MAINESUPREMEJUDICIALCOURT ReporterofDecisionsDecision: 2018ME113Docket: Cum-17-297Argued: May15,2018Decided: August9,2018Revised: October11,2018Panel: ALEXANDER,GORMAN,JABAR,HJELM,andHUMPHREY,JJ.

STATEOFMAINEv.

GREGORYNISBETJABAR,J.

[¶1]GregoryNisbetappealsfromajudgmentofconvictionforviolating

apublicsafetyfirerule(ClassE),25M.R.S.§2452(3)(2017),enteredbythe

UnifiedCriminalDocket (CumberlandCounty,Warren, J.) after abench trial.

Nisbet was convicted of failing to comply with section 24.2.2.3.3 of the

2009editionoftheNationalFireProtectionAssociation(NFPA)101:LifeSafety

Code,asincorporatedbyrulebytheCommissioneroftheDepartmentofPublic

Safety.1See25M.R.S.§2452(3);9C.M.R.16219020-1§1(2011);NFPA101:

1“TheLifeSafetyCodeisamodelcodeestablishedbytheNationalFireProtectionAssociation.”

EstateofSmithv.Salvesen,2016ME100,¶7n.2,143A.3d780.TheCommissioneroftheDepartmentofPublicSafetypromulgatedrules incorporating the2009editionof theNationalFireProtectionAssociation(NFPA)101:LifeSafetyCode,byreference,withcertainmodificationsnotapplicablehere.See25M.R.S.§2452(3)(2017);9C.M.R.16219020-1§1(2011);NFPA101:LifeSafetyCode(Nat’lFireProt.Ass’n2009ed.)(hereinafter“LifeSafetyCode”). Thus,thepublicfiresafetyrules

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LifeSafetyCode§24.2.2.3.3(Nat’lFireProt.Ass’n2009ed.)(hereinafter“Life

Safety Code”). On appeal, Nisbet makes the following arguments: that (1)

section24.2.2.3.3oftheLifeSafetyCodeisvoidforvaguenesspursuanttothe

dueprocessclausesoftheUnitedStatesandMaineConstitutions;(2)thecourt

abuseditsdiscretionindeterminingthattheState’sfailuretoprovidehimwith

a policy statement regarding the enforcement of section 24.2.2.3.3 did not

constituteaviolationpursuanttoBradyv.Maryland,373U.S.83(1963);and

(3)theevidencepresentedattrialwasinsufficienttosustainaconvictionfor

failuretocomplywithsection24.2.2.3.3.Weaffirmthejudgment.

I.BACKGROUND

A. FactualHistory

[¶2]“ViewingtheevidenceinthelightmostfavorabletotheState,the

trialrecordsupportsthefollowingfacts,”whichthecourtfoundafterafive-day

trial.Statev.Jeskey,2016ME134,¶2,146A.3d127.Nisbetwastheownerof

anapartmentbuildinglocatedon20NoyesStreetinPortland.Inthatcapacity,

he collected rent from the building’s occupants and exercisedmanagement

responsibilityovertheproperty.OnNovember1,2014,afireoccurredat20

NisbetwaschargedwithviolatingwerespecificprovisionsoftheLifeSafetyCode,incorporatedintotheCodeofMaineRulesbyreference,andthisopinionwillreferencethoseprovisionsdirectly.

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NoyesStreet,resultinginthedeathofsixpeople.Thefirebeganontheporch

outside the front door and proceeded up the stairway that served as the

primarymeans of escape for those on the second and third floors. On that

particular day, the entrance to the back stairway on the second floor was

blockedbyfurniturebecauseatenanthadrecentlymovedin.

[¶3] Threeof thebuilding’soccupantssurvived the firebyexiting the

buildingthroughawindowontothebackporchwithinninetysecondsaftertwo

ofthemwokeup.Oneofthosesurvivorstestifiedthatbeforeheescaped,the

frontdoorwas fully engulfed in flames, thick smokewasbillowing from the

doorandrisingupthestairway,andhewashavingdifficultybreathing.Asthe

survivors escaped, the front door opened and the fire proceeded up the

stairwayveryquickly,bringingintenseheatwithit.Smokeandaccompanying

gases,includingcarbonmonoxide,precededtheheatandroseupthestairways

to the third floor before spreading throughout the first and second floors.

Accordingtoexperttestimony,apersoncouldbecomeunconsciousinaslittle

as thirty seconds after breathing a significant amount of carbon

monoxide-ladensmoke.

