2015 china anti-monopoly annual report - anjie...

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2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT January 2016 2015 China Anti-Monopoly Annual Report Dr. Zhan Hao & Song Ying Wechat QR CODE www.anjielaw.com www.chinalawvision.com 19/F, Tower D1, Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building, No. 19 Dongfangdonglu, Chaoyang District, Beijing, China General Line: +86 10 8567 5988 Fax: +86 10 8567 5999 www.anjielaw.com

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2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY

ANNUAL REPORT January 2016

2015 China Anti-Monopoly Annual Report

Dr Zhan Hao amp Song Ying

Wechat QR CODE wwwanjielawcom

wwwchinalawvisioncom

19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing China General Line +86 10 8567 5988 Fax +86 10 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Contents I Legislation 1

A Legislation Tendency Highlight 1 B Legislation of SAIC 1

Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition 2 Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition 2

C Legislation of NDRC 3 Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines 3 Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses 4

D Legislation of MOFCOM 4 The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases 4 Auto Sales Management Measures 4

II Public Enforcement 5 A Merger Control 5 Enforcement Tendency Highlight 5 Significant Cases 6

GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions 6 AB InBevs Investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery 7 MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases 8 MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent 10 Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions 12 SeagateSamsungMOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions 14 FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM 16

B Monopolistic Agreements 18 Enforcement Tendency Highlight 18 Significant Cases 18

Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC 18 Analysis 21 Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau 21 Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC 23 DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC 24 Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC 25 Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC 26 Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC 27 Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC 30

C Abuse of Market Dominance 31 Enforcement Tendency Highlight 31 Significant Cases 31

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case 32 Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms 33 Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company 34 Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm 35

D Administrative Monopoly 37 Enforcement Tendency Highlight 37 Significant Cases 37

Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC 37 Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 38

III Private Litigation 40 A Enforcement Tendency Highlight 40 B Significant Cases 40

Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending) 40 Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 41 Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending) 44 Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals (Pending) 45 Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei 46 Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines 48

IV General Conclusion 50 Contact 52

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 1 of 51

2015 China Anti-Monopoly Annual Report

Dr Zhan Hao amp Song Ying1

I Legislation

A Legislation Tendency Highlight

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement agencies namely the National Development and Reform Commission (ldquoNDRCrdquo) the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoSAICrdquo) and the Ministry of Commerce (ldquoMOFCOMrdquo) made more efforts regarding legislation especially when it comes to strengthening the role of soft law compared to 2014

Intellectual property right (ldquoIPRrdquo) related antitrust issues are a hot topic At this stage three antitrust enforcement bodies and the State Intellectual Property Office are respectively drafting the IPR antitrust guidelines based on their respective enforcement areas and are going to submit their respective guidelines to the State Councilrsquos Anti-monopoly Commission (ldquoAMCrdquo) The AMC will eventually come up with the final and unified guidelines (the ldquoIPR Antitrust Guidelinesrdquo) based on the draft versions submitted by above-mentioned bodies

The auto industry has consistently attracted attention under the framework of AML Apart from continuous enforcement activities against cartel vertical monopolistic agreement and abusing dominance in the auto industry the antitrust guidelines for the auto industries being drafted by NDRC (the ldquoAuto Industry Antitrust Guidelinesrdquo) are the only antitrust guidelines specialized for a particular industry This suggests a deepening and detailing of legislative activities of Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement authorities

In addition to the IPR Antitrust Guidelines and the Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines the NDRC has also drafted four other guidelines in 2015 in order to normalize and guide the enforcement activities The four guidelines include Guidelines on Leniency Policy Guidelines on Commitment of Undertakings Guidelines on Calculating the Illegal Gains and Fines for Monopoly Conducts and Guidelines on Procedures of Monopolistic agreement Exemption

B Legislation of SAIC

1 Dr Zhan Hao is the managing partner of AnJie Law Firm and received his Doctoral degree Master degree and Bachelor degree in law Dr Zhan also conducted Post-doctoral research on Microeconomics E-mail address zhanhaoanjielawcom Song Ying is a partner of AnJie Law Firm whose practice focuses on antitrust and litigation Ms Song can be reached at the following e-mail address songyinganjielawcom The other team members of AnJie competition team including Li Xiang Wang Lingling Zhang Wenyi Zheng Shuangshi and Feng Siduo also make contribution to this report

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 2 of 52

Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition2

On April 7 2015 SAIC issued the Rules on the Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition (the ldquoIPR Antitrust Rulesrdquo) which have taken effect on August 1 2015

The IPR Antitrust Rules consist of six main parts including

clarifying the purpose and basis of the legislation and providing relevant legal concepts (eg Article 1)

prohibiting undertakings from reaching any monopolistic agreements through exercising intellectual property rights and providing the principle of ldquoSafe Harbourrdquo and its details (eg Article 5)

illustrating the rules for undertakings with dominant position exercising intellectual property rights and especially proposing the ldquoessential facility doctrinerdquo (eg Article 10)

laying out the rules for exercising IP rights related to the patent pool and standardization (eg Article 12 and 13)

providing the analytical approaches and consideration factors for conducting the antitrust assessment (eg Article 15) and

stipulating the possible punishments to be imposed in case of violation of this Rules (eg Article 17)

Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition

The Anti-monopoly and Anti-unfair Competition Enforcement Bureau of SAIC released the sixth draft of ldquoGuidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competitionrdquo (ldquoSAIC draft IPR Guidelinesrdquo) on January 6 2016

The SAIC draft IPR Guidelines cover various IPR related antitrust issues - such as restrictions on technology RampD between competitors exclusive grant-back clauses market division among competitors and safe harbour rules regarding monopolistic agreements involving IPRs etc The following areas are mainly illustrated

Chapter 1 clarifies general principles of the guidelines the relationship between antitrust law and IPR protection as well as the relationship between IPR abuse and monopolistic behaviour It also covers nature and type of conduct eliminating

2 The original Chinese notice published by SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnfldyfbzdjzzcfgzcfg201507t20150724_159428html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 3 of 52

or restricting competition via IPR abuse the relationship between IPR and market dominance position the legal responsibilities and remedies as well as the scope of application

Chapter 2 outlines the basic analysis framework including its methodology analytical steps factors and competition effects

Chapter 3 relates to defining the relevant market including the general principle and circumstances where relevant technology market and relevant innovation market should be defined

Chapter 4 refers to monopolistic agreements involving IPR including factors that should be taken into account when analysing these agreements and related safe harbour regulations

Chapter 5 stipulates the circumstances regarding the abuse of market dominance in the exercise of IPRs including refusal to license tie-in sales and other unjustifiable transactions

Chapter 6 involves undertakingsrsquo concentration when exercising IPRs

Chapter 7 analyses certain special behaviour-types related to the exercise of IPRs from the antitrust perspective including standard-setting related activities injunction for standard essential patents (ldquoSEPrdquo) patent pooling and behaviour of copyright management organizations

It is reported that the SAIC has finished soliciting opinions from the US and EU chambers of commerce some major Western companies and law firms The SAICrsquos antitrust division will gather feedback on the sixth draft from relevant departments of the Chinese government competition organizations and antitrust scholars The draft will then be submitted to the AMC for review

C Legislation of NDRC

Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines

During the Annual Conference of China Automobile Dealers Association held in November 2015 one of the NDRC officials said that the first draft of Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines (ldquoAuto Antitrust Guidelinesrdquo) has been completed According to the official Auto Antitrust Guidelines consist of six sections respectively preface basic issues monopolistic agreement abuse of dominant position concentration of undertakings and supplementary articles Furthermore the official stated that vertical price restrictions on sales of new energy auto might be exempted during the promotion period

Auto Antitrust Guidelines will likely be released in 2016 by the State Council instead of the NDRC according to Wei Tongwei general secretary of the spare part

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 4 of 52

working committee under the China Automotive Maintenance and Repair Trade Association

Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses3

NDRC published a draft of the Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses on December 31 2015 NDRC noted that the consultation period for the draft guidelines run from 1 until 20 January 2016

The draft guidelines constitute five parts preamble basic issues IPR-related agreements that may eliminate or restrict competition IPR-related abuse of dominant position and concentration involving IPR

The draft guidelines cover antitrust issues related to joint RampD patent pool cross licensing standardization price restriction exclusive grant-back no-challenge clause exemption of agreements unfairly high royalty fees refusal to license tying sale imposing unreasonable transaction conditions discriminatory treatment and injunctive relief

The draft guidelines also include factors for determining whether the application of injunction orders by standard essential patent owners can lead to the elimination or restriction of competition such as whether the parties involved expressed their true intentions during negotiations

D Legislation of MOFCOM

The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases4

MOFCOM issued the Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases on February 6 2015 which took effect at the same time

Auto Sales Management Measures

MOFCOM posted a draft of the Auto Sales Management Measures (the ldquodraft Measuresrdquo) on its website on 6 January 2016 and is soliciting for comments until 6 February 2016 MOFCOM intends to implement this new rule to replace the current Auto Brand Sales Management Measures

According to the draft Measures any vehicle sales and related services engaged in the territory of China shall be abided by this rule The draft Measures consist of five parts which are the general principles code of conduct supervision and management penalty provision and bylaw

The Measures clearly provide that the departments of the commercial 3 The original Chinese notice published by NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201512t20151231_770233html 4 The original notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticlei20150220150200891361shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 5 of 52

administration under the State Council will be in charge of nationwide auto sales management

In the second part the draft Measures list the conducts in which a supplier shall not engage in These conducts include restricting distributors from reselling their products requesting distributors to share expenses for their own marketing activities restricting distributors from selling parts of other brands or providing after-sales services for other brands and so on Most of these conducts are deemed as vertical monopolistic agreements which are likely to induce anti-competitive effects in EU and US practices

As reported the Chinese government will make efforts to coordinate the Auto Antitrust Guidelines and the Measures-- two upcoming industry-specific regulations

II Public Enforcement

A Merger Control

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

With the increase in the number of cases been filed and reviewed it is recognized that MOFCOM has become one of the most important jurisdictions of merger control in the world

The simplified procedure has improved the efficiency of MOFCOMrsquos merger review in a large degree Most cases in simple procedure were concluded during the first phase However MOFCOMrsquos review time lasts longer in a few cases For instance MOFCOM spent 162 days to clear Toyota Industries Corps purchase of a 55 stake in Singaporean logistics company LT Wuliao Banyun Holdings setting a new record for the length of a simple case review

MOFCOM used to focus on horizontal deals but now also considers vertical and conglomerate mergers important In 2015 only 35 of the cases being reviewed were horizontal mergers

The increased number of administrative punishment on cases that failed to notify in 2015 demonstrates that MOFCOM has further strengthened its enforcement on this respect

The supervision of remedy implementation has become ldquoroutinizedrdquo

All divisions of MOFCOMrsquos antitrust bureau are responsible for case reviewing from the end of 2015 with the aim to improve the work efficiency

The international cooperation between antitrust enforcement authorities with respect to merger controls happens more frequently On 15 October 2015 the competition department of EU Commissions (ldquoCommissionrdquo) and MOFCOM

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 6 of 52

have signed best practices for cooperation on reviewing mergers in Beijing As the Commissionrsquos officer says the growing number of international transactions is the main reason for this cooperation In addition the Commission also signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the NDRC and SAIC in 2012 which creates a dedicated framework to strengthen cooperation and coordination5

Statistics

From January of 2009 to the end of 2015 MOFCOM received 1445 cases and accepted 1364 cases Among the reviewed cases MOFCOM has cleared 26 deals with remedies since the AML took effect in 2008 with an average review time of 199 days

In 2015 MOFCOM accepted 338 cases out of which 332 were concluded including 18 cases dealing with applicants withdrawing merger filings The agency also imposed penalties on business operators in 9 cases that were related to failure to fulfil merger filing obligations

246 cases out of 332 cases in 2015 obtained MOFCOMrsquos approval in the first phase accounting for 74 of all reviewed cases

Of the cases cleared by MOFCOM in 2015 56 were related to manufacturing such as automotive components and parts vessels machinery manufacturing and electrical equipment

Acquisitions and joint-venture agreements were the most common types of transactions accounting for 87 of all deals Meanwhile joint ventures were still the most common channel for foreign investment in China

Significant Cases

GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions6

This is the first case in which MOFCOM agreed to remove a remedy imposed on a merger

MOFCOM partially removed the restrictions on Google based on the fact that Google had lost its control of Motorola Mobility

Facts

Google applied to MOFCOM on December 1 2014 to remove the condition that required Google to treat all original equipment manufacturers (ldquoOEMsrdquo) equally in android platform-related business after it bought Motorola

5 The original notice published by EC is available at httpeuropaeurapidpress-release_IP-15-5843_enhtml 6 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150120150100862331shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 7 of 52

The concerned remedy was imposed by MOFCOM according to its No 25 Announcement in 2012 which concerned Googlersquos acquisition of Motorola Mobility together with three other remedies as the following

1) Google will license the Android Platform on a free and open basis as it had done so far

2) Google shall continue to observe the existed FRAND obligation of Motorola Mobility in respect of the latterrsquos patents and

3) Google shall delegate an independent supervisor to supervise its performance according to the Provisional Regulations on the Disposal of the Undertakingrsquos Assets or Business in the Concentration stipulated by MOFCOM in 2010

The No 25 Announcement provided that the applied remedies would be valid for five years starting from its punishment unless Google no longer controls Motorola Mobility

Google lodged the remedy removal application based on the fact that Lenovo concluded its acquisition of Motorola Mobility from Google which had been approved by MOFCOM on October 16 2014 and closed on October 30 2014 and due to this acquisition Google lost its control of Motorola Mobility

Decision

After careful examination MOFCOM noted that upon completion of the MotorolaLenovo deal Google would not be engaged in any business of manufacturing smartphones but would keep the telecommunications patent technologies of Motorola Mobility

Based on this fact on January 6 2015 MOFCOM issued a notice that it had decided to approve Googlersquos application to remove one of the remedies with the other remedies remaining in place

AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery7

The transaction is related to a conditionally cleared merger case

The concentration parties notified the deal to MOFCOM following No 95 Announcement in 2008

Considering the slight increase of AB InBevrsquos shareholdings in Zhujiang Brewery MOFCOM approved the proposed transaction

Facts

7 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150820150801090985shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 8 of 52

On July 23 2015 Interbrew Investment International a fully owned subsidiary of AB InBev Guangzhou State-owned Assets Development Holdings and Guangzhou Securities entered into an agreement with Zhujiang Brewery to subscribe the latterrsquos new shares According to this agreement Interbrew Investment International would subscribe shares worth up to CNY 16 billion

Pursuant to a MOFCOM antitrust notice issued in 2008 if AB Inbev intended to further increase its stake in Zhujiang Brewery a filing should be submitted to MOFCOM before any deal were to be concluded

On July 29 2015 AB InBev submitted the filing for the deal to MOFCOM

Decision

MOFCOM noted that upon this subscription Interbrew Investment International would increase its stake in Zhujiang Brewery from 2562 to 2999 Since the stake increase is relatively small and will not result in material changes regarding the control of Zhujiang Brewery MOFCOM decided to approve the deal on 20 August 2015

MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases

MOFCOM reached these decisions based on the undertakingsrsquo failure to file notifications

None of these concentrations were determined as resulting in anti-competition effects

MOFCOM considered that a 35 shares acquisition could lead to the obtaining of control power over a company

Complaints from the third party are the main channel of triggering investigation on unnotified concentrations

The undertakings were fined up to RMB 200000 which is less than the imposed penalty (RMB 300000) in the last year and the maximum penalty (RMB 500000) for violations of merger control rules

Facts

On September 29 2015 MOFCOM issued notices regarding the penalty on four concentration dealings because the concerning undertakings failed to notify these dealings to MOFCOM before closing them Details of these notices are as follows

Shanghai Fosun Pharmaceutical (Group) Co Ltd has been imposed a fine of CNY 200000 (USD 31431) because of its failure to notify MOFCOM regarding its

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 9 of 52

acquisition of a 35 stake in Suzhou Erye Pharmaceutical Co Ltd (Suzhou Erye) and the target stake was transferred without MOFCOMrsquos allowance8

Fujian Electronics amp Information (Group) has been imposed a fine of CNY 150000 (USD 23568) for its failure to notify a 35 stake acquisition of Shenzhen CHINO-E Communication MOFCOM made this decision based on the fact that Fujian Electronics signed a transfer agreement with CHINO-Ersquo shareholders and completed this transaction without filing9

Bestv New Media and Microsoft have been imposed CNY 200000 (USD 31420) fines by MOFCOM since they did not lodge a merger review filling regarding their joint venture E-Home Entertainment Development which was established on October 1 201310

CSR Nanjing Puzhen and Bombardier Transportation Sweden have been fined CNY 150000 (USD 23562) respectively due to their failure to notify their proposed joint venture prior to setting it up These companies made an agreement about the joint venturersquos establishment on November 3 2014 and its business license was obtained on November 11 201411

MOFCOM identified that the above dealings shall be notified according to the fact that all of these dealings constituted concentration and turnovers of these concentrating undertakings reached the statutory turnover thresholds

Article 20 of the AML stipulates three kinds of concentration which are (i) a merger of undertakings (ii) an acquisition of control of other undertakings by acquisition of shares or assets with voting right of other undertakings to an adequate extent (iii) an acquisition of control of other undertakings or the capability of imposing determinative effects on other undertakings by contracts or other means

Article 3 of the Provisions of the State Council on the Thresholds for Concentration Notification of Undertakings provides the fillingrsquos thresholds which are as follows (i) The collective worldwide turnovers of all undertakings involved in the last fiscal year exceed CNY 10 billion and the turnovers within China of at least two undertakings each exceed CNY 400 million or (ii) The collective turnovers of all undertakings involved in the last fiscal year exceed CNY 2 billion (approximately USD 294 million) and the China-wide turnovers of at least two undertakings each exceed CNY 400 million (approximately USD CNY588 million)

These undertakings were penalized because of their violations of article 21 of the 8 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150920150901124896shtml 9 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150920150901124887shtml 10 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150920150901124903shtml 11 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150920150901124899shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 10 of 52

AML which provides that the concentration reaching the filling thresholds shall be notified to MOFCOM prior to its implementation and without this notification it shall not be conducted In addition according to article 48 of the AML and article 13 of the Interim Measures for Investigating and Punishing of Concentration of Undertakings Failing to File Notification an undertaking which is identified by MOFCOM for implementing a concentration without filling would be imposed a fine and instructed to recover the situation by MOFCOM The amount of this fine could be no more than CNY 500000

There is no provision that specifically describes the behaviour of implementing a concentration In practice obtaining a business license transferring the entity of assets delivering the shares and assigning directors or managers are likely to be deemed as the implementation of concentration

According to Shang Ming the former director general of MOFCOMrsquos Anti-monopoly Bureau so far MOFCOM has already penalized 15 companies for failing to notify MOFCOM regarding merger reviews MOFCOM has noticed an increase in companies shirking merger-filing responsibilities and has therefore intensified enforcement

MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent12

MOFCOM defines all of the information and communication technology SEPs as the relevant product market rather than divides each of them into the individual market

In the process of competition analysis MOFCOM evaluates various factors rather than comparing the market shares only which is consistent with the complexity and flexibility of the high-technology industry

In the process of formulating remedies MOFCOM pays more attention on protecting Chinese downstream companies and enhancing its supervision

Facts

On April 15 2015 Nokia Oyi (ldquoNokiardquo) signed a Memorandum of Understanding regarding the acquisition of Alcatel Lucent (ldquoAlcatelrdquo) According to this memorandum Nokia intends to acquire 100 shares of Alcatel through a tender off

A notification about this deal was filed on April 21 2015 and accepted by MOFCOM on June 15 2015 After reviewing this case MOFCOM moved it to Phases II and Phase III as the agency was of the opinion that this acquisition could have anti-competitive effects on the relevant market

12 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151020151001139743shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 11 of 52

On October 19 2015 MOFCOM cleared this deal with four behavioural remedies

Decision

Relevant Market

In the agencyrsquos view there are four relevant product markets which are the radio access network market the core network systems market the network infrastructure service market and the information and communication technology SEP licensing market Meanwhile the relevant geographical market is primarily the Chinese market

Competition Analysis

According to MOFCOM this deal would have no anti-competitive effects on the first three relevant product markets in China while it could constitute an obstacle or limit the competition in the information and communication technology SEP licensing market

The agency consideredafter the deal that Nokia would increase its holding in 2G 3G and 4G SEPs and strengthen the degree of concentration in the information and communication technology SEP licensing market If it refused to license charged overly high royalty fees or conducted any other anti-competitive behaviour the competition of downstream market would be distorted which would most likely impair customersrsquo interests in the end

Remedies

Four behavioural remedies focusing on maintaining fair licensing of standard-essential patents (ldquoSEPsrdquo) were imposed on Nokia which are

1) On a reciprocal basis Nokia commits to not use injunctions to prevent enforcements of FRAND (fair reasonable and non-discriminatory) encumbered SEPs unless the potential licensees are unwilling to sign FRAND licensing agreements and follow the terms

2) If Nokia transfers its SEPs to a third party it shall inform Chinese licensees as well as Chinese companies that are actively engaging in licensing negotiation about the transfer details

3) Nokia will only transfer its SEPs to a new owner on the basis that the new owner accepts the existing FRAND commitments made by Nokia

4) MOFCOM has the right to monitor the implementation of Nokiarsquos commitments Nokia shall report to MOFCOM about the implementation of the conditions within 45 days of the end of each calendar year The reporting obligation will last five years until October18 2020

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 12 of 52

Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions13

Western Digital had engaged in two conducts that violated the remedies provided in the No 9 Announcement in 2012 issued by MOFCOM

Western Digital lodged an application to remove certain restrictions in March 2014 and the agency made the decision on October 19 2015

MOFCOM considered the fact that the competition condition in the relevant product market has changed and decided to remove the hold-separate restrictions related to manufacture and RampD

Facts

In 2012 Western Digital Corporation (ldquoWestern Digitalrdquo) intended to acquire 100 shares of Viviti Technologies Ltd (ldquoViviti Technologiesrdquo) which was the holding company of Hitachi Global Storage Technologies Netherlands BV and Hitachi Global Storage Technologies Singapore Pte Ltd and engaged in the hard disk business

On April 2 2011 Western Digital filed a notification for this acquisition MOFCOM issued the No 9 Announcement in March 2012 and cleared this acquisition with six remedies According to this announcement Western Digital could apply for the removal of the first and second remedy after this decision has been carried out for 24 months

The first remedy refers to maintaining the Viviti Technologies as an independent competitor and the second remedy requires both Western Digital and Viviti Technologies to make a reasonable plan of their capacity and production and report these data to the trustee

Western Digital lodged an application to remove the first and second remedy in March 2014 MOFCOM found that Western Digital had engaged in two conducts that violated the first remedy and the competitive situation in the hard disk market had changed After talking with Western Digital collecting opinions from the relevant entities and delegating the independent party to make an economic evaluation MOFCOM decided to remove the hold-separate remedies partially

Western Digitalrsquos implementation of the duties imposed in the No 9 Announcement

Based on the implementation reports submitted by Western Digital and the monitoring reports submitted by the trustee MOFCOM found that Western

13 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151020151001139040shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 13 of 52

Digital had engaged in two conducts that violated the first remedy Those were

1) On March 8 2012 Western Digital consolidated Hitachi Global Storage Technology (ldquoHGSTrdquo) which was Vivitirsquos subsidiary in US

2) In January 2013 Western Digital dissolved the development division of VivitiHGST and transferred the relevant workforce to Western Digital

MOFCOM considered that these conducts impaired the independence of Viviti as a competitor so that it imposed CNY 300000 fines on each of these behaviours and requested Western Digital to rectify the situation As per the entrusted supervisorrsquos report such behaviours have been rectified and the first remedy has been fulfilled

According to MOFCOMrsquos announcement the agency found that other remedies have been entirely implemented

Competition Analysis

With respect to the current situation of the competition in the hard disk market MOFCOM made the following assessment

1) In the areas of portable application and corporate-level application solid-state drive has put constraint on the impact of the traditional hard disk as to strengthen the competition in the relevant market

2) Overcapacity problems in the conventional hard disk drive market became obvious

3) Western Digital and HGST are the major competitors in the hard disk drive market Both the layout and the major market competitors in this market have remained unchanged since 2012

4) The hold-separate duties restricted the full competition between Western Digital and HGST The implementation of such duties hindered them from integrating their products and providing the market with a full range of products and had an adverse impact on their clientsrsquo product procurement

Based on the above analysis MOFCOM deemed that

1) Removal of the conditions that required the two companies to remain independent in production and RampD activities would enable Western Digital to save costs to provide a full range of products to the market and to fully engage in market competition and benefit its clients

2) To keep the two sales teams and their respective brands independent from each other and the independence of sales activities could reduce competition restraint impacts arising from a complete merger

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 14 of 52

Remedies

After negotiating with MOFCOM the relevant entities agreed to undertake the following obligations

1) Western Digital and HGST will remain independent in sales and brands

2) Western Digital will not change its previous business modes or force its clients to exclusively purchase hard disk drive products from Western Digital or do so in disguise

3) Western Digital will continue its pace in investing in product innovation to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

This announcement will be effective within two years from the date of issuance If Western Digital can provide sufficient evidence to prove a substantial change in the market environment the company can propose to MOFCOM to remove the relevant conditions within the two years

SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions14

MOFCOM considered the fact that the competition condition in the relevant product market has changed and removed the hold-separate restrictions on Seagate and Samsung

Seagate shall remain its business model materially and continue to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

Facts

On December 12 2011 MOFCOM made the No 11 Announcement to clear Seagate Technology LLCrsquos (ldquoSeagaterdquo) acquisition with remedies In this acquisition Seagate intended to acquire hard disk drive business of Samsung Electronics Co Ltd (ldquoSamsung HDDrdquo) As per this announcement Seagate could apply for removing the first and second remedy after this decision has been carried out for 12 months

The first remedy is to preserve Samsung HDD as an independent competitor and the second remedy asks to maintain and expand Samsung HDDrsquos production capacity within six months of issuance of the No 11 Announcement and to set reasonable production volume targets based on market supply-demand conditions

Seagate lodged an application to remove the first and second remedy in May 2015 After making assessments on the relevant parties and the competition circumstance MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate remedies

14 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151020151001144105shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 15 of 52

Competition Analysis

With respect to the current situation of the competition in the hard disk drive market MOFCOM made the following assessments

1) In the areas of portable application and corporate-level application solid-state drive has put constraint on the impact of the traditional hard disk so that the competition in the relevant market has been strengthened

2) Overcapacity problems in the conventional hard disk drive market became obvious

3) Both the layout and the major market competitors in the hard disk drive market have remained unchanged since 2012

4) Seagate and Samsung HDDrsquos market overlap in the hard disk market is quite small and Samsung HDDrsquos competition in the traditional hard disk is quite weak

Based on the above analysis MOFCOM deemed that

1) Removal of certain conditions is possible because in the portable application and corporate level application sectors competition constraint of solid-state drive on traditional hard disk drives has strengthened traditional hard disk drives are facing overcapacity which has reduced the chance of a single or more competitors causing competition restraints Seagate has limited overlap with Samsung in the hard disk business and the latter has a relatively weaker market power in the hard drive disk business

2) Removal of all imposed conditions may still restrain market competition because the traditional hard disk drive market competition conditions have not undergone a major change Seagate is still the major player in all divisions of the market and Seagate will strengthen its power after the acquisition of Samsung HDD

Remedies

After negotiating with MOFCOM Seagate agreed to undertake the following obligations

1) Seagate shall not change its business model materially or force clients to purchase hard drive disks exclusively from it

2) Seagate shall not force Tokyo Dengikagaku Kogyo China to supply magnetic heads exclusively to Seagate (or other Seagate-controlled companies) or limit the number of magnetic heads Tokyo Dengikagaku Kogyo China would supply to other hard drive disk manufacturers

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 16 of 52

3) Seagate shall continue to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

This announcement will be effective within two years from the date of issuance If Seagate can provide sufficient evidence to prove substantial change in the market environment the company can propose to MOFCOM to remove relevant conditions within the two years

FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM15

MOFCOM deems that this acquisition would induce anti-competitive influence

NXP promises to dispose its radio frequency (ldquoRFrdquo) power transistor business

As the first case approved with structural remedies after the enactment of the Provisions on Imposing Restrictive Conditions MOFCOM conducted a comprehensive evaluation of the viability competitiveness and marketability of the divested business as well as the suitability of potential buyers

Facts

On April 3 2015 NXP filed for its acquisition of Freescale NXP Semiconductor (ldquoNXPrdquo) is a NASDAQ-listed company registered in the Netherlands which engages in the design manufacturing and sale of integration circuits and discrete components

Freescale Semiconductor (ldquoFreescalerdquo) is a New York-listed company registered in Bermuda and based in the US which engages in the manufacturing and RampD of microcontroller and digital networking processors (embedded processors)

According to the agreement between NXP and Freescale after closing Freescale will become the wholly owned subsidiary of NXP On November 25 2015 MOFCOM decided to clear this acquisition with remedies

Relevant Market

As per the announcement the relevant product markets are the general microcontroller automotive power-use analog integrated circuit and RF transistor product markets in which NXP and Freescale have horizontal overlap The relevant geographical markets should be the global market

Competition Analysis

After assessing this proposed deal the agency concluded that

1) The proposed deal would boost NXPrsquos market control power in the RF

15 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151120151101196182shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 17 of 52

transistor product market because the global and Chinese RF transistor product markets share a similar structure both featuring few competitors and high concentration levels Freescale and NXP as the number one and number two players are far ahead of their rivals in the market Therefore after closing the market control power of NXP in this market would be strengthened

2) Since Freescale was the fiercest competitor of NXP the proposed deal will remove competition between them

3) The proposed deal would reduce the options for clients and increase procurement risks

In practice the wireless infrastructure suppliers as the main client of the RF transistor product tend to procure products from both NXP and Freescale to prevent them from the risk arising from relying on one supplier

4) The proposed deal may induce an adverse impact on the technology RampD and innovation

Remedies

In accordance with MOFCOMrsquos decision NXP shall follow its written commitment submitted to MOFCOM and completely divest its RF power transistor business to Beijing Jianguang Asset Management At the same time NXP shall strictly fulfil its obligations during the transition period It is worth noting that the NXPFreescale deal shall only be implemented after the divestment deal has been concluded

In addition MOFCOM requires NXP to perform relevant obligations during the transition period from the date of approval announcement until the divestment deal has been concluded NXP shall endeavour

1) not to engage in any lsquounfair trade practicesrsquo relating to the divested business

2) not to implement any acts which may have a significant adverse impact on the value management or competitiveness of the divested business or any acts which may change the nature and scope industry or business strategy or investment policy of the divested business and to take reasonable measures to encourage core employees to stay in the divested business as well as not to seek or transfer employees to NXPrsquos non-divested business

3) to ensure supply to the divested business in a fair reasonable and non-discriminatory manner and

4) to maintain the independence of the divested business and not to exchange competitively sensitive information between the parties and the divested

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 18 of 52

business

B Monopolistic Agreements

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

With respect to the enforcement activities of the NDRC in light of the numbers of the published cases it seems that the law enforcement frequency of the NDRC regarding monopolistic agreements in 2015 is lower in comparison with 2014

The reason behind might be that the outstanding issue of human resource deficit of the antitrust authority still exists Besides the fact that more enterprises gradually attach increasing importance to the antitrust compliance might be another reason for the decrease in the number of cases investigated by the authorities

As to the enforcement activities of the SAIC 4 of 14 cases concluded by the SAIC and its local branches in 2015 are relevant to monopolistic agreements Meanwhile these four cases concern horizontal monopolistic agreements

It is noteworthy however that the Mercedes-Benz case and the Dongfeng Nissan case suggest that vertical agreements especially involving price-related restrictions on the downstream dealers is still the priority of antitrust enforcement Companies shall be very cautious when imposing restrictions on the resale prices or the minimum resale prices of commodities in the distribution agreements

Automobile industry and related industries are observed to be under continuous attention of Chinarsquos antitrust authorities

The industries relating to peoplersquos livelihoods remain to be the enforcement priority

Significant Cases

Enforcement by the NDRC and its local branches

Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC16

The investigation was triggered by a leniency application

The first leniency applicant was exempted from punishment

Eight ocean shipping companies involved were imposed a collective fine of CNY 4067 million

NDRC spent approximately 12 months to investigate and conclude the case 16 NDRCrsquos press release of the case is available at httpjjsndrcgovcngzdt201512t20151228_769084html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 19 of 52

Facts

In December 2015 the NDRC published its official punishment decisions regarding the cartel case in connection with eight ocean shipping companies namely Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha (ldquoNYKrdquo) Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha (ldquoK Linerdquo) Mitsui OSK Lines EUKOR Car Carriers Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics Compantildeiacutea Sud Americana de Vapores Eastern Car Liner and Compantildeiacutea Chilena de Navegacioacuten Interoceaacutenica

According to the official press release of the NDRC the investigation was triggered by a leniency application of NYK The evidence showed that the eight companies reached consensus on non-intrusion of each others existing business to maintain or increase shipping fees when shipping goods such as cars trucks and engineering machinery in the routes between China and other countries and regions

They were also found to frequently conduct bilateral or multilateral communications on the shippersrsquo invitation for bids andor price inquiries via phone conferences dinner parties e-mails visiting etc In addition they also conducted illegal behaviour such as sensitive information exchange price negotiations bidding intention discussion dividing clients and shipping routes reaching agreements on high price bids or non-bidding in order to help certain companies gain shipping orders

To avoid the regulation of the antitrust authority the relevant shipping companies adopted various illicit measures that showed their apparent intention to violate the AML The cartel lasted for at least four years and covered a broad range of shipping routes concerned with the import and export of products between China and other regions such as North America EU South America and so on involving multiple auto brands and engineering machinery brands

The NDRC held the opinion that the eight companies conducts had restricted and eliminated competition in the relevant market raising the international shipping fees and impairing interests of shippers and end consumers The eight companies breached the AML by reaching and implementing monopolistic agreements on fixing prices and dividing the market

All eight investigated companies put forward remedy measures including enhancing the antitrust compliance program arranging more antitrust compliance trainings and developing antitrust compliance technologies

The NDRC imposed fines based on the nature level and duration of their monopolistic volations as well as their respective sales of international freight service sales relevant to the Chinese market The companies involved were collectively fined CNY 4067 million

NYK as the first cartel member voluntarily reporting the illegal conducts to the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 20 of 52

authority and providing significant evidence was entirely exempted from the punishment K Line as the second leniency applicant was imposed a fine amounting to 4 of its 2014 annual sales of international freight services relevant to Chinarsquos import and export market The details of punishments imposed on the involved companies by the NDRC are as follow

Company Name Amount of Fines (RMB million)

Percentage of the Relevant Turnovers

Grounds

Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha

- - First leniency applicant

Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha

2398 4 Second leniency applicant

Mitsui OSK Lines 3812 7 Third leniency applicant

EUKOR Car Carriers 284 9 Lasted over a long period involved many brands and many violations violations were severe

Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics

4506 8 Lasted over a long period involved many brands and many violations violations were severe

Compantildeiacutea Sud Americana de Vapores

308 6 Lasted over a long period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Eastern Car Liner 1127 5 Lasted over a long period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Compantildeiacutea Chilena de 120 4 Lasted over a long

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 21 of 52

Navegacioacuten Interoceaacutenica

period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Total 4067

Analysis

In this case the agency applied the AML instead of the Tenders and Bids Law to collusive bidding Citing article 13 (3) of the AML the NDRC identified that the collusive bidding constituted a division of the sales market

The leading three leniency applicants were granted exemption from fines to a varying degree

According to the official who handled this case dawn raids performed by antitrust enforcement agencies in other jurisdictions drew the attention of the NDRC on the cartels of these shipping companies However there was limited effective evidence to prove that the companies had reached monopolistic agreements Through pressuring the involved parties three members of the shipping cartel actively confessed their illegal conduct This case once again stresses the significance of international cooperation between antitrust enforcement agencies

Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau17

The distribution agreements between Mercedes-Benz and its dealers are determined as vertical monopolistic agreement and Mercedes-Benz violated article 14 of the AML because it restricted the ability of its dealers to decide their own resale prices

Mercedes-Benzrsquos dealers violated article of 13 of the AML due to concluding a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Mercedes-Benz and its dealers were jointly fined CNY 3578 million

Facts

In April 2015 Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau which is the provincial branch of the NDRC released the punishment on its website and announced that it had imposed a fine of CNY 350 million on Mercedes-Benz along with the aggregated fine of CNY 787 million on its dealers The fine came as a result of Mercedes-Benz reaching and implementing resale price maintenance (ldquoRPMrdquo) agreements with dealers to fix the minimum resale price of several car models as well as certain auto parts 17 The original Chinese notice published by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau is available at httpwwwjswjjgovcnoffice_neweo_comm_zxnrxsphp

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 22 of 52

According to the decision the authority found that Mercedes-Benz fixed the minimum resale price of Class E and Class S cars in Nanjing Wuxi Changzhou and Suzhou markets through telephoneverbal communication and dealers meetings from January 2013 to July 2014 Since 2010 Mercedes-Benz had reached agreements with dealers in Jiangsu province to fix the minimum resale prices for auto parts by providing different levels of discounts for insured cars cars involving expired warranty periods and cars within the warranty period

In addition Mercedes-Benz implemented the minimum resale price maintaining agreement by

1) Tightening its monitoring measures on the dealers such as inspecting deals and their sale incentive system on a weekly basis

2) Tracking the sales process flow of cars and increasing the intensity of this assessment

3) Giving warnings and reducing support ndash for example halting the supply of bestselling cars and prohibiting the opening of new stores ndash to dealers if dealers refused to cooperate with the price-fixing related policies and measures and

4) Interviewing personnel of the dealers and requesting terminations if the staff engaged in serious violations of the RPM agreement

Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau concluded that Mercedes-Benz had excluded and eliminated market competition harmed consumer welfare and consequently violated article 1418 of the AML The authority therefore imposed a fine of CNY 350 million representing 7 of the sale revenue of the previous year in the relevant market against Mercedes-Benz and imposed a fine on the dealers amounting to an equivalence of 1 of the annual sales in the previous year

Analysis

Although the agency also addressed the horizontal violation among the dealers in this case the administrative penalty decision mainly focuses on the vertical violation The agency fined dealers involved in the RPM agreement a combined CNY 787 million equal to 1 of the previous-year sales which suggests that the agency decided to give lighter punishments to dealers who took initiative in reporting the activity and provided evidence

The Mercedes-Benz case is the third case where the agency successfully 18 Article 14 of the AML The following monopolistic agreements between operators and trading partners shall be prohibited (i) fixing the resale prices of commodities to third persons (ii) restricting the minimum resale prices of commodities to third persons (iii) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement Authority under the State Council

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 23 of 52

discovered both vertical and horizontal agreements in a case following the Audi case and the Chrysler case All these cases are rooted in the same industry indicating that industrial features play a large role in raising anti-trust concerns In fact it appears that the entire automotive industry is under antitrust scrutiny

Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC19

This case involved both a horizontal agreement and an administrative monopoly

A total fine of CNY 1318 million was imposed on the involved companies

Facts

In June 2015 the NDRC through its website announced the decision made by its regional branch -Yunnan Provincial Development and Reform Commission (ldquoYunnan DRCrdquo) regarding the horizontal monopolistic agreement case involving Yunnan Communications Administration and local subsidiaries of four state-owned telecommunication companies

Through the investigation Yunnan DRC found that Yunnan Communications Administration as a competent government agency had organized several meetings involving Yunnan branches of four state-owned telecoms - China Mobile China Telecom China Unicom and China Tietong in August and September of 2014 At the end of 2009 the four local branches entered into an agreement to regulate their sales promotions in terms of limiting the promotional items amount and frequency

Furthermore the agreement provides certain measures to ensure the implementation of relevant restrictions on promotions Specifically in case any cartel member violates the agreement the others could file complaints with Yunnan Communications Administration and the agency would then issue a rectification notice to the rule-breaker

Yunnan DRC stated that the four telecoms were main competitors in the relevant market and the promotions as a significant competition measure would exert direct influence on the final prices of the products The horizontal agreement organized by Yunnan Communications Administration on sales promotions restricted the competition capacity of telecoms and as a result eliminated the competition in the relevant market Consequently the behaviour of Yunnan Communications Administration violated article 8 20 of the AML and constituted administrative monopoly in terms of ldquoforcing undertakings to conduct monopolistic behaviour prohibited by the AMLrdquo

19 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpwwwsdpcgovcnfzgggzjgjdyfldjjszhdt201506t20150602_694802html 20 Article 8 of the AML Administrative organs and the public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 24 of 52

With respect to the penalties Yunnan DRC fined the local branch of China Tietong CNY 200000 for reaching but not implementing the agreement in regards to the other three telecoms a total fine of CNY 1298 million amounting to 2 of the sales of the relevant business in the previous year were imposed for entering into and implementing the horizontal monopolistic agreement

Analysis

The telecoms industry is still the enforcement priority of the antitrust enforcement authorities A company cannot be exempted from punishment even though it is forced by competent authorities to conduct monopoly behaviour

DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC21

Both a horizontal monopolistic agreement and a vertical monopolistic agreement were involved in this case

A total fine of CNY 14242 million was imposed on DongFeng Nissan and its distributors

Facts

In September 2015 the Guangdong Development and Reform Commission (ldquoGuangdong DRCrdquo) released an announcement regarding the administrative penalties on DongFeng Nissan and its provincial distributors for concluding price-related monopolistic agreements More specifically DongFeng Nissan was imposed a fine of CNY 1233 million for breaching article 14 of the AML in terms of restricting the resale price of certain car models 17 distributors domiciled in Guangdong were collectively fined CNY 1912 million for violating article 1322 of the AML in terms of entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements

According to the published official release the Guangdong DRC launched the investigation in August 2014 The authority discovered that from 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissan had set a rigorous restriction on its distributorsrsquo abilities to determine the resale prices of certain car models including the quoted prices in various platforms and the final resale price In addition DongFeng Nissan punished the distributors that failed to abide by such price restrictions in 2013 The authority 21 The original Chinese notice published by Guangdong DRC is available at httpwwwgddpcgovcnzwgkgzdtgzyw201509t20150910_328993html 22 Article 13 of the AML The following Monopolistic agreements among competing operators shall be prohibited (i) fix or change prices of commodities (ii) limit the outputs or sales volume of commodities (iii) segment the sales markets or the raw material purchasing markets (iv) limit the purchase of new technology new facilities or limit the development of new products new technology (v) jointly boycott transactions (vi) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-Monopoly Law enforcement Authority Monopolistic agreements in this Law refer to agreements decisions or other concerted practices that eliminate restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 25 of 52

believed that the vertical agreement concluded between DongFeng Nissan and its distributors eliminated and restricted the competition in the relevant market and damaged the consumer welfare as well which violates article 14 of the AML

Furthermore from April 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissanrsquos distributors in Guangdong province held multiple meetings to discuss issues relevant to sale price reached and implemented a horizontal monopolistic agreement in terms of fixing the prices of some car models which is prohibited by article 13 of the AML

Considering that both DongFeng Nissan and the involved distributors positively cooperated with the investigation and ceased the illegal behaviour immediately after the investigation Guangdong DRC decided to impose a fine amounting to 3 of its previous yearrsquos turnovers on DongFeng Nissan and a fine ranging from 2 to 4 on the relevant distributors in accordance with articles 4623 and 4924 of the AML

Analysis

This case demonstrates that auto and related industries are still under close attention of the authority Considering the NDRCrsquos successful series of antitrust investigations conducted throughout the auto industry it is observed that the agency currently overseeing price-related antitrust issues in China has accumulated a substantial amount of experience regarding antitrust enforcement in the auto industry Now is the right time to speed up the law-making process by amending the set of rules released earlier and drafting new laws to advise the auto industry on antitrust compliance

Enforcement by the SAIC and its local branches

Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC25

The investigation was triggered by whistle blowerrsquos submission

Cartel members were collectively fined CNY 139 million 23 Article 46 of the AML In case the operators violate the relevant provisions of this Law concluding and implementing Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall order the operators to cease such act impose fines more than 1 but less than 10 of the total turnover in the preceding year and confiscate the illegal gains where the Monopolistic agreement is not implemented a fine less than RMB 500000 can be imposed If the operators involved in Monopolistic agreement on its own initiative report information concerning the conclusion of Monopolistic agreements and provide important evidences to the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority they may be given a mitigated punishment or be exempted from punishment in accordance with the circumstances Where the industrial associations violate this Law organizing the operators in the industry to conclude Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority may impose a fine less than RMB 500000 in serious circumstances the agency of social organization administration and registration may cancel its registration 24 Article 49 of the AML As for the imposition of the fines stipulated by the Article 46 47 and 48 of this Law the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall take elements such as the nature extent and time it lasts of the illegal act into consideration in determining the specific amount of the fines 25 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201506t20150601_156889html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 26 of 52

Facts

In April 2015 the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) issued administrative penalties on several brick manufacturers for entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements This is the first case relevant to monopolistic agreements that has been publicized by the SAIC since the beginning of this year

Ten cartel members were involved in the case including one company and nine individuals Similar with most antitrust cases the investigation started as a result of a whistle blowerrsquos submission After a thorough investigation Hunan AIC found that those local brick manufacturers had reached agreements on controlling production volume and dividing sales areas in the forms of production and sales agreements plans and meeting minutes

The enforcement authority reached the conclusion that these brick manufacturers violated article 13 of the AML and imposed a total fine of CNY 1389400 on them

Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC26

The organizer of the monopolistic agreement the animation association was fined CNY 100000

The antitrust authority did not punish the members of the monopolistic agreement

Facts

In December 2015 the Guangdong Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoGuangdong AICrdquo) published its administrative punishment decision in regards to Guangzhou Panyu Animation amp Game Association (ldquoGAGArdquo) organizing member companies to conclude a monopolistic agreement

According to the decision GAGA drafted the ldquoAgreement of Exhibition Alliancerdquo (ldquoAgreementrdquo) and convened a conference with member companies in order to discuss the content and conclusion of the Agreement 52 member companies entered into the Agreement which actually requested the alliance companies to merely participate in the exhibitions either organized or supported by GAGA in Guangzhou In addition the Agreement prohibited the alliance companies from attending any other exhibition except if they obtained prior approval of GAGA

After a thorough investigation Guangdong AIC believed that the conclusion of the Agreement among GAGA and the 52 member companies violated article 13 (5) of the AML in terms of boycott GAGA who was deeply involved and restricted member companiesrsquo choice of exhibitions through the Agreement could be deemed as

26 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151208_164680html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 27 of 52

the participant and organizer of the monopolistic agreement In accordance with article 46 of the AML Guangdong AIC imposed a fine of CNY 100000 on GAGA for organizing the conclusion of the monopolistic agreement

Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC27

Hubei AIC considered the coinsurance for Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance illegal

Twelve insurance companies were fined CNY 469 million in total

Facts

In December 2015 the Hubei Administrative for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHubei AICrdquo) disclosed its punishment on 12 insurance companies for signing illegal coinsurance agreements

The disclosed punishment decision suggests that the Hubei branch of China Pacific Life Insurance (ldquothe Companyrdquo) 11 other insurance companies and Wuhan Construction Safety Technology Consultation Center (ldquoWCSTCCrdquo) signed a Coinsurance Agreement on Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance (ldquoCoinsurance Agreementrdquo) of which the main contents include

1) The Company and 11 other involved companies as the coinsurers jointly take charge of the personal accident insurance concerned with the construction project directly administered by the Wuhan government WCSTCC is responsible for providing safety professionalism and technology services regarding the relevant personal accident insurance

2) The Company as the chief insurer of the coinsurance occupies 12 of the total amount of the insurance and the other 11 companies respectively occupy 8

3) The Company as the representative of the coinsurance is in charge of collecting the premium signing the standard form insurance policies and issuing the invoice in its own name The Company should share the charged premium with the other companies in accordance with the Coinsurance Agreement

4) Both the Company and the other insurance companies should pay 25 of the actually received premium to WCSTCC as the service fee WCSTCC will assist the coinsurers in providing safety and technology management service to the insured In addition the 11 insurance companies should pay 5 of their premium to the Company as the management fee

27 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165445html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 28 of 52

5) In case an accident happens the 12 companies will jointly bear the damages based on their respective shares in the coinsurance

6) There is a contact mechanism established in the coinsurance The coinsurers will regularly hold coinsurance conferences to discuss existing problems

Furthermore the coinsurers and WCSTCC also signed a self-discipline agreement and established a complete management system to assure the implementation of the Coinsurance Agreement Any party violating the Coinsurance Agreement would be punished

Hubei AIC found that WCSTCC was solely invested by Wuhan Construction Safety Management Association which was under Wuhan Construction Commission The centre helped implement certain functions of the Wuhan Urban Construction Safety Management Station and was responsible for quality supervision and safety supervision of municipal construction projects

It later became a prerequisite for construction companies to purchase insurance from any member of the coinsurance in order to get approval to commence their project According to the decision Hubei AIC launched another separate investigation against WCSTCC

Through the investigation Hubei AIC concluded that the Coinsurance Agreement constituted a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by article 13 of the AML with the following analysis

First coinsurance as a common business model to jointly share and lower risks is widely adopted in the insurance industry A coinsurance arrangement for a specific project in order to avoid high risks faced by one insurer could be legal However coinsurance should not target the entire market In this case prior to the Coinsurance Agreement the risks of the construction projects were unpredictable since the scale of the construction projects the difficulty of the construction and the amount of construction workers could not be available It is impossible to predict the risks of the projects thus it is not necessary to cooperate with other insurers to collectively bear the risks The purpose of the 12 insurance companies to establish the coinsurance is to avoid the competition which demonstrates the Coinsurance Agreement belongs to a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by the AML

Second the companies through entering into the coinsurance agreement actually divided the relevant market of construction project personal accident insurance in Wuhan city which affected the competition in the relevant market and damaged the interests of other competitors and the consumers In particular the Construction Law as amended in 2011 stipulates that the purchase of personal accident insurance is not mandatory and the construction companies have the right to choose whether to buy the said insurance or not As mentioned purchasing insurance from the coinsurance had been the prerequisite for construction companies to obtain administration

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 29 of 52

approval for the project which seriously distorts the fair competition in the market

Citing article 46 of the AML the 12 insurance companies were collectively fined CNY 469 million including fines on the companies and confiscation of illegal gains It is noteworthy that the fines were calculated based on the companiesrsquo 2014 annual sales of the insurance product in connection with the coinsurance The Company as the chief insurer was fined amounting to 6 of its 2014 annual sales of the relevant insurance product in the coinsurance and other companies were fined amounting to 2 of relevant sales For more specific information please see the following table

Company Name (Hubei Branch)

Fines (CNY million)

Percentage of the sales

Illegal Gains (CNY

million)

China Pacific Life Insurance 00653 6 0941

Sino Life 00145 2 04332

Alltrust Insurance 00145 2 04332

Taikang Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Continent Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Pacific Property Insurance

00145 2 04332

China Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

PICC Property and Casualty 00145 2 02599

Taiping General Insurance 00145 2 013

Union Life Insurance 00145 2 01177

Ping An Annuity Insurance Company of China

00145 2 04201

Ping An Property amp Casualty Insurance Company of China

00145 2 -

Subtotal 02248 - 44679

Total 46927

Analysis

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 30 of 52

Coinsurance as an effective approach to lower risks of insurers is widely used in the insurance industry Information sharing and agreements on coinsurance were generally considered efficient and legitimate However from an antitrust perspective coinsurance may raise competition concerns depending on the circumstances of each agreement In the case that there is enough capacity for one insurer to cover the potential risks the coinsurance might be considered as entering into a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC28

The first leniency applicant was exempted from fines

The other concrete companies were imposed a fine of CNY 180000

Facts

In December 2015 the concrete companies monopolistic agreement case investigated by Hunan AIC was published on SAICrsquos website

In accordance with the antitrust enforcement announcement of SAIC this case was triggered by complaints from the Yongzhou City peoplersquos congress After the preliminary review the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) initiated the formal investigation on seven concrete companies domiciled in Yongzhou City Hunan Province which were suspected of being involved in a monopolistic agreement in terms of division of the volumes of the products

After further investigation Hunan AIC found that the seven concrete companies concluded a partnership agreement in 2011 which requested the involved companies to enter into a partnership business with assets In addition according to the partnership agreement it was planned to establish a comprehensive office to manage production marketing and distribution of the products of all the partners The seven companies intended to jointly adjust and control the output of concrete based on the partnership agreement However because there were disagreements over the allocation of the injected assets and market shares the companies did not implement the partnership agreement The agreement was cancelled in December 2012

Based on the findings Hunan AIC concluded that the seven concrete companies as competitors of each other restricted and eliminated the competition in the relevant market through reaching the partnership agreement and dividing the volumes of sales which violated article 13(3) of the AML in terms of division of sales market Considering that the agreement had not been implemented and the limited influence of the agreement according to article 46 of the AML and article 27 of the Administrative Penalties Law small amount fines were imposed on the involved companies Six companies were fined CNY 30000 each for their illegal behaviour 28 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165504html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 31 of 52

Yongzhou Shuangyuan Building Materials Co Ltd as the first one to actively report the monopolistic agreement and cooperate with the enforcement authority was exempted from the punishment

Outlook

It is expected that the AMLrsquos enforcement on monopolistic agreements will continue in the future Industries such as automobile shipping pharmaceuticals insurance etc will still remain the priority of the antitrust enforcement

The antitrust enforcement authorities have published a series of regulations in order to clarify the substantial and procedural issues relevant to the antitrust enforcement However Chinarsquos current antitrust legislation regime is still immature In the following years we expect that more attention will be paid to the legislative improvements

Another remarkable issue for cartel members is that with more Chinese enterprises attaching increasing importance to the AML the follow-on civil damages actions might become a tendency in the future

C Abuse of Market Dominance

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen a decent increase of abuse of market dominance cases both in public enforcement and private litigation Oftentimes the authorities responsible for public enforcement generally find it difficult to pursue investigations against abuse of market dominance cases The following two main reasons are often cited to explain this standoff first it is hard for the authorities to define the relevant markets and prove the undertaking(s)rsquo dominant market position through economic approaches second it is hard to collect evidence regarding abusive practices

The cases related to IPRs abuse are emerging significantly particularly in the telecommunication media and technology (ldquoTMTrdquo) sectors

The SAICrsquos latest refusal-to-deal probe against a local drug maker shows that the SAIC and its local branches have increasingly acquired a profile as an abuse of dominance regulator

Significant Cases

Cases pursued by the SAIC

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 32 of 52

Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case29

Facts

The local authority in Dongfang city reported to the Hainan provincial branch of SAIC on April 23 2014 of the suspected dominance abuse The SAIC authorized its Hainan bureau to officially investigate the matter on 25 July 2014 according to a decision dated January 9 2015 The AIC concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its market dominance by requiring users to pay a deposit without any legal basis and or justifiable reasons

In terms of the relevant product market the local authority found that in this case it was the urban water supply market in Dongfang city and its surrounding townships where Dongfang Water was the sole public operator in the local water supply market with a 100 market share which made all water users completely reliant on the companyrsquos supply In term of market access the local authority found it very unlikely that there were other operators due to the strict regulations

The Hainan SAIC then concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its dominance as it charged users a deposit by threatening to refuse to register users and also by threatening to restrict the water supply Dongfang Waters charging of deposits lacked a legal basis and hadnt received government approval to the detriment of household consumers and business water users and hampered the improvement of management and services of the company Such conduct was in breach of Chinarsquos Anti-Monopoly Law

Hainan AIC levied a fine of CNY 593208 a lighter penalty equivalent to 2 of the companyrsquos annual sales for the previous year and confiscated illicit gains of CNY 38521 for abuse of market dominance

Analysis

It is noteworthy that although handled by a local authority supervised by the SAIC the antitrust agency detailed the relevant market definition the assessment of the dominant market position the abusive practices and the scrutiny of the justifiable reasons

Although the definition of the relevant market and the reasoning of the Hainan provincial AIC and the SAIC are subject to criticism it is still applausive to see that the antitrust regulators have realized the importance of the application of rule of reason in an abuse case In addition through itrsquos a published decision practitioners may observe the regulatorsrsquo reasoning and thus transparency and legal certainty have been generated

29 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzfcfjd201502t20150212_152066html last visited on October 18 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 33 of 52

Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms30

Facts

In June 2013 the Ningxia AIC under authorization of SAIC opened an antitrust investigation into the alleged tie-in sales by the three major state-owned telecommunications operators China Tietong China Unicom and China Telecom for the tie-in sale of fixed-line telephones with broadband Internet services The Ningxia AIC found that the three companies had bundled fixed-line phone services with Internet services to subscribers

During the investigation all three telecommunications companies admitted the tie-in practice had recognized that such practice had improper influence on competition and deprived the choices of consumers The three companies promised to undertake internal rectification timely and eliminate the ill effects resulting from such practice The parties committed to taking the following corrective measures

1) Taking internal rectifications and conducting training to staff about antitrust laws and stop tie-in sales practices

2) Making public commitments to allow subscribers a free choice of services and strengthening the propaganda through the operating room call centre and other channels

3) Unbundling fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

The Ningxia AIC decided to suspend the probe on 14 May 2015 on the grounds that the three companies had actively worked together with the investigators and proposed workable remedy plans

Analysis

In the official announcement Ningxia AIC concluded that the purpose of antitrust enforcement is to restrain monopolistic conducts the protection of competition and to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of consumers Given that during the investigation process the parties had actively cooperated with the investigation formed a more profound understanding of the dangers of tying behaviour and moreover the parties proposed and implemented positive corrective measures to be able to remove the ill impact of their actions the agency believed that the purpose of antitrust law enforcement was fulfilled

It is worth noting that the Ningxia AIC also required the three companies to implement the commitment by August 30 2015and the submission of the written

30 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158908html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158906html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158910html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 34 of 52

implementation report on July 102015 and August 102015 respectively which is another illustration that an effective commitment by the undertakings shall directly deal with the effect that is brought by the monopolistic behaviour In this case the effect of the monopolistic act was restricted to the choice of the consumers therefore the commitment by the undertaking aimed at allowing the freedom of choice and the unbundling of fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company31

Facts

The Liaoning AIC imposed a fine of approximately CNY 433m on the Fushun Branch of Liaoning Tobacco Co on 1 June 2015 The agency also ordered the company to stop its illicit behaviour

The Liaoning AIC received a tip-off that the accused Liaoning Tobacco Corsquos Fushun branch was conducting tie-in sales of non-high-demand cigarette brands with high-demand cigarette brands After gaining authorization from SAIC the agency officially started an investigation regarding the companyrsquos suspected abuse of market dominance in June 2014

Analysis

According to the announcement the tobacco company argued that the tobacco industry is a state controlled or monopolized industry with a lawful monopolistic position therefore the company shall not be subject to the norms of general market competition rules or the anti-monopoly law

In this regards the agency concluded that in terms of the status of the undertaking admittedly the first paragraph of article 17 of the AML says that the State shall protect the lawful business operations of undertakings in these industries with respect to the industries which are under the control of the State-owned economic sector and have a bearing on the lifeline of the national economy or national security and the industries which exercise monopoly over the production and sale of certain commodities according to law However the second paragraph continues to say that the undertakings mentioned above shall do business according to law be honest faithful and strictly self-disciplined and subject themselves to public supervision and they shall not harm the consumers interests by taking advantage of their position of control or their monopolistic production and sale of certain commodities In particular in the preceding paragraph the ldquolawful businessrdquo and ldquoaccording to lawrdquo imply that the AML shall apply in the business operation The agency therefore believes that

31 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201508t20150813_16

0208html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 35 of 52

there shall be no exemption for the undertaking concerned the defences of the undertaking concerned is not established

Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm32

Facts

The Chongqing AIC fined Chongqing Qingyang Pharmaceutical CNY 439308 for alleged dominance abuse

The investigation was initiated when the company contacted the agency for verification on its potential breach of the AML related to an allopurinol active pharmaceuticals ingredient (API) distribution agreement with its exclusive distributor The company provided the relevant agreement and information and the agency conducted an investigation into the company and some other relevant companies

Analysis

Relevant Market

During the investigation the agency found that pharmaceutical ingredients are a special commodity the API is used to produce the preparations The chemical API is only used for the production of the preparation and could be used as a medicine for clinic use

The preparation is produced according to the requirements of certain form of prepared drugs and for the purpose of treatment and prevention which can be used as medicine

The allopurinol is used for the common treatment of hyperuricemia However the other treatments are different in pharmacological effects or treatment effects as well as in the cost for the patient Furthermore the company is the only manufacturer and supplier in the market nationwide since July 2012 Therefore the agency concluded that the relevant market is the allopurinol API market

Considering that the qualification for manufacturing the allopurinol API is national wide and the normal practice for purchasers and suppliers is domestic the relevant geographic market is the Chinese market

The Market Dominance

During the investigation the agency found that the company is the only supplier and manufacturer of allopurinol API in China there is no other competitor in the

32 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151222_16

5152html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 36 of 52

market and the company has a monopoly in the market The evidence shows that the company has the ability to control the prices the position for the downstream is relatively weak

With respect to the market entry the agency found that the market entry is relatively high in addition other undertakings are dependent on the company Thus the agency believed the company to have market dominance

Refusal to Deal

The agency found that on September 25 2015 the company reached an exclusive agreement and distribution agreement with its distributor Based on these agreements the company didnrsquot supply allopurinol API to the said distributor and other companies despite the fact that those companies requested for allopurinol API but were turned down by the company

Absence of Reasonable Cause

The agency found that the companyrsquos refusal to deal was not in line with the needs of normal business operation or economic efficiency On the other hand the refusal to deal was aimed at increasing the market share of the allopurinol drug product Also the agency found that the stop of supply was a manipulation of market power as to maximize the profit to the most The agency further found that the exclusive distribution agreement with suspension of supply for six months and the refusal to supply was to eliminate and restrict the competition as to gain the monopolistic profit

The Consequence of Refusal to Deal

The agency concluded that the refusal to deal harmed the competition of the allopurinol preparations market Because of the suspension of supply many demanders had to reduce their production or switch to the supply of other products or stop their production The suspension of supply affected the competition of the downstream market Consequently the raising of the price of allopurinol API also raised the cost for other manufacturers of allopurinol preparations

Furthermore the refusal to deal led to capacity loss of the allopurinol preparation industry

Ultimately the refusal to deal increased the burden on consumers as the refusal to supply changed the supply-demand relationship in the market

The agency concluded that the Company abused its dominant position in the allopurinol API market by refusing to deal with intended buyers in the period between October 2013 and March 2014Therefore the Company violated article 17 (1) of the AML which prohibits business operators with a dominant market position from abusing that position such as the refusal to deal without any justifications

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 37 of 52

D Administrative Monopoly

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 witnessed antitrust authoritiesrsquo significant efforts regarding the enforcement against administrative monopoly According to Mr Dong Zhiming the deputy director general of Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly Bureau ever since the AML coming into force six cases in connection with administrative monopoly were investigated by NDRC and among them five cases were handled in the year of 2015 These cases touched abuses of administrative power in terms of designative deal in relation to transportation communication and pharmaceutical industries

The first private litigation related to administrative monopolistic acts was heard in the court which is a milestone case in the enforcement of the AML

Significant Cases

Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC33

Facts

In March 2015 the NDRC released the official letter to Shandong Provincial Department of Transportation (ldquoShandong DOTrdquo) on its website with respect to correct its abuse of administrative power to exclude and restrict competition

During the investigation the NDRC found that since 2011 Shandong DOT had issued multiple relevant government orders in order to require certain types of vehicles to be directly connected to two designated information and service platforms both of which are operated and technically supported by one company namely Shandong Jiutong Internet of Things Technology Co Ltd (ldquoJiutong ITTrdquo) Furthermore according to the orders issued by the competent administrative department all the vehicle satellite positioning terminals entering into Shandong provincial market should be debugged through the said technology service platform which is operated by the mentioned company In addition Shandong DOT released the cap prices of vehicle satellite positioning terminals which is identical to the 2012 bid-winning price in the Ministry of Transportation demonstration project

The NDRC believed that Shandong DOTrsquos behaviour eliminated and restricted the competition in the monitoring platform market and the vehicle terminal market deprived the right of transportation enterprises to choose vehicle terminals and monitoring platform on their owns unreasonably raised the sales prices of vehicle terminals and service fees charged by the platform and increased the costs of transportation enterprises Therefore the antitrust agency concluded that Shandong

33 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201503t20150327_668911html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

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DOT violated article 8 of the AML which stipulates that ldquoadministrative organs and the public organizations with an administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude and restrict competitionrdquo Specifically Shandong DOT violated article 3234 in terms of requiring organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any designated operators and violated article 3735 in terms of setting rules with contents which eliminate and restrict competition

Based on article 51 of the AML ldquoWhere administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations abuse administrative powers performing activities which exclude and restrict competition the superior entity shall order it to correct impose administrative penalty on the chief officer and other staffs directly responsible pursuant to the laws The AML enforcement authority may give recommendations on disposal of activities to the relevant superior entityrdquo the NDRC proposed in writing that the Shandong provincial government should order Shandong DOT to rectify its behaviour with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Entirely open up the monitoring platform market by permitting transportation undertakings to freely choose any approved platform

2) Loosen the restrictions on the entry into Shandong vehicle terminals permit the undertakings to independently select the supplier of vehicle terminals and allow the qualified terminals to be connected to the relevant monitoring platform and

3) Revoke the official documentation relevant to the cap price of vehicle terminals in order to promote the price competition

Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 36

Facts

On 26 August 2015 the NDRC published its second decision with regard to the rectification of administrative monopoly since the beginning of this year According to the proposal letter sent to Anhui Provincial Government the investigation against the Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City (Bengbu HFPC) was trigged by third partiesrsquo complaints

34 Article 32 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to require organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any operators designated by them 35 Article 37 of the AML Administrative organs shall not abuse their administrative powers to set rules with contents which eliminate restrict competition 36 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201508t20150826_748682html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 39 of 52

The investigation suggests that Bengbu HFPC published three notices with regard to drugs procurement in April and May of this year

In the No C-2015-CG-X-111 Notice (ldquoNo111 Noticerdquo) released on 10 April2015 the health authority not only provided the dosage form and qualification of the requested drugs but also directly determined the suppliers of relevant drugs which eliminated and restricted the competition among pharmaceutical manufacturers and therefore violated articles 32 and 37 of the AML

In the No C-2015-CG-C-112 Notice (ldquoNo112 Noticerdquo) and No C-2015-CG-C-168 (ldquoNo 168 Noticerdquo) respectively released on 10 April and 22 May 2015 the Bengbu HFPC set discriminative qualification requirements on non-local undertakings in order to restrict their participation in the relevant bidding For instance in accordance with No 112 Notice to be a qualified bidder the turnover of non-local undertakings shall exceed CNY 2 billion which is 50 times as much as the turnover requirements of the local undertakings In the NDRCrsquos opinion the administrative monopoly activities conducted by the local health agency excluded the relevant undertakings from the market maintained the virtual-high prices of drugs and therefore violated articles 3237 and 37 of the AML

The NDRC suggested in a letter that Anhui Provincial Government should urge the Bengbu HFPC to rectify the abuse of monopoly powers with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Stop setting distinguishing restrictions on qualification requirements review standards and numbers of winning bidders as for local and non-local undertakings

2) Stop designating the suppliers of competitive drugs and

3) Take necessary measures to mitigate the negative effects resulting from the previous illegal monopolistic abuses

Outlook

At the beginning of the year the former director general of the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau under the NDRC Xu Kunlin stated that the agency would strengthen antitrust enforcement on abuse of administrative power in 2015

Since then the NDRC has made great efforts to rectify unreasonable abuses of administrative power The currently disclosed two cases investigated by the NDRC re-emphasize the Chinese Governmentrsquos strict scrutiny of antitrust issues in respect of

37 Article 34 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to restrict or reject the participation of operators from other regions in local bidding activities by measures such as prescribing discriminatory qualification requirements or assessment standards or by not publishing information according to law

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 40 of 52

administrative monopoly It reminds the local governments that antitrust compliance is of significant importance

III Private Litigation

A Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen more and more private antitrust litigations

The private antitrust litigation cases have become increasingly complicated especially the issues regarding the intersection areas of IP and antitrust law

Multinational giants and State-Owned Enterprises (the ldquoSOEsrdquo) are increasingly becoming the targets in antitrust civil litigations Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (the ldquoSMEsrdquo) tend to use the antitrust litigation to achieve their commercial goals in the business context

B Significant Cases

Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)38

This is the first-ever private litigation concerning administrative monopoly since the implementation of the AML in 2008

Facts

According to the currently disclosed details the case is relevant for designated trade

The plaintiff Shenzhen Sware Technology Co Ltd (ldquoSwarerdquo) is a software company The press releases suggest that Sware Gloden Software Co Ltd (ldquoGlodenrdquo) and Shanghai Ruban Software Co Ltd (ldquoShanghai Rubanrdquo) are the three main suppliers of construction cost software and possess the major shares of the relevant market An annual provincial vocational ability contest regarding the construction cost hosted by the Guangdong Department of Education (ldquoGuangdong DOE) designated Gloden as the exclusive supplier of the relevant software

After several unsuccessful verbal and written negotiations with Guangdong DOE in April 2014 Sware filed a lawsuit against Guangdong DOE before the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquothe Courtrdquo) alleging that the administrative organ abused its administrative power and violated the AML by designating exclusive software supplier for the contest and claimed a compensation for reasonable expense amounting to CNY 10800 Yuan

The opinions of the Court 38 The story of the case is available at httpfinancesinacomcnchinadfjj20150410074621924997shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 41 of 52

The full text of the judgment has not been disclosed yet In accordance with the information available to the public the Court invoked article 32 of the AML which prohibits an administrative organ from abusing its administrative power to require or in disguised form organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use only the commodities supplied by the entities designated by them The Court concluded that Guangdong DOE failed to prove the legitimacy of the designation and therefore abused its administration power

Currently the case is in appeal before the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court

Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 39

It is the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China

In the first instance ruling Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court ruled against Sinopec holding that the Yunnan branch of Sinopecs trading company was obligated to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its dominance in the sales market of refined oil by refusing to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding without justifiable reasons

In the second instance ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors Currently the case is pending

Facts

The First Trial

The lawsuit was filed before the Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoKunming Courtrdquo) in January 2014 Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy Co Ltd (ldquoYingdingrdquo) a bio-energy manufacturer claimed that Sinopec and the Yunnan branch of Sinopec trading company (ldquoSinopec Yunnan Branchrdquo) had failed to fulfil their obligations stipulated in the Renewable Energy Law and had abused their market dominance in sales market of refined oil by refusing to trade with Yingding without justifiable reasons

Sinopec and Sinopec Yunnan Branch mainly explained four reasons for why they rejected Yingdingrsquos biofuel Firstly Yingding had failed to prove that the biofuel complied with the relevant national standard and was safe to use Secondly Yingding had failed to provide complete trading terms Thirdly the laws and regulations regarding biofuel were incomplete the authorized refined oil sales companies were 39 The details of the case are available at httpnewsxinhuanetcomfortune2014-1217c_1113680039htm httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=9e71db51-6ff6-4d2c-8af6-8eacf023ebdeampKeyWord=E4BA91E58D97E79B88E9BC8E|E4B8ADE79FB3E58C96 httpnewsxinhuanetcomenergy2015-0422c_127721575htm httpwwwnbdcomcnarticles2015-04-23911348html last visited on December 17 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 42 of 52

obligated to purchase biofuel from the biofuel manufacturers if it met certain quality standards but there was a vacancy regarding how to reach the end consumers from the sales companies

On 8 December 2014 the Kunming Intermediate Peoples Court ruled that Sinopec Yunnan Branch bore a legal obligation to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its market dominance in refined oil market by refusing without any justifiable reasons to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding The court ordered Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network within 30 days Both Yingding and Sinopec filed appeals to the Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court

The Appellate Trial

The appeal hearing was held on 22 April 2015 in Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoYunnan Courtrdquo) Sinopec submitted 23 new pieces of evidence and introduced two expert witnesses in a bid to overturn several key elements in the first-instance ruling by Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court

In terms of the determination of the relevant market and the market dominance Sinopec argued that the relevant market in this case was for adipic acid monomethyl ester (ldquoAAMErdquo) the main ingredient of a biofuel additive known as BD100 Yingdingrsquos main product is BD100 which can be blended with fossil diesel to become biofuel In the AAME market Sinopec is a potential buyer instead of a market dominator In support of this argument Sinopec presented an expert witnessmdashGong Jiong a professor of economics at Beijings University of International Business and Economics who testified that AAME should be defined as the relevant product market on the basis of an economic analysis

However Yingding insisted that the first-instance ruling was correct in naming the sales market of refined oil as the relevant market and submitted new evidence an article on Sinopecs website that claimed it had a 67 market share in Yunnan to help establish the claim that Sinopec had market dominance

Another main dispute was whether Yingdingrsquos biofuel product met national standards which would make it mandatory for Sinopec to purchase under Chinas Renewable Energy Law The law stipulates that biofuel producers must sell their products first to an authorized refined oil sales company and the sales companies are obliged to buy the fuel if it meets certain quality standards In order to test the quality Sinopec introduced the second expert witness Lin Jianmin a leading author of Chinarsquos national biofuel standard Lin Jianmin pointed out that there are currently quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology which gives Sinopec a justifiable reason not to trade with Yingding Moreover Sinopec presented some precedents in which consumers had complained about the biofuel quality and also claimed that China didnt have a sound regulatory framework to support biofuel production neither in testing nor in sales

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 43 of 52

Nevertheless to refute this point Yingding referred to an earlier test in co-operation with Sinopec in 2011 where selected buses in Kunming used biofuel blended by Sinopec using BD100 produced by Yingding

On August 13 2015 Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors and now this case is pending In the written appellate ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court did not provide any details regarding its reasoning

Key Issues of the Case

Is there any competition between Yingding and Sinopec

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case the product of Yingding is biofuel while Sinopec does not engage in the business of biofuel From this perspective Yingding and Sinopec are not competitors Thus it is not necessary and not reasonable for Sinopec to eliminate or restrict the competition from Yingding

Relevant Market

The definition of the relevant market is a prerequisite to determine whether competition exists and whether the AML is applicable In accordance with the Judicial Interpretation of Antitrust civil litigation the plaintiff shall take the responsibility to prove the defendantrsquos dominance in the relevant market Also the methods of defining the relevant market are stipulated in the Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition (ldquoGuidelinesrdquo) However both Yingding and Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court defined the relevant market as the sales market of refined oil without sufficient antitrust analysis none of the methods in the Guidelines were used Therefore the definition of the relevant market remains arguable and needs to be sufficiently analysed in the upcoming retrial

Justifiable Reasons

The abuse of market dominance includes the behaviour of refusing to trade without justifiable reasons according to the AML but in the first instance ruling justifiable reasons were not investigated by the court During the appellate trial the expert witness introduced by Sinopec claimed that there were quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology and this was a justifiable reason to refuse to trade with Yingding Even though the first instance court and the appellate court did not reason the justifiable reason it should be discussed and investigated further during the retrial

AML or Renewable Energy Law

The claims of Yingding were based on both the AML and the Renewable Energy Law (ldquoRELrdquo) and the first instance ruling referred to both the AML and the REL as

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 44 of 52

well It seems that the laws the first instance court referred to were comprehensive but in fact the reasoning was not clear and logical In the first instance ruling some disputes regarding the AML were reviewed but all the orders were not based on the AML Specifically the first instance court ordered the Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network based on the REL and dismissed the other claims That the orders were not on account of reasoning is illogical It is anticipated that during the retrial the application of the laws will be clearer

Analysis

A lot of issues have not been clearly analysed by the courts such as the relevant market and the justifiable reasons Since the case is remanded the above-mentioned issues are expected to be resolved in the retrial In addition Yingding was in a disadvantaged position compared to its first instance trial since its claims based on the AML were challenged greatly during the appellate trial In the retrial it is probable that Yingding may switch its litigation strategy and base its claims on the REL Therefore maybe more preparation regarding the REL can give Sinopec a leg up

Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)

Rijing Electric a Chinese distributor seeks CNY 5m compensation

The first hearing was on 9 June 2015 and ended without a ruling

Facts

Rijing Electric (ldquoRijingrdquo) a Shanghai-based company and a former distributor for Panasonic accused Panasonic of abusing its dominance and dividing the market through monopolistic practice in an antitrust lawsuit filed in 2014 with Shanghai No 1 Intermediate Court (ldquoShanghai Courtrdquo) claiming compensation of CNY 5m (USD 815370) Wenzhou Mingda Automation System Co and Shanghai Qingying Automation Equipment as the distributor of Panasonic in China are the co-defendants were accused of conducting monopolistic behaviours by implementing Panasonicrsquos policy

The first hearing for evidence exchange was on June 9 2015 Rijing claimed a policy allegedly introduced by Panasonic in 2009 restricted the competition between distributors Panasonic claims the policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo and has full justifiable reasons It explained that the products in question required customization at considerable cost to distributors before its sale to customers Once carried out however other distributors leaving them open to quote much lower prices than the original distributor could simply and relatively cheap replicate this customization Besides Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and that the plaintiff had failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic said its market share for the four products

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 45 of 52

under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases Also Rijing failed to challenge the policy when it was first introduced instead initially agreeing it was reasonable as e-mail evidence submitted by Panasonic suggests

Key Issues of the Case

Whether Panasonic occupied a market dominant position

It is reported that Rijing claimed that Panasonic had abused its market dominance but Rijing failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and its market share for the four products under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases

Analysis

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case Panasonicrsquos policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo rather than to eliminate or restrict competition

Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals40 (Pending)

It is a battle over patent licensing issues

It is viewed as being among the most complicated antitrust lawsuits in China

The first hearing was on 17 and 18 December 2015

Facts

Four Chinese rare earth companies Ningbo Ketian Magnet Ningbo Permanent Magnetics Ningbo Tongchuang Strong Magnet Material and Ningbo Huahui Magnetic Industry filed antitrust lawsuits against Hitachi Metals over alleged patent licensing issues regarding rare earth magnets on December 11 2014 with the Ningbo Intermediate Peoples Court (ldquoNingbo Courtrdquo) in Zhejiang province As reported four Chinese rare earth companies claimed Hitachi Metals abused its market dominance and hurt the industry competition by refusing to license the patents to them The patents in this case are used in the manufacturing of sintered neodymium iron boron (ldquoNdFeBrdquo) magnets a rare-earth magnet alloy widely used in parts for airplanes automobiles and other products

Hitachi Metals filed a challenge with the Ningbo Court over its jurisdiction in April 2015 After Ningbo Court rejected Hitachi Metals jurisdiction objection on 28 April 2015 Hitachi Metals appealed to the Zhejiang High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoZhejiang

40The details of the story are available at httpwwwzbmagcomnews_viewphpid=80 httpwwwhitachicomcnaboutpress201510-121118_ahtml last visited on December 22 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 46 of 52

Courtrdquo) but Zhejiang Court affirmed the ruling of the Ningbo Court

The first day of a two-day hearing took place on 17 December 2015 during which the two sides cross-examined each otherrsquos evidence The evidence focused on clearing up several key elements in the case including the relevant market whether Hitachi Metals has dominance on that market and whether both sides acted in good faith during the licensing negotiations

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Product Market

The four Chinese rare earth companies claimed that the relevant product market should be the NdFeb-related patent licensing market However Hitachi Metals believed that the physical NdFeb market rather than the patent licensing market should be the relevant product market which is meaningful for assess the real competitive effects on the market

Whether Hitachi Metals occupies a dominant market position

In terms of market dominance Hitachi Metals claimed it does not occupy a dominant position because Hitachi Metalsrsquo patents were not in a standard in this case and there are substitutable technologies in the market SEP holders have the obligation to license on FRAND terms but none-SEP holders do not So while a refusal to license a SEP may constitute abuse of dominance refusal to license a non-SEP mdash even by a patent holder with a dominant position mdash should not be considered as an abuse

Analysis

Hitachi Metals as a patent holder should have the right to decide whether to retain those patents or not or who to license According to the legal theory the purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage and protect innovation by conferring monopoly right mdash that is to give intellectual property owners the proprietary rights which can exclude others from using the intellectual property The SEP holders admittedly need to comply with FRAND terms which can maintain a robust balance between competition and monopoly whereas the further intervention of antitrust law into non-SEP patents may undermine the purpose of intellectual property law To which extent the antitrust law should intervene is yet to be seen

Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei41

A confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the Beijing IP court made by the Beijing High Court

41 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcncpwswbjzscq201511t20151103_12225640htm last visited on December 28 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 47 of 52

Facts

On August 2 2013 the NDRC penalized Abbott for monopolistic price-fixing and then Abbott made a price adjustment in China where the prices of main products were reduced

On December 16 2014 Tian Junwei (ldquoTianrdquo) a Chinese citizen in Beijing sued Carrefour Shuangjing Branch (ldquoCarrefourrdquo) and Abbott (Shanghai) Sales Company (ldquoAbbottrdquo) at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (ldquoIP Courtrdquo) for their monopolistic price-fixing which damaged his interests However Carrefour and Abbott challenged the jurisdiction of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court They claimed there were two reasons Firstly according to the jurisdiction rules of the IP court issued by the Supreme Court the IP court has no jurisdiction over anti-trust cases Secondly if this case is a contractual dispute the court that is in the place of Carrefour should hear it if this case is a tort dispute the Shanghai Intermediate Court should hear it

In the ruling of the IP Court the IP Court decided it has the jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases for the following reasons According to the Provisions On Causes Of Action In Civil Cases issued by Supreme Court (最高人民法院案由规定) antimonopoly dispute is a tertiary cause of action belonging to IP and competition disputes Also according to the Provisions concerning the Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京

市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问题的规定 ) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was an IP and competition dispute and was sued after November 6 2014 Thus the IP Court had jurisdiction

Both Carrefour and Abbott appealed to the Beijing High Court over the jurisdiction ruling but the Beijing High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original ruling Reasons are listed in the written ruling issued on June 18 2015 Firstly the nature of the case was an antimonopoly dispute In accordance with Provisions of the Supreme Peoples Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民

事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) and Civil Litigation Law the monopolistic civil disputes in the first instance shall be under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Peoples Courts and an action involving a contractual dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the peoples court of the place where the defendant is domiciled or where the contract is performed Carrefour as the defendant in this case is domiciled in Chaoyang District Beijing Therefore the courts of Beijing have jurisdiction over this case Secondly according to article 3 of the Notification on the Jurisdiction of Intellectual Property Courts issued by Supreme Court (关于知识产权法院案件管辖

等有关问题的通知) IP courts have jurisdiction over first-instance civil disputes arising from monopolistic practices Lastly according to Provisions concerning the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Contents I Legislation 1

A Legislation Tendency Highlight 1 B Legislation of SAIC 1

Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition 2 Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition 2

C Legislation of NDRC 3 Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines 3 Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses 4

D Legislation of MOFCOM 4 The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases 4 Auto Sales Management Measures 4

II Public Enforcement 5 A Merger Control 5 Enforcement Tendency Highlight 5 Significant Cases 6

GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions 6 AB InBevs Investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery 7 MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases 8 MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent 10 Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions 12 SeagateSamsungMOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions 14 FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM 16

B Monopolistic Agreements 18 Enforcement Tendency Highlight 18 Significant Cases 18

Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC 18 Analysis 21 Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau 21 Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC 23 DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC 24 Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC 25 Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC 26 Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC 27 Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC 30

C Abuse of Market Dominance 31 Enforcement Tendency Highlight 31 Significant Cases 31

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case 32 Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms 33 Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company 34 Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm 35

D Administrative Monopoly 37 Enforcement Tendency Highlight 37 Significant Cases 37

Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC 37 Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 38

III Private Litigation 40 A Enforcement Tendency Highlight 40 B Significant Cases 40

Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending) 40 Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 41 Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending) 44 Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals (Pending) 45 Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei 46 Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines 48

IV General Conclusion 50 Contact 52

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 1 of 51

2015 China Anti-Monopoly Annual Report

Dr Zhan Hao amp Song Ying1

I Legislation

A Legislation Tendency Highlight

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement agencies namely the National Development and Reform Commission (ldquoNDRCrdquo) the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoSAICrdquo) and the Ministry of Commerce (ldquoMOFCOMrdquo) made more efforts regarding legislation especially when it comes to strengthening the role of soft law compared to 2014

Intellectual property right (ldquoIPRrdquo) related antitrust issues are a hot topic At this stage three antitrust enforcement bodies and the State Intellectual Property Office are respectively drafting the IPR antitrust guidelines based on their respective enforcement areas and are going to submit their respective guidelines to the State Councilrsquos Anti-monopoly Commission (ldquoAMCrdquo) The AMC will eventually come up with the final and unified guidelines (the ldquoIPR Antitrust Guidelinesrdquo) based on the draft versions submitted by above-mentioned bodies

The auto industry has consistently attracted attention under the framework of AML Apart from continuous enforcement activities against cartel vertical monopolistic agreement and abusing dominance in the auto industry the antitrust guidelines for the auto industries being drafted by NDRC (the ldquoAuto Industry Antitrust Guidelinesrdquo) are the only antitrust guidelines specialized for a particular industry This suggests a deepening and detailing of legislative activities of Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement authorities

In addition to the IPR Antitrust Guidelines and the Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines the NDRC has also drafted four other guidelines in 2015 in order to normalize and guide the enforcement activities The four guidelines include Guidelines on Leniency Policy Guidelines on Commitment of Undertakings Guidelines on Calculating the Illegal Gains and Fines for Monopoly Conducts and Guidelines on Procedures of Monopolistic agreement Exemption

B Legislation of SAIC

1 Dr Zhan Hao is the managing partner of AnJie Law Firm and received his Doctoral degree Master degree and Bachelor degree in law Dr Zhan also conducted Post-doctoral research on Microeconomics E-mail address zhanhaoanjielawcom Song Ying is a partner of AnJie Law Firm whose practice focuses on antitrust and litigation Ms Song can be reached at the following e-mail address songyinganjielawcom The other team members of AnJie competition team including Li Xiang Wang Lingling Zhang Wenyi Zheng Shuangshi and Feng Siduo also make contribution to this report

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 2 of 52

Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition2

On April 7 2015 SAIC issued the Rules on the Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition (the ldquoIPR Antitrust Rulesrdquo) which have taken effect on August 1 2015

The IPR Antitrust Rules consist of six main parts including

clarifying the purpose and basis of the legislation and providing relevant legal concepts (eg Article 1)

prohibiting undertakings from reaching any monopolistic agreements through exercising intellectual property rights and providing the principle of ldquoSafe Harbourrdquo and its details (eg Article 5)

illustrating the rules for undertakings with dominant position exercising intellectual property rights and especially proposing the ldquoessential facility doctrinerdquo (eg Article 10)

laying out the rules for exercising IP rights related to the patent pool and standardization (eg Article 12 and 13)

providing the analytical approaches and consideration factors for conducting the antitrust assessment (eg Article 15) and

stipulating the possible punishments to be imposed in case of violation of this Rules (eg Article 17)

Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition

The Anti-monopoly and Anti-unfair Competition Enforcement Bureau of SAIC released the sixth draft of ldquoGuidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competitionrdquo (ldquoSAIC draft IPR Guidelinesrdquo) on January 6 2016

The SAIC draft IPR Guidelines cover various IPR related antitrust issues - such as restrictions on technology RampD between competitors exclusive grant-back clauses market division among competitors and safe harbour rules regarding monopolistic agreements involving IPRs etc The following areas are mainly illustrated

Chapter 1 clarifies general principles of the guidelines the relationship between antitrust law and IPR protection as well as the relationship between IPR abuse and monopolistic behaviour It also covers nature and type of conduct eliminating

2 The original Chinese notice published by SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnfldyfbzdjzzcfgzcfg201507t20150724_159428html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 3 of 52

or restricting competition via IPR abuse the relationship between IPR and market dominance position the legal responsibilities and remedies as well as the scope of application

Chapter 2 outlines the basic analysis framework including its methodology analytical steps factors and competition effects

Chapter 3 relates to defining the relevant market including the general principle and circumstances where relevant technology market and relevant innovation market should be defined

Chapter 4 refers to monopolistic agreements involving IPR including factors that should be taken into account when analysing these agreements and related safe harbour regulations

Chapter 5 stipulates the circumstances regarding the abuse of market dominance in the exercise of IPRs including refusal to license tie-in sales and other unjustifiable transactions

Chapter 6 involves undertakingsrsquo concentration when exercising IPRs

Chapter 7 analyses certain special behaviour-types related to the exercise of IPRs from the antitrust perspective including standard-setting related activities injunction for standard essential patents (ldquoSEPrdquo) patent pooling and behaviour of copyright management organizations

It is reported that the SAIC has finished soliciting opinions from the US and EU chambers of commerce some major Western companies and law firms The SAICrsquos antitrust division will gather feedback on the sixth draft from relevant departments of the Chinese government competition organizations and antitrust scholars The draft will then be submitted to the AMC for review

C Legislation of NDRC

Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines

During the Annual Conference of China Automobile Dealers Association held in November 2015 one of the NDRC officials said that the first draft of Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines (ldquoAuto Antitrust Guidelinesrdquo) has been completed According to the official Auto Antitrust Guidelines consist of six sections respectively preface basic issues monopolistic agreement abuse of dominant position concentration of undertakings and supplementary articles Furthermore the official stated that vertical price restrictions on sales of new energy auto might be exempted during the promotion period

Auto Antitrust Guidelines will likely be released in 2016 by the State Council instead of the NDRC according to Wei Tongwei general secretary of the spare part

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 4 of 52

working committee under the China Automotive Maintenance and Repair Trade Association

Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses3

NDRC published a draft of the Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses on December 31 2015 NDRC noted that the consultation period for the draft guidelines run from 1 until 20 January 2016

The draft guidelines constitute five parts preamble basic issues IPR-related agreements that may eliminate or restrict competition IPR-related abuse of dominant position and concentration involving IPR

The draft guidelines cover antitrust issues related to joint RampD patent pool cross licensing standardization price restriction exclusive grant-back no-challenge clause exemption of agreements unfairly high royalty fees refusal to license tying sale imposing unreasonable transaction conditions discriminatory treatment and injunctive relief

The draft guidelines also include factors for determining whether the application of injunction orders by standard essential patent owners can lead to the elimination or restriction of competition such as whether the parties involved expressed their true intentions during negotiations

D Legislation of MOFCOM

The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases4

MOFCOM issued the Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases on February 6 2015 which took effect at the same time

Auto Sales Management Measures

MOFCOM posted a draft of the Auto Sales Management Measures (the ldquodraft Measuresrdquo) on its website on 6 January 2016 and is soliciting for comments until 6 February 2016 MOFCOM intends to implement this new rule to replace the current Auto Brand Sales Management Measures

According to the draft Measures any vehicle sales and related services engaged in the territory of China shall be abided by this rule The draft Measures consist of five parts which are the general principles code of conduct supervision and management penalty provision and bylaw

The Measures clearly provide that the departments of the commercial 3 The original Chinese notice published by NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201512t20151231_770233html 4 The original notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticlei20150220150200891361shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 5 of 52

administration under the State Council will be in charge of nationwide auto sales management

In the second part the draft Measures list the conducts in which a supplier shall not engage in These conducts include restricting distributors from reselling their products requesting distributors to share expenses for their own marketing activities restricting distributors from selling parts of other brands or providing after-sales services for other brands and so on Most of these conducts are deemed as vertical monopolistic agreements which are likely to induce anti-competitive effects in EU and US practices

As reported the Chinese government will make efforts to coordinate the Auto Antitrust Guidelines and the Measures-- two upcoming industry-specific regulations

II Public Enforcement

A Merger Control

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

With the increase in the number of cases been filed and reviewed it is recognized that MOFCOM has become one of the most important jurisdictions of merger control in the world

The simplified procedure has improved the efficiency of MOFCOMrsquos merger review in a large degree Most cases in simple procedure were concluded during the first phase However MOFCOMrsquos review time lasts longer in a few cases For instance MOFCOM spent 162 days to clear Toyota Industries Corps purchase of a 55 stake in Singaporean logistics company LT Wuliao Banyun Holdings setting a new record for the length of a simple case review

MOFCOM used to focus on horizontal deals but now also considers vertical and conglomerate mergers important In 2015 only 35 of the cases being reviewed were horizontal mergers

The increased number of administrative punishment on cases that failed to notify in 2015 demonstrates that MOFCOM has further strengthened its enforcement on this respect

The supervision of remedy implementation has become ldquoroutinizedrdquo

All divisions of MOFCOMrsquos antitrust bureau are responsible for case reviewing from the end of 2015 with the aim to improve the work efficiency

The international cooperation between antitrust enforcement authorities with respect to merger controls happens more frequently On 15 October 2015 the competition department of EU Commissions (ldquoCommissionrdquo) and MOFCOM

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 6 of 52

have signed best practices for cooperation on reviewing mergers in Beijing As the Commissionrsquos officer says the growing number of international transactions is the main reason for this cooperation In addition the Commission also signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the NDRC and SAIC in 2012 which creates a dedicated framework to strengthen cooperation and coordination5

Statistics

From January of 2009 to the end of 2015 MOFCOM received 1445 cases and accepted 1364 cases Among the reviewed cases MOFCOM has cleared 26 deals with remedies since the AML took effect in 2008 with an average review time of 199 days

In 2015 MOFCOM accepted 338 cases out of which 332 were concluded including 18 cases dealing with applicants withdrawing merger filings The agency also imposed penalties on business operators in 9 cases that were related to failure to fulfil merger filing obligations

246 cases out of 332 cases in 2015 obtained MOFCOMrsquos approval in the first phase accounting for 74 of all reviewed cases

Of the cases cleared by MOFCOM in 2015 56 were related to manufacturing such as automotive components and parts vessels machinery manufacturing and electrical equipment

Acquisitions and joint-venture agreements were the most common types of transactions accounting for 87 of all deals Meanwhile joint ventures were still the most common channel for foreign investment in China

Significant Cases

GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions6

This is the first case in which MOFCOM agreed to remove a remedy imposed on a merger

MOFCOM partially removed the restrictions on Google based on the fact that Google had lost its control of Motorola Mobility

Facts

Google applied to MOFCOM on December 1 2014 to remove the condition that required Google to treat all original equipment manufacturers (ldquoOEMsrdquo) equally in android platform-related business after it bought Motorola

5 The original notice published by EC is available at httpeuropaeurapidpress-release_IP-15-5843_enhtml 6 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150120150100862331shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 7 of 52

The concerned remedy was imposed by MOFCOM according to its No 25 Announcement in 2012 which concerned Googlersquos acquisition of Motorola Mobility together with three other remedies as the following

1) Google will license the Android Platform on a free and open basis as it had done so far

2) Google shall continue to observe the existed FRAND obligation of Motorola Mobility in respect of the latterrsquos patents and

3) Google shall delegate an independent supervisor to supervise its performance according to the Provisional Regulations on the Disposal of the Undertakingrsquos Assets or Business in the Concentration stipulated by MOFCOM in 2010

The No 25 Announcement provided that the applied remedies would be valid for five years starting from its punishment unless Google no longer controls Motorola Mobility

Google lodged the remedy removal application based on the fact that Lenovo concluded its acquisition of Motorola Mobility from Google which had been approved by MOFCOM on October 16 2014 and closed on October 30 2014 and due to this acquisition Google lost its control of Motorola Mobility

Decision

After careful examination MOFCOM noted that upon completion of the MotorolaLenovo deal Google would not be engaged in any business of manufacturing smartphones but would keep the telecommunications patent technologies of Motorola Mobility

Based on this fact on January 6 2015 MOFCOM issued a notice that it had decided to approve Googlersquos application to remove one of the remedies with the other remedies remaining in place

AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery7

The transaction is related to a conditionally cleared merger case

The concentration parties notified the deal to MOFCOM following No 95 Announcement in 2008

Considering the slight increase of AB InBevrsquos shareholdings in Zhujiang Brewery MOFCOM approved the proposed transaction

Facts

7 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150820150801090985shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 8 of 52

On July 23 2015 Interbrew Investment International a fully owned subsidiary of AB InBev Guangzhou State-owned Assets Development Holdings and Guangzhou Securities entered into an agreement with Zhujiang Brewery to subscribe the latterrsquos new shares According to this agreement Interbrew Investment International would subscribe shares worth up to CNY 16 billion

Pursuant to a MOFCOM antitrust notice issued in 2008 if AB Inbev intended to further increase its stake in Zhujiang Brewery a filing should be submitted to MOFCOM before any deal were to be concluded

On July 29 2015 AB InBev submitted the filing for the deal to MOFCOM

Decision

MOFCOM noted that upon this subscription Interbrew Investment International would increase its stake in Zhujiang Brewery from 2562 to 2999 Since the stake increase is relatively small and will not result in material changes regarding the control of Zhujiang Brewery MOFCOM decided to approve the deal on 20 August 2015

MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases

MOFCOM reached these decisions based on the undertakingsrsquo failure to file notifications

None of these concentrations were determined as resulting in anti-competition effects

MOFCOM considered that a 35 shares acquisition could lead to the obtaining of control power over a company

Complaints from the third party are the main channel of triggering investigation on unnotified concentrations

The undertakings were fined up to RMB 200000 which is less than the imposed penalty (RMB 300000) in the last year and the maximum penalty (RMB 500000) for violations of merger control rules

Facts

On September 29 2015 MOFCOM issued notices regarding the penalty on four concentration dealings because the concerning undertakings failed to notify these dealings to MOFCOM before closing them Details of these notices are as follows

Shanghai Fosun Pharmaceutical (Group) Co Ltd has been imposed a fine of CNY 200000 (USD 31431) because of its failure to notify MOFCOM regarding its

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 9 of 52

acquisition of a 35 stake in Suzhou Erye Pharmaceutical Co Ltd (Suzhou Erye) and the target stake was transferred without MOFCOMrsquos allowance8

Fujian Electronics amp Information (Group) has been imposed a fine of CNY 150000 (USD 23568) for its failure to notify a 35 stake acquisition of Shenzhen CHINO-E Communication MOFCOM made this decision based on the fact that Fujian Electronics signed a transfer agreement with CHINO-Ersquo shareholders and completed this transaction without filing9

Bestv New Media and Microsoft have been imposed CNY 200000 (USD 31420) fines by MOFCOM since they did not lodge a merger review filling regarding their joint venture E-Home Entertainment Development which was established on October 1 201310

CSR Nanjing Puzhen and Bombardier Transportation Sweden have been fined CNY 150000 (USD 23562) respectively due to their failure to notify their proposed joint venture prior to setting it up These companies made an agreement about the joint venturersquos establishment on November 3 2014 and its business license was obtained on November 11 201411

MOFCOM identified that the above dealings shall be notified according to the fact that all of these dealings constituted concentration and turnovers of these concentrating undertakings reached the statutory turnover thresholds

Article 20 of the AML stipulates three kinds of concentration which are (i) a merger of undertakings (ii) an acquisition of control of other undertakings by acquisition of shares or assets with voting right of other undertakings to an adequate extent (iii) an acquisition of control of other undertakings or the capability of imposing determinative effects on other undertakings by contracts or other means

Article 3 of the Provisions of the State Council on the Thresholds for Concentration Notification of Undertakings provides the fillingrsquos thresholds which are as follows (i) The collective worldwide turnovers of all undertakings involved in the last fiscal year exceed CNY 10 billion and the turnovers within China of at least two undertakings each exceed CNY 400 million or (ii) The collective turnovers of all undertakings involved in the last fiscal year exceed CNY 2 billion (approximately USD 294 million) and the China-wide turnovers of at least two undertakings each exceed CNY 400 million (approximately USD CNY588 million)

These undertakings were penalized because of their violations of article 21 of the 8 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150920150901124896shtml 9 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150920150901124887shtml 10 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150920150901124903shtml 11 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150920150901124899shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 10 of 52

AML which provides that the concentration reaching the filling thresholds shall be notified to MOFCOM prior to its implementation and without this notification it shall not be conducted In addition according to article 48 of the AML and article 13 of the Interim Measures for Investigating and Punishing of Concentration of Undertakings Failing to File Notification an undertaking which is identified by MOFCOM for implementing a concentration without filling would be imposed a fine and instructed to recover the situation by MOFCOM The amount of this fine could be no more than CNY 500000

There is no provision that specifically describes the behaviour of implementing a concentration In practice obtaining a business license transferring the entity of assets delivering the shares and assigning directors or managers are likely to be deemed as the implementation of concentration

According to Shang Ming the former director general of MOFCOMrsquos Anti-monopoly Bureau so far MOFCOM has already penalized 15 companies for failing to notify MOFCOM regarding merger reviews MOFCOM has noticed an increase in companies shirking merger-filing responsibilities and has therefore intensified enforcement

MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent12

MOFCOM defines all of the information and communication technology SEPs as the relevant product market rather than divides each of them into the individual market

In the process of competition analysis MOFCOM evaluates various factors rather than comparing the market shares only which is consistent with the complexity and flexibility of the high-technology industry

In the process of formulating remedies MOFCOM pays more attention on protecting Chinese downstream companies and enhancing its supervision

Facts

On April 15 2015 Nokia Oyi (ldquoNokiardquo) signed a Memorandum of Understanding regarding the acquisition of Alcatel Lucent (ldquoAlcatelrdquo) According to this memorandum Nokia intends to acquire 100 shares of Alcatel through a tender off

A notification about this deal was filed on April 21 2015 and accepted by MOFCOM on June 15 2015 After reviewing this case MOFCOM moved it to Phases II and Phase III as the agency was of the opinion that this acquisition could have anti-competitive effects on the relevant market

12 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151020151001139743shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

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On October 19 2015 MOFCOM cleared this deal with four behavioural remedies

Decision

Relevant Market

In the agencyrsquos view there are four relevant product markets which are the radio access network market the core network systems market the network infrastructure service market and the information and communication technology SEP licensing market Meanwhile the relevant geographical market is primarily the Chinese market

Competition Analysis

According to MOFCOM this deal would have no anti-competitive effects on the first three relevant product markets in China while it could constitute an obstacle or limit the competition in the information and communication technology SEP licensing market

The agency consideredafter the deal that Nokia would increase its holding in 2G 3G and 4G SEPs and strengthen the degree of concentration in the information and communication technology SEP licensing market If it refused to license charged overly high royalty fees or conducted any other anti-competitive behaviour the competition of downstream market would be distorted which would most likely impair customersrsquo interests in the end

Remedies

Four behavioural remedies focusing on maintaining fair licensing of standard-essential patents (ldquoSEPsrdquo) were imposed on Nokia which are

1) On a reciprocal basis Nokia commits to not use injunctions to prevent enforcements of FRAND (fair reasonable and non-discriminatory) encumbered SEPs unless the potential licensees are unwilling to sign FRAND licensing agreements and follow the terms

2) If Nokia transfers its SEPs to a third party it shall inform Chinese licensees as well as Chinese companies that are actively engaging in licensing negotiation about the transfer details

3) Nokia will only transfer its SEPs to a new owner on the basis that the new owner accepts the existing FRAND commitments made by Nokia

4) MOFCOM has the right to monitor the implementation of Nokiarsquos commitments Nokia shall report to MOFCOM about the implementation of the conditions within 45 days of the end of each calendar year The reporting obligation will last five years until October18 2020

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Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions13

Western Digital had engaged in two conducts that violated the remedies provided in the No 9 Announcement in 2012 issued by MOFCOM

Western Digital lodged an application to remove certain restrictions in March 2014 and the agency made the decision on October 19 2015

MOFCOM considered the fact that the competition condition in the relevant product market has changed and decided to remove the hold-separate restrictions related to manufacture and RampD

Facts

In 2012 Western Digital Corporation (ldquoWestern Digitalrdquo) intended to acquire 100 shares of Viviti Technologies Ltd (ldquoViviti Technologiesrdquo) which was the holding company of Hitachi Global Storage Technologies Netherlands BV and Hitachi Global Storage Technologies Singapore Pte Ltd and engaged in the hard disk business

On April 2 2011 Western Digital filed a notification for this acquisition MOFCOM issued the No 9 Announcement in March 2012 and cleared this acquisition with six remedies According to this announcement Western Digital could apply for the removal of the first and second remedy after this decision has been carried out for 24 months

The first remedy refers to maintaining the Viviti Technologies as an independent competitor and the second remedy requires both Western Digital and Viviti Technologies to make a reasonable plan of their capacity and production and report these data to the trustee

Western Digital lodged an application to remove the first and second remedy in March 2014 MOFCOM found that Western Digital had engaged in two conducts that violated the first remedy and the competitive situation in the hard disk market had changed After talking with Western Digital collecting opinions from the relevant entities and delegating the independent party to make an economic evaluation MOFCOM decided to remove the hold-separate remedies partially

Western Digitalrsquos implementation of the duties imposed in the No 9 Announcement

Based on the implementation reports submitted by Western Digital and the monitoring reports submitted by the trustee MOFCOM found that Western

13 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151020151001139040shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

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Digital had engaged in two conducts that violated the first remedy Those were

1) On March 8 2012 Western Digital consolidated Hitachi Global Storage Technology (ldquoHGSTrdquo) which was Vivitirsquos subsidiary in US

2) In January 2013 Western Digital dissolved the development division of VivitiHGST and transferred the relevant workforce to Western Digital

MOFCOM considered that these conducts impaired the independence of Viviti as a competitor so that it imposed CNY 300000 fines on each of these behaviours and requested Western Digital to rectify the situation As per the entrusted supervisorrsquos report such behaviours have been rectified and the first remedy has been fulfilled

According to MOFCOMrsquos announcement the agency found that other remedies have been entirely implemented

Competition Analysis

With respect to the current situation of the competition in the hard disk market MOFCOM made the following assessment

1) In the areas of portable application and corporate-level application solid-state drive has put constraint on the impact of the traditional hard disk as to strengthen the competition in the relevant market

2) Overcapacity problems in the conventional hard disk drive market became obvious

3) Western Digital and HGST are the major competitors in the hard disk drive market Both the layout and the major market competitors in this market have remained unchanged since 2012

4) The hold-separate duties restricted the full competition between Western Digital and HGST The implementation of such duties hindered them from integrating their products and providing the market with a full range of products and had an adverse impact on their clientsrsquo product procurement

Based on the above analysis MOFCOM deemed that

1) Removal of the conditions that required the two companies to remain independent in production and RampD activities would enable Western Digital to save costs to provide a full range of products to the market and to fully engage in market competition and benefit its clients

2) To keep the two sales teams and their respective brands independent from each other and the independence of sales activities could reduce competition restraint impacts arising from a complete merger

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 14 of 52

Remedies

After negotiating with MOFCOM the relevant entities agreed to undertake the following obligations

1) Western Digital and HGST will remain independent in sales and brands

2) Western Digital will not change its previous business modes or force its clients to exclusively purchase hard disk drive products from Western Digital or do so in disguise

3) Western Digital will continue its pace in investing in product innovation to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

This announcement will be effective within two years from the date of issuance If Western Digital can provide sufficient evidence to prove a substantial change in the market environment the company can propose to MOFCOM to remove the relevant conditions within the two years

SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions14

MOFCOM considered the fact that the competition condition in the relevant product market has changed and removed the hold-separate restrictions on Seagate and Samsung

Seagate shall remain its business model materially and continue to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

Facts

On December 12 2011 MOFCOM made the No 11 Announcement to clear Seagate Technology LLCrsquos (ldquoSeagaterdquo) acquisition with remedies In this acquisition Seagate intended to acquire hard disk drive business of Samsung Electronics Co Ltd (ldquoSamsung HDDrdquo) As per this announcement Seagate could apply for removing the first and second remedy after this decision has been carried out for 12 months

The first remedy is to preserve Samsung HDD as an independent competitor and the second remedy asks to maintain and expand Samsung HDDrsquos production capacity within six months of issuance of the No 11 Announcement and to set reasonable production volume targets based on market supply-demand conditions

Seagate lodged an application to remove the first and second remedy in May 2015 After making assessments on the relevant parties and the competition circumstance MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate remedies

14 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151020151001144105shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

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Competition Analysis

With respect to the current situation of the competition in the hard disk drive market MOFCOM made the following assessments

1) In the areas of portable application and corporate-level application solid-state drive has put constraint on the impact of the traditional hard disk so that the competition in the relevant market has been strengthened

2) Overcapacity problems in the conventional hard disk drive market became obvious

3) Both the layout and the major market competitors in the hard disk drive market have remained unchanged since 2012

4) Seagate and Samsung HDDrsquos market overlap in the hard disk market is quite small and Samsung HDDrsquos competition in the traditional hard disk is quite weak

Based on the above analysis MOFCOM deemed that

1) Removal of certain conditions is possible because in the portable application and corporate level application sectors competition constraint of solid-state drive on traditional hard disk drives has strengthened traditional hard disk drives are facing overcapacity which has reduced the chance of a single or more competitors causing competition restraints Seagate has limited overlap with Samsung in the hard disk business and the latter has a relatively weaker market power in the hard drive disk business

2) Removal of all imposed conditions may still restrain market competition because the traditional hard disk drive market competition conditions have not undergone a major change Seagate is still the major player in all divisions of the market and Seagate will strengthen its power after the acquisition of Samsung HDD

Remedies

After negotiating with MOFCOM Seagate agreed to undertake the following obligations

1) Seagate shall not change its business model materially or force clients to purchase hard drive disks exclusively from it

2) Seagate shall not force Tokyo Dengikagaku Kogyo China to supply magnetic heads exclusively to Seagate (or other Seagate-controlled companies) or limit the number of magnetic heads Tokyo Dengikagaku Kogyo China would supply to other hard drive disk manufacturers

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3) Seagate shall continue to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

This announcement will be effective within two years from the date of issuance If Seagate can provide sufficient evidence to prove substantial change in the market environment the company can propose to MOFCOM to remove relevant conditions within the two years

FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM15

MOFCOM deems that this acquisition would induce anti-competitive influence

NXP promises to dispose its radio frequency (ldquoRFrdquo) power transistor business

As the first case approved with structural remedies after the enactment of the Provisions on Imposing Restrictive Conditions MOFCOM conducted a comprehensive evaluation of the viability competitiveness and marketability of the divested business as well as the suitability of potential buyers

Facts

On April 3 2015 NXP filed for its acquisition of Freescale NXP Semiconductor (ldquoNXPrdquo) is a NASDAQ-listed company registered in the Netherlands which engages in the design manufacturing and sale of integration circuits and discrete components

Freescale Semiconductor (ldquoFreescalerdquo) is a New York-listed company registered in Bermuda and based in the US which engages in the manufacturing and RampD of microcontroller and digital networking processors (embedded processors)

According to the agreement between NXP and Freescale after closing Freescale will become the wholly owned subsidiary of NXP On November 25 2015 MOFCOM decided to clear this acquisition with remedies

Relevant Market

As per the announcement the relevant product markets are the general microcontroller automotive power-use analog integrated circuit and RF transistor product markets in which NXP and Freescale have horizontal overlap The relevant geographical markets should be the global market

Competition Analysis

After assessing this proposed deal the agency concluded that

1) The proposed deal would boost NXPrsquos market control power in the RF

15 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151120151101196182shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 17 of 52

transistor product market because the global and Chinese RF transistor product markets share a similar structure both featuring few competitors and high concentration levels Freescale and NXP as the number one and number two players are far ahead of their rivals in the market Therefore after closing the market control power of NXP in this market would be strengthened

2) Since Freescale was the fiercest competitor of NXP the proposed deal will remove competition between them

3) The proposed deal would reduce the options for clients and increase procurement risks

In practice the wireless infrastructure suppliers as the main client of the RF transistor product tend to procure products from both NXP and Freescale to prevent them from the risk arising from relying on one supplier

4) The proposed deal may induce an adverse impact on the technology RampD and innovation

Remedies

In accordance with MOFCOMrsquos decision NXP shall follow its written commitment submitted to MOFCOM and completely divest its RF power transistor business to Beijing Jianguang Asset Management At the same time NXP shall strictly fulfil its obligations during the transition period It is worth noting that the NXPFreescale deal shall only be implemented after the divestment deal has been concluded

In addition MOFCOM requires NXP to perform relevant obligations during the transition period from the date of approval announcement until the divestment deal has been concluded NXP shall endeavour

1) not to engage in any lsquounfair trade practicesrsquo relating to the divested business

2) not to implement any acts which may have a significant adverse impact on the value management or competitiveness of the divested business or any acts which may change the nature and scope industry or business strategy or investment policy of the divested business and to take reasonable measures to encourage core employees to stay in the divested business as well as not to seek or transfer employees to NXPrsquos non-divested business

3) to ensure supply to the divested business in a fair reasonable and non-discriminatory manner and

4) to maintain the independence of the divested business and not to exchange competitively sensitive information between the parties and the divested

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 18 of 52

business

B Monopolistic Agreements

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

With respect to the enforcement activities of the NDRC in light of the numbers of the published cases it seems that the law enforcement frequency of the NDRC regarding monopolistic agreements in 2015 is lower in comparison with 2014

The reason behind might be that the outstanding issue of human resource deficit of the antitrust authority still exists Besides the fact that more enterprises gradually attach increasing importance to the antitrust compliance might be another reason for the decrease in the number of cases investigated by the authorities

As to the enforcement activities of the SAIC 4 of 14 cases concluded by the SAIC and its local branches in 2015 are relevant to monopolistic agreements Meanwhile these four cases concern horizontal monopolistic agreements

It is noteworthy however that the Mercedes-Benz case and the Dongfeng Nissan case suggest that vertical agreements especially involving price-related restrictions on the downstream dealers is still the priority of antitrust enforcement Companies shall be very cautious when imposing restrictions on the resale prices or the minimum resale prices of commodities in the distribution agreements

Automobile industry and related industries are observed to be under continuous attention of Chinarsquos antitrust authorities

The industries relating to peoplersquos livelihoods remain to be the enforcement priority

Significant Cases

Enforcement by the NDRC and its local branches

Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC16

The investigation was triggered by a leniency application

The first leniency applicant was exempted from punishment

Eight ocean shipping companies involved were imposed a collective fine of CNY 4067 million

NDRC spent approximately 12 months to investigate and conclude the case 16 NDRCrsquos press release of the case is available at httpjjsndrcgovcngzdt201512t20151228_769084html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

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Facts

In December 2015 the NDRC published its official punishment decisions regarding the cartel case in connection with eight ocean shipping companies namely Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha (ldquoNYKrdquo) Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha (ldquoK Linerdquo) Mitsui OSK Lines EUKOR Car Carriers Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics Compantildeiacutea Sud Americana de Vapores Eastern Car Liner and Compantildeiacutea Chilena de Navegacioacuten Interoceaacutenica

According to the official press release of the NDRC the investigation was triggered by a leniency application of NYK The evidence showed that the eight companies reached consensus on non-intrusion of each others existing business to maintain or increase shipping fees when shipping goods such as cars trucks and engineering machinery in the routes between China and other countries and regions

They were also found to frequently conduct bilateral or multilateral communications on the shippersrsquo invitation for bids andor price inquiries via phone conferences dinner parties e-mails visiting etc In addition they also conducted illegal behaviour such as sensitive information exchange price negotiations bidding intention discussion dividing clients and shipping routes reaching agreements on high price bids or non-bidding in order to help certain companies gain shipping orders

To avoid the regulation of the antitrust authority the relevant shipping companies adopted various illicit measures that showed their apparent intention to violate the AML The cartel lasted for at least four years and covered a broad range of shipping routes concerned with the import and export of products between China and other regions such as North America EU South America and so on involving multiple auto brands and engineering machinery brands

The NDRC held the opinion that the eight companies conducts had restricted and eliminated competition in the relevant market raising the international shipping fees and impairing interests of shippers and end consumers The eight companies breached the AML by reaching and implementing monopolistic agreements on fixing prices and dividing the market

All eight investigated companies put forward remedy measures including enhancing the antitrust compliance program arranging more antitrust compliance trainings and developing antitrust compliance technologies

The NDRC imposed fines based on the nature level and duration of their monopolistic volations as well as their respective sales of international freight service sales relevant to the Chinese market The companies involved were collectively fined CNY 4067 million

NYK as the first cartel member voluntarily reporting the illegal conducts to the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 20 of 52

authority and providing significant evidence was entirely exempted from the punishment K Line as the second leniency applicant was imposed a fine amounting to 4 of its 2014 annual sales of international freight services relevant to Chinarsquos import and export market The details of punishments imposed on the involved companies by the NDRC are as follow

Company Name Amount of Fines (RMB million)

Percentage of the Relevant Turnovers

Grounds

Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha

- - First leniency applicant

Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha

2398 4 Second leniency applicant

Mitsui OSK Lines 3812 7 Third leniency applicant

EUKOR Car Carriers 284 9 Lasted over a long period involved many brands and many violations violations were severe

Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics

4506 8 Lasted over a long period involved many brands and many violations violations were severe

Compantildeiacutea Sud Americana de Vapores

308 6 Lasted over a long period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Eastern Car Liner 1127 5 Lasted over a long period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Compantildeiacutea Chilena de 120 4 Lasted over a long

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 21 of 52

Navegacioacuten Interoceaacutenica

period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Total 4067

Analysis

In this case the agency applied the AML instead of the Tenders and Bids Law to collusive bidding Citing article 13 (3) of the AML the NDRC identified that the collusive bidding constituted a division of the sales market

The leading three leniency applicants were granted exemption from fines to a varying degree

According to the official who handled this case dawn raids performed by antitrust enforcement agencies in other jurisdictions drew the attention of the NDRC on the cartels of these shipping companies However there was limited effective evidence to prove that the companies had reached monopolistic agreements Through pressuring the involved parties three members of the shipping cartel actively confessed their illegal conduct This case once again stresses the significance of international cooperation between antitrust enforcement agencies

Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau17

The distribution agreements between Mercedes-Benz and its dealers are determined as vertical monopolistic agreement and Mercedes-Benz violated article 14 of the AML because it restricted the ability of its dealers to decide their own resale prices

Mercedes-Benzrsquos dealers violated article of 13 of the AML due to concluding a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Mercedes-Benz and its dealers were jointly fined CNY 3578 million

Facts

In April 2015 Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau which is the provincial branch of the NDRC released the punishment on its website and announced that it had imposed a fine of CNY 350 million on Mercedes-Benz along with the aggregated fine of CNY 787 million on its dealers The fine came as a result of Mercedes-Benz reaching and implementing resale price maintenance (ldquoRPMrdquo) agreements with dealers to fix the minimum resale price of several car models as well as certain auto parts 17 The original Chinese notice published by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau is available at httpwwwjswjjgovcnoffice_neweo_comm_zxnrxsphp

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

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According to the decision the authority found that Mercedes-Benz fixed the minimum resale price of Class E and Class S cars in Nanjing Wuxi Changzhou and Suzhou markets through telephoneverbal communication and dealers meetings from January 2013 to July 2014 Since 2010 Mercedes-Benz had reached agreements with dealers in Jiangsu province to fix the minimum resale prices for auto parts by providing different levels of discounts for insured cars cars involving expired warranty periods and cars within the warranty period

In addition Mercedes-Benz implemented the minimum resale price maintaining agreement by

1) Tightening its monitoring measures on the dealers such as inspecting deals and their sale incentive system on a weekly basis

2) Tracking the sales process flow of cars and increasing the intensity of this assessment

3) Giving warnings and reducing support ndash for example halting the supply of bestselling cars and prohibiting the opening of new stores ndash to dealers if dealers refused to cooperate with the price-fixing related policies and measures and

4) Interviewing personnel of the dealers and requesting terminations if the staff engaged in serious violations of the RPM agreement

Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau concluded that Mercedes-Benz had excluded and eliminated market competition harmed consumer welfare and consequently violated article 1418 of the AML The authority therefore imposed a fine of CNY 350 million representing 7 of the sale revenue of the previous year in the relevant market against Mercedes-Benz and imposed a fine on the dealers amounting to an equivalence of 1 of the annual sales in the previous year

Analysis

Although the agency also addressed the horizontal violation among the dealers in this case the administrative penalty decision mainly focuses on the vertical violation The agency fined dealers involved in the RPM agreement a combined CNY 787 million equal to 1 of the previous-year sales which suggests that the agency decided to give lighter punishments to dealers who took initiative in reporting the activity and provided evidence

The Mercedes-Benz case is the third case where the agency successfully 18 Article 14 of the AML The following monopolistic agreements between operators and trading partners shall be prohibited (i) fixing the resale prices of commodities to third persons (ii) restricting the minimum resale prices of commodities to third persons (iii) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement Authority under the State Council

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 23 of 52

discovered both vertical and horizontal agreements in a case following the Audi case and the Chrysler case All these cases are rooted in the same industry indicating that industrial features play a large role in raising anti-trust concerns In fact it appears that the entire automotive industry is under antitrust scrutiny

Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC19

This case involved both a horizontal agreement and an administrative monopoly

A total fine of CNY 1318 million was imposed on the involved companies

Facts

In June 2015 the NDRC through its website announced the decision made by its regional branch -Yunnan Provincial Development and Reform Commission (ldquoYunnan DRCrdquo) regarding the horizontal monopolistic agreement case involving Yunnan Communications Administration and local subsidiaries of four state-owned telecommunication companies

Through the investigation Yunnan DRC found that Yunnan Communications Administration as a competent government agency had organized several meetings involving Yunnan branches of four state-owned telecoms - China Mobile China Telecom China Unicom and China Tietong in August and September of 2014 At the end of 2009 the four local branches entered into an agreement to regulate their sales promotions in terms of limiting the promotional items amount and frequency

Furthermore the agreement provides certain measures to ensure the implementation of relevant restrictions on promotions Specifically in case any cartel member violates the agreement the others could file complaints with Yunnan Communications Administration and the agency would then issue a rectification notice to the rule-breaker

Yunnan DRC stated that the four telecoms were main competitors in the relevant market and the promotions as a significant competition measure would exert direct influence on the final prices of the products The horizontal agreement organized by Yunnan Communications Administration on sales promotions restricted the competition capacity of telecoms and as a result eliminated the competition in the relevant market Consequently the behaviour of Yunnan Communications Administration violated article 8 20 of the AML and constituted administrative monopoly in terms of ldquoforcing undertakings to conduct monopolistic behaviour prohibited by the AMLrdquo

19 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpwwwsdpcgovcnfzgggzjgjdyfldjjszhdt201506t20150602_694802html 20 Article 8 of the AML Administrative organs and the public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 24 of 52

With respect to the penalties Yunnan DRC fined the local branch of China Tietong CNY 200000 for reaching but not implementing the agreement in regards to the other three telecoms a total fine of CNY 1298 million amounting to 2 of the sales of the relevant business in the previous year were imposed for entering into and implementing the horizontal monopolistic agreement

Analysis

The telecoms industry is still the enforcement priority of the antitrust enforcement authorities A company cannot be exempted from punishment even though it is forced by competent authorities to conduct monopoly behaviour

DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC21

Both a horizontal monopolistic agreement and a vertical monopolistic agreement were involved in this case

A total fine of CNY 14242 million was imposed on DongFeng Nissan and its distributors

Facts

In September 2015 the Guangdong Development and Reform Commission (ldquoGuangdong DRCrdquo) released an announcement regarding the administrative penalties on DongFeng Nissan and its provincial distributors for concluding price-related monopolistic agreements More specifically DongFeng Nissan was imposed a fine of CNY 1233 million for breaching article 14 of the AML in terms of restricting the resale price of certain car models 17 distributors domiciled in Guangdong were collectively fined CNY 1912 million for violating article 1322 of the AML in terms of entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements

According to the published official release the Guangdong DRC launched the investigation in August 2014 The authority discovered that from 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissan had set a rigorous restriction on its distributorsrsquo abilities to determine the resale prices of certain car models including the quoted prices in various platforms and the final resale price In addition DongFeng Nissan punished the distributors that failed to abide by such price restrictions in 2013 The authority 21 The original Chinese notice published by Guangdong DRC is available at httpwwwgddpcgovcnzwgkgzdtgzyw201509t20150910_328993html 22 Article 13 of the AML The following Monopolistic agreements among competing operators shall be prohibited (i) fix or change prices of commodities (ii) limit the outputs or sales volume of commodities (iii) segment the sales markets or the raw material purchasing markets (iv) limit the purchase of new technology new facilities or limit the development of new products new technology (v) jointly boycott transactions (vi) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-Monopoly Law enforcement Authority Monopolistic agreements in this Law refer to agreements decisions or other concerted practices that eliminate restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 25 of 52

believed that the vertical agreement concluded between DongFeng Nissan and its distributors eliminated and restricted the competition in the relevant market and damaged the consumer welfare as well which violates article 14 of the AML

Furthermore from April 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissanrsquos distributors in Guangdong province held multiple meetings to discuss issues relevant to sale price reached and implemented a horizontal monopolistic agreement in terms of fixing the prices of some car models which is prohibited by article 13 of the AML

Considering that both DongFeng Nissan and the involved distributors positively cooperated with the investigation and ceased the illegal behaviour immediately after the investigation Guangdong DRC decided to impose a fine amounting to 3 of its previous yearrsquos turnovers on DongFeng Nissan and a fine ranging from 2 to 4 on the relevant distributors in accordance with articles 4623 and 4924 of the AML

Analysis

This case demonstrates that auto and related industries are still under close attention of the authority Considering the NDRCrsquos successful series of antitrust investigations conducted throughout the auto industry it is observed that the agency currently overseeing price-related antitrust issues in China has accumulated a substantial amount of experience regarding antitrust enforcement in the auto industry Now is the right time to speed up the law-making process by amending the set of rules released earlier and drafting new laws to advise the auto industry on antitrust compliance

Enforcement by the SAIC and its local branches

Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC25

The investigation was triggered by whistle blowerrsquos submission

Cartel members were collectively fined CNY 139 million 23 Article 46 of the AML In case the operators violate the relevant provisions of this Law concluding and implementing Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall order the operators to cease such act impose fines more than 1 but less than 10 of the total turnover in the preceding year and confiscate the illegal gains where the Monopolistic agreement is not implemented a fine less than RMB 500000 can be imposed If the operators involved in Monopolistic agreement on its own initiative report information concerning the conclusion of Monopolistic agreements and provide important evidences to the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority they may be given a mitigated punishment or be exempted from punishment in accordance with the circumstances Where the industrial associations violate this Law organizing the operators in the industry to conclude Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority may impose a fine less than RMB 500000 in serious circumstances the agency of social organization administration and registration may cancel its registration 24 Article 49 of the AML As for the imposition of the fines stipulated by the Article 46 47 and 48 of this Law the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall take elements such as the nature extent and time it lasts of the illegal act into consideration in determining the specific amount of the fines 25 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201506t20150601_156889html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 26 of 52

Facts

In April 2015 the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) issued administrative penalties on several brick manufacturers for entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements This is the first case relevant to monopolistic agreements that has been publicized by the SAIC since the beginning of this year

Ten cartel members were involved in the case including one company and nine individuals Similar with most antitrust cases the investigation started as a result of a whistle blowerrsquos submission After a thorough investigation Hunan AIC found that those local brick manufacturers had reached agreements on controlling production volume and dividing sales areas in the forms of production and sales agreements plans and meeting minutes

The enforcement authority reached the conclusion that these brick manufacturers violated article 13 of the AML and imposed a total fine of CNY 1389400 on them

Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC26

The organizer of the monopolistic agreement the animation association was fined CNY 100000

The antitrust authority did not punish the members of the monopolistic agreement

Facts

In December 2015 the Guangdong Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoGuangdong AICrdquo) published its administrative punishment decision in regards to Guangzhou Panyu Animation amp Game Association (ldquoGAGArdquo) organizing member companies to conclude a monopolistic agreement

According to the decision GAGA drafted the ldquoAgreement of Exhibition Alliancerdquo (ldquoAgreementrdquo) and convened a conference with member companies in order to discuss the content and conclusion of the Agreement 52 member companies entered into the Agreement which actually requested the alliance companies to merely participate in the exhibitions either organized or supported by GAGA in Guangzhou In addition the Agreement prohibited the alliance companies from attending any other exhibition except if they obtained prior approval of GAGA

After a thorough investigation Guangdong AIC believed that the conclusion of the Agreement among GAGA and the 52 member companies violated article 13 (5) of the AML in terms of boycott GAGA who was deeply involved and restricted member companiesrsquo choice of exhibitions through the Agreement could be deemed as

26 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151208_164680html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 27 of 52

the participant and organizer of the monopolistic agreement In accordance with article 46 of the AML Guangdong AIC imposed a fine of CNY 100000 on GAGA for organizing the conclusion of the monopolistic agreement

Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC27

Hubei AIC considered the coinsurance for Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance illegal

Twelve insurance companies were fined CNY 469 million in total

Facts

In December 2015 the Hubei Administrative for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHubei AICrdquo) disclosed its punishment on 12 insurance companies for signing illegal coinsurance agreements

The disclosed punishment decision suggests that the Hubei branch of China Pacific Life Insurance (ldquothe Companyrdquo) 11 other insurance companies and Wuhan Construction Safety Technology Consultation Center (ldquoWCSTCCrdquo) signed a Coinsurance Agreement on Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance (ldquoCoinsurance Agreementrdquo) of which the main contents include

1) The Company and 11 other involved companies as the coinsurers jointly take charge of the personal accident insurance concerned with the construction project directly administered by the Wuhan government WCSTCC is responsible for providing safety professionalism and technology services regarding the relevant personal accident insurance

2) The Company as the chief insurer of the coinsurance occupies 12 of the total amount of the insurance and the other 11 companies respectively occupy 8

3) The Company as the representative of the coinsurance is in charge of collecting the premium signing the standard form insurance policies and issuing the invoice in its own name The Company should share the charged premium with the other companies in accordance with the Coinsurance Agreement

4) Both the Company and the other insurance companies should pay 25 of the actually received premium to WCSTCC as the service fee WCSTCC will assist the coinsurers in providing safety and technology management service to the insured In addition the 11 insurance companies should pay 5 of their premium to the Company as the management fee

27 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165445html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 28 of 52

5) In case an accident happens the 12 companies will jointly bear the damages based on their respective shares in the coinsurance

6) There is a contact mechanism established in the coinsurance The coinsurers will regularly hold coinsurance conferences to discuss existing problems

Furthermore the coinsurers and WCSTCC also signed a self-discipline agreement and established a complete management system to assure the implementation of the Coinsurance Agreement Any party violating the Coinsurance Agreement would be punished

Hubei AIC found that WCSTCC was solely invested by Wuhan Construction Safety Management Association which was under Wuhan Construction Commission The centre helped implement certain functions of the Wuhan Urban Construction Safety Management Station and was responsible for quality supervision and safety supervision of municipal construction projects

It later became a prerequisite for construction companies to purchase insurance from any member of the coinsurance in order to get approval to commence their project According to the decision Hubei AIC launched another separate investigation against WCSTCC

Through the investigation Hubei AIC concluded that the Coinsurance Agreement constituted a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by article 13 of the AML with the following analysis

First coinsurance as a common business model to jointly share and lower risks is widely adopted in the insurance industry A coinsurance arrangement for a specific project in order to avoid high risks faced by one insurer could be legal However coinsurance should not target the entire market In this case prior to the Coinsurance Agreement the risks of the construction projects were unpredictable since the scale of the construction projects the difficulty of the construction and the amount of construction workers could not be available It is impossible to predict the risks of the projects thus it is not necessary to cooperate with other insurers to collectively bear the risks The purpose of the 12 insurance companies to establish the coinsurance is to avoid the competition which demonstrates the Coinsurance Agreement belongs to a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by the AML

Second the companies through entering into the coinsurance agreement actually divided the relevant market of construction project personal accident insurance in Wuhan city which affected the competition in the relevant market and damaged the interests of other competitors and the consumers In particular the Construction Law as amended in 2011 stipulates that the purchase of personal accident insurance is not mandatory and the construction companies have the right to choose whether to buy the said insurance or not As mentioned purchasing insurance from the coinsurance had been the prerequisite for construction companies to obtain administration

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 29 of 52

approval for the project which seriously distorts the fair competition in the market

Citing article 46 of the AML the 12 insurance companies were collectively fined CNY 469 million including fines on the companies and confiscation of illegal gains It is noteworthy that the fines were calculated based on the companiesrsquo 2014 annual sales of the insurance product in connection with the coinsurance The Company as the chief insurer was fined amounting to 6 of its 2014 annual sales of the relevant insurance product in the coinsurance and other companies were fined amounting to 2 of relevant sales For more specific information please see the following table

Company Name (Hubei Branch)

Fines (CNY million)

Percentage of the sales

Illegal Gains (CNY

million)

China Pacific Life Insurance 00653 6 0941

Sino Life 00145 2 04332

Alltrust Insurance 00145 2 04332

Taikang Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Continent Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Pacific Property Insurance

00145 2 04332

China Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

PICC Property and Casualty 00145 2 02599

Taiping General Insurance 00145 2 013

Union Life Insurance 00145 2 01177

Ping An Annuity Insurance Company of China

00145 2 04201

Ping An Property amp Casualty Insurance Company of China

00145 2 -

Subtotal 02248 - 44679

Total 46927

Analysis

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 30 of 52

Coinsurance as an effective approach to lower risks of insurers is widely used in the insurance industry Information sharing and agreements on coinsurance were generally considered efficient and legitimate However from an antitrust perspective coinsurance may raise competition concerns depending on the circumstances of each agreement In the case that there is enough capacity for one insurer to cover the potential risks the coinsurance might be considered as entering into a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC28

The first leniency applicant was exempted from fines

The other concrete companies were imposed a fine of CNY 180000

Facts

In December 2015 the concrete companies monopolistic agreement case investigated by Hunan AIC was published on SAICrsquos website

In accordance with the antitrust enforcement announcement of SAIC this case was triggered by complaints from the Yongzhou City peoplersquos congress After the preliminary review the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) initiated the formal investigation on seven concrete companies domiciled in Yongzhou City Hunan Province which were suspected of being involved in a monopolistic agreement in terms of division of the volumes of the products

After further investigation Hunan AIC found that the seven concrete companies concluded a partnership agreement in 2011 which requested the involved companies to enter into a partnership business with assets In addition according to the partnership agreement it was planned to establish a comprehensive office to manage production marketing and distribution of the products of all the partners The seven companies intended to jointly adjust and control the output of concrete based on the partnership agreement However because there were disagreements over the allocation of the injected assets and market shares the companies did not implement the partnership agreement The agreement was cancelled in December 2012

Based on the findings Hunan AIC concluded that the seven concrete companies as competitors of each other restricted and eliminated the competition in the relevant market through reaching the partnership agreement and dividing the volumes of sales which violated article 13(3) of the AML in terms of division of sales market Considering that the agreement had not been implemented and the limited influence of the agreement according to article 46 of the AML and article 27 of the Administrative Penalties Law small amount fines were imposed on the involved companies Six companies were fined CNY 30000 each for their illegal behaviour 28 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165504html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 31 of 52

Yongzhou Shuangyuan Building Materials Co Ltd as the first one to actively report the monopolistic agreement and cooperate with the enforcement authority was exempted from the punishment

Outlook

It is expected that the AMLrsquos enforcement on monopolistic agreements will continue in the future Industries such as automobile shipping pharmaceuticals insurance etc will still remain the priority of the antitrust enforcement

The antitrust enforcement authorities have published a series of regulations in order to clarify the substantial and procedural issues relevant to the antitrust enforcement However Chinarsquos current antitrust legislation regime is still immature In the following years we expect that more attention will be paid to the legislative improvements

Another remarkable issue for cartel members is that with more Chinese enterprises attaching increasing importance to the AML the follow-on civil damages actions might become a tendency in the future

C Abuse of Market Dominance

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen a decent increase of abuse of market dominance cases both in public enforcement and private litigation Oftentimes the authorities responsible for public enforcement generally find it difficult to pursue investigations against abuse of market dominance cases The following two main reasons are often cited to explain this standoff first it is hard for the authorities to define the relevant markets and prove the undertaking(s)rsquo dominant market position through economic approaches second it is hard to collect evidence regarding abusive practices

The cases related to IPRs abuse are emerging significantly particularly in the telecommunication media and technology (ldquoTMTrdquo) sectors

The SAICrsquos latest refusal-to-deal probe against a local drug maker shows that the SAIC and its local branches have increasingly acquired a profile as an abuse of dominance regulator

Significant Cases

Cases pursued by the SAIC

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 32 of 52

Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case29

Facts

The local authority in Dongfang city reported to the Hainan provincial branch of SAIC on April 23 2014 of the suspected dominance abuse The SAIC authorized its Hainan bureau to officially investigate the matter on 25 July 2014 according to a decision dated January 9 2015 The AIC concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its market dominance by requiring users to pay a deposit without any legal basis and or justifiable reasons

In terms of the relevant product market the local authority found that in this case it was the urban water supply market in Dongfang city and its surrounding townships where Dongfang Water was the sole public operator in the local water supply market with a 100 market share which made all water users completely reliant on the companyrsquos supply In term of market access the local authority found it very unlikely that there were other operators due to the strict regulations

The Hainan SAIC then concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its dominance as it charged users a deposit by threatening to refuse to register users and also by threatening to restrict the water supply Dongfang Waters charging of deposits lacked a legal basis and hadnt received government approval to the detriment of household consumers and business water users and hampered the improvement of management and services of the company Such conduct was in breach of Chinarsquos Anti-Monopoly Law

Hainan AIC levied a fine of CNY 593208 a lighter penalty equivalent to 2 of the companyrsquos annual sales for the previous year and confiscated illicit gains of CNY 38521 for abuse of market dominance

Analysis

It is noteworthy that although handled by a local authority supervised by the SAIC the antitrust agency detailed the relevant market definition the assessment of the dominant market position the abusive practices and the scrutiny of the justifiable reasons

Although the definition of the relevant market and the reasoning of the Hainan provincial AIC and the SAIC are subject to criticism it is still applausive to see that the antitrust regulators have realized the importance of the application of rule of reason in an abuse case In addition through itrsquos a published decision practitioners may observe the regulatorsrsquo reasoning and thus transparency and legal certainty have been generated

29 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzfcfjd201502t20150212_152066html last visited on October 18 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 33 of 52

Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms30

Facts

In June 2013 the Ningxia AIC under authorization of SAIC opened an antitrust investigation into the alleged tie-in sales by the three major state-owned telecommunications operators China Tietong China Unicom and China Telecom for the tie-in sale of fixed-line telephones with broadband Internet services The Ningxia AIC found that the three companies had bundled fixed-line phone services with Internet services to subscribers

During the investigation all three telecommunications companies admitted the tie-in practice had recognized that such practice had improper influence on competition and deprived the choices of consumers The three companies promised to undertake internal rectification timely and eliminate the ill effects resulting from such practice The parties committed to taking the following corrective measures

1) Taking internal rectifications and conducting training to staff about antitrust laws and stop tie-in sales practices

2) Making public commitments to allow subscribers a free choice of services and strengthening the propaganda through the operating room call centre and other channels

3) Unbundling fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

The Ningxia AIC decided to suspend the probe on 14 May 2015 on the grounds that the three companies had actively worked together with the investigators and proposed workable remedy plans

Analysis

In the official announcement Ningxia AIC concluded that the purpose of antitrust enforcement is to restrain monopolistic conducts the protection of competition and to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of consumers Given that during the investigation process the parties had actively cooperated with the investigation formed a more profound understanding of the dangers of tying behaviour and moreover the parties proposed and implemented positive corrective measures to be able to remove the ill impact of their actions the agency believed that the purpose of antitrust law enforcement was fulfilled

It is worth noting that the Ningxia AIC also required the three companies to implement the commitment by August 30 2015and the submission of the written

30 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158908html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158906html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158910html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 34 of 52

implementation report on July 102015 and August 102015 respectively which is another illustration that an effective commitment by the undertakings shall directly deal with the effect that is brought by the monopolistic behaviour In this case the effect of the monopolistic act was restricted to the choice of the consumers therefore the commitment by the undertaking aimed at allowing the freedom of choice and the unbundling of fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company31

Facts

The Liaoning AIC imposed a fine of approximately CNY 433m on the Fushun Branch of Liaoning Tobacco Co on 1 June 2015 The agency also ordered the company to stop its illicit behaviour

The Liaoning AIC received a tip-off that the accused Liaoning Tobacco Corsquos Fushun branch was conducting tie-in sales of non-high-demand cigarette brands with high-demand cigarette brands After gaining authorization from SAIC the agency officially started an investigation regarding the companyrsquos suspected abuse of market dominance in June 2014

Analysis

According to the announcement the tobacco company argued that the tobacco industry is a state controlled or monopolized industry with a lawful monopolistic position therefore the company shall not be subject to the norms of general market competition rules or the anti-monopoly law

In this regards the agency concluded that in terms of the status of the undertaking admittedly the first paragraph of article 17 of the AML says that the State shall protect the lawful business operations of undertakings in these industries with respect to the industries which are under the control of the State-owned economic sector and have a bearing on the lifeline of the national economy or national security and the industries which exercise monopoly over the production and sale of certain commodities according to law However the second paragraph continues to say that the undertakings mentioned above shall do business according to law be honest faithful and strictly self-disciplined and subject themselves to public supervision and they shall not harm the consumers interests by taking advantage of their position of control or their monopolistic production and sale of certain commodities In particular in the preceding paragraph the ldquolawful businessrdquo and ldquoaccording to lawrdquo imply that the AML shall apply in the business operation The agency therefore believes that

31 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201508t20150813_16

0208html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 35 of 52

there shall be no exemption for the undertaking concerned the defences of the undertaking concerned is not established

Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm32

Facts

The Chongqing AIC fined Chongqing Qingyang Pharmaceutical CNY 439308 for alleged dominance abuse

The investigation was initiated when the company contacted the agency for verification on its potential breach of the AML related to an allopurinol active pharmaceuticals ingredient (API) distribution agreement with its exclusive distributor The company provided the relevant agreement and information and the agency conducted an investigation into the company and some other relevant companies

Analysis

Relevant Market

During the investigation the agency found that pharmaceutical ingredients are a special commodity the API is used to produce the preparations The chemical API is only used for the production of the preparation and could be used as a medicine for clinic use

The preparation is produced according to the requirements of certain form of prepared drugs and for the purpose of treatment and prevention which can be used as medicine

The allopurinol is used for the common treatment of hyperuricemia However the other treatments are different in pharmacological effects or treatment effects as well as in the cost for the patient Furthermore the company is the only manufacturer and supplier in the market nationwide since July 2012 Therefore the agency concluded that the relevant market is the allopurinol API market

Considering that the qualification for manufacturing the allopurinol API is national wide and the normal practice for purchasers and suppliers is domestic the relevant geographic market is the Chinese market

The Market Dominance

During the investigation the agency found that the company is the only supplier and manufacturer of allopurinol API in China there is no other competitor in the

32 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151222_16

5152html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 36 of 52

market and the company has a monopoly in the market The evidence shows that the company has the ability to control the prices the position for the downstream is relatively weak

With respect to the market entry the agency found that the market entry is relatively high in addition other undertakings are dependent on the company Thus the agency believed the company to have market dominance

Refusal to Deal

The agency found that on September 25 2015 the company reached an exclusive agreement and distribution agreement with its distributor Based on these agreements the company didnrsquot supply allopurinol API to the said distributor and other companies despite the fact that those companies requested for allopurinol API but were turned down by the company

Absence of Reasonable Cause

The agency found that the companyrsquos refusal to deal was not in line with the needs of normal business operation or economic efficiency On the other hand the refusal to deal was aimed at increasing the market share of the allopurinol drug product Also the agency found that the stop of supply was a manipulation of market power as to maximize the profit to the most The agency further found that the exclusive distribution agreement with suspension of supply for six months and the refusal to supply was to eliminate and restrict the competition as to gain the monopolistic profit

The Consequence of Refusal to Deal

The agency concluded that the refusal to deal harmed the competition of the allopurinol preparations market Because of the suspension of supply many demanders had to reduce their production or switch to the supply of other products or stop their production The suspension of supply affected the competition of the downstream market Consequently the raising of the price of allopurinol API also raised the cost for other manufacturers of allopurinol preparations

Furthermore the refusal to deal led to capacity loss of the allopurinol preparation industry

Ultimately the refusal to deal increased the burden on consumers as the refusal to supply changed the supply-demand relationship in the market

The agency concluded that the Company abused its dominant position in the allopurinol API market by refusing to deal with intended buyers in the period between October 2013 and March 2014Therefore the Company violated article 17 (1) of the AML which prohibits business operators with a dominant market position from abusing that position such as the refusal to deal without any justifications

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 37 of 52

D Administrative Monopoly

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 witnessed antitrust authoritiesrsquo significant efforts regarding the enforcement against administrative monopoly According to Mr Dong Zhiming the deputy director general of Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly Bureau ever since the AML coming into force six cases in connection with administrative monopoly were investigated by NDRC and among them five cases were handled in the year of 2015 These cases touched abuses of administrative power in terms of designative deal in relation to transportation communication and pharmaceutical industries

The first private litigation related to administrative monopolistic acts was heard in the court which is a milestone case in the enforcement of the AML

Significant Cases

Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC33

Facts

In March 2015 the NDRC released the official letter to Shandong Provincial Department of Transportation (ldquoShandong DOTrdquo) on its website with respect to correct its abuse of administrative power to exclude and restrict competition

During the investigation the NDRC found that since 2011 Shandong DOT had issued multiple relevant government orders in order to require certain types of vehicles to be directly connected to two designated information and service platforms both of which are operated and technically supported by one company namely Shandong Jiutong Internet of Things Technology Co Ltd (ldquoJiutong ITTrdquo) Furthermore according to the orders issued by the competent administrative department all the vehicle satellite positioning terminals entering into Shandong provincial market should be debugged through the said technology service platform which is operated by the mentioned company In addition Shandong DOT released the cap prices of vehicle satellite positioning terminals which is identical to the 2012 bid-winning price in the Ministry of Transportation demonstration project

The NDRC believed that Shandong DOTrsquos behaviour eliminated and restricted the competition in the monitoring platform market and the vehicle terminal market deprived the right of transportation enterprises to choose vehicle terminals and monitoring platform on their owns unreasonably raised the sales prices of vehicle terminals and service fees charged by the platform and increased the costs of transportation enterprises Therefore the antitrust agency concluded that Shandong

33 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201503t20150327_668911html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 38 of 52

DOT violated article 8 of the AML which stipulates that ldquoadministrative organs and the public organizations with an administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude and restrict competitionrdquo Specifically Shandong DOT violated article 3234 in terms of requiring organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any designated operators and violated article 3735 in terms of setting rules with contents which eliminate and restrict competition

Based on article 51 of the AML ldquoWhere administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations abuse administrative powers performing activities which exclude and restrict competition the superior entity shall order it to correct impose administrative penalty on the chief officer and other staffs directly responsible pursuant to the laws The AML enforcement authority may give recommendations on disposal of activities to the relevant superior entityrdquo the NDRC proposed in writing that the Shandong provincial government should order Shandong DOT to rectify its behaviour with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Entirely open up the monitoring platform market by permitting transportation undertakings to freely choose any approved platform

2) Loosen the restrictions on the entry into Shandong vehicle terminals permit the undertakings to independently select the supplier of vehicle terminals and allow the qualified terminals to be connected to the relevant monitoring platform and

3) Revoke the official documentation relevant to the cap price of vehicle terminals in order to promote the price competition

Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 36

Facts

On 26 August 2015 the NDRC published its second decision with regard to the rectification of administrative monopoly since the beginning of this year According to the proposal letter sent to Anhui Provincial Government the investigation against the Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City (Bengbu HFPC) was trigged by third partiesrsquo complaints

34 Article 32 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to require organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any operators designated by them 35 Article 37 of the AML Administrative organs shall not abuse their administrative powers to set rules with contents which eliminate restrict competition 36 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201508t20150826_748682html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 39 of 52

The investigation suggests that Bengbu HFPC published three notices with regard to drugs procurement in April and May of this year

In the No C-2015-CG-X-111 Notice (ldquoNo111 Noticerdquo) released on 10 April2015 the health authority not only provided the dosage form and qualification of the requested drugs but also directly determined the suppliers of relevant drugs which eliminated and restricted the competition among pharmaceutical manufacturers and therefore violated articles 32 and 37 of the AML

In the No C-2015-CG-C-112 Notice (ldquoNo112 Noticerdquo) and No C-2015-CG-C-168 (ldquoNo 168 Noticerdquo) respectively released on 10 April and 22 May 2015 the Bengbu HFPC set discriminative qualification requirements on non-local undertakings in order to restrict their participation in the relevant bidding For instance in accordance with No 112 Notice to be a qualified bidder the turnover of non-local undertakings shall exceed CNY 2 billion which is 50 times as much as the turnover requirements of the local undertakings In the NDRCrsquos opinion the administrative monopoly activities conducted by the local health agency excluded the relevant undertakings from the market maintained the virtual-high prices of drugs and therefore violated articles 3237 and 37 of the AML

The NDRC suggested in a letter that Anhui Provincial Government should urge the Bengbu HFPC to rectify the abuse of monopoly powers with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Stop setting distinguishing restrictions on qualification requirements review standards and numbers of winning bidders as for local and non-local undertakings

2) Stop designating the suppliers of competitive drugs and

3) Take necessary measures to mitigate the negative effects resulting from the previous illegal monopolistic abuses

Outlook

At the beginning of the year the former director general of the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau under the NDRC Xu Kunlin stated that the agency would strengthen antitrust enforcement on abuse of administrative power in 2015

Since then the NDRC has made great efforts to rectify unreasonable abuses of administrative power The currently disclosed two cases investigated by the NDRC re-emphasize the Chinese Governmentrsquos strict scrutiny of antitrust issues in respect of

37 Article 34 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to restrict or reject the participation of operators from other regions in local bidding activities by measures such as prescribing discriminatory qualification requirements or assessment standards or by not publishing information according to law

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 40 of 52

administrative monopoly It reminds the local governments that antitrust compliance is of significant importance

III Private Litigation

A Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen more and more private antitrust litigations

The private antitrust litigation cases have become increasingly complicated especially the issues regarding the intersection areas of IP and antitrust law

Multinational giants and State-Owned Enterprises (the ldquoSOEsrdquo) are increasingly becoming the targets in antitrust civil litigations Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (the ldquoSMEsrdquo) tend to use the antitrust litigation to achieve their commercial goals in the business context

B Significant Cases

Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)38

This is the first-ever private litigation concerning administrative monopoly since the implementation of the AML in 2008

Facts

According to the currently disclosed details the case is relevant for designated trade

The plaintiff Shenzhen Sware Technology Co Ltd (ldquoSwarerdquo) is a software company The press releases suggest that Sware Gloden Software Co Ltd (ldquoGlodenrdquo) and Shanghai Ruban Software Co Ltd (ldquoShanghai Rubanrdquo) are the three main suppliers of construction cost software and possess the major shares of the relevant market An annual provincial vocational ability contest regarding the construction cost hosted by the Guangdong Department of Education (ldquoGuangdong DOE) designated Gloden as the exclusive supplier of the relevant software

After several unsuccessful verbal and written negotiations with Guangdong DOE in April 2014 Sware filed a lawsuit against Guangdong DOE before the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquothe Courtrdquo) alleging that the administrative organ abused its administrative power and violated the AML by designating exclusive software supplier for the contest and claimed a compensation for reasonable expense amounting to CNY 10800 Yuan

The opinions of the Court 38 The story of the case is available at httpfinancesinacomcnchinadfjj20150410074621924997shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 41 of 52

The full text of the judgment has not been disclosed yet In accordance with the information available to the public the Court invoked article 32 of the AML which prohibits an administrative organ from abusing its administrative power to require or in disguised form organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use only the commodities supplied by the entities designated by them The Court concluded that Guangdong DOE failed to prove the legitimacy of the designation and therefore abused its administration power

Currently the case is in appeal before the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court

Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 39

It is the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China

In the first instance ruling Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court ruled against Sinopec holding that the Yunnan branch of Sinopecs trading company was obligated to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its dominance in the sales market of refined oil by refusing to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding without justifiable reasons

In the second instance ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors Currently the case is pending

Facts

The First Trial

The lawsuit was filed before the Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoKunming Courtrdquo) in January 2014 Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy Co Ltd (ldquoYingdingrdquo) a bio-energy manufacturer claimed that Sinopec and the Yunnan branch of Sinopec trading company (ldquoSinopec Yunnan Branchrdquo) had failed to fulfil their obligations stipulated in the Renewable Energy Law and had abused their market dominance in sales market of refined oil by refusing to trade with Yingding without justifiable reasons

Sinopec and Sinopec Yunnan Branch mainly explained four reasons for why they rejected Yingdingrsquos biofuel Firstly Yingding had failed to prove that the biofuel complied with the relevant national standard and was safe to use Secondly Yingding had failed to provide complete trading terms Thirdly the laws and regulations regarding biofuel were incomplete the authorized refined oil sales companies were 39 The details of the case are available at httpnewsxinhuanetcomfortune2014-1217c_1113680039htm httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=9e71db51-6ff6-4d2c-8af6-8eacf023ebdeampKeyWord=E4BA91E58D97E79B88E9BC8E|E4B8ADE79FB3E58C96 httpnewsxinhuanetcomenergy2015-0422c_127721575htm httpwwwnbdcomcnarticles2015-04-23911348html last visited on December 17 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 42 of 52

obligated to purchase biofuel from the biofuel manufacturers if it met certain quality standards but there was a vacancy regarding how to reach the end consumers from the sales companies

On 8 December 2014 the Kunming Intermediate Peoples Court ruled that Sinopec Yunnan Branch bore a legal obligation to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its market dominance in refined oil market by refusing without any justifiable reasons to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding The court ordered Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network within 30 days Both Yingding and Sinopec filed appeals to the Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court

The Appellate Trial

The appeal hearing was held on 22 April 2015 in Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoYunnan Courtrdquo) Sinopec submitted 23 new pieces of evidence and introduced two expert witnesses in a bid to overturn several key elements in the first-instance ruling by Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court

In terms of the determination of the relevant market and the market dominance Sinopec argued that the relevant market in this case was for adipic acid monomethyl ester (ldquoAAMErdquo) the main ingredient of a biofuel additive known as BD100 Yingdingrsquos main product is BD100 which can be blended with fossil diesel to become biofuel In the AAME market Sinopec is a potential buyer instead of a market dominator In support of this argument Sinopec presented an expert witnessmdashGong Jiong a professor of economics at Beijings University of International Business and Economics who testified that AAME should be defined as the relevant product market on the basis of an economic analysis

However Yingding insisted that the first-instance ruling was correct in naming the sales market of refined oil as the relevant market and submitted new evidence an article on Sinopecs website that claimed it had a 67 market share in Yunnan to help establish the claim that Sinopec had market dominance

Another main dispute was whether Yingdingrsquos biofuel product met national standards which would make it mandatory for Sinopec to purchase under Chinas Renewable Energy Law The law stipulates that biofuel producers must sell their products first to an authorized refined oil sales company and the sales companies are obliged to buy the fuel if it meets certain quality standards In order to test the quality Sinopec introduced the second expert witness Lin Jianmin a leading author of Chinarsquos national biofuel standard Lin Jianmin pointed out that there are currently quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology which gives Sinopec a justifiable reason not to trade with Yingding Moreover Sinopec presented some precedents in which consumers had complained about the biofuel quality and also claimed that China didnt have a sound regulatory framework to support biofuel production neither in testing nor in sales

