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UBA v. NEW TARZAN MOTORS LTD
CITATION: (2016) LPELR-41016(CA)
In the Court of AppealIn the Enugu Judicial Division
Holden at Enugu
ON FRIDAY, 20TH MAY, 2016Suit No: CA/E/139/2008
Before Their Lordships:
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU Justice, Court of AppealMASSOUD ABDULRAHMAN OREDOLA Justice, Court of AppealMISITURA OMODERE BOLAJI-YUSUFF Justice, Court of Appeal
BetweenUNITED BANK FOR AFRICA PLC - Appellant(s)
AndNEW TARZAN MOTORS LIMITED - Respondent(s)
RATIO DECIDENDI
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1. BANKING LAW - INTEREST ONCREDIT FACILITIES: General rule asto payment of interest on a debt orloan and its exception"It is now well settled that banks notbeing a charitable organization hasthe power or are entitled to chargeinterests on loans or other advancesor facilities granted and or madeavailable to a customer, even wherethere was no express agreement onthe rate of interest to be charged. Seethe case of Adetoro v. U. B. N. Plc.(2007) LPELR ??? 8991 . "Pe rOREDOLA, J.C.A. (P. 16, Paras. D-E) -read in context
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2. C O N T R A C T - T E R M S O FCONTRACT: Whether parties arebound by the t e rms o f t he i ragreement"Also, it is trite principles of law ofcontract that parties to a bindingcontract are bound by the terms ofthe sa id contract which theyvoluntarily entered into, see the casesof Best (Nigeria) Ltd. v. BlackwoodHodge (Nigeria) Ltd. (2011) 5 NWLR(Pt. 1239) 95; and A. G. Ferrero & Co.Ltd. V. Henkel Chemicals Nig. Ltd(2011) LPELR ??? 12."Per OREDOLA,J.C.A. (Pp. 16-17, Paras. F-A) - read incontext
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3. C O N T R A C T - T E R M S O FCONTRACT: Whether parties arebound by the terms of their contractand the duty of court to give effect tosame"Let me state, that I subscribe to thesubmission of the learned counsel tothe appellant on the fact that whereparties who are desirous of entering abusiness relationship have reducedthe terms of relationship into writing,they would be bound by such terms.Also, if the wordings of the agreementare plain and unambiguous, Courtsare generally bound to interpret theagreement literally, giving effect tothe terms already agreed upon by theparties. This is moreso, because it isnot the business of Courts to write ormake new agreement/contract for thepart ies. See Owoniboys Tech.Services Ltd. v. U. B. N. Ltd. (2003) 15NWLR (Pt. 844) 545; (2003) LPELR ???2854."Per OREDOLA, J.C.A. (Pp. 14-15,Paras. F-C) - read in context
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4. INTERPRETATION OF DOCUMENT -CONSTRUCTION OF DOCUMENTS:Guiding principles to the constructionof contract documents"It is also a trite law that, wheredocument(s) form part of a longdrawn transaction, such as in theinstant case , they shou ld beinterpreted not in isolation but in thecontract of the total i ty of thetransaction in order to full appreciatetheir legal import and purport andimpact. That is the only way to findout and determine the real intentionof the parties. A restrictive andrestricted interpretation which doesnot take cognizance of the totalpackage of the transaction in whichthe documents are integral partcannot meet the justice of the case.See the cases of R.E.A.N. Ltd. v.Aswani Textile Ind. (1991) 2 N.W.L.R.(Pt.176) 639 @ 669; and Agbachi v.Azubuike (2010) LPELR ??? 3646."PerOREDOLA, J.C.A. (Pp. 15-16, Paras. C-A) - read in context
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M A S S O U D A B D U L R A H M A N O R E D O L A ,J.C.A.(Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is anappeal against the judgment of the High Court of AnambraState, sitting at Onitsha (hereinafter referred to as theLower Court) delivered by Hon. Justice Vin Agbataon the28th day of January, 2008. The suit was originally institutedby the plaintiff/respondent vide a writ of summons filed onthe 9th day of June, 2005, wherein the Respondent claimedagainst the defendant/appellant in the following terms asreproduced below:“WHEREFORE the plaintiff claims from defendant thesum of N150,000.000.00 being general and specialdamages for wrongful deduction and breach ofcontract.PARTICULARS OF DAMAGES SPECIAL DAMAGESDeduction from plaintiff’s account from 25thDecember, 2000 – 25th January, 2002- N21,220,925.57Interest on the amount: - N37,681,220.21Total - N57,962,145.78General Damages: - N91,097,854.22Grand Total - N150,000.000.00”
At the close of pleadings, both parties led evidence in proofof their respective cases. The plaintiff/respondent calledtwo (2) witnesses, while the defendant/appellant
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called only one witness. At the end of it all, the learned trial
judge entered judgment for the plaintiff/respondent in the
following words:
“The plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to judgment in
this suit. The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff the
sum of N21,220,925.57 being unauthorized
deductions from the accounts of the plaintiff with her
from the 25th day of December, 2000 to the 25th day
January, 2002. The plaintiff claimed also, against the
defendant, the sum of N37, 681,220.21 being
interests on the above stated judgment debt. She did
not however, establish by evidence how she arrived at
that figure. Be that as it may, the Supreme Court in
the case ofBalogun vs. National Bank of Nigeria Ltd.
