analysed relationships.In fact, the Romanian society does not have a pronounced tendency to modernisation,so different traditional values specific to the military establishment do not cause perturbationsas far as the relationships between the military and society are concerned. Not to beaccused of subjectivity, I recommend that those interested in the subject should readthe work of a renowned sociologist, Ronald Inglehart, as well as the analysis of dataavailable on the Internet with regard to the world system of values1 or the Europeansystem of values2.

There are two main paradigms in the literature in the field. One of them statesthere is a necessary cultural difference between civilians and the military and thisparticular difference is not a negative one. The other as well agrees upon the idea thatthe armed forces have a culture that is different from that of the civil society, but thetraditional military culture serves less essential purposes nowadays; the armed forcesdo not have a functional imperative to maintain a culture that opposes the dominant civilvalues. Without embracing one or another of the above-mentioned paradigms, I considerimportant to discover the real functional equivalences to control certain distortions causedby the inevitable contextual differences. The armed forces functional imperative mustbe submitted to the society social imperative.

1 www.wvs.com2 www.evs.com

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Consequently, social research in the military domain has a double mission; on theone hand, it has to analyse the general problems regarding military structures adaptationto the existent social environment, especially when rapid social changes occur, whichresult in rapid changes as far as military organisations values are concerned; on the otherhand, it analyses the way that makes it possible to maintain traditional values (loyalty,discipline, sense of sacrifice etc.) within military organisations, values considered andproved to be functional, without the risk of impairing the social military-society relations.In other words, appealing to one of the classical outlook (Janowitz), the armed forcesshould be a faithful reflection of civil society, as protecting society from external threatsis important, but not important enough to justify the sacrifice of the values societyis based on.

Lieutenant Colonel George SPIRIDONESCU: The two syntagms, the militaryand society, on the one hand, and the armed forces and society, on the other hand, may beidentical at first sight. In fact, they are rather distinct, as they refer to different levelsof generalisation. The first syntagm is more general than the second one.

It is also necessary to refer to the domination-subordination relationships at thelevel of each syntagm. We will emphasise only one relationship of this type, respectivelythat existing between subsystem and system or, in other words, part-whole relationship.It is obvious the military is a subsystem of the global social system, of society respectively.

Hence the military is not face-to-face with society but within society. We can thusspeak about a binomial the military-society, about functionalities we could identify withincivil-military relationships. This aspect is though different. The military is an establishmentthat performs a social function, the military one. As any function, it makes possiblefor the categories of relationship, rule, law etc. to be universally applied. It is true thesecategories vary from a public domain to another but it does not mean they are applieddifferently. Our tendency to see the military related to society or vice versa is generatedby the confusion between essence and existence. However, the fact of being and obeyingthe rules of society means the same thing, no matter of location. Only the dictatorialpolitical rules could change this type of semantic, with a view to “warning” civil society.

Radu POPA: The question is inciting as well asextremely complex. Complex, as the evolution of the directrelationships between the military and society cannot beapproached, in a debate, other way but referring to thebackbone of its architecture and not to the details that coagulatethe concept or concepts as such. That is why I will refer,obviously at the level of enunciation, to some facts whoseevolution was and still is strongly determined by the relationshipsbetween the military and society evolution. Here, I have in viewissues related to military professionalisation and the probabilityof war assessment (Bengt Abrahamson), the condition

of professionalism within the military organisation from the perspective of corporatist“pressures” (Amos Perlmutter), the vocational, professional and occupational dimensions

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in contemporary military construction (Charles C. Moskos jr.) and the military profession(Samuel P. Huntington). Therefore, referring to the aspects concerning professionalmilitary socialisation, Huntington promotes the opinion according to which militaryprofessionalisation develops a pessimistic point of view on state security or, in other words,a manifest incapacity not to consider the possible positive consequences of the evolutionstowards peace and tensions reduction in international life on national defence programmes.To the extent professional socialisation of the military presupposes the assimilationof values that have an “absolutist” character, it implicitly means that the pessimismregarding the evolution of international situation has to be adequately reflected withinthe military hierarchy. However, if it is true or not that “absolutist” indoctrination reallyoccurs within the military establishment, it is a problem that requires special attentionwhen analysed. Without doubt, the analysts of the issue, Huntington for instance, arguethat the process of professionalisation leads to certain prejudices towards the militaryprofession, as well as a strong sense of duty, which “urges” the military to emphasisethe threats to national security, which, in turn, may result in the military seeing threatsto national security even though they did not exist. Therefore, such attitude seemsto point out the fact that the process of professionalisation has a strong impact uponthe military general attitudes and beliefs. On the ground and from the perspectiveof the relationships between the military and society evolution, we have to approachthe process of values building within the military profession as well as the mechanismsthat lie at the basis of the values social homogenisation within the military profession,the military profession within the spectrum of socialisation, the manifest judgementswith regard to the possibility for a war to be avoided or not, the military capacity to adaptto this profession exigencies, estimates regarding the probability for a war to occurand so on. As for the state and condition of professionalism within the military organisation,in the more than evident context of the tendencies towards a corporatist-type organisationand functionality within the armed forces system, we have to take into accountthe following: the military is an organisation that serves the public, in general, exceptthose that constitute the direct object of the organisation itself; the military profession is oneon a voluntary basis, on the one hand, as those who are attracted to it are free to choosea job within its limits and a coercive one, on the other hand, as its members cannot forman association on a voluntary basis, being forced to conform to a hierarchical-bureaucraticsituation, specific to the military; control, qualification and skills are qualitative variables,essential to the condition of military professionalism; as bureaucrats, professional militariesare strongly attached to the modern national state, whose technological capabilities arerevolutionary, as far as management, strategy and informational power are concerned;the professional military tendency to get involved in politics and in policies elaborationis related to the corporatist and bureaucratic roles and orientations; the effort to maximiseautonomy causes, among others, influences on politics, not only through organisationalcounter pressures but also through political institutions and regimes; within a militaryestablishment, professional and bureaucratic responsibilities are convergent; corporatistprofessionalism represents the fusion between professional and bureaucrat, in fact, the fusionbetween group exclusivity and managerial responsibility; modern industrial states authoritysystems inspire the military organisation, which is focused on professionals and professionalism

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with a sense of belonging and so on. With regard to the social evolution of the militaryprofession, even if things used to be blurred for a long time, nowadays the conceptI share has coagulated, the concept according to which, as far as the profession of armsis concerned, it is considered to be a genuine and unforced profession and not at alla vocationally-guided job or activity. Anyway, no matter what perspective we analysethe above-mentioned issue from, it is one thing that is clear: the relationships betweenthe military and society have evolved in tight interdependency, a reciprocal transferof values and mentalities having thus been realised, transfer that has evident symbioticconsequences.

Colonel Costinel PETRACHE, PhD: What is the significanceof “the military”, the military establishment and the military bodytoday ? What can you say about the society, which, in fact, projectsits military needs ?

Lieutenant Colonel George SPIRIDONESCU: Themilitary establishment used to be seen as one in charge withdefence, as well as one that had to carry out general missions,such as working in agriculture or participating in cultural life.Today, the armed forces are the expression of defence, fromthe perspective of the process of exploring and adapting thenew capabilities to successfully meet the challenges of a securityenvironment that undergoes almost continuous changes.

On the other hand, the society has an ontologicallyintegrating direction as it unifies the individuals, withoutpreventing them from being individualised but compellingthem to obey certain norms and values. In none of the cases society is perceivedas being an object or corps. As for the relationship between the military and society,the latter is reduced, through the agency of the military, to the military life and to its needfor being defended.

Why do we have to see society, on the one hand, and the military, on the otherhand ? We are used to attach, from the conceptual point of view, an independent meaningto the national institutions, to interpret them in relation to what they represent, in orderto be easy for us to adapt to a way of thinking or, perhaps, to a certain mentality lackingin qualitative aspects.

Major Mihail ANTON, Lecturer: To describe the two elements of the relationship,I will again mention the fact that the analysis aims at a part-whole relation. The armedforces are what society projects. If it were otherwise, we should take into accountthe legitimacy of the military establishment in a democratic society. However, as far aswe know, no problem like this has resulted from the available data. It is true, and we shouldnot have to stand aside stating it, there are opinions according to which the fact thatRomania has assumed missions considered having no direct relation with the nationalinterest. Such opinions prove, if you want, the ignorance of those who express them,

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the lack of information or the hypocritical inconsistencewith what it has been many times expressed, regardingthe European and Euro Atlantic integration. In other words,we want to be NATO/UE members but we are interestedonly in the advantages or benefits deriving from it. The naturalcontribution to security enhancement or economic welfare maybe delayed, according to this opinion. Obviously, this typeof conduct cannot be considered as a correct one in a relationship.We all have emotions but our faculty of reasoning shoulddetermine us, once we make a choice, to go one near the other,

even when the circumstances are not always happy. That is why we should be awareof the necessity for promoting and developing a culture of security among civilians.There are attempts of this kind but there is not a combined effort at the level of certainelements in the National Defence System, the Romanian Information Service, for instance.

Radu POPA: I have to confess that the mission to point out the two concepts,through defining, is a very difficult one, especially because I do not belong to the militaryor, better to say I am not a professional, although I fulfilled my military service timelyand in “real conditions”. I am trying to, though I have to mention my opinion hasa pronounced sentimental note. The military is, in my opinion, an institution with a nationalvocation meant to be an instrument of state power, the main one in the equation of nationalsecurity safeguarding. It is one of the products of society, as I have mentioned before,of its evolution and, I state in all sincerity, I cannot see the society future evolutionwithout the military power component, irrespective of the way the military establishmentwill be organised or it will function in the future, be it near or far. As far as societyis concerned, it will maintain the acknowledged characteristics, those of being a unitaryensemble, dynamic complex, organically integrated, of relationships between people,as a historically determined product, with common existentially general objectives, moreand more subjected to the postmodern effects of development.

Colonel Costinel PETRACHE, PhD: We are witnessing, without

doubt, a process of redefining the military organisation, implicitly“the military” as a state institution, specialised in violence management.The concept that helps managing the process is philosophicallysubordinated to “transformation”. What are the challenges that haveimminently determined the transformation of the armed forces,of the military establishment and what have the national states answers

to these challenges been ?

Lieutenant Colonel George SPIRIDONESCU: These transformations do notcause a change regarding the content of the military reason for being. If we analysethe transformations within a certain organisation, for instance, without detecting a changein the nature of the organisation itself, we intuit that the organisation is outside

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its members. Therefore, it is not only about redefining the military organisation but alsoabout redefining some principles that lie at the basis of current military strategy.

As far as the challenges are concerned, the “anxiety with regard to frozen conflict”in certain geographical areas represents the main challenge. Technological progresshas also resulted in transformations at the military level. The most important impacton the military environment is attributed to the development of information technology.Many national states have responded to these challenges through their armed forcesintegrally professionalisation.

Major Mihail ANTON, Lecturer: For Romania, the Armed Forces TransformationStrategy is, without doubt, a document that emphasises an unprecedented effortto conceptualise the change of an institution after 1989. Within the frameworkof the process of transformation undergone by the military organisation, beginningwith 1990, many stages have occurred, according to the Chief of the General Staff3,all of them having some essential characteristics, as follows. The period 1990-1993is characterised by both the lack of clear projects regarding the future of the militaryestablishment and the lack of experience regarding the domain of institutional change.The period 1994-1996 is characterised by devising wide-spread projects, on thebackground of a balanced optimism, but without having certain perspectives;it is the period in which the necessary proceedings to realise structural and actionalinteroperability with the armed forces of NATO Member States were initiated.The period 1997-1999 is that of the widely spread restructuring, of the significantreduction of effectives and of the determined sustainment of the option to adhere to theNorth Atlantic Alliance. The period 2000-2004 is characterised by the essentialisationof the process of restructuring and modernising the armed forces, of the operationalisationof the military capabilities meant to collective defence, as well as that of the continuationof the specific integration process. The year 2005 marked the beginning of the periodof the Romanian Armed Forces enduring development, characterised by the enhancementof qualitative transformation and completely professionalisation of the armed forces.