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 43 of 52

Nevertheless to refute this point Yingding referred to an earlier test in co-operation with Sinopec in 2011 where selected buses in Kunming used biofuel blended by Sinopec using BD100 produced by Yingding

On August 13 2015 Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors and now this case is pending In the written appellate ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court did not provide any details regarding its reasoning

Key Issues of the Case

Is there any competition between Yingding and Sinopec

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case the product of Yingding is biofuel while Sinopec does not engage in the business of biofuel From this perspective Yingding and Sinopec are not competitors Thus it is not necessary and not reasonable for Sinopec to eliminate or restrict the competition from Yingding

Relevant Market

The definition of the relevant market is a prerequisite to determine whether competition exists and whether the AML is applicable In accordance with the Judicial Interpretation of Antitrust civil litigation the plaintiff shall take the responsibility to prove the defendantrsquos dominance in the relevant market Also the methods of defining the relevant market are stipulated in the Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition (ldquoGuidelinesrdquo) However both Yingding and Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court defined the relevant market as the sales market of refined oil without sufficient antitrust analysis none of the methods in the Guidelines were used Therefore the definition of the relevant market remains arguable and needs to be sufficiently analysed in the upcoming retrial

Justifiable Reasons

The abuse of market dominance includes the behaviour of refusing to trade without justifiable reasons according to the AML but in the first instance ruling justifiable reasons were not investigated by the court During the appellate trial the expert witness introduced by Sinopec claimed that there were quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology and this was a justifiable reason to refuse to trade with Yingding Even though the first instance court and the appellate court did not reason the justifiable reason it should be discussed and investigated further during the retrial

AML or Renewable Energy Law

The claims of Yingding were based on both the AML and the Renewable Energy Law (ldquoRELrdquo) and the first instance ruling referred to both the AML and the REL as

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 44 of 52

well It seems that the laws the first instance court referred to were comprehensive but in fact the reasoning was not clear and logical In the first instance ruling some disputes regarding the AML were reviewed but all the orders were not based on the AML Specifically the first instance court ordered the Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network based on the REL and dismissed the other claims That the orders were not on account of reasoning is illogical It is anticipated that during the retrial the application of the laws will be clearer

Analysis

A lot of issues have not been clearly analysed by the courts such as the relevant market and the justifiable reasons Since the case is remanded the above-mentioned issues are expected to be resolved in the retrial In addition Yingding was in a disadvantaged position compared to its first instance trial since its claims based on the AML were challenged greatly during the appellate trial In the retrial it is probable that Yingding may switch its litigation strategy and base its claims on the REL Therefore maybe more preparation regarding the REL can give Sinopec a leg up

Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)

Rijing Electric a Chinese distributor seeks CNY 5m compensation

The first hearing was on 9 June 2015 and ended without a ruling

Facts

Rijing Electric (ldquoRijingrdquo) a Shanghai-based company and a former distributor for Panasonic accused Panasonic of abusing its dominance and dividing the market through monopolistic practice in an antitrust lawsuit filed in 2014 with Shanghai No 1 Intermediate Court (ldquoShanghai Courtrdquo) claiming compensation of CNY 5m (USD 815370) Wenzhou Mingda Automation System Co and Shanghai Qingying Automation Equipment as the distributor of Panasonic in China are the co-defendants were accused of conducting monopolistic behaviours by implementing Panasonicrsquos policy

The first hearing for evidence exchange was on June 9 2015 Rijing claimed a policy allegedly introduced by Panasonic in 2009 restricted the competition between distributors Panasonic claims the policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo and has full justifiable reasons It explained that the products in question required customization at considerable cost to distributors before its sale to customers Once carried out however other distributors leaving them open to quote much lower prices than the original distributor could simply and relatively cheap replicate this customization Besides Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and that the plaintiff had failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic said its market share for the four products

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 45 of 52

under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases Also Rijing failed to challenge the policy when it was first introduced instead initially agreeing it was reasonable as e-mail evidence submitted by Panasonic suggests

Key Issues of the Case

Whether Panasonic occupied a market dominant position

It is reported that Rijing claimed that Panasonic had abused its market dominance but Rijing failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and its market share for the four products under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases

Analysis

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case Panasonicrsquos policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo rather than to eliminate or restrict competition

Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals40 (Pending)

It is a battle over patent licensing issues

It is viewed as being among the most complicated antitrust lawsuits in China

The first hearing was on 17 and 18 December 2015

Facts

Four Chinese rare earth companies Ningbo Ketian Magnet Ningbo Permanent Magnetics Ningbo Tongchuang Strong Magnet Material and Ningbo Huahui Magnetic Industry filed antitrust lawsuits against Hitachi Metals over alleged patent licensing issues regarding rare earth magnets on December 11 2014 with the Ningbo Intermediate Peoples Court (ldquoNingbo Courtrdquo) in Zhejiang province As reported four Chinese rare earth companies claimed Hitachi Metals abused its market dominance and hurt the industry competition by refusing to license the patents to them The patents in this case are used in the manufacturing of sintered neodymium iron boron (ldquoNdFeBrdquo) magnets a rare-earth magnet alloy widely used in parts for airplanes automobiles and other products

Hitachi Metals filed a challenge with the Ningbo Court over its jurisdiction in April 2015 After Ningbo Court rejected Hitachi Metals jurisdiction objection on 28 April 2015 Hitachi Metals appealed to the Zhejiang High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoZhejiang

40The details of the story are available at httpwwwzbmagcomnews_viewphpid=80 httpwwwhitachicomcnaboutpress201510-121118_ahtml last visited on December 22 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 46 of 52

Courtrdquo) but Zhejiang Court affirmed the ruling of the Ningbo Court

The first day of a two-day hearing took place on 17 December 2015 during which the two sides cross-examined each otherrsquos evidence The evidence focused on clearing up several key elements in the case including the relevant market whether Hitachi Metals has dominance on that market and whether both sides acted in good faith during the licensing negotiations

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Product Market

The four Chinese rare earth companies claimed that the relevant product market should be the NdFeb-related patent licensing market However Hitachi Metals believed that the physical NdFeb market rather than the patent licensing market should be the relevant product market which is meaningful for assess the real competitive effects on the market

Whether Hitachi Metals occupies a dominant market position

In terms of market dominance Hitachi Metals claimed it does not occupy a dominant position because Hitachi Metalsrsquo patents were not in a standard in this case and there are substitutable technologies in the market SEP holders have the obligation to license on FRAND terms but none-SEP holders do not So while a refusal to license a SEP may constitute abuse of dominance refusal to license a non-SEP mdash even by a patent holder with a dominant position mdash should not be considered as an abuse

Analysis

Hitachi Metals as a patent holder should have the right to decide whether to retain those patents or not or who to license According to the legal theory the purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage and protect innovation by conferring monopoly right mdash that is to give intellectual property owners the proprietary rights which can exclude others from using the intellectual property The SEP holders admittedly need to comply with FRAND terms which can maintain a robust balance between competition and monopoly whereas the further intervention of antitrust law into non-SEP patents may undermine the purpose of intellectual property law To which extent the antitrust law should intervene is yet to be seen

Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei41

A confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the Beijing IP court made by the Beijing High Court

41 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcncpwswbjzscq201511t20151103_12225640htm last visited on December 28 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 47 of 52

Facts

On August 2 2013 the NDRC penalized Abbott for monopolistic price-fixing and then Abbott made a price adjustment in China where the prices of main products were reduced

On December 16 2014 Tian Junwei (ldquoTianrdquo) a Chinese citizen in Beijing sued Carrefour Shuangjing Branch (ldquoCarrefourrdquo) and Abbott (Shanghai) Sales Company (ldquoAbbottrdquo) at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (ldquoIP Courtrdquo) for their monopolistic price-fixing which damaged his interests However Carrefour and Abbott challenged the jurisdiction of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court They claimed there were two reasons Firstly according to the jurisdiction rules of the IP court issued by the Supreme Court the IP court has no jurisdiction over anti-trust cases Secondly if this case is a contractual dispute the court that is in the place of Carrefour should hear it if this case is a tort dispute the Shanghai Intermediate Court should hear it

In the ruling of the IP Court the IP Court decided it has the jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases for the following reasons According to the Provisions On Causes Of Action In Civil Cases issued by Supreme Court (最高人民法院案由规定) antimonopoly dispute is a tertiary cause of action belonging to IP and competition disputes Also according to the Provisions concerning the Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京

市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问题的规定 ) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was an IP and competition dispute and was sued after November 6 2014 Thus the IP Court had jurisdiction

Both Carrefour and Abbott appealed to the Beijing High Court over the jurisdiction ruling but the Beijing High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original ruling Reasons are listed in the written ruling issued on June 18 2015 Firstly the nature of the case was an antimonopoly dispute In accordance with Provisions of the Supreme Peoples Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民

事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) and Civil Litigation Law the monopolistic civil disputes in the first instance shall be under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Peoples Courts and an action involving a contractual dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the peoples court of the place where the defendant is domiciled or where the contract is performed Carrefour as the defendant in this case is domiciled in Chaoyang District Beijing Therefore the courts of Beijing have jurisdiction over this case Secondly according to article 3 of the Notification on the Jurisdiction of Intellectual Property Courts issued by Supreme Court (关于知识产权法院案件管辖

等有关问题的通知) IP courts have jurisdiction over first-instance civil disputes arising from monopolistic practices Lastly according to Provisions concerning the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case 32 Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms 33 Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company 34 Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm 35

D Administrative Monopoly 37 Enforcement Tendency Highlight 37 Significant Cases 37

Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC 37 Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 38

III Private Litigation 40 A Enforcement Tendency Highlight 40 B Significant Cases 40

Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending) 40 Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 41 Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending) 44 Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals (Pending) 45 Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei 46 Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines 48

IV General Conclusion 50 Contact 52

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 1 of 51

2015 China Anti-Monopoly Annual Report

Dr Zhan Hao amp Song Ying1

I Legislation

A Legislation Tendency Highlight

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement agencies namely the National Development and Reform Commission (ldquoNDRCrdquo) the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoSAICrdquo) and the Ministry of Commerce (ldquoMOFCOMrdquo) made more efforts regarding legislation especially when it comes to strengthening the role of soft law compared to 2014

Intellectual property right (ldquoIPRrdquo) related antitrust issues are a hot topic At this stage three antitrust enforcement bodies and the State Intellectual Property Office are respectively drafting the IPR antitrust guidelines based on their respective enforcement areas and are going to submit their respective guidelines to the State Councilrsquos Anti-monopoly Commission (ldquoAMCrdquo) The AMC will eventually come up with the final and unified guidelines (the ldquoIPR Antitrust Guidelinesrdquo) based on the draft versions submitted by above-mentioned bodies

The auto industry has consistently attracted attention under the framework of AML Apart from continuous enforcement activities against cartel vertical monopolistic agreement and abusing dominance in the auto industry the antitrust guidelines for the auto industries being drafted by NDRC (the ldquoAuto Industry Antitrust Guidelinesrdquo) are the only antitrust guidelines specialized for a particular industry This suggests a deepening and detailing of legislative activities of Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement authorities

In addition to the IPR Antitrust Guidelines and the Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines the NDRC has also drafted four other guidelines in 2015 in order to normalize and guide the enforcement activities The four guidelines include Guidelines on Leniency Policy Guidelines on Commitment of Undertakings Guidelines on Calculating the Illegal Gains and Fines for Monopoly Conducts and Guidelines on Procedures of Monopolistic agreement Exemption

B Legislation of SAIC

1 Dr Zhan Hao is the managing partner of AnJie Law Firm and received his Doctoral degree Master degree and Bachelor degree in law Dr Zhan also conducted Post-doctoral research on Microeconomics E-mail address zhanhaoanjielawcom Song Ying is a partner of AnJie Law Firm whose practice focuses on antitrust and litigation Ms Song can be reached at the following e-mail address songyinganjielawcom The other team members of AnJie competition team including Li Xiang Wang Lingling Zhang Wenyi Zheng Shuangshi and Feng Siduo also make contribution to this report

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 2 of 52

Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition2

On April 7 2015 SAIC issued the Rules on the Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition (the ldquoIPR Antitrust Rulesrdquo) which have taken effect on August 1 2015

The IPR Antitrust Rules consist of six main parts including

clarifying the purpose and basis of the legislation and providing relevant legal concepts (eg Article 1)

prohibiting undertakings from reaching any monopolistic agreements through exercising intellectual property rights and providing the principle of ldquoSafe Harbourrdquo and its details (eg Article 5)

illustrating the rules for undertakings with dominant position exercising intellectual property rights and especially proposing the ldquoessential facility doctrinerdquo (eg Article 10)

laying out the rules for exercising IP rights related to the patent pool and standardization (eg Article 12 and 13)

providing the analytical approaches and consideration factors for conducting the antitrust assessment (eg Article 15) and

stipulating the possible punishments to be imposed in case of violation of this Rules (eg Article 17)

Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition

The Anti-monopoly and Anti-unfair Competition Enforcement Bureau of SAIC released the sixth draft of ldquoGuidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competitionrdquo (ldquoSAIC draft IPR Guidelinesrdquo) on January 6 2016

The SAIC draft IPR Guidelines cover various IPR related antitrust issues - such as restrictions on technology RampD between competitors exclusive grant-back clauses market division among competitors and safe harbour rules regarding monopolistic agreements involving IPRs etc The following areas are mainly illustrated

Chapter 1 clarifies general principles of the guidelines the relationship between antitrust law and IPR protection as well as the relationship between IPR abuse and monopolistic behaviour It also covers nature and type of conduct eliminating

2 The original Chinese notice published by SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnfldyfbzdjzzcfgzcfg201507t20150724_159428html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 3 of 52

or restricting competition via IPR abuse the relationship between IPR and market dominance position the legal responsibilities and remedies as well as the scope of application

Chapter 2 outlines the basic analysis framework including its methodology analytical steps factors and competition effects

Chapter 3 relates to defining the relevant market including the general principle and circumstances where relevant technology market and relevant innovation market should be defined

Chapter 4 refers to monopolistic agreements involving IPR including factors that should be taken into account when analysing these agreements and related safe harbour regulations

Chapter 5 stipulates the circumstances regarding the abuse of market dominance in the exercise of IPRs including refusal to license tie-in sales and other unjustifiable transactions

Chapter 6 involves undertakingsrsquo concentration when exercising IPRs

Chapter 7 analyses certain special behaviour-types related to the exercise of IPRs from the antitrust perspective including standard-setting related activities injunction for standard essential patents (ldquoSEPrdquo) patent pooling and behaviour of copyright management organizations

It is reported that the SAIC has finished soliciting opinions from the US and EU chambers of commerce some major Western companies and law firms The SAICrsquos antitrust division will gather feedback on the sixth draft from relevant departments of the Chinese government competition organizations and antitrust scholars The draft will then be submitted to the AMC for review

C Legislation of NDRC

Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines

During the Annual Conference of China Automobile Dealers Association held in November 2015 one of the NDRC officials said that the first draft of Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines (ldquoAuto Antitrust Guidelinesrdquo) has been completed According to the official Auto Antitrust Guidelines consist of six sections respectively preface basic issues monopolistic agreement abuse of dominant position concentration of undertakings and supplementary articles Furthermore the official stated that vertical price restrictions on sales of new energy auto might be exempted during the promotion period

Auto Antitrust Guidelines will likely be released in 2016 by the State Council instead of the NDRC according to Wei Tongwei general secretary of the spare part

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 4 of 52

working committee under the China Automotive Maintenance and Repair Trade Association

Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses3

NDRC published a draft of the Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses on December 31 2015 NDRC noted that the consultation period for the draft guidelines run from 1 until 20 January 2016

The draft guidelines constitute five parts preamble basic issues IPR-related agreements that may eliminate or restrict competition IPR-related abuse of dominant position and concentration involving IPR

The draft guidelines cover antitrust issues related to joint RampD patent pool cross licensing standardization price restriction exclusive grant-back no-challenge clause exemption of agreements unfairly high royalty fees refusal to license tying sale imposing unreasonable transaction conditions discriminatory treatment and injunctive relief

The draft guidelines also include factors for determining whether the application of injunction orders by standard essential patent owners can lead to the elimination or restriction of competition such as whether the parties involved expressed their true intentions during negotiations

D Legislation of MOFCOM

The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases4

MOFCOM issued the Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases on February 6 2015 which took effect at the same time

Auto Sales Management Measures

MOFCOM posted a draft of the Auto Sales Management Measures (the ldquodraft Measuresrdquo) on its website on 6 January 2016 and is soliciting for comments until 6 February 2016 MOFCOM intends to implement this new rule to replace the current Auto Brand Sales Management Measures

According to the draft Measures any vehicle sales and related services engaged in the territory of China shall be abided by this rule The draft Measures consist of five parts which are the general principles code of conduct supervision and management penalty provision and bylaw

The Measures clearly provide that the departments of the commercial 3 The original Chinese notice published by NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201512t20151231_770233html 4 The original notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticlei20150220150200891361shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 5 of 52

administration under the State Council will be in charge of nationwide auto sales management

In the second part the draft Measures list the conducts in which a supplier shall not engage in These conducts include restricting distributors from reselling their products requesting distributors to share expenses for their own marketing activities restricting distributors from selling parts of other brands or providing after-sales services for other brands and so on Most of these conducts are deemed as vertical monopolistic agreements which are likely to induce anti-competitive effects in EU and US practices

As reported the Chinese government will make efforts to coordinate the Auto Antitrust Guidelines and the Measures-- two upcoming industry-specific regulations

II Public Enforcement

A Merger Control

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

With the increase in the number of cases been filed and reviewed it is recognized that MOFCOM has become one of the most important jurisdictions of merger control in the world

The simplified procedure has improved the efficiency of MOFCOMrsquos merger review in a large degree Most cases in simple procedure were concluded during the first phase However MOFCOMrsquos review time lasts longer in a few cases For instance MOFCOM spent 162 days to clear Toyota Industries Corps purchase of a 55 stake in Singaporean logistics company LT Wuliao Banyun Holdings setting a new record for the length of a simple case review

MOFCOM used to focus on horizontal deals but now also considers vertical and conglomerate mergers important In 2015 only 35 of the cases being reviewed were horizontal mergers

The increased number of administrative punishment on cases that failed to notify in 2015 demonstrates that MOFCOM has further strengthened its enforcement on this respect

The supervision of remedy implementation has become ldquoroutinizedrdquo

All divisions of MOFCOMrsquos antitrust bureau are responsible for case reviewing from the end of 2015 with the aim to improve the work efficiency

The international cooperation between antitrust enforcement authorities with respect to merger controls happens more frequently On 15 October 2015 the competition department of EU Commissions (ldquoCommissionrdquo) and MOFCOM

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 6 of 52

have signed best practices for cooperation on reviewing mergers in Beijing As the Commissionrsquos officer says the growing number of international transactions is the main reason for this cooperation In addition the Commission also signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the NDRC and SAIC in 2012 which creates a dedicated framework to strengthen cooperation and coordination5

Statistics

From January of 2009 to the end of 2015 MOFCOM received 1445 cases and accepted 1364 cases Among the reviewed cases MOFCOM has cleared 26 deals with remedies since the AML took effect in 2008 with an average review time of 199 days

In 2015 MOFCOM accepted 338 cases out of which 332 were concluded including 18 cases dealing with applicants withdrawing merger filings The agency also imposed penalties on business operators in 9 cases that were related to failure to fulfil merger filing obligations

246 cases out of 332 cases in 2015 obtained MOFCOMrsquos approval in the first phase accounting for 74 of all reviewed cases

Of the cases cleared by MOFCOM in 2015 56 were related to manufacturing such as automotive components and parts vessels machinery manufacturing and electrical equipment

Acquisitions and joint-venture agreements were the most common types of transactions accounting for 87 of all deals Meanwhile joint ventures were still the most common channel for foreign investment in China

Significant Cases

GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions6

This is the first case in which MOFCOM agreed to remove a remedy imposed on a merger

MOFCOM partially removed the restrictions on Google based on the fact that Google had lost its control of Motorola Mobility

Facts

Google applied to MOFCOM on December 1 2014 to remove the condition that required Google to treat all original equipment manufacturers (ldquoOEMsrdquo) equally in android platform-related business after it bought Motorola

5 The original notice published by EC is available at httpeuropaeurapidpress-release_IP-15-5843_enhtml 6 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150120150100862331shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

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The concerned remedy was imposed by MOFCOM according to its No 25 Announcement in 2012 which concerned Googlersquos acquisition of Motorola Mobility together with three other remedies as the following

1) Google will license the Android Platform on a free and open basis as it had done so far

2) Google shall continue to observe the existed FRAND obligation of Motorola Mobility in respect of the latterrsquos patents and

3) Google shall delegate an independent supervisor to supervise its performance according to the Provisional Regulations on the Disposal of the Undertakingrsquos Assets or Business in the Concentration stipulated by MOFCOM in 2010

The No 25 Announcement provided that the applied remedies would be valid for five years starting from its punishment unless Google no longer controls Motorola Mobility

Google lodged the remedy removal application based on the fact that Lenovo concluded its acquisition of Motorola Mobility from Google which had been approved by MOFCOM on October 16 2014 and closed on October 30 2014 and due to this acquisition Google lost its control of Motorola Mobility

Decision

After careful examination MOFCOM noted that upon completion of the MotorolaLenovo deal Google would not be engaged in any business of manufacturing smartphones but would keep the telecommunications patent technologies of Motorola Mobility

Based on this fact on January 6 2015 MOFCOM issued a notice that it had decided to approve Googlersquos application to remove one of the remedies with the other remedies remaining in place

AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery7

The transaction is related to a conditionally cleared merger case

The concentration parties notified the deal to MOFCOM following No 95 Announcement in 2008

Considering the slight increase of AB InBevrsquos shareholdings in Zhujiang Brewery MOFCOM approved the proposed transaction

Facts

7 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150820150801090985shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 8 of 52

On July 23 2015 Interbrew Investment International a fully owned subsidiary of AB InBev Guangzhou State-owned Assets Development Holdings and Guangzhou Securities entered into an agreement with Zhujiang Brewery to subscribe the latterrsquos new shares According to this agreement Interbrew Investment International would subscribe shares worth up to CNY 16 billion

Pursuant to a MOFCOM antitrust notice issued in 2008 if AB Inbev intended to further increase its stake in Zhujiang Brewery a filing should be submitted to MOFCOM before any deal were to be concluded

On July 29 2015 AB InBev submitted the filing for the deal to MOFCOM

Decision

MOFCOM noted that upon this subscription Interbrew Investment International would increase its stake in Zhujiang Brewery from 2562 to 2999 Since the stake increase is relatively small and will not result in material changes regarding the control of Zhujiang Brewery MOFCOM decided to approve the deal on 20 August 2015

MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases

MOFCOM reached these decisions based on the undertakingsrsquo failure to file notifications

None of these concentrations were determined as resulting in anti-competition effects

MOFCOM considered that a 35 shares acquisition could lead to the obtaining of control power over a company

Complaints from the third party are the main channel of triggering investigation on unnotified concentrations

The undertakings were fined up to RMB 200000 which is less than the imposed penalty (RMB 300000) in the last year and the maximum penalty (RMB 500000) for violations of merger control rules

Facts

On September 29 2015 MOFCOM issued notices regarding the penalty on four concentration dealings because the concerning undertakings failed to notify these dealings to MOFCOM before closing them Details of these notices are as follows

Shanghai Fosun Pharmaceutical (Group) Co Ltd has been imposed a fine of CNY 200000 (USD 31431) because of its failure to notify MOFCOM regarding its

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 9 of 52

acquisition of a 35 stake in Suzhou Erye Pharmaceutical Co Ltd (Suzhou Erye) and the target stake was transferred without MOFCOMrsquos allowance8

Fujian Electronics amp Information (Group) has been imposed a fine of CNY 150000 (USD 23568) for its failure to notify a 35 stake acquisition of Shenzhen CHINO-E Communication MOFCOM made this decision based on the fact that Fujian Electronics signed a transfer agreement with CHINO-Ersquo shareholders and completed this transaction without filing9

Bestv New Media and Microsoft have been imposed CNY 200000 (USD 31420) fines by MOFCOM since they did not lodge a merger review filling regarding their joint venture E-Home Entertainment Development which was established on October 1 201310

CSR Nanjing Puzhen and Bombardier Transportation Sweden have been fined CNY 150000 (USD 23562) respectively due to their failure to notify their proposed joint venture prior to setting it up These companies made an agreement about the joint venturersquos establishment on November 3 2014 and its business license was obtained on November 11 201411

MOFCOM identified that the above dealings shall be notified according to the fact that all of these dealings constituted concentration and turnovers of these concentrating undertakings reached the statutory turnover thresholds

Article 20 of the AML stipulates three kinds of concentration which are (i) a merger of undertakings (ii) an acquisition of control of other undertakings by acquisition of shares or assets with voting right of other undertakings to an adequate extent (iii) an acquisition of control of other undertakings or the capability of imposing determinative effects on other undertakings by contracts or other means

Article 3 of the Provisions of the State Council on the Thresholds for Concentration Notification of Undertakings provides the fillingrsquos thresholds which are as follows (i) The collective worldwide turnovers of all undertakings involved in the last fiscal year exceed CNY 10 billion and the turnovers within China of at least two undertakings each exceed CNY 400 million or (ii) The collective turnovers of all undertakings involved in the last fiscal year exceed CNY 2 billion (approximately USD 294 million) and the China-wide turnovers of at least two undertakings each exceed CNY 400 million (approximately USD CNY588 million)

These undertakings were penalized because of their violations of article 21 of the 8 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150920150901124896shtml 9 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150920150901124887shtml 10 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150920150901124903shtml 11 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150920150901124899shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 10 of 52

AML which provides that the concentration reaching the filling thresholds shall be notified to MOFCOM prior to its implementation and without this notification it shall not be conducted In addition according to article 48 of the AML and article 13 of the Interim Measures for Investigating and Punishing of Concentration of Undertakings Failing to File Notification an undertaking which is identified by MOFCOM for implementing a concentration without filling would be imposed a fine and instructed to recover the situation by MOFCOM The amount of this fine could be no more than CNY 500000

There is no provision that specifically describes the behaviour of implementing a concentration In practice obtaining a business license transferring the entity of assets delivering the shares and assigning directors or managers are likely to be deemed as the implementation of concentration

According to Shang Ming the former director general of MOFCOMrsquos Anti-monopoly Bureau so far MOFCOM has already penalized 15 companies for failing to notify MOFCOM regarding merger reviews MOFCOM has noticed an increase in companies shirking merger-filing responsibilities and has therefore intensified enforcement

MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent12

MOFCOM defines all of the information and communication technology SEPs as the relevant product market rather than divides each of them into the individual market

In the process of competition analysis MOFCOM evaluates various factors rather than comparing the market shares only which is consistent with the complexity and flexibility of the high-technology industry

In the process of formulating remedies MOFCOM pays more attention on protecting Chinese downstream companies and enhancing its supervision

Facts

On April 15 2015 Nokia Oyi (ldquoNokiardquo) signed a Memorandum of Understanding regarding the acquisition of Alcatel Lucent (ldquoAlcatelrdquo) According to this memorandum Nokia intends to acquire 100 shares of Alcatel through a tender off

A notification about this deal was filed on April 21 2015 and accepted by MOFCOM on June 15 2015 After reviewing this case MOFCOM moved it to Phases II and Phase III as the agency was of the opinion that this acquisition could have anti-competitive effects on the relevant market

12 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151020151001139743shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 11 of 52

On October 19 2015 MOFCOM cleared this deal with four behavioural remedies

Decision

Relevant Market

In the agencyrsquos view there are four relevant product markets which are the radio access network market the core network systems market the network infrastructure service market and the information and communication technology SEP licensing market Meanwhile the relevant geographical market is primarily the Chinese market

Competition Analysis

According to MOFCOM this deal would have no anti-competitive effects on the first three relevant product markets in China while it could constitute an obstacle or limit the competition in the information and communication technology SEP licensing market

The agency consideredafter the deal that Nokia would increase its holding in 2G 3G and 4G SEPs and strengthen the degree of concentration in the information and communication technology SEP licensing market If it refused to license charged overly high royalty fees or conducted any other anti-competitive behaviour the competition of downstream market would be distorted which would most likely impair customersrsquo interests in the end

Remedies

Four behavioural remedies focusing on maintaining fair licensing of standard-essential patents (ldquoSEPsrdquo) were imposed on Nokia which are

1) On a reciprocal basis Nokia commits to not use injunctions to prevent enforcements of FRAND (fair reasonable and non-discriminatory) encumbered SEPs unless the potential licensees are unwilling to sign FRAND licensing agreements and follow the terms

2) If Nokia transfers its SEPs to a third party it shall inform Chinese licensees as well as Chinese companies that are actively engaging in licensing negotiation about the transfer details

3) Nokia will only transfer its SEPs to a new owner on the basis that the new owner accepts the existing FRAND commitments made by Nokia

4) MOFCOM has the right to monitor the implementation of Nokiarsquos commitments Nokia shall report to MOFCOM about the implementation of the conditions within 45 days of the end of each calendar year The reporting obligation will last five years until October18 2020

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 12 of 52

Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions13

Western Digital had engaged in two conducts that violated the remedies provided in the No 9 Announcement in 2012 issued by MOFCOM

Western Digital lodged an application to remove certain restrictions in March 2014 and the agency made the decision on October 19 2015

MOFCOM considered the fact that the competition condition in the relevant product market has changed and decided to remove the hold-separate restrictions related to manufacture and RampD

Facts

In 2012 Western Digital Corporation (ldquoWestern Digitalrdquo) intended to acquire 100 shares of Viviti Technologies Ltd (ldquoViviti Technologiesrdquo) which was the holding company of Hitachi Global Storage Technologies Netherlands BV and Hitachi Global Storage Technologies Singapore Pte Ltd and engaged in the hard disk business

On April 2 2011 Western Digital filed a notification for this acquisition MOFCOM issued the No 9 Announcement in March 2012 and cleared this acquisition with six remedies According to this announcement Western Digital could apply for the removal of the first and second remedy after this decision has been carried out for 24 months

The first remedy refers to maintaining the Viviti Technologies as an independent competitor and the second remedy requires both Western Digital and Viviti Technologies to make a reasonable plan of their capacity and production and report these data to the trustee

Western Digital lodged an application to remove the first and second remedy in March 2014 MOFCOM found that Western Digital had engaged in two conducts that violated the first remedy and the competitive situation in the hard disk market had changed After talking with Western Digital collecting opinions from the relevant entities and delegating the independent party to make an economic evaluation MOFCOM decided to remove the hold-separate remedies partially

Western Digitalrsquos implementation of the duties imposed in the No 9 Announcement

Based on the implementation reports submitted by Western Digital and the monitoring reports submitted by the trustee MOFCOM found that Western

13 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151020151001139040shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 13 of 52

Digital had engaged in two conducts that violated the first remedy Those were

1) On March 8 2012 Western Digital consolidated Hitachi Global Storage Technology (ldquoHGSTrdquo) which was Vivitirsquos subsidiary in US

2) In January 2013 Western Digital dissolved the development division of VivitiHGST and transferred the relevant workforce to Western Digital

MOFCOM considered that these conducts impaired the independence of Viviti as a competitor so that it imposed CNY 300000 fines on each of these behaviours and requested Western Digital to rectify the situation As per the entrusted supervisorrsquos report such behaviours have been rectified and the first remedy has been fulfilled

According to MOFCOMrsquos announcement the agency found that other remedies have been entirely implemented

Competition Analysis

With respect to the current situation of the competition in the hard disk market MOFCOM made the following assessment

1) In the areas of portable application and corporate-level application solid-state drive has put constraint on the impact of the traditional hard disk as to strengthen the competition in the relevant market

2) Overcapacity problems in the conventional hard disk drive market became obvious

3) Western Digital and HGST are the major competitors in the hard disk drive market Both the layout and the major market competitors in this market have remained unchanged since 2012

4) The hold-separate duties restricted the full competition between Western Digital and HGST The implementation of such duties hindered them from integrating their products and providing the market with a full range of products and had an adverse impact on their clientsrsquo product procurement

Based on the above analysis MOFCOM deemed that

1) Removal of the conditions that required the two companies to remain independent in production and RampD activities would enable Western Digital to save costs to provide a full range of products to the market and to fully engage in market competition and benefit its clients

2) To keep the two sales teams and their respective brands independent from each other and the independence of sales activities could reduce competition restraint impacts arising from a complete merger

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 14 of 52

Remedies

After negotiating with MOFCOM the relevant entities agreed to undertake the following obligations

1) Western Digital and HGST will remain independent in sales and brands

2) Western Digital will not change its previous business modes or force its clients to exclusively purchase hard disk drive products from Western Digital or do so in disguise

3) Western Digital will continue its pace in investing in product innovation to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

This announcement will be effective within two years from the date of issuance If Western Digital can provide sufficient evidence to prove a substantial change in the market environment the company can propose to MOFCOM to remove the relevant conditions within the two years

SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions14

MOFCOM considered the fact that the competition condition in the relevant product market has changed and removed the hold-separate restrictions on Seagate and Samsung

Seagate shall remain its business model materially and continue to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

Facts

On December 12 2011 MOFCOM made the No 11 Announcement to clear Seagate Technology LLCrsquos (ldquoSeagaterdquo) acquisition with remedies In this acquisition Seagate intended to acquire hard disk drive business of Samsung Electronics Co Ltd (ldquoSamsung HDDrdquo) As per this announcement Seagate could apply for removing the first and second remedy after this decision has been carried out for 12 months

The first remedy is to preserve Samsung HDD as an independent competitor and the second remedy asks to maintain and expand Samsung HDDrsquos production capacity within six months of issuance of the No 11 Announcement and to set reasonable production volume targets based on market supply-demand conditions

Seagate lodged an application to remove the first and second remedy in May 2015 After making assessments on the relevant parties and the competition circumstance MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate remedies

14 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151020151001144105shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 15 of 52

Competition Analysis

With respect to the current situation of the competition in the hard disk drive market MOFCOM made the following assessments

1) In the areas of portable application and corporate-level application solid-state drive has put constraint on the impact of the traditional hard disk so that the competition in the relevant market has been strengthened

2) Overcapacity problems in the conventional hard disk drive market became obvious

3) Both the layout and the major market competitors in the hard disk drive market have remained unchanged since 2012

4) Seagate and Samsung HDDrsquos market overlap in the hard disk market is quite small and Samsung HDDrsquos competition in the traditional hard disk is quite weak

Based on the above analysis MOFCOM deemed that

1) Removal of certain conditions is possible because in the portable application and corporate level application sectors competition constraint of solid-state drive on traditional hard disk drives has strengthened traditional hard disk drives are facing overcapacity which has reduced the chance of a single or more competitors causing competition restraints Seagate has limited overlap with Samsung in the hard disk business and the latter has a relatively weaker market power in the hard drive disk business

2) Removal of all imposed conditions may still restrain market competition because the traditional hard disk drive market competition conditions have not undergone a major change Seagate is still the major player in all divisions of the market and Seagate will strengthen its power after the acquisition of Samsung HDD

Remedies

After negotiating with MOFCOM Seagate agreed to undertake the following obligations

1) Seagate shall not change its business model materially or force clients to purchase hard drive disks exclusively from it

2) Seagate shall not force Tokyo Dengikagaku Kogyo China to supply magnetic heads exclusively to Seagate (or other Seagate-controlled companies) or limit the number of magnetic heads Tokyo Dengikagaku Kogyo China would supply to other hard drive disk manufacturers

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

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3) Seagate shall continue to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

This announcement will be effective within two years from the date of issuance If Seagate can provide sufficient evidence to prove substantial change in the market environment the company can propose to MOFCOM to remove relevant conditions within the two years

FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM15

MOFCOM deems that this acquisition would induce anti-competitive influence

NXP promises to dispose its radio frequency (ldquoRFrdquo) power transistor business

As the first case approved with structural remedies after the enactment of the Provisions on Imposing Restrictive Conditions MOFCOM conducted a comprehensive evaluation of the viability competitiveness and marketability of the divested business as well as the suitability of potential buyers

Facts

On April 3 2015 NXP filed for its acquisition of Freescale NXP Semiconductor (ldquoNXPrdquo) is a NASDAQ-listed company registered in the Netherlands which engages in the design manufacturing and sale of integration circuits and discrete components

Freescale Semiconductor (ldquoFreescalerdquo) is a New York-listed company registered in Bermuda and based in the US which engages in the manufacturing and RampD of microcontroller and digital networking processors (embedded processors)

According to the agreement between NXP and Freescale after closing Freescale will become the wholly owned subsidiary of NXP On November 25 2015 MOFCOM decided to clear this acquisition with remedies

Relevant Market

As per the announcement the relevant product markets are the general microcontroller automotive power-use analog integrated circuit and RF transistor product markets in which NXP and Freescale have horizontal overlap The relevant geographical markets should be the global market

Competition Analysis

After assessing this proposed deal the agency concluded that

1) The proposed deal would boost NXPrsquos market control power in the RF

15 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151120151101196182shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 17 of 52

transistor product market because the global and Chinese RF transistor product markets share a similar structure both featuring few competitors and high concentration levels Freescale and NXP as the number one and number two players are far ahead of their rivals in the market Therefore after closing the market control power of NXP in this market would be strengthened

2) Since Freescale was the fiercest competitor of NXP the proposed deal will remove competition between them

3) The proposed deal would reduce the options for clients and increase procurement risks

In practice the wireless infrastructure suppliers as the main client of the RF transistor product tend to procure products from both NXP and Freescale to prevent them from the risk arising from relying on one supplier

4) The proposed deal may induce an adverse impact on the technology RampD and innovation

Remedies

In accordance with MOFCOMrsquos decision NXP shall follow its written commitment submitted to MOFCOM and completely divest its RF power transistor business to Beijing Jianguang Asset Management At the same time NXP shall strictly fulfil its obligations during the transition period It is worth noting that the NXPFreescale deal shall only be implemented after the divestment deal has been concluded

In addition MOFCOM requires NXP to perform relevant obligations during the transition period from the date of approval announcement until the divestment deal has been concluded NXP shall endeavour

1) not to engage in any lsquounfair trade practicesrsquo relating to the divested business

2) not to implement any acts which may have a significant adverse impact on the value management or competitiveness of the divested business or any acts which may change the nature and scope industry or business strategy or investment policy of the divested business and to take reasonable measures to encourage core employees to stay in the divested business as well as not to seek or transfer employees to NXPrsquos non-divested business

3) to ensure supply to the divested business in a fair reasonable and non-discriminatory manner and

4) to maintain the independence of the divested business and not to exchange competitively sensitive information between the parties and the divested

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 18 of 52

business

B Monopolistic Agreements

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

With respect to the enforcement activities of the NDRC in light of the numbers of the published cases it seems that the law enforcement frequency of the NDRC regarding monopolistic agreements in 2015 is lower in comparison with 2014

The reason behind might be that the outstanding issue of human resource deficit of the antitrust authority still exists Besides the fact that more enterprises gradually attach increasing importance to the antitrust compliance might be another reason for the decrease in the number of cases investigated by the authorities

As to the enforcement activities of the SAIC 4 of 14 cases concluded by the SAIC and its local branches in 2015 are relevant to monopolistic agreements Meanwhile these four cases concern horizontal monopolistic agreements

It is noteworthy however that the Mercedes-Benz case and the Dongfeng Nissan case suggest that vertical agreements especially involving price-related restrictions on the downstream dealers is still the priority of antitrust enforcement Companies shall be very cautious when imposing restrictions on the resale prices or the minimum resale prices of commodities in the distribution agreements

Automobile industry and related industries are observed to be under continuous attention of Chinarsquos antitrust authorities

The industries relating to peoplersquos livelihoods remain to be the enforcement priority

Significant Cases

Enforcement by the NDRC and its local branches

Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC16

The investigation was triggered by a leniency application

The first leniency applicant was exempted from punishment

Eight ocean shipping companies involved were imposed a collective fine of CNY 4067 million

NDRC spent approximately 12 months to investigate and conclude the case 16 NDRCrsquos press release of the case is available at httpjjsndrcgovcngzdt201512t20151228_769084html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 19 of 52

Facts

In December 2015 the NDRC published its official punishment decisions regarding the cartel case in connection with eight ocean shipping companies namely Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha (ldquoNYKrdquo) Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha (ldquoK Linerdquo) Mitsui OSK Lines EUKOR Car Carriers Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics Compantildeiacutea Sud Americana de Vapores Eastern Car Liner and Compantildeiacutea Chilena de Navegacioacuten Interoceaacutenica

According to the official press release of the NDRC the investigation was triggered by a leniency application of NYK The evidence showed that the eight companies reached consensus on non-intrusion of each others existing business to maintain or increase shipping fees when shipping goods such as cars trucks and engineering machinery in the routes between China and other countries and regions

They were also found to frequently conduct bilateral or multilateral communications on the shippersrsquo invitation for bids andor price inquiries via phone conferences dinner parties e-mails visiting etc In addition they also conducted illegal behaviour such as sensitive information exchange price negotiations bidding intention discussion dividing clients and shipping routes reaching agreements on high price bids or non-bidding in order to help certain companies gain shipping orders

To avoid the regulation of the antitrust authority the relevant shipping companies adopted various illicit measures that showed their apparent intention to violate the AML The cartel lasted for at least four years and covered a broad range of shipping routes concerned with the import and export of products between China and other regions such as North America EU South America and so on involving multiple auto brands and engineering machinery brands

The NDRC held the opinion that the eight companies conducts had restricted and eliminated competition in the relevant market raising the international shipping fees and impairing interests of shippers and end consumers The eight companies breached the AML by reaching and implementing monopolistic agreements on fixing prices and dividing the market

All eight investigated companies put forward remedy measures including enhancing the antitrust compliance program arranging more antitrust compliance trainings and developing antitrust compliance technologies

The NDRC imposed fines based on the nature level and duration of their monopolistic volations as well as their respective sales of international freight service sales relevant to the Chinese market The companies involved were collectively fined CNY 4067 million

NYK as the first cartel member voluntarily reporting the illegal conducts to the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 20 of 52

authority and providing significant evidence was entirely exempted from the punishment K Line as the second leniency applicant was imposed a fine amounting to 4 of its 2014 annual sales of international freight services relevant to Chinarsquos import and export market The details of punishments imposed on the involved companies by the NDRC are as follow

Company Name Amount of Fines (RMB million)

Percentage of the Relevant Turnovers

Grounds

Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha

- - First leniency applicant

Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha

2398 4 Second leniency applicant

Mitsui OSK Lines 3812 7 Third leniency applicant

EUKOR Car Carriers 284 9 Lasted over a long period involved many brands and many violations violations were severe

Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics

4506 8 Lasted over a long period involved many brands and many violations violations were severe

Compantildeiacutea Sud Americana de Vapores

308 6 Lasted over a long period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Eastern Car Liner 1127 5 Lasted over a long period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Compantildeiacutea Chilena de 120 4 Lasted over a long

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 21 of 52

Navegacioacuten Interoceaacutenica

period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Total 4067

Analysis

In this case the agency applied the AML instead of the Tenders and Bids Law to collusive bidding Citing article 13 (3) of the AML the NDRC identified that the collusive bidding constituted a division of the sales market

The leading three leniency applicants were granted exemption from fines to a varying degree

According to the official who handled this case dawn raids performed by antitrust enforcement agencies in other jurisdictions drew the attention of the NDRC on the cartels of these shipping companies However there was limited effective evidence to prove that the companies had reached monopolistic agreements Through pressuring the involved parties three members of the shipping cartel actively confessed their illegal conduct This case once again stresses the significance of international cooperation between antitrust enforcement agencies

Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau17

The distribution agreements between Mercedes-Benz and its dealers are determined as vertical monopolistic agreement and Mercedes-Benz violated article 14 of the AML because it restricted the ability of its dealers to decide their own resale prices

Mercedes-Benzrsquos dealers violated article of 13 of the AML due to concluding a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Mercedes-Benz and its dealers were jointly fined CNY 3578 million

Facts

In April 2015 Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau which is the provincial branch of the NDRC released the punishment on its website and announced that it had imposed a fine of CNY 350 million on Mercedes-Benz along with the aggregated fine of CNY 787 million on its dealers The fine came as a result of Mercedes-Benz reaching and implementing resale price maintenance (ldquoRPMrdquo) agreements with dealers to fix the minimum resale price of several car models as well as certain auto parts 17 The original Chinese notice published by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau is available at httpwwwjswjjgovcnoffice_neweo_comm_zxnrxsphp

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 22 of 52

According to the decision the authority found that Mercedes-Benz fixed the minimum resale price of Class E and Class S cars in Nanjing Wuxi Changzhou and Suzhou markets through telephoneverbal communication and dealers meetings from January 2013 to July 2014 Since 2010 Mercedes-Benz had reached agreements with dealers in Jiangsu province to fix the minimum resale prices for auto parts by providing different levels of discounts for insured cars cars involving expired warranty periods and cars within the warranty period

In addition Mercedes-Benz implemented the minimum resale price maintaining agreement by

1) Tightening its monitoring measures on the dealers such as inspecting deals and their sale incentive system on a weekly basis

2) Tracking the sales process flow of cars and increasing the intensity of this assessment

3) Giving warnings and reducing support ndash for example halting the supply of bestselling cars and prohibiting the opening of new stores ndash to dealers if dealers refused to cooperate with the price-fixing related policies and measures and

4) Interviewing personnel of the dealers and requesting terminations if the staff engaged in serious violations of the RPM agreement

Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau concluded that Mercedes-Benz had excluded and eliminated market competition harmed consumer welfare and consequently violated article 1418 of the AML The authority therefore imposed a fine of CNY 350 million representing 7 of the sale revenue of the previous year in the relevant market against Mercedes-Benz and imposed a fine on the dealers amounting to an equivalence of 1 of the annual sales in the previous year

Analysis

Although the agency also addressed the horizontal violation among the dealers in this case the administrative penalty decision mainly focuses on the vertical violation The agency fined dealers involved in the RPM agreement a combined CNY 787 million equal to 1 of the previous-year sales which suggests that the agency decided to give lighter punishments to dealers who took initiative in reporting the activity and provided evidence

The Mercedes-Benz case is the third case where the agency successfully 18 Article 14 of the AML The following monopolistic agreements between operators and trading partners shall be prohibited (i) fixing the resale prices of commodities to third persons (ii) restricting the minimum resale prices of commodities to third persons (iii) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement Authority under the State Council

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 23 of 52

discovered both vertical and horizontal agreements in a case following the Audi case and the Chrysler case All these cases are rooted in the same industry indicating that industrial features play a large role in raising anti-trust concerns In fact it appears that the entire automotive industry is under antitrust scrutiny

Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC19

This case involved both a horizontal agreement and an administrative monopoly

A total fine of CNY 1318 million was imposed on the involved companies

Facts

In June 2015 the NDRC through its website announced the decision made by its regional branch -Yunnan Provincial Development and Reform Commission (ldquoYunnan DRCrdquo) regarding the horizontal monopolistic agreement case involving Yunnan Communications Administration and local subsidiaries of four state-owned telecommunication companies

Through the investigation Yunnan DRC found that Yunnan Communications Administration as a competent government agency had organized several meetings involving Yunnan branches of four state-owned telecoms - China Mobile China Telecom China Unicom and China Tietong in August and September of 2014 At the end of 2009 the four local branches entered into an agreement to regulate their sales promotions in terms of limiting the promotional items amount and frequency

Furthermore the agreement provides certain measures to ensure the implementation of relevant restrictions on promotions Specifically in case any cartel member violates the agreement the others could file complaints with Yunnan Communications Administration and the agency would then issue a rectification notice to the rule-breaker

Yunnan DRC stated that the four telecoms were main competitors in the relevant market and the promotions as a significant competition measure would exert direct influence on the final prices of the products The horizontal agreement organized by Yunnan Communications Administration on sales promotions restricted the competition capacity of telecoms and as a result eliminated the competition in the relevant market Consequently the behaviour of Yunnan Communications Administration violated article 8 20 of the AML and constituted administrative monopoly in terms of ldquoforcing undertakings to conduct monopolistic behaviour prohibited by the AMLrdquo

19 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpwwwsdpcgovcnfzgggzjgjdyfldjjszhdt201506t20150602_694802html 20 Article 8 of the AML Administrative organs and the public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 24 of 52

With respect to the penalties Yunnan DRC fined the local branch of China Tietong CNY 200000 for reaching but not implementing the agreement in regards to the other three telecoms a total fine of CNY 1298 million amounting to 2 of the sales of the relevant business in the previous year were imposed for entering into and implementing the horizontal monopolistic agreement

Analysis

The telecoms industry is still the enforcement priority of the antitrust enforcement authorities A company cannot be exempted from punishment even though it is forced by competent authorities to conduct monopoly behaviour

DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC21

Both a horizontal monopolistic agreement and a vertical monopolistic agreement were involved in this case

A total fine of CNY 14242 million was imposed on DongFeng Nissan and its distributors

Facts

In September 2015 the Guangdong Development and Reform Commission (ldquoGuangdong DRCrdquo) released an announcement regarding the administrative penalties on DongFeng Nissan and its provincial distributors for concluding price-related monopolistic agreements More specifically DongFeng Nissan was imposed a fine of CNY 1233 million for breaching article 14 of the AML in terms of restricting the resale price of certain car models 17 distributors domiciled in Guangdong were collectively fined CNY 1912 million for violating article 1322 of the AML in terms of entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements

According to the published official release the Guangdong DRC launched the investigation in August 2014 The authority discovered that from 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissan had set a rigorous restriction on its distributorsrsquo abilities to determine the resale prices of certain car models including the quoted prices in various platforms and the final resale price In addition DongFeng Nissan punished the distributors that failed to abide by such price restrictions in 2013 The authority 21 The original Chinese notice published by Guangdong DRC is available at httpwwwgddpcgovcnzwgkgzdtgzyw201509t20150910_328993html 22 Article 13 of the AML The following Monopolistic agreements among competing operators shall be prohibited (i) fix or change prices of commodities (ii) limit the outputs or sales volume of commodities (iii) segment the sales markets or the raw material purchasing markets (iv) limit the purchase of new technology new facilities or limit the development of new products new technology (v) jointly boycott transactions (vi) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-Monopoly Law enforcement Authority Monopolistic agreements in this Law refer to agreements decisions or other concerted practices that eliminate restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 25 of 52

believed that the vertical agreement concluded between DongFeng Nissan and its distributors eliminated and restricted the competition in the relevant market and damaged the consumer welfare as well which violates article 14 of the AML

Furthermore from April 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissanrsquos distributors in Guangdong province held multiple meetings to discuss issues relevant to sale price reached and implemented a horizontal monopolistic agreement in terms of fixing the prices of some car models which is prohibited by article 13 of the AML

Considering that both DongFeng Nissan and the involved distributors positively cooperated with the investigation and ceased the illegal behaviour immediately after the investigation Guangdong DRC decided to impose a fine amounting to 3 of its previous yearrsquos turnovers on DongFeng Nissan and a fine ranging from 2 to 4 on the relevant distributors in accordance with articles 4623 and 4924 of the AML

Analysis

This case demonstrates that auto and related industries are still under close attention of the authority Considering the NDRCrsquos successful series of antitrust investigations conducted throughout the auto industry it is observed that the agency currently overseeing price-related antitrust issues in China has accumulated a substantial amount of experience regarding antitrust enforcement in the auto industry Now is the right time to speed up the law-making process by amending the set of rules released earlier and drafting new laws to advise the auto industry on antitrust compliance

Enforcement by the SAIC and its local branches

Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC25

The investigation was triggered by whistle blowerrsquos submission

Cartel members were collectively fined CNY 139 million 23 Article 46 of the AML In case the operators violate the relevant provisions of this Law concluding and implementing Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall order the operators to cease such act impose fines more than 1 but less than 10 of the total turnover in the preceding year and confiscate the illegal gains where the Monopolistic agreement is not implemented a fine less than RMB 500000 can be imposed If the operators involved in Monopolistic agreement on its own initiative report information concerning the conclusion of Monopolistic agreements and provide important evidences to the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority they may be given a mitigated punishment or be exempted from punishment in accordance with the circumstances Where the industrial associations violate this Law organizing the operators in the industry to conclude Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority may impose a fine less than RMB 500000 in serious circumstances the agency of social organization administration and registration may cancel its registration 24 Article 49 of the AML As for the imposition of the fines stipulated by the Article 46 47 and 48 of this Law the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall take elements such as the nature extent and time it lasts of the illegal act into consideration in determining the specific amount of the fines 25 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201506t20150601_156889html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 26 of 52

Facts

In April 2015 the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) issued administrative penalties on several brick manufacturers for entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements This is the first case relevant to monopolistic agreements that has been publicized by the SAIC since the beginning of this year

Ten cartel members were involved in the case including one company and nine individuals Similar with most antitrust cases the investigation started as a result of a whistle blowerrsquos submission After a thorough investigation Hunan AIC found that those local brick manufacturers had reached agreements on controlling production volume and dividing sales areas in the forms of production and sales agreements plans and meeting minutes

The enforcement authority reached the conclusion that these brick manufacturers violated article 13 of the AML and imposed a total fine of CNY 1389400 on them

Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC26

The organizer of the monopolistic agreement the animation association was fined CNY 100000

The antitrust authority did not punish the members of the monopolistic agreement

Facts

In December 2015 the Guangdong Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoGuangdong AICrdquo) published its administrative punishment decision in regards to Guangzhou Panyu Animation amp Game Association (ldquoGAGArdquo) organizing member companies to conclude a monopolistic agreement

According to the decision GAGA drafted the ldquoAgreement of Exhibition Alliancerdquo (ldquoAgreementrdquo) and convened a conference with member companies in order to discuss the content and conclusion of the Agreement 52 member companies entered into the Agreement which actually requested the alliance companies to merely participate in the exhibitions either organized or supported by GAGA in Guangzhou In addition the Agreement prohibited the alliance companies from attending any other exhibition except if they obtained prior approval of GAGA

After a thorough investigation Guangdong AIC believed that the conclusion of the Agreement among GAGA and the 52 member companies violated article 13 (5) of the AML in terms of boycott GAGA who was deeply involved and restricted member companiesrsquo choice of exhibitions through the Agreement could be deemed as

26 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151208_164680html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 27 of 52

the participant and organizer of the monopolistic agreement In accordance with article 46 of the AML Guangdong AIC imposed a fine of CNY 100000 on GAGA for organizing the conclusion of the monopolistic agreement

Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC27

Hubei AIC considered the coinsurance for Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance illegal

Twelve insurance companies were fined CNY 469 million in total

Facts

In December 2015 the Hubei Administrative for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHubei AICrdquo) disclosed its punishment on 12 insurance companies for signing illegal coinsurance agreements

The disclosed punishment decision suggests that the Hubei branch of China Pacific Life Insurance (ldquothe Companyrdquo) 11 other insurance companies and Wuhan Construction Safety Technology Consultation Center (ldquoWCSTCCrdquo) signed a Coinsurance Agreement on Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance (ldquoCoinsurance Agreementrdquo) of which the main contents include

1) The Company and 11 other involved companies as the coinsurers jointly take charge of the personal accident insurance concerned with the construction project directly administered by the Wuhan government WCSTCC is responsible for providing safety professionalism and technology services regarding the relevant personal accident insurance

2) The Company as the chief insurer of the coinsurance occupies 12 of the total amount of the insurance and the other 11 companies respectively occupy 8

3) The Company as the representative of the coinsurance is in charge of collecting the premium signing the standard form insurance policies and issuing the invoice in its own name The Company should share the charged premium with the other companies in accordance with the Coinsurance Agreement

4) Both the Company and the other insurance companies should pay 25 of the actually received premium to WCSTCC as the service fee WCSTCC will assist the coinsurers in providing safety and technology management service to the insured In addition the 11 insurance companies should pay 5 of their premium to the Company as the management fee

27 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165445html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 28 of 52

5) In case an accident happens the 12 companies will jointly bear the damages based on their respective shares in the coinsurance

6) There is a contact mechanism established in the coinsurance The coinsurers will regularly hold coinsurance conferences to discuss existing problems

Furthermore the coinsurers and WCSTCC also signed a self-discipline agreement and established a complete management system to assure the implementation of the Coinsurance Agreement Any party violating the Coinsurance Agreement would be punished

Hubei AIC found that WCSTCC was solely invested by Wuhan Construction Safety Management Association which was under Wuhan Construction Commission The centre helped implement certain functions of the Wuhan Urban Construction Safety Management Station and was responsible for quality supervision and safety supervision of municipal construction projects

It later became a prerequisite for construction companies to purchase insurance from any member of the coinsurance in order to get approval to commence their project According to the decision Hubei AIC launched another separate investigation against WCSTCC

Through the investigation Hubei AIC concluded that the Coinsurance Agreement constituted a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by article 13 of the AML with the following analysis

First coinsurance as a common business model to jointly share and lower risks is widely adopted in the insurance industry A coinsurance arrangement for a specific project in order to avoid high risks faced by one insurer could be legal However coinsurance should not target the entire market In this case prior to the Coinsurance Agreement the risks of the construction projects were unpredictable since the scale of the construction projects the difficulty of the construction and the amount of construction workers could not be available It is impossible to predict the risks of the projects thus it is not necessary to cooperate with other insurers to collectively bear the risks The purpose of the 12 insurance companies to establish the coinsurance is to avoid the competition which demonstrates the Coinsurance Agreement belongs to a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by the AML

Second the companies through entering into the coinsurance agreement actually divided the relevant market of construction project personal accident insurance in Wuhan city which affected the competition in the relevant market and damaged the interests of other competitors and the consumers In particular the Construction Law as amended in 2011 stipulates that the purchase of personal accident insurance is not mandatory and the construction companies have the right to choose whether to buy the said insurance or not As mentioned purchasing insurance from the coinsurance had been the prerequisite for construction companies to obtain administration

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 29 of 52

approval for the project which seriously distorts the fair competition in the market

Citing article 46 of the AML the 12 insurance companies were collectively fined CNY 469 million including fines on the companies and confiscation of illegal gains It is noteworthy that the fines were calculated based on the companiesrsquo 2014 annual sales of the insurance product in connection with the coinsurance The Company as the chief insurer was fined amounting to 6 of its 2014 annual sales of the relevant insurance product in the coinsurance and other companies were fined amounting to 2 of relevant sales For more specific information please see the following table

Company Name (Hubei Branch)

Fines (CNY million)

Percentage of the sales

Illegal Gains (CNY

million)

China Pacific Life Insurance 00653 6 0941

Sino Life 00145 2 04332

Alltrust Insurance 00145 2 04332

Taikang Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Continent Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Pacific Property Insurance

00145 2 04332

China Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

PICC Property and Casualty 00145 2 02599

Taiping General Insurance 00145 2 013

Union Life Insurance 00145 2 01177

Ping An Annuity Insurance Company of China

00145 2 04201

Ping An Property amp Casualty Insurance Company of China

00145 2 -

Subtotal 02248 - 44679

Total 46927

Analysis

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 30 of 52

Coinsurance as an effective approach to lower risks of insurers is widely used in the insurance industry Information sharing and agreements on coinsurance were generally considered efficient and legitimate However from an antitrust perspective coinsurance may raise competition concerns depending on the circumstances of each agreement In the case that there is enough capacity for one insurer to cover the potential risks the coinsurance might be considered as entering into a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC28

The first leniency applicant was exempted from fines

The other concrete companies were imposed a fine of CNY 180000

Facts

In December 2015 the concrete companies monopolistic agreement case investigated by Hunan AIC was published on SAICrsquos website

In accordance with the antitrust enforcement announcement of SAIC this case was triggered by complaints from the Yongzhou City peoplersquos congress After the preliminary review the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) initiated the formal investigation on seven concrete companies domiciled in Yongzhou City Hunan Province which were suspected of being involved in a monopolistic agreement in terms of division of the volumes of the products

After further investigation Hunan AIC found that the seven concrete companies concluded a partnership agreement in 2011 which requested the involved companies to enter into a partnership business with assets In addition according to the partnership agreement it was planned to establish a comprehensive office to manage production marketing and distribution of the products of all the partners The seven companies intended to jointly adjust and control the output of concrete based on the partnership agreement However because there were disagreements over the allocation of the injected assets and market shares the companies did not implement the partnership agreement The agreement was cancelled in December 2012

Based on the findings Hunan AIC concluded that the seven concrete companies as competitors of each other restricted and eliminated the competition in the relevant market through reaching the partnership agreement and dividing the volumes of sales which violated article 13(3) of the AML in terms of division of sales market Considering that the agreement had not been implemented and the limited influence of the agreement according to article 46 of the AML and article 27 of the Administrative Penalties Law small amount fines were imposed on the involved companies Six companies were fined CNY 30000 each for their illegal behaviour 28 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165504html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 31 of 52

Yongzhou Shuangyuan Building Materials Co Ltd as the first one to actively report the monopolistic agreement and cooperate with the enforcement authority was exempted from the punishment

Outlook

It is expected that the AMLrsquos enforcement on monopolistic agreements will continue in the future Industries such as automobile shipping pharmaceuticals insurance etc will still remain the priority of the antitrust enforcement

The antitrust enforcement authorities have published a series of regulations in order to clarify the substantial and procedural issues relevant to the antitrust enforcement However Chinarsquos current antitrust legislation regime is still immature In the following years we expect that more attention will be paid to the legislative improvements

Another remarkable issue for cartel members is that with more Chinese enterprises attaching increasing importance to the AML the follow-on civil damages actions might become a tendency in the future

C Abuse of Market Dominance

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen a decent increase of abuse of market dominance cases both in public enforcement and private litigation Oftentimes the authorities responsible for public enforcement generally find it difficult to pursue investigations against abuse of market dominance cases The following two main reasons are often cited to explain this standoff first it is hard for the authorities to define the relevant markets and prove the undertaking(s)rsquo dominant market position through economic approaches second it is hard to collect evidence regarding abusive practices

The cases related to IPRs abuse are emerging significantly particularly in the telecommunication media and technology (ldquoTMTrdquo) sectors

The SAICrsquos latest refusal-to-deal probe against a local drug maker shows that the SAIC and its local branches have increasingly acquired a profile as an abuse of dominance regulator

Significant Cases

Cases pursued by the SAIC

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 32 of 52

Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case29

Facts

The local authority in Dongfang city reported to the Hainan provincial branch of SAIC on April 23 2014 of the suspected dominance abuse The SAIC authorized its Hainan bureau to officially investigate the matter on 25 July 2014 according to a decision dated January 9 2015 The AIC concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its market dominance by requiring users to pay a deposit without any legal basis and or justifiable reasons

In terms of the relevant product market the local authority found that in this case it was the urban water supply market in Dongfang city and its surrounding townships where Dongfang Water was the sole public operator in the local water supply market with a 100 market share which made all water users completely reliant on the companyrsquos supply In term of market access the local authority found it very unlikely that there were other operators due to the strict regulations

The Hainan SAIC then concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its dominance as it charged users a deposit by threatening to refuse to register users and also by threatening to restrict the water supply Dongfang Waters charging of deposits lacked a legal basis and hadnt received government approval to the detriment of household consumers and business water users and hampered the improvement of management and services of the company Such conduct was in breach of Chinarsquos Anti-Monopoly Law

Hainan AIC levied a fine of CNY 593208 a lighter penalty equivalent to 2 of the companyrsquos annual sales for the previous year and confiscated illicit gains of CNY 38521 for abuse of market dominance

Analysis

It is noteworthy that although handled by a local authority supervised by the SAIC the antitrust agency detailed the relevant market definition the assessment of the dominant market position the abusive practices and the scrutiny of the justifiable reasons

Although the definition of the relevant market and the reasoning of the Hainan provincial AIC and the SAIC are subject to criticism it is still applausive to see that the antitrust regulators have realized the importance of the application of rule of reason in an abuse case In addition through itrsquos a published decision practitioners may observe the regulatorsrsquo reasoning and thus transparency and legal certainty have been generated

29 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzfcfjd201502t20150212_152066html last visited on October 18 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 33 of 52

Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms30

Facts

In June 2013 the Ningxia AIC under authorization of SAIC opened an antitrust investigation into the alleged tie-in sales by the three major state-owned telecommunications operators China Tietong China Unicom and China Telecom for the tie-in sale of fixed-line telephones with broadband Internet services The Ningxia AIC found that the three companies had bundled fixed-line phone services with Internet services to subscribers

During the investigation all three telecommunications companies admitted the tie-in practice had recognized that such practice had improper influence on competition and deprived the choices of consumers The three companies promised to undertake internal rectification timely and eliminate the ill effects resulting from such practice The parties committed to taking the following corrective measures

1) Taking internal rectifications and conducting training to staff about antitrust laws and stop tie-in sales practices

2) Making public commitments to allow subscribers a free choice of services and strengthening the propaganda through the operating room call centre and other channels

3) Unbundling fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

The Ningxia AIC decided to suspend the probe on 14 May 2015 on the grounds that the three companies had actively worked together with the investigators and proposed workable remedy plans

Analysis

In the official announcement Ningxia AIC concluded that the purpose of antitrust enforcement is to restrain monopolistic conducts the protection of competition and to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of consumers Given that during the investigation process the parties had actively cooperated with the investigation formed a more profound understanding of the dangers of tying behaviour and moreover the parties proposed and implemented positive corrective measures to be able to remove the ill impact of their actions the agency believed that the purpose of antitrust law enforcement was fulfilled

It is worth noting that the Ningxia AIC also required the three companies to implement the commitment by August 30 2015and the submission of the written

30 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158908html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158906html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158910html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 34 of 52

implementation report on July 102015 and August 102015 respectively which is another illustration that an effective commitment by the undertakings shall directly deal with the effect that is brought by the monopolistic behaviour In this case the effect of the monopolistic act was restricted to the choice of the consumers therefore the commitment by the undertaking aimed at allowing the freedom of choice and the unbundling of fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company31

Facts

The Liaoning AIC imposed a fine of approximately CNY 433m on the Fushun Branch of Liaoning Tobacco Co on 1 June 2015 The agency also ordered the company to stop its illicit behaviour

The Liaoning AIC received a tip-off that the accused Liaoning Tobacco Corsquos Fushun branch was conducting tie-in sales of non-high-demand cigarette brands with high-demand cigarette brands After gaining authorization from SAIC the agency officially started an investigation regarding the companyrsquos suspected abuse of market dominance in June 2014

Analysis

According to the announcement the tobacco company argued that the tobacco industry is a state controlled or monopolized industry with a lawful monopolistic position therefore the company shall not be subject to the norms of general market competition rules or the anti-monopoly law

In this regards the agency concluded that in terms of the status of the undertaking admittedly the first paragraph of article 17 of the AML says that the State shall protect the lawful business operations of undertakings in these industries with respect to the industries which are under the control of the State-owned economic sector and have a bearing on the lifeline of the national economy or national security and the industries which exercise monopoly over the production and sale of certain commodities according to law However the second paragraph continues to say that the undertakings mentioned above shall do business according to law be honest faithful and strictly self-disciplined and subject themselves to public supervision and they shall not harm the consumers interests by taking advantage of their position of control or their monopolistic production and sale of certain commodities In particular in the preceding paragraph the ldquolawful businessrdquo and ldquoaccording to lawrdquo imply that the AML shall apply in the business operation The agency therefore believes that

31 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201508t20150813_16

0208html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 35 of 52

there shall be no exemption for the undertaking concerned the defences of the undertaking concerned is not established

Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm32

Facts

The Chongqing AIC fined Chongqing Qingyang Pharmaceutical CNY 439308 for alleged dominance abuse

The investigation was initiated when the company contacted the agency for verification on its potential breach of the AML related to an allopurinol active pharmaceuticals ingredient (API) distribution agreement with its exclusive distributor The company provided the relevant agreement and information and the agency conducted an investigation into the company and some other relevant companies

Analysis

Relevant Market

During the investigation the agency found that pharmaceutical ingredients are a special commodity the API is used to produce the preparations The chemical API is only used for the production of the preparation and could be used as a medicine for clinic use

The preparation is produced according to the requirements of certain form of prepared drugs and for the purpose of treatment and prevention which can be used as medicine

The allopurinol is used for the common treatment of hyperuricemia However the other treatments are different in pharmacological effects or treatment effects as well as in the cost for the patient Furthermore the company is the only manufacturer and supplier in the market nationwide since July 2012 Therefore the agency concluded that the relevant market is the allopurinol API market

Considering that the qualification for manufacturing the allopurinol API is national wide and the normal practice for purchasers and suppliers is domestic the relevant geographic market is the Chinese market

The Market Dominance

During the investigation the agency found that the company is the only supplier and manufacturer of allopurinol API in China there is no other competitor in the

32 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151222_16

5152html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 36 of 52

market and the company has a monopoly in the market The evidence shows that the company has the ability to control the prices the position for the downstream is relatively weak

With respect to the market entry the agency found that the market entry is relatively high in addition other undertakings are dependent on the company Thus the agency believed the company to have market dominance

Refusal to Deal

The agency found that on September 25 2015 the company reached an exclusive agreement and distribution agreement with its distributor Based on these agreements the company didnrsquot supply allopurinol API to the said distributor and other companies despite the fact that those companies requested for allopurinol API but were turned down by the company

Absence of Reasonable Cause

The agency found that the companyrsquos refusal to deal was not in line with the needs of normal business operation or economic efficiency On the other hand the refusal to deal was aimed at increasing the market share of the allopurinol drug product Also the agency found that the stop of supply was a manipulation of market power as to maximize the profit to the most The agency further found that the exclusive distribution agreement with suspension of supply for six months and the refusal to supply was to eliminate and restrict the competition as to gain the monopolistic profit

The Consequence of Refusal to Deal

The agency concluded that the refusal to deal harmed the competition of the allopurinol preparations market Because of the suspension of supply many demanders had to reduce their production or switch to the supply of other products or stop their production The suspension of supply affected the competition of the downstream market Consequently the raising of the price of allopurinol API also raised the cost for other manufacturers of allopurinol preparations

Furthermore the refusal to deal led to capacity loss of the allopurinol preparation industry

Ultimately the refusal to deal increased the burden on consumers as the refusal to supply changed the supply-demand relationship in the market

The agency concluded that the Company abused its dominant position in the allopurinol API market by refusing to deal with intended buyers in the period between October 2013 and March 2014Therefore the Company violated article 17 (1) of the AML which prohibits business operators with a dominant market position from abusing that position such as the refusal to deal without any justifications

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 37 of 52

D Administrative Monopoly

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 witnessed antitrust authoritiesrsquo significant efforts regarding the enforcement against administrative monopoly According to Mr Dong Zhiming the deputy director general of Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly Bureau ever since the AML coming into force six cases in connection with administrative monopoly were investigated by NDRC and among them five cases were handled in the year of 2015 These cases touched abuses of administrative power in terms of designative deal in relation to transportation communication and pharmaceutical industries

The first private litigation related to administrative monopolistic acts was heard in the court which is a milestone case in the enforcement of the AML

Significant Cases

Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC33

Facts

In March 2015 the NDRC released the official letter to Shandong Provincial Department of Transportation (ldquoShandong DOTrdquo) on its website with respect to correct its abuse of administrative power to exclude and restrict competition

During the investigation the NDRC found that since 2011 Shandong DOT had issued multiple relevant government orders in order to require certain types of vehicles to be directly connected to two designated information and service platforms both of which are operated and technically supported by one company namely Shandong Jiutong Internet of Things Technology Co Ltd (ldquoJiutong ITTrdquo) Furthermore according to the orders issued by the competent administrative department all the vehicle satellite positioning terminals entering into Shandong provincial market should be debugged through the said technology service platform which is operated by the mentioned company In addition Shandong DOT released the cap prices of vehicle satellite positioning terminals which is identical to the 2012 bid-winning price in the Ministry of Transportation demonstration project

The NDRC believed that Shandong DOTrsquos behaviour eliminated and restricted the competition in the monitoring platform market and the vehicle terminal market deprived the right of transportation enterprises to choose vehicle terminals and monitoring platform on their owns unreasonably raised the sales prices of vehicle terminals and service fees charged by the platform and increased the costs of transportation enterprises Therefore the antitrust agency concluded that Shandong

33 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201503t20150327_668911html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 38 of 52

DOT violated article 8 of the AML which stipulates that ldquoadministrative organs and the public organizations with an administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude and restrict competitionrdquo Specifically Shandong DOT violated article 3234 in terms of requiring organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any designated operators and violated article 3735 in terms of setting rules with contents which eliminate and restrict competition

Based on article 51 of the AML ldquoWhere administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations abuse administrative powers performing activities which exclude and restrict competition the superior entity shall order it to correct impose administrative penalty on the chief officer and other staffs directly responsible pursuant to the laws The AML enforcement authority may give recommendations on disposal of activities to the relevant superior entityrdquo the NDRC proposed in writing that the Shandong provincial government should order Shandong DOT to rectify its behaviour with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Entirely open up the monitoring platform market by permitting transportation undertakings to freely choose any approved platform

2) Loosen the restrictions on the entry into Shandong vehicle terminals permit the undertakings to independently select the supplier of vehicle terminals and allow the qualified terminals to be connected to the relevant monitoring platform and

3) Revoke the official documentation relevant to the cap price of vehicle terminals in order to promote the price competition

Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 36

Facts

On 26 August 2015 the NDRC published its second decision with regard to the rectification of administrative monopoly since the beginning of this year According to the proposal letter sent to Anhui Provincial Government the investigation against the Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City (Bengbu HFPC) was trigged by third partiesrsquo complaints

34 Article 32 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to require organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any operators designated by them 35 Article 37 of the AML Administrative organs shall not abuse their administrative powers to set rules with contents which eliminate restrict competition 36 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201508t20150826_748682html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 39 of 52

The investigation suggests that Bengbu HFPC published three notices with regard to drugs procurement in April and May of this year

In the No C-2015-CG-X-111 Notice (ldquoNo111 Noticerdquo) released on 10 April2015 the health authority not only provided the dosage form and qualification of the requested drugs but also directly determined the suppliers of relevant drugs which eliminated and restricted the competition among pharmaceutical manufacturers and therefore violated articles 32 and 37 of the AML

In the No C-2015-CG-C-112 Notice (ldquoNo112 Noticerdquo) and No C-2015-CG-C-168 (ldquoNo 168 Noticerdquo) respectively released on 10 April and 22 May 2015 the Bengbu HFPC set discriminative qualification requirements on non-local undertakings in order to restrict their participation in the relevant bidding For instance in accordance with No 112 Notice to be a qualified bidder the turnover of non-local undertakings shall exceed CNY 2 billion which is 50 times as much as the turnover requirements of the local undertakings In the NDRCrsquos opinion the administrative monopoly activities conducted by the local health agency excluded the relevant undertakings from the market maintained the virtual-high prices of drugs and therefore violated articles 3237 and 37 of the AML

The NDRC suggested in a letter that Anhui Provincial Government should urge the Bengbu HFPC to rectify the abuse of monopoly powers with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Stop setting distinguishing restrictions on qualification requirements review standards and numbers of winning bidders as for local and non-local undertakings

2) Stop designating the suppliers of competitive drugs and

3) Take necessary measures to mitigate the negative effects resulting from the previous illegal monopolistic abuses

Outlook

At the beginning of the year the former director general of the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau under the NDRC Xu Kunlin stated that the agency would strengthen antitrust enforcement on abuse of administrative power in 2015

Since then the NDRC has made great efforts to rectify unreasonable abuses of administrative power The currently disclosed two cases investigated by the NDRC re-emphasize the Chinese Governmentrsquos strict scrutiny of antitrust issues in respect of

37 Article 34 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to restrict or reject the participation of operators from other regions in local bidding activities by measures such as prescribing discriminatory qualification requirements or assessment standards or by not publishing information according to law

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 40 of 52

administrative monopoly It reminds the local governments that antitrust compliance is of significant importance

III Private Litigation

A Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen more and more private antitrust litigations

The private antitrust litigation cases have become increasingly complicated especially the issues regarding the intersection areas of IP and antitrust law

Multinational giants and State-Owned Enterprises (the ldquoSOEsrdquo) are increasingly becoming the targets in antitrust civil litigations Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (the ldquoSMEsrdquo) tend to use the antitrust litigation to achieve their commercial goals in the business context

B Significant Cases

Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)38

This is the first-ever private litigation concerning administrative monopoly since the implementation of the AML in 2008

Facts

According to the currently disclosed details the case is relevant for designated trade

The plaintiff Shenzhen Sware Technology Co Ltd (ldquoSwarerdquo) is a software company The press releases suggest that Sware Gloden Software Co Ltd (ldquoGlodenrdquo) and Shanghai Ruban Software Co Ltd (ldquoShanghai Rubanrdquo) are the three main suppliers of construction cost software and possess the major shares of the relevant market An annual provincial vocational ability contest regarding the construction cost hosted by the Guangdong Department of Education (ldquoGuangdong DOE) designated Gloden as the exclusive supplier of the relevant software

After several unsuccessful verbal and written negotiations with Guangdong DOE in April 2014 Sware filed a lawsuit against Guangdong DOE before the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquothe Courtrdquo) alleging that the administrative organ abused its administrative power and violated the AML by designating exclusive software supplier for the contest and claimed a compensation for reasonable expense amounting to CNY 10800 Yuan

The opinions of the Court 38 The story of the case is available at httpfinancesinacomcnchinadfjj20150410074621924997shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 41 of 52

The full text of the judgment has not been disclosed yet In accordance with the information available to the public the Court invoked article 32 of the AML which prohibits an administrative organ from abusing its administrative power to require or in disguised form organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use only the commodities supplied by the entities designated by them The Court concluded that Guangdong DOE failed to prove the legitimacy of the designation and therefore abused its administration power

Currently the case is in appeal before the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court

Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 39

It is the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China

In the first instance ruling Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court ruled against Sinopec holding that the Yunnan branch of Sinopecs trading company was obligated to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its dominance in the sales market of refined oil by refusing to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding without justifiable reasons

In the second instance ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors Currently the case is pending

Facts

The First Trial

The lawsuit was filed before the Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoKunming Courtrdquo) in January 2014 Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy Co Ltd (ldquoYingdingrdquo) a bio-energy manufacturer claimed that Sinopec and the Yunnan branch of Sinopec trading company (ldquoSinopec Yunnan Branchrdquo) had failed to fulfil their obligations stipulated in the Renewable Energy Law and had abused their market dominance in sales market of refined oil by refusing to trade with Yingding without justifiable reasons

Sinopec and Sinopec Yunnan Branch mainly explained four reasons for why they rejected Yingdingrsquos biofuel Firstly Yingding had failed to prove that the biofuel complied with the relevant national standard and was safe to use Secondly Yingding had failed to provide complete trading terms Thirdly the laws and regulations regarding biofuel were incomplete the authorized refined oil sales companies were 39 The details of the case are available at httpnewsxinhuanetcomfortune2014-1217c_1113680039htm httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=9e71db51-6ff6-4d2c-8af6-8eacf023ebdeampKeyWord=E4BA91E58D97E79B88E9BC8E|E4B8ADE79FB3E58C96 httpnewsxinhuanetcomenergy2015-0422c_127721575htm httpwwwnbdcomcnarticles2015-04-23911348html last visited on December 17 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 42 of 52

obligated to purchase biofuel from the biofuel manufacturers if it met certain quality standards but there was a vacancy regarding how to reach the end consumers from the sales companies

On 8 December 2014 the Kunming Intermediate Peoples Court ruled that Sinopec Yunnan Branch bore a legal obligation to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its market dominance in refined oil market by refusing without any justifiable reasons to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding The court ordered Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network within 30 days Both Yingding and Sinopec filed appeals to the Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court

The Appellate Trial

The appeal hearing was held on 22 April 2015 in Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoYunnan Courtrdquo) Sinopec submitted 23 new pieces of evidence and introduced two expert witnesses in a bid to overturn several key elements in the first-instance ruling by Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court

In terms of the determination of the relevant market and the market dominance Sinopec argued that the relevant market in this case was for adipic acid monomethyl ester (ldquoAAMErdquo) the main ingredient of a biofuel additive known as BD100 Yingdingrsquos main product is BD100 which can be blended with fossil diesel to become biofuel In the AAME market Sinopec is a potential buyer instead of a market dominator In support of this argument Sinopec presented an expert witnessmdashGong Jiong a professor of economics at Beijings University of International Business and Economics who testified that AAME should be defined as the relevant product market on the basis of an economic analysis

However Yingding insisted that the first-instance ruling was correct in naming the sales market of refined oil as the relevant market and submitted new evidence an article on Sinopecs website that claimed it had a 67 market share in Yunnan to help establish the claim that Sinopec had market dominance

Another main dispute was whether Yingdingrsquos biofuel product met national standards which would make it mandatory for Sinopec to purchase under Chinas Renewable Energy Law The law stipulates that biofuel producers must sell their products first to an authorized refined oil sales company and the sales companies are obliged to buy the fuel if it meets certain quality standards In order to test the quality Sinopec introduced the second expert witness Lin Jianmin a leading author of Chinarsquos national biofuel standard Lin Jianmin pointed out that there are currently quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology which gives Sinopec a justifiable reason not to trade with Yingding Moreover Sinopec presented some precedents in which consumers had complained about the biofuel quality and also claimed that China didnt have a sound regulatory framework to support biofuel production neither in testing nor in sales

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 43 of 52

Nevertheless to refute this point Yingding referred to an earlier test in co-operation with Sinopec in 2011 where selected buses in Kunming used biofuel blended by Sinopec using BD100 produced by Yingding

On August 13 2015 Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors and now this case is pending In the written appellate ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court did not provide any details regarding its reasoning

Key Issues of the Case

Is there any competition between Yingding and Sinopec

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case the product of Yingding is biofuel while Sinopec does not engage in the business of biofuel From this perspective Yingding and Sinopec are not competitors Thus it is not necessary and not reasonable for Sinopec to eliminate or restrict the competition from Yingding

Relevant Market

The definition of the relevant market is a prerequisite to determine whether competition exists and whether the AML is applicable In accordance with the Judicial Interpretation of Antitrust civil litigation the plaintiff shall take the responsibility to prove the defendantrsquos dominance in the relevant market Also the methods of defining the relevant market are stipulated in the Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition (ldquoGuidelinesrdquo) However both Yingding and Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court defined the relevant market as the sales market of refined oil without sufficient antitrust analysis none of the methods in the Guidelines were used Therefore the definition of the relevant market remains arguable and needs to be sufficiently analysed in the upcoming retrial

Justifiable Reasons

The abuse of market dominance includes the behaviour of refusing to trade without justifiable reasons according to the AML but in the first instance ruling justifiable reasons were not investigated by the court During the appellate trial the expert witness introduced by Sinopec claimed that there were quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology and this was a justifiable reason to refuse to trade with Yingding Even though the first instance court and the appellate court did not reason the justifiable reason it should be discussed and investigated further during the retrial

AML or Renewable Energy Law

The claims of Yingding were based on both the AML and the Renewable Energy Law (ldquoRELrdquo) and the first instance ruling referred to both the AML and the REL as

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 44 of 52

well It seems that the laws the first instance court referred to were comprehensive but in fact the reasoning was not clear and logical In the first instance ruling some disputes regarding the AML were reviewed but all the orders were not based on the AML Specifically the first instance court ordered the Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network based on the REL and dismissed the other claims That the orders were not on account of reasoning is illogical It is anticipated that during the retrial the application of the laws will be clearer

Analysis

A lot of issues have not been clearly analysed by the courts such as the relevant market and the justifiable reasons Since the case is remanded the above-mentioned issues are expected to be resolved in the retrial In addition Yingding was in a disadvantaged position compared to its first instance trial since its claims based on the AML were challenged greatly during the appellate trial In the retrial it is probable that Yingding may switch its litigation strategy and base its claims on the REL Therefore maybe more preparation regarding the REL can give Sinopec a leg up

Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)

Rijing Electric a Chinese distributor seeks CNY 5m compensation

The first hearing was on 9 June 2015 and ended without a ruling

Facts

Rijing Electric (ldquoRijingrdquo) a Shanghai-based company and a former distributor for Panasonic accused Panasonic of abusing its dominance and dividing the market through monopolistic practice in an antitrust lawsuit filed in 2014 with Shanghai No 1 Intermediate Court (ldquoShanghai Courtrdquo) claiming compensation of CNY 5m (USD 815370) Wenzhou Mingda Automation System Co and Shanghai Qingying Automation Equipment as the distributor of Panasonic in China are the co-defendants were accused of conducting monopolistic behaviours by implementing Panasonicrsquos policy

The first hearing for evidence exchange was on June 9 2015 Rijing claimed a policy allegedly introduced by Panasonic in 2009 restricted the competition between distributors Panasonic claims the policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo and has full justifiable reasons It explained that the products in question required customization at considerable cost to distributors before its sale to customers Once carried out however other distributors leaving them open to quote much lower prices than the original distributor could simply and relatively cheap replicate this customization Besides Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and that the plaintiff had failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic said its market share for the four products

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 45 of 52

under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases Also Rijing failed to challenge the policy when it was first introduced instead initially agreeing it was reasonable as e-mail evidence submitted by Panasonic suggests

Key Issues of the Case

Whether Panasonic occupied a market dominant position

It is reported that Rijing claimed that Panasonic had abused its market dominance but Rijing failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and its market share for the four products under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases

Analysis

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case Panasonicrsquos policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo rather than to eliminate or restrict competition

Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals40 (Pending)

It is a battle over patent licensing issues

It is viewed as being among the most complicated antitrust lawsuits in China

The first hearing was on 17 and 18 December 2015

Facts

Four Chinese rare earth companies Ningbo Ketian Magnet Ningbo Permanent Magnetics Ningbo Tongchuang Strong Magnet Material and Ningbo Huahui Magnetic Industry filed antitrust lawsuits against Hitachi Metals over alleged patent licensing issues regarding rare earth magnets on December 11 2014 with the Ningbo Intermediate Peoples Court (ldquoNingbo Courtrdquo) in Zhejiang province As reported four Chinese rare earth companies claimed Hitachi Metals abused its market dominance and hurt the industry competition by refusing to license the patents to them The patents in this case are used in the manufacturing of sintered neodymium iron boron (ldquoNdFeBrdquo) magnets a rare-earth magnet alloy widely used in parts for airplanes automobiles and other products

Hitachi Metals filed a challenge with the Ningbo Court over its jurisdiction in April 2015 After Ningbo Court rejected Hitachi Metals jurisdiction objection on 28 April 2015 Hitachi Metals appealed to the Zhejiang High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoZhejiang

40The details of the story are available at httpwwwzbmagcomnews_viewphpid=80 httpwwwhitachicomcnaboutpress201510-121118_ahtml last visited on December 22 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 46 of 52

Courtrdquo) but Zhejiang Court affirmed the ruling of the Ningbo Court

The first day of a two-day hearing took place on 17 December 2015 during which the two sides cross-examined each otherrsquos evidence The evidence focused on clearing up several key elements in the case including the relevant market whether Hitachi Metals has dominance on that market and whether both sides acted in good faith during the licensing negotiations

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Product Market

The four Chinese rare earth companies claimed that the relevant product market should be the NdFeb-related patent licensing market However Hitachi Metals believed that the physical NdFeb market rather than the patent licensing market should be the relevant product market which is meaningful for assess the real competitive effects on the market

Whether Hitachi Metals occupies a dominant market position

In terms of market dominance Hitachi Metals claimed it does not occupy a dominant position because Hitachi Metalsrsquo patents were not in a standard in this case and there are substitutable technologies in the market SEP holders have the obligation to license on FRAND terms but none-SEP holders do not So while a refusal to license a SEP may constitute abuse of dominance refusal to license a non-SEP mdash even by a patent holder with a dominant position mdash should not be considered as an abuse

Analysis

Hitachi Metals as a patent holder should have the right to decide whether to retain those patents or not or who to license According to the legal theory the purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage and protect innovation by conferring monopoly right mdash that is to give intellectual property owners the proprietary rights which can exclude others from using the intellectual property The SEP holders admittedly need to comply with FRAND terms which can maintain a robust balance between competition and monopoly whereas the further intervention of antitrust law into non-SEP patents may undermine the purpose of intellectual property law To which extent the antitrust law should intervene is yet to be seen

Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei41

A confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the Beijing IP court made by the Beijing High Court

41 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcncpwswbjzscq201511t20151103_12225640htm last visited on December 28 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 47 of 52

Facts

On August 2 2013 the NDRC penalized Abbott for monopolistic price-fixing and then Abbott made a price adjustment in China where the prices of main products were reduced

On December 16 2014 Tian Junwei (ldquoTianrdquo) a Chinese citizen in Beijing sued Carrefour Shuangjing Branch (ldquoCarrefourrdquo) and Abbott (Shanghai) Sales Company (ldquoAbbottrdquo) at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (ldquoIP Courtrdquo) for their monopolistic price-fixing which damaged his interests However Carrefour and Abbott challenged the jurisdiction of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court They claimed there were two reasons Firstly according to the jurisdiction rules of the IP court issued by the Supreme Court the IP court has no jurisdiction over anti-trust cases Secondly if this case is a contractual dispute the court that is in the place of Carrefour should hear it if this case is a tort dispute the Shanghai Intermediate Court should hear it

In the ruling of the IP Court the IP Court decided it has the jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases for the following reasons According to the Provisions On Causes Of Action In Civil Cases issued by Supreme Court (最高人民法院案由规定) antimonopoly dispute is a tertiary cause of action belonging to IP and competition disputes Also according to the Provisions concerning the Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京

市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问题的规定 ) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was an IP and competition dispute and was sued after November 6 2014 Thus the IP Court had jurisdiction

Both Carrefour and Abbott appealed to the Beijing High Court over the jurisdiction ruling but the Beijing High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original ruling Reasons are listed in the written ruling issued on June 18 2015 Firstly the nature of the case was an antimonopoly dispute In accordance with Provisions of the Supreme Peoples Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民

事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) and Civil Litigation Law the monopolistic civil disputes in the first instance shall be under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Peoples Courts and an action involving a contractual dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the peoples court of the place where the defendant is domiciled or where the contract is performed Carrefour as the defendant in this case is domiciled in Chaoyang District Beijing Therefore the courts of Beijing have jurisdiction over this case Secondly according to article 3 of the Notification on the Jurisdiction of Intellectual Property Courts issued by Supreme Court (关于知识产权法院案件管辖

等有关问题的通知) IP courts have jurisdiction over first-instance civil disputes arising from monopolistic practices Lastly according to Provisions concerning the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 1 of 51

2015 China Anti-Monopoly Annual Report

Dr Zhan Hao amp Song Ying1

I Legislation

A Legislation Tendency Highlight

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement agencies namely the National Development and Reform Commission (ldquoNDRCrdquo) the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoSAICrdquo) and the Ministry of Commerce (ldquoMOFCOMrdquo) made more efforts regarding legislation especially when it comes to strengthening the role of soft law compared to 2014

Intellectual property right (ldquoIPRrdquo) related antitrust issues are a hot topic At this stage three antitrust enforcement bodies and the State Intellectual Property Office are respectively drafting the IPR antitrust guidelines based on their respective enforcement areas and are going to submit their respective guidelines to the State Councilrsquos Anti-monopoly Commission (ldquoAMCrdquo) The AMC will eventually come up with the final and unified guidelines (the ldquoIPR Antitrust Guidelinesrdquo) based on the draft versions submitted by above-mentioned bodies

The auto industry has consistently attracted attention under the framework of AML Apart from continuous enforcement activities against cartel vertical monopolistic agreement and abusing dominance in the auto industry the antitrust guidelines for the auto industries being drafted by NDRC (the ldquoAuto Industry Antitrust Guidelinesrdquo) are the only antitrust guidelines specialized for a particular industry This suggests a deepening and detailing of legislative activities of Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement authorities

In addition to the IPR Antitrust Guidelines and the Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines the NDRC has also drafted four other guidelines in 2015 in order to normalize and guide the enforcement activities The four guidelines include Guidelines on Leniency Policy Guidelines on Commitment of Undertakings Guidelines on Calculating the Illegal Gains and Fines for Monopoly Conducts and Guidelines on Procedures of Monopolistic agreement Exemption

B Legislation of SAIC

1 Dr Zhan Hao is the managing partner of AnJie Law Firm and received his Doctoral degree Master degree and Bachelor degree in law Dr Zhan also conducted Post-doctoral research on Microeconomics E-mail address zhanhaoanjielawcom Song Ying is a partner of AnJie Law Firm whose practice focuses on antitrust and litigation Ms Song can be reached at the following e-mail address songyinganjielawcom The other team members of AnJie competition team including Li Xiang Wang Lingling Zhang Wenyi Zheng Shuangshi and Feng Siduo also make contribution to this report

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 2 of 52

Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition2

On April 7 2015 SAIC issued the Rules on the Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition (the ldquoIPR Antitrust Rulesrdquo) which have taken effect on August 1 2015

The IPR Antitrust Rules consist of six main parts including

clarifying the purpose and basis of the legislation and providing relevant legal concepts (eg Article 1)

prohibiting undertakings from reaching any monopolistic agreements through exercising intellectual property rights and providing the principle of ldquoSafe Harbourrdquo and its details (eg Article 5)

illustrating the rules for undertakings with dominant position exercising intellectual property rights and especially proposing the ldquoessential facility doctrinerdquo (eg Article 10)

laying out the rules for exercising IP rights related to the patent pool and standardization (eg Article 12 and 13)

providing the analytical approaches and consideration factors for conducting the antitrust assessment (eg Article 15) and

stipulating the possible punishments to be imposed in case of violation of this Rules (eg Article 17)

Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition

The Anti-monopoly and Anti-unfair Competition Enforcement Bureau of SAIC released the sixth draft of ldquoGuidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competitionrdquo (ldquoSAIC draft IPR Guidelinesrdquo) on January 6 2016

The SAIC draft IPR Guidelines cover various IPR related antitrust issues - such as restrictions on technology RampD between competitors exclusive grant-back clauses market division among competitors and safe harbour rules regarding monopolistic agreements involving IPRs etc The following areas are mainly illustrated

Chapter 1 clarifies general principles of the guidelines the relationship between antitrust law and IPR protection as well as the relationship between IPR abuse and monopolistic behaviour It also covers nature and type of conduct eliminating

2 The original Chinese notice published by SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnfldyfbzdjzzcfgzcfg201507t20150724_159428html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 3 of 52

or restricting competition via IPR abuse the relationship between IPR and market dominance position the legal responsibilities and remedies as well as the scope of application

Chapter 2 outlines the basic analysis framework including its methodology analytical steps factors and competition effects

Chapter 3 relates to defining the relevant market including the general principle and circumstances where relevant technology market and relevant innovation market should be defined

Chapter 4 refers to monopolistic agreements involving IPR including factors that should be taken into account when analysing these agreements and related safe harbour regulations

Chapter 5 stipulates the circumstances regarding the abuse of market dominance in the exercise of IPRs including refusal to license tie-in sales and other unjustifiable transactions

Chapter 6 involves undertakingsrsquo concentration when exercising IPRs

Chapter 7 analyses certain special behaviour-types related to the exercise of IPRs from the antitrust perspective including standard-setting related activities injunction for standard essential patents (ldquoSEPrdquo) patent pooling and behaviour of copyright management organizations

It is reported that the SAIC has finished soliciting opinions from the US and EU chambers of commerce some major Western companies and law firms The SAICrsquos antitrust division will gather feedback on the sixth draft from relevant departments of the Chinese government competition organizations and antitrust scholars The draft will then be submitted to the AMC for review

C Legislation of NDRC

Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines

During the Annual Conference of China Automobile Dealers Association held in November 2015 one of the NDRC officials said that the first draft of Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines (ldquoAuto Antitrust Guidelinesrdquo) has been completed According to the official Auto Antitrust Guidelines consist of six sections respectively preface basic issues monopolistic agreement abuse of dominant position concentration of undertakings and supplementary articles Furthermore the official stated that vertical price restrictions on sales of new energy auto might be exempted during the promotion period

Auto Antitrust Guidelines will likely be released in 2016 by the State Council instead of the NDRC according to Wei Tongwei general secretary of the spare part

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 4 of 52

working committee under the China Automotive Maintenance and Repair Trade Association

Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses3

NDRC published a draft of the Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses on December 31 2015 NDRC noted that the consultation period for the draft guidelines run from 1 until 20 January 2016

The draft guidelines constitute five parts preamble basic issues IPR-related agreements that may eliminate or restrict competition IPR-related abuse of dominant position and concentration involving IPR

The draft guidelines cover antitrust issues related to joint RampD patent pool cross licensing standardization price restriction exclusive grant-back no-challenge clause exemption of agreements unfairly high royalty fees refusal to license tying sale imposing unreasonable transaction conditions discriminatory treatment and injunctive relief

The draft guidelines also include factors for determining whether the application of injunction orders by standard essential patent owners can lead to the elimination or restriction of competition such as whether the parties involved expressed their true intentions during negotiations

D Legislation of MOFCOM

The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases4

MOFCOM issued the Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases on February 6 2015 which took effect at the same time

Auto Sales Management Measures

MOFCOM posted a draft of the Auto Sales Management Measures (the ldquodraft Measuresrdquo) on its website on 6 January 2016 and is soliciting for comments until 6 February 2016 MOFCOM intends to implement this new rule to replace the current Auto Brand Sales Management Measures

According to the draft Measures any vehicle sales and related services engaged in the territory of China shall be abided by this rule The draft Measures consist of five parts which are the general principles code of conduct supervision and management penalty provision and bylaw

The Measures clearly provide that the departments of the commercial 3 The original Chinese notice published by NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201512t20151231_770233html 4 The original notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticlei20150220150200891361shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 5 of 52

administration under the State Council will be in charge of nationwide auto sales management

In the second part the draft Measures list the conducts in which a supplier shall not engage in These conducts include restricting distributors from reselling their products requesting distributors to share expenses for their own marketing activities restricting distributors from selling parts of other brands or providing after-sales services for other brands and so on Most of these conducts are deemed as vertical monopolistic agreements which are likely to induce anti-competitive effects in EU and US practices

As reported the Chinese government will make efforts to coordinate the Auto Antitrust Guidelines and the Measures-- two upcoming industry-specific regulations

II Public Enforcement

A Merger Control

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

With the increase in the number of cases been filed and reviewed it is recognized that MOFCOM has become one of the most important jurisdictions of merger control in the world

The simplified procedure has improved the efficiency of MOFCOMrsquos merger review in a large degree Most cases in simple procedure were concluded during the first phase However MOFCOMrsquos review time lasts longer in a few cases For instance MOFCOM spent 162 days to clear Toyota Industries Corps purchase of a 55 stake in Singaporean logistics company LT Wuliao Banyun Holdings setting a new record for the length of a simple case review

MOFCOM used to focus on horizontal deals but now also considers vertical and conglomerate mergers important In 2015 only 35 of the cases being reviewed were horizontal mergers

The increased number of administrative punishment on cases that failed to notify in 2015 demonstrates that MOFCOM has further strengthened its enforcement on this respect

The supervision of remedy implementation has become ldquoroutinizedrdquo

All divisions of MOFCOMrsquos antitrust bureau are responsible for case reviewing from the end of 2015 with the aim to improve the work efficiency

The international cooperation between antitrust enforcement authorities with respect to merger controls happens more frequently On 15 October 2015 the competition department of EU Commissions (ldquoCommissionrdquo) and MOFCOM

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 6 of 52

have signed best practices for cooperation on reviewing mergers in Beijing As the Commissionrsquos officer says the growing number of international transactions is the main reason for this cooperation In addition the Commission also signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the NDRC and SAIC in 2012 which creates a dedicated framework to strengthen cooperation and coordination5

Statistics

From January of 2009 to the end of 2015 MOFCOM received 1445 cases and accepted 1364 cases Among the reviewed cases MOFCOM has cleared 26 deals with remedies since the AML took effect in 2008 with an average review time of 199 days

In 2015 MOFCOM accepted 338 cases out of which 332 were concluded including 18 cases dealing with applicants withdrawing merger filings The agency also imposed penalties on business operators in 9 cases that were related to failure to fulfil merger filing obligations

246 cases out of 332 cases in 2015 obtained MOFCOMrsquos approval in the first phase accounting for 74 of all reviewed cases

Of the cases cleared by MOFCOM in 2015 56 were related to manufacturing such as automotive components and parts vessels machinery manufacturing and electrical equipment

Acquisitions and joint-venture agreements were the most common types of transactions accounting for 87 of all deals Meanwhile joint ventures were still the most common channel for foreign investment in China

Significant Cases

GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions6

This is the first case in which MOFCOM agreed to remove a remedy imposed on a merger

MOFCOM partially removed the restrictions on Google based on the fact that Google had lost its control of Motorola Mobility

Facts

Google applied to MOFCOM on December 1 2014 to remove the condition that required Google to treat all original equipment manufacturers (ldquoOEMsrdquo) equally in android platform-related business after it bought Motorola

5 The original notice published by EC is available at httpeuropaeurapidpress-release_IP-15-5843_enhtml 6 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150120150100862331shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 7 of 52

The concerned remedy was imposed by MOFCOM according to its No 25 Announcement in 2012 which concerned Googlersquos acquisition of Motorola Mobility together with three other remedies as the following

1) Google will license the Android Platform on a free and open basis as it had done so far

2) Google shall continue to observe the existed FRAND obligation of Motorola Mobility in respect of the latterrsquos patents and

3) Google shall delegate an independent supervisor to supervise its performance according to the Provisional Regulations on the Disposal of the Undertakingrsquos Assets or Business in the Concentration stipulated by MOFCOM in 2010

The No 25 Announcement provided that the applied remedies would be valid for five years starting from its punishment unless Google no longer controls Motorola Mobility

Google lodged the remedy removal application based on the fact that Lenovo concluded its acquisition of Motorola Mobility from Google which had been approved by MOFCOM on October 16 2014 and closed on October 30 2014 and due to this acquisition Google lost its control of Motorola Mobility

Decision

After careful examination MOFCOM noted that upon completion of the MotorolaLenovo deal Google would not be engaged in any business of manufacturing smartphones but would keep the telecommunications patent technologies of Motorola Mobility

Based on this fact on January 6 2015 MOFCOM issued a notice that it had decided to approve Googlersquos application to remove one of the remedies with the other remedies remaining in place

AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery7

The transaction is related to a conditionally cleared merger case

The concentration parties notified the deal to MOFCOM following No 95 Announcement in 2008

Considering the slight increase of AB InBevrsquos shareholdings in Zhujiang Brewery MOFCOM approved the proposed transaction

Facts

7 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150820150801090985shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 8 of 52

On July 23 2015 Interbrew Investment International a fully owned subsidiary of AB InBev Guangzhou State-owned Assets Development Holdings and Guangzhou Securities entered into an agreement with Zhujiang Brewery to subscribe the latterrsquos new shares According to this agreement Interbrew Investment International would subscribe shares worth up to CNY 16 billion

Pursuant to a MOFCOM antitrust notice issued in 2008 if AB Inbev intended to further increase its stake in Zhujiang Brewery a filing should be submitted to MOFCOM before any deal were to be concluded

On July 29 2015 AB InBev submitted the filing for the deal to MOFCOM

Decision

MOFCOM noted that upon this subscription Interbrew Investment International would increase its stake in Zhujiang Brewery from 2562 to 2999 Since the stake increase is relatively small and will not result in material changes regarding the control of Zhujiang Brewery MOFCOM decided to approve the deal on 20 August 2015

MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases

MOFCOM reached these decisions based on the undertakingsrsquo failure to file notifications

None of these concentrations were determined as resulting in anti-competition effects

MOFCOM considered that a 35 shares acquisition could lead to the obtaining of control power over a company

Complaints from the third party are the main channel of triggering investigation on unnotified concentrations

The undertakings were fined up to RMB 200000 which is less than the imposed penalty (RMB 300000) in the last year and the maximum penalty (RMB 500000) for violations of merger control rules

Facts

On September 29 2015 MOFCOM issued notices regarding the penalty on four concentration dealings because the concerning undertakings failed to notify these dealings to MOFCOM before closing them Details of these notices are as follows

Shanghai Fosun Pharmaceutical (Group) Co Ltd has been imposed a fine of CNY 200000 (USD 31431) because of its failure to notify MOFCOM regarding its

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 9 of 52

acquisition of a 35 stake in Suzhou Erye Pharmaceutical Co Ltd (Suzhou Erye) and the target stake was transferred without MOFCOMrsquos allowance8

Fujian Electronics amp Information (Group) has been imposed a fine of CNY 150000 (USD 23568) for its failure to notify a 35 stake acquisition of Shenzhen CHINO-E Communication MOFCOM made this decision based on the fact that Fujian Electronics signed a transfer agreement with CHINO-Ersquo shareholders and completed this transaction without filing9

Bestv New Media and Microsoft have been imposed CNY 200000 (USD 31420) fines by MOFCOM since they did not lodge a merger review filling regarding their joint venture E-Home Entertainment Development which was established on October 1 201310

CSR Nanjing Puzhen and Bombardier Transportation Sweden have been fined CNY 150000 (USD 23562) respectively due to their failure to notify their proposed joint venture prior to setting it up These companies made an agreement about the joint venturersquos establishment on November 3 2014 and its business license was obtained on November 11 201411

MOFCOM identified that the above dealings shall be notified according to the fact that all of these dealings constituted concentration and turnovers of these concentrating undertakings reached the statutory turnover thresholds

Article 20 of the AML stipulates three kinds of concentration which are (i) a merger of undertakings (ii) an acquisition of control of other undertakings by acquisition of shares or assets with voting right of other undertakings to an adequate extent (iii) an acquisition of control of other undertakings or the capability of imposing determinative effects on other undertakings by contracts or other means

Article 3 of the Provisions of the State Council on the Thresholds for Concentration Notification of Undertakings provides the fillingrsquos thresholds which are as follows (i) The collective worldwide turnovers of all undertakings involved in the last fiscal year exceed CNY 10 billion and the turnovers within China of at least two undertakings each exceed CNY 400 million or (ii) The collective turnovers of all undertakings involved in the last fiscal year exceed CNY 2 billion (approximately USD 294 million) and the China-wide turnovers of at least two undertakings each exceed CNY 400 million (approximately USD CNY588 million)

These undertakings were penalized because of their violations of article 21 of the 8 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150920150901124896shtml 9 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150920150901124887shtml 10 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150920150901124903shtml 11 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150920150901124899shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 10 of 52

AML which provides that the concentration reaching the filling thresholds shall be notified to MOFCOM prior to its implementation and without this notification it shall not be conducted In addition according to article 48 of the AML and article 13 of the Interim Measures for Investigating and Punishing of Concentration of Undertakings Failing to File Notification an undertaking which is identified by MOFCOM for implementing a concentration without filling would be imposed a fine and instructed to recover the situation by MOFCOM The amount of this fine could be no more than CNY 500000

There is no provision that specifically describes the behaviour of implementing a concentration In practice obtaining a business license transferring the entity of assets delivering the shares and assigning directors or managers are likely to be deemed as the implementation of concentration

According to Shang Ming the former director general of MOFCOMrsquos Anti-monopoly Bureau so far MOFCOM has already penalized 15 companies for failing to notify MOFCOM regarding merger reviews MOFCOM has noticed an increase in companies shirking merger-filing responsibilities and has therefore intensified enforcement

MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent12

MOFCOM defines all of the information and communication technology SEPs as the relevant product market rather than divides each of them into the individual market

In the process of competition analysis MOFCOM evaluates various factors rather than comparing the market shares only which is consistent with the complexity and flexibility of the high-technology industry

In the process of formulating remedies MOFCOM pays more attention on protecting Chinese downstream companies and enhancing its supervision

Facts

On April 15 2015 Nokia Oyi (ldquoNokiardquo) signed a Memorandum of Understanding regarding the acquisition of Alcatel Lucent (ldquoAlcatelrdquo) According to this memorandum Nokia intends to acquire 100 shares of Alcatel through a tender off

A notification about this deal was filed on April 21 2015 and accepted by MOFCOM on June 15 2015 After reviewing this case MOFCOM moved it to Phases II and Phase III as the agency was of the opinion that this acquisition could have anti-competitive effects on the relevant market

12 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151020151001139743shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 11 of 52

On October 19 2015 MOFCOM cleared this deal with four behavioural remedies

Decision

Relevant Market

In the agencyrsquos view there are four relevant product markets which are the radio access network market the core network systems market the network infrastructure service market and the information and communication technology SEP licensing market Meanwhile the relevant geographical market is primarily the Chinese market

Competition Analysis

According to MOFCOM this deal would have no anti-competitive effects on the first three relevant product markets in China while it could constitute an obstacle or limit the competition in the information and communication technology SEP licensing market

The agency consideredafter the deal that Nokia would increase its holding in 2G 3G and 4G SEPs and strengthen the degree of concentration in the information and communication technology SEP licensing market If it refused to license charged overly high royalty fees or conducted any other anti-competitive behaviour the competition of downstream market would be distorted which would most likely impair customersrsquo interests in the end

Remedies

Four behavioural remedies focusing on maintaining fair licensing of standard-essential patents (ldquoSEPsrdquo) were imposed on Nokia which are

1) On a reciprocal basis Nokia commits to not use injunctions to prevent enforcements of FRAND (fair reasonable and non-discriminatory) encumbered SEPs unless the potential licensees are unwilling to sign FRAND licensing agreements and follow the terms

2) If Nokia transfers its SEPs to a third party it shall inform Chinese licensees as well as Chinese companies that are actively engaging in licensing negotiation about the transfer details

3) Nokia will only transfer its SEPs to a new owner on the basis that the new owner accepts the existing FRAND commitments made by Nokia

4) MOFCOM has the right to monitor the implementation of Nokiarsquos commitments Nokia shall report to MOFCOM about the implementation of the conditions within 45 days of the end of each calendar year The reporting obligation will last five years until October18 2020

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 12 of 52

Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions13

Western Digital had engaged in two conducts that violated the remedies provided in the No 9 Announcement in 2012 issued by MOFCOM

Western Digital lodged an application to remove certain restrictions in March 2014 and the agency made the decision on October 19 2015

MOFCOM considered the fact that the competition condition in the relevant product market has changed and decided to remove the hold-separate restrictions related to manufacture and RampD

Facts

In 2012 Western Digital Corporation (ldquoWestern Digitalrdquo) intended to acquire 100 shares of Viviti Technologies Ltd (ldquoViviti Technologiesrdquo) which was the holding company of Hitachi Global Storage Technologies Netherlands BV and Hitachi Global Storage Technologies Singapore Pte Ltd and engaged in the hard disk business

On April 2 2011 Western Digital filed a notification for this acquisition MOFCOM issued the No 9 Announcement in March 2012 and cleared this acquisition with six remedies According to this announcement Western Digital could apply for the removal of the first and second remedy after this decision has been carried out for 24 months

The first remedy refers to maintaining the Viviti Technologies as an independent competitor and the second remedy requires both Western Digital and Viviti Technologies to make a reasonable plan of their capacity and production and report these data to the trustee

Western Digital lodged an application to remove the first and second remedy in March 2014 MOFCOM found that Western Digital had engaged in two conducts that violated the first remedy and the competitive situation in the hard disk market had changed After talking with Western Digital collecting opinions from the relevant entities and delegating the independent party to make an economic evaluation MOFCOM decided to remove the hold-separate remedies partially

Western Digitalrsquos implementation of the duties imposed in the No 9 Announcement

Based on the implementation reports submitted by Western Digital and the monitoring reports submitted by the trustee MOFCOM found that Western

13 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151020151001139040shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 13 of 52

Digital had engaged in two conducts that violated the first remedy Those were

1) On March 8 2012 Western Digital consolidated Hitachi Global Storage Technology (ldquoHGSTrdquo) which was Vivitirsquos subsidiary in US

2) In January 2013 Western Digital dissolved the development division of VivitiHGST and transferred the relevant workforce to Western Digital

MOFCOM considered that these conducts impaired the independence of Viviti as a competitor so that it imposed CNY 300000 fines on each of these behaviours and requested Western Digital to rectify the situation As per the entrusted supervisorrsquos report such behaviours have been rectified and the first remedy has been fulfilled

According to MOFCOMrsquos announcement the agency found that other remedies have been entirely implemented

Competition Analysis

With respect to the current situation of the competition in the hard disk market MOFCOM made the following assessment

1) In the areas of portable application and corporate-level application solid-state drive has put constraint on the impact of the traditional hard disk as to strengthen the competition in the relevant market

2) Overcapacity problems in the conventional hard disk drive market became obvious

3) Western Digital and HGST are the major competitors in the hard disk drive market Both the layout and the major market competitors in this market have remained unchanged since 2012

4) The hold-separate duties restricted the full competition between Western Digital and HGST The implementation of such duties hindered them from integrating their products and providing the market with a full range of products and had an adverse impact on their clientsrsquo product procurement

Based on the above analysis MOFCOM deemed that

1) Removal of the conditions that required the two companies to remain independent in production and RampD activities would enable Western Digital to save costs to provide a full range of products to the market and to fully engage in market competition and benefit its clients

2) To keep the two sales teams and their respective brands independent from each other and the independence of sales activities could reduce competition restraint impacts arising from a complete merger

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 14 of 52

Remedies

After negotiating with MOFCOM the relevant entities agreed to undertake the following obligations

1) Western Digital and HGST will remain independent in sales and brands

2) Western Digital will not change its previous business modes or force its clients to exclusively purchase hard disk drive products from Western Digital or do so in disguise

3) Western Digital will continue its pace in investing in product innovation to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

This announcement will be effective within two years from the date of issuance If Western Digital can provide sufficient evidence to prove a substantial change in the market environment the company can propose to MOFCOM to remove the relevant conditions within the two years

SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions14

MOFCOM considered the fact that the competition condition in the relevant product market has changed and removed the hold-separate restrictions on Seagate and Samsung

Seagate shall remain its business model materially and continue to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

Facts

On December 12 2011 MOFCOM made the No 11 Announcement to clear Seagate Technology LLCrsquos (ldquoSeagaterdquo) acquisition with remedies In this acquisition Seagate intended to acquire hard disk drive business of Samsung Electronics Co Ltd (ldquoSamsung HDDrdquo) As per this announcement Seagate could apply for removing the first and second remedy after this decision has been carried out for 12 months

The first remedy is to preserve Samsung HDD as an independent competitor and the second remedy asks to maintain and expand Samsung HDDrsquos production capacity within six months of issuance of the No 11 Announcement and to set reasonable production volume targets based on market supply-demand conditions

Seagate lodged an application to remove the first and second remedy in May 2015 After making assessments on the relevant parties and the competition circumstance MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate remedies

14 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151020151001144105shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 15 of 52

Competition Analysis

With respect to the current situation of the competition in the hard disk drive market MOFCOM made the following assessments

1) In the areas of portable application and corporate-level application solid-state drive has put constraint on the impact of the traditional hard disk so that the competition in the relevant market has been strengthened

2) Overcapacity problems in the conventional hard disk drive market became obvious

3) Both the layout and the major market competitors in the hard disk drive market have remained unchanged since 2012

4) Seagate and Samsung HDDrsquos market overlap in the hard disk market is quite small and Samsung HDDrsquos competition in the traditional hard disk is quite weak

Based on the above analysis MOFCOM deemed that

1) Removal of certain conditions is possible because in the portable application and corporate level application sectors competition constraint of solid-state drive on traditional hard disk drives has strengthened traditional hard disk drives are facing overcapacity which has reduced the chance of a single or more competitors causing competition restraints Seagate has limited overlap with Samsung in the hard disk business and the latter has a relatively weaker market power in the hard drive disk business

2) Removal of all imposed conditions may still restrain market competition because the traditional hard disk drive market competition conditions have not undergone a major change Seagate is still the major player in all divisions of the market and Seagate will strengthen its power after the acquisition of Samsung HDD

Remedies

After negotiating with MOFCOM Seagate agreed to undertake the following obligations

1) Seagate shall not change its business model materially or force clients to purchase hard drive disks exclusively from it

2) Seagate shall not force Tokyo Dengikagaku Kogyo China to supply magnetic heads exclusively to Seagate (or other Seagate-controlled companies) or limit the number of magnetic heads Tokyo Dengikagaku Kogyo China would supply to other hard drive disk manufacturers

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 16 of 52

3) Seagate shall continue to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

This announcement will be effective within two years from the date of issuance If Seagate can provide sufficient evidence to prove substantial change in the market environment the company can propose to MOFCOM to remove relevant conditions within the two years

FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM15

MOFCOM deems that this acquisition would induce anti-competitive influence

NXP promises to dispose its radio frequency (ldquoRFrdquo) power transistor business

As the first case approved with structural remedies after the enactment of the Provisions on Imposing Restrictive Conditions MOFCOM conducted a comprehensive evaluation of the viability competitiveness and marketability of the divested business as well as the suitability of potential buyers

Facts

On April 3 2015 NXP filed for its acquisition of Freescale NXP Semiconductor (ldquoNXPrdquo) is a NASDAQ-listed company registered in the Netherlands which engages in the design manufacturing and sale of integration circuits and discrete components

Freescale Semiconductor (ldquoFreescalerdquo) is a New York-listed company registered in Bermuda and based in the US which engages in the manufacturing and RampD of microcontroller and digital networking processors (embedded processors)

According to the agreement between NXP and Freescale after closing Freescale will become the wholly owned subsidiary of NXP On November 25 2015 MOFCOM decided to clear this acquisition with remedies

Relevant Market

As per the announcement the relevant product markets are the general microcontroller automotive power-use analog integrated circuit and RF transistor product markets in which NXP and Freescale have horizontal overlap The relevant geographical markets should be the global market

Competition Analysis

After assessing this proposed deal the agency concluded that

1) The proposed deal would boost NXPrsquos market control power in the RF

15 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151120151101196182shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 17 of 52

transistor product market because the global and Chinese RF transistor product markets share a similar structure both featuring few competitors and high concentration levels Freescale and NXP as the number one and number two players are far ahead of their rivals in the market Therefore after closing the market control power of NXP in this market would be strengthened

2) Since Freescale was the fiercest competitor of NXP the proposed deal will remove competition between them

3) The proposed deal would reduce the options for clients and increase procurement risks

In practice the wireless infrastructure suppliers as the main client of the RF transistor product tend to procure products from both NXP and Freescale to prevent them from the risk arising from relying on one supplier

4) The proposed deal may induce an adverse impact on the technology RampD and innovation

Remedies

In accordance with MOFCOMrsquos decision NXP shall follow its written commitment submitted to MOFCOM and completely divest its RF power transistor business to Beijing Jianguang Asset Management At the same time NXP shall strictly fulfil its obligations during the transition period It is worth noting that the NXPFreescale deal shall only be implemented after the divestment deal has been concluded

In addition MOFCOM requires NXP to perform relevant obligations during the transition period from the date of approval announcement until the divestment deal has been concluded NXP shall endeavour

1) not to engage in any lsquounfair trade practicesrsquo relating to the divested business

2) not to implement any acts which may have a significant adverse impact on the value management or competitiveness of the divested business or any acts which may change the nature and scope industry or business strategy or investment policy of the divested business and to take reasonable measures to encourage core employees to stay in the divested business as well as not to seek or transfer employees to NXPrsquos non-divested business

3) to ensure supply to the divested business in a fair reasonable and non-discriminatory manner and

4) to maintain the independence of the divested business and not to exchange competitively sensitive information between the parties and the divested

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 18 of 52

business

B Monopolistic Agreements

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

With respect to the enforcement activities of the NDRC in light of the numbers of the published cases it seems that the law enforcement frequency of the NDRC regarding monopolistic agreements in 2015 is lower in comparison with 2014

The reason behind might be that the outstanding issue of human resource deficit of the antitrust authority still exists Besides the fact that more enterprises gradually attach increasing importance to the antitrust compliance might be another reason for the decrease in the number of cases investigated by the authorities

As to the enforcement activities of the SAIC 4 of 14 cases concluded by the SAIC and its local branches in 2015 are relevant to monopolistic agreements Meanwhile these four cases concern horizontal monopolistic agreements

It is noteworthy however that the Mercedes-Benz case and the Dongfeng Nissan case suggest that vertical agreements especially involving price-related restrictions on the downstream dealers is still the priority of antitrust enforcement Companies shall be very cautious when imposing restrictions on the resale prices or the minimum resale prices of commodities in the distribution agreements

Automobile industry and related industries are observed to be under continuous attention of Chinarsquos antitrust authorities

The industries relating to peoplersquos livelihoods remain to be the enforcement priority

Significant Cases

Enforcement by the NDRC and its local branches

Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC16

The investigation was triggered by a leniency application

The first leniency applicant was exempted from punishment

Eight ocean shipping companies involved were imposed a collective fine of CNY 4067 million

NDRC spent approximately 12 months to investigate and conclude the case 16 NDRCrsquos press release of the case is available at httpjjsndrcgovcngzdt201512t20151228_769084html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 19 of 52

Facts

In December 2015 the NDRC published its official punishment decisions regarding the cartel case in connection with eight ocean shipping companies namely Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha (ldquoNYKrdquo) Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha (ldquoK Linerdquo) Mitsui OSK Lines EUKOR Car Carriers Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics Compantildeiacutea Sud Americana de Vapores Eastern Car Liner and Compantildeiacutea Chilena de Navegacioacuten Interoceaacutenica

According to the official press release of the NDRC the investigation was triggered by a leniency application of NYK The evidence showed that the eight companies reached consensus on non-intrusion of each others existing business to maintain or increase shipping fees when shipping goods such as cars trucks and engineering machinery in the routes between China and other countries and regions

They were also found to frequently conduct bilateral or multilateral communications on the shippersrsquo invitation for bids andor price inquiries via phone conferences dinner parties e-mails visiting etc In addition they also conducted illegal behaviour such as sensitive information exchange price negotiations bidding intention discussion dividing clients and shipping routes reaching agreements on high price bids or non-bidding in order to help certain companies gain shipping orders

To avoid the regulation of the antitrust authority the relevant shipping companies adopted various illicit measures that showed their apparent intention to violate the AML The cartel lasted for at least four years and covered a broad range of shipping routes concerned with the import and export of products between China and other regions such as North America EU South America and so on involving multiple auto brands and engineering machinery brands

The NDRC held the opinion that the eight companies conducts had restricted and eliminated competition in the relevant market raising the international shipping fees and impairing interests of shippers and end consumers The eight companies breached the AML by reaching and implementing monopolistic agreements on fixing prices and dividing the market

All eight investigated companies put forward remedy measures including enhancing the antitrust compliance program arranging more antitrust compliance trainings and developing antitrust compliance technologies

The NDRC imposed fines based on the nature level and duration of their monopolistic volations as well as their respective sales of international freight service sales relevant to the Chinese market The companies involved were collectively fined CNY 4067 million

NYK as the first cartel member voluntarily reporting the illegal conducts to the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 20 of 52

authority and providing significant evidence was entirely exempted from the punishment K Line as the second leniency applicant was imposed a fine amounting to 4 of its 2014 annual sales of international freight services relevant to Chinarsquos import and export market The details of punishments imposed on the involved companies by the NDRC are as follow

Company Name Amount of Fines (RMB million)

Percentage of the Relevant Turnovers

Grounds

Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha

- - First leniency applicant

Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha

2398 4 Second leniency applicant

Mitsui OSK Lines 3812 7 Third leniency applicant

EUKOR Car Carriers 284 9 Lasted over a long period involved many brands and many violations violations were severe

Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics

4506 8 Lasted over a long period involved many brands and many violations violations were severe

Compantildeiacutea Sud Americana de Vapores

308 6 Lasted over a long period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Eastern Car Liner 1127 5 Lasted over a long period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Compantildeiacutea Chilena de 120 4 Lasted over a long

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 21 of 52

Navegacioacuten Interoceaacutenica

period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Total 4067

Analysis

In this case the agency applied the AML instead of the Tenders and Bids Law to collusive bidding Citing article 13 (3) of the AML the NDRC identified that the collusive bidding constituted a division of the sales market

The leading three leniency applicants were granted exemption from fines to a varying degree

According to the official who handled this case dawn raids performed by antitrust enforcement agencies in other jurisdictions drew the attention of the NDRC on the cartels of these shipping companies However there was limited effective evidence to prove that the companies had reached monopolistic agreements Through pressuring the involved parties three members of the shipping cartel actively confessed their illegal conduct This case once again stresses the significance of international cooperation between antitrust enforcement agencies

Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau17

The distribution agreements between Mercedes-Benz and its dealers are determined as vertical monopolistic agreement and Mercedes-Benz violated article 14 of the AML because it restricted the ability of its dealers to decide their own resale prices

Mercedes-Benzrsquos dealers violated article of 13 of the AML due to concluding a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Mercedes-Benz and its dealers were jointly fined CNY 3578 million

Facts

In April 2015 Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau which is the provincial branch of the NDRC released the punishment on its website and announced that it had imposed a fine of CNY 350 million on Mercedes-Benz along with the aggregated fine of CNY 787 million on its dealers The fine came as a result of Mercedes-Benz reaching and implementing resale price maintenance (ldquoRPMrdquo) agreements with dealers to fix the minimum resale price of several car models as well as certain auto parts 17 The original Chinese notice published by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau is available at httpwwwjswjjgovcnoffice_neweo_comm_zxnrxsphp

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 22 of 52

According to the decision the authority found that Mercedes-Benz fixed the minimum resale price of Class E and Class S cars in Nanjing Wuxi Changzhou and Suzhou markets through telephoneverbal communication and dealers meetings from January 2013 to July 2014 Since 2010 Mercedes-Benz had reached agreements with dealers in Jiangsu province to fix the minimum resale prices for auto parts by providing different levels of discounts for insured cars cars involving expired warranty periods and cars within the warranty period

In addition Mercedes-Benz implemented the minimum resale price maintaining agreement by

1) Tightening its monitoring measures on the dealers such as inspecting deals and their sale incentive system on a weekly basis

2) Tracking the sales process flow of cars and increasing the intensity of this assessment

3) Giving warnings and reducing support ndash for example halting the supply of bestselling cars and prohibiting the opening of new stores ndash to dealers if dealers refused to cooperate with the price-fixing related policies and measures and

4) Interviewing personnel of the dealers and requesting terminations if the staff engaged in serious violations of the RPM agreement

Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau concluded that Mercedes-Benz had excluded and eliminated market competition harmed consumer welfare and consequently violated article 1418 of the AML The authority therefore imposed a fine of CNY 350 million representing 7 of the sale revenue of the previous year in the relevant market against Mercedes-Benz and imposed a fine on the dealers amounting to an equivalence of 1 of the annual sales in the previous year

Analysis

Although the agency also addressed the horizontal violation among the dealers in this case the administrative penalty decision mainly focuses on the vertical violation The agency fined dealers involved in the RPM agreement a combined CNY 787 million equal to 1 of the previous-year sales which suggests that the agency decided to give lighter punishments to dealers who took initiative in reporting the activity and provided evidence

The Mercedes-Benz case is the third case where the agency successfully 18 Article 14 of the AML The following monopolistic agreements between operators and trading partners shall be prohibited (i) fixing the resale prices of commodities to third persons (ii) restricting the minimum resale prices of commodities to third persons (iii) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement Authority under the State Council

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 23 of 52

discovered both vertical and horizontal agreements in a case following the Audi case and the Chrysler case All these cases are rooted in the same industry indicating that industrial features play a large role in raising anti-trust concerns In fact it appears that the entire automotive industry is under antitrust scrutiny

Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC19

This case involved both a horizontal agreement and an administrative monopoly

A total fine of CNY 1318 million was imposed on the involved companies

Facts

In June 2015 the NDRC through its website announced the decision made by its regional branch -Yunnan Provincial Development and Reform Commission (ldquoYunnan DRCrdquo) regarding the horizontal monopolistic agreement case involving Yunnan Communications Administration and local subsidiaries of four state-owned telecommunication companies

Through the investigation Yunnan DRC found that Yunnan Communications Administration as a competent government agency had organized several meetings involving Yunnan branches of four state-owned telecoms - China Mobile China Telecom China Unicom and China Tietong in August and September of 2014 At the end of 2009 the four local branches entered into an agreement to regulate their sales promotions in terms of limiting the promotional items amount and frequency

Furthermore the agreement provides certain measures to ensure the implementation of relevant restrictions on promotions Specifically in case any cartel member violates the agreement the others could file complaints with Yunnan Communications Administration and the agency would then issue a rectification notice to the rule-breaker

Yunnan DRC stated that the four telecoms were main competitors in the relevant market and the promotions as a significant competition measure would exert direct influence on the final prices of the products The horizontal agreement organized by Yunnan Communications Administration on sales promotions restricted the competition capacity of telecoms and as a result eliminated the competition in the relevant market Consequently the behaviour of Yunnan Communications Administration violated article 8 20 of the AML and constituted administrative monopoly in terms of ldquoforcing undertakings to conduct monopolistic behaviour prohibited by the AMLrdquo

19 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpwwwsdpcgovcnfzgggzjgjdyfldjjszhdt201506t20150602_694802html 20 Article 8 of the AML Administrative organs and the public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 24 of 52

With respect to the penalties Yunnan DRC fined the local branch of China Tietong CNY 200000 for reaching but not implementing the agreement in regards to the other three telecoms a total fine of CNY 1298 million amounting to 2 of the sales of the relevant business in the previous year were imposed for entering into and implementing the horizontal monopolistic agreement

Analysis

The telecoms industry is still the enforcement priority of the antitrust enforcement authorities A company cannot be exempted from punishment even though it is forced by competent authorities to conduct monopoly behaviour

DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC21

Both a horizontal monopolistic agreement and a vertical monopolistic agreement were involved in this case

A total fine of CNY 14242 million was imposed on DongFeng Nissan and its distributors

Facts

In September 2015 the Guangdong Development and Reform Commission (ldquoGuangdong DRCrdquo) released an announcement regarding the administrative penalties on DongFeng Nissan and its provincial distributors for concluding price-related monopolistic agreements More specifically DongFeng Nissan was imposed a fine of CNY 1233 million for breaching article 14 of the AML in terms of restricting the resale price of certain car models 17 distributors domiciled in Guangdong were collectively fined CNY 1912 million for violating article 1322 of the AML in terms of entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements

According to the published official release the Guangdong DRC launched the investigation in August 2014 The authority discovered that from 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissan had set a rigorous restriction on its distributorsrsquo abilities to determine the resale prices of certain car models including the quoted prices in various platforms and the final resale price In addition DongFeng Nissan punished the distributors that failed to abide by such price restrictions in 2013 The authority 21 The original Chinese notice published by Guangdong DRC is available at httpwwwgddpcgovcnzwgkgzdtgzyw201509t20150910_328993html 22 Article 13 of the AML The following Monopolistic agreements among competing operators shall be prohibited (i) fix or change prices of commodities (ii) limit the outputs or sales volume of commodities (iii) segment the sales markets or the raw material purchasing markets (iv) limit the purchase of new technology new facilities or limit the development of new products new technology (v) jointly boycott transactions (vi) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-Monopoly Law enforcement Authority Monopolistic agreements in this Law refer to agreements decisions or other concerted practices that eliminate restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 25 of 52

believed that the vertical agreement concluded between DongFeng Nissan and its distributors eliminated and restricted the competition in the relevant market and damaged the consumer welfare as well which violates article 14 of the AML

Furthermore from April 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissanrsquos distributors in Guangdong province held multiple meetings to discuss issues relevant to sale price reached and implemented a horizontal monopolistic agreement in terms of fixing the prices of some car models which is prohibited by article 13 of the AML

Considering that both DongFeng Nissan and the involved distributors positively cooperated with the investigation and ceased the illegal behaviour immediately after the investigation Guangdong DRC decided to impose a fine amounting to 3 of its previous yearrsquos turnovers on DongFeng Nissan and a fine ranging from 2 to 4 on the relevant distributors in accordance with articles 4623 and 4924 of the AML

Analysis

This case demonstrates that auto and related industries are still under close attention of the authority Considering the NDRCrsquos successful series of antitrust investigations conducted throughout the auto industry it is observed that the agency currently overseeing price-related antitrust issues in China has accumulated a substantial amount of experience regarding antitrust enforcement in the auto industry Now is the right time to speed up the law-making process by amending the set of rules released earlier and drafting new laws to advise the auto industry on antitrust compliance

Enforcement by the SAIC and its local branches

Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC25

The investigation was triggered by whistle blowerrsquos submission

Cartel members were collectively fined CNY 139 million 23 Article 46 of the AML In case the operators violate the relevant provisions of this Law concluding and implementing Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall order the operators to cease such act impose fines more than 1 but less than 10 of the total turnover in the preceding year and confiscate the illegal gains where the Monopolistic agreement is not implemented a fine less than RMB 500000 can be imposed If the operators involved in Monopolistic agreement on its own initiative report information concerning the conclusion of Monopolistic agreements and provide important evidences to the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority they may be given a mitigated punishment or be exempted from punishment in accordance with the circumstances Where the industrial associations violate this Law organizing the operators in the industry to conclude Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority may impose a fine less than RMB 500000 in serious circumstances the agency of social organization administration and registration may cancel its registration 24 Article 49 of the AML As for the imposition of the fines stipulated by the Article 46 47 and 48 of this Law the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall take elements such as the nature extent and time it lasts of the illegal act into consideration in determining the specific amount of the fines 25 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201506t20150601_156889html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 26 of 52

Facts

In April 2015 the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) issued administrative penalties on several brick manufacturers for entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements This is the first case relevant to monopolistic agreements that has been publicized by the SAIC since the beginning of this year

Ten cartel members were involved in the case including one company and nine individuals Similar with most antitrust cases the investigation started as a result of a whistle blowerrsquos submission After a thorough investigation Hunan AIC found that those local brick manufacturers had reached agreements on controlling production volume and dividing sales areas in the forms of production and sales agreements plans and meeting minutes

The enforcement authority reached the conclusion that these brick manufacturers violated article 13 of the AML and imposed a total fine of CNY 1389400 on them

Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC26

The organizer of the monopolistic agreement the animation association was fined CNY 100000

The antitrust authority did not punish the members of the monopolistic agreement

Facts

In December 2015 the Guangdong Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoGuangdong AICrdquo) published its administrative punishment decision in regards to Guangzhou Panyu Animation amp Game Association (ldquoGAGArdquo) organizing member companies to conclude a monopolistic agreement

According to the decision GAGA drafted the ldquoAgreement of Exhibition Alliancerdquo (ldquoAgreementrdquo) and convened a conference with member companies in order to discuss the content and conclusion of the Agreement 52 member companies entered into the Agreement which actually requested the alliance companies to merely participate in the exhibitions either organized or supported by GAGA in Guangzhou In addition the Agreement prohibited the alliance companies from attending any other exhibition except if they obtained prior approval of GAGA

After a thorough investigation Guangdong AIC believed that the conclusion of the Agreement among GAGA and the 52 member companies violated article 13 (5) of the AML in terms of boycott GAGA who was deeply involved and restricted member companiesrsquo choice of exhibitions through the Agreement could be deemed as

26 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151208_164680html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 27 of 52

the participant and organizer of the monopolistic agreement In accordance with article 46 of the AML Guangdong AIC imposed a fine of CNY 100000 on GAGA for organizing the conclusion of the monopolistic agreement

Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC27

Hubei AIC considered the coinsurance for Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance illegal

Twelve insurance companies were fined CNY 469 million in total

Facts

In December 2015 the Hubei Administrative for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHubei AICrdquo) disclosed its punishment on 12 insurance companies for signing illegal coinsurance agreements

The disclosed punishment decision suggests that the Hubei branch of China Pacific Life Insurance (ldquothe Companyrdquo) 11 other insurance companies and Wuhan Construction Safety Technology Consultation Center (ldquoWCSTCCrdquo) signed a Coinsurance Agreement on Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance (ldquoCoinsurance Agreementrdquo) of which the main contents include

1) The Company and 11 other involved companies as the coinsurers jointly take charge of the personal accident insurance concerned with the construction project directly administered by the Wuhan government WCSTCC is responsible for providing safety professionalism and technology services regarding the relevant personal accident insurance

2) The Company as the chief insurer of the coinsurance occupies 12 of the total amount of the insurance and the other 11 companies respectively occupy 8

3) The Company as the representative of the coinsurance is in charge of collecting the premium signing the standard form insurance policies and issuing the invoice in its own name The Company should share the charged premium with the other companies in accordance with the Coinsurance Agreement

4) Both the Company and the other insurance companies should pay 25 of the actually received premium to WCSTCC as the service fee WCSTCC will assist the coinsurers in providing safety and technology management service to the insured In addition the 11 insurance companies should pay 5 of their premium to the Company as the management fee

27 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165445html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 28 of 52

5) In case an accident happens the 12 companies will jointly bear the damages based on their respective shares in the coinsurance

6) There is a contact mechanism established in the coinsurance The coinsurers will regularly hold coinsurance conferences to discuss existing problems

Furthermore the coinsurers and WCSTCC also signed a self-discipline agreement and established a complete management system to assure the implementation of the Coinsurance Agreement Any party violating the Coinsurance Agreement would be punished

Hubei AIC found that WCSTCC was solely invested by Wuhan Construction Safety Management Association which was under Wuhan Construction Commission The centre helped implement certain functions of the Wuhan Urban Construction Safety Management Station and was responsible for quality supervision and safety supervision of municipal construction projects

It later became a prerequisite for construction companies to purchase insurance from any member of the coinsurance in order to get approval to commence their project According to the decision Hubei AIC launched another separate investigation against WCSTCC

Through the investigation Hubei AIC concluded that the Coinsurance Agreement constituted a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by article 13 of the AML with the following analysis

First coinsurance as a common business model to jointly share and lower risks is widely adopted in the insurance industry A coinsurance arrangement for a specific project in order to avoid high risks faced by one insurer could be legal However coinsurance should not target the entire market In this case prior to the Coinsurance Agreement the risks of the construction projects were unpredictable since the scale of the construction projects the difficulty of the construction and the amount of construction workers could not be available It is impossible to predict the risks of the projects thus it is not necessary to cooperate with other insurers to collectively bear the risks The purpose of the 12 insurance companies to establish the coinsurance is to avoid the competition which demonstrates the Coinsurance Agreement belongs to a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by the AML

Second the companies through entering into the coinsurance agreement actually divided the relevant market of construction project personal accident insurance in Wuhan city which affected the competition in the relevant market and damaged the interests of other competitors and the consumers In particular the Construction Law as amended in 2011 stipulates that the purchase of personal accident insurance is not mandatory and the construction companies have the right to choose whether to buy the said insurance or not As mentioned purchasing insurance from the coinsurance had been the prerequisite for construction companies to obtain administration

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 29 of 52

approval for the project which seriously distorts the fair competition in the market

Citing article 46 of the AML the 12 insurance companies were collectively fined CNY 469 million including fines on the companies and confiscation of illegal gains It is noteworthy that the fines were calculated based on the companiesrsquo 2014 annual sales of the insurance product in connection with the coinsurance The Company as the chief insurer was fined amounting to 6 of its 2014 annual sales of the relevant insurance product in the coinsurance and other companies were fined amounting to 2 of relevant sales For more specific information please see the following table

Company Name (Hubei Branch)

Fines (CNY million)

Percentage of the sales

Illegal Gains (CNY

million)

China Pacific Life Insurance 00653 6 0941

Sino Life 00145 2 04332

Alltrust Insurance 00145 2 04332

Taikang Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Continent Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Pacific Property Insurance

00145 2 04332

China Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

PICC Property and Casualty 00145 2 02599

Taiping General Insurance 00145 2 013

Union Life Insurance 00145 2 01177

Ping An Annuity Insurance Company of China

00145 2 04201

Ping An Property amp Casualty Insurance Company of China

00145 2 -

Subtotal 02248 - 44679

Total 46927

Analysis

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 30 of 52

Coinsurance as an effective approach to lower risks of insurers is widely used in the insurance industry Information sharing and agreements on coinsurance were generally considered efficient and legitimate However from an antitrust perspective coinsurance may raise competition concerns depending on the circumstances of each agreement In the case that there is enough capacity for one insurer to cover the potential risks the coinsurance might be considered as entering into a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC28

The first leniency applicant was exempted from fines

The other concrete companies were imposed a fine of CNY 180000

Facts

In December 2015 the concrete companies monopolistic agreement case investigated by Hunan AIC was published on SAICrsquos website

In accordance with the antitrust enforcement announcement of SAIC this case was triggered by complaints from the Yongzhou City peoplersquos congress After the preliminary review the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) initiated the formal investigation on seven concrete companies domiciled in Yongzhou City Hunan Province which were suspected of being involved in a monopolistic agreement in terms of division of the volumes of the products

After further investigation Hunan AIC found that the seven concrete companies concluded a partnership agreement in 2011 which requested the involved companies to enter into a partnership business with assets In addition according to the partnership agreement it was planned to establish a comprehensive office to manage production marketing and distribution of the products of all the partners The seven companies intended to jointly adjust and control the output of concrete based on the partnership agreement However because there were disagreements over the allocation of the injected assets and market shares the companies did not implement the partnership agreement The agreement was cancelled in December 2012

Based on the findings Hunan AIC concluded that the seven concrete companies as competitors of each other restricted and eliminated the competition in the relevant market through reaching the partnership agreement and dividing the volumes of sales which violated article 13(3) of the AML in terms of division of sales market Considering that the agreement had not been implemented and the limited influence of the agreement according to article 46 of the AML and article 27 of the Administrative Penalties Law small amount fines were imposed on the involved companies Six companies were fined CNY 30000 each for their illegal behaviour 28 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165504html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 31 of 52

Yongzhou Shuangyuan Building Materials Co Ltd as the first one to actively report the monopolistic agreement and cooperate with the enforcement authority was exempted from the punishment

Outlook

It is expected that the AMLrsquos enforcement on monopolistic agreements will continue in the future Industries such as automobile shipping pharmaceuticals insurance etc will still remain the priority of the antitrust enforcement

The antitrust enforcement authorities have published a series of regulations in order to clarify the substantial and procedural issues relevant to the antitrust enforcement However Chinarsquos current antitrust legislation regime is still immature In the following years we expect that more attention will be paid to the legislative improvements

Another remarkable issue for cartel members is that with more Chinese enterprises attaching increasing importance to the AML the follow-on civil damages actions might become a tendency in the future

C Abuse of Market Dominance

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen a decent increase of abuse of market dominance cases both in public enforcement and private litigation Oftentimes the authorities responsible for public enforcement generally find it difficult to pursue investigations against abuse of market dominance cases The following two main reasons are often cited to explain this standoff first it is hard for the authorities to define the relevant markets and prove the undertaking(s)rsquo dominant market position through economic approaches second it is hard to collect evidence regarding abusive practices

The cases related to IPRs abuse are emerging significantly particularly in the telecommunication media and technology (ldquoTMTrdquo) sectors

The SAICrsquos latest refusal-to-deal probe against a local drug maker shows that the SAIC and its local branches have increasingly acquired a profile as an abuse of dominance regulator

Significant Cases

Cases pursued by the SAIC

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 32 of 52

Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case29

Facts

The local authority in Dongfang city reported to the Hainan provincial branch of SAIC on April 23 2014 of the suspected dominance abuse The SAIC authorized its Hainan bureau to officially investigate the matter on 25 July 2014 according to a decision dated January 9 2015 The AIC concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its market dominance by requiring users to pay a deposit without any legal basis and or justifiable reasons

In terms of the relevant product market the local authority found that in this case it was the urban water supply market in Dongfang city and its surrounding townships where Dongfang Water was the sole public operator in the local water supply market with a 100 market share which made all water users completely reliant on the companyrsquos supply In term of market access the local authority found it very unlikely that there were other operators due to the strict regulations

The Hainan SAIC then concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its dominance as it charged users a deposit by threatening to refuse to register users and also by threatening to restrict the water supply Dongfang Waters charging of deposits lacked a legal basis and hadnt received government approval to the detriment of household consumers and business water users and hampered the improvement of management and services of the company Such conduct was in breach of Chinarsquos Anti-Monopoly Law

Hainan AIC levied a fine of CNY 593208 a lighter penalty equivalent to 2 of the companyrsquos annual sales for the previous year and confiscated illicit gains of CNY 38521 for abuse of market dominance

Analysis

It is noteworthy that although handled by a local authority supervised by the SAIC the antitrust agency detailed the relevant market definition the assessment of the dominant market position the abusive practices and the scrutiny of the justifiable reasons

Although the definition of the relevant market and the reasoning of the Hainan provincial AIC and the SAIC are subject to criticism it is still applausive to see that the antitrust regulators have realized the importance of the application of rule of reason in an abuse case In addition through itrsquos a published decision practitioners may observe the regulatorsrsquo reasoning and thus transparency and legal certainty have been generated

29 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzfcfjd201502t20150212_152066html last visited on October 18 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 33 of 52

Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms30

Facts

In June 2013 the Ningxia AIC under authorization of SAIC opened an antitrust investigation into the alleged tie-in sales by the three major state-owned telecommunications operators China Tietong China Unicom and China Telecom for the tie-in sale of fixed-line telephones with broadband Internet services The Ningxia AIC found that the three companies had bundled fixed-line phone services with Internet services to subscribers

During the investigation all three telecommunications companies admitted the tie-in practice had recognized that such practice had improper influence on competition and deprived the choices of consumers The three companies promised to undertake internal rectification timely and eliminate the ill effects resulting from such practice The parties committed to taking the following corrective measures

1) Taking internal rectifications and conducting training to staff about antitrust laws and stop tie-in sales practices

2) Making public commitments to allow subscribers a free choice of services and strengthening the propaganda through the operating room call centre and other channels

3) Unbundling fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

The Ningxia AIC decided to suspend the probe on 14 May 2015 on the grounds that the three companies had actively worked together with the investigators and proposed workable remedy plans

Analysis

In the official announcement Ningxia AIC concluded that the purpose of antitrust enforcement is to restrain monopolistic conducts the protection of competition and to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of consumers Given that during the investigation process the parties had actively cooperated with the investigation formed a more profound understanding of the dangers of tying behaviour and moreover the parties proposed and implemented positive corrective measures to be able to remove the ill impact of their actions the agency believed that the purpose of antitrust law enforcement was fulfilled

It is worth noting that the Ningxia AIC also required the three companies to implement the commitment by August 30 2015and the submission of the written

30 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158908html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158906html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158910html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 34 of 52

implementation report on July 102015 and August 102015 respectively which is another illustration that an effective commitment by the undertakings shall directly deal with the effect that is brought by the monopolistic behaviour In this case the effect of the monopolistic act was restricted to the choice of the consumers therefore the commitment by the undertaking aimed at allowing the freedom of choice and the unbundling of fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company31

Facts

The Liaoning AIC imposed a fine of approximately CNY 433m on the Fushun Branch of Liaoning Tobacco Co on 1 June 2015 The agency also ordered the company to stop its illicit behaviour

The Liaoning AIC received a tip-off that the accused Liaoning Tobacco Corsquos Fushun branch was conducting tie-in sales of non-high-demand cigarette brands with high-demand cigarette brands After gaining authorization from SAIC the agency officially started an investigation regarding the companyrsquos suspected abuse of market dominance in June 2014

Analysis

According to the announcement the tobacco company argued that the tobacco industry is a state controlled or monopolized industry with a lawful monopolistic position therefore the company shall not be subject to the norms of general market competition rules or the anti-monopoly law

In this regards the agency concluded that in terms of the status of the undertaking admittedly the first paragraph of article 17 of the AML says that the State shall protect the lawful business operations of undertakings in these industries with respect to the industries which are under the control of the State-owned economic sector and have a bearing on the lifeline of the national economy or national security and the industries which exercise monopoly over the production and sale of certain commodities according to law However the second paragraph continues to say that the undertakings mentioned above shall do business according to law be honest faithful and strictly self-disciplined and subject themselves to public supervision and they shall not harm the consumers interests by taking advantage of their position of control or their monopolistic production and sale of certain commodities In particular in the preceding paragraph the ldquolawful businessrdquo and ldquoaccording to lawrdquo imply that the AML shall apply in the business operation The agency therefore believes that

31 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201508t20150813_16

0208html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 35 of 52

there shall be no exemption for the undertaking concerned the defences of the undertaking concerned is not established

Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm32

Facts

The Chongqing AIC fined Chongqing Qingyang Pharmaceutical CNY 439308 for alleged dominance abuse

The investigation was initiated when the company contacted the agency for verification on its potential breach of the AML related to an allopurinol active pharmaceuticals ingredient (API) distribution agreement with its exclusive distributor The company provided the relevant agreement and information and the agency conducted an investigation into the company and some other relevant companies

Analysis

Relevant Market

During the investigation the agency found that pharmaceutical ingredients are a special commodity the API is used to produce the preparations The chemical API is only used for the production of the preparation and could be used as a medicine for clinic use

The preparation is produced according to the requirements of certain form of prepared drugs and for the purpose of treatment and prevention which can be used as medicine

The allopurinol is used for the common treatment of hyperuricemia However the other treatments are different in pharmacological effects or treatment effects as well as in the cost for the patient Furthermore the company is the only manufacturer and supplier in the market nationwide since July 2012 Therefore the agency concluded that the relevant market is the allopurinol API market

Considering that the qualification for manufacturing the allopurinol API is national wide and the normal practice for purchasers and suppliers is domestic the relevant geographic market is the Chinese market

The Market Dominance

During the investigation the agency found that the company is the only supplier and manufacturer of allopurinol API in China there is no other competitor in the

32 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151222_16

5152html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 36 of 52

market and the company has a monopoly in the market The evidence shows that the company has the ability to control the prices the position for the downstream is relatively weak

With respect to the market entry the agency found that the market entry is relatively high in addition other undertakings are dependent on the company Thus the agency believed the company to have market dominance

Refusal to Deal

The agency found that on September 25 2015 the company reached an exclusive agreement and distribution agreement with its distributor Based on these agreements the company didnrsquot supply allopurinol API to the said distributor and other companies despite the fact that those companies requested for allopurinol API but were turned down by the company

Absence of Reasonable Cause

The agency found that the companyrsquos refusal to deal was not in line with the needs of normal business operation or economic efficiency On the other hand the refusal to deal was aimed at increasing the market share of the allopurinol drug product Also the agency found that the stop of supply was a manipulation of market power as to maximize the profit to the most The agency further found that the exclusive distribution agreement with suspension of supply for six months and the refusal to supply was to eliminate and restrict the competition as to gain the monopolistic profit

The Consequence of Refusal to Deal

The agency concluded that the refusal to deal harmed the competition of the allopurinol preparations market Because of the suspension of supply many demanders had to reduce their production or switch to the supply of other products or stop their production The suspension of supply affected the competition of the downstream market Consequently the raising of the price of allopurinol API also raised the cost for other manufacturers of allopurinol preparations

Furthermore the refusal to deal led to capacity loss of the allopurinol preparation industry

Ultimately the refusal to deal increased the burden on consumers as the refusal to supply changed the supply-demand relationship in the market

The agency concluded that the Company abused its dominant position in the allopurinol API market by refusing to deal with intended buyers in the period between October 2013 and March 2014Therefore the Company violated article 17 (1) of the AML which prohibits business operators with a dominant market position from abusing that position such as the refusal to deal without any justifications

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 37 of 52

D Administrative Monopoly

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 witnessed antitrust authoritiesrsquo significant efforts regarding the enforcement against administrative monopoly According to Mr Dong Zhiming the deputy director general of Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly Bureau ever since the AML coming into force six cases in connection with administrative monopoly were investigated by NDRC and among them five cases were handled in the year of 2015 These cases touched abuses of administrative power in terms of designative deal in relation to transportation communication and pharmaceutical industries

The first private litigation related to administrative monopolistic acts was heard in the court which is a milestone case in the enforcement of the AML

Significant Cases

Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC33

Facts

In March 2015 the NDRC released the official letter to Shandong Provincial Department of Transportation (ldquoShandong DOTrdquo) on its website with respect to correct its abuse of administrative power to exclude and restrict competition

During the investigation the NDRC found that since 2011 Shandong DOT had issued multiple relevant government orders in order to require certain types of vehicles to be directly connected to two designated information and service platforms both of which are operated and technically supported by one company namely Shandong Jiutong Internet of Things Technology Co Ltd (ldquoJiutong ITTrdquo) Furthermore according to the orders issued by the competent administrative department all the vehicle satellite positioning terminals entering into Shandong provincial market should be debugged through the said technology service platform which is operated by the mentioned company In addition Shandong DOT released the cap prices of vehicle satellite positioning terminals which is identical to the 2012 bid-winning price in the Ministry of Transportation demonstration project

The NDRC believed that Shandong DOTrsquos behaviour eliminated and restricted the competition in the monitoring platform market and the vehicle terminal market deprived the right of transportation enterprises to choose vehicle terminals and monitoring platform on their owns unreasonably raised the sales prices of vehicle terminals and service fees charged by the platform and increased the costs of transportation enterprises Therefore the antitrust agency concluded that Shandong

33 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201503t20150327_668911html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

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DOT violated article 8 of the AML which stipulates that ldquoadministrative organs and the public organizations with an administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude and restrict competitionrdquo Specifically Shandong DOT violated article 3234 in terms of requiring organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any designated operators and violated article 3735 in terms of setting rules with contents which eliminate and restrict competition

Based on article 51 of the AML ldquoWhere administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations abuse administrative powers performing activities which exclude and restrict competition the superior entity shall order it to correct impose administrative penalty on the chief officer and other staffs directly responsible pursuant to the laws The AML enforcement authority may give recommendations on disposal of activities to the relevant superior entityrdquo the NDRC proposed in writing that the Shandong provincial government should order Shandong DOT to rectify its behaviour with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Entirely open up the monitoring platform market by permitting transportation undertakings to freely choose any approved platform

2) Loosen the restrictions on the entry into Shandong vehicle terminals permit the undertakings to independently select the supplier of vehicle terminals and allow the qualified terminals to be connected to the relevant monitoring platform and

3) Revoke the official documentation relevant to the cap price of vehicle terminals in order to promote the price competition

Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 36

Facts

On 26 August 2015 the NDRC published its second decision with regard to the rectification of administrative monopoly since the beginning of this year According to the proposal letter sent to Anhui Provincial Government the investigation against the Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City (Bengbu HFPC) was trigged by third partiesrsquo complaints

34 Article 32 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to require organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any operators designated by them 35 Article 37 of the AML Administrative organs shall not abuse their administrative powers to set rules with contents which eliminate restrict competition 36 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201508t20150826_748682html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 39 of 52

The investigation suggests that Bengbu HFPC published three notices with regard to drugs procurement in April and May of this year

In the No C-2015-CG-X-111 Notice (ldquoNo111 Noticerdquo) released on 10 April2015 the health authority not only provided the dosage form and qualification of the requested drugs but also directly determined the suppliers of relevant drugs which eliminated and restricted the competition among pharmaceutical manufacturers and therefore violated articles 32 and 37 of the AML

