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NATO Parliamentary Assembly

DEFENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE

NATO’S READINESS ACTION PLAN: ASSURANCE AND DETERRENCE FOR

THE POST-2014 SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

REPORT

Xavier PINTAT (France)Rapporteur,

Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities

www.nato-pa.int 10 October 2015

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION.....................................................................................................................1

II. BACKGROUND: NATO LATE TO WAKE UP TO THE NEW STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT?...................................................................................................................1

III. ALLIED ASSURANCE MEASURES.......................................................................................2

IV. RAP ADAPTATION MEASURES............................................................................................2A. UPGRADING THE NATO RESPONSE FORCE............................................................3B. THE VERY HIGH READINESS JOINT TASK FORCE – THE SPEARHEAD OF

THE NRF.......................................................................................................................3C. HQ READINESS / COMMAND AND CONTROL...........................................................5D. ADDITIONAL ENHANCEMENTS..................................................................................5E. SPECIAL FORCES........................................................................................................6F. TRAINING AND EXERCISES........................................................................................7G. NATIONAL MEASURES................................................................................................7

V. THE SHORT GAME VS. THE LONG GAME: THE RAP AND MOBILIZING NATO’S DIME-FL..................................................................................................................................8A. HURDLES TO THE RAP: A STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITY FOR RUSSIA?..................8

VI. PARLIAMENTARIANS AS KEY ENABLERS: RAP ROLES FOR PARLIAMENTS................9

VII. WILL THE RAP BE EFFECTIVE / SUFFICIENT?................................................................10

VIII. CONCLUSIONS – THE RAP AND BEYOND........................................................................11

BIBLIOGRAPHY...................................................................................................................12

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. 2014 introduced a dual shock to the international security environment – the return of a revisionist Russian state in Europe and the rise of Daesh, a powerful and disruptive non-state actor further destabilizing the arc of crisis from the Middle East to the Sahel. Both threats are pushing up against the NATO Alliance. Lulled into a sense of security in the decades after the Cold War, NATO is suddenly facing new strategic competition on its eastern and southern flanks requiring determined responses.

2. Russia’s actions in the Ukraine delivered a hard blow to longstanding assumptions about European security: particularly the non-use of force to alter state borders; the rejection of spheres of influence; and even the acceptance of the pluralistic nation state. Russian President Vladimir Putin has made it clear that he would use any available means to achieve his goal undoing the post-Cold War security norms in Europe.

3. Putin’s combination of conventional and asymmetrical tactics to achieve this vision have been termed ‘hybrid warfare’1, which exploit domestic weaknesses via non-military and non-attributable means (such as political, informational, and economic intimidation and manipulation) and are backed by the threat of conventional military means. This is largely a struggle for the Allies at the national level, but much also must be done at the Alliance level to prepare, protect, and defend member states. Faced with this new strategic context NATO announced its Readiness Action Plan (RAP).

4. The RAP encapsulates the effort to shore up NATO’s situational awareness, mobility, and response time. As this report will show, the RAP faces several challenges to its implementation. Furthermore, the RAP does not address all of the elements needed to face down Russian competition. While the RAP addresses the needs of Article 5 contingencies, the strategic competition between NATO and Russia in Europe will likely play out at the Articles 3 and 4 levels.

5. The effectiveness of the response to new threats will require renewed and vigorous expressions of political will among the 28 NATO member states and a comprehensive, ‘whole-of-Alliance’ response. Success in this new strategic environment will require the combined diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and, even financial and legal (DIME-FL) powers of all member states. The RAP is certainly a significant step toward both reassurance and deterrence, but, as NATO remains principally a military alliance – the M of the DIME-FL – Allies must continue to think dynamically about identifying and recognizing new threats to their integrity in order to react swiftly. This implies an important role for NATO member state parliamentarians as they will be increasingly called upon as key enablers for a range of Alliance needs.

II. BACKGROUND: NATO LATE TO WAKE UP TO THE NEW STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT?

6. Between Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and the Wales Summit in September 2014, the Alliance’s security priorities changed dramatically. The speed with which Russia was able to affect changes on the ground in the Ukraine required increased Alliance response readiness. In addition, increasing instability throughout the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) saw powerful non-state armed groups spread unprecedented violence and destruction in the region. As a result of this changed security environment, the Wales Summit made the 48 hour deployment of capable and manoeuvrable strike forces throughout the Alliance a priority.

