GSM063 GSM 16 E rev. 1Original: Italian

NATO Parliamentary Assembly

MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EAST SPECIAL GROUP

THE EXPANSION OF DAESH TO LIBYA AND THE WESTERN

MEDITERRANEAN

DRAFT REPORT

Andrea MANCIULLI (Italy)Rapporteur

www.nato-pa.int 26 October 2016

* Until this document has been adopted by the Mediterranean and Middle East Special Group, it represents only the views of the Rapporteur.

063 GSM 16 E rev. 1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION.........................................................................................................1

II. “LOST” TERRITORY AND THE PRESENCE OF DAESH...........................................2

A. LIBYAN EPICENTRE.......................................................................................................3B. REGIONAL REPERCUSSIONS......................................................................................5

III. DISPUTED TERRITORY: DAESH BETWEEN WELLS, TERMINALS AND TOWNS. .7

A. SURROUNDING INSTABILITY.......................................................................................7B. BALKAN EXTENSION...................................................................................................10

IV. BOUNDARY SPACE: BETWEEN THE SAHARA AND THE MEDITERRANEAN, MIGRATION PROSPECTS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR DAESH...........................11

V. ECONOMIC SPACE: BUSINESS FOR DAESH AT THE GATES OF THE MEDITERRANEAN....................................................................................................13

VI. VIRTUAL SPACE: INTERNET, CYBERNETICS AND THE MEDIA...........................14

VII. SURVIVAL SPACE: FROM VICTORY IN SIRTE TO THE STABILISATION OF LIBYA...................................................................................................................................15

VIII. CONCLUSIONS.........................................................................................................16

BIBLIOGRAPHY........................................................................................................18

i

063 GSM 16 E rev. 1

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Among the new challenges that the Atlantic Alliance has to face in the post-Arab Spring period, terrorism continues to constitute a central thread containing a concoction of problems that have not yet been solved. The new crises arising out of “revolutions” against the regimes in the MENA Region (Middle East and North Africa) have exacerbated already critical situations and heightened their effects. A case in point is illegal immigration and the overall context of social decay in the countries where the “revolutions” started.

2. Daesh was the subject of the previous report of the Mediterranean and Middle East Special Group (GSM). It is on the heels of the broader backdrop of terrorism that this analysis was conducted to better understand the nuances of the current phenomenon.

3. An attempt to define terrorism within the restricted confines of terminological codification is an arduous task, one that has led to endless discussions that continue to give rise to uncertainties and disagreements.

4. For the indiscriminate violence of terrorism, which is developing at several levels, to creep in, develop and spread in its closest acceptance of ideology, the phenomenon of terrorism requires: - a space;- one or more lines of action;- a reason or justification;- a receptive audience capable of “propagating” the respective lines of action.

5. These critical factors vary depending on the natural development of the culture and society of each community, generating continuous adjustments and gradual adaptations in the threat, which at times lead to the exhaustion or extinction of the phenomenon, but which most often create unprecedented profiles of innovation and brutality.

6. A globalised society such as the current one therefore has to face a terrorist threat which has inexorably developed accordingly, propelling instability and bewilderment in communities which used to be inaccessible. The change which al-Qaeda imposed on 11 September 2001 on the very notion of a terrorist threat through an attack against the society of the United States, was a turning point in the safety habits throughout the world: a revolution in military affairs, applied to this framework of indiscriminate and unjustifiable violence that demonstrates the common acceptance of terrorism. Since Nine Eleven, the main organisations that have disseminated and applied the strategy of terror on the international stage have been qualified as “Qaedist” or “inspired by al-Qaeda.” But the parable of this terrorist organisation has been demonstrably weakened due to several concurrent factors: - decimation of its leaders;- internal struggles and conflicts;- failure to achieve the territorial objective;- static nature of the threat (the violent rise of Daesh* has revived an albeit weakened Qaedist

activism).

7. The summary of the aforementioned factors has created the conditions for the affirmation of a new idealisation of extremism. The “change of pace” today is based essentially on the establishment of a particular territorial entity, which is offensive and unacceptable to the international community, but desired, propagated and actively defended by the partisans of Daesh, the “caliphate,” a social redemption strategy icon that attracts militants like magnets. The threat continues to stem from a transnational global terrorist organisation (since Daesh has evolved from al-Qaeda), even though the use of cells distributed through a capillary network (typical of the al-Qaeda strategy) has been replaced by a closure within the “borders” of a “quasi State” (materialised by the caliphate). Daesh is more conventional, with (real) aspirations for the territorial expansion of

* Arabic acronym for the terrorist organisation ‘’Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’’

1

063 GSM 16 E rev. 1

– and attached to -- the Caliphate, but with its own “foreign policy,” which is vital to the survival of its “domestic policy.” Daesh is far more than a mere terrorist organisation at this time, with millions of dollars at its disposal to finance its operations. It does not need to set up cells outside its borders. The media propaganda machine, which is clearly superior to that of al-Qaeda, has already manipulated and radicalised hundreds of followers. These are the “ambassadors” of the caliphate, the ones who have no opportunity of reaching the caliphate, who are incited to seek jihad in their countries of origin, if necessary supported and assisted by those returning from the caliphate: returnee veteran foreign fighters.

8. The multidimensional aspect of this extremist ideology acquires a decisive value in the strategy of Daesh: it is the physical area of a state which is turned into a conquered territory for the caliphate. Borders, which acquire anticolonialist revenge value against the infidel West that had created them years earlier, are today (virtually) eliminated by an ideological and brutal project that aims to exploit any geopolitical fragility of recognised state entities to enter, take root and consolidate. Emirs and sheiks were in the service of the colonial plan at the time to bring about new states, which are now crumbling. The guerrilla warfare and terrorism waged by the Islamic State of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi are currently in the service of a completely different plan: to tear down the borders drawn a century ago, and unite Sunnis under the black flag of a new caliphate (Negri).

9. Extremist proselytising finds breeding ground in the socio-institutional void created by governmental mismanagement to exploit the social malaise. The “Arab Spring” has paradoxically fostered the project of a militant armed and unarmed Islamic radicalism that exploits the chaotic, revolutionary situation and tries to put in place governmental entities that are close to the extremist ideology or, in the very least, to expand areas abandoned by the state to sow the seeds of extremism.

10. The essential issue to examine today consequently becomes the juxtaposition between the concept of “territory” and terrorism. The dynamics that govern every aspect of this equation shed greater light on the threat.

II. “LOST” TERRITORY AND THE PRESENCE OF DAESH

11. The concept of gradual enlargement of the caliphate’s borders is vital to Daesh’s propaganda, and follows different rationales and multiple implementation strategies. First of all, there is the simple territorial expansion of the established “non-State:” where precarious situations hold sway, as in Syria and Iraq, Daesh fighters try to undermine the previous sovereignty of the governments in Baghdad and Damascus. The situation of ongoing hostilities makes it impossible to speak of “effective control of a delimited territory” for the time being, which makes Daesh a non-State actor, i.e. a terrorist organisation endeavouring to overthrow governments and establish control.

12. The increasingly ramified and deeper penetration of Daesh in totally different social fabrics (from Europe to Asia, including the Maghreb, Africa and the Middle East), has followed a consolidated model thanks to the growing radicalisation of vast segments of society, particularly young people, who are at times disillusioned by the failure of revolutionary movements which they had launched themselves, and at other times seeking abortive social revenge, for whom the idealisation of a single Islamic state provides a surreptitious answer.

