A general theory of genericmodelling and paradigm shifts:

part 3 – the extensionMaurice Yolles

Business School, Liverpool John Moores University,Liverpool, UK, andGerhard Fink

IACCM, Vienna University of Economics and Business,Vienna, Austria

AbstractPurpose – Anticipating behaviour and responding to the needs of complexity and problematic issuesrequires modelling to facilitate analysis and diagnosis. Using arguments of anticipation as an imperativefor inquiry, the purpose of this paper is to introduce generic modelling for living systems theory, andassigns the number of generic constructs to orders of simplex modelling. An nth simplex order rests in annth order simplex cybernetic space. A general modelling theory of higher orders of simplexity is given,where each higher order responds to every generic construct involved, the properties of whichdetermining the rules of the complex system being that is represented. Higher orders of simplexity alsoexplain greater degrees of complexity relatively simply, and give rise to the development of newparadigms that are better able to explain perceived complex phenomena.Design/methodology/approach – This is Part 3 of three linked papers. Using principles that arisefrom Schwarz’s living systems set within a framework provided by cultural agency theory, and witha rationale provided by Rosen’s and Dubois’ concepts of anticipation, the papers develop a generalmodelling theory of simplex orders. They show that with the development of new higher orders,paradigm shifts can occur that become responsible for new ways of seeing and resolving stubbornproblematic issues. Part 1 established the fundamentals for a theory of modelling associated withcybernetic orders. Using this, in this Part 2 the authors established the principles of cyberneticorders using simplex modelling. This included a general theory of generic modelling. In this Part 3the authors extend this, developing a fourth order simplex model, and exploring the potential forhigher orders using recursive techniques through cultural agency theory. The authors also explorevarious forms of emergence.Findings – Cultural agency theory can be used to generate higher simplex through principles ofrecursion, and hence to create a potential for the generation of families of new paradigms. The ideaof conceptual emergence is also tied to the rise of new paradigms.Research limitations/implications – The use of higher order simplex models to represent complexsituations provides the ability to condense explanation concerning the development of particularsystem behaviours, and hence simplify the way in which the authors analyse, diagnose and anticipatebehaviour in complex situations. Illustration is also given showing how the theory can explain theemergence of new paradigms.Practical implications – Cultural agency can be used to structure problem issues that mayotherwise be problematic, within both a top-down and bottom-up approach. It may also be used toassist in establishing behavioural anticipation given an appropriate modelling approach. It may also beused to improve and compress explanation of complex situations.Originality/value – A new theory of simplex orders arises from the new concept of generic modelling,illustrating cybernetic order. This permits the possibility of improved analysis and diagnosis ofproblematic situations belonging to complex situations through the use of higher order simplex models,and facilitates improvement in behavioural anticipation.Keywords Behaviour, Adaptation, Cybernetics, Emergence, Complexity, Systems theoryPaper type Research paper

KybernetesVol. 44 No. 2, 2015

pp. 311-328©Emerald Group Publishing Limited

0368-492XDOI 10.1108/K-12-2014-0303

The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:www.emeraldinsight.com/0368-492X.htm

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IntroductionIn Part 1 of this paper we discussed the modelling of complexity, and argued that wecould formulate simplex substructures for any complex “living” social system that could“compress” complexity. In Part 2 we formulated a number of simplex model orders, eachassigned to a particular cybernetic space having rules/properties. The first order simplexmodel was deemed to be positivist, the second order radical constructivist and instrumental,and the third order constructivist.

In addition we created a general theory of simplex order modelling that had bothrecursive and incursive properties. Recursive properties are represented by formalmodelling approaches, while incursive properties represented informal inferences thatcould influence model building through constraints and conditions.

In this paper we shall create a fourth order simplex model sitting in a fourth ordercybernetic space. We originally suggested that simplex substructure models could beshown to be responsible for paradigm shifts that are able to reduce complexity. In thisPart 3 we demonstrate this attribute. Using cultural agency theory, we also show howrecursive techniques can be used to formulate orders of simplex model.