In the No C-2015-CG-C-112 Notice (ldquoNo112 Noticerdquo) and No C-2015-CG-C-168 (ldquoNo 168 Noticerdquo) respectively released on 10 April and 22 May 2015 the Bengbu HFPC set discriminative qualification requirements on non-local undertakings in order to restrict their participation in the relevant bidding For instance in accordance with No 112 Notice to be a qualified bidder the turnover of non-local undertakings shall exceed CNY 2 billion which is 50 times as much as the turnover requirements of the local undertakings In the NDRCrsquos opinion the administrative monopoly activities conducted by the local health agency excluded the relevant undertakings from the market maintained the virtual-high prices of drugs and therefore violated articles 3237 and 37 of the AML

The NDRC suggested in a letter that Anhui Provincial Government should urge the Bengbu HFPC to rectify the abuse of monopoly powers with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Stop setting distinguishing restrictions on qualification requirements review standards and numbers of winning bidders as for local and non-local undertakings

2) Stop designating the suppliers of competitive drugs and

3) Take necessary measures to mitigate the negative effects resulting from the previous illegal monopolistic abuses

Outlook

At the beginning of the year the former director general of the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau under the NDRC Xu Kunlin stated that the agency would strengthen antitrust enforcement on abuse of administrative power in 2015

Since then the NDRC has made great efforts to rectify unreasonable abuses of administrative power The currently disclosed two cases investigated by the NDRC re-emphasize the Chinese Governmentrsquos strict scrutiny of antitrust issues in respect of

37 Article 34 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to restrict or reject the participation of operators from other regions in local bidding activities by measures such as prescribing discriminatory qualification requirements or assessment standards or by not publishing information according to law

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 40 of 52

administrative monopoly It reminds the local governments that antitrust compliance is of significant importance

III Private Litigation

A Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen more and more private antitrust litigations

The private antitrust litigation cases have become increasingly complicated especially the issues regarding the intersection areas of IP and antitrust law

Multinational giants and State-Owned Enterprises (the ldquoSOEsrdquo) are increasingly becoming the targets in antitrust civil litigations Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (the ldquoSMEsrdquo) tend to use the antitrust litigation to achieve their commercial goals in the business context

B Significant Cases

Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)38

This is the first-ever private litigation concerning administrative monopoly since the implementation of the AML in 2008

Facts

According to the currently disclosed details the case is relevant for designated trade

The plaintiff Shenzhen Sware Technology Co Ltd (ldquoSwarerdquo) is a software company The press releases suggest that Sware Gloden Software Co Ltd (ldquoGlodenrdquo) and Shanghai Ruban Software Co Ltd (ldquoShanghai Rubanrdquo) are the three main suppliers of construction cost software and possess the major shares of the relevant market An annual provincial vocational ability contest regarding the construction cost hosted by the Guangdong Department of Education (ldquoGuangdong DOE) designated Gloden as the exclusive supplier of the relevant software

After several unsuccessful verbal and written negotiations with Guangdong DOE in April 2014 Sware filed a lawsuit against Guangdong DOE before the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquothe Courtrdquo) alleging that the administrative organ abused its administrative power and violated the AML by designating exclusive software supplier for the contest and claimed a compensation for reasonable expense amounting to CNY 10800 Yuan

The opinions of the Court 38 The story of the case is available at httpfinancesinacomcnchinadfjj20150410074621924997shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 41 of 52

The full text of the judgment has not been disclosed yet In accordance with the information available to the public the Court invoked article 32 of the AML which prohibits an administrative organ from abusing its administrative power to require or in disguised form organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use only the commodities supplied by the entities designated by them The Court concluded that Guangdong DOE failed to prove the legitimacy of the designation and therefore abused its administration power

Currently the case is in appeal before the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court

Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 39

It is the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China

In the first instance ruling Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court ruled against Sinopec holding that the Yunnan branch of Sinopecs trading company was obligated to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its dominance in the sales market of refined oil by refusing to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding without justifiable reasons

In the second instance ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors Currently the case is pending

Facts

The First Trial

The lawsuit was filed before the Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoKunming Courtrdquo) in January 2014 Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy Co Ltd (ldquoYingdingrdquo) a bio-energy manufacturer claimed that Sinopec and the Yunnan branch of Sinopec trading company (ldquoSinopec Yunnan Branchrdquo) had failed to fulfil their obligations stipulated in the Renewable Energy Law and had abused their market dominance in sales market of refined oil by refusing to trade with Yingding without justifiable reasons

Sinopec and Sinopec Yunnan Branch mainly explained four reasons for why they rejected Yingdingrsquos biofuel Firstly Yingding had failed to prove that the biofuel complied with the relevant national standard and was safe to use Secondly Yingding had failed to provide complete trading terms Thirdly the laws and regulations regarding biofuel were incomplete the authorized refined oil sales companies were 39 The details of the case are available at httpnewsxinhuanetcomfortune2014-1217c_1113680039htm httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=9e71db51-6ff6-4d2c-8af6-8eacf023ebdeampKeyWord=E4BA91E58D97E79B88E9BC8E|E4B8ADE79FB3E58C96 httpnewsxinhuanetcomenergy2015-0422c_127721575htm httpwwwnbdcomcnarticles2015-04-23911348html last visited on December 17 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 42 of 52

obligated to purchase biofuel from the biofuel manufacturers if it met certain quality standards but there was a vacancy regarding how to reach the end consumers from the sales companies

On 8 December 2014 the Kunming Intermediate Peoples Court ruled that Sinopec Yunnan Branch bore a legal obligation to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its market dominance in refined oil market by refusing without any justifiable reasons to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding The court ordered Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network within 30 days Both Yingding and Sinopec filed appeals to the Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court

The Appellate Trial

The appeal hearing was held on 22 April 2015 in Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoYunnan Courtrdquo) Sinopec submitted 23 new pieces of evidence and introduced two expert witnesses in a bid to overturn several key elements in the first-instance ruling by Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court

In terms of the determination of the relevant market and the market dominance Sinopec argued that the relevant market in this case was for adipic acid monomethyl ester (ldquoAAMErdquo) the main ingredient of a biofuel additive known as BD100 Yingdingrsquos main product is BD100 which can be blended with fossil diesel to become biofuel In the AAME market Sinopec is a potential buyer instead of a market dominator In support of this argument Sinopec presented an expert witnessmdashGong Jiong a professor of economics at Beijings University of International Business and Economics who testified that AAME should be defined as the relevant product market on the basis of an economic analysis

However Yingding insisted that the first-instance ruling was correct in naming the sales market of refined oil as the relevant market and submitted new evidence an article on Sinopecs website that claimed it had a 67 market share in Yunnan to help establish the claim that Sinopec had market dominance

Another main dispute was whether Yingdingrsquos biofuel product met national standards which would make it mandatory for Sinopec to purchase under Chinas Renewable Energy Law The law stipulates that biofuel producers must sell their products first to an authorized refined oil sales company and the sales companies are obliged to buy the fuel if it meets certain quality standards In order to test the quality Sinopec introduced the second expert witness Lin Jianmin a leading author of Chinarsquos national biofuel standard Lin Jianmin pointed out that there are currently quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology which gives Sinopec a justifiable reason not to trade with Yingding Moreover Sinopec presented some precedents in which consumers had complained about the biofuel quality and also claimed that China didnt have a sound regulatory framework to support biofuel production neither in testing nor in sales

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 43 of 52

Nevertheless to refute this point Yingding referred to an earlier test in co-operation with Sinopec in 2011 where selected buses in Kunming used biofuel blended by Sinopec using BD100 produced by Yingding

On August 13 2015 Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors and now this case is pending In the written appellate ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court did not provide any details regarding its reasoning

Key Issues of the Case

Is there any competition between Yingding and Sinopec

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case the product of Yingding is biofuel while Sinopec does not engage in the business of biofuel From this perspective Yingding and Sinopec are not competitors Thus it is not necessary and not reasonable for Sinopec to eliminate or restrict the competition from Yingding

Relevant Market

The definition of the relevant market is a prerequisite to determine whether competition exists and whether the AML is applicable In accordance with the Judicial Interpretation of Antitrust civil litigation the plaintiff shall take the responsibility to prove the defendantrsquos dominance in the relevant market Also the methods of defining the relevant market are stipulated in the Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition (ldquoGuidelinesrdquo) However both Yingding and Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court defined the relevant market as the sales market of refined oil without sufficient antitrust analysis none of the methods in the Guidelines were used Therefore the definition of the relevant market remains arguable and needs to be sufficiently analysed in the upcoming retrial

Justifiable Reasons

The abuse of market dominance includes the behaviour of refusing to trade without justifiable reasons according to the AML but in the first instance ruling justifiable reasons were not investigated by the court During the appellate trial the expert witness introduced by Sinopec claimed that there were quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology and this was a justifiable reason to refuse to trade with Yingding Even though the first instance court and the appellate court did not reason the justifiable reason it should be discussed and investigated further during the retrial

AML or Renewable Energy Law

The claims of Yingding were based on both the AML and the Renewable Energy Law (ldquoRELrdquo) and the first instance ruling referred to both the AML and the REL as

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 44 of 52

well It seems that the laws the first instance court referred to were comprehensive but in fact the reasoning was not clear and logical In the first instance ruling some disputes regarding the AML were reviewed but all the orders were not based on the AML Specifically the first instance court ordered the Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network based on the REL and dismissed the other claims That the orders were not on account of reasoning is illogical It is anticipated that during the retrial the application of the laws will be clearer

Analysis

A lot of issues have not been clearly analysed by the courts such as the relevant market and the justifiable reasons Since the case is remanded the above-mentioned issues are expected to be resolved in the retrial In addition Yingding was in a disadvantaged position compared to its first instance trial since its claims based on the AML were challenged greatly during the appellate trial In the retrial it is probable that Yingding may switch its litigation strategy and base its claims on the REL Therefore maybe more preparation regarding the REL can give Sinopec a leg up

Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)

Rijing Electric a Chinese distributor seeks CNY 5m compensation

The first hearing was on 9 June 2015 and ended without a ruling

Facts

Rijing Electric (ldquoRijingrdquo) a Shanghai-based company and a former distributor for Panasonic accused Panasonic of abusing its dominance and dividing the market through monopolistic practice in an antitrust lawsuit filed in 2014 with Shanghai No 1 Intermediate Court (ldquoShanghai Courtrdquo) claiming compensation of CNY 5m (USD 815370) Wenzhou Mingda Automation System Co and Shanghai Qingying Automation Equipment as the distributor of Panasonic in China are the co-defendants were accused of conducting monopolistic behaviours by implementing Panasonicrsquos policy

The first hearing for evidence exchange was on June 9 2015 Rijing claimed a policy allegedly introduced by Panasonic in 2009 restricted the competition between distributors Panasonic claims the policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo and has full justifiable reasons It explained that the products in question required customization at considerable cost to distributors before its sale to customers Once carried out however other distributors leaving them open to quote much lower prices than the original distributor could simply and relatively cheap replicate this customization Besides Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and that the plaintiff had failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic said its market share for the four products

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 45 of 52

under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases Also Rijing failed to challenge the policy when it was first introduced instead initially agreeing it was reasonable as e-mail evidence submitted by Panasonic suggests

Key Issues of the Case

Whether Panasonic occupied a market dominant position

It is reported that Rijing claimed that Panasonic had abused its market dominance but Rijing failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and its market share for the four products under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases

Analysis

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case Panasonicrsquos policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo rather than to eliminate or restrict competition

Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals40 (Pending)

It is a battle over patent licensing issues

It is viewed as being among the most complicated antitrust lawsuits in China

The first hearing was on 17 and 18 December 2015

Facts

Four Chinese rare earth companies Ningbo Ketian Magnet Ningbo Permanent Magnetics Ningbo Tongchuang Strong Magnet Material and Ningbo Huahui Magnetic Industry filed antitrust lawsuits against Hitachi Metals over alleged patent licensing issues regarding rare earth magnets on December 11 2014 with the Ningbo Intermediate Peoples Court (ldquoNingbo Courtrdquo) in Zhejiang province As reported four Chinese rare earth companies claimed Hitachi Metals abused its market dominance and hurt the industry competition by refusing to license the patents to them The patents in this case are used in the manufacturing of sintered neodymium iron boron (ldquoNdFeBrdquo) magnets a rare-earth magnet alloy widely used in parts for airplanes automobiles and other products

Hitachi Metals filed a challenge with the Ningbo Court over its jurisdiction in April 2015 After Ningbo Court rejected Hitachi Metals jurisdiction objection on 28 April 2015 Hitachi Metals appealed to the Zhejiang High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoZhejiang

40The details of the story are available at httpwwwzbmagcomnews_viewphpid=80 httpwwwhitachicomcnaboutpress201510-121118_ahtml last visited on December 22 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 46 of 52

Courtrdquo) but Zhejiang Court affirmed the ruling of the Ningbo Court

The first day of a two-day hearing took place on 17 December 2015 during which the two sides cross-examined each otherrsquos evidence The evidence focused on clearing up several key elements in the case including the relevant market whether Hitachi Metals has dominance on that market and whether both sides acted in good faith during the licensing negotiations

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Product Market

The four Chinese rare earth companies claimed that the relevant product market should be the NdFeb-related patent licensing market However Hitachi Metals believed that the physical NdFeb market rather than the patent licensing market should be the relevant product market which is meaningful for assess the real competitive effects on the market

Whether Hitachi Metals occupies a dominant market position

In terms of market dominance Hitachi Metals claimed it does not occupy a dominant position because Hitachi Metalsrsquo patents were not in a standard in this case and there are substitutable technologies in the market SEP holders have the obligation to license on FRAND terms but none-SEP holders do not So while a refusal to license a SEP may constitute abuse of dominance refusal to license a non-SEP mdash even by a patent holder with a dominant position mdash should not be considered as an abuse

Analysis

Hitachi Metals as a patent holder should have the right to decide whether to retain those patents or not or who to license According to the legal theory the purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage and protect innovation by conferring monopoly right mdash that is to give intellectual property owners the proprietary rights which can exclude others from using the intellectual property The SEP holders admittedly need to comply with FRAND terms which can maintain a robust balance between competition and monopoly whereas the further intervention of antitrust law into non-SEP patents may undermine the purpose of intellectual property law To which extent the antitrust law should intervene is yet to be seen

Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei41

A confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the Beijing IP court made by the Beijing High Court

41 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcncpwswbjzscq201511t20151103_12225640htm last visited on December 28 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 47 of 52

Facts

On August 2 2013 the NDRC penalized Abbott for monopolistic price-fixing and then Abbott made a price adjustment in China where the prices of main products were reduced

On December 16 2014 Tian Junwei (ldquoTianrdquo) a Chinese citizen in Beijing sued Carrefour Shuangjing Branch (ldquoCarrefourrdquo) and Abbott (Shanghai) Sales Company (ldquoAbbottrdquo) at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (ldquoIP Courtrdquo) for their monopolistic price-fixing which damaged his interests However Carrefour and Abbott challenged the jurisdiction of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court They claimed there were two reasons Firstly according to the jurisdiction rules of the IP court issued by the Supreme Court the IP court has no jurisdiction over anti-trust cases Secondly if this case is a contractual dispute the court that is in the place of Carrefour should hear it if this case is a tort dispute the Shanghai Intermediate Court should hear it

In the ruling of the IP Court the IP Court decided it has the jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases for the following reasons According to the Provisions On Causes Of Action In Civil Cases issued by Supreme Court (最高人民法院案由规定) antimonopoly dispute is a tertiary cause of action belonging to IP and competition disputes Also according to the Provisions concerning the Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京

市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问题的规定 ) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was an IP and competition dispute and was sued after November 6 2014 Thus the IP Court had jurisdiction

Both Carrefour and Abbott appealed to the Beijing High Court over the jurisdiction ruling but the Beijing High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original ruling Reasons are listed in the written ruling issued on June 18 2015 Firstly the nature of the case was an antimonopoly dispute In accordance with Provisions of the Supreme Peoples Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民

事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) and Civil Litigation Law the monopolistic civil disputes in the first instance shall be under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Peoples Courts and an action involving a contractual dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the peoples court of the place where the defendant is domiciled or where the contract is performed Carrefour as the defendant in this case is domiciled in Chaoyang District Beijing Therefore the courts of Beijing have jurisdiction over this case Secondly according to article 3 of the Notification on the Jurisdiction of Intellectual Property Courts issued by Supreme Court (关于知识产权法院案件管辖

等有关问题的通知) IP courts have jurisdiction over first-instance civil disputes arising from monopolistic practices Lastly according to Provisions concerning the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 2 of 52

Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition2

On April 7 2015 SAIC issued the Rules on the Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition (the ldquoIPR Antitrust Rulesrdquo) which have taken effect on August 1 2015

The IPR Antitrust Rules consist of six main parts including

clarifying the purpose and basis of the legislation and providing relevant legal concepts (eg Article 1)

prohibiting undertakings from reaching any monopolistic agreements through exercising intellectual property rights and providing the principle of ldquoSafe Harbourrdquo and its details (eg Article 5)

illustrating the rules for undertakings with dominant position exercising intellectual property rights and especially proposing the ldquoessential facility doctrinerdquo (eg Article 10)

laying out the rules for exercising IP rights related to the patent pool and standardization (eg Article 12 and 13)

providing the analytical approaches and consideration factors for conducting the antitrust assessment (eg Article 15) and

stipulating the possible punishments to be imposed in case of violation of this Rules (eg Article 17)

Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition

The Anti-monopoly and Anti-unfair Competition Enforcement Bureau of SAIC released the sixth draft of ldquoGuidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competitionrdquo (ldquoSAIC draft IPR Guidelinesrdquo) on January 6 2016

The SAIC draft IPR Guidelines cover various IPR related antitrust issues - such as restrictions on technology RampD between competitors exclusive grant-back clauses market division among competitors and safe harbour rules regarding monopolistic agreements involving IPRs etc The following areas are mainly illustrated

Chapter 1 clarifies general principles of the guidelines the relationship between antitrust law and IPR protection as well as the relationship between IPR abuse and monopolistic behaviour It also covers nature and type of conduct eliminating

2 The original Chinese notice published by SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnfldyfbzdjzzcfgzcfg201507t20150724_159428html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 3 of 52

or restricting competition via IPR abuse the relationship between IPR and market dominance position the legal responsibilities and remedies as well as the scope of application

Chapter 2 outlines the basic analysis framework including its methodology analytical steps factors and competition effects

Chapter 3 relates to defining the relevant market including the general principle and circumstances where relevant technology market and relevant innovation market should be defined

Chapter 4 refers to monopolistic agreements involving IPR including factors that should be taken into account when analysing these agreements and related safe harbour regulations

Chapter 5 stipulates the circumstances regarding the abuse of market dominance in the exercise of IPRs including refusal to license tie-in sales and other unjustifiable transactions

Chapter 6 involves undertakingsrsquo concentration when exercising IPRs

Chapter 7 analyses certain special behaviour-types related to the exercise of IPRs from the antitrust perspective including standard-setting related activities injunction for standard essential patents (ldquoSEPrdquo) patent pooling and behaviour of copyright management organizations

It is reported that the SAIC has finished soliciting opinions from the US and EU chambers of commerce some major Western companies and law firms The SAICrsquos antitrust division will gather feedback on the sixth draft from relevant departments of the Chinese government competition organizations and antitrust scholars The draft will then be submitted to the AMC for review

C Legislation of NDRC

Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines

During the Annual Conference of China Automobile Dealers Association held in November 2015 one of the NDRC officials said that the first draft of Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines (ldquoAuto Antitrust Guidelinesrdquo) has been completed According to the official Auto Antitrust Guidelines consist of six sections respectively preface basic issues monopolistic agreement abuse of dominant position concentration of undertakings and supplementary articles Furthermore the official stated that vertical price restrictions on sales of new energy auto might be exempted during the promotion period

Auto Antitrust Guidelines will likely be released in 2016 by the State Council instead of the NDRC according to Wei Tongwei general secretary of the spare part

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 4 of 52

working committee under the China Automotive Maintenance and Repair Trade Association

Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses3

NDRC published a draft of the Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses on December 31 2015 NDRC noted that the consultation period for the draft guidelines run from 1 until 20 January 2016

The draft guidelines constitute five parts preamble basic issues IPR-related agreements that may eliminate or restrict competition IPR-related abuse of dominant position and concentration involving IPR

The draft guidelines cover antitrust issues related to joint RampD patent pool cross licensing standardization price restriction exclusive grant-back no-challenge clause exemption of agreements unfairly high royalty fees refusal to license tying sale imposing unreasonable transaction conditions discriminatory treatment and injunctive relief

The draft guidelines also include factors for determining whether the application of injunction orders by standard essential patent owners can lead to the elimination or restriction of competition such as whether the parties involved expressed their true intentions during negotiations

D Legislation of MOFCOM

The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases4

MOFCOM issued the Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases on February 6 2015 which took effect at the same time

Auto Sales Management Measures

MOFCOM posted a draft of the Auto Sales Management Measures (the ldquodraft Measuresrdquo) on its website on 6 January 2016 and is soliciting for comments until 6 February 2016 MOFCOM intends to implement this new rule to replace the current Auto Brand Sales Management Measures

According to the draft Measures any vehicle sales and related services engaged in the territory of China shall be abided by this rule The draft Measures consist of five parts which are the general principles code of conduct supervision and management penalty provision and bylaw

The Measures clearly provide that the departments of the commercial 3 The original Chinese notice published by NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201512t20151231_770233html 4 The original notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticlei20150220150200891361shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 5 of 52

administration under the State Council will be in charge of nationwide auto sales management

In the second part the draft Measures list the conducts in which a supplier shall not engage in These conducts include restricting distributors from reselling their products requesting distributors to share expenses for their own marketing activities restricting distributors from selling parts of other brands or providing after-sales services for other brands and so on Most of these conducts are deemed as vertical monopolistic agreements which are likely to induce anti-competitive effects in EU and US practices

As reported the Chinese government will make efforts to coordinate the Auto Antitrust Guidelines and the Measures-- two upcoming industry-specific regulations

II Public Enforcement

A Merger Control

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

With the increase in the number of cases been filed and reviewed it is recognized that MOFCOM has become one of the most important jurisdictions of merger control in the world

The simplified procedure has improved the efficiency of MOFCOMrsquos merger review in a large degree Most cases in simple procedure were concluded during the first phase However MOFCOMrsquos review time lasts longer in a few cases For instance MOFCOM spent 162 days to clear Toyota Industries Corps purchase of a 55 stake in Singaporean logistics company LT Wuliao Banyun Holdings setting a new record for the length of a simple case review

MOFCOM used to focus on horizontal deals but now also considers vertical and conglomerate mergers important In 2015 only 35 of the cases being reviewed were horizontal mergers

The increased number of administrative punishment on cases that failed to notify in 2015 demonstrates that MOFCOM has further strengthened its enforcement on this respect

The supervision of remedy implementation has become ldquoroutinizedrdquo

All divisions of MOFCOMrsquos antitrust bureau are responsible for case reviewing from the end of 2015 with the aim to improve the work efficiency

The international cooperation between antitrust enforcement authorities with respect to merger controls happens more frequently On 15 October 2015 the competition department of EU Commissions (ldquoCommissionrdquo) and MOFCOM

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 6 of 52

have signed best practices for cooperation on reviewing mergers in Beijing As the Commissionrsquos officer says the growing number of international transactions is the main reason for this cooperation In addition the Commission also signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the NDRC and SAIC in 2012 which creates a dedicated framework to strengthen cooperation and coordination5

Statistics

From January of 2009 to the end of 2015 MOFCOM received 1445 cases and accepted 1364 cases Among the reviewed cases MOFCOM has cleared 26 deals with remedies since the AML took effect in 2008 with an average review time of 199 days

In 2015 MOFCOM accepted 338 cases out of which 332 were concluded including 18 cases dealing with applicants withdrawing merger filings The agency also imposed penalties on business operators in 9 cases that were related to failure to fulfil merger filing obligations

246 cases out of 332 cases in 2015 obtained MOFCOMrsquos approval in the first phase accounting for 74 of all reviewed cases

Of the cases cleared by MOFCOM in 2015 56 were related to manufacturing such as automotive components and parts vessels machinery manufacturing and electrical equipment

Acquisitions and joint-venture agreements were the most common types of transactions accounting for 87 of all deals Meanwhile joint ventures were still the most common channel for foreign investment in China

Significant Cases

GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions6

This is the first case in which MOFCOM agreed to remove a remedy imposed on a merger

MOFCOM partially removed the restrictions on Google based on the fact that Google had lost its control of Motorola Mobility

Facts

Google applied to MOFCOM on December 1 2014 to remove the condition that required Google to treat all original equipment manufacturers (ldquoOEMsrdquo) equally in android platform-related business after it bought Motorola

5 The original notice published by EC is available at httpeuropaeurapidpress-release_IP-15-5843_enhtml 6 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150120150100862331shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 7 of 52

The concerned remedy was imposed by MOFCOM according to its No 25 Announcement in 2012 which concerned Googlersquos acquisition of Motorola Mobility together with three other remedies as the following

1) Google will license the Android Platform on a free and open basis as it had done so far

2) Google shall continue to observe the existed FRAND obligation of Motorola Mobility in respect of the latterrsquos patents and

3) Google shall delegate an independent supervisor to supervise its performance according to the Provisional Regulations on the Disposal of the Undertakingrsquos Assets or Business in the Concentration stipulated by MOFCOM in 2010

The No 25 Announcement provided that the applied remedies would be valid for five years starting from its punishment unless Google no longer controls Motorola Mobility

Google lodged the remedy removal application based on the fact that Lenovo concluded its acquisition of Motorola Mobility from Google which had been approved by MOFCOM on October 16 2014 and closed on October 30 2014 and due to this acquisition Google lost its control of Motorola Mobility

Decision

After careful examination MOFCOM noted that upon completion of the MotorolaLenovo deal Google would not be engaged in any business of manufacturing smartphones but would keep the telecommunications patent technologies of Motorola Mobility

Based on this fact on January 6 2015 MOFCOM issued a notice that it had decided to approve Googlersquos application to remove one of the remedies with the other remedies remaining in place

AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery7

The transaction is related to a conditionally cleared merger case

The concentration parties notified the deal to MOFCOM following No 95 Announcement in 2008

Considering the slight increase of AB InBevrsquos shareholdings in Zhujiang Brewery MOFCOM approved the proposed transaction

Facts

7 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150820150801090985shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 8 of 52

On July 23 2015 Interbrew Investment International a fully owned subsidiary of AB InBev Guangzhou State-owned Assets Development Holdings and Guangzhou Securities entered into an agreement with Zhujiang Brewery to subscribe the latterrsquos new shares According to this agreement Interbrew Investment International would subscribe shares worth up to CNY 16 billion

Pursuant to a MOFCOM antitrust notice issued in 2008 if AB Inbev intended to further increase its stake in Zhujiang Brewery a filing should be submitted to MOFCOM before any deal were to be concluded

On July 29 2015 AB InBev submitted the filing for the deal to MOFCOM

Decision

MOFCOM noted that upon this subscription Interbrew Investment International would increase its stake in Zhujiang Brewery from 2562 to 2999 Since the stake increase is relatively small and will not result in material changes regarding the control of Zhujiang Brewery MOFCOM decided to approve the deal on 20 August 2015

MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases

MOFCOM reached these decisions based on the undertakingsrsquo failure to file notifications

None of these concentrations were determined as resulting in anti-competition effects

MOFCOM considered that a 35 shares acquisition could lead to the obtaining of control power over a company

Complaints from the third party are the main channel of triggering investigation on unnotified concentrations

The undertakings were fined up to RMB 200000 which is less than the imposed penalty (RMB 300000) in the last year and the maximum penalty (RMB 500000) for violations of merger control rules

Facts

On September 29 2015 MOFCOM issued notices regarding the penalty on four concentration dealings because the concerning undertakings failed to notify these dealings to MOFCOM before closing them Details of these notices are as follows

Shanghai Fosun Pharmaceutical (Group) Co Ltd has been imposed a fine of CNY 200000 (USD 31431) because of its failure to notify MOFCOM regarding its

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 9 of 52

acquisition of a 35 stake in Suzhou Erye Pharmaceutical Co Ltd (Suzhou Erye) and the target stake was transferred without MOFCOMrsquos allowance8

Fujian Electronics amp Information (Group) has been imposed a fine of CNY 150000 (USD 23568) for its failure to notify a 35 stake acquisition of Shenzhen CHINO-E Communication MOFCOM made this decision based on the fact that Fujian Electronics signed a transfer agreement with CHINO-Ersquo shareholders and completed this transaction without filing9

Bestv New Media and Microsoft have been imposed CNY 200000 (USD 31420) fines by MOFCOM since they did not lodge a merger review filling regarding their joint venture E-Home Entertainment Development which was established on October 1 201310

CSR Nanjing Puzhen and Bombardier Transportation Sweden have been fined CNY 150000 (USD 23562) respectively due to their failure to notify their proposed joint venture prior to setting it up These companies made an agreement about the joint venturersquos establishment on November 3 2014 and its business license was obtained on November 11 201411

MOFCOM identified that the above dealings shall be notified according to the fact that all of these dealings constituted concentration and turnovers of these concentrating undertakings reached the statutory turnover thresholds

Article 20 of the AML stipulates three kinds of concentration which are (i) a merger of undertakings (ii) an acquisition of control of other undertakings by acquisition of shares or assets with voting right of other undertakings to an adequate extent (iii) an acquisition of control of other undertakings or the capability of imposing determinative effects on other undertakings by contracts or other means

Article 3 of the Provisions of the State Council on the Thresholds for Concentration Notification of Undertakings provides the fillingrsquos thresholds which are as follows (i) The collective worldwide turnovers of all undertakings involved in the last fiscal year exceed CNY 10 billion and the turnovers within China of at least two undertakings each exceed CNY 400 million or (ii) The collective turnovers of all undertakings involved in the last fiscal year exceed CNY 2 billion (approximately USD 294 million) and the China-wide turnovers of at least two undertakings each exceed CNY 400 million (approximately USD CNY588 million)

These undertakings were penalized because of their violations of article 21 of the 8 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150920150901124896shtml 9 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150920150901124887shtml 10 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150920150901124903shtml 11 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150920150901124899shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 10 of 52

AML which provides that the concentration reaching the filling thresholds shall be notified to MOFCOM prior to its implementation and without this notification it shall not be conducted In addition according to article 48 of the AML and article 13 of the Interim Measures for Investigating and Punishing of Concentration of Undertakings Failing to File Notification an undertaking which is identified by MOFCOM for implementing a concentration without filling would be imposed a fine and instructed to recover the situation by MOFCOM The amount of this fine could be no more than CNY 500000

There is no provision that specifically describes the behaviour of implementing a concentration In practice obtaining a business license transferring the entity of assets delivering the shares and assigning directors or managers are likely to be deemed as the implementation of concentration

According to Shang Ming the former director general of MOFCOMrsquos Anti-monopoly Bureau so far MOFCOM has already penalized 15 companies for failing to notify MOFCOM regarding merger reviews MOFCOM has noticed an increase in companies shirking merger-filing responsibilities and has therefore intensified enforcement

MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent12

MOFCOM defines all of the information and communication technology SEPs as the relevant product market rather than divides each of them into the individual market

In the process of competition analysis MOFCOM evaluates various factors rather than comparing the market shares only which is consistent with the complexity and flexibility of the high-technology industry

In the process of formulating remedies MOFCOM pays more attention on protecting Chinese downstream companies and enhancing its supervision

Facts

On April 15 2015 Nokia Oyi (ldquoNokiardquo) signed a Memorandum of Understanding regarding the acquisition of Alcatel Lucent (ldquoAlcatelrdquo) According to this memorandum Nokia intends to acquire 100 shares of Alcatel through a tender off

A notification about this deal was filed on April 21 2015 and accepted by MOFCOM on June 15 2015 After reviewing this case MOFCOM moved it to Phases II and Phase III as the agency was of the opinion that this acquisition could have anti-competitive effects on the relevant market

12 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151020151001139743shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 11 of 52

On October 19 2015 MOFCOM cleared this deal with four behavioural remedies

Decision

Relevant Market

In the agencyrsquos view there are four relevant product markets which are the radio access network market the core network systems market the network infrastructure service market and the information and communication technology SEP licensing market Meanwhile the relevant geographical market is primarily the Chinese market

Competition Analysis

According to MOFCOM this deal would have no anti-competitive effects on the first three relevant product markets in China while it could constitute an obstacle or limit the competition in the information and communication technology SEP licensing market

The agency consideredafter the deal that Nokia would increase its holding in 2G 3G and 4G SEPs and strengthen the degree of concentration in the information and communication technology SEP licensing market If it refused to license charged overly high royalty fees or conducted any other anti-competitive behaviour the competition of downstream market would be distorted which would most likely impair customersrsquo interests in the end

Remedies

Four behavioural remedies focusing on maintaining fair licensing of standard-essential patents (ldquoSEPsrdquo) were imposed on Nokia which are

1) On a reciprocal basis Nokia commits to not use injunctions to prevent enforcements of FRAND (fair reasonable and non-discriminatory) encumbered SEPs unless the potential licensees are unwilling to sign FRAND licensing agreements and follow the terms

2) If Nokia transfers its SEPs to a third party it shall inform Chinese licensees as well as Chinese companies that are actively engaging in licensing negotiation about the transfer details

3) Nokia will only transfer its SEPs to a new owner on the basis that the new owner accepts the existing FRAND commitments made by Nokia

4) MOFCOM has the right to monitor the implementation of Nokiarsquos commitments Nokia shall report to MOFCOM about the implementation of the conditions within 45 days of the end of each calendar year The reporting obligation will last five years until October18 2020

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 12 of 52

Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions13

Western Digital had engaged in two conducts that violated the remedies provided in the No 9 Announcement in 2012 issued by MOFCOM

Western Digital lodged an application to remove certain restrictions in March 2014 and the agency made the decision on October 19 2015

MOFCOM considered the fact that the competition condition in the relevant product market has changed and decided to remove the hold-separate restrictions related to manufacture and RampD

Facts

In 2012 Western Digital Corporation (ldquoWestern Digitalrdquo) intended to acquire 100 shares of Viviti Technologies Ltd (ldquoViviti Technologiesrdquo) which was the holding company of Hitachi Global Storage Technologies Netherlands BV and Hitachi Global Storage Technologies Singapore Pte Ltd and engaged in the hard disk business

On April 2 2011 Western Digital filed a notification for this acquisition MOFCOM issued the No 9 Announcement in March 2012 and cleared this acquisition with six remedies According to this announcement Western Digital could apply for the removal of the first and second remedy after this decision has been carried out for 24 months

The first remedy refers to maintaining the Viviti Technologies as an independent competitor and the second remedy requires both Western Digital and Viviti Technologies to make a reasonable plan of their capacity and production and report these data to the trustee

Western Digital lodged an application to remove the first and second remedy in March 2014 MOFCOM found that Western Digital had engaged in two conducts that violated the first remedy and the competitive situation in the hard disk market had changed After talking with Western Digital collecting opinions from the relevant entities and delegating the independent party to make an economic evaluation MOFCOM decided to remove the hold-separate remedies partially

Western Digitalrsquos implementation of the duties imposed in the No 9 Announcement

Based on the implementation reports submitted by Western Digital and the monitoring reports submitted by the trustee MOFCOM found that Western

13 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151020151001139040shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 13 of 52

Digital had engaged in two conducts that violated the first remedy Those were

1) On March 8 2012 Western Digital consolidated Hitachi Global Storage Technology (ldquoHGSTrdquo) which was Vivitirsquos subsidiary in US

2) In January 2013 Western Digital dissolved the development division of VivitiHGST and transferred the relevant workforce to Western Digital

MOFCOM considered that these conducts impaired the independence of Viviti as a competitor so that it imposed CNY 300000 fines on each of these behaviours and requested Western Digital to rectify the situation As per the entrusted supervisorrsquos report such behaviours have been rectified and the first remedy has been fulfilled

According to MOFCOMrsquos announcement the agency found that other remedies have been entirely implemented

Competition Analysis

With respect to the current situation of the competition in the hard disk market MOFCOM made the following assessment

1) In the areas of portable application and corporate-level application solid-state drive has put constraint on the impact of the traditional hard disk as to strengthen the competition in the relevant market

2) Overcapacity problems in the conventional hard disk drive market became obvious

3) Western Digital and HGST are the major competitors in the hard disk drive market Both the layout and the major market competitors in this market have remained unchanged since 2012

4) The hold-separate duties restricted the full competition between Western Digital and HGST The implementation of such duties hindered them from integrating their products and providing the market with a full range of products and had an adverse impact on their clientsrsquo product procurement

Based on the above analysis MOFCOM deemed that

1) Removal of the conditions that required the two companies to remain independent in production and RampD activities would enable Western Digital to save costs to provide a full range of products to the market and to fully engage in market competition and benefit its clients

2) To keep the two sales teams and their respective brands independent from each other and the independence of sales activities could reduce competition restraint impacts arising from a complete merger

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 14 of 52

Remedies

After negotiating with MOFCOM the relevant entities agreed to undertake the following obligations

1) Western Digital and HGST will remain independent in sales and brands

2) Western Digital will not change its previous business modes or force its clients to exclusively purchase hard disk drive products from Western Digital or do so in disguise

3) Western Digital will continue its pace in investing in product innovation to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

This announcement will be effective within two years from the date of issuance If Western Digital can provide sufficient evidence to prove a substantial change in the market environment the company can propose to MOFCOM to remove the relevant conditions within the two years

SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions14

MOFCOM considered the fact that the competition condition in the relevant product market has changed and removed the hold-separate restrictions on Seagate and Samsung

Seagate shall remain its business model materially and continue to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

Facts

On December 12 2011 MOFCOM made the No 11 Announcement to clear Seagate Technology LLCrsquos (ldquoSeagaterdquo) acquisition with remedies In this acquisition Seagate intended to acquire hard disk drive business of Samsung Electronics Co Ltd (ldquoSamsung HDDrdquo) As per this announcement Seagate could apply for removing the first and second remedy after this decision has been carried out for 12 months

The first remedy is to preserve Samsung HDD as an independent competitor and the second remedy asks to maintain and expand Samsung HDDrsquos production capacity within six months of issuance of the No 11 Announcement and to set reasonable production volume targets based on market supply-demand conditions

Seagate lodged an application to remove the first and second remedy in May 2015 After making assessments on the relevant parties and the competition circumstance MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate remedies

14 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151020151001144105shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 15 of 52

Competition Analysis

With respect to the current situation of the competition in the hard disk drive market MOFCOM made the following assessments

1) In the areas of portable application and corporate-level application solid-state drive has put constraint on the impact of the traditional hard disk so that the competition in the relevant market has been strengthened

2) Overcapacity problems in the conventional hard disk drive market became obvious

3) Both the layout and the major market competitors in the hard disk drive market have remained unchanged since 2012

4) Seagate and Samsung HDDrsquos market overlap in the hard disk market is quite small and Samsung HDDrsquos competition in the traditional hard disk is quite weak

Based on the above analysis MOFCOM deemed that

1) Removal of certain conditions is possible because in the portable application and corporate level application sectors competition constraint of solid-state drive on traditional hard disk drives has strengthened traditional hard disk drives are facing overcapacity which has reduced the chance of a single or more competitors causing competition restraints Seagate has limited overlap with Samsung in the hard disk business and the latter has a relatively weaker market power in the hard drive disk business

2) Removal of all imposed conditions may still restrain market competition because the traditional hard disk drive market competition conditions have not undergone a major change Seagate is still the major player in all divisions of the market and Seagate will strengthen its power after the acquisition of Samsung HDD

Remedies

After negotiating with MOFCOM Seagate agreed to undertake the following obligations

1) Seagate shall not change its business model materially or force clients to purchase hard drive disks exclusively from it

2) Seagate shall not force Tokyo Dengikagaku Kogyo China to supply magnetic heads exclusively to Seagate (or other Seagate-controlled companies) or limit the number of magnetic heads Tokyo Dengikagaku Kogyo China would supply to other hard drive disk manufacturers

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 16 of 52

3) Seagate shall continue to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

This announcement will be effective within two years from the date of issuance If Seagate can provide sufficient evidence to prove substantial change in the market environment the company can propose to MOFCOM to remove relevant conditions within the two years

FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM15

MOFCOM deems that this acquisition would induce anti-competitive influence

NXP promises to dispose its radio frequency (ldquoRFrdquo) power transistor business

As the first case approved with structural remedies after the enactment of the Provisions on Imposing Restrictive Conditions MOFCOM conducted a comprehensive evaluation of the viability competitiveness and marketability of the divested business as well as the suitability of potential buyers

Facts

On April 3 2015 NXP filed for its acquisition of Freescale NXP Semiconductor (ldquoNXPrdquo) is a NASDAQ-listed company registered in the Netherlands which engages in the design manufacturing and sale of integration circuits and discrete components

Freescale Semiconductor (ldquoFreescalerdquo) is a New York-listed company registered in Bermuda and based in the US which engages in the manufacturing and RampD of microcontroller and digital networking processors (embedded processors)

According to the agreement between NXP and Freescale after closing Freescale will become the wholly owned subsidiary of NXP On November 25 2015 MOFCOM decided to clear this acquisition with remedies

Relevant Market

As per the announcement the relevant product markets are the general microcontroller automotive power-use analog integrated circuit and RF transistor product markets in which NXP and Freescale have horizontal overlap The relevant geographical markets should be the global market

Competition Analysis

After assessing this proposed deal the agency concluded that

1) The proposed deal would boost NXPrsquos market control power in the RF

15 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151120151101196182shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 17 of 52

transistor product market because the global and Chinese RF transistor product markets share a similar structure both featuring few competitors and high concentration levels Freescale and NXP as the number one and number two players are far ahead of their rivals in the market Therefore after closing the market control power of NXP in this market would be strengthened

2) Since Freescale was the fiercest competitor of NXP the proposed deal will remove competition between them

3) The proposed deal would reduce the options for clients and increase procurement risks

In practice the wireless infrastructure suppliers as the main client of the RF transistor product tend to procure products from both NXP and Freescale to prevent them from the risk arising from relying on one supplier

4) The proposed deal may induce an adverse impact on the technology RampD and innovation

Remedies

In accordance with MOFCOMrsquos decision NXP shall follow its written commitment submitted to MOFCOM and completely divest its RF power transistor business to Beijing Jianguang Asset Management At the same time NXP shall strictly fulfil its obligations during the transition period It is worth noting that the NXPFreescale deal shall only be implemented after the divestment deal has been concluded

In addition MOFCOM requires NXP to perform relevant obligations during the transition period from the date of approval announcement until the divestment deal has been concluded NXP shall endeavour

1) not to engage in any lsquounfair trade practicesrsquo relating to the divested business

2) not to implement any acts which may have a significant adverse impact on the value management or competitiveness of the divested business or any acts which may change the nature and scope industry or business strategy or investment policy of the divested business and to take reasonable measures to encourage core employees to stay in the divested business as well as not to seek or transfer employees to NXPrsquos non-divested business

3) to ensure supply to the divested business in a fair reasonable and non-discriminatory manner and

4) to maintain the independence of the divested business and not to exchange competitively sensitive information between the parties and the divested

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 18 of 52

business

B Monopolistic Agreements

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

With respect to the enforcement activities of the NDRC in light of the numbers of the published cases it seems that the law enforcement frequency of the NDRC regarding monopolistic agreements in 2015 is lower in comparison with 2014

The reason behind might be that the outstanding issue of human resource deficit of the antitrust authority still exists Besides the fact that more enterprises gradually attach increasing importance to the antitrust compliance might be another reason for the decrease in the number of cases investigated by the authorities

As to the enforcement activities of the SAIC 4 of 14 cases concluded by the SAIC and its local branches in 2015 are relevant to monopolistic agreements Meanwhile these four cases concern horizontal monopolistic agreements

It is noteworthy however that the Mercedes-Benz case and the Dongfeng Nissan case suggest that vertical agreements especially involving price-related restrictions on the downstream dealers is still the priority of antitrust enforcement Companies shall be very cautious when imposing restrictions on the resale prices or the minimum resale prices of commodities in the distribution agreements

Automobile industry and related industries are observed to be under continuous attention of Chinarsquos antitrust authorities

The industries relating to peoplersquos livelihoods remain to be the enforcement priority

Significant Cases

Enforcement by the NDRC and its local branches

Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC16

The investigation was triggered by a leniency application

The first leniency applicant was exempted from punishment

Eight ocean shipping companies involved were imposed a collective fine of CNY 4067 million

NDRC spent approximately 12 months to investigate and conclude the case 16 NDRCrsquos press release of the case is available at httpjjsndrcgovcngzdt201512t20151228_769084html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 19 of 52

Facts

In December 2015 the NDRC published its official punishment decisions regarding the cartel case in connection with eight ocean shipping companies namely Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha (ldquoNYKrdquo) Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha (ldquoK Linerdquo) Mitsui OSK Lines EUKOR Car Carriers Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics Compantildeiacutea Sud Americana de Vapores Eastern Car Liner and Compantildeiacutea Chilena de Navegacioacuten Interoceaacutenica

According to the official press release of the NDRC the investigation was triggered by a leniency application of NYK The evidence showed that the eight companies reached consensus on non-intrusion of each others existing business to maintain or increase shipping fees when shipping goods such as cars trucks and engineering machinery in the routes between China and other countries and regions

They were also found to frequently conduct bilateral or multilateral communications on the shippersrsquo invitation for bids andor price inquiries via phone conferences dinner parties e-mails visiting etc In addition they also conducted illegal behaviour such as sensitive information exchange price negotiations bidding intention discussion dividing clients and shipping routes reaching agreements on high price bids or non-bidding in order to help certain companies gain shipping orders

To avoid the regulation of the antitrust authority the relevant shipping companies adopted various illicit measures that showed their apparent intention to violate the AML The cartel lasted for at least four years and covered a broad range of shipping routes concerned with the import and export of products between China and other regions such as North America EU South America and so on involving multiple auto brands and engineering machinery brands

The NDRC held the opinion that the eight companies conducts had restricted and eliminated competition in the relevant market raising the international shipping fees and impairing interests of shippers and end consumers The eight companies breached the AML by reaching and implementing monopolistic agreements on fixing prices and dividing the market

All eight investigated companies put forward remedy measures including enhancing the antitrust compliance program arranging more antitrust compliance trainings and developing antitrust compliance technologies

The NDRC imposed fines based on the nature level and duration of their monopolistic volations as well as their respective sales of international freight service sales relevant to the Chinese market The companies involved were collectively fined CNY 4067 million

NYK as the first cartel member voluntarily reporting the illegal conducts to the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 20 of 52

authority and providing significant evidence was entirely exempted from the punishment K Line as the second leniency applicant was imposed a fine amounting to 4 of its 2014 annual sales of international freight services relevant to Chinarsquos import and export market The details of punishments imposed on the involved companies by the NDRC are as follow

Company Name Amount of Fines (RMB million)

Percentage of the Relevant Turnovers

Grounds

Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha

- - First leniency applicant

Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha

2398 4 Second leniency applicant

Mitsui OSK Lines 3812 7 Third leniency applicant

EUKOR Car Carriers 284 9 Lasted over a long period involved many brands and many violations violations were severe

Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics

4506 8 Lasted over a long period involved many brands and many violations violations were severe

Compantildeiacutea Sud Americana de Vapores

308 6 Lasted over a long period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Eastern Car Liner 1127 5 Lasted over a long period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Compantildeiacutea Chilena de 120 4 Lasted over a long

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 21 of 52

Navegacioacuten Interoceaacutenica

period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Total 4067

Analysis

In this case the agency applied the AML instead of the Tenders and Bids Law to collusive bidding Citing article 13 (3) of the AML the NDRC identified that the collusive bidding constituted a division of the sales market

The leading three leniency applicants were granted exemption from fines to a varying degree

According to the official who handled this case dawn raids performed by antitrust enforcement agencies in other jurisdictions drew the attention of the NDRC on the cartels of these shipping companies However there was limited effective evidence to prove that the companies had reached monopolistic agreements Through pressuring the involved parties three members of the shipping cartel actively confessed their illegal conduct This case once again stresses the significance of international cooperation between antitrust enforcement agencies

Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau17

The distribution agreements between Mercedes-Benz and its dealers are determined as vertical monopolistic agreement and Mercedes-Benz violated article 14 of the AML because it restricted the ability of its dealers to decide their own resale prices

Mercedes-Benzrsquos dealers violated article of 13 of the AML due to concluding a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Mercedes-Benz and its dealers were jointly fined CNY 3578 million

Facts

In April 2015 Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau which is the provincial branch of the NDRC released the punishment on its website and announced that it had imposed a fine of CNY 350 million on Mercedes-Benz along with the aggregated fine of CNY 787 million on its dealers The fine came as a result of Mercedes-Benz reaching and implementing resale price maintenance (ldquoRPMrdquo) agreements with dealers to fix the minimum resale price of several car models as well as certain auto parts 17 The original Chinese notice published by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau is available at httpwwwjswjjgovcnoffice_neweo_comm_zxnrxsphp

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 22 of 52

According to the decision the authority found that Mercedes-Benz fixed the minimum resale price of Class E and Class S cars in Nanjing Wuxi Changzhou and Suzhou markets through telephoneverbal communication and dealers meetings from January 2013 to July 2014 Since 2010 Mercedes-Benz had reached agreements with dealers in Jiangsu province to fix the minimum resale prices for auto parts by providing different levels of discounts for insured cars cars involving expired warranty periods and cars within the warranty period

In addition Mercedes-Benz implemented the minimum resale price maintaining agreement by

1) Tightening its monitoring measures on the dealers such as inspecting deals and their sale incentive system on a weekly basis

2) Tracking the sales process flow of cars and increasing the intensity of this assessment

3) Giving warnings and reducing support ndash for example halting the supply of bestselling cars and prohibiting the opening of new stores ndash to dealers if dealers refused to cooperate with the price-fixing related policies and measures and

4) Interviewing personnel of the dealers and requesting terminations if the staff engaged in serious violations of the RPM agreement

Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau concluded that Mercedes-Benz had excluded and eliminated market competition harmed consumer welfare and consequently violated article 1418 of the AML The authority therefore imposed a fine of CNY 350 million representing 7 of the sale revenue of the previous year in the relevant market against Mercedes-Benz and imposed a fine on the dealers amounting to an equivalence of 1 of the annual sales in the previous year

Analysis

Although the agency also addressed the horizontal violation among the dealers in this case the administrative penalty decision mainly focuses on the vertical violation The agency fined dealers involved in the RPM agreement a combined CNY 787 million equal to 1 of the previous-year sales which suggests that the agency decided to give lighter punishments to dealers who took initiative in reporting the activity and provided evidence

The Mercedes-Benz case is the third case where the agency successfully 18 Article 14 of the AML The following monopolistic agreements between operators and trading partners shall be prohibited (i) fixing the resale prices of commodities to third persons (ii) restricting the minimum resale prices of commodities to third persons (iii) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement Authority under the State Council

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 23 of 52

discovered both vertical and horizontal agreements in a case following the Audi case and the Chrysler case All these cases are rooted in the same industry indicating that industrial features play a large role in raising anti-trust concerns In fact it appears that the entire automotive industry is under antitrust scrutiny

Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC19

This case involved both a horizontal agreement and an administrative monopoly

A total fine of CNY 1318 million was imposed on the involved companies

Facts

In June 2015 the NDRC through its website announced the decision made by its regional branch -Yunnan Provincial Development and Reform Commission (ldquoYunnan DRCrdquo) regarding the horizontal monopolistic agreement case involving Yunnan Communications Administration and local subsidiaries of four state-owned telecommunication companies

Through the investigation Yunnan DRC found that Yunnan Communications Administration as a competent government agency had organized several meetings involving Yunnan branches of four state-owned telecoms - China Mobile China Telecom China Unicom and China Tietong in August and September of 2014 At the end of 2009 the four local branches entered into an agreement to regulate their sales promotions in terms of limiting the promotional items amount and frequency

Furthermore the agreement provides certain measures to ensure the implementation of relevant restrictions on promotions Specifically in case any cartel member violates the agreement the others could file complaints with Yunnan Communications Administration and the agency would then issue a rectification notice to the rule-breaker

Yunnan DRC stated that the four telecoms were main competitors in the relevant market and the promotions as a significant competition measure would exert direct influence on the final prices of the products The horizontal agreement organized by Yunnan Communications Administration on sales promotions restricted the competition capacity of telecoms and as a result eliminated the competition in the relevant market Consequently the behaviour of Yunnan Communications Administration violated article 8 20 of the AML and constituted administrative monopoly in terms of ldquoforcing undertakings to conduct monopolistic behaviour prohibited by the AMLrdquo

19 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpwwwsdpcgovcnfzgggzjgjdyfldjjszhdt201506t20150602_694802html 20 Article 8 of the AML Administrative organs and the public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 24 of 52

With respect to the penalties Yunnan DRC fined the local branch of China Tietong CNY 200000 for reaching but not implementing the agreement in regards to the other three telecoms a total fine of CNY 1298 million amounting to 2 of the sales of the relevant business in the previous year were imposed for entering into and implementing the horizontal monopolistic agreement

Analysis

The telecoms industry is still the enforcement priority of the antitrust enforcement authorities A company cannot be exempted from punishment even though it is forced by competent authorities to conduct monopoly behaviour

DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC21

Both a horizontal monopolistic agreement and a vertical monopolistic agreement were involved in this case

A total fine of CNY 14242 million was imposed on DongFeng Nissan and its distributors

Facts

In September 2015 the Guangdong Development and Reform Commission (ldquoGuangdong DRCrdquo) released an announcement regarding the administrative penalties on DongFeng Nissan and its provincial distributors for concluding price-related monopolistic agreements More specifically DongFeng Nissan was imposed a fine of CNY 1233 million for breaching article 14 of the AML in terms of restricting the resale price of certain car models 17 distributors domiciled in Guangdong were collectively fined CNY 1912 million for violating article 1322 of the AML in terms of entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements

According to the published official release the Guangdong DRC launched the investigation in August 2014 The authority discovered that from 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissan had set a rigorous restriction on its distributorsrsquo abilities to determine the resale prices of certain car models including the quoted prices in various platforms and the final resale price In addition DongFeng Nissan punished the distributors that failed to abide by such price restrictions in 2013 The authority 21 The original Chinese notice published by Guangdong DRC is available at httpwwwgddpcgovcnzwgkgzdtgzyw201509t20150910_328993html 22 Article 13 of the AML The following Monopolistic agreements among competing operators shall be prohibited (i) fix or change prices of commodities (ii) limit the outputs or sales volume of commodities (iii) segment the sales markets or the raw material purchasing markets (iv) limit the purchase of new technology new facilities or limit the development of new products new technology (v) jointly boycott transactions (vi) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-Monopoly Law enforcement Authority Monopolistic agreements in this Law refer to agreements decisions or other concerted practices that eliminate restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 25 of 52

believed that the vertical agreement concluded between DongFeng Nissan and its distributors eliminated and restricted the competition in the relevant market and damaged the consumer welfare as well which violates article 14 of the AML

Furthermore from April 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissanrsquos distributors in Guangdong province held multiple meetings to discuss issues relevant to sale price reached and implemented a horizontal monopolistic agreement in terms of fixing the prices of some car models which is prohibited by article 13 of the AML

Considering that both DongFeng Nissan and the involved distributors positively cooperated with the investigation and ceased the illegal behaviour immediately after the investigation Guangdong DRC decided to impose a fine amounting to 3 of its previous yearrsquos turnovers on DongFeng Nissan and a fine ranging from 2 to 4 on the relevant distributors in accordance with articles 4623 and 4924 of the AML

Analysis

This case demonstrates that auto and related industries are still under close attention of the authority Considering the NDRCrsquos successful series of antitrust investigations conducted throughout the auto industry it is observed that the agency currently overseeing price-related antitrust issues in China has accumulated a substantial amount of experience regarding antitrust enforcement in the auto industry Now is the right time to speed up the law-making process by amending the set of rules released earlier and drafting new laws to advise the auto industry on antitrust compliance

Enforcement by the SAIC and its local branches

Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC25

The investigation was triggered by whistle blowerrsquos submission

Cartel members were collectively fined CNY 139 million 23 Article 46 of the AML In case the operators violate the relevant provisions of this Law concluding and implementing Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall order the operators to cease such act impose fines more than 1 but less than 10 of the total turnover in the preceding year and confiscate the illegal gains where the Monopolistic agreement is not implemented a fine less than RMB 500000 can be imposed If the operators involved in Monopolistic agreement on its own initiative report information concerning the conclusion of Monopolistic agreements and provide important evidences to the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority they may be given a mitigated punishment or be exempted from punishment in accordance with the circumstances Where the industrial associations violate this Law organizing the operators in the industry to conclude Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority may impose a fine less than RMB 500000 in serious circumstances the agency of social organization administration and registration may cancel its registration 24 Article 49 of the AML As for the imposition of the fines stipulated by the Article 46 47 and 48 of this Law the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall take elements such as the nature extent and time it lasts of the illegal act into consideration in determining the specific amount of the fines 25 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201506t20150601_156889html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 26 of 52

Facts

In April 2015 the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) issued administrative penalties on several brick manufacturers for entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements This is the first case relevant to monopolistic agreements that has been publicized by the SAIC since the beginning of this year

Ten cartel members were involved in the case including one company and nine individuals Similar with most antitrust cases the investigation started as a result of a whistle blowerrsquos submission After a thorough investigation Hunan AIC found that those local brick manufacturers had reached agreements on controlling production volume and dividing sales areas in the forms of production and sales agreements plans and meeting minutes

The enforcement authority reached the conclusion that these brick manufacturers violated article 13 of the AML and imposed a total fine of CNY 1389400 on them

Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC26

The organizer of the monopolistic agreement the animation association was fined CNY 100000

The antitrust authority did not punish the members of the monopolistic agreement

Facts

In December 2015 the Guangdong Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoGuangdong AICrdquo) published its administrative punishment decision in regards to Guangzhou Panyu Animation amp Game Association (ldquoGAGArdquo) organizing member companies to conclude a monopolistic agreement

According to the decision GAGA drafted the ldquoAgreement of Exhibition Alliancerdquo (ldquoAgreementrdquo) and convened a conference with member companies in order to discuss the content and conclusion of the Agreement 52 member companies entered into the Agreement which actually requested the alliance companies to merely participate in the exhibitions either organized or supported by GAGA in Guangzhou In addition the Agreement prohibited the alliance companies from attending any other exhibition except if they obtained prior approval of GAGA

After a thorough investigation Guangdong AIC believed that the conclusion of the Agreement among GAGA and the 52 member companies violated article 13 (5) of the AML in terms of boycott GAGA who was deeply involved and restricted member companiesrsquo choice of exhibitions through the Agreement could be deemed as

26 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151208_164680html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 27 of 52

the participant and organizer of the monopolistic agreement In accordance with article 46 of the AML Guangdong AIC imposed a fine of CNY 100000 on GAGA for organizing the conclusion of the monopolistic agreement

Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC27

Hubei AIC considered the coinsurance for Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance illegal

Twelve insurance companies were fined CNY 469 million in total

Facts

In December 2015 the Hubei Administrative for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHubei AICrdquo) disclosed its punishment on 12 insurance companies for signing illegal coinsurance agreements

The disclosed punishment decision suggests that the Hubei branch of China Pacific Life Insurance (ldquothe Companyrdquo) 11 other insurance companies and Wuhan Construction Safety Technology Consultation Center (ldquoWCSTCCrdquo) signed a Coinsurance Agreement on Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance (ldquoCoinsurance Agreementrdquo) of which the main contents include

1) The Company and 11 other involved companies as the coinsurers jointly take charge of the personal accident insurance concerned with the construction project directly administered by the Wuhan government WCSTCC is responsible for providing safety professionalism and technology services regarding the relevant personal accident insurance

2) The Company as the chief insurer of the coinsurance occupies 12 of the total amount of the insurance and the other 11 companies respectively occupy 8

3) The Company as the representative of the coinsurance is in charge of collecting the premium signing the standard form insurance policies and issuing the invoice in its own name The Company should share the charged premium with the other companies in accordance with the Coinsurance Agreement

4) Both the Company and the other insurance companies should pay 25 of the actually received premium to WCSTCC as the service fee WCSTCC will assist the coinsurers in providing safety and technology management service to the insured In addition the 11 insurance companies should pay 5 of their premium to the Company as the management fee

27 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165445html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 28 of 52

5) In case an accident happens the 12 companies will jointly bear the damages based on their respective shares in the coinsurance

6) There is a contact mechanism established in the coinsurance The coinsurers will regularly hold coinsurance conferences to discuss existing problems

Furthermore the coinsurers and WCSTCC also signed a self-discipline agreement and established a complete management system to assure the implementation of the Coinsurance Agreement Any party violating the Coinsurance Agreement would be punished

Hubei AIC found that WCSTCC was solely invested by Wuhan Construction Safety Management Association which was under Wuhan Construction Commission The centre helped implement certain functions of the Wuhan Urban Construction Safety Management Station and was responsible for quality supervision and safety supervision of municipal construction projects

It later became a prerequisite for construction companies to purchase insurance from any member of the coinsurance in order to get approval to commence their project According to the decision Hubei AIC launched another separate investigation against WCSTCC

Through the investigation Hubei AIC concluded that the Coinsurance Agreement constituted a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by article 13 of the AML with the following analysis

First coinsurance as a common business model to jointly share and lower risks is widely adopted in the insurance industry A coinsurance arrangement for a specific project in order to avoid high risks faced by one insurer could be legal However coinsurance should not target the entire market In this case prior to the Coinsurance Agreement the risks of the construction projects were unpredictable since the scale of the construction projects the difficulty of the construction and the amount of construction workers could not be available It is impossible to predict the risks of the projects thus it is not necessary to cooperate with other insurers to collectively bear the risks The purpose of the 12 insurance companies to establish the coinsurance is to avoid the competition which demonstrates the Coinsurance Agreement belongs to a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by the AML

Second the companies through entering into the coinsurance agreement actually divided the relevant market of construction project personal accident insurance in Wuhan city which affected the competition in the relevant market and damaged the interests of other competitors and the consumers In particular the Construction Law as amended in 2011 stipulates that the purchase of personal accident insurance is not mandatory and the construction companies have the right to choose whether to buy the said insurance or not As mentioned purchasing insurance from the coinsurance had been the prerequisite for construction companies to obtain administration

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 29 of 52

approval for the project which seriously distorts the fair competition in the market

Citing article 46 of the AML the 12 insurance companies were collectively fined CNY 469 million including fines on the companies and confiscation of illegal gains It is noteworthy that the fines were calculated based on the companiesrsquo 2014 annual sales of the insurance product in connection with the coinsurance The Company as the chief insurer was fined amounting to 6 of its 2014 annual sales of the relevant insurance product in the coinsurance and other companies were fined amounting to 2 of relevant sales For more specific information please see the following table

Company Name (Hubei Branch)

Fines (CNY million)

Percentage of the sales

Illegal Gains (CNY

million)

China Pacific Life Insurance 00653 6 0941

Sino Life 00145 2 04332

Alltrust Insurance 00145 2 04332

Taikang Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Continent Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Pacific Property Insurance

00145 2 04332

China Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

PICC Property and Casualty 00145 2 02599

Taiping General Insurance 00145 2 013

Union Life Insurance 00145 2 01177

Ping An Annuity Insurance Company of China

00145 2 04201

Ping An Property amp Casualty Insurance Company of China

00145 2 -

Subtotal 02248 - 44679

Total 46927

Analysis

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 30 of 52

Coinsurance as an effective approach to lower risks of insurers is widely used in the insurance industry Information sharing and agreements on coinsurance were generally considered efficient and legitimate However from an antitrust perspective coinsurance may raise competition concerns depending on the circumstances of each agreement In the case that there is enough capacity for one insurer to cover the potential risks the coinsurance might be considered as entering into a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC28

The first leniency applicant was exempted from fines

The other concrete companies were imposed a fine of CNY 180000

Facts

In December 2015 the concrete companies monopolistic agreement case investigated by Hunan AIC was published on SAICrsquos website

In accordance with the antitrust enforcement announcement of SAIC this case was triggered by complaints from the Yongzhou City peoplersquos congress After the preliminary review the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) initiated the formal investigation on seven concrete companies domiciled in Yongzhou City Hunan Province which were suspected of being involved in a monopolistic agreement in terms of division of the volumes of the products

After further investigation Hunan AIC found that the seven concrete companies concluded a partnership agreement in 2011 which requested the involved companies to enter into a partnership business with assets In addition according to the partnership agreement it was planned to establish a comprehensive office to manage production marketing and distribution of the products of all the partners The seven companies intended to jointly adjust and control the output of concrete based on the partnership agreement However because there were disagreements over the allocation of the injected assets and market shares the companies did not implement the partnership agreement The agreement was cancelled in December 2012

Based on the findings Hunan AIC concluded that the seven concrete companies as competitors of each other restricted and eliminated the competition in the relevant market through reaching the partnership agreement and dividing the volumes of sales which violated article 13(3) of the AML in terms of division of sales market Considering that the agreement had not been implemented and the limited influence of the agreement according to article 46 of the AML and article 27 of the Administrative Penalties Law small amount fines were imposed on the involved companies Six companies were fined CNY 30000 each for their illegal behaviour 28 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165504html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 31 of 52

Yongzhou Shuangyuan Building Materials Co Ltd as the first one to actively report the monopolistic agreement and cooperate with the enforcement authority was exempted from the punishment

Outlook

It is expected that the AMLrsquos enforcement on monopolistic agreements will continue in the future Industries such as automobile shipping pharmaceuticals insurance etc will still remain the priority of the antitrust enforcement

The antitrust enforcement authorities have published a series of regulations in order to clarify the substantial and procedural issues relevant to the antitrust enforcement However Chinarsquos current antitrust legislation regime is still immature In the following years we expect that more attention will be paid to the legislative improvements

Another remarkable issue for cartel members is that with more Chinese enterprises attaching increasing importance to the AML the follow-on civil damages actions might become a tendency in the future

C Abuse of Market Dominance

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen a decent increase of abuse of market dominance cases both in public enforcement and private litigation Oftentimes the authorities responsible for public enforcement generally find it difficult to pursue investigations against abuse of market dominance cases The following two main reasons are often cited to explain this standoff first it is hard for the authorities to define the relevant markets and prove the undertaking(s)rsquo dominant market position through economic approaches second it is hard to collect evidence regarding abusive practices

The cases related to IPRs abuse are emerging significantly particularly in the telecommunication media and technology (ldquoTMTrdquo) sectors

The SAICrsquos latest refusal-to-deal probe against a local drug maker shows that the SAIC and its local branches have increasingly acquired a profile as an abuse of dominance regulator

Significant Cases

Cases pursued by the SAIC

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 32 of 52

Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case29

Facts

The local authority in Dongfang city reported to the Hainan provincial branch of SAIC on April 23 2014 of the suspected dominance abuse The SAIC authorized its Hainan bureau to officially investigate the matter on 25 July 2014 according to a decision dated January 9 2015 The AIC concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its market dominance by requiring users to pay a deposit without any legal basis and or justifiable reasons

In terms of the relevant product market the local authority found that in this case it was the urban water supply market in Dongfang city and its surrounding townships where Dongfang Water was the sole public operator in the local water supply market with a 100 market share which made all water users completely reliant on the companyrsquos supply In term of market access the local authority found it very unlikely that there were other operators due to the strict regulations

The Hainan SAIC then concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its dominance as it charged users a deposit by threatening to refuse to register users and also by threatening to restrict the water supply Dongfang Waters charging of deposits lacked a legal basis and hadnt received government approval to the detriment of household consumers and business water users and hampered the improvement of management and services of the company Such conduct was in breach of Chinarsquos Anti-Monopoly Law

Hainan AIC levied a fine of CNY 593208 a lighter penalty equivalent to 2 of the companyrsquos annual sales for the previous year and confiscated illicit gains of CNY 38521 for abuse of market dominance

Analysis

It is noteworthy that although handled by a local authority supervised by the SAIC the antitrust agency detailed the relevant market definition the assessment of the dominant market position the abusive practices and the scrutiny of the justifiable reasons

Although the definition of the relevant market and the reasoning of the Hainan provincial AIC and the SAIC are subject to criticism it is still applausive to see that the antitrust regulators have realized the importance of the application of rule of reason in an abuse case In addition through itrsquos a published decision practitioners may observe the regulatorsrsquo reasoning and thus transparency and legal certainty have been generated

29 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzfcfjd201502t20150212_152066html last visited on October 18 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 33 of 52

Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms30

Facts

In June 2013 the Ningxia AIC under authorization of SAIC opened an antitrust investigation into the alleged tie-in sales by the three major state-owned telecommunications operators China Tietong China Unicom and China Telecom for the tie-in sale of fixed-line telephones with broadband Internet services The Ningxia AIC found that the three companies had bundled fixed-line phone services with Internet services to subscribers

During the investigation all three telecommunications companies admitted the tie-in practice had recognized that such practice had improper influence on competition and deprived the choices of consumers The three companies promised to undertake internal rectification timely and eliminate the ill effects resulting from such practice The parties committed to taking the following corrective measures

1) Taking internal rectifications and conducting training to staff about antitrust laws and stop tie-in sales practices

2) Making public commitments to allow subscribers a free choice of services and strengthening the propaganda through the operating room call centre and other channels

3) Unbundling fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

The Ningxia AIC decided to suspend the probe on 14 May 2015 on the grounds that the three companies had actively worked together with the investigators and proposed workable remedy plans

Analysis

In the official announcement Ningxia AIC concluded that the purpose of antitrust enforcement is to restrain monopolistic conducts the protection of competition and to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of consumers Given that during the investigation process the parties had actively cooperated with the investigation formed a more profound understanding of the dangers of tying behaviour and moreover the parties proposed and implemented positive corrective measures to be able to remove the ill impact of their actions the agency believed that the purpose of antitrust law enforcement was fulfilled

It is worth noting that the Ningxia AIC also required the three companies to implement the commitment by August 30 2015and the submission of the written

30 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158908html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158906html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158910html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 34 of 52

implementation report on July 102015 and August 102015 respectively which is another illustration that an effective commitment by the undertakings shall directly deal with the effect that is brought by the monopolistic behaviour In this case the effect of the monopolistic act was restricted to the choice of the consumers therefore the commitment by the undertaking aimed at allowing the freedom of choice and the unbundling of fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company31

Facts

The Liaoning AIC imposed a fine of approximately CNY 433m on the Fushun Branch of Liaoning Tobacco Co on 1 June 2015 The agency also ordered the company to stop its illicit behaviour

The Liaoning AIC received a tip-off that the accused Liaoning Tobacco Corsquos Fushun branch was conducting tie-in sales of non-high-demand cigarette brands with high-demand cigarette brands After gaining authorization from SAIC the agency officially started an investigation regarding the companyrsquos suspected abuse of market dominance in June 2014

Analysis

According to the announcement the tobacco company argued that the tobacco industry is a state controlled or monopolized industry with a lawful monopolistic position therefore the company shall not be subject to the norms of general market competition rules or the anti-monopoly law

In this regards the agency concluded that in terms of the status of the undertaking admittedly the first paragraph of article 17 of the AML says that the State shall protect the lawful business operations of undertakings in these industries with respect to the industries which are under the control of the State-owned economic sector and have a bearing on the lifeline of the national economy or national security and the industries which exercise monopoly over the production and sale of certain commodities according to law However the second paragraph continues to say that the undertakings mentioned above shall do business according to law be honest faithful and strictly self-disciplined and subject themselves to public supervision and they shall not harm the consumers interests by taking advantage of their position of control or their monopolistic production and sale of certain commodities In particular in the preceding paragraph the ldquolawful businessrdquo and ldquoaccording to lawrdquo imply that the AML shall apply in the business operation The agency therefore believes that

31 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201508t20150813_16

0208html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 35 of 52

there shall be no exemption for the undertaking concerned the defences of the undertaking concerned is not established

Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm32

Facts

The Chongqing AIC fined Chongqing Qingyang Pharmaceutical CNY 439308 for alleged dominance abuse

The investigation was initiated when the company contacted the agency for verification on its potential breach of the AML related to an allopurinol active pharmaceuticals ingredient (API) distribution agreement with its exclusive distributor The company provided the relevant agreement and information and the agency conducted an investigation into the company and some other relevant companies

Analysis

Relevant Market

During the investigation the agency found that pharmaceutical ingredients are a special commodity the API is used to produce the preparations The chemical API is only used for the production of the preparation and could be used as a medicine for clinic use

The preparation is produced according to the requirements of certain form of prepared drugs and for the purpose of treatment and prevention which can be used as medicine

The allopurinol is used for the common treatment of hyperuricemia However the other treatments are different in pharmacological effects or treatment effects as well as in the cost for the patient Furthermore the company is the only manufacturer and supplier in the market nationwide since July 2012 Therefore the agency concluded that the relevant market is the allopurinol API market

Considering that the qualification for manufacturing the allopurinol API is national wide and the normal practice for purchasers and suppliers is domestic the relevant geographic market is the Chinese market

The Market Dominance

During the investigation the agency found that the company is the only supplier and manufacturer of allopurinol API in China there is no other competitor in the

32 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151222_16

5152html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 36 of 52

market and the company has a monopoly in the market The evidence shows that the company has the ability to control the prices the position for the downstream is relatively weak

With respect to the market entry the agency found that the market entry is relatively high in addition other undertakings are dependent on the company Thus the agency believed the company to have market dominance

Refusal to Deal

The agency found that on September 25 2015 the company reached an exclusive agreement and distribution agreement with its distributor Based on these agreements the company didnrsquot supply allopurinol API to the said distributor and other companies despite the fact that those companies requested for allopurinol API but were turned down by the company

Absence of Reasonable Cause

The agency found that the companyrsquos refusal to deal was not in line with the needs of normal business operation or economic efficiency On the other hand the refusal to deal was aimed at increasing the market share of the allopurinol drug product Also the agency found that the stop of supply was a manipulation of market power as to maximize the profit to the most The agency further found that the exclusive distribution agreement with suspension of supply for six months and the refusal to supply was to eliminate and restrict the competition as to gain the monopolistic profit

The Consequence of Refusal to Deal

The agency concluded that the refusal to deal harmed the competition of the allopurinol preparations market Because of the suspension of supply many demanders had to reduce their production or switch to the supply of other products or stop their production The suspension of supply affected the competition of the downstream market Consequently the raising of the price of allopurinol API also raised the cost for other manufacturers of allopurinol preparations

Furthermore the refusal to deal led to capacity loss of the allopurinol preparation industry

Ultimately the refusal to deal increased the burden on consumers as the refusal to supply changed the supply-demand relationship in the market

The agency concluded that the Company abused its dominant position in the allopurinol API market by refusing to deal with intended buyers in the period between October 2013 and March 2014Therefore the Company violated article 17 (1) of the AML which prohibits business operators with a dominant market position from abusing that position such as the refusal to deal without any justifications

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 37 of 52

D Administrative Monopoly

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 witnessed antitrust authoritiesrsquo significant efforts regarding the enforcement against administrative monopoly According to Mr Dong Zhiming the deputy director general of Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly Bureau ever since the AML coming into force six cases in connection with administrative monopoly were investigated by NDRC and among them five cases were handled in the year of 2015 These cases touched abuses of administrative power in terms of designative deal in relation to transportation communication and pharmaceutical industries

The first private litigation related to administrative monopolistic acts was heard in the court which is a milestone case in the enforcement of the AML

Significant Cases

Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC33

Facts

In March 2015 the NDRC released the official letter to Shandong Provincial Department of Transportation (ldquoShandong DOTrdquo) on its website with respect to correct its abuse of administrative power to exclude and restrict competition

During the investigation the NDRC found that since 2011 Shandong DOT had issued multiple relevant government orders in order to require certain types of vehicles to be directly connected to two designated information and service platforms both of which are operated and technically supported by one company namely Shandong Jiutong Internet of Things Technology Co Ltd (ldquoJiutong ITTrdquo) Furthermore according to the orders issued by the competent administrative department all the vehicle satellite positioning terminals entering into Shandong provincial market should be debugged through the said technology service platform which is operated by the mentioned company In addition Shandong DOT released the cap prices of vehicle satellite positioning terminals which is identical to the 2012 bid-winning price in the Ministry of Transportation demonstration project

The NDRC believed that Shandong DOTrsquos behaviour eliminated and restricted the competition in the monitoring platform market and the vehicle terminal market deprived the right of transportation enterprises to choose vehicle terminals and monitoring platform on their owns unreasonably raised the sales prices of vehicle terminals and service fees charged by the platform and increased the costs of transportation enterprises Therefore the antitrust agency concluded that Shandong

33 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201503t20150327_668911html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 38 of 52

DOT violated article 8 of the AML which stipulates that ldquoadministrative organs and the public organizations with an administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude and restrict competitionrdquo Specifically Shandong DOT violated article 3234 in terms of requiring organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any designated operators and violated article 3735 in terms of setting rules with contents which eliminate and restrict competition

Based on article 51 of the AML ldquoWhere administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations abuse administrative powers performing activities which exclude and restrict competition the superior entity shall order it to correct impose administrative penalty on the chief officer and other staffs directly responsible pursuant to the laws The AML enforcement authority may give recommendations on disposal of activities to the relevant superior entityrdquo the NDRC proposed in writing that the Shandong provincial government should order Shandong DOT to rectify its behaviour with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Entirely open up the monitoring platform market by permitting transportation undertakings to freely choose any approved platform

2) Loosen the restrictions on the entry into Shandong vehicle terminals permit the undertakings to independently select the supplier of vehicle terminals and allow the qualified terminals to be connected to the relevant monitoring platform and

3) Revoke the official documentation relevant to the cap price of vehicle terminals in order to promote the price competition

Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 36

Facts

On 26 August 2015 the NDRC published its second decision with regard to the rectification of administrative monopoly since the beginning of this year According to the proposal letter sent to Anhui Provincial Government the investigation against the Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City (Bengbu HFPC) was trigged by third partiesrsquo complaints

34 Article 32 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to require organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any operators designated by them 35 Article 37 of the AML Administrative organs shall not abuse their administrative powers to set rules with contents which eliminate restrict competition 36 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201508t20150826_748682html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 39 of 52

The investigation suggests that Bengbu HFPC published three notices with regard to drugs procurement in April and May of this year

In the No C-2015-CG-X-111 Notice (ldquoNo111 Noticerdquo) released on 10 April2015 the health authority not only provided the dosage form and qualification of the requested drugs but also directly determined the suppliers of relevant drugs which eliminated and restricted the competition among pharmaceutical manufacturers and therefore violated articles 32 and 37 of the AML

In the No C-2015-CG-C-112 Notice (ldquoNo112 Noticerdquo) and No C-2015-CG-C-168 (ldquoNo 168 Noticerdquo) respectively released on 10 April and 22 May 2015 the Bengbu HFPC set discriminative qualification requirements on non-local undertakings in order to restrict their participation in the relevant bidding For instance in accordance with No 112 Notice to be a qualified bidder the turnover of non-local undertakings shall exceed CNY 2 billion which is 50 times as much as the turnover requirements of the local undertakings In the NDRCrsquos opinion the administrative monopoly activities conducted by the local health agency excluded the relevant undertakings from the market maintained the virtual-high prices of drugs and therefore violated articles 3237 and 37 of the AML

The NDRC suggested in a letter that Anhui Provincial Government should urge the Bengbu HFPC to rectify the abuse of monopoly powers with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Stop setting distinguishing restrictions on qualification requirements review standards and numbers of winning bidders as for local and non-local undertakings

2) Stop designating the suppliers of competitive drugs and

3) Take necessary measures to mitigate the negative effects resulting from the previous illegal monopolistic abuses

Outlook

At the beginning of the year the former director general of the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau under the NDRC Xu Kunlin stated that the agency would strengthen antitrust enforcement on abuse of administrative power in 2015

Since then the NDRC has made great efforts to rectify unreasonable abuses of administrative power The currently disclosed two cases investigated by the NDRC re-emphasize the Chinese Governmentrsquos strict scrutiny of antitrust issues in respect of

37 Article 34 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to restrict or reject the participation of operators from other regions in local bidding activities by measures such as prescribing discriminatory qualification requirements or assessment standards or by not publishing information according to law

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 40 of 52

administrative monopoly It reminds the local governments that antitrust compliance is of significant importance

III Private Litigation

A Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen more and more private antitrust litigations

The private antitrust litigation cases have become increasingly complicated especially the issues regarding the intersection areas of IP and antitrust law

Multinational giants and State-Owned Enterprises (the ldquoSOEsrdquo) are increasingly becoming the targets in antitrust civil litigations Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (the ldquoSMEsrdquo) tend to use the antitrust litigation to achieve their commercial goals in the business context

B Significant Cases

Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)38

This is the first-ever private litigation concerning administrative monopoly since the implementation of the AML in 2008

Facts

According to the currently disclosed details the case is relevant for designated trade

The plaintiff Shenzhen Sware Technology Co Ltd (ldquoSwarerdquo) is a software company The press releases suggest that Sware Gloden Software Co Ltd (ldquoGlodenrdquo) and Shanghai Ruban Software Co Ltd (ldquoShanghai Rubanrdquo) are the three main suppliers of construction cost software and possess the major shares of the relevant market An annual provincial vocational ability contest regarding the construction cost hosted by the Guangdong Department of Education (ldquoGuangdong DOE) designated Gloden as the exclusive supplier of the relevant software

After several unsuccessful verbal and written negotiations with Guangdong DOE in April 2014 Sware filed a lawsuit against Guangdong DOE before the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquothe Courtrdquo) alleging that the administrative organ abused its administrative power and violated the AML by designating exclusive software supplier for the contest and claimed a compensation for reasonable expense amounting to CNY 10800 Yuan

The opinions of the Court 38 The story of the case is available at httpfinancesinacomcnchinadfjj20150410074621924997shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 41 of 52

The full text of the judgment has not been disclosed yet In accordance with the information available to the public the Court invoked article 32 of the AML which prohibits an administrative organ from abusing its administrative power to require or in disguised form organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use only the commodities supplied by the entities designated by them The Court concluded that Guangdong DOE failed to prove the legitimacy of the designation and therefore abused its administration power

Currently the case is in appeal before the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court

Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 39

It is the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China

In the first instance ruling Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court ruled against Sinopec holding that the Yunnan branch of Sinopecs trading company was obligated to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its dominance in the sales market of refined oil by refusing to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding without justifiable reasons

In the second instance ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors Currently the case is pending

Facts

The First Trial

The lawsuit was filed before the Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoKunming Courtrdquo) in January 2014 Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy Co Ltd (ldquoYingdingrdquo) a bio-energy manufacturer claimed that Sinopec and the Yunnan branch of Sinopec trading company (ldquoSinopec Yunnan Branchrdquo) had failed to fulfil their obligations stipulated in the Renewable Energy Law and had abused their market dominance in sales market of refined oil by refusing to trade with Yingding without justifiable reasons

Sinopec and Sinopec Yunnan Branch mainly explained four reasons for why they rejected Yingdingrsquos biofuel Firstly Yingding had failed to prove that the biofuel complied with the relevant national standard and was safe to use Secondly Yingding had failed to provide complete trading terms Thirdly the laws and regulations regarding biofuel were incomplete the authorized refined oil sales companies were 39 The details of the case are available at httpnewsxinhuanetcomfortune2014-1217c_1113680039htm httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=9e71db51-6ff6-4d2c-8af6-8eacf023ebdeampKeyWord=E4BA91E58D97E79B88E9BC8E|E4B8ADE79FB3E58C96 httpnewsxinhuanetcomenergy2015-0422c_127721575htm httpwwwnbdcomcnarticles2015-04-23911348html last visited on December 17 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 42 of 52

obligated to purchase biofuel from the biofuel manufacturers if it met certain quality standards but there was a vacancy regarding how to reach the end consumers from the sales companies

On 8 December 2014 the Kunming Intermediate Peoples Court ruled that Sinopec Yunnan Branch bore a legal obligation to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its market dominance in refined oil market by refusing without any justifiable reasons to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding The court ordered Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network within 30 days Both Yingding and Sinopec filed appeals to the Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court

The Appellate Trial

The appeal hearing was held on 22 April 2015 in Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoYunnan Courtrdquo) Sinopec submitted 23 new pieces of evidence and introduced two expert witnesses in a bid to overturn several key elements in the first-instance ruling by Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court

In terms of the determination of the relevant market and the market dominance Sinopec argued that the relevant market in this case was for adipic acid monomethyl ester (ldquoAAMErdquo) the main ingredient of a biofuel additive known as BD100 Yingdingrsquos main product is BD100 which can be blended with fossil diesel to become biofuel In the AAME market Sinopec is a potential buyer instead of a market dominator In support of this argument Sinopec presented an expert witnessmdashGong Jiong a professor of economics at Beijings University of International Business and Economics who testified that AAME should be defined as the relevant product market on the basis of an economic analysis

However Yingding insisted that the first-instance ruling was correct in naming the sales market of refined oil as the relevant market and submitted new evidence an article on Sinopecs website that claimed it had a 67 market share in Yunnan to help establish the claim that Sinopec had market dominance

Another main dispute was whether Yingdingrsquos biofuel product met national standards which would make it mandatory for Sinopec to purchase under Chinas Renewable Energy Law The law stipulates that biofuel producers must sell their products first to an authorized refined oil sales company and the sales companies are obliged to buy the fuel if it meets certain quality standards In order to test the quality Sinopec introduced the second expert witness Lin Jianmin a leading author of Chinarsquos national biofuel standard Lin Jianmin pointed out that there are currently quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology which gives Sinopec a justifiable reason not to trade with Yingding Moreover Sinopec presented some precedents in which consumers had complained about the biofuel quality and also claimed that China didnt have a sound regulatory framework to support biofuel production neither in testing nor in sales

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 43 of 52

Nevertheless to refute this point Yingding referred to an earlier test in co-operation with Sinopec in 2011 where selected buses in Kunming used biofuel blended by Sinopec using BD100 produced by Yingding

On August 13 2015 Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors and now this case is pending In the written appellate ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court did not provide any details regarding its reasoning

Key Issues of the Case

Is there any competition between Yingding and Sinopec

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case the product of Yingding is biofuel while Sinopec does not engage in the business of biofuel From this perspective Yingding and Sinopec are not competitors Thus it is not necessary and not reasonable for Sinopec to eliminate or restrict the competition from Yingding

Relevant Market

The definition of the relevant market is a prerequisite to determine whether competition exists and whether the AML is applicable In accordance with the Judicial Interpretation of Antitrust civil litigation the plaintiff shall take the responsibility to prove the defendantrsquos dominance in the relevant market Also the methods of defining the relevant market are stipulated in the Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition (ldquoGuidelinesrdquo) However both Yingding and Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court defined the relevant market as the sales market of refined oil without sufficient antitrust analysis none of the methods in the Guidelines were used Therefore the definition of the relevant market remains arguable and needs to be sufficiently analysed in the upcoming retrial

Justifiable Reasons

The abuse of market dominance includes the behaviour of refusing to trade without justifiable reasons according to the AML but in the first instance ruling justifiable reasons were not investigated by the court During the appellate trial the expert witness introduced by Sinopec claimed that there were quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology and this was a justifiable reason to refuse to trade with Yingding Even though the first instance court and the appellate court did not reason the justifiable reason it should be discussed and investigated further during the retrial

AML or Renewable Energy Law

The claims of Yingding were based on both the AML and the Renewable Energy Law (ldquoRELrdquo) and the first instance ruling referred to both the AML and the REL as

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 44 of 52

well It seems that the laws the first instance court referred to were comprehensive but in fact the reasoning was not clear and logical In the first instance ruling some disputes regarding the AML were reviewed but all the orders were not based on the AML Specifically the first instance court ordered the Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network based on the REL and dismissed the other claims That the orders were not on account of reasoning is illogical It is anticipated that during the retrial the application of the laws will be clearer

Analysis

A lot of issues have not been clearly analysed by the courts such as the relevant market and the justifiable reasons Since the case is remanded the above-mentioned issues are expected to be resolved in the retrial In addition Yingding was in a disadvantaged position compared to its first instance trial since its claims based on the AML were challenged greatly during the appellate trial In the retrial it is probable that Yingding may switch its litigation strategy and base its claims on the REL Therefore maybe more preparation regarding the REL can give Sinopec a leg up

Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)

Rijing Electric a Chinese distributor seeks CNY 5m compensation

The first hearing was on 9 June 2015 and ended without a ruling

Facts

Rijing Electric (ldquoRijingrdquo) a Shanghai-based company and a former distributor for Panasonic accused Panasonic of abusing its dominance and dividing the market through monopolistic practice in an antitrust lawsuit filed in 2014 with Shanghai No 1 Intermediate Court (ldquoShanghai Courtrdquo) claiming compensation of CNY 5m (USD 815370) Wenzhou Mingda Automation System Co and Shanghai Qingying Automation Equipment as the distributor of Panasonic in China are the co-defendants were accused of conducting monopolistic behaviours by implementing Panasonicrsquos policy

The first hearing for evidence exchange was on June 9 2015 Rijing claimed a policy allegedly introduced by Panasonic in 2009 restricted the competition between distributors Panasonic claims the policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo and has full justifiable reasons It explained that the products in question required customization at considerable cost to distributors before its sale to customers Once carried out however other distributors leaving them open to quote much lower prices than the original distributor could simply and relatively cheap replicate this customization Besides Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and that the plaintiff had failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic said its market share for the four products

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 45 of 52

under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases Also Rijing failed to challenge the policy when it was first introduced instead initially agreeing it was reasonable as e-mail evidence submitted by Panasonic suggests

Key Issues of the Case

Whether Panasonic occupied a market dominant position

It is reported that Rijing claimed that Panasonic had abused its market dominance but Rijing failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and its market share for the four products under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases

Analysis

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case Panasonicrsquos policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo rather than to eliminate or restrict competition

Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals40 (Pending)

It is a battle over patent licensing issues

It is viewed as being among the most complicated antitrust lawsuits in China

The first hearing was on 17 and 18 December 2015

Facts

Four Chinese rare earth companies Ningbo Ketian Magnet Ningbo Permanent Magnetics Ningbo Tongchuang Strong Magnet Material and Ningbo Huahui Magnetic Industry filed antitrust lawsuits against Hitachi Metals over alleged patent licensing issues regarding rare earth magnets on December 11 2014 with the Ningbo Intermediate Peoples Court (ldquoNingbo Courtrdquo) in Zhejiang province As reported four Chinese rare earth companies claimed Hitachi Metals abused its market dominance and hurt the industry competition by refusing to license the patents to them The patents in this case are used in the manufacturing of sintered neodymium iron boron (ldquoNdFeBrdquo) magnets a rare-earth magnet alloy widely used in parts for airplanes automobiles and other products

Hitachi Metals filed a challenge with the Ningbo Court over its jurisdiction in April 2015 After Ningbo Court rejected Hitachi Metals jurisdiction objection on 28 April 2015 Hitachi Metals appealed to the Zhejiang High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoZhejiang

40The details of the story are available at httpwwwzbmagcomnews_viewphpid=80 httpwwwhitachicomcnaboutpress201510-121118_ahtml last visited on December 22 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 46 of 52

Courtrdquo) but Zhejiang Court affirmed the ruling of the Ningbo Court

The first day of a two-day hearing took place on 17 December 2015 during which the two sides cross-examined each otherrsquos evidence The evidence focused on clearing up several key elements in the case including the relevant market whether Hitachi Metals has dominance on that market and whether both sides acted in good faith during the licensing negotiations

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Product Market

The four Chinese rare earth companies claimed that the relevant product market should be the NdFeb-related patent licensing market However Hitachi Metals believed that the physical NdFeb market rather than the patent licensing market should be the relevant product market which is meaningful for assess the real competitive effects on the market

Whether Hitachi Metals occupies a dominant market position

In terms of market dominance Hitachi Metals claimed it does not occupy a dominant position because Hitachi Metalsrsquo patents were not in a standard in this case and there are substitutable technologies in the market SEP holders have the obligation to license on FRAND terms but none-SEP holders do not So while a refusal to license a SEP may constitute abuse of dominance refusal to license a non-SEP mdash even by a patent holder with a dominant position mdash should not be considered as an abuse

Analysis

Hitachi Metals as a patent holder should have the right to decide whether to retain those patents or not or who to license According to the legal theory the purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage and protect innovation by conferring monopoly right mdash that is to give intellectual property owners the proprietary rights which can exclude others from using the intellectual property The SEP holders admittedly need to comply with FRAND terms which can maintain a robust balance between competition and monopoly whereas the further intervention of antitrust law into non-SEP patents may undermine the purpose of intellectual property law To which extent the antitrust law should intervene is yet to be seen

Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei41

A confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the Beijing IP court made by the Beijing High Court

41 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcncpwswbjzscq201511t20151103_12225640htm last visited on December 28 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 47 of 52

Facts

On August 2 2013 the NDRC penalized Abbott for monopolistic price-fixing and then Abbott made a price adjustment in China where the prices of main products were reduced

On December 16 2014 Tian Junwei (ldquoTianrdquo) a Chinese citizen in Beijing sued Carrefour Shuangjing Branch (ldquoCarrefourrdquo) and Abbott (Shanghai) Sales Company (ldquoAbbottrdquo) at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (ldquoIP Courtrdquo) for their monopolistic price-fixing which damaged his interests However Carrefour and Abbott challenged the jurisdiction of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court They claimed there were two reasons Firstly according to the jurisdiction rules of the IP court issued by the Supreme Court the IP court has no jurisdiction over anti-trust cases Secondly if this case is a contractual dispute the court that is in the place of Carrefour should hear it if this case is a tort dispute the Shanghai Intermediate Court should hear it

In the ruling of the IP Court the IP Court decided it has the jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases for the following reasons According to the Provisions On Causes Of Action In Civil Cases issued by Supreme Court (最高人民法院案由规定) antimonopoly dispute is a tertiary cause of action belonging to IP and competition disputes Also according to the Provisions concerning the Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京

市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问题的规定 ) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was an IP and competition dispute and was sued after November 6 2014 Thus the IP Court had jurisdiction

Both Carrefour and Abbott appealed to the Beijing High Court over the jurisdiction ruling but the Beijing High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original ruling Reasons are listed in the written ruling issued on June 18 2015 Firstly the nature of the case was an antimonopoly dispute In accordance with Provisions of the Supreme Peoples Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民

事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) and Civil Litigation Law the monopolistic civil disputes in the first instance shall be under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Peoples Courts and an action involving a contractual dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the peoples court of the place where the defendant is domiciled or where the contract is performed Carrefour as the defendant in this case is domiciled in Chaoyang District Beijing Therefore the courts of Beijing have jurisdiction over this case Secondly according to article 3 of the Notification on the Jurisdiction of Intellectual Property Courts issued by Supreme Court (关于知识产权法院案件管辖

等有关问题的通知) IP courts have jurisdiction over first-instance civil disputes arising from monopolistic practices Lastly according to Provisions concerning the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 3 of 52

or restricting competition via IPR abuse the relationship between IPR and market dominance position the legal responsibilities and remedies as well as the scope of application

Chapter 2 outlines the basic analysis framework including its methodology analytical steps factors and competition effects

Chapter 3 relates to defining the relevant market including the general principle and circumstances where relevant technology market and relevant innovation market should be defined

Chapter 4 refers to monopolistic agreements involving IPR including factors that should be taken into account when analysing these agreements and related safe harbour regulations

Chapter 5 stipulates the circumstances regarding the abuse of market dominance in the exercise of IPRs including refusal to license tie-in sales and other unjustifiable transactions

Chapter 6 involves undertakingsrsquo concentration when exercising IPRs

Chapter 7 analyses certain special behaviour-types related to the exercise of IPRs from the antitrust perspective including standard-setting related activities injunction for standard essential patents (ldquoSEPrdquo) patent pooling and behaviour of copyright management organizations

It is reported that the SAIC has finished soliciting opinions from the US and EU chambers of commerce some major Western companies and law firms The SAICrsquos antitrust division will gather feedback on the sixth draft from relevant departments of the Chinese government competition organizations and antitrust scholars The draft will then be submitted to the AMC for review

C Legislation of NDRC

Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines

During the Annual Conference of China Automobile Dealers Association held in November 2015 one of the NDRC officials said that the first draft of Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines (ldquoAuto Antitrust Guidelinesrdquo) has been completed According to the official Auto Antitrust Guidelines consist of six sections respectively preface basic issues monopolistic agreement abuse of dominant position concentration of undertakings and supplementary articles Furthermore the official stated that vertical price restrictions on sales of new energy auto might be exempted during the promotion period

Auto Antitrust Guidelines will likely be released in 2016 by the State Council instead of the NDRC according to Wei Tongwei general secretary of the spare part

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 4 of 52

working committee under the China Automotive Maintenance and Repair Trade Association

Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses3

NDRC published a draft of the Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses on December 31 2015 NDRC noted that the consultation period for the draft guidelines run from 1 until 20 January 2016

The draft guidelines constitute five parts preamble basic issues IPR-related agreements that may eliminate or restrict competition IPR-related abuse of dominant position and concentration involving IPR

The draft guidelines cover antitrust issues related to joint RampD patent pool cross licensing standardization price restriction exclusive grant-back no-challenge clause exemption of agreements unfairly high royalty fees refusal to license tying sale imposing unreasonable transaction conditions discriminatory treatment and injunctive relief

The draft guidelines also include factors for determining whether the application of injunction orders by standard essential patent owners can lead to the elimination or restriction of competition such as whether the parties involved expressed their true intentions during negotiations

D Legislation of MOFCOM

The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases4

MOFCOM issued the Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases on February 6 2015 which took effect at the same time

Auto Sales Management Measures

MOFCOM posted a draft of the Auto Sales Management Measures (the ldquodraft Measuresrdquo) on its website on 6 January 2016 and is soliciting for comments until 6 February 2016 MOFCOM intends to implement this new rule to replace the current Auto Brand Sales Management Measures

According to the draft Measures any vehicle sales and related services engaged in the territory of China shall be abided by this rule The draft Measures consist of five parts which are the general principles code of conduct supervision and management penalty provision and bylaw

The Measures clearly provide that the departments of the commercial 3 The original Chinese notice published by NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201512t20151231_770233html 4 The original notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticlei20150220150200891361shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 5 of 52

administration under the State Council will be in charge of nationwide auto sales management

In the second part the draft Measures list the conducts in which a supplier shall not engage in These conducts include restricting distributors from reselling their products requesting distributors to share expenses for their own marketing activities restricting distributors from selling parts of other brands or providing after-sales services for other brands and so on Most of these conducts are deemed as vertical monopolistic agreements which are likely to induce anti-competitive effects in EU and US practices

As reported the Chinese government will make efforts to coordinate the Auto Antitrust Guidelines and the Measures-- two upcoming industry-specific regulations

II Public Enforcement

A Merger Control

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

With the increase in the number of cases been filed and reviewed it is recognized that MOFCOM has become one of the most important jurisdictions of merger control in the world

The simplified procedure has improved the efficiency of MOFCOMrsquos merger review in a large degree Most cases in simple procedure were concluded during the first phase However MOFCOMrsquos review time lasts longer in a few cases For instance MOFCOM spent 162 days to clear Toyota Industries Corps purchase of a 55 stake in Singaporean logistics company LT Wuliao Banyun Holdings setting a new record for the length of a simple case review

MOFCOM used to focus on horizontal deals but now also considers vertical and conglomerate mergers important In 2015 only 35 of the cases being reviewed were horizontal mergers

The increased number of administrative punishment on cases that failed to notify in 2015 demonstrates that MOFCOM has further strengthened its enforcement on this respect

The supervision of remedy implementation has become ldquoroutinizedrdquo

All divisions of MOFCOMrsquos antitrust bureau are responsible for case reviewing from the end of 2015 with the aim to improve the work efficiency

The international cooperation between antitrust enforcement authorities with respect to merger controls happens more frequently On 15 October 2015 the competition department of EU Commissions (ldquoCommissionrdquo) and MOFCOM

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 6 of 52

have signed best practices for cooperation on reviewing mergers in Beijing As the Commissionrsquos officer says the growing number of international transactions is the main reason for this cooperation In addition the Commission also signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the NDRC and SAIC in 2012 which creates a dedicated framework to strengthen cooperation and coordination5

Statistics

From January of 2009 to the end of 2015 MOFCOM received 1445 cases and accepted 1364 cases Among the reviewed cases MOFCOM has cleared 26 deals with remedies since the AML took effect in 2008 with an average review time of 199 days

In 2015 MOFCOM accepted 338 cases out of which 332 were concluded including 18 cases dealing with applicants withdrawing merger filings The agency also imposed penalties on business operators in 9 cases that were related to failure to fulfil merger filing obligations

246 cases out of 332 cases in 2015 obtained MOFCOMrsquos approval in the first phase accounting for 74 of all reviewed cases

Of the cases cleared by MOFCOM in 2015 56 were related to manufacturing such as automotive components and parts vessels machinery manufacturing and electrical equipment

Acquisitions and joint-venture agreements were the most common types of transactions accounting for 87 of all deals Meanwhile joint ventures were still the most common channel for foreign investment in China

Significant Cases

GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions6

This is the first case in which MOFCOM agreed to remove a remedy imposed on a merger

MOFCOM partially removed the restrictions on Google based on the fact that Google had lost its control of Motorola Mobility

Facts

Google applied to MOFCOM on December 1 2014 to remove the condition that required Google to treat all original equipment manufacturers (ldquoOEMsrdquo) equally in android platform-related business after it bought Motorola

5 The original notice published by EC is available at httpeuropaeurapidpress-release_IP-15-5843_enhtml 6 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150120150100862331shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 7 of 52

The concerned remedy was imposed by MOFCOM according to its No 25 Announcement in 2012 which concerned Googlersquos acquisition of Motorola Mobility together with three other remedies as the following

1) Google will license the Android Platform on a free and open basis as it had done so far

2) Google shall continue to observe the existed FRAND obligation of Motorola Mobility in respect of the latterrsquos patents and

3) Google shall delegate an independent supervisor to supervise its performance according to the Provisional Regulations on the Disposal of the Undertakingrsquos Assets or Business in the Concentration stipulated by MOFCOM in 2010

The No 25 Announcement provided that the applied remedies would be valid for five years starting from its punishment unless Google no longer controls Motorola Mobility

Google lodged the remedy removal application based on the fact that Lenovo concluded its acquisition of Motorola Mobility from Google which had been approved by MOFCOM on October 16 2014 and closed on October 30 2014 and due to this acquisition Google lost its control of Motorola Mobility

Decision

After careful examination MOFCOM noted that upon completion of the MotorolaLenovo deal Google would not be engaged in any business of manufacturing smartphones but would keep the telecommunications patent technologies of Motorola Mobility

Based on this fact on January 6 2015 MOFCOM issued a notice that it had decided to approve Googlersquos application to remove one of the remedies with the other remedies remaining in place

AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery7

The transaction is related to a conditionally cleared merger case

The concentration parties notified the deal to MOFCOM following No 95 Announcement in 2008

Considering the slight increase of AB InBevrsquos shareholdings in Zhujiang Brewery MOFCOM approved the proposed transaction

Facts

7 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150820150801090985shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 8 of 52

On July 23 2015 Interbrew Investment International a fully owned subsidiary of AB InBev Guangzhou State-owned Assets Development Holdings and Guangzhou Securities entered into an agreement with Zhujiang Brewery to subscribe the latterrsquos new shares According to this agreement Interbrew Investment International would subscribe shares worth up to CNY 16 billion

Pursuant to a MOFCOM antitrust notice issued in 2008 if AB Inbev intended to further increase its stake in Zhujiang Brewery a filing should be submitted to MOFCOM before any deal were to be concluded

On July 29 2015 AB InBev submitted the filing for the deal to MOFCOM

Decision

MOFCOM noted that upon this subscription Interbrew Investment International would increase its stake in Zhujiang Brewery from 2562 to 2999 Since the stake increase is relatively small and will not result in material changes regarding the control of Zhujiang Brewery MOFCOM decided to approve the deal on 20 August 2015

MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases

MOFCOM reached these decisions based on the undertakingsrsquo failure to file notifications

None of these concentrations were determined as resulting in anti-competition effects

MOFCOM considered that a 35 shares acquisition could lead to the obtaining of control power over a company

Complaints from the third party are the main channel of triggering investigation on unnotified concentrations

The undertakings were fined up to RMB 200000 which is less than the imposed penalty (RMB 300000) in the last year and the maximum penalty (RMB 500000) for violations of merger control rules

Facts

On September 29 2015 MOFCOM issued notices regarding the penalty on four concentration dealings because the concerning undertakings failed to notify these dealings to MOFCOM before closing them Details of these notices are as follows

Shanghai Fosun Pharmaceutical (Group) Co Ltd has been imposed a fine of CNY 200000 (USD 31431) because of its failure to notify MOFCOM regarding its

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 9 of 52

acquisition of a 35 stake in Suzhou Erye Pharmaceutical Co Ltd (Suzhou Erye) and the target stake was transferred without MOFCOMrsquos allowance8

Fujian Electronics amp Information (Group) has been imposed a fine of CNY 150000 (USD 23568) for its failure to notify a 35 stake acquisition of Shenzhen CHINO-E Communication MOFCOM made this decision based on the fact that Fujian Electronics signed a transfer agreement with CHINO-Ersquo shareholders and completed this transaction without filing9

Bestv New Media and Microsoft have been imposed CNY 200000 (USD 31420) fines by MOFCOM since they did not lodge a merger review filling regarding their joint venture E-Home Entertainment Development which was established on October 1 201310

CSR Nanjing Puzhen and Bombardier Transportation Sweden have been fined CNY 150000 (USD 23562) respectively due to their failure to notify their proposed joint venture prior to setting it up These companies made an agreement about the joint venturersquos establishment on November 3 2014 and its business license was obtained on November 11 201411

MOFCOM identified that the above dealings shall be notified according to the fact that all of these dealings constituted concentration and turnovers of these concentrating undertakings reached the statutory turnover thresholds

Article 20 of the AML stipulates three kinds of concentration which are (i) a merger of undertakings (ii) an acquisition of control of other undertakings by acquisition of shares or assets with voting right of other undertakings to an adequate extent (iii) an acquisition of control of other undertakings or the capability of imposing determinative effects on other undertakings by contracts or other means

Article 3 of the Provisions of the State Council on the Thresholds for Concentration Notification of Undertakings provides the fillingrsquos thresholds which are as follows (i) The collective worldwide turnovers of all undertakings involved in the last fiscal year exceed CNY 10 billion and the turnovers within China of at least two undertakings each exceed CNY 400 million or (ii) The collective turnovers of all undertakings involved in the last fiscal year exceed CNY 2 billion (approximately USD 294 million) and the China-wide turnovers of at least two undertakings each exceed CNY 400 million (approximately USD CNY588 million)

These undertakings were penalized because of their violations of article 21 of the 8 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150920150901124896shtml 9 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150920150901124887shtml 10 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150920150901124903shtml 11 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150920150901124899shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 10 of 52

AML which provides that the concentration reaching the filling thresholds shall be notified to MOFCOM prior to its implementation and without this notification it shall not be conducted In addition according to article 48 of the AML and article 13 of the Interim Measures for Investigating and Punishing of Concentration of Undertakings Failing to File Notification an undertaking which is identified by MOFCOM for implementing a concentration without filling would be imposed a fine and instructed to recover the situation by MOFCOM The amount of this fine could be no more than CNY 500000

There is no provision that specifically describes the behaviour of implementing a concentration In practice obtaining a business license transferring the entity of assets delivering the shares and assigning directors or managers are likely to be deemed as the implementation of concentration

According to Shang Ming the former director general of MOFCOMrsquos Anti-monopoly Bureau so far MOFCOM has already penalized 15 companies for failing to notify MOFCOM regarding merger reviews MOFCOM has noticed an increase in companies shirking merger-filing responsibilities and has therefore intensified enforcement

MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent12

MOFCOM defines all of the information and communication technology SEPs as the relevant product market rather than divides each of them into the individual market

In the process of competition analysis MOFCOM evaluates various factors rather than comparing the market shares only which is consistent with the complexity and flexibility of the high-technology industry

In the process of formulating remedies MOFCOM pays more attention on protecting Chinese downstream companies and enhancing its supervision

Facts

On April 15 2015 Nokia Oyi (ldquoNokiardquo) signed a Memorandum of Understanding regarding the acquisition of Alcatel Lucent (ldquoAlcatelrdquo) According to this memorandum Nokia intends to acquire 100 shares of Alcatel through a tender off

A notification about this deal was filed on April 21 2015 and accepted by MOFCOM on June 15 2015 After reviewing this case MOFCOM moved it to Phases II and Phase III as the agency was of the opinion that this acquisition could have anti-competitive effects on the relevant market

12 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151020151001139743shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 11 of 52

On October 19 2015 MOFCOM cleared this deal with four behavioural remedies

Decision

Relevant Market

In the agencyrsquos view there are four relevant product markets which are the radio access network market the core network systems market the network infrastructure service market and the information and communication technology SEP licensing market Meanwhile the relevant geographical market is primarily the Chinese market

Competition Analysis

According to MOFCOM this deal would have no anti-competitive effects on the first three relevant product markets in China while it could constitute an obstacle or limit the competition in the information and communication technology SEP licensing market

The agency consideredafter the deal that Nokia would increase its holding in 2G 3G and 4G SEPs and strengthen the degree of concentration in the information and communication technology SEP licensing market If it refused to license charged overly high royalty fees or conducted any other anti-competitive behaviour the competition of downstream market would be distorted which would most likely impair customersrsquo interests in the end

Remedies

Four behavioural remedies focusing on maintaining fair licensing of standard-essential patents (ldquoSEPsrdquo) were imposed on Nokia which are

1) On a reciprocal basis Nokia commits to not use injunctions to prevent enforcements of FRAND (fair reasonable and non-discriminatory) encumbered SEPs unless the potential licensees are unwilling to sign FRAND licensing agreements and follow the terms

2) If Nokia transfers its SEPs to a third party it shall inform Chinese licensees as well as Chinese companies that are actively engaging in licensing negotiation about the transfer details

3) Nokia will only transfer its SEPs to a new owner on the basis that the new owner accepts the existing FRAND commitments made by Nokia

4) MOFCOM has the right to monitor the implementation of Nokiarsquos commitments Nokia shall report to MOFCOM about the implementation of the conditions within 45 days of the end of each calendar year The reporting obligation will last five years until October18 2020

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 12 of 52

Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions13

Western Digital had engaged in two conducts that violated the remedies provided in the No 9 Announcement in 2012 issued by MOFCOM

Western Digital lodged an application to remove certain restrictions in March 2014 and the agency made the decision on October 19 2015

MOFCOM considered the fact that the competition condition in the relevant product market has changed and decided to remove the hold-separate restrictions related to manufacture and RampD

Facts

In 2012 Western Digital Corporation (ldquoWestern Digitalrdquo) intended to acquire 100 shares of Viviti Technologies Ltd (ldquoViviti Technologiesrdquo) which was the holding company of Hitachi Global Storage Technologies Netherlands BV and Hitachi Global Storage Technologies Singapore Pte Ltd and engaged in the hard disk business

On April 2 2011 Western Digital filed a notification for this acquisition MOFCOM issued the No 9 Announcement in March 2012 and cleared this acquisition with six remedies According to this announcement Western Digital could apply for the removal of the first and second remedy after this decision has been carried out for 24 months

The first remedy refers to maintaining the Viviti Technologies as an independent competitor and the second remedy requires both Western Digital and Viviti Technologies to make a reasonable plan of their capacity and production and report these data to the trustee

Western Digital lodged an application to remove the first and second remedy in March 2014 MOFCOM found that Western Digital had engaged in two conducts that violated the first remedy and the competitive situation in the hard disk market had changed After talking with Western Digital collecting opinions from the relevant entities and delegating the independent party to make an economic evaluation MOFCOM decided to remove the hold-separate remedies partially

Western Digitalrsquos implementation of the duties imposed in the No 9 Announcement

Based on the implementation reports submitted by Western Digital and the monitoring reports submitted by the trustee MOFCOM found that Western

13 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151020151001139040shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 13 of 52

Digital had engaged in two conducts that violated the first remedy Those were

1) On March 8 2012 Western Digital consolidated Hitachi Global Storage Technology (ldquoHGSTrdquo) which was Vivitirsquos subsidiary in US

2) In January 2013 Western Digital dissolved the development division of VivitiHGST and transferred the relevant workforce to Western Digital

MOFCOM considered that these conducts impaired the independence of Viviti as a competitor so that it imposed CNY 300000 fines on each of these behaviours and requested Western Digital to rectify the situation As per the entrusted supervisorrsquos report such behaviours have been rectified and the first remedy has been fulfilled

According to MOFCOMrsquos announcement the agency found that other remedies have been entirely implemented

Competition Analysis

With respect to the current situation of the competition in the hard disk market MOFCOM made the following assessment

1) In the areas of portable application and corporate-level application solid-state drive has put constraint on the impact of the traditional hard disk as to strengthen the competition in the relevant market

2) Overcapacity problems in the conventional hard disk drive market became obvious

3) Western Digital and HGST are the major competitors in the hard disk drive market Both the layout and the major market competitors in this market have remained unchanged since 2012

4) The hold-separate duties restricted the full competition between Western Digital and HGST The implementation of such duties hindered them from integrating their products and providing the market with a full range of products and had an adverse impact on their clientsrsquo product procurement

Based on the above analysis MOFCOM deemed that

1) Removal of the conditions that required the two companies to remain independent in production and RampD activities would enable Western Digital to save costs to provide a full range of products to the market and to fully engage in market competition and benefit its clients

2) To keep the two sales teams and their respective brands independent from each other and the independence of sales activities could reduce competition restraint impacts arising from a complete merger

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 14 of 52

Remedies

After negotiating with MOFCOM the relevant entities agreed to undertake the following obligations

1) Western Digital and HGST will remain independent in sales and brands

2) Western Digital will not change its previous business modes or force its clients to exclusively purchase hard disk drive products from Western Digital or do so in disguise

3) Western Digital will continue its pace in investing in product innovation to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

This announcement will be effective within two years from the date of issuance If Western Digital can provide sufficient evidence to prove a substantial change in the market environment the company can propose to MOFCOM to remove the relevant conditions within the two years

SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions14

MOFCOM considered the fact that the competition condition in the relevant product market has changed and removed the hold-separate restrictions on Seagate and Samsung

Seagate shall remain its business model materially and continue to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

Facts

On December 12 2011 MOFCOM made the No 11 Announcement to clear Seagate Technology LLCrsquos (ldquoSeagaterdquo) acquisition with remedies In this acquisition Seagate intended to acquire hard disk drive business of Samsung Electronics Co Ltd (ldquoSamsung HDDrdquo) As per this announcement Seagate could apply for removing the first and second remedy after this decision has been carried out for 12 months

The first remedy is to preserve Samsung HDD as an independent competitor and the second remedy asks to maintain and expand Samsung HDDrsquos production capacity within six months of issuance of the No 11 Announcement and to set reasonable production volume targets based on market supply-demand conditions

Seagate lodged an application to remove the first and second remedy in May 2015 After making assessments on the relevant parties and the competition circumstance MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate remedies

14 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151020151001144105shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

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Competition Analysis

With respect to the current situation of the competition in the hard disk drive market MOFCOM made the following assessments

1) In the areas of portable application and corporate-level application solid-state drive has put constraint on the impact of the traditional hard disk so that the competition in the relevant market has been strengthened

2) Overcapacity problems in the conventional hard disk drive market became obvious

3) Both the layout and the major market competitors in the hard disk drive market have remained unchanged since 2012

4) Seagate and Samsung HDDrsquos market overlap in the hard disk market is quite small and Samsung HDDrsquos competition in the traditional hard disk is quite weak

Based on the above analysis MOFCOM deemed that

1) Removal of certain conditions is possible because in the portable application and corporate level application sectors competition constraint of solid-state drive on traditional hard disk drives has strengthened traditional hard disk drives are facing overcapacity which has reduced the chance of a single or more competitors causing competition restraints Seagate has limited overlap with Samsung in the hard disk business and the latter has a relatively weaker market power in the hard drive disk business

2) Removal of all imposed conditions may still restrain market competition because the traditional hard disk drive market competition conditions have not undergone a major change Seagate is still the major player in all divisions of the market and Seagate will strengthen its power after the acquisition of Samsung HDD

Remedies

After negotiating with MOFCOM Seagate agreed to undertake the following obligations

1) Seagate shall not change its business model materially or force clients to purchase hard drive disks exclusively from it

2) Seagate shall not force Tokyo Dengikagaku Kogyo China to supply magnetic heads exclusively to Seagate (or other Seagate-controlled companies) or limit the number of magnetic heads Tokyo Dengikagaku Kogyo China would supply to other hard drive disk manufacturers

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 16 of 52

3) Seagate shall continue to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

This announcement will be effective within two years from the date of issuance If Seagate can provide sufficient evidence to prove substantial change in the market environment the company can propose to MOFCOM to remove relevant conditions within the two years

FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM15

MOFCOM deems that this acquisition would induce anti-competitive influence

NXP promises to dispose its radio frequency (ldquoRFrdquo) power transistor business

As the first case approved with structural remedies after the enactment of the Provisions on Imposing Restrictive Conditions MOFCOM conducted a comprehensive evaluation of the viability competitiveness and marketability of the divested business as well as the suitability of potential buyers

Facts

On April 3 2015 NXP filed for its acquisition of Freescale NXP Semiconductor (ldquoNXPrdquo) is a NASDAQ-listed company registered in the Netherlands which engages in the design manufacturing and sale of integration circuits and discrete components

Freescale Semiconductor (ldquoFreescalerdquo) is a New York-listed company registered in Bermuda and based in the US which engages in the manufacturing and RampD of microcontroller and digital networking processors (embedded processors)

According to the agreement between NXP and Freescale after closing Freescale will become the wholly owned subsidiary of NXP On November 25 2015 MOFCOM decided to clear this acquisition with remedies

Relevant Market

As per the announcement the relevant product markets are the general microcontroller automotive power-use analog integrated circuit and RF transistor product markets in which NXP and Freescale have horizontal overlap The relevant geographical markets should be the global market

Competition Analysis

After assessing this proposed deal the agency concluded that

1) The proposed deal would boost NXPrsquos market control power in the RF

15 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151120151101196182shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 17 of 52

transistor product market because the global and Chinese RF transistor product markets share a similar structure both featuring few competitors and high concentration levels Freescale and NXP as the number one and number two players are far ahead of their rivals in the market Therefore after closing the market control power of NXP in this market would be strengthened

2) Since Freescale was the fiercest competitor of NXP the proposed deal will remove competition between them

3) The proposed deal would reduce the options for clients and increase procurement risks

In practice the wireless infrastructure suppliers as the main client of the RF transistor product tend to procure products from both NXP and Freescale to prevent them from the risk arising from relying on one supplier

4) The proposed deal may induce an adverse impact on the technology RampD and innovation

Remedies

In accordance with MOFCOMrsquos decision NXP shall follow its written commitment submitted to MOFCOM and completely divest its RF power transistor business to Beijing Jianguang Asset Management At the same time NXP shall strictly fulfil its obligations during the transition period It is worth noting that the NXPFreescale deal shall only be implemented after the divestment deal has been concluded

In addition MOFCOM requires NXP to perform relevant obligations during the transition period from the date of approval announcement until the divestment deal has been concluded NXP shall endeavour

1) not to engage in any lsquounfair trade practicesrsquo relating to the divested business

2) not to implement any acts which may have a significant adverse impact on the value management or competitiveness of the divested business or any acts which may change the nature and scope industry or business strategy or investment policy of the divested business and to take reasonable measures to encourage core employees to stay in the divested business as well as not to seek or transfer employees to NXPrsquos non-divested business

3) to ensure supply to the divested business in a fair reasonable and non-discriminatory manner and

4) to maintain the independence of the divested business and not to exchange competitively sensitive information between the parties and the divested

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 18 of 52

business

B Monopolistic Agreements

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

With respect to the enforcement activities of the NDRC in light of the numbers of the published cases it seems that the law enforcement frequency of the NDRC regarding monopolistic agreements in 2015 is lower in comparison with 2014

The reason behind might be that the outstanding issue of human resource deficit of the antitrust authority still exists Besides the fact that more enterprises gradually attach increasing importance to the antitrust compliance might be another reason for the decrease in the number of cases investigated by the authorities

As to the enforcement activities of the SAIC 4 of 14 cases concluded by the SAIC and its local branches in 2015 are relevant to monopolistic agreements Meanwhile these four cases concern horizontal monopolistic agreements

It is noteworthy however that the Mercedes-Benz case and the Dongfeng Nissan case suggest that vertical agreements especially involving price-related restrictions on the downstream dealers is still the priority of antitrust enforcement Companies shall be very cautious when imposing restrictions on the resale prices or the minimum resale prices of commodities in the distribution agreements

Automobile industry and related industries are observed to be under continuous attention of Chinarsquos antitrust authorities

The industries relating to peoplersquos livelihoods remain to be the enforcement priority

Significant Cases

Enforcement by the NDRC and its local branches

Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC16

The investigation was triggered by a leniency application

The first leniency applicant was exempted from punishment

Eight ocean shipping companies involved were imposed a collective fine of CNY 4067 million

NDRC spent approximately 12 months to investigate and conclude the case 16 NDRCrsquos press release of the case is available at httpjjsndrcgovcngzdt201512t20151228_769084html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 19 of 52

Facts

In December 2015 the NDRC published its official punishment decisions regarding the cartel case in connection with eight ocean shipping companies namely Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha (ldquoNYKrdquo) Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha (ldquoK Linerdquo) Mitsui OSK Lines EUKOR Car Carriers Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics Compantildeiacutea Sud Americana de Vapores Eastern Car Liner and Compantildeiacutea Chilena de Navegacioacuten Interoceaacutenica

According to the official press release of the NDRC the investigation was triggered by a leniency application of NYK The evidence showed that the eight companies reached consensus on non-intrusion of each others existing business to maintain or increase shipping fees when shipping goods such as cars trucks and engineering machinery in the routes between China and other countries and regions

They were also found to frequently conduct bilateral or multilateral communications on the shippersrsquo invitation for bids andor price inquiries via phone conferences dinner parties e-mails visiting etc In addition they also conducted illegal behaviour such as sensitive information exchange price negotiations bidding intention discussion dividing clients and shipping routes reaching agreements on high price bids or non-bidding in order to help certain companies gain shipping orders

To avoid the regulation of the antitrust authority the relevant shipping companies adopted various illicit measures that showed their apparent intention to violate the AML The cartel lasted for at least four years and covered a broad range of shipping routes concerned with the import and export of products between China and other regions such as North America EU South America and so on involving multiple auto brands and engineering machinery brands

The NDRC held the opinion that the eight companies conducts had restricted and eliminated competition in the relevant market raising the international shipping fees and impairing interests of shippers and end consumers The eight companies breached the AML by reaching and implementing monopolistic agreements on fixing prices and dividing the market

All eight investigated companies put forward remedy measures including enhancing the antitrust compliance program arranging more antitrust compliance trainings and developing antitrust compliance technologies

The NDRC imposed fines based on the nature level and duration of their monopolistic volations as well as their respective sales of international freight service sales relevant to the Chinese market The companies involved were collectively fined CNY 4067 million

NYK as the first cartel member voluntarily reporting the illegal conducts to the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 20 of 52

authority and providing significant evidence was entirely exempted from the punishment K Line as the second leniency applicant was imposed a fine amounting to 4 of its 2014 annual sales of international freight services relevant to Chinarsquos import and export market The details of punishments imposed on the involved companies by the NDRC are as follow

Company Name Amount of Fines (RMB million)

Percentage of the Relevant Turnovers

Grounds

Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha

- - First leniency applicant

Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha

2398 4 Second leniency applicant

Mitsui OSK Lines 3812 7 Third leniency applicant

EUKOR Car Carriers 284 9 Lasted over a long period involved many brands and many violations violations were severe

Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics

4506 8 Lasted over a long period involved many brands and many violations violations were severe

Compantildeiacutea Sud Americana de Vapores

308 6 Lasted over a long period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Eastern Car Liner 1127 5 Lasted over a long period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Compantildeiacutea Chilena de 120 4 Lasted over a long

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 21 of 52

Navegacioacuten Interoceaacutenica

period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Total 4067

Analysis

In this case the agency applied the AML instead of the Tenders and Bids Law to collusive bidding Citing article 13 (3) of the AML the NDRC identified that the collusive bidding constituted a division of the sales market

The leading three leniency applicants were granted exemption from fines to a varying degree

According to the official who handled this case dawn raids performed by antitrust enforcement agencies in other jurisdictions drew the attention of the NDRC on the cartels of these shipping companies However there was limited effective evidence to prove that the companies had reached monopolistic agreements Through pressuring the involved parties three members of the shipping cartel actively confessed their illegal conduct This case once again stresses the significance of international cooperation between antitrust enforcement agencies

Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau17

The distribution agreements between Mercedes-Benz and its dealers are determined as vertical monopolistic agreement and Mercedes-Benz violated article 14 of the AML because it restricted the ability of its dealers to decide their own resale prices

Mercedes-Benzrsquos dealers violated article of 13 of the AML due to concluding a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Mercedes-Benz and its dealers were jointly fined CNY 3578 million

Facts

In April 2015 Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau which is the provincial branch of the NDRC released the punishment on its website and announced that it had imposed a fine of CNY 350 million on Mercedes-Benz along with the aggregated fine of CNY 787 million on its dealers The fine came as a result of Mercedes-Benz reaching and implementing resale price maintenance (ldquoRPMrdquo) agreements with dealers to fix the minimum resale price of several car models as well as certain auto parts 17 The original Chinese notice published by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau is available at httpwwwjswjjgovcnoffice_neweo_comm_zxnrxsphp

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 22 of 52

According to the decision the authority found that Mercedes-Benz fixed the minimum resale price of Class E and Class S cars in Nanjing Wuxi Changzhou and Suzhou markets through telephoneverbal communication and dealers meetings from January 2013 to July 2014 Since 2010 Mercedes-Benz had reached agreements with dealers in Jiangsu province to fix the minimum resale prices for auto parts by providing different levels of discounts for insured cars cars involving expired warranty periods and cars within the warranty period

In addition Mercedes-Benz implemented the minimum resale price maintaining agreement by

1) Tightening its monitoring measures on the dealers such as inspecting deals and their sale incentive system on a weekly basis

2) Tracking the sales process flow of cars and increasing the intensity of this assessment

3) Giving warnings and reducing support ndash for example halting the supply of bestselling cars and prohibiting the opening of new stores ndash to dealers if dealers refused to cooperate with the price-fixing related policies and measures and

4) Interviewing personnel of the dealers and requesting terminations if the staff engaged in serious violations of the RPM agreement

Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau concluded that Mercedes-Benz had excluded and eliminated market competition harmed consumer welfare and consequently violated article 1418 of the AML The authority therefore imposed a fine of CNY 350 million representing 7 of the sale revenue of the previous year in the relevant market against Mercedes-Benz and imposed a fine on the dealers amounting to an equivalence of 1 of the annual sales in the previous year

Analysis

Although the agency also addressed the horizontal violation among the dealers in this case the administrative penalty decision mainly focuses on the vertical violation The agency fined dealers involved in the RPM agreement a combined CNY 787 million equal to 1 of the previous-year sales which suggests that the agency decided to give lighter punishments to dealers who took initiative in reporting the activity and provided evidence

The Mercedes-Benz case is the third case where the agency successfully 18 Article 14 of the AML The following monopolistic agreements between operators and trading partners shall be prohibited (i) fixing the resale prices of commodities to third persons (ii) restricting the minimum resale prices of commodities to third persons (iii) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement Authority under the State Council

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 23 of 52

discovered both vertical and horizontal agreements in a case following the Audi case and the Chrysler case All these cases are rooted in the same industry indicating that industrial features play a large role in raising anti-trust concerns In fact it appears that the entire automotive industry is under antitrust scrutiny

Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC19

This case involved both a horizontal agreement and an administrative monopoly

A total fine of CNY 1318 million was imposed on the involved companies

Facts

In June 2015 the NDRC through its website announced the decision made by its regional branch -Yunnan Provincial Development and Reform Commission (ldquoYunnan DRCrdquo) regarding the horizontal monopolistic agreement case involving Yunnan Communications Administration and local subsidiaries of four state-owned telecommunication companies

Through the investigation Yunnan DRC found that Yunnan Communications Administration as a competent government agency had organized several meetings involving Yunnan branches of four state-owned telecoms - China Mobile China Telecom China Unicom and China Tietong in August and September of 2014 At the end of 2009 the four local branches entered into an agreement to regulate their sales promotions in terms of limiting the promotional items amount and frequency

Furthermore the agreement provides certain measures to ensure the implementation of relevant restrictions on promotions Specifically in case any cartel member violates the agreement the others could file complaints with Yunnan Communications Administration and the agency would then issue a rectification notice to the rule-breaker

Yunnan DRC stated that the four telecoms were main competitors in the relevant market and the promotions as a significant competition measure would exert direct influence on the final prices of the products The horizontal agreement organized by Yunnan Communications Administration on sales promotions restricted the competition capacity of telecoms and as a result eliminated the competition in the relevant market Consequently the behaviour of Yunnan Communications Administration violated article 8 20 of the AML and constituted administrative monopoly in terms of ldquoforcing undertakings to conduct monopolistic behaviour prohibited by the AMLrdquo

19 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpwwwsdpcgovcnfzgggzjgjdyfldjjszhdt201506t20150602_694802html 20 Article 8 of the AML Administrative organs and the public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 24 of 52

With respect to the penalties Yunnan DRC fined the local branch of China Tietong CNY 200000 for reaching but not implementing the agreement in regards to the other three telecoms a total fine of CNY 1298 million amounting to 2 of the sales of the relevant business in the previous year were imposed for entering into and implementing the horizontal monopolistic agreement

Analysis

The telecoms industry is still the enforcement priority of the antitrust enforcement authorities A company cannot be exempted from punishment even though it is forced by competent authorities to conduct monopoly behaviour

DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC21

Both a horizontal monopolistic agreement and a vertical monopolistic agreement were involved in this case

A total fine of CNY 14242 million was imposed on DongFeng Nissan and its distributors

Facts

In September 2015 the Guangdong Development and Reform Commission (ldquoGuangdong DRCrdquo) released an announcement regarding the administrative penalties on DongFeng Nissan and its provincial distributors for concluding price-related monopolistic agreements More specifically DongFeng Nissan was imposed a fine of CNY 1233 million for breaching article 14 of the AML in terms of restricting the resale price of certain car models 17 distributors domiciled in Guangdong were collectively fined CNY 1912 million for violating article 1322 of the AML in terms of entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements

According to the published official release the Guangdong DRC launched the investigation in August 2014 The authority discovered that from 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissan had set a rigorous restriction on its distributorsrsquo abilities to determine the resale prices of certain car models including the quoted prices in various platforms and the final resale price In addition DongFeng Nissan punished the distributors that failed to abide by such price restrictions in 2013 The authority 21 The original Chinese notice published by Guangdong DRC is available at httpwwwgddpcgovcnzwgkgzdtgzyw201509t20150910_328993html 22 Article 13 of the AML The following Monopolistic agreements among competing operators shall be prohibited (i) fix or change prices of commodities (ii) limit the outputs or sales volume of commodities (iii) segment the sales markets or the raw material purchasing markets (iv) limit the purchase of new technology new facilities or limit the development of new products new technology (v) jointly boycott transactions (vi) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-Monopoly Law enforcement Authority Monopolistic agreements in this Law refer to agreements decisions or other concerted practices that eliminate restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 25 of 52

believed that the vertical agreement concluded between DongFeng Nissan and its distributors eliminated and restricted the competition in the relevant market and damaged the consumer welfare as well which violates article 14 of the AML

Furthermore from April 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissanrsquos distributors in Guangdong province held multiple meetings to discuss issues relevant to sale price reached and implemented a horizontal monopolistic agreement in terms of fixing the prices of some car models which is prohibited by article 13 of the AML

Considering that both DongFeng Nissan and the involved distributors positively cooperated with the investigation and ceased the illegal behaviour immediately after the investigation Guangdong DRC decided to impose a fine amounting to 3 of its previous yearrsquos turnovers on DongFeng Nissan and a fine ranging from 2 to 4 on the relevant distributors in accordance with articles 4623 and 4924 of the AML

Analysis

This case demonstrates that auto and related industries are still under close attention of the authority Considering the NDRCrsquos successful series of antitrust investigations conducted throughout the auto industry it is observed that the agency currently overseeing price-related antitrust issues in China has accumulated a substantial amount of experience regarding antitrust enforcement in the auto industry Now is the right time to speed up the law-making process by amending the set of rules released earlier and drafting new laws to advise the auto industry on antitrust compliance

Enforcement by the SAIC and its local branches

Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC25

The investigation was triggered by whistle blowerrsquos submission

Cartel members were collectively fined CNY 139 million 23 Article 46 of the AML In case the operators violate the relevant provisions of this Law concluding and implementing Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall order the operators to cease such act impose fines more than 1 but less than 10 of the total turnover in the preceding year and confiscate the illegal gains where the Monopolistic agreement is not implemented a fine less than RMB 500000 can be imposed If the operators involved in Monopolistic agreement on its own initiative report information concerning the conclusion of Monopolistic agreements and provide important evidences to the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority they may be given a mitigated punishment or be exempted from punishment in accordance with the circumstances Where the industrial associations violate this Law organizing the operators in the industry to conclude Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority may impose a fine less than RMB 500000 in serious circumstances the agency of social organization administration and registration may cancel its registration 24 Article 49 of the AML As for the imposition of the fines stipulated by the Article 46 47 and 48 of this Law the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall take elements such as the nature extent and time it lasts of the illegal act into consideration in determining the specific amount of the fines 25 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201506t20150601_156889html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 26 of 52

Facts

In April 2015 the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) issued administrative penalties on several brick manufacturers for entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements This is the first case relevant to monopolistic agreements that has been publicized by the SAIC since the beginning of this year

Ten cartel members were involved in the case including one company and nine individuals Similar with most antitrust cases the investigation started as a result of a whistle blowerrsquos submission After a thorough investigation Hunan AIC found that those local brick manufacturers had reached agreements on controlling production volume and dividing sales areas in the forms of production and sales agreements plans and meeting minutes

The enforcement authority reached the conclusion that these brick manufacturers violated article 13 of the AML and imposed a total fine of CNY 1389400 on them

Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC26

The organizer of the monopolistic agreement the animation association was fined CNY 100000

The antitrust authority did not punish the members of the monopolistic agreement

Facts

In December 2015 the Guangdong Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoGuangdong AICrdquo) published its administrative punishment decision in regards to Guangzhou Panyu Animation amp Game Association (ldquoGAGArdquo) organizing member companies to conclude a monopolistic agreement

According to the decision GAGA drafted the ldquoAgreement of Exhibition Alliancerdquo (ldquoAgreementrdquo) and convened a conference with member companies in order to discuss the content and conclusion of the Agreement 52 member companies entered into the Agreement which actually requested the alliance companies to merely participate in the exhibitions either organized or supported by GAGA in Guangzhou In addition the Agreement prohibited the alliance companies from attending any other exhibition except if they obtained prior approval of GAGA

After a thorough investigation Guangdong AIC believed that the conclusion of the Agreement among GAGA and the 52 member companies violated article 13 (5) of the AML in terms of boycott GAGA who was deeply involved and restricted member companiesrsquo choice of exhibitions through the Agreement could be deemed as

26 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151208_164680html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 27 of 52

the participant and organizer of the monopolistic agreement In accordance with article 46 of the AML Guangdong AIC imposed a fine of CNY 100000 on GAGA for organizing the conclusion of the monopolistic agreement

Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC27

Hubei AIC considered the coinsurance for Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance illegal

Twelve insurance companies were fined CNY 469 million in total

Facts

In December 2015 the Hubei Administrative for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHubei AICrdquo) disclosed its punishment on 12 insurance companies for signing illegal coinsurance agreements

The disclosed punishment decision suggests that the Hubei branch of China Pacific Life Insurance (ldquothe Companyrdquo) 11 other insurance companies and Wuhan Construction Safety Technology Consultation Center (ldquoWCSTCCrdquo) signed a Coinsurance Agreement on Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance (ldquoCoinsurance Agreementrdquo) of which the main contents include

1) The Company and 11 other involved companies as the coinsurers jointly take charge of the personal accident insurance concerned with the construction project directly administered by the Wuhan government WCSTCC is responsible for providing safety professionalism and technology services regarding the relevant personal accident insurance

2) The Company as the chief insurer of the coinsurance occupies 12 of the total amount of the insurance and the other 11 companies respectively occupy 8

3) The Company as the representative of the coinsurance is in charge of collecting the premium signing the standard form insurance policies and issuing the invoice in its own name The Company should share the charged premium with the other companies in accordance with the Coinsurance Agreement

4) Both the Company and the other insurance companies should pay 25 of the actually received premium to WCSTCC as the service fee WCSTCC will assist the coinsurers in providing safety and technology management service to the insured In addition the 11 insurance companies should pay 5 of their premium to the Company as the management fee

27 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165445html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 28 of 52

5) In case an accident happens the 12 companies will jointly bear the damages based on their respective shares in the coinsurance

6) There is a contact mechanism established in the coinsurance The coinsurers will regularly hold coinsurance conferences to discuss existing problems

Furthermore the coinsurers and WCSTCC also signed a self-discipline agreement and established a complete management system to assure the implementation of the Coinsurance Agreement Any party violating the Coinsurance Agreement would be punished

Hubei AIC found that WCSTCC was solely invested by Wuhan Construction Safety Management Association which was under Wuhan Construction Commission The centre helped implement certain functions of the Wuhan Urban Construction Safety Management Station and was responsible for quality supervision and safety supervision of municipal construction projects

It later became a prerequisite for construction companies to purchase insurance from any member of the coinsurance in order to get approval to commence their project According to the decision Hubei AIC launched another separate investigation against WCSTCC

Through the investigation Hubei AIC concluded that the Coinsurance Agreement constituted a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by article 13 of the AML with the following analysis

First coinsurance as a common business model to jointly share and lower risks is widely adopted in the insurance industry A coinsurance arrangement for a specific project in order to avoid high risks faced by one insurer could be legal However coinsurance should not target the entire market In this case prior to the Coinsurance Agreement the risks of the construction projects were unpredictable since the scale of the construction projects the difficulty of the construction and the amount of construction workers could not be available It is impossible to predict the risks of the projects thus it is not necessary to cooperate with other insurers to collectively bear the risks The purpose of the 12 insurance companies to establish the coinsurance is to avoid the competition which demonstrates the Coinsurance Agreement belongs to a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by the AML

Second the companies through entering into the coinsurance agreement actually divided the relevant market of construction project personal accident insurance in Wuhan city which affected the competition in the relevant market and damaged the interests of other competitors and the consumers In particular the Construction Law as amended in 2011 stipulates that the purchase of personal accident insurance is not mandatory and the construction companies have the right to choose whether to buy the said insurance or not As mentioned purchasing insurance from the coinsurance had been the prerequisite for construction companies to obtain administration

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

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approval for the project which seriously distorts the fair competition in the market

Citing article 46 of the AML the 12 insurance companies were collectively fined CNY 469 million including fines on the companies and confiscation of illegal gains It is noteworthy that the fines were calculated based on the companiesrsquo 2014 annual sales of the insurance product in connection with the coinsurance The Company as the chief insurer was fined amounting to 6 of its 2014 annual sales of the relevant insurance product in the coinsurance and other companies were fined amounting to 2 of relevant sales For more specific information please see the following table

Company Name (Hubei Branch)

Fines (CNY million)

Percentage of the sales

Illegal Gains (CNY

million)

China Pacific Life Insurance 00653 6 0941

Sino Life 00145 2 04332

Alltrust Insurance 00145 2 04332

Taikang Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Continent Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Pacific Property Insurance

00145 2 04332

China Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

PICC Property and Casualty 00145 2 02599

Taiping General Insurance 00145 2 013

Union Life Insurance 00145 2 01177

Ping An Annuity Insurance Company of China

00145 2 04201

Ping An Property amp Casualty Insurance Company of China

00145 2 -

Subtotal 02248 - 44679

Total 46927

Analysis

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

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Coinsurance as an effective approach to lower risks of insurers is widely used in the insurance industry Information sharing and agreements on coinsurance were generally considered efficient and legitimate However from an antitrust perspective coinsurance may raise competition concerns depending on the circumstances of each agreement In the case that there is enough capacity for one insurer to cover the potential risks the coinsurance might be considered as entering into a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC28

The first leniency applicant was exempted from fines

The other concrete companies were imposed a fine of CNY 180000

Facts

In December 2015 the concrete companies monopolistic agreement case investigated by Hunan AIC was published on SAICrsquos website

In accordance with the antitrust enforcement announcement of SAIC this case was triggered by complaints from the Yongzhou City peoplersquos congress After the preliminary review the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) initiated the formal investigation on seven concrete companies domiciled in Yongzhou City Hunan Province which were suspected of being involved in a monopolistic agreement in terms of division of the volumes of the products

After further investigation Hunan AIC found that the seven concrete companies concluded a partnership agreement in 2011 which requested the involved companies to enter into a partnership business with assets In addition according to the partnership agreement it was planned to establish a comprehensive office to manage production marketing and distribution of the products of all the partners The seven companies intended to jointly adjust and control the output of concrete based on the partnership agreement However because there were disagreements over the allocation of the injected assets and market shares the companies did not implement the partnership agreement The agreement was cancelled in December 2012

Based on the findings Hunan AIC concluded that the seven concrete companies as competitors of each other restricted and eliminated the competition in the relevant market through reaching the partnership agreement and dividing the volumes of sales which violated article 13(3) of the AML in terms of division of sales market Considering that the agreement had not been implemented and the limited influence of the agreement according to article 46 of the AML and article 27 of the Administrative Penalties Law small amount fines were imposed on the involved companies Six companies were fined CNY 30000 each for their illegal behaviour 28 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165504html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 31 of 52

Yongzhou Shuangyuan Building Materials Co Ltd as the first one to actively report the monopolistic agreement and cooperate with the enforcement authority was exempted from the punishment

Outlook

It is expected that the AMLrsquos enforcement on monopolistic agreements will continue in the future Industries such as automobile shipping pharmaceuticals insurance etc will still remain the priority of the antitrust enforcement

The antitrust enforcement authorities have published a series of regulations in order to clarify the substantial and procedural issues relevant to the antitrust enforcement However Chinarsquos current antitrust legislation regime is still immature In the following years we expect that more attention will be paid to the legislative improvements

Another remarkable issue for cartel members is that with more Chinese enterprises attaching increasing importance to the AML the follow-on civil damages actions might become a tendency in the future

C Abuse of Market Dominance

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen a decent increase of abuse of market dominance cases both in public enforcement and private litigation Oftentimes the authorities responsible for public enforcement generally find it difficult to pursue investigations against abuse of market dominance cases The following two main reasons are often cited to explain this standoff first it is hard for the authorities to define the relevant markets and prove the undertaking(s)rsquo dominant market position through economic approaches second it is hard to collect evidence regarding abusive practices

The cases related to IPRs abuse are emerging significantly particularly in the telecommunication media and technology (ldquoTMTrdquo) sectors

The SAICrsquos latest refusal-to-deal probe against a local drug maker shows that the SAIC and its local branches have increasingly acquired a profile as an abuse of dominance regulator

Significant Cases

Cases pursued by the SAIC

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

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Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case29

Facts

The local authority in Dongfang city reported to the Hainan provincial branch of SAIC on April 23 2014 of the suspected dominance abuse The SAIC authorized its Hainan bureau to officially investigate the matter on 25 July 2014 according to a decision dated January 9 2015 The AIC concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its market dominance by requiring users to pay a deposit without any legal basis and or justifiable reasons

In terms of the relevant product market the local authority found that in this case it was the urban water supply market in Dongfang city and its surrounding townships where Dongfang Water was the sole public operator in the local water supply market with a 100 market share which made all water users completely reliant on the companyrsquos supply In term of market access the local authority found it very unlikely that there were other operators due to the strict regulations

The Hainan SAIC then concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its dominance as it charged users a deposit by threatening to refuse to register users and also by threatening to restrict the water supply Dongfang Waters charging of deposits lacked a legal basis and hadnt received government approval to the detriment of household consumers and business water users and hampered the improvement of management and services of the company Such conduct was in breach of Chinarsquos Anti-Monopoly Law

Hainan AIC levied a fine of CNY 593208 a lighter penalty equivalent to 2 of the companyrsquos annual sales for the previous year and confiscated illicit gains of CNY 38521 for abuse of market dominance

Analysis

It is noteworthy that although handled by a local authority supervised by the SAIC the antitrust agency detailed the relevant market definition the assessment of the dominant market position the abusive practices and the scrutiny of the justifiable reasons

Although the definition of the relevant market and the reasoning of the Hainan provincial AIC and the SAIC are subject to criticism it is still applausive to see that the antitrust regulators have realized the importance of the application of rule of reason in an abuse case In addition through itrsquos a published decision practitioners may observe the regulatorsrsquo reasoning and thus transparency and legal certainty have been generated

29 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzfcfjd201502t20150212_152066html last visited on October 18 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 33 of 52

Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms30

Facts

In June 2013 the Ningxia AIC under authorization of SAIC opened an antitrust investigation into the alleged tie-in sales by the three major state-owned telecommunications operators China Tietong China Unicom and China Telecom for the tie-in sale of fixed-line telephones with broadband Internet services The Ningxia AIC found that the three companies had bundled fixed-line phone services with Internet services to subscribers

During the investigation all three telecommunications companies admitted the tie-in practice had recognized that such practice had improper influence on competition and deprived the choices of consumers The three companies promised to undertake internal rectification timely and eliminate the ill effects resulting from such practice The parties committed to taking the following corrective measures

1) Taking internal rectifications and conducting training to staff about antitrust laws and stop tie-in sales practices

2) Making public commitments to allow subscribers a free choice of services and strengthening the propaganda through the operating room call centre and other channels

3) Unbundling fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

The Ningxia AIC decided to suspend the probe on 14 May 2015 on the grounds that the three companies had actively worked together with the investigators and proposed workable remedy plans

Analysis

In the official announcement Ningxia AIC concluded that the purpose of antitrust enforcement is to restrain monopolistic conducts the protection of competition and to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of consumers Given that during the investigation process the parties had actively cooperated with the investigation formed a more profound understanding of the dangers of tying behaviour and moreover the parties proposed and implemented positive corrective measures to be able to remove the ill impact of their actions the agency believed that the purpose of antitrust law enforcement was fulfilled

It is worth noting that the Ningxia AIC also required the three companies to implement the commitment by August 30 2015and the submission of the written

30 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158908html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158906html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158910html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 34 of 52

implementation report on July 102015 and August 102015 respectively which is another illustration that an effective commitment by the undertakings shall directly deal with the effect that is brought by the monopolistic behaviour In this case the effect of the monopolistic act was restricted to the choice of the consumers therefore the commitment by the undertaking aimed at allowing the freedom of choice and the unbundling of fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company31

Facts

The Liaoning AIC imposed a fine of approximately CNY 433m on the Fushun Branch of Liaoning Tobacco Co on 1 June 2015 The agency also ordered the company to stop its illicit behaviour

The Liaoning AIC received a tip-off that the accused Liaoning Tobacco Corsquos Fushun branch was conducting tie-in sales of non-high-demand cigarette brands with high-demand cigarette brands After gaining authorization from SAIC the agency officially started an investigation regarding the companyrsquos suspected abuse of market dominance in June 2014

Analysis

According to the announcement the tobacco company argued that the tobacco industry is a state controlled or monopolized industry with a lawful monopolistic position therefore the company shall not be subject to the norms of general market competition rules or the anti-monopoly law

In this regards the agency concluded that in terms of the status of the undertaking admittedly the first paragraph of article 17 of the AML says that the State shall protect the lawful business operations of undertakings in these industries with respect to the industries which are under the control of the State-owned economic sector and have a bearing on the lifeline of the national economy or national security and the industries which exercise monopoly over the production and sale of certain commodities according to law However the second paragraph continues to say that the undertakings mentioned above shall do business according to law be honest faithful and strictly self-disciplined and subject themselves to public supervision and they shall not harm the consumers interests by taking advantage of their position of control or their monopolistic production and sale of certain commodities In particular in the preceding paragraph the ldquolawful businessrdquo and ldquoaccording to lawrdquo imply that the AML shall apply in the business operation The agency therefore believes that

31 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201508t20150813_16

0208html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 35 of 52

there shall be no exemption for the undertaking concerned the defences of the undertaking concerned is not established

Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm32

Facts

The Chongqing AIC fined Chongqing Qingyang Pharmaceutical CNY 439308 for alleged dominance abuse

The investigation was initiated when the company contacted the agency for verification on its potential breach of the AML related to an allopurinol active pharmaceuticals ingredient (API) distribution agreement with its exclusive distributor The company provided the relevant agreement and information and the agency conducted an investigation into the company and some other relevant companies

Analysis

Relevant Market

During the investigation the agency found that pharmaceutical ingredients are a special commodity the API is used to produce the preparations The chemical API is only used for the production of the preparation and could be used as a medicine for clinic use

The preparation is produced according to the requirements of certain form of prepared drugs and for the purpose of treatment and prevention which can be used as medicine

The allopurinol is used for the common treatment of hyperuricemia However the other treatments are different in pharmacological effects or treatment effects as well as in the cost for the patient Furthermore the company is the only manufacturer and supplier in the market nationwide since July 2012 Therefore the agency concluded that the relevant market is the allopurinol API market

Considering that the qualification for manufacturing the allopurinol API is national wide and the normal practice for purchasers and suppliers is domestic the relevant geographic market is the Chinese market

The Market Dominance

During the investigation the agency found that the company is the only supplier and manufacturer of allopurinol API in China there is no other competitor in the

32 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151222_16

5152html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 36 of 52

market and the company has a monopoly in the market The evidence shows that the company has the ability to control the prices the position for the downstream is relatively weak

With respect to the market entry the agency found that the market entry is relatively high in addition other undertakings are dependent on the company Thus the agency believed the company to have market dominance

Refusal to Deal

The agency found that on September 25 2015 the company reached an exclusive agreement and distribution agreement with its distributor Based on these agreements the company didnrsquot supply allopurinol API to the said distributor and other companies despite the fact that those companies requested for allopurinol API but were turned down by the company

Absence of Reasonable Cause

The agency found that the companyrsquos refusal to deal was not in line with the needs of normal business operation or economic efficiency On the other hand the refusal to deal was aimed at increasing the market share of the allopurinol drug product Also the agency found that the stop of supply was a manipulation of market power as to maximize the profit to the most The agency further found that the exclusive distribution agreement with suspension of supply for six months and the refusal to supply was to eliminate and restrict the competition as to gain the monopolistic profit

The Consequence of Refusal to Deal

The agency concluded that the refusal to deal harmed the competition of the allopurinol preparations market Because of the suspension of supply many demanders had to reduce their production or switch to the supply of other products or stop their production The suspension of supply affected the competition of the downstream market Consequently the raising of the price of allopurinol API also raised the cost for other manufacturers of allopurinol preparations

Furthermore the refusal to deal led to capacity loss of the allopurinol preparation industry

Ultimately the refusal to deal increased the burden on consumers as the refusal to supply changed the supply-demand relationship in the market

The agency concluded that the Company abused its dominant position in the allopurinol API market by refusing to deal with intended buyers in the period between October 2013 and March 2014Therefore the Company violated article 17 (1) of the AML which prohibits business operators with a dominant market position from abusing that position such as the refusal to deal without any justifications

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 37 of 52

D Administrative Monopoly

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 witnessed antitrust authoritiesrsquo significant efforts regarding the enforcement against administrative monopoly According to Mr Dong Zhiming the deputy director general of Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly Bureau ever since the AML coming into force six cases in connection with administrative monopoly were investigated by NDRC and among them five cases were handled in the year of 2015 These cases touched abuses of administrative power in terms of designative deal in relation to transportation communication and pharmaceutical industries

The first private litigation related to administrative monopolistic acts was heard in the court which is a milestone case in the enforcement of the AML

Significant Cases

Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC33

Facts

In March 2015 the NDRC released the official letter to Shandong Provincial Department of Transportation (ldquoShandong DOTrdquo) on its website with respect to correct its abuse of administrative power to exclude and restrict competition

During the investigation the NDRC found that since 2011 Shandong DOT had issued multiple relevant government orders in order to require certain types of vehicles to be directly connected to two designated information and service platforms both of which are operated and technically supported by one company namely Shandong Jiutong Internet of Things Technology Co Ltd (ldquoJiutong ITTrdquo) Furthermore according to the orders issued by the competent administrative department all the vehicle satellite positioning terminals entering into Shandong provincial market should be debugged through the said technology service platform which is operated by the mentioned company In addition Shandong DOT released the cap prices of vehicle satellite positioning terminals which is identical to the 2012 bid-winning price in the Ministry of Transportation demonstration project

The NDRC believed that Shandong DOTrsquos behaviour eliminated and restricted the competition in the monitoring platform market and the vehicle terminal market deprived the right of transportation enterprises to choose vehicle terminals and monitoring platform on their owns unreasonably raised the sales prices of vehicle terminals and service fees charged by the platform and increased the costs of transportation enterprises Therefore the antitrust agency concluded that Shandong

33 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201503t20150327_668911html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 38 of 52

DOT violated article 8 of the AML which stipulates that ldquoadministrative organs and the public organizations with an administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude and restrict competitionrdquo Specifically Shandong DOT violated article 3234 in terms of requiring organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any designated operators and violated article 3735 in terms of setting rules with contents which eliminate and restrict competition

Based on article 51 of the AML ldquoWhere administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations abuse administrative powers performing activities which exclude and restrict competition the superior entity shall order it to correct impose administrative penalty on the chief officer and other staffs directly responsible pursuant to the laws The AML enforcement authority may give recommendations on disposal of activities to the relevant superior entityrdquo the NDRC proposed in writing that the Shandong provincial government should order Shandong DOT to rectify its behaviour with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Entirely open up the monitoring platform market by permitting transportation undertakings to freely choose any approved platform

2) Loosen the restrictions on the entry into Shandong vehicle terminals permit the undertakings to independently select the supplier of vehicle terminals and allow the qualified terminals to be connected to the relevant monitoring platform and

3) Revoke the official documentation relevant to the cap price of vehicle terminals in order to promote the price competition

Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 36

Facts

On 26 August 2015 the NDRC published its second decision with regard to the rectification of administrative monopoly since the beginning of this year According to the proposal letter sent to Anhui Provincial Government the investigation against the Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City (Bengbu HFPC) was trigged by third partiesrsquo complaints

34 Article 32 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to require organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any operators designated by them 35 Article 37 of the AML Administrative organs shall not abuse their administrative powers to set rules with contents which eliminate restrict competition 36 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201508t20150826_748682html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 39 of 52

The investigation suggests that Bengbu HFPC published three notices with regard to drugs procurement in April and May of this year

In the No C-2015-CG-X-111 Notice (ldquoNo111 Noticerdquo) released on 10 April2015 the health authority not only provided the dosage form and qualification of the requested drugs but also directly determined the suppliers of relevant drugs which eliminated and restricted the competition among pharmaceutical manufacturers and therefore violated articles 32 and 37 of the AML