[¶4] Each victim except for one died from smoke inhalation. The

third-floorbedroomwindowswereconsiderablysmallerthanrequiredbythe

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LifeSafetyCodeand toosmall touseasasecondarymeansofescape. They

weredoublehung,andonewitnesstestifiedthattheycouldonlybeopenedas

littleaseightinches.Therewasalsotestimonythatapersoncouldremovethe

entirewindowframebyremovingcertainclips—ifthepersonknewhowtodo

that. Longbefore the fire,acontractorworking forNisbet toldhimthat the

third-floorwindowswerenot largeenoughtobea legalsecondarymeansof

escape,andNisbetbrushedoffthosecomments.

B. PreliminaryProceedings

[¶5]OnJuly10,2015,Nisbetwaschargedbyindictmentwithsixcounts

ofmanslaughter (ClassA), 17-AM.R.S. 203(1)(A) (2017), and four countsof

violating public fire safety rules (Class E), 25 M.R.S. § 2452(3), namely,

provisionsoftheLifeSafetyCode.OnSeptember31,2016,afterNisbetwaived

hisrighttoajurytrialpursuanttoM.R.U.Crim.P.23(a),theStatechargedan

eleventh count by information, alleging violation of the Life Safety Code

provisionthatisthesubjectofthisappeal,section24.2.2.3.3.See25M.R.S.§

2452(3);9C.M.R.16219020-1§1.Thatprovisionrequiresthateverysleeping

areainone-andtwo-familydwellingshavewindowsavailableasasecondary

meansofescape,thatthewindowsbeoperablefromtheinsidewithout“special

effort,” and that the windows have a “clear opening” of 5.7square feet, a

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minimumwidthoftwentyinches,andaminimumheightoftwenty-fourinches.

LifeSafetyCode§24.2.2.3.3.

C. TrialandSentencing

[¶6] The parties proceeded to a bench trial on October 3, 2016, and

evidencewaspresentedoverfivedays.OnOctober21,2016,thecourtfound

Nisbet not guilty on the six counts of manslaughter and the four counts of

violation of the Life Safety Code originally charged, and guilty on the

later-chargedviolationofsection24.2.2.3.3.OnDecember1,2016,thecourt

sentencedNisbettoninetydays’imprisonmentanda$1,000fine.

D. MotionforaNewTrial

[¶7] On December 19, 2016, Nisbet filed a motion for a new trial

pursuanttoM.R.U.Crim.P.33.Inthatmotion,NisbetallegedthattheStatehad

failedtoprovidehimwithapolicymemorandumthattheStateFireMarshal

issuedinOctober2013(2013Memorandum).2Thatdocument,whichindicates

thatitisinreferencetoa“[p]olicyforclarificationofexistingegresswindows,”

statesinpertinentpart:

2Pursuanttosection4.6.5oftheLifeSafetyCode,“Whereitisevidentthatareasonabledegree

ofsafetyisprovided,therequirementsforexistingbuildingsshallbepermittedtobemodifiediftheirapplicationwouldbe impracticalinthe judgmentof theauthorityhaving jurisdiction.” The2013Memorandumappearstohavebeenissuedpursuanttosection4.6.5.

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Any building constructed before 1976 will be allowed tomeetthefollowingspecifications.Thenetclearopeningwouldbeallowedtomeettheminimum20”inwidthand24”inheightwithatotalnetclearopeningof3.3sq.ft.;ifthewindowisconstructedof wood or vinyl and the overall window sash size meets aminimumof5.0sq.ft.

The“specialeffort”provisionfromsection24.2.2.3.3remainedthesame.

[¶8]AccordingtoNisbet,becausethesizeofhisthird-floorwindowsmet

theminimumdimensions set forth in thememorandum—and therewas no

disputethathisapartmentbuildingwasbuiltbefore1976—theState’sfailure

to provide the memorandum constituted a failure to disclose exculpatory

evidencepursuanttoBrady,373U.S.at87(“Wenowholdthatthesuppression

bytheprosecutionofevidencefavorabletoanaccused...violatesdueprocess

wheretheevidenceismaterialeithertoguiltortopunishment,irrespectiveof

thegoodfaithorbadfaithoftheprosecution.”). Nisbetarguedthathecould

nothavediscoveredthememorandumbeforetrialthroughtheexerciseofdue

diligence, and if the memorandum had been provided to him, “it probably

wouldhavechangedtheverdictinthiscase.”