1 The Defence and Security Committee’s 2015 general report focuses on the distinct challenges of Hybrid Warfare. For more information about Hybrid Warfare, Alliance response, and the role for member state Parliamentarians therein, please refer to the DSC General Report [166 DSC 15 E].

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7. To many, however, this was a late recognition of the changed strategic environment in which the Alliance found itself. They believe that Russia’s destabilizing actions over the last decade in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus should have been sufficient warning. In response to a perceived growing threat from Russia, as early as 2009 the Baltic States called on the Alliance to enhance its posture to focus more on territorial defence capabilities; build additional Article 5 contingency planning scenarios; and to increase Allied presence in areas of perceived strategic exposure (Arnadottir, 2009). However, political consensus on the Russian threat eluded the Alliance. Practical cooperation with Russia, suspended for a period following the conflict in Georgia, soon resumed and Russia was even identified as a strategic partner during the 2010 Lisbon Summit.

8. The post-Wales RAP is the most significant expansion of NATO’s collective defence capabilities since the end of the Cold War (NATO, 2015a). It includes assurance and adaptation measures while improving the responsiveness and effectiveness of NATO forces. The RAP updates the Alliance’s readiness and capabilities to protect and defend NATO territories and populations from attack, as outlined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. When fully implemented, the RAP will allow the Alliance to react swiftly and powerfully to emerging military threats, while also strengthening NATO’s collective defence and crisis management capabilities.

III. ALLIED ASSURANCE MEASURES

9. The RAP includes measures addressing the continuous need for assurance of Allies. All 28 Allies currently contribute to the assurance measures in Eastern Europe; including continuous air, land, and maritime presence in the eastern part of the Alliance. These measures provide a baseline requirement for assurance and deterrence, and are designed to be sufficiently flexible and scalable in response to evolving security situations (NATO, 2014a).

10. The result of such actions has seen heightened NATO presence and visibility in Central and Eastern Europe. European Allies have increased resources to the Baltic Air Police Mission over Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, increasing the number of fighter jets on air-police patrol (NATO, 2014b). There are now more aircraft based in Romania as well as Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) surveillance flights over Poland and Romania (NATO, 2015a). As noted above, the Baltic and Black Seas have seen increased maritime activity as well.

IV. RAP ADAPTATION MEASURES

11. The RAP adaptation measures aim to ensure the Alliance capability to address the array of potential future military challenges. These include significantly enhancing the responsiveness of the NATO Response Force (NRF) and establishment a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), a new Allied joint force within the NRF with some elements able to deploy within 48 hours. As it will be discussed below, many of the tactics of hybrid warfare used by Russia are not immediately identifiable as military. However, the use of unidentified Russian commandos to train, advise, and assist local rebel forces in the Ukraine and seize Crimea – all done with the backing of sizeable Russian conventional forces positioned near the conflict in southeast Ukraine, along with the repeated rhetorical mention of Russia’s significant and growing nuclear capabilities – gave Allies good reason to build up their military response capabilities were they to be faced with a similar situation in a NATO member state.

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A. UPGRADING THE NATO RESPONSE FORCE

12. NATO Defence Ministers formally endorsed the enhancement of the NRF in February 2015 to improve the Alliance’s military posture, capabilities, and readiness levels. If sustained, this will alter the Alliance’s long-term military posture.

13. NATO member states approved the establishment of the NRF at the 2002 Prague Summit as a highly capable and rapidly deployable multinational force. The NRF can operate independently, as an initial stabilizing rapid reaction force for out-of-area emergencies, or as a first line of defence for the Alliance. Prior to the Ukrainian crisis, the NRF was under-resourced and poorly utilized. Units assigned to the NRF were used only four times since its 2003 launch, and not at all since 2006.

14. Prior to the September 2014 Wales Summit, the NRF was composed of three elements: a command and control structure (600-700 personnel); the Immediate Response Force (IRF) – a joint force of around 13,000 personnel deployable within several weeks; and a “pool” of response forces, deployable within several months to supplement the IRF when necessary (AE, 2015a). Manning of the NRF is still based on a rotational system in which Allied nations commit land, air, maritime or Special Operations Forces (SOF) units to the IRF for 12 months. Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) has overall strategic command of the NRF, with operational command alternating between NATO's Joint Force Commands Brunssum and Naples.