At the level of attitudes, during these periods of transformation, the sociologicalpolls have shown the following defining notes with regard to the personnel opinion towardsthe military institution transformation: the reform in the military is accepted and considereda necessary process; a certain resistance to change is although manifest, especiallybecause the internal communication is ineffective, the social protection measuresunsatisfactory, the financial-budgetary support minimum; the efforts made for Romania’sNATO integration are supported by a large part of the military personnel; the expectationsregarding Euro-Atlantic integration aims at major benefits: the enhancement of the senseof security, the improvement of the level of professionalisation; the technologicalmodernisation; the rise in the living standard; the conception of human resourcesmanagement develops professional competencies in a transparent competitionalenvironment; the participation in external missions is an efficient way to professionaldevelopment and social prestige attainment.

3 Eugen B`d`lan, Sensul transform`rii, Bucure[ti, Editura Militar`, Colec]ia Gândirea Militar`Româneasc`, 2005.

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The transformation of the military profession, as its coordinates of evolution becomemore evident, because of the elimination of the situations of incertitude, will resultin positive changes in the personnel mood.

As far as the way other national states have reacted to the challenges or necessitiesregarding their own armed forces transformation process I cannot give generalities.Each case in turn has its particularities when analysed. What I would like to emphasiseis that, compared with the states we want to relate to, the Romanian Armed Forces havebeen confronted with a totally unfavourable to change conjuncture. Thus, no one canforesee with certainty all the directions regarding the armed forces transformation,given the fact that everything around is in a continuous change. The Romanian societyis undergoing a profound process of transformation. Some name it transition… NATOtransforms. The World, within the framework of globalisation processes, transforms, too.The economical dimension, which is the financial support for transformation, representsthe least happy conjuncture we have to face. Given the changing conditions, to havepretence of certitude or happiness seems to denote a little bit exaggerated attitude.

The armed forces, as the coordinates of the evolution of process become more evident,as the economy becomes really supportive for change, as the situations of incertitudeare eliminated, will certainly occur and it will be accompanied by an evident the personnelmood enhancement.

Radu POPA: In fact, if we pay attention while analysingthe evolution of the military establishment, of the military body,some aspects have already been mentioned even in our debate,we notice that, historically, we witness a continuous redefinitionof the military establishment, of the armed forces, transformationbeing a process with a continuous character, as the societytransformation is continuous, too. The armed forcestransformation has a continuous character but we have to takeinto account the fact that the process of redefining,of transformation is crucially sustained by the genuine shovesof change that constitute, historically, the backbone, I cannothelp repeating, of the transformation process. It is, in fact, the situation proper to theRomanian Armed Forces after December ’89, but especially now, when the Romanianmilitary body transformation is suprastructurally managed by the Romanian ArmedForces Transformation Strategy, a document inspired, conceived and devisedby the General Staff. I am not, for sure, the right person to judge this document, but,as far as I know, it is for the first time in the Armed Forces modern history when the visionof the transformation process has extended over a period of a quarter of a century,which considerably enhances its value and provides trust in the enduring continuityof transformation. What about the challenges that lie at the basis of the armed forces,not of our armed forces but the armed forces in general ? Agreeing with what has beenmentioned before, I would add the following: the consequences of the society globalpostmodern developments that are unpredictable on long and even medium term;the asymmetric development of the “global village”, with direct consequences

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in asymmetric-type reactions, some of them being liable to degenerate into armedconflicts; the proliferation of lack of control on the mass destruction weapons, as well asthe components that are vital for producing nuclear weapons; terrorism, in the alreadyknown forms but also in forms that have not been put in “role” yet; the tendenciesto “administrate” and “readministrate” the primary sources of energy and raw materials;the differences of global status, applied to the World states and, of course, otherchallenges that may be generated by the lack of control on the World enduringand balanced development.

Colonel Costinel PETRACHE, PhD: Does society needthe military ?

Radu POPA: This is a difficult question, not because of the answer it might entail,whatever this might be, but because of the intrinsic complexity of the answer as such.Can we say “no” ? We can say anything, you might say, but can we argue the answer ?The military is a product of society, it has developed together with society, it usedto maintain society’s vital purposes and still does it, and, (negatively) further applyingthis logic, it will cease to exist at the same time with society. Therefore, society needsthe military. It is true that the issues connected to its future organisation, the missionsit might be assigned, the social distribution of the military responsibilities, the philosophyof the military establishment as such are all debatable, but the military is and will furtherbe indispensable to national societies.

Major Mihail ANTON, Lecturer: Does society need the military ? I believe it isa false issue. The topic may be rephrased, in turn, from the perspective of an anachronisticestablishment regarding a society that has followed a more rapid course of evolutionon the civilisation ladder. From this perspective, acknowledging the experienceof military conservatism, we might take into account certain risks that derive fromthe lack of an opportune reaction that aims at adapting to the changes occurred in society.That is why there is so much concern for institutional transformation … At the sametime, we cannot claim that the military should represent a prototype of social organisationor cause the society to adapt to the military model.

However, if we were to accept the challenge represented by this question, the answerwould be entirely positive. As long as humankind exists, the military will last, too.If there is no army, there is nothing … Or at least we cannot imagine otherwise. Anotherargument is symbolised by the fact that the military means, for any state, the sameas the flag, national anthem and other symbols without which one’s feeling of belongingto a nation would be totally destroyed, and would lead to the lack of national identityand, consequently, of the concept of nation. Or, up to now, one has not been awareof other alternative forms of social organisation in the evolution from the modern societyto the postmodern one.

Lieutenant Colonel George SPIRIDONESCU: Society’s ontological constructioninvolves the need for armed forces as well. An officer lives through his soldiers, just associety exists through its institutions.

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Colonel Costinel PETRACHE, PhD: “The military in the21st century” is a very wide project, which has clustered someof the most assiduous national concerns. In what perspective do theseconcerns “meet”, and I am thinking of the sociological perspective,in the social forms specific to the 21st century, the military condition ?I have in view the vocational, occupational and professional patterns.

Lieutenant Colonel George SPIRIDONESCU: Owingto its structure, society is a functional reality, namely a realitythat does not exist in itself. Society is a reality “of the total”,and wholeness does not exist but through its parts – it wouldbe absurd to speak of an army without soldiers, for instance.It is only through this, the parts represent the relational reality– they do not exist as such outside the whole, either. In otherwords, the military condition is a social condition offeredby society.

The vocational, occupational and professional patternsare firstly social, and secondly military.

Major Mihail ANTON, Lecturer: The vocational, occupational or institutionalpatterns regarding the military profession represent a permanently current themefor the military sociology. Samuel Huntington, one of the most quoted researchersof the military profession, identifies three main elements for any profession: expertise,responsibility and esprit de corps. For the military profession, expertise is given by thespecific of the knowledge the military have in the “violence management” field, whileresponsibility consists in the military security of society. Esprit de corps is explainedthrough the felling of belonging to a social group having a unique responsibility.Huntington does not consider all the military men to be professionals, but only thosewho are involved in the “violence management”.

Charles Moskos, from the perspective of two models for analysing the profession(the institutional model and the occupational one), identifies the occupational influencesover the military profession, through which the members of the profession are notinterested in the “calling” anymore, but rather in obtaining certain material advantages(extrinsic motivation).

Framing the analysis of the military profession in the context of the presentedconceptual framework involves the military sociology finding answers to a series of questions.To what extent can we look at the military as being a profession or just some occupationon the labour market ? In what version is the concept of professionalism preponderantlyused within the public debate regarding the armed forces, as system of professionalnorms and values or as occupational ideology, being aware of the fact that both formsof professionalism, the normative and the ideological one, facilitate the organisationalchange ? Do the “internal forces” preponderantly intervene in initiating the neworganisational changes, in modifying the content of the military profession or do the “external”ones ? In other words, does the modification of the organisational field occur by the agency

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of institutional forces, professional elite, within a self-adjusting system or is the militaryprofession dominated by external forces ? In the absence of a military conduct code,may we speak of military profession ?

Some recent English-American research on professions have reinterpretedthe concept of professionalism as being a system of values involved in the socialisationof the new members of a professional group, in preserving and predicting social order.This current interpretation has materialised in a more equilibrated and careful evaluationand has led to acknowledging the power and self interests of certain professional groupsin order to preserve and promote professionalism as a normative system.

Professions are thoroughly involved in reproducing legitimate power, expert authority.Accepting the authority of professional experts goes hand in hand with consolidatingthe authority of states. Accepting the authority of governments and professionals havebeen interconnected and have been part of the process of normalising the state-citizenrelationship. The principles of organising professions can be interpreted as being the onesmodelling the normalising process: professionals’ training involves the developmentof a balance between one’s own interest and the one of the community, which is sustainedby the interaction with the occupational community. This kind of model can explainthe interest towards “professionalism”.

The ideology of professionalism, so attractive to occupational groups and theirpractitioners, includes aspects such as exclusive property over an expertise fieldand authority to define the nature of the problems in that particular field, as well ascontrol of the access to potential solutions, autonomy in decision-making and freedomof action in practicing the job.

The series of questions may be expanded. Nevertheless, in the absence of somesystematised answers, one cannot ignore the fact that the military profession is changing.The military profession transformation, which takes place under the spectrumof “professionalism”, brings multiple benefits for both the armed forces and society.

Radu POPA: The evolution of the military profession,extremely alert during the last years, represents a total concernfor the political decision maker who has guaranteed theintensification, on these issues, of the research in the militarysociological field. Calling, occupation, profession ? Once, theseused to be alternative conceptions of the military socialorganisation, the centre of gravity being consequentlyestablished on the social and institutional timely formatbelonging to a certain period. Underlining that the three termsare frequently used in an imprecise way during commondiscussions in current speech, let me remind them briefly.Therefore, the calling is legitimised in terms of institutional values: it is a purpose thattranscends the individual interest in favour of a higher accomplishment, a value whichcan be associated, according to society, with the value of self-sacrifice and full commitmentto a certain activity. Occupation is legitimised in the endogenous terms of market economy,in other words in the terms of the prevailing financial acknowledgement for equivalent

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services; profession is legitimised under the form of a specialised expertise, otherwisestated, of a formal qualification level attributed after a long term, intensive and superiortraining. In my opinion, in the 21st century, a century that has already astonished us withan almost incredible revolutionary evolution of technology, especially information technology,the job of arms cannot be practiced but by highly trained men, operationally capableof high professionalism. Why do I have this belief ? It may be a truism to restate thatthe rule of permanently including the most advanced discoveries of science and technologyin the military logistics and systems of armaments remains more than valid; it can neverbe lapsed. Or, only absolute professionals can efficiently put highly technical armamentin “motion”.

Colonel Costinel PETRACHE, PhD: The perspective of thisbinomial, military-society, has caused, especially lately, the civil-militaryrelations to have a certain typology. Would you be so kind to evincetheir evolution, content, the society’s management/control meansand, if possible, the latter ones evolution ?

Lieutenant Colonel George SPIRIDONESCU: Society is, by definition,existentially-functional, existentially-military consequently. This idea can also be explainedthrough the reason of a democratic principle, the control of the civil society overthe military. The relations between civilians and the military are expressed throughthis principle, and, in order to describe the typology of the civil-military-type relations,one must identify the relation between the civil institutions and the military onesin a political regime/system type.

