Contemporary Philosophy

The Body as Anstoss in Sartre's Account ofConstitution

David VesseyBeloit College

vesseyd@beloit.edu

ABSTRACT: Of all the German idealists, Sartrerefers the least to Fichte-so little in fact that therehave been long-standing suspicions that he wasnot even familiar with Fichte's writings. It isperhaps ironic, then, that Fichte's writings are ashelpful as they are for clarifying Sartre's views,especially his views on subjectivity and inter-subjectivity. Here I want to look closely at a keyconcept in Fichte's mature writings: the concept ofthe Anstoss, a concept which Dan Breazeale hascalled "Fichte's original insight." Fichte introducesthe Anstoss, or "check," to explain why the I positsthe world as it does. In effect, the Anstoss is theoccasion of the facticity of the I. I will show thathis concept can be uniquely helpful inunderstanding the role the body plays in Sartre'stheory of inter-subjectivity. The importance ofSartre's account of the body for his theory ofsubjectivity and inter-subjectivity has beenchronically under-appreciated by his interpreters;this comparison is the beginning of an attempt torectify that. In turn the concept of the Anstoss

provides a means for analyzing the necessarydifferences between any Sartrean and Fichteanethics based on their respective accounts of inter-subjectivity.

Of all the German Idealists, Sartre refers the least toFichte-so little in fact that there have been long-standingsuspicions that he wasn't even familiar with Fichte'swritings. It is perhaps ironic, then, that Fichte's writingsare as helpful as they are for clarifying Sartre's views-especially his views on subjectivity and intersubjectivity.Here I want to look closely at a key concept in Fichte'smature writings-the concept of the Anstoss, a conceptwhich has Dan Breazeale (implicitly against DieterHenrich) has called "Fichte's original insight." (1) I believe,and I hope to show here, that this concept can be uniquelyhelpful in understanding, of all things, the role the bodyplays in Sartre's theory of intersubjectivity. Theimportance of Sartre's account of the body for his theoryof subjectivity and intersubjectivity has been chronicallyunder-appreciated by his interpreters; this comparison isthe beginning of an attempt to rectify that. This introducesin turn a means for analyzing the necessary differencesbetween any Sartrean and Fichtean ethics based on theirrespective accounts of intersubjectivity.

The term Anstoss is first used in a systematic fashion byFichte in the Grundlage der Gesamten Wissenschaftslehrefrom 1794/95. (2) It appears near the end of the second partof the work where Fichte is both presenting theculmination of his theory of representation and laying thetransition to the practical part of the Wissenschaftslehre.The issue is the founding of the activity of representation:specifically, how can one explain both the spontaneity of

the I and the particular determination of representations.Fichte has recourse to one of the two first principles of hissystem-"The I posits itself absolutely" and "A Not-I isunqualifiedly posited in opposition to the I"-for thegrounding the meaning of representation, but which one?Is representation an activity of the self-positing I, or of theopposing Not-I? At stake here, of course, is the verystructure and content of Fichte's idealism. If the activity ofrepresentation is attributed solely to the subject then it isnot clear if Fichte can avoid either a transcendentalsolipsism, or a recourse to the Kantian thing-in-itself (asFichte calls it, "the wretched 'thing-in-itself'"). Bothsolutions are obviously unsatisfactory. Nor could Fichteground the meaning of a representation in the Not-Iwithout, in the end, giving up idealism altogether-a trulydisastrous "solution." Instead Fichte arrives at the theoryof "the mediacy of positing." Fichte recognized that thecontent of representation could be explained if a form ofpassivity could be introduced as the source and the limitof purely active I. He claims that representation, althoughclearly in the end founded in the activity of the I, isdependent for its content on the Anstoss-the check on theinfinite activity of the I which is both itself a posit ofconsciousness and a condition for the possibility of thepositing of consciousness. The viability of the solutionshangs with his ability to articulate the concept of theAnstoss-to show how the I posits something which is stillsufficiently external to its activity of positing to providethe differentiation between subject and object.

Consider the following crucial quotation.