13. This is supplemented by the countless shows of support by extremist entities and groups that have already taken root in many countries and thus represent an initial globalisation of the threat. Consideration should also be given to the most detrimental forms of growth of the caliphate: those that use the latest media resources to disseminate powerful propaganda messages that incite radicalisation from a distance. This is the strategy that exploits the discontents of Western societies, the lack of integration and the consequences of a worldwide economic crisis that still persists, thereby constituting many points of erosion of the state. It is the strategy geared to occupying the

2

063 GSM 16 E rev. 1

territories that the State has already lost or abandoned, the urban ghettos in the throes of crime or refugee camps for those fleeing from crisis zones. Daesh provides lone wolves, aspiring foreign fighters and returnee veterans with an added reason to support the extremist cause, namely to be part of the caliphate, whilst staying in their countries of origin; to become “ambassadors” and “sponsors” with the conviction to contribute in any way or manner to the dissemination and expansion of the state reality coveted and desired by Al-Baghdadi.

14. France (Charlie Hebdo, Bataclan, and Nice), Belgium (Brussels airport), or Turkey (Istanbul airport) are but a few sad cases in point of this new horrendously efficient form of reach at the caliphate disposal.

A. LIBYAN EPICENTRE

15. In terms of the proliferation of extremism, the Arab Spring provided major opportunities which were promptly seized, first by local extremist groups in various regional contexts. Then, better structured transnational terrorist organisations such as al-Qaeda, aware of the potential for expansion in those countries, invested resources and planned actions to take a gradual and persistent foothold.

16. The more chaotic the situation becomes in a society, the more rapid, arrogant (and brutal) the expansion of terrorist groups will be. Al-Qaeda has adjusted its presence through its ramification in Algeria, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), or through resident affiliated organisations, such as Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia (AST), and Ansar Bait al-Maqdis in Egypt. At the same time, starting from Syria and Iraq, Daesh has implemented its global programme for a worldwide outreach in open conflict with al-Qaeda. The appearance of a force such as Daesh alongside “historical” protagonists linked to al-Qaeda has altered and complicated the traditional frame of reference for regional terrorism. In West Africa, for instance, after joining Daesh, Boko Haram assumed the name of the Islamic State’s West African Province (ISWAP), and thus contributed to the turmoil of radicalism in neighbouring countries as well (Niger, Chad and Cameroon). Boko Haram has gained recognition in “world jihad” through this “marriage of convenience,” while Daesh has obtained undeniable benefits, especially on the propaganda front, since it can now boast of a vast region in the heart of Africa as an “expansion of the caliphate.”

17. Libya, one of the symbolic countries of the recent Arab revolutionary popular movements, has gradually become a refuge for terrorist groups operating in North Africa and in the Sahel-Saharan region. The persistence of a long period of post-regime political uncertainty, combined with the manifest activism of militias, has turned the country into a perfect epicentre of instability for the entire region. Furthermore, the abrupt elimination of the Gaddafi regime overturned political and administrative institutions which have not had the opportunity or the capacity to reorganise an efficient institutional and security apparatus. Libya has thus acquired strategic value for the penetration of Daesh in the Mediterranean by providing access to ports, vast stockpiles of arms, and lucrative smuggling routes (Barrett).

18. Fezzan (a southern region of Libya) has traditionally been a caravan and illegal trade route, long beyond the reach of security administrative authorities that have come and gone in the country’s government. The region is still dominated by armed ethnic tribes that have always controlled and governed this territory, open to the exploitation of the trafficking flows and therefore also open to alliances of convenience with extremist elements keen to infiltrate and to exploit such flows.

19. Cyrenaica, the historical oriental province far from the central power in Tripoli, welcomed the first groups of Libyan fighters back from Syria and Iraq, thus staying true to its tradition as the province most steeply inclined to a radical presence. This is the region where the revolution of February 2011 erupted as an expression of a latent and repressed social malaise. It is also the place where this malaise was transformed into radicalism with the greatest ease by providing the

3

063 GSM 16 E rev. 1

bases for the first pledges of allegiance to Daesh by local groups such as Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (ASL).

20. For its part, Tripolitania is still the centre of attempts to build a democratic state, even though it too is riven with corruption, active militias, historical and tribal antagonisms and vendettas that followed the collapse of the regime. Here, the resurgent phenomenon of terrorism is chiefly characterised by (at times major) occasional attacks against the fragile institutional apparatus under reconstruction, rather than a structured and stable presence of terrorist cells capable of controlling the territory.

21. Nevertheless, the presence of Daesh in Libya has very different characteristics from that in Syria and Iraq (Oxford Analytica). The clash between Sunnis and Shiites has never really affected the ethnic and social substrata (more than 97% of the population in Libya is Sunni). The process of taking root was decidedly slower, arduous and strongly influenced by the local confrontation between al-Qaeda and Daesh. Nevertheless, the prevailing chaotic situation in Libya is too great an opportunity for expansion to ignore. Al-Qaeda is very keen to preserve its control in certain areas, whilst Daesh is spreading to the detriment of its adversary and the state apparatus.

22. Al-Baghdadi called on aspiring foreign fighters from the African region to choose Libya rather than Syria and to expand the borders of the caliphate by flocking to the North African country, taking control, and creating an additional haven compared to the organisation’s experience in Syria and Iraq.

23. Daesh’s hub in Libya is therefore closely linked to the clandestine flows that cross its territory. Daesh in Libya has rapidly gone from a local entity (local groups who pledged allegiance to the caliph) to an organisation based on influx of foreign fighters and non-Libyan members. But it has also managed to retain and exploit a distinctly Libyan connotation: as in the case of Iraqi former Baathists in the organisation operating in Iraq and Syria, Daesh in Libya can count on a solid group of former members of the Gaddafi regime, who could not be reabsorbed in the post-revolutionary political and military context.

24. Daesh’s expansion and rooting rationale had to be adapted to the Libyan context as well, whilst capitalising on a well-defined, violent and efficient propaganda media push, similar to that used in Syria and Iraq. The steady progress of conquest by Daesh has been achieved in identified stages in each theatre where the phenomenon has developed: intelligence, Dawa (proselytism, moral indoctrination and missionary work), Hisbah (imposed observance of Islamic principles), military offensive, governance (Zelin).

25. From the first bastion of Derna, the Daesh cells defined and imposed local administrative rules and regulations similar to those applied elsewhere, as in Raqqa, Syria or Mosul, Iraq. The Daesh propaganda machine then included Libya among its priority objectives and flooded the virtual information world and the social media with messages just as effective as those that had been tried and tested in Syria and Iraq. The massive radicalisation action through the media was launched far ahead of initiatives on the ground (attacks). Daesh prepared (and frightened) a public opinion far too distracted by the political and military polarisation that still divides the country. It attracted and recruited hundreds of young non-Libyans by offering them the social redemption they yearned for in their country of origin. The Daesh propaganda machine in Libya carries out “soft” activities, such as Hisbah and Dawa (proselytism and moral indoctrination), concurrently with “harder” efforts, by referring to the security and violence of territorial conquest (Engel).