15. As part of the RAP, the NRF’s new principal task will be to provide an immediate response capacity in the event of an Article 5 operation within NATO territory. The NRF will grow to a division-size joint force with significantly increased readiness and responsiveness, composed of multinational forces trained and organized to respond rapidly to a wide array of contingencies (NATO, 2015b). The NRF will contain air, land, maritime, and Special Operations Forces components, along with the new VJTF – also known as the Spearhead. The current NRF command and control structure will also be enlarged to support this new structure. The NRF will grow to the size of a division (up to 40,000 troops), tripling its current size by 2018 (AE, 2015a; Tigner, 2015a; NATO, 2015d).

16. Since the NRF is intended to defend any Ally, deploy anywhere, and deal with unforeseen threats, the NRF must prepare for a wide array of tasks – as such the priorities of the revamped NRF focuses on deployable well-trained and exercised forces. A unanimous vote by all 28-member states at the North Atlantic Council (NAC) is required to deploy the NRF.

17. It is important to remember that the NRF is only a small subset of the total national forces that NATO may call upon in case of an emergency. While this report focuses on the RAP, the readiness and robustness of NATO’s broader force structure may also be a concern, particularly if NATO were to be engaged in a longer conflict.

B. THE VERY HIGH READINESS JOINT TASK FORCE – THE SPEARHEAD OF THE NRF

18. The centrepiece of the RAP is the establishment of the VJTF; a joint force capable of deploying in response to threats within two to seven days’ notice, particularly along NATO’s periphery (NATO, 2014a). NATO planners expect this will act as an escalation deterrent, making it well suited to hybrid warfare tactics (Tigner, 2015a). The VJTF forces, up to 5,000 strong (brigade-level), will be supplied from Allies. One Ally, in an annual rotation, will act as the framework nation for the force, though two to three nations might be needed to support the maintenance of the brigade’s scale-up and scale-down readiness.

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19. The VJTF is a multinational brigade with up to five manoeuvre battalions and a standing headquarters. As a whole, the brigade will be deployable within seven days at most in its full capability, which includes air and maritime support, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defence capabilities. At a minimum, at least one battalion of the brigade should be deployable within 48 hours (AE, 2015a).

20. The VJTF will operate on a three-year cycle. Each year, three multinational brigades will be mobilized for the NRF: the first brigade will fill the role of VJTF for the year in progress; the second brigade will prepare to take the role of VJTF during the following year and will maintain a readiness for deployment within six weeks; and the third brigade will have recently completed its role as VJTF and be deployable as part of the NRF within one month. The framework nation for the VJTF will provide one or two battalions, command capability (brigade headquarters), and transport and logistics (AE, 2015a).

21. The VJTF will be operational by the 2016 NATO summit in Warsaw. A number of Allies also continue to request that NATO establish a permanent presence in Central and Eastern Europe. Although the VJTF will be filled through rotations, year-round rotations will give NATO a close to de facto permanent presence near its Eastern border (Simón, 2014). Poland hopes that the Alliance will implement measures beyond the RAP to strengthen the Alliance’s eastern flank permanently, such as prepositioning sufficient equipment and improving infrastructure to support the rapid deployment of the entire NRF, rather than just the rapid deployment of the brigade-sized VJTF (AE, 2015b).

22. An interim VJTF capability is already training and exercising, led by Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway. While Germany is acting as the framework nation for this interim force, Spain, the United Kingdom, Italy, Poland, and France have agreed to take on the role of framework nation, in that order, for the annual rotations of the VJTF from 2016 to 2020 (AE, 2015a). Since the costs for the deployment and exercising of the VJTF currently lie where they fall, these nations must be prepared to take on significant financial costs, if necessary, while acting as the framework nation. This could affect future exercises and the ability to achieve a unanimous decision to deploy the force in ambiguous situations.

23. The primary contributors to the VJTF are European nations. However, the United States is actively supporting this endeavour with high-end military assets. In June 2015, the United States committed to support the VJTF with 10 categories of enablers: intra-theatre and strategic lift; airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; combat sustainment support; mid-air refuelling; an air and space expeditionary wing; naval support assets; precision joint-fires; combat helicopters; a deployable command post; and special operations air and maritime capabilities. The support includes a limited number of US personnel, some of which may be reassigned from existing posts in Europe. In a crisis situation, this could entail a temporary increase in US forces in Europe.