The objective element [the Not-I] that is to be excluded [fromthe I] has no need at all to be present; all that is needed, if Imay so put it, is the presence of an Anstoss for the I. That is tosay, the subjective element must, for some reason that simply

lies outside of the activity of the I, be unable to extend anyfurther. Such an impossibility of further extension would thenconstitute the indicated mere interplay or meshing; such anAnstoss would not limit the I as active, but would give it thetask of limiting itself. All limitation, however occurs throughopposition, and thus simply in order to be able to satisfy thistask, the I would have to oppose something objective to thesubjective element that is to be limited and would then haveto unite both synthetically, in the manner just indicated. Andthus the entire representation could be derived in this way. . . .What [this explanation] assumes is not a not-I that is presentoutside of the I, and not even a determination that is presentwithin the I, but rather the mere task, on the part of the Iitself, of undertaking a determination within itself-that is, themere determinability of the I. (3)

We can see two fundamental claims being made hereabout the Anstoss. The first claim is that Anstoss is notitself the not-I, but is in some sense a product of the I.Fichte says that the Anstoss does not check the I "from theoutside", it does not limit the I as active, but gives it the"task" of limiting itself. At some places Fichte refers to theAnstoss as a feeling-something which is clearly ours andcould not exist without us, but something which is not ourdoing. (4) The Anstoss is a passive event occurring within Ithus escaping the I's activity.

The Anstoss (unposited by the positing I) occurs to the Iinsofar as it is active, and is thus only a check insofar as thereis activity in the I; its possibility is conditional upon the I'sactivity: no activity of the I, no Anstoss. Conversely, theactivity of the I's own self-determining would be conditionedby the Anstoss: no Anstoss, no self-determination. Moreover,no self-determination, nothing objective. (5)

The second point about the Anstoss is that its primaryfunction is to check the positing I. The Anstoss is not aproduct of the active I, but it has its essential character as

a check only in virtue of the activity of the I. Consider anexample Sartre uses. A mountain is a limitation onsomeone's projects only if he/she has projects (forexample, walking to a point on the other side of themountain) which are limited by the mountain. It is only invirtue of a particular project that a mountain becomes acheck. Otherwise it's just a mountain. Of course, theanalogy between the Anstoss and the mountain fails whenwe recall that the Anstoss is not an external check, but aninternal check; still we can understand how it could be thecase that the Anstoss is both dependent on thedetermining I and necessary for the determinability of theI.

Essential to its identity as a check, is that it is immediatelyresponded to by the I. In response to the check of theAnstoss, the I posits a not-I as the necessary source of thecheck. The Anstoss, as a limit on the spontaneity of the egois the impetus, or to use a word Fichte often uses for theAnstoss, a summons (Aufforderung) for the I to positsomething outside itself. (6)

The form of the positing is determined through thefundamental drive for self-identity which is equivalent tothe drive for rationalization. (7) This drive, operating pre-consciously and pre-volitionally, takes two formsaccording to whether what are being rationalized arerepresentations or volitions. In the first case, allrepresentations are ordered to concepts of the mind. Thisis the theoretical goal of humanity. In the second case,when encountering other rational agents, the agents actsin accordance with the first principle to strive to worktogether with others to construct a community founded onreason. That is, we are driven towards for knowledge andmorality.

In The Science of Rights Fichte adds to the practical, moralside of the Anstoss.

This requirement [Aufforderung] to act is the content of theinfluence and its ultimate end is a free causality of the rationalbeing. . . . To do this however, it must have first understoodand comprehended the requirement, and this previouscognition of it is taken into consideration. Hence the positedground of the influence, or of the requirement addressed tothe subject must at least presuppose the possibility that thesubject can understand and comprehend it, for otherwise itsrequirement [Aufforderung] would have no end in view at all.(8)

The Anstoss does not merely summon us to act, itsummons us to act for the end of acting freely. That is itpresents the occasion for our fundamental drive to self-identity to manifest itself in our actions, but moreover, toconsciously manifest itself in our actions. That means thatthe Anstoss summons us to be cognizant of the ends towhich we are called. But, Fichte asks, what could summonus to form a conception of an end? Fichte claims it couldonly be another rational agent.