26. The gradual expansion of the Daesh phenomenon in Libya resulted from a combination of media propaganda, unscrupulous recruitment and the affiliation of indigenous groups exhilarated by the triumphs in Iraq and in Syria. Gradually, incidents of violence indicative of the organisation’s presence spread at a steady pace from the eastern end of Cyrenaica towards the capital (on the western front, at the other end of the country). This slow but steady advancement was marked by

4

063 GSM 16 E rev. 1

resounding events (pledges of allegiance by significant groups, territorial conquests, spectacular attacks), but also held back by the lack of a consolidated command and control structure and properly trained personnel.

27. Daesh declared the creation of three Wilayahs (governorates or provinces) in the peripheral region of Derna: Tarabuls, along the western coast; Barqah to the East, and Fezzan to the South-West.

28. The caliph’s men then moved to establish their Libyan capital in Sirte, modelled on Raqqa in Syria and Mosul in Iraq. 29. Daesh concentrated its expansion efforts on Sirte, Tripolitania, turning it into a symbolic bastion of its imposed presence in Libya. This is where the extremist ideology of Daesh converged with the interests of a privileged class of society (former Gaddafi followers) relegated by law to the political isolation imposed on the Libyan parliament by the Islamist parties (the Muslim Brotherhood) when the revolution had ended. Sirte thus witnessed a “Gaddafisation” of Daesh, in a way similar to the “Baathisation” of al-Qaeda in Iraq. Hundreds of former members of the security apparatus under the Gaddafi regime accepted to have the black banner of Daesh hoisted on their structures. Finally, there is probably a hard core of “effective” Libyan fighters in Sirte, which were joined over time by elements stemming chiefly from other terrorist organisations and militias.

30. In proclaiming its presence in Libya little by little, Daesh has to reckon with the solid position of Ansar al Sharia, a group of al-Qaeda-inspired local extremist militiamen, which took part in the revolution of February 2011. Relations between the two groups are diverse, ranging from the current confrontation in Derna between extremist groups backing al-Qaeda (including the Derna chapter of Ansar al-Sharia) and Daesh, to local tactical collaboration (Ajdabiya, Benghazi), or the total superposition and osmosis of the two entities (Sirte).

B. REGIONAL REPERCUSSIONS

31. Libya’s role as a destabilising centre is not due exclusively to the protracted institutional crisis. Two very important issues also come into play: - the first has to do with the consequences of the (unhindered) trafficking (of all sorts) in the

hinterland; - the second is linked to the spread of terrorism and territorial expansionism of Daesh, already

mentioned.

32. The confrontation between al-Qaeda and Daesh, which surfaced in the Syrian crisis, is a turning point in the context of the terrorist threat. This fault line on a global level means that all al-Qaeda inspired groups had to choose between siding with the new and brutal expression of transnational extremism (the caliphate of Daesh) or sticking with the organisation of Ayman al-Zawahiri.

33. North Africa was not spared from this reorganisation of power in the extremist world. Extremist groups affiliated with al-Qaeda, already present and well established in Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Egypt, also had to make a choice: maintain their allegiance to the “base” or get on the bandwagon of Al-Baghdadi’s rising star. As a result of such a choice, new tensions arose between previously allied groups, and cracks appeared in formerly solid organisations, with a resurgence of violence against the governments and societies where they had taken root in an effort to establish effective primacy. Moreover, the confrontation between al-Qaeda and Daesh has given rise to more opportunities for new extremist groups to emerge (affiliated mainly with Daesh), which have helped the organisation establish a foothold in certain areas.

34. In November 2014, a faction of the Al-Quaedist militia Ansar Bait al-Maqdis (ABM), already known for its actions in the Sinai against Cairo’s security forces, took on the cause of Al-Baghdadi

5

063 GSM 16 E rev. 1

by pledging allegiance to Daesh. It thus created a group called Ansar Abit al Maqdis/Wilayah Sinai, or Sinai Province of the Islamic State (ABM-WS). To seal the new oath, the organisation intensified its criminal activities in various locations in the Sinai, targeting Egypt’s defence and security apparatus, and even claimed responsibility for bringing down the Russian plane which crashed on 31 October 2015.

35. It is moreover significant that Daesh also focused on the complex panorama of Tunisian extremism: Daesh has countered the strategy pursued by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) which wants to extend the conflict to the entire North African and Sahel-Saharan region, by endeavouring to unify “local” terrorist groups under its leadership and to create a Wilaha (province) in Tunisia. As a result, the activities of Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia (AST) and the Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade (the operational arm of AQIM in Tunisia) are being opposed by the cumbersome presence of the “Wilayah Tunis.” Furthermore, new entities have emerged on the wave of these developments, such as Jund al-Khilafah in Tunisia (JaK-T), and have done their bit to destabilise their situation even more.

36. Against the background of this violence, it is worth mentioning an organisation which recently acquired considerable influence on the regional front and has credited its own rise to the interaction dynamics with Daesh: Ansar Al-Sharia (AAS) (“supporters of Islamic law”).

37. Ansar Al-Sharia came into being in Libya during the revolution of 2011 and took an active part, alongside other Libyan militias, in the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime. AAS adopted an al-Qaeda-inspired extremist ideology from the outset, which the group still adheres to at the end of the hostilities and in the chaotic situation of rebuilding institutions after the fall of Gaddafi. Whereas all revolutionary militias were characterised by anonymity, Ansar al-Sharia drew the attention of international public opinion after the attack on the US consulate in Benghazi in September 2012. This terrorist action enhanced the organisation’s prestige among those who thought that the situation had been lost since the Libyan revolution. The ranks of followers grew, as did recruitments and the attention of those who saw potential for affiliation with Daesh.

38. As in the case of the media propaganda for the group’s violent actions, the proselytism of this al-Qaeda affiliate acquires value through social actions and support for the population in areas where the state is absent and in inefficiency gaps of the bureaucratic apparatus. The members of the Ansar al-Sharia group provide meals, medicines and jobs for the population, in exchange for obedience to the rules of Islamic law according to their narrow interpretation of it. This formula addresses the frustrations of young North Africans, thereby feeding a vast recruiting campaign.

39. After the attack on the US consulate, Ansar al-Sharia became a source of inspiration for regional extremists groups, where the acronyms relating to the organisation are multiplying. The ranks of extremist groups that claim affiliation with the Libyan organisation are swelling in Tunisia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, and Egypt. The absorption of fighters is a definite reality, facilitated by the weak (or non-existent) border controls.

40. The establishment of the organisation in Morocco (in 2012 by an announcement on the social media), was pursued immediately by the authorities which repressed its dangerous growth, even though the Moroccan leaders had declared that their group did not adhere to armed struggle. In Mali, Ansar al-Sharia follows in the footsteps of already established groups, such as the “Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa” (MOJWA), and Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s “Al-Mourabitoun,” with which it shares fighters, in a confused overlap that hinders growth and activism. The group’s Mauritanian branch is called “Ansar al-Sharia fi Bilad al-Shinquit,” and is thought to take orders from Mokhtar Belmokhtar. The glue that binds this organisation to Ansar al-Sharia in neighbouring Mali is precisely this infamous terrorism.

41. In Egypt, the brother of Ayman Al-Zawahiri (Bin Laden’s successor), Mohammad Al-Zawahiri, is one of the main representatives of the organisation’s Egyptian branch, which inherits a clear pro

6

063 GSM 16 E rev. 1

al-Qaeda tendency. Following the persecution by the Egyptian authorities and the redeployment in the Sinai Peninsula, the organisation’s actions have been on the decline, making room for the growing assertion of Ansar Bait al-Maqdis, which is better known and more active, and with which Ansar al-Sharia still shares fighters nonetheless.