(1978) 3 S. C. 155, had restated the law to the effect
that people engaged in business should recover
substantial damages without proof of actual loss. The
defendant shall, therefore, also pay to the plaintiff
the sum N37, 681,220.21 being damages for breach of
contract.”
The appellant was dissatisfied with the said decision and
thus appealed against it. Originally this was done vide a
notice of appeal filed on the 30th of January, 2008,
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but was subsequently amended by the order of this court
made on the 17th day of November, 2008 which deemed
the same as having been properly filed and duly served.
Thus, the said judgment is being challenged before this
Court on seven (7) grounds of appeal; the grounds without
their particulars are reproduced below:
“GROUND ONE
The learned trial Judge misdirected himself and
thereby erred and came to a wrong conclusion when
he held as follows:
“It appears, to me preposterous that the Defendant
applied her own funds to acquire her own buses and
then debited the accounts of the plaintiff with
interests for the said funds when she was yet to take
possession of the buses. It does not make sense to
me”
“GROUND TWO
“The learned trial judge erred in law in awarding the
sum of N21,220,925.57 as special damages
representing the sum deducted from the plaintiff’s
account between 25th January, 2000 and 25 January,
2002”
“GROUND THREE
The learned trial judge erred on law when he held as
follows:
“… Be that as it may, the Supreme Court in the case
Balogun V National Bank of
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Nigeria Ltd (1978) 3 S. C. 155, had restated the law to
the effect that people engaged in business should
recover substantial damages without proof of actual
loss. The defendant shall, therefore, also pay to the
plaintiff the sum of N37,681,220,21 being damages
for breach of contact…”
“GROUND FOUR
The learned trial judge erred in law when he held as
follows:
“The transaction between the parties was a lease
finance transaction. It was not term loan, as
suggested by the defense counsel. Consequently, both
the principal sum and the interests thereon were part
and parcel of the 21 equal monthly rentals, which the
plaintiff had since paid to the defendant. It follows,
therefore, that any deductions outside the aforesaid
21 equal monthly rentals, made by the defendant
from the account of the plaintiff with her is not
allowed, neither by the law nor by the agreement of
the parties. It was done in breach of the contract
between the parties”
“GROUND FIVE
The trial Court erred in law in holding that:
“A bank, not being a charitable organization is
entitled to charge interests on funds which she
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released to her customer from the date of the release
of such funds. This is however true to the extent only
that the said funds were released to the customer. It
becomes a totally different ball game in such
circumstance as in the present case, where such
funds were never released to the customer, the
plaintiff, but were rather applied for the acquisition
of some buses the property in which remained in the
Defendant”
“GROUND SIX
The learned trial judge erred in law in considering
only the case for the plaintiff and failed to advert his
attention to the evidence adduced, and the
authorities referred to by the defendant.”
“GROUND SEVEN
The learned trial judge erred in law when he held as
follows:
“At all times material to this suit, the property in the
buses remained in the Defendant. Indeed, it was in
the exercise of her rights as owner of the said buses
that the Defendant had to sell one of them without
recourse to the plaintiff”
In accordance with the rules of this Court the parties filed
their respective briefs of argument. The appellant’s brief of
argument was prepared by Alfred
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Uwaka, Esq. and filed on the 3rd day of April, 2009. It was
deemed as properly filed and served on the 7th day of July,
2009. The respondent’s brief of argument, on the other
hand was filed by Chief S. O. P. Okeke. It was filed on the
6th day of August, 2009. The appellant’s counsel upon
being served with the respondent’s brief of argument, filed
a reply brief on the 13th day of September, 2010. The same
was deemed as properly filed and duly served on the 11th
day of October, 2010.