24. The first two exercises for the VJTF occurred in March and April 2015, testing national-level procedures, coordination capability of command structures, and mobilization capacity (standby, assembly and transport towards point of embarkation). The primary June 2015 exercise, Noble Jump 15, deployed the force on the ground in real conditions for the first time. During the exercise, 2100 soldiers from nine countries successfully deployed in four days, with 9 trains, 440 vehicles, 30 military convoys, 17 aircraft, and over 100 containers (AE, 2015f). Exercise Steadfast Cobalt 15 was also conducted in June 2015. This exercise tested the VJTF’s communication and information systems, particularly those intended to counter cyber-attacks. The largest exercise, Trident Juncture 2015, will take place from October to November

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2015 and will test the capabilities of the interim VJTF.2 Once operational, NATO plans to test the VJTF with two annual exercises held on a surprise request from SACEUR.

C. HQ READINESS / COMMAND AND CONTROL

25. For effective implementation of the RAP, NATO’s Command Structure should be robust, flexible, and able to address simultaneous challenges. At the Wales Summit, leaders recognized the necessity of increased regional focus and enhanced situational awareness. Therefore, Allies are increasing the readiness and capabilities of the Headquarters Multinational Corps Northeast (MNC NE) in Szczecin, Poland, while enhancing its role as a hub for regional cooperation.

26. Specifically, MNC NE is being raised from lower readiness (180 days’ notice) status to high readiness (30 days’ notice). Allies intend for MNC NE to fulfil a joint and regional role to exercise command and control of the full-range of Alliance missions in NATO’s northeast (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland), with emphasis on Article 5 operations. This will include command and control over the VJTF, NRF, and follow-on forces as well as the over four NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs) under its command, as described below (von der Leyen et al, 2015).

27. MNC NE reached initial operational capability in mid-2015, which includes achieving and maintaining joint and comprehensive situational awareness, coordination of NATO joint assurance measures, and command and control over its regional NFIUs. Full operational capability will be reached in 2016, with the ability to manage VJTF exercises on eastern Allied territory, and then exert control over all of the NRF by 2018. MNC NE will also likely be used to support exercises and/or operations in South-eastern Europe by a new multinational division headquarters (AE, 2015a).

28. MNC NE will be supported by new multinational command and control structures in NATO’s eastern territory - NFIUs. NFIUs are intended to form a visible, consistent NATO presence on the territories of eastern Allies facilitating the rapid deployment of Allied forces to the region, if necessary. The NFIUs will also support collective defence planning, and assist with the coordination of multinational training and exercises (NATO, 2015b). The establishment of the first six NFIUs in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania is underway, although they are not yet fully operational. Each NFIU will be comprised of approximately 40 NATO logistics and planning personnel. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has stated that NATO will consider establishing NFIUs in other allied countries, with several allies already offering to host such a facility (AE, 2015a; Tigner, 2015b). Finally, Romania has announced its intention to make available to NATO a new deployable Multinational Divisional Headquarters as Multinational Division Southeast (NATO, 2015b).

D. ADDITIONAL ENHANCEMENTS

29. Allies recognize the need to enhance NATO's ability to reinforce Allies along its eastern flank through the preparation of infrastructure, such as airfields and ports, prepositioning of equipment and supplies, and designation of specific bases. These preparations would allow the VJTF and NRF to have adequate host nation support if deployed. Progress on adapting infrastructure and pre-positioning equipment in support of direct VJTF deployment has been minimal, likely due, in part, to SACEUR’s impending presentation to the NAC of the specific areas of need (AE 2015b). Assessing the requirements for receiving a brigade is complex, and assigning tasks and costs to individual Allies is politically sensitive. Additionally, moving military equipment across European states can be a lengthy, complicated process. Nevertheless, the

2 The DSCFC will be sending a parliamentary mission to Sardinia in October 2015 to observe part of Trident Juncture 2015 exercises.

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United States has agreed to provide make some strategic transport means available in Europe. The goal is for the rest of these decisions to be taken prior to the 2016 Warsaw summit.

30. Additionally, there has been some bilateral progress to address adaptation of infrastructure. In June 2015, the United States announced its intent to temporarily pre-position tanks, infantry-fighting vehicles, artillery, and associated equipment needed for one armoured brigade combat team in Central and Eastern Europe. The equipment will be distributed across six NATO allies (Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland) and based near training locations. Two battalions are already in Europe, with the third set expected to arrive soon. This equipment is being installed under the framework of bilateral agreements, primarily strengthening the posture of US forces along the eastern flank and supporting the enhanced training program the United States has been involved in over the past year (Lute, 2015).