42. Like its Libyan counterpart, the Tunisian branch is one of the most active in terms of actions against Western interests in North Africa. Ansar al-Sharia appeared in Tunisia in April 2011 under the orders of Seif Allah Ben Hassine ibn Hussein, a.k.a. Abu Iyadh al-Tunisi, a terrorist who burst onto the Tunisian political stage in April 2011, when he was released from prison under an amnesty. Abu Iyadh and his group preached non-violence, at least in the initial phase, and devoted themselves to charitable works, reiterating that Tunisia was a land of proselytism and not of armed struggle. Nevertheless, when AQIM declared that it wanted to bring Tunisian territory under its ideological sphere, Abu Iyadh’s organisation adopted a strategy of violence. The Tunisian authorities banned the organisation for collusion with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. AQIM and Ansar al-Sharia capitalise in particular on the prevailing anarchy in Libya to strike and undermine the main pillar of the Tunisian economy, tourism, by attacking foreign tourists. It took two such bloody terrorist attacks in the Bardo Museum and Hammamet Beach in 2015 to aggravate an already dramatic economic situation and to destroy tens of thousands of jobs, thereby producing a growing throng of disenchanted and angry unemployed young people who thus become easier to radicalise (Redaelli).

43. Faced with the rise of Ansar al-Sharia in the North African region (like all the other extremist groups), the authorities of the countries in the region have made numerous efforts to destroy these groups, arrest their leaders, and put an end to their activities. In Tunisia, for example, the military authorities and the police have intensified their enforcement operations, particularly in the Jebel ech Chambi region, by neutralising many cells. The limited success of parallel social initiatives in support of counter-terrorism actions has not prevented the development of growing radicalisation in vast segments of society, particularly among young people: this has generated a continuous influx of foreign fighters of Tunisian origin in the ranks of Daesh in the Syrian-Iraqi theatre of operations and in Libya. The anti-terrorist actions need not therefore focus so much on the real dimensions of Daesh in Libya but rather on the constant escalation that leads to the current situation, and in particular on the capacity to attract and recruit veterans from crisis theatres and expert fighters of Ansar al-Sharia (Engel).

III. DISPUTED TERRITORY: DAESH BETWEEN WELLS, TERMINALS AND TOWNS

A. SURROUNDING INSTABILITY

44. The result of Daesh’s strategy of attraction in Libya, torn between the national dialectic, foreign interference and opportunities for terrorism, produces a profile of critical instability, the epicentre of which, as we have seen, is in Libya and dangerously close to the interests of the Atlantic Alliance. It is nonetheless incorrect to lay all the blame for such a threat to the “loss of control” due to the limited presence of the State. To identify better the reasons why Daesh has managed to leave a bigger imprint in the country, it is necessary to consider the dynamics that govern the activities of less influential groups which are nonetheless dedicated to the extremist cause.

45. The link between Ansar al-Sharia and the rise of Daesh in Libya has to do chiefly with the latter’s capacity to attract the fighters of the former in its sphere of influence. The total affiliation of Ansar al-Sharia represents the prospect of a strong assertion in the country for Daesh, but at the same time, in certain regions, particularly in Derna, the group is still an adversary that remains faithful to al-Qaeda.

7

063 GSM 16 E rev. 1

46. Derna has gone through a very different process than that characteristic of the main localities where Daesh is trying to consolidate its presence. It has gone from an initial bastion of Al-Baghdadi’s fighters to a battle field where Daesh is up against Libyan extremist groups united under the umbrella organisation of the “Shura Council of Mujahideen in Derna,” which comprises Ansar al-Sharia in Derna as well. The main reason behind this violent confrontation concerns the origin of the fighters in the different groups. The gradual predominance of non-Libyan members in Daesh’s bloody attacks in particular has given rise to a growing hostility among Libyan majority groups affiliated with al-Qaeda (starting with Ansar al-Sharia). This conflict has therefore exposed the localities to successive waves of violence that have led to the expulsion of Daesh from population centres and to the strengthening of positions of the Shura Council of Mujahideen.

47. What happened in Derna confirms the growing impact of the Daesh’s recruitment strategy which is essentially based on the exploitation of the social malaise in the region and on the ideological submission engendered by the unbridled exaltation of violence on the Internet. As a destination territory of migration flows from Africa and the Middle East, Libya has a strategic advantage for the recruitment of large numbers of destitute people as well as former fighters and fanatics. The fact of being in contact with an environment where the activities are based mainly on human trafficking has enabled Daesh to divert part of this human potential for its own interests, paying attention not to come into conflict with those who have profited for years from running this market. Daesh in Libya has capitalised on this strategy to make headway through surprise attacks and suicide bombings (in which the lack of training of the people is amply compensated by the quantity of explosives contained in the devices), which have in turn enabled it to multiply the presence of cells on the ground and to amplify the threat gradually.

48. Once it had taken root in Derna, the extremism of Daesh spread, in a second phase, to Benghazi, already fully engulfed in a violent and uncontrolled post-revolutionary quagmire, incapable of seizing the opportunities afforded by the fall of the regime and victim of violence and reprisals often attributed to extremist fury, but actually caused by simple score settling between criminals. And the intervention of General Haftar and his group of militias (united under the emphatic name of Libyan National Army) was ineffective in checking the spread of violence. Quite the contrary, with a few limited but frequent episodes of violence (target killings, kidnappings, attacks), the factions close to the general have exacerbated the problem by eliciting hardened reactions from the extremists, turning the confrontation into a real conflict that is still going on today.

49. In parallel with the deteriorating situation in Benghazi, where Daesh found a new opportunity for expansion (first by drawing close to local extremist groups, including the branch of Ansar al-Sharia in Benghazi, then rallying them to its cause), the precarious situation in Sirte was played out over time. During the political and military confrontation between Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, the province of Sirte (which opens onto the Gulf of Sirte, whose capital is actually the city of Sirte) enjoyed a period of relative stability whilst the clashes between the militias were the fiercest. This was due to the strong influence of stability from Misrata and its militias, as well as the strategic importance, for Libya, of many oil extraction plants and storage and marketing terminals.

50. The economic importance of this locality, precisely with respect to those factors, influenced first the competition between militias relating to one coalition (Tobruk) or the other (Tripoli). In what followed, Daesh then focused its attention, as it had done in Syria and Iraq, on the installations situated in the “oil crescent,” the vast production region of Cyrenaica, protected by the guards of oil installations headed by Ibrahim Jadhran, a Cyrenaican federalist commander from Ajdabiya, allied (for the sake of convenience) with General Haftar. His militias continue to control significant energy facilities and can still shut down the terminals and stop exports as a means of exerting pressure on the House of Representatives (Barrett).

51. Daesh in Libya does not have the capacity to control territory and manage installations that similar organisations have in Syria and Iraq. It can however compete when it comes to lack of scruples and potential for expansion. For this reason, the repeated attacks against the power

8

063 GSM 16 E rev. 1

stations and installations present in the oil crescent have not enabled it to gain control of the flow of crude oil, but have caused immense losses of stored oil and damage to infrastructure and facilities whilst getting a lot of media attention which led to a new escalation in recruitments and propaganda for Daesh. What cannot be conquered or controlled by Daesh becomes a target for destruction. And that applies to the territory and facilities as well as to citizens and influential groups.

