2015 predictions for east asia _ the diplomat

Last month I suggested a list of the biggestissues in Asian security of the previous year (aswell as a look back at big U.S. foreign policyevents in the region). This month I thought Iwould look forward and make some generalpredictions. As with look-back reviews at theend of the year, look-forward projections at the beginning are equally important for punditaccountability and credibility. Prediction is, ideally, the goal of good social science and punditry.It will be curious to revisit these forecasts a year from now to see what went wrong…and right.

So here are some thoughts on East Asia going forward this year. In brief, there is little to suggestthe status quo will be seriously disrupted, because nationalists and social conservativescommitted to traditional ideologies and growth models dominate the region’s administrations.

That is of course a safe and dull prediction – but nonetheless likely true. The only loose cannon ina region obsessed with stability and development is North Korea. External tension serves NorthKorea’s internal legitimacy needs, so it always a good bet it will do something foolish. One easyprediction is that North Korea’s interest in new technologies like drones and hacking, and the fearthat inspires in Washington particularly, will gin-up at least one faux crisis this year.

1. In Regional Policy, Little Interest in Compromise

China, Japan, and South Korea (and Russia) are all governed by nationalists and conservativeswhose domestic coalitions see little reason to compromise with other regional players. So long asthe U.S. presence in Asia continues, there is no external pressure to change either. Hence there islittle reason to think, barring some unpredictable catastrophe like a spiraling North Korea crisis,that territorial or memory issues will be overcome.

In China, a central prop of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) legitimacy, especially after thecollapse of communism, is nationalism with a particular focus on Japan. During China’s recentpresidential “transition” – more properly understood as a well-closeted bureaucratic knife-fight –there was always hope that a more liberal figure might emerge. Wen Jaibao, of the previousadministration, repeatedly hinted near the end of his tenure that China needs a liberalizingleadership. But current President Xi Jinping has instead cleaved to the standard playbook –

2015 Predictions for East Asia | The Diplomat http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/2015-predictions-for-east-asia/

1 of 3 1/14/2015 9:01 PM

nationalism, one-party rule, demagoguing Japan, a tough line on territorial disputes, and so on.

Predictions: The Senkaku/Diaoyu flap with Japan is a nice go-to distraction for the CCP. We canexpect Beijing to roll that out whenever needed. The Americans will play a similar bad-guy role inChinese foreign policy in the South China Sea. In this context, North Korea remains a usefulbuffer for China, so the current Beijing-Pyongyang mini-freeze will not last. Kim Jong-un, theNorth Korean leader, will not visit Moscow before Beijing as his first overseas visit (indeed he isunlikely to travel abroad at such an early point in his power-consolidation).

In South Korea, a similar nationalist-developmentalist consensus with a tough external focus onJapan is the rough ideology of the current administration. Both conservatives and progressives inKorea are deeply committed to a narrative (much of it accurate) of Japanese colonial misdeeds.Current President Park Geun-hye is also uniquely constrained on this issue, in that her fatherworked with the Japanese occupation authorities during the Pacific War. She cannot afford tolook soft.

Predictions: Yet another round of Dokdo and Yasukuni fights are an easy prediction here. Parkand Abe will not meet.

But Japan also is unlikely to move on the region’s divisive historical and territorial issues.Governed by yet another nationalist conservative deeply vested in (the other side of) thesedisputes, the right-wing coalition of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe would likely see any outreach onthis as national betrayal. Indeed, it seems like Abe himself has little interest in burying thehatchet with China, Korea, or Russia. This intransigence is almost certainly abetted by the U.S.military presence which insulates Japan from the regional fallout.

Predictions: Abe is simply too emotionally invested in nationalist revisionism – a regular themethroughout his career. So he will not make the rhetorical concessions necessary for Park to agreeto meet him. Xi grimaced his way through one meeting with Abe; another is unlikely. Instead,expect more Yasukuni visits, more foolish right-wing outbursts by the creepier parts of theJapanese right, and more internecine sniping among Japanese media and intellectual figures overwar-guilt.

Insofar as Abe just won re-election, Park’s presidency still has three more years, and Xi has(probably) eight more years, these conflicts will drag on and on, with little imminent resolution.Indeed, so vested in these disputes are nationalist factions in all the regional states, that I wonderif they really want them resolved.

2. More of the Same in Domestic Politics Too

Except for North Korea’s moribund gangster Marxism, regional economies are surprisinglysimilar – mercantile, export-oriented, focused on industry at the expense of services andinformation, with tight relationships between business and government elites, a strong emphasison education, wary of foreign “take-overs,” and so on – all nested in an overarching nationalideology of development.

This developmentalist consensus is unlikely to shift this year, despite rising pressure andawareness of its limits. In Japan, Abe has shown himself painfully reluctant to loose the “thirdarrow” of Abenomics – structural reform. He simply does not seem to have the political courage


2 of 3 1/14/2015 9:01 PM

to crack down on the guilds that lock-up much of Japan’s growth potential. In classic Asiandevelopmentalist fashion, he seems to content to rely on the old stand-bys of exports to the Westand currency manipulation. Yawn.

In South Korea, the election of a woman to the presidency, and then the Sewol ferry tragedy wassupposed to unleash a wave of domestic reform. But this has not happened. The chaebol familyconglomerates still dominate Korean politics and economics, often using insider access to thestate to buttress their own position (such as laws restricting foreign ownership). Nor have thefamily-friendly reforms many Korean feminists hoped for from the first female president comethrough. Day-care, for example, still is terribly difficult to find, routinely forcing educated womenout of the labor force. Like Abe, Park comes from a conservative domestic coalition stronglyvested in the status quo, and she has proven either unable or unwilling to challenge itsdysfunctions.

Predictions: Sadly, almost nothing. If the Asian Financial Crisis and the Great Recession couldnot break the hold of mercantilist crony corporatism in Korea and Japan, I wonder what will…

3. China: Stasis Then Crisis?

China is perhaps the greatest disappointment. As elected leaders, Park and Abe must to someextent mirror the preferences of their coalitions. But Xi has degrees of freedom to push change.He scarcely has. His environmental deal with Obama does not represent real change, as it targetsemissions levels China would likely hit anyway, and his signature initiative – the anti-corruptioncampaign – looks more and more like power-consolidation than a genuine graft crackdown. Xi isnot weaning Chinese industry off its bad habits like industrial espionage, state patronage, shadowbanking, infrastructural white elephants, and so on. He seems as unwilling as Abe to pursuestructural reforms when the old ways – exports and infrastructure – seem so easy.

Predictions: The CCP fears economic change and Xi is more interested in foreign policy, whichsuggests stasis at home. But the Chinese economy is so distorted now that a banking,infrastructural, health, or environmental crisis that deeply embarrasses the government isprobably coming.


3 of 3 1/14/2015 9:01 PM

2015 predictions for east asia _ the diplomat

Documents