Radu POPA: Civil-military relations have the history and the evolution of the relationsbetween the military and society, the forms and procedures of manifestation beingdetermined by the socio-historic characteristics of the period they operated in, as well asby the changes they provoked. Thus, as far as evolution is concerned, the facts areobvious: the civil-military relations have evolved in close connection with the evolutionof society and military institution, by borrowing their features up to assuming them.A comparative typology of the civil-military relations is difficult to undertake duringthis discussion, especially because we witness the uncontrolled proliferation of ad hocgeneral conclusions on this theme. I believe it is more important for us to see whichthe relational factors that influence the civil-military relations are, sense in which,in my opinion, we should take into account the development of professionalism in themilitary, since the professionalisation phenomenon determines the ineffectivenessof the political factor influence over the military environment. In this respect, one shouldalso bear in mind the political modernisation and the development of an active publicopinion not only towards the military establishment, but also towards its essential issues;society’s general attitude towards the military, on the one hand and that of the politicalclass towards the military content of national security, on the other hand, the traditionalmilitary conflicts metamorphose into armed conflict forms, in connection with whichone declares from the beginning that the final purpose must be zero civil losses; the levelof power and maturity of not only the civil institutions, but also of the armed forces;

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the nature of coercive, political, legislative-normative and organisational resources placedat civil society’s disposal in order to manage the relations with the military establishment,the nature of the direct relations between the military establishment and the social-politicalenvironment, as well as of the “frontiers” established between them. Last but not least,we should mention the interaction between the military power and the civil one, the militaryroles in politics etc. Besides the mentioned factors, I believe the typology of civil-militaryrelations is decisively determined by the nature of the control the society exerts overthe military through politics. The means as such are essentially configured by the state,maturity and condition of the democratic regime, the missions constitutionally assignedto the armed forces, as well as the cultural level of the two entities, the military and society.

Major Mihail ANTON, Lecturer: I have already addressed the civil-militaryrelations in my first answer. I would not like to repeat myself.

Colonel Costinel PETRACHE, PhD: How is the military “seen”in the postmodern society ?

Radu POPA: Such a delicate issue ! I would rather say how the warfare is seenin postmodern society and, from here, it is relatively easy for us to imagine the institutioncapable to wage it, capable to manage armed violence. Thus, in my opinion, this is thewarfare in postmodernity: hyper-technologisation of instruments, be they lethal or not,so that they could materially sustain the armed fight; extension of the possibilitiesof armed engagement at the level of all the physical possibilities accessible to the landcondition; complementary spread of confrontation in the economic, mediatic, information,scientific, political, cultural, social and other environments; excessive professionalisationdetermined by the vertical shifts occurred not only in the structure, the content and theimportance of military branches, but also in the operational priority of the categoriesof armed forces; laborious, spatial and mobile improvement in the training didacticsof combatants; the marginalisation of the tactic and operational exigencies underthe pressure of the constantly increasing influence of strategic thinking and action;considerable decrease of the area in which conflicts take place and in the numberof directly engaged forces, balanced by the complexity of the procedures of surgicallyintervening on strategic dimensions; communication and information become both causesand support for the operational concentration focused on the desired project “zero dead”;live and unhindered transmission of armed confrontations and the deepening of the militaryestablishment socialisation process towards acquiring and asserting an ineluctablelegitimacy. In other words, a different war and different armed forces, accordingly.

Major Mihail ANTON, Lecturer: The military must be analysed, in postmodernsociety, through the angle of the relation between postmodernism and nation/nationalism,which is one difficult to grasp. The national feelings will not be missing in a postmodernsociety. Following a previously expressed reasoning, the military will develop formsof manifestation in accordance with the new society. Otherwise, the issue of the militaryinstitution being anachronistic will be once more raised. The solution is for it to permanentlyadapt to the society it is part of and to redesign its functional imperative.

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The alternative theoretical perspectives regardingthe forms of social organisation do not contradict as far asthe future of the nation, and, consequently, that of the militaryis concerned. The perspectives on the nation and nationalismaccording to which nations are conceived as “primordialand natural” divisions of humanity and nationalism is“omnipresent and universal” are placed under the labelof primacy. What we understand now by “primordialism”derives from these assertions.

Primordialism can be identified under three forms.The first one is represented by the organic (popular or nationalist) primordialism,according to which “nations exist in their natural state”, they are the consequenceand effect of a divine plan, not only of historic evolutions. The nations are conceivedin an organicist manner, namely they are subjected to the laws of nature, with a perpetualexistence. The second form derives from socio-biology, which argues that nations or ethniccommunities are “expressions of kindred” and represent genetic “extensions” of smallerunits, such as families or clans. There is, as the followers of this perspective argue,a logical coherence and a truth between the myth of “common origin” and the biologicalreality. The third type is that of the cultural primordialism, which leaves the biologicaspect aside, but further mentions the major power the so-called “primordial links” mighthave, which are seen as major starting points for of human experience. These arethe blood, language, customs, religion, territory etc. connections, crucial connectionsthat tend to dissolve or lead to crisis, at one point, at least, the “civil connections” alreadyestablished in modern states. What should be mentioned is that, within this approach,the matter of the human being “assigning” these ineffable powers is addressed, namelyabout the members of the community conferring some fundamental valences to thecommunity. The purpose of this analysis is to highlight the centrality of symbolismin constituting the nation and ethnicity. As I stated before, I consider the military to bea necessary symbol in the existence of every nation. Perennialism focuses its speechon the crucial importance of the nation in the history of humanity. Therefore, the nationshave existed ever since the beginning of history, although they are not necessarilyparts of the natural order. The representatives of this movement identify nations whereverin history, from the ancient Egyptians to Babylonians to Frenchmen or Englishmenand explain history in terms such as: conflicts, alliances or other different types of relations.

Ethno-symbolism is an approach that aims to go beyond failures, without neverthelessfalling into the simplifications of a vulgar primordialism. It is an approach that attemptsat deconstructing the two myths: the one of the “perennial nation” and the one of the“modern nation”. Just as its name shows, the movement stresses the subjective elementsin the persistence of ethnic communities and their connection to the future nations.This connection is not direct or causal, but incidental. In other words, not any ethniccommunity generates a nation, but, in order that a nation can be established and resist,it must be based on an ethnical nucleus, even if rather symbolically perceived (founding

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myths, specific identity symbols etc. are included here). In this perspective, the nationis a modern creation, but its roots are premodern and it will last in the postmodern society,too, next to its armed forces.

Lieutenant Colonel George SPIRIDONESCU: I will respond as briefly aspossible: strongly computerised. In fact, the concept of informational society is gainingground as we speak in the detriment of the one of postmodern society.

Colonel Costinel PETRACHE, PhD: We are at the end of thiscentury, the 21st. Would you please define the military, in an exerciseof adaptation which transcends time.

Lieutenant Colonel George SPIRIDONESCU: It is difficult to make suchan imaginary projection. This would mean to reduce much of the reality and omit manydetails. Yet, we are convinced of one thing, that the military will define itself throughthe type of society it will be part of. In this case, we have not different, but identicalforms of ontology. We will probably have a postinformational society, thereforepostinformatised armed forces, and the weapons of the soldiers will be informationand computers. Probabilistically speaking, it is wiser for us to make sure that the thingswill be somehow similar, by virtue of another universal dialectic law: inertia.

Major Mihail ANTON, Lecturer: The level of incertitude and non-determinationin social sciences remains high, but one does not sufficiently considers the fact that,in natural sciences, so-called exact, the modern scientific revolution shows that thereis no advance towards a definitive truth, but only towards a better one. Military sociologyis trying nowadays to find solutions for the issues occurred in the international securityenvironment without nevertheless pretending to have the optimal answer to them.People’s need for certitude, for minimum certainty or guarantee for the future stimulatesthem to search around existential guidelines for orientation, generically named values.It is unanimously accepted the fact that we are all obliged to certain cultural conceptswhich regulate our perceptions and govern our expectations. Yet, in the current transitorysocietal ensemble, the value guidelines are not fixed and, immutable anymore. Everythingis subjected to change, to transformation. Given these circumstances, to predict todaythe evolution of certain social phenomena or processes definitely represents a hazard.Therefore, I will not set myself up for being a futurologist or a prophet.

Radu POPA: It is the institution without which going towards the 22nd centurywould not be possible !

Colonel Costinel PETRACHE, PhD: Society – a unique complexof creating values, organically integrated, which goes throughouthistory by applying the principle of the systemic self-managementof relations between individuals; a qualitatively distinct unityof individuals, conditioned by the revolving rigours of history

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RMT Debates

and objectively determined by the meditative laws of becoming;the most ample and heterogeneous instance which, tacitly or assuminglyinspired, may determine one path of history or another, havingthe conviction that was the right path; a superior form for organisingthe general-human relations, in which the party distributionand assuming political and ideological options and beliefs determinethe public format of the action for obtaining and maintaining the power;a formal construction of the bureaucratic state, bureaucratic itselfthrough its functions, organisation and purposes, in which the proximalpolitical type and the nature of the specific differences, as well asthe validation by contrast, all develop asymmetries able to generateabrupt social cleavages or even fratricide confrontations.

The military – a fundamental creation of society, indispensableto its evolution, mostly contradictory and lacking in horizon,its instrument in proving its power, credibility, aspirationsand grandeur; sometimes decisively ignored up to the limitof the institutional disregard and the identitary marginalisation,is heroically treated when, at the constrained limit of hope, is sociallyasked to safeguard the aspirations and the present of one nation;an instrument of the Power and not an instrument for power, it isoften superior, by means of understanding, responsibility and altruism,to the general social context to which it belongs and to whichit unconditionally serves.

The military and society – Which is genetically the first ? As aninstitution specialised in the armed violence management, it isdefinitely the product of society, although the violent conflictsbetween individuals precede their unitary organisation, sociallyintegrated. Far from history’s tempting simple facts, the militaryundergoes very modestly the winner’s social glory, while solitarilyand quietly accepting the unconditioned sacrifice. A glory he forgetswhen returning from the training field.

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he outbreak of the First World War, in the summer of 1914, caused thepolitical-military decision-makers to face problems regarding the strategyand the political orientation that were of capital importance for the future

THE ROMANIAN ARMYCAMPAIGN PLAN IN 1916

THE “Z” HYPOTHESIS~ ~Brigadier (r.) Nicolae CIOBANU, PhD

~ Member of the Academy of Scientists in Romania ~

and the fate of Romania. The fact that two belligerent groups were constituted – the CentralPowers and the Entente – came to make the political debates in Romania, over the decisionthe Romanian Government should have taken regarding the attitude towards the FirstWorld War, even more complicated. A first decision, considered to be in completeaccordance with the interests of the Romanian state was that regarding the adoptionof a neutral position on the war that was shaking Europe.

Romania was in an ambiguous situation: on the one hand, it signed the Romanian-Austro-Hungarian Treaty of Alliance in October 18/30, 1883, in Vienna1, treaty that waskept secret and should have been renewed every 3 years if no party denounced it and,on the other hand, it had to take into account the quasiunanimous opinion of the Romanianpopulace who were hostile towards the Austro-Hungarian Empire, considered to beoppressive, as the Romanians who lived in Transylvania did not have political and nationalrights and were subjected to national prosecutions, especially after the Austro-Hungariandualism was set up2.

Given the complex situation, the military factors were imposed, by the politicalfactor, to have military objectives that sometimes opposed each other. Thus, with regardto a campaign plan that should have been drawn up to guide the army in case of war,there were many variants proposed, in time. During the period that followed the signingof the Treaty with Austria-Hungary, to which Germany adhered, too, the CampaignPlan – “C” Hypothesis was drawn up, establishing the way Romania should have taken

T

1Istoria României în date, Bucure[ti, Editura Enciclopedic`, 2003, p. 255.2 On 5/17th of February 1867, the Austro-Hungarian Pact was sealed, regarding the establishment

of the dualist state Austro-Hungary (Emperor Franz Joseph I was crowned on 27 May/8 June 1867,as King of Hungary), of which Transylvania was part of, Hungary’s autonomy being at the same timecancelled. Proclaiming of the Austro-Hungarian dualism resulted in negative effects on the Romaniansin Transylvania, because of the policy of discrimination and desnationalisation promoted by the Hungarianauthorities, under the slogan: “There is only one nation in Hungary – the Hungarian one”.