In the No C-2015-CG-C-112 Notice (ldquoNo112 Noticerdquo) and No C-2015-CG-C-168 (ldquoNo 168 Noticerdquo) respectively released on 10 April and 22 May 2015 the Bengbu HFPC set discriminative qualification requirements on non-local undertakings in order to restrict their participation in the relevant bidding For instance in accordance with No 112 Notice to be a qualified bidder the turnover of non-local undertakings shall exceed CNY 2 billion which is 50 times as much as the turnover requirements of the local undertakings In the NDRCrsquos opinion the administrative monopoly activities conducted by the local health agency excluded the relevant undertakings from the market maintained the virtual-high prices of drugs and therefore violated articles 3237 and 37 of the AML

The NDRC suggested in a letter that Anhui Provincial Government should urge the Bengbu HFPC to rectify the abuse of monopoly powers with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Stop setting distinguishing restrictions on qualification requirements review standards and numbers of winning bidders as for local and non-local undertakings

2) Stop designating the suppliers of competitive drugs and

3) Take necessary measures to mitigate the negative effects resulting from the previous illegal monopolistic abuses

Outlook

At the beginning of the year the former director general of the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau under the NDRC Xu Kunlin stated that the agency would strengthen antitrust enforcement on abuse of administrative power in 2015

Since then the NDRC has made great efforts to rectify unreasonable abuses of administrative power The currently disclosed two cases investigated by the NDRC re-emphasize the Chinese Governmentrsquos strict scrutiny of antitrust issues in respect of

37 Article 34 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to restrict or reject the participation of operators from other regions in local bidding activities by measures such as prescribing discriminatory qualification requirements or assessment standards or by not publishing information according to law

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 40 of 52

administrative monopoly It reminds the local governments that antitrust compliance is of significant importance

III Private Litigation

A Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen more and more private antitrust litigations

The private antitrust litigation cases have become increasingly complicated especially the issues regarding the intersection areas of IP and antitrust law

Multinational giants and State-Owned Enterprises (the ldquoSOEsrdquo) are increasingly becoming the targets in antitrust civil litigations Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (the ldquoSMEsrdquo) tend to use the antitrust litigation to achieve their commercial goals in the business context

B Significant Cases

Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)38

This is the first-ever private litigation concerning administrative monopoly since the implementation of the AML in 2008

Facts

According to the currently disclosed details the case is relevant for designated trade

The plaintiff Shenzhen Sware Technology Co Ltd (ldquoSwarerdquo) is a software company The press releases suggest that Sware Gloden Software Co Ltd (ldquoGlodenrdquo) and Shanghai Ruban Software Co Ltd (ldquoShanghai Rubanrdquo) are the three main suppliers of construction cost software and possess the major shares of the relevant market An annual provincial vocational ability contest regarding the construction cost hosted by the Guangdong Department of Education (ldquoGuangdong DOE) designated Gloden as the exclusive supplier of the relevant software

After several unsuccessful verbal and written negotiations with Guangdong DOE in April 2014 Sware filed a lawsuit against Guangdong DOE before the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquothe Courtrdquo) alleging that the administrative organ abused its administrative power and violated the AML by designating exclusive software supplier for the contest and claimed a compensation for reasonable expense amounting to CNY 10800 Yuan

The opinions of the Court 38 The story of the case is available at httpfinancesinacomcnchinadfjj20150410074621924997shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 41 of 52

The full text of the judgment has not been disclosed yet In accordance with the information available to the public the Court invoked article 32 of the AML which prohibits an administrative organ from abusing its administrative power to require or in disguised form organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use only the commodities supplied by the entities designated by them The Court concluded that Guangdong DOE failed to prove the legitimacy of the designation and therefore abused its administration power

Currently the case is in appeal before the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court

Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 39

It is the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China

In the first instance ruling Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court ruled against Sinopec holding that the Yunnan branch of Sinopecs trading company was obligated to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its dominance in the sales market of refined oil by refusing to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding without justifiable reasons

In the second instance ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors Currently the case is pending

Facts

The First Trial

The lawsuit was filed before the Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoKunming Courtrdquo) in January 2014 Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy Co Ltd (ldquoYingdingrdquo) a bio-energy manufacturer claimed that Sinopec and the Yunnan branch of Sinopec trading company (ldquoSinopec Yunnan Branchrdquo) had failed to fulfil their obligations stipulated in the Renewable Energy Law and had abused their market dominance in sales market of refined oil by refusing to trade with Yingding without justifiable reasons

Sinopec and Sinopec Yunnan Branch mainly explained four reasons for why they rejected Yingdingrsquos biofuel Firstly Yingding had failed to prove that the biofuel complied with the relevant national standard and was safe to use Secondly Yingding had failed to provide complete trading terms Thirdly the laws and regulations regarding biofuel were incomplete the authorized refined oil sales companies were 39 The details of the case are available at httpnewsxinhuanetcomfortune2014-1217c_1113680039htm httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=9e71db51-6ff6-4d2c-8af6-8eacf023ebdeampKeyWord=E4BA91E58D97E79B88E9BC8E|E4B8ADE79FB3E58C96 httpnewsxinhuanetcomenergy2015-0422c_127721575htm httpwwwnbdcomcnarticles2015-04-23911348html last visited on December 17 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 42 of 52

obligated to purchase biofuel from the biofuel manufacturers if it met certain quality standards but there was a vacancy regarding how to reach the end consumers from the sales companies

On 8 December 2014 the Kunming Intermediate Peoples Court ruled that Sinopec Yunnan Branch bore a legal obligation to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its market dominance in refined oil market by refusing without any justifiable reasons to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding The court ordered Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network within 30 days Both Yingding and Sinopec filed appeals to the Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court

The Appellate Trial

The appeal hearing was held on 22 April 2015 in Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoYunnan Courtrdquo) Sinopec submitted 23 new pieces of evidence and introduced two expert witnesses in a bid to overturn several key elements in the first-instance ruling by Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court

In terms of the determination of the relevant market and the market dominance Sinopec argued that the relevant market in this case was for adipic acid monomethyl ester (ldquoAAMErdquo) the main ingredient of a biofuel additive known as BD100 Yingdingrsquos main product is BD100 which can be blended with fossil diesel to become biofuel In the AAME market Sinopec is a potential buyer instead of a market dominator In support of this argument Sinopec presented an expert witnessmdashGong Jiong a professor of economics at Beijings University of International Business and Economics who testified that AAME should be defined as the relevant product market on the basis of an economic analysis

However Yingding insisted that the first-instance ruling was correct in naming the sales market of refined oil as the relevant market and submitted new evidence an article on Sinopecs website that claimed it had a 67 market share in Yunnan to help establish the claim that Sinopec had market dominance

Another main dispute was whether Yingdingrsquos biofuel product met national standards which would make it mandatory for Sinopec to purchase under Chinas Renewable Energy Law The law stipulates that biofuel producers must sell their products first to an authorized refined oil sales company and the sales companies are obliged to buy the fuel if it meets certain quality standards In order to test the quality Sinopec introduced the second expert witness Lin Jianmin a leading author of Chinarsquos national biofuel standard Lin Jianmin pointed out that there are currently quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology which gives Sinopec a justifiable reason not to trade with Yingding Moreover Sinopec presented some precedents in which consumers had complained about the biofuel quality and also claimed that China didnt have a sound regulatory framework to support biofuel production neither in testing nor in sales

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 43 of 52

Nevertheless to refute this point Yingding referred to an earlier test in co-operation with Sinopec in 2011 where selected buses in Kunming used biofuel blended by Sinopec using BD100 produced by Yingding

On August 13 2015 Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors and now this case is pending In the written appellate ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court did not provide any details regarding its reasoning

Key Issues of the Case

Is there any competition between Yingding and Sinopec

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case the product of Yingding is biofuel while Sinopec does not engage in the business of biofuel From this perspective Yingding and Sinopec are not competitors Thus it is not necessary and not reasonable for Sinopec to eliminate or restrict the competition from Yingding

Relevant Market

The definition of the relevant market is a prerequisite to determine whether competition exists and whether the AML is applicable In accordance with the Judicial Interpretation of Antitrust civil litigation the plaintiff shall take the responsibility to prove the defendantrsquos dominance in the relevant market Also the methods of defining the relevant market are stipulated in the Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition (ldquoGuidelinesrdquo) However both Yingding and Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court defined the relevant market as the sales market of refined oil without sufficient antitrust analysis none of the methods in the Guidelines were used Therefore the definition of the relevant market remains arguable and needs to be sufficiently analysed in the upcoming retrial

Justifiable Reasons

The abuse of market dominance includes the behaviour of refusing to trade without justifiable reasons according to the AML but in the first instance ruling justifiable reasons were not investigated by the court During the appellate trial the expert witness introduced by Sinopec claimed that there were quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology and this was a justifiable reason to refuse to trade with Yingding Even though the first instance court and the appellate court did not reason the justifiable reason it should be discussed and investigated further during the retrial

AML or Renewable Energy Law

The claims of Yingding were based on both the AML and the Renewable Energy Law (ldquoRELrdquo) and the first instance ruling referred to both the AML and the REL as

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 44 of 52

well It seems that the laws the first instance court referred to were comprehensive but in fact the reasoning was not clear and logical In the first instance ruling some disputes regarding the AML were reviewed but all the orders were not based on the AML Specifically the first instance court ordered the Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network based on the REL and dismissed the other claims That the orders were not on account of reasoning is illogical It is anticipated that during the retrial the application of the laws will be clearer

Analysis

A lot of issues have not been clearly analysed by the courts such as the relevant market and the justifiable reasons Since the case is remanded the above-mentioned issues are expected to be resolved in the retrial In addition Yingding was in a disadvantaged position compared to its first instance trial since its claims based on the AML were challenged greatly during the appellate trial In the retrial it is probable that Yingding may switch its litigation strategy and base its claims on the REL Therefore maybe more preparation regarding the REL can give Sinopec a leg up

Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)

Rijing Electric a Chinese distributor seeks CNY 5m compensation

The first hearing was on 9 June 2015 and ended without a ruling

Facts

Rijing Electric (ldquoRijingrdquo) a Shanghai-based company and a former distributor for Panasonic accused Panasonic of abusing its dominance and dividing the market through monopolistic practice in an antitrust lawsuit filed in 2014 with Shanghai No 1 Intermediate Court (ldquoShanghai Courtrdquo) claiming compensation of CNY 5m (USD 815370) Wenzhou Mingda Automation System Co and Shanghai Qingying Automation Equipment as the distributor of Panasonic in China are the co-defendants were accused of conducting monopolistic behaviours by implementing Panasonicrsquos policy

The first hearing for evidence exchange was on June 9 2015 Rijing claimed a policy allegedly introduced by Panasonic in 2009 restricted the competition between distributors Panasonic claims the policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo and has full justifiable reasons It explained that the products in question required customization at considerable cost to distributors before its sale to customers Once carried out however other distributors leaving them open to quote much lower prices than the original distributor could simply and relatively cheap replicate this customization Besides Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and that the plaintiff had failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic said its market share for the four products

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 45 of 52

under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases Also Rijing failed to challenge the policy when it was first introduced instead initially agreeing it was reasonable as e-mail evidence submitted by Panasonic suggests

Key Issues of the Case

Whether Panasonic occupied a market dominant position

It is reported that Rijing claimed that Panasonic had abused its market dominance but Rijing failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and its market share for the four products under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases

Analysis

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case Panasonicrsquos policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo rather than to eliminate or restrict competition

Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals40 (Pending)

It is a battle over patent licensing issues

It is viewed as being among the most complicated antitrust lawsuits in China

The first hearing was on 17 and 18 December 2015

Facts

Four Chinese rare earth companies Ningbo Ketian Magnet Ningbo Permanent Magnetics Ningbo Tongchuang Strong Magnet Material and Ningbo Huahui Magnetic Industry filed antitrust lawsuits against Hitachi Metals over alleged patent licensing issues regarding rare earth magnets on December 11 2014 with the Ningbo Intermediate Peoples Court (ldquoNingbo Courtrdquo) in Zhejiang province As reported four Chinese rare earth companies claimed Hitachi Metals abused its market dominance and hurt the industry competition by refusing to license the patents to them The patents in this case are used in the manufacturing of sintered neodymium iron boron (ldquoNdFeBrdquo) magnets a rare-earth magnet alloy widely used in parts for airplanes automobiles and other products

Hitachi Metals filed a challenge with the Ningbo Court over its jurisdiction in April 2015 After Ningbo Court rejected Hitachi Metals jurisdiction objection on 28 April 2015 Hitachi Metals appealed to the Zhejiang High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoZhejiang

40The details of the story are available at httpwwwzbmagcomnews_viewphpid=80 httpwwwhitachicomcnaboutpress201510-121118_ahtml last visited on December 22 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 46 of 52

Courtrdquo) but Zhejiang Court affirmed the ruling of the Ningbo Court

The first day of a two-day hearing took place on 17 December 2015 during which the two sides cross-examined each otherrsquos evidence The evidence focused on clearing up several key elements in the case including the relevant market whether Hitachi Metals has dominance on that market and whether both sides acted in good faith during the licensing negotiations

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Product Market

The four Chinese rare earth companies claimed that the relevant product market should be the NdFeb-related patent licensing market However Hitachi Metals believed that the physical NdFeb market rather than the patent licensing market should be the relevant product market which is meaningful for assess the real competitive effects on the market

Whether Hitachi Metals occupies a dominant market position

In terms of market dominance Hitachi Metals claimed it does not occupy a dominant position because Hitachi Metalsrsquo patents were not in a standard in this case and there are substitutable technologies in the market SEP holders have the obligation to license on FRAND terms but none-SEP holders do not So while a refusal to license a SEP may constitute abuse of dominance refusal to license a non-SEP mdash even by a patent holder with a dominant position mdash should not be considered as an abuse

Analysis

Hitachi Metals as a patent holder should have the right to decide whether to retain those patents or not or who to license According to the legal theory the purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage and protect innovation by conferring monopoly right mdash that is to give intellectual property owners the proprietary rights which can exclude others from using the intellectual property The SEP holders admittedly need to comply with FRAND terms which can maintain a robust balance between competition and monopoly whereas the further intervention of antitrust law into non-SEP patents may undermine the purpose of intellectual property law To which extent the antitrust law should intervene is yet to be seen

Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei41

A confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the Beijing IP court made by the Beijing High Court

41 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcncpwswbjzscq201511t20151103_12225640htm last visited on December 28 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 47 of 52

Facts

On August 2 2013 the NDRC penalized Abbott for monopolistic price-fixing and then Abbott made a price adjustment in China where the prices of main products were reduced

On December 16 2014 Tian Junwei (ldquoTianrdquo) a Chinese citizen in Beijing sued Carrefour Shuangjing Branch (ldquoCarrefourrdquo) and Abbott (Shanghai) Sales Company (ldquoAbbottrdquo) at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (ldquoIP Courtrdquo) for their monopolistic price-fixing which damaged his interests However Carrefour and Abbott challenged the jurisdiction of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court They claimed there were two reasons Firstly according to the jurisdiction rules of the IP court issued by the Supreme Court the IP court has no jurisdiction over anti-trust cases Secondly if this case is a contractual dispute the court that is in the place of Carrefour should hear it if this case is a tort dispute the Shanghai Intermediate Court should hear it

In the ruling of the IP Court the IP Court decided it has the jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases for the following reasons According to the Provisions On Causes Of Action In Civil Cases issued by Supreme Court (最高人民法院案由规定) antimonopoly dispute is a tertiary cause of action belonging to IP and competition disputes Also according to the Provisions concerning the Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京

市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问题的规定 ) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was an IP and competition dispute and was sued after November 6 2014 Thus the IP Court had jurisdiction

Both Carrefour and Abbott appealed to the Beijing High Court over the jurisdiction ruling but the Beijing High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original ruling Reasons are listed in the written ruling issued on June 18 2015 Firstly the nature of the case was an antimonopoly dispute In accordance with Provisions of the Supreme Peoples Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民

事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) and Civil Litigation Law the monopolistic civil disputes in the first instance shall be under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Peoples Courts and an action involving a contractual dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the peoples court of the place where the defendant is domiciled or where the contract is performed Carrefour as the defendant in this case is domiciled in Chaoyang District Beijing Therefore the courts of Beijing have jurisdiction over this case Secondly according to article 3 of the Notification on the Jurisdiction of Intellectual Property Courts issued by Supreme Court (关于知识产权法院案件管辖

等有关问题的通知) IP courts have jurisdiction over first-instance civil disputes arising from monopolistic practices Lastly according to Provisions concerning the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 4 of 52

working committee under the China Automotive Maintenance and Repair Trade Association

Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses3

NDRC published a draft of the Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses on December 31 2015 NDRC noted that the consultation period for the draft guidelines run from 1 until 20 January 2016

The draft guidelines constitute five parts preamble basic issues IPR-related agreements that may eliminate or restrict competition IPR-related abuse of dominant position and concentration involving IPR

The draft guidelines cover antitrust issues related to joint RampD patent pool cross licensing standardization price restriction exclusive grant-back no-challenge clause exemption of agreements unfairly high royalty fees refusal to license tying sale imposing unreasonable transaction conditions discriminatory treatment and injunctive relief

The draft guidelines also include factors for determining whether the application of injunction orders by standard essential patent owners can lead to the elimination or restriction of competition such as whether the parties involved expressed their true intentions during negotiations

D Legislation of MOFCOM

The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases4

MOFCOM issued the Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases on February 6 2015 which took effect at the same time

Auto Sales Management Measures

MOFCOM posted a draft of the Auto Sales Management Measures (the ldquodraft Measuresrdquo) on its website on 6 January 2016 and is soliciting for comments until 6 February 2016 MOFCOM intends to implement this new rule to replace the current Auto Brand Sales Management Measures

According to the draft Measures any vehicle sales and related services engaged in the territory of China shall be abided by this rule The draft Measures consist of five parts which are the general principles code of conduct supervision and management penalty provision and bylaw

The Measures clearly provide that the departments of the commercial 3 The original Chinese notice published by NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201512t20151231_770233html 4 The original notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticlei20150220150200891361shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 5 of 52

administration under the State Council will be in charge of nationwide auto sales management

In the second part the draft Measures list the conducts in which a supplier shall not engage in These conducts include restricting distributors from reselling their products requesting distributors to share expenses for their own marketing activities restricting distributors from selling parts of other brands or providing after-sales services for other brands and so on Most of these conducts are deemed as vertical monopolistic agreements which are likely to induce anti-competitive effects in EU and US practices

As reported the Chinese government will make efforts to coordinate the Auto Antitrust Guidelines and the Measures-- two upcoming industry-specific regulations

II Public Enforcement

A Merger Control

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

With the increase in the number of cases been filed and reviewed it is recognized that MOFCOM has become one of the most important jurisdictions of merger control in the world

The simplified procedure has improved the efficiency of MOFCOMrsquos merger review in a large degree Most cases in simple procedure were concluded during the first phase However MOFCOMrsquos review time lasts longer in a few cases For instance MOFCOM spent 162 days to clear Toyota Industries Corps purchase of a 55 stake in Singaporean logistics company LT Wuliao Banyun Holdings setting a new record for the length of a simple case review

MOFCOM used to focus on horizontal deals but now also considers vertical and conglomerate mergers important In 2015 only 35 of the cases being reviewed were horizontal mergers

The increased number of administrative punishment on cases that failed to notify in 2015 demonstrates that MOFCOM has further strengthened its enforcement on this respect

The supervision of remedy implementation has become ldquoroutinizedrdquo

All divisions of MOFCOMrsquos antitrust bureau are responsible for case reviewing from the end of 2015 with the aim to improve the work efficiency

The international cooperation between antitrust enforcement authorities with respect to merger controls happens more frequently On 15 October 2015 the competition department of EU Commissions (ldquoCommissionrdquo) and MOFCOM

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 6 of 52

have signed best practices for cooperation on reviewing mergers in Beijing As the Commissionrsquos officer says the growing number of international transactions is the main reason for this cooperation In addition the Commission also signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the NDRC and SAIC in 2012 which creates a dedicated framework to strengthen cooperation and coordination5

Statistics

From January of 2009 to the end of 2015 MOFCOM received 1445 cases and accepted 1364 cases Among the reviewed cases MOFCOM has cleared 26 deals with remedies since the AML took effect in 2008 with an average review time of 199 days

In 2015 MOFCOM accepted 338 cases out of which 332 were concluded including 18 cases dealing with applicants withdrawing merger filings The agency also imposed penalties on business operators in 9 cases that were related to failure to fulfil merger filing obligations

246 cases out of 332 cases in 2015 obtained MOFCOMrsquos approval in the first phase accounting for 74 of all reviewed cases

Of the cases cleared by MOFCOM in 2015 56 were related to manufacturing such as automotive components and parts vessels machinery manufacturing and electrical equipment

Acquisitions and joint-venture agreements were the most common types of transactions accounting for 87 of all deals Meanwhile joint ventures were still the most common channel for foreign investment in China

Significant Cases

GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions6

This is the first case in which MOFCOM agreed to remove a remedy imposed on a merger

MOFCOM partially removed the restrictions on Google based on the fact that Google had lost its control of Motorola Mobility

Facts

Google applied to MOFCOM on December 1 2014 to remove the condition that required Google to treat all original equipment manufacturers (ldquoOEMsrdquo) equally in android platform-related business after it bought Motorola

5 The original notice published by EC is available at httpeuropaeurapidpress-release_IP-15-5843_enhtml 6 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150120150100862331shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 7 of 52

The concerned remedy was imposed by MOFCOM according to its No 25 Announcement in 2012 which concerned Googlersquos acquisition of Motorola Mobility together with three other remedies as the following

1) Google will license the Android Platform on a free and open basis as it had done so far

2) Google shall continue to observe the existed FRAND obligation of Motorola Mobility in respect of the latterrsquos patents and

3) Google shall delegate an independent supervisor to supervise its performance according to the Provisional Regulations on the Disposal of the Undertakingrsquos Assets or Business in the Concentration stipulated by MOFCOM in 2010

The No 25 Announcement provided that the applied remedies would be valid for five years starting from its punishment unless Google no longer controls Motorola Mobility

Google lodged the remedy removal application based on the fact that Lenovo concluded its acquisition of Motorola Mobility from Google which had been approved by MOFCOM on October 16 2014 and closed on October 30 2014 and due to this acquisition Google lost its control of Motorola Mobility

Decision

After careful examination MOFCOM noted that upon completion of the MotorolaLenovo deal Google would not be engaged in any business of manufacturing smartphones but would keep the telecommunications patent technologies of Motorola Mobility

Based on this fact on January 6 2015 MOFCOM issued a notice that it had decided to approve Googlersquos application to remove one of the remedies with the other remedies remaining in place

AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery7

The transaction is related to a conditionally cleared merger case

The concentration parties notified the deal to MOFCOM following No 95 Announcement in 2008

Considering the slight increase of AB InBevrsquos shareholdings in Zhujiang Brewery MOFCOM approved the proposed transaction

Facts

7 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150820150801090985shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 8 of 52

On July 23 2015 Interbrew Investment International a fully owned subsidiary of AB InBev Guangzhou State-owned Assets Development Holdings and Guangzhou Securities entered into an agreement with Zhujiang Brewery to subscribe the latterrsquos new shares According to this agreement Interbrew Investment International would subscribe shares worth up to CNY 16 billion

Pursuant to a MOFCOM antitrust notice issued in 2008 if AB Inbev intended to further increase its stake in Zhujiang Brewery a filing should be submitted to MOFCOM before any deal were to be concluded

On July 29 2015 AB InBev submitted the filing for the deal to MOFCOM

Decision

MOFCOM noted that upon this subscription Interbrew Investment International would increase its stake in Zhujiang Brewery from 2562 to 2999 Since the stake increase is relatively small and will not result in material changes regarding the control of Zhujiang Brewery MOFCOM decided to approve the deal on 20 August 2015

MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases

MOFCOM reached these decisions based on the undertakingsrsquo failure to file notifications

None of these concentrations were determined as resulting in anti-competition effects

MOFCOM considered that a 35 shares acquisition could lead to the obtaining of control power over a company

Complaints from the third party are the main channel of triggering investigation on unnotified concentrations

The undertakings were fined up to RMB 200000 which is less than the imposed penalty (RMB 300000) in the last year and the maximum penalty (RMB 500000) for violations of merger control rules

Facts

On September 29 2015 MOFCOM issued notices regarding the penalty on four concentration dealings because the concerning undertakings failed to notify these dealings to MOFCOM before closing them Details of these notices are as follows

Shanghai Fosun Pharmaceutical (Group) Co Ltd has been imposed a fine of CNY 200000 (USD 31431) because of its failure to notify MOFCOM regarding its

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 9 of 52

acquisition of a 35 stake in Suzhou Erye Pharmaceutical Co Ltd (Suzhou Erye) and the target stake was transferred without MOFCOMrsquos allowance8

Fujian Electronics amp Information (Group) has been imposed a fine of CNY 150000 (USD 23568) for its failure to notify a 35 stake acquisition of Shenzhen CHINO-E Communication MOFCOM made this decision based on the fact that Fujian Electronics signed a transfer agreement with CHINO-Ersquo shareholders and completed this transaction without filing9

Bestv New Media and Microsoft have been imposed CNY 200000 (USD 31420) fines by MOFCOM since they did not lodge a merger review filling regarding their joint venture E-Home Entertainment Development which was established on October 1 201310

CSR Nanjing Puzhen and Bombardier Transportation Sweden have been fined CNY 150000 (USD 23562) respectively due to their failure to notify their proposed joint venture prior to setting it up These companies made an agreement about the joint venturersquos establishment on November 3 2014 and its business license was obtained on November 11 201411

MOFCOM identified that the above dealings shall be notified according to the fact that all of these dealings constituted concentration and turnovers of these concentrating undertakings reached the statutory turnover thresholds

Article 20 of the AML stipulates three kinds of concentration which are (i) a merger of undertakings (ii) an acquisition of control of other undertakings by acquisition of shares or assets with voting right of other undertakings to an adequate extent (iii) an acquisition of control of other undertakings or the capability of imposing determinative effects on other undertakings by contracts or other means

Article 3 of the Provisions of the State Council on the Thresholds for Concentration Notification of Undertakings provides the fillingrsquos thresholds which are as follows (i) The collective worldwide turnovers of all undertakings involved in the last fiscal year exceed CNY 10 billion and the turnovers within China of at least two undertakings each exceed CNY 400 million or (ii) The collective turnovers of all undertakings involved in the last fiscal year exceed CNY 2 billion (approximately USD 294 million) and the China-wide turnovers of at least two undertakings each exceed CNY 400 million (approximately USD CNY588 million)

These undertakings were penalized because of their violations of article 21 of the 8 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150920150901124896shtml 9 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150920150901124887shtml 10 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150920150901124903shtml 11 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150920150901124899shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 10 of 52

AML which provides that the concentration reaching the filling thresholds shall be notified to MOFCOM prior to its implementation and without this notification it shall not be conducted In addition according to article 48 of the AML and article 13 of the Interim Measures for Investigating and Punishing of Concentration of Undertakings Failing to File Notification an undertaking which is identified by MOFCOM for implementing a concentration without filling would be imposed a fine and instructed to recover the situation by MOFCOM The amount of this fine could be no more than CNY 500000

There is no provision that specifically describes the behaviour of implementing a concentration In practice obtaining a business license transferring the entity of assets delivering the shares and assigning directors or managers are likely to be deemed as the implementation of concentration

According to Shang Ming the former director general of MOFCOMrsquos Anti-monopoly Bureau so far MOFCOM has already penalized 15 companies for failing to notify MOFCOM regarding merger reviews MOFCOM has noticed an increase in companies shirking merger-filing responsibilities and has therefore intensified enforcement

MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent12

MOFCOM defines all of the information and communication technology SEPs as the relevant product market rather than divides each of them into the individual market

In the process of competition analysis MOFCOM evaluates various factors rather than comparing the market shares only which is consistent with the complexity and flexibility of the high-technology industry

In the process of formulating remedies MOFCOM pays more attention on protecting Chinese downstream companies and enhancing its supervision

Facts

On April 15 2015 Nokia Oyi (ldquoNokiardquo) signed a Memorandum of Understanding regarding the acquisition of Alcatel Lucent (ldquoAlcatelrdquo) According to this memorandum Nokia intends to acquire 100 shares of Alcatel through a tender off

A notification about this deal was filed on April 21 2015 and accepted by MOFCOM on June 15 2015 After reviewing this case MOFCOM moved it to Phases II and Phase III as the agency was of the opinion that this acquisition could have anti-competitive effects on the relevant market

12 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151020151001139743shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 11 of 52

On October 19 2015 MOFCOM cleared this deal with four behavioural remedies

Decision

Relevant Market

In the agencyrsquos view there are four relevant product markets which are the radio access network market the core network systems market the network infrastructure service market and the information and communication technology SEP licensing market Meanwhile the relevant geographical market is primarily the Chinese market

Competition Analysis

According to MOFCOM this deal would have no anti-competitive effects on the first three relevant product markets in China while it could constitute an obstacle or limit the competition in the information and communication technology SEP licensing market

The agency consideredafter the deal that Nokia would increase its holding in 2G 3G and 4G SEPs and strengthen the degree of concentration in the information and communication technology SEP licensing market If it refused to license charged overly high royalty fees or conducted any other anti-competitive behaviour the competition of downstream market would be distorted which would most likely impair customersrsquo interests in the end

Remedies

Four behavioural remedies focusing on maintaining fair licensing of standard-essential patents (ldquoSEPsrdquo) were imposed on Nokia which are

1) On a reciprocal basis Nokia commits to not use injunctions to prevent enforcements of FRAND (fair reasonable and non-discriminatory) encumbered SEPs unless the potential licensees are unwilling to sign FRAND licensing agreements and follow the terms

2) If Nokia transfers its SEPs to a third party it shall inform Chinese licensees as well as Chinese companies that are actively engaging in licensing negotiation about the transfer details

3) Nokia will only transfer its SEPs to a new owner on the basis that the new owner accepts the existing FRAND commitments made by Nokia

4) MOFCOM has the right to monitor the implementation of Nokiarsquos commitments Nokia shall report to MOFCOM about the implementation of the conditions within 45 days of the end of each calendar year The reporting obligation will last five years until October18 2020

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

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Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions13

Western Digital had engaged in two conducts that violated the remedies provided in the No 9 Announcement in 2012 issued by MOFCOM

Western Digital lodged an application to remove certain restrictions in March 2014 and the agency made the decision on October 19 2015

MOFCOM considered the fact that the competition condition in the relevant product market has changed and decided to remove the hold-separate restrictions related to manufacture and RampD

Facts

In 2012 Western Digital Corporation (ldquoWestern Digitalrdquo) intended to acquire 100 shares of Viviti Technologies Ltd (ldquoViviti Technologiesrdquo) which was the holding company of Hitachi Global Storage Technologies Netherlands BV and Hitachi Global Storage Technologies Singapore Pte Ltd and engaged in the hard disk business

On April 2 2011 Western Digital filed a notification for this acquisition MOFCOM issued the No 9 Announcement in March 2012 and cleared this acquisition with six remedies According to this announcement Western Digital could apply for the removal of the first and second remedy after this decision has been carried out for 24 months

The first remedy refers to maintaining the Viviti Technologies as an independent competitor and the second remedy requires both Western Digital and Viviti Technologies to make a reasonable plan of their capacity and production and report these data to the trustee

Western Digital lodged an application to remove the first and second remedy in March 2014 MOFCOM found that Western Digital had engaged in two conducts that violated the first remedy and the competitive situation in the hard disk market had changed After talking with Western Digital collecting opinions from the relevant entities and delegating the independent party to make an economic evaluation MOFCOM decided to remove the hold-separate remedies partially

Western Digitalrsquos implementation of the duties imposed in the No 9 Announcement

Based on the implementation reports submitted by Western Digital and the monitoring reports submitted by the trustee MOFCOM found that Western

13 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151020151001139040shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

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Digital had engaged in two conducts that violated the first remedy Those were

1) On March 8 2012 Western Digital consolidated Hitachi Global Storage Technology (ldquoHGSTrdquo) which was Vivitirsquos subsidiary in US

2) In January 2013 Western Digital dissolved the development division of VivitiHGST and transferred the relevant workforce to Western Digital

MOFCOM considered that these conducts impaired the independence of Viviti as a competitor so that it imposed CNY 300000 fines on each of these behaviours and requested Western Digital to rectify the situation As per the entrusted supervisorrsquos report such behaviours have been rectified and the first remedy has been fulfilled

According to MOFCOMrsquos announcement the agency found that other remedies have been entirely implemented

Competition Analysis

With respect to the current situation of the competition in the hard disk market MOFCOM made the following assessment

1) In the areas of portable application and corporate-level application solid-state drive has put constraint on the impact of the traditional hard disk as to strengthen the competition in the relevant market

2) Overcapacity problems in the conventional hard disk drive market became obvious

3) Western Digital and HGST are the major competitors in the hard disk drive market Both the layout and the major market competitors in this market have remained unchanged since 2012

4) The hold-separate duties restricted the full competition between Western Digital and HGST The implementation of such duties hindered them from integrating their products and providing the market with a full range of products and had an adverse impact on their clientsrsquo product procurement

Based on the above analysis MOFCOM deemed that

1) Removal of the conditions that required the two companies to remain independent in production and RampD activities would enable Western Digital to save costs to provide a full range of products to the market and to fully engage in market competition and benefit its clients

2) To keep the two sales teams and their respective brands independent from each other and the independence of sales activities could reduce competition restraint impacts arising from a complete merger

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

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Remedies

After negotiating with MOFCOM the relevant entities agreed to undertake the following obligations

1) Western Digital and HGST will remain independent in sales and brands

2) Western Digital will not change its previous business modes or force its clients to exclusively purchase hard disk drive products from Western Digital or do so in disguise

3) Western Digital will continue its pace in investing in product innovation to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

This announcement will be effective within two years from the date of issuance If Western Digital can provide sufficient evidence to prove a substantial change in the market environment the company can propose to MOFCOM to remove the relevant conditions within the two years

SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions14

MOFCOM considered the fact that the competition condition in the relevant product market has changed and removed the hold-separate restrictions on Seagate and Samsung

Seagate shall remain its business model materially and continue to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

Facts

On December 12 2011 MOFCOM made the No 11 Announcement to clear Seagate Technology LLCrsquos (ldquoSeagaterdquo) acquisition with remedies In this acquisition Seagate intended to acquire hard disk drive business of Samsung Electronics Co Ltd (ldquoSamsung HDDrdquo) As per this announcement Seagate could apply for removing the first and second remedy after this decision has been carried out for 12 months

The first remedy is to preserve Samsung HDD as an independent competitor and the second remedy asks to maintain and expand Samsung HDDrsquos production capacity within six months of issuance of the No 11 Announcement and to set reasonable production volume targets based on market supply-demand conditions

Seagate lodged an application to remove the first and second remedy in May 2015 After making assessments on the relevant parties and the competition circumstance MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate remedies

14 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151020151001144105shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

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Competition Analysis

With respect to the current situation of the competition in the hard disk drive market MOFCOM made the following assessments

1) In the areas of portable application and corporate-level application solid-state drive has put constraint on the impact of the traditional hard disk so that the competition in the relevant market has been strengthened

2) Overcapacity problems in the conventional hard disk drive market became obvious

3) Both the layout and the major market competitors in the hard disk drive market have remained unchanged since 2012

4) Seagate and Samsung HDDrsquos market overlap in the hard disk market is quite small and Samsung HDDrsquos competition in the traditional hard disk is quite weak

Based on the above analysis MOFCOM deemed that

1) Removal of certain conditions is possible because in the portable application and corporate level application sectors competition constraint of solid-state drive on traditional hard disk drives has strengthened traditional hard disk drives are facing overcapacity which has reduced the chance of a single or more competitors causing competition restraints Seagate has limited overlap with Samsung in the hard disk business and the latter has a relatively weaker market power in the hard drive disk business

2) Removal of all imposed conditions may still restrain market competition because the traditional hard disk drive market competition conditions have not undergone a major change Seagate is still the major player in all divisions of the market and Seagate will strengthen its power after the acquisition of Samsung HDD

Remedies

After negotiating with MOFCOM Seagate agreed to undertake the following obligations

1) Seagate shall not change its business model materially or force clients to purchase hard drive disks exclusively from it

2) Seagate shall not force Tokyo Dengikagaku Kogyo China to supply magnetic heads exclusively to Seagate (or other Seagate-controlled companies) or limit the number of magnetic heads Tokyo Dengikagaku Kogyo China would supply to other hard drive disk manufacturers

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

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3) Seagate shall continue to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

This announcement will be effective within two years from the date of issuance If Seagate can provide sufficient evidence to prove substantial change in the market environment the company can propose to MOFCOM to remove relevant conditions within the two years

FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM15

MOFCOM deems that this acquisition would induce anti-competitive influence

NXP promises to dispose its radio frequency (ldquoRFrdquo) power transistor business

As the first case approved with structural remedies after the enactment of the Provisions on Imposing Restrictive Conditions MOFCOM conducted a comprehensive evaluation of the viability competitiveness and marketability of the divested business as well as the suitability of potential buyers

Facts

On April 3 2015 NXP filed for its acquisition of Freescale NXP Semiconductor (ldquoNXPrdquo) is a NASDAQ-listed company registered in the Netherlands which engages in the design manufacturing and sale of integration circuits and discrete components

Freescale Semiconductor (ldquoFreescalerdquo) is a New York-listed company registered in Bermuda and based in the US which engages in the manufacturing and RampD of microcontroller and digital networking processors (embedded processors)

According to the agreement between NXP and Freescale after closing Freescale will become the wholly owned subsidiary of NXP On November 25 2015 MOFCOM decided to clear this acquisition with remedies

Relevant Market

As per the announcement the relevant product markets are the general microcontroller automotive power-use analog integrated circuit and RF transistor product markets in which NXP and Freescale have horizontal overlap The relevant geographical markets should be the global market

Competition Analysis

After assessing this proposed deal the agency concluded that

1) The proposed deal would boost NXPrsquos market control power in the RF

15 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151120151101196182shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 17 of 52

transistor product market because the global and Chinese RF transistor product markets share a similar structure both featuring few competitors and high concentration levels Freescale and NXP as the number one and number two players are far ahead of their rivals in the market Therefore after closing the market control power of NXP in this market would be strengthened

2) Since Freescale was the fiercest competitor of NXP the proposed deal will remove competition between them

3) The proposed deal would reduce the options for clients and increase procurement risks

In practice the wireless infrastructure suppliers as the main client of the RF transistor product tend to procure products from both NXP and Freescale to prevent them from the risk arising from relying on one supplier

4) The proposed deal may induce an adverse impact on the technology RampD and innovation

Remedies

In accordance with MOFCOMrsquos decision NXP shall follow its written commitment submitted to MOFCOM and completely divest its RF power transistor business to Beijing Jianguang Asset Management At the same time NXP shall strictly fulfil its obligations during the transition period It is worth noting that the NXPFreescale deal shall only be implemented after the divestment deal has been concluded

In addition MOFCOM requires NXP to perform relevant obligations during the transition period from the date of approval announcement until the divestment deal has been concluded NXP shall endeavour

1) not to engage in any lsquounfair trade practicesrsquo relating to the divested business

2) not to implement any acts which may have a significant adverse impact on the value management or competitiveness of the divested business or any acts which may change the nature and scope industry or business strategy or investment policy of the divested business and to take reasonable measures to encourage core employees to stay in the divested business as well as not to seek or transfer employees to NXPrsquos non-divested business

3) to ensure supply to the divested business in a fair reasonable and non-discriminatory manner and

4) to maintain the independence of the divested business and not to exchange competitively sensitive information between the parties and the divested

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 18 of 52

business

B Monopolistic Agreements

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

With respect to the enforcement activities of the NDRC in light of the numbers of the published cases it seems that the law enforcement frequency of the NDRC regarding monopolistic agreements in 2015 is lower in comparison with 2014

The reason behind might be that the outstanding issue of human resource deficit of the antitrust authority still exists Besides the fact that more enterprises gradually attach increasing importance to the antitrust compliance might be another reason for the decrease in the number of cases investigated by the authorities

As to the enforcement activities of the SAIC 4 of 14 cases concluded by the SAIC and its local branches in 2015 are relevant to monopolistic agreements Meanwhile these four cases concern horizontal monopolistic agreements

It is noteworthy however that the Mercedes-Benz case and the Dongfeng Nissan case suggest that vertical agreements especially involving price-related restrictions on the downstream dealers is still the priority of antitrust enforcement Companies shall be very cautious when imposing restrictions on the resale prices or the minimum resale prices of commodities in the distribution agreements

Automobile industry and related industries are observed to be under continuous attention of Chinarsquos antitrust authorities

The industries relating to peoplersquos livelihoods remain to be the enforcement priority

Significant Cases

Enforcement by the NDRC and its local branches

Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC16

The investigation was triggered by a leniency application

The first leniency applicant was exempted from punishment

Eight ocean shipping companies involved were imposed a collective fine of CNY 4067 million

NDRC spent approximately 12 months to investigate and conclude the case 16 NDRCrsquos press release of the case is available at httpjjsndrcgovcngzdt201512t20151228_769084html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

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Facts

In December 2015 the NDRC published its official punishment decisions regarding the cartel case in connection with eight ocean shipping companies namely Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha (ldquoNYKrdquo) Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha (ldquoK Linerdquo) Mitsui OSK Lines EUKOR Car Carriers Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics Compantildeiacutea Sud Americana de Vapores Eastern Car Liner and Compantildeiacutea Chilena de Navegacioacuten Interoceaacutenica

According to the official press release of the NDRC the investigation was triggered by a leniency application of NYK The evidence showed that the eight companies reached consensus on non-intrusion of each others existing business to maintain or increase shipping fees when shipping goods such as cars trucks and engineering machinery in the routes between China and other countries and regions

They were also found to frequently conduct bilateral or multilateral communications on the shippersrsquo invitation for bids andor price inquiries via phone conferences dinner parties e-mails visiting etc In addition they also conducted illegal behaviour such as sensitive information exchange price negotiations bidding intention discussion dividing clients and shipping routes reaching agreements on high price bids or non-bidding in order to help certain companies gain shipping orders

To avoid the regulation of the antitrust authority the relevant shipping companies adopted various illicit measures that showed their apparent intention to violate the AML The cartel lasted for at least four years and covered a broad range of shipping routes concerned with the import and export of products between China and other regions such as North America EU South America and so on involving multiple auto brands and engineering machinery brands

The NDRC held the opinion that the eight companies conducts had restricted and eliminated competition in the relevant market raising the international shipping fees and impairing interests of shippers and end consumers The eight companies breached the AML by reaching and implementing monopolistic agreements on fixing prices and dividing the market

All eight investigated companies put forward remedy measures including enhancing the antitrust compliance program arranging more antitrust compliance trainings and developing antitrust compliance technologies

The NDRC imposed fines based on the nature level and duration of their monopolistic volations as well as their respective sales of international freight service sales relevant to the Chinese market The companies involved were collectively fined CNY 4067 million

NYK as the first cartel member voluntarily reporting the illegal conducts to the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 20 of 52

authority and providing significant evidence was entirely exempted from the punishment K Line as the second leniency applicant was imposed a fine amounting to 4 of its 2014 annual sales of international freight services relevant to Chinarsquos import and export market The details of punishments imposed on the involved companies by the NDRC are as follow

Company Name Amount of Fines (RMB million)

Percentage of the Relevant Turnovers

Grounds

Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha

- - First leniency applicant

Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha

2398 4 Second leniency applicant

Mitsui OSK Lines 3812 7 Third leniency applicant

EUKOR Car Carriers 284 9 Lasted over a long period involved many brands and many violations violations were severe

Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics

4506 8 Lasted over a long period involved many brands and many violations violations were severe

Compantildeiacutea Sud Americana de Vapores

308 6 Lasted over a long period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Eastern Car Liner 1127 5 Lasted over a long period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Compantildeiacutea Chilena de 120 4 Lasted over a long

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 21 of 52

Navegacioacuten Interoceaacutenica

period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Total 4067

Analysis

In this case the agency applied the AML instead of the Tenders and Bids Law to collusive bidding Citing article 13 (3) of the AML the NDRC identified that the collusive bidding constituted a division of the sales market

The leading three leniency applicants were granted exemption from fines to a varying degree

According to the official who handled this case dawn raids performed by antitrust enforcement agencies in other jurisdictions drew the attention of the NDRC on the cartels of these shipping companies However there was limited effective evidence to prove that the companies had reached monopolistic agreements Through pressuring the involved parties three members of the shipping cartel actively confessed their illegal conduct This case once again stresses the significance of international cooperation between antitrust enforcement agencies

Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau17

The distribution agreements between Mercedes-Benz and its dealers are determined as vertical monopolistic agreement and Mercedes-Benz violated article 14 of the AML because it restricted the ability of its dealers to decide their own resale prices

Mercedes-Benzrsquos dealers violated article of 13 of the AML due to concluding a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Mercedes-Benz and its dealers were jointly fined CNY 3578 million

Facts

In April 2015 Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau which is the provincial branch of the NDRC released the punishment on its website and announced that it had imposed a fine of CNY 350 million on Mercedes-Benz along with the aggregated fine of CNY 787 million on its dealers The fine came as a result of Mercedes-Benz reaching and implementing resale price maintenance (ldquoRPMrdquo) agreements with dealers to fix the minimum resale price of several car models as well as certain auto parts 17 The original Chinese notice published by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau is available at httpwwwjswjjgovcnoffice_neweo_comm_zxnrxsphp

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 22 of 52

According to the decision the authority found that Mercedes-Benz fixed the minimum resale price of Class E and Class S cars in Nanjing Wuxi Changzhou and Suzhou markets through telephoneverbal communication and dealers meetings from January 2013 to July 2014 Since 2010 Mercedes-Benz had reached agreements with dealers in Jiangsu province to fix the minimum resale prices for auto parts by providing different levels of discounts for insured cars cars involving expired warranty periods and cars within the warranty period

In addition Mercedes-Benz implemented the minimum resale price maintaining agreement by

1) Tightening its monitoring measures on the dealers such as inspecting deals and their sale incentive system on a weekly basis

2) Tracking the sales process flow of cars and increasing the intensity of this assessment

3) Giving warnings and reducing support ndash for example halting the supply of bestselling cars and prohibiting the opening of new stores ndash to dealers if dealers refused to cooperate with the price-fixing related policies and measures and

4) Interviewing personnel of the dealers and requesting terminations if the staff engaged in serious violations of the RPM agreement

Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau concluded that Mercedes-Benz had excluded and eliminated market competition harmed consumer welfare and consequently violated article 1418 of the AML The authority therefore imposed a fine of CNY 350 million representing 7 of the sale revenue of the previous year in the relevant market against Mercedes-Benz and imposed a fine on the dealers amounting to an equivalence of 1 of the annual sales in the previous year

Analysis

Although the agency also addressed the horizontal violation among the dealers in this case the administrative penalty decision mainly focuses on the vertical violation The agency fined dealers involved in the RPM agreement a combined CNY 787 million equal to 1 of the previous-year sales which suggests that the agency decided to give lighter punishments to dealers who took initiative in reporting the activity and provided evidence

The Mercedes-Benz case is the third case where the agency successfully 18 Article 14 of the AML The following monopolistic agreements between operators and trading partners shall be prohibited (i) fixing the resale prices of commodities to third persons (ii) restricting the minimum resale prices of commodities to third persons (iii) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement Authority under the State Council

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 23 of 52

discovered both vertical and horizontal agreements in a case following the Audi case and the Chrysler case All these cases are rooted in the same industry indicating that industrial features play a large role in raising anti-trust concerns In fact it appears that the entire automotive industry is under antitrust scrutiny

Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC19

This case involved both a horizontal agreement and an administrative monopoly

A total fine of CNY 1318 million was imposed on the involved companies

Facts

In June 2015 the NDRC through its website announced the decision made by its regional branch -Yunnan Provincial Development and Reform Commission (ldquoYunnan DRCrdquo) regarding the horizontal monopolistic agreement case involving Yunnan Communications Administration and local subsidiaries of four state-owned telecommunication companies

Through the investigation Yunnan DRC found that Yunnan Communications Administration as a competent government agency had organized several meetings involving Yunnan branches of four state-owned telecoms - China Mobile China Telecom China Unicom and China Tietong in August and September of 2014 At the end of 2009 the four local branches entered into an agreement to regulate their sales promotions in terms of limiting the promotional items amount and frequency

Furthermore the agreement provides certain measures to ensure the implementation of relevant restrictions on promotions Specifically in case any cartel member violates the agreement the others could file complaints with Yunnan Communications Administration and the agency would then issue a rectification notice to the rule-breaker

Yunnan DRC stated that the four telecoms were main competitors in the relevant market and the promotions as a significant competition measure would exert direct influence on the final prices of the products The horizontal agreement organized by Yunnan Communications Administration on sales promotions restricted the competition capacity of telecoms and as a result eliminated the competition in the relevant market Consequently the behaviour of Yunnan Communications Administration violated article 8 20 of the AML and constituted administrative monopoly in terms of ldquoforcing undertakings to conduct monopolistic behaviour prohibited by the AMLrdquo

19 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpwwwsdpcgovcnfzgggzjgjdyfldjjszhdt201506t20150602_694802html 20 Article 8 of the AML Administrative organs and the public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 24 of 52

With respect to the penalties Yunnan DRC fined the local branch of China Tietong CNY 200000 for reaching but not implementing the agreement in regards to the other three telecoms a total fine of CNY 1298 million amounting to 2 of the sales of the relevant business in the previous year were imposed for entering into and implementing the horizontal monopolistic agreement

Analysis

The telecoms industry is still the enforcement priority of the antitrust enforcement authorities A company cannot be exempted from punishment even though it is forced by competent authorities to conduct monopoly behaviour

DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC21

Both a horizontal monopolistic agreement and a vertical monopolistic agreement were involved in this case

A total fine of CNY 14242 million was imposed on DongFeng Nissan and its distributors

Facts

In September 2015 the Guangdong Development and Reform Commission (ldquoGuangdong DRCrdquo) released an announcement regarding the administrative penalties on DongFeng Nissan and its provincial distributors for concluding price-related monopolistic agreements More specifically DongFeng Nissan was imposed a fine of CNY 1233 million for breaching article 14 of the AML in terms of restricting the resale price of certain car models 17 distributors domiciled in Guangdong were collectively fined CNY 1912 million for violating article 1322 of the AML in terms of entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements

According to the published official release the Guangdong DRC launched the investigation in August 2014 The authority discovered that from 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissan had set a rigorous restriction on its distributorsrsquo abilities to determine the resale prices of certain car models including the quoted prices in various platforms and the final resale price In addition DongFeng Nissan punished the distributors that failed to abide by such price restrictions in 2013 The authority 21 The original Chinese notice published by Guangdong DRC is available at httpwwwgddpcgovcnzwgkgzdtgzyw201509t20150910_328993html 22 Article 13 of the AML The following Monopolistic agreements among competing operators shall be prohibited (i) fix or change prices of commodities (ii) limit the outputs or sales volume of commodities (iii) segment the sales markets or the raw material purchasing markets (iv) limit the purchase of new technology new facilities or limit the development of new products new technology (v) jointly boycott transactions (vi) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-Monopoly Law enforcement Authority Monopolistic agreements in this Law refer to agreements decisions or other concerted practices that eliminate restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 25 of 52

believed that the vertical agreement concluded between DongFeng Nissan and its distributors eliminated and restricted the competition in the relevant market and damaged the consumer welfare as well which violates article 14 of the AML

Furthermore from April 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissanrsquos distributors in Guangdong province held multiple meetings to discuss issues relevant to sale price reached and implemented a horizontal monopolistic agreement in terms of fixing the prices of some car models which is prohibited by article 13 of the AML

Considering that both DongFeng Nissan and the involved distributors positively cooperated with the investigation and ceased the illegal behaviour immediately after the investigation Guangdong DRC decided to impose a fine amounting to 3 of its previous yearrsquos turnovers on DongFeng Nissan and a fine ranging from 2 to 4 on the relevant distributors in accordance with articles 4623 and 4924 of the AML

Analysis

This case demonstrates that auto and related industries are still under close attention of the authority Considering the NDRCrsquos successful series of antitrust investigations conducted throughout the auto industry it is observed that the agency currently overseeing price-related antitrust issues in China has accumulated a substantial amount of experience regarding antitrust enforcement in the auto industry Now is the right time to speed up the law-making process by amending the set of rules released earlier and drafting new laws to advise the auto industry on antitrust compliance

Enforcement by the SAIC and its local branches

Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC25

The investigation was triggered by whistle blowerrsquos submission

Cartel members were collectively fined CNY 139 million 23 Article 46 of the AML In case the operators violate the relevant provisions of this Law concluding and implementing Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall order the operators to cease such act impose fines more than 1 but less than 10 of the total turnover in the preceding year and confiscate the illegal gains where the Monopolistic agreement is not implemented a fine less than RMB 500000 can be imposed If the operators involved in Monopolistic agreement on its own initiative report information concerning the conclusion of Monopolistic agreements and provide important evidences to the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority they may be given a mitigated punishment or be exempted from punishment in accordance with the circumstances Where the industrial associations violate this Law organizing the operators in the industry to conclude Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority may impose a fine less than RMB 500000 in serious circumstances the agency of social organization administration and registration may cancel its registration 24 Article 49 of the AML As for the imposition of the fines stipulated by the Article 46 47 and 48 of this Law the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall take elements such as the nature extent and time it lasts of the illegal act into consideration in determining the specific amount of the fines 25 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201506t20150601_156889html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 26 of 52

Facts

In April 2015 the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) issued administrative penalties on several brick manufacturers for entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements This is the first case relevant to monopolistic agreements that has been publicized by the SAIC since the beginning of this year

Ten cartel members were involved in the case including one company and nine individuals Similar with most antitrust cases the investigation started as a result of a whistle blowerrsquos submission After a thorough investigation Hunan AIC found that those local brick manufacturers had reached agreements on controlling production volume and dividing sales areas in the forms of production and sales agreements plans and meeting minutes

The enforcement authority reached the conclusion that these brick manufacturers violated article 13 of the AML and imposed a total fine of CNY 1389400 on them

Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC26

The organizer of the monopolistic agreement the animation association was fined CNY 100000

The antitrust authority did not punish the members of the monopolistic agreement

Facts

In December 2015 the Guangdong Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoGuangdong AICrdquo) published its administrative punishment decision in regards to Guangzhou Panyu Animation amp Game Association (ldquoGAGArdquo) organizing member companies to conclude a monopolistic agreement

According to the decision GAGA drafted the ldquoAgreement of Exhibition Alliancerdquo (ldquoAgreementrdquo) and convened a conference with member companies in order to discuss the content and conclusion of the Agreement 52 member companies entered into the Agreement which actually requested the alliance companies to merely participate in the exhibitions either organized or supported by GAGA in Guangzhou In addition the Agreement prohibited the alliance companies from attending any other exhibition except if they obtained prior approval of GAGA

After a thorough investigation Guangdong AIC believed that the conclusion of the Agreement among GAGA and the 52 member companies violated article 13 (5) of the AML in terms of boycott GAGA who was deeply involved and restricted member companiesrsquo choice of exhibitions through the Agreement could be deemed as

26 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151208_164680html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 27 of 52

the participant and organizer of the monopolistic agreement In accordance with article 46 of the AML Guangdong AIC imposed a fine of CNY 100000 on GAGA for organizing the conclusion of the monopolistic agreement

Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC27

Hubei AIC considered the coinsurance for Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance illegal

Twelve insurance companies were fined CNY 469 million in total

Facts

In December 2015 the Hubei Administrative for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHubei AICrdquo) disclosed its punishment on 12 insurance companies for signing illegal coinsurance agreements

The disclosed punishment decision suggests that the Hubei branch of China Pacific Life Insurance (ldquothe Companyrdquo) 11 other insurance companies and Wuhan Construction Safety Technology Consultation Center (ldquoWCSTCCrdquo) signed a Coinsurance Agreement on Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance (ldquoCoinsurance Agreementrdquo) of which the main contents include

1) The Company and 11 other involved companies as the coinsurers jointly take charge of the personal accident insurance concerned with the construction project directly administered by the Wuhan government WCSTCC is responsible for providing safety professionalism and technology services regarding the relevant personal accident insurance

2) The Company as the chief insurer of the coinsurance occupies 12 of the total amount of the insurance and the other 11 companies respectively occupy 8

3) The Company as the representative of the coinsurance is in charge of collecting the premium signing the standard form insurance policies and issuing the invoice in its own name The Company should share the charged premium with the other companies in accordance with the Coinsurance Agreement

4) Both the Company and the other insurance companies should pay 25 of the actually received premium to WCSTCC as the service fee WCSTCC will assist the coinsurers in providing safety and technology management service to the insured In addition the 11 insurance companies should pay 5 of their premium to the Company as the management fee

27 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165445html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

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5) In case an accident happens the 12 companies will jointly bear the damages based on their respective shares in the coinsurance

6) There is a contact mechanism established in the coinsurance The coinsurers will regularly hold coinsurance conferences to discuss existing problems

Furthermore the coinsurers and WCSTCC also signed a self-discipline agreement and established a complete management system to assure the implementation of the Coinsurance Agreement Any party violating the Coinsurance Agreement would be punished

Hubei AIC found that WCSTCC was solely invested by Wuhan Construction Safety Management Association which was under Wuhan Construction Commission The centre helped implement certain functions of the Wuhan Urban Construction Safety Management Station and was responsible for quality supervision and safety supervision of municipal construction projects

It later became a prerequisite for construction companies to purchase insurance from any member of the coinsurance in order to get approval to commence their project According to the decision Hubei AIC launched another separate investigation against WCSTCC

Through the investigation Hubei AIC concluded that the Coinsurance Agreement constituted a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by article 13 of the AML with the following analysis

First coinsurance as a common business model to jointly share and lower risks is widely adopted in the insurance industry A coinsurance arrangement for a specific project in order to avoid high risks faced by one insurer could be legal However coinsurance should not target the entire market In this case prior to the Coinsurance Agreement the risks of the construction projects were unpredictable since the scale of the construction projects the difficulty of the construction and the amount of construction workers could not be available It is impossible to predict the risks of the projects thus it is not necessary to cooperate with other insurers to collectively bear the risks The purpose of the 12 insurance companies to establish the coinsurance is to avoid the competition which demonstrates the Coinsurance Agreement belongs to a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by the AML

Second the companies through entering into the coinsurance agreement actually divided the relevant market of construction project personal accident insurance in Wuhan city which affected the competition in the relevant market and damaged the interests of other competitors and the consumers In particular the Construction Law as amended in 2011 stipulates that the purchase of personal accident insurance is not mandatory and the construction companies have the right to choose whether to buy the said insurance or not As mentioned purchasing insurance from the coinsurance had been the prerequisite for construction companies to obtain administration

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 29 of 52

approval for the project which seriously distorts the fair competition in the market

Citing article 46 of the AML the 12 insurance companies were collectively fined CNY 469 million including fines on the companies and confiscation of illegal gains It is noteworthy that the fines were calculated based on the companiesrsquo 2014 annual sales of the insurance product in connection with the coinsurance The Company as the chief insurer was fined amounting to 6 of its 2014 annual sales of the relevant insurance product in the coinsurance and other companies were fined amounting to 2 of relevant sales For more specific information please see the following table

Company Name (Hubei Branch)

Fines (CNY million)

Percentage of the sales

Illegal Gains (CNY

million)

China Pacific Life Insurance 00653 6 0941

Sino Life 00145 2 04332

Alltrust Insurance 00145 2 04332

Taikang Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Continent Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Pacific Property Insurance

00145 2 04332

China Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

PICC Property and Casualty 00145 2 02599

Taiping General Insurance 00145 2 013

Union Life Insurance 00145 2 01177

Ping An Annuity Insurance Company of China

00145 2 04201

Ping An Property amp Casualty Insurance Company of China

00145 2 -

Subtotal 02248 - 44679

Total 46927

Analysis

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 30 of 52

Coinsurance as an effective approach to lower risks of insurers is widely used in the insurance industry Information sharing and agreements on coinsurance were generally considered efficient and legitimate However from an antitrust perspective coinsurance may raise competition concerns depending on the circumstances of each agreement In the case that there is enough capacity for one insurer to cover the potential risks the coinsurance might be considered as entering into a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC28

The first leniency applicant was exempted from fines

The other concrete companies were imposed a fine of CNY 180000

Facts

In December 2015 the concrete companies monopolistic agreement case investigated by Hunan AIC was published on SAICrsquos website

In accordance with the antitrust enforcement announcement of SAIC this case was triggered by complaints from the Yongzhou City peoplersquos congress After the preliminary review the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) initiated the formal investigation on seven concrete companies domiciled in Yongzhou City Hunan Province which were suspected of being involved in a monopolistic agreement in terms of division of the volumes of the products

After further investigation Hunan AIC found that the seven concrete companies concluded a partnership agreement in 2011 which requested the involved companies to enter into a partnership business with assets In addition according to the partnership agreement it was planned to establish a comprehensive office to manage production marketing and distribution of the products of all the partners The seven companies intended to jointly adjust and control the output of concrete based on the partnership agreement However because there were disagreements over the allocation of the injected assets and market shares the companies did not implement the partnership agreement The agreement was cancelled in December 2012

Based on the findings Hunan AIC concluded that the seven concrete companies as competitors of each other restricted and eliminated the competition in the relevant market through reaching the partnership agreement and dividing the volumes of sales which violated article 13(3) of the AML in terms of division of sales market Considering that the agreement had not been implemented and the limited influence of the agreement according to article 46 of the AML and article 27 of the Administrative Penalties Law small amount fines were imposed on the involved companies Six companies were fined CNY 30000 each for their illegal behaviour 28 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165504html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 31 of 52

Yongzhou Shuangyuan Building Materials Co Ltd as the first one to actively report the monopolistic agreement and cooperate with the enforcement authority was exempted from the punishment

Outlook

It is expected that the AMLrsquos enforcement on monopolistic agreements will continue in the future Industries such as automobile shipping pharmaceuticals insurance etc will still remain the priority of the antitrust enforcement

The antitrust enforcement authorities have published a series of regulations in order to clarify the substantial and procedural issues relevant to the antitrust enforcement However Chinarsquos current antitrust legislation regime is still immature In the following years we expect that more attention will be paid to the legislative improvements

Another remarkable issue for cartel members is that with more Chinese enterprises attaching increasing importance to the AML the follow-on civil damages actions might become a tendency in the future

C Abuse of Market Dominance

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen a decent increase of abuse of market dominance cases both in public enforcement and private litigation Oftentimes the authorities responsible for public enforcement generally find it difficult to pursue investigations against abuse of market dominance cases The following two main reasons are often cited to explain this standoff first it is hard for the authorities to define the relevant markets and prove the undertaking(s)rsquo dominant market position through economic approaches second it is hard to collect evidence regarding abusive practices

The cases related to IPRs abuse are emerging significantly particularly in the telecommunication media and technology (ldquoTMTrdquo) sectors

The SAICrsquos latest refusal-to-deal probe against a local drug maker shows that the SAIC and its local branches have increasingly acquired a profile as an abuse of dominance regulator

Significant Cases

Cases pursued by the SAIC

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 32 of 52

Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case29

Facts

The local authority in Dongfang city reported to the Hainan provincial branch of SAIC on April 23 2014 of the suspected dominance abuse The SAIC authorized its Hainan bureau to officially investigate the matter on 25 July 2014 according to a decision dated January 9 2015 The AIC concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its market dominance by requiring users to pay a deposit without any legal basis and or justifiable reasons

In terms of the relevant product market the local authority found that in this case it was the urban water supply market in Dongfang city and its surrounding townships where Dongfang Water was the sole public operator in the local water supply market with a 100 market share which made all water users completely reliant on the companyrsquos supply In term of market access the local authority found it very unlikely that there were other operators due to the strict regulations

The Hainan SAIC then concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its dominance as it charged users a deposit by threatening to refuse to register users and also by threatening to restrict the water supply Dongfang Waters charging of deposits lacked a legal basis and hadnt received government approval to the detriment of household consumers and business water users and hampered the improvement of management and services of the company Such conduct was in breach of Chinarsquos Anti-Monopoly Law

Hainan AIC levied a fine of CNY 593208 a lighter penalty equivalent to 2 of the companyrsquos annual sales for the previous year and confiscated illicit gains of CNY 38521 for abuse of market dominance

Analysis

It is noteworthy that although handled by a local authority supervised by the SAIC the antitrust agency detailed the relevant market definition the assessment of the dominant market position the abusive practices and the scrutiny of the justifiable reasons

Although the definition of the relevant market and the reasoning of the Hainan provincial AIC and the SAIC are subject to criticism it is still applausive to see that the antitrust regulators have realized the importance of the application of rule of reason in an abuse case In addition through itrsquos a published decision practitioners may observe the regulatorsrsquo reasoning and thus transparency and legal certainty have been generated

29 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzfcfjd201502t20150212_152066html last visited on October 18 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 33 of 52

Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms30

Facts

In June 2013 the Ningxia AIC under authorization of SAIC opened an antitrust investigation into the alleged tie-in sales by the three major state-owned telecommunications operators China Tietong China Unicom and China Telecom for the tie-in sale of fixed-line telephones with broadband Internet services The Ningxia AIC found that the three companies had bundled fixed-line phone services with Internet services to subscribers

During the investigation all three telecommunications companies admitted the tie-in practice had recognized that such practice had improper influence on competition and deprived the choices of consumers The three companies promised to undertake internal rectification timely and eliminate the ill effects resulting from such practice The parties committed to taking the following corrective measures

1) Taking internal rectifications and conducting training to staff about antitrust laws and stop tie-in sales practices

2) Making public commitments to allow subscribers a free choice of services and strengthening the propaganda through the operating room call centre and other channels

3) Unbundling fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

The Ningxia AIC decided to suspend the probe on 14 May 2015 on the grounds that the three companies had actively worked together with the investigators and proposed workable remedy plans

Analysis

In the official announcement Ningxia AIC concluded that the purpose of antitrust enforcement is to restrain monopolistic conducts the protection of competition and to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of consumers Given that during the investigation process the parties had actively cooperated with the investigation formed a more profound understanding of the dangers of tying behaviour and moreover the parties proposed and implemented positive corrective measures to be able to remove the ill impact of their actions the agency believed that the purpose of antitrust law enforcement was fulfilled

It is worth noting that the Ningxia AIC also required the three companies to implement the commitment by August 30 2015and the submission of the written

30 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158908html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158906html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158910html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 34 of 52

implementation report on July 102015 and August 102015 respectively which is another illustration that an effective commitment by the undertakings shall directly deal with the effect that is brought by the monopolistic behaviour In this case the effect of the monopolistic act was restricted to the choice of the consumers therefore the commitment by the undertaking aimed at allowing the freedom of choice and the unbundling of fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company31

Facts

The Liaoning AIC imposed a fine of approximately CNY 433m on the Fushun Branch of Liaoning Tobacco Co on 1 June 2015 The agency also ordered the company to stop its illicit behaviour

The Liaoning AIC received a tip-off that the accused Liaoning Tobacco Corsquos Fushun branch was conducting tie-in sales of non-high-demand cigarette brands with high-demand cigarette brands After gaining authorization from SAIC the agency officially started an investigation regarding the companyrsquos suspected abuse of market dominance in June 2014

Analysis

According to the announcement the tobacco company argued that the tobacco industry is a state controlled or monopolized industry with a lawful monopolistic position therefore the company shall not be subject to the norms of general market competition rules or the anti-monopoly law

In this regards the agency concluded that in terms of the status of the undertaking admittedly the first paragraph of article 17 of the AML says that the State shall protect the lawful business operations of undertakings in these industries with respect to the industries which are under the control of the State-owned economic sector and have a bearing on the lifeline of the national economy or national security and the industries which exercise monopoly over the production and sale of certain commodities according to law However the second paragraph continues to say that the undertakings mentioned above shall do business according to law be honest faithful and strictly self-disciplined and subject themselves to public supervision and they shall not harm the consumers interests by taking advantage of their position of control or their monopolistic production and sale of certain commodities In particular in the preceding paragraph the ldquolawful businessrdquo and ldquoaccording to lawrdquo imply that the AML shall apply in the business operation The agency therefore believes that

31 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201508t20150813_16

0208html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 35 of 52

there shall be no exemption for the undertaking concerned the defences of the undertaking concerned is not established

Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm32

Facts

The Chongqing AIC fined Chongqing Qingyang Pharmaceutical CNY 439308 for alleged dominance abuse

The investigation was initiated when the company contacted the agency for verification on its potential breach of the AML related to an allopurinol active pharmaceuticals ingredient (API) distribution agreement with its exclusive distributor The company provided the relevant agreement and information and the agency conducted an investigation into the company and some other relevant companies

Analysis

Relevant Market

During the investigation the agency found that pharmaceutical ingredients are a special commodity the API is used to produce the preparations The chemical API is only used for the production of the preparation and could be used as a medicine for clinic use

The preparation is produced according to the requirements of certain form of prepared drugs and for the purpose of treatment and prevention which can be used as medicine

The allopurinol is used for the common treatment of hyperuricemia However the other treatments are different in pharmacological effects or treatment effects as well as in the cost for the patient Furthermore the company is the only manufacturer and supplier in the market nationwide since July 2012 Therefore the agency concluded that the relevant market is the allopurinol API market

Considering that the qualification for manufacturing the allopurinol API is national wide and the normal practice for purchasers and suppliers is domestic the relevant geographic market is the Chinese market

The Market Dominance

During the investigation the agency found that the company is the only supplier and manufacturer of allopurinol API in China there is no other competitor in the

32 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151222_16

5152html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 36 of 52

market and the company has a monopoly in the market The evidence shows that the company has the ability to control the prices the position for the downstream is relatively weak

With respect to the market entry the agency found that the market entry is relatively high in addition other undertakings are dependent on the company Thus the agency believed the company to have market dominance

Refusal to Deal

The agency found that on September 25 2015 the company reached an exclusive agreement and distribution agreement with its distributor Based on these agreements the company didnrsquot supply allopurinol API to the said distributor and other companies despite the fact that those companies requested for allopurinol API but were turned down by the company

Absence of Reasonable Cause

The agency found that the companyrsquos refusal to deal was not in line with the needs of normal business operation or economic efficiency On the other hand the refusal to deal was aimed at increasing the market share of the allopurinol drug product Also the agency found that the stop of supply was a manipulation of market power as to maximize the profit to the most The agency further found that the exclusive distribution agreement with suspension of supply for six months and the refusal to supply was to eliminate and restrict the competition as to gain the monopolistic profit

The Consequence of Refusal to Deal

The agency concluded that the refusal to deal harmed the competition of the allopurinol preparations market Because of the suspension of supply many demanders had to reduce their production or switch to the supply of other products or stop their production The suspension of supply affected the competition of the downstream market Consequently the raising of the price of allopurinol API also raised the cost for other manufacturers of allopurinol preparations

Furthermore the refusal to deal led to capacity loss of the allopurinol preparation industry

Ultimately the refusal to deal increased the burden on consumers as the refusal to supply changed the supply-demand relationship in the market

The agency concluded that the Company abused its dominant position in the allopurinol API market by refusing to deal with intended buyers in the period between October 2013 and March 2014Therefore the Company violated article 17 (1) of the AML which prohibits business operators with a dominant market position from abusing that position such as the refusal to deal without any justifications

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 37 of 52

D Administrative Monopoly

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 witnessed antitrust authoritiesrsquo significant efforts regarding the enforcement against administrative monopoly According to Mr Dong Zhiming the deputy director general of Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly Bureau ever since the AML coming into force six cases in connection with administrative monopoly were investigated by NDRC and among them five cases were handled in the year of 2015 These cases touched abuses of administrative power in terms of designative deal in relation to transportation communication and pharmaceutical industries

The first private litigation related to administrative monopolistic acts was heard in the court which is a milestone case in the enforcement of the AML

Significant Cases

Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC33

Facts

In March 2015 the NDRC released the official letter to Shandong Provincial Department of Transportation (ldquoShandong DOTrdquo) on its website with respect to correct its abuse of administrative power to exclude and restrict competition

During the investigation the NDRC found that since 2011 Shandong DOT had issued multiple relevant government orders in order to require certain types of vehicles to be directly connected to two designated information and service platforms both of which are operated and technically supported by one company namely Shandong Jiutong Internet of Things Technology Co Ltd (ldquoJiutong ITTrdquo) Furthermore according to the orders issued by the competent administrative department all the vehicle satellite positioning terminals entering into Shandong provincial market should be debugged through the said technology service platform which is operated by the mentioned company In addition Shandong DOT released the cap prices of vehicle satellite positioning terminals which is identical to the 2012 bid-winning price in the Ministry of Transportation demonstration project

The NDRC believed that Shandong DOTrsquos behaviour eliminated and restricted the competition in the monitoring platform market and the vehicle terminal market deprived the right of transportation enterprises to choose vehicle terminals and monitoring platform on their owns unreasonably raised the sales prices of vehicle terminals and service fees charged by the platform and increased the costs of transportation enterprises Therefore the antitrust agency concluded that Shandong

33 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201503t20150327_668911html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 38 of 52

DOT violated article 8 of the AML which stipulates that ldquoadministrative organs and the public organizations with an administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude and restrict competitionrdquo Specifically Shandong DOT violated article 3234 in terms of requiring organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any designated operators and violated article 3735 in terms of setting rules with contents which eliminate and restrict competition

Based on article 51 of the AML ldquoWhere administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations abuse administrative powers performing activities which exclude and restrict competition the superior entity shall order it to correct impose administrative penalty on the chief officer and other staffs directly responsible pursuant to the laws The AML enforcement authority may give recommendations on disposal of activities to the relevant superior entityrdquo the NDRC proposed in writing that the Shandong provincial government should order Shandong DOT to rectify its behaviour with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Entirely open up the monitoring platform market by permitting transportation undertakings to freely choose any approved platform

2) Loosen the restrictions on the entry into Shandong vehicle terminals permit the undertakings to independently select the supplier of vehicle terminals and allow the qualified terminals to be connected to the relevant monitoring platform and

3) Revoke the official documentation relevant to the cap price of vehicle terminals in order to promote the price competition

Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 36

Facts

On 26 August 2015 the NDRC published its second decision with regard to the rectification of administrative monopoly since the beginning of this year According to the proposal letter sent to Anhui Provincial Government the investigation against the Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City (Bengbu HFPC) was trigged by third partiesrsquo complaints

34 Article 32 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to require organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any operators designated by them 35 Article 37 of the AML Administrative organs shall not abuse their administrative powers to set rules with contents which eliminate restrict competition 36 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201508t20150826_748682html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 39 of 52

The investigation suggests that Bengbu HFPC published three notices with regard to drugs procurement in April and May of this year

In the No C-2015-CG-X-111 Notice (ldquoNo111 Noticerdquo) released on 10 April2015 the health authority not only provided the dosage form and qualification of the requested drugs but also directly determined the suppliers of relevant drugs which eliminated and restricted the competition among pharmaceutical manufacturers and therefore violated articles 32 and 37 of the AML

In the No C-2015-CG-C-112 Notice (ldquoNo112 Noticerdquo) and No C-2015-CG-C-168 (ldquoNo 168 Noticerdquo) respectively released on 10 April and 22 May 2015 the Bengbu HFPC set discriminative qualification requirements on non-local undertakings in order to restrict their participation in the relevant bidding For instance in accordance with No 112 Notice to be a qualified bidder the turnover of non-local undertakings shall exceed CNY 2 billion which is 50 times as much as the turnover requirements of the local undertakings In the NDRCrsquos opinion the administrative monopoly activities conducted by the local health agency excluded the relevant undertakings from the market maintained the virtual-high prices of drugs and therefore violated articles 3237 and 37 of the AML

The NDRC suggested in a letter that Anhui Provincial Government should urge the Bengbu HFPC to rectify the abuse of monopoly powers with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Stop setting distinguishing restrictions on qualification requirements review standards and numbers of winning bidders as for local and non-local undertakings

2) Stop designating the suppliers of competitive drugs and

3) Take necessary measures to mitigate the negative effects resulting from the previous illegal monopolistic abuses

Outlook

At the beginning of the year the former director general of the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau under the NDRC Xu Kunlin stated that the agency would strengthen antitrust enforcement on abuse of administrative power in 2015

Since then the NDRC has made great efforts to rectify unreasonable abuses of administrative power The currently disclosed two cases investigated by the NDRC re-emphasize the Chinese Governmentrsquos strict scrutiny of antitrust issues in respect of

37 Article 34 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to restrict or reject the participation of operators from other regions in local bidding activities by measures such as prescribing discriminatory qualification requirements or assessment standards or by not publishing information according to law

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 40 of 52

administrative monopoly It reminds the local governments that antitrust compliance is of significant importance

III Private Litigation

A Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen more and more private antitrust litigations

The private antitrust litigation cases have become increasingly complicated especially the issues regarding the intersection areas of IP and antitrust law

Multinational giants and State-Owned Enterprises (the ldquoSOEsrdquo) are increasingly becoming the targets in antitrust civil litigations Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (the ldquoSMEsrdquo) tend to use the antitrust litigation to achieve their commercial goals in the business context

B Significant Cases

Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)38

This is the first-ever private litigation concerning administrative monopoly since the implementation of the AML in 2008

Facts

According to the currently disclosed details the case is relevant for designated trade

The plaintiff Shenzhen Sware Technology Co Ltd (ldquoSwarerdquo) is a software company The press releases suggest that Sware Gloden Software Co Ltd (ldquoGlodenrdquo) and Shanghai Ruban Software Co Ltd (ldquoShanghai Rubanrdquo) are the three main suppliers of construction cost software and possess the major shares of the relevant market An annual provincial vocational ability contest regarding the construction cost hosted by the Guangdong Department of Education (ldquoGuangdong DOE) designated Gloden as the exclusive supplier of the relevant software

After several unsuccessful verbal and written negotiations with Guangdong DOE in April 2014 Sware filed a lawsuit against Guangdong DOE before the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquothe Courtrdquo) alleging that the administrative organ abused its administrative power and violated the AML by designating exclusive software supplier for the contest and claimed a compensation for reasonable expense amounting to CNY 10800 Yuan

The opinions of the Court 38 The story of the case is available at httpfinancesinacomcnchinadfjj20150410074621924997shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 41 of 52

The full text of the judgment has not been disclosed yet In accordance with the information available to the public the Court invoked article 32 of the AML which prohibits an administrative organ from abusing its administrative power to require or in disguised form organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use only the commodities supplied by the entities designated by them The Court concluded that Guangdong DOE failed to prove the legitimacy of the designation and therefore abused its administration power

Currently the case is in appeal before the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court

Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 39

It is the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China

In the first instance ruling Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court ruled against Sinopec holding that the Yunnan branch of Sinopecs trading company was obligated to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its dominance in the sales market of refined oil by refusing to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding without justifiable reasons

In the second instance ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors Currently the case is pending

Facts

The First Trial

The lawsuit was filed before the Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoKunming Courtrdquo) in January 2014 Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy Co Ltd (ldquoYingdingrdquo) a bio-energy manufacturer claimed that Sinopec and the Yunnan branch of Sinopec trading company (ldquoSinopec Yunnan Branchrdquo) had failed to fulfil their obligations stipulated in the Renewable Energy Law and had abused their market dominance in sales market of refined oil by refusing to trade with Yingding without justifiable reasons

Sinopec and Sinopec Yunnan Branch mainly explained four reasons for why they rejected Yingdingrsquos biofuel Firstly Yingding had failed to prove that the biofuel complied with the relevant national standard and was safe to use Secondly Yingding had failed to provide complete trading terms Thirdly the laws and regulations regarding biofuel were incomplete the authorized refined oil sales companies were 39 The details of the case are available at httpnewsxinhuanetcomfortune2014-1217c_1113680039htm httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=9e71db51-6ff6-4d2c-8af6-8eacf023ebdeampKeyWord=E4BA91E58D97E79B88E9BC8E|E4B8ADE79FB3E58C96 httpnewsxinhuanetcomenergy2015-0422c_127721575htm httpwwwnbdcomcnarticles2015-04-23911348html last visited on December 17 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 42 of 52

obligated to purchase biofuel from the biofuel manufacturers if it met certain quality standards but there was a vacancy regarding how to reach the end consumers from the sales companies

On 8 December 2014 the Kunming Intermediate Peoples Court ruled that Sinopec Yunnan Branch bore a legal obligation to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its market dominance in refined oil market by refusing without any justifiable reasons to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding The court ordered Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network within 30 days Both Yingding and Sinopec filed appeals to the Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court

The Appellate Trial

The appeal hearing was held on 22 April 2015 in Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoYunnan Courtrdquo) Sinopec submitted 23 new pieces of evidence and introduced two expert witnesses in a bid to overturn several key elements in the first-instance ruling by Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court

In terms of the determination of the relevant market and the market dominance Sinopec argued that the relevant market in this case was for adipic acid monomethyl ester (ldquoAAMErdquo) the main ingredient of a biofuel additive known as BD100 Yingdingrsquos main product is BD100 which can be blended with fossil diesel to become biofuel In the AAME market Sinopec is a potential buyer instead of a market dominator In support of this argument Sinopec presented an expert witnessmdashGong Jiong a professor of economics at Beijings University of International Business and Economics who testified that AAME should be defined as the relevant product market on the basis of an economic analysis

However Yingding insisted that the first-instance ruling was correct in naming the sales market of refined oil as the relevant market and submitted new evidence an article on Sinopecs website that claimed it had a 67 market share in Yunnan to help establish the claim that Sinopec had market dominance

Another main dispute was whether Yingdingrsquos biofuel product met national standards which would make it mandatory for Sinopec to purchase under Chinas Renewable Energy Law The law stipulates that biofuel producers must sell their products first to an authorized refined oil sales company and the sales companies are obliged to buy the fuel if it meets certain quality standards In order to test the quality Sinopec introduced the second expert witness Lin Jianmin a leading author of Chinarsquos national biofuel standard Lin Jianmin pointed out that there are currently quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology which gives Sinopec a justifiable reason not to trade with Yingding Moreover Sinopec presented some precedents in which consumers had complained about the biofuel quality and also claimed that China didnt have a sound regulatory framework to support biofuel production neither in testing nor in sales

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 43 of 52

Nevertheless to refute this point Yingding referred to an earlier test in co-operation with Sinopec in 2011 where selected buses in Kunming used biofuel blended by Sinopec using BD100 produced by Yingding

On August 13 2015 Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors and now this case is pending In the written appellate ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court did not provide any details regarding its reasoning

Key Issues of the Case

Is there any competition between Yingding and Sinopec

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case the product of Yingding is biofuel while Sinopec does not engage in the business of biofuel From this perspective Yingding and Sinopec are not competitors Thus it is not necessary and not reasonable for Sinopec to eliminate or restrict the competition from Yingding

Relevant Market

The definition of the relevant market is a prerequisite to determine whether competition exists and whether the AML is applicable In accordance with the Judicial Interpretation of Antitrust civil litigation the plaintiff shall take the responsibility to prove the defendantrsquos dominance in the relevant market Also the methods of defining the relevant market are stipulated in the Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition (ldquoGuidelinesrdquo) However both Yingding and Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court defined the relevant market as the sales market of refined oil without sufficient antitrust analysis none of the methods in the Guidelines were used Therefore the definition of the relevant market remains arguable and needs to be sufficiently analysed in the upcoming retrial

Justifiable Reasons

The abuse of market dominance includes the behaviour of refusing to trade without justifiable reasons according to the AML but in the first instance ruling justifiable reasons were not investigated by the court During the appellate trial the expert witness introduced by Sinopec claimed that there were quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology and this was a justifiable reason to refuse to trade with Yingding Even though the first instance court and the appellate court did not reason the justifiable reason it should be discussed and investigated further during the retrial

AML or Renewable Energy Law

The claims of Yingding were based on both the AML and the Renewable Energy Law (ldquoRELrdquo) and the first instance ruling referred to both the AML and the REL as

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 44 of 52

well It seems that the laws the first instance court referred to were comprehensive but in fact the reasoning was not clear and logical In the first instance ruling some disputes regarding the AML were reviewed but all the orders were not based on the AML Specifically the first instance court ordered the Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network based on the REL and dismissed the other claims That the orders were not on account of reasoning is illogical It is anticipated that during the retrial the application of the laws will be clearer

Analysis

A lot of issues have not been clearly analysed by the courts such as the relevant market and the justifiable reasons Since the case is remanded the above-mentioned issues are expected to be resolved in the retrial In addition Yingding was in a disadvantaged position compared to its first instance trial since its claims based on the AML were challenged greatly during the appellate trial In the retrial it is probable that Yingding may switch its litigation strategy and base its claims on the REL Therefore maybe more preparation regarding the REL can give Sinopec a leg up

Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)

Rijing Electric a Chinese distributor seeks CNY 5m compensation

The first hearing was on 9 June 2015 and ended without a ruling

Facts

Rijing Electric (ldquoRijingrdquo) a Shanghai-based company and a former distributor for Panasonic accused Panasonic of abusing its dominance and dividing the market through monopolistic practice in an antitrust lawsuit filed in 2014 with Shanghai No 1 Intermediate Court (ldquoShanghai Courtrdquo) claiming compensation of CNY 5m (USD 815370) Wenzhou Mingda Automation System Co and Shanghai Qingying Automation Equipment as the distributor of Panasonic in China are the co-defendants were accused of conducting monopolistic behaviours by implementing Panasonicrsquos policy

The first hearing for evidence exchange was on June 9 2015 Rijing claimed a policy allegedly introduced by Panasonic in 2009 restricted the competition between distributors Panasonic claims the policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo and has full justifiable reasons It explained that the products in question required customization at considerable cost to distributors before its sale to customers Once carried out however other distributors leaving them open to quote much lower prices than the original distributor could simply and relatively cheap replicate this customization Besides Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and that the plaintiff had failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic said its market share for the four products

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 45 of 52

under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases Also Rijing failed to challenge the policy when it was first introduced instead initially agreeing it was reasonable as e-mail evidence submitted by Panasonic suggests

Key Issues of the Case

Whether Panasonic occupied a market dominant position

It is reported that Rijing claimed that Panasonic had abused its market dominance but Rijing failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and its market share for the four products under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases

Analysis

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case Panasonicrsquos policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo rather than to eliminate or restrict competition

Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals40 (Pending)

It is a battle over patent licensing issues

It is viewed as being among the most complicated antitrust lawsuits in China

The first hearing was on 17 and 18 December 2015

Facts

Four Chinese rare earth companies Ningbo Ketian Magnet Ningbo Permanent Magnetics Ningbo Tongchuang Strong Magnet Material and Ningbo Huahui Magnetic Industry filed antitrust lawsuits against Hitachi Metals over alleged patent licensing issues regarding rare earth magnets on December 11 2014 with the Ningbo Intermediate Peoples Court (ldquoNingbo Courtrdquo) in Zhejiang province As reported four Chinese rare earth companies claimed Hitachi Metals abused its market dominance and hurt the industry competition by refusing to license the patents to them The patents in this case are used in the manufacturing of sintered neodymium iron boron (ldquoNdFeBrdquo) magnets a rare-earth magnet alloy widely used in parts for airplanes automobiles and other products

Hitachi Metals filed a challenge with the Ningbo Court over its jurisdiction in April 2015 After Ningbo Court rejected Hitachi Metals jurisdiction objection on 28 April 2015 Hitachi Metals appealed to the Zhejiang High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoZhejiang

40The details of the story are available at httpwwwzbmagcomnews_viewphpid=80 httpwwwhitachicomcnaboutpress201510-121118_ahtml last visited on December 22 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 46 of 52

Courtrdquo) but Zhejiang Court affirmed the ruling of the Ningbo Court

The first day of a two-day hearing took place on 17 December 2015 during which the two sides cross-examined each otherrsquos evidence The evidence focused on clearing up several key elements in the case including the relevant market whether Hitachi Metals has dominance on that market and whether both sides acted in good faith during the licensing negotiations

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Product Market

The four Chinese rare earth companies claimed that the relevant product market should be the NdFeb-related patent licensing market However Hitachi Metals believed that the physical NdFeb market rather than the patent licensing market should be the relevant product market which is meaningful for assess the real competitive effects on the market

Whether Hitachi Metals occupies a dominant market position

In terms of market dominance Hitachi Metals claimed it does not occupy a dominant position because Hitachi Metalsrsquo patents were not in a standard in this case and there are substitutable technologies in the market SEP holders have the obligation to license on FRAND terms but none-SEP holders do not So while a refusal to license a SEP may constitute abuse of dominance refusal to license a non-SEP mdash even by a patent holder with a dominant position mdash should not be considered as an abuse

Analysis

Hitachi Metals as a patent holder should have the right to decide whether to retain those patents or not or who to license According to the legal theory the purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage and protect innovation by conferring monopoly right mdash that is to give intellectual property owners the proprietary rights which can exclude others from using the intellectual property The SEP holders admittedly need to comply with FRAND terms which can maintain a robust balance between competition and monopoly whereas the further intervention of antitrust law into non-SEP patents may undermine the purpose of intellectual property law To which extent the antitrust law should intervene is yet to be seen

Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei41

A confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the Beijing IP court made by the Beijing High Court

41 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcncpwswbjzscq201511t20151103_12225640htm last visited on December 28 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 47 of 52

Facts

On August 2 2013 the NDRC penalized Abbott for monopolistic price-fixing and then Abbott made a price adjustment in China where the prices of main products were reduced

On December 16 2014 Tian Junwei (ldquoTianrdquo) a Chinese citizen in Beijing sued Carrefour Shuangjing Branch (ldquoCarrefourrdquo) and Abbott (Shanghai) Sales Company (ldquoAbbottrdquo) at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (ldquoIP Courtrdquo) for their monopolistic price-fixing which damaged his interests However Carrefour and Abbott challenged the jurisdiction of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court They claimed there were two reasons Firstly according to the jurisdiction rules of the IP court issued by the Supreme Court the IP court has no jurisdiction over anti-trust cases Secondly if this case is a contractual dispute the court that is in the place of Carrefour should hear it if this case is a tort dispute the Shanghai Intermediate Court should hear it

In the ruling of the IP Court the IP Court decided it has the jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases for the following reasons According to the Provisions On Causes Of Action In Civil Cases issued by Supreme Court (最高人民法院案由规定) antimonopoly dispute is a tertiary cause of action belonging to IP and competition disputes Also according to the Provisions concerning the Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京

市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问题的规定 ) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was an IP and competition dispute and was sued after November 6 2014 Thus the IP Court had jurisdiction

Both Carrefour and Abbott appealed to the Beijing High Court over the jurisdiction ruling but the Beijing High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original ruling Reasons are listed in the written ruling issued on June 18 2015 Firstly the nature of the case was an antimonopoly dispute In accordance with Provisions of the Supreme Peoples Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民

事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) and Civil Litigation Law the monopolistic civil disputes in the first instance shall be under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Peoples Courts and an action involving a contractual dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the peoples court of the place where the defendant is domiciled or where the contract is performed Carrefour as the defendant in this case is domiciled in Chaoyang District Beijing Therefore the courts of Beijing have jurisdiction over this case Secondly according to article 3 of the Notification on the Jurisdiction of Intellectual Property Courts issued by Supreme Court (关于知识产权法院案件管辖

等有关问题的通知) IP courts have jurisdiction over first-instance civil disputes arising from monopolistic practices Lastly according to Provisions concerning the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 5 of 52

administration under the State Council will be in charge of nationwide auto sales management

In the second part the draft Measures list the conducts in which a supplier shall not engage in These conducts include restricting distributors from reselling their products requesting distributors to share expenses for their own marketing activities restricting distributors from selling parts of other brands or providing after-sales services for other brands and so on Most of these conducts are deemed as vertical monopolistic agreements which are likely to induce anti-competitive effects in EU and US practices

As reported the Chinese government will make efforts to coordinate the Auto Antitrust Guidelines and the Measures-- two upcoming industry-specific regulations

II Public Enforcement

A Merger Control

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

With the increase in the number of cases been filed and reviewed it is recognized that MOFCOM has become one of the most important jurisdictions of merger control in the world

The simplified procedure has improved the efficiency of MOFCOMrsquos merger review in a large degree Most cases in simple procedure were concluded during the first phase However MOFCOMrsquos review time lasts longer in a few cases For instance MOFCOM spent 162 days to clear Toyota Industries Corps purchase of a 55 stake in Singaporean logistics company LT Wuliao Banyun Holdings setting a new record for the length of a simple case review

MOFCOM used to focus on horizontal deals but now also considers vertical and conglomerate mergers important In 2015 only 35 of the cases being reviewed were horizontal mergers

The increased number of administrative punishment on cases that failed to notify in 2015 demonstrates that MOFCOM has further strengthened its enforcement on this respect

The supervision of remedy implementation has become ldquoroutinizedrdquo

All divisions of MOFCOMrsquos antitrust bureau are responsible for case reviewing from the end of 2015 with the aim to improve the work efficiency

The international cooperation between antitrust enforcement authorities with respect to merger controls happens more frequently On 15 October 2015 the competition department of EU Commissions (ldquoCommissionrdquo) and MOFCOM

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 6 of 52

have signed best practices for cooperation on reviewing mergers in Beijing As the Commissionrsquos officer says the growing number of international transactions is the main reason for this cooperation In addition the Commission also signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the NDRC and SAIC in 2012 which creates a dedicated framework to strengthen cooperation and coordination5

Statistics

From January of 2009 to the end of 2015 MOFCOM received 1445 cases and accepted 1364 cases Among the reviewed cases MOFCOM has cleared 26 deals with remedies since the AML took effect in 2008 with an average review time of 199 days

In 2015 MOFCOM accepted 338 cases out of which 332 were concluded including 18 cases dealing with applicants withdrawing merger filings The agency also imposed penalties on business operators in 9 cases that were related to failure to fulfil merger filing obligations

246 cases out of 332 cases in 2015 obtained MOFCOMrsquos approval in the first phase accounting for 74 of all reviewed cases

Of the cases cleared by MOFCOM in 2015 56 were related to manufacturing such as automotive components and parts vessels machinery manufacturing and electrical equipment

Acquisitions and joint-venture agreements were the most common types of transactions accounting for 87 of all deals Meanwhile joint ventures were still the most common channel for foreign investment in China

Significant Cases

GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions6

This is the first case in which MOFCOM agreed to remove a remedy imposed on a merger

MOFCOM partially removed the restrictions on Google based on the fact that Google had lost its control of Motorola Mobility

Facts

Google applied to MOFCOM on December 1 2014 to remove the condition that required Google to treat all original equipment manufacturers (ldquoOEMsrdquo) equally in android platform-related business after it bought Motorola

5 The original notice published by EC is available at httpeuropaeurapidpress-release_IP-15-5843_enhtml 6 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150120150100862331shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 7 of 52

The concerned remedy was imposed by MOFCOM according to its No 25 Announcement in 2012 which concerned Googlersquos acquisition of Motorola Mobility together with three other remedies as the following

1) Google will license the Android Platform on a free and open basis as it had done so far

2) Google shall continue to observe the existed FRAND obligation of Motorola Mobility in respect of the latterrsquos patents and

3) Google shall delegate an independent supervisor to supervise its performance according to the Provisional Regulations on the Disposal of the Undertakingrsquos Assets or Business in the Concentration stipulated by MOFCOM in 2010

The No 25 Announcement provided that the applied remedies would be valid for five years starting from its punishment unless Google no longer controls Motorola Mobility

Google lodged the remedy removal application based on the fact that Lenovo concluded its acquisition of Motorola Mobility from Google which had been approved by MOFCOM on October 16 2014 and closed on October 30 2014 and due to this acquisition Google lost its control of Motorola Mobility

Decision

After careful examination MOFCOM noted that upon completion of the MotorolaLenovo deal Google would not be engaged in any business of manufacturing smartphones but would keep the telecommunications patent technologies of Motorola Mobility

Based on this fact on January 6 2015 MOFCOM issued a notice that it had decided to approve Googlersquos application to remove one of the remedies with the other remedies remaining in place

AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery7

The transaction is related to a conditionally cleared merger case

The concentration parties notified the deal to MOFCOM following No 95 Announcement in 2008

Considering the slight increase of AB InBevrsquos shareholdings in Zhujiang Brewery MOFCOM approved the proposed transaction

Facts

7 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150820150801090985shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 8 of 52

On July 23 2015 Interbrew Investment International a fully owned subsidiary of AB InBev Guangzhou State-owned Assets Development Holdings and Guangzhou Securities entered into an agreement with Zhujiang Brewery to subscribe the latterrsquos new shares According to this agreement Interbrew Investment International would subscribe shares worth up to CNY 16 billion

Pursuant to a MOFCOM antitrust notice issued in 2008 if AB Inbev intended to further increase its stake in Zhujiang Brewery a filing should be submitted to MOFCOM before any deal were to be concluded

On July 29 2015 AB InBev submitted the filing for the deal to MOFCOM

Decision

MOFCOM noted that upon this subscription Interbrew Investment International would increase its stake in Zhujiang Brewery from 2562 to 2999 Since the stake increase is relatively small and will not result in material changes regarding the control of Zhujiang Brewery MOFCOM decided to approve the deal on 20 August 2015

MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases

MOFCOM reached these decisions based on the undertakingsrsquo failure to file notifications

None of these concentrations were determined as resulting in anti-competition effects

MOFCOM considered that a 35 shares acquisition could lead to the obtaining of control power over a company

Complaints from the third party are the main channel of triggering investigation on unnotified concentrations

The undertakings were fined up to RMB 200000 which is less than the imposed penalty (RMB 300000) in the last year and the maximum penalty (RMB 500000) for violations of merger control rules

Facts

On September 29 2015 MOFCOM issued notices regarding the penalty on four concentration dealings because the concerning undertakings failed to notify these dealings to MOFCOM before closing them Details of these notices are as follows

Shanghai Fosun Pharmaceutical (Group) Co Ltd has been imposed a fine of CNY 200000 (USD 31431) because of its failure to notify MOFCOM regarding its

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 9 of 52

acquisition of a 35 stake in Suzhou Erye Pharmaceutical Co Ltd (Suzhou Erye) and the target stake was transferred without MOFCOMrsquos allowance8

Fujian Electronics amp Information (Group) has been imposed a fine of CNY 150000 (USD 23568) for its failure to notify a 35 stake acquisition of Shenzhen CHINO-E Communication MOFCOM made this decision based on the fact that Fujian Electronics signed a transfer agreement with CHINO-Ersquo shareholders and completed this transaction without filing9

Bestv New Media and Microsoft have been imposed CNY 200000 (USD 31420) fines by MOFCOM since they did not lodge a merger review filling regarding their joint venture E-Home Entertainment Development which was established on October 1 201310

CSR Nanjing Puzhen and Bombardier Transportation Sweden have been fined CNY 150000 (USD 23562) respectively due to their failure to notify their proposed joint venture prior to setting it up These companies made an agreement about the joint venturersquos establishment on November 3 2014 and its business license was obtained on November 11 201411

MOFCOM identified that the above dealings shall be notified according to the fact that all of these dealings constituted concentration and turnovers of these concentrating undertakings reached the statutory turnover thresholds

Article 20 of the AML stipulates three kinds of concentration which are (i) a merger of undertakings (ii) an acquisition of control of other undertakings by acquisition of shares or assets with voting right of other undertakings to an adequate extent (iii) an acquisition of control of other undertakings or the capability of imposing determinative effects on other undertakings by contracts or other means

Article 3 of the Provisions of the State Council on the Thresholds for Concentration Notification of Undertakings provides the fillingrsquos thresholds which are as follows (i) The collective worldwide turnovers of all undertakings involved in the last fiscal year exceed CNY 10 billion and the turnovers within China of at least two undertakings each exceed CNY 400 million or (ii) The collective turnovers of all undertakings involved in the last fiscal year exceed CNY 2 billion (approximately USD 294 million) and the China-wide turnovers of at least two undertakings each exceed CNY 400 million (approximately USD CNY588 million)

These undertakings were penalized because of their violations of article 21 of the 8 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150920150901124896shtml 9 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150920150901124887shtml 10 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150920150901124903shtml 11 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150920150901124899shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 10 of 52

AML which provides that the concentration reaching the filling thresholds shall be notified to MOFCOM prior to its implementation and without this notification it shall not be conducted In addition according to article 48 of the AML and article 13 of the Interim Measures for Investigating and Punishing of Concentration of Undertakings Failing to File Notification an undertaking which is identified by MOFCOM for implementing a concentration without filling would be imposed a fine and instructed to recover the situation by MOFCOM The amount of this fine could be no more than CNY 500000

There is no provision that specifically describes the behaviour of implementing a concentration In practice obtaining a business license transferring the entity of assets delivering the shares and assigning directors or managers are likely to be deemed as the implementation of concentration

According to Shang Ming the former director general of MOFCOMrsquos Anti-monopoly Bureau so far MOFCOM has already penalized 15 companies for failing to notify MOFCOM regarding merger reviews MOFCOM has noticed an increase in companies shirking merger-filing responsibilities and has therefore intensified enforcement

MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent12

MOFCOM defines all of the information and communication technology SEPs as the relevant product market rather than divides each of them into the individual market

In the process of competition analysis MOFCOM evaluates various factors rather than comparing the market shares only which is consistent with the complexity and flexibility of the high-technology industry

In the process of formulating remedies MOFCOM pays more attention on protecting Chinese downstream companies and enhancing its supervision

Facts

On April 15 2015 Nokia Oyi (ldquoNokiardquo) signed a Memorandum of Understanding regarding the acquisition of Alcatel Lucent (ldquoAlcatelrdquo) According to this memorandum Nokia intends to acquire 100 shares of Alcatel through a tender off

A notification about this deal was filed on April 21 2015 and accepted by MOFCOM on June 15 2015 After reviewing this case MOFCOM moved it to Phases II and Phase III as the agency was of the opinion that this acquisition could have anti-competitive effects on the relevant market

12 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151020151001139743shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 11 of 52

On October 19 2015 MOFCOM cleared this deal with four behavioural remedies

Decision

Relevant Market

In the agencyrsquos view there are four relevant product markets which are the radio access network market the core network systems market the network infrastructure service market and the information and communication technology SEP licensing market Meanwhile the relevant geographical market is primarily the Chinese market

Competition Analysis

According to MOFCOM this deal would have no anti-competitive effects on the first three relevant product markets in China while it could constitute an obstacle or limit the competition in the information and communication technology SEP licensing market

The agency consideredafter the deal that Nokia would increase its holding in 2G 3G and 4G SEPs and strengthen the degree of concentration in the information and communication technology SEP licensing market If it refused to license charged overly high royalty fees or conducted any other anti-competitive behaviour the competition of downstream market would be distorted which would most likely impair customersrsquo interests in the end

Remedies

Four behavioural remedies focusing on maintaining fair licensing of standard-essential patents (ldquoSEPsrdquo) were imposed on Nokia which are

1) On a reciprocal basis Nokia commits to not use injunctions to prevent enforcements of FRAND (fair reasonable and non-discriminatory) encumbered SEPs unless the potential licensees are unwilling to sign FRAND licensing agreements and follow the terms

2) If Nokia transfers its SEPs to a third party it shall inform Chinese licensees as well as Chinese companies that are actively engaging in licensing negotiation about the transfer details

3) Nokia will only transfer its SEPs to a new owner on the basis that the new owner accepts the existing FRAND commitments made by Nokia

4) MOFCOM has the right to monitor the implementation of Nokiarsquos commitments Nokia shall report to MOFCOM about the implementation of the conditions within 45 days of the end of each calendar year The reporting obligation will last five years until October18 2020

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Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions13

Western Digital had engaged in two conducts that violated the remedies provided in the No 9 Announcement in 2012 issued by MOFCOM

Western Digital lodged an application to remove certain restrictions in March 2014 and the agency made the decision on October 19 2015

MOFCOM considered the fact that the competition condition in the relevant product market has changed and decided to remove the hold-separate restrictions related to manufacture and RampD

Facts

In 2012 Western Digital Corporation (ldquoWestern Digitalrdquo) intended to acquire 100 shares of Viviti Technologies Ltd (ldquoViviti Technologiesrdquo) which was the holding company of Hitachi Global Storage Technologies Netherlands BV and Hitachi Global Storage Technologies Singapore Pte Ltd and engaged in the hard disk business

On April 2 2011 Western Digital filed a notification for this acquisition MOFCOM issued the No 9 Announcement in March 2012 and cleared this acquisition with six remedies According to this announcement Western Digital could apply for the removal of the first and second remedy after this decision has been carried out for 24 months

The first remedy refers to maintaining the Viviti Technologies as an independent competitor and the second remedy requires both Western Digital and Viviti Technologies to make a reasonable plan of their capacity and production and report these data to the trustee

Western Digital lodged an application to remove the first and second remedy in March 2014 MOFCOM found that Western Digital had engaged in two conducts that violated the first remedy and the competitive situation in the hard disk market had changed After talking with Western Digital collecting opinions from the relevant entities and delegating the independent party to make an economic evaluation MOFCOM decided to remove the hold-separate remedies partially

Western Digitalrsquos implementation of the duties imposed in the No 9 Announcement

Based on the implementation reports submitted by Western Digital and the monitoring reports submitted by the trustee MOFCOM found that Western

13 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151020151001139040shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 13 of 52

Digital had engaged in two conducts that violated the first remedy Those were

1) On March 8 2012 Western Digital consolidated Hitachi Global Storage Technology (ldquoHGSTrdquo) which was Vivitirsquos subsidiary in US

2) In January 2013 Western Digital dissolved the development division of VivitiHGST and transferred the relevant workforce to Western Digital

MOFCOM considered that these conducts impaired the independence of Viviti as a competitor so that it imposed CNY 300000 fines on each of these behaviours and requested Western Digital to rectify the situation As per the entrusted supervisorrsquos report such behaviours have been rectified and the first remedy has been fulfilled

According to MOFCOMrsquos announcement the agency found that other remedies have been entirely implemented

Competition Analysis

With respect to the current situation of the competition in the hard disk market MOFCOM made the following assessment

1) In the areas of portable application and corporate-level application solid-state drive has put constraint on the impact of the traditional hard disk as to strengthen the competition in the relevant market

2) Overcapacity problems in the conventional hard disk drive market became obvious

3) Western Digital and HGST are the major competitors in the hard disk drive market Both the layout and the major market competitors in this market have remained unchanged since 2012

4) The hold-separate duties restricted the full competition between Western Digital and HGST The implementation of such duties hindered them from integrating their products and providing the market with a full range of products and had an adverse impact on their clientsrsquo product procurement

Based on the above analysis MOFCOM deemed that

1) Removal of the conditions that required the two companies to remain independent in production and RampD activities would enable Western Digital to save costs to provide a full range of products to the market and to fully engage in market competition and benefit its clients

2) To keep the two sales teams and their respective brands independent from each other and the independence of sales activities could reduce competition restraint impacts arising from a complete merger

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 14 of 52

Remedies

After negotiating with MOFCOM the relevant entities agreed to undertake the following obligations

1) Western Digital and HGST will remain independent in sales and brands

2) Western Digital will not change its previous business modes or force its clients to exclusively purchase hard disk drive products from Western Digital or do so in disguise

3) Western Digital will continue its pace in investing in product innovation to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

This announcement will be effective within two years from the date of issuance If Western Digital can provide sufficient evidence to prove a substantial change in the market environment the company can propose to MOFCOM to remove the relevant conditions within the two years

SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions14

MOFCOM considered the fact that the competition condition in the relevant product market has changed and removed the hold-separate restrictions on Seagate and Samsung

Seagate shall remain its business model materially and continue to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

Facts

On December 12 2011 MOFCOM made the No 11 Announcement to clear Seagate Technology LLCrsquos (ldquoSeagaterdquo) acquisition with remedies In this acquisition Seagate intended to acquire hard disk drive business of Samsung Electronics Co Ltd (ldquoSamsung HDDrdquo) As per this announcement Seagate could apply for removing the first and second remedy after this decision has been carried out for 12 months

The first remedy is to preserve Samsung HDD as an independent competitor and the second remedy asks to maintain and expand Samsung HDDrsquos production capacity within six months of issuance of the No 11 Announcement and to set reasonable production volume targets based on market supply-demand conditions

Seagate lodged an application to remove the first and second remedy in May 2015 After making assessments on the relevant parties and the competition circumstance MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate remedies

14 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151020151001144105shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

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Competition Analysis

With respect to the current situation of the competition in the hard disk drive market MOFCOM made the following assessments

1) In the areas of portable application and corporate-level application solid-state drive has put constraint on the impact of the traditional hard disk so that the competition in the relevant market has been strengthened

2) Overcapacity problems in the conventional hard disk drive market became obvious

3) Both the layout and the major market competitors in the hard disk drive market have remained unchanged since 2012

4) Seagate and Samsung HDDrsquos market overlap in the hard disk market is quite small and Samsung HDDrsquos competition in the traditional hard disk is quite weak

Based on the above analysis MOFCOM deemed that

1) Removal of certain conditions is possible because in the portable application and corporate level application sectors competition constraint of solid-state drive on traditional hard disk drives has strengthened traditional hard disk drives are facing overcapacity which has reduced the chance of a single or more competitors causing competition restraints Seagate has limited overlap with Samsung in the hard disk business and the latter has a relatively weaker market power in the hard drive disk business

2) Removal of all imposed conditions may still restrain market competition because the traditional hard disk drive market competition conditions have not undergone a major change Seagate is still the major player in all divisions of the market and Seagate will strengthen its power after the acquisition of Samsung HDD

Remedies

After negotiating with MOFCOM Seagate agreed to undertake the following obligations

1) Seagate shall not change its business model materially or force clients to purchase hard drive disks exclusively from it

2) Seagate shall not force Tokyo Dengikagaku Kogyo China to supply magnetic heads exclusively to Seagate (or other Seagate-controlled companies) or limit the number of magnetic heads Tokyo Dengikagaku Kogyo China would supply to other hard drive disk manufacturers

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

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3) Seagate shall continue to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

This announcement will be effective within two years from the date of issuance If Seagate can provide sufficient evidence to prove substantial change in the market environment the company can propose to MOFCOM to remove relevant conditions within the two years

FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM15

MOFCOM deems that this acquisition would induce anti-competitive influence

NXP promises to dispose its radio frequency (ldquoRFrdquo) power transistor business

As the first case approved with structural remedies after the enactment of the Provisions on Imposing Restrictive Conditions MOFCOM conducted a comprehensive evaluation of the viability competitiveness and marketability of the divested business as well as the suitability of potential buyers

Facts

On April 3 2015 NXP filed for its acquisition of Freescale NXP Semiconductor (ldquoNXPrdquo) is a NASDAQ-listed company registered in the Netherlands which engages in the design manufacturing and sale of integration circuits and discrete components

Freescale Semiconductor (ldquoFreescalerdquo) is a New York-listed company registered in Bermuda and based in the US which engages in the manufacturing and RampD of microcontroller and digital networking processors (embedded processors)

According to the agreement between NXP and Freescale after closing Freescale will become the wholly owned subsidiary of NXP On November 25 2015 MOFCOM decided to clear this acquisition with remedies

Relevant Market

As per the announcement the relevant product markets are the general microcontroller automotive power-use analog integrated circuit and RF transistor product markets in which NXP and Freescale have horizontal overlap The relevant geographical markets should be the global market

Competition Analysis

After assessing this proposed deal the agency concluded that

1) The proposed deal would boost NXPrsquos market control power in the RF

15 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151120151101196182shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 17 of 52

transistor product market because the global and Chinese RF transistor product markets share a similar structure both featuring few competitors and high concentration levels Freescale and NXP as the number one and number two players are far ahead of their rivals in the market Therefore after closing the market control power of NXP in this market would be strengthened

2) Since Freescale was the fiercest competitor of NXP the proposed deal will remove competition between them

3) The proposed deal would reduce the options for clients and increase procurement risks

In practice the wireless infrastructure suppliers as the main client of the RF transistor product tend to procure products from both NXP and Freescale to prevent them from the risk arising from relying on one supplier

4) The proposed deal may induce an adverse impact on the technology RampD and innovation

Remedies

In accordance with MOFCOMrsquos decision NXP shall follow its written commitment submitted to MOFCOM and completely divest its RF power transistor business to Beijing Jianguang Asset Management At the same time NXP shall strictly fulfil its obligations during the transition period It is worth noting that the NXPFreescale deal shall only be implemented after the divestment deal has been concluded

In addition MOFCOM requires NXP to perform relevant obligations during the transition period from the date of approval announcement until the divestment deal has been concluded NXP shall endeavour

1) not to engage in any lsquounfair trade practicesrsquo relating to the divested business

2) not to implement any acts which may have a significant adverse impact on the value management or competitiveness of the divested business or any acts which may change the nature and scope industry or business strategy or investment policy of the divested business and to take reasonable measures to encourage core employees to stay in the divested business as well as not to seek or transfer employees to NXPrsquos non-divested business

3) to ensure supply to the divested business in a fair reasonable and non-discriminatory manner and

4) to maintain the independence of the divested business and not to exchange competitively sensitive information between the parties and the divested

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 18 of 52

business

B Monopolistic Agreements

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

With respect to the enforcement activities of the NDRC in light of the numbers of the published cases it seems that the law enforcement frequency of the NDRC regarding monopolistic agreements in 2015 is lower in comparison with 2014

The reason behind might be that the outstanding issue of human resource deficit of the antitrust authority still exists Besides the fact that more enterprises gradually attach increasing importance to the antitrust compliance might be another reason for the decrease in the number of cases investigated by the authorities

As to the enforcement activities of the SAIC 4 of 14 cases concluded by the SAIC and its local branches in 2015 are relevant to monopolistic agreements Meanwhile these four cases concern horizontal monopolistic agreements

It is noteworthy however that the Mercedes-Benz case and the Dongfeng Nissan case suggest that vertical agreements especially involving price-related restrictions on the downstream dealers is still the priority of antitrust enforcement Companies shall be very cautious when imposing restrictions on the resale prices or the minimum resale prices of commodities in the distribution agreements

Automobile industry and related industries are observed to be under continuous attention of Chinarsquos antitrust authorities

The industries relating to peoplersquos livelihoods remain to be the enforcement priority

Significant Cases

Enforcement by the NDRC and its local branches

Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC16

The investigation was triggered by a leniency application

The first leniency applicant was exempted from punishment

Eight ocean shipping companies involved were imposed a collective fine of CNY 4067 million

NDRC spent approximately 12 months to investigate and conclude the case 16 NDRCrsquos press release of the case is available at httpjjsndrcgovcngzdt201512t20151228_769084html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 19 of 52

Facts

In December 2015 the NDRC published its official punishment decisions regarding the cartel case in connection with eight ocean shipping companies namely Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha (ldquoNYKrdquo) Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha (ldquoK Linerdquo) Mitsui OSK Lines EUKOR Car Carriers Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics Compantildeiacutea Sud Americana de Vapores Eastern Car Liner and Compantildeiacutea Chilena de Navegacioacuten Interoceaacutenica

According to the official press release of the NDRC the investigation was triggered by a leniency application of NYK The evidence showed that the eight companies reached consensus on non-intrusion of each others existing business to maintain or increase shipping fees when shipping goods such as cars trucks and engineering machinery in the routes between China and other countries and regions

They were also found to frequently conduct bilateral or multilateral communications on the shippersrsquo invitation for bids andor price inquiries via phone conferences dinner parties e-mails visiting etc In addition they also conducted illegal behaviour such as sensitive information exchange price negotiations bidding intention discussion dividing clients and shipping routes reaching agreements on high price bids or non-bidding in order to help certain companies gain shipping orders

To avoid the regulation of the antitrust authority the relevant shipping companies adopted various illicit measures that showed their apparent intention to violate the AML The cartel lasted for at least four years and covered a broad range of shipping routes concerned with the import and export of products between China and other regions such as North America EU South America and so on involving multiple auto brands and engineering machinery brands

The NDRC held the opinion that the eight companies conducts had restricted and eliminated competition in the relevant market raising the international shipping fees and impairing interests of shippers and end consumers The eight companies breached the AML by reaching and implementing monopolistic agreements on fixing prices and dividing the market

All eight investigated companies put forward remedy measures including enhancing the antitrust compliance program arranging more antitrust compliance trainings and developing antitrust compliance technologies

The NDRC imposed fines based on the nature level and duration of their monopolistic volations as well as their respective sales of international freight service sales relevant to the Chinese market The companies involved were collectively fined CNY 4067 million

NYK as the first cartel member voluntarily reporting the illegal conducts to the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 20 of 52

authority and providing significant evidence was entirely exempted from the punishment K Line as the second leniency applicant was imposed a fine amounting to 4 of its 2014 annual sales of international freight services relevant to Chinarsquos import and export market The details of punishments imposed on the involved companies by the NDRC are as follow

Company Name Amount of Fines (RMB million)

Percentage of the Relevant Turnovers

Grounds

Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha

- - First leniency applicant

Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha

2398 4 Second leniency applicant

Mitsui OSK Lines 3812 7 Third leniency applicant

EUKOR Car Carriers 284 9 Lasted over a long period involved many brands and many violations violations were severe

Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics

4506 8 Lasted over a long period involved many brands and many violations violations were severe

Compantildeiacutea Sud Americana de Vapores

308 6 Lasted over a long period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Eastern Car Liner 1127 5 Lasted over a long period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Compantildeiacutea Chilena de 120 4 Lasted over a long

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 21 of 52

Navegacioacuten Interoceaacutenica

period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Total 4067

Analysis

In this case the agency applied the AML instead of the Tenders and Bids Law to collusive bidding Citing article 13 (3) of the AML the NDRC identified that the collusive bidding constituted a division of the sales market

The leading three leniency applicants were granted exemption from fines to a varying degree

According to the official who handled this case dawn raids performed by antitrust enforcement agencies in other jurisdictions drew the attention of the NDRC on the cartels of these shipping companies However there was limited effective evidence to prove that the companies had reached monopolistic agreements Through pressuring the involved parties three members of the shipping cartel actively confessed their illegal conduct This case once again stresses the significance of international cooperation between antitrust enforcement agencies

Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau17

The distribution agreements between Mercedes-Benz and its dealers are determined as vertical monopolistic agreement and Mercedes-Benz violated article 14 of the AML because it restricted the ability of its dealers to decide their own resale prices

Mercedes-Benzrsquos dealers violated article of 13 of the AML due to concluding a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Mercedes-Benz and its dealers were jointly fined CNY 3578 million

Facts

In April 2015 Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau which is the provincial branch of the NDRC released the punishment on its website and announced that it had imposed a fine of CNY 350 million on Mercedes-Benz along with the aggregated fine of CNY 787 million on its dealers The fine came as a result of Mercedes-Benz reaching and implementing resale price maintenance (ldquoRPMrdquo) agreements with dealers to fix the minimum resale price of several car models as well as certain auto parts 17 The original Chinese notice published by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau is available at httpwwwjswjjgovcnoffice_neweo_comm_zxnrxsphp

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 22 of 52

According to the decision the authority found that Mercedes-Benz fixed the minimum resale price of Class E and Class S cars in Nanjing Wuxi Changzhou and Suzhou markets through telephoneverbal communication and dealers meetings from January 2013 to July 2014 Since 2010 Mercedes-Benz had reached agreements with dealers in Jiangsu province to fix the minimum resale prices for auto parts by providing different levels of discounts for insured cars cars involving expired warranty periods and cars within the warranty period

In addition Mercedes-Benz implemented the minimum resale price maintaining agreement by

1) Tightening its monitoring measures on the dealers such as inspecting deals and their sale incentive system on a weekly basis

2) Tracking the sales process flow of cars and increasing the intensity of this assessment

3) Giving warnings and reducing support ndash for example halting the supply of bestselling cars and prohibiting the opening of new stores ndash to dealers if dealers refused to cooperate with the price-fixing related policies and measures and

4) Interviewing personnel of the dealers and requesting terminations if the staff engaged in serious violations of the RPM agreement

Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau concluded that Mercedes-Benz had excluded and eliminated market competition harmed consumer welfare and consequently violated article 1418 of the AML The authority therefore imposed a fine of CNY 350 million representing 7 of the sale revenue of the previous year in the relevant market against Mercedes-Benz and imposed a fine on the dealers amounting to an equivalence of 1 of the annual sales in the previous year

Analysis

Although the agency also addressed the horizontal violation among the dealers in this case the administrative penalty decision mainly focuses on the vertical violation The agency fined dealers involved in the RPM agreement a combined CNY 787 million equal to 1 of the previous-year sales which suggests that the agency decided to give lighter punishments to dealers who took initiative in reporting the activity and provided evidence

The Mercedes-Benz case is the third case where the agency successfully 18 Article 14 of the AML The following monopolistic agreements between operators and trading partners shall be prohibited (i) fixing the resale prices of commodities to third persons (ii) restricting the minimum resale prices of commodities to third persons (iii) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement Authority under the State Council

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 23 of 52

discovered both vertical and horizontal agreements in a case following the Audi case and the Chrysler case All these cases are rooted in the same industry indicating that industrial features play a large role in raising anti-trust concerns In fact it appears that the entire automotive industry is under antitrust scrutiny

Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC19

This case involved both a horizontal agreement and an administrative monopoly

A total fine of CNY 1318 million was imposed on the involved companies

Facts

In June 2015 the NDRC through its website announced the decision made by its regional branch -Yunnan Provincial Development and Reform Commission (ldquoYunnan DRCrdquo) regarding the horizontal monopolistic agreement case involving Yunnan Communications Administration and local subsidiaries of four state-owned telecommunication companies

Through the investigation Yunnan DRC found that Yunnan Communications Administration as a competent government agency had organized several meetings involving Yunnan branches of four state-owned telecoms - China Mobile China Telecom China Unicom and China Tietong in August and September of 2014 At the end of 2009 the four local branches entered into an agreement to regulate their sales promotions in terms of limiting the promotional items amount and frequency

Furthermore the agreement provides certain measures to ensure the implementation of relevant restrictions on promotions Specifically in case any cartel member violates the agreement the others could file complaints with Yunnan Communications Administration and the agency would then issue a rectification notice to the rule-breaker

Yunnan DRC stated that the four telecoms were main competitors in the relevant market and the promotions as a significant competition measure would exert direct influence on the final prices of the products The horizontal agreement organized by Yunnan Communications Administration on sales promotions restricted the competition capacity of telecoms and as a result eliminated the competition in the relevant market Consequently the behaviour of Yunnan Communications Administration violated article 8 20 of the AML and constituted administrative monopoly in terms of ldquoforcing undertakings to conduct monopolistic behaviour prohibited by the AMLrdquo

19 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpwwwsdpcgovcnfzgggzjgjdyfldjjszhdt201506t20150602_694802html 20 Article 8 of the AML Administrative organs and the public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 24 of 52

With respect to the penalties Yunnan DRC fined the local branch of China Tietong CNY 200000 for reaching but not implementing the agreement in regards to the other three telecoms a total fine of CNY 1298 million amounting to 2 of the sales of the relevant business in the previous year were imposed for entering into and implementing the horizontal monopolistic agreement

Analysis

The telecoms industry is still the enforcement priority of the antitrust enforcement authorities A company cannot be exempted from punishment even though it is forced by competent authorities to conduct monopoly behaviour

DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC21

Both a horizontal monopolistic agreement and a vertical monopolistic agreement were involved in this case

A total fine of CNY 14242 million was imposed on DongFeng Nissan and its distributors

Facts

In September 2015 the Guangdong Development and Reform Commission (ldquoGuangdong DRCrdquo) released an announcement regarding the administrative penalties on DongFeng Nissan and its provincial distributors for concluding price-related monopolistic agreements More specifically DongFeng Nissan was imposed a fine of CNY 1233 million for breaching article 14 of the AML in terms of restricting the resale price of certain car models 17 distributors domiciled in Guangdong were collectively fined CNY 1912 million for violating article 1322 of the AML in terms of entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements

According to the published official release the Guangdong DRC launched the investigation in August 2014 The authority discovered that from 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissan had set a rigorous restriction on its distributorsrsquo abilities to determine the resale prices of certain car models including the quoted prices in various platforms and the final resale price In addition DongFeng Nissan punished the distributors that failed to abide by such price restrictions in 2013 The authority 21 The original Chinese notice published by Guangdong DRC is available at httpwwwgddpcgovcnzwgkgzdtgzyw201509t20150910_328993html 22 Article 13 of the AML The following Monopolistic agreements among competing operators shall be prohibited (i) fix or change prices of commodities (ii) limit the outputs or sales volume of commodities (iii) segment the sales markets or the raw material purchasing markets (iv) limit the purchase of new technology new facilities or limit the development of new products new technology (v) jointly boycott transactions (vi) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-Monopoly Law enforcement Authority Monopolistic agreements in this Law refer to agreements decisions or other concerted practices that eliminate restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 25 of 52

believed that the vertical agreement concluded between DongFeng Nissan and its distributors eliminated and restricted the competition in the relevant market and damaged the consumer welfare as well which violates article 14 of the AML

Furthermore from April 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissanrsquos distributors in Guangdong province held multiple meetings to discuss issues relevant to sale price reached and implemented a horizontal monopolistic agreement in terms of fixing the prices of some car models which is prohibited by article 13 of the AML

Considering that both DongFeng Nissan and the involved distributors positively cooperated with the investigation and ceased the illegal behaviour immediately after the investigation Guangdong DRC decided to impose a fine amounting to 3 of its previous yearrsquos turnovers on DongFeng Nissan and a fine ranging from 2 to 4 on the relevant distributors in accordance with articles 4623 and 4924 of the AML

Analysis

This case demonstrates that auto and related industries are still under close attention of the authority Considering the NDRCrsquos successful series of antitrust investigations conducted throughout the auto industry it is observed that the agency currently overseeing price-related antitrust issues in China has accumulated a substantial amount of experience regarding antitrust enforcement in the auto industry Now is the right time to speed up the law-making process by amending the set of rules released earlier and drafting new laws to advise the auto industry on antitrust compliance

Enforcement by the SAIC and its local branches

Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC25

The investigation was triggered by whistle blowerrsquos submission

Cartel members were collectively fined CNY 139 million 23 Article 46 of the AML In case the operators violate the relevant provisions of this Law concluding and implementing Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall order the operators to cease such act impose fines more than 1 but less than 10 of the total turnover in the preceding year and confiscate the illegal gains where the Monopolistic agreement is not implemented a fine less than RMB 500000 can be imposed If the operators involved in Monopolistic agreement on its own initiative report information concerning the conclusion of Monopolistic agreements and provide important evidences to the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority they may be given a mitigated punishment or be exempted from punishment in accordance with the circumstances Where the industrial associations violate this Law organizing the operators in the industry to conclude Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority may impose a fine less than RMB 500000 in serious circumstances the agency of social organization administration and registration may cancel its registration 24 Article 49 of the AML As for the imposition of the fines stipulated by the Article 46 47 and 48 of this Law the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall take elements such as the nature extent and time it lasts of the illegal act into consideration in determining the specific amount of the fines 25 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201506t20150601_156889html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 26 of 52

Facts

In April 2015 the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) issued administrative penalties on several brick manufacturers for entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements This is the first case relevant to monopolistic agreements that has been publicized by the SAIC since the beginning of this year

Ten cartel members were involved in the case including one company and nine individuals Similar with most antitrust cases the investigation started as a result of a whistle blowerrsquos submission After a thorough investigation Hunan AIC found that those local brick manufacturers had reached agreements on controlling production volume and dividing sales areas in the forms of production and sales agreements plans and meeting minutes

The enforcement authority reached the conclusion that these brick manufacturers violated article 13 of the AML and imposed a total fine of CNY 1389400 on them

Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC26

The organizer of the monopolistic agreement the animation association was fined CNY 100000

The antitrust authority did not punish the members of the monopolistic agreement

Facts

In December 2015 the Guangdong Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoGuangdong AICrdquo) published its administrative punishment decision in regards to Guangzhou Panyu Animation amp Game Association (ldquoGAGArdquo) organizing member companies to conclude a monopolistic agreement

According to the decision GAGA drafted the ldquoAgreement of Exhibition Alliancerdquo (ldquoAgreementrdquo) and convened a conference with member companies in order to discuss the content and conclusion of the Agreement 52 member companies entered into the Agreement which actually requested the alliance companies to merely participate in the exhibitions either organized or supported by GAGA in Guangzhou In addition the Agreement prohibited the alliance companies from attending any other exhibition except if they obtained prior approval of GAGA

After a thorough investigation Guangdong AIC believed that the conclusion of the Agreement among GAGA and the 52 member companies violated article 13 (5) of the AML in terms of boycott GAGA who was deeply involved and restricted member companiesrsquo choice of exhibitions through the Agreement could be deemed as

26 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151208_164680html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 27 of 52

the participant and organizer of the monopolistic agreement In accordance with article 46 of the AML Guangdong AIC imposed a fine of CNY 100000 on GAGA for organizing the conclusion of the monopolistic agreement

Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC27

Hubei AIC considered the coinsurance for Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance illegal

Twelve insurance companies were fined CNY 469 million in total

Facts

In December 2015 the Hubei Administrative for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHubei AICrdquo) disclosed its punishment on 12 insurance companies for signing illegal coinsurance agreements

The disclosed punishment decision suggests that the Hubei branch of China Pacific Life Insurance (ldquothe Companyrdquo) 11 other insurance companies and Wuhan Construction Safety Technology Consultation Center (ldquoWCSTCCrdquo) signed a Coinsurance Agreement on Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance (ldquoCoinsurance Agreementrdquo) of which the main contents include

1) The Company and 11 other involved companies as the coinsurers jointly take charge of the personal accident insurance concerned with the construction project directly administered by the Wuhan government WCSTCC is responsible for providing safety professionalism and technology services regarding the relevant personal accident insurance

2) The Company as the chief insurer of the coinsurance occupies 12 of the total amount of the insurance and the other 11 companies respectively occupy 8

3) The Company as the representative of the coinsurance is in charge of collecting the premium signing the standard form insurance policies and issuing the invoice in its own name The Company should share the charged premium with the other companies in accordance with the Coinsurance Agreement

4) Both the Company and the other insurance companies should pay 25 of the actually received premium to WCSTCC as the service fee WCSTCC will assist the coinsurers in providing safety and technology management service to the insured In addition the 11 insurance companies should pay 5 of their premium to the Company as the management fee

27 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165445html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 28 of 52

5) In case an accident happens the 12 companies will jointly bear the damages based on their respective shares in the coinsurance

6) There is a contact mechanism established in the coinsurance The coinsurers will regularly hold coinsurance conferences to discuss existing problems

Furthermore the coinsurers and WCSTCC also signed a self-discipline agreement and established a complete management system to assure the implementation of the Coinsurance Agreement Any party violating the Coinsurance Agreement would be punished

Hubei AIC found that WCSTCC was solely invested by Wuhan Construction Safety Management Association which was under Wuhan Construction Commission The centre helped implement certain functions of the Wuhan Urban Construction Safety Management Station and was responsible for quality supervision and safety supervision of municipal construction projects

It later became a prerequisite for construction companies to purchase insurance from any member of the coinsurance in order to get approval to commence their project According to the decision Hubei AIC launched another separate investigation against WCSTCC

Through the investigation Hubei AIC concluded that the Coinsurance Agreement constituted a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by article 13 of the AML with the following analysis

First coinsurance as a common business model to jointly share and lower risks is widely adopted in the insurance industry A coinsurance arrangement for a specific project in order to avoid high risks faced by one insurer could be legal However coinsurance should not target the entire market In this case prior to the Coinsurance Agreement the risks of the construction projects were unpredictable since the scale of the construction projects the difficulty of the construction and the amount of construction workers could not be available It is impossible to predict the risks of the projects thus it is not necessary to cooperate with other insurers to collectively bear the risks The purpose of the 12 insurance companies to establish the coinsurance is to avoid the competition which demonstrates the Coinsurance Agreement belongs to a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by the AML

Second the companies through entering into the coinsurance agreement actually divided the relevant market of construction project personal accident insurance in Wuhan city which affected the competition in the relevant market and damaged the interests of other competitors and the consumers In particular the Construction Law as amended in 2011 stipulates that the purchase of personal accident insurance is not mandatory and the construction companies have the right to choose whether to buy the said insurance or not As mentioned purchasing insurance from the coinsurance had been the prerequisite for construction companies to obtain administration

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 29 of 52

approval for the project which seriously distorts the fair competition in the market

Citing article 46 of the AML the 12 insurance companies were collectively fined CNY 469 million including fines on the companies and confiscation of illegal gains It is noteworthy that the fines were calculated based on the companiesrsquo 2014 annual sales of the insurance product in connection with the coinsurance The Company as the chief insurer was fined amounting to 6 of its 2014 annual sales of the relevant insurance product in the coinsurance and other companies were fined amounting to 2 of relevant sales For more specific information please see the following table

Company Name (Hubei Branch)

Fines (CNY million)

Percentage of the sales

Illegal Gains (CNY

million)

China Pacific Life Insurance 00653 6 0941

Sino Life 00145 2 04332

Alltrust Insurance 00145 2 04332

Taikang Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Continent Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Pacific Property Insurance

00145 2 04332

China Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

PICC Property and Casualty 00145 2 02599

Taiping General Insurance 00145 2 013

Union Life Insurance 00145 2 01177

Ping An Annuity Insurance Company of China

00145 2 04201

Ping An Property amp Casualty Insurance Company of China

00145 2 -

Subtotal 02248 - 44679

Total 46927

Analysis

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 30 of 52

Coinsurance as an effective approach to lower risks of insurers is widely used in the insurance industry Information sharing and agreements on coinsurance were generally considered efficient and legitimate However from an antitrust perspective coinsurance may raise competition concerns depending on the circumstances of each agreement In the case that there is enough capacity for one insurer to cover the potential risks the coinsurance might be considered as entering into a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC28

The first leniency applicant was exempted from fines

The other concrete companies were imposed a fine of CNY 180000

Facts

In December 2015 the concrete companies monopolistic agreement case investigated by Hunan AIC was published on SAICrsquos website

In accordance with the antitrust enforcement announcement of SAIC this case was triggered by complaints from the Yongzhou City peoplersquos congress After the preliminary review the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) initiated the formal investigation on seven concrete companies domiciled in Yongzhou City Hunan Province which were suspected of being involved in a monopolistic agreement in terms of division of the volumes of the products

After further investigation Hunan AIC found that the seven concrete companies concluded a partnership agreement in 2011 which requested the involved companies to enter into a partnership business with assets In addition according to the partnership agreement it was planned to establish a comprehensive office to manage production marketing and distribution of the products of all the partners The seven companies intended to jointly adjust and control the output of concrete based on the partnership agreement However because there were disagreements over the allocation of the injected assets and market shares the companies did not implement the partnership agreement The agreement was cancelled in December 2012

Based on the findings Hunan AIC concluded that the seven concrete companies as competitors of each other restricted and eliminated the competition in the relevant market through reaching the partnership agreement and dividing the volumes of sales which violated article 13(3) of the AML in terms of division of sales market Considering that the agreement had not been implemented and the limited influence of the agreement according to article 46 of the AML and article 27 of the Administrative Penalties Law small amount fines were imposed on the involved companies Six companies were fined CNY 30000 each for their illegal behaviour 28 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165504html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 31 of 52

Yongzhou Shuangyuan Building Materials Co Ltd as the first one to actively report the monopolistic agreement and cooperate with the enforcement authority was exempted from the punishment

Outlook

It is expected that the AMLrsquos enforcement on monopolistic agreements will continue in the future Industries such as automobile shipping pharmaceuticals insurance etc will still remain the priority of the antitrust enforcement

The antitrust enforcement authorities have published a series of regulations in order to clarify the substantial and procedural issues relevant to the antitrust enforcement However Chinarsquos current antitrust legislation regime is still immature In the following years we expect that more attention will be paid to the legislative improvements

Another remarkable issue for cartel members is that with more Chinese enterprises attaching increasing importance to the AML the follow-on civil damages actions might become a tendency in the future

C Abuse of Market Dominance

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen a decent increase of abuse of market dominance cases both in public enforcement and private litigation Oftentimes the authorities responsible for public enforcement generally find it difficult to pursue investigations against abuse of market dominance cases The following two main reasons are often cited to explain this standoff first it is hard for the authorities to define the relevant markets and prove the undertaking(s)rsquo dominant market position through economic approaches second it is hard to collect evidence regarding abusive practices

The cases related to IPRs abuse are emerging significantly particularly in the telecommunication media and technology (ldquoTMTrdquo) sectors

The SAICrsquos latest refusal-to-deal probe against a local drug maker shows that the SAIC and its local branches have increasingly acquired a profile as an abuse of dominance regulator

Significant Cases

Cases pursued by the SAIC

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 32 of 52

Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case29

Facts

The local authority in Dongfang city reported to the Hainan provincial branch of SAIC on April 23 2014 of the suspected dominance abuse The SAIC authorized its Hainan bureau to officially investigate the matter on 25 July 2014 according to a decision dated January 9 2015 The AIC concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its market dominance by requiring users to pay a deposit without any legal basis and or justifiable reasons

In terms of the relevant product market the local authority found that in this case it was the urban water supply market in Dongfang city and its surrounding townships where Dongfang Water was the sole public operator in the local water supply market with a 100 market share which made all water users completely reliant on the companyrsquos supply In term of market access the local authority found it very unlikely that there were other operators due to the strict regulations

The Hainan SAIC then concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its dominance as it charged users a deposit by threatening to refuse to register users and also by threatening to restrict the water supply Dongfang Waters charging of deposits lacked a legal basis and hadnt received government approval to the detriment of household consumers and business water users and hampered the improvement of management and services of the company Such conduct was in breach of Chinarsquos Anti-Monopoly Law

Hainan AIC levied a fine of CNY 593208 a lighter penalty equivalent to 2 of the companyrsquos annual sales for the previous year and confiscated illicit gains of CNY 38521 for abuse of market dominance

Analysis

It is noteworthy that although handled by a local authority supervised by the SAIC the antitrust agency detailed the relevant market definition the assessment of the dominant market position the abusive practices and the scrutiny of the justifiable reasons

Although the definition of the relevant market and the reasoning of the Hainan provincial AIC and the SAIC are subject to criticism it is still applausive to see that the antitrust regulators have realized the importance of the application of rule of reason in an abuse case In addition through itrsquos a published decision practitioners may observe the regulatorsrsquo reasoning and thus transparency and legal certainty have been generated

29 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzfcfjd201502t20150212_152066html last visited on October 18 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 33 of 52

Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms30

Facts

In June 2013 the Ningxia AIC under authorization of SAIC opened an antitrust investigation into the alleged tie-in sales by the three major state-owned telecommunications operators China Tietong China Unicom and China Telecom for the tie-in sale of fixed-line telephones with broadband Internet services The Ningxia AIC found that the three companies had bundled fixed-line phone services with Internet services to subscribers

During the investigation all three telecommunications companies admitted the tie-in practice had recognized that such practice had improper influence on competition and deprived the choices of consumers The three companies promised to undertake internal rectification timely and eliminate the ill effects resulting from such practice The parties committed to taking the following corrective measures

1) Taking internal rectifications and conducting training to staff about antitrust laws and stop tie-in sales practices

2) Making public commitments to allow subscribers a free choice of services and strengthening the propaganda through the operating room call centre and other channels

3) Unbundling fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

The Ningxia AIC decided to suspend the probe on 14 May 2015 on the grounds that the three companies had actively worked together with the investigators and proposed workable remedy plans

Analysis

In the official announcement Ningxia AIC concluded that the purpose of antitrust enforcement is to restrain monopolistic conducts the protection of competition and to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of consumers Given that during the investigation process the parties had actively cooperated with the investigation formed a more profound understanding of the dangers of tying behaviour and moreover the parties proposed and implemented positive corrective measures to be able to remove the ill impact of their actions the agency believed that the purpose of antitrust law enforcement was fulfilled

It is worth noting that the Ningxia AIC also required the three companies to implement the commitment by August 30 2015and the submission of the written

30 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158908html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158906html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158910html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 34 of 52

implementation report on July 102015 and August 102015 respectively which is another illustration that an effective commitment by the undertakings shall directly deal with the effect that is brought by the monopolistic behaviour In this case the effect of the monopolistic act was restricted to the choice of the consumers therefore the commitment by the undertaking aimed at allowing the freedom of choice and the unbundling of fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company31

Facts

The Liaoning AIC imposed a fine of approximately CNY 433m on the Fushun Branch of Liaoning Tobacco Co on 1 June 2015 The agency also ordered the company to stop its illicit behaviour

The Liaoning AIC received a tip-off that the accused Liaoning Tobacco Corsquos Fushun branch was conducting tie-in sales of non-high-demand cigarette brands with high-demand cigarette brands After gaining authorization from SAIC the agency officially started an investigation regarding the companyrsquos suspected abuse of market dominance in June 2014

Analysis

According to the announcement the tobacco company argued that the tobacco industry is a state controlled or monopolized industry with a lawful monopolistic position therefore the company shall not be subject to the norms of general market competition rules or the anti-monopoly law

In this regards the agency concluded that in terms of the status of the undertaking admittedly the first paragraph of article 17 of the AML says that the State shall protect the lawful business operations of undertakings in these industries with respect to the industries which are under the control of the State-owned economic sector and have a bearing on the lifeline of the national economy or national security and the industries which exercise monopoly over the production and sale of certain commodities according to law However the second paragraph continues to say that the undertakings mentioned above shall do business according to law be honest faithful and strictly self-disciplined and subject themselves to public supervision and they shall not harm the consumers interests by taking advantage of their position of control or their monopolistic production and sale of certain commodities In particular in the preceding paragraph the ldquolawful businessrdquo and ldquoaccording to lawrdquo imply that the AML shall apply in the business operation The agency therefore believes that

31 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201508t20150813_16

0208html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 35 of 52

there shall be no exemption for the undertaking concerned the defences of the undertaking concerned is not established

Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm32

Facts

The Chongqing AIC fined Chongqing Qingyang Pharmaceutical CNY 439308 for alleged dominance abuse

The investigation was initiated when the company contacted the agency for verification on its potential breach of the AML related to an allopurinol active pharmaceuticals ingredient (API) distribution agreement with its exclusive distributor The company provided the relevant agreement and information and the agency conducted an investigation into the company and some other relevant companies

Analysis

Relevant Market

During the investigation the agency found that pharmaceutical ingredients are a special commodity the API is used to produce the preparations The chemical API is only used for the production of the preparation and could be used as a medicine for clinic use

The preparation is produced according to the requirements of certain form of prepared drugs and for the purpose of treatment and prevention which can be used as medicine

The allopurinol is used for the common treatment of hyperuricemia However the other treatments are different in pharmacological effects or treatment effects as well as in the cost for the patient Furthermore the company is the only manufacturer and supplier in the market nationwide since July 2012 Therefore the agency concluded that the relevant market is the allopurinol API market

Considering that the qualification for manufacturing the allopurinol API is national wide and the normal practice for purchasers and suppliers is domestic the relevant geographic market is the Chinese market

The Market Dominance

During the investigation the agency found that the company is the only supplier and manufacturer of allopurinol API in China there is no other competitor in the

32 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151222_16

5152html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 36 of 52

market and the company has a monopoly in the market The evidence shows that the company has the ability to control the prices the position for the downstream is relatively weak

With respect to the market entry the agency found that the market entry is relatively high in addition other undertakings are dependent on the company Thus the agency believed the company to have market dominance

Refusal to Deal

The agency found that on September 25 2015 the company reached an exclusive agreement and distribution agreement with its distributor Based on these agreements the company didnrsquot supply allopurinol API to the said distributor and other companies despite the fact that those companies requested for allopurinol API but were turned down by the company

Absence of Reasonable Cause

The agency found that the companyrsquos refusal to deal was not in line with the needs of normal business operation or economic efficiency On the other hand the refusal to deal was aimed at increasing the market share of the allopurinol drug product Also the agency found that the stop of supply was a manipulation of market power as to maximize the profit to the most The agency further found that the exclusive distribution agreement with suspension of supply for six months and the refusal to supply was to eliminate and restrict the competition as to gain the monopolistic profit

The Consequence of Refusal to Deal

The agency concluded that the refusal to deal harmed the competition of the allopurinol preparations market Because of the suspension of supply many demanders had to reduce their production or switch to the supply of other products or stop their production The suspension of supply affected the competition of the downstream market Consequently the raising of the price of allopurinol API also raised the cost for other manufacturers of allopurinol preparations

Furthermore the refusal to deal led to capacity loss of the allopurinol preparation industry

Ultimately the refusal to deal increased the burden on consumers as the refusal to supply changed the supply-demand relationship in the market

The agency concluded that the Company abused its dominant position in the allopurinol API market by refusing to deal with intended buyers in the period between October 2013 and March 2014Therefore the Company violated article 17 (1) of the AML which prohibits business operators with a dominant market position from abusing that position such as the refusal to deal without any justifications

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 37 of 52

D Administrative Monopoly

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 witnessed antitrust authoritiesrsquo significant efforts regarding the enforcement against administrative monopoly According to Mr Dong Zhiming the deputy director general of Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly Bureau ever since the AML coming into force six cases in connection with administrative monopoly were investigated by NDRC and among them five cases were handled in the year of 2015 These cases touched abuses of administrative power in terms of designative deal in relation to transportation communication and pharmaceutical industries

The first private litigation related to administrative monopolistic acts was heard in the court which is a milestone case in the enforcement of the AML

Significant Cases

Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC33

Facts

In March 2015 the NDRC released the official letter to Shandong Provincial Department of Transportation (ldquoShandong DOTrdquo) on its website with respect to correct its abuse of administrative power to exclude and restrict competition

During the investigation the NDRC found that since 2011 Shandong DOT had issued multiple relevant government orders in order to require certain types of vehicles to be directly connected to two designated information and service platforms both of which are operated and technically supported by one company namely Shandong Jiutong Internet of Things Technology Co Ltd (ldquoJiutong ITTrdquo) Furthermore according to the orders issued by the competent administrative department all the vehicle satellite positioning terminals entering into Shandong provincial market should be debugged through the said technology service platform which is operated by the mentioned company In addition Shandong DOT released the cap prices of vehicle satellite positioning terminals which is identical to the 2012 bid-winning price in the Ministry of Transportation demonstration project

The NDRC believed that Shandong DOTrsquos behaviour eliminated and restricted the competition in the monitoring platform market and the vehicle terminal market deprived the right of transportation enterprises to choose vehicle terminals and monitoring platform on their owns unreasonably raised the sales prices of vehicle terminals and service fees charged by the platform and increased the costs of transportation enterprises Therefore the antitrust agency concluded that Shandong

33 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201503t20150327_668911html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 38 of 52

DOT violated article 8 of the AML which stipulates that ldquoadministrative organs and the public organizations with an administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude and restrict competitionrdquo Specifically Shandong DOT violated article 3234 in terms of requiring organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any designated operators and violated article 3735 in terms of setting rules with contents which eliminate and restrict competition

Based on article 51 of the AML ldquoWhere administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations abuse administrative powers performing activities which exclude and restrict competition the superior entity shall order it to correct impose administrative penalty on the chief officer and other staffs directly responsible pursuant to the laws The AML enforcement authority may give recommendations on disposal of activities to the relevant superior entityrdquo the NDRC proposed in writing that the Shandong provincial government should order Shandong DOT to rectify its behaviour with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Entirely open up the monitoring platform market by permitting transportation undertakings to freely choose any approved platform

2) Loosen the restrictions on the entry into Shandong vehicle terminals permit the undertakings to independently select the supplier of vehicle terminals and allow the qualified terminals to be connected to the relevant monitoring platform and

3) Revoke the official documentation relevant to the cap price of vehicle terminals in order to promote the price competition

Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 36

Facts

On 26 August 2015 the NDRC published its second decision with regard to the rectification of administrative monopoly since the beginning of this year According to the proposal letter sent to Anhui Provincial Government the investigation against the Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City (Bengbu HFPC) was trigged by third partiesrsquo complaints

34 Article 32 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to require organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any operators designated by them 35 Article 37 of the AML Administrative organs shall not abuse their administrative powers to set rules with contents which eliminate restrict competition 36 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201508t20150826_748682html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 39 of 52

The investigation suggests that Bengbu HFPC published three notices with regard to drugs procurement in April and May of this year

In the No C-2015-CG-X-111 Notice (ldquoNo111 Noticerdquo) released on 10 April2015 the health authority not only provided the dosage form and qualification of the requested drugs but also directly determined the suppliers of relevant drugs which eliminated and restricted the competition among pharmaceutical manufacturers and therefore violated articles 32 and 37 of the AML

In the No C-2015-CG-C-112 Notice (ldquoNo112 Noticerdquo) and No C-2015-CG-C-168 (ldquoNo 168 Noticerdquo) respectively released on 10 April and 22 May 2015 the Bengbu HFPC set discriminative qualification requirements on non-local undertakings in order to restrict their participation in the relevant bidding For instance in accordance with No 112 Notice to be a qualified bidder the turnover of non-local undertakings shall exceed CNY 2 billion which is 50 times as much as the turnover requirements of the local undertakings In the NDRCrsquos opinion the administrative monopoly activities conducted by the local health agency excluded the relevant undertakings from the market maintained the virtual-high prices of drugs and therefore violated articles 3237 and 37 of the AML

The NDRC suggested in a letter that Anhui Provincial Government should urge the Bengbu HFPC to rectify the abuse of monopoly powers with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Stop setting distinguishing restrictions on qualification requirements review standards and numbers of winning bidders as for local and non-local undertakings

2) Stop designating the suppliers of competitive drugs and

3) Take necessary measures to mitigate the negative effects resulting from the previous illegal monopolistic abuses

Outlook

At the beginning of the year the former director general of the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau under the NDRC Xu Kunlin stated that the agency would strengthen antitrust enforcement on abuse of administrative power in 2015

Since then the NDRC has made great efforts to rectify unreasonable abuses of administrative power The currently disclosed two cases investigated by the NDRC re-emphasize the Chinese Governmentrsquos strict scrutiny of antitrust issues in respect of

37 Article 34 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to restrict or reject the participation of operators from other regions in local bidding activities by measures such as prescribing discriminatory qualification requirements or assessment standards or by not publishing information according to law

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 40 of 52

administrative monopoly It reminds the local governments that antitrust compliance is of significant importance

III Private Litigation

A Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen more and more private antitrust litigations

The private antitrust litigation cases have become increasingly complicated especially the issues regarding the intersection areas of IP and antitrust law

Multinational giants and State-Owned Enterprises (the ldquoSOEsrdquo) are increasingly becoming the targets in antitrust civil litigations Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (the ldquoSMEsrdquo) tend to use the antitrust litigation to achieve their commercial goals in the business context

B Significant Cases

Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)38

This is the first-ever private litigation concerning administrative monopoly since the implementation of the AML in 2008

Facts

According to the currently disclosed details the case is relevant for designated trade

The plaintiff Shenzhen Sware Technology Co Ltd (ldquoSwarerdquo) is a software company The press releases suggest that Sware Gloden Software Co Ltd (ldquoGlodenrdquo) and Shanghai Ruban Software Co Ltd (ldquoShanghai Rubanrdquo) are the three main suppliers of construction cost software and possess the major shares of the relevant market An annual provincial vocational ability contest regarding the construction cost hosted by the Guangdong Department of Education (ldquoGuangdong DOE) designated Gloden as the exclusive supplier of the relevant software

After several unsuccessful verbal and written negotiations with Guangdong DOE in April 2014 Sware filed a lawsuit against Guangdong DOE before the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquothe Courtrdquo) alleging that the administrative organ abused its administrative power and violated the AML by designating exclusive software supplier for the contest and claimed a compensation for reasonable expense amounting to CNY 10800 Yuan

The opinions of the Court 38 The story of the case is available at httpfinancesinacomcnchinadfjj20150410074621924997shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 41 of 52

The full text of the judgment has not been disclosed yet In accordance with the information available to the public the Court invoked article 32 of the AML which prohibits an administrative organ from abusing its administrative power to require or in disguised form organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use only the commodities supplied by the entities designated by them The Court concluded that Guangdong DOE failed to prove the legitimacy of the designation and therefore abused its administration power

Currently the case is in appeal before the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court

Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 39

It is the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China

In the first instance ruling Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court ruled against Sinopec holding that the Yunnan branch of Sinopecs trading company was obligated to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its dominance in the sales market of refined oil by refusing to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding without justifiable reasons

In the second instance ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors Currently the case is pending

Facts

The First Trial

The lawsuit was filed before the Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoKunming Courtrdquo) in January 2014 Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy Co Ltd (ldquoYingdingrdquo) a bio-energy manufacturer claimed that Sinopec and the Yunnan branch of Sinopec trading company (ldquoSinopec Yunnan Branchrdquo) had failed to fulfil their obligations stipulated in the Renewable Energy Law and had abused their market dominance in sales market of refined oil by refusing to trade with Yingding without justifiable reasons

Sinopec and Sinopec Yunnan Branch mainly explained four reasons for why they rejected Yingdingrsquos biofuel Firstly Yingding had failed to prove that the biofuel complied with the relevant national standard and was safe to use Secondly Yingding had failed to provide complete trading terms Thirdly the laws and regulations regarding biofuel were incomplete the authorized refined oil sales companies were 39 The details of the case are available at httpnewsxinhuanetcomfortune2014-1217c_1113680039htm httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=9e71db51-6ff6-4d2c-8af6-8eacf023ebdeampKeyWord=E4BA91E58D97E79B88E9BC8E|E4B8ADE79FB3E58C96 httpnewsxinhuanetcomenergy2015-0422c_127721575htm httpwwwnbdcomcnarticles2015-04-23911348html last visited on December 17 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 42 of 52

obligated to purchase biofuel from the biofuel manufacturers if it met certain quality standards but there was a vacancy regarding how to reach the end consumers from the sales companies

On 8 December 2014 the Kunming Intermediate Peoples Court ruled that Sinopec Yunnan Branch bore a legal obligation to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its market dominance in refined oil market by refusing without any justifiable reasons to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding The court ordered Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network within 30 days Both Yingding and Sinopec filed appeals to the Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court

The Appellate Trial

The appeal hearing was held on 22 April 2015 in Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoYunnan Courtrdquo) Sinopec submitted 23 new pieces of evidence and introduced two expert witnesses in a bid to overturn several key elements in the first-instance ruling by Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court

In terms of the determination of the relevant market and the market dominance Sinopec argued that the relevant market in this case was for adipic acid monomethyl ester (ldquoAAMErdquo) the main ingredient of a biofuel additive known as BD100 Yingdingrsquos main product is BD100 which can be blended with fossil diesel to become biofuel In the AAME market Sinopec is a potential buyer instead of a market dominator In support of this argument Sinopec presented an expert witnessmdashGong Jiong a professor of economics at Beijings University of International Business and Economics who testified that AAME should be defined as the relevant product market on the basis of an economic analysis

However Yingding insisted that the first-instance ruling was correct in naming the sales market of refined oil as the relevant market and submitted new evidence an article on Sinopecs website that claimed it had a 67 market share in Yunnan to help establish the claim that Sinopec had market dominance