[¶9] A hearing on the motion for a new trial was held on

February23,2017,duringwhichthecourtheardtestimonyfrombothparties

regardingtheState’snondisclosureofthe2013Memorandum.Thecourtthen

deniedNisbet’smotioninanorderdatedJune15,2017,inwhichitmadethe

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followingfindingsof fact,whicharesupportedbycompetentevidenceinthe

motionrecord.SeeStatev.Twardus,2013ME74,¶29,72A.3d523(“When

reviewingthedenialofamotionforanewtrialpursuanttoM.R.Crim.P.33on

thebasisofnewlydiscoveredevidence,wereviewthecourt’sfindingsoffact

forclearerror....”).3

[¶10]NeitheroftheAssistantAttorneysGeneral(AAG)prosecutingthe

case was aware of the 2013 Memorandum until an assistant fire marshal

mentionedittooneoftheAAGsontheeveningofOctober4,2016—afterthe

second day of trial. The AAG told the assistant fire marshal to bring the

memorandumtocourtthenextmorning,butafterreceivingitonOctober5,the

AAGreaditquicklyanddidnotcorrectlyunderstanditscontents.Atthetime,

hewasprimarilyfocusedondraftingastipulationwithdefensecounsel.When

heanddefensecounsel firstspokevia telephoneonOctober5, theAAGtold

defensecounselthattheyneededtodiscussthestipulationandmentionedthat

hehadadocumenttoprovide.TheAAGanddefensecounselsubsequentlymet

toworkonrevisionstothestipulation,andalthoughtheAAGhadnospecific

3Although,unlikeTwardus,thiscaseinvolvesthedenialofaM.R.U.Crim.P.33motionforanew

trialbasedonallegedviolationspursuanttoBradyv.Maryland,373U.S.83(1963),andnotnewlydiscovered evidence, we nonetheless apply the same standard of review. See State v. Twardus,2013ME74,¶29,72A.3d523.

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recollectionofgivingdefensecounselacopyofthe2013Memorandum,itwas

evident fromhis testimony thathebelievedhedid. Thus, althoughtheAAG

intendedtoprovidethedefensewiththe2013Memorandum,hefailedtodoso.

Forherpart,defensecounseldidnotrecallreceivingthe2013Memorandum.

[¶11] The court found that each of the third-floor windows was

double-hung,withabottomsashcoveringtwo-thirdsofthewindowheightand

atopsashcoveringone-thirdofthewindowheight.Asaresult,thewindows

couldonlybeopenedtoaheightthatwasone-thirdofthetotalwindowheight.

Thecourtalsorecognizedthattheonlywindowmeasurementsofferedattrial

indicated that thewindow framesmeasured 34inches high and 21.5 inches

wide, but that it had previously declined to rely on those measurements

because—contrarytoallphotographicevidence—thosemeasurementswould

make the third-floorwindow openings taller than the second-floorwindow

openings,whichthecourtfoundnottobethecase.

[¶12]Evenassumingthatthosemeasurementswerereliable,however,

thecourtagainnotedthatthewindowcouldthenonlybeopenedtoaheightof

approximately11.3inches.Assumingalsothatthewindowswere21.5inches

wide,theclearopeningtheyprovidedwouldhavebeen1.7squarefeet—only

half of the clear opening required by the 2013 Memorandum. This

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determinationwasconsistentwithwitnesses’testimonythatthewindowsonly

opened“eightinches,”“sixinches,”“notveryfar. . .maybeaboutafoot,”and

“lessthantwelveinches.”

[¶13] Applying the test articulated by the Supreme Court in Brady,

373U.S. at 87, the court reached several conclusions of law based on these

findings. First, the court reasoned that the 2013Memorandumqualified as

exculpatory evidence, and that it was in the possession of the prosecution.

Second,thecourtdeterminedthatalthoughthe2013Memorandumwasnotin

theexclusivepossessionoftheFireMarshal’sOffice—ithadapparentlybeen

madeavailable to defense counselby someone in the real estate industry—

therewas “no evidence that the policy statement itself . . . had beenwidely

publicized,wasreadilyavailablefrompublicsources,orwouldlikelyhavebeen

obtainedby defense counsel through theexerciseof reasonablediligence in

preparing for trial.” As such, the court concluded that the memorandum’s

nondisclosurewasnot excusedby thepossibility that it couldhave come to

defense counsel’s attention throughanother sourcebefore trial. Finally, the

courtdeterminedthatthe2013Memorandumwasnot“material”forpurposes

of the Brady analysis because “all of the evidence offered at the trial

demonstratedbeyondareasonabledoubtthat...thethirdfloorwindowsdid

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notcomplywith theFireCodeevenapplying [themore lenientrequirement

containedinthe2013Memorandum].”