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action in case Russia, allied with Bulgaria, had endangered Romania that was alliedwith the Central Powers3.

The second variant of the Plan was drawn up having in view that Bulgaria, moreand more closed to the Central Powers, signed, on September 6, 1915, a secret treatywith the Central Powers and Turkey, engaging itself in the war within 35 days4. The “B”Hypothesis Plan was thus drawn up, stipulating the use of the majority of forces for theoffensive against Austria-Hungary and for the defence of the frontier with Bulgaria.

“B1” Hypothesis Plan was also drawn up, plan that would have been put into practiceif Bulgaria had declared neuter. In this case, the main forces, the entire military effortwas to be directed towards a single front, the one in the Northwest, to free Transylvaniaand Bucovina from the foreign occupation5.

Finally, based on both the Treaty signed with the Entente on August 4/17, 1916and on the Military Convention, the engagement of all the forces in a military actionagainst Bulgaria was adopted, with the considerable insistence of not only GeneralM.V. Alexeev (Chief of Stavká, the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces) but alsothat of General Joseph Joffre. The Romanian Supreme Headquarter stood firm on its positionregarding the concentration of main forces on the front against Austria-Hungary.Eventually the “Romanian Campaign Plan” from 1916 was adopted, with the entire titlethe “Project on Operation Regarding a War against the Central Powers and Bulgaria.Romania Allied with the Quadruple Entente”, also known as the “Z” Hypothesis6.

The first chapter of the Campaign Plan specified that the main desideratum of Romania’sengagement in the vortex of the First World War was the accomplishment of our nationalideal, respectively reuniting the nation and the “liberation of the territories inhabitedby Romanians that are, today, part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy”7. The strategicaims of taking armed action were the annihilation of the enemy forces in Transylvania,the debouche in the Hungarian Plain and the exit in the Tisza and the Danube Valleysto take control over the Austro-Hungarian armed forces procurement8.

Analysing the enemy capabilities and groupings of forces, the authors of the CampaignPlan justly concluded the disposition, the force and the intentions of the Central Powers’forces in Transylvania, Banat and the Northern part of Bulgaria. Thus, it was appreciatedthat the about 70 000 soldiers of the Austro-Hungarian Army in Transylvania were capableof carrying out defensive fights on successive lines, from the line of the frontier betweenRomania and Austria-Hungary, a greater resistance being expected in the Southernand Eastern Carpathians passage.

Concomitantly, the enemy Headquarter could concentrate in the area Cluj – Dej –Bistri]a forces summing up about 100 000 soldiers, appreciated to be capable of defendingthe front and hindering the Romanian invasion on the middle course of the Mure[.

3 Apud România în anii Primului R`zboi Mondial, vol. 1, Bucure[ti, Editura Militar`, p. 212.4 Istoria lumii în date, Bucure[ti, Editura Enciclopedic` Român`, 1969, p. 341.5 România în R`zboiul Mondial, vol. 1, Documents – Annexes (further on the source will be cited

under RRM), Bucure[ti, 1934, pp. 110-111.6 Ibid., p. 111 and passim.7 Apud România în anii Primului R`zboi Mondial, op. cit., p. 216.8 Curs de Istoria artei militare, vol. II, Arta militar` na]ional` [i universal` în epoca modern`,

Bucure[ti, 1990, p. 236.

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National FoundationsIn Banat, the enemy was considered to dispose of about 20 000 people in the area

Caransebe[ – Deva – Lugoj and of about 10 000 soldiers on the Cerna Valley.At the Southern frontier, in the North of Bulgaria, the Romanian General Staff

appreciated that the enemy had a series of groups, consisting of Bulgarian troops,disposed as follows: between the Timoc and the junction of the Olt and the Danube,approximately 10 000-15 000 militaries, in Rusciuc area and the outskirts about25 000-30 000 militaries were disposed, and in Rusciuc – Razgard – {umla – Varna area,about 70 000-75 000 people. All in all, at the Southern frontier, the enemy had about105 000-120 000 militaries9. The mission of the Bulgarian forces disposed near or evenon the frontier with Romania was, probably, to concentrate the forces of the RomanianArmy, through demonstrative actions meant to force a crossing over the Danube, especiallyin Giurgiu and Olteni]a sectors10 and to take offensive in the South of Dobruja, all withthe clear end of attracting more forces of the Romanian Army from the front in Transylvania.

The General Staff did not have enough available data regarding the enemy strategicsupplies and did not consider the possibility to bring forces from other fronts in order tolaunch counteroffensive in Transylvania.

In accordance with the established strategic purpose and with the enemy possibilitiesand the probable character of actions, the Romanian Headquarters plan comprised provisionsregarding the strategic disposition, the armies mission and the stages in the developmentof the operation.

Thus, the majority of the forces (the North Army, the Second Army and the FirstArmy, reinforced, then, with general reserve), approximately 75% from the total of forces,were to launch offensive in Transylvania, Banat and Hungary, attacking Budapest11

on the general direction, while the Third Army (25% from the mobilised effectives)was to launch defence on the Northern bank of the Danube and in Dobruja. The 5th ArmedCorps was in the reserve of the General Staff.

With a view to launching offensive, the Armies were assigned the following missions:• The Northern Army12 (commander – General Constantin Prezan), concentrated

on Romania Western frontier with the Austro-Hungarian Empire, between CâmpulungMoldovenesc and the Oituz Valley, had the mission to break through the enemy defencelines between Dorna and Oituz, to get out through the “Some[ Gate” and to debouchwith the main forces in Turda Plain.

• The Second Army (commander – General Alexandru Averescu), disposedbetween the Oituz Valley and the superior course of the Arge[, behind the Romanian-Austro-Hungarian frontier, with the mission to launch offensive, initially coming out tothe Mure[ course, between Târgu Mure[ and Alba Iulia. Subsequently, it had to developoffensive in cooperation with the North Army through the “Some[ Gate”.

• The First Army (commander – General Mihail Asian) was assigned the missionof defending the Southern border, behind the Danube, at Or[ova, then, in the Southof Dobruja, up to the Black Sea Coast, at Ekime. It had the mission to reject all the attempts

9 RRM, op. cit., p. 113.10 Istoria militar` a poporului român, vol. V, Bucure[ti, Editura Militar`, 1988, p. 387.11 RRM, op. cit., p. 97.12 The Northern Army is also called the Fourth Army in some documents regarding carrying out

strategic offensive operation.


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the enemy made in order to force a crossing over the Danube and ensure the concentrationof the 47th Russian Army Corps13 (the 61st Infantry Division and the 3rd Cavalry one, bothRussians, and the Serbian Division)14. Subsequently, the army had to be capable of takingthe offensive in order to conquer the line Rusciuk – {umla – Varna, eliminating the riskof an enemy action in force.

The Campaign Plan established the stages of the fighting actions carried with a viewto fulfil the strategic objective.

Therefore, during the first phase, the three Armies (the Northern, the Second andthe Third ones), by initially using covering detachments, had to reject the enemy fromthe positions organised in the 18 gorges15. Then they were to carry on the offensivein Transylvania, the major goal being a break through, after about 25 days sincemobilisation, on the middle course of the Mure[, where it was estimated that the decisivebattle for Transylvania would be fought.

At this stage, the forces of the Third Army, positioned on the Southern border(The Western Group) – the 20th Infantry Division, located in Oltenia; “The Central Group”– consisting of the 16th, 18th Infantry and 1st Cavalry Division, between the spring of theRiver Olt and the confluence of the River Arge[ and the Danube; “The Eastern Group”,consisting of the 9th, 17th and 19th Infantry Divisions, positioned in Southern Dobruja),had to stay in defence and secure the disembarkation and concentration of the 47th RussianArmy Corps southwards the line Cernavod`-Constan]a.

During the second stage, of approximately 4-5 days, the Northern Army and theSecond one were to continue the offensive and, by rejecting the enemy, to reachthe line Dej-Cluj, penetrate through the “Some[ Gate” and the Apuseni Mountains.Simultaneously, the First Army had to use its main forces along the Mure[ Valley,protruding in the Caransebe[-Dobra area and, concomitantly with a detachment, takepossession over the Abrud area, in order to intercept the communication lines leadingto the Rivers Cri[ul Alb and Cri[ul Negru.

During this stage, the Third Army, after the concentration of Russian forces in Dobruja(approximately in the 10th day since launching the mobilisation), was to take the offensivewith the Romanian and Russian forces from Dobrogea in order to take possession overthe line Rusciuc – {umla – Varna. In addition, it was to attack and annihilate the enemyforces from Northern and Eastern Bulgaria. The offensive operations carried in SouthernDobruja were to take place in cooperation with the Romanian Danube Fleet and the RussianFleet in the Black Sea.

During the third stage, estimated to last for 8-9 days, the Northern and Second Armieswere to reposition most of their forces in the Tizsa Plain, the Debrecen-Oradea area,while the Fifth Army Corps (the strategic reserve of the Romanian General Headquarters)was to enter the battle with the mission to penetrate, through the valleys of the RiversCri[ul Negru and Cri[ul Repede, in the Oradea-Békéscsaba area. There, they were to beable to attack, in flank and from behind, the enemy forces that might have resisted

13 Apud Istoria militar` a poporului român, op. cit., p. 381.14 The Serbian Division consisted of both Serbians who did not manage to evacuate themselves

from the Austrian-Hungarian armies and prisoners captured by the Russian army among the Serbiansolders enrolled in the Austrian-Hungarian army.

15 Istoria românilor, vol. VII, De la Independen]` la Marea Unire, Bucure[ti, Editura Enciclopedic`,2003, p. 423.

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National Foundationsin the Debrecen-Oradea area. In this stage, the First Army was to take action in Banatagainst the enemy groups in the area and establish connections for cooperation withthe French-British-Serbian army which was to move forward from the Thessaloniki area,through Serbia, towards the Middle Danube. At the same time, a detachment belongingto the First Army, which had the strength of a division, was to go forward on the lowercourse of the River Mure[ in order to ensure the junction with the Romanian troopsfrom the Oradea district16.

Analysing the Campaign Plan the “Z” Hypothesis now, after almost nine decadessince it was drafted, we think that this was not the best plan to choose, which should havetaken into account the geopolitical circumstances and the strategic situation on differentEuropean battlefronts at the time Romania entered the war, in August 1916. It is a positiveand unquestionable fact that the Romanian Armed Forces General Staff had a scientificallygrounded campaign plan, taking into account the requirements of certain laws and principlesof the armed fight, such as: the law of the agreement between purpose, forces and means,the law of the ratio of forces but also the observance of certain principles, such as theone of focusing the effort on the decisive directions, freedom of action, surprisingand avoiding surprise or manoeuvre.

The plan corresponded to the political-strategic purposes sought by the political-military decision-making factors and, in the main, it was in keeping with the situationthat Romania confronted with at that particular moment, and the provisions of the AllianceTreaty and the Military Convention between Romania and the Triple Entente, signedin August 4/17, 1916.

The terms necessary to fulfil the missions and the duration of the stages were properlycalculated, especially for the first phase of the strategic offensive from Transylvania.Establishing the fact that the decisive battle for Transylvania would be carried out on themiddle course of the River Mure[ was realistic, because on that line the frontal displayof the offensive strip of the three armies would have been diminished with almosttwo thirds, from 900 to 300 km.

The final objective of the offensive operation led in Transylvania was establishedtoo far from the Romanian forces possibilities, with a strategic reserve with the valueof an army corps.

The main drawback of the Campaign Plan consisted in the stipulation of the offensivetaking place, some day, “in the tenth day since mobilisation”, on two diametrically opposedfronts at the same time, which, as they became more and more remote from each other,required special lengths for communication lines, impressive quantities of forcesand means for supplying the effort on the two strategic directions, for which Romaniawas not ready at all. The human and material potential of the country did not lead towardsadopting this kind of strategic conception. The drawback was noticed by the authorsof the Plan, and, for that fact, the offensive in Southern Dobruja was set a limitedobjective: reaching the line Rusciuk – {umla – Varna17.

