AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT

UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT January 26, 2016

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TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS

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1. Rifts over leadership of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) may be evidenced by target selection. A TTP faction attacked a university in Charsadda, Pakistan, though central TTP leadership denied connections.

2. Al Qaeda- and ISIS-linked groups may benefit from civil unrest in Tunisia. Widespread protests broke out after events that mirrored the lead-up to the 2011 Jasmine Revolution.

3. Conservatives within the Iranian regime continue to block reformist activity by disqualifying many of President Hassan Rouhani’s potential allies from the upcoming parliamentary elections.

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ASSESSMENT:

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al Qaeda NetworkAl Qaeda’s core network remains cohesive despite the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in areas in which al Qaeda operates. The competition between ISIS and al Qaeda for leadership of the global salafi-jihadi movement, as well as recruits and finances, has driven al Qaeda’s network to become more cohesive and for local groups to put aside tactical differences.Separately, an al Qaeda operative who had escaped from a Mauritanian prison on December 31, 2015, was captured in Guinea near the Guinea Bissau border on January 21. Cheikh Ould Saleck was attempting to go to Algeria. He had been sentenced to death in Mauritania for his role in a 2010 al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb plot to assassinate Mauritanian President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz. Outlook: Al Qaeda-linked groups will continue to conduct their local and regional military campaigns as al Qaeda leadership attempts to counter ISIS messaging.

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda AssociatesTehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) splinter groups carried out multiple large-scale attacks in various parts of the country. A TTP splinter group attacked Bacha Khan University in Charsadda, Pakistan, killing 22 people and wounding dozens of others on January 20. The attack was reminiscent of the 2014 Peshawar school massacre. Khalifa Umar Mansoor, who commands a faction of TTP, masterminded both the Bacha Khan University attack and Peshawar school massacre. The core TTP leadership released a statement condemning the attack and asserting that it had no involvement with it, though the group had supported the 2014 attack. Al Qaeda leadership admonished the TTP in 2014 for the attack.Separately, a TTP suicide attack killed at least 10 people, and wounded 20 others in the Jamrud area of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Five Pakistani police officers were also killed in the attack.

Outlook: Pakistani security forces are likely to increase security in the country, following the recent large-scale attacks.

AL QAEDA

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PoliticalRhetoric increasingly describes the Yemen conflict along sectarian terms. An al Houthi cleric issued a fatwa calling for jihad against President Hadi and his supporters, labeled as infidels. Yemeni Prime Minister Khaled Bahah described the al Houthis as worse than al Qaeda and ISIS and called on Iran to “give up the culture of violence.” There may be tensions in the Iran-al Houthi relationship, though, as al Houthi official Mohammed Ali al Imad called for the expulsion of Iranian embassy staff from Yemen over attempts to buy the Yemeni people. He framed the Iranian activities as simply replacing those of Saudi Arabia.

Outlook: Sectarian appeals and mutual recriminations will continue to sow distrust and present an obstacle to peace.

SecuritySaudi-led coalition troops clashed with al Houthi-Saleh forces along the Saudi-Yemeni border after a period of low activity, while the coalition continued airstrikes against al Houthi-Saleh targets in northern and central Yemen. The coalition also deployed naval forces eastward to ports in Shabwah and Hadramawt governorates to disrupt smuggling routes used by al Houthi-Saleh forces and AQAP. Assassinations continued in Aden, which remains unsecured as PM Bahah’s cabinet attempts to return.

Outlook: The coalition probably seeks to isolate al Houthi-Saleh forces in order to defeat them, but may also be preparing for limited operations against AQAP in the east.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in YemenMilitants, likely AQAP, seized government buildings and blew up a police headquarters in al Hawta, the capital of Lahij governorate, which is 40 km north of Aden. If confirmed, these reports indicate that AQAP holds bases in Lahij, Aden, and Abyan, providing it a nearly continuous area of operation from Aden to al Mukalla.

Outlook: AQAP will probably continue to consolidate control in Abyan and may continue to expand into Lahij, expanding its areas of control in Yemen.