31. NATO recognizes Allies may choose to use the RAP to assist countries confronted by hybrid threats in a sub-Article 5 scenario. NATO ministers have approved changes/enhancements in the planning provisions, allowing for graduated response planning. Ministers believe that graduated response planning will facilitate and accelerate the decision-making process (AE, 2015c), as NATO is already working with specific countries to put some mechanisms in place to engage the VJTF or other non-assigned forces should they be needed. The engagement of the VJTF to shore up defences is intended to alleviate pressure on the host government, theoretically allowing it to focus on non-military aspects of the threat faced.

32. In the face of the asymmetrical challenges posed by Hybrid warfare, NATO is also enhancing its intelligence and strategic awareness. Additionally, the Alliance is exploring new ways of working with international partners, from nation states to international organizations. Allied forces also need to maintain adequate readiness to conduct NATO's full range of missions. Some Allies are contributing to enhancing NATO’s readiness simply by raising the readiness of their forces.

33. While the land force element RAP is being emphasized, air and maritime will also have increased roles. NATO is enhancing its maritime situational awareness and moving assets to allow for quick deployment of fast patrol boats, submarines, and amphibious landing ships to hold water and major forts in the instance of conflict. NATO maritime assets will be able to conduct the full spectrum of conventional maritime operations; their current focus is on Russia’s principal outlets for maritime aggression in Europe: the Baltic and Black Seas.

E. SPECIAL FORCES

34. The role of Special Forces in the VJTF should not be underestimated. The addition of member states’ Special Forces to the VJTF has the dual-effect of increasing not only the range of operational capacity of the force, but also a heightened ability for situational awareness – a critical asset when facing hybrid warfare challenges. A particular strength of NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ) has been its ability to develop a trained, familiar network of member-state Special Operations Forces (SOF).

35. Over the years of training and close operational partnership from the Balkan conflicts to Afghanistan, NSHQ has created a robust network between NATO member states’ SOFs – which has proven to be a reliable source of intelligence and manpower for the Alliance throughout its last two decades of operations. Their emphasis on military assistance builds the capacity for all NATO member states to have high-level SOF capability for direct action and extensive reconnaissance – thereby raising situational awareness alliance-wide.

36. The Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities (DSCFC) visited the French Special Forces in July 2015. The delegation gained greater insight into the national

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capabilities of France’s SOF, as well as its service to the Alliance’s greater interests. It is clear that closer incorporation of SOF capabilities is key to facing down many of the challenges of the 21st century security environment.

F. TRAINING AND EXERCISES3

37. At the Wales Summit, Allies agreed to establish an enhanced exercise program with an increased focus on exercising collective defence, including practising comprehensive responses to complex civil-military scenarios. Member States are deploying ground troops to the eastern parts of the Alliance for training and exercises, on a rotational basis. With these additional resources, training initiatives in Central and Eastern Europe have been scaled up (Simón, 2014). NATO expects to hold 270 exercises in 2015, with half taking place on the eastern flank. General Jean-Paul Paloméros, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, contends that the scope and realism of these exercises have been dramatically improved, with exercises now incorporating hybrid threats such as cyber and ballistic missile defence (AE, 2015e). 

38. The largest exercise, Trident Juncture 2015, is intended to qualify elements of the NRF for rotational duties in 2016, test the capabilities of the interim VJTF, and demonstrate the Alliance’s solidarity and strength. Allies and partners will train, deploy and exercise in a complex and distributed environment reflecting contemporary warfare as realistically as possible, with cyber-defence and countering aggressive propaganda from a fictitious enemy playing an important role in the exercise. New concepts will be utilized, including missile defence and interconnected communications systems. The exercise represents the final step in the certification process for the command and control elements of the NRF for 2016. Trident Juncture 2015 is scheduled for 3 October to 6 November with over 36,000 troops expected to participate from all allied countries (except Iceland) and 7 partner countries, as well as 15 international organizations and NGOs, including the European Union, African Union, and Red Cross. Additionally, observers from the Russian Federation have been invited (JFC Brunssum, 2015; AE, 2015e; AE, 2015g).

G. NATIONAL MEASURES

39. RAP assurance measures are supported by and implemented through individual and/or joint member state initiatives. The United States’ European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) is the most prominent to date. The ERI will improve the Alliance’s long-term military posture and partnerships (particularly the Ukraine, Georgia, and the Republic of Moldova). In December 2014, the US Congress approved $985 million for the programme to ensure: an increased, continuous presence of US air, land, and maritime forces along the Alliance’s eastern flank; deployments of additional US warships to the Baltic and Black Seas; increased US participation in NATO exercises; prepositioned equipment and supplies; and upgraded infrastructure.4 US staff officers will be stationed at each of NATO’s new command and control centres in Eastern Europe.