In the resolution of this appeal, the learned appellant’s
counsel formulated two (2) issues for determination. The
issues are as follows:
ISSUE 1
Whether the learned trial judge was right to have
awarded the sum of N37,681,220.21k (Thirty Seven
Million Six Hundred and Eighty one Thousand Two
Hundred and Twenty Naira Twenty One Kobo) as
d a m a g e s f o r b r e a c h o f c o n t r a c t t o t h e
plaintiff/respondent.
ISSUE 2
“Whether the learned trial judge was right in the
circumstance in holding that both the principal sum
and interest were part and parcel of the 21 equal
monthly rentals, thereby disallowing the interest
charged by the
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defendant/appellant and awarding the sum of
N21,220,925,57k (Twenty One Million, Two Hundred
Twenty Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty Five
Naira Fifty Seven Kobo) to the plaintiff/respondent as
special damages.”
The learned counsel to the respondent on his own, distilled
four (4) issues for the determination of this appeal the
issues are as follows:
“(i) Whether the respondent/defendant was right to
have deducted money from the account of the
respondent/plaintiff when no business was done for
the respondent/plaintiff.
(ii) Whether the Learned Trial judge was right to have
awarded the sum of N37,681,220.21k (Thirty Seven
Million Six Hundred and Eighty One Thousand Two
Hundred and Twenty One Kobo as damages for the
breach of contract to the plaintiff/respondent.
(iii) Whether the learned trial judge was right in the
circumstance in holding that both the principal sum
and interest were part and parcel of the 21 equal
monthly rentals, thereby disallowing the interest
charged by the defendant/appellant and awarding of
t h e s u m o f N 2 1 , 2 2 0 , 9 2 5 . 5 7 k t o t h e
respondent/plaintiff as special damages.
(iv) Whether this Court can interfere
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with the finding of the trial Court.”
It is instructive to observe at this point, that the issues as
distilled by the learned counsel to the respondent are
materially the same with those distilled by the learned
appellant’s counsel except for the fact that the learned
respondent’s counsel merely crafted the issues in an
expanded form.
I have carefully gone through all the evidence on record;
the judgment of the Lower Court, issues formulated by
learned counsel to both parties and arguments, and I am of
the opinion that the issues formulated by the learned
counsel to the appellant are more apt for the resolution of
this appeal. Thus, the issues are hereby adopted towards
the determination of this appeal. Having carefully examined
the said issues adopted for the determination of this appeal
I am of the view that they are inter-related and mutually
dependent. Thus, it would be better that they are
considered together.
ARGUMENT ON ISSUES. (ISSUE 1 AND ISSUE 2)
The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that a
party must establish his claim by evidence before he could
be entitled to judgment. He referred to and relied on
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the cases of Sokwo v. Kpongbo (2008) 7 NWLR (Pt.
1086) 342 @ 362; and Nzeribe v. Dave Eng. Co. Ltd.
(1994) 8 NWLR (Pt. 361) 124 @ 136. The learned
counsel also contended that the respondent failed to prove
that they are entitled to special damages (in form of
interest on the amount the appellant allegedly wrongfully
deducted from its account, and that the learned trial judge
so found, but went ahead to grant the relief.
The learned counsel submitted in another vein, that the
authorities in respect of which the Lower Court relied upon
in reaching its decision in this regard were decided on a
different principle of law and the same is not applicable to
the instant case. The learned counsel finally submitted on
this point that the Lower Court “had no jurisdiction to
award to the plaintiff/respondent damages for a relief not
claimed as the Court did.” He called in support the cases
of Ekpenyong v. Nyong (1975) 2 SC 65 @ 73-74; Fabiyi
v. Adeniyi (2000) 6 NWLR (Pt. 662) 532 @ 542; and
Odofin v. Agu (1992) 3 NWLR (Pt. 229) 350 @ 372 -
373.
The learned counsel to the respondent on his own part
contended that, there was evidence on record which
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established the fact that the appellant wrongfully deducted
the sum of N21,220,925,57k from the respondent’s
account. The learned counsel thereby submitted that the
damages in this respect were awarded to compensate the
respondent in order to make reparation for all the actual
damage done to the respondent which flowed directly from
the said act. He called in aid the cases of Doyle v. Olby
(Iron Mongers Ltd.) (1969) 2 All E. R. 119 @ 122; and
Balogun v. National Bank of Nigeria Ltd (1978) 3 S.