At the risk of stirring discussions, I however state that the Campaign Plan the “Z”Hypothesis was drafted more with the “heart” and less with the “mind” ! In establishingthe political-military strategic objective, one took into consideration especially the national

16 Istoria artei militare, op. cit., p. 238.17 RRM, op. cit., p. 121.

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feelings that animated population, such as freeing the brothers from the Austrian-Hungarianterror, especially the Hungarian one, while the military necessities, the material conditionswere taken to the secondary plan.

The political decision-making factors, especially Prime Minister I.C. Br`tianu,“drastically negotiated” Romania’s entering the war, thus obtaining “what theywanted”: commitments and promises coming from the allies, who, practically, as it wasproved afterwards, did not even think of keeping them.

From the beginning, the stand taken by the chief of Stavka, General M.V. Alekseev,was open and firm towards an “offensive with Romania’s main forces against Bulgaria”18,a stand that had been upheld by the Russians ever since January 1916. The supremecommander of the French armed forces, Marshal Joseph Joffre, embraced the sameattitude between 1914-1916, sustaining, during the negotiations with the Romanian party,from June 1916, an “action with most of the Romanian troops in Bulgaria”19.

I reckon that applying the “B Plan” would have been more efficient, but focusedthe main effort in the South. This would have allowed for the efforts of the Alliance andRomania to sum up, meaning the offensive from Thessaloniki of General Maurice Saraillwould have been favoured (he had been prevented from moving towards the Balkans,and even rejected, on some directions, by the Bulgarian forces). Thus, the back of theBulgarian army would have been attacked through Romanian offensive, and, consequently,they would have been forced to fight on two fronts or “with the front reversed”.

At the same time, sending Russian forces on the Romanian front would have hada different qualitative and quantitative value, as they would have represented the secondstrategic echelon of the offensive between the Danube and the Balkans.

Thus, in this respect, one can raise the issue of some Romanian troops resisting at theborder with Austria-Hungary. Experience showed that, in order to open the gorges, theCentral Powers, with the two armies – the Ninth German and the First Austrian-Hungarianones –, fought from the second half of September to the first week of November,and meanwhile, of course, expecting the situation on the Southern Front to have beenresolved. Caught between two fronts, the Bulgarian army would have been defeated.

The Campaign Plan adopted in 1916 – offensive in Transylvania and defence on theDanube and in Dobruja –, according to, among others, the historian Florin Constantiniu,took into account the state of mind of the population rather than the military necessities.It was implemented in order to satisfy the public’s feeling, obsessed with setting Transylvaniafree, which determined the strategic option of the offensive over the Carpathians, ratherthan for fear that the enemy would separate Moldova from Muntenia by breaking throughthe Romanian lines from the Carpathians curve. This mountain mass, easy to defendwith reduced effective, would have represented a safe shield for an offensive in South,which would have taken Bulgaria out of the war, interrupted the connection betweenthe Central Powers and Turkey and ensured the security of the Romanian Southernflank, in order to allow for the operations in Transylvania to take place20.

18 Apud România în anii Primului R`zboi Mondial, op. cit., p. 214.19 Colonel Atanasiu Victor, Unele considera]ii asupra angaj`rii României în Primul R`zboi Mondial.

Ipoteza “Z”, in revista “Studii”, nr. 6/1971, p. 213.20 Florin Constantiniu, O istorie sincer` a poporului român, Bucure[ti, Editura Univers Enciclopedic,

1997, p. 277.

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Défense nationale et sécurité collective,France, no. 2, February 2006

Austria’s Expectations Concerning EuropeanSecurity and Defense Policy (ESDP) • WEUand ESDP • Policy Impact on French-GermanMilitary Cooperation • Political Dimensionof ESDP: the First Half 2005 • European SecurityStrategy: Surveying an Integration Project• European Military Space Activities • Intelligenceand ESDP • Map Examination of EuropeanDefense Strategy • New Models for MilitaryCooperation in Mediterranean • The Futureof Turkey • Consensus Regarding Defense,Between Totem and Taboo • Institutional

Yvory Coast: LicorneExercise to SupportUN Forces • MedicalE m e r g e n c y f o rRepublican Guard• Military ChaplainIsabelle Maurel •Nuclear DissuasionRevisited • An Armyfor Democracy in theDemocratic Republicof Congo • FrenchDefense MinistryEngaged to CombatBird Influenza • Monaco Principality’s Carabiniers• Joint Defense College • ALFOST – OceanStrategic Forces Command • Iraq, After ThreeYears (File) • Hidden Weapons of MultipurposeAmerican Aircraft F35 • Must We Still SendPermanent Journalists to Iraq ?

Bulletin européen, Italy, no. 671, April 2006Why does Moscow Hold G8 Chairmanship ?Do not Ask Too Many Questions About Russia• Breaking Silence About Tchetchnya • FranceAspires to Have a Major Role in Europe in the Frameof the Global Europen Security and Defense

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Deficiencies and Social Dissolution • ForeignInvestments in Strategic Domains • SpecificProfessions in Economic Intelligence

Europäische Sicherheit, Germany, no. 1,January 2006

Interview with the New German Minister of Defence• Berlin Behind the Scenes • UN Peacekeeping– Developments and Trends • Finland: StrongDefense Will Generates Efficient Defence Forces• Land Mines of the Bundeswehr – BalanceBetween Humanitarian Interests and MilitaryRequirements • Pakistan – The Islamic NuclearPower and the Fight Against Terror • NavalShipbuilding Industry in Germany • ExperiencesGained from Standing Naval Force Mediterranean• “The Most Powerful Weapon of the World”• Network Centric Warfare – Determinationof Position from an Information TechnologyAspect • Application of Modern ManagementMethods in the Transformation of the Air Force• Participation of the Air Force in the NATOResponse Force • Interview with the Ambassadorof Russia in Berlin • Creative Managers withLaptop and Loafers: Field Grade Reserve Officers• Prevention and Fight Against InternationalTerrorism – Contribution of the Bundeswehrto an Interdepartamental Approach • USA-Europe-South America. Transatlantic Free TradeTriangle in the Making or a Flop

Ten Years We Want to Catch up with Boeingin the Field of Armaments as Well” • High-AltitudeReconnaissance • NBC Defence of the Bundeswehr• The Difficult Task of the IAEA • Drones in theArmy • Certification and Qualification of the A 400Transport Aircraft After the Commercial Approch• First Experiences Gained with CooperativeLogistic Facilities of the Air Force

Military Technology, Germany, vol. 30, no. 2, 2006High Poker • US Defence: Myth-Busting & Policies& Plans, Year 2006 • Help Wanted: Chieftainwith a Proven Record • India’s New Approachto Comprehensive Security • Indian Army 2020• Towards a Global Partnership Between the USand India • India’s New Defense ProcurementProcedures and Offsets Policy • India’s NavalPosture – An Assessment • India and France InkSCORPÈNE Deal • BrahMos – The JV Trend-Setter• China’s Changing Military • China DevelopsStealth Fighter • Precision Strike Weapons &Net-Centric Warfare • Spanish Air Defense• Powering the Future • SAPA Placencia SA• Artillery 2006 • Simulation and TrainingHorizons Expand

ÖMZ (Österreichische Militärische

Zeitschrift), Austria, nr. 3, May-June 2006Operational Thinking and Comand in theBundeswehr on the Way to a Combat Army• Japan’s Security – Political Situation • ThePipeline Policy: Energy Supply and Alliances• Multinational Interagency Groups – Supportfor Security Provisions Within a Total GovernmentApproch • A Brief Outline of China’s SecurityPolicy in 2005 • The Bosnian Dschihad • Terrorismin Spain Against the Backdrop of the Attacksof 11th March 2004

Revue Militaire Suisse, Swizerland, nos. 1-2,January-February 2006

Swiss Army, its Structures and Financial Means• Swiss Army and its Development • Human Rightsin the Swiss Army • About Some “Collisions”Between Technology and Strategy • Geostrategyof Latitude • Towards Resuming of Cold War ?• Intelligence, Terrorism, Counter-Terrorismand Anti-terrorism • Organic Infantry SupportForces

Global Responsibilityof the EU in Mattersof Security Policy• Berlin Scenery• German ArmedForces in the Processof Transformation– An Interim Balance• Christian Ethicas a Basis of theGerman Soldier’sAbility to Make theRight Dec is ionsi n M i s s i o n s a n dOperations – Where does the Truth Lie ? • Socio-Political Challenges to Postmodern Armed Forces• Perspectives for Afghanistan • TransformationSeen as a Chance • Network-Oriented Thinkingin Network Centric Warfare • “Within the Next

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Military Publications Universe

Signal, SUA, vol.60, no. 7, March 2006Agency Fast-Tracks Acquisition • NationalGateway System Spreads the Word • Stiletto Cutsa Swath to New Navy Technologies • Smack’emFlattens Targets • Israel Deploys Robot Guardians• Experimental Power System Expands FlightCapabilities • Intelligence Center Mines OpenSources • 500-Day Plan Rouses Dialogue • ItalianSoftware Defined Radio Exits the Lab for the Field• Global Threats Demand Credible Responsein Less Time

Signal, SUA, vol.60, no. 8, April 2006A Brighter Future for Battlefield Vision • SensingDanger Within • Biological Sensor Detects Hazards• Intelligence Agency Merges TechnologyCenters • Marine Corps Experiments Prepare

for the Future • Portable Sensors Extend Warriors’Reach • China Builds Modern Marine Corps Force• Netherlands Melds Satellite Communications• Semantic Web Ready for Prime Time • SoftwareArchitecture Offers New Possibilities • Waron Terror Drives Dynamic Military Innovations

Survival, UK, vol. 48, no. 1, Spring 2006Darfur and Beyond: For a Capability to Protect: MassKilling, the African Union and NATO • MilitaryForce and European Strategy; Intelligence Gaps:Thinking Straight and Talking Straight: Problemsof Intelligence Analysis; Relationships: Iran andNorth Korea: The Proliferation Nexus • Turkeyand Russia: Axis of the Excluded ? • Ukraineand the West; Afghanistan : Averting Failurein Afghanistan • Securing Afghanistan’s Border;Eurasian Energy : The Persian Gulf and theGeopolitics of Oil • China, Japan and the Scramblefor Siberia • China’s Energy Security: Domesticand International Issues

Vox Magazine, Belgium, no. 4, April 2006European Views (Mistral Missiles) • JointTraining • 11th Engineer Battalion in Benin• Kosovo at the Crossroad • Past Memory– Historical Pole of Defense • Royal Armyand Military History Museum • Breedonk Fort• Shooting Manoeuvre in the British Campin Castelmartin • Logistics and IntelligenceSupport Abroad

Vox Magazine, Belgium, no. 5, Mai 2006Light Aircraft School: Mountain Training • CrazyTrip Exercise • Floating Airfield • NationalGeographic Institute – 175 Years • A-109Hellicopters Used to Transport Human Organs• For a Defense Career • A New TechnologyPlatform – an Infantry Armoured Vehicle • Eben-Emael Fort • The New Reserve Forces Concept.

The German Navy.Part. 1 • Allergies –F r o m I t c h i n g t oDeadly State of Shock• The New e-Passport• Austrian ArmedF o r c e s A c q u i r eIRIS-T • “Bomb Job”Explosive OrdnanceDisposal. Part. 2.Equipment and Assets• D e v e l o p i n g aC o m m a n d a n dControl Structure for EU – Operations • Qadesh,Approximately 1300 BC • Austrian Armed ForcesLogistics Centres • European Security andDefence Policy • At Distant Borders – Mountainsof Kosovo • The Advance on Bagdad – The LimitedPossibilities of High-Tech • Task Force DULJE– We Were There • German NBC Defence Withinthe NATO Response Force

Research, Translation and Selection Ioana MANAFU, Delia PETRACHE, Mihai POPESCU

National Military Library

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PlanePlanePlanePlanePlane

ShipwreckShipwreckShipwreckShipwreckShipwreck

When it comes to the contemporarymilitary matters, we can think ...differently.