Fourth order simplex modellingIt is possible to formulate a statement of fourth order cybernetics in terms of the higherlevels of relationship between observed and observing systems as an extension ofBoxer and Cohen (2000). However, a more pragmatic and satisfactory (Ashby, 1968)approach allows one to respond to the variety in a complex situation with an invariantgeneric construct more capable of generating requisite variety. Higher orders of simplexmodelling have this capability since they provide new ways of explaining complexityby representing external influences as internal imperatives, thereby creating greatercomplexity for the immanent agency dynamics, but reducing undecidability. To explainthe use of higher order models, rather than use observers relationships, a more minimalway is to adopt a concept of generic loop learning as an extension of Agryris (1982), evenif this redirects us away from von Glasersfeld’s tenet of adaptability. Here then, fourthorder cybernetics could be represented as triple loop generic learning (beyond the doubleloop generic learning of third cybernetics), referring to the way in which knowledge is notonly acquired but also identified. Another way to express this is that an n-level genericlearning loop plus generic feedback gives an (n+ 1) order simplex model. Learning canalso be seen as a control process that embraces the dialectic of deviation-counteractingand deviation-amplifying (Maruyama, 1963).

Fourth order simplexity sits in a fourth order cybernetics space, lies “beyondconstructivism” and is “post-constructivist” (Osborne, 1996; Aviram, 2000). It should beseen as social constructivist (Boudourides, 2003), and adopts socio-cultural perspectives(Duit and Treagust, 1998) that embrace the socio-cultural setting during the constructionof knowledge (Treagust and Duit, 2008). It is therefore a reflection of Vygotsky’s (1962)view that knowledge is socially created, now seen as a fourth order cybernetic process incontrast to Piaget’s third order process. This is distinct from the current wisdom thatVygotsgy’s theory is constructivist (Lund and Sjøvoll, 2009). This recognition createslogical harmony between Piaget’s and Vygotsky’s theories of the knowledge creationprocess, overturning the idea that the two models are in conflict.

While the social is important to both fourth and second order simplex modelling, itsrole in social constructivism is different from that of radical constructivism. In theformer case the social is part of the frame of reference and central to internalisedmodelling through R(4), providing formal explanations for the influence on R(1). In the

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latter the social is only part of the environment forR(1), facilitating informal explanations,including social filtering of virtual knowledge. There is also a connection betweenPiaget’s R(3) knowledge self-creation, and the internalisation of the social imperativesthat occur for Vygotsky’s social knowledge creation inR(4). While we shall explore thisinternalisations more fully shortly, it is worth note that Wertsch (1979) explains howPiaget and Vygotsky views on this differ. Piaget’s interest lies in how the childabstracts and internalises certain features of actions carried out within the physicalworld. In contrast, Vygotsky’s interest is in how the child internalises features ofcertain social and cultural activities.

We present a fourth order simplex model in Figure 1 which arises from Figure 4(in Part 2 of this series of papers) by taking n¼ 3. Here, the ((n+ 1)¼ 4) referent systemis a “defining system” that has a third order invariant generic construct linked to itslower order coupling. Figure 1 involves a particular superstructure that providesepistemic content. The generic model differentiates referent system orders bydistinguishing between a cognitive and defining system. It does this by suggestingthat it is through the defining system that agency develops its attribute of socialself-identity (Turner, 1976; Hogg et al., 1995; Grandey et al., 2005). It is also here wheredefining information originates. The connecting channel between the defining systemand the rest of the model occurs through the invariant generic construct we callautogenetesis: coming from genetic meaning “relating to or determined by theorigin, development, or causal antecedents of something”. So autogenetesis refers toa self-defining network of triple generic learning loop of simplex processes.