52. There is one element on which Daesh has not manage to impose its strategy, except through an indiscriminate and deleterious use of violence: control of the tribal substratum of the country. The preponderance of foreign elements among the extremist organisation’s forces in fact stands in the way of creating stable ties with the local population (and the corresponding tribal centres of influence). This disrupts the concept of ascendant strategy that the group has in Iraq where it is the expression of Sunni revenge and can thus involve many substrata of society. The tribalism in Libya becomes a limit to the gradual spread of Al-Baghdadi’s organisation. It limits the establishment thereof in rural areas by sacrificing portions of territory already beyond the control of the (central, local or tribal) authorities and it stands in the way of media recruitment through the sense of affiliation typical of the tribal concept.

53. In Libya, the tribe tends to identify as a group that recognises itself as belonging to a common lineage of an elder from which one or more genealogical lines descend through generally male kinship. In general, the Sheik, the member of a family which hands the title down from father to son, plays the role of representative of the tribe, moral authority and mediator in the internal disputes within the group or external conflicts with other tribes on the basis of the (unwritten) customary law (‘urf). He does not have the power to give orders nor demand obedience from the members of the group; he is not their military leader. On the political front, he is the privileged intermediary of the local or central authorities.

54. Libyan tribal identity is therefore not a static reality opposed to ideological notions such as nationalism. On the contrary, it is the expression of a distinct ideology, compatible with the national aspirations, which has hitherto made it possible to face the threat from the radical extremism of Daesh, albeit on a tactical and local level. In this sense, the growing tribal identity in Libya does not come into opposition with the possible affirmation of Libyan nationalism. The tribal ethic is a cultural system of mutual assistance which, in the post-Gaddafi period, has provided pragmatic solutions to problems, likewise of limited scope, because of the failure of the “new” state to provide social security to its own citizens.

55. The tribal system also has a strong organisational aspect, according to a precise pattern based on specific rules. The Libyan socio-political architecture is actually structured on more than 140 tribes, about 30 of which are said to play an important role. The tribes can be united in a “Saff” (confederation) and grouped in “buyut” (plural of “bayt” – house), with each “bayt” in turn grouped into “lamhat” (family groups). This division is not systematic, however, and may vary depending on the context: members of the same tribe may belong to two different fronts, as happened during the revolution.

56. Libyan tribalism can therefore follow either a nationalist trend or a revolutionary or Islamic thought. At times it combines these different elements according to a specific need, to describe, influence or test the different dimensions of the social situation. The men can be – and often are – far more than simple members of a given tribe. The relationship that exists between tribal practice and ideology varies depending on the circumstances, political changes and practical necessities. The tribal factor cannot therefore be seen as the reflection of rigidly conservative reality, but rather of a flexible, manipulable and heterogeneous one linked to the changes in political circumstances. The tribe is today reconsidered as a “patchwork of relational possibilities and available social resources, not of uncontested obligations or rights” (Cherstich).

57. The tribal ethic is therefore often associated with other concepts, depending on the particular consideration that the men of the Libyan tribes have for tribalism. In Cyrenaica, for example, where

9

063 GSM 16 E rev. 1

many Salafist communities are found in traditionally tribal areas, many Salafists consider the tribe as an unacceptable divisive factor for a Muslim, while others see no contradiction between the practice of Salafism and observance of tribal rules. Consequently, whereas the tribal chiefs are united against Islamism, many Islamists from Cyrenaica stemming from a tribal milieu are ready to gloss over the tribal ethic in the name of broader national or religious purposes, and vice-versa.

58. In the context of stabilisation, tribalism represents an indigenous factor capable of integrating initiatives to fight against terrorism and infiltration by Daesh. Strengthening the impact of this multi-faceted aspect could help counter the proselytism campaign which has now turned violent and become uncontrollable, supported by an influx of non-Libyans with no tribal ties.

59. Conversely, properly capitalised on, tribalism could provide a base of legitimate and recognised support for the current institutional reconstruction process, by relying on its values relating to politics, security and opposition to terrorism. These values have been extensively defended hitherto by all the Libyan authorities that have successively managed the country.

B. BALKAN EXTENSION

60. The conditions that provide a Daesh proselytism with fertile ground for its extremist ideology to take root are not limited to the Middle East and North Africa (with the near-abroad extensions on the Sahel and Central and West Africa). The same social problems and respective expectations of emancipation and revenge by the population are found also in parts of Europe, particularly in the Balkans.

61. The precarious economic conditions, political instability and atavistic inter-ethnic conflicts that still stain the local social dynamics are making this region more permeable to terrorist influences which also exploit its strategic geographic position in relation to the current theatres of crisis. With a social fabric where peaks of prosperity are poignantly countered by pockets of poverty and isolation, the Balkan region has emerged as a propitious territory for the spreading of extremist and radical thought, characterised by the presence of many transit routes for fighters directly involved in war operations in Syria and Iraq.

62. Radical proselytism is proving particularly efficient. It has taken root through the direct participation in war operations in Syria and Iraq by many individuals (nearly one thousand) from the Balkans (most of whom are enlisted in the ranks of Daesh), and by the transit of thousands of foreign fighters. This confirms the key role acquired by the Balkans in the constellation of international terrorism by radical Islamists. This role is also reflected in the brutality of actions that have enabled some fighters from the Balkans to reach high positions and important roles in the Daesh top brass. A case in point is Lavdrim Muhaxheri, who has rapidly become an example to follow by young people from many communities of extremists in the Balkans.

63. The territorial compartmentalisation of the Balkans has fostered the establishment and proliferation of a tightly knit network of “closed” radical Islamist communities. These are small “autonomous” residential agglomerations which came forward in a more brazen manner after the establishment of the caliphate was declared in June 2014. Against the background of the prevailing dynamics in these regions of relations between clans, criminal organisations and nationalist movements, the Wahhabist communities appear to have struck a sort of balance that enabled them to “coexist” and increase their influence and popularity. The intense repressive activities of the police forces in the region led to the arrest and conviction of many individuals for terrorism crimes, including a number of radical preachers. These interventions are nonetheless deployed in cyclical fashion on both the political and religious fronts, and their efficiency is reduced as a result. Nevertheless, the demonstrated commitment of the security forces following the identification of two foreigners among the terrorists who died in the attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015 who had arrived in Europe by exploiting the flow of migrants through the Balkans, confirmed the risk that this region can provide terrorist organisations such as Daesh with a useful and accessible route to bring

10

063 GSM 16 E rev. 1

to bear the threat of attacks in the heart of Europe.

64. This situation was complicated even further by another critical destabilisation element, represented by the sizeable flow of migrants arriving in the Schengen area through the “Anatolian and Balkan route.” The sheer numbers of this phenomenon, which make any form of efficient border controls “unfeasible” and facilitate the penetration of potential terrorists in the Old Continent, “elevate” the Balkans even more in the Jihadist universe to a potential “outpost” for terrorist actions in Europe, over and beyond a base for logistics, recruitment and transit.

IV. BOUNDARY SPACE: BETWEEN THE SAHARA AND THE MEDITERRANEAN, MIGRATION PROSPECTS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR DAESH

65. Libya is not only the epicentre of regional imbalance where Daesh is planning the next phase of its terrorist expansion, but also (and above all) the threshold of Europe for thousands of migrants desperately fleeing a crisis situation to seek a better life. It is a phenomenon where the unscrupulous speculations of very lucrative criminal business concur with the aspirations and histories of entire generations of displaced persons, violence of war, and corrupt states.