Our colleague,Cristi VECERDEA – CRIV

who, being very keen on the worldthat can be taken seriously evenin ... a different way, proves it,exercising essential impliedmeanings.

CRIV’s artistic personality,affirmed with modesty, althoughoverwhe lming through i tssubstance, comprehension, useand finality, does not needflattering speeches. His work,and it is indeed the authenticwork of genius, recommends himwith incontestable certainty.

ThinkingThinkingThinkingThinkingThinkingDifferently ...Differently ...Differently ...Differently ...Differently ...

ThinkingThinkingThinkingThinkingThinkingDifferently ...Differently ...Differently ...Differently ...Differently ...

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Thinking Differently ...

ChanceChanceChanceChanceChance

We are not going to mention thenumber of times he has exhibitedin the galleries in the country as,for about a quarter of a century,he has participated in all therepresentative manifestationsin the field.

Abroad, CRIV has left the markof his brilliant talent on the spiritin countries like Japan, Bulgaria,Hungary, Turkey, Iran, Germany,Belgium, Holland, the USA,Canada, Brasil, Tunis, Poland,Ukraine, Former Yugoslavia,England, Egypt, Italy, France,Korea, Hong-Kong, Portugal.

Sign of … his artistic valueglobalisation, his caricatures canbe found in private collections allover the world. We do not mentionthe states as such, as it would beeasier to identify those CRIV hasnot got to yet.

As for the prizes he has beenawarded ? A lot ! There is not roomenough here to mere enumeratethem. Anyway, the Chief of theMilitary Circle in Lugoj is theart i s t who, wi th regard toeverything we know under thename of geopolitics, geostrategy,g l o b a l i s a t i o n , t e r r o r i s m ,antiterrorism, counterterrorism etc.,brings us closer to a meaning.

“GMR”

Dreaming in a BarrackDreaming in a BarrackDreaming in a BarrackDreaming in a BarrackDreaming in a Barrack~ like Manner like Manner like Manner like Manner like Manner

� EDITORIAL EVENTS EDITORIAL EVENTS EDITORIAL EVENTS EDITORIAL EVENTS EDITORIAL EVENTS

“The Cold War was not an event planned or anticipatedby the main actors who participated in it, nevertheless,the political, ideological and military confrontation lastedmore that any of the “warm” wars that took place in the worldduring the last half of millennium. Even if it is alreadya page of history, the Cold War has consequences that haveinfluenced the events that followed. That is why it representsa phenomenon that must be further studied, the lessons learntresulted being important for the development of the eventswe are undergoing at present and will confront within the future”. Solu]ionarea crizelor interna]ionale(The Settlement of International Crises) comesas a possible response to the host of questions regardingthe evolution of the international system for the last 15 years.

Being structured on three chapters, the book of Major General ProfessorTeodor FRUNZETI, PhD, published by the Institutul European, in the Seria Studiistrategice [i de securitate, whose coordinator he is, succinctly evinces the role of militarypower in conflict prevention, crises management and settlement during the Cold War,the importance of the military instrument in transforming the international securityenvironment, while mentioning the new type of conflict – the fourth generation warfare,whose main purpose is changing the system of thought of the enemy’s political leadership,the North Atlantic Alliance’s vision regarding crises management, conflict and pre-emptiveactions prevention, ways for the pacifical settlement of international disputes, the Charterof the United Nations representing, in this respect, the document that stipulates them,“in the most explicit and comprehensive way possible”. Thus, together with the meansstipulated by Article 33 of the UN Charter, the author presents other types of solutionsfor settling, through non-military means, international conflicts and crises, which arenow put in practice, such as: negotiations, which are centred on settling a conflictbefore it reaches its violent phase; the enquiry, developed under different names– observation, investigation, establishing the facts, control, monitoring, surveillance,prevention and early warning (the Hague Conventions, in 1899, 1907 respectively, playedan important part for the fact that the former introduced the inquiry among the pacificways for settling a conflict, its content being detailed subsequently); the good offices,laying the stress on establishing a contact having an “exploratory and informative role”;

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“I have entitled my book Persona since my relationwith the fictional characters and the public ones is an unusualone: during the years when I practiced my profession as anactor, art seemed so real, that I was forgetting to live my ownreality. When I became a public figure, real life became moresurprising and original than fiction. Between the stony effigyof the public life and the incomplete and vulnerable creaturethere has always circulated an image having a very hardto outline essence, which might be called persona, namelythe face that connects our dreams and the daily moments”.

The words are not enough, it seems that thoughtsfly much too fast, especially when we want to stop them.“Moment, wait ! Your are so beautiful !” – it is all I can sayafter reading this marvel expressed in Persona !

It seems like words do not help me anymore, I feel they are helpless and emptiedby any kind of significance. Prince Radu of HOHENZOLLERN-VERINGEN delightsus with this journal-confession, not leaving room for applause. As you read, you seeyourself projected in His world, a world of the Stage at first, a world wherein the Maskis discovered, and the Soul does not find itself. It was probably for its best, since“the mask can also be educated, by denying certain feelings to the soul in orderto protect it from excesses or ridicule”. Then, a world of the genuineness, served asa stage: “the 7th of June 1996 was my first birthday spent at Versoix, among those who weregoing to become my family and in whose family I was going to enter, a few weeks later…I was a Romanian actor at the Court of the exiled king, who performed acts of heroismon August 23rd, 1944”.

It is a book that “lasts through its spiritual force” (Michel Camus, the one whosigns the foreword of the book). A book written for us, from which we ought to learnor, perhaps, only to remember that the history of Romania consists of its intellectuality,too, and the glory of those who defended its territory and life, and of what Brâncu[iand Carol I left us with, but also from the “nobleness of its peasants, and from her poverty,belief and uplifting dreams”.

reconciliation; arbitration; legal course, the International Court of Justice in the Haguebeing the representative of the international jurisdiction functioning in case of litigationsbetween states; international mediation, which aims at leading the conflict towardsan acceptable solution for the belligerent parts, in accordance with the interestsof the mediator.

The book “announces a discussion”, according to the Romanian Foreign AffairsMinister, Mihai R`zvan Ungureanu, with respect to the recent international eventsand changes occurred in the military area of interest. It is an inciting book, which providesanswers but also … poses questions that we must consider, in our position of readersand Romanian citizens.

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Editorial Events


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The book was published by Editura Nemira, in an exceptional edition, withthe assistance of Halewood Romania&Cramele Halewood, by the kindnessof J.E. Halewood. Last but not least, the book is dedicated to Her Royal HighnessPrincess Margarita of Romania: “In a certain way, this book, as well as my identityand my whole life belong to her”.

On national security, seen as the ultimate value of onenation. On the ratios established between the powerstructure of the state, the Parliament – as legislative power– and the public administrative authorities specialisedin national security. Parlamentul [i securitateana]ional` (The Parliament and the National

Security), published by R.A. Monitorul Oficial, havingan interdisciplinary approach, submits to the reader’sattention the idea that national security can and must beanalysed from the angle of the historic and geopoliticalrealities, by obviously taking into account the identificationof some possible operational solutions and the exigenciesof the international context. In this respect, both the

Parliament and the national security institutions make every effort in order to materialisethe collaboration and cooperation as far as the legislative harmonisation in the nationalsecurity domain, the parliamentary control and the response to it, as well as the diplomaticactivities are concerned.

By sharply and objectively analysing the state of the fulfilment at legislativeand institutional level, Constantin MONAC presents the complex inter-relationalmechanisms between the Parliament and the administrative authorities having vocationfor national security, by highlighting their role in promoting and protecting the nationalinterests and values. It is an analysis of the national security, having as ground a rangeof disciplines and theories, such as constitutional law and political institutions,administrative law and the science of administration.

Finally, yet important, although it is at the end of the paper, the author suggestscertain punctual and of a national interest “possible solutions”, which aim at improvingthe relations between the Parliament and the executive authorities from the nationalsecurity field, on different lines of action, as follows: defining the national securityobjectives, in its complexity, as society needs a “cult of national security, but also a securityculture”, designing, conceptualising and guiding the National Security Strategy, whollyanchored in the realities of the internal, European and international security environment,improving the relations between the Parliament and the national security authoritiesfrom the viewpoint of their elements – subject (parts), object, content, the authorsuggesting, for instance, the transition from electing the list to electing the personas far as senators and deputies are concerned.

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Editorial EventsThe paper is dedicated to “those who believe in the solidity of the fundamental

establishments of the rule of law and the fundamental values of the nations, such assovereignty, security, citizens rights and liberties, as well as to those who are more scepticalas far as the above are concerned”, and he also thanks to all his readers, as “I feel you areall very close to my soul now !”.

“Military Theory and Establishment”, “OperationalCommand”, “Geopolitical Meanings”. These are the keypoints and, at the same time, the pillars of the problemsapproached by Brigadier Visarion NEAGOE, PhDin Elemente de teorie [i teorie [i construc]ie militar`,a bilingual edition – Elements of Military Theoryand Establishment published by Editura Militar`, in theGândirea Militar` Româneasc` Collection.

The work gathers the main articles published inspecialised journals, between 1997 and 2005, their topicshaving found their assertion and relevance in studies suchas: “Military strategies – from theory to practice”, “Thecorrelation strategy-technology – a Romanian version”,“Operational requirements regarding the structure of theRomanian Armed Forces for counteracting asymmetric risks and threats”, “Formsand proceedings of terrorist activity in crisis situations and conflict areas”, “The permanentRomanian territory peacetime anti-aircraft defence battle service – between necessityand possibilities”, “Air forces and anti-aircraft defence manoeuvre during the first defenceoperation”, “Perspective and possibilities of taking part in multinational operationscommand”, “Armed forces categories coordination”, “CJTF concept and the militaryoperations of the future”, “The Romanian national state – historical process”, “Romaniansin Modern Europe – synchronisation, isolation, integration”, “From bipolarity towardsmulti-polarity – directions of evolution”.

And, just as general Eugen B`d`lan, PhD, the one who signed the Foreword, assesses,beyond or even above all these, the “operational” qualities of the author are to be found– “a theorist always dissatisfied with himself, a scrupulous and persevering practitioner,a professor with an authentic didactic calling”.

A convincing paper, wherein the penmanship of the word is a constant ! And, fromthe combination of the military theory and establishment elements, I would like to believethat this will be one of the books that will be present on your writing table !

Interested in Romania, the author of many studies, analyses, articles and booksabout our country, major Christophe MIDAN – French officer specialised in internationalrelations, graduate of the 15th series of the National Defence College of the NationalDefence University “Carol I” – proposes us in the book Roumanie. 1944-1974.De l’armée royale à l’armée du peuple tout entier (Romania. 1944-1974.

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From the royal armed forces to the armed forcesof the entire people), published in the CollectionAujourd-hui l’Europe of L’Harmattan Publishing House,Paris, a synthesis of the activity of the Romanian ArmedForces at that time. The idea is a consequence of theundertaken studies and started especially from the needto “establish the truth on the situation of the RomanianArmed Forces and the sound transformations occurredin that period as objectively as possible”, in a chronologicaland thematic presentation of the facts that have put a printon the great phases of the Romanian Armed Forcestransformation between 1944-1975.