Another main dispute was whether Yingdingrsquos biofuel product met national standards which would make it mandatory for Sinopec to purchase under Chinas Renewable Energy Law The law stipulates that biofuel producers must sell their products first to an authorized refined oil sales company and the sales companies are obliged to buy the fuel if it meets certain quality standards In order to test the quality Sinopec introduced the second expert witness Lin Jianmin a leading author of Chinarsquos national biofuel standard Lin Jianmin pointed out that there are currently quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology which gives Sinopec a justifiable reason not to trade with Yingding Moreover Sinopec presented some precedents in which consumers had complained about the biofuel quality and also claimed that China didnt have a sound regulatory framework to support biofuel production neither in testing nor in sales

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 43 of 52

Nevertheless to refute this point Yingding referred to an earlier test in co-operation with Sinopec in 2011 where selected buses in Kunming used biofuel blended by Sinopec using BD100 produced by Yingding

On August 13 2015 Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors and now this case is pending In the written appellate ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court did not provide any details regarding its reasoning

Key Issues of the Case

Is there any competition between Yingding and Sinopec

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case the product of Yingding is biofuel while Sinopec does not engage in the business of biofuel From this perspective Yingding and Sinopec are not competitors Thus it is not necessary and not reasonable for Sinopec to eliminate or restrict the competition from Yingding

Relevant Market

The definition of the relevant market is a prerequisite to determine whether competition exists and whether the AML is applicable In accordance with the Judicial Interpretation of Antitrust civil litigation the plaintiff shall take the responsibility to prove the defendantrsquos dominance in the relevant market Also the methods of defining the relevant market are stipulated in the Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition (ldquoGuidelinesrdquo) However both Yingding and Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court defined the relevant market as the sales market of refined oil without sufficient antitrust analysis none of the methods in the Guidelines were used Therefore the definition of the relevant market remains arguable and needs to be sufficiently analysed in the upcoming retrial

Justifiable Reasons

The abuse of market dominance includes the behaviour of refusing to trade without justifiable reasons according to the AML but in the first instance ruling justifiable reasons were not investigated by the court During the appellate trial the expert witness introduced by Sinopec claimed that there were quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology and this was a justifiable reason to refuse to trade with Yingding Even though the first instance court and the appellate court did not reason the justifiable reason it should be discussed and investigated further during the retrial

AML or Renewable Energy Law

The claims of Yingding were based on both the AML and the Renewable Energy Law (ldquoRELrdquo) and the first instance ruling referred to both the AML and the REL as

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 44 of 52

well It seems that the laws the first instance court referred to were comprehensive but in fact the reasoning was not clear and logical In the first instance ruling some disputes regarding the AML were reviewed but all the orders were not based on the AML Specifically the first instance court ordered the Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network based on the REL and dismissed the other claims That the orders were not on account of reasoning is illogical It is anticipated that during the retrial the application of the laws will be clearer

Analysis

A lot of issues have not been clearly analysed by the courts such as the relevant market and the justifiable reasons Since the case is remanded the above-mentioned issues are expected to be resolved in the retrial In addition Yingding was in a disadvantaged position compared to its first instance trial since its claims based on the AML were challenged greatly during the appellate trial In the retrial it is probable that Yingding may switch its litigation strategy and base its claims on the REL Therefore maybe more preparation regarding the REL can give Sinopec a leg up

Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)

Rijing Electric a Chinese distributor seeks CNY 5m compensation

The first hearing was on 9 June 2015 and ended without a ruling

Facts

Rijing Electric (ldquoRijingrdquo) a Shanghai-based company and a former distributor for Panasonic accused Panasonic of abusing its dominance and dividing the market through monopolistic practice in an antitrust lawsuit filed in 2014 with Shanghai No 1 Intermediate Court (ldquoShanghai Courtrdquo) claiming compensation of CNY 5m (USD 815370) Wenzhou Mingda Automation System Co and Shanghai Qingying Automation Equipment as the distributor of Panasonic in China are the co-defendants were accused of conducting monopolistic behaviours by implementing Panasonicrsquos policy

The first hearing for evidence exchange was on June 9 2015 Rijing claimed a policy allegedly introduced by Panasonic in 2009 restricted the competition between distributors Panasonic claims the policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo and has full justifiable reasons It explained that the products in question required customization at considerable cost to distributors before its sale to customers Once carried out however other distributors leaving them open to quote much lower prices than the original distributor could simply and relatively cheap replicate this customization Besides Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and that the plaintiff had failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic said its market share for the four products

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 45 of 52

under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases Also Rijing failed to challenge the policy when it was first introduced instead initially agreeing it was reasonable as e-mail evidence submitted by Panasonic suggests

Key Issues of the Case

Whether Panasonic occupied a market dominant position

It is reported that Rijing claimed that Panasonic had abused its market dominance but Rijing failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and its market share for the four products under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases

Analysis

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case Panasonicrsquos policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo rather than to eliminate or restrict competition

Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals40 (Pending)

It is a battle over patent licensing issues

It is viewed as being among the most complicated antitrust lawsuits in China

The first hearing was on 17 and 18 December 2015

Facts

Four Chinese rare earth companies Ningbo Ketian Magnet Ningbo Permanent Magnetics Ningbo Tongchuang Strong Magnet Material and Ningbo Huahui Magnetic Industry filed antitrust lawsuits against Hitachi Metals over alleged patent licensing issues regarding rare earth magnets on December 11 2014 with the Ningbo Intermediate Peoples Court (ldquoNingbo Courtrdquo) in Zhejiang province As reported four Chinese rare earth companies claimed Hitachi Metals abused its market dominance and hurt the industry competition by refusing to license the patents to them The patents in this case are used in the manufacturing of sintered neodymium iron boron (ldquoNdFeBrdquo) magnets a rare-earth magnet alloy widely used in parts for airplanes automobiles and other products

Hitachi Metals filed a challenge with the Ningbo Court over its jurisdiction in April 2015 After Ningbo Court rejected Hitachi Metals jurisdiction objection on 28 April 2015 Hitachi Metals appealed to the Zhejiang High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoZhejiang

40The details of the story are available at httpwwwzbmagcomnews_viewphpid=80 httpwwwhitachicomcnaboutpress201510-121118_ahtml last visited on December 22 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 46 of 52

Courtrdquo) but Zhejiang Court affirmed the ruling of the Ningbo Court

The first day of a two-day hearing took place on 17 December 2015 during which the two sides cross-examined each otherrsquos evidence The evidence focused on clearing up several key elements in the case including the relevant market whether Hitachi Metals has dominance on that market and whether both sides acted in good faith during the licensing negotiations

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Product Market

The four Chinese rare earth companies claimed that the relevant product market should be the NdFeb-related patent licensing market However Hitachi Metals believed that the physical NdFeb market rather than the patent licensing market should be the relevant product market which is meaningful for assess the real competitive effects on the market

Whether Hitachi Metals occupies a dominant market position

In terms of market dominance Hitachi Metals claimed it does not occupy a dominant position because Hitachi Metalsrsquo patents were not in a standard in this case and there are substitutable technologies in the market SEP holders have the obligation to license on FRAND terms but none-SEP holders do not So while a refusal to license a SEP may constitute abuse of dominance refusal to license a non-SEP mdash even by a patent holder with a dominant position mdash should not be considered as an abuse

Analysis

Hitachi Metals as a patent holder should have the right to decide whether to retain those patents or not or who to license According to the legal theory the purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage and protect innovation by conferring monopoly right mdash that is to give intellectual property owners the proprietary rights which can exclude others from using the intellectual property The SEP holders admittedly need to comply with FRAND terms which can maintain a robust balance between competition and monopoly whereas the further intervention of antitrust law into non-SEP patents may undermine the purpose of intellectual property law To which extent the antitrust law should intervene is yet to be seen

Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei41

A confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the Beijing IP court made by the Beijing High Court

41 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcncpwswbjzscq201511t20151103_12225640htm last visited on December 28 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 47 of 52

Facts

On August 2 2013 the NDRC penalized Abbott for monopolistic price-fixing and then Abbott made a price adjustment in China where the prices of main products were reduced

On December 16 2014 Tian Junwei (ldquoTianrdquo) a Chinese citizen in Beijing sued Carrefour Shuangjing Branch (ldquoCarrefourrdquo) and Abbott (Shanghai) Sales Company (ldquoAbbottrdquo) at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (ldquoIP Courtrdquo) for their monopolistic price-fixing which damaged his interests However Carrefour and Abbott challenged the jurisdiction of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court They claimed there were two reasons Firstly according to the jurisdiction rules of the IP court issued by the Supreme Court the IP court has no jurisdiction over anti-trust cases Secondly if this case is a contractual dispute the court that is in the place of Carrefour should hear it if this case is a tort dispute the Shanghai Intermediate Court should hear it

In the ruling of the IP Court the IP Court decided it has the jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases for the following reasons According to the Provisions On Causes Of Action In Civil Cases issued by Supreme Court (最高人民法院案由规定) antimonopoly dispute is a tertiary cause of action belonging to IP and competition disputes Also according to the Provisions concerning the Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京

市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问题的规定 ) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was an IP and competition dispute and was sued after November 6 2014 Thus the IP Court had jurisdiction

Both Carrefour and Abbott appealed to the Beijing High Court over the jurisdiction ruling but the Beijing High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original ruling Reasons are listed in the written ruling issued on June 18 2015 Firstly the nature of the case was an antimonopoly dispute In accordance with Provisions of the Supreme Peoples Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民

事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) and Civil Litigation Law the monopolistic civil disputes in the first instance shall be under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Peoples Courts and an action involving a contractual dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the peoples court of the place where the defendant is domiciled or where the contract is performed Carrefour as the defendant in this case is domiciled in Chaoyang District Beijing Therefore the courts of Beijing have jurisdiction over this case Secondly according to article 3 of the Notification on the Jurisdiction of Intellectual Property Courts issued by Supreme Court (关于知识产权法院案件管辖

等有关问题的通知) IP courts have jurisdiction over first-instance civil disputes arising from monopolistic practices Lastly according to Provisions concerning the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 6 of 52

have signed best practices for cooperation on reviewing mergers in Beijing As the Commissionrsquos officer says the growing number of international transactions is the main reason for this cooperation In addition the Commission also signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the NDRC and SAIC in 2012 which creates a dedicated framework to strengthen cooperation and coordination5

Statistics

From January of 2009 to the end of 2015 MOFCOM received 1445 cases and accepted 1364 cases Among the reviewed cases MOFCOM has cleared 26 deals with remedies since the AML took effect in 2008 with an average review time of 199 days

In 2015 MOFCOM accepted 338 cases out of which 332 were concluded including 18 cases dealing with applicants withdrawing merger filings The agency also imposed penalties on business operators in 9 cases that were related to failure to fulfil merger filing obligations

246 cases out of 332 cases in 2015 obtained MOFCOMrsquos approval in the first phase accounting for 74 of all reviewed cases

Of the cases cleared by MOFCOM in 2015 56 were related to manufacturing such as automotive components and parts vessels machinery manufacturing and electrical equipment

Acquisitions and joint-venture agreements were the most common types of transactions accounting for 87 of all deals Meanwhile joint ventures were still the most common channel for foreign investment in China

Significant Cases

GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions6

This is the first case in which MOFCOM agreed to remove a remedy imposed on a merger

MOFCOM partially removed the restrictions on Google based on the fact that Google had lost its control of Motorola Mobility

Facts

Google applied to MOFCOM on December 1 2014 to remove the condition that required Google to treat all original equipment manufacturers (ldquoOEMsrdquo) equally in android platform-related business after it bought Motorola

5 The original notice published by EC is available at httpeuropaeurapidpress-release_IP-15-5843_enhtml 6 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150120150100862331shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 7 of 52

The concerned remedy was imposed by MOFCOM according to its No 25 Announcement in 2012 which concerned Googlersquos acquisition of Motorola Mobility together with three other remedies as the following

1) Google will license the Android Platform on a free and open basis as it had done so far

2) Google shall continue to observe the existed FRAND obligation of Motorola Mobility in respect of the latterrsquos patents and

3) Google shall delegate an independent supervisor to supervise its performance according to the Provisional Regulations on the Disposal of the Undertakingrsquos Assets or Business in the Concentration stipulated by MOFCOM in 2010

The No 25 Announcement provided that the applied remedies would be valid for five years starting from its punishment unless Google no longer controls Motorola Mobility

Google lodged the remedy removal application based on the fact that Lenovo concluded its acquisition of Motorola Mobility from Google which had been approved by MOFCOM on October 16 2014 and closed on October 30 2014 and due to this acquisition Google lost its control of Motorola Mobility

Decision

After careful examination MOFCOM noted that upon completion of the MotorolaLenovo deal Google would not be engaged in any business of manufacturing smartphones but would keep the telecommunications patent technologies of Motorola Mobility

Based on this fact on January 6 2015 MOFCOM issued a notice that it had decided to approve Googlersquos application to remove one of the remedies with the other remedies remaining in place

AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery7

The transaction is related to a conditionally cleared merger case

The concentration parties notified the deal to MOFCOM following No 95 Announcement in 2008

Considering the slight increase of AB InBevrsquos shareholdings in Zhujiang Brewery MOFCOM approved the proposed transaction

Facts

7 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150820150801090985shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 8 of 52

On July 23 2015 Interbrew Investment International a fully owned subsidiary of AB InBev Guangzhou State-owned Assets Development Holdings and Guangzhou Securities entered into an agreement with Zhujiang Brewery to subscribe the latterrsquos new shares According to this agreement Interbrew Investment International would subscribe shares worth up to CNY 16 billion

Pursuant to a MOFCOM antitrust notice issued in 2008 if AB Inbev intended to further increase its stake in Zhujiang Brewery a filing should be submitted to MOFCOM before any deal were to be concluded

On July 29 2015 AB InBev submitted the filing for the deal to MOFCOM

Decision

MOFCOM noted that upon this subscription Interbrew Investment International would increase its stake in Zhujiang Brewery from 2562 to 2999 Since the stake increase is relatively small and will not result in material changes regarding the control of Zhujiang Brewery MOFCOM decided to approve the deal on 20 August 2015

MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases

MOFCOM reached these decisions based on the undertakingsrsquo failure to file notifications

None of these concentrations were determined as resulting in anti-competition effects

MOFCOM considered that a 35 shares acquisition could lead to the obtaining of control power over a company

Complaints from the third party are the main channel of triggering investigation on unnotified concentrations

The undertakings were fined up to RMB 200000 which is less than the imposed penalty (RMB 300000) in the last year and the maximum penalty (RMB 500000) for violations of merger control rules

Facts

On September 29 2015 MOFCOM issued notices regarding the penalty on four concentration dealings because the concerning undertakings failed to notify these dealings to MOFCOM before closing them Details of these notices are as follows

Shanghai Fosun Pharmaceutical (Group) Co Ltd has been imposed a fine of CNY 200000 (USD 31431) because of its failure to notify MOFCOM regarding its

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 9 of 52

acquisition of a 35 stake in Suzhou Erye Pharmaceutical Co Ltd (Suzhou Erye) and the target stake was transferred without MOFCOMrsquos allowance8

Fujian Electronics amp Information (Group) has been imposed a fine of CNY 150000 (USD 23568) for its failure to notify a 35 stake acquisition of Shenzhen CHINO-E Communication MOFCOM made this decision based on the fact that Fujian Electronics signed a transfer agreement with CHINO-Ersquo shareholders and completed this transaction without filing9

Bestv New Media and Microsoft have been imposed CNY 200000 (USD 31420) fines by MOFCOM since they did not lodge a merger review filling regarding their joint venture E-Home Entertainment Development which was established on October 1 201310

CSR Nanjing Puzhen and Bombardier Transportation Sweden have been fined CNY 150000 (USD 23562) respectively due to their failure to notify their proposed joint venture prior to setting it up These companies made an agreement about the joint venturersquos establishment on November 3 2014 and its business license was obtained on November 11 201411

MOFCOM identified that the above dealings shall be notified according to the fact that all of these dealings constituted concentration and turnovers of these concentrating undertakings reached the statutory turnover thresholds

Article 20 of the AML stipulates three kinds of concentration which are (i) a merger of undertakings (ii) an acquisition of control of other undertakings by acquisition of shares or assets with voting right of other undertakings to an adequate extent (iii) an acquisition of control of other undertakings or the capability of imposing determinative effects on other undertakings by contracts or other means

Article 3 of the Provisions of the State Council on the Thresholds for Concentration Notification of Undertakings provides the fillingrsquos thresholds which are as follows (i) The collective worldwide turnovers of all undertakings involved in the last fiscal year exceed CNY 10 billion and the turnovers within China of at least two undertakings each exceed CNY 400 million or (ii) The collective turnovers of all undertakings involved in the last fiscal year exceed CNY 2 billion (approximately USD 294 million) and the China-wide turnovers of at least two undertakings each exceed CNY 400 million (approximately USD CNY588 million)

These undertakings were penalized because of their violations of article 21 of the 8 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150920150901124896shtml 9 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150920150901124887shtml 10 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150920150901124903shtml 11 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150920150901124899shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 10 of 52

AML which provides that the concentration reaching the filling thresholds shall be notified to MOFCOM prior to its implementation and without this notification it shall not be conducted In addition according to article 48 of the AML and article 13 of the Interim Measures for Investigating and Punishing of Concentration of Undertakings Failing to File Notification an undertaking which is identified by MOFCOM for implementing a concentration without filling would be imposed a fine and instructed to recover the situation by MOFCOM The amount of this fine could be no more than CNY 500000

There is no provision that specifically describes the behaviour of implementing a concentration In practice obtaining a business license transferring the entity of assets delivering the shares and assigning directors or managers are likely to be deemed as the implementation of concentration

According to Shang Ming the former director general of MOFCOMrsquos Anti-monopoly Bureau so far MOFCOM has already penalized 15 companies for failing to notify MOFCOM regarding merger reviews MOFCOM has noticed an increase in companies shirking merger-filing responsibilities and has therefore intensified enforcement

MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent12

MOFCOM defines all of the information and communication technology SEPs as the relevant product market rather than divides each of them into the individual market

In the process of competition analysis MOFCOM evaluates various factors rather than comparing the market shares only which is consistent with the complexity and flexibility of the high-technology industry

In the process of formulating remedies MOFCOM pays more attention on protecting Chinese downstream companies and enhancing its supervision

Facts

On April 15 2015 Nokia Oyi (ldquoNokiardquo) signed a Memorandum of Understanding regarding the acquisition of Alcatel Lucent (ldquoAlcatelrdquo) According to this memorandum Nokia intends to acquire 100 shares of Alcatel through a tender off

A notification about this deal was filed on April 21 2015 and accepted by MOFCOM on June 15 2015 After reviewing this case MOFCOM moved it to Phases II and Phase III as the agency was of the opinion that this acquisition could have anti-competitive effects on the relevant market

12 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151020151001139743shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 11 of 52

On October 19 2015 MOFCOM cleared this deal with four behavioural remedies

Decision

Relevant Market

In the agencyrsquos view there are four relevant product markets which are the radio access network market the core network systems market the network infrastructure service market and the information and communication technology SEP licensing market Meanwhile the relevant geographical market is primarily the Chinese market

Competition Analysis

According to MOFCOM this deal would have no anti-competitive effects on the first three relevant product markets in China while it could constitute an obstacle or limit the competition in the information and communication technology SEP licensing market

The agency consideredafter the deal that Nokia would increase its holding in 2G 3G and 4G SEPs and strengthen the degree of concentration in the information and communication technology SEP licensing market If it refused to license charged overly high royalty fees or conducted any other anti-competitive behaviour the competition of downstream market would be distorted which would most likely impair customersrsquo interests in the end

Remedies

Four behavioural remedies focusing on maintaining fair licensing of standard-essential patents (ldquoSEPsrdquo) were imposed on Nokia which are

1) On a reciprocal basis Nokia commits to not use injunctions to prevent enforcements of FRAND (fair reasonable and non-discriminatory) encumbered SEPs unless the potential licensees are unwilling to sign FRAND licensing agreements and follow the terms

2) If Nokia transfers its SEPs to a third party it shall inform Chinese licensees as well as Chinese companies that are actively engaging in licensing negotiation about the transfer details

3) Nokia will only transfer its SEPs to a new owner on the basis that the new owner accepts the existing FRAND commitments made by Nokia

4) MOFCOM has the right to monitor the implementation of Nokiarsquos commitments Nokia shall report to MOFCOM about the implementation of the conditions within 45 days of the end of each calendar year The reporting obligation will last five years until October18 2020

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 12 of 52

Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions13

Western Digital had engaged in two conducts that violated the remedies provided in the No 9 Announcement in 2012 issued by MOFCOM

Western Digital lodged an application to remove certain restrictions in March 2014 and the agency made the decision on October 19 2015

MOFCOM considered the fact that the competition condition in the relevant product market has changed and decided to remove the hold-separate restrictions related to manufacture and RampD

Facts

In 2012 Western Digital Corporation (ldquoWestern Digitalrdquo) intended to acquire 100 shares of Viviti Technologies Ltd (ldquoViviti Technologiesrdquo) which was the holding company of Hitachi Global Storage Technologies Netherlands BV and Hitachi Global Storage Technologies Singapore Pte Ltd and engaged in the hard disk business

On April 2 2011 Western Digital filed a notification for this acquisition MOFCOM issued the No 9 Announcement in March 2012 and cleared this acquisition with six remedies According to this announcement Western Digital could apply for the removal of the first and second remedy after this decision has been carried out for 24 months

The first remedy refers to maintaining the Viviti Technologies as an independent competitor and the second remedy requires both Western Digital and Viviti Technologies to make a reasonable plan of their capacity and production and report these data to the trustee

Western Digital lodged an application to remove the first and second remedy in March 2014 MOFCOM found that Western Digital had engaged in two conducts that violated the first remedy and the competitive situation in the hard disk market had changed After talking with Western Digital collecting opinions from the relevant entities and delegating the independent party to make an economic evaluation MOFCOM decided to remove the hold-separate remedies partially

Western Digitalrsquos implementation of the duties imposed in the No 9 Announcement

Based on the implementation reports submitted by Western Digital and the monitoring reports submitted by the trustee MOFCOM found that Western

13 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151020151001139040shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 13 of 52

Digital had engaged in two conducts that violated the first remedy Those were

1) On March 8 2012 Western Digital consolidated Hitachi Global Storage Technology (ldquoHGSTrdquo) which was Vivitirsquos subsidiary in US

2) In January 2013 Western Digital dissolved the development division of VivitiHGST and transferred the relevant workforce to Western Digital

MOFCOM considered that these conducts impaired the independence of Viviti as a competitor so that it imposed CNY 300000 fines on each of these behaviours and requested Western Digital to rectify the situation As per the entrusted supervisorrsquos report such behaviours have been rectified and the first remedy has been fulfilled

According to MOFCOMrsquos announcement the agency found that other remedies have been entirely implemented

Competition Analysis

With respect to the current situation of the competition in the hard disk market MOFCOM made the following assessment

1) In the areas of portable application and corporate-level application solid-state drive has put constraint on the impact of the traditional hard disk as to strengthen the competition in the relevant market

2) Overcapacity problems in the conventional hard disk drive market became obvious

3) Western Digital and HGST are the major competitors in the hard disk drive market Both the layout and the major market competitors in this market have remained unchanged since 2012

4) The hold-separate duties restricted the full competition between Western Digital and HGST The implementation of such duties hindered them from integrating their products and providing the market with a full range of products and had an adverse impact on their clientsrsquo product procurement

Based on the above analysis MOFCOM deemed that

1) Removal of the conditions that required the two companies to remain independent in production and RampD activities would enable Western Digital to save costs to provide a full range of products to the market and to fully engage in market competition and benefit its clients

2) To keep the two sales teams and their respective brands independent from each other and the independence of sales activities could reduce competition restraint impacts arising from a complete merger

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 14 of 52

Remedies

After negotiating with MOFCOM the relevant entities agreed to undertake the following obligations

1) Western Digital and HGST will remain independent in sales and brands

2) Western Digital will not change its previous business modes or force its clients to exclusively purchase hard disk drive products from Western Digital or do so in disguise

3) Western Digital will continue its pace in investing in product innovation to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

This announcement will be effective within two years from the date of issuance If Western Digital can provide sufficient evidence to prove a substantial change in the market environment the company can propose to MOFCOM to remove the relevant conditions within the two years

SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions14

MOFCOM considered the fact that the competition condition in the relevant product market has changed and removed the hold-separate restrictions on Seagate and Samsung

Seagate shall remain its business model materially and continue to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

Facts

On December 12 2011 MOFCOM made the No 11 Announcement to clear Seagate Technology LLCrsquos (ldquoSeagaterdquo) acquisition with remedies In this acquisition Seagate intended to acquire hard disk drive business of Samsung Electronics Co Ltd (ldquoSamsung HDDrdquo) As per this announcement Seagate could apply for removing the first and second remedy after this decision has been carried out for 12 months

The first remedy is to preserve Samsung HDD as an independent competitor and the second remedy asks to maintain and expand Samsung HDDrsquos production capacity within six months of issuance of the No 11 Announcement and to set reasonable production volume targets based on market supply-demand conditions

Seagate lodged an application to remove the first and second remedy in May 2015 After making assessments on the relevant parties and the competition circumstance MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate remedies

14 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151020151001144105shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

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Competition Analysis

With respect to the current situation of the competition in the hard disk drive market MOFCOM made the following assessments

1) In the areas of portable application and corporate-level application solid-state drive has put constraint on the impact of the traditional hard disk so that the competition in the relevant market has been strengthened

2) Overcapacity problems in the conventional hard disk drive market became obvious

3) Both the layout and the major market competitors in the hard disk drive market have remained unchanged since 2012

4) Seagate and Samsung HDDrsquos market overlap in the hard disk market is quite small and Samsung HDDrsquos competition in the traditional hard disk is quite weak

Based on the above analysis MOFCOM deemed that

1) Removal of certain conditions is possible because in the portable application and corporate level application sectors competition constraint of solid-state drive on traditional hard disk drives has strengthened traditional hard disk drives are facing overcapacity which has reduced the chance of a single or more competitors causing competition restraints Seagate has limited overlap with Samsung in the hard disk business and the latter has a relatively weaker market power in the hard drive disk business

2) Removal of all imposed conditions may still restrain market competition because the traditional hard disk drive market competition conditions have not undergone a major change Seagate is still the major player in all divisions of the market and Seagate will strengthen its power after the acquisition of Samsung HDD

Remedies

After negotiating with MOFCOM Seagate agreed to undertake the following obligations

1) Seagate shall not change its business model materially or force clients to purchase hard drive disks exclusively from it

2) Seagate shall not force Tokyo Dengikagaku Kogyo China to supply magnetic heads exclusively to Seagate (or other Seagate-controlled companies) or limit the number of magnetic heads Tokyo Dengikagaku Kogyo China would supply to other hard drive disk manufacturers

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 16 of 52

3) Seagate shall continue to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

This announcement will be effective within two years from the date of issuance If Seagate can provide sufficient evidence to prove substantial change in the market environment the company can propose to MOFCOM to remove relevant conditions within the two years

FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM15

MOFCOM deems that this acquisition would induce anti-competitive influence

NXP promises to dispose its radio frequency (ldquoRFrdquo) power transistor business

As the first case approved with structural remedies after the enactment of the Provisions on Imposing Restrictive Conditions MOFCOM conducted a comprehensive evaluation of the viability competitiveness and marketability of the divested business as well as the suitability of potential buyers

Facts

On April 3 2015 NXP filed for its acquisition of Freescale NXP Semiconductor (ldquoNXPrdquo) is a NASDAQ-listed company registered in the Netherlands which engages in the design manufacturing and sale of integration circuits and discrete components

Freescale Semiconductor (ldquoFreescalerdquo) is a New York-listed company registered in Bermuda and based in the US which engages in the manufacturing and RampD of microcontroller and digital networking processors (embedded processors)

According to the agreement between NXP and Freescale after closing Freescale will become the wholly owned subsidiary of NXP On November 25 2015 MOFCOM decided to clear this acquisition with remedies

Relevant Market

As per the announcement the relevant product markets are the general microcontroller automotive power-use analog integrated circuit and RF transistor product markets in which NXP and Freescale have horizontal overlap The relevant geographical markets should be the global market

Competition Analysis

After assessing this proposed deal the agency concluded that

1) The proposed deal would boost NXPrsquos market control power in the RF

15 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151120151101196182shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 17 of 52

transistor product market because the global and Chinese RF transistor product markets share a similar structure both featuring few competitors and high concentration levels Freescale and NXP as the number one and number two players are far ahead of their rivals in the market Therefore after closing the market control power of NXP in this market would be strengthened

2) Since Freescale was the fiercest competitor of NXP the proposed deal will remove competition between them

3) The proposed deal would reduce the options for clients and increase procurement risks

In practice the wireless infrastructure suppliers as the main client of the RF transistor product tend to procure products from both NXP and Freescale to prevent them from the risk arising from relying on one supplier

4) The proposed deal may induce an adverse impact on the technology RampD and innovation

Remedies

In accordance with MOFCOMrsquos decision NXP shall follow its written commitment submitted to MOFCOM and completely divest its RF power transistor business to Beijing Jianguang Asset Management At the same time NXP shall strictly fulfil its obligations during the transition period It is worth noting that the NXPFreescale deal shall only be implemented after the divestment deal has been concluded

In addition MOFCOM requires NXP to perform relevant obligations during the transition period from the date of approval announcement until the divestment deal has been concluded NXP shall endeavour

1) not to engage in any lsquounfair trade practicesrsquo relating to the divested business

2) not to implement any acts which may have a significant adverse impact on the value management or competitiveness of the divested business or any acts which may change the nature and scope industry or business strategy or investment policy of the divested business and to take reasonable measures to encourage core employees to stay in the divested business as well as not to seek or transfer employees to NXPrsquos non-divested business

3) to ensure supply to the divested business in a fair reasonable and non-discriminatory manner and

4) to maintain the independence of the divested business and not to exchange competitively sensitive information between the parties and the divested

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 18 of 52

business

B Monopolistic Agreements

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

With respect to the enforcement activities of the NDRC in light of the numbers of the published cases it seems that the law enforcement frequency of the NDRC regarding monopolistic agreements in 2015 is lower in comparison with 2014

The reason behind might be that the outstanding issue of human resource deficit of the antitrust authority still exists Besides the fact that more enterprises gradually attach increasing importance to the antitrust compliance might be another reason for the decrease in the number of cases investigated by the authorities

As to the enforcement activities of the SAIC 4 of 14 cases concluded by the SAIC and its local branches in 2015 are relevant to monopolistic agreements Meanwhile these four cases concern horizontal monopolistic agreements

It is noteworthy however that the Mercedes-Benz case and the Dongfeng Nissan case suggest that vertical agreements especially involving price-related restrictions on the downstream dealers is still the priority of antitrust enforcement Companies shall be very cautious when imposing restrictions on the resale prices or the minimum resale prices of commodities in the distribution agreements

Automobile industry and related industries are observed to be under continuous attention of Chinarsquos antitrust authorities

The industries relating to peoplersquos livelihoods remain to be the enforcement priority

Significant Cases

Enforcement by the NDRC and its local branches

Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC16

The investigation was triggered by a leniency application

The first leniency applicant was exempted from punishment

Eight ocean shipping companies involved were imposed a collective fine of CNY 4067 million

NDRC spent approximately 12 months to investigate and conclude the case 16 NDRCrsquos press release of the case is available at httpjjsndrcgovcngzdt201512t20151228_769084html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 19 of 52

Facts

In December 2015 the NDRC published its official punishment decisions regarding the cartel case in connection with eight ocean shipping companies namely Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha (ldquoNYKrdquo) Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha (ldquoK Linerdquo) Mitsui OSK Lines EUKOR Car Carriers Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics Compantildeiacutea Sud Americana de Vapores Eastern Car Liner and Compantildeiacutea Chilena de Navegacioacuten Interoceaacutenica

According to the official press release of the NDRC the investigation was triggered by a leniency application of NYK The evidence showed that the eight companies reached consensus on non-intrusion of each others existing business to maintain or increase shipping fees when shipping goods such as cars trucks and engineering machinery in the routes between China and other countries and regions

They were also found to frequently conduct bilateral or multilateral communications on the shippersrsquo invitation for bids andor price inquiries via phone conferences dinner parties e-mails visiting etc In addition they also conducted illegal behaviour such as sensitive information exchange price negotiations bidding intention discussion dividing clients and shipping routes reaching agreements on high price bids or non-bidding in order to help certain companies gain shipping orders

To avoid the regulation of the antitrust authority the relevant shipping companies adopted various illicit measures that showed their apparent intention to violate the AML The cartel lasted for at least four years and covered a broad range of shipping routes concerned with the import and export of products between China and other regions such as North America EU South America and so on involving multiple auto brands and engineering machinery brands

The NDRC held the opinion that the eight companies conducts had restricted and eliminated competition in the relevant market raising the international shipping fees and impairing interests of shippers and end consumers The eight companies breached the AML by reaching and implementing monopolistic agreements on fixing prices and dividing the market

All eight investigated companies put forward remedy measures including enhancing the antitrust compliance program arranging more antitrust compliance trainings and developing antitrust compliance technologies

The NDRC imposed fines based on the nature level and duration of their monopolistic volations as well as their respective sales of international freight service sales relevant to the Chinese market The companies involved were collectively fined CNY 4067 million

NYK as the first cartel member voluntarily reporting the illegal conducts to the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 20 of 52

authority and providing significant evidence was entirely exempted from the punishment K Line as the second leniency applicant was imposed a fine amounting to 4 of its 2014 annual sales of international freight services relevant to Chinarsquos import and export market The details of punishments imposed on the involved companies by the NDRC are as follow

Company Name Amount of Fines (RMB million)

Percentage of the Relevant Turnovers

Grounds

Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha

- - First leniency applicant

Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha

2398 4 Second leniency applicant

Mitsui OSK Lines 3812 7 Third leniency applicant

EUKOR Car Carriers 284 9 Lasted over a long period involved many brands and many violations violations were severe

Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics

4506 8 Lasted over a long period involved many brands and many violations violations were severe

Compantildeiacutea Sud Americana de Vapores

308 6 Lasted over a long period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Eastern Car Liner 1127 5 Lasted over a long period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Compantildeiacutea Chilena de 120 4 Lasted over a long

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 21 of 52

Navegacioacuten Interoceaacutenica

period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Total 4067

Analysis

In this case the agency applied the AML instead of the Tenders and Bids Law to collusive bidding Citing article 13 (3) of the AML the NDRC identified that the collusive bidding constituted a division of the sales market

The leading three leniency applicants were granted exemption from fines to a varying degree

According to the official who handled this case dawn raids performed by antitrust enforcement agencies in other jurisdictions drew the attention of the NDRC on the cartels of these shipping companies However there was limited effective evidence to prove that the companies had reached monopolistic agreements Through pressuring the involved parties three members of the shipping cartel actively confessed their illegal conduct This case once again stresses the significance of international cooperation between antitrust enforcement agencies

Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau17

The distribution agreements between Mercedes-Benz and its dealers are determined as vertical monopolistic agreement and Mercedes-Benz violated article 14 of the AML because it restricted the ability of its dealers to decide their own resale prices

Mercedes-Benzrsquos dealers violated article of 13 of the AML due to concluding a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Mercedes-Benz and its dealers were jointly fined CNY 3578 million

Facts

In April 2015 Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau which is the provincial branch of the NDRC released the punishment on its website and announced that it had imposed a fine of CNY 350 million on Mercedes-Benz along with the aggregated fine of CNY 787 million on its dealers The fine came as a result of Mercedes-Benz reaching and implementing resale price maintenance (ldquoRPMrdquo) agreements with dealers to fix the minimum resale price of several car models as well as certain auto parts 17 The original Chinese notice published by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau is available at httpwwwjswjjgovcnoffice_neweo_comm_zxnrxsphp

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 22 of 52

According to the decision the authority found that Mercedes-Benz fixed the minimum resale price of Class E and Class S cars in Nanjing Wuxi Changzhou and Suzhou markets through telephoneverbal communication and dealers meetings from January 2013 to July 2014 Since 2010 Mercedes-Benz had reached agreements with dealers in Jiangsu province to fix the minimum resale prices for auto parts by providing different levels of discounts for insured cars cars involving expired warranty periods and cars within the warranty period

In addition Mercedes-Benz implemented the minimum resale price maintaining agreement by

1) Tightening its monitoring measures on the dealers such as inspecting deals and their sale incentive system on a weekly basis

2) Tracking the sales process flow of cars and increasing the intensity of this assessment

3) Giving warnings and reducing support ndash for example halting the supply of bestselling cars and prohibiting the opening of new stores ndash to dealers if dealers refused to cooperate with the price-fixing related policies and measures and

4) Interviewing personnel of the dealers and requesting terminations if the staff engaged in serious violations of the RPM agreement

Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau concluded that Mercedes-Benz had excluded and eliminated market competition harmed consumer welfare and consequently violated article 1418 of the AML The authority therefore imposed a fine of CNY 350 million representing 7 of the sale revenue of the previous year in the relevant market against Mercedes-Benz and imposed a fine on the dealers amounting to an equivalence of 1 of the annual sales in the previous year

Analysis

Although the agency also addressed the horizontal violation among the dealers in this case the administrative penalty decision mainly focuses on the vertical violation The agency fined dealers involved in the RPM agreement a combined CNY 787 million equal to 1 of the previous-year sales which suggests that the agency decided to give lighter punishments to dealers who took initiative in reporting the activity and provided evidence

The Mercedes-Benz case is the third case where the agency successfully 18 Article 14 of the AML The following monopolistic agreements between operators and trading partners shall be prohibited (i) fixing the resale prices of commodities to third persons (ii) restricting the minimum resale prices of commodities to third persons (iii) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement Authority under the State Council

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 23 of 52

discovered both vertical and horizontal agreements in a case following the Audi case and the Chrysler case All these cases are rooted in the same industry indicating that industrial features play a large role in raising anti-trust concerns In fact it appears that the entire automotive industry is under antitrust scrutiny

Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC19

This case involved both a horizontal agreement and an administrative monopoly

A total fine of CNY 1318 million was imposed on the involved companies

Facts

In June 2015 the NDRC through its website announced the decision made by its regional branch -Yunnan Provincial Development and Reform Commission (ldquoYunnan DRCrdquo) regarding the horizontal monopolistic agreement case involving Yunnan Communications Administration and local subsidiaries of four state-owned telecommunication companies

Through the investigation Yunnan DRC found that Yunnan Communications Administration as a competent government agency had organized several meetings involving Yunnan branches of four state-owned telecoms - China Mobile China Telecom China Unicom and China Tietong in August and September of 2014 At the end of 2009 the four local branches entered into an agreement to regulate their sales promotions in terms of limiting the promotional items amount and frequency

Furthermore the agreement provides certain measures to ensure the implementation of relevant restrictions on promotions Specifically in case any cartel member violates the agreement the others could file complaints with Yunnan Communications Administration and the agency would then issue a rectification notice to the rule-breaker

Yunnan DRC stated that the four telecoms were main competitors in the relevant market and the promotions as a significant competition measure would exert direct influence on the final prices of the products The horizontal agreement organized by Yunnan Communications Administration on sales promotions restricted the competition capacity of telecoms and as a result eliminated the competition in the relevant market Consequently the behaviour of Yunnan Communications Administration violated article 8 20 of the AML and constituted administrative monopoly in terms of ldquoforcing undertakings to conduct monopolistic behaviour prohibited by the AMLrdquo

19 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpwwwsdpcgovcnfzgggzjgjdyfldjjszhdt201506t20150602_694802html 20 Article 8 of the AML Administrative organs and the public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 24 of 52

With respect to the penalties Yunnan DRC fined the local branch of China Tietong CNY 200000 for reaching but not implementing the agreement in regards to the other three telecoms a total fine of CNY 1298 million amounting to 2 of the sales of the relevant business in the previous year were imposed for entering into and implementing the horizontal monopolistic agreement

Analysis

The telecoms industry is still the enforcement priority of the antitrust enforcement authorities A company cannot be exempted from punishment even though it is forced by competent authorities to conduct monopoly behaviour

DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC21

Both a horizontal monopolistic agreement and a vertical monopolistic agreement were involved in this case

A total fine of CNY 14242 million was imposed on DongFeng Nissan and its distributors

Facts

In September 2015 the Guangdong Development and Reform Commission (ldquoGuangdong DRCrdquo) released an announcement regarding the administrative penalties on DongFeng Nissan and its provincial distributors for concluding price-related monopolistic agreements More specifically DongFeng Nissan was imposed a fine of CNY 1233 million for breaching article 14 of the AML in terms of restricting the resale price of certain car models 17 distributors domiciled in Guangdong were collectively fined CNY 1912 million for violating article 1322 of the AML in terms of entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements

According to the published official release the Guangdong DRC launched the investigation in August 2014 The authority discovered that from 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissan had set a rigorous restriction on its distributorsrsquo abilities to determine the resale prices of certain car models including the quoted prices in various platforms and the final resale price In addition DongFeng Nissan punished the distributors that failed to abide by such price restrictions in 2013 The authority 21 The original Chinese notice published by Guangdong DRC is available at httpwwwgddpcgovcnzwgkgzdtgzyw201509t20150910_328993html 22 Article 13 of the AML The following Monopolistic agreements among competing operators shall be prohibited (i) fix or change prices of commodities (ii) limit the outputs or sales volume of commodities (iii) segment the sales markets or the raw material purchasing markets (iv) limit the purchase of new technology new facilities or limit the development of new products new technology (v) jointly boycott transactions (vi) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-Monopoly Law enforcement Authority Monopolistic agreements in this Law refer to agreements decisions or other concerted practices that eliminate restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 25 of 52

believed that the vertical agreement concluded between DongFeng Nissan and its distributors eliminated and restricted the competition in the relevant market and damaged the consumer welfare as well which violates article 14 of the AML

Furthermore from April 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissanrsquos distributors in Guangdong province held multiple meetings to discuss issues relevant to sale price reached and implemented a horizontal monopolistic agreement in terms of fixing the prices of some car models which is prohibited by article 13 of the AML

Considering that both DongFeng Nissan and the involved distributors positively cooperated with the investigation and ceased the illegal behaviour immediately after the investigation Guangdong DRC decided to impose a fine amounting to 3 of its previous yearrsquos turnovers on DongFeng Nissan and a fine ranging from 2 to 4 on the relevant distributors in accordance with articles 4623 and 4924 of the AML

Analysis

This case demonstrates that auto and related industries are still under close attention of the authority Considering the NDRCrsquos successful series of antitrust investigations conducted throughout the auto industry it is observed that the agency currently overseeing price-related antitrust issues in China has accumulated a substantial amount of experience regarding antitrust enforcement in the auto industry Now is the right time to speed up the law-making process by amending the set of rules released earlier and drafting new laws to advise the auto industry on antitrust compliance

Enforcement by the SAIC and its local branches

Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC25

The investigation was triggered by whistle blowerrsquos submission

Cartel members were collectively fined CNY 139 million 23 Article 46 of the AML In case the operators violate the relevant provisions of this Law concluding and implementing Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall order the operators to cease such act impose fines more than 1 but less than 10 of the total turnover in the preceding year and confiscate the illegal gains where the Monopolistic agreement is not implemented a fine less than RMB 500000 can be imposed If the operators involved in Monopolistic agreement on its own initiative report information concerning the conclusion of Monopolistic agreements and provide important evidences to the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority they may be given a mitigated punishment or be exempted from punishment in accordance with the circumstances Where the industrial associations violate this Law organizing the operators in the industry to conclude Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority may impose a fine less than RMB 500000 in serious circumstances the agency of social organization administration and registration may cancel its registration 24 Article 49 of the AML As for the imposition of the fines stipulated by the Article 46 47 and 48 of this Law the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall take elements such as the nature extent and time it lasts of the illegal act into consideration in determining the specific amount of the fines 25 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201506t20150601_156889html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 26 of 52

Facts

In April 2015 the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) issued administrative penalties on several brick manufacturers for entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements This is the first case relevant to monopolistic agreements that has been publicized by the SAIC since the beginning of this year

Ten cartel members were involved in the case including one company and nine individuals Similar with most antitrust cases the investigation started as a result of a whistle blowerrsquos submission After a thorough investigation Hunan AIC found that those local brick manufacturers had reached agreements on controlling production volume and dividing sales areas in the forms of production and sales agreements plans and meeting minutes

The enforcement authority reached the conclusion that these brick manufacturers violated article 13 of the AML and imposed a total fine of CNY 1389400 on them

Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC26

The organizer of the monopolistic agreement the animation association was fined CNY 100000

The antitrust authority did not punish the members of the monopolistic agreement

Facts

In December 2015 the Guangdong Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoGuangdong AICrdquo) published its administrative punishment decision in regards to Guangzhou Panyu Animation amp Game Association (ldquoGAGArdquo) organizing member companies to conclude a monopolistic agreement

According to the decision GAGA drafted the ldquoAgreement of Exhibition Alliancerdquo (ldquoAgreementrdquo) and convened a conference with member companies in order to discuss the content and conclusion of the Agreement 52 member companies entered into the Agreement which actually requested the alliance companies to merely participate in the exhibitions either organized or supported by GAGA in Guangzhou In addition the Agreement prohibited the alliance companies from attending any other exhibition except if they obtained prior approval of GAGA

After a thorough investigation Guangdong AIC believed that the conclusion of the Agreement among GAGA and the 52 member companies violated article 13 (5) of the AML in terms of boycott GAGA who was deeply involved and restricted member companiesrsquo choice of exhibitions through the Agreement could be deemed as

26 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151208_164680html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 27 of 52

the participant and organizer of the monopolistic agreement In accordance with article 46 of the AML Guangdong AIC imposed a fine of CNY 100000 on GAGA for organizing the conclusion of the monopolistic agreement

Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC27

Hubei AIC considered the coinsurance for Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance illegal

Twelve insurance companies were fined CNY 469 million in total

Facts

In December 2015 the Hubei Administrative for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHubei AICrdquo) disclosed its punishment on 12 insurance companies for signing illegal coinsurance agreements

The disclosed punishment decision suggests that the Hubei branch of China Pacific Life Insurance (ldquothe Companyrdquo) 11 other insurance companies and Wuhan Construction Safety Technology Consultation Center (ldquoWCSTCCrdquo) signed a Coinsurance Agreement on Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance (ldquoCoinsurance Agreementrdquo) of which the main contents include

1) The Company and 11 other involved companies as the coinsurers jointly take charge of the personal accident insurance concerned with the construction project directly administered by the Wuhan government WCSTCC is responsible for providing safety professionalism and technology services regarding the relevant personal accident insurance

2) The Company as the chief insurer of the coinsurance occupies 12 of the total amount of the insurance and the other 11 companies respectively occupy 8

3) The Company as the representative of the coinsurance is in charge of collecting the premium signing the standard form insurance policies and issuing the invoice in its own name The Company should share the charged premium with the other companies in accordance with the Coinsurance Agreement

4) Both the Company and the other insurance companies should pay 25 of the actually received premium to WCSTCC as the service fee WCSTCC will assist the coinsurers in providing safety and technology management service to the insured In addition the 11 insurance companies should pay 5 of their premium to the Company as the management fee

27 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165445html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 28 of 52

5) In case an accident happens the 12 companies will jointly bear the damages based on their respective shares in the coinsurance

6) There is a contact mechanism established in the coinsurance The coinsurers will regularly hold coinsurance conferences to discuss existing problems

Furthermore the coinsurers and WCSTCC also signed a self-discipline agreement and established a complete management system to assure the implementation of the Coinsurance Agreement Any party violating the Coinsurance Agreement would be punished

Hubei AIC found that WCSTCC was solely invested by Wuhan Construction Safety Management Association which was under Wuhan Construction Commission The centre helped implement certain functions of the Wuhan Urban Construction Safety Management Station and was responsible for quality supervision and safety supervision of municipal construction projects

It later became a prerequisite for construction companies to purchase insurance from any member of the coinsurance in order to get approval to commence their project According to the decision Hubei AIC launched another separate investigation against WCSTCC

Through the investigation Hubei AIC concluded that the Coinsurance Agreement constituted a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by article 13 of the AML with the following analysis

First coinsurance as a common business model to jointly share and lower risks is widely adopted in the insurance industry A coinsurance arrangement for a specific project in order to avoid high risks faced by one insurer could be legal However coinsurance should not target the entire market In this case prior to the Coinsurance Agreement the risks of the construction projects were unpredictable since the scale of the construction projects the difficulty of the construction and the amount of construction workers could not be available It is impossible to predict the risks of the projects thus it is not necessary to cooperate with other insurers to collectively bear the risks The purpose of the 12 insurance companies to establish the coinsurance is to avoid the competition which demonstrates the Coinsurance Agreement belongs to a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by the AML

Second the companies through entering into the coinsurance agreement actually divided the relevant market of construction project personal accident insurance in Wuhan city which affected the competition in the relevant market and damaged the interests of other competitors and the consumers In particular the Construction Law as amended in 2011 stipulates that the purchase of personal accident insurance is not mandatory and the construction companies have the right to choose whether to buy the said insurance or not As mentioned purchasing insurance from the coinsurance had been the prerequisite for construction companies to obtain administration

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 29 of 52

approval for the project which seriously distorts the fair competition in the market

Citing article 46 of the AML the 12 insurance companies were collectively fined CNY 469 million including fines on the companies and confiscation of illegal gains It is noteworthy that the fines were calculated based on the companiesrsquo 2014 annual sales of the insurance product in connection with the coinsurance The Company as the chief insurer was fined amounting to 6 of its 2014 annual sales of the relevant insurance product in the coinsurance and other companies were fined amounting to 2 of relevant sales For more specific information please see the following table

Company Name (Hubei Branch)

Fines (CNY million)

Percentage of the sales

Illegal Gains (CNY

million)

China Pacific Life Insurance 00653 6 0941

Sino Life 00145 2 04332

Alltrust Insurance 00145 2 04332

Taikang Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Continent Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Pacific Property Insurance

00145 2 04332

China Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

PICC Property and Casualty 00145 2 02599

Taiping General Insurance 00145 2 013

Union Life Insurance 00145 2 01177

Ping An Annuity Insurance Company of China

00145 2 04201

Ping An Property amp Casualty Insurance Company of China

00145 2 -

Subtotal 02248 - 44679

Total 46927

Analysis

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 30 of 52

Coinsurance as an effective approach to lower risks of insurers is widely used in the insurance industry Information sharing and agreements on coinsurance were generally considered efficient and legitimate However from an antitrust perspective coinsurance may raise competition concerns depending on the circumstances of each agreement In the case that there is enough capacity for one insurer to cover the potential risks the coinsurance might be considered as entering into a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC28

The first leniency applicant was exempted from fines

The other concrete companies were imposed a fine of CNY 180000

Facts

In December 2015 the concrete companies monopolistic agreement case investigated by Hunan AIC was published on SAICrsquos website

In accordance with the antitrust enforcement announcement of SAIC this case was triggered by complaints from the Yongzhou City peoplersquos congress After the preliminary review the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) initiated the formal investigation on seven concrete companies domiciled in Yongzhou City Hunan Province which were suspected of being involved in a monopolistic agreement in terms of division of the volumes of the products

After further investigation Hunan AIC found that the seven concrete companies concluded a partnership agreement in 2011 which requested the involved companies to enter into a partnership business with assets In addition according to the partnership agreement it was planned to establish a comprehensive office to manage production marketing and distribution of the products of all the partners The seven companies intended to jointly adjust and control the output of concrete based on the partnership agreement However because there were disagreements over the allocation of the injected assets and market shares the companies did not implement the partnership agreement The agreement was cancelled in December 2012

Based on the findings Hunan AIC concluded that the seven concrete companies as competitors of each other restricted and eliminated the competition in the relevant market through reaching the partnership agreement and dividing the volumes of sales which violated article 13(3) of the AML in terms of division of sales market Considering that the agreement had not been implemented and the limited influence of the agreement according to article 46 of the AML and article 27 of the Administrative Penalties Law small amount fines were imposed on the involved companies Six companies were fined CNY 30000 each for their illegal behaviour 28 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165504html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 31 of 52

Yongzhou Shuangyuan Building Materials Co Ltd as the first one to actively report the monopolistic agreement and cooperate with the enforcement authority was exempted from the punishment

Outlook

It is expected that the AMLrsquos enforcement on monopolistic agreements will continue in the future Industries such as automobile shipping pharmaceuticals insurance etc will still remain the priority of the antitrust enforcement

The antitrust enforcement authorities have published a series of regulations in order to clarify the substantial and procedural issues relevant to the antitrust enforcement However Chinarsquos current antitrust legislation regime is still immature In the following years we expect that more attention will be paid to the legislative improvements

Another remarkable issue for cartel members is that with more Chinese enterprises attaching increasing importance to the AML the follow-on civil damages actions might become a tendency in the future

C Abuse of Market Dominance

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen a decent increase of abuse of market dominance cases both in public enforcement and private litigation Oftentimes the authorities responsible for public enforcement generally find it difficult to pursue investigations against abuse of market dominance cases The following two main reasons are often cited to explain this standoff first it is hard for the authorities to define the relevant markets and prove the undertaking(s)rsquo dominant market position through economic approaches second it is hard to collect evidence regarding abusive practices

The cases related to IPRs abuse are emerging significantly particularly in the telecommunication media and technology (ldquoTMTrdquo) sectors

The SAICrsquos latest refusal-to-deal probe against a local drug maker shows that the SAIC and its local branches have increasingly acquired a profile as an abuse of dominance regulator

Significant Cases

Cases pursued by the SAIC

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 32 of 52

Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case29

Facts

The local authority in Dongfang city reported to the Hainan provincial branch of SAIC on April 23 2014 of the suspected dominance abuse The SAIC authorized its Hainan bureau to officially investigate the matter on 25 July 2014 according to a decision dated January 9 2015 The AIC concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its market dominance by requiring users to pay a deposit without any legal basis and or justifiable reasons

In terms of the relevant product market the local authority found that in this case it was the urban water supply market in Dongfang city and its surrounding townships where Dongfang Water was the sole public operator in the local water supply market with a 100 market share which made all water users completely reliant on the companyrsquos supply In term of market access the local authority found it very unlikely that there were other operators due to the strict regulations

The Hainan SAIC then concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its dominance as it charged users a deposit by threatening to refuse to register users and also by threatening to restrict the water supply Dongfang Waters charging of deposits lacked a legal basis and hadnt received government approval to the detriment of household consumers and business water users and hampered the improvement of management and services of the company Such conduct was in breach of Chinarsquos Anti-Monopoly Law

Hainan AIC levied a fine of CNY 593208 a lighter penalty equivalent to 2 of the companyrsquos annual sales for the previous year and confiscated illicit gains of CNY 38521 for abuse of market dominance

Analysis

It is noteworthy that although handled by a local authority supervised by the SAIC the antitrust agency detailed the relevant market definition the assessment of the dominant market position the abusive practices and the scrutiny of the justifiable reasons

Although the definition of the relevant market and the reasoning of the Hainan provincial AIC and the SAIC are subject to criticism it is still applausive to see that the antitrust regulators have realized the importance of the application of rule of reason in an abuse case In addition through itrsquos a published decision practitioners may observe the regulatorsrsquo reasoning and thus transparency and legal certainty have been generated

29 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzfcfjd201502t20150212_152066html last visited on October 18 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 33 of 52

Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms30

Facts

In June 2013 the Ningxia AIC under authorization of SAIC opened an antitrust investigation into the alleged tie-in sales by the three major state-owned telecommunications operators China Tietong China Unicom and China Telecom for the tie-in sale of fixed-line telephones with broadband Internet services The Ningxia AIC found that the three companies had bundled fixed-line phone services with Internet services to subscribers

During the investigation all three telecommunications companies admitted the tie-in practice had recognized that such practice had improper influence on competition and deprived the choices of consumers The three companies promised to undertake internal rectification timely and eliminate the ill effects resulting from such practice The parties committed to taking the following corrective measures

1) Taking internal rectifications and conducting training to staff about antitrust laws and stop tie-in sales practices

2) Making public commitments to allow subscribers a free choice of services and strengthening the propaganda through the operating room call centre and other channels

3) Unbundling fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

The Ningxia AIC decided to suspend the probe on 14 May 2015 on the grounds that the three companies had actively worked together with the investigators and proposed workable remedy plans

Analysis

In the official announcement Ningxia AIC concluded that the purpose of antitrust enforcement is to restrain monopolistic conducts the protection of competition and to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of consumers Given that during the investigation process the parties had actively cooperated with the investigation formed a more profound understanding of the dangers of tying behaviour and moreover the parties proposed and implemented positive corrective measures to be able to remove the ill impact of their actions the agency believed that the purpose of antitrust law enforcement was fulfilled

It is worth noting that the Ningxia AIC also required the three companies to implement the commitment by August 30 2015and the submission of the written

30 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158908html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158906html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158910html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 34 of 52

implementation report on July 102015 and August 102015 respectively which is another illustration that an effective commitment by the undertakings shall directly deal with the effect that is brought by the monopolistic behaviour In this case the effect of the monopolistic act was restricted to the choice of the consumers therefore the commitment by the undertaking aimed at allowing the freedom of choice and the unbundling of fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company31

Facts

The Liaoning AIC imposed a fine of approximately CNY 433m on the Fushun Branch of Liaoning Tobacco Co on 1 June 2015 The agency also ordered the company to stop its illicit behaviour

The Liaoning AIC received a tip-off that the accused Liaoning Tobacco Corsquos Fushun branch was conducting tie-in sales of non-high-demand cigarette brands with high-demand cigarette brands After gaining authorization from SAIC the agency officially started an investigation regarding the companyrsquos suspected abuse of market dominance in June 2014

Analysis

According to the announcement the tobacco company argued that the tobacco industry is a state controlled or monopolized industry with a lawful monopolistic position therefore the company shall not be subject to the norms of general market competition rules or the anti-monopoly law

In this regards the agency concluded that in terms of the status of the undertaking admittedly the first paragraph of article 17 of the AML says that the State shall protect the lawful business operations of undertakings in these industries with respect to the industries which are under the control of the State-owned economic sector and have a bearing on the lifeline of the national economy or national security and the industries which exercise monopoly over the production and sale of certain commodities according to law However the second paragraph continues to say that the undertakings mentioned above shall do business according to law be honest faithful and strictly self-disciplined and subject themselves to public supervision and they shall not harm the consumers interests by taking advantage of their position of control or their monopolistic production and sale of certain commodities In particular in the preceding paragraph the ldquolawful businessrdquo and ldquoaccording to lawrdquo imply that the AML shall apply in the business operation The agency therefore believes that

31 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201508t20150813_16

0208html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 35 of 52

there shall be no exemption for the undertaking concerned the defences of the undertaking concerned is not established

Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm32

Facts

The Chongqing AIC fined Chongqing Qingyang Pharmaceutical CNY 439308 for alleged dominance abuse

The investigation was initiated when the company contacted the agency for verification on its potential breach of the AML related to an allopurinol active pharmaceuticals ingredient (API) distribution agreement with its exclusive distributor The company provided the relevant agreement and information and the agency conducted an investigation into the company and some other relevant companies

Analysis

Relevant Market

During the investigation the agency found that pharmaceutical ingredients are a special commodity the API is used to produce the preparations The chemical API is only used for the production of the preparation and could be used as a medicine for clinic use

The preparation is produced according to the requirements of certain form of prepared drugs and for the purpose of treatment and prevention which can be used as medicine

The allopurinol is used for the common treatment of hyperuricemia However the other treatments are different in pharmacological effects or treatment effects as well as in the cost for the patient Furthermore the company is the only manufacturer and supplier in the market nationwide since July 2012 Therefore the agency concluded that the relevant market is the allopurinol API market

Considering that the qualification for manufacturing the allopurinol API is national wide and the normal practice for purchasers and suppliers is domestic the relevant geographic market is the Chinese market

The Market Dominance

During the investigation the agency found that the company is the only supplier and manufacturer of allopurinol API in China there is no other competitor in the

32 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151222_16

5152html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 36 of 52

market and the company has a monopoly in the market The evidence shows that the company has the ability to control the prices the position for the downstream is relatively weak

With respect to the market entry the agency found that the market entry is relatively high in addition other undertakings are dependent on the company Thus the agency believed the company to have market dominance

Refusal to Deal

The agency found that on September 25 2015 the company reached an exclusive agreement and distribution agreement with its distributor Based on these agreements the company didnrsquot supply allopurinol API to the said distributor and other companies despite the fact that those companies requested for allopurinol API but were turned down by the company

Absence of Reasonable Cause

The agency found that the companyrsquos refusal to deal was not in line with the needs of normal business operation or economic efficiency On the other hand the refusal to deal was aimed at increasing the market share of the allopurinol drug product Also the agency found that the stop of supply was a manipulation of market power as to maximize the profit to the most The agency further found that the exclusive distribution agreement with suspension of supply for six months and the refusal to supply was to eliminate and restrict the competition as to gain the monopolistic profit

The Consequence of Refusal to Deal

The agency concluded that the refusal to deal harmed the competition of the allopurinol preparations market Because of the suspension of supply many demanders had to reduce their production or switch to the supply of other products or stop their production The suspension of supply affected the competition of the downstream market Consequently the raising of the price of allopurinol API also raised the cost for other manufacturers of allopurinol preparations

Furthermore the refusal to deal led to capacity loss of the allopurinol preparation industry

Ultimately the refusal to deal increased the burden on consumers as the refusal to supply changed the supply-demand relationship in the market

The agency concluded that the Company abused its dominant position in the allopurinol API market by refusing to deal with intended buyers in the period between October 2013 and March 2014Therefore the Company violated article 17 (1) of the AML which prohibits business operators with a dominant market position from abusing that position such as the refusal to deal without any justifications

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 37 of 52

D Administrative Monopoly

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 witnessed antitrust authoritiesrsquo significant efforts regarding the enforcement against administrative monopoly According to Mr Dong Zhiming the deputy director general of Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly Bureau ever since the AML coming into force six cases in connection with administrative monopoly were investigated by NDRC and among them five cases were handled in the year of 2015 These cases touched abuses of administrative power in terms of designative deal in relation to transportation communication and pharmaceutical industries

The first private litigation related to administrative monopolistic acts was heard in the court which is a milestone case in the enforcement of the AML

Significant Cases

Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC33

Facts

In March 2015 the NDRC released the official letter to Shandong Provincial Department of Transportation (ldquoShandong DOTrdquo) on its website with respect to correct its abuse of administrative power to exclude and restrict competition

During the investigation the NDRC found that since 2011 Shandong DOT had issued multiple relevant government orders in order to require certain types of vehicles to be directly connected to two designated information and service platforms both of which are operated and technically supported by one company namely Shandong Jiutong Internet of Things Technology Co Ltd (ldquoJiutong ITTrdquo) Furthermore according to the orders issued by the competent administrative department all the vehicle satellite positioning terminals entering into Shandong provincial market should be debugged through the said technology service platform which is operated by the mentioned company In addition Shandong DOT released the cap prices of vehicle satellite positioning terminals which is identical to the 2012 bid-winning price in the Ministry of Transportation demonstration project

The NDRC believed that Shandong DOTrsquos behaviour eliminated and restricted the competition in the monitoring platform market and the vehicle terminal market deprived the right of transportation enterprises to choose vehicle terminals and monitoring platform on their owns unreasonably raised the sales prices of vehicle terminals and service fees charged by the platform and increased the costs of transportation enterprises Therefore the antitrust agency concluded that Shandong

33 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201503t20150327_668911html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 38 of 52

DOT violated article 8 of the AML which stipulates that ldquoadministrative organs and the public organizations with an administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude and restrict competitionrdquo Specifically Shandong DOT violated article 3234 in terms of requiring organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any designated operators and violated article 3735 in terms of setting rules with contents which eliminate and restrict competition

Based on article 51 of the AML ldquoWhere administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations abuse administrative powers performing activities which exclude and restrict competition the superior entity shall order it to correct impose administrative penalty on the chief officer and other staffs directly responsible pursuant to the laws The AML enforcement authority may give recommendations on disposal of activities to the relevant superior entityrdquo the NDRC proposed in writing that the Shandong provincial government should order Shandong DOT to rectify its behaviour with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Entirely open up the monitoring platform market by permitting transportation undertakings to freely choose any approved platform

2) Loosen the restrictions on the entry into Shandong vehicle terminals permit the undertakings to independently select the supplier of vehicle terminals and allow the qualified terminals to be connected to the relevant monitoring platform and

3) Revoke the official documentation relevant to the cap price of vehicle terminals in order to promote the price competition

Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 36

Facts

On 26 August 2015 the NDRC published its second decision with regard to the rectification of administrative monopoly since the beginning of this year According to the proposal letter sent to Anhui Provincial Government the investigation against the Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City (Bengbu HFPC) was trigged by third partiesrsquo complaints

34 Article 32 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to require organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any operators designated by them 35 Article 37 of the AML Administrative organs shall not abuse their administrative powers to set rules with contents which eliminate restrict competition 36 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201508t20150826_748682html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 39 of 52

The investigation suggests that Bengbu HFPC published three notices with regard to drugs procurement in April and May of this year

In the No C-2015-CG-X-111 Notice (ldquoNo111 Noticerdquo) released on 10 April2015 the health authority not only provided the dosage form and qualification of the requested drugs but also directly determined the suppliers of relevant drugs which eliminated and restricted the competition among pharmaceutical manufacturers and therefore violated articles 32 and 37 of the AML

In the No C-2015-CG-C-112 Notice (ldquoNo112 Noticerdquo) and No C-2015-CG-C-168 (ldquoNo 168 Noticerdquo) respectively released on 10 April and 22 May 2015 the Bengbu HFPC set discriminative qualification requirements on non-local undertakings in order to restrict their participation in the relevant bidding For instance in accordance with No 112 Notice to be a qualified bidder the turnover of non-local undertakings shall exceed CNY 2 billion which is 50 times as much as the turnover requirements of the local undertakings In the NDRCrsquos opinion the administrative monopoly activities conducted by the local health agency excluded the relevant undertakings from the market maintained the virtual-high prices of drugs and therefore violated articles 3237 and 37 of the AML

The NDRC suggested in a letter that Anhui Provincial Government should urge the Bengbu HFPC to rectify the abuse of monopoly powers with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Stop setting distinguishing restrictions on qualification requirements review standards and numbers of winning bidders as for local and non-local undertakings

2) Stop designating the suppliers of competitive drugs and

3) Take necessary measures to mitigate the negative effects resulting from the previous illegal monopolistic abuses

Outlook

At the beginning of the year the former director general of the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau under the NDRC Xu Kunlin stated that the agency would strengthen antitrust enforcement on abuse of administrative power in 2015

Since then the NDRC has made great efforts to rectify unreasonable abuses of administrative power The currently disclosed two cases investigated by the NDRC re-emphasize the Chinese Governmentrsquos strict scrutiny of antitrust issues in respect of

37 Article 34 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to restrict or reject the participation of operators from other regions in local bidding activities by measures such as prescribing discriminatory qualification requirements or assessment standards or by not publishing information according to law

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 40 of 52

administrative monopoly It reminds the local governments that antitrust compliance is of significant importance

III Private Litigation

A Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen more and more private antitrust litigations

The private antitrust litigation cases have become increasingly complicated especially the issues regarding the intersection areas of IP and antitrust law

Multinational giants and State-Owned Enterprises (the ldquoSOEsrdquo) are increasingly becoming the targets in antitrust civil litigations Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (the ldquoSMEsrdquo) tend to use the antitrust litigation to achieve their commercial goals in the business context

B Significant Cases

Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)38

This is the first-ever private litigation concerning administrative monopoly since the implementation of the AML in 2008

Facts

According to the currently disclosed details the case is relevant for designated trade

The plaintiff Shenzhen Sware Technology Co Ltd (ldquoSwarerdquo) is a software company The press releases suggest that Sware Gloden Software Co Ltd (ldquoGlodenrdquo) and Shanghai Ruban Software Co Ltd (ldquoShanghai Rubanrdquo) are the three main suppliers of construction cost software and possess the major shares of the relevant market An annual provincial vocational ability contest regarding the construction cost hosted by the Guangdong Department of Education (ldquoGuangdong DOE) designated Gloden as the exclusive supplier of the relevant software

After several unsuccessful verbal and written negotiations with Guangdong DOE in April 2014 Sware filed a lawsuit against Guangdong DOE before the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquothe Courtrdquo) alleging that the administrative organ abused its administrative power and violated the AML by designating exclusive software supplier for the contest and claimed a compensation for reasonable expense amounting to CNY 10800 Yuan

The opinions of the Court 38 The story of the case is available at httpfinancesinacomcnchinadfjj20150410074621924997shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 41 of 52

The full text of the judgment has not been disclosed yet In accordance with the information available to the public the Court invoked article 32 of the AML which prohibits an administrative organ from abusing its administrative power to require or in disguised form organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use only the commodities supplied by the entities designated by them The Court concluded that Guangdong DOE failed to prove the legitimacy of the designation and therefore abused its administration power

Currently the case is in appeal before the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court

Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 39

It is the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China

In the first instance ruling Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court ruled against Sinopec holding that the Yunnan branch of Sinopecs trading company was obligated to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its dominance in the sales market of refined oil by refusing to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding without justifiable reasons

In the second instance ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors Currently the case is pending

Facts

The First Trial

The lawsuit was filed before the Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoKunming Courtrdquo) in January 2014 Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy Co Ltd (ldquoYingdingrdquo) a bio-energy manufacturer claimed that Sinopec and the Yunnan branch of Sinopec trading company (ldquoSinopec Yunnan Branchrdquo) had failed to fulfil their obligations stipulated in the Renewable Energy Law and had abused their market dominance in sales market of refined oil by refusing to trade with Yingding without justifiable reasons

Sinopec and Sinopec Yunnan Branch mainly explained four reasons for why they rejected Yingdingrsquos biofuel Firstly Yingding had failed to prove that the biofuel complied with the relevant national standard and was safe to use Secondly Yingding had failed to provide complete trading terms Thirdly the laws and regulations regarding biofuel were incomplete the authorized refined oil sales companies were 39 The details of the case are available at httpnewsxinhuanetcomfortune2014-1217c_1113680039htm httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=9e71db51-6ff6-4d2c-8af6-8eacf023ebdeampKeyWord=E4BA91E58D97E79B88E9BC8E|E4B8ADE79FB3E58C96 httpnewsxinhuanetcomenergy2015-0422c_127721575htm httpwwwnbdcomcnarticles2015-04-23911348html last visited on December 17 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 42 of 52

obligated to purchase biofuel from the biofuel manufacturers if it met certain quality standards but there was a vacancy regarding how to reach the end consumers from the sales companies

On 8 December 2014 the Kunming Intermediate Peoples Court ruled that Sinopec Yunnan Branch bore a legal obligation to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its market dominance in refined oil market by refusing without any justifiable reasons to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding The court ordered Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network within 30 days Both Yingding and Sinopec filed appeals to the Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court

The Appellate Trial

The appeal hearing was held on 22 April 2015 in Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoYunnan Courtrdquo) Sinopec submitted 23 new pieces of evidence and introduced two expert witnesses in a bid to overturn several key elements in the first-instance ruling by Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court

In terms of the determination of the relevant market and the market dominance Sinopec argued that the relevant market in this case was for adipic acid monomethyl ester (ldquoAAMErdquo) the main ingredient of a biofuel additive known as BD100 Yingdingrsquos main product is BD100 which can be blended with fossil diesel to become biofuel In the AAME market Sinopec is a potential buyer instead of a market dominator In support of this argument Sinopec presented an expert witnessmdashGong Jiong a professor of economics at Beijings University of International Business and Economics who testified that AAME should be defined as the relevant product market on the basis of an economic analysis

However Yingding insisted that the first-instance ruling was correct in naming the sales market of refined oil as the relevant market and submitted new evidence an article on Sinopecs website that claimed it had a 67 market share in Yunnan to help establish the claim that Sinopec had market dominance

Another main dispute was whether Yingdingrsquos biofuel product met national standards which would make it mandatory for Sinopec to purchase under Chinas Renewable Energy Law The law stipulates that biofuel producers must sell their products first to an authorized refined oil sales company and the sales companies are obliged to buy the fuel if it meets certain quality standards In order to test the quality Sinopec introduced the second expert witness Lin Jianmin a leading author of Chinarsquos national biofuel standard Lin Jianmin pointed out that there are currently quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology which gives Sinopec a justifiable reason not to trade with Yingding Moreover Sinopec presented some precedents in which consumers had complained about the biofuel quality and also claimed that China didnt have a sound regulatory framework to support biofuel production neither in testing nor in sales

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 43 of 52

Nevertheless to refute this point Yingding referred to an earlier test in co-operation with Sinopec in 2011 where selected buses in Kunming used biofuel blended by Sinopec using BD100 produced by Yingding

On August 13 2015 Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors and now this case is pending In the written appellate ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court did not provide any details regarding its reasoning

Key Issues of the Case

Is there any competition between Yingding and Sinopec

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case the product of Yingding is biofuel while Sinopec does not engage in the business of biofuel From this perspective Yingding and Sinopec are not competitors Thus it is not necessary and not reasonable for Sinopec to eliminate or restrict the competition from Yingding

Relevant Market

The definition of the relevant market is a prerequisite to determine whether competition exists and whether the AML is applicable In accordance with the Judicial Interpretation of Antitrust civil litigation the plaintiff shall take the responsibility to prove the defendantrsquos dominance in the relevant market Also the methods of defining the relevant market are stipulated in the Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition (ldquoGuidelinesrdquo) However both Yingding and Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court defined the relevant market as the sales market of refined oil without sufficient antitrust analysis none of the methods in the Guidelines were used Therefore the definition of the relevant market remains arguable and needs to be sufficiently analysed in the upcoming retrial

Justifiable Reasons

The abuse of market dominance includes the behaviour of refusing to trade without justifiable reasons according to the AML but in the first instance ruling justifiable reasons were not investigated by the court During the appellate trial the expert witness introduced by Sinopec claimed that there were quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology and this was a justifiable reason to refuse to trade with Yingding Even though the first instance court and the appellate court did not reason the justifiable reason it should be discussed and investigated further during the retrial

AML or Renewable Energy Law

The claims of Yingding were based on both the AML and the Renewable Energy Law (ldquoRELrdquo) and the first instance ruling referred to both the AML and the REL as

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 44 of 52

well It seems that the laws the first instance court referred to were comprehensive but in fact the reasoning was not clear and logical In the first instance ruling some disputes regarding the AML were reviewed but all the orders were not based on the AML Specifically the first instance court ordered the Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network based on the REL and dismissed the other claims That the orders were not on account of reasoning is illogical It is anticipated that during the retrial the application of the laws will be clearer

Analysis

A lot of issues have not been clearly analysed by the courts such as the relevant market and the justifiable reasons Since the case is remanded the above-mentioned issues are expected to be resolved in the retrial In addition Yingding was in a disadvantaged position compared to its first instance trial since its claims based on the AML were challenged greatly during the appellate trial In the retrial it is probable that Yingding may switch its litigation strategy and base its claims on the REL Therefore maybe more preparation regarding the REL can give Sinopec a leg up

Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)

Rijing Electric a Chinese distributor seeks CNY 5m compensation

The first hearing was on 9 June 2015 and ended without a ruling

Facts

Rijing Electric (ldquoRijingrdquo) a Shanghai-based company and a former distributor for Panasonic accused Panasonic of abusing its dominance and dividing the market through monopolistic practice in an antitrust lawsuit filed in 2014 with Shanghai No 1 Intermediate Court (ldquoShanghai Courtrdquo) claiming compensation of CNY 5m (USD 815370) Wenzhou Mingda Automation System Co and Shanghai Qingying Automation Equipment as the distributor of Panasonic in China are the co-defendants were accused of conducting monopolistic behaviours by implementing Panasonicrsquos policy

The first hearing for evidence exchange was on June 9 2015 Rijing claimed a policy allegedly introduced by Panasonic in 2009 restricted the competition between distributors Panasonic claims the policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo and has full justifiable reasons It explained that the products in question required customization at considerable cost to distributors before its sale to customers Once carried out however other distributors leaving them open to quote much lower prices than the original distributor could simply and relatively cheap replicate this customization Besides Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and that the plaintiff had failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic said its market share for the four products

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 45 of 52

under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases Also Rijing failed to challenge the policy when it was first introduced instead initially agreeing it was reasonable as e-mail evidence submitted by Panasonic suggests

Key Issues of the Case

Whether Panasonic occupied a market dominant position

It is reported that Rijing claimed that Panasonic had abused its market dominance but Rijing failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and its market share for the four products under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases

Analysis

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case Panasonicrsquos policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo rather than to eliminate or restrict competition

Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals40 (Pending)

It is a battle over patent licensing issues

It is viewed as being among the most complicated antitrust lawsuits in China

The first hearing was on 17 and 18 December 2015

Facts

Four Chinese rare earth companies Ningbo Ketian Magnet Ningbo Permanent Magnetics Ningbo Tongchuang Strong Magnet Material and Ningbo Huahui Magnetic Industry filed antitrust lawsuits against Hitachi Metals over alleged patent licensing issues regarding rare earth magnets on December 11 2014 with the Ningbo Intermediate Peoples Court (ldquoNingbo Courtrdquo) in Zhejiang province As reported four Chinese rare earth companies claimed Hitachi Metals abused its market dominance and hurt the industry competition by refusing to license the patents to them The patents in this case are used in the manufacturing of sintered neodymium iron boron (ldquoNdFeBrdquo) magnets a rare-earth magnet alloy widely used in parts for airplanes automobiles and other products

Hitachi Metals filed a challenge with the Ningbo Court over its jurisdiction in April 2015 After Ningbo Court rejected Hitachi Metals jurisdiction objection on 28 April 2015 Hitachi Metals appealed to the Zhejiang High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoZhejiang

40The details of the story are available at httpwwwzbmagcomnews_viewphpid=80 httpwwwhitachicomcnaboutpress201510-121118_ahtml last visited on December 22 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 46 of 52

Courtrdquo) but Zhejiang Court affirmed the ruling of the Ningbo Court

The first day of a two-day hearing took place on 17 December 2015 during which the two sides cross-examined each otherrsquos evidence The evidence focused on clearing up several key elements in the case including the relevant market whether Hitachi Metals has dominance on that market and whether both sides acted in good faith during the licensing negotiations

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Product Market

The four Chinese rare earth companies claimed that the relevant product market should be the NdFeb-related patent licensing market However Hitachi Metals believed that the physical NdFeb market rather than the patent licensing market should be the relevant product market which is meaningful for assess the real competitive effects on the market

Whether Hitachi Metals occupies a dominant market position

In terms of market dominance Hitachi Metals claimed it does not occupy a dominant position because Hitachi Metalsrsquo patents were not in a standard in this case and there are substitutable technologies in the market SEP holders have the obligation to license on FRAND terms but none-SEP holders do not So while a refusal to license a SEP may constitute abuse of dominance refusal to license a non-SEP mdash even by a patent holder with a dominant position mdash should not be considered as an abuse

Analysis

Hitachi Metals as a patent holder should have the right to decide whether to retain those patents or not or who to license According to the legal theory the purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage and protect innovation by conferring monopoly right mdash that is to give intellectual property owners the proprietary rights which can exclude others from using the intellectual property The SEP holders admittedly need to comply with FRAND terms which can maintain a robust balance between competition and monopoly whereas the further intervention of antitrust law into non-SEP patents may undermine the purpose of intellectual property law To which extent the antitrust law should intervene is yet to be seen

Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei41

A confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the Beijing IP court made by the Beijing High Court

41 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcncpwswbjzscq201511t20151103_12225640htm last visited on December 28 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 47 of 52

Facts

On August 2 2013 the NDRC penalized Abbott for monopolistic price-fixing and then Abbott made a price adjustment in China where the prices of main products were reduced

On December 16 2014 Tian Junwei (ldquoTianrdquo) a Chinese citizen in Beijing sued Carrefour Shuangjing Branch (ldquoCarrefourrdquo) and Abbott (Shanghai) Sales Company (ldquoAbbottrdquo) at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (ldquoIP Courtrdquo) for their monopolistic price-fixing which damaged his interests However Carrefour and Abbott challenged the jurisdiction of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court They claimed there were two reasons Firstly according to the jurisdiction rules of the IP court issued by the Supreme Court the IP court has no jurisdiction over anti-trust cases Secondly if this case is a contractual dispute the court that is in the place of Carrefour should hear it if this case is a tort dispute the Shanghai Intermediate Court should hear it

In the ruling of the IP Court the IP Court decided it has the jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases for the following reasons According to the Provisions On Causes Of Action In Civil Cases issued by Supreme Court (最高人民法院案由规定) antimonopoly dispute is a tertiary cause of action belonging to IP and competition disputes Also according to the Provisions concerning the Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京

市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问题的规定 ) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was an IP and competition dispute and was sued after November 6 2014 Thus the IP Court had jurisdiction

Both Carrefour and Abbott appealed to the Beijing High Court over the jurisdiction ruling but the Beijing High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original ruling Reasons are listed in the written ruling issued on June 18 2015 Firstly the nature of the case was an antimonopoly dispute In accordance with Provisions of the Supreme Peoples Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民

事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) and Civil Litigation Law the monopolistic civil disputes in the first instance shall be under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Peoples Courts and an action involving a contractual dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the peoples court of the place where the defendant is domiciled or where the contract is performed Carrefour as the defendant in this case is domiciled in Chaoyang District Beijing Therefore the courts of Beijing have jurisdiction over this case Secondly according to article 3 of the Notification on the Jurisdiction of Intellectual Property Courts issued by Supreme Court (关于知识产权法院案件管辖

等有关问题的通知) IP courts have jurisdiction over first-instance civil disputes arising from monopolistic practices Lastly according to Provisions concerning the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 7 of 52

The concerned remedy was imposed by MOFCOM according to its No 25 Announcement in 2012 which concerned Googlersquos acquisition of Motorola Mobility together with three other remedies as the following

1) Google will license the Android Platform on a free and open basis as it had done so far

2) Google shall continue to observe the existed FRAND obligation of Motorola Mobility in respect of the latterrsquos patents and

3) Google shall delegate an independent supervisor to supervise its performance according to the Provisional Regulations on the Disposal of the Undertakingrsquos Assets or Business in the Concentration stipulated by MOFCOM in 2010

The No 25 Announcement provided that the applied remedies would be valid for five years starting from its punishment unless Google no longer controls Motorola Mobility

Google lodged the remedy removal application based on the fact that Lenovo concluded its acquisition of Motorola Mobility from Google which had been approved by MOFCOM on October 16 2014 and closed on October 30 2014 and due to this acquisition Google lost its control of Motorola Mobility

Decision

After careful examination MOFCOM noted that upon completion of the MotorolaLenovo deal Google would not be engaged in any business of manufacturing smartphones but would keep the telecommunications patent technologies of Motorola Mobility

Based on this fact on January 6 2015 MOFCOM issued a notice that it had decided to approve Googlersquos application to remove one of the remedies with the other remedies remaining in place

AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery7

The transaction is related to a conditionally cleared merger case

The concentration parties notified the deal to MOFCOM following No 95 Announcement in 2008

Considering the slight increase of AB InBevrsquos shareholdings in Zhujiang Brewery MOFCOM approved the proposed transaction

Facts

7 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150820150801090985shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 8 of 52

On July 23 2015 Interbrew Investment International a fully owned subsidiary of AB InBev Guangzhou State-owned Assets Development Holdings and Guangzhou Securities entered into an agreement with Zhujiang Brewery to subscribe the latterrsquos new shares According to this agreement Interbrew Investment International would subscribe shares worth up to CNY 16 billion

Pursuant to a MOFCOM antitrust notice issued in 2008 if AB Inbev intended to further increase its stake in Zhujiang Brewery a filing should be submitted to MOFCOM before any deal were to be concluded

On July 29 2015 AB InBev submitted the filing for the deal to MOFCOM

Decision

MOFCOM noted that upon this subscription Interbrew Investment International would increase its stake in Zhujiang Brewery from 2562 to 2999 Since the stake increase is relatively small and will not result in material changes regarding the control of Zhujiang Brewery MOFCOM decided to approve the deal on 20 August 2015

MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases

MOFCOM reached these decisions based on the undertakingsrsquo failure to file notifications

None of these concentrations were determined as resulting in anti-competition effects

MOFCOM considered that a 35 shares acquisition could lead to the obtaining of control power over a company

Complaints from the third party are the main channel of triggering investigation on unnotified concentrations

The undertakings were fined up to RMB 200000 which is less than the imposed penalty (RMB 300000) in the last year and the maximum penalty (RMB 500000) for violations of merger control rules

Facts

On September 29 2015 MOFCOM issued notices regarding the penalty on four concentration dealings because the concerning undertakings failed to notify these dealings to MOFCOM before closing them Details of these notices are as follows

Shanghai Fosun Pharmaceutical (Group) Co Ltd has been imposed a fine of CNY 200000 (USD 31431) because of its failure to notify MOFCOM regarding its

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 9 of 52

acquisition of a 35 stake in Suzhou Erye Pharmaceutical Co Ltd (Suzhou Erye) and the target stake was transferred without MOFCOMrsquos allowance8

Fujian Electronics amp Information (Group) has been imposed a fine of CNY 150000 (USD 23568) for its failure to notify a 35 stake acquisition of Shenzhen CHINO-E Communication MOFCOM made this decision based on the fact that Fujian Electronics signed a transfer agreement with CHINO-Ersquo shareholders and completed this transaction without filing9

Bestv New Media and Microsoft have been imposed CNY 200000 (USD 31420) fines by MOFCOM since they did not lodge a merger review filling regarding their joint venture E-Home Entertainment Development which was established on October 1 201310

CSR Nanjing Puzhen and Bombardier Transportation Sweden have been fined CNY 150000 (USD 23562) respectively due to their failure to notify their proposed joint venture prior to setting it up These companies made an agreement about the joint venturersquos establishment on November 3 2014 and its business license was obtained on November 11 201411

MOFCOM identified that the above dealings shall be notified according to the fact that all of these dealings constituted concentration and turnovers of these concentrating undertakings reached the statutory turnover thresholds

Article 20 of the AML stipulates three kinds of concentration which are (i) a merger of undertakings (ii) an acquisition of control of other undertakings by acquisition of shares or assets with voting right of other undertakings to an adequate extent (iii) an acquisition of control of other undertakings or the capability of imposing determinative effects on other undertakings by contracts or other means

Article 3 of the Provisions of the State Council on the Thresholds for Concentration Notification of Undertakings provides the fillingrsquos thresholds which are as follows (i) The collective worldwide turnovers of all undertakings involved in the last fiscal year exceed CNY 10 billion and the turnovers within China of at least two undertakings each exceed CNY 400 million or (ii) The collective turnovers of all undertakings involved in the last fiscal year exceed CNY 2 billion (approximately USD 294 million) and the China-wide turnovers of at least two undertakings each exceed CNY 400 million (approximately USD CNY588 million)

These undertakings were penalized because of their violations of article 21 of the 8 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150920150901124896shtml 9 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150920150901124887shtml 10 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150920150901124903shtml 11 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150920150901124899shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 10 of 52

AML which provides that the concentration reaching the filling thresholds shall be notified to MOFCOM prior to its implementation and without this notification it shall not be conducted In addition according to article 48 of the AML and article 13 of the Interim Measures for Investigating and Punishing of Concentration of Undertakings Failing to File Notification an undertaking which is identified by MOFCOM for implementing a concentration without filling would be imposed a fine and instructed to recover the situation by MOFCOM The amount of this fine could be no more than CNY 500000

There is no provision that specifically describes the behaviour of implementing a concentration In practice obtaining a business license transferring the entity of assets delivering the shares and assigning directors or managers are likely to be deemed as the implementation of concentration

According to Shang Ming the former director general of MOFCOMrsquos Anti-monopoly Bureau so far MOFCOM has already penalized 15 companies for failing to notify MOFCOM regarding merger reviews MOFCOM has noticed an increase in companies shirking merger-filing responsibilities and has therefore intensified enforcement

MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent12

MOFCOM defines all of the information and communication technology SEPs as the relevant product market rather than divides each of them into the individual market

In the process of competition analysis MOFCOM evaluates various factors rather than comparing the market shares only which is consistent with the complexity and flexibility of the high-technology industry

In the process of formulating remedies MOFCOM pays more attention on protecting Chinese downstream companies and enhancing its supervision

Facts

On April 15 2015 Nokia Oyi (ldquoNokiardquo) signed a Memorandum of Understanding regarding the acquisition of Alcatel Lucent (ldquoAlcatelrdquo) According to this memorandum Nokia intends to acquire 100 shares of Alcatel through a tender off

A notification about this deal was filed on April 21 2015 and accepted by MOFCOM on June 15 2015 After reviewing this case MOFCOM moved it to Phases II and Phase III as the agency was of the opinion that this acquisition could have anti-competitive effects on the relevant market

12 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151020151001139743shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 11 of 52

On October 19 2015 MOFCOM cleared this deal with four behavioural remedies

Decision

Relevant Market

In the agencyrsquos view there are four relevant product markets which are the radio access network market the core network systems market the network infrastructure service market and the information and communication technology SEP licensing market Meanwhile the relevant geographical market is primarily the Chinese market

Competition Analysis

According to MOFCOM this deal would have no anti-competitive effects on the first three relevant product markets in China while it could constitute an obstacle or limit the competition in the information and communication technology SEP licensing market

The agency consideredafter the deal that Nokia would increase its holding in 2G 3G and 4G SEPs and strengthen the degree of concentration in the information and communication technology SEP licensing market If it refused to license charged overly high royalty fees or conducted any other anti-competitive behaviour the competition of downstream market would be distorted which would most likely impair customersrsquo interests in the end

Remedies

Four behavioural remedies focusing on maintaining fair licensing of standard-essential patents (ldquoSEPsrdquo) were imposed on Nokia which are

1) On a reciprocal basis Nokia commits to not use injunctions to prevent enforcements of FRAND (fair reasonable and non-discriminatory) encumbered SEPs unless the potential licensees are unwilling to sign FRAND licensing agreements and follow the terms

2) If Nokia transfers its SEPs to a third party it shall inform Chinese licensees as well as Chinese companies that are actively engaging in licensing negotiation about the transfer details

3) Nokia will only transfer its SEPs to a new owner on the basis that the new owner accepts the existing FRAND commitments made by Nokia

4) MOFCOM has the right to monitor the implementation of Nokiarsquos commitments Nokia shall report to MOFCOM about the implementation of the conditions within 45 days of the end of each calendar year The reporting obligation will last five years until October18 2020

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 12 of 52

Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions13

Western Digital had engaged in two conducts that violated the remedies provided in the No 9 Announcement in 2012 issued by MOFCOM

Western Digital lodged an application to remove certain restrictions in March 2014 and the agency made the decision on October 19 2015

MOFCOM considered the fact that the competition condition in the relevant product market has changed and decided to remove the hold-separate restrictions related to manufacture and RampD

Facts

In 2012 Western Digital Corporation (ldquoWestern Digitalrdquo) intended to acquire 100 shares of Viviti Technologies Ltd (ldquoViviti Technologiesrdquo) which was the holding company of Hitachi Global Storage Technologies Netherlands BV and Hitachi Global Storage Technologies Singapore Pte Ltd and engaged in the hard disk business

On April 2 2011 Western Digital filed a notification for this acquisition MOFCOM issued the No 9 Announcement in March 2012 and cleared this acquisition with six remedies According to this announcement Western Digital could apply for the removal of the first and second remedy after this decision has been carried out for 24 months

The first remedy refers to maintaining the Viviti Technologies as an independent competitor and the second remedy requires both Western Digital and Viviti Technologies to make a reasonable plan of their capacity and production and report these data to the trustee

Western Digital lodged an application to remove the first and second remedy in March 2014 MOFCOM found that Western Digital had engaged in two conducts that violated the first remedy and the competitive situation in the hard disk market had changed After talking with Western Digital collecting opinions from the relevant entities and delegating the independent party to make an economic evaluation MOFCOM decided to remove the hold-separate remedies partially

Western Digitalrsquos implementation of the duties imposed in the No 9 Announcement

Based on the implementation reports submitted by Western Digital and the monitoring reports submitted by the trustee MOFCOM found that Western

13 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151020151001139040shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 13 of 52

Digital had engaged in two conducts that violated the first remedy Those were

1) On March 8 2012 Western Digital consolidated Hitachi Global Storage Technology (ldquoHGSTrdquo) which was Vivitirsquos subsidiary in US

2) In January 2013 Western Digital dissolved the development division of VivitiHGST and transferred the relevant workforce to Western Digital

MOFCOM considered that these conducts impaired the independence of Viviti as a competitor so that it imposed CNY 300000 fines on each of these behaviours and requested Western Digital to rectify the situation As per the entrusted supervisorrsquos report such behaviours have been rectified and the first remedy has been fulfilled

According to MOFCOMrsquos announcement the agency found that other remedies have been entirely implemented

Competition Analysis

With respect to the current situation of the competition in the hard disk market MOFCOM made the following assessment

1) In the areas of portable application and corporate-level application solid-state drive has put constraint on the impact of the traditional hard disk as to strengthen the competition in the relevant market

2) Overcapacity problems in the conventional hard disk drive market became obvious

3) Western Digital and HGST are the major competitors in the hard disk drive market Both the layout and the major market competitors in this market have remained unchanged since 2012

4) The hold-separate duties restricted the full competition between Western Digital and HGST The implementation of such duties hindered them from integrating their products and providing the market with a full range of products and had an adverse impact on their clientsrsquo product procurement

Based on the above analysis MOFCOM deemed that

1) Removal of the conditions that required the two companies to remain independent in production and RampD activities would enable Western Digital to save costs to provide a full range of products to the market and to fully engage in market competition and benefit its clients

2) To keep the two sales teams and their respective brands independent from each other and the independence of sales activities could reduce competition restraint impacts arising from a complete merger

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 14 of 52

Remedies

After negotiating with MOFCOM the relevant entities agreed to undertake the following obligations

1) Western Digital and HGST will remain independent in sales and brands

2) Western Digital will not change its previous business modes or force its clients to exclusively purchase hard disk drive products from Western Digital or do so in disguise

3) Western Digital will continue its pace in investing in product innovation to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

This announcement will be effective within two years from the date of issuance If Western Digital can provide sufficient evidence to prove a substantial change in the market environment the company can propose to MOFCOM to remove the relevant conditions within the two years

SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions14

MOFCOM considered the fact that the competition condition in the relevant product market has changed and removed the hold-separate restrictions on Seagate and Samsung

Seagate shall remain its business model materially and continue to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

Facts

On December 12 2011 MOFCOM made the No 11 Announcement to clear Seagate Technology LLCrsquos (ldquoSeagaterdquo) acquisition with remedies In this acquisition Seagate intended to acquire hard disk drive business of Samsung Electronics Co Ltd (ldquoSamsung HDDrdquo) As per this announcement Seagate could apply for removing the first and second remedy after this decision has been carried out for 12 months

The first remedy is to preserve Samsung HDD as an independent competitor and the second remedy asks to maintain and expand Samsung HDDrsquos production capacity within six months of issuance of the No 11 Announcement and to set reasonable production volume targets based on market supply-demand conditions

Seagate lodged an application to remove the first and second remedy in May 2015 After making assessments on the relevant parties and the competition circumstance MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate remedies

14 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151020151001144105shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 15 of 52

Competition Analysis

With respect to the current situation of the competition in the hard disk drive market MOFCOM made the following assessments

1) In the areas of portable application and corporate-level application solid-state drive has put constraint on the impact of the traditional hard disk so that the competition in the relevant market has been strengthened

2) Overcapacity problems in the conventional hard disk drive market became obvious

3) Both the layout and the major market competitors in the hard disk drive market have remained unchanged since 2012

4) Seagate and Samsung HDDrsquos market overlap in the hard disk market is quite small and Samsung HDDrsquos competition in the traditional hard disk is quite weak

Based on the above analysis MOFCOM deemed that

1) Removal of certain conditions is possible because in the portable application and corporate level application sectors competition constraint of solid-state drive on traditional hard disk drives has strengthened traditional hard disk drives are facing overcapacity which has reduced the chance of a single or more competitors causing competition restraints Seagate has limited overlap with Samsung in the hard disk business and the latter has a relatively weaker market power in the hard drive disk business

2) Removal of all imposed conditions may still restrain market competition because the traditional hard disk drive market competition conditions have not undergone a major change Seagate is still the major player in all divisions of the market and Seagate will strengthen its power after the acquisition of Samsung HDD

Remedies

After negotiating with MOFCOM Seagate agreed to undertake the following obligations

1) Seagate shall not change its business model materially or force clients to purchase hard drive disks exclusively from it

2) Seagate shall not force Tokyo Dengikagaku Kogyo China to supply magnetic heads exclusively to Seagate (or other Seagate-controlled companies) or limit the number of magnetic heads Tokyo Dengikagaku Kogyo China would supply to other hard drive disk manufacturers

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 16 of 52

3) Seagate shall continue to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

This announcement will be effective within two years from the date of issuance If Seagate can provide sufficient evidence to prove substantial change in the market environment the company can propose to MOFCOM to remove relevant conditions within the two years

FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM15

MOFCOM deems that this acquisition would induce anti-competitive influence

NXP promises to dispose its radio frequency (ldquoRFrdquo) power transistor business

As the first case approved with structural remedies after the enactment of the Provisions on Imposing Restrictive Conditions MOFCOM conducted a comprehensive evaluation of the viability competitiveness and marketability of the divested business as well as the suitability of potential buyers

Facts

On April 3 2015 NXP filed for its acquisition of Freescale NXP Semiconductor (ldquoNXPrdquo) is a NASDAQ-listed company registered in the Netherlands which engages in the design manufacturing and sale of integration circuits and discrete components

Freescale Semiconductor (ldquoFreescalerdquo) is a New York-listed company registered in Bermuda and based in the US which engages in the manufacturing and RampD of microcontroller and digital networking processors (embedded processors)

According to the agreement between NXP and Freescale after closing Freescale will become the wholly owned subsidiary of NXP On November 25 2015 MOFCOM decided to clear this acquisition with remedies

Relevant Market

As per the announcement the relevant product markets are the general microcontroller automotive power-use analog integrated circuit and RF transistor product markets in which NXP and Freescale have horizontal overlap The relevant geographical markets should be the global market

Competition Analysis

After assessing this proposed deal the agency concluded that

1) The proposed deal would boost NXPrsquos market control power in the RF

15 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151120151101196182shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 17 of 52

transistor product market because the global and Chinese RF transistor product markets share a similar structure both featuring few competitors and high concentration levels Freescale and NXP as the number one and number two players are far ahead of their rivals in the market Therefore after closing the market control power of NXP in this market would be strengthened

2) Since Freescale was the fiercest competitor of NXP the proposed deal will remove competition between them

3) The proposed deal would reduce the options for clients and increase procurement risks

In practice the wireless infrastructure suppliers as the main client of the RF transistor product tend to procure products from both NXP and Freescale to prevent them from the risk arising from relying on one supplier

4) The proposed deal may induce an adverse impact on the technology RampD and innovation

Remedies

In accordance with MOFCOMrsquos decision NXP shall follow its written commitment submitted to MOFCOM and completely divest its RF power transistor business to Beijing Jianguang Asset Management At the same time NXP shall strictly fulfil its obligations during the transition period It is worth noting that the NXPFreescale deal shall only be implemented after the divestment deal has been concluded

In addition MOFCOM requires NXP to perform relevant obligations during the transition period from the date of approval announcement until the divestment deal has been concluded NXP shall endeavour

1) not to engage in any lsquounfair trade practicesrsquo relating to the divested business

2) not to implement any acts which may have a significant adverse impact on the value management or competitiveness of the divested business or any acts which may change the nature and scope industry or business strategy or investment policy of the divested business and to take reasonable measures to encourage core employees to stay in the divested business as well as not to seek or transfer employees to NXPrsquos non-divested business

3) to ensure supply to the divested business in a fair reasonable and non-discriminatory manner and

4) to maintain the independence of the divested business and not to exchange competitively sensitive information between the parties and the divested

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 18 of 52

business

B Monopolistic Agreements

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

With respect to the enforcement activities of the NDRC in light of the numbers of the published cases it seems that the law enforcement frequency of the NDRC regarding monopolistic agreements in 2015 is lower in comparison with 2014

The reason behind might be that the outstanding issue of human resource deficit of the antitrust authority still exists Besides the fact that more enterprises gradually attach increasing importance to the antitrust compliance might be another reason for the decrease in the number of cases investigated by the authorities

As to the enforcement activities of the SAIC 4 of 14 cases concluded by the SAIC and its local branches in 2015 are relevant to monopolistic agreements Meanwhile these four cases concern horizontal monopolistic agreements

It is noteworthy however that the Mercedes-Benz case and the Dongfeng Nissan case suggest that vertical agreements especially involving price-related restrictions on the downstream dealers is still the priority of antitrust enforcement Companies shall be very cautious when imposing restrictions on the resale prices or the minimum resale prices of commodities in the distribution agreements

Automobile industry and related industries are observed to be under continuous attention of Chinarsquos antitrust authorities

The industries relating to peoplersquos livelihoods remain to be the enforcement priority

Significant Cases

Enforcement by the NDRC and its local branches

Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC16

The investigation was triggered by a leniency application

The first leniency applicant was exempted from punishment

Eight ocean shipping companies involved were imposed a collective fine of CNY 4067 million

NDRC spent approximately 12 months to investigate and conclude the case 16 NDRCrsquos press release of the case is available at httpjjsndrcgovcngzdt201512t20151228_769084html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 19 of 52

Facts

In December 2015 the NDRC published its official punishment decisions regarding the cartel case in connection with eight ocean shipping companies namely Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha (ldquoNYKrdquo) Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha (ldquoK Linerdquo) Mitsui OSK Lines EUKOR Car Carriers Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics Compantildeiacutea Sud Americana de Vapores Eastern Car Liner and Compantildeiacutea Chilena de Navegacioacuten Interoceaacutenica

According to the official press release of the NDRC the investigation was triggered by a leniency application of NYK The evidence showed that the eight companies reached consensus on non-intrusion of each others existing business to maintain or increase shipping fees when shipping goods such as cars trucks and engineering machinery in the routes between China and other countries and regions

They were also found to frequently conduct bilateral or multilateral communications on the shippersrsquo invitation for bids andor price inquiries via phone conferences dinner parties e-mails visiting etc In addition they also conducted illegal behaviour such as sensitive information exchange price negotiations bidding intention discussion dividing clients and shipping routes reaching agreements on high price bids or non-bidding in order to help certain companies gain shipping orders

To avoid the regulation of the antitrust authority the relevant shipping companies adopted various illicit measures that showed their apparent intention to violate the AML The cartel lasted for at least four years and covered a broad range of shipping routes concerned with the import and export of products between China and other regions such as North America EU South America and so on involving multiple auto brands and engineering machinery brands

The NDRC held the opinion that the eight companies conducts had restricted and eliminated competition in the relevant market raising the international shipping fees and impairing interests of shippers and end consumers The eight companies breached the AML by reaching and implementing monopolistic agreements on fixing prices and dividing the market

All eight investigated companies put forward remedy measures including enhancing the antitrust compliance program arranging more antitrust compliance trainings and developing antitrust compliance technologies

The NDRC imposed fines based on the nature level and duration of their monopolistic volations as well as their respective sales of international freight service sales relevant to the Chinese market The companies involved were collectively fined CNY 4067 million

NYK as the first cartel member voluntarily reporting the illegal conducts to the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 20 of 52

authority and providing significant evidence was entirely exempted from the punishment K Line as the second leniency applicant was imposed a fine amounting to 4 of its 2014 annual sales of international freight services relevant to Chinarsquos import and export market The details of punishments imposed on the involved companies by the NDRC are as follow

Company Name Amount of Fines (RMB million)

Percentage of the Relevant Turnovers

Grounds

Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha

- - First leniency applicant

Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha

2398 4 Second leniency applicant

Mitsui OSK Lines 3812 7 Third leniency applicant

EUKOR Car Carriers 284 9 Lasted over a long period involved many brands and many violations violations were severe

Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics

4506 8 Lasted over a long period involved many brands and many violations violations were severe

Compantildeiacutea Sud Americana de Vapores

308 6 Lasted over a long period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Eastern Car Liner 1127 5 Lasted over a long period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Compantildeiacutea Chilena de 120 4 Lasted over a long

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 21 of 52

Navegacioacuten Interoceaacutenica

period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Total 4067

Analysis

In this case the agency applied the AML instead of the Tenders and Bids Law to collusive bidding Citing article 13 (3) of the AML the NDRC identified that the collusive bidding constituted a division of the sales market

The leading three leniency applicants were granted exemption from fines to a varying degree

According to the official who handled this case dawn raids performed by antitrust enforcement agencies in other jurisdictions drew the attention of the NDRC on the cartels of these shipping companies However there was limited effective evidence to prove that the companies had reached monopolistic agreements Through pressuring the involved parties three members of the shipping cartel actively confessed their illegal conduct This case once again stresses the significance of international cooperation between antitrust enforcement agencies

Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau17

The distribution agreements between Mercedes-Benz and its dealers are determined as vertical monopolistic agreement and Mercedes-Benz violated article 14 of the AML because it restricted the ability of its dealers to decide their own resale prices

Mercedes-Benzrsquos dealers violated article of 13 of the AML due to concluding a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Mercedes-Benz and its dealers were jointly fined CNY 3578 million

Facts

In April 2015 Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau which is the provincial branch of the NDRC released the punishment on its website and announced that it had imposed a fine of CNY 350 million on Mercedes-Benz along with the aggregated fine of CNY 787 million on its dealers The fine came as a result of Mercedes-Benz reaching and implementing resale price maintenance (ldquoRPMrdquo) agreements with dealers to fix the minimum resale price of several car models as well as certain auto parts 17 The original Chinese notice published by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau is available at httpwwwjswjjgovcnoffice_neweo_comm_zxnrxsphp

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 22 of 52

According to the decision the authority found that Mercedes-Benz fixed the minimum resale price of Class E and Class S cars in Nanjing Wuxi Changzhou and Suzhou markets through telephoneverbal communication and dealers meetings from January 2013 to July 2014 Since 2010 Mercedes-Benz had reached agreements with dealers in Jiangsu province to fix the minimum resale prices for auto parts by providing different levels of discounts for insured cars cars involving expired warranty periods and cars within the warranty period

In addition Mercedes-Benz implemented the minimum resale price maintaining agreement by

1) Tightening its monitoring measures on the dealers such as inspecting deals and their sale incentive system on a weekly basis

2) Tracking the sales process flow of cars and increasing the intensity of this assessment

3) Giving warnings and reducing support ndash for example halting the supply of bestselling cars and prohibiting the opening of new stores ndash to dealers if dealers refused to cooperate with the price-fixing related policies and measures and

4) Interviewing personnel of the dealers and requesting terminations if the staff engaged in serious violations of the RPM agreement

Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau concluded that Mercedes-Benz had excluded and eliminated market competition harmed consumer welfare and consequently violated article 1418 of the AML The authority therefore imposed a fine of CNY 350 million representing 7 of the sale revenue of the previous year in the relevant market against Mercedes-Benz and imposed a fine on the dealers amounting to an equivalence of 1 of the annual sales in the previous year

Analysis

Although the agency also addressed the horizontal violation among the dealers in this case the administrative penalty decision mainly focuses on the vertical violation The agency fined dealers involved in the RPM agreement a combined CNY 787 million equal to 1 of the previous-year sales which suggests that the agency decided to give lighter punishments to dealers who took initiative in reporting the activity and provided evidence

The Mercedes-Benz case is the third case where the agency successfully 18 Article 14 of the AML The following monopolistic agreements between operators and trading partners shall be prohibited (i) fixing the resale prices of commodities to third persons (ii) restricting the minimum resale prices of commodities to third persons (iii) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement Authority under the State Council

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 23 of 52

discovered both vertical and horizontal agreements in a case following the Audi case and the Chrysler case All these cases are rooted in the same industry indicating that industrial features play a large role in raising anti-trust concerns In fact it appears that the entire automotive industry is under antitrust scrutiny

Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC19

This case involved both a horizontal agreement and an administrative monopoly

A total fine of CNY 1318 million was imposed on the involved companies

Facts

In June 2015 the NDRC through its website announced the decision made by its regional branch -Yunnan Provincial Development and Reform Commission (ldquoYunnan DRCrdquo) regarding the horizontal monopolistic agreement case involving Yunnan Communications Administration and local subsidiaries of four state-owned telecommunication companies

Through the investigation Yunnan DRC found that Yunnan Communications Administration as a competent government agency had organized several meetings involving Yunnan branches of four state-owned telecoms - China Mobile China Telecom China Unicom and China Tietong in August and September of 2014 At the end of 2009 the four local branches entered into an agreement to regulate their sales promotions in terms of limiting the promotional items amount and frequency

Furthermore the agreement provides certain measures to ensure the implementation of relevant restrictions on promotions Specifically in case any cartel member violates the agreement the others could file complaints with Yunnan Communications Administration and the agency would then issue a rectification notice to the rule-breaker

Yunnan DRC stated that the four telecoms were main competitors in the relevant market and the promotions as a significant competition measure would exert direct influence on the final prices of the products The horizontal agreement organized by Yunnan Communications Administration on sales promotions restricted the competition capacity of telecoms and as a result eliminated the competition in the relevant market Consequently the behaviour of Yunnan Communications Administration violated article 8 20 of the AML and constituted administrative monopoly in terms of ldquoforcing undertakings to conduct monopolistic behaviour prohibited by the AMLrdquo

19 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpwwwsdpcgovcnfzgggzjgjdyfldjjszhdt201506t20150602_694802html 20 Article 8 of the AML Administrative organs and the public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 24 of 52

With respect to the penalties Yunnan DRC fined the local branch of China Tietong CNY 200000 for reaching but not implementing the agreement in regards to the other three telecoms a total fine of CNY 1298 million amounting to 2 of the sales of the relevant business in the previous year were imposed for entering into and implementing the horizontal monopolistic agreement

Analysis

The telecoms industry is still the enforcement priority of the antitrust enforcement authorities A company cannot be exempted from punishment even though it is forced by competent authorities to conduct monopoly behaviour

DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC21

Both a horizontal monopolistic agreement and a vertical monopolistic agreement were involved in this case

A total fine of CNY 14242 million was imposed on DongFeng Nissan and its distributors

Facts

In September 2015 the Guangdong Development and Reform Commission (ldquoGuangdong DRCrdquo) released an announcement regarding the administrative penalties on DongFeng Nissan and its provincial distributors for concluding price-related monopolistic agreements More specifically DongFeng Nissan was imposed a fine of CNY 1233 million for breaching article 14 of the AML in terms of restricting the resale price of certain car models 17 distributors domiciled in Guangdong were collectively fined CNY 1912 million for violating article 1322 of the AML in terms of entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements

According to the published official release the Guangdong DRC launched the investigation in August 2014 The authority discovered that from 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissan had set a rigorous restriction on its distributorsrsquo abilities to determine the resale prices of certain car models including the quoted prices in various platforms and the final resale price In addition DongFeng Nissan punished the distributors that failed to abide by such price restrictions in 2013 The authority 21 The original Chinese notice published by Guangdong DRC is available at httpwwwgddpcgovcnzwgkgzdtgzyw201509t20150910_328993html 22 Article 13 of the AML The following Monopolistic agreements among competing operators shall be prohibited (i) fix or change prices of commodities (ii) limit the outputs or sales volume of commodities (iii) segment the sales markets or the raw material purchasing markets (iv) limit the purchase of new technology new facilities or limit the development of new products new technology (v) jointly boycott transactions (vi) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-Monopoly Law enforcement Authority Monopolistic agreements in this Law refer to agreements decisions or other concerted practices that eliminate restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 25 of 52

believed that the vertical agreement concluded between DongFeng Nissan and its distributors eliminated and restricted the competition in the relevant market and damaged the consumer welfare as well which violates article 14 of the AML

Furthermore from April 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissanrsquos distributors in Guangdong province held multiple meetings to discuss issues relevant to sale price reached and implemented a horizontal monopolistic agreement in terms of fixing the prices of some car models which is prohibited by article 13 of the AML

Considering that both DongFeng Nissan and the involved distributors positively cooperated with the investigation and ceased the illegal behaviour immediately after the investigation Guangdong DRC decided to impose a fine amounting to 3 of its previous yearrsquos turnovers on DongFeng Nissan and a fine ranging from 2 to 4 on the relevant distributors in accordance with articles 4623 and 4924 of the AML

Analysis

This case demonstrates that auto and related industries are still under close attention of the authority Considering the NDRCrsquos successful series of antitrust investigations conducted throughout the auto industry it is observed that the agency currently overseeing price-related antitrust issues in China has accumulated a substantial amount of experience regarding antitrust enforcement in the auto industry Now is the right time to speed up the law-making process by amending the set of rules released earlier and drafting new laws to advise the auto industry on antitrust compliance

Enforcement by the SAIC and its local branches

Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC25

The investigation was triggered by whistle blowerrsquos submission

Cartel members were collectively fined CNY 139 million 23 Article 46 of the AML In case the operators violate the relevant provisions of this Law concluding and implementing Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall order the operators to cease such act impose fines more than 1 but less than 10 of the total turnover in the preceding year and confiscate the illegal gains where the Monopolistic agreement is not implemented a fine less than RMB 500000 can be imposed If the operators involved in Monopolistic agreement on its own initiative report information concerning the conclusion of Monopolistic agreements and provide important evidences to the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority they may be given a mitigated punishment or be exempted from punishment in accordance with the circumstances Where the industrial associations violate this Law organizing the operators in the industry to conclude Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority may impose a fine less than RMB 500000 in serious circumstances the agency of social organization administration and registration may cancel its registration 24 Article 49 of the AML As for the imposition of the fines stipulated by the Article 46 47 and 48 of this Law the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall take elements such as the nature extent and time it lasts of the illegal act into consideration in determining the specific amount of the fines 25 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201506t20150601_156889html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 26 of 52

Facts

In April 2015 the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) issued administrative penalties on several brick manufacturers for entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements This is the first case relevant to monopolistic agreements that has been publicized by the SAIC since the beginning of this year

Ten cartel members were involved in the case including one company and nine individuals Similar with most antitrust cases the investigation started as a result of a whistle blowerrsquos submission After a thorough investigation Hunan AIC found that those local brick manufacturers had reached agreements on controlling production volume and dividing sales areas in the forms of production and sales agreements plans and meeting minutes

The enforcement authority reached the conclusion that these brick manufacturers violated article 13 of the AML and imposed a total fine of CNY 1389400 on them

Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC26

The organizer of the monopolistic agreement the animation association was fined CNY 100000

The antitrust authority did not punish the members of the monopolistic agreement

Facts

In December 2015 the Guangdong Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoGuangdong AICrdquo) published its administrative punishment decision in regards to Guangzhou Panyu Animation amp Game Association (ldquoGAGArdquo) organizing member companies to conclude a monopolistic agreement

According to the decision GAGA drafted the ldquoAgreement of Exhibition Alliancerdquo (ldquoAgreementrdquo) and convened a conference with member companies in order to discuss the content and conclusion of the Agreement 52 member companies entered into the Agreement which actually requested the alliance companies to merely participate in the exhibitions either organized or supported by GAGA in Guangzhou In addition the Agreement prohibited the alliance companies from attending any other exhibition except if they obtained prior approval of GAGA

After a thorough investigation Guangdong AIC believed that the conclusion of the Agreement among GAGA and the 52 member companies violated article 13 (5) of the AML in terms of boycott GAGA who was deeply involved and restricted member companiesrsquo choice of exhibitions through the Agreement could be deemed as

26 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151208_164680html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 27 of 52

the participant and organizer of the monopolistic agreement In accordance with article 46 of the AML Guangdong AIC imposed a fine of CNY 100000 on GAGA for organizing the conclusion of the monopolistic agreement

Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC27

Hubei AIC considered the coinsurance for Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance illegal

Twelve insurance companies were fined CNY 469 million in total

Facts

In December 2015 the Hubei Administrative for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHubei AICrdquo) disclosed its punishment on 12 insurance companies for signing illegal coinsurance agreements

The disclosed punishment decision suggests that the Hubei branch of China Pacific Life Insurance (ldquothe Companyrdquo) 11 other insurance companies and Wuhan Construction Safety Technology Consultation Center (ldquoWCSTCCrdquo) signed a Coinsurance Agreement on Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance (ldquoCoinsurance Agreementrdquo) of which the main contents include

1) The Company and 11 other involved companies as the coinsurers jointly take charge of the personal accident insurance concerned with the construction project directly administered by the Wuhan government WCSTCC is responsible for providing safety professionalism and technology services regarding the relevant personal accident insurance

2) The Company as the chief insurer of the coinsurance occupies 12 of the total amount of the insurance and the other 11 companies respectively occupy 8

3) The Company as the representative of the coinsurance is in charge of collecting the premium signing the standard form insurance policies and issuing the invoice in its own name The Company should share the charged premium with the other companies in accordance with the Coinsurance Agreement

4) Both the Company and the other insurance companies should pay 25 of the actually received premium to WCSTCC as the service fee WCSTCC will assist the coinsurers in providing safety and technology management service to the insured In addition the 11 insurance companies should pay 5 of their premium to the Company as the management fee

27 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165445html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 28 of 52

5) In case an accident happens the 12 companies will jointly bear the damages based on their respective shares in the coinsurance

6) There is a contact mechanism established in the coinsurance The coinsurers will regularly hold coinsurance conferences to discuss existing problems

Furthermore the coinsurers and WCSTCC also signed a self-discipline agreement and established a complete management system to assure the implementation of the Coinsurance Agreement Any party violating the Coinsurance Agreement would be punished

Hubei AIC found that WCSTCC was solely invested by Wuhan Construction Safety Management Association which was under Wuhan Construction Commission The centre helped implement certain functions of the Wuhan Urban Construction Safety Management Station and was responsible for quality supervision and safety supervision of municipal construction projects

It later became a prerequisite for construction companies to purchase insurance from any member of the coinsurance in order to get approval to commence their project According to the decision Hubei AIC launched another separate investigation against WCSTCC

Through the investigation Hubei AIC concluded that the Coinsurance Agreement constituted a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by article 13 of the AML with the following analysis

First coinsurance as a common business model to jointly share and lower risks is widely adopted in the insurance industry A coinsurance arrangement for a specific project in order to avoid high risks faced by one insurer could be legal However coinsurance should not target the entire market In this case prior to the Coinsurance Agreement the risks of the construction projects were unpredictable since the scale of the construction projects the difficulty of the construction and the amount of construction workers could not be available It is impossible to predict the risks of the projects thus it is not necessary to cooperate with other insurers to collectively bear the risks The purpose of the 12 insurance companies to establish the coinsurance is to avoid the competition which demonstrates the Coinsurance Agreement belongs to a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by the AML

Second the companies through entering into the coinsurance agreement actually divided the relevant market of construction project personal accident insurance in Wuhan city which affected the competition in the relevant market and damaged the interests of other competitors and the consumers In particular the Construction Law as amended in 2011 stipulates that the purchase of personal accident insurance is not mandatory and the construction companies have the right to choose whether to buy the said insurance or not As mentioned purchasing insurance from the coinsurance had been the prerequisite for construction companies to obtain administration

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 29 of 52

approval for the project which seriously distorts the fair competition in the market

Citing article 46 of the AML the 12 insurance companies were collectively fined CNY 469 million including fines on the companies and confiscation of illegal gains It is noteworthy that the fines were calculated based on the companiesrsquo 2014 annual sales of the insurance product in connection with the coinsurance The Company as the chief insurer was fined amounting to 6 of its 2014 annual sales of the relevant insurance product in the coinsurance and other companies were fined amounting to 2 of relevant sales For more specific information please see the following table

Company Name (Hubei Branch)

Fines (CNY million)

Percentage of the sales

Illegal Gains (CNY

million)

China Pacific Life Insurance 00653 6 0941

Sino Life 00145 2 04332

Alltrust Insurance 00145 2 04332

Taikang Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Continent Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Pacific Property Insurance

00145 2 04332

China Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

PICC Property and Casualty 00145 2 02599

Taiping General Insurance 00145 2 013

Union Life Insurance 00145 2 01177

Ping An Annuity Insurance Company of China

00145 2 04201

Ping An Property amp Casualty Insurance Company of China

00145 2 -

Subtotal 02248 - 44679

Total 46927

Analysis

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 30 of 52

Coinsurance as an effective approach to lower risks of insurers is widely used in the insurance industry Information sharing and agreements on coinsurance were generally considered efficient and legitimate However from an antitrust perspective coinsurance may raise competition concerns depending on the circumstances of each agreement In the case that there is enough capacity for one insurer to cover the potential risks the coinsurance might be considered as entering into a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC28

The first leniency applicant was exempted from fines

The other concrete companies were imposed a fine of CNY 180000

Facts

In December 2015 the concrete companies monopolistic agreement case investigated by Hunan AIC was published on SAICrsquos website

In accordance with the antitrust enforcement announcement of SAIC this case was triggered by complaints from the Yongzhou City peoplersquos congress After the preliminary review the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) initiated the formal investigation on seven concrete companies domiciled in Yongzhou City Hunan Province which were suspected of being involved in a monopolistic agreement in terms of division of the volumes of the products

After further investigation Hunan AIC found that the seven concrete companies concluded a partnership agreement in 2011 which requested the involved companies to enter into a partnership business with assets In addition according to the partnership agreement it was planned to establish a comprehensive office to manage production marketing and distribution of the products of all the partners The seven companies intended to jointly adjust and control the output of concrete based on the partnership agreement However because there were disagreements over the allocation of the injected assets and market shares the companies did not implement the partnership agreement The agreement was cancelled in December 2012

Based on the findings Hunan AIC concluded that the seven concrete companies as competitors of each other restricted and eliminated the competition in the relevant market through reaching the partnership agreement and dividing the volumes of sales which violated article 13(3) of the AML in terms of division of sales market Considering that the agreement had not been implemented and the limited influence of the agreement according to article 46 of the AML and article 27 of the Administrative Penalties Law small amount fines were imposed on the involved companies Six companies were fined CNY 30000 each for their illegal behaviour 28 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165504html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 31 of 52

Yongzhou Shuangyuan Building Materials Co Ltd as the first one to actively report the monopolistic agreement and cooperate with the enforcement authority was exempted from the punishment

Outlook

It is expected that the AMLrsquos enforcement on monopolistic agreements will continue in the future Industries such as automobile shipping pharmaceuticals insurance etc will still remain the priority of the antitrust enforcement

The antitrust enforcement authorities have published a series of regulations in order to clarify the substantial and procedural issues relevant to the antitrust enforcement However Chinarsquos current antitrust legislation regime is still immature In the following years we expect that more attention will be paid to the legislative improvements

Another remarkable issue for cartel members is that with more Chinese enterprises attaching increasing importance to the AML the follow-on civil damages actions might become a tendency in the future

C Abuse of Market Dominance

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen a decent increase of abuse of market dominance cases both in public enforcement and private litigation Oftentimes the authorities responsible for public enforcement generally find it difficult to pursue investigations against abuse of market dominance cases The following two main reasons are often cited to explain this standoff first it is hard for the authorities to define the relevant markets and prove the undertaking(s)rsquo dominant market position through economic approaches second it is hard to collect evidence regarding abusive practices

The cases related to IPRs abuse are emerging significantly particularly in the telecommunication media and technology (ldquoTMTrdquo) sectors

The SAICrsquos latest refusal-to-deal probe against a local drug maker shows that the SAIC and its local branches have increasingly acquired a profile as an abuse of dominance regulator

Significant Cases

Cases pursued by the SAIC

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 32 of 52

Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case29

Facts

The local authority in Dongfang city reported to the Hainan provincial branch of SAIC on April 23 2014 of the suspected dominance abuse The SAIC authorized its Hainan bureau to officially investigate the matter on 25 July 2014 according to a decision dated January 9 2015 The AIC concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its market dominance by requiring users to pay a deposit without any legal basis and or justifiable reasons

In terms of the relevant product market the local authority found that in this case it was the urban water supply market in Dongfang city and its surrounding townships where Dongfang Water was the sole public operator in the local water supply market with a 100 market share which made all water users completely reliant on the companyrsquos supply In term of market access the local authority found it very unlikely that there were other operators due to the strict regulations

The Hainan SAIC then concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its dominance as it charged users a deposit by threatening to refuse to register users and also by threatening to restrict the water supply Dongfang Waters charging of deposits lacked a legal basis and hadnt received government approval to the detriment of household consumers and business water users and hampered the improvement of management and services of the company Such conduct was in breach of Chinarsquos Anti-Monopoly Law

Hainan AIC levied a fine of CNY 593208 a lighter penalty equivalent to 2 of the companyrsquos annual sales for the previous year and confiscated illicit gains of CNY 38521 for abuse of market dominance

Analysis

It is noteworthy that although handled by a local authority supervised by the SAIC the antitrust agency detailed the relevant market definition the assessment of the dominant market position the abusive practices and the scrutiny of the justifiable reasons

Although the definition of the relevant market and the reasoning of the Hainan provincial AIC and the SAIC are subject to criticism it is still applausive to see that the antitrust regulators have realized the importance of the application of rule of reason in an abuse case In addition through itrsquos a published decision practitioners may observe the regulatorsrsquo reasoning and thus transparency and legal certainty have been generated

29 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzfcfjd201502t20150212_152066html last visited on October 18 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 33 of 52

Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms30

Facts

In June 2013 the Ningxia AIC under authorization of SAIC opened an antitrust investigation into the alleged tie-in sales by the three major state-owned telecommunications operators China Tietong China Unicom and China Telecom for the tie-in sale of fixed-line telephones with broadband Internet services The Ningxia AIC found that the three companies had bundled fixed-line phone services with Internet services to subscribers

During the investigation all three telecommunications companies admitted the tie-in practice had recognized that such practice had improper influence on competition and deprived the choices of consumers The three companies promised to undertake internal rectification timely and eliminate the ill effects resulting from such practice The parties committed to taking the following corrective measures

1) Taking internal rectifications and conducting training to staff about antitrust laws and stop tie-in sales practices

2) Making public commitments to allow subscribers a free choice of services and strengthening the propaganda through the operating room call centre and other channels

3) Unbundling fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

The Ningxia AIC decided to suspend the probe on 14 May 2015 on the grounds that the three companies had actively worked together with the investigators and proposed workable remedy plans

Analysis

In the official announcement Ningxia AIC concluded that the purpose of antitrust enforcement is to restrain monopolistic conducts the protection of competition and to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of consumers Given that during the investigation process the parties had actively cooperated with the investigation formed a more profound understanding of the dangers of tying behaviour and moreover the parties proposed and implemented positive corrective measures to be able to remove the ill impact of their actions the agency believed that the purpose of antitrust law enforcement was fulfilled

It is worth noting that the Ningxia AIC also required the three companies to implement the commitment by August 30 2015and the submission of the written

30 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158908html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158906html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158910html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 34 of 52

implementation report on July 102015 and August 102015 respectively which is another illustration that an effective commitment by the undertakings shall directly deal with the effect that is brought by the monopolistic behaviour In this case the effect of the monopolistic act was restricted to the choice of the consumers therefore the commitment by the undertaking aimed at allowing the freedom of choice and the unbundling of fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company31

Facts

The Liaoning AIC imposed a fine of approximately CNY 433m on the Fushun Branch of Liaoning Tobacco Co on 1 June 2015 The agency also ordered the company to stop its illicit behaviour

The Liaoning AIC received a tip-off that the accused Liaoning Tobacco Corsquos Fushun branch was conducting tie-in sales of non-high-demand cigarette brands with high-demand cigarette brands After gaining authorization from SAIC the agency officially started an investigation regarding the companyrsquos suspected abuse of market dominance in June 2014

Analysis

According to the announcement the tobacco company argued that the tobacco industry is a state controlled or monopolized industry with a lawful monopolistic position therefore the company shall not be subject to the norms of general market competition rules or the anti-monopoly law

In this regards the agency concluded that in terms of the status of the undertaking admittedly the first paragraph of article 17 of the AML says that the State shall protect the lawful business operations of undertakings in these industries with respect to the industries which are under the control of the State-owned economic sector and have a bearing on the lifeline of the national economy or national security and the industries which exercise monopoly over the production and sale of certain commodities according to law However the second paragraph continues to say that the undertakings mentioned above shall do business according to law be honest faithful and strictly self-disciplined and subject themselves to public supervision and they shall not harm the consumers interests by taking advantage of their position of control or their monopolistic production and sale of certain commodities In particular in the preceding paragraph the ldquolawful businessrdquo and ldquoaccording to lawrdquo imply that the AML shall apply in the business operation The agency therefore believes that

31 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201508t20150813_16

0208html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 35 of 52

there shall be no exemption for the undertaking concerned the defences of the undertaking concerned is not established

Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm32

Facts

The Chongqing AIC fined Chongqing Qingyang Pharmaceutical CNY 439308 for alleged dominance abuse

The investigation was initiated when the company contacted the agency for verification on its potential breach of the AML related to an allopurinol active pharmaceuticals ingredient (API) distribution agreement with its exclusive distributor The company provided the relevant agreement and information and the agency conducted an investigation into the company and some other relevant companies

Analysis

Relevant Market

During the investigation the agency found that pharmaceutical ingredients are a special commodity the API is used to produce the preparations The chemical API is only used for the production of the preparation and could be used as a medicine for clinic use

The preparation is produced according to the requirements of certain form of prepared drugs and for the purpose of treatment and prevention which can be used as medicine

The allopurinol is used for the common treatment of hyperuricemia However the other treatments are different in pharmacological effects or treatment effects as well as in the cost for the patient Furthermore the company is the only manufacturer and supplier in the market nationwide since July 2012 Therefore the agency concluded that the relevant market is the allopurinol API market

Considering that the qualification for manufacturing the allopurinol API is national wide and the normal practice for purchasers and suppliers is domestic the relevant geographic market is the Chinese market

The Market Dominance

During the investigation the agency found that the company is the only supplier and manufacturer of allopurinol API in China there is no other competitor in the

32 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151222_16

5152html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 36 of 52

market and the company has a monopoly in the market The evidence shows that the company has the ability to control the prices the position for the downstream is relatively weak

With respect to the market entry the agency found that the market entry is relatively high in addition other undertakings are dependent on the company Thus the agency believed the company to have market dominance

Refusal to Deal

The agency found that on September 25 2015 the company reached an exclusive agreement and distribution agreement with its distributor Based on these agreements the company didnrsquot supply allopurinol API to the said distributor and other companies despite the fact that those companies requested for allopurinol API but were turned down by the company

Absence of Reasonable Cause

The agency found that the companyrsquos refusal to deal was not in line with the needs of normal business operation or economic efficiency On the other hand the refusal to deal was aimed at increasing the market share of the allopurinol drug product Also the agency found that the stop of supply was a manipulation of market power as to maximize the profit to the most The agency further found that the exclusive distribution agreement with suspension of supply for six months and the refusal to supply was to eliminate and restrict the competition as to gain the monopolistic profit

The Consequence of Refusal to Deal

The agency concluded that the refusal to deal harmed the competition of the allopurinol preparations market Because of the suspension of supply many demanders had to reduce their production or switch to the supply of other products or stop their production The suspension of supply affected the competition of the downstream market Consequently the raising of the price of allopurinol API also raised the cost for other manufacturers of allopurinol preparations

Furthermore the refusal to deal led to capacity loss of the allopurinol preparation industry

Ultimately the refusal to deal increased the burden on consumers as the refusal to supply changed the supply-demand relationship in the market

The agency concluded that the Company abused its dominant position in the allopurinol API market by refusing to deal with intended buyers in the period between October 2013 and March 2014Therefore the Company violated article 17 (1) of the AML which prohibits business operators with a dominant market position from abusing that position such as the refusal to deal without any justifications

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 37 of 52

D Administrative Monopoly

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 witnessed antitrust authoritiesrsquo significant efforts regarding the enforcement against administrative monopoly According to Mr Dong Zhiming the deputy director general of Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly Bureau ever since the AML coming into force six cases in connection with administrative monopoly were investigated by NDRC and among them five cases were handled in the year of 2015 These cases touched abuses of administrative power in terms of designative deal in relation to transportation communication and pharmaceutical industries

The first private litigation related to administrative monopolistic acts was heard in the court which is a milestone case in the enforcement of the AML

Significant Cases

Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC33

Facts

In March 2015 the NDRC released the official letter to Shandong Provincial Department of Transportation (ldquoShandong DOTrdquo) on its website with respect to correct its abuse of administrative power to exclude and restrict competition

During the investigation the NDRC found that since 2011 Shandong DOT had issued multiple relevant government orders in order to require certain types of vehicles to be directly connected to two designated information and service platforms both of which are operated and technically supported by one company namely Shandong Jiutong Internet of Things Technology Co Ltd (ldquoJiutong ITTrdquo) Furthermore according to the orders issued by the competent administrative department all the vehicle satellite positioning terminals entering into Shandong provincial market should be debugged through the said technology service platform which is operated by the mentioned company In addition Shandong DOT released the cap prices of vehicle satellite positioning terminals which is identical to the 2012 bid-winning price in the Ministry of Transportation demonstration project

The NDRC believed that Shandong DOTrsquos behaviour eliminated and restricted the competition in the monitoring platform market and the vehicle terminal market deprived the right of transportation enterprises to choose vehicle terminals and monitoring platform on their owns unreasonably raised the sales prices of vehicle terminals and service fees charged by the platform and increased the costs of transportation enterprises Therefore the antitrust agency concluded that Shandong

33 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201503t20150327_668911html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 38 of 52

DOT violated article 8 of the AML which stipulates that ldquoadministrative organs and the public organizations with an administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude and restrict competitionrdquo Specifically Shandong DOT violated article 3234 in terms of requiring organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any designated operators and violated article 3735 in terms of setting rules with contents which eliminate and restrict competition

Based on article 51 of the AML ldquoWhere administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations abuse administrative powers performing activities which exclude and restrict competition the superior entity shall order it to correct impose administrative penalty on the chief officer and other staffs directly responsible pursuant to the laws The AML enforcement authority may give recommendations on disposal of activities to the relevant superior entityrdquo the NDRC proposed in writing that the Shandong provincial government should order Shandong DOT to rectify its behaviour with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Entirely open up the monitoring platform market by permitting transportation undertakings to freely choose any approved platform

2) Loosen the restrictions on the entry into Shandong vehicle terminals permit the undertakings to independently select the supplier of vehicle terminals and allow the qualified terminals to be connected to the relevant monitoring platform and

3) Revoke the official documentation relevant to the cap price of vehicle terminals in order to promote the price competition

Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 36

Facts

On 26 August 2015 the NDRC published its second decision with regard to the rectification of administrative monopoly since the beginning of this year According to the proposal letter sent to Anhui Provincial Government the investigation against the Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City (Bengbu HFPC) was trigged by third partiesrsquo complaints

34 Article 32 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to require organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any operators designated by them 35 Article 37 of the AML Administrative organs shall not abuse their administrative powers to set rules with contents which eliminate restrict competition 36 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201508t20150826_748682html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 39 of 52

The investigation suggests that Bengbu HFPC published three notices with regard to drugs procurement in April and May of this year

In the No C-2015-CG-X-111 Notice (ldquoNo111 Noticerdquo) released on 10 April2015 the health authority not only provided the dosage form and qualification of the requested drugs but also directly determined the suppliers of relevant drugs which eliminated and restricted the competition among pharmaceutical manufacturers and therefore violated articles 32 and 37 of the AML

In the No C-2015-CG-C-112 Notice (ldquoNo112 Noticerdquo) and No C-2015-CG-C-168 (ldquoNo 168 Noticerdquo) respectively released on 10 April and 22 May 2015 the Bengbu HFPC set discriminative qualification requirements on non-local undertakings in order to restrict their participation in the relevant bidding For instance in accordance with No 112 Notice to be a qualified bidder the turnover of non-local undertakings shall exceed CNY 2 billion which is 50 times as much as the turnover requirements of the local undertakings In the NDRCrsquos opinion the administrative monopoly activities conducted by the local health agency excluded the relevant undertakings from the market maintained the virtual-high prices of drugs and therefore violated articles 3237 and 37 of the AML

The NDRC suggested in a letter that Anhui Provincial Government should urge the Bengbu HFPC to rectify the abuse of monopoly powers with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Stop setting distinguishing restrictions on qualification requirements review standards and numbers of winning bidders as for local and non-local undertakings

2) Stop designating the suppliers of competitive drugs and

3) Take necessary measures to mitigate the negative effects resulting from the previous illegal monopolistic abuses

Outlook

At the beginning of the year the former director general of the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau under the NDRC Xu Kunlin stated that the agency would strengthen antitrust enforcement on abuse of administrative power in 2015

Since then the NDRC has made great efforts to rectify unreasonable abuses of administrative power The currently disclosed two cases investigated by the NDRC re-emphasize the Chinese Governmentrsquos strict scrutiny of antitrust issues in respect of

37 Article 34 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to restrict or reject the participation of operators from other regions in local bidding activities by measures such as prescribing discriminatory qualification requirements or assessment standards or by not publishing information according to law

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 40 of 52

administrative monopoly It reminds the local governments that antitrust compliance is of significant importance

III Private Litigation

A Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen more and more private antitrust litigations

The private antitrust litigation cases have become increasingly complicated especially the issues regarding the intersection areas of IP and antitrust law

Multinational giants and State-Owned Enterprises (the ldquoSOEsrdquo) are increasingly becoming the targets in antitrust civil litigations Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (the ldquoSMEsrdquo) tend to use the antitrust litigation to achieve their commercial goals in the business context

B Significant Cases

Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)38

This is the first-ever private litigation concerning administrative monopoly since the implementation of the AML in 2008

Facts

According to the currently disclosed details the case is relevant for designated trade

The plaintiff Shenzhen Sware Technology Co Ltd (ldquoSwarerdquo) is a software company The press releases suggest that Sware Gloden Software Co Ltd (ldquoGlodenrdquo) and Shanghai Ruban Software Co Ltd (ldquoShanghai Rubanrdquo) are the three main suppliers of construction cost software and possess the major shares of the relevant market An annual provincial vocational ability contest regarding the construction cost hosted by the Guangdong Department of Education (ldquoGuangdong DOE) designated Gloden as the exclusive supplier of the relevant software

After several unsuccessful verbal and written negotiations with Guangdong DOE in April 2014 Sware filed a lawsuit against Guangdong DOE before the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquothe Courtrdquo) alleging that the administrative organ abused its administrative power and violated the AML by designating exclusive software supplier for the contest and claimed a compensation for reasonable expense amounting to CNY 10800 Yuan

The opinions of the Court 38 The story of the case is available at httpfinancesinacomcnchinadfjj20150410074621924997shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 41 of 52

The full text of the judgment has not been disclosed yet In accordance with the information available to the public the Court invoked article 32 of the AML which prohibits an administrative organ from abusing its administrative power to require or in disguised form organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use only the commodities supplied by the entities designated by them The Court concluded that Guangdong DOE failed to prove the legitimacy of the designation and therefore abused its administration power

Currently the case is in appeal before the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court

Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 39

It is the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China

In the first instance ruling Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court ruled against Sinopec holding that the Yunnan branch of Sinopecs trading company was obligated to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its dominance in the sales market of refined oil by refusing to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding without justifiable reasons

In the second instance ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors Currently the case is pending

Facts

The First Trial

The lawsuit was filed before the Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoKunming Courtrdquo) in January 2014 Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy Co Ltd (ldquoYingdingrdquo) a bio-energy manufacturer claimed that Sinopec and the Yunnan branch of Sinopec trading company (ldquoSinopec Yunnan Branchrdquo) had failed to fulfil their obligations stipulated in the Renewable Energy Law and had abused their market dominance in sales market of refined oil by refusing to trade with Yingding without justifiable reasons

Sinopec and Sinopec Yunnan Branch mainly explained four reasons for why they rejected Yingdingrsquos biofuel Firstly Yingding had failed to prove that the biofuel complied with the relevant national standard and was safe to use Secondly Yingding had failed to provide complete trading terms Thirdly the laws and regulations regarding biofuel were incomplete the authorized refined oil sales companies were 39 The details of the case are available at httpnewsxinhuanetcomfortune2014-1217c_1113680039htm httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=9e71db51-6ff6-4d2c-8af6-8eacf023ebdeampKeyWord=E4BA91E58D97E79B88E9BC8E|E4B8ADE79FB3E58C96 httpnewsxinhuanetcomenergy2015-0422c_127721575htm httpwwwnbdcomcnarticles2015-04-23911348html last visited on December 17 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 42 of 52

obligated to purchase biofuel from the biofuel manufacturers if it met certain quality standards but there was a vacancy regarding how to reach the end consumers from the sales companies

On 8 December 2014 the Kunming Intermediate Peoples Court ruled that Sinopec Yunnan Branch bore a legal obligation to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its market dominance in refined oil market by refusing without any justifiable reasons to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding The court ordered Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network within 30 days Both Yingding and Sinopec filed appeals to the Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court

The Appellate Trial

The appeal hearing was held on 22 April 2015 in Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoYunnan Courtrdquo) Sinopec submitted 23 new pieces of evidence and introduced two expert witnesses in a bid to overturn several key elements in the first-instance ruling by Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court

In terms of the determination of the relevant market and the market dominance Sinopec argued that the relevant market in this case was for adipic acid monomethyl ester (ldquoAAMErdquo) the main ingredient of a biofuel additive known as BD100 Yingdingrsquos main product is BD100 which can be blended with fossil diesel to become biofuel In the AAME market Sinopec is a potential buyer instead of a market dominator In support of this argument Sinopec presented an expert witnessmdashGong Jiong a professor of economics at Beijings University of International Business and Economics who testified that AAME should be defined as the relevant product market on the basis of an economic analysis

However Yingding insisted that the first-instance ruling was correct in naming the sales market of refined oil as the relevant market and submitted new evidence an article on Sinopecs website that claimed it had a 67 market share in Yunnan to help establish the claim that Sinopec had market dominance

Another main dispute was whether Yingdingrsquos biofuel product met national standards which would make it mandatory for Sinopec to purchase under Chinas Renewable Energy Law The law stipulates that biofuel producers must sell their products first to an authorized refined oil sales company and the sales companies are obliged to buy the fuel if it meets certain quality standards In order to test the quality Sinopec introduced the second expert witness Lin Jianmin a leading author of Chinarsquos national biofuel standard Lin Jianmin pointed out that there are currently quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology which gives Sinopec a justifiable reason not to trade with Yingding Moreover Sinopec presented some precedents in which consumers had complained about the biofuel quality and also claimed that China didnt have a sound regulatory framework to support biofuel production neither in testing nor in sales

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 43 of 52

Nevertheless to refute this point Yingding referred to an earlier test in co-operation with Sinopec in 2011 where selected buses in Kunming used biofuel blended by Sinopec using BD100 produced by Yingding

On August 13 2015 Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors and now this case is pending In the written appellate ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court did not provide any details regarding its reasoning

Key Issues of the Case

Is there any competition between Yingding and Sinopec

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case the product of Yingding is biofuel while Sinopec does not engage in the business of biofuel From this perspective Yingding and Sinopec are not competitors Thus it is not necessary and not reasonable for Sinopec to eliminate or restrict the competition from Yingding

Relevant Market

The definition of the relevant market is a prerequisite to determine whether competition exists and whether the AML is applicable In accordance with the Judicial Interpretation of Antitrust civil litigation the plaintiff shall take the responsibility to prove the defendantrsquos dominance in the relevant market Also the methods of defining the relevant market are stipulated in the Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition (ldquoGuidelinesrdquo) However both Yingding and Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court defined the relevant market as the sales market of refined oil without sufficient antitrust analysis none of the methods in the Guidelines were used Therefore the definition of the relevant market remains arguable and needs to be sufficiently analysed in the upcoming retrial

Justifiable Reasons

The abuse of market dominance includes the behaviour of refusing to trade without justifiable reasons according to the AML but in the first instance ruling justifiable reasons were not investigated by the court During the appellate trial the expert witness introduced by Sinopec claimed that there were quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology and this was a justifiable reason to refuse to trade with Yingding Even though the first instance court and the appellate court did not reason the justifiable reason it should be discussed and investigated further during the retrial

AML or Renewable Energy Law

The claims of Yingding were based on both the AML and the Renewable Energy Law (ldquoRELrdquo) and the first instance ruling referred to both the AML and the REL as

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 44 of 52

well It seems that the laws the first instance court referred to were comprehensive but in fact the reasoning was not clear and logical In the first instance ruling some disputes regarding the AML were reviewed but all the orders were not based on the AML Specifically the first instance court ordered the Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network based on the REL and dismissed the other claims That the orders were not on account of reasoning is illogical It is anticipated that during the retrial the application of the laws will be clearer

Analysis

A lot of issues have not been clearly analysed by the courts such as the relevant market and the justifiable reasons Since the case is remanded the above-mentioned issues are expected to be resolved in the retrial In addition Yingding was in a disadvantaged position compared to its first instance trial since its claims based on the AML were challenged greatly during the appellate trial In the retrial it is probable that Yingding may switch its litigation strategy and base its claims on the REL Therefore maybe more preparation regarding the REL can give Sinopec a leg up

Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)

Rijing Electric a Chinese distributor seeks CNY 5m compensation

The first hearing was on 9 June 2015 and ended without a ruling

Facts

Rijing Electric (ldquoRijingrdquo) a Shanghai-based company and a former distributor for Panasonic accused Panasonic of abusing its dominance and dividing the market through monopolistic practice in an antitrust lawsuit filed in 2014 with Shanghai No 1 Intermediate Court (ldquoShanghai Courtrdquo) claiming compensation of CNY 5m (USD 815370) Wenzhou Mingda Automation System Co and Shanghai Qingying Automation Equipment as the distributor of Panasonic in China are the co-defendants were accused of conducting monopolistic behaviours by implementing Panasonicrsquos policy

The first hearing for evidence exchange was on June 9 2015 Rijing claimed a policy allegedly introduced by Panasonic in 2009 restricted the competition between distributors Panasonic claims the policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo and has full justifiable reasons It explained that the products in question required customization at considerable cost to distributors before its sale to customers Once carried out however other distributors leaving them open to quote much lower prices than the original distributor could simply and relatively cheap replicate this customization Besides Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and that the plaintiff had failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic said its market share for the four products

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 45 of 52

under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases Also Rijing failed to challenge the policy when it was first introduced instead initially agreeing it was reasonable as e-mail evidence submitted by Panasonic suggests

Key Issues of the Case

Whether Panasonic occupied a market dominant position

It is reported that Rijing claimed that Panasonic had abused its market dominance but Rijing failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and its market share for the four products under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases

Analysis

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case Panasonicrsquos policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo rather than to eliminate or restrict competition

Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals40 (Pending)

It is a battle over patent licensing issues

It is viewed as being among the most complicated antitrust lawsuits in China

The first hearing was on 17 and 18 December 2015

Facts

Four Chinese rare earth companies Ningbo Ketian Magnet Ningbo Permanent Magnetics Ningbo Tongchuang Strong Magnet Material and Ningbo Huahui Magnetic Industry filed antitrust lawsuits against Hitachi Metals over alleged patent licensing issues regarding rare earth magnets on December 11 2014 with the Ningbo Intermediate Peoples Court (ldquoNingbo Courtrdquo) in Zhejiang province As reported four Chinese rare earth companies claimed Hitachi Metals abused its market dominance and hurt the industry competition by refusing to license the patents to them The patents in this case are used in the manufacturing of sintered neodymium iron boron (ldquoNdFeBrdquo) magnets a rare-earth magnet alloy widely used in parts for airplanes automobiles and other products

Hitachi Metals filed a challenge with the Ningbo Court over its jurisdiction in April 2015 After Ningbo Court rejected Hitachi Metals jurisdiction objection on 28 April 2015 Hitachi Metals appealed to the Zhejiang High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoZhejiang

40The details of the story are available at httpwwwzbmagcomnews_viewphpid=80 httpwwwhitachicomcnaboutpress201510-121118_ahtml last visited on December 22 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 46 of 52

Courtrdquo) but Zhejiang Court affirmed the ruling of the Ningbo Court

The first day of a two-day hearing took place on 17 December 2015 during which the two sides cross-examined each otherrsquos evidence The evidence focused on clearing up several key elements in the case including the relevant market whether Hitachi Metals has dominance on that market and whether both sides acted in good faith during the licensing negotiations

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Product Market

The four Chinese rare earth companies claimed that the relevant product market should be the NdFeb-related patent licensing market However Hitachi Metals believed that the physical NdFeb market rather than the patent licensing market should be the relevant product market which is meaningful for assess the real competitive effects on the market

Whether Hitachi Metals occupies a dominant market position

In terms of market dominance Hitachi Metals claimed it does not occupy a dominant position because Hitachi Metalsrsquo patents were not in a standard in this case and there are substitutable technologies in the market SEP holders have the obligation to license on FRAND terms but none-SEP holders do not So while a refusal to license a SEP may constitute abuse of dominance refusal to license a non-SEP mdash even by a patent holder with a dominant position mdash should not be considered as an abuse

Analysis

Hitachi Metals as a patent holder should have the right to decide whether to retain those patents or not or who to license According to the legal theory the purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage and protect innovation by conferring monopoly right mdash that is to give intellectual property owners the proprietary rights which can exclude others from using the intellectual property The SEP holders admittedly need to comply with FRAND terms which can maintain a robust balance between competition and monopoly whereas the further intervention of antitrust law into non-SEP patents may undermine the purpose of intellectual property law To which extent the antitrust law should intervene is yet to be seen

Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei41

A confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the Beijing IP court made by the Beijing High Court

41 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcncpwswbjzscq201511t20151103_12225640htm last visited on December 28 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 47 of 52

Facts

On August 2 2013 the NDRC penalized Abbott for monopolistic price-fixing and then Abbott made a price adjustment in China where the prices of main products were reduced

On December 16 2014 Tian Junwei (ldquoTianrdquo) a Chinese citizen in Beijing sued Carrefour Shuangjing Branch (ldquoCarrefourrdquo) and Abbott (Shanghai) Sales Company (ldquoAbbottrdquo) at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (ldquoIP Courtrdquo) for their monopolistic price-fixing which damaged his interests However Carrefour and Abbott challenged the jurisdiction of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court They claimed there were two reasons Firstly according to the jurisdiction rules of the IP court issued by the Supreme Court the IP court has no jurisdiction over anti-trust cases Secondly if this case is a contractual dispute the court that is in the place of Carrefour should hear it if this case is a tort dispute the Shanghai Intermediate Court should hear it

In the ruling of the IP Court the IP Court decided it has the jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases for the following reasons According to the Provisions On Causes Of Action In Civil Cases issued by Supreme Court (最高人民法院案由规定) antimonopoly dispute is a tertiary cause of action belonging to IP and competition disputes Also according to the Provisions concerning the Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京

市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问题的规定 ) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was an IP and competition dispute and was sued after November 6 2014 Thus the IP Court had jurisdiction

Both Carrefour and Abbott appealed to the Beijing High Court over the jurisdiction ruling but the Beijing High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original ruling Reasons are listed in the written ruling issued on June 18 2015 Firstly the nature of the case was an antimonopoly dispute In accordance with Provisions of the Supreme Peoples Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民

事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) and Civil Litigation Law the monopolistic civil disputes in the first instance shall be under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Peoples Courts and an action involving a contractual dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the peoples court of the place where the defendant is domiciled or where the contract is performed Carrefour as the defendant in this case is domiciled in Chaoyang District Beijing Therefore the courts of Beijing have jurisdiction over this case Secondly according to article 3 of the Notification on the Jurisdiction of Intellectual Property Courts issued by Supreme Court (关于知识产权法院案件管辖

等有关问题的通知) IP courts have jurisdiction over first-instance civil disputes arising from monopolistic practices Lastly according to Provisions concerning the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 8 of 52

On July 23 2015 Interbrew Investment International a fully owned subsidiary of AB InBev Guangzhou State-owned Assets Development Holdings and Guangzhou Securities entered into an agreement with Zhujiang Brewery to subscribe the latterrsquos new shares According to this agreement Interbrew Investment International would subscribe shares worth up to CNY 16 billion

Pursuant to a MOFCOM antitrust notice issued in 2008 if AB Inbev intended to further increase its stake in Zhujiang Brewery a filing should be submitted to MOFCOM before any deal were to be concluded

On July 29 2015 AB InBev submitted the filing for the deal to MOFCOM

Decision

MOFCOM noted that upon this subscription Interbrew Investment International would increase its stake in Zhujiang Brewery from 2562 to 2999 Since the stake increase is relatively small and will not result in material changes regarding the control of Zhujiang Brewery MOFCOM decided to approve the deal on 20 August 2015

MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases

MOFCOM reached these decisions based on the undertakingsrsquo failure to file notifications

None of these concentrations were determined as resulting in anti-competition effects

MOFCOM considered that a 35 shares acquisition could lead to the obtaining of control power over a company

Complaints from the third party are the main channel of triggering investigation on unnotified concentrations

The undertakings were fined up to RMB 200000 which is less than the imposed penalty (RMB 300000) in the last year and the maximum penalty (RMB 500000) for violations of merger control rules

Facts

On September 29 2015 MOFCOM issued notices regarding the penalty on four concentration dealings because the concerning undertakings failed to notify these dealings to MOFCOM before closing them Details of these notices are as follows

Shanghai Fosun Pharmaceutical (Group) Co Ltd has been imposed a fine of CNY 200000 (USD 31431) because of its failure to notify MOFCOM regarding its

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 9 of 52

acquisition of a 35 stake in Suzhou Erye Pharmaceutical Co Ltd (Suzhou Erye) and the target stake was transferred without MOFCOMrsquos allowance8

Fujian Electronics amp Information (Group) has been imposed a fine of CNY 150000 (USD 23568) for its failure to notify a 35 stake acquisition of Shenzhen CHINO-E Communication MOFCOM made this decision based on the fact that Fujian Electronics signed a transfer agreement with CHINO-Ersquo shareholders and completed this transaction without filing9

Bestv New Media and Microsoft have been imposed CNY 200000 (USD 31420) fines by MOFCOM since they did not lodge a merger review filling regarding their joint venture E-Home Entertainment Development which was established on October 1 201310

CSR Nanjing Puzhen and Bombardier Transportation Sweden have been fined CNY 150000 (USD 23562) respectively due to their failure to notify their proposed joint venture prior to setting it up These companies made an agreement about the joint venturersquos establishment on November 3 2014 and its business license was obtained on November 11 201411

MOFCOM identified that the above dealings shall be notified according to the fact that all of these dealings constituted concentration and turnovers of these concentrating undertakings reached the statutory turnover thresholds

Article 20 of the AML stipulates three kinds of concentration which are (i) a merger of undertakings (ii) an acquisition of control of other undertakings by acquisition of shares or assets with voting right of other undertakings to an adequate extent (iii) an acquisition of control of other undertakings or the capability of imposing determinative effects on other undertakings by contracts or other means