[¶14] As such, the courtdeniedNisbet’smotion for anew trial. This

appealfollowed.See15M.R.S.§2115(2017);M.R.App.P.2(b)(2)(A)(Tower

2016).4

II.DISCUSSION

A. LifeSafetyCodeConstitutionality

[¶15] NisbetcontendsthatLifeSafetyCode§24.2.2.3.3“issimplytoo

vague to comportwith due process requirements,” such that “[n]o ordinary

personcouldreasonablybeheldtoanswertoitsstandard.”Nisbetspecifically

takes issue with the section’s use of the terms “special effort” and “clear

opening,"whichhearguesarevoidforvagueness.LifeSafetyCode§24.2.2.3.3.

Healsoarguesthat25M.R.S.§2452(3)andsection24.2.2.3.3violatehisrights

pursuanttothedueprocessclauseoftheMaineandUnitedStatesConstitutions

becausehelackednoticeofthem.

[¶16] We normally review the constitutionality of a Maine statute

denovo. See State v.McLaughlin, 2002ME55,¶5, 794A.2d69. However,

4 TherestyledMaineRulesofAppellateProceduredonotapplybecausethisappealwasfiled

beforeSeptember1,2017.SeeM.R.App.P.1(restyledRules).

11

becauseNisbetfailedtoraisethisissueduringthetrialproceedings,wereview

for obvious error the trial court’s failure to declare the statute

unconstitutional.5 M.R.U.Crim.P.52(b);seeStatev.Greenleaf,2004ME149,

¶34,863A.2d877.

[¶17] The due process clauses of the United States and Maine

Constitutions “require that criminal defendants be given fair notice of the

standardofconducttowhichtheycanbeheldaccountable.”Statev.Witham,

2005ME79,¶7,876A.2d40(alterationomitted)(quotationmarksomitted).

Becauseastatute ispresumedtobeconstitutional,UnionMut.Life Ins.Co.v.

Emerson,345A.2d504,507(Me.1975),“[a]partyclaimingastatuteisvoidfor

vaguenessmustdemonstratethatthestatutehasnovalidapplicationorlogical

construction,”StewartTitleGuar.Co.v.StateTaxAssessor,2009ME8,¶ 40,963

A.2d169.Inordertofindastatutevoidforvagueness,“wemustfindthatthe

statute fails to define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that

ordinarypeoplecanunderstandwhatconduct isprohibitedandinamanner

thatdoesnotencouragearbitraryanddiscriminatoryenforcement.” Statev.

5 “ForanerrorordefecttobeobviousforpurposesofRule52(b),theremustbe(1)anerror,(2)

thatisplain,and(3)thataffectssubstantialrights.Iftheseconditionsaremet,wewillexerciseourdiscretiontonoticeanunpreservederroronlyifwealsoconcludethat(4)theerrorseriouslyaffectsthefairnessandintegrityorpublicreputationofjudicialproceedings.”Statev.Pabon,2011ME100,¶29,28A.3d1147.

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Falcone,2006ME90,¶6,902A.2d141(quotationmarksomitted).“Suchan

unacceptablestatutewouldoftenbe‘sovagueandindefiniteasreallytobeno

ruleorstandardatall.’”ShapiroBros.ShoeCo.v.Lewiston-AuburnShoeworkers

ProtectiveAss’n,320A.2d247,253(Me.1974)(quotingA.B.SmallCo.v.Am.

SugarRef.Co.,267U.S.233,239(1925)).

[¶18] However, “[i]n examining the sufficiency of statutory language,

[o]bjectivequantification,mathematicalcertainty,andabsoluteprecisionare

not required.” Witham, 2005 ME 79, ¶ 7, 876 A.2d 40 (quotation marks

omitted).Indeed,avoid-for-vaguenesschallengewillfail“[w]herethemeaning

of a term can be adequately determined by examining the plain language

definitionorthecommonlawdefinition.”Falcone,2006ME90,¶10,902A.2d

141. “In a facial challenge to a statute on vagueness grounds,we need not

examine the facial validity of the statute and test its constitutionality in all

conceivablefactualcontexts.” Statev.Aboda,2010ME125,¶15,8A.3d719

(quotation marks omitted). Rather, “[w]e address a void for vagueness

challenge by testing it in the circumstances of the individual case.” State v.

Thongsavanh,2007ME20,¶36,915A.2d421.

1. TheRegulatoryLanguage

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[¶19] TheruleNisbet allegedlyviolated,LifeSafetyCode§24.2.2.3.3,

providesinrelevantpartthatasecondarymeansofescape

shall be an outside window or door operable from the insidewithouttheuseoftools,keys,orspecialeffortandshallprovideaclearopeningofnotlessthan5.7ft2(0.53m2).Thewidthshallbenotlessthan20in.(510mm),andtheheightshallbenotlessthan24in.(610mm).