Other well-known system “self” attributes beyond identity (as shown in Figure 1)formally include self-identity (arising from the collective consciousness), self-reference,self-regulation and self-organisation, as well as cognitive attributes of influence,significance, purpose and intention. While these are functionally relative to the defining(referent) system, the epistemic natures of the variant generic constructs in Figure 1 areunderstood from context. The manifestation of information between these occursthrough the levels of generic learning loop in a way that is pathology dependent.Originating information from the internalised social is directly manifested to thecognitive system and the autopoietic coupling, but coded information may also betaken indirectly through the autogenetic coupling to the autopoietic coupling. Figure 5(in Part 2 of this series of papers) also constitutes an autogenetesic coupling. Each ofthese autopoietic orders has the potential to generate a new family of paradigms. Theseare capable of simplifying complexity through new higher order generic constructs.So this too constitutes a process of emergence. The consequence of Figure 4 (in Part 2 ofthe series) is that such emergence can occur through recursion.

Identity and the many selvesJust as Boudourides (2003) recognises that third order constructivism requiresa self-referential process for maintaining self-identity, so fourth order social constructivismrequires social reference for maintaining social identity. Bozicnik and Mulej (2011) takesuch social reference of fourth order cybernetics to be seated in holism. However, socialreference may more generally be seen in terms of Durkheim’s “collective consciousness”,which explains how autonomous agency comes to identity within its embracing socialenvironment (Piepmeyer, 2004).

This coming to identity develops through a process of internalisation: an agencyembraces external phenomena and represents it internally. To explain internalisationwe find it useful to create a synergy between three sources of theory that together make

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For Deci and Ryan (2009) internalisation begins with extrinsic motivation, thisreferring to instrumental activities on an environment that relate to some operationallyseparable consequence. Four degrees of this are identified, ranging from purely externalimperatives towards behaviour, to those that have been internalised. Internalisation isresponsible of intrinsic motivation, and there are degrees of this that relate directly todegrees of autonomy in enacting behaviour. Underpinning this Wertsch (1979) notes thatagencies are not just passive receivers of input from the external environment, butare always directed towards an object or motive. Activity motivated by a goal motive (anintrinsic motivation), is mediated by physical and psychological tools (includinglanguage) that allows and even leads to the creation of types of activities that would nototherwise exist. These instrumental activities have at their basis the values, behavioursand opinions that they encounter. Deci and Ryan note that agencies maintain a naturaltendency to take these in. For Boje (2004) such external phenomena can be expressedthrough knowledge scripts. These emerge from social rules that have materialised andgained traction through social interactions, and which in turn influence how socialrelationships are enacted (Sanders, 2010). In other words it is not only values, behavioursand opinions that matter, but more generally social rules/scripts that underpin these. Theinternalising of the scripts constitutes a means by which agencies are influenced byknowledge-based information relating to its social environments.

Identifying the process of internalisation does not explain how it occurs. ForVerenikina and Gould (1998) internalisation is the transition in which externalprocesses with external material objects are transformed into processes that takeplace mentally at the level of consciousness. During this transition these processes(adopt knowledge scripts which are integrated, and) become generalised, verbalised,abbreviated; importantly, they become the means for further development thattranscends what is possible with external activity (thereby effecting epistemicemergence). For Wertsch (1979) it is through external (motivational) social activitiesthat a plane of consciousness is constructed (i.e. ontologically emerges). It is possibleto envisage that many of these levels may be created as can be modelled by the (n+ 1)referent systems of Figure 4 (in Part 2 of this series). This links with Lucas’s (2002)exploration of plural levels of cognitive consciousness, and offers an explanation forthe ontological emergence of higher simplex orders, and the recognition thatconsciousness is a social phenomenon (Shanon, 1993; Praetorius, 2000).

So, internal representation is not just a transmission of knowledge from an externalsocial plane to the internal psychological plane, but it rather occurs through (theemergent assembly of generic learning loop networks of ) processes by which the internalplane is actually constructed (Davydov et al., 1983, p. 34, cited in Coupland, 2004). In thisinternal plane psychological operations develop as higher and qualitatively new formsof mental function (Vygotsky, 1978, cited in Coupland, 2004). For Vygotsky all highermental functions are internalised social relationships. This allows for a variety of analyticand related processes to occur that begin with abstraction. In Piaget’s theory of learning,a process of abstracting actions allows an agency to replace perceptual judgments forthose based on reasoned internalised actions (Elkind, 1976).