Article 3 of the Provisions of the State Council on the Thresholds for Concentration Notification of Undertakings provides the fillingrsquos thresholds which are as follows (i) The collective worldwide turnovers of all undertakings involved in the last fiscal year exceed CNY 10 billion and the turnovers within China of at least two undertakings each exceed CNY 400 million or (ii) The collective turnovers of all undertakings involved in the last fiscal year exceed CNY 2 billion (approximately USD 294 million) and the China-wide turnovers of at least two undertakings each exceed CNY 400 million (approximately USD CNY588 million)

These undertakings were penalized because of their violations of article 21 of the 8 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150920150901124896shtml 9 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150920150901124887shtml 10 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150920150901124903shtml 11 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150920150901124899shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 10 of 52

AML which provides that the concentration reaching the filling thresholds shall be notified to MOFCOM prior to its implementation and without this notification it shall not be conducted In addition according to article 48 of the AML and article 13 of the Interim Measures for Investigating and Punishing of Concentration of Undertakings Failing to File Notification an undertaking which is identified by MOFCOM for implementing a concentration without filling would be imposed a fine and instructed to recover the situation by MOFCOM The amount of this fine could be no more than CNY 500000

There is no provision that specifically describes the behaviour of implementing a concentration In practice obtaining a business license transferring the entity of assets delivering the shares and assigning directors or managers are likely to be deemed as the implementation of concentration

According to Shang Ming the former director general of MOFCOMrsquos Anti-monopoly Bureau so far MOFCOM has already penalized 15 companies for failing to notify MOFCOM regarding merger reviews MOFCOM has noticed an increase in companies shirking merger-filing responsibilities and has therefore intensified enforcement

MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent12

MOFCOM defines all of the information and communication technology SEPs as the relevant product market rather than divides each of them into the individual market

In the process of competition analysis MOFCOM evaluates various factors rather than comparing the market shares only which is consistent with the complexity and flexibility of the high-technology industry

In the process of formulating remedies MOFCOM pays more attention on protecting Chinese downstream companies and enhancing its supervision

Facts

On April 15 2015 Nokia Oyi (ldquoNokiardquo) signed a Memorandum of Understanding regarding the acquisition of Alcatel Lucent (ldquoAlcatelrdquo) According to this memorandum Nokia intends to acquire 100 shares of Alcatel through a tender off

A notification about this deal was filed on April 21 2015 and accepted by MOFCOM on June 15 2015 After reviewing this case MOFCOM moved it to Phases II and Phase III as the agency was of the opinion that this acquisition could have anti-competitive effects on the relevant market

12 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151020151001139743shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 11 of 52

On October 19 2015 MOFCOM cleared this deal with four behavioural remedies

Decision

Relevant Market

In the agencyrsquos view there are four relevant product markets which are the radio access network market the core network systems market the network infrastructure service market and the information and communication technology SEP licensing market Meanwhile the relevant geographical market is primarily the Chinese market

Competition Analysis

According to MOFCOM this deal would have no anti-competitive effects on the first three relevant product markets in China while it could constitute an obstacle or limit the competition in the information and communication technology SEP licensing market

The agency consideredafter the deal that Nokia would increase its holding in 2G 3G and 4G SEPs and strengthen the degree of concentration in the information and communication technology SEP licensing market If it refused to license charged overly high royalty fees or conducted any other anti-competitive behaviour the competition of downstream market would be distorted which would most likely impair customersrsquo interests in the end

Remedies

Four behavioural remedies focusing on maintaining fair licensing of standard-essential patents (ldquoSEPsrdquo) were imposed on Nokia which are

1) On a reciprocal basis Nokia commits to not use injunctions to prevent enforcements of FRAND (fair reasonable and non-discriminatory) encumbered SEPs unless the potential licensees are unwilling to sign FRAND licensing agreements and follow the terms

2) If Nokia transfers its SEPs to a third party it shall inform Chinese licensees as well as Chinese companies that are actively engaging in licensing negotiation about the transfer details

3) Nokia will only transfer its SEPs to a new owner on the basis that the new owner accepts the existing FRAND commitments made by Nokia

4) MOFCOM has the right to monitor the implementation of Nokiarsquos commitments Nokia shall report to MOFCOM about the implementation of the conditions within 45 days of the end of each calendar year The reporting obligation will last five years until October18 2020

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 12 of 52

Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions13

Western Digital had engaged in two conducts that violated the remedies provided in the No 9 Announcement in 2012 issued by MOFCOM

Western Digital lodged an application to remove certain restrictions in March 2014 and the agency made the decision on October 19 2015

MOFCOM considered the fact that the competition condition in the relevant product market has changed and decided to remove the hold-separate restrictions related to manufacture and RampD

Facts

In 2012 Western Digital Corporation (ldquoWestern Digitalrdquo) intended to acquire 100 shares of Viviti Technologies Ltd (ldquoViviti Technologiesrdquo) which was the holding company of Hitachi Global Storage Technologies Netherlands BV and Hitachi Global Storage Technologies Singapore Pte Ltd and engaged in the hard disk business

On April 2 2011 Western Digital filed a notification for this acquisition MOFCOM issued the No 9 Announcement in March 2012 and cleared this acquisition with six remedies According to this announcement Western Digital could apply for the removal of the first and second remedy after this decision has been carried out for 24 months

The first remedy refers to maintaining the Viviti Technologies as an independent competitor and the second remedy requires both Western Digital and Viviti Technologies to make a reasonable plan of their capacity and production and report these data to the trustee

Western Digital lodged an application to remove the first and second remedy in March 2014 MOFCOM found that Western Digital had engaged in two conducts that violated the first remedy and the competitive situation in the hard disk market had changed After talking with Western Digital collecting opinions from the relevant entities and delegating the independent party to make an economic evaluation MOFCOM decided to remove the hold-separate remedies partially

Western Digitalrsquos implementation of the duties imposed in the No 9 Announcement

Based on the implementation reports submitted by Western Digital and the monitoring reports submitted by the trustee MOFCOM found that Western

13 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151020151001139040shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 13 of 52

Digital had engaged in two conducts that violated the first remedy Those were

1) On March 8 2012 Western Digital consolidated Hitachi Global Storage Technology (ldquoHGSTrdquo) which was Vivitirsquos subsidiary in US

2) In January 2013 Western Digital dissolved the development division of VivitiHGST and transferred the relevant workforce to Western Digital

MOFCOM considered that these conducts impaired the independence of Viviti as a competitor so that it imposed CNY 300000 fines on each of these behaviours and requested Western Digital to rectify the situation As per the entrusted supervisorrsquos report such behaviours have been rectified and the first remedy has been fulfilled

According to MOFCOMrsquos announcement the agency found that other remedies have been entirely implemented

Competition Analysis

With respect to the current situation of the competition in the hard disk market MOFCOM made the following assessment

1) In the areas of portable application and corporate-level application solid-state drive has put constraint on the impact of the traditional hard disk as to strengthen the competition in the relevant market

2) Overcapacity problems in the conventional hard disk drive market became obvious

3) Western Digital and HGST are the major competitors in the hard disk drive market Both the layout and the major market competitors in this market have remained unchanged since 2012

4) The hold-separate duties restricted the full competition between Western Digital and HGST The implementation of such duties hindered them from integrating their products and providing the market with a full range of products and had an adverse impact on their clientsrsquo product procurement

Based on the above analysis MOFCOM deemed that

1) Removal of the conditions that required the two companies to remain independent in production and RampD activities would enable Western Digital to save costs to provide a full range of products to the market and to fully engage in market competition and benefit its clients

2) To keep the two sales teams and their respective brands independent from each other and the independence of sales activities could reduce competition restraint impacts arising from a complete merger

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 14 of 52

Remedies

After negotiating with MOFCOM the relevant entities agreed to undertake the following obligations

1) Western Digital and HGST will remain independent in sales and brands

2) Western Digital will not change its previous business modes or force its clients to exclusively purchase hard disk drive products from Western Digital or do so in disguise

3) Western Digital will continue its pace in investing in product innovation to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

This announcement will be effective within two years from the date of issuance If Western Digital can provide sufficient evidence to prove a substantial change in the market environment the company can propose to MOFCOM to remove the relevant conditions within the two years

SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions14

MOFCOM considered the fact that the competition condition in the relevant product market has changed and removed the hold-separate restrictions on Seagate and Samsung

Seagate shall remain its business model materially and continue to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

Facts

On December 12 2011 MOFCOM made the No 11 Announcement to clear Seagate Technology LLCrsquos (ldquoSeagaterdquo) acquisition with remedies In this acquisition Seagate intended to acquire hard disk drive business of Samsung Electronics Co Ltd (ldquoSamsung HDDrdquo) As per this announcement Seagate could apply for removing the first and second remedy after this decision has been carried out for 12 months

The first remedy is to preserve Samsung HDD as an independent competitor and the second remedy asks to maintain and expand Samsung HDDrsquos production capacity within six months of issuance of the No 11 Announcement and to set reasonable production volume targets based on market supply-demand conditions

Seagate lodged an application to remove the first and second remedy in May 2015 After making assessments on the relevant parties and the competition circumstance MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate remedies

14 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151020151001144105shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 15 of 52

Competition Analysis

With respect to the current situation of the competition in the hard disk drive market MOFCOM made the following assessments

1) In the areas of portable application and corporate-level application solid-state drive has put constraint on the impact of the traditional hard disk so that the competition in the relevant market has been strengthened

2) Overcapacity problems in the conventional hard disk drive market became obvious

3) Both the layout and the major market competitors in the hard disk drive market have remained unchanged since 2012

4) Seagate and Samsung HDDrsquos market overlap in the hard disk market is quite small and Samsung HDDrsquos competition in the traditional hard disk is quite weak

Based on the above analysis MOFCOM deemed that

1) Removal of certain conditions is possible because in the portable application and corporate level application sectors competition constraint of solid-state drive on traditional hard disk drives has strengthened traditional hard disk drives are facing overcapacity which has reduced the chance of a single or more competitors causing competition restraints Seagate has limited overlap with Samsung in the hard disk business and the latter has a relatively weaker market power in the hard drive disk business

2) Removal of all imposed conditions may still restrain market competition because the traditional hard disk drive market competition conditions have not undergone a major change Seagate is still the major player in all divisions of the market and Seagate will strengthen its power after the acquisition of Samsung HDD

Remedies

After negotiating with MOFCOM Seagate agreed to undertake the following obligations

1) Seagate shall not change its business model materially or force clients to purchase hard drive disks exclusively from it

2) Seagate shall not force Tokyo Dengikagaku Kogyo China to supply magnetic heads exclusively to Seagate (or other Seagate-controlled companies) or limit the number of magnetic heads Tokyo Dengikagaku Kogyo China would supply to other hard drive disk manufacturers

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 16 of 52

3) Seagate shall continue to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

This announcement will be effective within two years from the date of issuance If Seagate can provide sufficient evidence to prove substantial change in the market environment the company can propose to MOFCOM to remove relevant conditions within the two years

FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM15

MOFCOM deems that this acquisition would induce anti-competitive influence

NXP promises to dispose its radio frequency (ldquoRFrdquo) power transistor business

As the first case approved with structural remedies after the enactment of the Provisions on Imposing Restrictive Conditions MOFCOM conducted a comprehensive evaluation of the viability competitiveness and marketability of the divested business as well as the suitability of potential buyers

Facts

On April 3 2015 NXP filed for its acquisition of Freescale NXP Semiconductor (ldquoNXPrdquo) is a NASDAQ-listed company registered in the Netherlands which engages in the design manufacturing and sale of integration circuits and discrete components

Freescale Semiconductor (ldquoFreescalerdquo) is a New York-listed company registered in Bermuda and based in the US which engages in the manufacturing and RampD of microcontroller and digital networking processors (embedded processors)

According to the agreement between NXP and Freescale after closing Freescale will become the wholly owned subsidiary of NXP On November 25 2015 MOFCOM decided to clear this acquisition with remedies

Relevant Market

As per the announcement the relevant product markets are the general microcontroller automotive power-use analog integrated circuit and RF transistor product markets in which NXP and Freescale have horizontal overlap The relevant geographical markets should be the global market

Competition Analysis

After assessing this proposed deal the agency concluded that

1) The proposed deal would boost NXPrsquos market control power in the RF

15 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151120151101196182shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 17 of 52

transistor product market because the global and Chinese RF transistor product markets share a similar structure both featuring few competitors and high concentration levels Freescale and NXP as the number one and number two players are far ahead of their rivals in the market Therefore after closing the market control power of NXP in this market would be strengthened

2) Since Freescale was the fiercest competitor of NXP the proposed deal will remove competition between them

3) The proposed deal would reduce the options for clients and increase procurement risks

In practice the wireless infrastructure suppliers as the main client of the RF transistor product tend to procure products from both NXP and Freescale to prevent them from the risk arising from relying on one supplier

4) The proposed deal may induce an adverse impact on the technology RampD and innovation

Remedies

In accordance with MOFCOMrsquos decision NXP shall follow its written commitment submitted to MOFCOM and completely divest its RF power transistor business to Beijing Jianguang Asset Management At the same time NXP shall strictly fulfil its obligations during the transition period It is worth noting that the NXPFreescale deal shall only be implemented after the divestment deal has been concluded

In addition MOFCOM requires NXP to perform relevant obligations during the transition period from the date of approval announcement until the divestment deal has been concluded NXP shall endeavour

1) not to engage in any lsquounfair trade practicesrsquo relating to the divested business

2) not to implement any acts which may have a significant adverse impact on the value management or competitiveness of the divested business or any acts which may change the nature and scope industry or business strategy or investment policy of the divested business and to take reasonable measures to encourage core employees to stay in the divested business as well as not to seek or transfer employees to NXPrsquos non-divested business

3) to ensure supply to the divested business in a fair reasonable and non-discriminatory manner and

4) to maintain the independence of the divested business and not to exchange competitively sensitive information between the parties and the divested

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 18 of 52

business

B Monopolistic Agreements

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

With respect to the enforcement activities of the NDRC in light of the numbers of the published cases it seems that the law enforcement frequency of the NDRC regarding monopolistic agreements in 2015 is lower in comparison with 2014

The reason behind might be that the outstanding issue of human resource deficit of the antitrust authority still exists Besides the fact that more enterprises gradually attach increasing importance to the antitrust compliance might be another reason for the decrease in the number of cases investigated by the authorities

As to the enforcement activities of the SAIC 4 of 14 cases concluded by the SAIC and its local branches in 2015 are relevant to monopolistic agreements Meanwhile these four cases concern horizontal monopolistic agreements

It is noteworthy however that the Mercedes-Benz case and the Dongfeng Nissan case suggest that vertical agreements especially involving price-related restrictions on the downstream dealers is still the priority of antitrust enforcement Companies shall be very cautious when imposing restrictions on the resale prices or the minimum resale prices of commodities in the distribution agreements

Automobile industry and related industries are observed to be under continuous attention of Chinarsquos antitrust authorities

The industries relating to peoplersquos livelihoods remain to be the enforcement priority

Significant Cases

Enforcement by the NDRC and its local branches

Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC16

The investigation was triggered by a leniency application

The first leniency applicant was exempted from punishment

Eight ocean shipping companies involved were imposed a collective fine of CNY 4067 million

NDRC spent approximately 12 months to investigate and conclude the case 16 NDRCrsquos press release of the case is available at httpjjsndrcgovcngzdt201512t20151228_769084html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 19 of 52

Facts

In December 2015 the NDRC published its official punishment decisions regarding the cartel case in connection with eight ocean shipping companies namely Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha (ldquoNYKrdquo) Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha (ldquoK Linerdquo) Mitsui OSK Lines EUKOR Car Carriers Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics Compantildeiacutea Sud Americana de Vapores Eastern Car Liner and Compantildeiacutea Chilena de Navegacioacuten Interoceaacutenica

According to the official press release of the NDRC the investigation was triggered by a leniency application of NYK The evidence showed that the eight companies reached consensus on non-intrusion of each others existing business to maintain or increase shipping fees when shipping goods such as cars trucks and engineering machinery in the routes between China and other countries and regions

They were also found to frequently conduct bilateral or multilateral communications on the shippersrsquo invitation for bids andor price inquiries via phone conferences dinner parties e-mails visiting etc In addition they also conducted illegal behaviour such as sensitive information exchange price negotiations bidding intention discussion dividing clients and shipping routes reaching agreements on high price bids or non-bidding in order to help certain companies gain shipping orders

To avoid the regulation of the antitrust authority the relevant shipping companies adopted various illicit measures that showed their apparent intention to violate the AML The cartel lasted for at least four years and covered a broad range of shipping routes concerned with the import and export of products between China and other regions such as North America EU South America and so on involving multiple auto brands and engineering machinery brands

The NDRC held the opinion that the eight companies conducts had restricted and eliminated competition in the relevant market raising the international shipping fees and impairing interests of shippers and end consumers The eight companies breached the AML by reaching and implementing monopolistic agreements on fixing prices and dividing the market

All eight investigated companies put forward remedy measures including enhancing the antitrust compliance program arranging more antitrust compliance trainings and developing antitrust compliance technologies

The NDRC imposed fines based on the nature level and duration of their monopolistic volations as well as their respective sales of international freight service sales relevant to the Chinese market The companies involved were collectively fined CNY 4067 million

NYK as the first cartel member voluntarily reporting the illegal conducts to the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 20 of 52

authority and providing significant evidence was entirely exempted from the punishment K Line as the second leniency applicant was imposed a fine amounting to 4 of its 2014 annual sales of international freight services relevant to Chinarsquos import and export market The details of punishments imposed on the involved companies by the NDRC are as follow

Company Name Amount of Fines (RMB million)

Percentage of the Relevant Turnovers

Grounds

Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha

- - First leniency applicant

Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha

2398 4 Second leniency applicant

Mitsui OSK Lines 3812 7 Third leniency applicant

EUKOR Car Carriers 284 9 Lasted over a long period involved many brands and many violations violations were severe

Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics

4506 8 Lasted over a long period involved many brands and many violations violations were severe

Compantildeiacutea Sud Americana de Vapores

308 6 Lasted over a long period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Eastern Car Liner 1127 5 Lasted over a long period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Compantildeiacutea Chilena de 120 4 Lasted over a long

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 21 of 52

Navegacioacuten Interoceaacutenica

period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Total 4067

Analysis

In this case the agency applied the AML instead of the Tenders and Bids Law to collusive bidding Citing article 13 (3) of the AML the NDRC identified that the collusive bidding constituted a division of the sales market

The leading three leniency applicants were granted exemption from fines to a varying degree

According to the official who handled this case dawn raids performed by antitrust enforcement agencies in other jurisdictions drew the attention of the NDRC on the cartels of these shipping companies However there was limited effective evidence to prove that the companies had reached monopolistic agreements Through pressuring the involved parties three members of the shipping cartel actively confessed their illegal conduct This case once again stresses the significance of international cooperation between antitrust enforcement agencies

Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau17

The distribution agreements between Mercedes-Benz and its dealers are determined as vertical monopolistic agreement and Mercedes-Benz violated article 14 of the AML because it restricted the ability of its dealers to decide their own resale prices

Mercedes-Benzrsquos dealers violated article of 13 of the AML due to concluding a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Mercedes-Benz and its dealers were jointly fined CNY 3578 million

Facts

In April 2015 Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau which is the provincial branch of the NDRC released the punishment on its website and announced that it had imposed a fine of CNY 350 million on Mercedes-Benz along with the aggregated fine of CNY 787 million on its dealers The fine came as a result of Mercedes-Benz reaching and implementing resale price maintenance (ldquoRPMrdquo) agreements with dealers to fix the minimum resale price of several car models as well as certain auto parts 17 The original Chinese notice published by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau is available at httpwwwjswjjgovcnoffice_neweo_comm_zxnrxsphp

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

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According to the decision the authority found that Mercedes-Benz fixed the minimum resale price of Class E and Class S cars in Nanjing Wuxi Changzhou and Suzhou markets through telephoneverbal communication and dealers meetings from January 2013 to July 2014 Since 2010 Mercedes-Benz had reached agreements with dealers in Jiangsu province to fix the minimum resale prices for auto parts by providing different levels of discounts for insured cars cars involving expired warranty periods and cars within the warranty period

In addition Mercedes-Benz implemented the minimum resale price maintaining agreement by

1) Tightening its monitoring measures on the dealers such as inspecting deals and their sale incentive system on a weekly basis

2) Tracking the sales process flow of cars and increasing the intensity of this assessment

3) Giving warnings and reducing support ndash for example halting the supply of bestselling cars and prohibiting the opening of new stores ndash to dealers if dealers refused to cooperate with the price-fixing related policies and measures and

4) Interviewing personnel of the dealers and requesting terminations if the staff engaged in serious violations of the RPM agreement

Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau concluded that Mercedes-Benz had excluded and eliminated market competition harmed consumer welfare and consequently violated article 1418 of the AML The authority therefore imposed a fine of CNY 350 million representing 7 of the sale revenue of the previous year in the relevant market against Mercedes-Benz and imposed a fine on the dealers amounting to an equivalence of 1 of the annual sales in the previous year

Analysis

Although the agency also addressed the horizontal violation among the dealers in this case the administrative penalty decision mainly focuses on the vertical violation The agency fined dealers involved in the RPM agreement a combined CNY 787 million equal to 1 of the previous-year sales which suggests that the agency decided to give lighter punishments to dealers who took initiative in reporting the activity and provided evidence

The Mercedes-Benz case is the third case where the agency successfully 18 Article 14 of the AML The following monopolistic agreements between operators and trading partners shall be prohibited (i) fixing the resale prices of commodities to third persons (ii) restricting the minimum resale prices of commodities to third persons (iii) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement Authority under the State Council

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 23 of 52

discovered both vertical and horizontal agreements in a case following the Audi case and the Chrysler case All these cases are rooted in the same industry indicating that industrial features play a large role in raising anti-trust concerns In fact it appears that the entire automotive industry is under antitrust scrutiny

Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC19

This case involved both a horizontal agreement and an administrative monopoly

A total fine of CNY 1318 million was imposed on the involved companies

Facts

In June 2015 the NDRC through its website announced the decision made by its regional branch -Yunnan Provincial Development and Reform Commission (ldquoYunnan DRCrdquo) regarding the horizontal monopolistic agreement case involving Yunnan Communications Administration and local subsidiaries of four state-owned telecommunication companies

Through the investigation Yunnan DRC found that Yunnan Communications Administration as a competent government agency had organized several meetings involving Yunnan branches of four state-owned telecoms - China Mobile China Telecom China Unicom and China Tietong in August and September of 2014 At the end of 2009 the four local branches entered into an agreement to regulate their sales promotions in terms of limiting the promotional items amount and frequency

Furthermore the agreement provides certain measures to ensure the implementation of relevant restrictions on promotions Specifically in case any cartel member violates the agreement the others could file complaints with Yunnan Communications Administration and the agency would then issue a rectification notice to the rule-breaker

Yunnan DRC stated that the four telecoms were main competitors in the relevant market and the promotions as a significant competition measure would exert direct influence on the final prices of the products The horizontal agreement organized by Yunnan Communications Administration on sales promotions restricted the competition capacity of telecoms and as a result eliminated the competition in the relevant market Consequently the behaviour of Yunnan Communications Administration violated article 8 20 of the AML and constituted administrative monopoly in terms of ldquoforcing undertakings to conduct monopolistic behaviour prohibited by the AMLrdquo

19 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpwwwsdpcgovcnfzgggzjgjdyfldjjszhdt201506t20150602_694802html 20 Article 8 of the AML Administrative organs and the public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 24 of 52

With respect to the penalties Yunnan DRC fined the local branch of China Tietong CNY 200000 for reaching but not implementing the agreement in regards to the other three telecoms a total fine of CNY 1298 million amounting to 2 of the sales of the relevant business in the previous year were imposed for entering into and implementing the horizontal monopolistic agreement

Analysis

The telecoms industry is still the enforcement priority of the antitrust enforcement authorities A company cannot be exempted from punishment even though it is forced by competent authorities to conduct monopoly behaviour

DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC21

Both a horizontal monopolistic agreement and a vertical monopolistic agreement were involved in this case

A total fine of CNY 14242 million was imposed on DongFeng Nissan and its distributors

Facts

In September 2015 the Guangdong Development and Reform Commission (ldquoGuangdong DRCrdquo) released an announcement regarding the administrative penalties on DongFeng Nissan and its provincial distributors for concluding price-related monopolistic agreements More specifically DongFeng Nissan was imposed a fine of CNY 1233 million for breaching article 14 of the AML in terms of restricting the resale price of certain car models 17 distributors domiciled in Guangdong were collectively fined CNY 1912 million for violating article 1322 of the AML in terms of entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements

According to the published official release the Guangdong DRC launched the investigation in August 2014 The authority discovered that from 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissan had set a rigorous restriction on its distributorsrsquo abilities to determine the resale prices of certain car models including the quoted prices in various platforms and the final resale price In addition DongFeng Nissan punished the distributors that failed to abide by such price restrictions in 2013 The authority 21 The original Chinese notice published by Guangdong DRC is available at httpwwwgddpcgovcnzwgkgzdtgzyw201509t20150910_328993html 22 Article 13 of the AML The following Monopolistic agreements among competing operators shall be prohibited (i) fix or change prices of commodities (ii) limit the outputs or sales volume of commodities (iii) segment the sales markets or the raw material purchasing markets (iv) limit the purchase of new technology new facilities or limit the development of new products new technology (v) jointly boycott transactions (vi) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-Monopoly Law enforcement Authority Monopolistic agreements in this Law refer to agreements decisions or other concerted practices that eliminate restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 25 of 52

believed that the vertical agreement concluded between DongFeng Nissan and its distributors eliminated and restricted the competition in the relevant market and damaged the consumer welfare as well which violates article 14 of the AML

Furthermore from April 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissanrsquos distributors in Guangdong province held multiple meetings to discuss issues relevant to sale price reached and implemented a horizontal monopolistic agreement in terms of fixing the prices of some car models which is prohibited by article 13 of the AML

Considering that both DongFeng Nissan and the involved distributors positively cooperated with the investigation and ceased the illegal behaviour immediately after the investigation Guangdong DRC decided to impose a fine amounting to 3 of its previous yearrsquos turnovers on DongFeng Nissan and a fine ranging from 2 to 4 on the relevant distributors in accordance with articles 4623 and 4924 of the AML

Analysis

This case demonstrates that auto and related industries are still under close attention of the authority Considering the NDRCrsquos successful series of antitrust investigations conducted throughout the auto industry it is observed that the agency currently overseeing price-related antitrust issues in China has accumulated a substantial amount of experience regarding antitrust enforcement in the auto industry Now is the right time to speed up the law-making process by amending the set of rules released earlier and drafting new laws to advise the auto industry on antitrust compliance

Enforcement by the SAIC and its local branches

Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC25

The investigation was triggered by whistle blowerrsquos submission

Cartel members were collectively fined CNY 139 million 23 Article 46 of the AML In case the operators violate the relevant provisions of this Law concluding and implementing Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall order the operators to cease such act impose fines more than 1 but less than 10 of the total turnover in the preceding year and confiscate the illegal gains where the Monopolistic agreement is not implemented a fine less than RMB 500000 can be imposed If the operators involved in Monopolistic agreement on its own initiative report information concerning the conclusion of Monopolistic agreements and provide important evidences to the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority they may be given a mitigated punishment or be exempted from punishment in accordance with the circumstances Where the industrial associations violate this Law organizing the operators in the industry to conclude Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority may impose a fine less than RMB 500000 in serious circumstances the agency of social organization administration and registration may cancel its registration 24 Article 49 of the AML As for the imposition of the fines stipulated by the Article 46 47 and 48 of this Law the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall take elements such as the nature extent and time it lasts of the illegal act into consideration in determining the specific amount of the fines 25 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201506t20150601_156889html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 26 of 52

Facts

In April 2015 the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) issued administrative penalties on several brick manufacturers for entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements This is the first case relevant to monopolistic agreements that has been publicized by the SAIC since the beginning of this year

Ten cartel members were involved in the case including one company and nine individuals Similar with most antitrust cases the investigation started as a result of a whistle blowerrsquos submission After a thorough investigation Hunan AIC found that those local brick manufacturers had reached agreements on controlling production volume and dividing sales areas in the forms of production and sales agreements plans and meeting minutes

The enforcement authority reached the conclusion that these brick manufacturers violated article 13 of the AML and imposed a total fine of CNY 1389400 on them

Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC26

The organizer of the monopolistic agreement the animation association was fined CNY 100000

The antitrust authority did not punish the members of the monopolistic agreement

Facts

In December 2015 the Guangdong Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoGuangdong AICrdquo) published its administrative punishment decision in regards to Guangzhou Panyu Animation amp Game Association (ldquoGAGArdquo) organizing member companies to conclude a monopolistic agreement

According to the decision GAGA drafted the ldquoAgreement of Exhibition Alliancerdquo (ldquoAgreementrdquo) and convened a conference with member companies in order to discuss the content and conclusion of the Agreement 52 member companies entered into the Agreement which actually requested the alliance companies to merely participate in the exhibitions either organized or supported by GAGA in Guangzhou In addition the Agreement prohibited the alliance companies from attending any other exhibition except if they obtained prior approval of GAGA

After a thorough investigation Guangdong AIC believed that the conclusion of the Agreement among GAGA and the 52 member companies violated article 13 (5) of the AML in terms of boycott GAGA who was deeply involved and restricted member companiesrsquo choice of exhibitions through the Agreement could be deemed as

26 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151208_164680html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 27 of 52

the participant and organizer of the monopolistic agreement In accordance with article 46 of the AML Guangdong AIC imposed a fine of CNY 100000 on GAGA for organizing the conclusion of the monopolistic agreement

Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC27

Hubei AIC considered the coinsurance for Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance illegal

Twelve insurance companies were fined CNY 469 million in total

Facts

In December 2015 the Hubei Administrative for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHubei AICrdquo) disclosed its punishment on 12 insurance companies for signing illegal coinsurance agreements

The disclosed punishment decision suggests that the Hubei branch of China Pacific Life Insurance (ldquothe Companyrdquo) 11 other insurance companies and Wuhan Construction Safety Technology Consultation Center (ldquoWCSTCCrdquo) signed a Coinsurance Agreement on Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance (ldquoCoinsurance Agreementrdquo) of which the main contents include

1) The Company and 11 other involved companies as the coinsurers jointly take charge of the personal accident insurance concerned with the construction project directly administered by the Wuhan government WCSTCC is responsible for providing safety professionalism and technology services regarding the relevant personal accident insurance

2) The Company as the chief insurer of the coinsurance occupies 12 of the total amount of the insurance and the other 11 companies respectively occupy 8

3) The Company as the representative of the coinsurance is in charge of collecting the premium signing the standard form insurance policies and issuing the invoice in its own name The Company should share the charged premium with the other companies in accordance with the Coinsurance Agreement

4) Both the Company and the other insurance companies should pay 25 of the actually received premium to WCSTCC as the service fee WCSTCC will assist the coinsurers in providing safety and technology management service to the insured In addition the 11 insurance companies should pay 5 of their premium to the Company as the management fee

27 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165445html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 28 of 52

5) In case an accident happens the 12 companies will jointly bear the damages based on their respective shares in the coinsurance

6) There is a contact mechanism established in the coinsurance The coinsurers will regularly hold coinsurance conferences to discuss existing problems

Furthermore the coinsurers and WCSTCC also signed a self-discipline agreement and established a complete management system to assure the implementation of the Coinsurance Agreement Any party violating the Coinsurance Agreement would be punished

Hubei AIC found that WCSTCC was solely invested by Wuhan Construction Safety Management Association which was under Wuhan Construction Commission The centre helped implement certain functions of the Wuhan Urban Construction Safety Management Station and was responsible for quality supervision and safety supervision of municipal construction projects

It later became a prerequisite for construction companies to purchase insurance from any member of the coinsurance in order to get approval to commence their project According to the decision Hubei AIC launched another separate investigation against WCSTCC

Through the investigation Hubei AIC concluded that the Coinsurance Agreement constituted a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by article 13 of the AML with the following analysis

First coinsurance as a common business model to jointly share and lower risks is widely adopted in the insurance industry A coinsurance arrangement for a specific project in order to avoid high risks faced by one insurer could be legal However coinsurance should not target the entire market In this case prior to the Coinsurance Agreement the risks of the construction projects were unpredictable since the scale of the construction projects the difficulty of the construction and the amount of construction workers could not be available It is impossible to predict the risks of the projects thus it is not necessary to cooperate with other insurers to collectively bear the risks The purpose of the 12 insurance companies to establish the coinsurance is to avoid the competition which demonstrates the Coinsurance Agreement belongs to a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by the AML

Second the companies through entering into the coinsurance agreement actually divided the relevant market of construction project personal accident insurance in Wuhan city which affected the competition in the relevant market and damaged the interests of other competitors and the consumers In particular the Construction Law as amended in 2011 stipulates that the purchase of personal accident insurance is not mandatory and the construction companies have the right to choose whether to buy the said insurance or not As mentioned purchasing insurance from the coinsurance had been the prerequisite for construction companies to obtain administration

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 29 of 52

approval for the project which seriously distorts the fair competition in the market

Citing article 46 of the AML the 12 insurance companies were collectively fined CNY 469 million including fines on the companies and confiscation of illegal gains It is noteworthy that the fines were calculated based on the companiesrsquo 2014 annual sales of the insurance product in connection with the coinsurance The Company as the chief insurer was fined amounting to 6 of its 2014 annual sales of the relevant insurance product in the coinsurance and other companies were fined amounting to 2 of relevant sales For more specific information please see the following table

Company Name (Hubei Branch)

Fines (CNY million)

Percentage of the sales

Illegal Gains (CNY

million)

China Pacific Life Insurance 00653 6 0941

Sino Life 00145 2 04332

Alltrust Insurance 00145 2 04332

Taikang Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Continent Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Pacific Property Insurance

00145 2 04332

China Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

PICC Property and Casualty 00145 2 02599

Taiping General Insurance 00145 2 013

Union Life Insurance 00145 2 01177

Ping An Annuity Insurance Company of China

00145 2 04201

Ping An Property amp Casualty Insurance Company of China

00145 2 -

Subtotal 02248 - 44679

Total 46927

Analysis

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 30 of 52

Coinsurance as an effective approach to lower risks of insurers is widely used in the insurance industry Information sharing and agreements on coinsurance were generally considered efficient and legitimate However from an antitrust perspective coinsurance may raise competition concerns depending on the circumstances of each agreement In the case that there is enough capacity for one insurer to cover the potential risks the coinsurance might be considered as entering into a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC28

The first leniency applicant was exempted from fines

The other concrete companies were imposed a fine of CNY 180000

Facts

In December 2015 the concrete companies monopolistic agreement case investigated by Hunan AIC was published on SAICrsquos website

In accordance with the antitrust enforcement announcement of SAIC this case was triggered by complaints from the Yongzhou City peoplersquos congress After the preliminary review the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) initiated the formal investigation on seven concrete companies domiciled in Yongzhou City Hunan Province which were suspected of being involved in a monopolistic agreement in terms of division of the volumes of the products

After further investigation Hunan AIC found that the seven concrete companies concluded a partnership agreement in 2011 which requested the involved companies to enter into a partnership business with assets In addition according to the partnership agreement it was planned to establish a comprehensive office to manage production marketing and distribution of the products of all the partners The seven companies intended to jointly adjust and control the output of concrete based on the partnership agreement However because there were disagreements over the allocation of the injected assets and market shares the companies did not implement the partnership agreement The agreement was cancelled in December 2012

Based on the findings Hunan AIC concluded that the seven concrete companies as competitors of each other restricted and eliminated the competition in the relevant market through reaching the partnership agreement and dividing the volumes of sales which violated article 13(3) of the AML in terms of division of sales market Considering that the agreement had not been implemented and the limited influence of the agreement according to article 46 of the AML and article 27 of the Administrative Penalties Law small amount fines were imposed on the involved companies Six companies were fined CNY 30000 each for their illegal behaviour 28 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165504html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 31 of 52

Yongzhou Shuangyuan Building Materials Co Ltd as the first one to actively report the monopolistic agreement and cooperate with the enforcement authority was exempted from the punishment

Outlook

It is expected that the AMLrsquos enforcement on monopolistic agreements will continue in the future Industries such as automobile shipping pharmaceuticals insurance etc will still remain the priority of the antitrust enforcement

The antitrust enforcement authorities have published a series of regulations in order to clarify the substantial and procedural issues relevant to the antitrust enforcement However Chinarsquos current antitrust legislation regime is still immature In the following years we expect that more attention will be paid to the legislative improvements

Another remarkable issue for cartel members is that with more Chinese enterprises attaching increasing importance to the AML the follow-on civil damages actions might become a tendency in the future

C Abuse of Market Dominance

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen a decent increase of abuse of market dominance cases both in public enforcement and private litigation Oftentimes the authorities responsible for public enforcement generally find it difficult to pursue investigations against abuse of market dominance cases The following two main reasons are often cited to explain this standoff first it is hard for the authorities to define the relevant markets and prove the undertaking(s)rsquo dominant market position through economic approaches second it is hard to collect evidence regarding abusive practices

The cases related to IPRs abuse are emerging significantly particularly in the telecommunication media and technology (ldquoTMTrdquo) sectors

The SAICrsquos latest refusal-to-deal probe against a local drug maker shows that the SAIC and its local branches have increasingly acquired a profile as an abuse of dominance regulator

Significant Cases

Cases pursued by the SAIC

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 32 of 52

Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case29

Facts

The local authority in Dongfang city reported to the Hainan provincial branch of SAIC on April 23 2014 of the suspected dominance abuse The SAIC authorized its Hainan bureau to officially investigate the matter on 25 July 2014 according to a decision dated January 9 2015 The AIC concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its market dominance by requiring users to pay a deposit without any legal basis and or justifiable reasons

In terms of the relevant product market the local authority found that in this case it was the urban water supply market in Dongfang city and its surrounding townships where Dongfang Water was the sole public operator in the local water supply market with a 100 market share which made all water users completely reliant on the companyrsquos supply In term of market access the local authority found it very unlikely that there were other operators due to the strict regulations

The Hainan SAIC then concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its dominance as it charged users a deposit by threatening to refuse to register users and also by threatening to restrict the water supply Dongfang Waters charging of deposits lacked a legal basis and hadnt received government approval to the detriment of household consumers and business water users and hampered the improvement of management and services of the company Such conduct was in breach of Chinarsquos Anti-Monopoly Law

Hainan AIC levied a fine of CNY 593208 a lighter penalty equivalent to 2 of the companyrsquos annual sales for the previous year and confiscated illicit gains of CNY 38521 for abuse of market dominance

Analysis

It is noteworthy that although handled by a local authority supervised by the SAIC the antitrust agency detailed the relevant market definition the assessment of the dominant market position the abusive practices and the scrutiny of the justifiable reasons

Although the definition of the relevant market and the reasoning of the Hainan provincial AIC and the SAIC are subject to criticism it is still applausive to see that the antitrust regulators have realized the importance of the application of rule of reason in an abuse case In addition through itrsquos a published decision practitioners may observe the regulatorsrsquo reasoning and thus transparency and legal certainty have been generated

29 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzfcfjd201502t20150212_152066html last visited on October 18 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

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Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms30

Facts

In June 2013 the Ningxia AIC under authorization of SAIC opened an antitrust investigation into the alleged tie-in sales by the three major state-owned telecommunications operators China Tietong China Unicom and China Telecom for the tie-in sale of fixed-line telephones with broadband Internet services The Ningxia AIC found that the three companies had bundled fixed-line phone services with Internet services to subscribers

During the investigation all three telecommunications companies admitted the tie-in practice had recognized that such practice had improper influence on competition and deprived the choices of consumers The three companies promised to undertake internal rectification timely and eliminate the ill effects resulting from such practice The parties committed to taking the following corrective measures

1) Taking internal rectifications and conducting training to staff about antitrust laws and stop tie-in sales practices

2) Making public commitments to allow subscribers a free choice of services and strengthening the propaganda through the operating room call centre and other channels

3) Unbundling fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

The Ningxia AIC decided to suspend the probe on 14 May 2015 on the grounds that the three companies had actively worked together with the investigators and proposed workable remedy plans

Analysis

In the official announcement Ningxia AIC concluded that the purpose of antitrust enforcement is to restrain monopolistic conducts the protection of competition and to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of consumers Given that during the investigation process the parties had actively cooperated with the investigation formed a more profound understanding of the dangers of tying behaviour and moreover the parties proposed and implemented positive corrective measures to be able to remove the ill impact of their actions the agency believed that the purpose of antitrust law enforcement was fulfilled

It is worth noting that the Ningxia AIC also required the three companies to implement the commitment by August 30 2015and the submission of the written

30 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158908html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158906html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158910html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 34 of 52

implementation report on July 102015 and August 102015 respectively which is another illustration that an effective commitment by the undertakings shall directly deal with the effect that is brought by the monopolistic behaviour In this case the effect of the monopolistic act was restricted to the choice of the consumers therefore the commitment by the undertaking aimed at allowing the freedom of choice and the unbundling of fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company31

Facts

The Liaoning AIC imposed a fine of approximately CNY 433m on the Fushun Branch of Liaoning Tobacco Co on 1 June 2015 The agency also ordered the company to stop its illicit behaviour

The Liaoning AIC received a tip-off that the accused Liaoning Tobacco Corsquos Fushun branch was conducting tie-in sales of non-high-demand cigarette brands with high-demand cigarette brands After gaining authorization from SAIC the agency officially started an investigation regarding the companyrsquos suspected abuse of market dominance in June 2014

Analysis

According to the announcement the tobacco company argued that the tobacco industry is a state controlled or monopolized industry with a lawful monopolistic position therefore the company shall not be subject to the norms of general market competition rules or the anti-monopoly law

In this regards the agency concluded that in terms of the status of the undertaking admittedly the first paragraph of article 17 of the AML says that the State shall protect the lawful business operations of undertakings in these industries with respect to the industries which are under the control of the State-owned economic sector and have a bearing on the lifeline of the national economy or national security and the industries which exercise monopoly over the production and sale of certain commodities according to law However the second paragraph continues to say that the undertakings mentioned above shall do business according to law be honest faithful and strictly self-disciplined and subject themselves to public supervision and they shall not harm the consumers interests by taking advantage of their position of control or their monopolistic production and sale of certain commodities In particular in the preceding paragraph the ldquolawful businessrdquo and ldquoaccording to lawrdquo imply that the AML shall apply in the business operation The agency therefore believes that

31 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201508t20150813_16

0208html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 35 of 52

there shall be no exemption for the undertaking concerned the defences of the undertaking concerned is not established

Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm32

Facts

The Chongqing AIC fined Chongqing Qingyang Pharmaceutical CNY 439308 for alleged dominance abuse

The investigation was initiated when the company contacted the agency for verification on its potential breach of the AML related to an allopurinol active pharmaceuticals ingredient (API) distribution agreement with its exclusive distributor The company provided the relevant agreement and information and the agency conducted an investigation into the company and some other relevant companies

Analysis

Relevant Market

During the investigation the agency found that pharmaceutical ingredients are a special commodity the API is used to produce the preparations The chemical API is only used for the production of the preparation and could be used as a medicine for clinic use

The preparation is produced according to the requirements of certain form of prepared drugs and for the purpose of treatment and prevention which can be used as medicine

The allopurinol is used for the common treatment of hyperuricemia However the other treatments are different in pharmacological effects or treatment effects as well as in the cost for the patient Furthermore the company is the only manufacturer and supplier in the market nationwide since July 2012 Therefore the agency concluded that the relevant market is the allopurinol API market

Considering that the qualification for manufacturing the allopurinol API is national wide and the normal practice for purchasers and suppliers is domestic the relevant geographic market is the Chinese market

The Market Dominance

During the investigation the agency found that the company is the only supplier and manufacturer of allopurinol API in China there is no other competitor in the

32 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151222_16

5152html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 36 of 52

market and the company has a monopoly in the market The evidence shows that the company has the ability to control the prices the position for the downstream is relatively weak

With respect to the market entry the agency found that the market entry is relatively high in addition other undertakings are dependent on the company Thus the agency believed the company to have market dominance

Refusal to Deal

The agency found that on September 25 2015 the company reached an exclusive agreement and distribution agreement with its distributor Based on these agreements the company didnrsquot supply allopurinol API to the said distributor and other companies despite the fact that those companies requested for allopurinol API but were turned down by the company

Absence of Reasonable Cause

The agency found that the companyrsquos refusal to deal was not in line with the needs of normal business operation or economic efficiency On the other hand the refusal to deal was aimed at increasing the market share of the allopurinol drug product Also the agency found that the stop of supply was a manipulation of market power as to maximize the profit to the most The agency further found that the exclusive distribution agreement with suspension of supply for six months and the refusal to supply was to eliminate and restrict the competition as to gain the monopolistic profit

The Consequence of Refusal to Deal

The agency concluded that the refusal to deal harmed the competition of the allopurinol preparations market Because of the suspension of supply many demanders had to reduce their production or switch to the supply of other products or stop their production The suspension of supply affected the competition of the downstream market Consequently the raising of the price of allopurinol API also raised the cost for other manufacturers of allopurinol preparations

Furthermore the refusal to deal led to capacity loss of the allopurinol preparation industry

Ultimately the refusal to deal increased the burden on consumers as the refusal to supply changed the supply-demand relationship in the market

The agency concluded that the Company abused its dominant position in the allopurinol API market by refusing to deal with intended buyers in the period between October 2013 and March 2014Therefore the Company violated article 17 (1) of the AML which prohibits business operators with a dominant market position from abusing that position such as the refusal to deal without any justifications

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 37 of 52

D Administrative Monopoly

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 witnessed antitrust authoritiesrsquo significant efforts regarding the enforcement against administrative monopoly According to Mr Dong Zhiming the deputy director general of Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly Bureau ever since the AML coming into force six cases in connection with administrative monopoly were investigated by NDRC and among them five cases were handled in the year of 2015 These cases touched abuses of administrative power in terms of designative deal in relation to transportation communication and pharmaceutical industries

The first private litigation related to administrative monopolistic acts was heard in the court which is a milestone case in the enforcement of the AML

Significant Cases

Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC33

Facts

In March 2015 the NDRC released the official letter to Shandong Provincial Department of Transportation (ldquoShandong DOTrdquo) on its website with respect to correct its abuse of administrative power to exclude and restrict competition

During the investigation the NDRC found that since 2011 Shandong DOT had issued multiple relevant government orders in order to require certain types of vehicles to be directly connected to two designated information and service platforms both of which are operated and technically supported by one company namely Shandong Jiutong Internet of Things Technology Co Ltd (ldquoJiutong ITTrdquo) Furthermore according to the orders issued by the competent administrative department all the vehicle satellite positioning terminals entering into Shandong provincial market should be debugged through the said technology service platform which is operated by the mentioned company In addition Shandong DOT released the cap prices of vehicle satellite positioning terminals which is identical to the 2012 bid-winning price in the Ministry of Transportation demonstration project

The NDRC believed that Shandong DOTrsquos behaviour eliminated and restricted the competition in the monitoring platform market and the vehicle terminal market deprived the right of transportation enterprises to choose vehicle terminals and monitoring platform on their owns unreasonably raised the sales prices of vehicle terminals and service fees charged by the platform and increased the costs of transportation enterprises Therefore the antitrust agency concluded that Shandong

33 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201503t20150327_668911html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

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DOT violated article 8 of the AML which stipulates that ldquoadministrative organs and the public organizations with an administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude and restrict competitionrdquo Specifically Shandong DOT violated article 3234 in terms of requiring organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any designated operators and violated article 3735 in terms of setting rules with contents which eliminate and restrict competition

Based on article 51 of the AML ldquoWhere administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations abuse administrative powers performing activities which exclude and restrict competition the superior entity shall order it to correct impose administrative penalty on the chief officer and other staffs directly responsible pursuant to the laws The AML enforcement authority may give recommendations on disposal of activities to the relevant superior entityrdquo the NDRC proposed in writing that the Shandong provincial government should order Shandong DOT to rectify its behaviour with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Entirely open up the monitoring platform market by permitting transportation undertakings to freely choose any approved platform

2) Loosen the restrictions on the entry into Shandong vehicle terminals permit the undertakings to independently select the supplier of vehicle terminals and allow the qualified terminals to be connected to the relevant monitoring platform and

3) Revoke the official documentation relevant to the cap price of vehicle terminals in order to promote the price competition

Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 36

Facts

On 26 August 2015 the NDRC published its second decision with regard to the rectification of administrative monopoly since the beginning of this year According to the proposal letter sent to Anhui Provincial Government the investigation against the Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City (Bengbu HFPC) was trigged by third partiesrsquo complaints

34 Article 32 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to require organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any operators designated by them 35 Article 37 of the AML Administrative organs shall not abuse their administrative powers to set rules with contents which eliminate restrict competition 36 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201508t20150826_748682html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 39 of 52

The investigation suggests that Bengbu HFPC published three notices with regard to drugs procurement in April and May of this year

In the No C-2015-CG-X-111 Notice (ldquoNo111 Noticerdquo) released on 10 April2015 the health authority not only provided the dosage form and qualification of the requested drugs but also directly determined the suppliers of relevant drugs which eliminated and restricted the competition among pharmaceutical manufacturers and therefore violated articles 32 and 37 of the AML

In the No C-2015-CG-C-112 Notice (ldquoNo112 Noticerdquo) and No C-2015-CG-C-168 (ldquoNo 168 Noticerdquo) respectively released on 10 April and 22 May 2015 the Bengbu HFPC set discriminative qualification requirements on non-local undertakings in order to restrict their participation in the relevant bidding For instance in accordance with No 112 Notice to be a qualified bidder the turnover of non-local undertakings shall exceed CNY 2 billion which is 50 times as much as the turnover requirements of the local undertakings In the NDRCrsquos opinion the administrative monopoly activities conducted by the local health agency excluded the relevant undertakings from the market maintained the virtual-high prices of drugs and therefore violated articles 3237 and 37 of the AML

The NDRC suggested in a letter that Anhui Provincial Government should urge the Bengbu HFPC to rectify the abuse of monopoly powers with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Stop setting distinguishing restrictions on qualification requirements review standards and numbers of winning bidders as for local and non-local undertakings

2) Stop designating the suppliers of competitive drugs and

3) Take necessary measures to mitigate the negative effects resulting from the previous illegal monopolistic abuses

Outlook

At the beginning of the year the former director general of the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau under the NDRC Xu Kunlin stated that the agency would strengthen antitrust enforcement on abuse of administrative power in 2015

Since then the NDRC has made great efforts to rectify unreasonable abuses of administrative power The currently disclosed two cases investigated by the NDRC re-emphasize the Chinese Governmentrsquos strict scrutiny of antitrust issues in respect of

37 Article 34 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to restrict or reject the participation of operators from other regions in local bidding activities by measures such as prescribing discriminatory qualification requirements or assessment standards or by not publishing information according to law

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 40 of 52

administrative monopoly It reminds the local governments that antitrust compliance is of significant importance

III Private Litigation

A Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen more and more private antitrust litigations

The private antitrust litigation cases have become increasingly complicated especially the issues regarding the intersection areas of IP and antitrust law

Multinational giants and State-Owned Enterprises (the ldquoSOEsrdquo) are increasingly becoming the targets in antitrust civil litigations Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (the ldquoSMEsrdquo) tend to use the antitrust litigation to achieve their commercial goals in the business context

B Significant Cases

Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)38

This is the first-ever private litigation concerning administrative monopoly since the implementation of the AML in 2008

Facts

According to the currently disclosed details the case is relevant for designated trade

The plaintiff Shenzhen Sware Technology Co Ltd (ldquoSwarerdquo) is a software company The press releases suggest that Sware Gloden Software Co Ltd (ldquoGlodenrdquo) and Shanghai Ruban Software Co Ltd (ldquoShanghai Rubanrdquo) are the three main suppliers of construction cost software and possess the major shares of the relevant market An annual provincial vocational ability contest regarding the construction cost hosted by the Guangdong Department of Education (ldquoGuangdong DOE) designated Gloden as the exclusive supplier of the relevant software

After several unsuccessful verbal and written negotiations with Guangdong DOE in April 2014 Sware filed a lawsuit against Guangdong DOE before the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquothe Courtrdquo) alleging that the administrative organ abused its administrative power and violated the AML by designating exclusive software supplier for the contest and claimed a compensation for reasonable expense amounting to CNY 10800 Yuan

The opinions of the Court 38 The story of the case is available at httpfinancesinacomcnchinadfjj20150410074621924997shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 41 of 52

The full text of the judgment has not been disclosed yet In accordance with the information available to the public the Court invoked article 32 of the AML which prohibits an administrative organ from abusing its administrative power to require or in disguised form organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use only the commodities supplied by the entities designated by them The Court concluded that Guangdong DOE failed to prove the legitimacy of the designation and therefore abused its administration power

Currently the case is in appeal before the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court

Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 39

It is the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China

In the first instance ruling Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court ruled against Sinopec holding that the Yunnan branch of Sinopecs trading company was obligated to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its dominance in the sales market of refined oil by refusing to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding without justifiable reasons

In the second instance ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors Currently the case is pending

Facts

The First Trial

The lawsuit was filed before the Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoKunming Courtrdquo) in January 2014 Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy Co Ltd (ldquoYingdingrdquo) a bio-energy manufacturer claimed that Sinopec and the Yunnan branch of Sinopec trading company (ldquoSinopec Yunnan Branchrdquo) had failed to fulfil their obligations stipulated in the Renewable Energy Law and had abused their market dominance in sales market of refined oil by refusing to trade with Yingding without justifiable reasons

Sinopec and Sinopec Yunnan Branch mainly explained four reasons for why they rejected Yingdingrsquos biofuel Firstly Yingding had failed to prove that the biofuel complied with the relevant national standard and was safe to use Secondly Yingding had failed to provide complete trading terms Thirdly the laws and regulations regarding biofuel were incomplete the authorized refined oil sales companies were 39 The details of the case are available at httpnewsxinhuanetcomfortune2014-1217c_1113680039htm httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=9e71db51-6ff6-4d2c-8af6-8eacf023ebdeampKeyWord=E4BA91E58D97E79B88E9BC8E|E4B8ADE79FB3E58C96 httpnewsxinhuanetcomenergy2015-0422c_127721575htm httpwwwnbdcomcnarticles2015-04-23911348html last visited on December 17 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 42 of 52

obligated to purchase biofuel from the biofuel manufacturers if it met certain quality standards but there was a vacancy regarding how to reach the end consumers from the sales companies

On 8 December 2014 the Kunming Intermediate Peoples Court ruled that Sinopec Yunnan Branch bore a legal obligation to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its market dominance in refined oil market by refusing without any justifiable reasons to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding The court ordered Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network within 30 days Both Yingding and Sinopec filed appeals to the Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court

The Appellate Trial

The appeal hearing was held on 22 April 2015 in Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoYunnan Courtrdquo) Sinopec submitted 23 new pieces of evidence and introduced two expert witnesses in a bid to overturn several key elements in the first-instance ruling by Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court

In terms of the determination of the relevant market and the market dominance Sinopec argued that the relevant market in this case was for adipic acid monomethyl ester (ldquoAAMErdquo) the main ingredient of a biofuel additive known as BD100 Yingdingrsquos main product is BD100 which can be blended with fossil diesel to become biofuel In the AAME market Sinopec is a potential buyer instead of a market dominator In support of this argument Sinopec presented an expert witnessmdashGong Jiong a professor of economics at Beijings University of International Business and Economics who testified that AAME should be defined as the relevant product market on the basis of an economic analysis

However Yingding insisted that the first-instance ruling was correct in naming the sales market of refined oil as the relevant market and submitted new evidence an article on Sinopecs website that claimed it had a 67 market share in Yunnan to help establish the claim that Sinopec had market dominance

Another main dispute was whether Yingdingrsquos biofuel product met national standards which would make it mandatory for Sinopec to purchase under Chinas Renewable Energy Law The law stipulates that biofuel producers must sell their products first to an authorized refined oil sales company and the sales companies are obliged to buy the fuel if it meets certain quality standards In order to test the quality Sinopec introduced the second expert witness Lin Jianmin a leading author of Chinarsquos national biofuel standard Lin Jianmin pointed out that there are currently quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology which gives Sinopec a justifiable reason not to trade with Yingding Moreover Sinopec presented some precedents in which consumers had complained about the biofuel quality and also claimed that China didnt have a sound regulatory framework to support biofuel production neither in testing nor in sales

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 43 of 52

Nevertheless to refute this point Yingding referred to an earlier test in co-operation with Sinopec in 2011 where selected buses in Kunming used biofuel blended by Sinopec using BD100 produced by Yingding

On August 13 2015 Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors and now this case is pending In the written appellate ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court did not provide any details regarding its reasoning

Key Issues of the Case

Is there any competition between Yingding and Sinopec

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case the product of Yingding is biofuel while Sinopec does not engage in the business of biofuel From this perspective Yingding and Sinopec are not competitors Thus it is not necessary and not reasonable for Sinopec to eliminate or restrict the competition from Yingding

Relevant Market

The definition of the relevant market is a prerequisite to determine whether competition exists and whether the AML is applicable In accordance with the Judicial Interpretation of Antitrust civil litigation the plaintiff shall take the responsibility to prove the defendantrsquos dominance in the relevant market Also the methods of defining the relevant market are stipulated in the Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition (ldquoGuidelinesrdquo) However both Yingding and Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court defined the relevant market as the sales market of refined oil without sufficient antitrust analysis none of the methods in the Guidelines were used Therefore the definition of the relevant market remains arguable and needs to be sufficiently analysed in the upcoming retrial

Justifiable Reasons

The abuse of market dominance includes the behaviour of refusing to trade without justifiable reasons according to the AML but in the first instance ruling justifiable reasons were not investigated by the court During the appellate trial the expert witness introduced by Sinopec claimed that there were quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology and this was a justifiable reason to refuse to trade with Yingding Even though the first instance court and the appellate court did not reason the justifiable reason it should be discussed and investigated further during the retrial

AML or Renewable Energy Law

The claims of Yingding were based on both the AML and the Renewable Energy Law (ldquoRELrdquo) and the first instance ruling referred to both the AML and the REL as

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

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well It seems that the laws the first instance court referred to were comprehensive but in fact the reasoning was not clear and logical In the first instance ruling some disputes regarding the AML were reviewed but all the orders were not based on the AML Specifically the first instance court ordered the Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network based on the REL and dismissed the other claims That the orders were not on account of reasoning is illogical It is anticipated that during the retrial the application of the laws will be clearer

Analysis

A lot of issues have not been clearly analysed by the courts such as the relevant market and the justifiable reasons Since the case is remanded the above-mentioned issues are expected to be resolved in the retrial In addition Yingding was in a disadvantaged position compared to its first instance trial since its claims based on the AML were challenged greatly during the appellate trial In the retrial it is probable that Yingding may switch its litigation strategy and base its claims on the REL Therefore maybe more preparation regarding the REL can give Sinopec a leg up

Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)

Rijing Electric a Chinese distributor seeks CNY 5m compensation

The first hearing was on 9 June 2015 and ended without a ruling

Facts

Rijing Electric (ldquoRijingrdquo) a Shanghai-based company and a former distributor for Panasonic accused Panasonic of abusing its dominance and dividing the market through monopolistic practice in an antitrust lawsuit filed in 2014 with Shanghai No 1 Intermediate Court (ldquoShanghai Courtrdquo) claiming compensation of CNY 5m (USD 815370) Wenzhou Mingda Automation System Co and Shanghai Qingying Automation Equipment as the distributor of Panasonic in China are the co-defendants were accused of conducting monopolistic behaviours by implementing Panasonicrsquos policy

The first hearing for evidence exchange was on June 9 2015 Rijing claimed a policy allegedly introduced by Panasonic in 2009 restricted the competition between distributors Panasonic claims the policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo and has full justifiable reasons It explained that the products in question required customization at considerable cost to distributors before its sale to customers Once carried out however other distributors leaving them open to quote much lower prices than the original distributor could simply and relatively cheap replicate this customization Besides Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and that the plaintiff had failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic said its market share for the four products

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 45 of 52

under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases Also Rijing failed to challenge the policy when it was first introduced instead initially agreeing it was reasonable as e-mail evidence submitted by Panasonic suggests

Key Issues of the Case

Whether Panasonic occupied a market dominant position

It is reported that Rijing claimed that Panasonic had abused its market dominance but Rijing failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and its market share for the four products under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases

Analysis

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case Panasonicrsquos policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo rather than to eliminate or restrict competition

Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals40 (Pending)

It is a battle over patent licensing issues

It is viewed as being among the most complicated antitrust lawsuits in China

The first hearing was on 17 and 18 December 2015

Facts

Four Chinese rare earth companies Ningbo Ketian Magnet Ningbo Permanent Magnetics Ningbo Tongchuang Strong Magnet Material and Ningbo Huahui Magnetic Industry filed antitrust lawsuits against Hitachi Metals over alleged patent licensing issues regarding rare earth magnets on December 11 2014 with the Ningbo Intermediate Peoples Court (ldquoNingbo Courtrdquo) in Zhejiang province As reported four Chinese rare earth companies claimed Hitachi Metals abused its market dominance and hurt the industry competition by refusing to license the patents to them The patents in this case are used in the manufacturing of sintered neodymium iron boron (ldquoNdFeBrdquo) magnets a rare-earth magnet alloy widely used in parts for airplanes automobiles and other products

Hitachi Metals filed a challenge with the Ningbo Court over its jurisdiction in April 2015 After Ningbo Court rejected Hitachi Metals jurisdiction objection on 28 April 2015 Hitachi Metals appealed to the Zhejiang High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoZhejiang

40The details of the story are available at httpwwwzbmagcomnews_viewphpid=80 httpwwwhitachicomcnaboutpress201510-121118_ahtml last visited on December 22 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 46 of 52

Courtrdquo) but Zhejiang Court affirmed the ruling of the Ningbo Court

The first day of a two-day hearing took place on 17 December 2015 during which the two sides cross-examined each otherrsquos evidence The evidence focused on clearing up several key elements in the case including the relevant market whether Hitachi Metals has dominance on that market and whether both sides acted in good faith during the licensing negotiations

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Product Market

The four Chinese rare earth companies claimed that the relevant product market should be the NdFeb-related patent licensing market However Hitachi Metals believed that the physical NdFeb market rather than the patent licensing market should be the relevant product market which is meaningful for assess the real competitive effects on the market

Whether Hitachi Metals occupies a dominant market position

In terms of market dominance Hitachi Metals claimed it does not occupy a dominant position because Hitachi Metalsrsquo patents were not in a standard in this case and there are substitutable technologies in the market SEP holders have the obligation to license on FRAND terms but none-SEP holders do not So while a refusal to license a SEP may constitute abuse of dominance refusal to license a non-SEP mdash even by a patent holder with a dominant position mdash should not be considered as an abuse

Analysis

Hitachi Metals as a patent holder should have the right to decide whether to retain those patents or not or who to license According to the legal theory the purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage and protect innovation by conferring monopoly right mdash that is to give intellectual property owners the proprietary rights which can exclude others from using the intellectual property The SEP holders admittedly need to comply with FRAND terms which can maintain a robust balance between competition and monopoly whereas the further intervention of antitrust law into non-SEP patents may undermine the purpose of intellectual property law To which extent the antitrust law should intervene is yet to be seen

Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei41

A confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the Beijing IP court made by the Beijing High Court

41 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcncpwswbjzscq201511t20151103_12225640htm last visited on December 28 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 47 of 52

Facts

On August 2 2013 the NDRC penalized Abbott for monopolistic price-fixing and then Abbott made a price adjustment in China where the prices of main products were reduced

On December 16 2014 Tian Junwei (ldquoTianrdquo) a Chinese citizen in Beijing sued Carrefour Shuangjing Branch (ldquoCarrefourrdquo) and Abbott (Shanghai) Sales Company (ldquoAbbottrdquo) at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (ldquoIP Courtrdquo) for their monopolistic price-fixing which damaged his interests However Carrefour and Abbott challenged the jurisdiction of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court They claimed there were two reasons Firstly according to the jurisdiction rules of the IP court issued by the Supreme Court the IP court has no jurisdiction over anti-trust cases Secondly if this case is a contractual dispute the court that is in the place of Carrefour should hear it if this case is a tort dispute the Shanghai Intermediate Court should hear it

In the ruling of the IP Court the IP Court decided it has the jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases for the following reasons According to the Provisions On Causes Of Action In Civil Cases issued by Supreme Court (最高人民法院案由规定) antimonopoly dispute is a tertiary cause of action belonging to IP and competition disputes Also according to the Provisions concerning the Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京

市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问题的规定 ) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was an IP and competition dispute and was sued after November 6 2014 Thus the IP Court had jurisdiction

Both Carrefour and Abbott appealed to the Beijing High Court over the jurisdiction ruling but the Beijing High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original ruling Reasons are listed in the written ruling issued on June 18 2015 Firstly the nature of the case was an antimonopoly dispute In accordance with Provisions of the Supreme Peoples Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民

事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) and Civil Litigation Law the monopolistic civil disputes in the first instance shall be under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Peoples Courts and an action involving a contractual dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the peoples court of the place where the defendant is domiciled or where the contract is performed Carrefour as the defendant in this case is domiciled in Chaoyang District Beijing Therefore the courts of Beijing have jurisdiction over this case Secondly according to article 3 of the Notification on the Jurisdiction of Intellectual Property Courts issued by Supreme Court (关于知识产权法院案件管辖

等有关问题的通知) IP courts have jurisdiction over first-instance civil disputes arising from monopolistic practices Lastly according to Provisions concerning the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 9 of 52

acquisition of a 35 stake in Suzhou Erye Pharmaceutical Co Ltd (Suzhou Erye) and the target stake was transferred without MOFCOMrsquos allowance8

Fujian Electronics amp Information (Group) has been imposed a fine of CNY 150000 (USD 23568) for its failure to notify a 35 stake acquisition of Shenzhen CHINO-E Communication MOFCOM made this decision based on the fact that Fujian Electronics signed a transfer agreement with CHINO-Ersquo shareholders and completed this transaction without filing9

Bestv New Media and Microsoft have been imposed CNY 200000 (USD 31420) fines by MOFCOM since they did not lodge a merger review filling regarding their joint venture E-Home Entertainment Development which was established on October 1 201310

CSR Nanjing Puzhen and Bombardier Transportation Sweden have been fined CNY 150000 (USD 23562) respectively due to their failure to notify their proposed joint venture prior to setting it up These companies made an agreement about the joint venturersquos establishment on November 3 2014 and its business license was obtained on November 11 201411

MOFCOM identified that the above dealings shall be notified according to the fact that all of these dealings constituted concentration and turnovers of these concentrating undertakings reached the statutory turnover thresholds

Article 20 of the AML stipulates three kinds of concentration which are (i) a merger of undertakings (ii) an acquisition of control of other undertakings by acquisition of shares or assets with voting right of other undertakings to an adequate extent (iii) an acquisition of control of other undertakings or the capability of imposing determinative effects on other undertakings by contracts or other means

Article 3 of the Provisions of the State Council on the Thresholds for Concentration Notification of Undertakings provides the fillingrsquos thresholds which are as follows (i) The collective worldwide turnovers of all undertakings involved in the last fiscal year exceed CNY 10 billion and the turnovers within China of at least two undertakings each exceed CNY 400 million or (ii) The collective turnovers of all undertakings involved in the last fiscal year exceed CNY 2 billion (approximately USD 294 million) and the China-wide turnovers of at least two undertakings each exceed CNY 400 million (approximately USD CNY588 million)

These undertakings were penalized because of their violations of article 21 of the 8 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150920150901124896shtml 9 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150920150901124887shtml 10 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150920150901124903shtml 11 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20150920150901124899shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 10 of 52

AML which provides that the concentration reaching the filling thresholds shall be notified to MOFCOM prior to its implementation and without this notification it shall not be conducted In addition according to article 48 of the AML and article 13 of the Interim Measures for Investigating and Punishing of Concentration of Undertakings Failing to File Notification an undertaking which is identified by MOFCOM for implementing a concentration without filling would be imposed a fine and instructed to recover the situation by MOFCOM The amount of this fine could be no more than CNY 500000

There is no provision that specifically describes the behaviour of implementing a concentration In practice obtaining a business license transferring the entity of assets delivering the shares and assigning directors or managers are likely to be deemed as the implementation of concentration

According to Shang Ming the former director general of MOFCOMrsquos Anti-monopoly Bureau so far MOFCOM has already penalized 15 companies for failing to notify MOFCOM regarding merger reviews MOFCOM has noticed an increase in companies shirking merger-filing responsibilities and has therefore intensified enforcement

MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent12

MOFCOM defines all of the information and communication technology SEPs as the relevant product market rather than divides each of them into the individual market

In the process of competition analysis MOFCOM evaluates various factors rather than comparing the market shares only which is consistent with the complexity and flexibility of the high-technology industry

In the process of formulating remedies MOFCOM pays more attention on protecting Chinese downstream companies and enhancing its supervision

Facts

On April 15 2015 Nokia Oyi (ldquoNokiardquo) signed a Memorandum of Understanding regarding the acquisition of Alcatel Lucent (ldquoAlcatelrdquo) According to this memorandum Nokia intends to acquire 100 shares of Alcatel through a tender off

A notification about this deal was filed on April 21 2015 and accepted by MOFCOM on June 15 2015 After reviewing this case MOFCOM moved it to Phases II and Phase III as the agency was of the opinion that this acquisition could have anti-competitive effects on the relevant market

12 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151020151001139743shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 11 of 52

On October 19 2015 MOFCOM cleared this deal with four behavioural remedies

Decision

Relevant Market

In the agencyrsquos view there are four relevant product markets which are the radio access network market the core network systems market the network infrastructure service market and the information and communication technology SEP licensing market Meanwhile the relevant geographical market is primarily the Chinese market

Competition Analysis

According to MOFCOM this deal would have no anti-competitive effects on the first three relevant product markets in China while it could constitute an obstacle or limit the competition in the information and communication technology SEP licensing market

The agency consideredafter the deal that Nokia would increase its holding in 2G 3G and 4G SEPs and strengthen the degree of concentration in the information and communication technology SEP licensing market If it refused to license charged overly high royalty fees or conducted any other anti-competitive behaviour the competition of downstream market would be distorted which would most likely impair customersrsquo interests in the end

Remedies

Four behavioural remedies focusing on maintaining fair licensing of standard-essential patents (ldquoSEPsrdquo) were imposed on Nokia which are

1) On a reciprocal basis Nokia commits to not use injunctions to prevent enforcements of FRAND (fair reasonable and non-discriminatory) encumbered SEPs unless the potential licensees are unwilling to sign FRAND licensing agreements and follow the terms

2) If Nokia transfers its SEPs to a third party it shall inform Chinese licensees as well as Chinese companies that are actively engaging in licensing negotiation about the transfer details

3) Nokia will only transfer its SEPs to a new owner on the basis that the new owner accepts the existing FRAND commitments made by Nokia

4) MOFCOM has the right to monitor the implementation of Nokiarsquos commitments Nokia shall report to MOFCOM about the implementation of the conditions within 45 days of the end of each calendar year The reporting obligation will last five years until October18 2020

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 12 of 52

Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions13

Western Digital had engaged in two conducts that violated the remedies provided in the No 9 Announcement in 2012 issued by MOFCOM

Western Digital lodged an application to remove certain restrictions in March 2014 and the agency made the decision on October 19 2015

MOFCOM considered the fact that the competition condition in the relevant product market has changed and decided to remove the hold-separate restrictions related to manufacture and RampD

Facts

In 2012 Western Digital Corporation (ldquoWestern Digitalrdquo) intended to acquire 100 shares of Viviti Technologies Ltd (ldquoViviti Technologiesrdquo) which was the holding company of Hitachi Global Storage Technologies Netherlands BV and Hitachi Global Storage Technologies Singapore Pte Ltd and engaged in the hard disk business

On April 2 2011 Western Digital filed a notification for this acquisition MOFCOM issued the No 9 Announcement in March 2012 and cleared this acquisition with six remedies According to this announcement Western Digital could apply for the removal of the first and second remedy after this decision has been carried out for 24 months

The first remedy refers to maintaining the Viviti Technologies as an independent competitor and the second remedy requires both Western Digital and Viviti Technologies to make a reasonable plan of their capacity and production and report these data to the trustee

Western Digital lodged an application to remove the first and second remedy in March 2014 MOFCOM found that Western Digital had engaged in two conducts that violated the first remedy and the competitive situation in the hard disk market had changed After talking with Western Digital collecting opinions from the relevant entities and delegating the independent party to make an economic evaluation MOFCOM decided to remove the hold-separate remedies partially

Western Digitalrsquos implementation of the duties imposed in the No 9 Announcement

Based on the implementation reports submitted by Western Digital and the monitoring reports submitted by the trustee MOFCOM found that Western

13 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151020151001139040shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 13 of 52

Digital had engaged in two conducts that violated the first remedy Those were

1) On March 8 2012 Western Digital consolidated Hitachi Global Storage Technology (ldquoHGSTrdquo) which was Vivitirsquos subsidiary in US

2) In January 2013 Western Digital dissolved the development division of VivitiHGST and transferred the relevant workforce to Western Digital

MOFCOM considered that these conducts impaired the independence of Viviti as a competitor so that it imposed CNY 300000 fines on each of these behaviours and requested Western Digital to rectify the situation As per the entrusted supervisorrsquos report such behaviours have been rectified and the first remedy has been fulfilled

According to MOFCOMrsquos announcement the agency found that other remedies have been entirely implemented

Competition Analysis

With respect to the current situation of the competition in the hard disk market MOFCOM made the following assessment

1) In the areas of portable application and corporate-level application solid-state drive has put constraint on the impact of the traditional hard disk as to strengthen the competition in the relevant market

2) Overcapacity problems in the conventional hard disk drive market became obvious

3) Western Digital and HGST are the major competitors in the hard disk drive market Both the layout and the major market competitors in this market have remained unchanged since 2012

4) The hold-separate duties restricted the full competition between Western Digital and HGST The implementation of such duties hindered them from integrating their products and providing the market with a full range of products and had an adverse impact on their clientsrsquo product procurement

Based on the above analysis MOFCOM deemed that

1) Removal of the conditions that required the two companies to remain independent in production and RampD activities would enable Western Digital to save costs to provide a full range of products to the market and to fully engage in market competition and benefit its clients

2) To keep the two sales teams and their respective brands independent from each other and the independence of sales activities could reduce competition restraint impacts arising from a complete merger

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 14 of 52

Remedies

After negotiating with MOFCOM the relevant entities agreed to undertake the following obligations

1) Western Digital and HGST will remain independent in sales and brands

2) Western Digital will not change its previous business modes or force its clients to exclusively purchase hard disk drive products from Western Digital or do so in disguise

3) Western Digital will continue its pace in investing in product innovation to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

This announcement will be effective within two years from the date of issuance If Western Digital can provide sufficient evidence to prove a substantial change in the market environment the company can propose to MOFCOM to remove the relevant conditions within the two years

SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions14

MOFCOM considered the fact that the competition condition in the relevant product market has changed and removed the hold-separate restrictions on Seagate and Samsung

Seagate shall remain its business model materially and continue to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

Facts

On December 12 2011 MOFCOM made the No 11 Announcement to clear Seagate Technology LLCrsquos (ldquoSeagaterdquo) acquisition with remedies In this acquisition Seagate intended to acquire hard disk drive business of Samsung Electronics Co Ltd (ldquoSamsung HDDrdquo) As per this announcement Seagate could apply for removing the first and second remedy after this decision has been carried out for 12 months

The first remedy is to preserve Samsung HDD as an independent competitor and the second remedy asks to maintain and expand Samsung HDDrsquos production capacity within six months of issuance of the No 11 Announcement and to set reasonable production volume targets based on market supply-demand conditions

Seagate lodged an application to remove the first and second remedy in May 2015 After making assessments on the relevant parties and the competition circumstance MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate remedies

14 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151020151001144105shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 15 of 52

Competition Analysis

With respect to the current situation of the competition in the hard disk drive market MOFCOM made the following assessments

1) In the areas of portable application and corporate-level application solid-state drive has put constraint on the impact of the traditional hard disk so that the competition in the relevant market has been strengthened

2) Overcapacity problems in the conventional hard disk drive market became obvious

3) Both the layout and the major market competitors in the hard disk drive market have remained unchanged since 2012

4) Seagate and Samsung HDDrsquos market overlap in the hard disk market is quite small and Samsung HDDrsquos competition in the traditional hard disk is quite weak

Based on the above analysis MOFCOM deemed that

1) Removal of certain conditions is possible because in the portable application and corporate level application sectors competition constraint of solid-state drive on traditional hard disk drives has strengthened traditional hard disk drives are facing overcapacity which has reduced the chance of a single or more competitors causing competition restraints Seagate has limited overlap with Samsung in the hard disk business and the latter has a relatively weaker market power in the hard drive disk business

2) Removal of all imposed conditions may still restrain market competition because the traditional hard disk drive market competition conditions have not undergone a major change Seagate is still the major player in all divisions of the market and Seagate will strengthen its power after the acquisition of Samsung HDD

Remedies

After negotiating with MOFCOM Seagate agreed to undertake the following obligations

1) Seagate shall not change its business model materially or force clients to purchase hard drive disks exclusively from it

2) Seagate shall not force Tokyo Dengikagaku Kogyo China to supply magnetic heads exclusively to Seagate (or other Seagate-controlled companies) or limit the number of magnetic heads Tokyo Dengikagaku Kogyo China would supply to other hard drive disk manufacturers

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 16 of 52

3) Seagate shall continue to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

This announcement will be effective within two years from the date of issuance If Seagate can provide sufficient evidence to prove substantial change in the market environment the company can propose to MOFCOM to remove relevant conditions within the two years

FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM15

MOFCOM deems that this acquisition would induce anti-competitive influence

NXP promises to dispose its radio frequency (ldquoRFrdquo) power transistor business

As the first case approved with structural remedies after the enactment of the Provisions on Imposing Restrictive Conditions MOFCOM conducted a comprehensive evaluation of the viability competitiveness and marketability of the divested business as well as the suitability of potential buyers

Facts

On April 3 2015 NXP filed for its acquisition of Freescale NXP Semiconductor (ldquoNXPrdquo) is a NASDAQ-listed company registered in the Netherlands which engages in the design manufacturing and sale of integration circuits and discrete components

Freescale Semiconductor (ldquoFreescalerdquo) is a New York-listed company registered in Bermuda and based in the US which engages in the manufacturing and RampD of microcontroller and digital networking processors (embedded processors)

According to the agreement between NXP and Freescale after closing Freescale will become the wholly owned subsidiary of NXP On November 25 2015 MOFCOM decided to clear this acquisition with remedies

Relevant Market

As per the announcement the relevant product markets are the general microcontroller automotive power-use analog integrated circuit and RF transistor product markets in which NXP and Freescale have horizontal overlap The relevant geographical markets should be the global market

Competition Analysis

After assessing this proposed deal the agency concluded that

1) The proposed deal would boost NXPrsquos market control power in the RF

15 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151120151101196182shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 17 of 52

transistor product market because the global and Chinese RF transistor product markets share a similar structure both featuring few competitors and high concentration levels Freescale and NXP as the number one and number two players are far ahead of their rivals in the market Therefore after closing the market control power of NXP in this market would be strengthened

2) Since Freescale was the fiercest competitor of NXP the proposed deal will remove competition between them

3) The proposed deal would reduce the options for clients and increase procurement risks

In practice the wireless infrastructure suppliers as the main client of the RF transistor product tend to procure products from both NXP and Freescale to prevent them from the risk arising from relying on one supplier

4) The proposed deal may induce an adverse impact on the technology RampD and innovation

Remedies

In accordance with MOFCOMrsquos decision NXP shall follow its written commitment submitted to MOFCOM and completely divest its RF power transistor business to Beijing Jianguang Asset Management At the same time NXP shall strictly fulfil its obligations during the transition period It is worth noting that the NXPFreescale deal shall only be implemented after the divestment deal has been concluded

In addition MOFCOM requires NXP to perform relevant obligations during the transition period from the date of approval announcement until the divestment deal has been concluded NXP shall endeavour

1) not to engage in any lsquounfair trade practicesrsquo relating to the divested business

2) not to implement any acts which may have a significant adverse impact on the value management or competitiveness of the divested business or any acts which may change the nature and scope industry or business strategy or investment policy of the divested business and to take reasonable measures to encourage core employees to stay in the divested business as well as not to seek or transfer employees to NXPrsquos non-divested business

3) to ensure supply to the divested business in a fair reasonable and non-discriminatory manner and

4) to maintain the independence of the divested business and not to exchange competitively sensitive information between the parties and the divested

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 18 of 52

business

B Monopolistic Agreements

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

With respect to the enforcement activities of the NDRC in light of the numbers of the published cases it seems that the law enforcement frequency of the NDRC regarding monopolistic agreements in 2015 is lower in comparison with 2014

The reason behind might be that the outstanding issue of human resource deficit of the antitrust authority still exists Besides the fact that more enterprises gradually attach increasing importance to the antitrust compliance might be another reason for the decrease in the number of cases investigated by the authorities

As to the enforcement activities of the SAIC 4 of 14 cases concluded by the SAIC and its local branches in 2015 are relevant to monopolistic agreements Meanwhile these four cases concern horizontal monopolistic agreements

It is noteworthy however that the Mercedes-Benz case and the Dongfeng Nissan case suggest that vertical agreements especially involving price-related restrictions on the downstream dealers is still the priority of antitrust enforcement Companies shall be very cautious when imposing restrictions on the resale prices or the minimum resale prices of commodities in the distribution agreements

Automobile industry and related industries are observed to be under continuous attention of Chinarsquos antitrust authorities

The industries relating to peoplersquos livelihoods remain to be the enforcement priority

Significant Cases

Enforcement by the NDRC and its local branches

Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC16

The investigation was triggered by a leniency application

The first leniency applicant was exempted from punishment

Eight ocean shipping companies involved were imposed a collective fine of CNY 4067 million

NDRC spent approximately 12 months to investigate and conclude the case 16 NDRCrsquos press release of the case is available at httpjjsndrcgovcngzdt201512t20151228_769084html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 19 of 52

Facts

In December 2015 the NDRC published its official punishment decisions regarding the cartel case in connection with eight ocean shipping companies namely Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha (ldquoNYKrdquo) Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha (ldquoK Linerdquo) Mitsui OSK Lines EUKOR Car Carriers Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics Compantildeiacutea Sud Americana de Vapores Eastern Car Liner and Compantildeiacutea Chilena de Navegacioacuten Interoceaacutenica

According to the official press release of the NDRC the investigation was triggered by a leniency application of NYK The evidence showed that the eight companies reached consensus on non-intrusion of each others existing business to maintain or increase shipping fees when shipping goods such as cars trucks and engineering machinery in the routes between China and other countries and regions

They were also found to frequently conduct bilateral or multilateral communications on the shippersrsquo invitation for bids andor price inquiries via phone conferences dinner parties e-mails visiting etc In addition they also conducted illegal behaviour such as sensitive information exchange price negotiations bidding intention discussion dividing clients and shipping routes reaching agreements on high price bids or non-bidding in order to help certain companies gain shipping orders

To avoid the regulation of the antitrust authority the relevant shipping companies adopted various illicit measures that showed their apparent intention to violate the AML The cartel lasted for at least four years and covered a broad range of shipping routes concerned with the import and export of products between China and other regions such as North America EU South America and so on involving multiple auto brands and engineering machinery brands

The NDRC held the opinion that the eight companies conducts had restricted and eliminated competition in the relevant market raising the international shipping fees and impairing interests of shippers and end consumers The eight companies breached the AML by reaching and implementing monopolistic agreements on fixing prices and dividing the market

All eight investigated companies put forward remedy measures including enhancing the antitrust compliance program arranging more antitrust compliance trainings and developing antitrust compliance technologies

The NDRC imposed fines based on the nature level and duration of their monopolistic volations as well as their respective sales of international freight service sales relevant to the Chinese market The companies involved were collectively fined CNY 4067 million

NYK as the first cartel member voluntarily reporting the illegal conducts to the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 20 of 52

authority and providing significant evidence was entirely exempted from the punishment K Line as the second leniency applicant was imposed a fine amounting to 4 of its 2014 annual sales of international freight services relevant to Chinarsquos import and export market The details of punishments imposed on the involved companies by the NDRC are as follow

Company Name Amount of Fines (RMB million)

Percentage of the Relevant Turnovers

Grounds

Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha

- - First leniency applicant

Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha

2398 4 Second leniency applicant

Mitsui OSK Lines 3812 7 Third leniency applicant

EUKOR Car Carriers 284 9 Lasted over a long period involved many brands and many violations violations were severe

Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics

4506 8 Lasted over a long period involved many brands and many violations violations were severe

Compantildeiacutea Sud Americana de Vapores

308 6 Lasted over a long period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Eastern Car Liner 1127 5 Lasted over a long period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Compantildeiacutea Chilena de 120 4 Lasted over a long

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 21 of 52

Navegacioacuten Interoceaacutenica

period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Total 4067

Analysis

In this case the agency applied the AML instead of the Tenders and Bids Law to collusive bidding Citing article 13 (3) of the AML the NDRC identified that the collusive bidding constituted a division of the sales market

The leading three leniency applicants were granted exemption from fines to a varying degree

According to the official who handled this case dawn raids performed by antitrust enforcement agencies in other jurisdictions drew the attention of the NDRC on the cartels of these shipping companies However there was limited effective evidence to prove that the companies had reached monopolistic agreements Through pressuring the involved parties three members of the shipping cartel actively confessed their illegal conduct This case once again stresses the significance of international cooperation between antitrust enforcement agencies

Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau17

The distribution agreements between Mercedes-Benz and its dealers are determined as vertical monopolistic agreement and Mercedes-Benz violated article 14 of the AML because it restricted the ability of its dealers to decide their own resale prices

Mercedes-Benzrsquos dealers violated article of 13 of the AML due to concluding a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Mercedes-Benz and its dealers were jointly fined CNY 3578 million

Facts

In April 2015 Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau which is the provincial branch of the NDRC released the punishment on its website and announced that it had imposed a fine of CNY 350 million on Mercedes-Benz along with the aggregated fine of CNY 787 million on its dealers The fine came as a result of Mercedes-Benz reaching and implementing resale price maintenance (ldquoRPMrdquo) agreements with dealers to fix the minimum resale price of several car models as well as certain auto parts 17 The original Chinese notice published by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau is available at httpwwwjswjjgovcnoffice_neweo_comm_zxnrxsphp

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 22 of 52

According to the decision the authority found that Mercedes-Benz fixed the minimum resale price of Class E and Class S cars in Nanjing Wuxi Changzhou and Suzhou markets through telephoneverbal communication and dealers meetings from January 2013 to July 2014 Since 2010 Mercedes-Benz had reached agreements with dealers in Jiangsu province to fix the minimum resale prices for auto parts by providing different levels of discounts for insured cars cars involving expired warranty periods and cars within the warranty period

In addition Mercedes-Benz implemented the minimum resale price maintaining agreement by

1) Tightening its monitoring measures on the dealers such as inspecting deals and their sale incentive system on a weekly basis

2) Tracking the sales process flow of cars and increasing the intensity of this assessment

3) Giving warnings and reducing support ndash for example halting the supply of bestselling cars and prohibiting the opening of new stores ndash to dealers if dealers refused to cooperate with the price-fixing related policies and measures and

4) Interviewing personnel of the dealers and requesting terminations if the staff engaged in serious violations of the RPM agreement

Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau concluded that Mercedes-Benz had excluded and eliminated market competition harmed consumer welfare and consequently violated article 1418 of the AML The authority therefore imposed a fine of CNY 350 million representing 7 of the sale revenue of the previous year in the relevant market against Mercedes-Benz and imposed a fine on the dealers amounting to an equivalence of 1 of the annual sales in the previous year

Analysis

Although the agency also addressed the horizontal violation among the dealers in this case the administrative penalty decision mainly focuses on the vertical violation The agency fined dealers involved in the RPM agreement a combined CNY 787 million equal to 1 of the previous-year sales which suggests that the agency decided to give lighter punishments to dealers who took initiative in reporting the activity and provided evidence

The Mercedes-Benz case is the third case where the agency successfully 18 Article 14 of the AML The following monopolistic agreements between operators and trading partners shall be prohibited (i) fixing the resale prices of commodities to third persons (ii) restricting the minimum resale prices of commodities to third persons (iii) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement Authority under the State Council

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 23 of 52

discovered both vertical and horizontal agreements in a case following the Audi case and the Chrysler case All these cases are rooted in the same industry indicating that industrial features play a large role in raising anti-trust concerns In fact it appears that the entire automotive industry is under antitrust scrutiny

Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC19

This case involved both a horizontal agreement and an administrative monopoly

A total fine of CNY 1318 million was imposed on the involved companies

Facts

In June 2015 the NDRC through its website announced the decision made by its regional branch -Yunnan Provincial Development and Reform Commission (ldquoYunnan DRCrdquo) regarding the horizontal monopolistic agreement case involving Yunnan Communications Administration and local subsidiaries of four state-owned telecommunication companies

Through the investigation Yunnan DRC found that Yunnan Communications Administration as a competent government agency had organized several meetings involving Yunnan branches of four state-owned telecoms - China Mobile China Telecom China Unicom and China Tietong in August and September of 2014 At the end of 2009 the four local branches entered into an agreement to regulate their sales promotions in terms of limiting the promotional items amount and frequency

Furthermore the agreement provides certain measures to ensure the implementation of relevant restrictions on promotions Specifically in case any cartel member violates the agreement the others could file complaints with Yunnan Communications Administration and the agency would then issue a rectification notice to the rule-breaker

Yunnan DRC stated that the four telecoms were main competitors in the relevant market and the promotions as a significant competition measure would exert direct influence on the final prices of the products The horizontal agreement organized by Yunnan Communications Administration on sales promotions restricted the competition capacity of telecoms and as a result eliminated the competition in the relevant market Consequently the behaviour of Yunnan Communications Administration violated article 8 20 of the AML and constituted administrative monopoly in terms of ldquoforcing undertakings to conduct monopolistic behaviour prohibited by the AMLrdquo

19 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpwwwsdpcgovcnfzgggzjgjdyfldjjszhdt201506t20150602_694802html 20 Article 8 of the AML Administrative organs and the public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 24 of 52

With respect to the penalties Yunnan DRC fined the local branch of China Tietong CNY 200000 for reaching but not implementing the agreement in regards to the other three telecoms a total fine of CNY 1298 million amounting to 2 of the sales of the relevant business in the previous year were imposed for entering into and implementing the horizontal monopolistic agreement

Analysis

The telecoms industry is still the enforcement priority of the antitrust enforcement authorities A company cannot be exempted from punishment even though it is forced by competent authorities to conduct monopoly behaviour

DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC21

Both a horizontal monopolistic agreement and a vertical monopolistic agreement were involved in this case

A total fine of CNY 14242 million was imposed on DongFeng Nissan and its distributors

Facts

In September 2015 the Guangdong Development and Reform Commission (ldquoGuangdong DRCrdquo) released an announcement regarding the administrative penalties on DongFeng Nissan and its provincial distributors for concluding price-related monopolistic agreements More specifically DongFeng Nissan was imposed a fine of CNY 1233 million for breaching article 14 of the AML in terms of restricting the resale price of certain car models 17 distributors domiciled in Guangdong were collectively fined CNY 1912 million for violating article 1322 of the AML in terms of entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements

According to the published official release the Guangdong DRC launched the investigation in August 2014 The authority discovered that from 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissan had set a rigorous restriction on its distributorsrsquo abilities to determine the resale prices of certain car models including the quoted prices in various platforms and the final resale price In addition DongFeng Nissan punished the distributors that failed to abide by such price restrictions in 2013 The authority 21 The original Chinese notice published by Guangdong DRC is available at httpwwwgddpcgovcnzwgkgzdtgzyw201509t20150910_328993html 22 Article 13 of the AML The following Monopolistic agreements among competing operators shall be prohibited (i) fix or change prices of commodities (ii) limit the outputs or sales volume of commodities (iii) segment the sales markets or the raw material purchasing markets (iv) limit the purchase of new technology new facilities or limit the development of new products new technology (v) jointly boycott transactions (vi) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-Monopoly Law enforcement Authority Monopolistic agreements in this Law refer to agreements decisions or other concerted practices that eliminate restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 25 of 52

believed that the vertical agreement concluded between DongFeng Nissan and its distributors eliminated and restricted the competition in the relevant market and damaged the consumer welfare as well which violates article 14 of the AML

Furthermore from April 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissanrsquos distributors in Guangdong province held multiple meetings to discuss issues relevant to sale price reached and implemented a horizontal monopolistic agreement in terms of fixing the prices of some car models which is prohibited by article 13 of the AML

Considering that both DongFeng Nissan and the involved distributors positively cooperated with the investigation and ceased the illegal behaviour immediately after the investigation Guangdong DRC decided to impose a fine amounting to 3 of its previous yearrsquos turnovers on DongFeng Nissan and a fine ranging from 2 to 4 on the relevant distributors in accordance with articles 4623 and 4924 of the AML

Analysis

This case demonstrates that auto and related industries are still under close attention of the authority Considering the NDRCrsquos successful series of antitrust investigations conducted throughout the auto industry it is observed that the agency currently overseeing price-related antitrust issues in China has accumulated a substantial amount of experience regarding antitrust enforcement in the auto industry Now is the right time to speed up the law-making process by amending the set of rules released earlier and drafting new laws to advise the auto industry on antitrust compliance

Enforcement by the SAIC and its local branches

Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC25

The investigation was triggered by whistle blowerrsquos submission

Cartel members were collectively fined CNY 139 million 23 Article 46 of the AML In case the operators violate the relevant provisions of this Law concluding and implementing Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall order the operators to cease such act impose fines more than 1 but less than 10 of the total turnover in the preceding year and confiscate the illegal gains where the Monopolistic agreement is not implemented a fine less than RMB 500000 can be imposed If the operators involved in Monopolistic agreement on its own initiative report information concerning the conclusion of Monopolistic agreements and provide important evidences to the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority they may be given a mitigated punishment or be exempted from punishment in accordance with the circumstances Where the industrial associations violate this Law organizing the operators in the industry to conclude Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority may impose a fine less than RMB 500000 in serious circumstances the agency of social organization administration and registration may cancel its registration 24 Article 49 of the AML As for the imposition of the fines stipulated by the Article 46 47 and 48 of this Law the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall take elements such as the nature extent and time it lasts of the illegal act into consideration in determining the specific amount of the fines 25 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201506t20150601_156889html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 26 of 52

Facts

In April 2015 the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) issued administrative penalties on several brick manufacturers for entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements This is the first case relevant to monopolistic agreements that has been publicized by the SAIC since the beginning of this year

Ten cartel members were involved in the case including one company and nine individuals Similar with most antitrust cases the investigation started as a result of a whistle blowerrsquos submission After a thorough investigation Hunan AIC found that those local brick manufacturers had reached agreements on controlling production volume and dividing sales areas in the forms of production and sales agreements plans and meeting minutes

The enforcement authority reached the conclusion that these brick manufacturers violated article 13 of the AML and imposed a total fine of CNY 1389400 on them

Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC26

The organizer of the monopolistic agreement the animation association was fined CNY 100000

The antitrust authority did not punish the members of the monopolistic agreement

Facts

In December 2015 the Guangdong Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoGuangdong AICrdquo) published its administrative punishment decision in regards to Guangzhou Panyu Animation amp Game Association (ldquoGAGArdquo) organizing member companies to conclude a monopolistic agreement

According to the decision GAGA drafted the ldquoAgreement of Exhibition Alliancerdquo (ldquoAgreementrdquo) and convened a conference with member companies in order to discuss the content and conclusion of the Agreement 52 member companies entered into the Agreement which actually requested the alliance companies to merely participate in the exhibitions either organized or supported by GAGA in Guangzhou In addition the Agreement prohibited the alliance companies from attending any other exhibition except if they obtained prior approval of GAGA

After a thorough investigation Guangdong AIC believed that the conclusion of the Agreement among GAGA and the 52 member companies violated article 13 (5) of the AML in terms of boycott GAGA who was deeply involved and restricted member companiesrsquo choice of exhibitions through the Agreement could be deemed as

26 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151208_164680html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 27 of 52

the participant and organizer of the monopolistic agreement In accordance with article 46 of the AML Guangdong AIC imposed a fine of CNY 100000 on GAGA for organizing the conclusion of the monopolistic agreement

Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC27

Hubei AIC considered the coinsurance for Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance illegal

Twelve insurance companies were fined CNY 469 million in total

Facts

In December 2015 the Hubei Administrative for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHubei AICrdquo) disclosed its punishment on 12 insurance companies for signing illegal coinsurance agreements

The disclosed punishment decision suggests that the Hubei branch of China Pacific Life Insurance (ldquothe Companyrdquo) 11 other insurance companies and Wuhan Construction Safety Technology Consultation Center (ldquoWCSTCCrdquo) signed a Coinsurance Agreement on Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance (ldquoCoinsurance Agreementrdquo) of which the main contents include

1) The Company and 11 other involved companies as the coinsurers jointly take charge of the personal accident insurance concerned with the construction project directly administered by the Wuhan government WCSTCC is responsible for providing safety professionalism and technology services regarding the relevant personal accident insurance

2) The Company as the chief insurer of the coinsurance occupies 12 of the total amount of the insurance and the other 11 companies respectively occupy 8

3) The Company as the representative of the coinsurance is in charge of collecting the premium signing the standard form insurance policies and issuing the invoice in its own name The Company should share the charged premium with the other companies in accordance with the Coinsurance Agreement

4) Both the Company and the other insurance companies should pay 25 of the actually received premium to WCSTCC as the service fee WCSTCC will assist the coinsurers in providing safety and technology management service to the insured In addition the 11 insurance companies should pay 5 of their premium to the Company as the management fee

27 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165445html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 28 of 52

5) In case an accident happens the 12 companies will jointly bear the damages based on their respective shares in the coinsurance

6) There is a contact mechanism established in the coinsurance The coinsurers will regularly hold coinsurance conferences to discuss existing problems

Furthermore the coinsurers and WCSTCC also signed a self-discipline agreement and established a complete management system to assure the implementation of the Coinsurance Agreement Any party violating the Coinsurance Agreement would be punished

Hubei AIC found that WCSTCC was solely invested by Wuhan Construction Safety Management Association which was under Wuhan Construction Commission The centre helped implement certain functions of the Wuhan Urban Construction Safety Management Station and was responsible for quality supervision and safety supervision of municipal construction projects

It later became a prerequisite for construction companies to purchase insurance from any member of the coinsurance in order to get approval to commence their project According to the decision Hubei AIC launched another separate investigation against WCSTCC

Through the investigation Hubei AIC concluded that the Coinsurance Agreement constituted a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by article 13 of the AML with the following analysis

First coinsurance as a common business model to jointly share and lower risks is widely adopted in the insurance industry A coinsurance arrangement for a specific project in order to avoid high risks faced by one insurer could be legal However coinsurance should not target the entire market In this case prior to the Coinsurance Agreement the risks of the construction projects were unpredictable since the scale of the construction projects the difficulty of the construction and the amount of construction workers could not be available It is impossible to predict the risks of the projects thus it is not necessary to cooperate with other insurers to collectively bear the risks The purpose of the 12 insurance companies to establish the coinsurance is to avoid the competition which demonstrates the Coinsurance Agreement belongs to a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by the AML

Second the companies through entering into the coinsurance agreement actually divided the relevant market of construction project personal accident insurance in Wuhan city which affected the competition in the relevant market and damaged the interests of other competitors and the consumers In particular the Construction Law as amended in 2011 stipulates that the purchase of personal accident insurance is not mandatory and the construction companies have the right to choose whether to buy the said insurance or not As mentioned purchasing insurance from the coinsurance had been the prerequisite for construction companies to obtain administration

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 29 of 52

approval for the project which seriously distorts the fair competition in the market

Citing article 46 of the AML the 12 insurance companies were collectively fined CNY 469 million including fines on the companies and confiscation of illegal gains It is noteworthy that the fines were calculated based on the companiesrsquo 2014 annual sales of the insurance product in connection with the coinsurance The Company as the chief insurer was fined amounting to 6 of its 2014 annual sales of the relevant insurance product in the coinsurance and other companies were fined amounting to 2 of relevant sales For more specific information please see the following table

Company Name (Hubei Branch)

Fines (CNY million)

Percentage of the sales

Illegal Gains (CNY

million)

China Pacific Life Insurance 00653 6 0941

Sino Life 00145 2 04332

Alltrust Insurance 00145 2 04332

Taikang Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Continent Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Pacific Property Insurance

00145 2 04332

China Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

PICC Property and Casualty 00145 2 02599

Taiping General Insurance 00145 2 013

Union Life Insurance 00145 2 01177

Ping An Annuity Insurance Company of China

00145 2 04201

Ping An Property amp Casualty Insurance Company of China

00145 2 -

Subtotal 02248 - 44679

Total 46927

Analysis

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 30 of 52

Coinsurance as an effective approach to lower risks of insurers is widely used in the insurance industry Information sharing and agreements on coinsurance were generally considered efficient and legitimate However from an antitrust perspective coinsurance may raise competition concerns depending on the circumstances of each agreement In the case that there is enough capacity for one insurer to cover the potential risks the coinsurance might be considered as entering into a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC28

The first leniency applicant was exempted from fines

The other concrete companies were imposed a fine of CNY 180000

Facts

In December 2015 the concrete companies monopolistic agreement case investigated by Hunan AIC was published on SAICrsquos website

In accordance with the antitrust enforcement announcement of SAIC this case was triggered by complaints from the Yongzhou City peoplersquos congress After the preliminary review the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) initiated the formal investigation on seven concrete companies domiciled in Yongzhou City Hunan Province which were suspected of being involved in a monopolistic agreement in terms of division of the volumes of the products

After further investigation Hunan AIC found that the seven concrete companies concluded a partnership agreement in 2011 which requested the involved companies to enter into a partnership business with assets In addition according to the partnership agreement it was planned to establish a comprehensive office to manage production marketing and distribution of the products of all the partners The seven companies intended to jointly adjust and control the output of concrete based on the partnership agreement However because there were disagreements over the allocation of the injected assets and market shares the companies did not implement the partnership agreement The agreement was cancelled in December 2012

Based on the findings Hunan AIC concluded that the seven concrete companies as competitors of each other restricted and eliminated the competition in the relevant market through reaching the partnership agreement and dividing the volumes of sales which violated article 13(3) of the AML in terms of division of sales market Considering that the agreement had not been implemented and the limited influence of the agreement according to article 46 of the AML and article 27 of the Administrative Penalties Law small amount fines were imposed on the involved companies Six companies were fined CNY 30000 each for their illegal behaviour 28 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165504html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 31 of 52

Yongzhou Shuangyuan Building Materials Co Ltd as the first one to actively report the monopolistic agreement and cooperate with the enforcement authority was exempted from the punishment

Outlook

It is expected that the AMLrsquos enforcement on monopolistic agreements will continue in the future Industries such as automobile shipping pharmaceuticals insurance etc will still remain the priority of the antitrust enforcement

The antitrust enforcement authorities have published a series of regulations in order to clarify the substantial and procedural issues relevant to the antitrust enforcement However Chinarsquos current antitrust legislation regime is still immature In the following years we expect that more attention will be paid to the legislative improvements

Another remarkable issue for cartel members is that with more Chinese enterprises attaching increasing importance to the AML the follow-on civil damages actions might become a tendency in the future

C Abuse of Market Dominance

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen a decent increase of abuse of market dominance cases both in public enforcement and private litigation Oftentimes the authorities responsible for public enforcement generally find it difficult to pursue investigations against abuse of market dominance cases The following two main reasons are often cited to explain this standoff first it is hard for the authorities to define the relevant markets and prove the undertaking(s)rsquo dominant market position through economic approaches second it is hard to collect evidence regarding abusive practices

The cases related to IPRs abuse are emerging significantly particularly in the telecommunication media and technology (ldquoTMTrdquo) sectors

The SAICrsquos latest refusal-to-deal probe against a local drug maker shows that the SAIC and its local branches have increasingly acquired a profile as an abuse of dominance regulator

Significant Cases

Cases pursued by the SAIC

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 32 of 52

Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case29

Facts

The local authority in Dongfang city reported to the Hainan provincial branch of SAIC on April 23 2014 of the suspected dominance abuse The SAIC authorized its Hainan bureau to officially investigate the matter on 25 July 2014 according to a decision dated January 9 2015 The AIC concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its market dominance by requiring users to pay a deposit without any legal basis and or justifiable reasons

In terms of the relevant product market the local authority found that in this case it was the urban water supply market in Dongfang city and its surrounding townships where Dongfang Water was the sole public operator in the local water supply market with a 100 market share which made all water users completely reliant on the companyrsquos supply In term of market access the local authority found it very unlikely that there were other operators due to the strict regulations

The Hainan SAIC then concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its dominance as it charged users a deposit by threatening to refuse to register users and also by threatening to restrict the water supply Dongfang Waters charging of deposits lacked a legal basis and hadnt received government approval to the detriment of household consumers and business water users and hampered the improvement of management and services of the company Such conduct was in breach of Chinarsquos Anti-Monopoly Law

Hainan AIC levied a fine of CNY 593208 a lighter penalty equivalent to 2 of the companyrsquos annual sales for the previous year and confiscated illicit gains of CNY 38521 for abuse of market dominance

Analysis

It is noteworthy that although handled by a local authority supervised by the SAIC the antitrust agency detailed the relevant market definition the assessment of the dominant market position the abusive practices and the scrutiny of the justifiable reasons

Although the definition of the relevant market and the reasoning of the Hainan provincial AIC and the SAIC are subject to criticism it is still applausive to see that the antitrust regulators have realized the importance of the application of rule of reason in an abuse case In addition through itrsquos a published decision practitioners may observe the regulatorsrsquo reasoning and thus transparency and legal certainty have been generated

29 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzfcfjd201502t20150212_152066html last visited on October 18 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 33 of 52

Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms30

Facts

In June 2013 the Ningxia AIC under authorization of SAIC opened an antitrust investigation into the alleged tie-in sales by the three major state-owned telecommunications operators China Tietong China Unicom and China Telecom for the tie-in sale of fixed-line telephones with broadband Internet services The Ningxia AIC found that the three companies had bundled fixed-line phone services with Internet services to subscribers

During the investigation all three telecommunications companies admitted the tie-in practice had recognized that such practice had improper influence on competition and deprived the choices of consumers The three companies promised to undertake internal rectification timely and eliminate the ill effects resulting from such practice The parties committed to taking the following corrective measures

1) Taking internal rectifications and conducting training to staff about antitrust laws and stop tie-in sales practices

2) Making public commitments to allow subscribers a free choice of services and strengthening the propaganda through the operating room call centre and other channels

3) Unbundling fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

The Ningxia AIC decided to suspend the probe on 14 May 2015 on the grounds that the three companies had actively worked together with the investigators and proposed workable remedy plans

Analysis

In the official announcement Ningxia AIC concluded that the purpose of antitrust enforcement is to restrain monopolistic conducts the protection of competition and to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of consumers Given that during the investigation process the parties had actively cooperated with the investigation formed a more profound understanding of the dangers of tying behaviour and moreover the parties proposed and implemented positive corrective measures to be able to remove the ill impact of their actions the agency believed that the purpose of antitrust law enforcement was fulfilled

It is worth noting that the Ningxia AIC also required the three companies to implement the commitment by August 30 2015and the submission of the written

30 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158908html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158906html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158910html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 34 of 52

implementation report on July 102015 and August 102015 respectively which is another illustration that an effective commitment by the undertakings shall directly deal with the effect that is brought by the monopolistic behaviour In this case the effect of the monopolistic act was restricted to the choice of the consumers therefore the commitment by the undertaking aimed at allowing the freedom of choice and the unbundling of fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company31

Facts

The Liaoning AIC imposed a fine of approximately CNY 433m on the Fushun Branch of Liaoning Tobacco Co on 1 June 2015 The agency also ordered the company to stop its illicit behaviour

The Liaoning AIC received a tip-off that the accused Liaoning Tobacco Corsquos Fushun branch was conducting tie-in sales of non-high-demand cigarette brands with high-demand cigarette brands After gaining authorization from SAIC the agency officially started an investigation regarding the companyrsquos suspected abuse of market dominance in June 2014

Analysis

According to the announcement the tobacco company argued that the tobacco industry is a state controlled or monopolized industry with a lawful monopolistic position therefore the company shall not be subject to the norms of general market competition rules or the anti-monopoly law

In this regards the agency concluded that in terms of the status of the undertaking admittedly the first paragraph of article 17 of the AML says that the State shall protect the lawful business operations of undertakings in these industries with respect to the industries which are under the control of the State-owned economic sector and have a bearing on the lifeline of the national economy or national security and the industries which exercise monopoly over the production and sale of certain commodities according to law However the second paragraph continues to say that the undertakings mentioned above shall do business according to law be honest faithful and strictly self-disciplined and subject themselves to public supervision and they shall not harm the consumers interests by taking advantage of their position of control or their monopolistic production and sale of certain commodities In particular in the preceding paragraph the ldquolawful businessrdquo and ldquoaccording to lawrdquo imply that the AML shall apply in the business operation The agency therefore believes that

31 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201508t20150813_16

0208html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 35 of 52

there shall be no exemption for the undertaking concerned the defences of the undertaking concerned is not established

Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm32

Facts

The Chongqing AIC fined Chongqing Qingyang Pharmaceutical CNY 439308 for alleged dominance abuse

The investigation was initiated when the company contacted the agency for verification on its potential breach of the AML related to an allopurinol active pharmaceuticals ingredient (API) distribution agreement with its exclusive distributor The company provided the relevant agreement and information and the agency conducted an investigation into the company and some other relevant companies

Analysis

Relevant Market

During the investigation the agency found that pharmaceutical ingredients are a special commodity the API is used to produce the preparations The chemical API is only used for the production of the preparation and could be used as a medicine for clinic use

The preparation is produced according to the requirements of certain form of prepared drugs and for the purpose of treatment and prevention which can be used as medicine

The allopurinol is used for the common treatment of hyperuricemia However the other treatments are different in pharmacological effects or treatment effects as well as in the cost for the patient Furthermore the company is the only manufacturer and supplier in the market nationwide since July 2012 Therefore the agency concluded that the relevant market is the allopurinol API market

Considering that the qualification for manufacturing the allopurinol API is national wide and the normal practice for purchasers and suppliers is domestic the relevant geographic market is the Chinese market

The Market Dominance

During the investigation the agency found that the company is the only supplier and manufacturer of allopurinol API in China there is no other competitor in the

32 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151222_16

5152html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 36 of 52

market and the company has a monopoly in the market The evidence shows that the company has the ability to control the prices the position for the downstream is relatively weak

With respect to the market entry the agency found that the market entry is relatively high in addition other undertakings are dependent on the company Thus the agency believed the company to have market dominance

Refusal to Deal

The agency found that on September 25 2015 the company reached an exclusive agreement and distribution agreement with its distributor Based on these agreements the company didnrsquot supply allopurinol API to the said distributor and other companies despite the fact that those companies requested for allopurinol API but were turned down by the company

Absence of Reasonable Cause

The agency found that the companyrsquos refusal to deal was not in line with the needs of normal business operation or economic efficiency On the other hand the refusal to deal was aimed at increasing the market share of the allopurinol drug product Also the agency found that the stop of supply was a manipulation of market power as to maximize the profit to the most The agency further found that the exclusive distribution agreement with suspension of supply for six months and the refusal to supply was to eliminate and restrict the competition as to gain the monopolistic profit

The Consequence of Refusal to Deal

The agency concluded that the refusal to deal harmed the competition of the allopurinol preparations market Because of the suspension of supply many demanders had to reduce their production or switch to the supply of other products or stop their production The suspension of supply affected the competition of the downstream market Consequently the raising of the price of allopurinol API also raised the cost for other manufacturers of allopurinol preparations

Furthermore the refusal to deal led to capacity loss of the allopurinol preparation industry

Ultimately the refusal to deal increased the burden on consumers as the refusal to supply changed the supply-demand relationship in the market

The agency concluded that the Company abused its dominant position in the allopurinol API market by refusing to deal with intended buyers in the period between October 2013 and March 2014Therefore the Company violated article 17 (1) of the AML which prohibits business operators with a dominant market position from abusing that position such as the refusal to deal without any justifications

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 37 of 52

D Administrative Monopoly

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 witnessed antitrust authoritiesrsquo significant efforts regarding the enforcement against administrative monopoly According to Mr Dong Zhiming the deputy director general of Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly Bureau ever since the AML coming into force six cases in connection with administrative monopoly were investigated by NDRC and among them five cases were handled in the year of 2015 These cases touched abuses of administrative power in terms of designative deal in relation to transportation communication and pharmaceutical industries

The first private litigation related to administrative monopolistic acts was heard in the court which is a milestone case in the enforcement of the AML

Significant Cases

Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC33

Facts

In March 2015 the NDRC released the official letter to Shandong Provincial Department of Transportation (ldquoShandong DOTrdquo) on its website with respect to correct its abuse of administrative power to exclude and restrict competition

During the investigation the NDRC found that since 2011 Shandong DOT had issued multiple relevant government orders in order to require certain types of vehicles to be directly connected to two designated information and service platforms both of which are operated and technically supported by one company namely Shandong Jiutong Internet of Things Technology Co Ltd (ldquoJiutong ITTrdquo) Furthermore according to the orders issued by the competent administrative department all the vehicle satellite positioning terminals entering into Shandong provincial market should be debugged through the said technology service platform which is operated by the mentioned company In addition Shandong DOT released the cap prices of vehicle satellite positioning terminals which is identical to the 2012 bid-winning price in the Ministry of Transportation demonstration project

The NDRC believed that Shandong DOTrsquos behaviour eliminated and restricted the competition in the monitoring platform market and the vehicle terminal market deprived the right of transportation enterprises to choose vehicle terminals and monitoring platform on their owns unreasonably raised the sales prices of vehicle terminals and service fees charged by the platform and increased the costs of transportation enterprises Therefore the antitrust agency concluded that Shandong

33 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201503t20150327_668911html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 38 of 52

DOT violated article 8 of the AML which stipulates that ldquoadministrative organs and the public organizations with an administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude and restrict competitionrdquo Specifically Shandong DOT violated article 3234 in terms of requiring organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any designated operators and violated article 3735 in terms of setting rules with contents which eliminate and restrict competition

Based on article 51 of the AML ldquoWhere administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations abuse administrative powers performing activities which exclude and restrict competition the superior entity shall order it to correct impose administrative penalty on the chief officer and other staffs directly responsible pursuant to the laws The AML enforcement authority may give recommendations on disposal of activities to the relevant superior entityrdquo the NDRC proposed in writing that the Shandong provincial government should order Shandong DOT to rectify its behaviour with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Entirely open up the monitoring platform market by permitting transportation undertakings to freely choose any approved platform

2) Loosen the restrictions on the entry into Shandong vehicle terminals permit the undertakings to independently select the supplier of vehicle terminals and allow the qualified terminals to be connected to the relevant monitoring platform and

3) Revoke the official documentation relevant to the cap price of vehicle terminals in order to promote the price competition

Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 36

Facts

On 26 August 2015 the NDRC published its second decision with regard to the rectification of administrative monopoly since the beginning of this year According to the proposal letter sent to Anhui Provincial Government the investigation against the Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City (Bengbu HFPC) was trigged by third partiesrsquo complaints

34 Article 32 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to require organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any operators designated by them 35 Article 37 of the AML Administrative organs shall not abuse their administrative powers to set rules with contents which eliminate restrict competition 36 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201508t20150826_748682html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 39 of 52

The investigation suggests that Bengbu HFPC published three notices with regard to drugs procurement in April and May of this year

In the No C-2015-CG-X-111 Notice (ldquoNo111 Noticerdquo) released on 10 April2015 the health authority not only provided the dosage form and qualification of the requested drugs but also directly determined the suppliers of relevant drugs which eliminated and restricted the competition among pharmaceutical manufacturers and therefore violated articles 32 and 37 of the AML

In the No C-2015-CG-C-112 Notice (ldquoNo112 Noticerdquo) and No C-2015-CG-C-168 (ldquoNo 168 Noticerdquo) respectively released on 10 April and 22 May 2015 the Bengbu HFPC set discriminative qualification requirements on non-local undertakings in order to restrict their participation in the relevant bidding For instance in accordance with No 112 Notice to be a qualified bidder the turnover of non-local undertakings shall exceed CNY 2 billion which is 50 times as much as the turnover requirements of the local undertakings In the NDRCrsquos opinion the administrative monopoly activities conducted by the local health agency excluded the relevant undertakings from the market maintained the virtual-high prices of drugs and therefore violated articles 3237 and 37 of the AML

The NDRC suggested in a letter that Anhui Provincial Government should urge the Bengbu HFPC to rectify the abuse of monopoly powers with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Stop setting distinguishing restrictions on qualification requirements review standards and numbers of winning bidders as for local and non-local undertakings

2) Stop designating the suppliers of competitive drugs and

3) Take necessary measures to mitigate the negative effects resulting from the previous illegal monopolistic abuses

Outlook

At the beginning of the year the former director general of the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau under the NDRC Xu Kunlin stated that the agency would strengthen antitrust enforcement on abuse of administrative power in 2015

Since then the NDRC has made great efforts to rectify unreasonable abuses of administrative power The currently disclosed two cases investigated by the NDRC re-emphasize the Chinese Governmentrsquos strict scrutiny of antitrust issues in respect of

37 Article 34 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to restrict or reject the participation of operators from other regions in local bidding activities by measures such as prescribing discriminatory qualification requirements or assessment standards or by not publishing information according to law

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 40 of 52

administrative monopoly It reminds the local governments that antitrust compliance is of significant importance

III Private Litigation

A Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen more and more private antitrust litigations

The private antitrust litigation cases have become increasingly complicated especially the issues regarding the intersection areas of IP and antitrust law

Multinational giants and State-Owned Enterprises (the ldquoSOEsrdquo) are increasingly becoming the targets in antitrust civil litigations Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (the ldquoSMEsrdquo) tend to use the antitrust litigation to achieve their commercial goals in the business context

B Significant Cases

Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)38

This is the first-ever private litigation concerning administrative monopoly since the implementation of the AML in 2008

Facts

According to the currently disclosed details the case is relevant for designated trade

The plaintiff Shenzhen Sware Technology Co Ltd (ldquoSwarerdquo) is a software company The press releases suggest that Sware Gloden Software Co Ltd (ldquoGlodenrdquo) and Shanghai Ruban Software Co Ltd (ldquoShanghai Rubanrdquo) are the three main suppliers of construction cost software and possess the major shares of the relevant market An annual provincial vocational ability contest regarding the construction cost hosted by the Guangdong Department of Education (ldquoGuangdong DOE) designated Gloden as the exclusive supplier of the relevant software

After several unsuccessful verbal and written negotiations with Guangdong DOE in April 2014 Sware filed a lawsuit against Guangdong DOE before the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquothe Courtrdquo) alleging that the administrative organ abused its administrative power and violated the AML by designating exclusive software supplier for the contest and claimed a compensation for reasonable expense amounting to CNY 10800 Yuan

The opinions of the Court 38 The story of the case is available at httpfinancesinacomcnchinadfjj20150410074621924997shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 41 of 52

The full text of the judgment has not been disclosed yet In accordance with the information available to the public the Court invoked article 32 of the AML which prohibits an administrative organ from abusing its administrative power to require or in disguised form organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use only the commodities supplied by the entities designated by them The Court concluded that Guangdong DOE failed to prove the legitimacy of the designation and therefore abused its administration power

Currently the case is in appeal before the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court

Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 39

It is the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China

In the first instance ruling Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court ruled against Sinopec holding that the Yunnan branch of Sinopecs trading company was obligated to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its dominance in the sales market of refined oil by refusing to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding without justifiable reasons

In the second instance ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors Currently the case is pending

Facts

The First Trial

The lawsuit was filed before the Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoKunming Courtrdquo) in January 2014 Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy Co Ltd (ldquoYingdingrdquo) a bio-energy manufacturer claimed that Sinopec and the Yunnan branch of Sinopec trading company (ldquoSinopec Yunnan Branchrdquo) had failed to fulfil their obligations stipulated in the Renewable Energy Law and had abused their market dominance in sales market of refined oil by refusing to trade with Yingding without justifiable reasons

Sinopec and Sinopec Yunnan Branch mainly explained four reasons for why they rejected Yingdingrsquos biofuel Firstly Yingding had failed to prove that the biofuel complied with the relevant national standard and was safe to use Secondly Yingding had failed to provide complete trading terms Thirdly the laws and regulations regarding biofuel were incomplete the authorized refined oil sales companies were 39 The details of the case are available at httpnewsxinhuanetcomfortune2014-1217c_1113680039htm httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=9e71db51-6ff6-4d2c-8af6-8eacf023ebdeampKeyWord=E4BA91E58D97E79B88E9BC8E|E4B8ADE79FB3E58C96 httpnewsxinhuanetcomenergy2015-0422c_127721575htm httpwwwnbdcomcnarticles2015-04-23911348html last visited on December 17 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 42 of 52

obligated to purchase biofuel from the biofuel manufacturers if it met certain quality standards but there was a vacancy regarding how to reach the end consumers from the sales companies

On 8 December 2014 the Kunming Intermediate Peoples Court ruled that Sinopec Yunnan Branch bore a legal obligation to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its market dominance in refined oil market by refusing without any justifiable reasons to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding The court ordered Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network within 30 days Both Yingding and Sinopec filed appeals to the Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court

The Appellate Trial

The appeal hearing was held on 22 April 2015 in Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoYunnan Courtrdquo) Sinopec submitted 23 new pieces of evidence and introduced two expert witnesses in a bid to overturn several key elements in the first-instance ruling by Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court

In terms of the determination of the relevant market and the market dominance Sinopec argued that the relevant market in this case was for adipic acid monomethyl ester (ldquoAAMErdquo) the main ingredient of a biofuel additive known as BD100 Yingdingrsquos main product is BD100 which can be blended with fossil diesel to become biofuel In the AAME market Sinopec is a potential buyer instead of a market dominator In support of this argument Sinopec presented an expert witnessmdashGong Jiong a professor of economics at Beijings University of International Business and Economics who testified that AAME should be defined as the relevant product market on the basis of an economic analysis

However Yingding insisted that the first-instance ruling was correct in naming the sales market of refined oil as the relevant market and submitted new evidence an article on Sinopecs website that claimed it had a 67 market share in Yunnan to help establish the claim that Sinopec had market dominance

Another main dispute was whether Yingdingrsquos biofuel product met national standards which would make it mandatory for Sinopec to purchase under Chinas Renewable Energy Law The law stipulates that biofuel producers must sell their products first to an authorized refined oil sales company and the sales companies are obliged to buy the fuel if it meets certain quality standards In order to test the quality Sinopec introduced the second expert witness Lin Jianmin a leading author of Chinarsquos national biofuel standard Lin Jianmin pointed out that there are currently quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology which gives Sinopec a justifiable reason not to trade with Yingding Moreover Sinopec presented some precedents in which consumers had complained about the biofuel quality and also claimed that China didnt have a sound regulatory framework to support biofuel production neither in testing nor in sales

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 43 of 52

Nevertheless to refute this point Yingding referred to an earlier test in co-operation with Sinopec in 2011 where selected buses in Kunming used biofuel blended by Sinopec using BD100 produced by Yingding

On August 13 2015 Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors and now this case is pending In the written appellate ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court did not provide any details regarding its reasoning

Key Issues of the Case

Is there any competition between Yingding and Sinopec

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case the product of Yingding is biofuel while Sinopec does not engage in the business of biofuel From this perspective Yingding and Sinopec are not competitors Thus it is not necessary and not reasonable for Sinopec to eliminate or restrict the competition from Yingding

Relevant Market

The definition of the relevant market is a prerequisite to determine whether competition exists and whether the AML is applicable In accordance with the Judicial Interpretation of Antitrust civil litigation the plaintiff shall take the responsibility to prove the defendantrsquos dominance in the relevant market Also the methods of defining the relevant market are stipulated in the Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition (ldquoGuidelinesrdquo) However both Yingding and Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court defined the relevant market as the sales market of refined oil without sufficient antitrust analysis none of the methods in the Guidelines were used Therefore the definition of the relevant market remains arguable and needs to be sufficiently analysed in the upcoming retrial

Justifiable Reasons

The abuse of market dominance includes the behaviour of refusing to trade without justifiable reasons according to the AML but in the first instance ruling justifiable reasons were not investigated by the court During the appellate trial the expert witness introduced by Sinopec claimed that there were quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology and this was a justifiable reason to refuse to trade with Yingding Even though the first instance court and the appellate court did not reason the justifiable reason it should be discussed and investigated further during the retrial

AML or Renewable Energy Law

The claims of Yingding were based on both the AML and the Renewable Energy Law (ldquoRELrdquo) and the first instance ruling referred to both the AML and the REL as

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 44 of 52

well It seems that the laws the first instance court referred to were comprehensive but in fact the reasoning was not clear and logical In the first instance ruling some disputes regarding the AML were reviewed but all the orders were not based on the AML Specifically the first instance court ordered the Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network based on the REL and dismissed the other claims That the orders were not on account of reasoning is illogical It is anticipated that during the retrial the application of the laws will be clearer

Analysis

A lot of issues have not been clearly analysed by the courts such as the relevant market and the justifiable reasons Since the case is remanded the above-mentioned issues are expected to be resolved in the retrial In addition Yingding was in a disadvantaged position compared to its first instance trial since its claims based on the AML were challenged greatly during the appellate trial In the retrial it is probable that Yingding may switch its litigation strategy and base its claims on the REL Therefore maybe more preparation regarding the REL can give Sinopec a leg up

Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)

Rijing Electric a Chinese distributor seeks CNY 5m compensation

The first hearing was on 9 June 2015 and ended without a ruling

Facts

Rijing Electric (ldquoRijingrdquo) a Shanghai-based company and a former distributor for Panasonic accused Panasonic of abusing its dominance and dividing the market through monopolistic practice in an antitrust lawsuit filed in 2014 with Shanghai No 1 Intermediate Court (ldquoShanghai Courtrdquo) claiming compensation of CNY 5m (USD 815370) Wenzhou Mingda Automation System Co and Shanghai Qingying Automation Equipment as the distributor of Panasonic in China are the co-defendants were accused of conducting monopolistic behaviours by implementing Panasonicrsquos policy

The first hearing for evidence exchange was on June 9 2015 Rijing claimed a policy allegedly introduced by Panasonic in 2009 restricted the competition between distributors Panasonic claims the policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo and has full justifiable reasons It explained that the products in question required customization at considerable cost to distributors before its sale to customers Once carried out however other distributors leaving them open to quote much lower prices than the original distributor could simply and relatively cheap replicate this customization Besides Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and that the plaintiff had failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic said its market share for the four products

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 45 of 52

under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases Also Rijing failed to challenge the policy when it was first introduced instead initially agreeing it was reasonable as e-mail evidence submitted by Panasonic suggests

Key Issues of the Case

Whether Panasonic occupied a market dominant position

It is reported that Rijing claimed that Panasonic had abused its market dominance but Rijing failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and its market share for the four products under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases

Analysis

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case Panasonicrsquos policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo rather than to eliminate or restrict competition

Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals40 (Pending)

It is a battle over patent licensing issues

It is viewed as being among the most complicated antitrust lawsuits in China

The first hearing was on 17 and 18 December 2015

Facts

Four Chinese rare earth companies Ningbo Ketian Magnet Ningbo Permanent Magnetics Ningbo Tongchuang Strong Magnet Material and Ningbo Huahui Magnetic Industry filed antitrust lawsuits against Hitachi Metals over alleged patent licensing issues regarding rare earth magnets on December 11 2014 with the Ningbo Intermediate Peoples Court (ldquoNingbo Courtrdquo) in Zhejiang province As reported four Chinese rare earth companies claimed Hitachi Metals abused its market dominance and hurt the industry competition by refusing to license the patents to them The patents in this case are used in the manufacturing of sintered neodymium iron boron (ldquoNdFeBrdquo) magnets a rare-earth magnet alloy widely used in parts for airplanes automobiles and other products

Hitachi Metals filed a challenge with the Ningbo Court over its jurisdiction in April 2015 After Ningbo Court rejected Hitachi Metals jurisdiction objection on 28 April 2015 Hitachi Metals appealed to the Zhejiang High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoZhejiang

40The details of the story are available at httpwwwzbmagcomnews_viewphpid=80 httpwwwhitachicomcnaboutpress201510-121118_ahtml last visited on December 22 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 46 of 52

Courtrdquo) but Zhejiang Court affirmed the ruling of the Ningbo Court

The first day of a two-day hearing took place on 17 December 2015 during which the two sides cross-examined each otherrsquos evidence The evidence focused on clearing up several key elements in the case including the relevant market whether Hitachi Metals has dominance on that market and whether both sides acted in good faith during the licensing negotiations

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Product Market

The four Chinese rare earth companies claimed that the relevant product market should be the NdFeb-related patent licensing market However Hitachi Metals believed that the physical NdFeb market rather than the patent licensing market should be the relevant product market which is meaningful for assess the real competitive effects on the market

Whether Hitachi Metals occupies a dominant market position

In terms of market dominance Hitachi Metals claimed it does not occupy a dominant position because Hitachi Metalsrsquo patents were not in a standard in this case and there are substitutable technologies in the market SEP holders have the obligation to license on FRAND terms but none-SEP holders do not So while a refusal to license a SEP may constitute abuse of dominance refusal to license a non-SEP mdash even by a patent holder with a dominant position mdash should not be considered as an abuse

Analysis

Hitachi Metals as a patent holder should have the right to decide whether to retain those patents or not or who to license According to the legal theory the purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage and protect innovation by conferring monopoly right mdash that is to give intellectual property owners the proprietary rights which can exclude others from using the intellectual property The SEP holders admittedly need to comply with FRAND terms which can maintain a robust balance between competition and monopoly whereas the further intervention of antitrust law into non-SEP patents may undermine the purpose of intellectual property law To which extent the antitrust law should intervene is yet to be seen

Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei41

A confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the Beijing IP court made by the Beijing High Court

41 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcncpwswbjzscq201511t20151103_12225640htm last visited on December 28 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 47 of 52

Facts

On August 2 2013 the NDRC penalized Abbott for monopolistic price-fixing and then Abbott made a price adjustment in China where the prices of main products were reduced

On December 16 2014 Tian Junwei (ldquoTianrdquo) a Chinese citizen in Beijing sued Carrefour Shuangjing Branch (ldquoCarrefourrdquo) and Abbott (Shanghai) Sales Company (ldquoAbbottrdquo) at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (ldquoIP Courtrdquo) for their monopolistic price-fixing which damaged his interests However Carrefour and Abbott challenged the jurisdiction of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court They claimed there were two reasons Firstly according to the jurisdiction rules of the IP court issued by the Supreme Court the IP court has no jurisdiction over anti-trust cases Secondly if this case is a contractual dispute the court that is in the place of Carrefour should hear it if this case is a tort dispute the Shanghai Intermediate Court should hear it

In the ruling of the IP Court the IP Court decided it has the jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases for the following reasons According to the Provisions On Causes Of Action In Civil Cases issued by Supreme Court (最高人民法院案由规定) antimonopoly dispute is a tertiary cause of action belonging to IP and competition disputes Also according to the Provisions concerning the Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京

市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问题的规定 ) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was an IP and competition dispute and was sued after November 6 2014 Thus the IP Court had jurisdiction

Both Carrefour and Abbott appealed to the Beijing High Court over the jurisdiction ruling but the Beijing High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original ruling Reasons are listed in the written ruling issued on June 18 2015 Firstly the nature of the case was an antimonopoly dispute In accordance with Provisions of the Supreme Peoples Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民

事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) and Civil Litigation Law the monopolistic civil disputes in the first instance shall be under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Peoples Courts and an action involving a contractual dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the peoples court of the place where the defendant is domiciled or where the contract is performed Carrefour as the defendant in this case is domiciled in Chaoyang District Beijing Therefore the courts of Beijing have jurisdiction over this case Secondly according to article 3 of the Notification on the Jurisdiction of Intellectual Property Courts issued by Supreme Court (关于知识产权法院案件管辖

等有关问题的通知) IP courts have jurisdiction over first-instance civil disputes arising from monopolistic practices Lastly according to Provisions concerning the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 10 of 52

AML which provides that the concentration reaching the filling thresholds shall be notified to MOFCOM prior to its implementation and without this notification it shall not be conducted In addition according to article 48 of the AML and article 13 of the Interim Measures for Investigating and Punishing of Concentration of Undertakings Failing to File Notification an undertaking which is identified by MOFCOM for implementing a concentration without filling would be imposed a fine and instructed to recover the situation by MOFCOM The amount of this fine could be no more than CNY 500000

There is no provision that specifically describes the behaviour of implementing a concentration In practice obtaining a business license transferring the entity of assets delivering the shares and assigning directors or managers are likely to be deemed as the implementation of concentration

According to Shang Ming the former director general of MOFCOMrsquos Anti-monopoly Bureau so far MOFCOM has already penalized 15 companies for failing to notify MOFCOM regarding merger reviews MOFCOM has noticed an increase in companies shirking merger-filing responsibilities and has therefore intensified enforcement

MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent12

MOFCOM defines all of the information and communication technology SEPs as the relevant product market rather than divides each of them into the individual market

In the process of competition analysis MOFCOM evaluates various factors rather than comparing the market shares only which is consistent with the complexity and flexibility of the high-technology industry

In the process of formulating remedies MOFCOM pays more attention on protecting Chinese downstream companies and enhancing its supervision

Facts

On April 15 2015 Nokia Oyi (ldquoNokiardquo) signed a Memorandum of Understanding regarding the acquisition of Alcatel Lucent (ldquoAlcatelrdquo) According to this memorandum Nokia intends to acquire 100 shares of Alcatel through a tender off

A notification about this deal was filed on April 21 2015 and accepted by MOFCOM on June 15 2015 After reviewing this case MOFCOM moved it to Phases II and Phase III as the agency was of the opinion that this acquisition could have anti-competitive effects on the relevant market

12 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151020151001139743shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 11 of 52

On October 19 2015 MOFCOM cleared this deal with four behavioural remedies

Decision

Relevant Market

In the agencyrsquos view there are four relevant product markets which are the radio access network market the core network systems market the network infrastructure service market and the information and communication technology SEP licensing market Meanwhile the relevant geographical market is primarily the Chinese market

Competition Analysis

According to MOFCOM this deal would have no anti-competitive effects on the first three relevant product markets in China while it could constitute an obstacle or limit the competition in the information and communication technology SEP licensing market

The agency consideredafter the deal that Nokia would increase its holding in 2G 3G and 4G SEPs and strengthen the degree of concentration in the information and communication technology SEP licensing market If it refused to license charged overly high royalty fees or conducted any other anti-competitive behaviour the competition of downstream market would be distorted which would most likely impair customersrsquo interests in the end

Remedies

Four behavioural remedies focusing on maintaining fair licensing of standard-essential patents (ldquoSEPsrdquo) were imposed on Nokia which are

1) On a reciprocal basis Nokia commits to not use injunctions to prevent enforcements of FRAND (fair reasonable and non-discriminatory) encumbered SEPs unless the potential licensees are unwilling to sign FRAND licensing agreements and follow the terms

2) If Nokia transfers its SEPs to a third party it shall inform Chinese licensees as well as Chinese companies that are actively engaging in licensing negotiation about the transfer details

3) Nokia will only transfer its SEPs to a new owner on the basis that the new owner accepts the existing FRAND commitments made by Nokia

4) MOFCOM has the right to monitor the implementation of Nokiarsquos commitments Nokia shall report to MOFCOM about the implementation of the conditions within 45 days of the end of each calendar year The reporting obligation will last five years until October18 2020

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 12 of 52

Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions13

Western Digital had engaged in two conducts that violated the remedies provided in the No 9 Announcement in 2012 issued by MOFCOM

Western Digital lodged an application to remove certain restrictions in March 2014 and the agency made the decision on October 19 2015

MOFCOM considered the fact that the competition condition in the relevant product market has changed and decided to remove the hold-separate restrictions related to manufacture and RampD

Facts

In 2012 Western Digital Corporation (ldquoWestern Digitalrdquo) intended to acquire 100 shares of Viviti Technologies Ltd (ldquoViviti Technologiesrdquo) which was the holding company of Hitachi Global Storage Technologies Netherlands BV and Hitachi Global Storage Technologies Singapore Pte Ltd and engaged in the hard disk business

On April 2 2011 Western Digital filed a notification for this acquisition MOFCOM issued the No 9 Announcement in March 2012 and cleared this acquisition with six remedies According to this announcement Western Digital could apply for the removal of the first and second remedy after this decision has been carried out for 24 months

The first remedy refers to maintaining the Viviti Technologies as an independent competitor and the second remedy requires both Western Digital and Viviti Technologies to make a reasonable plan of their capacity and production and report these data to the trustee

Western Digital lodged an application to remove the first and second remedy in March 2014 MOFCOM found that Western Digital had engaged in two conducts that violated the first remedy and the competitive situation in the hard disk market had changed After talking with Western Digital collecting opinions from the relevant entities and delegating the independent party to make an economic evaluation MOFCOM decided to remove the hold-separate remedies partially

Western Digitalrsquos implementation of the duties imposed in the No 9 Announcement

Based on the implementation reports submitted by Western Digital and the monitoring reports submitted by the trustee MOFCOM found that Western

13 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151020151001139040shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 13 of 52

Digital had engaged in two conducts that violated the first remedy Those were

1) On March 8 2012 Western Digital consolidated Hitachi Global Storage Technology (ldquoHGSTrdquo) which was Vivitirsquos subsidiary in US

2) In January 2013 Western Digital dissolved the development division of VivitiHGST and transferred the relevant workforce to Western Digital

MOFCOM considered that these conducts impaired the independence of Viviti as a competitor so that it imposed CNY 300000 fines on each of these behaviours and requested Western Digital to rectify the situation As per the entrusted supervisorrsquos report such behaviours have been rectified and the first remedy has been fulfilled

According to MOFCOMrsquos announcement the agency found that other remedies have been entirely implemented

Competition Analysis

With respect to the current situation of the competition in the hard disk market MOFCOM made the following assessment

1) In the areas of portable application and corporate-level application solid-state drive has put constraint on the impact of the traditional hard disk as to strengthen the competition in the relevant market

2) Overcapacity problems in the conventional hard disk drive market became obvious

3) Western Digital and HGST are the major competitors in the hard disk drive market Both the layout and the major market competitors in this market have remained unchanged since 2012

4) The hold-separate duties restricted the full competition between Western Digital and HGST The implementation of such duties hindered them from integrating their products and providing the market with a full range of products and had an adverse impact on their clientsrsquo product procurement

Based on the above analysis MOFCOM deemed that

1) Removal of the conditions that required the two companies to remain independent in production and RampD activities would enable Western Digital to save costs to provide a full range of products to the market and to fully engage in market competition and benefit its clients

2) To keep the two sales teams and their respective brands independent from each other and the independence of sales activities could reduce competition restraint impacts arising from a complete merger

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 14 of 52

Remedies

After negotiating with MOFCOM the relevant entities agreed to undertake the following obligations

1) Western Digital and HGST will remain independent in sales and brands

2) Western Digital will not change its previous business modes or force its clients to exclusively purchase hard disk drive products from Western Digital or do so in disguise

3) Western Digital will continue its pace in investing in product innovation to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

This announcement will be effective within two years from the date of issuance If Western Digital can provide sufficient evidence to prove a substantial change in the market environment the company can propose to MOFCOM to remove the relevant conditions within the two years

SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions14

MOFCOM considered the fact that the competition condition in the relevant product market has changed and removed the hold-separate restrictions on Seagate and Samsung

Seagate shall remain its business model materially and continue to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

Facts

On December 12 2011 MOFCOM made the No 11 Announcement to clear Seagate Technology LLCrsquos (ldquoSeagaterdquo) acquisition with remedies In this acquisition Seagate intended to acquire hard disk drive business of Samsung Electronics Co Ltd (ldquoSamsung HDDrdquo) As per this announcement Seagate could apply for removing the first and second remedy after this decision has been carried out for 12 months

The first remedy is to preserve Samsung HDD as an independent competitor and the second remedy asks to maintain and expand Samsung HDDrsquos production capacity within six months of issuance of the No 11 Announcement and to set reasonable production volume targets based on market supply-demand conditions

Seagate lodged an application to remove the first and second remedy in May 2015 After making assessments on the relevant parties and the competition circumstance MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate remedies

14 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151020151001144105shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 15 of 52

Competition Analysis

With respect to the current situation of the competition in the hard disk drive market MOFCOM made the following assessments

1) In the areas of portable application and corporate-level application solid-state drive has put constraint on the impact of the traditional hard disk so that the competition in the relevant market has been strengthened

2) Overcapacity problems in the conventional hard disk drive market became obvious

3) Both the layout and the major market competitors in the hard disk drive market have remained unchanged since 2012

4) Seagate and Samsung HDDrsquos market overlap in the hard disk market is quite small and Samsung HDDrsquos competition in the traditional hard disk is quite weak

Based on the above analysis MOFCOM deemed that

1) Removal of certain conditions is possible because in the portable application and corporate level application sectors competition constraint of solid-state drive on traditional hard disk drives has strengthened traditional hard disk drives are facing overcapacity which has reduced the chance of a single or more competitors causing competition restraints Seagate has limited overlap with Samsung in the hard disk business and the latter has a relatively weaker market power in the hard drive disk business

2) Removal of all imposed conditions may still restrain market competition because the traditional hard disk drive market competition conditions have not undergone a major change Seagate is still the major player in all divisions of the market and Seagate will strengthen its power after the acquisition of Samsung HDD

Remedies

After negotiating with MOFCOM Seagate agreed to undertake the following obligations

1) Seagate shall not change its business model materially or force clients to purchase hard drive disks exclusively from it

2) Seagate shall not force Tokyo Dengikagaku Kogyo China to supply magnetic heads exclusively to Seagate (or other Seagate-controlled companies) or limit the number of magnetic heads Tokyo Dengikagaku Kogyo China would supply to other hard drive disk manufacturers

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 16 of 52

3) Seagate shall continue to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

This announcement will be effective within two years from the date of issuance If Seagate can provide sufficient evidence to prove substantial change in the market environment the company can propose to MOFCOM to remove relevant conditions within the two years

FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM15

MOFCOM deems that this acquisition would induce anti-competitive influence

NXP promises to dispose its radio frequency (ldquoRFrdquo) power transistor business

As the first case approved with structural remedies after the enactment of the Provisions on Imposing Restrictive Conditions MOFCOM conducted a comprehensive evaluation of the viability competitiveness and marketability of the divested business as well as the suitability of potential buyers

Facts

On April 3 2015 NXP filed for its acquisition of Freescale NXP Semiconductor (ldquoNXPrdquo) is a NASDAQ-listed company registered in the Netherlands which engages in the design manufacturing and sale of integration circuits and discrete components

Freescale Semiconductor (ldquoFreescalerdquo) is a New York-listed company registered in Bermuda and based in the US which engages in the manufacturing and RampD of microcontroller and digital networking processors (embedded processors)

According to the agreement between NXP and Freescale after closing Freescale will become the wholly owned subsidiary of NXP On November 25 2015 MOFCOM decided to clear this acquisition with remedies

Relevant Market

As per the announcement the relevant product markets are the general microcontroller automotive power-use analog integrated circuit and RF transistor product markets in which NXP and Freescale have horizontal overlap The relevant geographical markets should be the global market

Competition Analysis

After assessing this proposed deal the agency concluded that

1) The proposed deal would boost NXPrsquos market control power in the RF

15 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151120151101196182shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 17 of 52

transistor product market because the global and Chinese RF transistor product markets share a similar structure both featuring few competitors and high concentration levels Freescale and NXP as the number one and number two players are far ahead of their rivals in the market Therefore after closing the market control power of NXP in this market would be strengthened

2) Since Freescale was the fiercest competitor of NXP the proposed deal will remove competition between them

3) The proposed deal would reduce the options for clients and increase procurement risks

In practice the wireless infrastructure suppliers as the main client of the RF transistor product tend to procure products from both NXP and Freescale to prevent them from the risk arising from relying on one supplier

4) The proposed deal may induce an adverse impact on the technology RampD and innovation

Remedies

In accordance with MOFCOMrsquos decision NXP shall follow its written commitment submitted to MOFCOM and completely divest its RF power transistor business to Beijing Jianguang Asset Management At the same time NXP shall strictly fulfil its obligations during the transition period It is worth noting that the NXPFreescale deal shall only be implemented after the divestment deal has been concluded

In addition MOFCOM requires NXP to perform relevant obligations during the transition period from the date of approval announcement until the divestment deal has been concluded NXP shall endeavour

1) not to engage in any lsquounfair trade practicesrsquo relating to the divested business

2) not to implement any acts which may have a significant adverse impact on the value management or competitiveness of the divested business or any acts which may change the nature and scope industry or business strategy or investment policy of the divested business and to take reasonable measures to encourage core employees to stay in the divested business as well as not to seek or transfer employees to NXPrsquos non-divested business

3) to ensure supply to the divested business in a fair reasonable and non-discriminatory manner and

4) to maintain the independence of the divested business and not to exchange competitively sensitive information between the parties and the divested

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 18 of 52

business

B Monopolistic Agreements

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

With respect to the enforcement activities of the NDRC in light of the numbers of the published cases it seems that the law enforcement frequency of the NDRC regarding monopolistic agreements in 2015 is lower in comparison with 2014

The reason behind might be that the outstanding issue of human resource deficit of the antitrust authority still exists Besides the fact that more enterprises gradually attach increasing importance to the antitrust compliance might be another reason for the decrease in the number of cases investigated by the authorities

As to the enforcement activities of the SAIC 4 of 14 cases concluded by the SAIC and its local branches in 2015 are relevant to monopolistic agreements Meanwhile these four cases concern horizontal monopolistic agreements

It is noteworthy however that the Mercedes-Benz case and the Dongfeng Nissan case suggest that vertical agreements especially involving price-related restrictions on the downstream dealers is still the priority of antitrust enforcement Companies shall be very cautious when imposing restrictions on the resale prices or the minimum resale prices of commodities in the distribution agreements

Automobile industry and related industries are observed to be under continuous attention of Chinarsquos antitrust authorities

The industries relating to peoplersquos livelihoods remain to be the enforcement priority

Significant Cases

Enforcement by the NDRC and its local branches

Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC16

The investigation was triggered by a leniency application

The first leniency applicant was exempted from punishment

Eight ocean shipping companies involved were imposed a collective fine of CNY 4067 million

NDRC spent approximately 12 months to investigate and conclude the case 16 NDRCrsquos press release of the case is available at httpjjsndrcgovcngzdt201512t20151228_769084html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 19 of 52

Facts

In December 2015 the NDRC published its official punishment decisions regarding the cartel case in connection with eight ocean shipping companies namely Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha (ldquoNYKrdquo) Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha (ldquoK Linerdquo) Mitsui OSK Lines EUKOR Car Carriers Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics Compantildeiacutea Sud Americana de Vapores Eastern Car Liner and Compantildeiacutea Chilena de Navegacioacuten Interoceaacutenica

According to the official press release of the NDRC the investigation was triggered by a leniency application of NYK The evidence showed that the eight companies reached consensus on non-intrusion of each others existing business to maintain or increase shipping fees when shipping goods such as cars trucks and engineering machinery in the routes between China and other countries and regions

They were also found to frequently conduct bilateral or multilateral communications on the shippersrsquo invitation for bids andor price inquiries via phone conferences dinner parties e-mails visiting etc In addition they also conducted illegal behaviour such as sensitive information exchange price negotiations bidding intention discussion dividing clients and shipping routes reaching agreements on high price bids or non-bidding in order to help certain companies gain shipping orders

To avoid the regulation of the antitrust authority the relevant shipping companies adopted various illicit measures that showed their apparent intention to violate the AML The cartel lasted for at least four years and covered a broad range of shipping routes concerned with the import and export of products between China and other regions such as North America EU South America and so on involving multiple auto brands and engineering machinery brands

The NDRC held the opinion that the eight companies conducts had restricted and eliminated competition in the relevant market raising the international shipping fees and impairing interests of shippers and end consumers The eight companies breached the AML by reaching and implementing monopolistic agreements on fixing prices and dividing the market

All eight investigated companies put forward remedy measures including enhancing the antitrust compliance program arranging more antitrust compliance trainings and developing antitrust compliance technologies

The NDRC imposed fines based on the nature level and duration of their monopolistic volations as well as their respective sales of international freight service sales relevant to the Chinese market The companies involved were collectively fined CNY 4067 million

NYK as the first cartel member voluntarily reporting the illegal conducts to the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 20 of 52

authority and providing significant evidence was entirely exempted from the punishment K Line as the second leniency applicant was imposed a fine amounting to 4 of its 2014 annual sales of international freight services relevant to Chinarsquos import and export market The details of punishments imposed on the involved companies by the NDRC are as follow

Company Name Amount of Fines (RMB million)

Percentage of the Relevant Turnovers

Grounds

Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha

- - First leniency applicant

Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha

2398 4 Second leniency applicant

Mitsui OSK Lines 3812 7 Third leniency applicant

EUKOR Car Carriers 284 9 Lasted over a long period involved many brands and many violations violations were severe

Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics

4506 8 Lasted over a long period involved many brands and many violations violations were severe

Compantildeiacutea Sud Americana de Vapores

308 6 Lasted over a long period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Eastern Car Liner 1127 5 Lasted over a long period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Compantildeiacutea Chilena de 120 4 Lasted over a long

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 21 of 52

Navegacioacuten Interoceaacutenica

period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Total 4067

Analysis

In this case the agency applied the AML instead of the Tenders and Bids Law to collusive bidding Citing article 13 (3) of the AML the NDRC identified that the collusive bidding constituted a division of the sales market

The leading three leniency applicants were granted exemption from fines to a varying degree

According to the official who handled this case dawn raids performed by antitrust enforcement agencies in other jurisdictions drew the attention of the NDRC on the cartels of these shipping companies However there was limited effective evidence to prove that the companies had reached monopolistic agreements Through pressuring the involved parties three members of the shipping cartel actively confessed their illegal conduct This case once again stresses the significance of international cooperation between antitrust enforcement agencies

Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau17

The distribution agreements between Mercedes-Benz and its dealers are determined as vertical monopolistic agreement and Mercedes-Benz violated article 14 of the AML because it restricted the ability of its dealers to decide their own resale prices

Mercedes-Benzrsquos dealers violated article of 13 of the AML due to concluding a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Mercedes-Benz and its dealers were jointly fined CNY 3578 million

Facts

In April 2015 Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau which is the provincial branch of the NDRC released the punishment on its website and announced that it had imposed a fine of CNY 350 million on Mercedes-Benz along with the aggregated fine of CNY 787 million on its dealers The fine came as a result of Mercedes-Benz reaching and implementing resale price maintenance (ldquoRPMrdquo) agreements with dealers to fix the minimum resale price of several car models as well as certain auto parts 17 The original Chinese notice published by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau is available at httpwwwjswjjgovcnoffice_neweo_comm_zxnrxsphp

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 22 of 52

According to the decision the authority found that Mercedes-Benz fixed the minimum resale price of Class E and Class S cars in Nanjing Wuxi Changzhou and Suzhou markets through telephoneverbal communication and dealers meetings from January 2013 to July 2014 Since 2010 Mercedes-Benz had reached agreements with dealers in Jiangsu province to fix the minimum resale prices for auto parts by providing different levels of discounts for insured cars cars involving expired warranty periods and cars within the warranty period

In addition Mercedes-Benz implemented the minimum resale price maintaining agreement by

1) Tightening its monitoring measures on the dealers such as inspecting deals and their sale incentive system on a weekly basis

2) Tracking the sales process flow of cars and increasing the intensity of this assessment

3) Giving warnings and reducing support ndash for example halting the supply of bestselling cars and prohibiting the opening of new stores ndash to dealers if dealers refused to cooperate with the price-fixing related policies and measures and

4) Interviewing personnel of the dealers and requesting terminations if the staff engaged in serious violations of the RPM agreement

Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau concluded that Mercedes-Benz had excluded and eliminated market competition harmed consumer welfare and consequently violated article 1418 of the AML The authority therefore imposed a fine of CNY 350 million representing 7 of the sale revenue of the previous year in the relevant market against Mercedes-Benz and imposed a fine on the dealers amounting to an equivalence of 1 of the annual sales in the previous year

Analysis

Although the agency also addressed the horizontal violation among the dealers in this case the administrative penalty decision mainly focuses on the vertical violation The agency fined dealers involved in the RPM agreement a combined CNY 787 million equal to 1 of the previous-year sales which suggests that the agency decided to give lighter punishments to dealers who took initiative in reporting the activity and provided evidence

The Mercedes-Benz case is the third case where the agency successfully 18 Article 14 of the AML The following monopolistic agreements between operators and trading partners shall be prohibited (i) fixing the resale prices of commodities to third persons (ii) restricting the minimum resale prices of commodities to third persons (iii) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement Authority under the State Council

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 23 of 52

discovered both vertical and horizontal agreements in a case following the Audi case and the Chrysler case All these cases are rooted in the same industry indicating that industrial features play a large role in raising anti-trust concerns In fact it appears that the entire automotive industry is under antitrust scrutiny

Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC19

This case involved both a horizontal agreement and an administrative monopoly

A total fine of CNY 1318 million was imposed on the involved companies

Facts

In June 2015 the NDRC through its website announced the decision made by its regional branch -Yunnan Provincial Development and Reform Commission (ldquoYunnan DRCrdquo) regarding the horizontal monopolistic agreement case involving Yunnan Communications Administration and local subsidiaries of four state-owned telecommunication companies

Through the investigation Yunnan DRC found that Yunnan Communications Administration as a competent government agency had organized several meetings involving Yunnan branches of four state-owned telecoms - China Mobile China Telecom China Unicom and China Tietong in August and September of 2014 At the end of 2009 the four local branches entered into an agreement to regulate their sales promotions in terms of limiting the promotional items amount and frequency

Furthermore the agreement provides certain measures to ensure the implementation of relevant restrictions on promotions Specifically in case any cartel member violates the agreement the others could file complaints with Yunnan Communications Administration and the agency would then issue a rectification notice to the rule-breaker

Yunnan DRC stated that the four telecoms were main competitors in the relevant market and the promotions as a significant competition measure would exert direct influence on the final prices of the products The horizontal agreement organized by Yunnan Communications Administration on sales promotions restricted the competition capacity of telecoms and as a result eliminated the competition in the relevant market Consequently the behaviour of Yunnan Communications Administration violated article 8 20 of the AML and constituted administrative monopoly in terms of ldquoforcing undertakings to conduct monopolistic behaviour prohibited by the AMLrdquo

19 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpwwwsdpcgovcnfzgggzjgjdyfldjjszhdt201506t20150602_694802html 20 Article 8 of the AML Administrative organs and the public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 24 of 52