The ground [of the Anstoss] must therefore necessarily [itself]have the conception of reason and freedom and musttherefore be itself a being capable of comprehension, that is,an intelligence, and since this is not possible without freedom,it must be a free and hence a rational being, and must beposited as such. (9)

In response to the feeling of the Aufforderung-to thefeeling summoning us to act freely, in effect, ourconscience-we must posit another rational being as theorigin of the summons. But recall, the Anstoss is acondition for self-consciousness, therefore the positedexistence of other persons is a condition of self-consciousness (and their existence is known with the

certainty of self-consciousness). (10) With the twofundamental features of Fichte's account of the Anstoss inmind-it is a product of the I and a summoning check, aswell as the connection between the Anstoss andintersubjectivity-let's turn to Sartre's account of the bodyto realize the parallels. (11)

Exactly as Sartre divides subjectivity in its modes of being-for-itself and being-for-others and has emphasized notconfusing the two, Sartre also distinguishes the body-for-itself from the body-for-others. The two ontologicaldimensions are "incommunicable" and irreconcilable:"either it is a thing among other things [the body forothers], or it is that by which things are revealed to me[the body for itself] . . ., it can not be both." (12) Theinstructive example Sartre gives is that when we put ourhands together one is always touching, the other alwaystouched; never is there a "double sensation." The firstontological dimension of the body-the body for-itself "bywhich things are revealed" is what concerns us.

The body-for-itself is our facticity. Following Heidegger,Sartre claims the essential mode of being of humans isonly realized as being-there. (13) The world is only for us tothe extent we exist here and now, although the fact thatwe are at this particular here and now (as well as the factthat we are at all) is contingent. This contingency of ouroriented, spatio-temporal being-in-the world is ourfacticity. The for-itself is always attempting to surpass itscontingency through its projects in a futile attempt tojustify itself absolutely. Notice the parallel: both Fichteand Sartre present the subject as striving to separate itselffrom the Not-I (the In-Itself) in an attempt to become free.In Sartre, the negation of the facticity in the striving fortranscendence is the concrete determination of the for-

itself. The body, then, as Sartre writes,

is nothing other than the For-itself, it is not an In-itself in theFor-itself, for in that case it would solidify everything. But it isthe fact that the For-itself is not its own foundation. . . . As suchthe body is not distinct from the situation of the For-itselfsince for the For-itself to exist and to be situated are one andthe same. (14)

Like Fichte's Anstoss, the body belongs to the I (the For-Itself), not the Not-I (the In-Itself). In addition Sartre saysthat the body

is the immediate presence to the For-itself of "sensible" thingsin so far as this presence indicates a center of reference and isalready surpassed either toward the appearance of a new thisor toward a new combination of instrumental-things. . . . Thismeans that it is at once a point of view and a point ofdeparture-a point of view, a point of departure which I am andwhich at the same time I surpass towards what I have to be.(15)

The body, for Sartre, plays the same role with respect toconsciousness as the Anstoss did for Fichte: that necessitywhich summons and checks our conscious positing.Moreover as our past and as our point of view, Sartre saysthat the body is the locus of the sedimentation of our pastexperiences all the way back to our birth. (16) Our body isthat which we are before our subjectivity makes us whatwe are; it is our past and our world. Much like the Anstoss,then, the body opens us to the would "summoning" ourreply and in the process "checks" and limits ourpossibilities. And the limiting, in the final analysis, is notof our doing. Consider what Sartre says in the followingpassage.