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the explanation more suitable to this paper: motivation, knowledge scripting andpsychological learning theory. These explanations will be sparsely peppered withinsertions to create greater synergy to satisfy the method of open coding for theoryconstruction as part of Grounded Theory (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). We use curvedbrackets to insert material from other theories, or from our own theoretical development,so as to maintain sources.

These abstractions work through information that arises, as explained by Boje(2004), where there is a will towards historically constituted and informationallyscripted patterns of knowledge. Thus, an agency becomes part of a knowledge scriptsystem that responds to and generates informational consequences (that are structuredfiguratively as schemas). The schemas are activated through intrinsic motivation, andoccurs as a reflection of an agency’s inner interests (or pressures), providing volitionand a sense of choice (or relief) relating to autotelism (Deci and Ryan, 2009).

An illustration of internalisation due to Froebel (cited in Elkind, 1976) is that duringperiods of early learning, the external cultural world may be made internal byincorporating cultural knowledge. The internalisation of cultural knowledge into a planeof socio-cultural consciousness results in imperatives that are of such fundamentalimportance that their orientations dominate the agency entirely during periods ofcultural stability. They result in immanent agency socio-cultural dynamics (Sorokin,1937-1942/1962) that anchors social processes, explains large scale adaptation,establishes cycles of stability and instability and enables the exploration of viabilityover macroscopic periods of time.

Agency theory and higher simplex ordersDue to the autonomy of living systems, it is possible to use simplex modelling ordersrecursively. This is permitted through an extension to Beer’s (1979) proposition onrecursion: that every viable living system (Figure 3, in Part 2 of this series of papers)contains and is contained in a viable living system.

The third order simplex model of Figure 3 can be used recursively (Yolles and Fink,2011), since it is a core model for the viable living system (Schwarz, 1994). We can nowmodel the cognitive agency by increasing generic order and highlighting a potentialfamily of paradigms through invariant generic constructs (Figure 2). Consistent withDuit and Treagust (1998), this model should be seen to be one of social constructivism,with collective identity and cultural self-reference.

The cognitive fulcrum for the dynamic invariant generic constructs of Figure 2 isthe personality operative system. Now, Piaget and Inhelder (1973) considered thatintelligence takes on a transformative function in respect to perception and the creationof knowledge. This is reflected in Figure 2 where the invariant generic constructs ofFigure 1 are now referred to in terms of the equivalent Piagetian intelligences. Whilethe use of these intelligences as invariant generic constructs is relatively new (Yolles,2007, 2009a), adopting cultural figurative intelligence as a third order construct is quitenew (Yolles et al., 2011) and represents autogenetesis. This agency model also includesvariant generic constructs of cultural, personality and agency operative systems, thepersonality being a recursion of Figure 3. This process of recursion can do two things.First, shift focus down the system hierarchy to examine particular systems and exploregreater detail. Second, we have found that in exploring personality (Yolles and Fink,2014a, b), certain unexpected properties of attraction emerge in a third order simplexmodel that influence the rest of the system. In the case of a relatively simple model of anorganisation with a culture, the culture has an unmistakable influence on the strategicand operative dimensions of the organisation that is more pronounced than isattributed to cultural norms, aiding behavioural anticipation.

To arrive at Figure 2 we need to return to Figure 1. There are three steps:

(1) One needs to realise that the personality operative system is a natural fulcrumconnecting structured personality that determines decision making, with agency

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structure that determines behaviour. It also allows us to distinguish between theleft and right hand sides of the figure.

(2) We extrapolate agency operative intelligence to the operative system of theagency personality (dotted I4 arrows – both feed-forward I41 and feedbackI42). This is because the conscious operative system directs the structuralprocesses of the agency, so distinguishing the agency operative system fromthe rest of agency.

(3) The personality operative system can take on the second cybernetic role of theagency metasystem – connected with the agency operative system. This showshow reducing the simplex order of the model (by assigning the cognitivestructures of personality and culture to a horizon of influences) limits genericexplanations for operative processes in the personality and hence agencyanticipation.