The paper, prefaced by one of the most knownspecialists in the history of Romania from France– Catherine Durandin, is structured on three chapters, which successively dwell uponthe systematic destruction of the royal armed forces (1944-1947/1948), the setting upof the armed forces of the people (1947/1948-1955) and the part played by Romaniain founding the Warsaw Pact (1955-1975), by laying the stress on the acceptance of thenew Soviet strategy. By searching the archives of the Historical Service of the Army(France), various documents, articles, laws, regulations, specialised studies generallywritten in Romanian, but without consulting the Romanian military archives, the authorsurprises us with the accuracy of details and the elaborated report of the facts, obviouslyleaving room to possible modifications. By illustrating, in the creation of a new military“elite”, the author describes the process of the Romanian soldiers transformationin “political soldiers, connected through an ideological comradeship”, their objective beingthe “triumph of socialism”. The priority was not the regeneration of effectively operationalarmed forces, but of a political structure loyal to the communists, an instrument devotedto the power. A reorganisation of the armed forces based on a Soviet model, which“eliminated all the Romanian traditions”.

A mixture of nationalism and communism, “the armed forces of the people” developedbetween 1963 and 1975, Nicolae Ceau[escu coming into power being responsiblefor amplifying the role of this movement, over which he exerted a merciless control.On the other hand, the opening towards West was a frail one, with “modest repercussionson the armed forces”.

A delicate topic, aspects that have never been analysed before, all from the angleof the ability of an officer of the French Armed Forces, who has devoted time and soulin researching the history of the armed forces of a country with which he is connectedthrough friendship, admiration and, last but not least, human affection.

Editorial Selection and Arguments Alina UNGHEANU�

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Le leaderL’éditorial met en évidence l’une de principalescaractéristiques d’un chef – la pouvoir et l’influencedécisive de son personnalité, qui incombeinclusivement ses responsabilités fondamentales.Ainsi, il poursuit d’optimiser le rapport entrece qu’attendent les subordonnés et ce qu’ilspourraient offre, il transmet à l’organisationun rythme positif d’accommodation, tout pourobtenir la performance. Au plus, c’est le leaderqui, croyant effectivement en chance, la provoque,en stimulant ses subordonnés par l’exemplepersonnel, vers la réussite.

L’emploi de la pouvoir militaireaprès la Guerre froideL’article présente trois aspects importantsdu monde post-la Guerre froide, insistantsur l’emploi de la pouvoir militaire. En premier lieu,on vise l’élimination des conflits et des rivalitésqui existent dans la politique internationale avantla Deuxième Guerre Mondiale, ensuite, une certainestabilité des désaccordes entre les grandespuissances, de la division du monde en groupementsadverses. A troisième lieu, il faut empêcherla prolifération d’immenses quantités et typesd’armement de grandes puissances versla périphérie du système international.

Le système de commandementet de contrôle dans les missionsd’appui aérien rapprochéL’article relève la signification du systèmede commandement et de contrôle dans lesopérations interarmées, avant tout dans les missionsd’appui aérien rapproché. Au-delà des définitionsclassiques des termes de commande et de contrôle,l’auteur insiste sur la définition d’appui aérienrapproché de la perspective de Doctrine pourles Opérations des Forces Aériennes. Il nous

��

présente les caractéristiques des aéronefs et lesprincipales objectives et étapes de déroulementdes opérations interarmées.

L’asymétrie dans la guerreL’article “décrit” l’asymétrie du point de vue de sonorigine, son lieu et son rôle dans le combat armé.L’un des aspects met en évidence l’inexorabilitéde l’asymétrie, comme une différence entre deux“quelque chose” ou “quelqu’un”. L’asymétrie est vuecomme une présence constante dans l’intérieurdu phénomène de guerre. On peut remarquerune possible conclusion: l’existence de l’asymétriepositive, c’est-à-dire la supériorité en relationavec l’adversaire est l’élément décisif pourobtenir le succès.

Le managementdes ressources humainesdans l’ère de la mondialisationL’article relève les principales tendancesde l’adoptabilité des politiques de ressourceshumaines dans les pays membres de l’Unioneuropéenne. Celui se rapporte au quatre domainesfondamentaux, confirmés par le Conseil de l’Europeen 2004: l’adaptabilité des employés et des firmes,la stimulation de la population vers le marchédu travail, l’investissement effectif au capitalhumain et l’implémentation réelle de toutesles reformes. L’auteur présente aussi certainesmesures pour renouveler le management desressources humaines.

Opérations basées sur les effets.Une nouvelle approche du conflit arméLes auteurs mettent au centre des changementsdans le système militaire la réalisation des effetsmilitaires, concept qui concerne l’utilisationdes instruments du pouvoir nationale pour obtenir


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des résultats désires et viables, en temps de paixautant qu’en situation de conflit. Le concept a étépromu par le Commandement Allié pour laTransformation, en tant qu’élément essentielde la transformation de l’Alliance, surtout aprèsles attaques terroristes de 11 septembre 2001.

Un nouveau concept stratégiquede l’OTAN. Le pro et le contreL’auteur nous offre quelques possibles réponsessur la nécessité et l’opportunité pour revoir le présentconcept stratégique. Les unes des analystesde ce domaine considèrent périmé ce conceptet l’auteur recourt aux similitudes et distinctionsentre les concepts stratégiques de l’année 1991,respectivement 1999. S’il n’est pas nécessaireun nouveau concept stratégique, tant il estinopportune. C’est l’opinion d’autre part desanalystes, à laquelle l’auteur insiste encore.

Le managementdes ressources de l’OTANC’est un exposé de l’issue et le rôle du mécanismede financer de l’OTAN. L’auteur présente quelquesexemples d’accorder l’appui d’Alliance en diversesactions, comme: la formation des forces de sécuritéiraquienne, le transport d’équipement militairedonné au Iraq, le transport des alimenteset matériels, le financement des projets pourla reconstruct ion – le case de Pakistan,la coopération dans le Conseil OTAN – Russieou l’établissement des éventuelles frais pourles activités de financement intégré.

Les conceptspour les futures opérationsinterarmées de l’OTANL’auteur fait une présentation des “Concepts pourles futures opérations interarmées de l’OTAN”,c’est le résultat de “La Directive du Comité Militairevers les commandants stratégiques relatif à latransformation”. Ce document a été finalisé dansle mois maïs, l’année dernière. L’objective c’est

que ces concepts doivent faciliter, dans le nouveaucontexte stratégique, leur transformation dans descapacités des directives politico-militairesde l’Alliance, qui représentent le fondement pourses forces et ses capacités.

L’opportunité d’une stratégiedes performancesA l’opinion de l’auteur, une stratégie de laperformance et de l’efficience d’une organisationmilitaire compte sur l’accomplissement parle leader de l’organisation de la mission reçue,mais aussi sur la capacité d’adaptation, qui estrelatif réduite, des entités dont il les conduisent.Il exprime un point de vue sur la nécessité d’uneculture de la performance dans le domaine militaire,qui inclue la compétition correcte et l’espritde la camaraderie.

Le système national de managementintégré des crises. Structure et repèresconceptuelsLes auteurs mettent en évidence le rôle du systèmede gestion intégré national de crise, qui doit assurerle mécanisme nécessaire, des procédures et, aussi,un statut approprié de la promptitude de possibilitésopérationnelles civiles et militaires. Et cela,pour permettre une réponse nationale opportuneet intégrée au spectre entier de la crise qui pourraitapparaître sur le territoire national ou dansl’environnement international.

CIMIC – les relations civilo-militairesau niveau opérationnelL’auteur décrit la coopération civilo-militairede la perspective d’appliquer ce concept militairedans la collaboration et d’appui des forces arméeset les autorités de l’administration publique,les organisations civiles et la population civilepour accomplisser un but commun. L’auteurrecourt à une distinction entre CIMIC et les affairesciviles. Celles-ci visent une série d’activitésqui mettent en évidence les coopérations civileset militaires.

La communicationdans le managementdes états conflictuelsL’auteur présente les possibles sources de conflitsde l’organisation. Bien qu’elles ne puissent pas êtreévitées ou éliminées en totalité, le manager doitles identifier et les comprendre, en visant lesobjectives de l’organisation, aussi les butsde l’individu. Tant plus, il doit actionner pour

Abstracts

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Version française parAlina UNGHEANU�

réduire les effets négatifs de ces conflits.Par exemple, en cas de la réconciliation de certainspoints de vue divers, c’est la négociation quireprésente la forme spécifique de communication.

D’une approche paradigmatiquede la sécuritédans les relations internationalesL’auteur nous propose, en comparant diversescourantes de pensée qui ont traités la problématiquede la sécurité, de l’Ecole de Copenhague jusqu’aupoststructuralisme, l ’approche de ce sujetde la perspective des relations internationales.Les caractéristiques présentées mettenten évidence des points de vue différents, ausside nombreuses confrontations et transformationsqui se produisent, au premièrement, sur lesrelations interhumaines.

De nouvelles dimensionsde la culture organisationnelleL’article souligne la spécificité de la cultureorganisationnelle de la perspective de seséléments: convictions et valeurs, des tabous et desmythes, des symboles, des statuts, des rôleset des normes comportementales, traditions,rites et cérémonies. La culture organisationnelleest un phénomène complexe, influencé par unemultitude des facteurs qui, successivement,influencent d’autres facteurs. C’est la raison pourlaquelle les organisations aspirent à une cultureorganisationnelle efficiente, axée sur la qualitéet les valeurs.

La science militaireet son impacte stratégiqueL’article défini la science militaire de la perspectivede son objet d’étude – l’aspect militaire de l’actionhumaine et, au principal, la guerre, aussi commeles stratégies pour générer des forces, des moyenset des actions reçues par la formation et ledéploiement d’un conflit. La science militaire“se prolonge dans l’action militaire”, en passant,successivement, de savoir à savoir faire et, par là,

à savoir comment le faire. L’article défini aussil’évolution des concepts stratégiques post-Prague,au sujet des mesures prises par l’Etat-majorgénéral de l’Armée Roumaine.

Les paradigmes de sécuritéou “qu’est-ce qu’on attenddu futur du contrôle d’armement” ?L’article présente, chronologique et détaillé,le concept de contrôle de l’armement. Ainsi,l’auteur souligne le déploiement des mesurespour la consolidation de la confiance réciproque,le maintien des démarches pour adopter les traités,les accords et d’autres obligations légales,la prévention de la dissémination de la technologienucléaire, en particulier de l’Union Soviétique,et assurer l’application des prévisions des obligeantslégales, par l’accent sur l’inspection “sur la vie”.Celui est un instrument efficient dans la situationdu contrôle des armements.

Les défis actifs de la mondialisationCet article présente une modalité de réponsedu monde aux défis générés par la globalisation,combien de capacité doit-il en disposer. L’auteursouligne certains aspects relatif à ce qui nous apportela mondialisation – positivement et négativement,interne et externe, quels sont les problèmesprovoqués par ce phénomène et en quelle mesureil y a un réponse de la communauté internationale,qui se confronte avec de nouveaux défis.

Le plan de campagne de l’ArméeRoumaine ~ 1916. L’hypothèse “Z”L’article représente une page de l’histoiretumulteuse de la Roumanie pendant la premièreguerre mondiale, quand plusieurs solutions derechange pour le “plan de campagne” ont étéproposés et sur la base duquel les forces arméesroumaines aurait du agir. Après les discussions,“l’hypothèse Z” a été adoptée, qui était un projetdes opérations visant une guerre contre la Bulgarieet les Puissances Centrales. C’ était un plan rédigéplus avec l’âme qu’avec l’esprit, conclut l’auteur,qui pourrait provoquer de possible interpretations !

ZusammenfassungenZusammenfassungenZusammenfassungenZusammenfassungenZusammenfassungen

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Der LeaderDas Editorial eine der Haupteigenschaften einesLeaders hervorhebt – die Macht und dereinscheidende Einfluß seiner Persönlichkeit,wovon auch ihren Verantwortlichkeiten ergeben.So, er die Optimierung des Verhältnisses zwischendie Untergebenenerwartungen und-angebotver fo lgt , der Organisat ion e in pos i t iverAnpassungstakt ausprägt dessen Endpunkt ist dieLeistung zu erzielen. Insbesondere, der Leader,eigentilich in die Chance glaubend, herausfordertsie und durch eigenem Beispiel ihren Untergebenenzum Sieg anregt.