40. As part of the ERI, the US Congress approved $175 million to provide military assistance to Ukraine and the Baltics. Furthermore, the US Department of Defense has requested an additional $789.3 million to continue ERI initiatives in 2016, with a heightened investment in European training exercises.

3 For more information on the increased training and exercise initiatives, please see the DSCTC Report “Realizing the Goals of the Summit: Strengthening the Transatlantic Link” [168 DSCTC 15 E].

4 Specifically, the ERI provides funding for the NATO Response Force, Army Rotational Forces, the Black Sea Rotational Forces, increased participation in the Baltic Air Policing Mission and Poland Aviation Detachment (AVDET) Training, along with air-to-air-refuelling missions and Open Skies Treaty Flights.

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41. A number of European nations are participating in initiatives under the Framework Nations Concept (FNC). Germany is leading an initiative supporting the implementation of the NATO Readiness Action Plan. Their initiative concentrates on logistics support; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear protection; delivering firepower; and deployable headquarters. The United Kingdom is also leading a FNC initiative – a Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) that also includes the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The force is set to deploy rapidly into theatre, particularly in the Baltic region, conduct the full spectrum of operations, and increase the Alliance’s readiness and ability to project maritime and amphibious power in the North and Baltic Seas. The UK has stated its intention to integrate JEF partners’ contributions fully into the UK’s existing high readiness capabilities before 2018. Other Allies will be expected to continue to ramp up their own individual reassurance measures throughout the year.

V. THE SHORT GAME VS. THE LONG GAME: THE RAP AND MOBILIZING NATO’SDIME-FL

42. The Alliance is composed of 28 democratic member states each with its own history, culture, and institutions; domestic decision-making in each, fortunately, requires debate and discussion. The Alliance, on the other hand, adopts measures by unanimous vote. This means that, structurally, the speed of decision-making is much slower, though far more transparent, than in a country like Russia. The extreme concentration of power in the hands of Vladimir Putin today means that Russian action depends largely on the will of a single actor within the state.

43. In addition, the hurdles to effective interstate cooperation are multiplied by 28, presenting challenges to accurate situational awareness in every region of the Alliance. A principal challenge to the Alliance, therefore, is to come to a shared understanding of threats. Further, the lack of seamless coordination with other regional institutions, such as the EU, is a continued drain on the full potential of the Alliance.

A. HURDLES TO THE RAP: A STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITY FOR RUSSIA?

44. There are also several immediate challenges to the establishment of an effective RAP:

45. Time: The implementation of the RAP and VJTF is ahead of schedule with the stand-up of an interim VJTF. Trident Juncture exercise, however, does not take place until late 2015. The implementation of some of the 12 adaptation measures contained in the RAP remain outstanding, but the allied Chiefs of Defence stressed that all decisions will be put into effect by the Warsaw Summit in July 2016. The VJTF is expected to reach full operational capability by the Warsaw Summit as well.

46. Deployment: The VJTF has a 2-7 days notice-to-move ambition under the RAP’s revamped NRF. Many analysts still question the ability to get sufficient forces to the area before an irrevocable change on the ground, should there be, for example, a Russian incursion into the Baltics. SACEUR has been given the authority to alert, stage, and prepare troops so that they are ready to move once a political decision by the NAC is made. SACEUR had proposed, however, having the ability to begin the deployment of forces prior to NAC authorization, as it was deemed militarily prudent to have such a rapid reaction capability. This ‘Alert, Stage, and Deploy’ measure was taken off the table by the NAC in a clear message that, in line with member state constitutions, the authority for any movement of forces will remain a political decision. The NAC believes that it should be able to meet as a matter of urgency and take a decision within 12 hours under the new procedures put in place (AE, 2015c).

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47. Even if NATO is able to make these decisions with sufficient speed, the Baltic States and Poland believe that NATO’s readiness to deploy the VJTF rapidly does not provide them with sufficient guarantees of security. The Polish government has put out a text entitled “Warsaw initiative for strategic adaptation,” with its primary demand being the modification of the NATO defence posture such that it can rapidly deploy the entire 40,000-person NRF to the eastern front, rather than just the brigade-sized VJTF. The Baltic States would like to host new permanent NATO bases on their territory (AE, 2015d).