With respect to the penalties Yunnan DRC fined the local branch of China Tietong CNY 200000 for reaching but not implementing the agreement in regards to the other three telecoms a total fine of CNY 1298 million amounting to 2 of the sales of the relevant business in the previous year were imposed for entering into and implementing the horizontal monopolistic agreement

Analysis

The telecoms industry is still the enforcement priority of the antitrust enforcement authorities A company cannot be exempted from punishment even though it is forced by competent authorities to conduct monopoly behaviour

DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC21

Both a horizontal monopolistic agreement and a vertical monopolistic agreement were involved in this case

A total fine of CNY 14242 million was imposed on DongFeng Nissan and its distributors

Facts

In September 2015 the Guangdong Development and Reform Commission (ldquoGuangdong DRCrdquo) released an announcement regarding the administrative penalties on DongFeng Nissan and its provincial distributors for concluding price-related monopolistic agreements More specifically DongFeng Nissan was imposed a fine of CNY 1233 million for breaching article 14 of the AML in terms of restricting the resale price of certain car models 17 distributors domiciled in Guangdong were collectively fined CNY 1912 million for violating article 1322 of the AML in terms of entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements

According to the published official release the Guangdong DRC launched the investigation in August 2014 The authority discovered that from 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissan had set a rigorous restriction on its distributorsrsquo abilities to determine the resale prices of certain car models including the quoted prices in various platforms and the final resale price In addition DongFeng Nissan punished the distributors that failed to abide by such price restrictions in 2013 The authority 21 The original Chinese notice published by Guangdong DRC is available at httpwwwgddpcgovcnzwgkgzdtgzyw201509t20150910_328993html 22 Article 13 of the AML The following Monopolistic agreements among competing operators shall be prohibited (i) fix or change prices of commodities (ii) limit the outputs or sales volume of commodities (iii) segment the sales markets or the raw material purchasing markets (iv) limit the purchase of new technology new facilities or limit the development of new products new technology (v) jointly boycott transactions (vi) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-Monopoly Law enforcement Authority Monopolistic agreements in this Law refer to agreements decisions or other concerted practices that eliminate restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 25 of 52

believed that the vertical agreement concluded between DongFeng Nissan and its distributors eliminated and restricted the competition in the relevant market and damaged the consumer welfare as well which violates article 14 of the AML

Furthermore from April 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissanrsquos distributors in Guangdong province held multiple meetings to discuss issues relevant to sale price reached and implemented a horizontal monopolistic agreement in terms of fixing the prices of some car models which is prohibited by article 13 of the AML

Considering that both DongFeng Nissan and the involved distributors positively cooperated with the investigation and ceased the illegal behaviour immediately after the investigation Guangdong DRC decided to impose a fine amounting to 3 of its previous yearrsquos turnovers on DongFeng Nissan and a fine ranging from 2 to 4 on the relevant distributors in accordance with articles 4623 and 4924 of the AML

Analysis

This case demonstrates that auto and related industries are still under close attention of the authority Considering the NDRCrsquos successful series of antitrust investigations conducted throughout the auto industry it is observed that the agency currently overseeing price-related antitrust issues in China has accumulated a substantial amount of experience regarding antitrust enforcement in the auto industry Now is the right time to speed up the law-making process by amending the set of rules released earlier and drafting new laws to advise the auto industry on antitrust compliance

Enforcement by the SAIC and its local branches

Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC25

The investigation was triggered by whistle blowerrsquos submission

Cartel members were collectively fined CNY 139 million 23 Article 46 of the AML In case the operators violate the relevant provisions of this Law concluding and implementing Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall order the operators to cease such act impose fines more than 1 but less than 10 of the total turnover in the preceding year and confiscate the illegal gains where the Monopolistic agreement is not implemented a fine less than RMB 500000 can be imposed If the operators involved in Monopolistic agreement on its own initiative report information concerning the conclusion of Monopolistic agreements and provide important evidences to the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority they may be given a mitigated punishment or be exempted from punishment in accordance with the circumstances Where the industrial associations violate this Law organizing the operators in the industry to conclude Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority may impose a fine less than RMB 500000 in serious circumstances the agency of social organization administration and registration may cancel its registration 24 Article 49 of the AML As for the imposition of the fines stipulated by the Article 46 47 and 48 of this Law the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall take elements such as the nature extent and time it lasts of the illegal act into consideration in determining the specific amount of the fines 25 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201506t20150601_156889html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 26 of 52

Facts

In April 2015 the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) issued administrative penalties on several brick manufacturers for entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements This is the first case relevant to monopolistic agreements that has been publicized by the SAIC since the beginning of this year

Ten cartel members were involved in the case including one company and nine individuals Similar with most antitrust cases the investigation started as a result of a whistle blowerrsquos submission After a thorough investigation Hunan AIC found that those local brick manufacturers had reached agreements on controlling production volume and dividing sales areas in the forms of production and sales agreements plans and meeting minutes

The enforcement authority reached the conclusion that these brick manufacturers violated article 13 of the AML and imposed a total fine of CNY 1389400 on them

Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC26

The organizer of the monopolistic agreement the animation association was fined CNY 100000

The antitrust authority did not punish the members of the monopolistic agreement

Facts

In December 2015 the Guangdong Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoGuangdong AICrdquo) published its administrative punishment decision in regards to Guangzhou Panyu Animation amp Game Association (ldquoGAGArdquo) organizing member companies to conclude a monopolistic agreement

According to the decision GAGA drafted the ldquoAgreement of Exhibition Alliancerdquo (ldquoAgreementrdquo) and convened a conference with member companies in order to discuss the content and conclusion of the Agreement 52 member companies entered into the Agreement which actually requested the alliance companies to merely participate in the exhibitions either organized or supported by GAGA in Guangzhou In addition the Agreement prohibited the alliance companies from attending any other exhibition except if they obtained prior approval of GAGA

After a thorough investigation Guangdong AIC believed that the conclusion of the Agreement among GAGA and the 52 member companies violated article 13 (5) of the AML in terms of boycott GAGA who was deeply involved and restricted member companiesrsquo choice of exhibitions through the Agreement could be deemed as

26 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151208_164680html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 27 of 52

the participant and organizer of the monopolistic agreement In accordance with article 46 of the AML Guangdong AIC imposed a fine of CNY 100000 on GAGA for organizing the conclusion of the monopolistic agreement

Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC27

Hubei AIC considered the coinsurance for Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance illegal

Twelve insurance companies were fined CNY 469 million in total

Facts

In December 2015 the Hubei Administrative for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHubei AICrdquo) disclosed its punishment on 12 insurance companies for signing illegal coinsurance agreements

The disclosed punishment decision suggests that the Hubei branch of China Pacific Life Insurance (ldquothe Companyrdquo) 11 other insurance companies and Wuhan Construction Safety Technology Consultation Center (ldquoWCSTCCrdquo) signed a Coinsurance Agreement on Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance (ldquoCoinsurance Agreementrdquo) of which the main contents include

1) The Company and 11 other involved companies as the coinsurers jointly take charge of the personal accident insurance concerned with the construction project directly administered by the Wuhan government WCSTCC is responsible for providing safety professionalism and technology services regarding the relevant personal accident insurance

2) The Company as the chief insurer of the coinsurance occupies 12 of the total amount of the insurance and the other 11 companies respectively occupy 8

3) The Company as the representative of the coinsurance is in charge of collecting the premium signing the standard form insurance policies and issuing the invoice in its own name The Company should share the charged premium with the other companies in accordance with the Coinsurance Agreement

4) Both the Company and the other insurance companies should pay 25 of the actually received premium to WCSTCC as the service fee WCSTCC will assist the coinsurers in providing safety and technology management service to the insured In addition the 11 insurance companies should pay 5 of their premium to the Company as the management fee

27 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165445html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 28 of 52

5) In case an accident happens the 12 companies will jointly bear the damages based on their respective shares in the coinsurance

6) There is a contact mechanism established in the coinsurance The coinsurers will regularly hold coinsurance conferences to discuss existing problems

Furthermore the coinsurers and WCSTCC also signed a self-discipline agreement and established a complete management system to assure the implementation of the Coinsurance Agreement Any party violating the Coinsurance Agreement would be punished

Hubei AIC found that WCSTCC was solely invested by Wuhan Construction Safety Management Association which was under Wuhan Construction Commission The centre helped implement certain functions of the Wuhan Urban Construction Safety Management Station and was responsible for quality supervision and safety supervision of municipal construction projects

It later became a prerequisite for construction companies to purchase insurance from any member of the coinsurance in order to get approval to commence their project According to the decision Hubei AIC launched another separate investigation against WCSTCC

Through the investigation Hubei AIC concluded that the Coinsurance Agreement constituted a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by article 13 of the AML with the following analysis

First coinsurance as a common business model to jointly share and lower risks is widely adopted in the insurance industry A coinsurance arrangement for a specific project in order to avoid high risks faced by one insurer could be legal However coinsurance should not target the entire market In this case prior to the Coinsurance Agreement the risks of the construction projects were unpredictable since the scale of the construction projects the difficulty of the construction and the amount of construction workers could not be available It is impossible to predict the risks of the projects thus it is not necessary to cooperate with other insurers to collectively bear the risks The purpose of the 12 insurance companies to establish the coinsurance is to avoid the competition which demonstrates the Coinsurance Agreement belongs to a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by the AML

Second the companies through entering into the coinsurance agreement actually divided the relevant market of construction project personal accident insurance in Wuhan city which affected the competition in the relevant market and damaged the interests of other competitors and the consumers In particular the Construction Law as amended in 2011 stipulates that the purchase of personal accident insurance is not mandatory and the construction companies have the right to choose whether to buy the said insurance or not As mentioned purchasing insurance from the coinsurance had been the prerequisite for construction companies to obtain administration

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 29 of 52

approval for the project which seriously distorts the fair competition in the market

Citing article 46 of the AML the 12 insurance companies were collectively fined CNY 469 million including fines on the companies and confiscation of illegal gains It is noteworthy that the fines were calculated based on the companiesrsquo 2014 annual sales of the insurance product in connection with the coinsurance The Company as the chief insurer was fined amounting to 6 of its 2014 annual sales of the relevant insurance product in the coinsurance and other companies were fined amounting to 2 of relevant sales For more specific information please see the following table

Company Name (Hubei Branch)

Fines (CNY million)

Percentage of the sales

Illegal Gains (CNY

million)

China Pacific Life Insurance 00653 6 0941

Sino Life 00145 2 04332

Alltrust Insurance 00145 2 04332

Taikang Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Continent Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Pacific Property Insurance

00145 2 04332

China Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

PICC Property and Casualty 00145 2 02599

Taiping General Insurance 00145 2 013

Union Life Insurance 00145 2 01177

Ping An Annuity Insurance Company of China

00145 2 04201

Ping An Property amp Casualty Insurance Company of China

00145 2 -

Subtotal 02248 - 44679

Total 46927

Analysis

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 30 of 52

Coinsurance as an effective approach to lower risks of insurers is widely used in the insurance industry Information sharing and agreements on coinsurance were generally considered efficient and legitimate However from an antitrust perspective coinsurance may raise competition concerns depending on the circumstances of each agreement In the case that there is enough capacity for one insurer to cover the potential risks the coinsurance might be considered as entering into a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC28

The first leniency applicant was exempted from fines

The other concrete companies were imposed a fine of CNY 180000

Facts

In December 2015 the concrete companies monopolistic agreement case investigated by Hunan AIC was published on SAICrsquos website

In accordance with the antitrust enforcement announcement of SAIC this case was triggered by complaints from the Yongzhou City peoplersquos congress After the preliminary review the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) initiated the formal investigation on seven concrete companies domiciled in Yongzhou City Hunan Province which were suspected of being involved in a monopolistic agreement in terms of division of the volumes of the products

After further investigation Hunan AIC found that the seven concrete companies concluded a partnership agreement in 2011 which requested the involved companies to enter into a partnership business with assets In addition according to the partnership agreement it was planned to establish a comprehensive office to manage production marketing and distribution of the products of all the partners The seven companies intended to jointly adjust and control the output of concrete based on the partnership agreement However because there were disagreements over the allocation of the injected assets and market shares the companies did not implement the partnership agreement The agreement was cancelled in December 2012

Based on the findings Hunan AIC concluded that the seven concrete companies as competitors of each other restricted and eliminated the competition in the relevant market through reaching the partnership agreement and dividing the volumes of sales which violated article 13(3) of the AML in terms of division of sales market Considering that the agreement had not been implemented and the limited influence of the agreement according to article 46 of the AML and article 27 of the Administrative Penalties Law small amount fines were imposed on the involved companies Six companies were fined CNY 30000 each for their illegal behaviour 28 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165504html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 31 of 52

Yongzhou Shuangyuan Building Materials Co Ltd as the first one to actively report the monopolistic agreement and cooperate with the enforcement authority was exempted from the punishment

Outlook

It is expected that the AMLrsquos enforcement on monopolistic agreements will continue in the future Industries such as automobile shipping pharmaceuticals insurance etc will still remain the priority of the antitrust enforcement

The antitrust enforcement authorities have published a series of regulations in order to clarify the substantial and procedural issues relevant to the antitrust enforcement However Chinarsquos current antitrust legislation regime is still immature In the following years we expect that more attention will be paid to the legislative improvements

Another remarkable issue for cartel members is that with more Chinese enterprises attaching increasing importance to the AML the follow-on civil damages actions might become a tendency in the future

C Abuse of Market Dominance

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen a decent increase of abuse of market dominance cases both in public enforcement and private litigation Oftentimes the authorities responsible for public enforcement generally find it difficult to pursue investigations against abuse of market dominance cases The following two main reasons are often cited to explain this standoff first it is hard for the authorities to define the relevant markets and prove the undertaking(s)rsquo dominant market position through economic approaches second it is hard to collect evidence regarding abusive practices

The cases related to IPRs abuse are emerging significantly particularly in the telecommunication media and technology (ldquoTMTrdquo) sectors

The SAICrsquos latest refusal-to-deal probe against a local drug maker shows that the SAIC and its local branches have increasingly acquired a profile as an abuse of dominance regulator

Significant Cases

Cases pursued by the SAIC

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 32 of 52

Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case29

Facts

The local authority in Dongfang city reported to the Hainan provincial branch of SAIC on April 23 2014 of the suspected dominance abuse The SAIC authorized its Hainan bureau to officially investigate the matter on 25 July 2014 according to a decision dated January 9 2015 The AIC concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its market dominance by requiring users to pay a deposit without any legal basis and or justifiable reasons

In terms of the relevant product market the local authority found that in this case it was the urban water supply market in Dongfang city and its surrounding townships where Dongfang Water was the sole public operator in the local water supply market with a 100 market share which made all water users completely reliant on the companyrsquos supply In term of market access the local authority found it very unlikely that there were other operators due to the strict regulations

The Hainan SAIC then concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its dominance as it charged users a deposit by threatening to refuse to register users and also by threatening to restrict the water supply Dongfang Waters charging of deposits lacked a legal basis and hadnt received government approval to the detriment of household consumers and business water users and hampered the improvement of management and services of the company Such conduct was in breach of Chinarsquos Anti-Monopoly Law

Hainan AIC levied a fine of CNY 593208 a lighter penalty equivalent to 2 of the companyrsquos annual sales for the previous year and confiscated illicit gains of CNY 38521 for abuse of market dominance

Analysis

It is noteworthy that although handled by a local authority supervised by the SAIC the antitrust agency detailed the relevant market definition the assessment of the dominant market position the abusive practices and the scrutiny of the justifiable reasons

Although the definition of the relevant market and the reasoning of the Hainan provincial AIC and the SAIC are subject to criticism it is still applausive to see that the antitrust regulators have realized the importance of the application of rule of reason in an abuse case In addition through itrsquos a published decision practitioners may observe the regulatorsrsquo reasoning and thus transparency and legal certainty have been generated

29 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzfcfjd201502t20150212_152066html last visited on October 18 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 33 of 52

Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms30

Facts

In June 2013 the Ningxia AIC under authorization of SAIC opened an antitrust investigation into the alleged tie-in sales by the three major state-owned telecommunications operators China Tietong China Unicom and China Telecom for the tie-in sale of fixed-line telephones with broadband Internet services The Ningxia AIC found that the three companies had bundled fixed-line phone services with Internet services to subscribers

During the investigation all three telecommunications companies admitted the tie-in practice had recognized that such practice had improper influence on competition and deprived the choices of consumers The three companies promised to undertake internal rectification timely and eliminate the ill effects resulting from such practice The parties committed to taking the following corrective measures

1) Taking internal rectifications and conducting training to staff about antitrust laws and stop tie-in sales practices

2) Making public commitments to allow subscribers a free choice of services and strengthening the propaganda through the operating room call centre and other channels

3) Unbundling fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

The Ningxia AIC decided to suspend the probe on 14 May 2015 on the grounds that the three companies had actively worked together with the investigators and proposed workable remedy plans

Analysis

In the official announcement Ningxia AIC concluded that the purpose of antitrust enforcement is to restrain monopolistic conducts the protection of competition and to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of consumers Given that during the investigation process the parties had actively cooperated with the investigation formed a more profound understanding of the dangers of tying behaviour and moreover the parties proposed and implemented positive corrective measures to be able to remove the ill impact of their actions the agency believed that the purpose of antitrust law enforcement was fulfilled

It is worth noting that the Ningxia AIC also required the three companies to implement the commitment by August 30 2015and the submission of the written

30 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158908html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158906html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158910html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 34 of 52

implementation report on July 102015 and August 102015 respectively which is another illustration that an effective commitment by the undertakings shall directly deal with the effect that is brought by the monopolistic behaviour In this case the effect of the monopolistic act was restricted to the choice of the consumers therefore the commitment by the undertaking aimed at allowing the freedom of choice and the unbundling of fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company31

Facts

The Liaoning AIC imposed a fine of approximately CNY 433m on the Fushun Branch of Liaoning Tobacco Co on 1 June 2015 The agency also ordered the company to stop its illicit behaviour

The Liaoning AIC received a tip-off that the accused Liaoning Tobacco Corsquos Fushun branch was conducting tie-in sales of non-high-demand cigarette brands with high-demand cigarette brands After gaining authorization from SAIC the agency officially started an investigation regarding the companyrsquos suspected abuse of market dominance in June 2014

Analysis

According to the announcement the tobacco company argued that the tobacco industry is a state controlled or monopolized industry with a lawful monopolistic position therefore the company shall not be subject to the norms of general market competition rules or the anti-monopoly law

In this regards the agency concluded that in terms of the status of the undertaking admittedly the first paragraph of article 17 of the AML says that the State shall protect the lawful business operations of undertakings in these industries with respect to the industries which are under the control of the State-owned economic sector and have a bearing on the lifeline of the national economy or national security and the industries which exercise monopoly over the production and sale of certain commodities according to law However the second paragraph continues to say that the undertakings mentioned above shall do business according to law be honest faithful and strictly self-disciplined and subject themselves to public supervision and they shall not harm the consumers interests by taking advantage of their position of control or their monopolistic production and sale of certain commodities In particular in the preceding paragraph the ldquolawful businessrdquo and ldquoaccording to lawrdquo imply that the AML shall apply in the business operation The agency therefore believes that

31 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201508t20150813_16

0208html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 35 of 52

there shall be no exemption for the undertaking concerned the defences of the undertaking concerned is not established

Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm32

Facts

The Chongqing AIC fined Chongqing Qingyang Pharmaceutical CNY 439308 for alleged dominance abuse

The investigation was initiated when the company contacted the agency for verification on its potential breach of the AML related to an allopurinol active pharmaceuticals ingredient (API) distribution agreement with its exclusive distributor The company provided the relevant agreement and information and the agency conducted an investigation into the company and some other relevant companies

Analysis

Relevant Market

During the investigation the agency found that pharmaceutical ingredients are a special commodity the API is used to produce the preparations The chemical API is only used for the production of the preparation and could be used as a medicine for clinic use

The preparation is produced according to the requirements of certain form of prepared drugs and for the purpose of treatment and prevention which can be used as medicine

The allopurinol is used for the common treatment of hyperuricemia However the other treatments are different in pharmacological effects or treatment effects as well as in the cost for the patient Furthermore the company is the only manufacturer and supplier in the market nationwide since July 2012 Therefore the agency concluded that the relevant market is the allopurinol API market

Considering that the qualification for manufacturing the allopurinol API is national wide and the normal practice for purchasers and suppliers is domestic the relevant geographic market is the Chinese market

The Market Dominance

During the investigation the agency found that the company is the only supplier and manufacturer of allopurinol API in China there is no other competitor in the

32 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151222_16

5152html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 36 of 52

market and the company has a monopoly in the market The evidence shows that the company has the ability to control the prices the position for the downstream is relatively weak

With respect to the market entry the agency found that the market entry is relatively high in addition other undertakings are dependent on the company Thus the agency believed the company to have market dominance

Refusal to Deal

The agency found that on September 25 2015 the company reached an exclusive agreement and distribution agreement with its distributor Based on these agreements the company didnrsquot supply allopurinol API to the said distributor and other companies despite the fact that those companies requested for allopurinol API but were turned down by the company

Absence of Reasonable Cause

The agency found that the companyrsquos refusal to deal was not in line with the needs of normal business operation or economic efficiency On the other hand the refusal to deal was aimed at increasing the market share of the allopurinol drug product Also the agency found that the stop of supply was a manipulation of market power as to maximize the profit to the most The agency further found that the exclusive distribution agreement with suspension of supply for six months and the refusal to supply was to eliminate and restrict the competition as to gain the monopolistic profit

The Consequence of Refusal to Deal

The agency concluded that the refusal to deal harmed the competition of the allopurinol preparations market Because of the suspension of supply many demanders had to reduce their production or switch to the supply of other products or stop their production The suspension of supply affected the competition of the downstream market Consequently the raising of the price of allopurinol API also raised the cost for other manufacturers of allopurinol preparations

Furthermore the refusal to deal led to capacity loss of the allopurinol preparation industry

Ultimately the refusal to deal increased the burden on consumers as the refusal to supply changed the supply-demand relationship in the market

The agency concluded that the Company abused its dominant position in the allopurinol API market by refusing to deal with intended buyers in the period between October 2013 and March 2014Therefore the Company violated article 17 (1) of the AML which prohibits business operators with a dominant market position from abusing that position such as the refusal to deal without any justifications

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 37 of 52

D Administrative Monopoly

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 witnessed antitrust authoritiesrsquo significant efforts regarding the enforcement against administrative monopoly According to Mr Dong Zhiming the deputy director general of Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly Bureau ever since the AML coming into force six cases in connection with administrative monopoly were investigated by NDRC and among them five cases were handled in the year of 2015 These cases touched abuses of administrative power in terms of designative deal in relation to transportation communication and pharmaceutical industries

The first private litigation related to administrative monopolistic acts was heard in the court which is a milestone case in the enforcement of the AML

Significant Cases

Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC33

Facts

In March 2015 the NDRC released the official letter to Shandong Provincial Department of Transportation (ldquoShandong DOTrdquo) on its website with respect to correct its abuse of administrative power to exclude and restrict competition

During the investigation the NDRC found that since 2011 Shandong DOT had issued multiple relevant government orders in order to require certain types of vehicles to be directly connected to two designated information and service platforms both of which are operated and technically supported by one company namely Shandong Jiutong Internet of Things Technology Co Ltd (ldquoJiutong ITTrdquo) Furthermore according to the orders issued by the competent administrative department all the vehicle satellite positioning terminals entering into Shandong provincial market should be debugged through the said technology service platform which is operated by the mentioned company In addition Shandong DOT released the cap prices of vehicle satellite positioning terminals which is identical to the 2012 bid-winning price in the Ministry of Transportation demonstration project

The NDRC believed that Shandong DOTrsquos behaviour eliminated and restricted the competition in the monitoring platform market and the vehicle terminal market deprived the right of transportation enterprises to choose vehicle terminals and monitoring platform on their owns unreasonably raised the sales prices of vehicle terminals and service fees charged by the platform and increased the costs of transportation enterprises Therefore the antitrust agency concluded that Shandong

33 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201503t20150327_668911html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 38 of 52

DOT violated article 8 of the AML which stipulates that ldquoadministrative organs and the public organizations with an administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude and restrict competitionrdquo Specifically Shandong DOT violated article 3234 in terms of requiring organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any designated operators and violated article 3735 in terms of setting rules with contents which eliminate and restrict competition

Based on article 51 of the AML ldquoWhere administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations abuse administrative powers performing activities which exclude and restrict competition the superior entity shall order it to correct impose administrative penalty on the chief officer and other staffs directly responsible pursuant to the laws The AML enforcement authority may give recommendations on disposal of activities to the relevant superior entityrdquo the NDRC proposed in writing that the Shandong provincial government should order Shandong DOT to rectify its behaviour with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Entirely open up the monitoring platform market by permitting transportation undertakings to freely choose any approved platform

2) Loosen the restrictions on the entry into Shandong vehicle terminals permit the undertakings to independently select the supplier of vehicle terminals and allow the qualified terminals to be connected to the relevant monitoring platform and

3) Revoke the official documentation relevant to the cap price of vehicle terminals in order to promote the price competition

Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 36

Facts

On 26 August 2015 the NDRC published its second decision with regard to the rectification of administrative monopoly since the beginning of this year According to the proposal letter sent to Anhui Provincial Government the investigation against the Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City (Bengbu HFPC) was trigged by third partiesrsquo complaints

34 Article 32 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to require organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any operators designated by them 35 Article 37 of the AML Administrative organs shall not abuse their administrative powers to set rules with contents which eliminate restrict competition 36 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201508t20150826_748682html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 39 of 52

The investigation suggests that Bengbu HFPC published three notices with regard to drugs procurement in April and May of this year

In the No C-2015-CG-X-111 Notice (ldquoNo111 Noticerdquo) released on 10 April2015 the health authority not only provided the dosage form and qualification of the requested drugs but also directly determined the suppliers of relevant drugs which eliminated and restricted the competition among pharmaceutical manufacturers and therefore violated articles 32 and 37 of the AML

In the No C-2015-CG-C-112 Notice (ldquoNo112 Noticerdquo) and No C-2015-CG-C-168 (ldquoNo 168 Noticerdquo) respectively released on 10 April and 22 May 2015 the Bengbu HFPC set discriminative qualification requirements on non-local undertakings in order to restrict their participation in the relevant bidding For instance in accordance with No 112 Notice to be a qualified bidder the turnover of non-local undertakings shall exceed CNY 2 billion which is 50 times as much as the turnover requirements of the local undertakings In the NDRCrsquos opinion the administrative monopoly activities conducted by the local health agency excluded the relevant undertakings from the market maintained the virtual-high prices of drugs and therefore violated articles 3237 and 37 of the AML

The NDRC suggested in a letter that Anhui Provincial Government should urge the Bengbu HFPC to rectify the abuse of monopoly powers with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Stop setting distinguishing restrictions on qualification requirements review standards and numbers of winning bidders as for local and non-local undertakings

2) Stop designating the suppliers of competitive drugs and

3) Take necessary measures to mitigate the negative effects resulting from the previous illegal monopolistic abuses

Outlook

At the beginning of the year the former director general of the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau under the NDRC Xu Kunlin stated that the agency would strengthen antitrust enforcement on abuse of administrative power in 2015

Since then the NDRC has made great efforts to rectify unreasonable abuses of administrative power The currently disclosed two cases investigated by the NDRC re-emphasize the Chinese Governmentrsquos strict scrutiny of antitrust issues in respect of

37 Article 34 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to restrict or reject the participation of operators from other regions in local bidding activities by measures such as prescribing discriminatory qualification requirements or assessment standards or by not publishing information according to law

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 40 of 52

administrative monopoly It reminds the local governments that antitrust compliance is of significant importance

III Private Litigation

A Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen more and more private antitrust litigations

The private antitrust litigation cases have become increasingly complicated especially the issues regarding the intersection areas of IP and antitrust law

Multinational giants and State-Owned Enterprises (the ldquoSOEsrdquo) are increasingly becoming the targets in antitrust civil litigations Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (the ldquoSMEsrdquo) tend to use the antitrust litigation to achieve their commercial goals in the business context

B Significant Cases

Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)38

This is the first-ever private litigation concerning administrative monopoly since the implementation of the AML in 2008

Facts

According to the currently disclosed details the case is relevant for designated trade

The plaintiff Shenzhen Sware Technology Co Ltd (ldquoSwarerdquo) is a software company The press releases suggest that Sware Gloden Software Co Ltd (ldquoGlodenrdquo) and Shanghai Ruban Software Co Ltd (ldquoShanghai Rubanrdquo) are the three main suppliers of construction cost software and possess the major shares of the relevant market An annual provincial vocational ability contest regarding the construction cost hosted by the Guangdong Department of Education (ldquoGuangdong DOE) designated Gloden as the exclusive supplier of the relevant software

After several unsuccessful verbal and written negotiations with Guangdong DOE in April 2014 Sware filed a lawsuit against Guangdong DOE before the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquothe Courtrdquo) alleging that the administrative organ abused its administrative power and violated the AML by designating exclusive software supplier for the contest and claimed a compensation for reasonable expense amounting to CNY 10800 Yuan

The opinions of the Court 38 The story of the case is available at httpfinancesinacomcnchinadfjj20150410074621924997shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 41 of 52

The full text of the judgment has not been disclosed yet In accordance with the information available to the public the Court invoked article 32 of the AML which prohibits an administrative organ from abusing its administrative power to require or in disguised form organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use only the commodities supplied by the entities designated by them The Court concluded that Guangdong DOE failed to prove the legitimacy of the designation and therefore abused its administration power

Currently the case is in appeal before the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court

Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 39

It is the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China

In the first instance ruling Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court ruled against Sinopec holding that the Yunnan branch of Sinopecs trading company was obligated to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its dominance in the sales market of refined oil by refusing to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding without justifiable reasons

In the second instance ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors Currently the case is pending

Facts

The First Trial

The lawsuit was filed before the Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoKunming Courtrdquo) in January 2014 Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy Co Ltd (ldquoYingdingrdquo) a bio-energy manufacturer claimed that Sinopec and the Yunnan branch of Sinopec trading company (ldquoSinopec Yunnan Branchrdquo) had failed to fulfil their obligations stipulated in the Renewable Energy Law and had abused their market dominance in sales market of refined oil by refusing to trade with Yingding without justifiable reasons

Sinopec and Sinopec Yunnan Branch mainly explained four reasons for why they rejected Yingdingrsquos biofuel Firstly Yingding had failed to prove that the biofuel complied with the relevant national standard and was safe to use Secondly Yingding had failed to provide complete trading terms Thirdly the laws and regulations regarding biofuel were incomplete the authorized refined oil sales companies were 39 The details of the case are available at httpnewsxinhuanetcomfortune2014-1217c_1113680039htm httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=9e71db51-6ff6-4d2c-8af6-8eacf023ebdeampKeyWord=E4BA91E58D97E79B88E9BC8E|E4B8ADE79FB3E58C96 httpnewsxinhuanetcomenergy2015-0422c_127721575htm httpwwwnbdcomcnarticles2015-04-23911348html last visited on December 17 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 42 of 52

obligated to purchase biofuel from the biofuel manufacturers if it met certain quality standards but there was a vacancy regarding how to reach the end consumers from the sales companies

On 8 December 2014 the Kunming Intermediate Peoples Court ruled that Sinopec Yunnan Branch bore a legal obligation to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its market dominance in refined oil market by refusing without any justifiable reasons to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding The court ordered Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network within 30 days Both Yingding and Sinopec filed appeals to the Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court

The Appellate Trial

The appeal hearing was held on 22 April 2015 in Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoYunnan Courtrdquo) Sinopec submitted 23 new pieces of evidence and introduced two expert witnesses in a bid to overturn several key elements in the first-instance ruling by Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court

In terms of the determination of the relevant market and the market dominance Sinopec argued that the relevant market in this case was for adipic acid monomethyl ester (ldquoAAMErdquo) the main ingredient of a biofuel additive known as BD100 Yingdingrsquos main product is BD100 which can be blended with fossil diesel to become biofuel In the AAME market Sinopec is a potential buyer instead of a market dominator In support of this argument Sinopec presented an expert witnessmdashGong Jiong a professor of economics at Beijings University of International Business and Economics who testified that AAME should be defined as the relevant product market on the basis of an economic analysis

However Yingding insisted that the first-instance ruling was correct in naming the sales market of refined oil as the relevant market and submitted new evidence an article on Sinopecs website that claimed it had a 67 market share in Yunnan to help establish the claim that Sinopec had market dominance

Another main dispute was whether Yingdingrsquos biofuel product met national standards which would make it mandatory for Sinopec to purchase under Chinas Renewable Energy Law The law stipulates that biofuel producers must sell their products first to an authorized refined oil sales company and the sales companies are obliged to buy the fuel if it meets certain quality standards In order to test the quality Sinopec introduced the second expert witness Lin Jianmin a leading author of Chinarsquos national biofuel standard Lin Jianmin pointed out that there are currently quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology which gives Sinopec a justifiable reason not to trade with Yingding Moreover Sinopec presented some precedents in which consumers had complained about the biofuel quality and also claimed that China didnt have a sound regulatory framework to support biofuel production neither in testing nor in sales

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 43 of 52

Nevertheless to refute this point Yingding referred to an earlier test in co-operation with Sinopec in 2011 where selected buses in Kunming used biofuel blended by Sinopec using BD100 produced by Yingding

On August 13 2015 Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors and now this case is pending In the written appellate ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court did not provide any details regarding its reasoning

Key Issues of the Case

Is there any competition between Yingding and Sinopec

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case the product of Yingding is biofuel while Sinopec does not engage in the business of biofuel From this perspective Yingding and Sinopec are not competitors Thus it is not necessary and not reasonable for Sinopec to eliminate or restrict the competition from Yingding

Relevant Market

The definition of the relevant market is a prerequisite to determine whether competition exists and whether the AML is applicable In accordance with the Judicial Interpretation of Antitrust civil litigation the plaintiff shall take the responsibility to prove the defendantrsquos dominance in the relevant market Also the methods of defining the relevant market are stipulated in the Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition (ldquoGuidelinesrdquo) However both Yingding and Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court defined the relevant market as the sales market of refined oil without sufficient antitrust analysis none of the methods in the Guidelines were used Therefore the definition of the relevant market remains arguable and needs to be sufficiently analysed in the upcoming retrial

Justifiable Reasons

The abuse of market dominance includes the behaviour of refusing to trade without justifiable reasons according to the AML but in the first instance ruling justifiable reasons were not investigated by the court During the appellate trial the expert witness introduced by Sinopec claimed that there were quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology and this was a justifiable reason to refuse to trade with Yingding Even though the first instance court and the appellate court did not reason the justifiable reason it should be discussed and investigated further during the retrial

AML or Renewable Energy Law

The claims of Yingding were based on both the AML and the Renewable Energy Law (ldquoRELrdquo) and the first instance ruling referred to both the AML and the REL as

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 44 of 52

well It seems that the laws the first instance court referred to were comprehensive but in fact the reasoning was not clear and logical In the first instance ruling some disputes regarding the AML were reviewed but all the orders were not based on the AML Specifically the first instance court ordered the Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network based on the REL and dismissed the other claims That the orders were not on account of reasoning is illogical It is anticipated that during the retrial the application of the laws will be clearer

Analysis

A lot of issues have not been clearly analysed by the courts such as the relevant market and the justifiable reasons Since the case is remanded the above-mentioned issues are expected to be resolved in the retrial In addition Yingding was in a disadvantaged position compared to its first instance trial since its claims based on the AML were challenged greatly during the appellate trial In the retrial it is probable that Yingding may switch its litigation strategy and base its claims on the REL Therefore maybe more preparation regarding the REL can give Sinopec a leg up

Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)

Rijing Electric a Chinese distributor seeks CNY 5m compensation

The first hearing was on 9 June 2015 and ended without a ruling

Facts

Rijing Electric (ldquoRijingrdquo) a Shanghai-based company and a former distributor for Panasonic accused Panasonic of abusing its dominance and dividing the market through monopolistic practice in an antitrust lawsuit filed in 2014 with Shanghai No 1 Intermediate Court (ldquoShanghai Courtrdquo) claiming compensation of CNY 5m (USD 815370) Wenzhou Mingda Automation System Co and Shanghai Qingying Automation Equipment as the distributor of Panasonic in China are the co-defendants were accused of conducting monopolistic behaviours by implementing Panasonicrsquos policy

The first hearing for evidence exchange was on June 9 2015 Rijing claimed a policy allegedly introduced by Panasonic in 2009 restricted the competition between distributors Panasonic claims the policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo and has full justifiable reasons It explained that the products in question required customization at considerable cost to distributors before its sale to customers Once carried out however other distributors leaving them open to quote much lower prices than the original distributor could simply and relatively cheap replicate this customization Besides Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and that the plaintiff had failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic said its market share for the four products

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 45 of 52

under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases Also Rijing failed to challenge the policy when it was first introduced instead initially agreeing it was reasonable as e-mail evidence submitted by Panasonic suggests

Key Issues of the Case

Whether Panasonic occupied a market dominant position

It is reported that Rijing claimed that Panasonic had abused its market dominance but Rijing failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and its market share for the four products under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases

Analysis

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case Panasonicrsquos policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo rather than to eliminate or restrict competition

Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals40 (Pending)

It is a battle over patent licensing issues

It is viewed as being among the most complicated antitrust lawsuits in China

The first hearing was on 17 and 18 December 2015

Facts

Four Chinese rare earth companies Ningbo Ketian Magnet Ningbo Permanent Magnetics Ningbo Tongchuang Strong Magnet Material and Ningbo Huahui Magnetic Industry filed antitrust lawsuits against Hitachi Metals over alleged patent licensing issues regarding rare earth magnets on December 11 2014 with the Ningbo Intermediate Peoples Court (ldquoNingbo Courtrdquo) in Zhejiang province As reported four Chinese rare earth companies claimed Hitachi Metals abused its market dominance and hurt the industry competition by refusing to license the patents to them The patents in this case are used in the manufacturing of sintered neodymium iron boron (ldquoNdFeBrdquo) magnets a rare-earth magnet alloy widely used in parts for airplanes automobiles and other products

Hitachi Metals filed a challenge with the Ningbo Court over its jurisdiction in April 2015 After Ningbo Court rejected Hitachi Metals jurisdiction objection on 28 April 2015 Hitachi Metals appealed to the Zhejiang High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoZhejiang

40The details of the story are available at httpwwwzbmagcomnews_viewphpid=80 httpwwwhitachicomcnaboutpress201510-121118_ahtml last visited on December 22 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 46 of 52

Courtrdquo) but Zhejiang Court affirmed the ruling of the Ningbo Court

The first day of a two-day hearing took place on 17 December 2015 during which the two sides cross-examined each otherrsquos evidence The evidence focused on clearing up several key elements in the case including the relevant market whether Hitachi Metals has dominance on that market and whether both sides acted in good faith during the licensing negotiations

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Product Market

The four Chinese rare earth companies claimed that the relevant product market should be the NdFeb-related patent licensing market However Hitachi Metals believed that the physical NdFeb market rather than the patent licensing market should be the relevant product market which is meaningful for assess the real competitive effects on the market

Whether Hitachi Metals occupies a dominant market position

In terms of market dominance Hitachi Metals claimed it does not occupy a dominant position because Hitachi Metalsrsquo patents were not in a standard in this case and there are substitutable technologies in the market SEP holders have the obligation to license on FRAND terms but none-SEP holders do not So while a refusal to license a SEP may constitute abuse of dominance refusal to license a non-SEP mdash even by a patent holder with a dominant position mdash should not be considered as an abuse

Analysis

Hitachi Metals as a patent holder should have the right to decide whether to retain those patents or not or who to license According to the legal theory the purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage and protect innovation by conferring monopoly right mdash that is to give intellectual property owners the proprietary rights which can exclude others from using the intellectual property The SEP holders admittedly need to comply with FRAND terms which can maintain a robust balance between competition and monopoly whereas the further intervention of antitrust law into non-SEP patents may undermine the purpose of intellectual property law To which extent the antitrust law should intervene is yet to be seen

Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei41

A confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the Beijing IP court made by the Beijing High Court

41 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcncpwswbjzscq201511t20151103_12225640htm last visited on December 28 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 47 of 52

Facts

On August 2 2013 the NDRC penalized Abbott for monopolistic price-fixing and then Abbott made a price adjustment in China where the prices of main products were reduced

On December 16 2014 Tian Junwei (ldquoTianrdquo) a Chinese citizen in Beijing sued Carrefour Shuangjing Branch (ldquoCarrefourrdquo) and Abbott (Shanghai) Sales Company (ldquoAbbottrdquo) at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (ldquoIP Courtrdquo) for their monopolistic price-fixing which damaged his interests However Carrefour and Abbott challenged the jurisdiction of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court They claimed there were two reasons Firstly according to the jurisdiction rules of the IP court issued by the Supreme Court the IP court has no jurisdiction over anti-trust cases Secondly if this case is a contractual dispute the court that is in the place of Carrefour should hear it if this case is a tort dispute the Shanghai Intermediate Court should hear it

In the ruling of the IP Court the IP Court decided it has the jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases for the following reasons According to the Provisions On Causes Of Action In Civil Cases issued by Supreme Court (最高人民法院案由规定) antimonopoly dispute is a tertiary cause of action belonging to IP and competition disputes Also according to the Provisions concerning the Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京

市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问题的规定 ) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was an IP and competition dispute and was sued after November 6 2014 Thus the IP Court had jurisdiction

Both Carrefour and Abbott appealed to the Beijing High Court over the jurisdiction ruling but the Beijing High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original ruling Reasons are listed in the written ruling issued on June 18 2015 Firstly the nature of the case was an antimonopoly dispute In accordance with Provisions of the Supreme Peoples Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民

事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) and Civil Litigation Law the monopolistic civil disputes in the first instance shall be under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Peoples Courts and an action involving a contractual dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the peoples court of the place where the defendant is domiciled or where the contract is performed Carrefour as the defendant in this case is domiciled in Chaoyang District Beijing Therefore the courts of Beijing have jurisdiction over this case Secondly according to article 3 of the Notification on the Jurisdiction of Intellectual Property Courts issued by Supreme Court (关于知识产权法院案件管辖

等有关问题的通知) IP courts have jurisdiction over first-instance civil disputes arising from monopolistic practices Lastly according to Provisions concerning the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 11 of 52

On October 19 2015 MOFCOM cleared this deal with four behavioural remedies

Decision

Relevant Market

In the agencyrsquos view there are four relevant product markets which are the radio access network market the core network systems market the network infrastructure service market and the information and communication technology SEP licensing market Meanwhile the relevant geographical market is primarily the Chinese market

Competition Analysis

According to MOFCOM this deal would have no anti-competitive effects on the first three relevant product markets in China while it could constitute an obstacle or limit the competition in the information and communication technology SEP licensing market

The agency consideredafter the deal that Nokia would increase its holding in 2G 3G and 4G SEPs and strengthen the degree of concentration in the information and communication technology SEP licensing market If it refused to license charged overly high royalty fees or conducted any other anti-competitive behaviour the competition of downstream market would be distorted which would most likely impair customersrsquo interests in the end

Remedies

Four behavioural remedies focusing on maintaining fair licensing of standard-essential patents (ldquoSEPsrdquo) were imposed on Nokia which are

1) On a reciprocal basis Nokia commits to not use injunctions to prevent enforcements of FRAND (fair reasonable and non-discriminatory) encumbered SEPs unless the potential licensees are unwilling to sign FRAND licensing agreements and follow the terms

2) If Nokia transfers its SEPs to a third party it shall inform Chinese licensees as well as Chinese companies that are actively engaging in licensing negotiation about the transfer details

3) Nokia will only transfer its SEPs to a new owner on the basis that the new owner accepts the existing FRAND commitments made by Nokia

4) MOFCOM has the right to monitor the implementation of Nokiarsquos commitments Nokia shall report to MOFCOM about the implementation of the conditions within 45 days of the end of each calendar year The reporting obligation will last five years until October18 2020

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 12 of 52

Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions13

Western Digital had engaged in two conducts that violated the remedies provided in the No 9 Announcement in 2012 issued by MOFCOM

Western Digital lodged an application to remove certain restrictions in March 2014 and the agency made the decision on October 19 2015

MOFCOM considered the fact that the competition condition in the relevant product market has changed and decided to remove the hold-separate restrictions related to manufacture and RampD

Facts

In 2012 Western Digital Corporation (ldquoWestern Digitalrdquo) intended to acquire 100 shares of Viviti Technologies Ltd (ldquoViviti Technologiesrdquo) which was the holding company of Hitachi Global Storage Technologies Netherlands BV and Hitachi Global Storage Technologies Singapore Pte Ltd and engaged in the hard disk business

On April 2 2011 Western Digital filed a notification for this acquisition MOFCOM issued the No 9 Announcement in March 2012 and cleared this acquisition with six remedies According to this announcement Western Digital could apply for the removal of the first and second remedy after this decision has been carried out for 24 months

The first remedy refers to maintaining the Viviti Technologies as an independent competitor and the second remedy requires both Western Digital and Viviti Technologies to make a reasonable plan of their capacity and production and report these data to the trustee

Western Digital lodged an application to remove the first and second remedy in March 2014 MOFCOM found that Western Digital had engaged in two conducts that violated the first remedy and the competitive situation in the hard disk market had changed After talking with Western Digital collecting opinions from the relevant entities and delegating the independent party to make an economic evaluation MOFCOM decided to remove the hold-separate remedies partially

Western Digitalrsquos implementation of the duties imposed in the No 9 Announcement

Based on the implementation reports submitted by Western Digital and the monitoring reports submitted by the trustee MOFCOM found that Western

13 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151020151001139040shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 13 of 52

Digital had engaged in two conducts that violated the first remedy Those were

1) On March 8 2012 Western Digital consolidated Hitachi Global Storage Technology (ldquoHGSTrdquo) which was Vivitirsquos subsidiary in US

2) In January 2013 Western Digital dissolved the development division of VivitiHGST and transferred the relevant workforce to Western Digital

MOFCOM considered that these conducts impaired the independence of Viviti as a competitor so that it imposed CNY 300000 fines on each of these behaviours and requested Western Digital to rectify the situation As per the entrusted supervisorrsquos report such behaviours have been rectified and the first remedy has been fulfilled

According to MOFCOMrsquos announcement the agency found that other remedies have been entirely implemented

Competition Analysis

With respect to the current situation of the competition in the hard disk market MOFCOM made the following assessment

1) In the areas of portable application and corporate-level application solid-state drive has put constraint on the impact of the traditional hard disk as to strengthen the competition in the relevant market

2) Overcapacity problems in the conventional hard disk drive market became obvious

3) Western Digital and HGST are the major competitors in the hard disk drive market Both the layout and the major market competitors in this market have remained unchanged since 2012

4) The hold-separate duties restricted the full competition between Western Digital and HGST The implementation of such duties hindered them from integrating their products and providing the market with a full range of products and had an adverse impact on their clientsrsquo product procurement

Based on the above analysis MOFCOM deemed that

1) Removal of the conditions that required the two companies to remain independent in production and RampD activities would enable Western Digital to save costs to provide a full range of products to the market and to fully engage in market competition and benefit its clients

2) To keep the two sales teams and their respective brands independent from each other and the independence of sales activities could reduce competition restraint impacts arising from a complete merger

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 14 of 52

Remedies

After negotiating with MOFCOM the relevant entities agreed to undertake the following obligations

1) Western Digital and HGST will remain independent in sales and brands

2) Western Digital will not change its previous business modes or force its clients to exclusively purchase hard disk drive products from Western Digital or do so in disguise

3) Western Digital will continue its pace in investing in product innovation to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

This announcement will be effective within two years from the date of issuance If Western Digital can provide sufficient evidence to prove a substantial change in the market environment the company can propose to MOFCOM to remove the relevant conditions within the two years

SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions14

MOFCOM considered the fact that the competition condition in the relevant product market has changed and removed the hold-separate restrictions on Seagate and Samsung

Seagate shall remain its business model materially and continue to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

Facts

On December 12 2011 MOFCOM made the No 11 Announcement to clear Seagate Technology LLCrsquos (ldquoSeagaterdquo) acquisition with remedies In this acquisition Seagate intended to acquire hard disk drive business of Samsung Electronics Co Ltd (ldquoSamsung HDDrdquo) As per this announcement Seagate could apply for removing the first and second remedy after this decision has been carried out for 12 months

The first remedy is to preserve Samsung HDD as an independent competitor and the second remedy asks to maintain and expand Samsung HDDrsquos production capacity within six months of issuance of the No 11 Announcement and to set reasonable production volume targets based on market supply-demand conditions

Seagate lodged an application to remove the first and second remedy in May 2015 After making assessments on the relevant parties and the competition circumstance MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate remedies

14 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151020151001144105shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 15 of 52

Competition Analysis

With respect to the current situation of the competition in the hard disk drive market MOFCOM made the following assessments

1) In the areas of portable application and corporate-level application solid-state drive has put constraint on the impact of the traditional hard disk so that the competition in the relevant market has been strengthened

2) Overcapacity problems in the conventional hard disk drive market became obvious

3) Both the layout and the major market competitors in the hard disk drive market have remained unchanged since 2012

4) Seagate and Samsung HDDrsquos market overlap in the hard disk market is quite small and Samsung HDDrsquos competition in the traditional hard disk is quite weak

Based on the above analysis MOFCOM deemed that

1) Removal of certain conditions is possible because in the portable application and corporate level application sectors competition constraint of solid-state drive on traditional hard disk drives has strengthened traditional hard disk drives are facing overcapacity which has reduced the chance of a single or more competitors causing competition restraints Seagate has limited overlap with Samsung in the hard disk business and the latter has a relatively weaker market power in the hard drive disk business

2) Removal of all imposed conditions may still restrain market competition because the traditional hard disk drive market competition conditions have not undergone a major change Seagate is still the major player in all divisions of the market and Seagate will strengthen its power after the acquisition of Samsung HDD

Remedies

After negotiating with MOFCOM Seagate agreed to undertake the following obligations

1) Seagate shall not change its business model materially or force clients to purchase hard drive disks exclusively from it

2) Seagate shall not force Tokyo Dengikagaku Kogyo China to supply magnetic heads exclusively to Seagate (or other Seagate-controlled companies) or limit the number of magnetic heads Tokyo Dengikagaku Kogyo China would supply to other hard drive disk manufacturers

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 16 of 52

3) Seagate shall continue to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

This announcement will be effective within two years from the date of issuance If Seagate can provide sufficient evidence to prove substantial change in the market environment the company can propose to MOFCOM to remove relevant conditions within the two years

FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM15

MOFCOM deems that this acquisition would induce anti-competitive influence

NXP promises to dispose its radio frequency (ldquoRFrdquo) power transistor business

As the first case approved with structural remedies after the enactment of the Provisions on Imposing Restrictive Conditions MOFCOM conducted a comprehensive evaluation of the viability competitiveness and marketability of the divested business as well as the suitability of potential buyers

Facts

On April 3 2015 NXP filed for its acquisition of Freescale NXP Semiconductor (ldquoNXPrdquo) is a NASDAQ-listed company registered in the Netherlands which engages in the design manufacturing and sale of integration circuits and discrete components

Freescale Semiconductor (ldquoFreescalerdquo) is a New York-listed company registered in Bermuda and based in the US which engages in the manufacturing and RampD of microcontroller and digital networking processors (embedded processors)

According to the agreement between NXP and Freescale after closing Freescale will become the wholly owned subsidiary of NXP On November 25 2015 MOFCOM decided to clear this acquisition with remedies

Relevant Market

As per the announcement the relevant product markets are the general microcontroller automotive power-use analog integrated circuit and RF transistor product markets in which NXP and Freescale have horizontal overlap The relevant geographical markets should be the global market

Competition Analysis

After assessing this proposed deal the agency concluded that

1) The proposed deal would boost NXPrsquos market control power in the RF

15 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151120151101196182shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 17 of 52

transistor product market because the global and Chinese RF transistor product markets share a similar structure both featuring few competitors and high concentration levels Freescale and NXP as the number one and number two players are far ahead of their rivals in the market Therefore after closing the market control power of NXP in this market would be strengthened

2) Since Freescale was the fiercest competitor of NXP the proposed deal will remove competition between them

3) The proposed deal would reduce the options for clients and increase procurement risks

In practice the wireless infrastructure suppliers as the main client of the RF transistor product tend to procure products from both NXP and Freescale to prevent them from the risk arising from relying on one supplier

4) The proposed deal may induce an adverse impact on the technology RampD and innovation

Remedies

In accordance with MOFCOMrsquos decision NXP shall follow its written commitment submitted to MOFCOM and completely divest its RF power transistor business to Beijing Jianguang Asset Management At the same time NXP shall strictly fulfil its obligations during the transition period It is worth noting that the NXPFreescale deal shall only be implemented after the divestment deal has been concluded

In addition MOFCOM requires NXP to perform relevant obligations during the transition period from the date of approval announcement until the divestment deal has been concluded NXP shall endeavour

1) not to engage in any lsquounfair trade practicesrsquo relating to the divested business

2) not to implement any acts which may have a significant adverse impact on the value management or competitiveness of the divested business or any acts which may change the nature and scope industry or business strategy or investment policy of the divested business and to take reasonable measures to encourage core employees to stay in the divested business as well as not to seek or transfer employees to NXPrsquos non-divested business

3) to ensure supply to the divested business in a fair reasonable and non-discriminatory manner and

4) to maintain the independence of the divested business and not to exchange competitively sensitive information between the parties and the divested

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 18 of 52

business

B Monopolistic Agreements

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

With respect to the enforcement activities of the NDRC in light of the numbers of the published cases it seems that the law enforcement frequency of the NDRC regarding monopolistic agreements in 2015 is lower in comparison with 2014

The reason behind might be that the outstanding issue of human resource deficit of the antitrust authority still exists Besides the fact that more enterprises gradually attach increasing importance to the antitrust compliance might be another reason for the decrease in the number of cases investigated by the authorities

As to the enforcement activities of the SAIC 4 of 14 cases concluded by the SAIC and its local branches in 2015 are relevant to monopolistic agreements Meanwhile these four cases concern horizontal monopolistic agreements

It is noteworthy however that the Mercedes-Benz case and the Dongfeng Nissan case suggest that vertical agreements especially involving price-related restrictions on the downstream dealers is still the priority of antitrust enforcement Companies shall be very cautious when imposing restrictions on the resale prices or the minimum resale prices of commodities in the distribution agreements

Automobile industry and related industries are observed to be under continuous attention of Chinarsquos antitrust authorities

The industries relating to peoplersquos livelihoods remain to be the enforcement priority

Significant Cases

Enforcement by the NDRC and its local branches

Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC16

The investigation was triggered by a leniency application

The first leniency applicant was exempted from punishment

Eight ocean shipping companies involved were imposed a collective fine of CNY 4067 million

NDRC spent approximately 12 months to investigate and conclude the case 16 NDRCrsquos press release of the case is available at httpjjsndrcgovcngzdt201512t20151228_769084html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 19 of 52

Facts

In December 2015 the NDRC published its official punishment decisions regarding the cartel case in connection with eight ocean shipping companies namely Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha (ldquoNYKrdquo) Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha (ldquoK Linerdquo) Mitsui OSK Lines EUKOR Car Carriers Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics Compantildeiacutea Sud Americana de Vapores Eastern Car Liner and Compantildeiacutea Chilena de Navegacioacuten Interoceaacutenica

According to the official press release of the NDRC the investigation was triggered by a leniency application of NYK The evidence showed that the eight companies reached consensus on non-intrusion of each others existing business to maintain or increase shipping fees when shipping goods such as cars trucks and engineering machinery in the routes between China and other countries and regions

They were also found to frequently conduct bilateral or multilateral communications on the shippersrsquo invitation for bids andor price inquiries via phone conferences dinner parties e-mails visiting etc In addition they also conducted illegal behaviour such as sensitive information exchange price negotiations bidding intention discussion dividing clients and shipping routes reaching agreements on high price bids or non-bidding in order to help certain companies gain shipping orders

To avoid the regulation of the antitrust authority the relevant shipping companies adopted various illicit measures that showed their apparent intention to violate the AML The cartel lasted for at least four years and covered a broad range of shipping routes concerned with the import and export of products between China and other regions such as North America EU South America and so on involving multiple auto brands and engineering machinery brands

The NDRC held the opinion that the eight companies conducts had restricted and eliminated competition in the relevant market raising the international shipping fees and impairing interests of shippers and end consumers The eight companies breached the AML by reaching and implementing monopolistic agreements on fixing prices and dividing the market

All eight investigated companies put forward remedy measures including enhancing the antitrust compliance program arranging more antitrust compliance trainings and developing antitrust compliance technologies

The NDRC imposed fines based on the nature level and duration of their monopolistic volations as well as their respective sales of international freight service sales relevant to the Chinese market The companies involved were collectively fined CNY 4067 million

NYK as the first cartel member voluntarily reporting the illegal conducts to the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 20 of 52

authority and providing significant evidence was entirely exempted from the punishment K Line as the second leniency applicant was imposed a fine amounting to 4 of its 2014 annual sales of international freight services relevant to Chinarsquos import and export market The details of punishments imposed on the involved companies by the NDRC are as follow

Company Name Amount of Fines (RMB million)

Percentage of the Relevant Turnovers

Grounds

Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha

- - First leniency applicant

Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha

2398 4 Second leniency applicant

Mitsui OSK Lines 3812 7 Third leniency applicant

EUKOR Car Carriers 284 9 Lasted over a long period involved many brands and many violations violations were severe

Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics

4506 8 Lasted over a long period involved many brands and many violations violations were severe

Compantildeiacutea Sud Americana de Vapores

308 6 Lasted over a long period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Eastern Car Liner 1127 5 Lasted over a long period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Compantildeiacutea Chilena de 120 4 Lasted over a long

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 21 of 52

Navegacioacuten Interoceaacutenica

period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Total 4067

Analysis

In this case the agency applied the AML instead of the Tenders and Bids Law to collusive bidding Citing article 13 (3) of the AML the NDRC identified that the collusive bidding constituted a division of the sales market

The leading three leniency applicants were granted exemption from fines to a varying degree

According to the official who handled this case dawn raids performed by antitrust enforcement agencies in other jurisdictions drew the attention of the NDRC on the cartels of these shipping companies However there was limited effective evidence to prove that the companies had reached monopolistic agreements Through pressuring the involved parties three members of the shipping cartel actively confessed their illegal conduct This case once again stresses the significance of international cooperation between antitrust enforcement agencies

Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau17

The distribution agreements between Mercedes-Benz and its dealers are determined as vertical monopolistic agreement and Mercedes-Benz violated article 14 of the AML because it restricted the ability of its dealers to decide their own resale prices

Mercedes-Benzrsquos dealers violated article of 13 of the AML due to concluding a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Mercedes-Benz and its dealers were jointly fined CNY 3578 million

Facts

In April 2015 Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau which is the provincial branch of the NDRC released the punishment on its website and announced that it had imposed a fine of CNY 350 million on Mercedes-Benz along with the aggregated fine of CNY 787 million on its dealers The fine came as a result of Mercedes-Benz reaching and implementing resale price maintenance (ldquoRPMrdquo) agreements with dealers to fix the minimum resale price of several car models as well as certain auto parts 17 The original Chinese notice published by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau is available at httpwwwjswjjgovcnoffice_neweo_comm_zxnrxsphp

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 22 of 52

According to the decision the authority found that Mercedes-Benz fixed the minimum resale price of Class E and Class S cars in Nanjing Wuxi Changzhou and Suzhou markets through telephoneverbal communication and dealers meetings from January 2013 to July 2014 Since 2010 Mercedes-Benz had reached agreements with dealers in Jiangsu province to fix the minimum resale prices for auto parts by providing different levels of discounts for insured cars cars involving expired warranty periods and cars within the warranty period

In addition Mercedes-Benz implemented the minimum resale price maintaining agreement by

1) Tightening its monitoring measures on the dealers such as inspecting deals and their sale incentive system on a weekly basis

2) Tracking the sales process flow of cars and increasing the intensity of this assessment

3) Giving warnings and reducing support ndash for example halting the supply of bestselling cars and prohibiting the opening of new stores ndash to dealers if dealers refused to cooperate with the price-fixing related policies and measures and

4) Interviewing personnel of the dealers and requesting terminations if the staff engaged in serious violations of the RPM agreement

Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau concluded that Mercedes-Benz had excluded and eliminated market competition harmed consumer welfare and consequently violated article 1418 of the AML The authority therefore imposed a fine of CNY 350 million representing 7 of the sale revenue of the previous year in the relevant market against Mercedes-Benz and imposed a fine on the dealers amounting to an equivalence of 1 of the annual sales in the previous year

Analysis

Although the agency also addressed the horizontal violation among the dealers in this case the administrative penalty decision mainly focuses on the vertical violation The agency fined dealers involved in the RPM agreement a combined CNY 787 million equal to 1 of the previous-year sales which suggests that the agency decided to give lighter punishments to dealers who took initiative in reporting the activity and provided evidence

The Mercedes-Benz case is the third case where the agency successfully 18 Article 14 of the AML The following monopolistic agreements between operators and trading partners shall be prohibited (i) fixing the resale prices of commodities to third persons (ii) restricting the minimum resale prices of commodities to third persons (iii) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement Authority under the State Council

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 23 of 52

discovered both vertical and horizontal agreements in a case following the Audi case and the Chrysler case All these cases are rooted in the same industry indicating that industrial features play a large role in raising anti-trust concerns In fact it appears that the entire automotive industry is under antitrust scrutiny

Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC19

This case involved both a horizontal agreement and an administrative monopoly

A total fine of CNY 1318 million was imposed on the involved companies

Facts

In June 2015 the NDRC through its website announced the decision made by its regional branch -Yunnan Provincial Development and Reform Commission (ldquoYunnan DRCrdquo) regarding the horizontal monopolistic agreement case involving Yunnan Communications Administration and local subsidiaries of four state-owned telecommunication companies

Through the investigation Yunnan DRC found that Yunnan Communications Administration as a competent government agency had organized several meetings involving Yunnan branches of four state-owned telecoms - China Mobile China Telecom China Unicom and China Tietong in August and September of 2014 At the end of 2009 the four local branches entered into an agreement to regulate their sales promotions in terms of limiting the promotional items amount and frequency

Furthermore the agreement provides certain measures to ensure the implementation of relevant restrictions on promotions Specifically in case any cartel member violates the agreement the others could file complaints with Yunnan Communications Administration and the agency would then issue a rectification notice to the rule-breaker

Yunnan DRC stated that the four telecoms were main competitors in the relevant market and the promotions as a significant competition measure would exert direct influence on the final prices of the products The horizontal agreement organized by Yunnan Communications Administration on sales promotions restricted the competition capacity of telecoms and as a result eliminated the competition in the relevant market Consequently the behaviour of Yunnan Communications Administration violated article 8 20 of the AML and constituted administrative monopoly in terms of ldquoforcing undertakings to conduct monopolistic behaviour prohibited by the AMLrdquo

19 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpwwwsdpcgovcnfzgggzjgjdyfldjjszhdt201506t20150602_694802html 20 Article 8 of the AML Administrative organs and the public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 24 of 52

With respect to the penalties Yunnan DRC fined the local branch of China Tietong CNY 200000 for reaching but not implementing the agreement in regards to the other three telecoms a total fine of CNY 1298 million amounting to 2 of the sales of the relevant business in the previous year were imposed for entering into and implementing the horizontal monopolistic agreement

Analysis

The telecoms industry is still the enforcement priority of the antitrust enforcement authorities A company cannot be exempted from punishment even though it is forced by competent authorities to conduct monopoly behaviour

DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC21

Both a horizontal monopolistic agreement and a vertical monopolistic agreement were involved in this case

A total fine of CNY 14242 million was imposed on DongFeng Nissan and its distributors

Facts

In September 2015 the Guangdong Development and Reform Commission (ldquoGuangdong DRCrdquo) released an announcement regarding the administrative penalties on DongFeng Nissan and its provincial distributors for concluding price-related monopolistic agreements More specifically DongFeng Nissan was imposed a fine of CNY 1233 million for breaching article 14 of the AML in terms of restricting the resale price of certain car models 17 distributors domiciled in Guangdong were collectively fined CNY 1912 million for violating article 1322 of the AML in terms of entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements

According to the published official release the Guangdong DRC launched the investigation in August 2014 The authority discovered that from 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissan had set a rigorous restriction on its distributorsrsquo abilities to determine the resale prices of certain car models including the quoted prices in various platforms and the final resale price In addition DongFeng Nissan punished the distributors that failed to abide by such price restrictions in 2013 The authority 21 The original Chinese notice published by Guangdong DRC is available at httpwwwgddpcgovcnzwgkgzdtgzyw201509t20150910_328993html 22 Article 13 of the AML The following Monopolistic agreements among competing operators shall be prohibited (i) fix or change prices of commodities (ii) limit the outputs or sales volume of commodities (iii) segment the sales markets or the raw material purchasing markets (iv) limit the purchase of new technology new facilities or limit the development of new products new technology (v) jointly boycott transactions (vi) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-Monopoly Law enforcement Authority Monopolistic agreements in this Law refer to agreements decisions or other concerted practices that eliminate restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 25 of 52

believed that the vertical agreement concluded between DongFeng Nissan and its distributors eliminated and restricted the competition in the relevant market and damaged the consumer welfare as well which violates article 14 of the AML

Furthermore from April 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissanrsquos distributors in Guangdong province held multiple meetings to discuss issues relevant to sale price reached and implemented a horizontal monopolistic agreement in terms of fixing the prices of some car models which is prohibited by article 13 of the AML

Considering that both DongFeng Nissan and the involved distributors positively cooperated with the investigation and ceased the illegal behaviour immediately after the investigation Guangdong DRC decided to impose a fine amounting to 3 of its previous yearrsquos turnovers on DongFeng Nissan and a fine ranging from 2 to 4 on the relevant distributors in accordance with articles 4623 and 4924 of the AML

Analysis

This case demonstrates that auto and related industries are still under close attention of the authority Considering the NDRCrsquos successful series of antitrust investigations conducted throughout the auto industry it is observed that the agency currently overseeing price-related antitrust issues in China has accumulated a substantial amount of experience regarding antitrust enforcement in the auto industry Now is the right time to speed up the law-making process by amending the set of rules released earlier and drafting new laws to advise the auto industry on antitrust compliance

Enforcement by the SAIC and its local branches

Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC25

The investigation was triggered by whistle blowerrsquos submission

Cartel members were collectively fined CNY 139 million 23 Article 46 of the AML In case the operators violate the relevant provisions of this Law concluding and implementing Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall order the operators to cease such act impose fines more than 1 but less than 10 of the total turnover in the preceding year and confiscate the illegal gains where the Monopolistic agreement is not implemented a fine less than RMB 500000 can be imposed If the operators involved in Monopolistic agreement on its own initiative report information concerning the conclusion of Monopolistic agreements and provide important evidences to the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority they may be given a mitigated punishment or be exempted from punishment in accordance with the circumstances Where the industrial associations violate this Law organizing the operators in the industry to conclude Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority may impose a fine less than RMB 500000 in serious circumstances the agency of social organization administration and registration may cancel its registration 24 Article 49 of the AML As for the imposition of the fines stipulated by the Article 46 47 and 48 of this Law the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall take elements such as the nature extent and time it lasts of the illegal act into consideration in determining the specific amount of the fines 25 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201506t20150601_156889html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 26 of 52

Facts

In April 2015 the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) issued administrative penalties on several brick manufacturers for entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements This is the first case relevant to monopolistic agreements that has been publicized by the SAIC since the beginning of this year

Ten cartel members were involved in the case including one company and nine individuals Similar with most antitrust cases the investigation started as a result of a whistle blowerrsquos submission After a thorough investigation Hunan AIC found that those local brick manufacturers had reached agreements on controlling production volume and dividing sales areas in the forms of production and sales agreements plans and meeting minutes

The enforcement authority reached the conclusion that these brick manufacturers violated article 13 of the AML and imposed a total fine of CNY 1389400 on them

Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC26

The organizer of the monopolistic agreement the animation association was fined CNY 100000

The antitrust authority did not punish the members of the monopolistic agreement

Facts

In December 2015 the Guangdong Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoGuangdong AICrdquo) published its administrative punishment decision in regards to Guangzhou Panyu Animation amp Game Association (ldquoGAGArdquo) organizing member companies to conclude a monopolistic agreement

According to the decision GAGA drafted the ldquoAgreement of Exhibition Alliancerdquo (ldquoAgreementrdquo) and convened a conference with member companies in order to discuss the content and conclusion of the Agreement 52 member companies entered into the Agreement which actually requested the alliance companies to merely participate in the exhibitions either organized or supported by GAGA in Guangzhou In addition the Agreement prohibited the alliance companies from attending any other exhibition except if they obtained prior approval of GAGA

After a thorough investigation Guangdong AIC believed that the conclusion of the Agreement among GAGA and the 52 member companies violated article 13 (5) of the AML in terms of boycott GAGA who was deeply involved and restricted member companiesrsquo choice of exhibitions through the Agreement could be deemed as

26 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151208_164680html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 27 of 52

the participant and organizer of the monopolistic agreement In accordance with article 46 of the AML Guangdong AIC imposed a fine of CNY 100000 on GAGA for organizing the conclusion of the monopolistic agreement

Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC27

Hubei AIC considered the coinsurance for Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance illegal

Twelve insurance companies were fined CNY 469 million in total

Facts

In December 2015 the Hubei Administrative for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHubei AICrdquo) disclosed its punishment on 12 insurance companies for signing illegal coinsurance agreements

The disclosed punishment decision suggests that the Hubei branch of China Pacific Life Insurance (ldquothe Companyrdquo) 11 other insurance companies and Wuhan Construction Safety Technology Consultation Center (ldquoWCSTCCrdquo) signed a Coinsurance Agreement on Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance (ldquoCoinsurance Agreementrdquo) of which the main contents include

1) The Company and 11 other involved companies as the coinsurers jointly take charge of the personal accident insurance concerned with the construction project directly administered by the Wuhan government WCSTCC is responsible for providing safety professionalism and technology services regarding the relevant personal accident insurance

2) The Company as the chief insurer of the coinsurance occupies 12 of the total amount of the insurance and the other 11 companies respectively occupy 8

3) The Company as the representative of the coinsurance is in charge of collecting the premium signing the standard form insurance policies and issuing the invoice in its own name The Company should share the charged premium with the other companies in accordance with the Coinsurance Agreement

4) Both the Company and the other insurance companies should pay 25 of the actually received premium to WCSTCC as the service fee WCSTCC will assist the coinsurers in providing safety and technology management service to the insured In addition the 11 insurance companies should pay 5 of their premium to the Company as the management fee

27 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165445html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 28 of 52

5) In case an accident happens the 12 companies will jointly bear the damages based on their respective shares in the coinsurance

6) There is a contact mechanism established in the coinsurance The coinsurers will regularly hold coinsurance conferences to discuss existing problems

Furthermore the coinsurers and WCSTCC also signed a self-discipline agreement and established a complete management system to assure the implementation of the Coinsurance Agreement Any party violating the Coinsurance Agreement would be punished

Hubei AIC found that WCSTCC was solely invested by Wuhan Construction Safety Management Association which was under Wuhan Construction Commission The centre helped implement certain functions of the Wuhan Urban Construction Safety Management Station and was responsible for quality supervision and safety supervision of municipal construction projects

It later became a prerequisite for construction companies to purchase insurance from any member of the coinsurance in order to get approval to commence their project According to the decision Hubei AIC launched another separate investigation against WCSTCC

Through the investigation Hubei AIC concluded that the Coinsurance Agreement constituted a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by article 13 of the AML with the following analysis

First coinsurance as a common business model to jointly share and lower risks is widely adopted in the insurance industry A coinsurance arrangement for a specific project in order to avoid high risks faced by one insurer could be legal However coinsurance should not target the entire market In this case prior to the Coinsurance Agreement the risks of the construction projects were unpredictable since the scale of the construction projects the difficulty of the construction and the amount of construction workers could not be available It is impossible to predict the risks of the projects thus it is not necessary to cooperate with other insurers to collectively bear the risks The purpose of the 12 insurance companies to establish the coinsurance is to avoid the competition which demonstrates the Coinsurance Agreement belongs to a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by the AML

Second the companies through entering into the coinsurance agreement actually divided the relevant market of construction project personal accident insurance in Wuhan city which affected the competition in the relevant market and damaged the interests of other competitors and the consumers In particular the Construction Law as amended in 2011 stipulates that the purchase of personal accident insurance is not mandatory and the construction companies have the right to choose whether to buy the said insurance or not As mentioned purchasing insurance from the coinsurance had been the prerequisite for construction companies to obtain administration

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 29 of 52

approval for the project which seriously distorts the fair competition in the market

Citing article 46 of the AML the 12 insurance companies were collectively fined CNY 469 million including fines on the companies and confiscation of illegal gains It is noteworthy that the fines were calculated based on the companiesrsquo 2014 annual sales of the insurance product in connection with the coinsurance The Company as the chief insurer was fined amounting to 6 of its 2014 annual sales of the relevant insurance product in the coinsurance and other companies were fined amounting to 2 of relevant sales For more specific information please see the following table

Company Name (Hubei Branch)

Fines (CNY million)

Percentage of the sales

Illegal Gains (CNY

million)

China Pacific Life Insurance 00653 6 0941

Sino Life 00145 2 04332

Alltrust Insurance 00145 2 04332

Taikang Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Continent Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Pacific Property Insurance

00145 2 04332

China Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

PICC Property and Casualty 00145 2 02599

Taiping General Insurance 00145 2 013

Union Life Insurance 00145 2 01177

Ping An Annuity Insurance Company of China

00145 2 04201

Ping An Property amp Casualty Insurance Company of China

00145 2 -

Subtotal 02248 - 44679

Total 46927

Analysis

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 30 of 52

Coinsurance as an effective approach to lower risks of insurers is widely used in the insurance industry Information sharing and agreements on coinsurance were generally considered efficient and legitimate However from an antitrust perspective coinsurance may raise competition concerns depending on the circumstances of each agreement In the case that there is enough capacity for one insurer to cover the potential risks the coinsurance might be considered as entering into a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC28

The first leniency applicant was exempted from fines

The other concrete companies were imposed a fine of CNY 180000

Facts

In December 2015 the concrete companies monopolistic agreement case investigated by Hunan AIC was published on SAICrsquos website

In accordance with the antitrust enforcement announcement of SAIC this case was triggered by complaints from the Yongzhou City peoplersquos congress After the preliminary review the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) initiated the formal investigation on seven concrete companies domiciled in Yongzhou City Hunan Province which were suspected of being involved in a monopolistic agreement in terms of division of the volumes of the products

After further investigation Hunan AIC found that the seven concrete companies concluded a partnership agreement in 2011 which requested the involved companies to enter into a partnership business with assets In addition according to the partnership agreement it was planned to establish a comprehensive office to manage production marketing and distribution of the products of all the partners The seven companies intended to jointly adjust and control the output of concrete based on the partnership agreement However because there were disagreements over the allocation of the injected assets and market shares the companies did not implement the partnership agreement The agreement was cancelled in December 2012

Based on the findings Hunan AIC concluded that the seven concrete companies as competitors of each other restricted and eliminated the competition in the relevant market through reaching the partnership agreement and dividing the volumes of sales which violated article 13(3) of the AML in terms of division of sales market Considering that the agreement had not been implemented and the limited influence of the agreement according to article 46 of the AML and article 27 of the Administrative Penalties Law small amount fines were imposed on the involved companies Six companies were fined CNY 30000 each for their illegal behaviour 28 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165504html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 31 of 52

Yongzhou Shuangyuan Building Materials Co Ltd as the first one to actively report the monopolistic agreement and cooperate with the enforcement authority was exempted from the punishment

Outlook

It is expected that the AMLrsquos enforcement on monopolistic agreements will continue in the future Industries such as automobile shipping pharmaceuticals insurance etc will still remain the priority of the antitrust enforcement

The antitrust enforcement authorities have published a series of regulations in order to clarify the substantial and procedural issues relevant to the antitrust enforcement However Chinarsquos current antitrust legislation regime is still immature In the following years we expect that more attention will be paid to the legislative improvements

Another remarkable issue for cartel members is that with more Chinese enterprises attaching increasing importance to the AML the follow-on civil damages actions might become a tendency in the future

C Abuse of Market Dominance

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen a decent increase of abuse of market dominance cases both in public enforcement and private litigation Oftentimes the authorities responsible for public enforcement generally find it difficult to pursue investigations against abuse of market dominance cases The following two main reasons are often cited to explain this standoff first it is hard for the authorities to define the relevant markets and prove the undertaking(s)rsquo dominant market position through economic approaches second it is hard to collect evidence regarding abusive practices

The cases related to IPRs abuse are emerging significantly particularly in the telecommunication media and technology (ldquoTMTrdquo) sectors

The SAICrsquos latest refusal-to-deal probe against a local drug maker shows that the SAIC and its local branches have increasingly acquired a profile as an abuse of dominance regulator

Significant Cases

Cases pursued by the SAIC

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 32 of 52

Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case29

Facts

The local authority in Dongfang city reported to the Hainan provincial branch of SAIC on April 23 2014 of the suspected dominance abuse The SAIC authorized its Hainan bureau to officially investigate the matter on 25 July 2014 according to a decision dated January 9 2015 The AIC concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its market dominance by requiring users to pay a deposit without any legal basis and or justifiable reasons

In terms of the relevant product market the local authority found that in this case it was the urban water supply market in Dongfang city and its surrounding townships where Dongfang Water was the sole public operator in the local water supply market with a 100 market share which made all water users completely reliant on the companyrsquos supply In term of market access the local authority found it very unlikely that there were other operators due to the strict regulations

The Hainan SAIC then concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its dominance as it charged users a deposit by threatening to refuse to register users and also by threatening to restrict the water supply Dongfang Waters charging of deposits lacked a legal basis and hadnt received government approval to the detriment of household consumers and business water users and hampered the improvement of management and services of the company Such conduct was in breach of Chinarsquos Anti-Monopoly Law

Hainan AIC levied a fine of CNY 593208 a lighter penalty equivalent to 2 of the companyrsquos annual sales for the previous year and confiscated illicit gains of CNY 38521 for abuse of market dominance

Analysis

It is noteworthy that although handled by a local authority supervised by the SAIC the antitrust agency detailed the relevant market definition the assessment of the dominant market position the abusive practices and the scrutiny of the justifiable reasons

Although the definition of the relevant market and the reasoning of the Hainan provincial AIC and the SAIC are subject to criticism it is still applausive to see that the antitrust regulators have realized the importance of the application of rule of reason in an abuse case In addition through itrsquos a published decision practitioners may observe the regulatorsrsquo reasoning and thus transparency and legal certainty have been generated

29 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzfcfjd201502t20150212_152066html last visited on October 18 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 33 of 52

Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms30

Facts

In June 2013 the Ningxia AIC under authorization of SAIC opened an antitrust investigation into the alleged tie-in sales by the three major state-owned telecommunications operators China Tietong China Unicom and China Telecom for the tie-in sale of fixed-line telephones with broadband Internet services The Ningxia AIC found that the three companies had bundled fixed-line phone services with Internet services to subscribers

During the investigation all three telecommunications companies admitted the tie-in practice had recognized that such practice had improper influence on competition and deprived the choices of consumers The three companies promised to undertake internal rectification timely and eliminate the ill effects resulting from such practice The parties committed to taking the following corrective measures

1) Taking internal rectifications and conducting training to staff about antitrust laws and stop tie-in sales practices

2) Making public commitments to allow subscribers a free choice of services and strengthening the propaganda through the operating room call centre and other channels

3) Unbundling fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

The Ningxia AIC decided to suspend the probe on 14 May 2015 on the grounds that the three companies had actively worked together with the investigators and proposed workable remedy plans

Analysis

In the official announcement Ningxia AIC concluded that the purpose of antitrust enforcement is to restrain monopolistic conducts the protection of competition and to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of consumers Given that during the investigation process the parties had actively cooperated with the investigation formed a more profound understanding of the dangers of tying behaviour and moreover the parties proposed and implemented positive corrective measures to be able to remove the ill impact of their actions the agency believed that the purpose of antitrust law enforcement was fulfilled

It is worth noting that the Ningxia AIC also required the three companies to implement the commitment by August 30 2015and the submission of the written

30 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158908html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158906html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158910html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 34 of 52

implementation report on July 102015 and August 102015 respectively which is another illustration that an effective commitment by the undertakings shall directly deal with the effect that is brought by the monopolistic behaviour In this case the effect of the monopolistic act was restricted to the choice of the consumers therefore the commitment by the undertaking aimed at allowing the freedom of choice and the unbundling of fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company31

Facts

The Liaoning AIC imposed a fine of approximately CNY 433m on the Fushun Branch of Liaoning Tobacco Co on 1 June 2015 The agency also ordered the company to stop its illicit behaviour

The Liaoning AIC received a tip-off that the accused Liaoning Tobacco Corsquos Fushun branch was conducting tie-in sales of non-high-demand cigarette brands with high-demand cigarette brands After gaining authorization from SAIC the agency officially started an investigation regarding the companyrsquos suspected abuse of market dominance in June 2014

Analysis

According to the announcement the tobacco company argued that the tobacco industry is a state controlled or monopolized industry with a lawful monopolistic position therefore the company shall not be subject to the norms of general market competition rules or the anti-monopoly law

In this regards the agency concluded that in terms of the status of the undertaking admittedly the first paragraph of article 17 of the AML says that the State shall protect the lawful business operations of undertakings in these industries with respect to the industries which are under the control of the State-owned economic sector and have a bearing on the lifeline of the national economy or national security and the industries which exercise monopoly over the production and sale of certain commodities according to law However the second paragraph continues to say that the undertakings mentioned above shall do business according to law be honest faithful and strictly self-disciplined and subject themselves to public supervision and they shall not harm the consumers interests by taking advantage of their position of control or their monopolistic production and sale of certain commodities In particular in the preceding paragraph the ldquolawful businessrdquo and ldquoaccording to lawrdquo imply that the AML shall apply in the business operation The agency therefore believes that

31 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201508t20150813_16

0208html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 35 of 52

there shall be no exemption for the undertaking concerned the defences of the undertaking concerned is not established

Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm32

Facts

The Chongqing AIC fined Chongqing Qingyang Pharmaceutical CNY 439308 for alleged dominance abuse

The investigation was initiated when the company contacted the agency for verification on its potential breach of the AML related to an allopurinol active pharmaceuticals ingredient (API) distribution agreement with its exclusive distributor The company provided the relevant agreement and information and the agency conducted an investigation into the company and some other relevant companies

Analysis

Relevant Market

During the investigation the agency found that pharmaceutical ingredients are a special commodity the API is used to produce the preparations The chemical API is only used for the production of the preparation and could be used as a medicine for clinic use

The preparation is produced according to the requirements of certain form of prepared drugs and for the purpose of treatment and prevention which can be used as medicine

The allopurinol is used for the common treatment of hyperuricemia However the other treatments are different in pharmacological effects or treatment effects as well as in the cost for the patient Furthermore the company is the only manufacturer and supplier in the market nationwide since July 2012 Therefore the agency concluded that the relevant market is the allopurinol API market

Considering that the qualification for manufacturing the allopurinol API is national wide and the normal practice for purchasers and suppliers is domestic the relevant geographic market is the Chinese market

The Market Dominance

During the investigation the agency found that the company is the only supplier and manufacturer of allopurinol API in China there is no other competitor in the

32 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151222_16

5152html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 36 of 52

market and the company has a monopoly in the market The evidence shows that the company has the ability to control the prices the position for the downstream is relatively weak

With respect to the market entry the agency found that the market entry is relatively high in addition other undertakings are dependent on the company Thus the agency believed the company to have market dominance

Refusal to Deal

The agency found that on September 25 2015 the company reached an exclusive agreement and distribution agreement with its distributor Based on these agreements the company didnrsquot supply allopurinol API to the said distributor and other companies despite the fact that those companies requested for allopurinol API but were turned down by the company

Absence of Reasonable Cause

The agency found that the companyrsquos refusal to deal was not in line with the needs of normal business operation or economic efficiency On the other hand the refusal to deal was aimed at increasing the market share of the allopurinol drug product Also the agency found that the stop of supply was a manipulation of market power as to maximize the profit to the most The agency further found that the exclusive distribution agreement with suspension of supply for six months and the refusal to supply was to eliminate and restrict the competition as to gain the monopolistic profit

The Consequence of Refusal to Deal

The agency concluded that the refusal to deal harmed the competition of the allopurinol preparations market Because of the suspension of supply many demanders had to reduce their production or switch to the supply of other products or stop their production The suspension of supply affected the competition of the downstream market Consequently the raising of the price of allopurinol API also raised the cost for other manufacturers of allopurinol preparations

Furthermore the refusal to deal led to capacity loss of the allopurinol preparation industry

Ultimately the refusal to deal increased the burden on consumers as the refusal to supply changed the supply-demand relationship in the market

The agency concluded that the Company abused its dominant position in the allopurinol API market by refusing to deal with intended buyers in the period between October 2013 and March 2014Therefore the Company violated article 17 (1) of the AML which prohibits business operators with a dominant market position from abusing that position such as the refusal to deal without any justifications

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 37 of 52

D Administrative Monopoly

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 witnessed antitrust authoritiesrsquo significant efforts regarding the enforcement against administrative monopoly According to Mr Dong Zhiming the deputy director general of Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly Bureau ever since the AML coming into force six cases in connection with administrative monopoly were investigated by NDRC and among them five cases were handled in the year of 2015 These cases touched abuses of administrative power in terms of designative deal in relation to transportation communication and pharmaceutical industries

The first private litigation related to administrative monopolistic acts was heard in the court which is a milestone case in the enforcement of the AML

Significant Cases

Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC33

Facts

In March 2015 the NDRC released the official letter to Shandong Provincial Department of Transportation (ldquoShandong DOTrdquo) on its website with respect to correct its abuse of administrative power to exclude and restrict competition

During the investigation the NDRC found that since 2011 Shandong DOT had issued multiple relevant government orders in order to require certain types of vehicles to be directly connected to two designated information and service platforms both of which are operated and technically supported by one company namely Shandong Jiutong Internet of Things Technology Co Ltd (ldquoJiutong ITTrdquo) Furthermore according to the orders issued by the competent administrative department all the vehicle satellite positioning terminals entering into Shandong provincial market should be debugged through the said technology service platform which is operated by the mentioned company In addition Shandong DOT released the cap prices of vehicle satellite positioning terminals which is identical to the 2012 bid-winning price in the Ministry of Transportation demonstration project

The NDRC believed that Shandong DOTrsquos behaviour eliminated and restricted the competition in the monitoring platform market and the vehicle terminal market deprived the right of transportation enterprises to choose vehicle terminals and monitoring platform on their owns unreasonably raised the sales prices of vehicle terminals and service fees charged by the platform and increased the costs of transportation enterprises Therefore the antitrust agency concluded that Shandong

33 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201503t20150327_668911html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 38 of 52

DOT violated article 8 of the AML which stipulates that ldquoadministrative organs and the public organizations with an administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude and restrict competitionrdquo Specifically Shandong DOT violated article 3234 in terms of requiring organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any designated operators and violated article 3735 in terms of setting rules with contents which eliminate and restrict competition

Based on article 51 of the AML ldquoWhere administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations abuse administrative powers performing activities which exclude and restrict competition the superior entity shall order it to correct impose administrative penalty on the chief officer and other staffs directly responsible pursuant to the laws The AML enforcement authority may give recommendations on disposal of activities to the relevant superior entityrdquo the NDRC proposed in writing that the Shandong provincial government should order Shandong DOT to rectify its behaviour with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Entirely open up the monitoring platform market by permitting transportation undertakings to freely choose any approved platform

2) Loosen the restrictions on the entry into Shandong vehicle terminals permit the undertakings to independently select the supplier of vehicle terminals and allow the qualified terminals to be connected to the relevant monitoring platform and

3) Revoke the official documentation relevant to the cap price of vehicle terminals in order to promote the price competition

Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 36

Facts

On 26 August 2015 the NDRC published its second decision with regard to the rectification of administrative monopoly since the beginning of this year According to the proposal letter sent to Anhui Provincial Government the investigation against the Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City (Bengbu HFPC) was trigged by third partiesrsquo complaints

34 Article 32 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to require organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any operators designated by them 35 Article 37 of the AML Administrative organs shall not abuse their administrative powers to set rules with contents which eliminate restrict competition 36 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201508t20150826_748682html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 39 of 52

The investigation suggests that Bengbu HFPC published three notices with regard to drugs procurement in April and May of this year

In the No C-2015-CG-X-111 Notice (ldquoNo111 Noticerdquo) released on 10 April2015 the health authority not only provided the dosage form and qualification of the requested drugs but also directly determined the suppliers of relevant drugs which eliminated and restricted the competition among pharmaceutical manufacturers and therefore violated articles 32 and 37 of the AML

In the No C-2015-CG-C-112 Notice (ldquoNo112 Noticerdquo) and No C-2015-CG-C-168 (ldquoNo 168 Noticerdquo) respectively released on 10 April and 22 May 2015 the Bengbu HFPC set discriminative qualification requirements on non-local undertakings in order to restrict their participation in the relevant bidding For instance in accordance with No 112 Notice to be a qualified bidder the turnover of non-local undertakings shall exceed CNY 2 billion which is 50 times as much as the turnover requirements of the local undertakings In the NDRCrsquos opinion the administrative monopoly activities conducted by the local health agency excluded the relevant undertakings from the market maintained the virtual-high prices of drugs and therefore violated articles 3237 and 37 of the AML

The NDRC suggested in a letter that Anhui Provincial Government should urge the Bengbu HFPC to rectify the abuse of monopoly powers with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Stop setting distinguishing restrictions on qualification requirements review standards and numbers of winning bidders as for local and non-local undertakings

2) Stop designating the suppliers of competitive drugs and

3) Take necessary measures to mitigate the negative effects resulting from the previous illegal monopolistic abuses

Outlook

At the beginning of the year the former director general of the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau under the NDRC Xu Kunlin stated that the agency would strengthen antitrust enforcement on abuse of administrative power in 2015

Since then the NDRC has made great efforts to rectify unreasonable abuses of administrative power The currently disclosed two cases investigated by the NDRC re-emphasize the Chinese Governmentrsquos strict scrutiny of antitrust issues in respect of

37 Article 34 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to restrict or reject the participation of operators from other regions in local bidding activities by measures such as prescribing discriminatory qualification requirements or assessment standards or by not publishing information according to law

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 40 of 52

administrative monopoly It reminds the local governments that antitrust compliance is of significant importance

III Private Litigation

A Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen more and more private antitrust litigations

The private antitrust litigation cases have become increasingly complicated especially the issues regarding the intersection areas of IP and antitrust law

Multinational giants and State-Owned Enterprises (the ldquoSOEsrdquo) are increasingly becoming the targets in antitrust civil litigations Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (the ldquoSMEsrdquo) tend to use the antitrust litigation to achieve their commercial goals in the business context

B Significant Cases

Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)38

This is the first-ever private litigation concerning administrative monopoly since the implementation of the AML in 2008

Facts

According to the currently disclosed details the case is relevant for designated trade

The plaintiff Shenzhen Sware Technology Co Ltd (ldquoSwarerdquo) is a software company The press releases suggest that Sware Gloden Software Co Ltd (ldquoGlodenrdquo) and Shanghai Ruban Software Co Ltd (ldquoShanghai Rubanrdquo) are the three main suppliers of construction cost software and possess the major shares of the relevant market An annual provincial vocational ability contest regarding the construction cost hosted by the Guangdong Department of Education (ldquoGuangdong DOE) designated Gloden as the exclusive supplier of the relevant software

After several unsuccessful verbal and written negotiations with Guangdong DOE in April 2014 Sware filed a lawsuit against Guangdong DOE before the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquothe Courtrdquo) alleging that the administrative organ abused its administrative power and violated the AML by designating exclusive software supplier for the contest and claimed a compensation for reasonable expense amounting to CNY 10800 Yuan

The opinions of the Court 38 The story of the case is available at httpfinancesinacomcnchinadfjj20150410074621924997shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 41 of 52

The full text of the judgment has not been disclosed yet In accordance with the information available to the public the Court invoked article 32 of the AML which prohibits an administrative organ from abusing its administrative power to require or in disguised form organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use only the commodities supplied by the entities designated by them The Court concluded that Guangdong DOE failed to prove the legitimacy of the designation and therefore abused its administration power

Currently the case is in appeal before the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court

Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 39

It is the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China

In the first instance ruling Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court ruled against Sinopec holding that the Yunnan branch of Sinopecs trading company was obligated to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its dominance in the sales market of refined oil by refusing to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding without justifiable reasons

In the second instance ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors Currently the case is pending

Facts

The First Trial

The lawsuit was filed before the Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoKunming Courtrdquo) in January 2014 Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy Co Ltd (ldquoYingdingrdquo) a bio-energy manufacturer claimed that Sinopec and the Yunnan branch of Sinopec trading company (ldquoSinopec Yunnan Branchrdquo) had failed to fulfil their obligations stipulated in the Renewable Energy Law and had abused their market dominance in sales market of refined oil by refusing to trade with Yingding without justifiable reasons

Sinopec and Sinopec Yunnan Branch mainly explained four reasons for why they rejected Yingdingrsquos biofuel Firstly Yingding had failed to prove that the biofuel complied with the relevant national standard and was safe to use Secondly Yingding had failed to provide complete trading terms Thirdly the laws and regulations regarding biofuel were incomplete the authorized refined oil sales companies were 39 The details of the case are available at httpnewsxinhuanetcomfortune2014-1217c_1113680039htm httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=9e71db51-6ff6-4d2c-8af6-8eacf023ebdeampKeyWord=E4BA91E58D97E79B88E9BC8E|E4B8ADE79FB3E58C96 httpnewsxinhuanetcomenergy2015-0422c_127721575htm httpwwwnbdcomcnarticles2015-04-23911348html last visited on December 17 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 42 of 52

obligated to purchase biofuel from the biofuel manufacturers if it met certain quality standards but there was a vacancy regarding how to reach the end consumers from the sales companies

On 8 December 2014 the Kunming Intermediate Peoples Court ruled that Sinopec Yunnan Branch bore a legal obligation to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its market dominance in refined oil market by refusing without any justifiable reasons to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding The court ordered Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network within 30 days Both Yingding and Sinopec filed appeals to the Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court

The Appellate Trial

The appeal hearing was held on 22 April 2015 in Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoYunnan Courtrdquo) Sinopec submitted 23 new pieces of evidence and introduced two expert witnesses in a bid to overturn several key elements in the first-instance ruling by Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court

In terms of the determination of the relevant market and the market dominance Sinopec argued that the relevant market in this case was for adipic acid monomethyl ester (ldquoAAMErdquo) the main ingredient of a biofuel additive known as BD100 Yingdingrsquos main product is BD100 which can be blended with fossil diesel to become biofuel In the AAME market Sinopec is a potential buyer instead of a market dominator In support of this argument Sinopec presented an expert witnessmdashGong Jiong a professor of economics at Beijings University of International Business and Economics who testified that AAME should be defined as the relevant product market on the basis of an economic analysis

However Yingding insisted that the first-instance ruling was correct in naming the sales market of refined oil as the relevant market and submitted new evidence an article on Sinopecs website that claimed it had a 67 market share in Yunnan to help establish the claim that Sinopec had market dominance

Another main dispute was whether Yingdingrsquos biofuel product met national standards which would make it mandatory for Sinopec to purchase under Chinas Renewable Energy Law The law stipulates that biofuel producers must sell their products first to an authorized refined oil sales company and the sales companies are obliged to buy the fuel if it meets certain quality standards In order to test the quality Sinopec introduced the second expert witness Lin Jianmin a leading author of Chinarsquos national biofuel standard Lin Jianmin pointed out that there are currently quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology which gives Sinopec a justifiable reason not to trade with Yingding Moreover Sinopec presented some precedents in which consumers had complained about the biofuel quality and also claimed that China didnt have a sound regulatory framework to support biofuel production neither in testing nor in sales

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 43 of 52

Nevertheless to refute this point Yingding referred to an earlier test in co-operation with Sinopec in 2011 where selected buses in Kunming used biofuel blended by Sinopec using BD100 produced by Yingding

On August 13 2015 Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors and now this case is pending In the written appellate ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court did not provide any details regarding its reasoning

Key Issues of the Case

Is there any competition between Yingding and Sinopec

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case the product of Yingding is biofuel while Sinopec does not engage in the business of biofuel From this perspective Yingding and Sinopec are not competitors Thus it is not necessary and not reasonable for Sinopec to eliminate or restrict the competition from Yingding

Relevant Market

The definition of the relevant market is a prerequisite to determine whether competition exists and whether the AML is applicable In accordance with the Judicial Interpretation of Antitrust civil litigation the plaintiff shall take the responsibility to prove the defendantrsquos dominance in the relevant market Also the methods of defining the relevant market are stipulated in the Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition (ldquoGuidelinesrdquo) However both Yingding and Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court defined the relevant market as the sales market of refined oil without sufficient antitrust analysis none of the methods in the Guidelines were used Therefore the definition of the relevant market remains arguable and needs to be sufficiently analysed in the upcoming retrial

Justifiable Reasons

The abuse of market dominance includes the behaviour of refusing to trade without justifiable reasons according to the AML but in the first instance ruling justifiable reasons were not investigated by the court During the appellate trial the expert witness introduced by Sinopec claimed that there were quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology and this was a justifiable reason to refuse to trade with Yingding Even though the first instance court and the appellate court did not reason the justifiable reason it should be discussed and investigated further during the retrial

AML or Renewable Energy Law

The claims of Yingding were based on both the AML and the Renewable Energy Law (ldquoRELrdquo) and the first instance ruling referred to both the AML and the REL as

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 44 of 52

well It seems that the laws the first instance court referred to were comprehensive but in fact the reasoning was not clear and logical In the first instance ruling some disputes regarding the AML were reviewed but all the orders were not based on the AML Specifically the first instance court ordered the Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network based on the REL and dismissed the other claims That the orders were not on account of reasoning is illogical It is anticipated that during the retrial the application of the laws will be clearer

Analysis

A lot of issues have not been clearly analysed by the courts such as the relevant market and the justifiable reasons Since the case is remanded the above-mentioned issues are expected to be resolved in the retrial In addition Yingding was in a disadvantaged position compared to its first instance trial since its claims based on the AML were challenged greatly during the appellate trial In the retrial it is probable that Yingding may switch its litigation strategy and base its claims on the REL Therefore maybe more preparation regarding the REL can give Sinopec a leg up

Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)

Rijing Electric a Chinese distributor seeks CNY 5m compensation

The first hearing was on 9 June 2015 and ended without a ruling

Facts

Rijing Electric (ldquoRijingrdquo) a Shanghai-based company and a former distributor for Panasonic accused Panasonic of abusing its dominance and dividing the market through monopolistic practice in an antitrust lawsuit filed in 2014 with Shanghai No 1 Intermediate Court (ldquoShanghai Courtrdquo) claiming compensation of CNY 5m (USD 815370) Wenzhou Mingda Automation System Co and Shanghai Qingying Automation Equipment as the distributor of Panasonic in China are the co-defendants were accused of conducting monopolistic behaviours by implementing Panasonicrsquos policy

The first hearing for evidence exchange was on June 9 2015 Rijing claimed a policy allegedly introduced by Panasonic in 2009 restricted the competition between distributors Panasonic claims the policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo and has full justifiable reasons It explained that the products in question required customization at considerable cost to distributors before its sale to customers Once carried out however other distributors leaving them open to quote much lower prices than the original distributor could simply and relatively cheap replicate this customization Besides Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and that the plaintiff had failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic said its market share for the four products

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 45 of 52

under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases Also Rijing failed to challenge the policy when it was first introduced instead initially agreeing it was reasonable as e-mail evidence submitted by Panasonic suggests

Key Issues of the Case

Whether Panasonic occupied a market dominant position

It is reported that Rijing claimed that Panasonic had abused its market dominance but Rijing failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and its market share for the four products under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases

Analysis

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case Panasonicrsquos policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo rather than to eliminate or restrict competition

Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals40 (Pending)

It is a battle over patent licensing issues

It is viewed as being among the most complicated antitrust lawsuits in China

The first hearing was on 17 and 18 December 2015

Facts

Four Chinese rare earth companies Ningbo Ketian Magnet Ningbo Permanent Magnetics Ningbo Tongchuang Strong Magnet Material and Ningbo Huahui Magnetic Industry filed antitrust lawsuits against Hitachi Metals over alleged patent licensing issues regarding rare earth magnets on December 11 2014 with the Ningbo Intermediate Peoples Court (ldquoNingbo Courtrdquo) in Zhejiang province As reported four Chinese rare earth companies claimed Hitachi Metals abused its market dominance and hurt the industry competition by refusing to license the patents to them The patents in this case are used in the manufacturing of sintered neodymium iron boron (ldquoNdFeBrdquo) magnets a rare-earth magnet alloy widely used in parts for airplanes automobiles and other products

Hitachi Metals filed a challenge with the Ningbo Court over its jurisdiction in April 2015 After Ningbo Court rejected Hitachi Metals jurisdiction objection on 28 April 2015 Hitachi Metals appealed to the Zhejiang High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoZhejiang

40The details of the story are available at httpwwwzbmagcomnews_viewphpid=80 httpwwwhitachicomcnaboutpress201510-121118_ahtml last visited on December 22 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 46 of 52

Courtrdquo) but Zhejiang Court affirmed the ruling of the Ningbo Court

The first day of a two-day hearing took place on 17 December 2015 during which the two sides cross-examined each otherrsquos evidence The evidence focused on clearing up several key elements in the case including the relevant market whether Hitachi Metals has dominance on that market and whether both sides acted in good faith during the licensing negotiations

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Product Market

The four Chinese rare earth companies claimed that the relevant product market should be the NdFeb-related patent licensing market However Hitachi Metals believed that the physical NdFeb market rather than the patent licensing market should be the relevant product market which is meaningful for assess the real competitive effects on the market

Whether Hitachi Metals occupies a dominant market position

In terms of market dominance Hitachi Metals claimed it does not occupy a dominant position because Hitachi Metalsrsquo patents were not in a standard in this case and there are substitutable technologies in the market SEP holders have the obligation to license on FRAND terms but none-SEP holders do not So while a refusal to license a SEP may constitute abuse of dominance refusal to license a non-SEP mdash even by a patent holder with a dominant position mdash should not be considered as an abuse

Analysis

Hitachi Metals as a patent holder should have the right to decide whether to retain those patents or not or who to license According to the legal theory the purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage and protect innovation by conferring monopoly right mdash that is to give intellectual property owners the proprietary rights which can exclude others from using the intellectual property The SEP holders admittedly need to comply with FRAND terms which can maintain a robust balance between competition and monopoly whereas the further intervention of antitrust law into non-SEP patents may undermine the purpose of intellectual property law To which extent the antitrust law should intervene is yet to be seen

Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei41

A confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the Beijing IP court made by the Beijing High Court

41 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcncpwswbjzscq201511t20151103_12225640htm last visited on December 28 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 47 of 52

Facts

On August 2 2013 the NDRC penalized Abbott for monopolistic price-fixing and then Abbott made a price adjustment in China where the prices of main products were reduced

On December 16 2014 Tian Junwei (ldquoTianrdquo) a Chinese citizen in Beijing sued Carrefour Shuangjing Branch (ldquoCarrefourrdquo) and Abbott (Shanghai) Sales Company (ldquoAbbottrdquo) at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (ldquoIP Courtrdquo) for their monopolistic price-fixing which damaged his interests However Carrefour and Abbott challenged the jurisdiction of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court They claimed there were two reasons Firstly according to the jurisdiction rules of the IP court issued by the Supreme Court the IP court has no jurisdiction over anti-trust cases Secondly if this case is a contractual dispute the court that is in the place of Carrefour should hear it if this case is a tort dispute the Shanghai Intermediate Court should hear it

In the ruling of the IP Court the IP Court decided it has the jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases for the following reasons According to the Provisions On Causes Of Action In Civil Cases issued by Supreme Court (最高人民法院案由规定) antimonopoly dispute is a tertiary cause of action belonging to IP and competition disputes Also according to the Provisions concerning the Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京

市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问题的规定 ) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was an IP and competition dispute and was sued after November 6 2014 Thus the IP Court had jurisdiction

Both Carrefour and Abbott appealed to the Beijing High Court over the jurisdiction ruling but the Beijing High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original ruling Reasons are listed in the written ruling issued on June 18 2015 Firstly the nature of the case was an antimonopoly dispute In accordance with Provisions of the Supreme Peoples Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民

事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) and Civil Litigation Law the monopolistic civil disputes in the first instance shall be under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Peoples Courts and an action involving a contractual dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the peoples court of the place where the defendant is domiciled or where the contract is performed Carrefour as the defendant in this case is domiciled in Chaoyang District Beijing Therefore the courts of Beijing have jurisdiction over this case Secondly according to article 3 of the Notification on the Jurisdiction of Intellectual Property Courts issued by Supreme Court (关于知识产权法院案件管辖

等有关问题的通知) IP courts have jurisdiction over first-instance civil disputes arising from monopolistic practices Lastly according to Provisions concerning the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 12 of 52

Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions13

Western Digital had engaged in two conducts that violated the remedies provided in the No 9 Announcement in 2012 issued by MOFCOM

Western Digital lodged an application to remove certain restrictions in March 2014 and the agency made the decision on October 19 2015

MOFCOM considered the fact that the competition condition in the relevant product market has changed and decided to remove the hold-separate restrictions related to manufacture and RampD

Facts

In 2012 Western Digital Corporation (ldquoWestern Digitalrdquo) intended to acquire 100 shares of Viviti Technologies Ltd (ldquoViviti Technologiesrdquo) which was the holding company of Hitachi Global Storage Technologies Netherlands BV and Hitachi Global Storage Technologies Singapore Pte Ltd and engaged in the hard disk business

On April 2 2011 Western Digital filed a notification for this acquisition MOFCOM issued the No 9 Announcement in March 2012 and cleared this acquisition with six remedies According to this announcement Western Digital could apply for the removal of the first and second remedy after this decision has been carried out for 24 months

The first remedy refers to maintaining the Viviti Technologies as an independent competitor and the second remedy requires both Western Digital and Viviti Technologies to make a reasonable plan of their capacity and production and report these data to the trustee

Western Digital lodged an application to remove the first and second remedy in March 2014 MOFCOM found that Western Digital had engaged in two conducts that violated the first remedy and the competitive situation in the hard disk market had changed After talking with Western Digital collecting opinions from the relevant entities and delegating the independent party to make an economic evaluation MOFCOM decided to remove the hold-separate remedies partially

Western Digitalrsquos implementation of the duties imposed in the No 9 Announcement

Based on the implementation reports submitted by Western Digital and the monitoring reports submitted by the trustee MOFCOM found that Western

13 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151020151001139040shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 13 of 52

Digital had engaged in two conducts that violated the first remedy Those were

1) On March 8 2012 Western Digital consolidated Hitachi Global Storage Technology (ldquoHGSTrdquo) which was Vivitirsquos subsidiary in US

2) In January 2013 Western Digital dissolved the development division of VivitiHGST and transferred the relevant workforce to Western Digital

MOFCOM considered that these conducts impaired the independence of Viviti as a competitor so that it imposed CNY 300000 fines on each of these behaviours and requested Western Digital to rectify the situation As per the entrusted supervisorrsquos report such behaviours have been rectified and the first remedy has been fulfilled

According to MOFCOMrsquos announcement the agency found that other remedies have been entirely implemented

Competition Analysis

With respect to the current situation of the competition in the hard disk market MOFCOM made the following assessment

1) In the areas of portable application and corporate-level application solid-state drive has put constraint on the impact of the traditional hard disk as to strengthen the competition in the relevant market

2) Overcapacity problems in the conventional hard disk drive market became obvious

3) Western Digital and HGST are the major competitors in the hard disk drive market Both the layout and the major market competitors in this market have remained unchanged since 2012

4) The hold-separate duties restricted the full competition between Western Digital and HGST The implementation of such duties hindered them from integrating their products and providing the market with a full range of products and had an adverse impact on their clientsrsquo product procurement

Based on the above analysis MOFCOM deemed that

1) Removal of the conditions that required the two companies to remain independent in production and RampD activities would enable Western Digital to save costs to provide a full range of products to the market and to fully engage in market competition and benefit its clients

2) To keep the two sales teams and their respective brands independent from each other and the independence of sales activities could reduce competition restraint impacts arising from a complete merger

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 14 of 52

Remedies

After negotiating with MOFCOM the relevant entities agreed to undertake the following obligations

1) Western Digital and HGST will remain independent in sales and brands

2) Western Digital will not change its previous business modes or force its clients to exclusively purchase hard disk drive products from Western Digital or do so in disguise

3) Western Digital will continue its pace in investing in product innovation to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

This announcement will be effective within two years from the date of issuance If Western Digital can provide sufficient evidence to prove a substantial change in the market environment the company can propose to MOFCOM to remove the relevant conditions within the two years

SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions14

MOFCOM considered the fact that the competition condition in the relevant product market has changed and removed the hold-separate restrictions on Seagate and Samsung

Seagate shall remain its business model materially and continue to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

Facts

On December 12 2011 MOFCOM made the No 11 Announcement to clear Seagate Technology LLCrsquos (ldquoSeagaterdquo) acquisition with remedies In this acquisition Seagate intended to acquire hard disk drive business of Samsung Electronics Co Ltd (ldquoSamsung HDDrdquo) As per this announcement Seagate could apply for removing the first and second remedy after this decision has been carried out for 12 months

The first remedy is to preserve Samsung HDD as an independent competitor and the second remedy asks to maintain and expand Samsung HDDrsquos production capacity within six months of issuance of the No 11 Announcement and to set reasonable production volume targets based on market supply-demand conditions

Seagate lodged an application to remove the first and second remedy in May 2015 After making assessments on the relevant parties and the competition circumstance MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate remedies

14 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151020151001144105shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 15 of 52

Competition Analysis

With respect to the current situation of the competition in the hard disk drive market MOFCOM made the following assessments

1) In the areas of portable application and corporate-level application solid-state drive has put constraint on the impact of the traditional hard disk so that the competition in the relevant market has been strengthened

2) Overcapacity problems in the conventional hard disk drive market became obvious

3) Both the layout and the major market competitors in the hard disk drive market have remained unchanged since 2012

4) Seagate and Samsung HDDrsquos market overlap in the hard disk market is quite small and Samsung HDDrsquos competition in the traditional hard disk is quite weak

Based on the above analysis MOFCOM deemed that

1) Removal of certain conditions is possible because in the portable application and corporate level application sectors competition constraint of solid-state drive on traditional hard disk drives has strengthened traditional hard disk drives are facing overcapacity which has reduced the chance of a single or more competitors causing competition restraints Seagate has limited overlap with Samsung in the hard disk business and the latter has a relatively weaker market power in the hard drive disk business

2) Removal of all imposed conditions may still restrain market competition because the traditional hard disk drive market competition conditions have not undergone a major change Seagate is still the major player in all divisions of the market and Seagate will strengthen its power after the acquisition of Samsung HDD

Remedies

After negotiating with MOFCOM Seagate agreed to undertake the following obligations

1) Seagate shall not change its business model materially or force clients to purchase hard drive disks exclusively from it

2) Seagate shall not force Tokyo Dengikagaku Kogyo China to supply magnetic heads exclusively to Seagate (or other Seagate-controlled companies) or limit the number of magnetic heads Tokyo Dengikagaku Kogyo China would supply to other hard drive disk manufacturers

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 16 of 52

3) Seagate shall continue to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

This announcement will be effective within two years from the date of issuance If Seagate can provide sufficient evidence to prove substantial change in the market environment the company can propose to MOFCOM to remove relevant conditions within the two years

FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM15

MOFCOM deems that this acquisition would induce anti-competitive influence

NXP promises to dispose its radio frequency (ldquoRFrdquo) power transistor business

As the first case approved with structural remedies after the enactment of the Provisions on Imposing Restrictive Conditions MOFCOM conducted a comprehensive evaluation of the viability competitiveness and marketability of the divested business as well as the suitability of potential buyers

Facts

On April 3 2015 NXP filed for its acquisition of Freescale NXP Semiconductor (ldquoNXPrdquo) is a NASDAQ-listed company registered in the Netherlands which engages in the design manufacturing and sale of integration circuits and discrete components

Freescale Semiconductor (ldquoFreescalerdquo) is a New York-listed company registered in Bermuda and based in the US which engages in the manufacturing and RampD of microcontroller and digital networking processors (embedded processors)

According to the agreement between NXP and Freescale after closing Freescale will become the wholly owned subsidiary of NXP On November 25 2015 MOFCOM decided to clear this acquisition with remedies

Relevant Market

As per the announcement the relevant product markets are the general microcontroller automotive power-use analog integrated circuit and RF transistor product markets in which NXP and Freescale have horizontal overlap The relevant geographical markets should be the global market

Competition Analysis

After assessing this proposed deal the agency concluded that

1) The proposed deal would boost NXPrsquos market control power in the RF

15 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151120151101196182shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 17 of 52

transistor product market because the global and Chinese RF transistor product markets share a similar structure both featuring few competitors and high concentration levels Freescale and NXP as the number one and number two players are far ahead of their rivals in the market Therefore after closing the market control power of NXP in this market would be strengthened

2) Since Freescale was the fiercest competitor of NXP the proposed deal will remove competition between them

3) The proposed deal would reduce the options for clients and increase procurement risks

In practice the wireless infrastructure suppliers as the main client of the RF transistor product tend to procure products from both NXP and Freescale to prevent them from the risk arising from relying on one supplier

4) The proposed deal may induce an adverse impact on the technology RampD and innovation

Remedies

In accordance with MOFCOMrsquos decision NXP shall follow its written commitment submitted to MOFCOM and completely divest its RF power transistor business to Beijing Jianguang Asset Management At the same time NXP shall strictly fulfil its obligations during the transition period It is worth noting that the NXPFreescale deal shall only be implemented after the divestment deal has been concluded

In addition MOFCOM requires NXP to perform relevant obligations during the transition period from the date of approval announcement until the divestment deal has been concluded NXP shall endeavour

1) not to engage in any lsquounfair trade practicesrsquo relating to the divested business

2) not to implement any acts which may have a significant adverse impact on the value management or competitiveness of the divested business or any acts which may change the nature and scope industry or business strategy or investment policy of the divested business and to take reasonable measures to encourage core employees to stay in the divested business as well as not to seek or transfer employees to NXPrsquos non-divested business

3) to ensure supply to the divested business in a fair reasonable and non-discriminatory manner and

4) to maintain the independence of the divested business and not to exchange competitively sensitive information between the parties and the divested

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 18 of 52

business

B Monopolistic Agreements

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

With respect to the enforcement activities of the NDRC in light of the numbers of the published cases it seems that the law enforcement frequency of the NDRC regarding monopolistic agreements in 2015 is lower in comparison with 2014

The reason behind might be that the outstanding issue of human resource deficit of the antitrust authority still exists Besides the fact that more enterprises gradually attach increasing importance to the antitrust compliance might be another reason for the decrease in the number of cases investigated by the authorities

As to the enforcement activities of the SAIC 4 of 14 cases concluded by the SAIC and its local branches in 2015 are relevant to monopolistic agreements Meanwhile these four cases concern horizontal monopolistic agreements

It is noteworthy however that the Mercedes-Benz case and the Dongfeng Nissan case suggest that vertical agreements especially involving price-related restrictions on the downstream dealers is still the priority of antitrust enforcement Companies shall be very cautious when imposing restrictions on the resale prices or the minimum resale prices of commodities in the distribution agreements

Automobile industry and related industries are observed to be under continuous attention of Chinarsquos antitrust authorities

The industries relating to peoplersquos livelihoods remain to be the enforcement priority

Significant Cases

Enforcement by the NDRC and its local branches

Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC16

The investigation was triggered by a leniency application

The first leniency applicant was exempted from punishment

Eight ocean shipping companies involved were imposed a collective fine of CNY 4067 million

NDRC spent approximately 12 months to investigate and conclude the case 16 NDRCrsquos press release of the case is available at httpjjsndrcgovcngzdt201512t20151228_769084html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 19 of 52

Facts

In December 2015 the NDRC published its official punishment decisions regarding the cartel case in connection with eight ocean shipping companies namely Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha (ldquoNYKrdquo) Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha (ldquoK Linerdquo) Mitsui OSK Lines EUKOR Car Carriers Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics Compantildeiacutea Sud Americana de Vapores Eastern Car Liner and Compantildeiacutea Chilena de Navegacioacuten Interoceaacutenica

According to the official press release of the NDRC the investigation was triggered by a leniency application of NYK The evidence showed that the eight companies reached consensus on non-intrusion of each others existing business to maintain or increase shipping fees when shipping goods such as cars trucks and engineering machinery in the routes between China and other countries and regions

They were also found to frequently conduct bilateral or multilateral communications on the shippersrsquo invitation for bids andor price inquiries via phone conferences dinner parties e-mails visiting etc In addition they also conducted illegal behaviour such as sensitive information exchange price negotiations bidding intention discussion dividing clients and shipping routes reaching agreements on high price bids or non-bidding in order to help certain companies gain shipping orders

To avoid the regulation of the antitrust authority the relevant shipping companies adopted various illicit measures that showed their apparent intention to violate the AML The cartel lasted for at least four years and covered a broad range of shipping routes concerned with the import and export of products between China and other regions such as North America EU South America and so on involving multiple auto brands and engineering machinery brands

The NDRC held the opinion that the eight companies conducts had restricted and eliminated competition in the relevant market raising the international shipping fees and impairing interests of shippers and end consumers The eight companies breached the AML by reaching and implementing monopolistic agreements on fixing prices and dividing the market

All eight investigated companies put forward remedy measures including enhancing the antitrust compliance program arranging more antitrust compliance trainings and developing antitrust compliance technologies

The NDRC imposed fines based on the nature level and duration of their monopolistic volations as well as their respective sales of international freight service sales relevant to the Chinese market The companies involved were collectively fined CNY 4067 million

NYK as the first cartel member voluntarily reporting the illegal conducts to the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 20 of 52

authority and providing significant evidence was entirely exempted from the punishment K Line as the second leniency applicant was imposed a fine amounting to 4 of its 2014 annual sales of international freight services relevant to Chinarsquos import and export market The details of punishments imposed on the involved companies by the NDRC are as follow

Company Name Amount of Fines (RMB million)

Percentage of the Relevant Turnovers

Grounds

Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha

- - First leniency applicant

Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha

2398 4 Second leniency applicant

Mitsui OSK Lines 3812 7 Third leniency applicant

EUKOR Car Carriers 284 9 Lasted over a long period involved many brands and many violations violations were severe

Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics

4506 8 Lasted over a long period involved many brands and many violations violations were severe

Compantildeiacutea Sud Americana de Vapores

308 6 Lasted over a long period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Eastern Car Liner 1127 5 Lasted over a long period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Compantildeiacutea Chilena de 120 4 Lasted over a long

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 21 of 52

Navegacioacuten Interoceaacutenica

period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Total 4067

Analysis

In this case the agency applied the AML instead of the Tenders and Bids Law to collusive bidding Citing article 13 (3) of the AML the NDRC identified that the collusive bidding constituted a division of the sales market

The leading three leniency applicants were granted exemption from fines to a varying degree

According to the official who handled this case dawn raids performed by antitrust enforcement agencies in other jurisdictions drew the attention of the NDRC on the cartels of these shipping companies However there was limited effective evidence to prove that the companies had reached monopolistic agreements Through pressuring the involved parties three members of the shipping cartel actively confessed their illegal conduct This case once again stresses the significance of international cooperation between antitrust enforcement agencies

Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau17

The distribution agreements between Mercedes-Benz and its dealers are determined as vertical monopolistic agreement and Mercedes-Benz violated article 14 of the AML because it restricted the ability of its dealers to decide their own resale prices

Mercedes-Benzrsquos dealers violated article of 13 of the AML due to concluding a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Mercedes-Benz and its dealers were jointly fined CNY 3578 million

Facts

In April 2015 Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau which is the provincial branch of the NDRC released the punishment on its website and announced that it had imposed a fine of CNY 350 million on Mercedes-Benz along with the aggregated fine of CNY 787 million on its dealers The fine came as a result of Mercedes-Benz reaching and implementing resale price maintenance (ldquoRPMrdquo) agreements with dealers to fix the minimum resale price of several car models as well as certain auto parts 17 The original Chinese notice published by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau is available at httpwwwjswjjgovcnoffice_neweo_comm_zxnrxsphp

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 22 of 52

According to the decision the authority found that Mercedes-Benz fixed the minimum resale price of Class E and Class S cars in Nanjing Wuxi Changzhou and Suzhou markets through telephoneverbal communication and dealers meetings from January 2013 to July 2014 Since 2010 Mercedes-Benz had reached agreements with dealers in Jiangsu province to fix the minimum resale prices for auto parts by providing different levels of discounts for insured cars cars involving expired warranty periods and cars within the warranty period

In addition Mercedes-Benz implemented the minimum resale price maintaining agreement by

1) Tightening its monitoring measures on the dealers such as inspecting deals and their sale incentive system on a weekly basis

2) Tracking the sales process flow of cars and increasing the intensity of this assessment

3) Giving warnings and reducing support ndash for example halting the supply of bestselling cars and prohibiting the opening of new stores ndash to dealers if dealers refused to cooperate with the price-fixing related policies and measures and

4) Interviewing personnel of the dealers and requesting terminations if the staff engaged in serious violations of the RPM agreement

Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau concluded that Mercedes-Benz had excluded and eliminated market competition harmed consumer welfare and consequently violated article 1418 of the AML The authority therefore imposed a fine of CNY 350 million representing 7 of the sale revenue of the previous year in the relevant market against Mercedes-Benz and imposed a fine on the dealers amounting to an equivalence of 1 of the annual sales in the previous year

Analysis

Although the agency also addressed the horizontal violation among the dealers in this case the administrative penalty decision mainly focuses on the vertical violation The agency fined dealers involved in the RPM agreement a combined CNY 787 million equal to 1 of the previous-year sales which suggests that the agency decided to give lighter punishments to dealers who took initiative in reporting the activity and provided evidence

The Mercedes-Benz case is the third case where the agency successfully 18 Article 14 of the AML The following monopolistic agreements between operators and trading partners shall be prohibited (i) fixing the resale prices of commodities to third persons (ii) restricting the minimum resale prices of commodities to third persons (iii) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement Authority under the State Council

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 23 of 52

discovered both vertical and horizontal agreements in a case following the Audi case and the Chrysler case All these cases are rooted in the same industry indicating that industrial features play a large role in raising anti-trust concerns In fact it appears that the entire automotive industry is under antitrust scrutiny

Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC19

This case involved both a horizontal agreement and an administrative monopoly

A total fine of CNY 1318 million was imposed on the involved companies

Facts

In June 2015 the NDRC through its website announced the decision made by its regional branch -Yunnan Provincial Development and Reform Commission (ldquoYunnan DRCrdquo) regarding the horizontal monopolistic agreement case involving Yunnan Communications Administration and local subsidiaries of four state-owned telecommunication companies

Through the investigation Yunnan DRC found that Yunnan Communications Administration as a competent government agency had organized several meetings involving Yunnan branches of four state-owned telecoms - China Mobile China Telecom China Unicom and China Tietong in August and September of 2014 At the end of 2009 the four local branches entered into an agreement to regulate their sales promotions in terms of limiting the promotional items amount and frequency

Furthermore the agreement provides certain measures to ensure the implementation of relevant restrictions on promotions Specifically in case any cartel member violates the agreement the others could file complaints with Yunnan Communications Administration and the agency would then issue a rectification notice to the rule-breaker

Yunnan DRC stated that the four telecoms were main competitors in the relevant market and the promotions as a significant competition measure would exert direct influence on the final prices of the products The horizontal agreement organized by Yunnan Communications Administration on sales promotions restricted the competition capacity of telecoms and as a result eliminated the competition in the relevant market Consequently the behaviour of Yunnan Communications Administration violated article 8 20 of the AML and constituted administrative monopoly in terms of ldquoforcing undertakings to conduct monopolistic behaviour prohibited by the AMLrdquo

19 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpwwwsdpcgovcnfzgggzjgjdyfldjjszhdt201506t20150602_694802html 20 Article 8 of the AML Administrative organs and the public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 24 of 52

With respect to the penalties Yunnan DRC fined the local branch of China Tietong CNY 200000 for reaching but not implementing the agreement in regards to the other three telecoms a total fine of CNY 1298 million amounting to 2 of the sales of the relevant business in the previous year were imposed for entering into and implementing the horizontal monopolistic agreement

Analysis

The telecoms industry is still the enforcement priority of the antitrust enforcement authorities A company cannot be exempted from punishment even though it is forced by competent authorities to conduct monopoly behaviour

DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC21

Both a horizontal monopolistic agreement and a vertical monopolistic agreement were involved in this case

A total fine of CNY 14242 million was imposed on DongFeng Nissan and its distributors

Facts

In September 2015 the Guangdong Development and Reform Commission (ldquoGuangdong DRCrdquo) released an announcement regarding the administrative penalties on DongFeng Nissan and its provincial distributors for concluding price-related monopolistic agreements More specifically DongFeng Nissan was imposed a fine of CNY 1233 million for breaching article 14 of the AML in terms of restricting the resale price of certain car models 17 distributors domiciled in Guangdong were collectively fined CNY 1912 million for violating article 1322 of the AML in terms of entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements

According to the published official release the Guangdong DRC launched the investigation in August 2014 The authority discovered that from 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissan had set a rigorous restriction on its distributorsrsquo abilities to determine the resale prices of certain car models including the quoted prices in various platforms and the final resale price In addition DongFeng Nissan punished the distributors that failed to abide by such price restrictions in 2013 The authority 21 The original Chinese notice published by Guangdong DRC is available at httpwwwgddpcgovcnzwgkgzdtgzyw201509t20150910_328993html 22 Article 13 of the AML The following Monopolistic agreements among competing operators shall be prohibited (i) fix or change prices of commodities (ii) limit the outputs or sales volume of commodities (iii) segment the sales markets or the raw material purchasing markets (iv) limit the purchase of new technology new facilities or limit the development of new products new technology (v) jointly boycott transactions (vi) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-Monopoly Law enforcement Authority Monopolistic agreements in this Law refer to agreements decisions or other concerted practices that eliminate restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 25 of 52

believed that the vertical agreement concluded between DongFeng Nissan and its distributors eliminated and restricted the competition in the relevant market and damaged the consumer welfare as well which violates article 14 of the AML

Furthermore from April 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissanrsquos distributors in Guangdong province held multiple meetings to discuss issues relevant to sale price reached and implemented a horizontal monopolistic agreement in terms of fixing the prices of some car models which is prohibited by article 13 of the AML

Considering that both DongFeng Nissan and the involved distributors positively cooperated with the investigation and ceased the illegal behaviour immediately after the investigation Guangdong DRC decided to impose a fine amounting to 3 of its previous yearrsquos turnovers on DongFeng Nissan and a fine ranging from 2 to 4 on the relevant distributors in accordance with articles 4623 and 4924 of the AML

Analysis

This case demonstrates that auto and related industries are still under close attention of the authority Considering the NDRCrsquos successful series of antitrust investigations conducted throughout the auto industry it is observed that the agency currently overseeing price-related antitrust issues in China has accumulated a substantial amount of experience regarding antitrust enforcement in the auto industry Now is the right time to speed up the law-making process by amending the set of rules released earlier and drafting new laws to advise the auto industry on antitrust compliance

Enforcement by the SAIC and its local branches

Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC25

The investigation was triggered by whistle blowerrsquos submission

Cartel members were collectively fined CNY 139 million 23 Article 46 of the AML In case the operators violate the relevant provisions of this Law concluding and implementing Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall order the operators to cease such act impose fines more than 1 but less than 10 of the total turnover in the preceding year and confiscate the illegal gains where the Monopolistic agreement is not implemented a fine less than RMB 500000 can be imposed If the operators involved in Monopolistic agreement on its own initiative report information concerning the conclusion of Monopolistic agreements and provide important evidences to the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority they may be given a mitigated punishment or be exempted from punishment in accordance with the circumstances Where the industrial associations violate this Law organizing the operators in the industry to conclude Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority may impose a fine less than RMB 500000 in serious circumstances the agency of social organization administration and registration may cancel its registration 24 Article 49 of the AML As for the imposition of the fines stipulated by the Article 46 47 and 48 of this Law the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall take elements such as the nature extent and time it lasts of the illegal act into consideration in determining the specific amount of the fines 25 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201506t20150601_156889html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 26 of 52

Facts

In April 2015 the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) issued administrative penalties on several brick manufacturers for entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements This is the first case relevant to monopolistic agreements that has been publicized by the SAIC since the beginning of this year

Ten cartel members were involved in the case including one company and nine individuals Similar with most antitrust cases the investigation started as a result of a whistle blowerrsquos submission After a thorough investigation Hunan AIC found that those local brick manufacturers had reached agreements on controlling production volume and dividing sales areas in the forms of production and sales agreements plans and meeting minutes

The enforcement authority reached the conclusion that these brick manufacturers violated article 13 of the AML and imposed a total fine of CNY 1389400 on them

Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC26

The organizer of the monopolistic agreement the animation association was fined CNY 100000

The antitrust authority did not punish the members of the monopolistic agreement

Facts

In December 2015 the Guangdong Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoGuangdong AICrdquo) published its administrative punishment decision in regards to Guangzhou Panyu Animation amp Game Association (ldquoGAGArdquo) organizing member companies to conclude a monopolistic agreement

According to the decision GAGA drafted the ldquoAgreement of Exhibition Alliancerdquo (ldquoAgreementrdquo) and convened a conference with member companies in order to discuss the content and conclusion of the Agreement 52 member companies entered into the Agreement which actually requested the alliance companies to merely participate in the exhibitions either organized or supported by GAGA in Guangzhou In addition the Agreement prohibited the alliance companies from attending any other exhibition except if they obtained prior approval of GAGA

After a thorough investigation Guangdong AIC believed that the conclusion of the Agreement among GAGA and the 52 member companies violated article 13 (5) of the AML in terms of boycott GAGA who was deeply involved and restricted member companiesrsquo choice of exhibitions through the Agreement could be deemed as

26 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151208_164680html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 27 of 52

the participant and organizer of the monopolistic agreement In accordance with article 46 of the AML Guangdong AIC imposed a fine of CNY 100000 on GAGA for organizing the conclusion of the monopolistic agreement

Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC27

Hubei AIC considered the coinsurance for Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance illegal

Twelve insurance companies were fined CNY 469 million in total

Facts

In December 2015 the Hubei Administrative for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHubei AICrdquo) disclosed its punishment on 12 insurance companies for signing illegal coinsurance agreements

The disclosed punishment decision suggests that the Hubei branch of China Pacific Life Insurance (ldquothe Companyrdquo) 11 other insurance companies and Wuhan Construction Safety Technology Consultation Center (ldquoWCSTCCrdquo) signed a Coinsurance Agreement on Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance (ldquoCoinsurance Agreementrdquo) of which the main contents include

1) The Company and 11 other involved companies as the coinsurers jointly take charge of the personal accident insurance concerned with the construction project directly administered by the Wuhan government WCSTCC is responsible for providing safety professionalism and technology services regarding the relevant personal accident insurance

2) The Company as the chief insurer of the coinsurance occupies 12 of the total amount of the insurance and the other 11 companies respectively occupy 8

3) The Company as the representative of the coinsurance is in charge of collecting the premium signing the standard form insurance policies and issuing the invoice in its own name The Company should share the charged premium with the other companies in accordance with the Coinsurance Agreement

4) Both the Company and the other insurance companies should pay 25 of the actually received premium to WCSTCC as the service fee WCSTCC will assist the coinsurers in providing safety and technology management service to the insured In addition the 11 insurance companies should pay 5 of their premium to the Company as the management fee

27 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165445html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 28 of 52

5) In case an accident happens the 12 companies will jointly bear the damages based on their respective shares in the coinsurance

6) There is a contact mechanism established in the coinsurance The coinsurers will regularly hold coinsurance conferences to discuss existing problems

Furthermore the coinsurers and WCSTCC also signed a self-discipline agreement and established a complete management system to assure the implementation of the Coinsurance Agreement Any party violating the Coinsurance Agreement would be punished

Hubei AIC found that WCSTCC was solely invested by Wuhan Construction Safety Management Association which was under Wuhan Construction Commission The centre helped implement certain functions of the Wuhan Urban Construction Safety Management Station and was responsible for quality supervision and safety supervision of municipal construction projects

It later became a prerequisite for construction companies to purchase insurance from any member of the coinsurance in order to get approval to commence their project According to the decision Hubei AIC launched another separate investigation against WCSTCC

Through the investigation Hubei AIC concluded that the Coinsurance Agreement constituted a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by article 13 of the AML with the following analysis

First coinsurance as a common business model to jointly share and lower risks is widely adopted in the insurance industry A coinsurance arrangement for a specific project in order to avoid high risks faced by one insurer could be legal However coinsurance should not target the entire market In this case prior to the Coinsurance Agreement the risks of the construction projects were unpredictable since the scale of the construction projects the difficulty of the construction and the amount of construction workers could not be available It is impossible to predict the risks of the projects thus it is not necessary to cooperate with other insurers to collectively bear the risks The purpose of the 12 insurance companies to establish the coinsurance is to avoid the competition which demonstrates the Coinsurance Agreement belongs to a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by the AML

Second the companies through entering into the coinsurance agreement actually divided the relevant market of construction project personal accident insurance in Wuhan city which affected the competition in the relevant market and damaged the interests of other competitors and the consumers In particular the Construction Law as amended in 2011 stipulates that the purchase of personal accident insurance is not mandatory and the construction companies have the right to choose whether to buy the said insurance or not As mentioned purchasing insurance from the coinsurance had been the prerequisite for construction companies to obtain administration

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 29 of 52

approval for the project which seriously distorts the fair competition in the market

Citing article 46 of the AML the 12 insurance companies were collectively fined CNY 469 million including fines on the companies and confiscation of illegal gains It is noteworthy that the fines were calculated based on the companiesrsquo 2014 annual sales of the insurance product in connection with the coinsurance The Company as the chief insurer was fined amounting to 6 of its 2014 annual sales of the relevant insurance product in the coinsurance and other companies were fined amounting to 2 of relevant sales For more specific information please see the following table

Company Name (Hubei Branch)

Fines (CNY million)

Percentage of the sales

Illegal Gains (CNY

million)

China Pacific Life Insurance 00653 6 0941

Sino Life 00145 2 04332

Alltrust Insurance 00145 2 04332

Taikang Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Continent Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Pacific Property Insurance

00145 2 04332

China Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

PICC Property and Casualty 00145 2 02599

Taiping General Insurance 00145 2 013

Union Life Insurance 00145 2 01177

Ping An Annuity Insurance Company of China

00145 2 04201

Ping An Property amp Casualty Insurance Company of China

00145 2 -

Subtotal 02248 - 44679

Total 46927

Analysis

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 30 of 52

Coinsurance as an effective approach to lower risks of insurers is widely used in the insurance industry Information sharing and agreements on coinsurance were generally considered efficient and legitimate However from an antitrust perspective coinsurance may raise competition concerns depending on the circumstances of each agreement In the case that there is enough capacity for one insurer to cover the potential risks the coinsurance might be considered as entering into a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC28

The first leniency applicant was exempted from fines

The other concrete companies were imposed a fine of CNY 180000

Facts

In December 2015 the concrete companies monopolistic agreement case investigated by Hunan AIC was published on SAICrsquos website

In accordance with the antitrust enforcement announcement of SAIC this case was triggered by complaints from the Yongzhou City peoplersquos congress After the preliminary review the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) initiated the formal investigation on seven concrete companies domiciled in Yongzhou City Hunan Province which were suspected of being involved in a monopolistic agreement in terms of division of the volumes of the products

After further investigation Hunan AIC found that the seven concrete companies concluded a partnership agreement in 2011 which requested the involved companies to enter into a partnership business with assets In addition according to the partnership agreement it was planned to establish a comprehensive office to manage production marketing and distribution of the products of all the partners The seven companies intended to jointly adjust and control the output of concrete based on the partnership agreement However because there were disagreements over the allocation of the injected assets and market shares the companies did not implement the partnership agreement The agreement was cancelled in December 2012

Based on the findings Hunan AIC concluded that the seven concrete companies as competitors of each other restricted and eliminated the competition in the relevant market through reaching the partnership agreement and dividing the volumes of sales which violated article 13(3) of the AML in terms of division of sales market Considering that the agreement had not been implemented and the limited influence of the agreement according to article 46 of the AML and article 27 of the Administrative Penalties Law small amount fines were imposed on the involved companies Six companies were fined CNY 30000 each for their illegal behaviour 28 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165504html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 31 of 52

Yongzhou Shuangyuan Building Materials Co Ltd as the first one to actively report the monopolistic agreement and cooperate with the enforcement authority was exempted from the punishment

Outlook

It is expected that the AMLrsquos enforcement on monopolistic agreements will continue in the future Industries such as automobile shipping pharmaceuticals insurance etc will still remain the priority of the antitrust enforcement

The antitrust enforcement authorities have published a series of regulations in order to clarify the substantial and procedural issues relevant to the antitrust enforcement However Chinarsquos current antitrust legislation regime is still immature In the following years we expect that more attention will be paid to the legislative improvements

Another remarkable issue for cartel members is that with more Chinese enterprises attaching increasing importance to the AML the follow-on civil damages actions might become a tendency in the future

C Abuse of Market Dominance

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen a decent increase of abuse of market dominance cases both in public enforcement and private litigation Oftentimes the authorities responsible for public enforcement generally find it difficult to pursue investigations against abuse of market dominance cases The following two main reasons are often cited to explain this standoff first it is hard for the authorities to define the relevant markets and prove the undertaking(s)rsquo dominant market position through economic approaches second it is hard to collect evidence regarding abusive practices

The cases related to IPRs abuse are emerging significantly particularly in the telecommunication media and technology (ldquoTMTrdquo) sectors

The SAICrsquos latest refusal-to-deal probe against a local drug maker shows that the SAIC and its local branches have increasingly acquired a profile as an abuse of dominance regulator

Significant Cases

Cases pursued by the SAIC

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 32 of 52

Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case29

Facts

The local authority in Dongfang city reported to the Hainan provincial branch of SAIC on April 23 2014 of the suspected dominance abuse The SAIC authorized its Hainan bureau to officially investigate the matter on 25 July 2014 according to a decision dated January 9 2015 The AIC concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its market dominance by requiring users to pay a deposit without any legal basis and or justifiable reasons

In terms of the relevant product market the local authority found that in this case it was the urban water supply market in Dongfang city and its surrounding townships where Dongfang Water was the sole public operator in the local water supply market with a 100 market share which made all water users completely reliant on the companyrsquos supply In term of market access the local authority found it very unlikely that there were other operators due to the strict regulations

The Hainan SAIC then concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its dominance as it charged users a deposit by threatening to refuse to register users and also by threatening to restrict the water supply Dongfang Waters charging of deposits lacked a legal basis and hadnt received government approval to the detriment of household consumers and business water users and hampered the improvement of management and services of the company Such conduct was in breach of Chinarsquos Anti-Monopoly Law

Hainan AIC levied a fine of CNY 593208 a lighter penalty equivalent to 2 of the companyrsquos annual sales for the previous year and confiscated illicit gains of CNY 38521 for abuse of market dominance

Analysis

It is noteworthy that although handled by a local authority supervised by the SAIC the antitrust agency detailed the relevant market definition the assessment of the dominant market position the abusive practices and the scrutiny of the justifiable reasons

Although the definition of the relevant market and the reasoning of the Hainan provincial AIC and the SAIC are subject to criticism it is still applausive to see that the antitrust regulators have realized the importance of the application of rule of reason in an abuse case In addition through itrsquos a published decision practitioners may observe the regulatorsrsquo reasoning and thus transparency and legal certainty have been generated

29 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzfcfjd201502t20150212_152066html last visited on October 18 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 33 of 52

Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms30

Facts

In June 2013 the Ningxia AIC under authorization of SAIC opened an antitrust investigation into the alleged tie-in sales by the three major state-owned telecommunications operators China Tietong China Unicom and China Telecom for the tie-in sale of fixed-line telephones with broadband Internet services The Ningxia AIC found that the three companies had bundled fixed-line phone services with Internet services to subscribers

During the investigation all three telecommunications companies admitted the tie-in practice had recognized that such practice had improper influence on competition and deprived the choices of consumers The three companies promised to undertake internal rectification timely and eliminate the ill effects resulting from such practice The parties committed to taking the following corrective measures

1) Taking internal rectifications and conducting training to staff about antitrust laws and stop tie-in sales practices

2) Making public commitments to allow subscribers a free choice of services and strengthening the propaganda through the operating room call centre and other channels

3) Unbundling fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

The Ningxia AIC decided to suspend the probe on 14 May 2015 on the grounds that the three companies had actively worked together with the investigators and proposed workable remedy plans

Analysis

In the official announcement Ningxia AIC concluded that the purpose of antitrust enforcement is to restrain monopolistic conducts the protection of competition and to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of consumers Given that during the investigation process the parties had actively cooperated with the investigation formed a more profound understanding of the dangers of tying behaviour and moreover the parties proposed and implemented positive corrective measures to be able to remove the ill impact of their actions the agency believed that the purpose of antitrust law enforcement was fulfilled

It is worth noting that the Ningxia AIC also required the three companies to implement the commitment by August 30 2015and the submission of the written

30 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158908html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158906html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158910html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 34 of 52

implementation report on July 102015 and August 102015 respectively which is another illustration that an effective commitment by the undertakings shall directly deal with the effect that is brought by the monopolistic behaviour In this case the effect of the monopolistic act was restricted to the choice of the consumers therefore the commitment by the undertaking aimed at allowing the freedom of choice and the unbundling of fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company31

Facts

The Liaoning AIC imposed a fine of approximately CNY 433m on the Fushun Branch of Liaoning Tobacco Co on 1 June 2015 The agency also ordered the company to stop its illicit behaviour

The Liaoning AIC received a tip-off that the accused Liaoning Tobacco Corsquos Fushun branch was conducting tie-in sales of non-high-demand cigarette brands with high-demand cigarette brands After gaining authorization from SAIC the agency officially started an investigation regarding the companyrsquos suspected abuse of market dominance in June 2014

Analysis

According to the announcement the tobacco company argued that the tobacco industry is a state controlled or monopolized industry with a lawful monopolistic position therefore the company shall not be subject to the norms of general market competition rules or the anti-monopoly law

In this regards the agency concluded that in terms of the status of the undertaking admittedly the first paragraph of article 17 of the AML says that the State shall protect the lawful business operations of undertakings in these industries with respect to the industries which are under the control of the State-owned economic sector and have a bearing on the lifeline of the national economy or national security and the industries which exercise monopoly over the production and sale of certain commodities according to law However the second paragraph continues to say that the undertakings mentioned above shall do business according to law be honest faithful and strictly self-disciplined and subject themselves to public supervision and they shall not harm the consumers interests by taking advantage of their position of control or their monopolistic production and sale of certain commodities In particular in the preceding paragraph the ldquolawful businessrdquo and ldquoaccording to lawrdquo imply that the AML shall apply in the business operation The agency therefore believes that

31 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201508t20150813_16

0208html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 35 of 52

there shall be no exemption for the undertaking concerned the defences of the undertaking concerned is not established

Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm32

Facts

The Chongqing AIC fined Chongqing Qingyang Pharmaceutical CNY 439308 for alleged dominance abuse

The investigation was initiated when the company contacted the agency for verification on its potential breach of the AML related to an allopurinol active pharmaceuticals ingredient (API) distribution agreement with its exclusive distributor The company provided the relevant agreement and information and the agency conducted an investigation into the company and some other relevant companies

Analysis

Relevant Market

During the investigation the agency found that pharmaceutical ingredients are a special commodity the API is used to produce the preparations The chemical API is only used for the production of the preparation and could be used as a medicine for clinic use

The preparation is produced according to the requirements of certain form of prepared drugs and for the purpose of treatment and prevention which can be used as medicine

The allopurinol is used for the common treatment of hyperuricemia However the other treatments are different in pharmacological effects or treatment effects as well as in the cost for the patient Furthermore the company is the only manufacturer and supplier in the market nationwide since July 2012 Therefore the agency concluded that the relevant market is the allopurinol API market

Considering that the qualification for manufacturing the allopurinol API is national wide and the normal practice for purchasers and suppliers is domestic the relevant geographic market is the Chinese market

The Market Dominance

During the investigation the agency found that the company is the only supplier and manufacturer of allopurinol API in China there is no other competitor in the

32 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151222_16

5152html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 36 of 52

market and the company has a monopoly in the market The evidence shows that the company has the ability to control the prices the position for the downstream is relatively weak

With respect to the market entry the agency found that the market entry is relatively high in addition other undertakings are dependent on the company Thus the agency believed the company to have market dominance

Refusal to Deal

The agency found that on September 25 2015 the company reached an exclusive agreement and distribution agreement with its distributor Based on these agreements the company didnrsquot supply allopurinol API to the said distributor and other companies despite the fact that those companies requested for allopurinol API but were turned down by the company

Absence of Reasonable Cause

The agency found that the companyrsquos refusal to deal was not in line with the needs of normal business operation or economic efficiency On the other hand the refusal to deal was aimed at increasing the market share of the allopurinol drug product Also the agency found that the stop of supply was a manipulation of market power as to maximize the profit to the most The agency further found that the exclusive distribution agreement with suspension of supply for six months and the refusal to supply was to eliminate and restrict the competition as to gain the monopolistic profit

The Consequence of Refusal to Deal

The agency concluded that the refusal to deal harmed the competition of the allopurinol preparations market Because of the suspension of supply many demanders had to reduce their production or switch to the supply of other products or stop their production The suspension of supply affected the competition of the downstream market Consequently the raising of the price of allopurinol API also raised the cost for other manufacturers of allopurinol preparations

Furthermore the refusal to deal led to capacity loss of the allopurinol preparation industry

Ultimately the refusal to deal increased the burden on consumers as the refusal to supply changed the supply-demand relationship in the market

The agency concluded that the Company abused its dominant position in the allopurinol API market by refusing to deal with intended buyers in the period between October 2013 and March 2014Therefore the Company violated article 17 (1) of the AML which prohibits business operators with a dominant market position from abusing that position such as the refusal to deal without any justifications

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 37 of 52

D Administrative Monopoly

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 witnessed antitrust authoritiesrsquo significant efforts regarding the enforcement against administrative monopoly According to Mr Dong Zhiming the deputy director general of Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly Bureau ever since the AML coming into force six cases in connection with administrative monopoly were investigated by NDRC and among them five cases were handled in the year of 2015 These cases touched abuses of administrative power in terms of designative deal in relation to transportation communication and pharmaceutical industries

The first private litigation related to administrative monopolistic acts was heard in the court which is a milestone case in the enforcement of the AML

Significant Cases

Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC33

Facts

In March 2015 the NDRC released the official letter to Shandong Provincial Department of Transportation (ldquoShandong DOTrdquo) on its website with respect to correct its abuse of administrative power to exclude and restrict competition

During the investigation the NDRC found that since 2011 Shandong DOT had issued multiple relevant government orders in order to require certain types of vehicles to be directly connected to two designated information and service platforms both of which are operated and technically supported by one company namely Shandong Jiutong Internet of Things Technology Co Ltd (ldquoJiutong ITTrdquo) Furthermore according to the orders issued by the competent administrative department all the vehicle satellite positioning terminals entering into Shandong provincial market should be debugged through the said technology service platform which is operated by the mentioned company In addition Shandong DOT released the cap prices of vehicle satellite positioning terminals which is identical to the 2012 bid-winning price in the Ministry of Transportation demonstration project

The NDRC believed that Shandong DOTrsquos behaviour eliminated and restricted the competition in the monitoring platform market and the vehicle terminal market deprived the right of transportation enterprises to choose vehicle terminals and monitoring platform on their owns unreasonably raised the sales prices of vehicle terminals and service fees charged by the platform and increased the costs of transportation enterprises Therefore the antitrust agency concluded that Shandong

33 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201503t20150327_668911html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 38 of 52

DOT violated article 8 of the AML which stipulates that ldquoadministrative organs and the public organizations with an administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude and restrict competitionrdquo Specifically Shandong DOT violated article 3234 in terms of requiring organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any designated operators and violated article 3735 in terms of setting rules with contents which eliminate and restrict competition

Based on article 51 of the AML ldquoWhere administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations abuse administrative powers performing activities which exclude and restrict competition the superior entity shall order it to correct impose administrative penalty on the chief officer and other staffs directly responsible pursuant to the laws The AML enforcement authority may give recommendations on disposal of activities to the relevant superior entityrdquo the NDRC proposed in writing that the Shandong provincial government should order Shandong DOT to rectify its behaviour with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Entirely open up the monitoring platform market by permitting transportation undertakings to freely choose any approved platform

2) Loosen the restrictions on the entry into Shandong vehicle terminals permit the undertakings to independently select the supplier of vehicle terminals and allow the qualified terminals to be connected to the relevant monitoring platform and

3) Revoke the official documentation relevant to the cap price of vehicle terminals in order to promote the price competition

Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 36

Facts

On 26 August 2015 the NDRC published its second decision with regard to the rectification of administrative monopoly since the beginning of this year According to the proposal letter sent to Anhui Provincial Government the investigation against the Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City (Bengbu HFPC) was trigged by third partiesrsquo complaints

34 Article 32 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to require organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any operators designated by them 35 Article 37 of the AML Administrative organs shall not abuse their administrative powers to set rules with contents which eliminate restrict competition 36 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201508t20150826_748682html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 39 of 52

The investigation suggests that Bengbu HFPC published three notices with regard to drugs procurement in April and May of this year

In the No C-2015-CG-X-111 Notice (ldquoNo111 Noticerdquo) released on 10 April2015 the health authority not only provided the dosage form and qualification of the requested drugs but also directly determined the suppliers of relevant drugs which eliminated and restricted the competition among pharmaceutical manufacturers and therefore violated articles 32 and 37 of the AML

In the No C-2015-CG-C-112 Notice (ldquoNo112 Noticerdquo) and No C-2015-CG-C-168 (ldquoNo 168 Noticerdquo) respectively released on 10 April and 22 May 2015 the Bengbu HFPC set discriminative qualification requirements on non-local undertakings in order to restrict their participation in the relevant bidding For instance in accordance with No 112 Notice to be a qualified bidder the turnover of non-local undertakings shall exceed CNY 2 billion which is 50 times as much as the turnover requirements of the local undertakings In the NDRCrsquos opinion the administrative monopoly activities conducted by the local health agency excluded the relevant undertakings from the market maintained the virtual-high prices of drugs and therefore violated articles 3237 and 37 of the AML

The NDRC suggested in a letter that Anhui Provincial Government should urge the Bengbu HFPC to rectify the abuse of monopoly powers with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Stop setting distinguishing restrictions on qualification requirements review standards and numbers of winning bidders as for local and non-local undertakings

2) Stop designating the suppliers of competitive drugs and

3) Take necessary measures to mitigate the negative effects resulting from the previous illegal monopolistic abuses

Outlook

At the beginning of the year the former director general of the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau under the NDRC Xu Kunlin stated that the agency would strengthen antitrust enforcement on abuse of administrative power in 2015

Since then the NDRC has made great efforts to rectify unreasonable abuses of administrative power The currently disclosed two cases investigated by the NDRC re-emphasize the Chinese Governmentrsquos strict scrutiny of antitrust issues in respect of

37 Article 34 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to restrict or reject the participation of operators from other regions in local bidding activities by measures such as prescribing discriminatory qualification requirements or assessment standards or by not publishing information according to law

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 40 of 52

administrative monopoly It reminds the local governments that antitrust compliance is of significant importance

III Private Litigation

A Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen more and more private antitrust litigations

The private antitrust litigation cases have become increasingly complicated especially the issues regarding the intersection areas of IP and antitrust law

Multinational giants and State-Owned Enterprises (the ldquoSOEsrdquo) are increasingly becoming the targets in antitrust civil litigations Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (the ldquoSMEsrdquo) tend to use the antitrust litigation to achieve their commercial goals in the business context

B Significant Cases

Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)38

This is the first-ever private litigation concerning administrative monopoly since the implementation of the AML in 2008

Facts

According to the currently disclosed details the case is relevant for designated trade

The plaintiff Shenzhen Sware Technology Co Ltd (ldquoSwarerdquo) is a software company The press releases suggest that Sware Gloden Software Co Ltd (ldquoGlodenrdquo) and Shanghai Ruban Software Co Ltd (ldquoShanghai Rubanrdquo) are the three main suppliers of construction cost software and possess the major shares of the relevant market An annual provincial vocational ability contest regarding the construction cost hosted by the Guangdong Department of Education (ldquoGuangdong DOE) designated Gloden as the exclusive supplier of the relevant software

After several unsuccessful verbal and written negotiations with Guangdong DOE in April 2014 Sware filed a lawsuit against Guangdong DOE before the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquothe Courtrdquo) alleging that the administrative organ abused its administrative power and violated the AML by designating exclusive software supplier for the contest and claimed a compensation for reasonable expense amounting to CNY 10800 Yuan

The opinions of the Court 38 The story of the case is available at httpfinancesinacomcnchinadfjj20150410074621924997shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 41 of 52

The full text of the judgment has not been disclosed yet In accordance with the information available to the public the Court invoked article 32 of the AML which prohibits an administrative organ from abusing its administrative power to require or in disguised form organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use only the commodities supplied by the entities designated by them The Court concluded that Guangdong DOE failed to prove the legitimacy of the designation and therefore abused its administration power

Currently the case is in appeal before the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court

Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 39

It is the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China

In the first instance ruling Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court ruled against Sinopec holding that the Yunnan branch of Sinopecs trading company was obligated to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its dominance in the sales market of refined oil by refusing to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding without justifiable reasons

In the second instance ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors Currently the case is pending

Facts

The First Trial

The lawsuit was filed before the Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoKunming Courtrdquo) in January 2014 Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy Co Ltd (ldquoYingdingrdquo) a bio-energy manufacturer claimed that Sinopec and the Yunnan branch of Sinopec trading company (ldquoSinopec Yunnan Branchrdquo) had failed to fulfil their obligations stipulated in the Renewable Energy Law and had abused their market dominance in sales market of refined oil by refusing to trade with Yingding without justifiable reasons

Sinopec and Sinopec Yunnan Branch mainly explained four reasons for why they rejected Yingdingrsquos biofuel Firstly Yingding had failed to prove that the biofuel complied with the relevant national standard and was safe to use Secondly Yingding had failed to provide complete trading terms Thirdly the laws and regulations regarding biofuel were incomplete the authorized refined oil sales companies were 39 The details of the case are available at httpnewsxinhuanetcomfortune2014-1217c_1113680039htm httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=9e71db51-6ff6-4d2c-8af6-8eacf023ebdeampKeyWord=E4BA91E58D97E79B88E9BC8E|E4B8ADE79FB3E58C96 httpnewsxinhuanetcomenergy2015-0422c_127721575htm httpwwwnbdcomcnarticles2015-04-23911348html last visited on December 17 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 42 of 52

obligated to purchase biofuel from the biofuel manufacturers if it met certain quality standards but there was a vacancy regarding how to reach the end consumers from the sales companies