66. The illegal migration movement to Schengen countries uses schematically four different routes of entry, called: - the northern route, used by migrants from Eastern Europe and Asia who try to reach

Schengen countries through Russia and the republics of the former Soviet bloc; - the western Mediterranean route, taken by a substantial portion of migrants from West Africa

through Morocco, to reach Iberia via the sea; - the “central” Mediterranean (or North African) route, taken by migrants from Africa, the Middle

East and Asia, who converge mainly in Libya, the uncontested platform for illegal migration to Europe by the sea;

- the eastern Mediterranean (or Anatolian and Balkan route), where Turkish territory serves as the main artery for migration flows from the Middle East, Asia and the Horn of Africa to the Schengen area, through Greece and the Balkan peninsula.

67. The most important flows are currently concentrated on the last two routes, whereas the first two seem to show a downward trend. Of the two most active routes, Libya remains the most important country of departure for migrants heading for Italy, although Libyan criminal organisations have “adjusted” their modus operandi, as they have recently experienced difficulties finding wooden boats capable of transporting a larger number of migrants. The Ubari, Sebha, Murzuq (Fezzan) triangle constitutes a consolidated staging post for a large number of illegal migrants who arrive in Libya through the south-western borders.

68. Migrants and asylum seekers contribute in several ways in the Libyan illegal economy. First, each of them pays for his own trip to Libya, through Libya and to Europe. Then, migrants often pay for their ticket by forced labour in border communities or coastal towns, which thus become a low-wage recruitment basin for the legal and illegal economy. Finally, the detention centres all across the country, official or otherwise, actually allow migrants and asylum seekers to be kidnapped, and then authorise their release only against the payment of ransom (Toaldo).

69. The soaring inflow of refugees via the Balkan land routes (more than 900,000 people reached Greece through Turkey in 2015) caused a temporary lull in the inflows from Libya. Similarly, stricter border controls along the land route triggered a slight increase in arrivals on the Adriatic coasts, thereby confirming that nearly all refugees opt to follow the Balkan route to head for Central Europe. It is clear, however, that such an overwhelming flow of refugees, whether via the North-African sea route or the Balkan land route, is a phenomenon that defies barriers, where limits will always be circumvented. The solution therefore lies more in action to be taken at the places of origin and destination rather than of transit.

11

063 GSM 16 E rev. 1

70. The Pandora’s Box opened with the Arab Spring and the ongoing crisis in Syria and Iraq has fomented a migration phenomenon, which had already commenced, but which is now reaching alarming proportions on several fronts, including the proliferation of the terrorist threat and possible penetration of extremists in Europe. Although this aspect must not be underestimated as a possible option for extremist groups in Libya, the contents should be put in perspective to show the actual threat that it represents.

71. Daesh has at this time effective control of an area limited to certain parts of the Sirte region which extend to the south, east and west of the Sirte bastion. This situation does not allow for the full management of a deeply-rooted activity such as migration which is concentrated mainly in the coastal areas of Western Tripolitania, under the attentive supervision of criminal groups that are well established in the territory. These groups exercise a very high level of control of the territory with well-structured capacities to penetrate and connive with the government’s security apparatus which remains weak. The possibility of interference by a non-Libyan organisation (such as Daesh) in a consolidated and lucrative criminal activity such as this is limited to small interventions on the flows to recruit followers who cannot afford to pay for their crossing.

72. Duties and taxes can be imposed on migration networks only in the isolated areas of Fezzan where Daesh is raising funds for its expansion by taxing the flows of migrants. The organisation has no intention of moving people on its own. It prefers to “tax” the traffickers and to use the proceeds for its recruitment needs (Crowcroft). In brief, the terrorists show no inclination to work on their own on the criminal front, but prefer to rely on the expertise of criminals.

73. Consequently, having a constant concentration of people who are easy to co-opt for recruitment purposes is the profitable option for Daesh when it comes to migration flows. This recently secured an increase in the number of fighters, albeit with a limited level of training and decidedly different motivations than the ideological drift of the fighters in Syria and Iraq.

74. Overall, however, it cannot be excluded that Daesh might exploit the migration traffic to infiltrate its members into Europe. Quite the contrary, the risk that elements linked to terrorist and radical groups creep among migrants is increasing exponentially and becoming increasingly more probable (as in the case of the Bataclan in Paris), because of the ease with which borders can be crossed and the weak controls along the immigration routes. Simple numerical figures are often reductive and potentially misleading: a drop in the flow of returnee fighters to their country of origin does not necessarily mean a reduction in the threat level. The re-enactment of attacks “confirms” the level of danger posed by foreign fighters. This term is used here with the wider connation that includes both returnees and aspiring returnees, i.e. those who during their brief contact with the extremist “front” received, in addition to basic training, useful (logistics and coordination) guidelines for carrying out violent actions against Western targets. Furthermore, it cannot be excluded that these people will devote themselves to recruiting or radicalising others in risk communities thus laying the bases for the creation of indigenous terrorist cells. This risk is exacerbated further by the presence of radical, criminal and nationalistic structures in the Western Balkans that could promote or support elements related to terrorism.

75. Al-Baghdadi has various options to that end, of which operating boats from North Africa is one of the most dangerous with the least possibilities for success. Such a hypothesis would entail sophisticated planning to have extremist operatives infiltrate via the boats (which are highly exposed to being intercepted by the European security forces) with a view to future, hypothetical employment – employment which will in any way be linked to a subsequent stage of recruitment (or regrouping with extremist cells on location), organisation and execution. These are therefore medium- and long-term assumptions that presuppose a well-defined strategy probably attributable to the Daesh hard-core leadership, rather than to the Libyan offshoot which is still peripheral. The possibility of implementing this option through the safer (and easier) Balkan land route, is another problem.

76. It is moreover obvious that hardening the admission criteria cannot stem the migration tide

12

063 GSM 16 E rev. 1

which circumvents all obstacles by changing itineraries and using criminal routes. In the expected upcoming confirmation (if not increase) of the migratory pressure, the criminal associations along the traditional influx routes are purportedly honing their collaboration to manage the market better. Such collaboration is still lacking between governments which have an obligation to dismantle that market.

V. ECONOMIC SPACE: BUSINESS FOR DAESH AT THE GATES OF THE MEDITERRANEAN

77. Immigration is not the only type of illegal trafficking in both directions in this region, although it is preponderant. The caravans of human traffickers often cross the path of other traffickers, merchants, arms smugglers and extremist groups. The real connection between these situations is one of the underlying premises of dynamics between terrorist groups which increase the risks to the detriment of commercial interests. The many no go areas for the state are actually exploited by the local (sedentary or nomadic) populations who have turned the region into a trafficking zone of oil, arms, materiel, radioactive waste, tobacco and humanitarian aid as well as a fighter transit zone for political and autonomist ends. The Sahara and the Sahel are the transit corridors of drugs from South America to Europe, a highly important trade used above all by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) to finance its terrorist activities and attract new recruits, chiefly thanks to the support of Islamist chiefs and Tuareg fighters who are particularly inclined to smuggling and to terrorism.