[¶20] Although the Life Safety Code does not define the terms “clear

opening” or “special effort,” it provides that “[w]here terms are not defined

...theyshallbedefinedusing theirordinarilyacceptedmeaningswithin the

context inwhich they are used.” Life Safety Code § 3.1. The Code further

specifies“Webster’sThirdNewInternationalDictionaryoftheEnglishLanguage,

Unabridged,”asasourceforordinarilyacceptedmeanings.Id.Weaddresseach

terminturn.

a. “ClearOpening”

[¶21] Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines “clear” as

“freefromobstruction,burden,limitation,defect,orotherrestrictingfeatures,”

and defines “opening” as “something that is open.” Webster’s Third New

InternationalDictionaryoftheEnglishLanguageUnabridged(Webster’s)419,

1580 (2002). That dictionary defines “open” as “fit to be traveled over or

through: presenting no serious obstacle to passage or view.” Id. at 1579.

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Accordingly,theordinarilyacceptedmeaningoftheterm“clearopening”—in

the context of section 24.2.2.3.3—plainly requires that a door or window

servingasasecondarymeansofescapemustprovideanobstruction-freespace

thatisfittobetraveledthrough.SeeFalcone,2006ME90,¶10,902A.2d141.

[¶22] Even if thisplain languagewerenotsoclear, however,Nisbet’s

void-for-vagueness argument is foreclosed by the fact that the term “clear

opening”ismodifiedbyprecisemeasurementsrequiringthatthespacebeat

least20inches(510mm)wideand24inches(610mm)tall,andaminimumof

5.7squarefeet(0.53m2)insize.LifeSafetyCode§24.2.2.3.3.Thisstandard

canhardlybedeemedtobesovagueorindefinite“asreallytobenoruleor

standard at all.” Shapiro Bros. Shoe Co., 320 A.2d at 253 (quotation marks

omitted).

b. “SpecialEffort”

[¶23] Webster’s ThirdNew InternationalDictionary defines “effort” as

“consciousexertionofphysicalormentalpower,”anddefines“special”as“one

outside of or in addition to the regular or normal number, quantity, series,

range,orsimilarcategory.”Webster’sat725,2186.Assuch,theplainlanguage

oftheterm“specialeffort”—inthecontextofsection24.2.2.3.3—requiresthat

anoccupantbeabletooperateadoororwindowservingasasecondarymeans

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ofescapewithoutusinganamountofphysicalexertiongreaterthannormally

required. Although lacking in “mathematical certainty [and] absolute

precision,”Witham,2005ME79,¶7,876A.2d40(quotationmarksomitted),

the term is sufficiently definite that ordinary people can understand its

meaning,seeFalcone,2006ME90,¶6,902A.2d141.AsNisbetcontends,the

standard established by this term may be difficult to apply in different

scenarios.However,thefactthat“insomehypotheticalinstances[regulatory

language]mightrequireinterpretationorpresentformidablefactualissuesof

proof...doesnotmeanthatthejudiciarycannotapplythelawinaccordance

withthespiritofthelegislativeintent.”ShapiroBros.ShoeCo.,320A.2dat253-

54.

[¶24] Finally—of equal applicability to the terms “clearopening” and

“special effort”—wehavepreviouslyheld that,whendeterminingwhether a

statute is void for vagueness, that statute may be construed “in light of its

contextandpurpose.”StewartTitleGuar.Co.,2009ME8,¶41,963A.2d169.

Here, the Life Safety Code’s stated purpose is “to provide minimum

requirements, with due regard to function, for the design, operation, and

maintenanceofbuildingsandstructuresforsafetytolifefromfire.”LifeSafety

Code§ 1.2. In lightof thatpurpose, themeaningsof the terms at issue are

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furtherclarified—giventhattheCodeisintendedtoensure“safetytolifefrom

fire,”id.,itisreasonabletoconcludethattheregulationmustbeconstruedto

affordbuildingoccupantsanunobstructed,easy-to-openwindowordoorinthe

eventofafire.Thus,construedbothinisolationand“inlightofitscontextand

itspurpose,”StewartTitleGuar.Co.,2009ME8,¶41,963A.2d169,theterms

“clearopening”and“specialeffort”aresufficientlycleartoputordinarypeople

on fair notice that they can be held accountable for failing to provide a

secondarymeansofescapethatiseasytooperateandlargeenoughtotravel

through.