C. 155.
The learned counsel to the appellant had hitherto
submitted that this issue was borne out of the Lower
Court’s findings, where it was stated as follows
“…both the principal sum and the interest thereon
were part and parcel of the 21 equal monthly rentals
which the plaintiff had since paid to the defendant. It
follows, therefore, that any deduction, outside the
aforesaid 21 equal monthly rentals, made by the
defendant from the account of the plaintiff with here
is not allowed, neither by the law nor by the
agreement of the parties. It is done in breach of the
contract between the parties.”
The learned counsel then
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maintained that the respondent did not at any point
pleaded that both the principal sum and interest were part
and parcel of the 21 monthly rentals. Thus, the decision of
the Lower Court amounted to formulating or putting
forward a different case from what the respondent averred.
The learned counsel, thus, submitted that the trial Court
had no jurisdiction to make findings to the effect that both
the principal sum and interest are part and parcel of the 21
equal monthly rentals, and that by this finding, the Court
made a case different from the case made by the
respondent. He relied on the case ofFabiyi v. Adeniyi
(2000) 6 NWLR (Pt. 662) 532 @ 542, on the established
point that a Court has no jurisdiction to grant a relief which
has not been pleaded or prayed for.
The learned counsel contended further that the contract
between the parties was not a case of finance transaction
strictly speaking, as the agreement clearly contemplated
and stipulated the payment of interest apart from rentals.
The learned counsel went ahead to buttress this fact with
references to pieces of evidence on record. Thus, the
learned counsel submitted that learned trial judge
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(with due respect) failed to properly grasp and appreciate
the transaction between the parties and evidence of the
appellant.
The learned counsel submitted also the respondent failed to
strictly prove that she was entitled to the special damages
claimed. He submitted further that for a party to claim
special damages and succeed, he must specifically plead it
and strictly prove the same. He relied on the case of
Arabambi v. A. B. I Ltd (2006) 3 M. J. S. C., 61 @
98-99.
The learned counsel argued further that the transaction
was in form of “disguised borrowing” equivalent to a
form of term loan in respect of which the sum released by
the appellant was to attract interest in accordance with the
custom and practice of banking transactions. The learned
counsel argued further that the Lower Court failed to
properly evaluate the evidence before it; thus, it
erroneously found that both the interest and the principal
sum was part and parcel of the 21 equal monthly rental
payments. He therefore, urged this Court to interfere with
the findings of the Lower Court and find in favour of the
appellant. He relied on the following cases in making his
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submissions; Sha (Jnr.) v. Kwan (2000) 8 NWLR (Pt.
670) 685 @ 704 among others.
Finally, the learned counsel argued that the transaction
between the parties was reduced into a written agreement
to which both parties are bound and while the Court is only
saddled with the responsibility of interpreting plainly, the
terms as agreed by the parties. He stated that any effort in
default of the above would amount to re-writing
agreements for the parties which the law frowns at. He
cited and relied on the cases of Larmie vs. DATA
Processing Maintenance & Services Ltd. (2006) 3
M.J.S.C., 20. He argued that Exhibits D1, D6 and D7
clearly showed and stipulated that the payment of interests
would be differentiated and excluded from the monthly
rental payment. Relying on all the above arguments and
authorities in support thereof, he therefore urged this
Court to allow this appeal and make an order dismissing
the respondent’s claim in its entirety.
The learned counsel to the respondent in further response
contended that the transaction between the parties is a
finance lease contract. He also stated that the transaction
is akin to Equipment Leasing which
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is all about financing. He referred us to the case of
Mulliner v. Flounce (1878) 3 Q.B.D. 484. The learned
counsel contended that a finance lease contract is drawn
up in such a way as to involve payment over an obligation
period of specified sums, sufficient in total to amortize the
capital out lay of the lessor and some profit. He argued
further that the appellant as the lessor in the instant case,
entered the contract that did not anticipate deductions
upfront. The learned counsel then maintained with
insistence, that the monthly rental consists of the capital
and interest. He referred us to the text written by
Professor T. M. Clark (LEASING) 1978, pages 3 and
12.
The learned counsel therefore submitted that, it amounts to
double portion for the appellant to deduct the sum of
N21,220,925.57k and also collect the full rental which
comprised of the principal and the interest thereon. He
further opined that the learned trial judge was right when
he disallowed the interest and awarded the sum of
N21,220,925.57 to the respondent.