Benutzung der Militärmachtnach dem kalten KriegDer Artikel stellt drei wichtige Aspekte der Weltnach dem kalten Krieg vor, mit stärker Betonungder Benutzung der Militärmacht. Erstens dieEntfernung der Konflikte und der gegenwärtigenRivalitäten in der internationalen Politik von vordem zweiten Weltkrieg, und dann eine solcheStabilisierung der Meinungsverschiedenheitenzwischen den großen Mächte, der Welteinteilungin antagonistischen Blöcken und drittens dieVerbreitung von unermeßlichen Quantitäten undTypen von Rüstung der großen Mächte zurPeripherie internationaler System.

Das Führung und Kontrollesystemim NahluftunterstützungaufgabenDer Artikel beschreibt die Bedeutung desFührung – und Kontrollsystems im Falle derversammelten Operationen, besonders imNahluftunterstützungaufgaben. Neben denklassische Definitionen der Führung – und derKontrollekonzepte besteht der Autor darauf, diean der Perspektive der Doktrin für die Operationender Luftstreitkräfte der Luftunterstützung zudefinieren, und uns sowohl die Eigenschaften derLuftschiffe als auch die Hauptzielsetzungen undEtappen der Entwicklung einer versammeltenOperation vorstellt.

Asymmetrie im KriegDer Art ikel “die Symmetr ie unter demGesichtspunkt seines Ursprungs, seines Ortesund seiner Rolle beim bewaffneten Kampf”beschreibt. Einer Aspekt bezieht sich auf dieUnerbittlichkeit der Asymmetrie als Unterschiedzwischen zwei “etwas” oder “jemandes”. Sie wirdals eine konstante, legitime Anwesenheit imKriegsphänomen gesehen. Man kann einemögliche Schlußfolgerung ziehen: die Existenzder positive Asymmetrie, mit anderen Worten dieÜberlegenheit in Bezug auf den gegner ist es dasentscheidende Element, um den Erfolg zu erhalten.

Verwaltung von Humanressourcenim Zeitalter der GlobalisierungDer Artikel stellt die Haupttendenzen der Annahmeder Politiken der Humanressourcen in denMitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Union in vierwichtigen Bereichen vor, die durch den Europaratim Jahre 2004 bestätigt wurde: die Anwendbarkeitder Freiwilligen und der Unternehmen, dieAnziehung der Bevölkerung auf dem Arbeitsmarkt,die wirksame Investition ein Humankapital unddie wirkliche Implementierung aller Reformen. DerAutor legt uns einige Maßnahmen zur Erneuerungder Verwaltung der Humanressourcen vor.

Auf Wirkungen basierten Operationen.Eine neue Anschneidungbewaffneter KonfliktDie Autoren s te l l en am ers ten P lan derÄnderungen des Militärs die Verwirklichung derMilitärwirkungen, Konzept was die Anwendungder Kapazitäten der Instrumente nationaler Machtbetrifft, um das gewünschten und lebensfähigenErgebnisse sowohl in Friedenszeit, als auch beiKonflikt wiederzufinden. Das Konzept ist durchden Aliierterkommando für die Umwandlungals wichtiges Element der Umwandlungder Allianz, besonders nach den Angriffen vom11 September 2001, benutzt worden.

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AbstractsEin neues strategisches Konzeptder NATO. Argumente pro und gegenDer Autor bietet uns einige mögliche Antwortenüber die Notwendigkeit und die Gelegenheit derRevision des aktuellen strategischen Konzeptesan. Es gibt auf dem bei Analytiker, die diesesKonzept als überschritten betrachten, der Autorder Ähnlichkeiten und Unterschiede zwischenden strategischen Konzepten des Jahres 1991beziehungsweise 1999 in Anspruch nimmt. Wennein neues strategischen Konzept nicht notwendigist, um so ist es unangebracht. Es ist die Meinunganderer Analytiker, auf der der Autor besteht auch.

Die Ressoucenverwaltung der NATOAb dem Ursprung und der Rol le desFinanzierungsmechanismus der NATO stellt derAutor uns einige Beispiele des Abkommens derUnterstützung der Allianz in verschiedenenAktionen vor wie beispielsweise: die Ausbildungder irakischen Sicherheitsstreitkräften, derTransport der Militärausstattung, die dem Irakgegeben wurde, der Transport von Nahrungsmittelnund von Materialien, die Finanzierung der Projektefür den Wiederaufbau – der Fall Pakistans, dieZusammenarbeit im NATO – Rußland-Rat oderdie Schaffung der möglichen Ausgaben fürAktivitäten integrierter Finanzierung.

Konzepte für die künftigenversammelten Operationen der NATODer Autor macht eine Vorstellung “der Konzeptefür die künftigen versammelten Operationender NATO”, Produkt “der Richt l in ie desMilitärausschusses an den strategischenKommandanten bezüglich der Umwandlung”,Dokument der im Monat Mai des vergangenenJahres abgeschlossen wurde. Die Zielsetzungbesteht darin, durch ihre Konzepte im neuenstrategischen Zusammenhang die Umsetzung inKapazitäten der politico-militärischen Richtliniender Allianz, Entwicklunggrundlage ihrer Kräftenund ihrer Kapazitäten zu vereinfachen.

Erwägungen betreffs eineLeistungenstrategieEine Leistungstrategie und eine Leistungsfähigkeitder Militärorganisation ist, nach der Meinung desAutors, sowohl auf der Erfüllung durch denFührer einer Organisation des eingegangenen

Aufgabe als auch auf der Kapazität ziemlichbegrenzt des Gebildes das diese führt begründet.Der Autor drückt einen Gesichtspunkt auf derNotwendigkeit einer Kultur der Leistung imMilitärbereich aus, der den ehrlichen Wettbewerbund den Freundschaftsgeist umfaßt.

Das nationale System integriertenKrisenmanagements. BegrifflicheKonstruktion und BezugspunkteDie Autoren heben die Rolle des Systemsintegrierten Krisenmanagements hervor,die den notwendigen Mechanismus und dieVerfahrensweisen versichern muß, aber auch eineigenes Statut der Schnelligkeit der zivilen undmilitärischen operationellen Möglichkeiten. Alldas, um eine nationale opportune ins ganzeSpektrum einer möglichen Krise integriertAntwort zu erlauben, die auf dem Staatsgebietoder in der internationalen Mitte erschienen ist.

CIMIC ~ Ausdruckder Zivilmilitärbeziehungenauf dem operationellen EbeneDer Autor die Zivilmilitärzusammenarbeitbehandelt unter dem Gesichtspunkt derAnwendung dieses Militärkonzeptes auf dieZusammenarbeit und auf die Unterstützungzwischen der Streitkräfte und den Behörden deröffentlichen Verwaltung, den Zivilorganisationenund der Zivilbevölkerung, um ein gemeinsamesZiel auszuführen. Der Autor auch eineUnterscheidung zwischen CIMIC und denZivilangelegenheiten macht, diesen Letzten, dieeine Reihe von Aktivitäten umfassen, dieZ i v i l m i l i t ä r z u s a m m e n a r b e i t , n u r e i n eKomponente ist.

Die Mitteilung in der Verwaltungder KonfliktständeDer Autor stellt die möglichen Konfliktquellen ineiner Organisation vor, Quellen die, auch wennman nicht gänzlich vermeiden oder eliminierenkann, der Manager identifizieren und begreifenmuß, sowohl aus Zielsetzungensicht derOrganisation, als auch jener des Individuums. Umso mehr muß er wirken, um die negativenWirkungen dieser Konflikte zu reduzieren. ZumBeispiel, im Falle der Vermittlung bestimmtenGegengesichtspunkten wird die in der Organisationzu benutzende spezifische Kommunikationskraftdie Verhandlung sein.

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ÜbersetzungDelia PETRACHE

Militärische Nationale Bibliothek�

Zu eine pragmatischen Analyseder Sicherheit in den internationalenBeziehungenDer Autor vergleicht verschiedene Gedankenströmedie sich über das Problem der Sicherheit, von derKopenhagenschule bis zum Poststrukturalismus,beunruhigt haben und schlägt uns dieses Konzeptunter dem Gesichtspunkt der internationalesBeziehungen zu analysieren. Es ergibt, daß zu diesemThema verchiedenene Gesichtspunkte, zahlreichenGegenüberstellungen und Veränderungen gibt es,die erstens auf ihren zwischenmenschlicheBeziehungen eintreten.

Umgestaltung der organisatorischenKulturDer Artikel unterstreicht das Spezifische derorganisatorischen Kultur unter dem Gesichtspunktseiner Komponente: Glauben und Werte, Tabus,Mythen und Symbole, Statuten, Rolle undVerhal tennormen, Tradit ion, Ri ten undZeremonien. Die organisatorische Kultur ist einkomplexes Phänomen, durch eine große Anzahlvon Faktoren beeinflußt, die ihrerseits andereFaktoren beeinflussen. Deshalb manifestieren dieOrganisationen die Tendenz, eine starkeorganisatorische Kultur auf Qualität und Werteausgerichtete, zu haben.

Die Militärwissenschaftund ihre strategische AuswirkungDer Artikel definiert die Militärwissenschaft ausGesichtspunkt ihres Studiengegenstands – dieMilitärkomponente der menschlichen Aktion undhauptsächlich der Krieg, und auch die Strategieder Kräften –, der Mitteln – und der durch dieVorbereitung und die Entwicklung einesKonfliktes zu verlangenden Aktionenerzeugung.Die Militärwissenschaft, zeigt den Autor, “immermehr in der Militäraktion verlängert wird”, indemman nach und nach von savoir à savoir faire estd’ici à savoir comment le faire übergeht. Der Artikelhebt auch die Entwicklung der strategischenKonzepte post-Prag hervor, an Hinweis auf dieSchritte, die durch den Generalstab General derrumänischen Armee unternommen wurden.

Die Paradigmen der Sicherheitoder der Zukunftder Rüstungskontrolle ?Der Artikel chronologisch und detailliert dasRüstungskontrollenkonzept behandelt. Sounterstreicht er die Entwicklung der Maßnahmenzur Konsolidierung des gegenseitigen Glaubens,der Wartung des Vorgehens für das Inkrafttretender Verträge, der Abkommen und anderer legalerVerpflichtungen, die Vorbeugung der Verbreitungder nuklearen Technologie, besonders von derehemaligen Sowjetunion und die Versicherungder Anwendung der Prognosen der legalenVerpflichtungen an Akzent über die Inspektion“am Ort”, wirksames Instrument im Falle derRüstungskontrolle.

Die aktiven Herausforderungender GlobalisierungDieses Vorgehen beabsichtigt zu verfolgen, wie diezeitgenössische Welt fähig auf die Herausforderungdurch das Phänomen der Globalisierungerzeugende zu antworten ist. Der Autor deuteteinige Aspekte an, betrifft, was die Globalisierunguns – von positivem und von negativem innerlichund äußerlich – mitnimmt, welches die durchdieses Phänomen erzeugten Probleme sind, undinwieweit es eine Antwort der internationalenGemeinschaft gibt, die mit diesen neuenHerausforderungen konfrontiert wurde.

Der Feldzugsplander rumänischen Armee ~ 1916.Die Hypothese “Z”Der Artikel stellt eine Seite der lärmendenGeschichte von Rumänien im ersten Weltkriegdar , wenn man mehrere Var ianten von“Feldzugsplänen” vorgeschlagen hat, von dem dierumänische Armee handeln mußte. Zum Schlußder Diskussionen die Planvariante “Hypothese Z”,ein Operationsprojekt für ein Krieg gegen diezentralen Kräfte und Bulgarien angenommenwurde. Ein eher mit der Seele als mit dem Geistausgearbeiteter Plan schließt den Autor ab,der mögliche Kommentare verursacht !

Romanian Military Thinking Journal’s design is produced by Col Costinel PETRACHE, PhD

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