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YEMENGULF OF ADEN

ASSESSMENT:

PoliticalRepresentatives from several Somali states were unable to agree on an electoral system for the country’s summer 2016 elections, reducing the chance that the Somali National Consultative Forum will meet the UN-imposed deadline at the end of January. Furthermore, several Somali MPs expressed outrage at Kenyan airstrikes against several villages in Gedo region.

Outlook: Electoral system questions will likely remain unresolved as competing power factions seek to maximize their influence in the future Somali state. 

SecurityKenyan security forces intensified operations against al Shabaab following the January 15 el Adde attack. Kenyan Anti-terror Police killed Suleiman Mohammed Awadh, an al Shabaab operative connected to the 2015 Garissa University attack and 2014 Mpeketoni attack. Kenyan forces deployed under AMISOM’s mandate in Somalia appear to be consolidating positions in Gedo region after the el Adde attack, which will create space for al Shabaab to operate in the area.

Outlook: Kenyan security forces will sustain a high operations tempo along the Somali border to crack down on al Shabaab.

Al ShabaabAl Shabaab continues to operate in Mogadishu against Somali government and foreign targets. A complex attack killed at least 17 people at Mogadishu’s Lido Beach, a site that had been seen as a symbol of the government’s progress against al Shabaab. The group also attacked AMISOM troops in Bay and Bakool regions in central Somalia. Separately, al Shabaab released propaganda showing reversals in Kenyan gains inside of Somalia, focusing on the el Adde attack, which counters the narrative that the 2011 Kenyan offensive significantly weakened al Shabaab.

Outlook: Al Shabaab will exploit the security gaps in southern Somalia and continue disruptive attacks against AMISOM forces.

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HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

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PoliticalThe Tobruk-based Libyan House of Representatives (HoR) rejected a preliminary cabinet for the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA), arguing that the 32-member cabinet was too large. HoR-backed Gen. Khalifa Haftar was not named as the defense minister in this cabinet. The GNA Presidency Council has ten days to select a new cabinet. The HoR is also opposing an article that transfers the authority over military appointments to the new government, slowing the transition.

Outlook: Conflicts of interest between the HoR and GNC will continue to frustrate the process of political reconciliation in Libya.

SecurityThe international community is looking to take action against ISIS in Libya. Italy has put forth a plan, endorsed by the British, French, and Germans to provide intelligence, logistical and strategic air support to Libyan forces on the ground. The U.S. is also considering combating ISIS in Libya with targeted airstrikes and special operations raids.  Outlook: The U.S. and European allies will likely take action against ISIS in Libya, though plans may be contingent on a partnership that runs through the GNA.

Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in LibyaISIS is targeting Libyan oil infrastructure, which may have been driven by the arrival of a senior ISIS official, Abu Omar, in Sirte from Iraq and Syria in October 2015. Abu Omar reportedly is charged with strengthening the group’s institutions and expanding territorial holdings in Libya. ISIS militants conducted several attacks, the most significant of which targeted oil facilities near the Libyan port of Ras Lanuf, destroying at least two oil storage tanks. ISIS also attacked an oil pipeline between the Amal oilfield and the el Sidra terminal. Following the attack, ISIS released a video promising future attacks on Libyan oil infrastructure.

Outlook: ISIS fighters will continue their efforts to seize Libyan oil infrastructure.

LIBYAWEST AFRICA

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AQIM AQIM stayed silent after the January 15 Burkina Faso attack and last week’s call for jihad in Libya. The Islamic State launched a massive, and likely retaliatory, recruitment campaign with a similar goal of attracting Salafi-jihadi militants and those linked to AQIM to join ISIS in its fight in Libya.

Outlook: AQIM and its affiliates will continue to release statements and conduct operations in an effort to drive al Qaeda recruitment in response to the ISIS media push, unite radical Islamist militants, and propel the Salafi-jihadi fight in Libya.