Let me state, that I subscribe to the submission of the
learned counsel to the appellant on the fact that where
parties who
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are desirous of entering a business relationship have
reduced the terms of relationship into writing, they would
be bound by such terms. Also, if the wordings of the
agreement are plain and unambiguous, Courts are
generally bound to interpret the agreement literally, giving
effect to the terms already agreed upon by the parties. This
is moreso, because it is not the business of Courts to write
or make new agreement/contract for the parties. See
Owoniboys Tech. Services Ltd. v. U. B. N. Ltd. (2003)
15 NWLR (Pt. 844) 545; (2003) LPELR – 2854.
It is also a trite law that, where document(s) form part of a
long drawn transaction, such as in the instant case, they
should be interpreted not in isolation but in the contract of
the totality of the transaction in order to fully appreciate
their legal import and purport and impact. That is the only
way to find out and determine the real intention of the
parties. A restrictive and restricted interpretation which
does not take cognizance of the total package of the
transaction in which the documents are integral part
cannot meet the justice of the case. See the cases of
R.E.A.N. Ltd. v. Aswani Textile Ind. (1991)
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2 N.W.L.R. (Pt.176) 639 @ 669; and Agbachi v.
Azubuike (2010) LPELR – 3646.
I have carefully examined Exhibits D1 and D7 (which forms
the fulcrum of this case), vis-à-vis the conduct of the
parties, and it is my firm view point that the parties
expressly agreed for the payment of a separate interest
apart from the monthly rentals. It is clear on the face of the
said exhibits that the parties contemplated and agreed for
the payment of interest apart from the rental payments on
the lease facility. I also agree with the learned counsel to
the appellant that the transaction between the parties is in
a hybrid form; encompassing both Loan facility and Lease
Financing.
It is now well settled that banks not being a charitable
organization has the power or are entitled to charge
interests on loans or other advances or facilities granted
and or made available to a customer, even where there was
no express agreement on the rate of interest to be charged.
See the case ofAdetoro v. U. B. N. Plc. (2007) LPELR –
8991.
Also, it is trite principles of law of contract that parties to a
binding contract are bound by the terms of the said
contract
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which they voluntarily entered into, see the cases of Best
(Nigeria) Ltd. v. Blackwood Hodge (Nigeria) Ltd.
(2011) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1239) 95; and A. G. Ferrero & Co.
Ltd. V. Henkel Chemicals Nig. Ltd (2011) LPELR – 12.
On the strength of the above established principles of law
and the authorities cited in support as well as all the
evidence on the printed record placed before us, it is my
humble and firm view point, that the appellant has the right
under the said contract to charge separate interest (as it
has done in this case) on the ‘loan’ advanced to the
respondent in form of letter of credit as well as receive
monthly rental from the respondent in discharge of the
lease financing afforded it by the appellant. Thus, both
issues formulated in determination of this appeal are
hereby resolved in favour of the appellant.
Having resolved the issues formulated and adopted for the
resolution of this appeal as done above, it is my finding that
this appeal is meritorious and it is accordingly allowed.
Consequently, it is my standpoint that the Lower Court
acted in error when it ordered the appellant to pay the sum
of N21,220, 925. 57K (Twenty
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One Million, Two Hundred Twenty Thousand Nine Hundred
and Twenty Five Naira, Fifty Seven Kobo) and N37,
681,220. 21k (Thirty Seven Million, Six Hundred and Eighty
one thousand, Two hundred and Twenty Naira and Twenty
One Kobo) to the respondent as unauthorized deduction
from the accounts of the respondent from 25th day of
December, 2000 to the 25th day of January, 2002 and
general damages for breach of contract, respectively. In the
premise, the judgment of the Lower Court delivered on
28th day of January, 2008 in Suit No. 0/3/8/2005 is hereby
set aside and the respondent’s case is accordingly
dismissed. No order is made with regard to costs. Parties
are to bear their respective costs.
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, J.C.A.: I have hadthe privilege of reading before now the judgment of mylearned brother MASSOUD ABDULRAHMAN OREDOLAJCA. Parties are bound by the contract they voluntarilyenter into. I agree with my brother that the partiescontemplated and agreed for the payment of interest apartfrom rental payments on the lease facility both being anintegral part of the same contract. I agree with thereasoning, conclusion and order in the lead judgment todismiss the case of the Respondent and thus allow theappeal.
MISITURA OMODERE BOLAJI-YUSUFF, J.C.A.:
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I was privilege to read in draft the judgment of my learned
brother, MASSOUD ABDULRAHMAN OREDOLA, JCA. I
agree entirely with the reasoning and conclusions therein
that this appeal is meritorious and it is accordingly allowed.
I abide by the consequential orders made therein.
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Appearances:
Mrs. Helen Ovonlen For Appellant(s)
Chief S. O. P. Okeke with him, G. N. Ideh, Esq.For Respondent(s)
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