In the cultural system symbolic epistemic material (knowledge) is manifested (as typesof information) to the personality and to the agency operative system (as behaviouralnorms with trait influences). Dotted arrows occur between I3 and I2 showing thatsymbolic epistemic material may be directed to the operative system (and back assupportive/unsupportive imperatives) using this manifestation route. This enables I3to be seen as a third order invariant construct of the personality permitting it to emergeas a cognitive (culture and personality) fourth order simplex model.

The I3 constructs are called cultural figurative intelligence, an agency capacity torepresent cultural values/beliefs as a coalescence of normative ideological, ethical andbehavioural standards that ultimately indicate social legitimacy. Where the intelligencesoperate with efficacy, system viability is improved. So under a plurality of competingcultural factions efficacious cultural figurative intelligence can moderate the potential forconflict and hence increase system viability.

That we have been able to identify a fourth order simplex model in Figure 2 providesinterest, when comparing it to the general fourth order simplex model of Figure 1. Thecultural environment takes on the philosophical function of social constructivism, with itsimplied social reference and social identity. This is consistent with the view that and thatfourth order cybernetics is socio-cultural (Duit and Treagust, 1998; Treagust and Duit,2008). Replacing the term social with cultural gives us cultural constructivism, culturalreference and cultural identity, and the latter two terms are frequently used culturaltheory. There is another implication: since Vygotsky’s fourth order activity theory oflearning is a socio-cultural theory (Vuorinen, 2009), embracing its cultural content mayenhance Sorokin’s (1937-1942/1962) theory of socio-cultural dynamics.

Paradigm shifts and generic constructsWe can now argue that the generic learning loops of autopoiesis, autogenesis andautogenetesis constitute a basis for a family of paradigm shifts since each offernew ways of seeing. There is a significant support in the literature that this hashappened. In particular autopoiesis has caused a paradigm shift (e.g. Li et al., 2010).There is no clear view that autogenesis constitutes a paradigm shift (Schwalbe andSchwalbe, 1991), probably because of the lack of agreement concerning its nature(Paecht-Horowitz, 1973; Csányi and Kampis, 1985; Drazin and Sandelands, 1992).However, the functional equivalents to autopoeisis/autogenesis, defined as Piaget’soperative/figurative intelligences, have constituted a paradigm shift (DeVries, 1991).

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This brings us to autogenetesis, an unsupported newly proposed term that requiresa little closer examination. Through recursive modelling and the use of Piaget’s(1950/1972) intelligences, autogenetesis takes the contextually sensitive name culturalfigurative intelligence. So has this triple-level generic learning loop the potential togenerate a family of paradigms creating greater simplicity in complexity?

At this point it is useful to reflect again on Vygotsky’s third-level network ofprocesses. There appears to be no clear generic learning loop that facilitates the sociallearning process indicated. If we assign this social constructivist process to the culturalenvironment, then we can similarly identify cultural figurative intelligence as thenetwork of processes that facilitates this level of learning. While there is no place topursue this here, it would be interesting to further explore this.

A reduced form of cultural figurative intelligence is called Cultural Intelligence(Earley and Ang, 2003, p. 3; Thamas and Inkson, 2009). For Ang et al. (2011) this offersan agency an ability to adapt to change while at the same time having an ability tofunction efficiently under cultural diversity. If Cultural Intelligence is a basis of a newfamily of paradigms, then so is the broader cultural figurative intelligence.

Cultural Intelligence was introduced by Earley and Ang (2003) and conceivedduring a period of unprecedented globalisation and interconnectedness (Held et al.,1999) that Ionescu (1975) indicates represents an increasingly complex centrifugalsociety. However, the attendant increase in intercultural interactions enhances theprobability of cultural misunderstandings, tensions and conflicts (Ang et al., 2011). Theconcept of cultural intelligence can now provide compressed explanations for resolvingsuch situations, thus creating a simpler view of complexity and contributing to the riseof new paradigms (Seed and Tomasello, 2010; Chen et al., 2012). For Blum (2009) themultiple cultural perspectives highlighted by cultural intelligence do constitute aparadigm shift.