And we must understand it in the two senses of the word"limit." On the side of the limiting, indeed, the limit is

apprehended as the container which contains me andsurrounds me, the shell of emptiness which pleads for me as atotality while putting me out of play; on the side of the limited,it is wholly a phenomenon of selfness and is as themathematical limit is to the infinite series which progressestowards it without ever reaching it. (17)

Clearly the twofold nature of "limit" is precisely thetwofold nature of Fichte's Anstoss: it is that which checksthe infinite activity of consciousness yet which remains aninfinite goal of appropriation for the end of justifyingitself. However, Sartre thinks that only a consciousnesscan check consciousness. (18)

Here Sartre's account of intersubjectivity enters thenarrative. That our body is in the midst of the world is aresult of our being-seen by others. Our body in itself ispresent to us as something to surpass on the basis of itbeing for-others. The other, then, brings about the body asthe mediator (which is surpassed) between subjectivityand the world and establishes the condition for thepossibility of any and all determination of the for-itself.From the fact that we are a body in the mode of being-for-others we can recognize what Sartre calls "the thirdontological dimension of the body", namely that our bodyhas an outside which escapes us. We can attempt torecapture our alienated "outside" through eitherembracing our facticity, giving up our attempts attranscendence and resigning ourselves. To overcome ourfinitude means confronting the other in his/hersubjectivity. This is the basis of Sartre's "ethics." (19) Since itis through the gaze of the Other that we are embodied, theattempt to regain our freedom and ground ourselves(through making the contingencies of our own body theresult of our own constitution) requires that we force theothers to recognize us on our own terms. This battle

between subjects for recognition is the fundamentaldefining feature of Sartre's theory of intersubjectivity. Weattempt to determine ourselves against the Other's gazethrough articulating ourselves to the Other in an attemptto reach consensus about ourselves. We express ourtranscendence by trying to flee our facticity by expressingour subjectivity, thereby trying to manipulate the Otherinto returning ourselves to ourselves.

Let us conclude by noting some of the differences betweenthe views. First, since in Sartre's account the not-I is thestimulus to conscious activity he does not need todistinguish (as Fichte did) the Anstoss from the not-I.Fichte needed to find some ground within the ego whichmotivates the ego to posit itself absolutely; Sartre does notneed to find the ground within the ego. In fact, it isessential to his view that the ground be independent of theego. The passivity which constitutes the Anstoss is part ofthe I (in Fichte); in Sartre it is the origin of alienation.Second, Sartre's externalization of the Anstoss putsconsciousness in the world from the start. As such, ourfacticity can become our fundamental limitation. Thus it ispossible on Sartre's, and not Fichte's, account tounderstand the role of the historicity of the ego in theconstitution of the world. Fichte, on the contrary, mustplace the ego outside of the world and then use the egoitself as the source of its own limitation. Third, in Sartre itis precisely the being-seen by the other which establishesourselves as being in the midst of the world-that is to say,establishes our body as our facticity which must besurpassed by the for-itself. The intersubjectiverelationship operates through the body as a condition forthe determination of consciousness. In Fichte, thesummons to rationality which is the character of theAnstoss points to the necessary existence of other rational

subjects. Finally, Fichtean consciousness posits the not-I,and then infers to its own free existence on the basis of therecognition of the other I while Sartrean consciousnessnegates the not-I and then posits itself in this negation.Fichte's relation to the other is fundamentally one ofidentification; Sartre's of differentiation. Analogously,Fichte's ethics is based on the relation of mutualrecognition; Sartre's ethics is based on the attempt to forcerecognition. In spite of these differences, many of whichcan be understood as effects of their different conceptionsof freedom, it is clear a structural similarity persists inFichte's and Sartre's account of constitution: the necessarypresence of a passivity, be it the body or the Anstoss, at theheart of subjectivity and intersubjectivity.

Notes

(1) Anstoss has usually been translated as check, butbecause of the complexity of the concept (as will becomeclear) I will leave it untranslated. My analysis of thecentrality of the concept of the Anstoss is heavilyinfluenced by Dan Breazeale, "Check or Checkmate? Onthe Finitude of the Fichtean Self" in Karl Ameriks's andDieter Sturma's The Modern Subject: Conceptions of the Selfin Classical German Philosophy (Albany, NY: SUNY Press,1995), hereafter "Breazeale." Breazeale's reference is toDieter Henrich's classic article, "Fichte's Original Insight."