2. LackofNotice

[¶25]Nisbetadditionallyarguesthatboth“thestatutoryschemecreated

by[25M.R.S.§2452(3)]andtheLifeSafetyCode[are]fundamentallyunfair”

becausehedidnothavenoticeof thatscheme. Thisargument isunavailing,

giventhattheLifeSafetyCodeisnotunconstitutionallyvagueandcitizens“are

generallyrequiredtoknowthelawandcannotclaimignoranceofthelawasa

defense.” Falcone,2006ME90,¶23,902A.2d141(Dana, J.,dissenting);see

alsoStatev.Goodenow,65Me.30,32-33(1876)(“[Thedefendants]pleadtheir

ignoranceofthelaw.Thiscannotexcusethem.Ignoranceofthelawexcuses

noone.”);Jenksv.Mathews,31Me.318,320(1850)(“Itisawellknownmaxim

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that ignoranceof lawwill not furnishanexcuse for anyperson, either for a

breachoranomissionofduty.”(quotationmarksomitted)).

[¶26] Moreover, even if Nisbet were not specifically aware of the

requirementssetforthinsection24.2.2.3.3,hewasatleastgenerallyawareof

them because a contractor informed him that the windows were not large

enoughtoserveasalegalsecondarymeansofescape.Cf.Nicholsv.Marsden,

483 A.2d 341, 343 (Me. 1984) (stating that although the common law rule

providesthat“alandlordisnotliabletoatenantforpersonalinjuriescaused

byadefectiveconditioninpremisesunderthetenant’sexclusivecontrol,”an

exceptiontothisruleoccurswherethelandlord“failstodisclosetheexistence

of a latent defectwhich he knows or should have known existed” (emphasis

added)).

B. BradyViolation

[¶27] Nisbet next argues that the court abused its discretion in

determining that the State’s failure to provide him with a copy of the

2013MemorandumwasnotmaterialandthereforenotaBradyviolation.He

contends that the2013Memorandum“couldreasonablybe taken toput the

wholecaseinsuchadifferentlightastoundermineconfidenceintheverdict”

because,interalia,boththecourtandtheparties“preparedfortheentiretrial,

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examined all thewitnesses and evidence, deliberated and reached a verdict

informedbythewronglegalstandard.”

[¶28] The denial of a motion for a new trial based on an alleged

Bradyviolationisreviewedforanabuseofdiscretion.6Twardus,2013ME74,

¶32,72A.3d523(citingUnitedStatesv.Connolly,504F.3d206,211-12,219

(1stCir.2007)).“[A]trialcourthasexceededtheboundsofitsdiscretionwhen,

indiscretionarydecision-making,thecourt:(1)considersafactorprohibited

bylaw;(2)declinestoconsideralegallyproperfactorunderamistakenbelief

that the factor cannot be considered; (3) acts or declines to act based on a

mistakenviewofthelaw;or(4)expresslyorimplicitlyfindsfactsnotsupported

bytherecordaccordingtotheclearerrorstandardofreview.”Smithv.Rideout,

2010ME69,¶13,1A.3d441(citationsomitted).

[¶29] “A defendant’s due process rights are violated when the

prosecutionwithholdsevidencefavorabletohim.”Statev.Jobin,510A.2d527,

529-30(Me.1986)(citingBrady,373U.S.at87).ABradyviolationhasthree

6Althoughwegenerallyreviewanallegeddueprocessviolationdenovo,Statev.Williamson,2017

ME108,¶21,163A.3d127,inthecontextofadenialofaM.R.U.Crim.P.33motionforanewtrialbaseduponaBradyviolation,“anappreciablemeasureofrespectisduetothepresider’ssenseoftheebbandflowoftherecentlyconcludedtrial,”UnitedStatesv.Connolly,504F.3d206,211(1stCir.2007)(quotationmarksomitted).However,thatdistinctionisminimalherebecause“a[trial]courtabusesitsdiscretionwheneveritpredicatesitsrulingonanerroneousviewofthelawandabstractquestionsoflawengenderdenovoreview.”Id.at211-12(citationomitted).

19

elements:(1)theevidencemustbefavorabletothedefendantbecauseitwas

exculpatoryorimpeaching;(2)theevidencemusthavebeensuppressedbythe

State, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3)prejudicemust have ensued.

Twardus,2013ME74,¶32,72A.3d523(citingStricklerv.Greene,527U.S.263,

281-82 (1999)). Evidence is prejudicial when it is “material”—that is, “the

nondisclosurewas so serious that there is a reasonable probability that the

suppressedevidencewouldhaveproducedadifferentverdict.”Strickler,527

U.S. at 281 (emphasis added). A “reasonable probability” exists when “the

likelihoodofadifferentresultisgreatenoughtoundermineconfidenceinthe

outcomeofthetrial.”Smithv.Cain,565U.S.73,75(2012)(alterationomitted)

(quotationmarksomitted).