Uqba Ibn Nafa’a (Tunisia)Uqba Ibn Nafa’a remained relatively quiet this week, though mass demonstrations over unemployment threatened Tunisian stability and prompted a nationwide curfew. Civil unrest raised concerns for Salafi-jihadi activity near Mount Chaambi, just outside the protests’ epicenter in Kasserine. Tunisian forces interdicted a suspected terrorist group there on January 22, though sources have not confirmed the group’s allegiance.

Outlook: Uqba Ibn Nafa’a will remain in its mountain strongholds, likely preparing to take advantage of the unstable political environment should protests continue.

Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun) Ansar al Din and its affiliate, the Macina Liberation Front (MLF), attacked security forces in northeastern and central Mali. The MLF ambushed Malian security forces, while Ansar al Din launched IED attacks on UN peacekeeping and French counterterrorism troops. The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), a Tuareg group participating in the peace process, clashed with the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), an AQIM-affiliated militant group, in northeastern Mali. The MNLA and MUJAO were allies briefly in early 2012 in Mali.

Outlook: Ansar al Din and its affiliates will continue attacks to disrupt the implementation of the peace agreement.

MAGHREB AND SAHEL

WEST AFRICA

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Domestic Politics

Political infighting continued over the Guardian Council’s mass disqualification of parliamentary candidates, a disproportionate number of whom were Reformists. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei implicitly defended the disqualifications in a January 20 speech, asserting that there is “no country in the world” that does not prevent some candidates from running in elections. Guardian Council Secretary Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati similarly asserted that the Guardian Council “will not be affected by pressure” to revise its vetting process. President Hassan Rouhani, meanwhile, questioned the point of noncompetitive elections in a televised speech on January 21 by asking, “If one faction is represented in the elections and another is not, then why are we holding elections?” Rouhani added that he has urged Interior Minister Abdolreza Fazli, Intelligence Minister Hojjat ol Eslam Mahmoud Alavi, and Vice President Eshagh Jahangiri to meet with the Guardian Council about the vetting process. The Guardian Council is currently reviewing appeals to reverse disqualifications and will create a semifinal list of approved candidates by February 5.

Outlook: The Guardian Council is unlikely to reverse the majority of its disqualifications, decreasing chances that Rouhani’s allies will gain a significant number of seats in Parliament.

Regional Developments and Diplomacy

President Hassan Rouhani and Chinese President Xi Jinping issued a 20-point roadmap aimed at expanding Iran and China’s “comprehensive strategic partnership” during the Chinese president’s visit to Tehran on January 23. The roadmap emphasizes developing bilateral relations in the economic, defense, and political realms and expanding cooperation in areas such as transportation, energy, and space over a 25-year period. It also stresses the two sides’ “readiness” to enhance cooperation on “major regional issues, including developments in Syria and Yemen.” Rouhani pledged that trade between the two countries will increase to $600 billion in the next decade as well. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, meanwhile, lauded China as an alternative partner to the West, which he stated “has never won” Iran’s trust. The Iranian Ministry of Communications and Information Technology also signed an agreement with Chinese officials to boost technology cooperation between the two countries. Chinese multinational telecom company Huawei will establish a data center inside Iran under the agreement.

Outlook: Iran will seek to expand defense and technology cooperation in addition to economic activities with China in the post-sanctions era.

IRAN

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ACRONYMSAtomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI)International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)Libyan National Army (LNA)Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)Pakistani Military (PakMil)Possible military dimensions (PMD)Somalia National Army (SNA)Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

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AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT

Katherine Zimmermansenior al Qaeda analystkatherine.zimmerman@aei.org (202) 888-6576

Paul BucalaIran analystpaul.bucala@aei.org(202) 888-6573

Marie DonovanIran analystmarie.donovan@aei.org(202) 888-6572

Heather Malacariaprogram managerheather.malacaria@aei.org(202) 888-6575

Emily Estelleal Qaeda analystemily.estelle@aei.org(202) 888-6570

Caitlin PendletonIran analystcaitlin.pendleton@aei.org(202) 888-6577

For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.

Frederick W. Kagandirector

fkagan@aei.org (202) 888-6569