(2) Translated as Science of Knowledge. Ed. and tr. Heath,Peter and John Lachs (New York: Appelton Century Crofts,1970).

(3) Science of Knowledge, pg. 188; translation fromBreazeale, pg. 89-90.

(4) For example: "Here is the basis for all reality: Reality-whether of the I or the Not-I-is possible for the I onlythrough the relation of feeling to the I, as we have nowshown-something that is possible only through the relationof a feeling, without the I being conscious or being able tobe conscious, of its own intuition of this feeling, and whichtherefore appears to be felt, is believed." (Quoted inBreazeale pg. 107)

(5) Science of Knowledge, pg. 191. The use of the terms'outside' and 'external' can be misleading here. Either wecould say that Fichte is not being careful or perhaps thatthey should be interpreted in the sense of outside theconscious activity of the ego.

(6) "In so far as the described influence enters sensation, isfelt, it is a limitation of the ego; and the subject must haveposited it as such; but there is no limitation without alimiting. Hence the subject, in positing that influence,must have posited at the same time something outside ofitself as the determining ground of that influence." TheScience of Rights. Tr. A. E. Krueger (London: Routledge,1970), pg. 56

(7) "The highest principle in man" is "[b]e always at onewith yourself." He continued, "according to this principlehe . . . seeks-not directly from a clearly conceiveddetermining principle, but from one interwoven throughhis entire being and without any contribution of his freewill-to subjugate irrational nature so that everything willharmonize with his reason."(from "On the LinguisticCapacity and the Origin of Language" translated as anappendix to Jere Surber's Language and German Idealism:Fichte's Linguistic Philosophy (Humanities Press, 1995) pg.209).

(8) The Science of Rights, pg. 57. B the time of the Science ofRights, Fichte has begun using "Aufforderung" rather than"Anstoss" to focus on the "summoning" aspect more thanthe "checking" aspect of the concept. Of course, if we arediscussing the determination of representation, we areconcerned with the limit, if we are discussing ethics, weare concerned with the summons to be moral.

(9) The Science of Rights, pg. 57

(10) Thus the duly famous passage, "Man becomes manonly among men; and since he can only be man, andwould not be at all unless he were man, it follows that ifman is to be at all, there must be men. This is not anarbitrary assumption, not an opinion based on pastexperience or on other probability-reasons; but it is atruth to be strictly deduced from the conception of man."(The Science of Rights, pg. 60).

(11) I find it interesting (and illuminating) that Fichte'ssocial ontology does not fall prey to Sartre's criticisms ofidealism, and realism. Nor can Fichte's view beassimilated to Hegel's, Husserl's, or Heidegger's views allof which fall under Sartre's scrutiny.

(12) Being and Nothingness, pg. 402.

(13) "For human reality, to be is to-be-there. . . . It is anontological necessity." Being and Nothingness, pg. 407.About facticity, he writes that the For-Itself "is in so far asthere is in it something which it is not the foundation-itspresence to the world. . . .This perpetually evanescentcontingency of the in-itself which, without ever allowingitself to be apprehended, haunts the for-itself andreattaches itself to being-in-itself-this contingency is whatwe shall call the facticity of the for-itself." (Being and

Nothingness, pg. 128, 131. italics his)

(14) Being and Nothingness, pg. 408.

(15) Being and Nothingness, pp. 429-30

(16) Being and Nothingness, pp. 431-2

(17) Being and Nothingness, pg. 381

(18) Immediately prior to the above quotation Sartrewrites: "But this limit can neither come from me nor bethought by me, for I can not limit myself; otherwise Iwould be a finite totality. On the other hand, in Spinoza'sterms, thought can only be limited by thought.Consciousness can be limited only by my consciousness."

(19) Though, depending on the extent one draws on thelater notebooks, Sartre's ethics may move well beyond thisbattle for recognition. See Thomas Anderson's Sartre'sTwo Ethics: From Authenticity to IntegralHumanity(Chicago: Open Court, 1993)

 

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