[¶30]Here,theStatedoesnotdisputethatthe2013Memorandumwas

favorabletoNisbetandthatitwasnotdisclosedtohim.7Thus,thesoleissue

beforeusiswhetherthe2013Memorandumwasmaterialtothedetermination

ofNisbet’sguilt.

7TheStatedoescitetofederalcaselawforthepropositionthat,pursuanttoBrady,evidenceis

notdeemed tobe suppressedwhere it isavailable to thedefense throughanother source in theexerciseofduediligence.SeeUnitedStatesv.Shields,789F.3d733,747(7thCir.2015);Matthewsv.Ishee,486F.3d883,891(6thCir.2007).However,wedeclinetoaddresstheissuebecausetheStateacknowledgesthatthecourtdeterminedthe2013Memorandumhadbeensuppressedanddoesnotaffirmativelyarguethatweshouldconcludeotherwise.

20

[¶31]Weconcludethetrialcourtdidnotabuseitsdiscretioninholding

that, if the 2013 Memorandum had not been suppressed and Nisbet had

planned his “defense strategy, cross examination, witness presentations,

decisionsaboutobjectionsandstipulations,andargumentstothecourt”based

onthatmemorandum,thereisnopossibilitythathecouldhaveestablishedthat

thewindowcouldhavebeenopenedtoprovideaclearopeningof3.3square

feet.8 Eachofthe third-floorwindowswasdoublehung,withabottomsash

covering two-thirdsof thewindow anda top sash coveringone thirdof the

window,therebypermittingthewindowtobeopenedonlytoone-thirdofits

total height. Therefore, even crediting the accuracy of the measurements

introducedattrialthatthewindowframeswere34inchestalland21.5inches

wide—whichthecourtdidnot,giventhatthosemeasurementswould,contrary

tophotographicevidence,makethemlargerthanthesecond-floorwindows—

thewindowcouldonlyhavebeenopenedtoaheightof11.3inches,creatinga

clearopeningofonly1.7squarefeet.

[¶32] This conclusion is buttressed by the testimony of former

third-floor inhabitants, all of whom stated that the windows opened only

8AsthecourtnotedinitsorderdenyingNisbet’sRule33motion,“Thetrialtestimonyofdefense

witnesses...demonstratesthatthedefensewasawareatthetimeoftrialthatthe5.7squarefootrequirementdidnotnecessarilyapply.Itdidnotpursuethatissue.”

21

between six to twelve inches. Even using the most generous of these

recollections,theclearopeningprovidedbythewindowwouldonlythenequal

justoveronesquarefoot,lessthanhalfofthe3.3squarefeetrequiredpursuant

to the 2013 Memorandum.9 Accordingly, the 2013 Memorandum was not

material within the meaning of Brady because there is no reasonable

probability that the State’s production of the 2013 Memorandum and its

admissioninevidencewouldhaveproducedadifferentresultforNisbetinthe

sensethatconfidenceintheoutcomeofhistrialhasbeenundermined.10See

Strickler,527U.S.at281;Smith,565U.S.at75.

9 At oral argument, Nisbet for the first time raised the alternative contention that if the

2013Memorandumhadbeenavailabletohim,hewouldnothaveattemptedtoestablishthatthewindowsmettheminimumsizerequirementsandwould insteadhave focusedondemonstratingthat the windows did not require “special effort” to operate. See Life Safety Code §24.2.2.3.3.However,becauseNisbetfailedtoadvancethistheorybothinhismotionforanewtrialandinhisbriefsbeforeus,wedeclinetoconsiderit.SeeLaqualiav.Laqualia,2011ME114,¶16n.6,30A.3d838;Teelv.Colson,396A.2d529,534(Me.1979). Even ifpreserved, the issuewouldhavebeenunavailinggiventhecourt’ssupportedfactualfindingthatremovingthewindowaltogether—whichishowNisbetarguestheopeningpermittedbythe2013Memorandumwouldhavebeensatisfied—would require “special effort” because someone trying to escape couldwell beunaware that thewindow could be removed and, in any event,wouldnot have time to remove thewindow in anemergency.10Nisbet’smoregeneralizedargument,thatthe2013Memorandumwas“material”becausethe

partiesandthecourthadfailedtoapplythecorrectlegalstandard,isthereforemisplaced.Asthecaselawmakesclear,theSupremeCourt’sreasoningregarding“confidenceintheoutcomeofthetrial”iscenteredonthereasonableprobabilitythatadifferentoutcomewouldhaveresultedwiththeinclusion of the suppressed evidence, and not on the nature of the proceedings that occurred—howevererroneously—intheabsenceofthatevidence.UnitedStatesv.Bagley,473U.S.667,682-84(1985);seeSmithv.Cain,565U.S.73,75-77(2012);Stricklerv.Greene,527U.S.263,290-96(1999);Kylesv.Whitney,514U.S.419,434-35,441-54(1995);seealsoTwardus,2013ME74,¶¶34-50,72A.3d523;Statev.Silva,2012ME120,¶10,56A.3d1230;Statev.Harnish,560A.2d5,7(Me.1989).