Support for this construct as the basis of new paradigms may take time tomaterialise social support, and may currently be a “virtual paradigm” (Yolles, 1999) onthe way to become a paradigm.

Exploring cultural agencyWe can also explore Figure 2 in broader terms. The modelling concept for this isbedded on recursive principles of systemic hierarchy (Boulding, 1956; Heylighen, 1992).Here living systems are structured as a hierarchically nested set of recursivelyembedded systems, one within another, creating more complexity in the modellingprocess, but with more explanatory power. This improves the potential for requisitevariety, and increasingly bounds undecidability.

The agency model consists of a cultural system, a personality system – a normativesupersystem with its own interconnected cognitive system with culturally based“identification” information; figurative system with strategic “elaboration” information;and operative system with “execution” information. At both levels, the “higher” agencylevel and the “lower” recursive normative personality level, the same principles applyfor self-identification, self-regulation and self-organisation.

The generic framework of Figure 2 allows complex “bottom-up” interpersonalinterrelationships to be modelled through a multiplicity of interconnected reasons thatare often taken as a principle of emergence or “emergent causation”. Lower levelinteractions, i.e. countless repeated petty acts, “cause” higher order systemic forms toemerge, where complexity becomes reduced to an invisible horizon of meanings. Undernormal circumstances, under the legitimisation of selected patterns of behaviour

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(e.g. by institutions), top-down influences can constrain the nature of the interactions atthe lower level. However, such constraints may become ineffective in post-normalsituations where uncertainty is experienced due to the system being at the edge ofstability (Dempster, 1999; Tognetti, 1999). Thus, the modelling approach adopted forFigure 2 can represent networks of processes at the individual and small group level, aswell as having impact on the higher level social influence networks of processes andvice versa (Yolles, 2006).

This now brings us to further consideration of the capacity to anticipate patterns ofcultural agency behaviour. The generic model of Figure 2 represents a plural agencywhich is durable (and hence viable) when it maintains a stable culture, and embraceslearning and development through its cybernetic processes; with a normative personality,an operative capacity, and a social environment. The agency operates through invariantgeneric constructs of Piagetian intelligences that facilitate learning, adapts to changingsituations, and creates and implements its own policies. It enables specific relationships tobe introduced within and across systemic domains, as necessary and according to thelogical processes that may be proposed within socio/economic/political situations. Thecultural orientation traits orient agency behaviour towards cultural norms of the culturalenvironment, which can be followed or neglected; and the social orientation traits towardsthe social environment within which the agency interacts with other agencies. Here,countless repeated petty acts are performed, which in the end constitute cultural practiceswithin a social frame.

The intelligences we have referred to are susceptible to pathologies (Yolles and Fink,2014c). Pathologies in systems emerge when important processes within the agency areneglected and dysfunctional behaviour emerges. In Figure 2, generic pathologies are seenas a function of neglect indicated by grey bars, e.g. the bar at I3,1 indicates that thesecond order agency element does not comply with the cultural norms of the higher ordersocial whole. The bar at I4,1 indicates that the deployed behaviour, i.e. the action of thenormative personality, does not conform with behavioural rules in the social frame.

The traits belonging to the state systems of Figure 2 may take epistemic bipolarvalues. Without higher order invariant generic construct pathologies, cultural traitvalues directly influence the other agency trait values. These values contribute toformative anticipation of patterns of behaviour, while emotive components can impacton these patterns. Thus, cultural trait values adopted by an agency can act asattractors for the other traits, resulting in the agency tending towards becoming eitherindividualist or collectivist in its cognitions and behaviours (Yolles and Fink, 2013,2014a, b, d). This enables some significant capacity to anticipate patterns of behaviourgiven known social environment contexts (Yolles and Fink, 2013).

This is reflected for instance in the finding by Bogilović et al. (2014), that there is aninverse relationship between cultural intelligence and collective creativity. Culturalintelligence is a biased measure which gives too much weight to agency adaptation.Creativity, it seems, has more of an Individualist bent, while adaptation has a more acollectivist one. This highlights the need for balanced orientation, where both creativityand adaptation are needed, and where one is able to take measures of culturalintelligence expectation about the potential for behaviours that are created.