78. Under a different risk profile, Libya, like Iraq, “benefits” from the presence of considerable natural resources which feed the political, economic and military dynamics of the country, and are the target of extensive external interference. Daesh concentrates part of its expansionist planning to gain control of revenues generated from the exploitation of these resources. This aspiration has materialised in the Syrian-Iraqi region through the acquisition of many extraction, machining, storage and distribution sites, as well as the corresponding specialised workforce, which has made it possible to consolidate an extremely lucrative illegal trade, making Al-Baghdadi’s organisation one of the richest such organisations.

79. The effectiveness of the air raids by the international coalition, and more recently, the Russian air force, has seriously reduced the organisation’s revenues from oil smuggling. This has caused (and continues to cause) a serious shortage of cash at Al-Baghdadi’s disposal for the management of his “non-state.” Daesh is currently faced with an economic crisis in Syria and Iraq which hampers recruitment and operations directly. Libya is therefore an alternative for the survival of all fighters and leaders of Daesh, which is bound to be availed of sooner or later (Middle East Newsline).

80. Daesh identifies such state strategic assets in Libya today as useful objectives for its own recruitment propaganda, and certainly not for the potential revenues that could be generated from their management. The lack of effective technical capacities has excluded any attempt at exploitation up to now. This is significant also because of the type of organisation that the Libyan (and non-Libyan) authorities have to face. Daesh has a clearly inferior operational maturity in Libya in fact, than the main Iraqi branch which needs resources to manage a caliphate.

81. The current threat for the Western community in this respect is therefore represented by an eventual attack of the Libyan installations by Daesh. The Mellitah plan in the Tripolitania region is a striking example of the topical nature of this threat. Significantly below its potential volumes, the plant’s production capacity is earmarked entirely to meeting the internal electric power generation and gas consumption requirements for the capital region. An eventual attack by Daesh against Mellitah would thus have disastrous consequences for the country’s economy, over and beyond the significant repercussions for the production flows intended for export. Given the extremely precarious economic conditions prevailing in Libya, such a hard blow to an already limited production sector could cause an irreversible collapse.

13

063 GSM 16 E rev. 1

82. In terms of threat, it would be nonetheless advisable to consider the relative projection for the medium- and long-term also. The eventual decision of the leaders of Libya to make the necessary quality leap to attain effective operational maturity could result in the acquisition (in the near future) of the capacities needed to manage these installations in an effort to offset the restrictions in Syria and Iraq on this front (Copley). This eventuality would create new risk prospects for the member countries of the Alliance, for Daesh in Libya would then have, in addition to determination, the capacities to manage oil smuggling and the immense profits generated from it. In a land whose economy is based only on the exploitation of oil and gas, whoever manages those resources controls the country.

83. The link between the events involving the Libyan National Oil Company (NOC) and national oil production on the one hand, and the current crisis on the other became obvious last year. Oil production has dropped dramatically in fact, even by comparison with the minimum levels registered in the months after February 2011. Furthermore, there is an ongoing dispute between the NOC in Tripoli and a subsidiary in Cyrenaica which refused to recognise the authority of the “parent company” for a long time. All this has led to a drop in production, and has also created a situation of uncertainty on the international markets concerning cargos of crude from Libya. The situation seems to have improved today, and the NOC is seen as a reliable, unitary organisation by international operators. Nevertheless, the periodic threats to close the terminals in order to evacuate crude oil have not ceased, as Libyan factions continue to vie for control of the oil production facilities.

VI. VIRTUAL SPACE: INTERNET, CYBERNETICS AND THE MEDIA

84. One of the factors that highlight in optimal fashion the dynamism and advance of Daesh compared to al-Qaeda (which had already changed profoundly) is the use of the Internet and digital technology. Terrorist groups advertise their success, stress the defeat of adversaries, give instructions to their followers, carry out proselytising activities and disseminate training manuals on the Web. Compared to the notion of “space” mentioned hitherto, the scope of the Web, its weak points and intrinsic difficulty to control it, make it a perfect “territory” for the anonymity that terrorists need to act in social media which are “hostile” to them or which would refuse their presence (Weimann). Daesh has planned its actions beyond the conventional use of the Internet, to turn the Web into a pillar for recruitment, radicalisation and representation of the threat, if only in terms of simple immediate perception of a social alert. The elements that have proved most receptive to the extremist message belong to the educated segment which is apparently integrated in the socio-economic fabric. There is therefore an increase in the number of people who are radicalised through the Web, who are born and raised in Western countries, and thus, in addition to being fully integrated in their respective societies, enjoy far greater freedom of movement and are “above” suspicion because they lack the characteristic risk indicators.

85. Beyond simple propaganda, an intense radicalisation drive is being pursued through self-indoctrination, as propounded by the Syrian engineer, Abu Musab al-Suri, the theoretician of “Individual Jihad.” In his work “The Call to Global Islamic Resistance,” he encourages the establishment of “small, completely separate non-central cells” to wage resistance. The aim is to increase the sense of vulnerability in the Western civil populations through such initiatives, even by rudimentary means (weapons for hand-to-hand combat, improvised bombs), by self-organised individuals or small groups.

86. Today, “The Call to Global Islamic Resistance” seems more like the vision of a farsighted military planner than the exhortation of an ideologue. It is an order which, in view of the most recent attacks in the heart of Europe, seems to have been heeded and scrupulously carried out by groups and individuals who have developed a radical and deformed vision of the societies in which they live. “Kill them wherever you find them” is one of the slogans encountered frequently on extremist propaganda sites which project the threats of the caliphate’s territory (through the Internet) to

14

063 GSM 16 E rev. 1

beaches and museums in Tunisia, luxury restaurants in Dacca, or the festive promenade in Nice. 87. The radicalisation of the perpetrators of recent attacks in the heart of Europe highlights the parallel paths to extremism, which are often accompanied by stories of social exclusion or serious mental disorders. The threat of Daesh against NATO includes also the incitation to emulate “rudimentary” attacks such as those of Nice addressed to a captive audience in front of a computer screen.

88. The potential of cyber warfare is not limited to the intrinsic capacity of media influence and propaganda. One deterrent to the planning of spectacular cyber-attacks coordinated by a possible control centre in Raqqa at this time might have to do with resources, given the strong military pressure being exerted on the caliphate. The current centre of interest is focused on operations on the ground, and all resources are devoted thereto (in addition to cybernetic operations).

89. Nevertheless, an attack against the sensitive infrastructure and facilities of a country, though feasible, is not a self-evident operation that is easy to carry out, given the professionals recruited by Daesh (Graham-Harrison). Planning and carrying out a cyber-attack capable of causing (invisible) effective damage to a community requires more capacity (and resources) than a simple misappropriation of information. It requires being able to corrupt people and exploit human weaknesses in order to identify the starting point of the attack, and to have the time and resources necessary to penetrate networks which are isolated from the general context of the Internet.

90. In view of the excellent recruitment of hackers by Daesh and the development of various counter-terrorism strategies, the prevention of a cyber-attack requires attention from the governments fighting against Al-Baghdadi’s organisation. The step from using the Internet as a simple propaganda machine to an additional terror tool needs only an effective impetus from the Daesh leadership. Coalition success in operations on the ground could provide that impetus.