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C. SufficiencyoftheEvidence

[¶33]Finally,Nisbetarguesthattheevidencewasinsufficienttosupport

hisconvictionfortworeasons.First,hecontendsthatduetotheexistenceof

the2013Memorandum,theStatewasrequiredtoprovethat20NoyesStreet

wasconstructedafter1976inorderforthecourttoapplythestandardsetforth

insection24.2.2.3.3.Second,Nisbetarguesthathiscontractor’stestimony—

thatheinformedNisbetthatthethird-floorwindowswerenotlargeenoughto

bealegalsecondarymeansofescape—wasinsufficienttosupportthecourt’s

findingthatheknowinglyviolatedsection24.2.2.3.3.

[¶34] “In assessing the sufficiency of evidence to support a criminal

conviction,wereviewtheevidence,andallreasonableinferencesdrawnfrom

thatevidence,inthelightmostfavorabletotheStatetodeterminewhetherthe

trierof factcouldhavefoundeveryelementoftheoffensechargedbeyonda

reasonabledoubt.” State v.Tayman, 2008ME177,¶4, 960A.2d1151. “In

dwellingsordwellingunitsoftworoomsormore,”LifeSafetyCode§24.2.2.1.1,

it is a Class E crime pursuant to 25 M.R.S. § 2452(3) to fail to provide a

secondarymeans of escape in compliancewith the requirements of section

23

24.2.2.3.3.Althoughsection2542(3)doesnotspecifyaculpablestateofmind,

thecourtfoundthatNisbet’sviolationhadbeenknowing.11

1. The2013Memorandum

[¶35]Nisbetcontendsthat“theStatedidnotmeetitsthresholdburden

ofprovingbeyondareasonabledoubtthat[section]24.2.2.3.3actuallyapplied

totheAppellant,asthebuildinginquestionwasconstructedpriorto1976and

that section, unmodified, does apply to buildings constructed in that time

period.”Thisargumentisunpersuasive.AlthoughthecourtfoundNisbetguilty

after considering section 24.2.2.3.3—rather than the more lenient

specifications requiredby the2013Memorandum—any errorwasharmless

because,uponconsiderationofNisbet’smotionforanewtrial,thecourtfound

that itsdeterminationof guiltwould have remained the sameeven if it had

appliedthe2013Memorandum’srequirements.SeeM.R.U.Crim.P.52(a);State

v.Larsen,2013ME38,¶23,65A.3d1203.

2. TheContractor’sTestimony

11Inpost-trialmemoranda,theStatearguedthataculpablestateofmindwasnotrequiredfora

violationpursuantto25M.R.S.§2452(3)(2017),whileNisbetarguedthat“theappropriatementalstatetouseiseitherintentional,knowingorreckless.” Becauseneitherpartyonappealcontendsthatthecourterredinapplyingtheculpablestateofmindof“knowing,”weassume,withoutdeciding,thatthisisthementalstaterequiredbysection2453(3).

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[¶36] Finally, Nisbet argues that his contractor’s testimony—that he

informed Nisbet that the third-floor windows were legally too small—is

insufficient to support a finding that Nisbet knowingly violated section

24.2.2.3.3.“Inajury-waivedtrial,itisthedutyofthefact-findertoreconcile

conflictingtestimony,todetermineitsrelativeweight,andtodeterminewhat

partofthetestimonyiscredibleandworthyofbelief.”Statev.Cotton,673A.2d

1317, 1321 (Me. 1996) (alteration omitted) (quotation marks omitted).

ViewingtheevidenceinthelightmostfavorabletotheState,thecourt,asthe

fact-finder,couldhaveattachedsufficientweighttoNisbet’s interactionwith

hiscontractortofindbeyondareasonabledoubtthatNisbetwasawarethat

the third-floorwindowswere impermissiblysmall. See id.;seealsoTayman,

2008ME177,¶4,960A.2d1151.

Theentryis:

Judgmentaffirmed. LukeS.Rioux,Esq.(orally),Rioux,Donahue,Chmelecki&Peltier,Portland,forappellantGregoryNisbetJanet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Donald W. Macomber, Asst. Atty. Gen.(orally),OfficeoftheAttorneyGeneral,Augusta,forappelleeStateofMaineCumberlandCountyUnifiedCriminalDocketdocketnumberCR-2015-4030FORCLERKREFERENCEONLY