At this stage it is worth having some reflection on control. Second order cyberneticsis represented here through “within system control”, where the executives within asystem control the operative domain. However, executives ( participant observers whocontrol operations) are also subject to systemic higher order influences, which arebeyond their control. Thus, higher order cybernetics (beyond second order cybernetics)

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models these influences as agency internalisations that create immanent dynamicimperatives for the system that cannot be ignored unless influenced by appropriatepathologies. Interaction with these systemic higher order influences is possible, forinstance, through related “legitimacy management” processes and the feedback loops tothe cybernetic higher order domains (Dauber et al., 2012). In Figure 1 the autogenetesicfeedback has such a function, and as indicated in Figure 2, “impulses for culturaladjustment” are a reflection of these processes through which executives might try toinfluence the cultural environment.

ConclusionThis paper begins by discussing social complexity and the need to model it generically.While cybernetic orders provide a propositional environment that guides modelbuilding, this paper develops a general theory of generic modelling that satisfies therepresentation of conceptual emergence.

Exploring the needs of anticipation, the idea of generic structuring developed.Linking this with Cohen and Stewart’s wish to reduce complexity, the idea of orders ofsimplex modelling was introduced. A simplex order model has a generic structurethat is housed in a cybernetic space. Higher order simplex models come about throughthe conceptual emergence of invariant generic (axiomatically accepted) constructs.The idea of conceptual emergence is also tied to the rise of paradigms. This enables usto formulate a general theory of generic modelling, set within the framework of ordersof simplex modelling, which has its seat in the work of Dubois (1998) on incursive andhypericursive anticipatory systems. This work is useful in particular for the modellingand simulation of future behaviours represented by variables, given historical andcurrent data associated with those variables.

A general theory of cybernetic orders has been proposed using generic simplex orders,calling on recursive representation to do so. Each system in a recursive supersystem canbe populated with particular testable models, while the incursive systems generatequalitative inferences. These particular models normally have quantitative variables thatcan be used for simulation. In our agency theory we developed a personality theoryhaving trait variables, but other of particular models are also possible.

On the way to developing our general theory, the paper gave examples of first,second, third and fourth order simplexity. Higher orders of simplex modelling undercomplexity exist through the conceptual generic concepts that define them. This is theresult of conceptual emergence, important to processes of systemic modelling. So far wehave not attempted to move beyond fourth order simplexity, awaiting for new conceptsable to generate fifth and higher orders of simplexity. However, we have shown thathigher order simplex models can be generated through the use of recursion.

It should be recognised that the creation of higher orders of simplexity is not anarbitrary process Rather it is a function of a capacity to convincingly argue that certainobservable processes, that may be seen as seriously influencing agency behaviour, doso through processes of agency internalisation –when the domain of influence becomesan imperative for immanent agency dynamics. By the word convincing is meant thatwhile it may be easily possible to suggest that certain influences can be represented asvariant generic constructs, they must be associated with invariant generic constructs(generic learning loops) that operate as a network of processes to manifest theinfluences to the rest of the agency. The nature of these processes should be recognisedand their interconnections should also be explored. This is important since it is throughsuch the emergence of such invariant generic constructs that paradigm shifts develop.

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The convincing theory provided by Vygotsky school of thought on the internalisationof external motivational influences on behaviour is important. It explains epistemicemergence where new agency capabilities develop, as well as ontological emergencewhere new orders of conscious facility develop. The latter is enabled by the emergence ofnew networks of processes. When represented by a simplex model, these can be shown tocreate new ways of seeing complex phenomenal environments.

The base approach in the development of a theory of generic modelling arises fromthe principles of cultural agency theory that sits on the earlier work of Eric Schwarz(1994). It is from this theory that a recursive generator for higher order simplex modelscan result. Each order is also a potential generator of a family of thematic paradigms,since each order is able to simplify explanations that relate to observed complexphenomena.