VII. SURVIVAL SPACE: FROM VICTORY IN SIRTE TO THE STABILISATION OF LIBYA

91. Like al-Qaeda, Daesh has shown a high level of ability, persistence and resilience. These are characteristics that modern mass communication tools and the social media have projected throughout the world, without any regard for national borders and customs controls. As we have seen, Sirte is the aggregation centre of the Daesh threat in Libya and that is where Libyan and international efforts to fight this phenomenon are concentrated. The al-Bunyan al-Marsus operation, carried out by the Misurata militias, has managed to stem and to limit the core of the threat. The large number of Misurata fighters who fell during the battles in Sirte represents in every respect a heavy contribution by the coastal city to the future institutional organisation and security of the country.

92. The air campaign pursued by the United States against Daesh targets in the Sirte region subsequently gave new impetus to the Misurata operation. The retreat of Daesh from Sirte is therefore imminent, but the potential threat remains unchanged, if not heightened. The recapture of the city by the Misurata militias will not prevent the repositioning of Daesh fighters in other parts of the country. Such fragmentation will not only promote the partial reabsorption of its militants in terrorist groups already established in the region (al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar al-Sharia, al-Mourabitoun) but will also upset the balance in critical regions such as Sabratha, one of the centres of illegal immigration.

93. The annihilation of Daesh in Sirte is therefore a fundamental factor for the future of Libya, albeit not the only one on which to build a strategy for the recovery of the country. The military successes of Misurata and the alliance against Daesh will not easily translate into progress on political and institutional stabilisation. As we have underscored, the radicalisation and recruitment on the part of extremist groups are closely connected also to the socio-economic and security conditions that the state cannot guarantee for its people. It is therefore obvious that the persistent

15

063 GSM 16 E rev. 1

fragmentation of the main Libyan Institutions (National Oil Company – NOC; Libyan Investment Authority – LIA; Libyan Central Bank – LCB) and corresponding factions on the territory (Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, Tripoli and Tobruk) constitute one of the main factors for the dispersion of capital that can be easily attributed to corruption and constant lack of control of financial flows.

94. All the extremist organisations present on the territory (starting with Daesh) have built their media and recruitment campaigns on the weakness of Libyan institutions, the voids of the respective governments, and the administrative and security shortcomings.

95. For an oil-producing country, wealth management is a decisive factor for the well-being of its people and the survival of its government. Daesh consequently is keenly interested in dealing a blow to this potential (if it cannot exploit it) and hinder the regular extraction of oil so as to exacerbate social malaise.

96. To recapitulate, the survival of the Daesh threat in Libya is not a variable that depends solely on the results of the battles in Sirte. The capacity of the international community to maintain the main economic and financial institutions firm and united and to secure the territorial unity of Libya also plays a key role.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS

97. Exceeding all previous attempts to turn a terrorist organisation into a state entity, Daesh has changed the situation by managing to go beyond the simple programme declarations and to give shape to its radical extremist aspirations through territorial conquest. More than a year after the declaration of the establishment of the “caliphate,” Daesh continues to exercise military -- and partially administrative – control over an admittedly fragmented region between Syria and Iraq, with its bastions in Raqqa (Syria) and Mosul (Iraq). It is of paramount importance to stress that Daesh is strongly embedded in this conceptualisation of space and territory that the caliphate has made possible to consolidate. Nevertheless, the threat represented by Al-Baghdadi’s organisation goes beyond the expression of a “quasi state,” fundamental though that is. Born from a perfect storm of historical circumstances, Daesh has taken geographic, ideological and political roots that will not be easy to eradicate (Atwan).

98. Daesh will therefore not disappear with the elimination of the caliphate. Already in the past, organisations from which Daesh originated had strategically decided to disperse rather than suffer a defeat against a superior enemy, to fight another day in different places with more tenacity. The intensification of the fight against Daesh could once again lead to this type of outcome and be defined as a “win/win situation” for the extremist group. In the event of a military defeat of Daesh, even if this represents the “best scenario,” it will be difficult to reduce the level of the threat on an international level. The result would probably be:

a. A widespread redeployment of fighters with the risk of retaliatory terrorist attacks; b. The return to the country of origin of families (including children) who have lived in the

caliphate, where rejoining society could prove difficult because of the indoctrination they have undergone;

c. Other changes in the organisation and strategies of this phenomenon, accompanied by the search for new refugees or the destabilising penetration in other regions, already declared to belong to the caliphate. It is precisely in this respect that the situation in Libya must be given overriding priority. The most frightening prospect, in fact, is that a new theatre of Jihadist action could be developed and that areas controlled by the caliphate are turned into a base of operations from which to launch offensives against the European continent.

99. From an analytical point of view, these are scenarios that the recent attacks help bring dangerously close to reality.

16

063 GSM 16 E rev. 1

100. If Daesh should “hold” – which also entails a good measure of economic and financial capacity - it is possible that this entity will continue to exert a power of attraction on aspiring extremists the world over and constitute a source of inspiration for individual terrorist actions.

101. At the same time, the risk of infiltration among migrants and penetration of Western borders would be enhanced because of the lack of common policies to combat this problem. In this respect, foreign fighters are bound to represent a long-term threat for Europe.

102. The imminence of the terrorist threat against NATO is an unquestionable reality. The solid nature of the actions towards which the Member Countries will manage to steer the Alliance will determine the space given to Daesh for survival.

17

063 GSM 16 E rev. 1

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Atwan A.B., “Islamic State: the Digital Caliphate”, University of California Press, USA, April 2015.Barrett R., “Libya, Extremism, & The Consequences of Collapse”, The Soufan Group - TSG,

January 2016Cherstich I., “When tribesmen do not act tribal: Libyan tribalism as ideology (not as

schizophrenia)”, University College of London, UK, Middle East Critique, 05 Nov 2014Copley G.R., “Migration of ISIL jihadists: Out of Siria… and into Libya”, World Tribune,

http://www.worldtribune.com/isiloutofsyriaandintolibya, (accessed 10 March 2016).Crowcroft O., “Isis: People trafficking, smuggling and punitive taxes boost Islamic State economy”,

www.ibtimes.co.uk/isis-inside-struggling-islamic-state-economy-iraq-syria-1495726

Engel A., “The Islamic State’s Expansion in Libya”, The Washington Institute for NearEast Policy, Policy Watch 2371, 11 February 2015.

Graham-Harrison E., “Could Isis’s ‘cyber caliphate’ unleash a deadly attack on key targets?”, The Guardian, April 2015

Middle East Newsline, “ISIL Transfers fighters to Libya”, www.menewsline.com (accessed 10 March 2016)

Negri A., “A proposito di ISIL” in “Il Medio Oriente che cambia. La ristrutturazione dei rapporti internazionali e i focolai di crisi”, e-book du Centro Italiano per la Pace in medio Oriente (CIPMO) en collaboration avec le European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), 2015

Oxford Analytica Daily Brief, “Islamic State aims to build regional hub in Libya”, 19 November 2015Redaelli R., “Ecco come la Tunisia cerca di difendersi dallo

Jihadismo”, www.formiche.net/2016/03/11/tunisia-europa, 11/03/2016 (accessed 29 March 2016)

Toaldo M., “Migrations Through and From Libya: A Mediterranean Challenge”, New MedResearch network, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), 2015

Weimann G., "Terrorism in Cyberspace: The next Generation", Columbia UniversityPress, USA, May 2015.

Zelin A, "The lslamic State's Terrirorial Methodlogy", The Washington lnstitute for NearEast Policy, Research Notes n. 29, January 2016.

___________________

18