48. Resources: The RAP can be effective only if it is resourced sufficiently. The VJTF and RAP are currently funded primarily under NATO’s costs-lie-where-they-fall principle, i.e. national contributions. Maintaining high-level readiness, however, is costly and resource-intensive, as is adjusting infrastructure and prepositioning equipment. Assurance measures are also expensive: transporting troops and equipment for training and exercises can pose significant burdens, particularly when defence budgets are already strained. There is a legitimate question about the current level of funding being made available for assurance/deterrence measures Alliance-wide and whether more aspects of these measures should fall under NATO common funding.

49. Similarly, generating a sufficient number of forces for the NRF will not be easy. Decades of defence reductions have hollowed many European states’ ability to field and sustain corps (even divisions); only time and money will fix this. Even if there is the political will to build the NRF to levels of ambition, sustaining the force into the future will be difficult, particularly if the threat diminishes or becomes more ‘normalized.’ More broadly, the RAP is only effective in Article 5 situations if the broader NATO force structure can fill in and support it when necessary. A division-sized force cannot tackle today’s challenges like Russia or Daesh on its own should conflicts escalate. If nations do not adopt the Wales Summit Defence Spending Pledge, neither the RAP nor enhancement of the broader NATO force will be affordable. This underscores the importance of more efficient use of funds and equipment going forward.

VI. PARLIAMENTARIANS AS KEY ENABLERS: RAP ROLES FOR PARLIAMENTS

50. More than ever, NATO member state parliamentarians have a vital role to play in the near and long-term viability of the Alliance. Parliamentarians will be the key enablers of an effective RAP. Deterrence and reassurance are about capability, capacity, and will. Parliamentarians need to demonstrate the political will to act when a threat is hard to define.

51. Political Will and Investment – The RAP is largely a conventional, military response to a hybrid threat. It is only effective if the necessary defence capabilities are achieved and the political will to use them exists. Member states must therefore be able to reach common accord for its use. Since the costs for the RAP lie with the participating nation, successful implementation cannot be directed solely by executives – member state parliamentarians must support the provision of the funding necessary to build and sustain it.

52. Force Mobilization and Political Authority – A key hurdle to be cleared regarding the RAP, particularly the VJTF, is facilitating the necessary parliamentary approval needed for force deployment. This is an issue that the NATO PA must debate and understand the steps individual member state parliaments are taking to address this issue.

53. Public Outreach – Another role for parliamentarians is undertaking public outreach and education, particularly within their constituencies as this will help build public awareness and resilience in the face of attempts at subversion via propaganda. Working to strengthen the role of an informed civil society in every member state will help populations in general, as well as those particularly vulnerable, resist hybrid tactics of message manipulation. This is critical to sustaining

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support for Alliance solidarity, as many publics seem to be unaware of the nature of the threats facing all member states in the 21st century security environment and, therefore, the continued and increased relevance of NATO today. For example, a recent study by the PEW Research Center found that more than half of respondents in France, Italy, and Germany would not support the use of military force to defend a NATO ally that was invaded by Russia – this does not bode well for the credibility of future commitment to Article 5. (Simmons, Stokes, and Poushter, 2015).

54. Intelligence Sharing – Intelligence sharing among Allies has long been an issue of debate – the RAP brings this back to the forefront as clear mechanisms for intelligence sharing are necessary for accurate situational awareness. While links between member states’ external intelligence services exist, the degree to which domestic intelligence is shared should be brought back into the debate. The ambiguity of Russian tactics employed in the Ukraine as well as those used by jihadist terrorists underscores the vital nature of this point. NATO member state parliaments can advance this issue in the right direction.

55. Coordination – Significant legal and technical obstacles to the cross-border transit of military equipment continue to exist throughout the Alliance. Such a reality clearly challenges the rapid deployment of the VJTF. One NATO official contests that it can easily take up to three weeks to move equipment by surface across Europe (Tigner, 2015b). This is an area for national parliaments to work together to harmonize legislation and/or facilitate movement during contingency operations.

VII. WILL THE RAP BE EFFECTIVE / SUFFICIENT?

56. The RAP’s first aim is to address traditional military threats – it does not speak directly to hybrid threats. NATO has recognized the need to both counter and defend against hostile non-military actions like those outlined above and leaders have announced NATO’s intention to enhance strategic communications, develop exercise scenarios, and strengthen coordination between NATO and other organizations with a view to improving information sharing, political consultations, and staff-to-staff coordination. However, few details expanding on these initiatives are available, but they are essential to reinforcing overall security.