In discussing increasing simplex orders, we have also briefly considered somethingof their philosophical nature, and since simplex orders have cybernetic orderenvironments, such considerations are also pertinent to the latter. As a result, we havebeen able to classify first order simplex models as positivist, second order as radicallyconstructivist (denying formal knowledge self-creation but allowing it informally), thirdorder as constructivist, and fourth order as social constructivist. Each simplex orderresides in a (simplex) cybernetic space of the same order.

The general model for nth order simplex models was mapped into a cultural agencycontext. This created a generic model that facilitates the structuring of particularmodelling components. It does this through propositions that can be explored throughmodel building activities or empirical investigation. Thus for instance, propositions couldbe raised concerning shifting contexts, exogenous agency problems or endogenousissues like that of inefficacy in the intelligences. Relating this to our particular personalitymodelling, any of these factors will have an impact on agency trait values with aconsequential impact on its patterns of behaviour. To make issues more problematic,emotive attributes could be introduced since these condition, which energise an agencytowards or away from, particular patterns of behaviour. Following Bradley et al. (2001,p. 276), they also create a regulatory influence on cognitive thinking processes.

Elaborating on this particular model, so far only the cognitive attributes of cultureand personality of a cultural agency are representable by fourth cybernetics. Theknowledge embedded in the cultural system is of course related to the cognitiveinformation of the personality. The distinction between them is that knowledge is astructured pattern of symbolic concepts at some horizon that can provide cognitivemeaning when sampled. In contrast information is a concrete selected context-sensitivesymbolic pattern of epistemic concepts that has been manifested to the personality.This recognition compresses complexity and provides more powerful ways ofexplaining, analysing and diagnosing problematic issues.

We will recall that autopoiesis/self-producing/operative-intelligence is a network ofinstrumental first order generic processes, autogenesis/self-creating/operative-intelligenceis a network of cognitive second order generic processes. The fourth order simplex modelis consistent with the cognitive component (involving culture and personality). This meansthat culture and personality operate together as a fourth order simplex model. This createsa potential for a new family of paradigms. It enables complexity to be simplified throughthe new autogenetesis/self-defining/figurative-cultural-intelligence invariant genericconstruct, which can become the basis of a new family of paradigms.

Von Glasersfeld was interested in at least two significant things in his cyberneticjourney. One was relativism and the other adaptation. These together formed a core for

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his radical constructivism. Relativism in relation to the observer provides the basis fora discussion about the observer and the observed, which is all very well as far as firstand second cybernetics is concerned, but for higher cybernetic orders the use of thislanguage become clumsy and problematic. Perhaps this approach actually draws awayfrom the core of constructivism as indicated by Taber (2006), embracing rareficationaway from Piaget’s original conceptualisation. In exploring higher cybernetic orderswith their related simplex models, it is so much easier to return to learning loops andhence discuss relativism and adaptation in other terms. This still allows one to embracethe essences of cybernetics. Here, then the concepts of self-production (second cybernetics),self-creation (third cybernetics) and even self-definition (fourth cybernetics) can be used tohighlight principles that underlie knowledge development and acquisition.

This paper has recognised the importance of adaptation, viability and anticipation,but we have rather explored these concepts from the perspective of learning thatreflects on increasing boundedness on undecidability. In respect of this approach, wemay recall that in Part 1 of this paper we asked three questions:

(1) How many levels of learning loops actually exist, and what might higher orderloops mean for cybernetic modelling?

(2) What is the role of the learning loop, in particular as a control and discoveryprocess for cybernetic modelling, and how does it enhance our understandingof reality?

(3) How can one select starting points for learning loops?

The answers are now apparent. In respect of (1), the number of level of learning are afunction of the complexity of the system and its capacity for emergence. The meaningof higher level loops is a function of the emergence that has occurred. In respect of (2),the role of a learning loop is to establish higher orders of meaning and control thatreduces undecidability and improve viability. In relation to (3), starting points forlearning loops are determined by the allocation of a fulcrum of examination in acomplex systems model, in order to satisfy perspective and context.

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Corresponding authorDr Maurice Yolles can be contacted at: prof.m.yolles@gmail.com

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