57. The rise of Daesh in the MENA region presents a new challenge to the Alliance. Since it is out of area, NATO is not envisioning an operation to confront Daesh at this time, though NATO states are contributing to the current US effort to degrade and dislodge the group from the territories it holds. Rather, NATO is treating the possible effects of the group’s regional disruption as potential crisis response scenarios. To this affect, Turkey requested Article 4 consultations in July 2015 to brief Allies on the measures it is taking to deal with the threat on its border. While the RAP permits faster response times to crises as well, it would be ill-suited for the type of longer term containment necessary for a group like Daesh. This group is but one of the elements engendering an arc of instability extending down through Libya into the Sahel out to Nigeria and Somalia. There is no current official strategy for dealing with the challenges to NATO’s southern flank; one is expected in the near-term.

58. Some experts argue that the deterrent provided by the RAP will make aggressors rethink any significant hostile actions against NATO territories, both military and non-military. The RAP would counter a strategy of escalation dominance, as utilized by both sides during the Cold War. Escalation dominance holds that a nation can best contain conflicts and avoid escalation if its capabilities are dominant at each successive rung up the escalation ladder, all the way to the top rung of nuclear weapons (Kitfield, 2015). NATO adaptation and assurance measures are designed to demonstrate to Russians that Russia’s tactical toolset is not dominant to NATO’s, and introduce scepticism about whether their operational and strategic kits could dominate

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NATO’s and provide adequate reinforcement in the case of a crisis. Others worry that Russia will see the implementation of the RAP as provocative, leading to further spiraling tensions.

59. At a minimum, it is important to remember that the Russian armed forces and defence establishment is undergoing a significant, deliberate modernization with accompanying updated strategies and guidelines; perhaps most significant among these reforms being the modernization of Russia’s nuclear forces, which are receiving an additional 40 intercontinental ballistic missiles this year.

60. It can be argued that augmenting conventional military power, such as that supplied by the RAP, will have a limited deterrent effect against unconventional / hybrid threats. Such threats include cyber-attacks, under-cover assets, energy blackmail, financial manipulation, agitation of ethnic Russian minorities, information warfare, etc. (Simón, 2014). The United States has committed to strengthen NATO’s Cyber Defence Center of Excellence and encouraged member states to participate more in cyber exercises to prepare for this type of threat. Member states can also pursue national initiatives to work towards meeting NATO’s cyber defence targets in order to strengthen the security of national and NATO networks. These actions are necessary but insufficient. With these unconventional threats, the RAP is only one of several instruments that must be employed. The RAP can help relieve the pressure from more appropriately mandated organizations, like domestic governments and the European Union, giving them additional space and capacity to act. NATO is actively testing this theory through the inclusion of international organisations in Trident Juncture Exercise.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS – THE RAP AND BEYOND

61. The RAP is the most significant effort by NATO to adapt to the challenges of the 21 st

century security environment. Revamping the NRF and creating a VJTF with a notice-to-move of 2-7 days gives NATO the ability to bring significant firepower and manoeuvre to any part of the Alliance that is threatened. This is the most substantial outcome from the Wales Summit; its implementation will test the commitment and credibility of the Alliance going forward.

62. With the RAP, NATO is preparing for Article 5 contingencies. Hybrid warfare is at its most disruptive at the Article 4 level. It is clearly important to mobilize the Allies’ military resources, but this is only the M of the vast potential offered by the Alliance’s diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial and legal power. New dynamic thinking will be required to mobilize the DIME-FL of all 28 NATO member states.

63. Generating political cohesion to support the implementation of the RAP will be more difficult than generating the plans for its stand-up. There needs to be solidarity, cohesion, and resolve in meeting the challenge. This requires a common understanding and strategic assessment of threat. Instead, there is a wide array of threat perceptions amongst the 28 Allies – the June 2015 political guidance positions the RAP to address the strategic interests of the entire Alliance.

64. Similarly, there are varying comfort levels with how much authority should be given to military authorities over the deployment and utilization of the NRF. Even if the force is maintained at the prescribed levels of readiness, disagreements between Allies over its deployment and mission could seriously hinder the ability of the force to arrive before a conflict escalates to a crisis.

65. In the words of U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter, NATO understands “its need to change, change the way it operates, change the way it invests, change the way it plans, change the way it makes the decision to deal with these new [security] circumstances” (Carter, 2015). The RAP is a

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significant step in the right direction, but it must be one of many tools in a newly configured toolbox for the Alliance as it faces a new, complex security environment.

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