On 8 December 2014 the Kunming Intermediate Peoples Court ruled that Sinopec Yunnan Branch bore a legal obligation to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its market dominance in refined oil market by refusing without any justifiable reasons to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding The court ordered Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network within 30 days Both Yingding and Sinopec filed appeals to the Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court

The Appellate Trial

The appeal hearing was held on 22 April 2015 in Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoYunnan Courtrdquo) Sinopec submitted 23 new pieces of evidence and introduced two expert witnesses in a bid to overturn several key elements in the first-instance ruling by Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court

In terms of the determination of the relevant market and the market dominance Sinopec argued that the relevant market in this case was for adipic acid monomethyl ester (ldquoAAMErdquo) the main ingredient of a biofuel additive known as BD100 Yingdingrsquos main product is BD100 which can be blended with fossil diesel to become biofuel In the AAME market Sinopec is a potential buyer instead of a market dominator In support of this argument Sinopec presented an expert witnessmdashGong Jiong a professor of economics at Beijings University of International Business and Economics who testified that AAME should be defined as the relevant product market on the basis of an economic analysis

However Yingding insisted that the first-instance ruling was correct in naming the sales market of refined oil as the relevant market and submitted new evidence an article on Sinopecs website that claimed it had a 67 market share in Yunnan to help establish the claim that Sinopec had market dominance

Another main dispute was whether Yingdingrsquos biofuel product met national standards which would make it mandatory for Sinopec to purchase under Chinas Renewable Energy Law The law stipulates that biofuel producers must sell their products first to an authorized refined oil sales company and the sales companies are obliged to buy the fuel if it meets certain quality standards In order to test the quality Sinopec introduced the second expert witness Lin Jianmin a leading author of Chinarsquos national biofuel standard Lin Jianmin pointed out that there are currently quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology which gives Sinopec a justifiable reason not to trade with Yingding Moreover Sinopec presented some precedents in which consumers had complained about the biofuel quality and also claimed that China didnt have a sound regulatory framework to support biofuel production neither in testing nor in sales

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 43 of 52

Nevertheless to refute this point Yingding referred to an earlier test in co-operation with Sinopec in 2011 where selected buses in Kunming used biofuel blended by Sinopec using BD100 produced by Yingding

On August 13 2015 Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors and now this case is pending In the written appellate ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court did not provide any details regarding its reasoning

Key Issues of the Case

Is there any competition between Yingding and Sinopec

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case the product of Yingding is biofuel while Sinopec does not engage in the business of biofuel From this perspective Yingding and Sinopec are not competitors Thus it is not necessary and not reasonable for Sinopec to eliminate or restrict the competition from Yingding

Relevant Market

The definition of the relevant market is a prerequisite to determine whether competition exists and whether the AML is applicable In accordance with the Judicial Interpretation of Antitrust civil litigation the plaintiff shall take the responsibility to prove the defendantrsquos dominance in the relevant market Also the methods of defining the relevant market are stipulated in the Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition (ldquoGuidelinesrdquo) However both Yingding and Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court defined the relevant market as the sales market of refined oil without sufficient antitrust analysis none of the methods in the Guidelines were used Therefore the definition of the relevant market remains arguable and needs to be sufficiently analysed in the upcoming retrial

Justifiable Reasons

The abuse of market dominance includes the behaviour of refusing to trade without justifiable reasons according to the AML but in the first instance ruling justifiable reasons were not investigated by the court During the appellate trial the expert witness introduced by Sinopec claimed that there were quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology and this was a justifiable reason to refuse to trade with Yingding Even though the first instance court and the appellate court did not reason the justifiable reason it should be discussed and investigated further during the retrial

AML or Renewable Energy Law

The claims of Yingding were based on both the AML and the Renewable Energy Law (ldquoRELrdquo) and the first instance ruling referred to both the AML and the REL as

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 44 of 52

well It seems that the laws the first instance court referred to were comprehensive but in fact the reasoning was not clear and logical In the first instance ruling some disputes regarding the AML were reviewed but all the orders were not based on the AML Specifically the first instance court ordered the Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network based on the REL and dismissed the other claims That the orders were not on account of reasoning is illogical It is anticipated that during the retrial the application of the laws will be clearer

Analysis

A lot of issues have not been clearly analysed by the courts such as the relevant market and the justifiable reasons Since the case is remanded the above-mentioned issues are expected to be resolved in the retrial In addition Yingding was in a disadvantaged position compared to its first instance trial since its claims based on the AML were challenged greatly during the appellate trial In the retrial it is probable that Yingding may switch its litigation strategy and base its claims on the REL Therefore maybe more preparation regarding the REL can give Sinopec a leg up

Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)

Rijing Electric a Chinese distributor seeks CNY 5m compensation

The first hearing was on 9 June 2015 and ended without a ruling

Facts

Rijing Electric (ldquoRijingrdquo) a Shanghai-based company and a former distributor for Panasonic accused Panasonic of abusing its dominance and dividing the market through monopolistic practice in an antitrust lawsuit filed in 2014 with Shanghai No 1 Intermediate Court (ldquoShanghai Courtrdquo) claiming compensation of CNY 5m (USD 815370) Wenzhou Mingda Automation System Co and Shanghai Qingying Automation Equipment as the distributor of Panasonic in China are the co-defendants were accused of conducting monopolistic behaviours by implementing Panasonicrsquos policy

The first hearing for evidence exchange was on June 9 2015 Rijing claimed a policy allegedly introduced by Panasonic in 2009 restricted the competition between distributors Panasonic claims the policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo and has full justifiable reasons It explained that the products in question required customization at considerable cost to distributors before its sale to customers Once carried out however other distributors leaving them open to quote much lower prices than the original distributor could simply and relatively cheap replicate this customization Besides Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and that the plaintiff had failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic said its market share for the four products

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 45 of 52

under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases Also Rijing failed to challenge the policy when it was first introduced instead initially agreeing it was reasonable as e-mail evidence submitted by Panasonic suggests

Key Issues of the Case

Whether Panasonic occupied a market dominant position

It is reported that Rijing claimed that Panasonic had abused its market dominance but Rijing failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and its market share for the four products under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases

Analysis

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case Panasonicrsquos policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo rather than to eliminate or restrict competition

Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals40 (Pending)

It is a battle over patent licensing issues

It is viewed as being among the most complicated antitrust lawsuits in China

The first hearing was on 17 and 18 December 2015

Facts

Four Chinese rare earth companies Ningbo Ketian Magnet Ningbo Permanent Magnetics Ningbo Tongchuang Strong Magnet Material and Ningbo Huahui Magnetic Industry filed antitrust lawsuits against Hitachi Metals over alleged patent licensing issues regarding rare earth magnets on December 11 2014 with the Ningbo Intermediate Peoples Court (ldquoNingbo Courtrdquo) in Zhejiang province As reported four Chinese rare earth companies claimed Hitachi Metals abused its market dominance and hurt the industry competition by refusing to license the patents to them The patents in this case are used in the manufacturing of sintered neodymium iron boron (ldquoNdFeBrdquo) magnets a rare-earth magnet alloy widely used in parts for airplanes automobiles and other products

Hitachi Metals filed a challenge with the Ningbo Court over its jurisdiction in April 2015 After Ningbo Court rejected Hitachi Metals jurisdiction objection on 28 April 2015 Hitachi Metals appealed to the Zhejiang High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoZhejiang

40The details of the story are available at httpwwwzbmagcomnews_viewphpid=80 httpwwwhitachicomcnaboutpress201510-121118_ahtml last visited on December 22 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 46 of 52

Courtrdquo) but Zhejiang Court affirmed the ruling of the Ningbo Court

The first day of a two-day hearing took place on 17 December 2015 during which the two sides cross-examined each otherrsquos evidence The evidence focused on clearing up several key elements in the case including the relevant market whether Hitachi Metals has dominance on that market and whether both sides acted in good faith during the licensing negotiations

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Product Market

The four Chinese rare earth companies claimed that the relevant product market should be the NdFeb-related patent licensing market However Hitachi Metals believed that the physical NdFeb market rather than the patent licensing market should be the relevant product market which is meaningful for assess the real competitive effects on the market

Whether Hitachi Metals occupies a dominant market position

In terms of market dominance Hitachi Metals claimed it does not occupy a dominant position because Hitachi Metalsrsquo patents were not in a standard in this case and there are substitutable technologies in the market SEP holders have the obligation to license on FRAND terms but none-SEP holders do not So while a refusal to license a SEP may constitute abuse of dominance refusal to license a non-SEP mdash even by a patent holder with a dominant position mdash should not be considered as an abuse

Analysis

Hitachi Metals as a patent holder should have the right to decide whether to retain those patents or not or who to license According to the legal theory the purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage and protect innovation by conferring monopoly right mdash that is to give intellectual property owners the proprietary rights which can exclude others from using the intellectual property The SEP holders admittedly need to comply with FRAND terms which can maintain a robust balance between competition and monopoly whereas the further intervention of antitrust law into non-SEP patents may undermine the purpose of intellectual property law To which extent the antitrust law should intervene is yet to be seen

Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei41

A confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the Beijing IP court made by the Beijing High Court

41 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcncpwswbjzscq201511t20151103_12225640htm last visited on December 28 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 47 of 52

Facts

On August 2 2013 the NDRC penalized Abbott for monopolistic price-fixing and then Abbott made a price adjustment in China where the prices of main products were reduced

On December 16 2014 Tian Junwei (ldquoTianrdquo) a Chinese citizen in Beijing sued Carrefour Shuangjing Branch (ldquoCarrefourrdquo) and Abbott (Shanghai) Sales Company (ldquoAbbottrdquo) at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (ldquoIP Courtrdquo) for their monopolistic price-fixing which damaged his interests However Carrefour and Abbott challenged the jurisdiction of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court They claimed there were two reasons Firstly according to the jurisdiction rules of the IP court issued by the Supreme Court the IP court has no jurisdiction over anti-trust cases Secondly if this case is a contractual dispute the court that is in the place of Carrefour should hear it if this case is a tort dispute the Shanghai Intermediate Court should hear it

In the ruling of the IP Court the IP Court decided it has the jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases for the following reasons According to the Provisions On Causes Of Action In Civil Cases issued by Supreme Court (最高人民法院案由规定) antimonopoly dispute is a tertiary cause of action belonging to IP and competition disputes Also according to the Provisions concerning the Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京

市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问题的规定 ) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was an IP and competition dispute and was sued after November 6 2014 Thus the IP Court had jurisdiction

Both Carrefour and Abbott appealed to the Beijing High Court over the jurisdiction ruling but the Beijing High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original ruling Reasons are listed in the written ruling issued on June 18 2015 Firstly the nature of the case was an antimonopoly dispute In accordance with Provisions of the Supreme Peoples Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民

事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) and Civil Litigation Law the monopolistic civil disputes in the first instance shall be under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Peoples Courts and an action involving a contractual dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the peoples court of the place where the defendant is domiciled or where the contract is performed Carrefour as the defendant in this case is domiciled in Chaoyang District Beijing Therefore the courts of Beijing have jurisdiction over this case Secondly according to article 3 of the Notification on the Jurisdiction of Intellectual Property Courts issued by Supreme Court (关于知识产权法院案件管辖

等有关问题的通知) IP courts have jurisdiction over first-instance civil disputes arising from monopolistic practices Lastly according to Provisions concerning the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 13 of 52

Digital had engaged in two conducts that violated the first remedy Those were

1) On March 8 2012 Western Digital consolidated Hitachi Global Storage Technology (ldquoHGSTrdquo) which was Vivitirsquos subsidiary in US

2) In January 2013 Western Digital dissolved the development division of VivitiHGST and transferred the relevant workforce to Western Digital

MOFCOM considered that these conducts impaired the independence of Viviti as a competitor so that it imposed CNY 300000 fines on each of these behaviours and requested Western Digital to rectify the situation As per the entrusted supervisorrsquos report such behaviours have been rectified and the first remedy has been fulfilled

According to MOFCOMrsquos announcement the agency found that other remedies have been entirely implemented

Competition Analysis

With respect to the current situation of the competition in the hard disk market MOFCOM made the following assessment

1) In the areas of portable application and corporate-level application solid-state drive has put constraint on the impact of the traditional hard disk as to strengthen the competition in the relevant market

2) Overcapacity problems in the conventional hard disk drive market became obvious

3) Western Digital and HGST are the major competitors in the hard disk drive market Both the layout and the major market competitors in this market have remained unchanged since 2012

4) The hold-separate duties restricted the full competition between Western Digital and HGST The implementation of such duties hindered them from integrating their products and providing the market with a full range of products and had an adverse impact on their clientsrsquo product procurement

Based on the above analysis MOFCOM deemed that

1) Removal of the conditions that required the two companies to remain independent in production and RampD activities would enable Western Digital to save costs to provide a full range of products to the market and to fully engage in market competition and benefit its clients

2) To keep the two sales teams and their respective brands independent from each other and the independence of sales activities could reduce competition restraint impacts arising from a complete merger

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 14 of 52

Remedies

After negotiating with MOFCOM the relevant entities agreed to undertake the following obligations

1) Western Digital and HGST will remain independent in sales and brands

2) Western Digital will not change its previous business modes or force its clients to exclusively purchase hard disk drive products from Western Digital or do so in disguise

3) Western Digital will continue its pace in investing in product innovation to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

This announcement will be effective within two years from the date of issuance If Western Digital can provide sufficient evidence to prove a substantial change in the market environment the company can propose to MOFCOM to remove the relevant conditions within the two years

SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions14

MOFCOM considered the fact that the competition condition in the relevant product market has changed and removed the hold-separate restrictions on Seagate and Samsung

Seagate shall remain its business model materially and continue to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

Facts

On December 12 2011 MOFCOM made the No 11 Announcement to clear Seagate Technology LLCrsquos (ldquoSeagaterdquo) acquisition with remedies In this acquisition Seagate intended to acquire hard disk drive business of Samsung Electronics Co Ltd (ldquoSamsung HDDrdquo) As per this announcement Seagate could apply for removing the first and second remedy after this decision has been carried out for 12 months

The first remedy is to preserve Samsung HDD as an independent competitor and the second remedy asks to maintain and expand Samsung HDDrsquos production capacity within six months of issuance of the No 11 Announcement and to set reasonable production volume targets based on market supply-demand conditions

Seagate lodged an application to remove the first and second remedy in May 2015 After making assessments on the relevant parties and the competition circumstance MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate remedies

14 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151020151001144105shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 15 of 52

Competition Analysis

With respect to the current situation of the competition in the hard disk drive market MOFCOM made the following assessments

1) In the areas of portable application and corporate-level application solid-state drive has put constraint on the impact of the traditional hard disk so that the competition in the relevant market has been strengthened

2) Overcapacity problems in the conventional hard disk drive market became obvious

3) Both the layout and the major market competitors in the hard disk drive market have remained unchanged since 2012

4) Seagate and Samsung HDDrsquos market overlap in the hard disk market is quite small and Samsung HDDrsquos competition in the traditional hard disk is quite weak

Based on the above analysis MOFCOM deemed that

1) Removal of certain conditions is possible because in the portable application and corporate level application sectors competition constraint of solid-state drive on traditional hard disk drives has strengthened traditional hard disk drives are facing overcapacity which has reduced the chance of a single or more competitors causing competition restraints Seagate has limited overlap with Samsung in the hard disk business and the latter has a relatively weaker market power in the hard drive disk business

2) Removal of all imposed conditions may still restrain market competition because the traditional hard disk drive market competition conditions have not undergone a major change Seagate is still the major player in all divisions of the market and Seagate will strengthen its power after the acquisition of Samsung HDD

Remedies

After negotiating with MOFCOM Seagate agreed to undertake the following obligations

1) Seagate shall not change its business model materially or force clients to purchase hard drive disks exclusively from it

2) Seagate shall not force Tokyo Dengikagaku Kogyo China to supply magnetic heads exclusively to Seagate (or other Seagate-controlled companies) or limit the number of magnetic heads Tokyo Dengikagaku Kogyo China would supply to other hard drive disk manufacturers

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 16 of 52

3) Seagate shall continue to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

This announcement will be effective within two years from the date of issuance If Seagate can provide sufficient evidence to prove substantial change in the market environment the company can propose to MOFCOM to remove relevant conditions within the two years

FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM15

MOFCOM deems that this acquisition would induce anti-competitive influence

NXP promises to dispose its radio frequency (ldquoRFrdquo) power transistor business

As the first case approved with structural remedies after the enactment of the Provisions on Imposing Restrictive Conditions MOFCOM conducted a comprehensive evaluation of the viability competitiveness and marketability of the divested business as well as the suitability of potential buyers

Facts

On April 3 2015 NXP filed for its acquisition of Freescale NXP Semiconductor (ldquoNXPrdquo) is a NASDAQ-listed company registered in the Netherlands which engages in the design manufacturing and sale of integration circuits and discrete components

Freescale Semiconductor (ldquoFreescalerdquo) is a New York-listed company registered in Bermuda and based in the US which engages in the manufacturing and RampD of microcontroller and digital networking processors (embedded processors)

According to the agreement between NXP and Freescale after closing Freescale will become the wholly owned subsidiary of NXP On November 25 2015 MOFCOM decided to clear this acquisition with remedies

Relevant Market

As per the announcement the relevant product markets are the general microcontroller automotive power-use analog integrated circuit and RF transistor product markets in which NXP and Freescale have horizontal overlap The relevant geographical markets should be the global market

Competition Analysis

After assessing this proposed deal the agency concluded that

1) The proposed deal would boost NXPrsquos market control power in the RF

15 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151120151101196182shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 17 of 52

transistor product market because the global and Chinese RF transistor product markets share a similar structure both featuring few competitors and high concentration levels Freescale and NXP as the number one and number two players are far ahead of their rivals in the market Therefore after closing the market control power of NXP in this market would be strengthened

2) Since Freescale was the fiercest competitor of NXP the proposed deal will remove competition between them

3) The proposed deal would reduce the options for clients and increase procurement risks

In practice the wireless infrastructure suppliers as the main client of the RF transistor product tend to procure products from both NXP and Freescale to prevent them from the risk arising from relying on one supplier

4) The proposed deal may induce an adverse impact on the technology RampD and innovation

Remedies

In accordance with MOFCOMrsquos decision NXP shall follow its written commitment submitted to MOFCOM and completely divest its RF power transistor business to Beijing Jianguang Asset Management At the same time NXP shall strictly fulfil its obligations during the transition period It is worth noting that the NXPFreescale deal shall only be implemented after the divestment deal has been concluded

In addition MOFCOM requires NXP to perform relevant obligations during the transition period from the date of approval announcement until the divestment deal has been concluded NXP shall endeavour

1) not to engage in any lsquounfair trade practicesrsquo relating to the divested business

2) not to implement any acts which may have a significant adverse impact on the value management or competitiveness of the divested business or any acts which may change the nature and scope industry or business strategy or investment policy of the divested business and to take reasonable measures to encourage core employees to stay in the divested business as well as not to seek or transfer employees to NXPrsquos non-divested business

3) to ensure supply to the divested business in a fair reasonable and non-discriminatory manner and

4) to maintain the independence of the divested business and not to exchange competitively sensitive information between the parties and the divested

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 18 of 52

business

B Monopolistic Agreements

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

With respect to the enforcement activities of the NDRC in light of the numbers of the published cases it seems that the law enforcement frequency of the NDRC regarding monopolistic agreements in 2015 is lower in comparison with 2014

The reason behind might be that the outstanding issue of human resource deficit of the antitrust authority still exists Besides the fact that more enterprises gradually attach increasing importance to the antitrust compliance might be another reason for the decrease in the number of cases investigated by the authorities

As to the enforcement activities of the SAIC 4 of 14 cases concluded by the SAIC and its local branches in 2015 are relevant to monopolistic agreements Meanwhile these four cases concern horizontal monopolistic agreements

It is noteworthy however that the Mercedes-Benz case and the Dongfeng Nissan case suggest that vertical agreements especially involving price-related restrictions on the downstream dealers is still the priority of antitrust enforcement Companies shall be very cautious when imposing restrictions on the resale prices or the minimum resale prices of commodities in the distribution agreements

Automobile industry and related industries are observed to be under continuous attention of Chinarsquos antitrust authorities

The industries relating to peoplersquos livelihoods remain to be the enforcement priority

Significant Cases

Enforcement by the NDRC and its local branches

Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC16

The investigation was triggered by a leniency application

The first leniency applicant was exempted from punishment

Eight ocean shipping companies involved were imposed a collective fine of CNY 4067 million

NDRC spent approximately 12 months to investigate and conclude the case 16 NDRCrsquos press release of the case is available at httpjjsndrcgovcngzdt201512t20151228_769084html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 19 of 52

Facts

In December 2015 the NDRC published its official punishment decisions regarding the cartel case in connection with eight ocean shipping companies namely Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha (ldquoNYKrdquo) Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha (ldquoK Linerdquo) Mitsui OSK Lines EUKOR Car Carriers Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics Compantildeiacutea Sud Americana de Vapores Eastern Car Liner and Compantildeiacutea Chilena de Navegacioacuten Interoceaacutenica

According to the official press release of the NDRC the investigation was triggered by a leniency application of NYK The evidence showed that the eight companies reached consensus on non-intrusion of each others existing business to maintain or increase shipping fees when shipping goods such as cars trucks and engineering machinery in the routes between China and other countries and regions

They were also found to frequently conduct bilateral or multilateral communications on the shippersrsquo invitation for bids andor price inquiries via phone conferences dinner parties e-mails visiting etc In addition they also conducted illegal behaviour such as sensitive information exchange price negotiations bidding intention discussion dividing clients and shipping routes reaching agreements on high price bids or non-bidding in order to help certain companies gain shipping orders

To avoid the regulation of the antitrust authority the relevant shipping companies adopted various illicit measures that showed their apparent intention to violate the AML The cartel lasted for at least four years and covered a broad range of shipping routes concerned with the import and export of products between China and other regions such as North America EU South America and so on involving multiple auto brands and engineering machinery brands

The NDRC held the opinion that the eight companies conducts had restricted and eliminated competition in the relevant market raising the international shipping fees and impairing interests of shippers and end consumers The eight companies breached the AML by reaching and implementing monopolistic agreements on fixing prices and dividing the market

All eight investigated companies put forward remedy measures including enhancing the antitrust compliance program arranging more antitrust compliance trainings and developing antitrust compliance technologies

The NDRC imposed fines based on the nature level and duration of their monopolistic volations as well as their respective sales of international freight service sales relevant to the Chinese market The companies involved were collectively fined CNY 4067 million

NYK as the first cartel member voluntarily reporting the illegal conducts to the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 20 of 52

authority and providing significant evidence was entirely exempted from the punishment K Line as the second leniency applicant was imposed a fine amounting to 4 of its 2014 annual sales of international freight services relevant to Chinarsquos import and export market The details of punishments imposed on the involved companies by the NDRC are as follow

Company Name Amount of Fines (RMB million)

Percentage of the Relevant Turnovers

Grounds

Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha

- - First leniency applicant

Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha

2398 4 Second leniency applicant

Mitsui OSK Lines 3812 7 Third leniency applicant

EUKOR Car Carriers 284 9 Lasted over a long period involved many brands and many violations violations were severe

Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics

4506 8 Lasted over a long period involved many brands and many violations violations were severe

Compantildeiacutea Sud Americana de Vapores

308 6 Lasted over a long period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Eastern Car Liner 1127 5 Lasted over a long period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Compantildeiacutea Chilena de 120 4 Lasted over a long

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 21 of 52

Navegacioacuten Interoceaacutenica

period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Total 4067

Analysis

In this case the agency applied the AML instead of the Tenders and Bids Law to collusive bidding Citing article 13 (3) of the AML the NDRC identified that the collusive bidding constituted a division of the sales market

The leading three leniency applicants were granted exemption from fines to a varying degree

According to the official who handled this case dawn raids performed by antitrust enforcement agencies in other jurisdictions drew the attention of the NDRC on the cartels of these shipping companies However there was limited effective evidence to prove that the companies had reached monopolistic agreements Through pressuring the involved parties three members of the shipping cartel actively confessed their illegal conduct This case once again stresses the significance of international cooperation between antitrust enforcement agencies

Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau17

The distribution agreements between Mercedes-Benz and its dealers are determined as vertical monopolistic agreement and Mercedes-Benz violated article 14 of the AML because it restricted the ability of its dealers to decide their own resale prices

Mercedes-Benzrsquos dealers violated article of 13 of the AML due to concluding a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Mercedes-Benz and its dealers were jointly fined CNY 3578 million

Facts

In April 2015 Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau which is the provincial branch of the NDRC released the punishment on its website and announced that it had imposed a fine of CNY 350 million on Mercedes-Benz along with the aggregated fine of CNY 787 million on its dealers The fine came as a result of Mercedes-Benz reaching and implementing resale price maintenance (ldquoRPMrdquo) agreements with dealers to fix the minimum resale price of several car models as well as certain auto parts 17 The original Chinese notice published by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau is available at httpwwwjswjjgovcnoffice_neweo_comm_zxnrxsphp

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 22 of 52

According to the decision the authority found that Mercedes-Benz fixed the minimum resale price of Class E and Class S cars in Nanjing Wuxi Changzhou and Suzhou markets through telephoneverbal communication and dealers meetings from January 2013 to July 2014 Since 2010 Mercedes-Benz had reached agreements with dealers in Jiangsu province to fix the minimum resale prices for auto parts by providing different levels of discounts for insured cars cars involving expired warranty periods and cars within the warranty period

In addition Mercedes-Benz implemented the minimum resale price maintaining agreement by

1) Tightening its monitoring measures on the dealers such as inspecting deals and their sale incentive system on a weekly basis

2) Tracking the sales process flow of cars and increasing the intensity of this assessment

3) Giving warnings and reducing support ndash for example halting the supply of bestselling cars and prohibiting the opening of new stores ndash to dealers if dealers refused to cooperate with the price-fixing related policies and measures and

4) Interviewing personnel of the dealers and requesting terminations if the staff engaged in serious violations of the RPM agreement

Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau concluded that Mercedes-Benz had excluded and eliminated market competition harmed consumer welfare and consequently violated article 1418 of the AML The authority therefore imposed a fine of CNY 350 million representing 7 of the sale revenue of the previous year in the relevant market against Mercedes-Benz and imposed a fine on the dealers amounting to an equivalence of 1 of the annual sales in the previous year

Analysis

Although the agency also addressed the horizontal violation among the dealers in this case the administrative penalty decision mainly focuses on the vertical violation The agency fined dealers involved in the RPM agreement a combined CNY 787 million equal to 1 of the previous-year sales which suggests that the agency decided to give lighter punishments to dealers who took initiative in reporting the activity and provided evidence

The Mercedes-Benz case is the third case where the agency successfully 18 Article 14 of the AML The following monopolistic agreements between operators and trading partners shall be prohibited (i) fixing the resale prices of commodities to third persons (ii) restricting the minimum resale prices of commodities to third persons (iii) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement Authority under the State Council

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 23 of 52

discovered both vertical and horizontal agreements in a case following the Audi case and the Chrysler case All these cases are rooted in the same industry indicating that industrial features play a large role in raising anti-trust concerns In fact it appears that the entire automotive industry is under antitrust scrutiny

Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC19

This case involved both a horizontal agreement and an administrative monopoly

A total fine of CNY 1318 million was imposed on the involved companies

Facts

In June 2015 the NDRC through its website announced the decision made by its regional branch -Yunnan Provincial Development and Reform Commission (ldquoYunnan DRCrdquo) regarding the horizontal monopolistic agreement case involving Yunnan Communications Administration and local subsidiaries of four state-owned telecommunication companies

Through the investigation Yunnan DRC found that Yunnan Communications Administration as a competent government agency had organized several meetings involving Yunnan branches of four state-owned telecoms - China Mobile China Telecom China Unicom and China Tietong in August and September of 2014 At the end of 2009 the four local branches entered into an agreement to regulate their sales promotions in terms of limiting the promotional items amount and frequency

Furthermore the agreement provides certain measures to ensure the implementation of relevant restrictions on promotions Specifically in case any cartel member violates the agreement the others could file complaints with Yunnan Communications Administration and the agency would then issue a rectification notice to the rule-breaker

Yunnan DRC stated that the four telecoms were main competitors in the relevant market and the promotions as a significant competition measure would exert direct influence on the final prices of the products The horizontal agreement organized by Yunnan Communications Administration on sales promotions restricted the competition capacity of telecoms and as a result eliminated the competition in the relevant market Consequently the behaviour of Yunnan Communications Administration violated article 8 20 of the AML and constituted administrative monopoly in terms of ldquoforcing undertakings to conduct monopolistic behaviour prohibited by the AMLrdquo

19 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpwwwsdpcgovcnfzgggzjgjdyfldjjszhdt201506t20150602_694802html 20 Article 8 of the AML Administrative organs and the public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 24 of 52

With respect to the penalties Yunnan DRC fined the local branch of China Tietong CNY 200000 for reaching but not implementing the agreement in regards to the other three telecoms a total fine of CNY 1298 million amounting to 2 of the sales of the relevant business in the previous year were imposed for entering into and implementing the horizontal monopolistic agreement

Analysis

The telecoms industry is still the enforcement priority of the antitrust enforcement authorities A company cannot be exempted from punishment even though it is forced by competent authorities to conduct monopoly behaviour

DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC21

Both a horizontal monopolistic agreement and a vertical monopolistic agreement were involved in this case

A total fine of CNY 14242 million was imposed on DongFeng Nissan and its distributors

Facts

In September 2015 the Guangdong Development and Reform Commission (ldquoGuangdong DRCrdquo) released an announcement regarding the administrative penalties on DongFeng Nissan and its provincial distributors for concluding price-related monopolistic agreements More specifically DongFeng Nissan was imposed a fine of CNY 1233 million for breaching article 14 of the AML in terms of restricting the resale price of certain car models 17 distributors domiciled in Guangdong were collectively fined CNY 1912 million for violating article 1322 of the AML in terms of entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements

According to the published official release the Guangdong DRC launched the investigation in August 2014 The authority discovered that from 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissan had set a rigorous restriction on its distributorsrsquo abilities to determine the resale prices of certain car models including the quoted prices in various platforms and the final resale price In addition DongFeng Nissan punished the distributors that failed to abide by such price restrictions in 2013 The authority 21 The original Chinese notice published by Guangdong DRC is available at httpwwwgddpcgovcnzwgkgzdtgzyw201509t20150910_328993html 22 Article 13 of the AML The following Monopolistic agreements among competing operators shall be prohibited (i) fix or change prices of commodities (ii) limit the outputs or sales volume of commodities (iii) segment the sales markets or the raw material purchasing markets (iv) limit the purchase of new technology new facilities or limit the development of new products new technology (v) jointly boycott transactions (vi) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-Monopoly Law enforcement Authority Monopolistic agreements in this Law refer to agreements decisions or other concerted practices that eliminate restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 25 of 52

believed that the vertical agreement concluded between DongFeng Nissan and its distributors eliminated and restricted the competition in the relevant market and damaged the consumer welfare as well which violates article 14 of the AML

Furthermore from April 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissanrsquos distributors in Guangdong province held multiple meetings to discuss issues relevant to sale price reached and implemented a horizontal monopolistic agreement in terms of fixing the prices of some car models which is prohibited by article 13 of the AML

Considering that both DongFeng Nissan and the involved distributors positively cooperated with the investigation and ceased the illegal behaviour immediately after the investigation Guangdong DRC decided to impose a fine amounting to 3 of its previous yearrsquos turnovers on DongFeng Nissan and a fine ranging from 2 to 4 on the relevant distributors in accordance with articles 4623 and 4924 of the AML

Analysis

This case demonstrates that auto and related industries are still under close attention of the authority Considering the NDRCrsquos successful series of antitrust investigations conducted throughout the auto industry it is observed that the agency currently overseeing price-related antitrust issues in China has accumulated a substantial amount of experience regarding antitrust enforcement in the auto industry Now is the right time to speed up the law-making process by amending the set of rules released earlier and drafting new laws to advise the auto industry on antitrust compliance

Enforcement by the SAIC and its local branches

Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC25

The investigation was triggered by whistle blowerrsquos submission

Cartel members were collectively fined CNY 139 million 23 Article 46 of the AML In case the operators violate the relevant provisions of this Law concluding and implementing Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall order the operators to cease such act impose fines more than 1 but less than 10 of the total turnover in the preceding year and confiscate the illegal gains where the Monopolistic agreement is not implemented a fine less than RMB 500000 can be imposed If the operators involved in Monopolistic agreement on its own initiative report information concerning the conclusion of Monopolistic agreements and provide important evidences to the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority they may be given a mitigated punishment or be exempted from punishment in accordance with the circumstances Where the industrial associations violate this Law organizing the operators in the industry to conclude Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority may impose a fine less than RMB 500000 in serious circumstances the agency of social organization administration and registration may cancel its registration 24 Article 49 of the AML As for the imposition of the fines stipulated by the Article 46 47 and 48 of this Law the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall take elements such as the nature extent and time it lasts of the illegal act into consideration in determining the specific amount of the fines 25 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201506t20150601_156889html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 26 of 52

Facts

In April 2015 the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) issued administrative penalties on several brick manufacturers for entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements This is the first case relevant to monopolistic agreements that has been publicized by the SAIC since the beginning of this year

Ten cartel members were involved in the case including one company and nine individuals Similar with most antitrust cases the investigation started as a result of a whistle blowerrsquos submission After a thorough investigation Hunan AIC found that those local brick manufacturers had reached agreements on controlling production volume and dividing sales areas in the forms of production and sales agreements plans and meeting minutes

The enforcement authority reached the conclusion that these brick manufacturers violated article 13 of the AML and imposed a total fine of CNY 1389400 on them

Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC26

The organizer of the monopolistic agreement the animation association was fined CNY 100000

The antitrust authority did not punish the members of the monopolistic agreement

Facts

In December 2015 the Guangdong Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoGuangdong AICrdquo) published its administrative punishment decision in regards to Guangzhou Panyu Animation amp Game Association (ldquoGAGArdquo) organizing member companies to conclude a monopolistic agreement

According to the decision GAGA drafted the ldquoAgreement of Exhibition Alliancerdquo (ldquoAgreementrdquo) and convened a conference with member companies in order to discuss the content and conclusion of the Agreement 52 member companies entered into the Agreement which actually requested the alliance companies to merely participate in the exhibitions either organized or supported by GAGA in Guangzhou In addition the Agreement prohibited the alliance companies from attending any other exhibition except if they obtained prior approval of GAGA

After a thorough investigation Guangdong AIC believed that the conclusion of the Agreement among GAGA and the 52 member companies violated article 13 (5) of the AML in terms of boycott GAGA who was deeply involved and restricted member companiesrsquo choice of exhibitions through the Agreement could be deemed as

26 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151208_164680html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 27 of 52

the participant and organizer of the monopolistic agreement In accordance with article 46 of the AML Guangdong AIC imposed a fine of CNY 100000 on GAGA for organizing the conclusion of the monopolistic agreement

Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC27

Hubei AIC considered the coinsurance for Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance illegal

Twelve insurance companies were fined CNY 469 million in total

Facts

In December 2015 the Hubei Administrative for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHubei AICrdquo) disclosed its punishment on 12 insurance companies for signing illegal coinsurance agreements

The disclosed punishment decision suggests that the Hubei branch of China Pacific Life Insurance (ldquothe Companyrdquo) 11 other insurance companies and Wuhan Construction Safety Technology Consultation Center (ldquoWCSTCCrdquo) signed a Coinsurance Agreement on Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance (ldquoCoinsurance Agreementrdquo) of which the main contents include

1) The Company and 11 other involved companies as the coinsurers jointly take charge of the personal accident insurance concerned with the construction project directly administered by the Wuhan government WCSTCC is responsible for providing safety professionalism and technology services regarding the relevant personal accident insurance

2) The Company as the chief insurer of the coinsurance occupies 12 of the total amount of the insurance and the other 11 companies respectively occupy 8

3) The Company as the representative of the coinsurance is in charge of collecting the premium signing the standard form insurance policies and issuing the invoice in its own name The Company should share the charged premium with the other companies in accordance with the Coinsurance Agreement

4) Both the Company and the other insurance companies should pay 25 of the actually received premium to WCSTCC as the service fee WCSTCC will assist the coinsurers in providing safety and technology management service to the insured In addition the 11 insurance companies should pay 5 of their premium to the Company as the management fee

27 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165445html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 28 of 52

5) In case an accident happens the 12 companies will jointly bear the damages based on their respective shares in the coinsurance

6) There is a contact mechanism established in the coinsurance The coinsurers will regularly hold coinsurance conferences to discuss existing problems

Furthermore the coinsurers and WCSTCC also signed a self-discipline agreement and established a complete management system to assure the implementation of the Coinsurance Agreement Any party violating the Coinsurance Agreement would be punished

Hubei AIC found that WCSTCC was solely invested by Wuhan Construction Safety Management Association which was under Wuhan Construction Commission The centre helped implement certain functions of the Wuhan Urban Construction Safety Management Station and was responsible for quality supervision and safety supervision of municipal construction projects

It later became a prerequisite for construction companies to purchase insurance from any member of the coinsurance in order to get approval to commence their project According to the decision Hubei AIC launched another separate investigation against WCSTCC

Through the investigation Hubei AIC concluded that the Coinsurance Agreement constituted a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by article 13 of the AML with the following analysis

First coinsurance as a common business model to jointly share and lower risks is widely adopted in the insurance industry A coinsurance arrangement for a specific project in order to avoid high risks faced by one insurer could be legal However coinsurance should not target the entire market In this case prior to the Coinsurance Agreement the risks of the construction projects were unpredictable since the scale of the construction projects the difficulty of the construction and the amount of construction workers could not be available It is impossible to predict the risks of the projects thus it is not necessary to cooperate with other insurers to collectively bear the risks The purpose of the 12 insurance companies to establish the coinsurance is to avoid the competition which demonstrates the Coinsurance Agreement belongs to a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by the AML

Second the companies through entering into the coinsurance agreement actually divided the relevant market of construction project personal accident insurance in Wuhan city which affected the competition in the relevant market and damaged the interests of other competitors and the consumers In particular the Construction Law as amended in 2011 stipulates that the purchase of personal accident insurance is not mandatory and the construction companies have the right to choose whether to buy the said insurance or not As mentioned purchasing insurance from the coinsurance had been the prerequisite for construction companies to obtain administration

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 29 of 52

approval for the project which seriously distorts the fair competition in the market

Citing article 46 of the AML the 12 insurance companies were collectively fined CNY 469 million including fines on the companies and confiscation of illegal gains It is noteworthy that the fines were calculated based on the companiesrsquo 2014 annual sales of the insurance product in connection with the coinsurance The Company as the chief insurer was fined amounting to 6 of its 2014 annual sales of the relevant insurance product in the coinsurance and other companies were fined amounting to 2 of relevant sales For more specific information please see the following table

Company Name (Hubei Branch)

Fines (CNY million)

Percentage of the sales

Illegal Gains (CNY

million)

China Pacific Life Insurance 00653 6 0941

Sino Life 00145 2 04332

Alltrust Insurance 00145 2 04332

Taikang Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Continent Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Pacific Property Insurance

00145 2 04332

China Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

PICC Property and Casualty 00145 2 02599

Taiping General Insurance 00145 2 013

Union Life Insurance 00145 2 01177

Ping An Annuity Insurance Company of China

00145 2 04201

Ping An Property amp Casualty Insurance Company of China

00145 2 -

Subtotal 02248 - 44679

Total 46927

Analysis

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 30 of 52

Coinsurance as an effective approach to lower risks of insurers is widely used in the insurance industry Information sharing and agreements on coinsurance were generally considered efficient and legitimate However from an antitrust perspective coinsurance may raise competition concerns depending on the circumstances of each agreement In the case that there is enough capacity for one insurer to cover the potential risks the coinsurance might be considered as entering into a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC28

The first leniency applicant was exempted from fines

The other concrete companies were imposed a fine of CNY 180000

Facts

In December 2015 the concrete companies monopolistic agreement case investigated by Hunan AIC was published on SAICrsquos website

In accordance with the antitrust enforcement announcement of SAIC this case was triggered by complaints from the Yongzhou City peoplersquos congress After the preliminary review the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) initiated the formal investigation on seven concrete companies domiciled in Yongzhou City Hunan Province which were suspected of being involved in a monopolistic agreement in terms of division of the volumes of the products

After further investigation Hunan AIC found that the seven concrete companies concluded a partnership agreement in 2011 which requested the involved companies to enter into a partnership business with assets In addition according to the partnership agreement it was planned to establish a comprehensive office to manage production marketing and distribution of the products of all the partners The seven companies intended to jointly adjust and control the output of concrete based on the partnership agreement However because there were disagreements over the allocation of the injected assets and market shares the companies did not implement the partnership agreement The agreement was cancelled in December 2012

Based on the findings Hunan AIC concluded that the seven concrete companies as competitors of each other restricted and eliminated the competition in the relevant market through reaching the partnership agreement and dividing the volumes of sales which violated article 13(3) of the AML in terms of division of sales market Considering that the agreement had not been implemented and the limited influence of the agreement according to article 46 of the AML and article 27 of the Administrative Penalties Law small amount fines were imposed on the involved companies Six companies were fined CNY 30000 each for their illegal behaviour 28 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165504html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 31 of 52

Yongzhou Shuangyuan Building Materials Co Ltd as the first one to actively report the monopolistic agreement and cooperate with the enforcement authority was exempted from the punishment

Outlook

It is expected that the AMLrsquos enforcement on monopolistic agreements will continue in the future Industries such as automobile shipping pharmaceuticals insurance etc will still remain the priority of the antitrust enforcement

The antitrust enforcement authorities have published a series of regulations in order to clarify the substantial and procedural issues relevant to the antitrust enforcement However Chinarsquos current antitrust legislation regime is still immature In the following years we expect that more attention will be paid to the legislative improvements

Another remarkable issue for cartel members is that with more Chinese enterprises attaching increasing importance to the AML the follow-on civil damages actions might become a tendency in the future

C Abuse of Market Dominance

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen a decent increase of abuse of market dominance cases both in public enforcement and private litigation Oftentimes the authorities responsible for public enforcement generally find it difficult to pursue investigations against abuse of market dominance cases The following two main reasons are often cited to explain this standoff first it is hard for the authorities to define the relevant markets and prove the undertaking(s)rsquo dominant market position through economic approaches second it is hard to collect evidence regarding abusive practices

The cases related to IPRs abuse are emerging significantly particularly in the telecommunication media and technology (ldquoTMTrdquo) sectors

The SAICrsquos latest refusal-to-deal probe against a local drug maker shows that the SAIC and its local branches have increasingly acquired a profile as an abuse of dominance regulator

Significant Cases

Cases pursued by the SAIC

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 32 of 52

Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case29

Facts

The local authority in Dongfang city reported to the Hainan provincial branch of SAIC on April 23 2014 of the suspected dominance abuse The SAIC authorized its Hainan bureau to officially investigate the matter on 25 July 2014 according to a decision dated January 9 2015 The AIC concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its market dominance by requiring users to pay a deposit without any legal basis and or justifiable reasons

In terms of the relevant product market the local authority found that in this case it was the urban water supply market in Dongfang city and its surrounding townships where Dongfang Water was the sole public operator in the local water supply market with a 100 market share which made all water users completely reliant on the companyrsquos supply In term of market access the local authority found it very unlikely that there were other operators due to the strict regulations

The Hainan SAIC then concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its dominance as it charged users a deposit by threatening to refuse to register users and also by threatening to restrict the water supply Dongfang Waters charging of deposits lacked a legal basis and hadnt received government approval to the detriment of household consumers and business water users and hampered the improvement of management and services of the company Such conduct was in breach of Chinarsquos Anti-Monopoly Law

Hainan AIC levied a fine of CNY 593208 a lighter penalty equivalent to 2 of the companyrsquos annual sales for the previous year and confiscated illicit gains of CNY 38521 for abuse of market dominance

Analysis

It is noteworthy that although handled by a local authority supervised by the SAIC the antitrust agency detailed the relevant market definition the assessment of the dominant market position the abusive practices and the scrutiny of the justifiable reasons

Although the definition of the relevant market and the reasoning of the Hainan provincial AIC and the SAIC are subject to criticism it is still applausive to see that the antitrust regulators have realized the importance of the application of rule of reason in an abuse case In addition through itrsquos a published decision practitioners may observe the regulatorsrsquo reasoning and thus transparency and legal certainty have been generated

29 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzfcfjd201502t20150212_152066html last visited on October 18 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 33 of 52

Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms30

Facts

In June 2013 the Ningxia AIC under authorization of SAIC opened an antitrust investigation into the alleged tie-in sales by the three major state-owned telecommunications operators China Tietong China Unicom and China Telecom for the tie-in sale of fixed-line telephones with broadband Internet services The Ningxia AIC found that the three companies had bundled fixed-line phone services with Internet services to subscribers

During the investigation all three telecommunications companies admitted the tie-in practice had recognized that such practice had improper influence on competition and deprived the choices of consumers The three companies promised to undertake internal rectification timely and eliminate the ill effects resulting from such practice The parties committed to taking the following corrective measures

1) Taking internal rectifications and conducting training to staff about antitrust laws and stop tie-in sales practices

2) Making public commitments to allow subscribers a free choice of services and strengthening the propaganda through the operating room call centre and other channels

3) Unbundling fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

The Ningxia AIC decided to suspend the probe on 14 May 2015 on the grounds that the three companies had actively worked together with the investigators and proposed workable remedy plans

Analysis

In the official announcement Ningxia AIC concluded that the purpose of antitrust enforcement is to restrain monopolistic conducts the protection of competition and to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of consumers Given that during the investigation process the parties had actively cooperated with the investigation formed a more profound understanding of the dangers of tying behaviour and moreover the parties proposed and implemented positive corrective measures to be able to remove the ill impact of their actions the agency believed that the purpose of antitrust law enforcement was fulfilled

It is worth noting that the Ningxia AIC also required the three companies to implement the commitment by August 30 2015and the submission of the written

30 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158908html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158906html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158910html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 34 of 52

implementation report on July 102015 and August 102015 respectively which is another illustration that an effective commitment by the undertakings shall directly deal with the effect that is brought by the monopolistic behaviour In this case the effect of the monopolistic act was restricted to the choice of the consumers therefore the commitment by the undertaking aimed at allowing the freedom of choice and the unbundling of fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company31

Facts

The Liaoning AIC imposed a fine of approximately CNY 433m on the Fushun Branch of Liaoning Tobacco Co on 1 June 2015 The agency also ordered the company to stop its illicit behaviour

The Liaoning AIC received a tip-off that the accused Liaoning Tobacco Corsquos Fushun branch was conducting tie-in sales of non-high-demand cigarette brands with high-demand cigarette brands After gaining authorization from SAIC the agency officially started an investigation regarding the companyrsquos suspected abuse of market dominance in June 2014

Analysis

According to the announcement the tobacco company argued that the tobacco industry is a state controlled or monopolized industry with a lawful monopolistic position therefore the company shall not be subject to the norms of general market competition rules or the anti-monopoly law

In this regards the agency concluded that in terms of the status of the undertaking admittedly the first paragraph of article 17 of the AML says that the State shall protect the lawful business operations of undertakings in these industries with respect to the industries which are under the control of the State-owned economic sector and have a bearing on the lifeline of the national economy or national security and the industries which exercise monopoly over the production and sale of certain commodities according to law However the second paragraph continues to say that the undertakings mentioned above shall do business according to law be honest faithful and strictly self-disciplined and subject themselves to public supervision and they shall not harm the consumers interests by taking advantage of their position of control or their monopolistic production and sale of certain commodities In particular in the preceding paragraph the ldquolawful businessrdquo and ldquoaccording to lawrdquo imply that the AML shall apply in the business operation The agency therefore believes that

31 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201508t20150813_16

0208html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 35 of 52

there shall be no exemption for the undertaking concerned the defences of the undertaking concerned is not established

Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm32

Facts

The Chongqing AIC fined Chongqing Qingyang Pharmaceutical CNY 439308 for alleged dominance abuse

The investigation was initiated when the company contacted the agency for verification on its potential breach of the AML related to an allopurinol active pharmaceuticals ingredient (API) distribution agreement with its exclusive distributor The company provided the relevant agreement and information and the agency conducted an investigation into the company and some other relevant companies

Analysis

Relevant Market

During the investigation the agency found that pharmaceutical ingredients are a special commodity the API is used to produce the preparations The chemical API is only used for the production of the preparation and could be used as a medicine for clinic use

The preparation is produced according to the requirements of certain form of prepared drugs and for the purpose of treatment and prevention which can be used as medicine

The allopurinol is used for the common treatment of hyperuricemia However the other treatments are different in pharmacological effects or treatment effects as well as in the cost for the patient Furthermore the company is the only manufacturer and supplier in the market nationwide since July 2012 Therefore the agency concluded that the relevant market is the allopurinol API market

Considering that the qualification for manufacturing the allopurinol API is national wide and the normal practice for purchasers and suppliers is domestic the relevant geographic market is the Chinese market

The Market Dominance

During the investigation the agency found that the company is the only supplier and manufacturer of allopurinol API in China there is no other competitor in the

32 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151222_16

5152html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 36 of 52

market and the company has a monopoly in the market The evidence shows that the company has the ability to control the prices the position for the downstream is relatively weak

With respect to the market entry the agency found that the market entry is relatively high in addition other undertakings are dependent on the company Thus the agency believed the company to have market dominance

Refusal to Deal

The agency found that on September 25 2015 the company reached an exclusive agreement and distribution agreement with its distributor Based on these agreements the company didnrsquot supply allopurinol API to the said distributor and other companies despite the fact that those companies requested for allopurinol API but were turned down by the company

Absence of Reasonable Cause

The agency found that the companyrsquos refusal to deal was not in line with the needs of normal business operation or economic efficiency On the other hand the refusal to deal was aimed at increasing the market share of the allopurinol drug product Also the agency found that the stop of supply was a manipulation of market power as to maximize the profit to the most The agency further found that the exclusive distribution agreement with suspension of supply for six months and the refusal to supply was to eliminate and restrict the competition as to gain the monopolistic profit

The Consequence of Refusal to Deal

The agency concluded that the refusal to deal harmed the competition of the allopurinol preparations market Because of the suspension of supply many demanders had to reduce their production or switch to the supply of other products or stop their production The suspension of supply affected the competition of the downstream market Consequently the raising of the price of allopurinol API also raised the cost for other manufacturers of allopurinol preparations

Furthermore the refusal to deal led to capacity loss of the allopurinol preparation industry

Ultimately the refusal to deal increased the burden on consumers as the refusal to supply changed the supply-demand relationship in the market

The agency concluded that the Company abused its dominant position in the allopurinol API market by refusing to deal with intended buyers in the period between October 2013 and March 2014Therefore the Company violated article 17 (1) of the AML which prohibits business operators with a dominant market position from abusing that position such as the refusal to deal without any justifications

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 37 of 52

D Administrative Monopoly

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 witnessed antitrust authoritiesrsquo significant efforts regarding the enforcement against administrative monopoly According to Mr Dong Zhiming the deputy director general of Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly Bureau ever since the AML coming into force six cases in connection with administrative monopoly were investigated by NDRC and among them five cases were handled in the year of 2015 These cases touched abuses of administrative power in terms of designative deal in relation to transportation communication and pharmaceutical industries

The first private litigation related to administrative monopolistic acts was heard in the court which is a milestone case in the enforcement of the AML

Significant Cases

Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC33

Facts

In March 2015 the NDRC released the official letter to Shandong Provincial Department of Transportation (ldquoShandong DOTrdquo) on its website with respect to correct its abuse of administrative power to exclude and restrict competition

During the investigation the NDRC found that since 2011 Shandong DOT had issued multiple relevant government orders in order to require certain types of vehicles to be directly connected to two designated information and service platforms both of which are operated and technically supported by one company namely Shandong Jiutong Internet of Things Technology Co Ltd (ldquoJiutong ITTrdquo) Furthermore according to the orders issued by the competent administrative department all the vehicle satellite positioning terminals entering into Shandong provincial market should be debugged through the said technology service platform which is operated by the mentioned company In addition Shandong DOT released the cap prices of vehicle satellite positioning terminals which is identical to the 2012 bid-winning price in the Ministry of Transportation demonstration project

The NDRC believed that Shandong DOTrsquos behaviour eliminated and restricted the competition in the monitoring platform market and the vehicle terminal market deprived the right of transportation enterprises to choose vehicle terminals and monitoring platform on their owns unreasonably raised the sales prices of vehicle terminals and service fees charged by the platform and increased the costs of transportation enterprises Therefore the antitrust agency concluded that Shandong

33 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201503t20150327_668911html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 38 of 52

DOT violated article 8 of the AML which stipulates that ldquoadministrative organs and the public organizations with an administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude and restrict competitionrdquo Specifically Shandong DOT violated article 3234 in terms of requiring organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any designated operators and violated article 3735 in terms of setting rules with contents which eliminate and restrict competition

Based on article 51 of the AML ldquoWhere administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations abuse administrative powers performing activities which exclude and restrict competition the superior entity shall order it to correct impose administrative penalty on the chief officer and other staffs directly responsible pursuant to the laws The AML enforcement authority may give recommendations on disposal of activities to the relevant superior entityrdquo the NDRC proposed in writing that the Shandong provincial government should order Shandong DOT to rectify its behaviour with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Entirely open up the monitoring platform market by permitting transportation undertakings to freely choose any approved platform

2) Loosen the restrictions on the entry into Shandong vehicle terminals permit the undertakings to independently select the supplier of vehicle terminals and allow the qualified terminals to be connected to the relevant monitoring platform and

3) Revoke the official documentation relevant to the cap price of vehicle terminals in order to promote the price competition

Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 36

Facts

On 26 August 2015 the NDRC published its second decision with regard to the rectification of administrative monopoly since the beginning of this year According to the proposal letter sent to Anhui Provincial Government the investigation against the Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City (Bengbu HFPC) was trigged by third partiesrsquo complaints

34 Article 32 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to require organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any operators designated by them 35 Article 37 of the AML Administrative organs shall not abuse their administrative powers to set rules with contents which eliminate restrict competition 36 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201508t20150826_748682html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 39 of 52

The investigation suggests that Bengbu HFPC published three notices with regard to drugs procurement in April and May of this year

In the No C-2015-CG-X-111 Notice (ldquoNo111 Noticerdquo) released on 10 April2015 the health authority not only provided the dosage form and qualification of the requested drugs but also directly determined the suppliers of relevant drugs which eliminated and restricted the competition among pharmaceutical manufacturers and therefore violated articles 32 and 37 of the AML

In the No C-2015-CG-C-112 Notice (ldquoNo112 Noticerdquo) and No C-2015-CG-C-168 (ldquoNo 168 Noticerdquo) respectively released on 10 April and 22 May 2015 the Bengbu HFPC set discriminative qualification requirements on non-local undertakings in order to restrict their participation in the relevant bidding For instance in accordance with No 112 Notice to be a qualified bidder the turnover of non-local undertakings shall exceed CNY 2 billion which is 50 times as much as the turnover requirements of the local undertakings In the NDRCrsquos opinion the administrative monopoly activities conducted by the local health agency excluded the relevant undertakings from the market maintained the virtual-high prices of drugs and therefore violated articles 3237 and 37 of the AML

The NDRC suggested in a letter that Anhui Provincial Government should urge the Bengbu HFPC to rectify the abuse of monopoly powers with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Stop setting distinguishing restrictions on qualification requirements review standards and numbers of winning bidders as for local and non-local undertakings

2) Stop designating the suppliers of competitive drugs and

3) Take necessary measures to mitigate the negative effects resulting from the previous illegal monopolistic abuses

Outlook

At the beginning of the year the former director general of the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau under the NDRC Xu Kunlin stated that the agency would strengthen antitrust enforcement on abuse of administrative power in 2015

Since then the NDRC has made great efforts to rectify unreasonable abuses of administrative power The currently disclosed two cases investigated by the NDRC re-emphasize the Chinese Governmentrsquos strict scrutiny of antitrust issues in respect of

37 Article 34 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to restrict or reject the participation of operators from other regions in local bidding activities by measures such as prescribing discriminatory qualification requirements or assessment standards or by not publishing information according to law

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 40 of 52

administrative monopoly It reminds the local governments that antitrust compliance is of significant importance

III Private Litigation

A Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen more and more private antitrust litigations

The private antitrust litigation cases have become increasingly complicated especially the issues regarding the intersection areas of IP and antitrust law

Multinational giants and State-Owned Enterprises (the ldquoSOEsrdquo) are increasingly becoming the targets in antitrust civil litigations Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (the ldquoSMEsrdquo) tend to use the antitrust litigation to achieve their commercial goals in the business context

B Significant Cases

Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)38

This is the first-ever private litigation concerning administrative monopoly since the implementation of the AML in 2008

Facts

According to the currently disclosed details the case is relevant for designated trade

The plaintiff Shenzhen Sware Technology Co Ltd (ldquoSwarerdquo) is a software company The press releases suggest that Sware Gloden Software Co Ltd (ldquoGlodenrdquo) and Shanghai Ruban Software Co Ltd (ldquoShanghai Rubanrdquo) are the three main suppliers of construction cost software and possess the major shares of the relevant market An annual provincial vocational ability contest regarding the construction cost hosted by the Guangdong Department of Education (ldquoGuangdong DOE) designated Gloden as the exclusive supplier of the relevant software

After several unsuccessful verbal and written negotiations with Guangdong DOE in April 2014 Sware filed a lawsuit against Guangdong DOE before the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquothe Courtrdquo) alleging that the administrative organ abused its administrative power and violated the AML by designating exclusive software supplier for the contest and claimed a compensation for reasonable expense amounting to CNY 10800 Yuan

The opinions of the Court 38 The story of the case is available at httpfinancesinacomcnchinadfjj20150410074621924997shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 41 of 52

The full text of the judgment has not been disclosed yet In accordance with the information available to the public the Court invoked article 32 of the AML which prohibits an administrative organ from abusing its administrative power to require or in disguised form organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use only the commodities supplied by the entities designated by them The Court concluded that Guangdong DOE failed to prove the legitimacy of the designation and therefore abused its administration power

Currently the case is in appeal before the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court

Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 39

It is the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China

In the first instance ruling Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court ruled against Sinopec holding that the Yunnan branch of Sinopecs trading company was obligated to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its dominance in the sales market of refined oil by refusing to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding without justifiable reasons

In the second instance ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors Currently the case is pending

Facts

The First Trial

The lawsuit was filed before the Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoKunming Courtrdquo) in January 2014 Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy Co Ltd (ldquoYingdingrdquo) a bio-energy manufacturer claimed that Sinopec and the Yunnan branch of Sinopec trading company (ldquoSinopec Yunnan Branchrdquo) had failed to fulfil their obligations stipulated in the Renewable Energy Law and had abused their market dominance in sales market of refined oil by refusing to trade with Yingding without justifiable reasons

Sinopec and Sinopec Yunnan Branch mainly explained four reasons for why they rejected Yingdingrsquos biofuel Firstly Yingding had failed to prove that the biofuel complied with the relevant national standard and was safe to use Secondly Yingding had failed to provide complete trading terms Thirdly the laws and regulations regarding biofuel were incomplete the authorized refined oil sales companies were 39 The details of the case are available at httpnewsxinhuanetcomfortune2014-1217c_1113680039htm httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=9e71db51-6ff6-4d2c-8af6-8eacf023ebdeampKeyWord=E4BA91E58D97E79B88E9BC8E|E4B8ADE79FB3E58C96 httpnewsxinhuanetcomenergy2015-0422c_127721575htm httpwwwnbdcomcnarticles2015-04-23911348html last visited on December 17 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 42 of 52

obligated to purchase biofuel from the biofuel manufacturers if it met certain quality standards but there was a vacancy regarding how to reach the end consumers from the sales companies

On 8 December 2014 the Kunming Intermediate Peoples Court ruled that Sinopec Yunnan Branch bore a legal obligation to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its market dominance in refined oil market by refusing without any justifiable reasons to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding The court ordered Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network within 30 days Both Yingding and Sinopec filed appeals to the Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court

The Appellate Trial

The appeal hearing was held on 22 April 2015 in Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoYunnan Courtrdquo) Sinopec submitted 23 new pieces of evidence and introduced two expert witnesses in a bid to overturn several key elements in the first-instance ruling by Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court

In terms of the determination of the relevant market and the market dominance Sinopec argued that the relevant market in this case was for adipic acid monomethyl ester (ldquoAAMErdquo) the main ingredient of a biofuel additive known as BD100 Yingdingrsquos main product is BD100 which can be blended with fossil diesel to become biofuel In the AAME market Sinopec is a potential buyer instead of a market dominator In support of this argument Sinopec presented an expert witnessmdashGong Jiong a professor of economics at Beijings University of International Business and Economics who testified that AAME should be defined as the relevant product market on the basis of an economic analysis

However Yingding insisted that the first-instance ruling was correct in naming the sales market of refined oil as the relevant market and submitted new evidence an article on Sinopecs website that claimed it had a 67 market share in Yunnan to help establish the claim that Sinopec had market dominance

Another main dispute was whether Yingdingrsquos biofuel product met national standards which would make it mandatory for Sinopec to purchase under Chinas Renewable Energy Law The law stipulates that biofuel producers must sell their products first to an authorized refined oil sales company and the sales companies are obliged to buy the fuel if it meets certain quality standards In order to test the quality Sinopec introduced the second expert witness Lin Jianmin a leading author of Chinarsquos national biofuel standard Lin Jianmin pointed out that there are currently quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology which gives Sinopec a justifiable reason not to trade with Yingding Moreover Sinopec presented some precedents in which consumers had complained about the biofuel quality and also claimed that China didnt have a sound regulatory framework to support biofuel production neither in testing nor in sales

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 43 of 52

Nevertheless to refute this point Yingding referred to an earlier test in co-operation with Sinopec in 2011 where selected buses in Kunming used biofuel blended by Sinopec using BD100 produced by Yingding

On August 13 2015 Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors and now this case is pending In the written appellate ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court did not provide any details regarding its reasoning

Key Issues of the Case

Is there any competition between Yingding and Sinopec

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case the product of Yingding is biofuel while Sinopec does not engage in the business of biofuel From this perspective Yingding and Sinopec are not competitors Thus it is not necessary and not reasonable for Sinopec to eliminate or restrict the competition from Yingding

Relevant Market

The definition of the relevant market is a prerequisite to determine whether competition exists and whether the AML is applicable In accordance with the Judicial Interpretation of Antitrust civil litigation the plaintiff shall take the responsibility to prove the defendantrsquos dominance in the relevant market Also the methods of defining the relevant market are stipulated in the Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition (ldquoGuidelinesrdquo) However both Yingding and Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court defined the relevant market as the sales market of refined oil without sufficient antitrust analysis none of the methods in the Guidelines were used Therefore the definition of the relevant market remains arguable and needs to be sufficiently analysed in the upcoming retrial

Justifiable Reasons

The abuse of market dominance includes the behaviour of refusing to trade without justifiable reasons according to the AML but in the first instance ruling justifiable reasons were not investigated by the court During the appellate trial the expert witness introduced by Sinopec claimed that there were quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology and this was a justifiable reason to refuse to trade with Yingding Even though the first instance court and the appellate court did not reason the justifiable reason it should be discussed and investigated further during the retrial

AML or Renewable Energy Law

The claims of Yingding were based on both the AML and the Renewable Energy Law (ldquoRELrdquo) and the first instance ruling referred to both the AML and the REL as

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 44 of 52

well It seems that the laws the first instance court referred to were comprehensive but in fact the reasoning was not clear and logical In the first instance ruling some disputes regarding the AML were reviewed but all the orders were not based on the AML Specifically the first instance court ordered the Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network based on the REL and dismissed the other claims That the orders were not on account of reasoning is illogical It is anticipated that during the retrial the application of the laws will be clearer

Analysis

A lot of issues have not been clearly analysed by the courts such as the relevant market and the justifiable reasons Since the case is remanded the above-mentioned issues are expected to be resolved in the retrial In addition Yingding was in a disadvantaged position compared to its first instance trial since its claims based on the AML were challenged greatly during the appellate trial In the retrial it is probable that Yingding may switch its litigation strategy and base its claims on the REL Therefore maybe more preparation regarding the REL can give Sinopec a leg up

Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)

Rijing Electric a Chinese distributor seeks CNY 5m compensation

The first hearing was on 9 June 2015 and ended without a ruling

Facts

Rijing Electric (ldquoRijingrdquo) a Shanghai-based company and a former distributor for Panasonic accused Panasonic of abusing its dominance and dividing the market through monopolistic practice in an antitrust lawsuit filed in 2014 with Shanghai No 1 Intermediate Court (ldquoShanghai Courtrdquo) claiming compensation of CNY 5m (USD 815370) Wenzhou Mingda Automation System Co and Shanghai Qingying Automation Equipment as the distributor of Panasonic in China are the co-defendants were accused of conducting monopolistic behaviours by implementing Panasonicrsquos policy

The first hearing for evidence exchange was on June 9 2015 Rijing claimed a policy allegedly introduced by Panasonic in 2009 restricted the competition between distributors Panasonic claims the policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo and has full justifiable reasons It explained that the products in question required customization at considerable cost to distributors before its sale to customers Once carried out however other distributors leaving them open to quote much lower prices than the original distributor could simply and relatively cheap replicate this customization Besides Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and that the plaintiff had failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic said its market share for the four products

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 45 of 52

under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases Also Rijing failed to challenge the policy when it was first introduced instead initially agreeing it was reasonable as e-mail evidence submitted by Panasonic suggests

Key Issues of the Case

Whether Panasonic occupied a market dominant position

It is reported that Rijing claimed that Panasonic had abused its market dominance but Rijing failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and its market share for the four products under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases

Analysis

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case Panasonicrsquos policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo rather than to eliminate or restrict competition

Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals40 (Pending)

It is a battle over patent licensing issues

It is viewed as being among the most complicated antitrust lawsuits in China

The first hearing was on 17 and 18 December 2015

Facts

Four Chinese rare earth companies Ningbo Ketian Magnet Ningbo Permanent Magnetics Ningbo Tongchuang Strong Magnet Material and Ningbo Huahui Magnetic Industry filed antitrust lawsuits against Hitachi Metals over alleged patent licensing issues regarding rare earth magnets on December 11 2014 with the Ningbo Intermediate Peoples Court (ldquoNingbo Courtrdquo) in Zhejiang province As reported four Chinese rare earth companies claimed Hitachi Metals abused its market dominance and hurt the industry competition by refusing to license the patents to them The patents in this case are used in the manufacturing of sintered neodymium iron boron (ldquoNdFeBrdquo) magnets a rare-earth magnet alloy widely used in parts for airplanes automobiles and other products

Hitachi Metals filed a challenge with the Ningbo Court over its jurisdiction in April 2015 After Ningbo Court rejected Hitachi Metals jurisdiction objection on 28 April 2015 Hitachi Metals appealed to the Zhejiang High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoZhejiang

40The details of the story are available at httpwwwzbmagcomnews_viewphpid=80 httpwwwhitachicomcnaboutpress201510-121118_ahtml last visited on December 22 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 46 of 52

Courtrdquo) but Zhejiang Court affirmed the ruling of the Ningbo Court

The first day of a two-day hearing took place on 17 December 2015 during which the two sides cross-examined each otherrsquos evidence The evidence focused on clearing up several key elements in the case including the relevant market whether Hitachi Metals has dominance on that market and whether both sides acted in good faith during the licensing negotiations

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Product Market

The four Chinese rare earth companies claimed that the relevant product market should be the NdFeb-related patent licensing market However Hitachi Metals believed that the physical NdFeb market rather than the patent licensing market should be the relevant product market which is meaningful for assess the real competitive effects on the market

Whether Hitachi Metals occupies a dominant market position

In terms of market dominance Hitachi Metals claimed it does not occupy a dominant position because Hitachi Metalsrsquo patents were not in a standard in this case and there are substitutable technologies in the market SEP holders have the obligation to license on FRAND terms but none-SEP holders do not So while a refusal to license a SEP may constitute abuse of dominance refusal to license a non-SEP mdash even by a patent holder with a dominant position mdash should not be considered as an abuse

Analysis

Hitachi Metals as a patent holder should have the right to decide whether to retain those patents or not or who to license According to the legal theory the purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage and protect innovation by conferring monopoly right mdash that is to give intellectual property owners the proprietary rights which can exclude others from using the intellectual property The SEP holders admittedly need to comply with FRAND terms which can maintain a robust balance between competition and monopoly whereas the further intervention of antitrust law into non-SEP patents may undermine the purpose of intellectual property law To which extent the antitrust law should intervene is yet to be seen

Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei41

A confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the Beijing IP court made by the Beijing High Court

41 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcncpwswbjzscq201511t20151103_12225640htm last visited on December 28 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 47 of 52

Facts

On August 2 2013 the NDRC penalized Abbott for monopolistic price-fixing and then Abbott made a price adjustment in China where the prices of main products were reduced

On December 16 2014 Tian Junwei (ldquoTianrdquo) a Chinese citizen in Beijing sued Carrefour Shuangjing Branch (ldquoCarrefourrdquo) and Abbott (Shanghai) Sales Company (ldquoAbbottrdquo) at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (ldquoIP Courtrdquo) for their monopolistic price-fixing which damaged his interests However Carrefour and Abbott challenged the jurisdiction of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court They claimed there were two reasons Firstly according to the jurisdiction rules of the IP court issued by the Supreme Court the IP court has no jurisdiction over anti-trust cases Secondly if this case is a contractual dispute the court that is in the place of Carrefour should hear it if this case is a tort dispute the Shanghai Intermediate Court should hear it

In the ruling of the IP Court the IP Court decided it has the jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases for the following reasons According to the Provisions On Causes Of Action In Civil Cases issued by Supreme Court (最高人民法院案由规定) antimonopoly dispute is a tertiary cause of action belonging to IP and competition disputes Also according to the Provisions concerning the Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京

市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问题的规定 ) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was an IP and competition dispute and was sued after November 6 2014 Thus the IP Court had jurisdiction

Both Carrefour and Abbott appealed to the Beijing High Court over the jurisdiction ruling but the Beijing High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original ruling Reasons are listed in the written ruling issued on June 18 2015 Firstly the nature of the case was an antimonopoly dispute In accordance with Provisions of the Supreme Peoples Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民

事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) and Civil Litigation Law the monopolistic civil disputes in the first instance shall be under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Peoples Courts and an action involving a contractual dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the peoples court of the place where the defendant is domiciled or where the contract is performed Carrefour as the defendant in this case is domiciled in Chaoyang District Beijing Therefore the courts of Beijing have jurisdiction over this case Secondly according to article 3 of the Notification on the Jurisdiction of Intellectual Property Courts issued by Supreme Court (关于知识产权法院案件管辖

等有关问题的通知) IP courts have jurisdiction over first-instance civil disputes arising from monopolistic practices Lastly according to Provisions concerning the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 14 of 52

Remedies

After negotiating with MOFCOM the relevant entities agreed to undertake the following obligations

1) Western Digital and HGST will remain independent in sales and brands

2) Western Digital will not change its previous business modes or force its clients to exclusively purchase hard disk drive products from Western Digital or do so in disguise

3) Western Digital will continue its pace in investing in product innovation to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

This announcement will be effective within two years from the date of issuance If Western Digital can provide sufficient evidence to prove a substantial change in the market environment the company can propose to MOFCOM to remove the relevant conditions within the two years

SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions14

MOFCOM considered the fact that the competition condition in the relevant product market has changed and removed the hold-separate restrictions on Seagate and Samsung

Seagate shall remain its business model materially and continue to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

Facts

On December 12 2011 MOFCOM made the No 11 Announcement to clear Seagate Technology LLCrsquos (ldquoSeagaterdquo) acquisition with remedies In this acquisition Seagate intended to acquire hard disk drive business of Samsung Electronics Co Ltd (ldquoSamsung HDDrdquo) As per this announcement Seagate could apply for removing the first and second remedy after this decision has been carried out for 12 months

The first remedy is to preserve Samsung HDD as an independent competitor and the second remedy asks to maintain and expand Samsung HDDrsquos production capacity within six months of issuance of the No 11 Announcement and to set reasonable production volume targets based on market supply-demand conditions

Seagate lodged an application to remove the first and second remedy in May 2015 After making assessments on the relevant parties and the competition circumstance MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate remedies

14 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151020151001144105shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 15 of 52

Competition Analysis

With respect to the current situation of the competition in the hard disk drive market MOFCOM made the following assessments

1) In the areas of portable application and corporate-level application solid-state drive has put constraint on the impact of the traditional hard disk so that the competition in the relevant market has been strengthened

2) Overcapacity problems in the conventional hard disk drive market became obvious

3) Both the layout and the major market competitors in the hard disk drive market have remained unchanged since 2012

4) Seagate and Samsung HDDrsquos market overlap in the hard disk market is quite small and Samsung HDDrsquos competition in the traditional hard disk is quite weak

Based on the above analysis MOFCOM deemed that

1) Removal of certain conditions is possible because in the portable application and corporate level application sectors competition constraint of solid-state drive on traditional hard disk drives has strengthened traditional hard disk drives are facing overcapacity which has reduced the chance of a single or more competitors causing competition restraints Seagate has limited overlap with Samsung in the hard disk business and the latter has a relatively weaker market power in the hard drive disk business

2) Removal of all imposed conditions may still restrain market competition because the traditional hard disk drive market competition conditions have not undergone a major change Seagate is still the major player in all divisions of the market and Seagate will strengthen its power after the acquisition of Samsung HDD

Remedies

After negotiating with MOFCOM Seagate agreed to undertake the following obligations

1) Seagate shall not change its business model materially or force clients to purchase hard drive disks exclusively from it

2) Seagate shall not force Tokyo Dengikagaku Kogyo China to supply magnetic heads exclusively to Seagate (or other Seagate-controlled companies) or limit the number of magnetic heads Tokyo Dengikagaku Kogyo China would supply to other hard drive disk manufacturers

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 16 of 52

3) Seagate shall continue to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

This announcement will be effective within two years from the date of issuance If Seagate can provide sufficient evidence to prove substantial change in the market environment the company can propose to MOFCOM to remove relevant conditions within the two years

FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM15

MOFCOM deems that this acquisition would induce anti-competitive influence

NXP promises to dispose its radio frequency (ldquoRFrdquo) power transistor business

As the first case approved with structural remedies after the enactment of the Provisions on Imposing Restrictive Conditions MOFCOM conducted a comprehensive evaluation of the viability competitiveness and marketability of the divested business as well as the suitability of potential buyers

Facts

On April 3 2015 NXP filed for its acquisition of Freescale NXP Semiconductor (ldquoNXPrdquo) is a NASDAQ-listed company registered in the Netherlands which engages in the design manufacturing and sale of integration circuits and discrete components

Freescale Semiconductor (ldquoFreescalerdquo) is a New York-listed company registered in Bermuda and based in the US which engages in the manufacturing and RampD of microcontroller and digital networking processors (embedded processors)

According to the agreement between NXP and Freescale after closing Freescale will become the wholly owned subsidiary of NXP On November 25 2015 MOFCOM decided to clear this acquisition with remedies

Relevant Market

As per the announcement the relevant product markets are the general microcontroller automotive power-use analog integrated circuit and RF transistor product markets in which NXP and Freescale have horizontal overlap The relevant geographical markets should be the global market

Competition Analysis

After assessing this proposed deal the agency concluded that

1) The proposed deal would boost NXPrsquos market control power in the RF

15 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151120151101196182shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 17 of 52

transistor product market because the global and Chinese RF transistor product markets share a similar structure both featuring few competitors and high concentration levels Freescale and NXP as the number one and number two players are far ahead of their rivals in the market Therefore after closing the market control power of NXP in this market would be strengthened

2) Since Freescale was the fiercest competitor of NXP the proposed deal will remove competition between them

3) The proposed deal would reduce the options for clients and increase procurement risks

In practice the wireless infrastructure suppliers as the main client of the RF transistor product tend to procure products from both NXP and Freescale to prevent them from the risk arising from relying on one supplier

4) The proposed deal may induce an adverse impact on the technology RampD and innovation

Remedies

In accordance with MOFCOMrsquos decision NXP shall follow its written commitment submitted to MOFCOM and completely divest its RF power transistor business to Beijing Jianguang Asset Management At the same time NXP shall strictly fulfil its obligations during the transition period It is worth noting that the NXPFreescale deal shall only be implemented after the divestment deal has been concluded

In addition MOFCOM requires NXP to perform relevant obligations during the transition period from the date of approval announcement until the divestment deal has been concluded NXP shall endeavour

1) not to engage in any lsquounfair trade practicesrsquo relating to the divested business

2) not to implement any acts which may have a significant adverse impact on the value management or competitiveness of the divested business or any acts which may change the nature and scope industry or business strategy or investment policy of the divested business and to take reasonable measures to encourage core employees to stay in the divested business as well as not to seek or transfer employees to NXPrsquos non-divested business

3) to ensure supply to the divested business in a fair reasonable and non-discriminatory manner and

4) to maintain the independence of the divested business and not to exchange competitively sensitive information between the parties and the divested

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 18 of 52

business

B Monopolistic Agreements

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

With respect to the enforcement activities of the NDRC in light of the numbers of the published cases it seems that the law enforcement frequency of the NDRC regarding monopolistic agreements in 2015 is lower in comparison with 2014

The reason behind might be that the outstanding issue of human resource deficit of the antitrust authority still exists Besides the fact that more enterprises gradually attach increasing importance to the antitrust compliance might be another reason for the decrease in the number of cases investigated by the authorities

As to the enforcement activities of the SAIC 4 of 14 cases concluded by the SAIC and its local branches in 2015 are relevant to monopolistic agreements Meanwhile these four cases concern horizontal monopolistic agreements

It is noteworthy however that the Mercedes-Benz case and the Dongfeng Nissan case suggest that vertical agreements especially involving price-related restrictions on the downstream dealers is still the priority of antitrust enforcement Companies shall be very cautious when imposing restrictions on the resale prices or the minimum resale prices of commodities in the distribution agreements

Automobile industry and related industries are observed to be under continuous attention of Chinarsquos antitrust authorities

The industries relating to peoplersquos livelihoods remain to be the enforcement priority

Significant Cases

Enforcement by the NDRC and its local branches

Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC16

The investigation was triggered by a leniency application

The first leniency applicant was exempted from punishment

Eight ocean shipping companies involved were imposed a collective fine of CNY 4067 million

NDRC spent approximately 12 months to investigate and conclude the case 16 NDRCrsquos press release of the case is available at httpjjsndrcgovcngzdt201512t20151228_769084html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 19 of 52

Facts

In December 2015 the NDRC published its official punishment decisions regarding the cartel case in connection with eight ocean shipping companies namely Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha (ldquoNYKrdquo) Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha (ldquoK Linerdquo) Mitsui OSK Lines EUKOR Car Carriers Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics Compantildeiacutea Sud Americana de Vapores Eastern Car Liner and Compantildeiacutea Chilena de Navegacioacuten Interoceaacutenica

According to the official press release of the NDRC the investigation was triggered by a leniency application of NYK The evidence showed that the eight companies reached consensus on non-intrusion of each others existing business to maintain or increase shipping fees when shipping goods such as cars trucks and engineering machinery in the routes between China and other countries and regions

They were also found to frequently conduct bilateral or multilateral communications on the shippersrsquo invitation for bids andor price inquiries via phone conferences dinner parties e-mails visiting etc In addition they also conducted illegal behaviour such as sensitive information exchange price negotiations bidding intention discussion dividing clients and shipping routes reaching agreements on high price bids or non-bidding in order to help certain companies gain shipping orders

To avoid the regulation of the antitrust authority the relevant shipping companies adopted various illicit measures that showed their apparent intention to violate the AML The cartel lasted for at least four years and covered a broad range of shipping routes concerned with the import and export of products between China and other regions such as North America EU South America and so on involving multiple auto brands and engineering machinery brands

The NDRC held the opinion that the eight companies conducts had restricted and eliminated competition in the relevant market raising the international shipping fees and impairing interests of shippers and end consumers The eight companies breached the AML by reaching and implementing monopolistic agreements on fixing prices and dividing the market

All eight investigated companies put forward remedy measures including enhancing the antitrust compliance program arranging more antitrust compliance trainings and developing antitrust compliance technologies

The NDRC imposed fines based on the nature level and duration of their monopolistic volations as well as their respective sales of international freight service sales relevant to the Chinese market The companies involved were collectively fined CNY 4067 million

NYK as the first cartel member voluntarily reporting the illegal conducts to the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 20 of 52

authority and providing significant evidence was entirely exempted from the punishment K Line as the second leniency applicant was imposed a fine amounting to 4 of its 2014 annual sales of international freight services relevant to Chinarsquos import and export market The details of punishments imposed on the involved companies by the NDRC are as follow

Company Name Amount of Fines (RMB million)

Percentage of the Relevant Turnovers

Grounds

Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha

- - First leniency applicant

Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha

2398 4 Second leniency applicant

Mitsui OSK Lines 3812 7 Third leniency applicant

EUKOR Car Carriers 284 9 Lasted over a long period involved many brands and many violations violations were severe

Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics

4506 8 Lasted over a long period involved many brands and many violations violations were severe

Compantildeiacutea Sud Americana de Vapores

308 6 Lasted over a long period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Eastern Car Liner 1127 5 Lasted over a long period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Compantildeiacutea Chilena de 120 4 Lasted over a long

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 21 of 52

Navegacioacuten Interoceaacutenica

period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Total 4067

Analysis

In this case the agency applied the AML instead of the Tenders and Bids Law to collusive bidding Citing article 13 (3) of the AML the NDRC identified that the collusive bidding constituted a division of the sales market

The leading three leniency applicants were granted exemption from fines to a varying degree

According to the official who handled this case dawn raids performed by antitrust enforcement agencies in other jurisdictions drew the attention of the NDRC on the cartels of these shipping companies However there was limited effective evidence to prove that the companies had reached monopolistic agreements Through pressuring the involved parties three members of the shipping cartel actively confessed their illegal conduct This case once again stresses the significance of international cooperation between antitrust enforcement agencies

Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau17

The distribution agreements between Mercedes-Benz and its dealers are determined as vertical monopolistic agreement and Mercedes-Benz violated article 14 of the AML because it restricted the ability of its dealers to decide their own resale prices

Mercedes-Benzrsquos dealers violated article of 13 of the AML due to concluding a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Mercedes-Benz and its dealers were jointly fined CNY 3578 million

Facts

In April 2015 Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau which is the provincial branch of the NDRC released the punishment on its website and announced that it had imposed a fine of CNY 350 million on Mercedes-Benz along with the aggregated fine of CNY 787 million on its dealers The fine came as a result of Mercedes-Benz reaching and implementing resale price maintenance (ldquoRPMrdquo) agreements with dealers to fix the minimum resale price of several car models as well as certain auto parts 17 The original Chinese notice published by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau is available at httpwwwjswjjgovcnoffice_neweo_comm_zxnrxsphp

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 22 of 52

According to the decision the authority found that Mercedes-Benz fixed the minimum resale price of Class E and Class S cars in Nanjing Wuxi Changzhou and Suzhou markets through telephoneverbal communication and dealers meetings from January 2013 to July 2014 Since 2010 Mercedes-Benz had reached agreements with dealers in Jiangsu province to fix the minimum resale prices for auto parts by providing different levels of discounts for insured cars cars involving expired warranty periods and cars within the warranty period

In addition Mercedes-Benz implemented the minimum resale price maintaining agreement by

1) Tightening its monitoring measures on the dealers such as inspecting deals and their sale incentive system on a weekly basis

2) Tracking the sales process flow of cars and increasing the intensity of this assessment

3) Giving warnings and reducing support ndash for example halting the supply of bestselling cars and prohibiting the opening of new stores ndash to dealers if dealers refused to cooperate with the price-fixing related policies and measures and

4) Interviewing personnel of the dealers and requesting terminations if the staff engaged in serious violations of the RPM agreement

Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau concluded that Mercedes-Benz had excluded and eliminated market competition harmed consumer welfare and consequently violated article 1418 of the AML The authority therefore imposed a fine of CNY 350 million representing 7 of the sale revenue of the previous year in the relevant market against Mercedes-Benz and imposed a fine on the dealers amounting to an equivalence of 1 of the annual sales in the previous year

Analysis

Although the agency also addressed the horizontal violation among the dealers in this case the administrative penalty decision mainly focuses on the vertical violation The agency fined dealers involved in the RPM agreement a combined CNY 787 million equal to 1 of the previous-year sales which suggests that the agency decided to give lighter punishments to dealers who took initiative in reporting the activity and provided evidence

The Mercedes-Benz case is the third case where the agency successfully 18 Article 14 of the AML The following monopolistic agreements between operators and trading partners shall be prohibited (i) fixing the resale prices of commodities to third persons (ii) restricting the minimum resale prices of commodities to third persons (iii) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement Authority under the State Council

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 23 of 52

discovered both vertical and horizontal agreements in a case following the Audi case and the Chrysler case All these cases are rooted in the same industry indicating that industrial features play a large role in raising anti-trust concerns In fact it appears that the entire automotive industry is under antitrust scrutiny

Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC19

This case involved both a horizontal agreement and an administrative monopoly

A total fine of CNY 1318 million was imposed on the involved companies

Facts

In June 2015 the NDRC through its website announced the decision made by its regional branch -Yunnan Provincial Development and Reform Commission (ldquoYunnan DRCrdquo) regarding the horizontal monopolistic agreement case involving Yunnan Communications Administration and local subsidiaries of four state-owned telecommunication companies

Through the investigation Yunnan DRC found that Yunnan Communications Administration as a competent government agency had organized several meetings involving Yunnan branches of four state-owned telecoms - China Mobile China Telecom China Unicom and China Tietong in August and September of 2014 At the end of 2009 the four local branches entered into an agreement to regulate their sales promotions in terms of limiting the promotional items amount and frequency

Furthermore the agreement provides certain measures to ensure the implementation of relevant restrictions on promotions Specifically in case any cartel member violates the agreement the others could file complaints with Yunnan Communications Administration and the agency would then issue a rectification notice to the rule-breaker

Yunnan DRC stated that the four telecoms were main competitors in the relevant market and the promotions as a significant competition measure would exert direct influence on the final prices of the products The horizontal agreement organized by Yunnan Communications Administration on sales promotions restricted the competition capacity of telecoms and as a result eliminated the competition in the relevant market Consequently the behaviour of Yunnan Communications Administration violated article 8 20 of the AML and constituted administrative monopoly in terms of ldquoforcing undertakings to conduct monopolistic behaviour prohibited by the AMLrdquo

19 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpwwwsdpcgovcnfzgggzjgjdyfldjjszhdt201506t20150602_694802html 20 Article 8 of the AML Administrative organs and the public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 24 of 52

With respect to the penalties Yunnan DRC fined the local branch of China Tietong CNY 200000 for reaching but not implementing the agreement in regards to the other three telecoms a total fine of CNY 1298 million amounting to 2 of the sales of the relevant business in the previous year were imposed for entering into and implementing the horizontal monopolistic agreement

Analysis

The telecoms industry is still the enforcement priority of the antitrust enforcement authorities A company cannot be exempted from punishment even though it is forced by competent authorities to conduct monopoly behaviour

DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC21

Both a horizontal monopolistic agreement and a vertical monopolistic agreement were involved in this case

A total fine of CNY 14242 million was imposed on DongFeng Nissan and its distributors

Facts

In September 2015 the Guangdong Development and Reform Commission (ldquoGuangdong DRCrdquo) released an announcement regarding the administrative penalties on DongFeng Nissan and its provincial distributors for concluding price-related monopolistic agreements More specifically DongFeng Nissan was imposed a fine of CNY 1233 million for breaching article 14 of the AML in terms of restricting the resale price of certain car models 17 distributors domiciled in Guangdong were collectively fined CNY 1912 million for violating article 1322 of the AML in terms of entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements

According to the published official release the Guangdong DRC launched the investigation in August 2014 The authority discovered that from 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissan had set a rigorous restriction on its distributorsrsquo abilities to determine the resale prices of certain car models including the quoted prices in various platforms and the final resale price In addition DongFeng Nissan punished the distributors that failed to abide by such price restrictions in 2013 The authority 21 The original Chinese notice published by Guangdong DRC is available at httpwwwgddpcgovcnzwgkgzdtgzyw201509t20150910_328993html 22 Article 13 of the AML The following Monopolistic agreements among competing operators shall be prohibited (i) fix or change prices of commodities (ii) limit the outputs or sales volume of commodities (iii) segment the sales markets or the raw material purchasing markets (iv) limit the purchase of new technology new facilities or limit the development of new products new technology (v) jointly boycott transactions (vi) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-Monopoly Law enforcement Authority Monopolistic agreements in this Law refer to agreements decisions or other concerted practices that eliminate restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 25 of 52

believed that the vertical agreement concluded between DongFeng Nissan and its distributors eliminated and restricted the competition in the relevant market and damaged the consumer welfare as well which violates article 14 of the AML

Furthermore from April 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissanrsquos distributors in Guangdong province held multiple meetings to discuss issues relevant to sale price reached and implemented a horizontal monopolistic agreement in terms of fixing the prices of some car models which is prohibited by article 13 of the AML

Considering that both DongFeng Nissan and the involved distributors positively cooperated with the investigation and ceased the illegal behaviour immediately after the investigation Guangdong DRC decided to impose a fine amounting to 3 of its previous yearrsquos turnovers on DongFeng Nissan and a fine ranging from 2 to 4 on the relevant distributors in accordance with articles 4623 and 4924 of the AML

Analysis

This case demonstrates that auto and related industries are still under close attention of the authority Considering the NDRCrsquos successful series of antitrust investigations conducted throughout the auto industry it is observed that the agency currently overseeing price-related antitrust issues in China has accumulated a substantial amount of experience regarding antitrust enforcement in the auto industry Now is the right time to speed up the law-making process by amending the set of rules released earlier and drafting new laws to advise the auto industry on antitrust compliance

Enforcement by the SAIC and its local branches

Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC25

The investigation was triggered by whistle blowerrsquos submission

Cartel members were collectively fined CNY 139 million 23 Article 46 of the AML In case the operators violate the relevant provisions of this Law concluding and implementing Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall order the operators to cease such act impose fines more than 1 but less than 10 of the total turnover in the preceding year and confiscate the illegal gains where the Monopolistic agreement is not implemented a fine less than RMB 500000 can be imposed If the operators involved in Monopolistic agreement on its own initiative report information concerning the conclusion of Monopolistic agreements and provide important evidences to the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority they may be given a mitigated punishment or be exempted from punishment in accordance with the circumstances Where the industrial associations violate this Law organizing the operators in the industry to conclude Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority may impose a fine less than RMB 500000 in serious circumstances the agency of social organization administration and registration may cancel its registration 24 Article 49 of the AML As for the imposition of the fines stipulated by the Article 46 47 and 48 of this Law the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall take elements such as the nature extent and time it lasts of the illegal act into consideration in determining the specific amount of the fines 25 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201506t20150601_156889html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 26 of 52

Facts

In April 2015 the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) issued administrative penalties on several brick manufacturers for entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements This is the first case relevant to monopolistic agreements that has been publicized by the SAIC since the beginning of this year

Ten cartel members were involved in the case including one company and nine individuals Similar with most antitrust cases the investigation started as a result of a whistle blowerrsquos submission After a thorough investigation Hunan AIC found that those local brick manufacturers had reached agreements on controlling production volume and dividing sales areas in the forms of production and sales agreements plans and meeting minutes

The enforcement authority reached the conclusion that these brick manufacturers violated article 13 of the AML and imposed a total fine of CNY 1389400 on them

Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC26

The organizer of the monopolistic agreement the animation association was fined CNY 100000

The antitrust authority did not punish the members of the monopolistic agreement

Facts

In December 2015 the Guangdong Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoGuangdong AICrdquo) published its administrative punishment decision in regards to Guangzhou Panyu Animation amp Game Association (ldquoGAGArdquo) organizing member companies to conclude a monopolistic agreement

According to the decision GAGA drafted the ldquoAgreement of Exhibition Alliancerdquo (ldquoAgreementrdquo) and convened a conference with member companies in order to discuss the content and conclusion of the Agreement 52 member companies entered into the Agreement which actually requested the alliance companies to merely participate in the exhibitions either organized or supported by GAGA in Guangzhou In addition the Agreement prohibited the alliance companies from attending any other exhibition except if they obtained prior approval of GAGA

After a thorough investigation Guangdong AIC believed that the conclusion of the Agreement among GAGA and the 52 member companies violated article 13 (5) of the AML in terms of boycott GAGA who was deeply involved and restricted member companiesrsquo choice of exhibitions through the Agreement could be deemed as

26 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151208_164680html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 27 of 52

the participant and organizer of the monopolistic agreement In accordance with article 46 of the AML Guangdong AIC imposed a fine of CNY 100000 on GAGA for organizing the conclusion of the monopolistic agreement

Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC27

Hubei AIC considered the coinsurance for Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance illegal

Twelve insurance companies were fined CNY 469 million in total

Facts

In December 2015 the Hubei Administrative for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHubei AICrdquo) disclosed its punishment on 12 insurance companies for signing illegal coinsurance agreements

The disclosed punishment decision suggests that the Hubei branch of China Pacific Life Insurance (ldquothe Companyrdquo) 11 other insurance companies and Wuhan Construction Safety Technology Consultation Center (ldquoWCSTCCrdquo) signed a Coinsurance Agreement on Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance (ldquoCoinsurance Agreementrdquo) of which the main contents include

1) The Company and 11 other involved companies as the coinsurers jointly take charge of the personal accident insurance concerned with the construction project directly administered by the Wuhan government WCSTCC is responsible for providing safety professionalism and technology services regarding the relevant personal accident insurance

2) The Company as the chief insurer of the coinsurance occupies 12 of the total amount of the insurance and the other 11 companies respectively occupy 8

3) The Company as the representative of the coinsurance is in charge of collecting the premium signing the standard form insurance policies and issuing the invoice in its own name The Company should share the charged premium with the other companies in accordance with the Coinsurance Agreement

4) Both the Company and the other insurance companies should pay 25 of the actually received premium to WCSTCC as the service fee WCSTCC will assist the coinsurers in providing safety and technology management service to the insured In addition the 11 insurance companies should pay 5 of their premium to the Company as the management fee

27 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165445html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 28 of 52

5) In case an accident happens the 12 companies will jointly bear the damages based on their respective shares in the coinsurance

6) There is a contact mechanism established in the coinsurance The coinsurers will regularly hold coinsurance conferences to discuss existing problems

Furthermore the coinsurers and WCSTCC also signed a self-discipline agreement and established a complete management system to assure the implementation of the Coinsurance Agreement Any party violating the Coinsurance Agreement would be punished

Hubei AIC found that WCSTCC was solely invested by Wuhan Construction Safety Management Association which was under Wuhan Construction Commission The centre helped implement certain functions of the Wuhan Urban Construction Safety Management Station and was responsible for quality supervision and safety supervision of municipal construction projects

It later became a prerequisite for construction companies to purchase insurance from any member of the coinsurance in order to get approval to commence their project According to the decision Hubei AIC launched another separate investigation against WCSTCC

Through the investigation Hubei AIC concluded that the Coinsurance Agreement constituted a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by article 13 of the AML with the following analysis

First coinsurance as a common business model to jointly share and lower risks is widely adopted in the insurance industry A coinsurance arrangement for a specific project in order to avoid high risks faced by one insurer could be legal However coinsurance should not target the entire market In this case prior to the Coinsurance Agreement the risks of the construction projects were unpredictable since the scale of the construction projects the difficulty of the construction and the amount of construction workers could not be available It is impossible to predict the risks of the projects thus it is not necessary to cooperate with other insurers to collectively bear the risks The purpose of the 12 insurance companies to establish the coinsurance is to avoid the competition which demonstrates the Coinsurance Agreement belongs to a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by the AML

Second the companies through entering into the coinsurance agreement actually divided the relevant market of construction project personal accident insurance in Wuhan city which affected the competition in the relevant market and damaged the interests of other competitors and the consumers In particular the Construction Law as amended in 2011 stipulates that the purchase of personal accident insurance is not mandatory and the construction companies have the right to choose whether to buy the said insurance or not As mentioned purchasing insurance from the coinsurance had been the prerequisite for construction companies to obtain administration

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 29 of 52

approval for the project which seriously distorts the fair competition in the market

Citing article 46 of the AML the 12 insurance companies were collectively fined CNY 469 million including fines on the companies and confiscation of illegal gains It is noteworthy that the fines were calculated based on the companiesrsquo 2014 annual sales of the insurance product in connection with the coinsurance The Company as the chief insurer was fined amounting to 6 of its 2014 annual sales of the relevant insurance product in the coinsurance and other companies were fined amounting to 2 of relevant sales For more specific information please see the following table

Company Name (Hubei Branch)

Fines (CNY million)

Percentage of the sales

Illegal Gains (CNY

million)

China Pacific Life Insurance 00653 6 0941

Sino Life 00145 2 04332

Alltrust Insurance 00145 2 04332

Taikang Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Continent Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Pacific Property Insurance

00145 2 04332

China Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

PICC Property and Casualty 00145 2 02599

Taiping General Insurance 00145 2 013

Union Life Insurance 00145 2 01177

Ping An Annuity Insurance Company of China

00145 2 04201

Ping An Property amp Casualty Insurance Company of China

00145 2 -

Subtotal 02248 - 44679

Total 46927

Analysis

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 30 of 52

Coinsurance as an effective approach to lower risks of insurers is widely used in the insurance industry Information sharing and agreements on coinsurance were generally considered efficient and legitimate However from an antitrust perspective coinsurance may raise competition concerns depending on the circumstances of each agreement In the case that there is enough capacity for one insurer to cover the potential risks the coinsurance might be considered as entering into a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC28

The first leniency applicant was exempted from fines

The other concrete companies were imposed a fine of CNY 180000

Facts

In December 2015 the concrete companies monopolistic agreement case investigated by Hunan AIC was published on SAICrsquos website

In accordance with the antitrust enforcement announcement of SAIC this case was triggered by complaints from the Yongzhou City peoplersquos congress After the preliminary review the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) initiated the formal investigation on seven concrete companies domiciled in Yongzhou City Hunan Province which were suspected of being involved in a monopolistic agreement in terms of division of the volumes of the products

After further investigation Hunan AIC found that the seven concrete companies concluded a partnership agreement in 2011 which requested the involved companies to enter into a partnership business with assets In addition according to the partnership agreement it was planned to establish a comprehensive office to manage production marketing and distribution of the products of all the partners The seven companies intended to jointly adjust and control the output of concrete based on the partnership agreement However because there were disagreements over the allocation of the injected assets and market shares the companies did not implement the partnership agreement The agreement was cancelled in December 2012

Based on the findings Hunan AIC concluded that the seven concrete companies as competitors of each other restricted and eliminated the competition in the relevant market through reaching the partnership agreement and dividing the volumes of sales which violated article 13(3) of the AML in terms of division of sales market Considering that the agreement had not been implemented and the limited influence of the agreement according to article 46 of the AML and article 27 of the Administrative Penalties Law small amount fines were imposed on the involved companies Six companies were fined CNY 30000 each for their illegal behaviour 28 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165504html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 31 of 52

Yongzhou Shuangyuan Building Materials Co Ltd as the first one to actively report the monopolistic agreement and cooperate with the enforcement authority was exempted from the punishment

Outlook

It is expected that the AMLrsquos enforcement on monopolistic agreements will continue in the future Industries such as automobile shipping pharmaceuticals insurance etc will still remain the priority of the antitrust enforcement

The antitrust enforcement authorities have published a series of regulations in order to clarify the substantial and procedural issues relevant to the antitrust enforcement However Chinarsquos current antitrust legislation regime is still immature In the following years we expect that more attention will be paid to the legislative improvements

Another remarkable issue for cartel members is that with more Chinese enterprises attaching increasing importance to the AML the follow-on civil damages actions might become a tendency in the future

C Abuse of Market Dominance

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen a decent increase of abuse of market dominance cases both in public enforcement and private litigation Oftentimes the authorities responsible for public enforcement generally find it difficult to pursue investigations against abuse of market dominance cases The following two main reasons are often cited to explain this standoff first it is hard for the authorities to define the relevant markets and prove the undertaking(s)rsquo dominant market position through economic approaches second it is hard to collect evidence regarding abusive practices

The cases related to IPRs abuse are emerging significantly particularly in the telecommunication media and technology (ldquoTMTrdquo) sectors

The SAICrsquos latest refusal-to-deal probe against a local drug maker shows that the SAIC and its local branches have increasingly acquired a profile as an abuse of dominance regulator

Significant Cases

Cases pursued by the SAIC

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 32 of 52

Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case29

Facts

The local authority in Dongfang city reported to the Hainan provincial branch of SAIC on April 23 2014 of the suspected dominance abuse The SAIC authorized its Hainan bureau to officially investigate the matter on 25 July 2014 according to a decision dated January 9 2015 The AIC concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its market dominance by requiring users to pay a deposit without any legal basis and or justifiable reasons

In terms of the relevant product market the local authority found that in this case it was the urban water supply market in Dongfang city and its surrounding townships where Dongfang Water was the sole public operator in the local water supply market with a 100 market share which made all water users completely reliant on the companyrsquos supply In term of market access the local authority found it very unlikely that there were other operators due to the strict regulations

The Hainan SAIC then concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its dominance as it charged users a deposit by threatening to refuse to register users and also by threatening to restrict the water supply Dongfang Waters charging of deposits lacked a legal basis and hadnt received government approval to the detriment of household consumers and business water users and hampered the improvement of management and services of the company Such conduct was in breach of Chinarsquos Anti-Monopoly Law

Hainan AIC levied a fine of CNY 593208 a lighter penalty equivalent to 2 of the companyrsquos annual sales for the previous year and confiscated illicit gains of CNY 38521 for abuse of market dominance

Analysis

It is noteworthy that although handled by a local authority supervised by the SAIC the antitrust agency detailed the relevant market definition the assessment of the dominant market position the abusive practices and the scrutiny of the justifiable reasons

Although the definition of the relevant market and the reasoning of the Hainan provincial AIC and the SAIC are subject to criticism it is still applausive to see that the antitrust regulators have realized the importance of the application of rule of reason in an abuse case In addition through itrsquos a published decision practitioners may observe the regulatorsrsquo reasoning and thus transparency and legal certainty have been generated

29 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzfcfjd201502t20150212_152066html last visited on October 18 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 33 of 52

Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms30

Facts

In June 2013 the Ningxia AIC under authorization of SAIC opened an antitrust investigation into the alleged tie-in sales by the three major state-owned telecommunications operators China Tietong China Unicom and China Telecom for the tie-in sale of fixed-line telephones with broadband Internet services The Ningxia AIC found that the three companies had bundled fixed-line phone services with Internet services to subscribers

During the investigation all three telecommunications companies admitted the tie-in practice had recognized that such practice had improper influence on competition and deprived the choices of consumers The three companies promised to undertake internal rectification timely and eliminate the ill effects resulting from such practice The parties committed to taking the following corrective measures

1) Taking internal rectifications and conducting training to staff about antitrust laws and stop tie-in sales practices

2) Making public commitments to allow subscribers a free choice of services and strengthening the propaganda through the operating room call centre and other channels

3) Unbundling fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

The Ningxia AIC decided to suspend the probe on 14 May 2015 on the grounds that the three companies had actively worked together with the investigators and proposed workable remedy plans

Analysis

In the official announcement Ningxia AIC concluded that the purpose of antitrust enforcement is to restrain monopolistic conducts the protection of competition and to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of consumers Given that during the investigation process the parties had actively cooperated with the investigation formed a more profound understanding of the dangers of tying behaviour and moreover the parties proposed and implemented positive corrective measures to be able to remove the ill impact of their actions the agency believed that the purpose of antitrust law enforcement was fulfilled

It is worth noting that the Ningxia AIC also required the three companies to implement the commitment by August 30 2015and the submission of the written

30 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158908html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158906html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158910html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 34 of 52

implementation report on July 102015 and August 102015 respectively which is another illustration that an effective commitment by the undertakings shall directly deal with the effect that is brought by the monopolistic behaviour In this case the effect of the monopolistic act was restricted to the choice of the consumers therefore the commitment by the undertaking aimed at allowing the freedom of choice and the unbundling of fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company31

Facts

The Liaoning AIC imposed a fine of approximately CNY 433m on the Fushun Branch of Liaoning Tobacco Co on 1 June 2015 The agency also ordered the company to stop its illicit behaviour

The Liaoning AIC received a tip-off that the accused Liaoning Tobacco Corsquos Fushun branch was conducting tie-in sales of non-high-demand cigarette brands with high-demand cigarette brands After gaining authorization from SAIC the agency officially started an investigation regarding the companyrsquos suspected abuse of market dominance in June 2014

Analysis

According to the announcement the tobacco company argued that the tobacco industry is a state controlled or monopolized industry with a lawful monopolistic position therefore the company shall not be subject to the norms of general market competition rules or the anti-monopoly law

In this regards the agency concluded that in terms of the status of the undertaking admittedly the first paragraph of article 17 of the AML says that the State shall protect the lawful business operations of undertakings in these industries with respect to the industries which are under the control of the State-owned economic sector and have a bearing on the lifeline of the national economy or national security and the industries which exercise monopoly over the production and sale of certain commodities according to law However the second paragraph continues to say that the undertakings mentioned above shall do business according to law be honest faithful and strictly self-disciplined and subject themselves to public supervision and they shall not harm the consumers interests by taking advantage of their position of control or their monopolistic production and sale of certain commodities In particular in the preceding paragraph the ldquolawful businessrdquo and ldquoaccording to lawrdquo imply that the AML shall apply in the business operation The agency therefore believes that

31 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201508t20150813_16

0208html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 35 of 52

there shall be no exemption for the undertaking concerned the defences of the undertaking concerned is not established

Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm32

Facts

The Chongqing AIC fined Chongqing Qingyang Pharmaceutical CNY 439308 for alleged dominance abuse

The investigation was initiated when the company contacted the agency for verification on its potential breach of the AML related to an allopurinol active pharmaceuticals ingredient (API) distribution agreement with its exclusive distributor The company provided the relevant agreement and information and the agency conducted an investigation into the company and some other relevant companies

Analysis

Relevant Market

During the investigation the agency found that pharmaceutical ingredients are a special commodity the API is used to produce the preparations The chemical API is only used for the production of the preparation and could be used as a medicine for clinic use

The preparation is produced according to the requirements of certain form of prepared drugs and for the purpose of treatment and prevention which can be used as medicine

The allopurinol is used for the common treatment of hyperuricemia However the other treatments are different in pharmacological effects or treatment effects as well as in the cost for the patient Furthermore the company is the only manufacturer and supplier in the market nationwide since July 2012 Therefore the agency concluded that the relevant market is the allopurinol API market

Considering that the qualification for manufacturing the allopurinol API is national wide and the normal practice for purchasers and suppliers is domestic the relevant geographic market is the Chinese market

The Market Dominance

During the investigation the agency found that the company is the only supplier and manufacturer of allopurinol API in China there is no other competitor in the

32 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151222_16

5152html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 36 of 52

market and the company has a monopoly in the market The evidence shows that the company has the ability to control the prices the position for the downstream is relatively weak

With respect to the market entry the agency found that the market entry is relatively high in addition other undertakings are dependent on the company Thus the agency believed the company to have market dominance

Refusal to Deal

The agency found that on September 25 2015 the company reached an exclusive agreement and distribution agreement with its distributor Based on these agreements the company didnrsquot supply allopurinol API to the said distributor and other companies despite the fact that those companies requested for allopurinol API but were turned down by the company

Absence of Reasonable Cause

The agency found that the companyrsquos refusal to deal was not in line with the needs of normal business operation or economic efficiency On the other hand the refusal to deal was aimed at increasing the market share of the allopurinol drug product Also the agency found that the stop of supply was a manipulation of market power as to maximize the profit to the most The agency further found that the exclusive distribution agreement with suspension of supply for six months and the refusal to supply was to eliminate and restrict the competition as to gain the monopolistic profit

The Consequence of Refusal to Deal

The agency concluded that the refusal to deal harmed the competition of the allopurinol preparations market Because of the suspension of supply many demanders had to reduce their production or switch to the supply of other products or stop their production The suspension of supply affected the competition of the downstream market Consequently the raising of the price of allopurinol API also raised the cost for other manufacturers of allopurinol preparations

Furthermore the refusal to deal led to capacity loss of the allopurinol preparation industry

Ultimately the refusal to deal increased the burden on consumers as the refusal to supply changed the supply-demand relationship in the market

The agency concluded that the Company abused its dominant position in the allopurinol API market by refusing to deal with intended buyers in the period between October 2013 and March 2014Therefore the Company violated article 17 (1) of the AML which prohibits business operators with a dominant market position from abusing that position such as the refusal to deal without any justifications

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 37 of 52

D Administrative Monopoly

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 witnessed antitrust authoritiesrsquo significant efforts regarding the enforcement against administrative monopoly According to Mr Dong Zhiming the deputy director general of Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly Bureau ever since the AML coming into force six cases in connection with administrative monopoly were investigated by NDRC and among them five cases were handled in the year of 2015 These cases touched abuses of administrative power in terms of designative deal in relation to transportation communication and pharmaceutical industries

The first private litigation related to administrative monopolistic acts was heard in the court which is a milestone case in the enforcement of the AML

Significant Cases

Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC33

Facts

In March 2015 the NDRC released the official letter to Shandong Provincial Department of Transportation (ldquoShandong DOTrdquo) on its website with respect to correct its abuse of administrative power to exclude and restrict competition

During the investigation the NDRC found that since 2011 Shandong DOT had issued multiple relevant government orders in order to require certain types of vehicles to be directly connected to two designated information and service platforms both of which are operated and technically supported by one company namely Shandong Jiutong Internet of Things Technology Co Ltd (ldquoJiutong ITTrdquo) Furthermore according to the orders issued by the competent administrative department all the vehicle satellite positioning terminals entering into Shandong provincial market should be debugged through the said technology service platform which is operated by the mentioned company In addition Shandong DOT released the cap prices of vehicle satellite positioning terminals which is identical to the 2012 bid-winning price in the Ministry of Transportation demonstration project

The NDRC believed that Shandong DOTrsquos behaviour eliminated and restricted the competition in the monitoring platform market and the vehicle terminal market deprived the right of transportation enterprises to choose vehicle terminals and monitoring platform on their owns unreasonably raised the sales prices of vehicle terminals and service fees charged by the platform and increased the costs of transportation enterprises Therefore the antitrust agency concluded that Shandong

33 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201503t20150327_668911html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 38 of 52

DOT violated article 8 of the AML which stipulates that ldquoadministrative organs and the public organizations with an administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude and restrict competitionrdquo Specifically Shandong DOT violated article 3234 in terms of requiring organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any designated operators and violated article 3735 in terms of setting rules with contents which eliminate and restrict competition

Based on article 51 of the AML ldquoWhere administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations abuse administrative powers performing activities which exclude and restrict competition the superior entity shall order it to correct impose administrative penalty on the chief officer and other staffs directly responsible pursuant to the laws The AML enforcement authority may give recommendations on disposal of activities to the relevant superior entityrdquo the NDRC proposed in writing that the Shandong provincial government should order Shandong DOT to rectify its behaviour with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Entirely open up the monitoring platform market by permitting transportation undertakings to freely choose any approved platform

2) Loosen the restrictions on the entry into Shandong vehicle terminals permit the undertakings to independently select the supplier of vehicle terminals and allow the qualified terminals to be connected to the relevant monitoring platform and

3) Revoke the official documentation relevant to the cap price of vehicle terminals in order to promote the price competition

Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 36

Facts

On 26 August 2015 the NDRC published its second decision with regard to the rectification of administrative monopoly since the beginning of this year According to the proposal letter sent to Anhui Provincial Government the investigation against the Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City (Bengbu HFPC) was trigged by third partiesrsquo complaints

34 Article 32 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to require organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any operators designated by them 35 Article 37 of the AML Administrative organs shall not abuse their administrative powers to set rules with contents which eliminate restrict competition 36 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201508t20150826_748682html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 39 of 52

The investigation suggests that Bengbu HFPC published three notices with regard to drugs procurement in April and May of this year

In the No C-2015-CG-X-111 Notice (ldquoNo111 Noticerdquo) released on 10 April2015 the health authority not only provided the dosage form and qualification of the requested drugs but also directly determined the suppliers of relevant drugs which eliminated and restricted the competition among pharmaceutical manufacturers and therefore violated articles 32 and 37 of the AML

In the No C-2015-CG-C-112 Notice (ldquoNo112 Noticerdquo) and No C-2015-CG-C-168 (ldquoNo 168 Noticerdquo) respectively released on 10 April and 22 May 2015 the Bengbu HFPC set discriminative qualification requirements on non-local undertakings in order to restrict their participation in the relevant bidding For instance in accordance with No 112 Notice to be a qualified bidder the turnover of non-local undertakings shall exceed CNY 2 billion which is 50 times as much as the turnover requirements of the local undertakings In the NDRCrsquos opinion the administrative monopoly activities conducted by the local health agency excluded the relevant undertakings from the market maintained the virtual-high prices of drugs and therefore violated articles 3237 and 37 of the AML

The NDRC suggested in a letter that Anhui Provincial Government should urge the Bengbu HFPC to rectify the abuse of monopoly powers with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Stop setting distinguishing restrictions on qualification requirements review standards and numbers of winning bidders as for local and non-local undertakings

2) Stop designating the suppliers of competitive drugs and

3) Take necessary measures to mitigate the negative effects resulting from the previous illegal monopolistic abuses

Outlook

At the beginning of the year the former director general of the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau under the NDRC Xu Kunlin stated that the agency would strengthen antitrust enforcement on abuse of administrative power in 2015

Since then the NDRC has made great efforts to rectify unreasonable abuses of administrative power The currently disclosed two cases investigated by the NDRC re-emphasize the Chinese Governmentrsquos strict scrutiny of antitrust issues in respect of

37 Article 34 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to restrict or reject the participation of operators from other regions in local bidding activities by measures such as prescribing discriminatory qualification requirements or assessment standards or by not publishing information according to law

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 40 of 52

administrative monopoly It reminds the local governments that antitrust compliance is of significant importance

III Private Litigation

A Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen more and more private antitrust litigations

The private antitrust litigation cases have become increasingly complicated especially the issues regarding the intersection areas of IP and antitrust law

Multinational giants and State-Owned Enterprises (the ldquoSOEsrdquo) are increasingly becoming the targets in antitrust civil litigations Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (the ldquoSMEsrdquo) tend to use the antitrust litigation to achieve their commercial goals in the business context

B Significant Cases

Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)38

This is the first-ever private litigation concerning administrative monopoly since the implementation of the AML in 2008

Facts

According to the currently disclosed details the case is relevant for designated trade

The plaintiff Shenzhen Sware Technology Co Ltd (ldquoSwarerdquo) is a software company The press releases suggest that Sware Gloden Software Co Ltd (ldquoGlodenrdquo) and Shanghai Ruban Software Co Ltd (ldquoShanghai Rubanrdquo) are the three main suppliers of construction cost software and possess the major shares of the relevant market An annual provincial vocational ability contest regarding the construction cost hosted by the Guangdong Department of Education (ldquoGuangdong DOE) designated Gloden as the exclusive supplier of the relevant software

After several unsuccessful verbal and written negotiations with Guangdong DOE in April 2014 Sware filed a lawsuit against Guangdong DOE before the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquothe Courtrdquo) alleging that the administrative organ abused its administrative power and violated the AML by designating exclusive software supplier for the contest and claimed a compensation for reasonable expense amounting to CNY 10800 Yuan

The opinions of the Court 38 The story of the case is available at httpfinancesinacomcnchinadfjj20150410074621924997shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 41 of 52

The full text of the judgment has not been disclosed yet In accordance with the information available to the public the Court invoked article 32 of the AML which prohibits an administrative organ from abusing its administrative power to require or in disguised form organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use only the commodities supplied by the entities designated by them The Court concluded that Guangdong DOE failed to prove the legitimacy of the designation and therefore abused its administration power

Currently the case is in appeal before the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court

Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 39

It is the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China

In the first instance ruling Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court ruled against Sinopec holding that the Yunnan branch of Sinopecs trading company was obligated to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its dominance in the sales market of refined oil by refusing to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding without justifiable reasons

In the second instance ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors Currently the case is pending

Facts

The First Trial

The lawsuit was filed before the Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoKunming Courtrdquo) in January 2014 Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy Co Ltd (ldquoYingdingrdquo) a bio-energy manufacturer claimed that Sinopec and the Yunnan branch of Sinopec trading company (ldquoSinopec Yunnan Branchrdquo) had failed to fulfil their obligations stipulated in the Renewable Energy Law and had abused their market dominance in sales market of refined oil by refusing to trade with Yingding without justifiable reasons

Sinopec and Sinopec Yunnan Branch mainly explained four reasons for why they rejected Yingdingrsquos biofuel Firstly Yingding had failed to prove that the biofuel complied with the relevant national standard and was safe to use Secondly Yingding had failed to provide complete trading terms Thirdly the laws and regulations regarding biofuel were incomplete the authorized refined oil sales companies were 39 The details of the case are available at httpnewsxinhuanetcomfortune2014-1217c_1113680039htm httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=9e71db51-6ff6-4d2c-8af6-8eacf023ebdeampKeyWord=E4BA91E58D97E79B88E9BC8E|E4B8ADE79FB3E58C96 httpnewsxinhuanetcomenergy2015-0422c_127721575htm httpwwwnbdcomcnarticles2015-04-23911348html last visited on December 17 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 42 of 52

obligated to purchase biofuel from the biofuel manufacturers if it met certain quality standards but there was a vacancy regarding how to reach the end consumers from the sales companies

On 8 December 2014 the Kunming Intermediate Peoples Court ruled that Sinopec Yunnan Branch bore a legal obligation to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its market dominance in refined oil market by refusing without any justifiable reasons to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding The court ordered Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network within 30 days Both Yingding and Sinopec filed appeals to the Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court

The Appellate Trial

The appeal hearing was held on 22 April 2015 in Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoYunnan Courtrdquo) Sinopec submitted 23 new pieces of evidence and introduced two expert witnesses in a bid to overturn several key elements in the first-instance ruling by Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court

In terms of the determination of the relevant market and the market dominance Sinopec argued that the relevant market in this case was for adipic acid monomethyl ester (ldquoAAMErdquo) the main ingredient of a biofuel additive known as BD100 Yingdingrsquos main product is BD100 which can be blended with fossil diesel to become biofuel In the AAME market Sinopec is a potential buyer instead of a market dominator In support of this argument Sinopec presented an expert witnessmdashGong Jiong a professor of economics at Beijings University of International Business and Economics who testified that AAME should be defined as the relevant product market on the basis of an economic analysis

However Yingding insisted that the first-instance ruling was correct in naming the sales market of refined oil as the relevant market and submitted new evidence an article on Sinopecs website that claimed it had a 67 market share in Yunnan to help establish the claim that Sinopec had market dominance

Another main dispute was whether Yingdingrsquos biofuel product met national standards which would make it mandatory for Sinopec to purchase under Chinas Renewable Energy Law The law stipulates that biofuel producers must sell their products first to an authorized refined oil sales company and the sales companies are obliged to buy the fuel if it meets certain quality standards In order to test the quality Sinopec introduced the second expert witness Lin Jianmin a leading author of Chinarsquos national biofuel standard Lin Jianmin pointed out that there are currently quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology which gives Sinopec a justifiable reason not to trade with Yingding Moreover Sinopec presented some precedents in which consumers had complained about the biofuel quality and also claimed that China didnt have a sound regulatory framework to support biofuel production neither in testing nor in sales

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 43 of 52

Nevertheless to refute this point Yingding referred to an earlier test in co-operation with Sinopec in 2011 where selected buses in Kunming used biofuel blended by Sinopec using BD100 produced by Yingding

On August 13 2015 Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors and now this case is pending In the written appellate ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court did not provide any details regarding its reasoning

Key Issues of the Case

Is there any competition between Yingding and Sinopec

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case the product of Yingding is biofuel while Sinopec does not engage in the business of biofuel From this perspective Yingding and Sinopec are not competitors Thus it is not necessary and not reasonable for Sinopec to eliminate or restrict the competition from Yingding

Relevant Market

The definition of the relevant market is a prerequisite to determine whether competition exists and whether the AML is applicable In accordance with the Judicial Interpretation of Antitrust civil litigation the plaintiff shall take the responsibility to prove the defendantrsquos dominance in the relevant market Also the methods of defining the relevant market are stipulated in the Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition (ldquoGuidelinesrdquo) However both Yingding and Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court defined the relevant market as the sales market of refined oil without sufficient antitrust analysis none of the methods in the Guidelines were used Therefore the definition of the relevant market remains arguable and needs to be sufficiently analysed in the upcoming retrial

Justifiable Reasons

The abuse of market dominance includes the behaviour of refusing to trade without justifiable reasons according to the AML but in the first instance ruling justifiable reasons were not investigated by the court During the appellate trial the expert witness introduced by Sinopec claimed that there were quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology and this was a justifiable reason to refuse to trade with Yingding Even though the first instance court and the appellate court did not reason the justifiable reason it should be discussed and investigated further during the retrial

AML or Renewable Energy Law

The claims of Yingding were based on both the AML and the Renewable Energy Law (ldquoRELrdquo) and the first instance ruling referred to both the AML and the REL as

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 44 of 52

well It seems that the laws the first instance court referred to were comprehensive but in fact the reasoning was not clear and logical In the first instance ruling some disputes regarding the AML were reviewed but all the orders were not based on the AML Specifically the first instance court ordered the Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network based on the REL and dismissed the other claims That the orders were not on account of reasoning is illogical It is anticipated that during the retrial the application of the laws will be clearer

Analysis

A lot of issues have not been clearly analysed by the courts such as the relevant market and the justifiable reasons Since the case is remanded the above-mentioned issues are expected to be resolved in the retrial In addition Yingding was in a disadvantaged position compared to its first instance trial since its claims based on the AML were challenged greatly during the appellate trial In the retrial it is probable that Yingding may switch its litigation strategy and base its claims on the REL Therefore maybe more preparation regarding the REL can give Sinopec a leg up

Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)

Rijing Electric a Chinese distributor seeks CNY 5m compensation

The first hearing was on 9 June 2015 and ended without a ruling

Facts

Rijing Electric (ldquoRijingrdquo) a Shanghai-based company and a former distributor for Panasonic accused Panasonic of abusing its dominance and dividing the market through monopolistic practice in an antitrust lawsuit filed in 2014 with Shanghai No 1 Intermediate Court (ldquoShanghai Courtrdquo) claiming compensation of CNY 5m (USD 815370) Wenzhou Mingda Automation System Co and Shanghai Qingying Automation Equipment as the distributor of Panasonic in China are the co-defendants were accused of conducting monopolistic behaviours by implementing Panasonicrsquos policy

The first hearing for evidence exchange was on June 9 2015 Rijing claimed a policy allegedly introduced by Panasonic in 2009 restricted the competition between distributors Panasonic claims the policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo and has full justifiable reasons It explained that the products in question required customization at considerable cost to distributors before its sale to customers Once carried out however other distributors leaving them open to quote much lower prices than the original distributor could simply and relatively cheap replicate this customization Besides Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and that the plaintiff had failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic said its market share for the four products

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 45 of 52

under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases Also Rijing failed to challenge the policy when it was first introduced instead initially agreeing it was reasonable as e-mail evidence submitted by Panasonic suggests

Key Issues of the Case

Whether Panasonic occupied a market dominant position

It is reported that Rijing claimed that Panasonic had abused its market dominance but Rijing failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and its market share for the four products under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases

Analysis

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case Panasonicrsquos policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo rather than to eliminate or restrict competition

Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals40 (Pending)

It is a battle over patent licensing issues

It is viewed as being among the most complicated antitrust lawsuits in China

The first hearing was on 17 and 18 December 2015

Facts

Four Chinese rare earth companies Ningbo Ketian Magnet Ningbo Permanent Magnetics Ningbo Tongchuang Strong Magnet Material and Ningbo Huahui Magnetic Industry filed antitrust lawsuits against Hitachi Metals over alleged patent licensing issues regarding rare earth magnets on December 11 2014 with the Ningbo Intermediate Peoples Court (ldquoNingbo Courtrdquo) in Zhejiang province As reported four Chinese rare earth companies claimed Hitachi Metals abused its market dominance and hurt the industry competition by refusing to license the patents to them The patents in this case are used in the manufacturing of sintered neodymium iron boron (ldquoNdFeBrdquo) magnets a rare-earth magnet alloy widely used in parts for airplanes automobiles and other products

Hitachi Metals filed a challenge with the Ningbo Court over its jurisdiction in April 2015 After Ningbo Court rejected Hitachi Metals jurisdiction objection on 28 April 2015 Hitachi Metals appealed to the Zhejiang High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoZhejiang

40The details of the story are available at httpwwwzbmagcomnews_viewphpid=80 httpwwwhitachicomcnaboutpress201510-121118_ahtml last visited on December 22 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 46 of 52

Courtrdquo) but Zhejiang Court affirmed the ruling of the Ningbo Court

The first day of a two-day hearing took place on 17 December 2015 during which the two sides cross-examined each otherrsquos evidence The evidence focused on clearing up several key elements in the case including the relevant market whether Hitachi Metals has dominance on that market and whether both sides acted in good faith during the licensing negotiations

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Product Market

The four Chinese rare earth companies claimed that the relevant product market should be the NdFeb-related patent licensing market However Hitachi Metals believed that the physical NdFeb market rather than the patent licensing market should be the relevant product market which is meaningful for assess the real competitive effects on the market

Whether Hitachi Metals occupies a dominant market position

In terms of market dominance Hitachi Metals claimed it does not occupy a dominant position because Hitachi Metalsrsquo patents were not in a standard in this case and there are substitutable technologies in the market SEP holders have the obligation to license on FRAND terms but none-SEP holders do not So while a refusal to license a SEP may constitute abuse of dominance refusal to license a non-SEP mdash even by a patent holder with a dominant position mdash should not be considered as an abuse

Analysis

Hitachi Metals as a patent holder should have the right to decide whether to retain those patents or not or who to license According to the legal theory the purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage and protect innovation by conferring monopoly right mdash that is to give intellectual property owners the proprietary rights which can exclude others from using the intellectual property The SEP holders admittedly need to comply with FRAND terms which can maintain a robust balance between competition and monopoly whereas the further intervention of antitrust law into non-SEP patents may undermine the purpose of intellectual property law To which extent the antitrust law should intervene is yet to be seen

Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei41

A confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the Beijing IP court made by the Beijing High Court

41 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcncpwswbjzscq201511t20151103_12225640htm last visited on December 28 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 47 of 52

Facts

On August 2 2013 the NDRC penalized Abbott for monopolistic price-fixing and then Abbott made a price adjustment in China where the prices of main products were reduced

On December 16 2014 Tian Junwei (ldquoTianrdquo) a Chinese citizen in Beijing sued Carrefour Shuangjing Branch (ldquoCarrefourrdquo) and Abbott (Shanghai) Sales Company (ldquoAbbottrdquo) at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (ldquoIP Courtrdquo) for their monopolistic price-fixing which damaged his interests However Carrefour and Abbott challenged the jurisdiction of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court They claimed there were two reasons Firstly according to the jurisdiction rules of the IP court issued by the Supreme Court the IP court has no jurisdiction over anti-trust cases Secondly if this case is a contractual dispute the court that is in the place of Carrefour should hear it if this case is a tort dispute the Shanghai Intermediate Court should hear it

In the ruling of the IP Court the IP Court decided it has the jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases for the following reasons According to the Provisions On Causes Of Action In Civil Cases issued by Supreme Court (最高人民法院案由规定) antimonopoly dispute is a tertiary cause of action belonging to IP and competition disputes Also according to the Provisions concerning the Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京

市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问题的规定 ) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was an IP and competition dispute and was sued after November 6 2014 Thus the IP Court had jurisdiction

Both Carrefour and Abbott appealed to the Beijing High Court over the jurisdiction ruling but the Beijing High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original ruling Reasons are listed in the written ruling issued on June 18 2015 Firstly the nature of the case was an antimonopoly dispute In accordance with Provisions of the Supreme Peoples Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民

事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) and Civil Litigation Law the monopolistic civil disputes in the first instance shall be under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Peoples Courts and an action involving a contractual dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the peoples court of the place where the defendant is domiciled or where the contract is performed Carrefour as the defendant in this case is domiciled in Chaoyang District Beijing Therefore the courts of Beijing have jurisdiction over this case Secondly according to article 3 of the Notification on the Jurisdiction of Intellectual Property Courts issued by Supreme Court (关于知识产权法院案件管辖

等有关问题的通知) IP courts have jurisdiction over first-instance civil disputes arising from monopolistic practices Lastly according to Provisions concerning the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 15 of 52

Competition Analysis

With respect to the current situation of the competition in the hard disk drive market MOFCOM made the following assessments

1) In the areas of portable application and corporate-level application solid-state drive has put constraint on the impact of the traditional hard disk so that the competition in the relevant market has been strengthened

2) Overcapacity problems in the conventional hard disk drive market became obvious

3) Both the layout and the major market competitors in the hard disk drive market have remained unchanged since 2012

4) Seagate and Samsung HDDrsquos market overlap in the hard disk market is quite small and Samsung HDDrsquos competition in the traditional hard disk is quite weak

Based on the above analysis MOFCOM deemed that

1) Removal of certain conditions is possible because in the portable application and corporate level application sectors competition constraint of solid-state drive on traditional hard disk drives has strengthened traditional hard disk drives are facing overcapacity which has reduced the chance of a single or more competitors causing competition restraints Seagate has limited overlap with Samsung in the hard disk business and the latter has a relatively weaker market power in the hard drive disk business

2) Removal of all imposed conditions may still restrain market competition because the traditional hard disk drive market competition conditions have not undergone a major change Seagate is still the major player in all divisions of the market and Seagate will strengthen its power after the acquisition of Samsung HDD

Remedies

After negotiating with MOFCOM Seagate agreed to undertake the following obligations

1) Seagate shall not change its business model materially or force clients to purchase hard drive disks exclusively from it

2) Seagate shall not force Tokyo Dengikagaku Kogyo China to supply magnetic heads exclusively to Seagate (or other Seagate-controlled companies) or limit the number of magnetic heads Tokyo Dengikagaku Kogyo China would supply to other hard drive disk manufacturers

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 16 of 52

3) Seagate shall continue to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

This announcement will be effective within two years from the date of issuance If Seagate can provide sufficient evidence to prove substantial change in the market environment the company can propose to MOFCOM to remove relevant conditions within the two years

FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM15

MOFCOM deems that this acquisition would induce anti-competitive influence

NXP promises to dispose its radio frequency (ldquoRFrdquo) power transistor business

As the first case approved with structural remedies after the enactment of the Provisions on Imposing Restrictive Conditions MOFCOM conducted a comprehensive evaluation of the viability competitiveness and marketability of the divested business as well as the suitability of potential buyers

Facts

On April 3 2015 NXP filed for its acquisition of Freescale NXP Semiconductor (ldquoNXPrdquo) is a NASDAQ-listed company registered in the Netherlands which engages in the design manufacturing and sale of integration circuits and discrete components

Freescale Semiconductor (ldquoFreescalerdquo) is a New York-listed company registered in Bermuda and based in the US which engages in the manufacturing and RampD of microcontroller and digital networking processors (embedded processors)

According to the agreement between NXP and Freescale after closing Freescale will become the wholly owned subsidiary of NXP On November 25 2015 MOFCOM decided to clear this acquisition with remedies

Relevant Market

As per the announcement the relevant product markets are the general microcontroller automotive power-use analog integrated circuit and RF transistor product markets in which NXP and Freescale have horizontal overlap The relevant geographical markets should be the global market

Competition Analysis

After assessing this proposed deal the agency concluded that

1) The proposed deal would boost NXPrsquos market control power in the RF

15 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151120151101196182shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 17 of 52

transistor product market because the global and Chinese RF transistor product markets share a similar structure both featuring few competitors and high concentration levels Freescale and NXP as the number one and number two players are far ahead of their rivals in the market Therefore after closing the market control power of NXP in this market would be strengthened

2) Since Freescale was the fiercest competitor of NXP the proposed deal will remove competition between them

3) The proposed deal would reduce the options for clients and increase procurement risks

In practice the wireless infrastructure suppliers as the main client of the RF transistor product tend to procure products from both NXP and Freescale to prevent them from the risk arising from relying on one supplier

4) The proposed deal may induce an adverse impact on the technology RampD and innovation

Remedies

In accordance with MOFCOMrsquos decision NXP shall follow its written commitment submitted to MOFCOM and completely divest its RF power transistor business to Beijing Jianguang Asset Management At the same time NXP shall strictly fulfil its obligations during the transition period It is worth noting that the NXPFreescale deal shall only be implemented after the divestment deal has been concluded

In addition MOFCOM requires NXP to perform relevant obligations during the transition period from the date of approval announcement until the divestment deal has been concluded NXP shall endeavour

1) not to engage in any lsquounfair trade practicesrsquo relating to the divested business

2) not to implement any acts which may have a significant adverse impact on the value management or competitiveness of the divested business or any acts which may change the nature and scope industry or business strategy or investment policy of the divested business and to take reasonable measures to encourage core employees to stay in the divested business as well as not to seek or transfer employees to NXPrsquos non-divested business

3) to ensure supply to the divested business in a fair reasonable and non-discriminatory manner and

4) to maintain the independence of the divested business and not to exchange competitively sensitive information between the parties and the divested

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 18 of 52

business

B Monopolistic Agreements

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

With respect to the enforcement activities of the NDRC in light of the numbers of the published cases it seems that the law enforcement frequency of the NDRC regarding monopolistic agreements in 2015 is lower in comparison with 2014

The reason behind might be that the outstanding issue of human resource deficit of the antitrust authority still exists Besides the fact that more enterprises gradually attach increasing importance to the antitrust compliance might be another reason for the decrease in the number of cases investigated by the authorities

As to the enforcement activities of the SAIC 4 of 14 cases concluded by the SAIC and its local branches in 2015 are relevant to monopolistic agreements Meanwhile these four cases concern horizontal monopolistic agreements

It is noteworthy however that the Mercedes-Benz case and the Dongfeng Nissan case suggest that vertical agreements especially involving price-related restrictions on the downstream dealers is still the priority of antitrust enforcement Companies shall be very cautious when imposing restrictions on the resale prices or the minimum resale prices of commodities in the distribution agreements

Automobile industry and related industries are observed to be under continuous attention of Chinarsquos antitrust authorities

The industries relating to peoplersquos livelihoods remain to be the enforcement priority

Significant Cases

Enforcement by the NDRC and its local branches

Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC16

The investigation was triggered by a leniency application

The first leniency applicant was exempted from punishment

Eight ocean shipping companies involved were imposed a collective fine of CNY 4067 million

NDRC spent approximately 12 months to investigate and conclude the case 16 NDRCrsquos press release of the case is available at httpjjsndrcgovcngzdt201512t20151228_769084html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 19 of 52

Facts

In December 2015 the NDRC published its official punishment decisions regarding the cartel case in connection with eight ocean shipping companies namely Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha (ldquoNYKrdquo) Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha (ldquoK Linerdquo) Mitsui OSK Lines EUKOR Car Carriers Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics Compantildeiacutea Sud Americana de Vapores Eastern Car Liner and Compantildeiacutea Chilena de Navegacioacuten Interoceaacutenica

According to the official press release of the NDRC the investigation was triggered by a leniency application of NYK The evidence showed that the eight companies reached consensus on non-intrusion of each others existing business to maintain or increase shipping fees when shipping goods such as cars trucks and engineering machinery in the routes between China and other countries and regions

They were also found to frequently conduct bilateral or multilateral communications on the shippersrsquo invitation for bids andor price inquiries via phone conferences dinner parties e-mails visiting etc In addition they also conducted illegal behaviour such as sensitive information exchange price negotiations bidding intention discussion dividing clients and shipping routes reaching agreements on high price bids or non-bidding in order to help certain companies gain shipping orders

To avoid the regulation of the antitrust authority the relevant shipping companies adopted various illicit measures that showed their apparent intention to violate the AML The cartel lasted for at least four years and covered a broad range of shipping routes concerned with the import and export of products between China and other regions such as North America EU South America and so on involving multiple auto brands and engineering machinery brands

The NDRC held the opinion that the eight companies conducts had restricted and eliminated competition in the relevant market raising the international shipping fees and impairing interests of shippers and end consumers The eight companies breached the AML by reaching and implementing monopolistic agreements on fixing prices and dividing the market

All eight investigated companies put forward remedy measures including enhancing the antitrust compliance program arranging more antitrust compliance trainings and developing antitrust compliance technologies

The NDRC imposed fines based on the nature level and duration of their monopolistic volations as well as their respective sales of international freight service sales relevant to the Chinese market The companies involved were collectively fined CNY 4067 million

NYK as the first cartel member voluntarily reporting the illegal conducts to the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 20 of 52

authority and providing significant evidence was entirely exempted from the punishment K Line as the second leniency applicant was imposed a fine amounting to 4 of its 2014 annual sales of international freight services relevant to Chinarsquos import and export market The details of punishments imposed on the involved companies by the NDRC are as follow

Company Name Amount of Fines (RMB million)

Percentage of the Relevant Turnovers

Grounds

Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha

- - First leniency applicant

Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha

2398 4 Second leniency applicant

Mitsui OSK Lines 3812 7 Third leniency applicant

EUKOR Car Carriers 284 9 Lasted over a long period involved many brands and many violations violations were severe

Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics

4506 8 Lasted over a long period involved many brands and many violations violations were severe

Compantildeiacutea Sud Americana de Vapores

308 6 Lasted over a long period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Eastern Car Liner 1127 5 Lasted over a long period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Compantildeiacutea Chilena de 120 4 Lasted over a long

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 21 of 52

Navegacioacuten Interoceaacutenica

period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Total 4067

Analysis

In this case the agency applied the AML instead of the Tenders and Bids Law to collusive bidding Citing article 13 (3) of the AML the NDRC identified that the collusive bidding constituted a division of the sales market

The leading three leniency applicants were granted exemption from fines to a varying degree

According to the official who handled this case dawn raids performed by antitrust enforcement agencies in other jurisdictions drew the attention of the NDRC on the cartels of these shipping companies However there was limited effective evidence to prove that the companies had reached monopolistic agreements Through pressuring the involved parties three members of the shipping cartel actively confessed their illegal conduct This case once again stresses the significance of international cooperation between antitrust enforcement agencies

Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau17

The distribution agreements between Mercedes-Benz and its dealers are determined as vertical monopolistic agreement and Mercedes-Benz violated article 14 of the AML because it restricted the ability of its dealers to decide their own resale prices

Mercedes-Benzrsquos dealers violated article of 13 of the AML due to concluding a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Mercedes-Benz and its dealers were jointly fined CNY 3578 million

Facts

In April 2015 Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau which is the provincial branch of the NDRC released the punishment on its website and announced that it had imposed a fine of CNY 350 million on Mercedes-Benz along with the aggregated fine of CNY 787 million on its dealers The fine came as a result of Mercedes-Benz reaching and implementing resale price maintenance (ldquoRPMrdquo) agreements with dealers to fix the minimum resale price of several car models as well as certain auto parts 17 The original Chinese notice published by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau is available at httpwwwjswjjgovcnoffice_neweo_comm_zxnrxsphp

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 22 of 52

According to the decision the authority found that Mercedes-Benz fixed the minimum resale price of Class E and Class S cars in Nanjing Wuxi Changzhou and Suzhou markets through telephoneverbal communication and dealers meetings from January 2013 to July 2014 Since 2010 Mercedes-Benz had reached agreements with dealers in Jiangsu province to fix the minimum resale prices for auto parts by providing different levels of discounts for insured cars cars involving expired warranty periods and cars within the warranty period

In addition Mercedes-Benz implemented the minimum resale price maintaining agreement by

1) Tightening its monitoring measures on the dealers such as inspecting deals and their sale incentive system on a weekly basis

2) Tracking the sales process flow of cars and increasing the intensity of this assessment

3) Giving warnings and reducing support ndash for example halting the supply of bestselling cars and prohibiting the opening of new stores ndash to dealers if dealers refused to cooperate with the price-fixing related policies and measures and

4) Interviewing personnel of the dealers and requesting terminations if the staff engaged in serious violations of the RPM agreement

Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau concluded that Mercedes-Benz had excluded and eliminated market competition harmed consumer welfare and consequently violated article 1418 of the AML The authority therefore imposed a fine of CNY 350 million representing 7 of the sale revenue of the previous year in the relevant market against Mercedes-Benz and imposed a fine on the dealers amounting to an equivalence of 1 of the annual sales in the previous year

Analysis

Although the agency also addressed the horizontal violation among the dealers in this case the administrative penalty decision mainly focuses on the vertical violation The agency fined dealers involved in the RPM agreement a combined CNY 787 million equal to 1 of the previous-year sales which suggests that the agency decided to give lighter punishments to dealers who took initiative in reporting the activity and provided evidence

The Mercedes-Benz case is the third case where the agency successfully 18 Article 14 of the AML The following monopolistic agreements between operators and trading partners shall be prohibited (i) fixing the resale prices of commodities to third persons (ii) restricting the minimum resale prices of commodities to third persons (iii) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement Authority under the State Council

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 23 of 52

discovered both vertical and horizontal agreements in a case following the Audi case and the Chrysler case All these cases are rooted in the same industry indicating that industrial features play a large role in raising anti-trust concerns In fact it appears that the entire automotive industry is under antitrust scrutiny

Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC19

This case involved both a horizontal agreement and an administrative monopoly

A total fine of CNY 1318 million was imposed on the involved companies

Facts

In June 2015 the NDRC through its website announced the decision made by its regional branch -Yunnan Provincial Development and Reform Commission (ldquoYunnan DRCrdquo) regarding the horizontal monopolistic agreement case involving Yunnan Communications Administration and local subsidiaries of four state-owned telecommunication companies

Through the investigation Yunnan DRC found that Yunnan Communications Administration as a competent government agency had organized several meetings involving Yunnan branches of four state-owned telecoms - China Mobile China Telecom China Unicom and China Tietong in August and September of 2014 At the end of 2009 the four local branches entered into an agreement to regulate their sales promotions in terms of limiting the promotional items amount and frequency

Furthermore the agreement provides certain measures to ensure the implementation of relevant restrictions on promotions Specifically in case any cartel member violates the agreement the others could file complaints with Yunnan Communications Administration and the agency would then issue a rectification notice to the rule-breaker

Yunnan DRC stated that the four telecoms were main competitors in the relevant market and the promotions as a significant competition measure would exert direct influence on the final prices of the products The horizontal agreement organized by Yunnan Communications Administration on sales promotions restricted the competition capacity of telecoms and as a result eliminated the competition in the relevant market Consequently the behaviour of Yunnan Communications Administration violated article 8 20 of the AML and constituted administrative monopoly in terms of ldquoforcing undertakings to conduct monopolistic behaviour prohibited by the AMLrdquo

19 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpwwwsdpcgovcnfzgggzjgjdyfldjjszhdt201506t20150602_694802html 20 Article 8 of the AML Administrative organs and the public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 24 of 52

With respect to the penalties Yunnan DRC fined the local branch of China Tietong CNY 200000 for reaching but not implementing the agreement in regards to the other three telecoms a total fine of CNY 1298 million amounting to 2 of the sales of the relevant business in the previous year were imposed for entering into and implementing the horizontal monopolistic agreement

Analysis

The telecoms industry is still the enforcement priority of the antitrust enforcement authorities A company cannot be exempted from punishment even though it is forced by competent authorities to conduct monopoly behaviour

DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC21

Both a horizontal monopolistic agreement and a vertical monopolistic agreement were involved in this case

A total fine of CNY 14242 million was imposed on DongFeng Nissan and its distributors

Facts

In September 2015 the Guangdong Development and Reform Commission (ldquoGuangdong DRCrdquo) released an announcement regarding the administrative penalties on DongFeng Nissan and its provincial distributors for concluding price-related monopolistic agreements More specifically DongFeng Nissan was imposed a fine of CNY 1233 million for breaching article 14 of the AML in terms of restricting the resale price of certain car models 17 distributors domiciled in Guangdong were collectively fined CNY 1912 million for violating article 1322 of the AML in terms of entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements

According to the published official release the Guangdong DRC launched the investigation in August 2014 The authority discovered that from 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissan had set a rigorous restriction on its distributorsrsquo abilities to determine the resale prices of certain car models including the quoted prices in various platforms and the final resale price In addition DongFeng Nissan punished the distributors that failed to abide by such price restrictions in 2013 The authority 21 The original Chinese notice published by Guangdong DRC is available at httpwwwgddpcgovcnzwgkgzdtgzyw201509t20150910_328993html 22 Article 13 of the AML The following Monopolistic agreements among competing operators shall be prohibited (i) fix or change prices of commodities (ii) limit the outputs or sales volume of commodities (iii) segment the sales markets or the raw material purchasing markets (iv) limit the purchase of new technology new facilities or limit the development of new products new technology (v) jointly boycott transactions (vi) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-Monopoly Law enforcement Authority Monopolistic agreements in this Law refer to agreements decisions or other concerted practices that eliminate restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 25 of 52

believed that the vertical agreement concluded between DongFeng Nissan and its distributors eliminated and restricted the competition in the relevant market and damaged the consumer welfare as well which violates article 14 of the AML

Furthermore from April 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissanrsquos distributors in Guangdong province held multiple meetings to discuss issues relevant to sale price reached and implemented a horizontal monopolistic agreement in terms of fixing the prices of some car models which is prohibited by article 13 of the AML

Considering that both DongFeng Nissan and the involved distributors positively cooperated with the investigation and ceased the illegal behaviour immediately after the investigation Guangdong DRC decided to impose a fine amounting to 3 of its previous yearrsquos turnovers on DongFeng Nissan and a fine ranging from 2 to 4 on the relevant distributors in accordance with articles 4623 and 4924 of the AML

Analysis

This case demonstrates that auto and related industries are still under close attention of the authority Considering the NDRCrsquos successful series of antitrust investigations conducted throughout the auto industry it is observed that the agency currently overseeing price-related antitrust issues in China has accumulated a substantial amount of experience regarding antitrust enforcement in the auto industry Now is the right time to speed up the law-making process by amending the set of rules released earlier and drafting new laws to advise the auto industry on antitrust compliance

Enforcement by the SAIC and its local branches

Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC25

The investigation was triggered by whistle blowerrsquos submission

Cartel members were collectively fined CNY 139 million 23 Article 46 of the AML In case the operators violate the relevant provisions of this Law concluding and implementing Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall order the operators to cease such act impose fines more than 1 but less than 10 of the total turnover in the preceding year and confiscate the illegal gains where the Monopolistic agreement is not implemented a fine less than RMB 500000 can be imposed If the operators involved in Monopolistic agreement on its own initiative report information concerning the conclusion of Monopolistic agreements and provide important evidences to the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority they may be given a mitigated punishment or be exempted from punishment in accordance with the circumstances Where the industrial associations violate this Law organizing the operators in the industry to conclude Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority may impose a fine less than RMB 500000 in serious circumstances the agency of social organization administration and registration may cancel its registration 24 Article 49 of the AML As for the imposition of the fines stipulated by the Article 46 47 and 48 of this Law the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall take elements such as the nature extent and time it lasts of the illegal act into consideration in determining the specific amount of the fines 25 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201506t20150601_156889html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 26 of 52

Facts

In April 2015 the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) issued administrative penalties on several brick manufacturers for entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements This is the first case relevant to monopolistic agreements that has been publicized by the SAIC since the beginning of this year

Ten cartel members were involved in the case including one company and nine individuals Similar with most antitrust cases the investigation started as a result of a whistle blowerrsquos submission After a thorough investigation Hunan AIC found that those local brick manufacturers had reached agreements on controlling production volume and dividing sales areas in the forms of production and sales agreements plans and meeting minutes

The enforcement authority reached the conclusion that these brick manufacturers violated article 13 of the AML and imposed a total fine of CNY 1389400 on them

Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC26

The organizer of the monopolistic agreement the animation association was fined CNY 100000

The antitrust authority did not punish the members of the monopolistic agreement

Facts

In December 2015 the Guangdong Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoGuangdong AICrdquo) published its administrative punishment decision in regards to Guangzhou Panyu Animation amp Game Association (ldquoGAGArdquo) organizing member companies to conclude a monopolistic agreement

According to the decision GAGA drafted the ldquoAgreement of Exhibition Alliancerdquo (ldquoAgreementrdquo) and convened a conference with member companies in order to discuss the content and conclusion of the Agreement 52 member companies entered into the Agreement which actually requested the alliance companies to merely participate in the exhibitions either organized or supported by GAGA in Guangzhou In addition the Agreement prohibited the alliance companies from attending any other exhibition except if they obtained prior approval of GAGA

After a thorough investigation Guangdong AIC believed that the conclusion of the Agreement among GAGA and the 52 member companies violated article 13 (5) of the AML in terms of boycott GAGA who was deeply involved and restricted member companiesrsquo choice of exhibitions through the Agreement could be deemed as

26 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151208_164680html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 27 of 52

the participant and organizer of the monopolistic agreement In accordance with article 46 of the AML Guangdong AIC imposed a fine of CNY 100000 on GAGA for organizing the conclusion of the monopolistic agreement

Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC27

Hubei AIC considered the coinsurance for Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance illegal

Twelve insurance companies were fined CNY 469 million in total

Facts

In December 2015 the Hubei Administrative for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHubei AICrdquo) disclosed its punishment on 12 insurance companies for signing illegal coinsurance agreements

The disclosed punishment decision suggests that the Hubei branch of China Pacific Life Insurance (ldquothe Companyrdquo) 11 other insurance companies and Wuhan Construction Safety Technology Consultation Center (ldquoWCSTCCrdquo) signed a Coinsurance Agreement on Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance (ldquoCoinsurance Agreementrdquo) of which the main contents include

1) The Company and 11 other involved companies as the coinsurers jointly take charge of the personal accident insurance concerned with the construction project directly administered by the Wuhan government WCSTCC is responsible for providing safety professionalism and technology services regarding the relevant personal accident insurance

2) The Company as the chief insurer of the coinsurance occupies 12 of the total amount of the insurance and the other 11 companies respectively occupy 8

3) The Company as the representative of the coinsurance is in charge of collecting the premium signing the standard form insurance policies and issuing the invoice in its own name The Company should share the charged premium with the other companies in accordance with the Coinsurance Agreement

4) Both the Company and the other insurance companies should pay 25 of the actually received premium to WCSTCC as the service fee WCSTCC will assist the coinsurers in providing safety and technology management service to the insured In addition the 11 insurance companies should pay 5 of their premium to the Company as the management fee

27 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165445html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 28 of 52

5) In case an accident happens the 12 companies will jointly bear the damages based on their respective shares in the coinsurance

6) There is a contact mechanism established in the coinsurance The coinsurers will regularly hold coinsurance conferences to discuss existing problems

Furthermore the coinsurers and WCSTCC also signed a self-discipline agreement and established a complete management system to assure the implementation of the Coinsurance Agreement Any party violating the Coinsurance Agreement would be punished

Hubei AIC found that WCSTCC was solely invested by Wuhan Construction Safety Management Association which was under Wuhan Construction Commission The centre helped implement certain functions of the Wuhan Urban Construction Safety Management Station and was responsible for quality supervision and safety supervision of municipal construction projects

It later became a prerequisite for construction companies to purchase insurance from any member of the coinsurance in order to get approval to commence their project According to the decision Hubei AIC launched another separate investigation against WCSTCC

Through the investigation Hubei AIC concluded that the Coinsurance Agreement constituted a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by article 13 of the AML with the following analysis

First coinsurance as a common business model to jointly share and lower risks is widely adopted in the insurance industry A coinsurance arrangement for a specific project in order to avoid high risks faced by one insurer could be legal However coinsurance should not target the entire market In this case prior to the Coinsurance Agreement the risks of the construction projects were unpredictable since the scale of the construction projects the difficulty of the construction and the amount of construction workers could not be available It is impossible to predict the risks of the projects thus it is not necessary to cooperate with other insurers to collectively bear the risks The purpose of the 12 insurance companies to establish the coinsurance is to avoid the competition which demonstrates the Coinsurance Agreement belongs to a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by the AML

Second the companies through entering into the coinsurance agreement actually divided the relevant market of construction project personal accident insurance in Wuhan city which affected the competition in the relevant market and damaged the interests of other competitors and the consumers In particular the Construction Law as amended in 2011 stipulates that the purchase of personal accident insurance is not mandatory and the construction companies have the right to choose whether to buy the said insurance or not As mentioned purchasing insurance from the coinsurance had been the prerequisite for construction companies to obtain administration

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 29 of 52

approval for the project which seriously distorts the fair competition in the market

Citing article 46 of the AML the 12 insurance companies were collectively fined CNY 469 million including fines on the companies and confiscation of illegal gains It is noteworthy that the fines were calculated based on the companiesrsquo 2014 annual sales of the insurance product in connection with the coinsurance The Company as the chief insurer was fined amounting to 6 of its 2014 annual sales of the relevant insurance product in the coinsurance and other companies were fined amounting to 2 of relevant sales For more specific information please see the following table

Company Name (Hubei Branch)

Fines (CNY million)

Percentage of the sales

Illegal Gains (CNY

million)

China Pacific Life Insurance 00653 6 0941

Sino Life 00145 2 04332

Alltrust Insurance 00145 2 04332

Taikang Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Continent Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Pacific Property Insurance

00145 2 04332

China Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

PICC Property and Casualty 00145 2 02599

Taiping General Insurance 00145 2 013

Union Life Insurance 00145 2 01177

Ping An Annuity Insurance Company of China

00145 2 04201

Ping An Property amp Casualty Insurance Company of China

00145 2 -

Subtotal 02248 - 44679

Total 46927

Analysis

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 30 of 52

Coinsurance as an effective approach to lower risks of insurers is widely used in the insurance industry Information sharing and agreements on coinsurance were generally considered efficient and legitimate However from an antitrust perspective coinsurance may raise competition concerns depending on the circumstances of each agreement In the case that there is enough capacity for one insurer to cover the potential risks the coinsurance might be considered as entering into a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC28

The first leniency applicant was exempted from fines

The other concrete companies were imposed a fine of CNY 180000

Facts

In December 2015 the concrete companies monopolistic agreement case investigated by Hunan AIC was published on SAICrsquos website

In accordance with the antitrust enforcement announcement of SAIC this case was triggered by complaints from the Yongzhou City peoplersquos congress After the preliminary review the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) initiated the formal investigation on seven concrete companies domiciled in Yongzhou City Hunan Province which were suspected of being involved in a monopolistic agreement in terms of division of the volumes of the products

After further investigation Hunan AIC found that the seven concrete companies concluded a partnership agreement in 2011 which requested the involved companies to enter into a partnership business with assets In addition according to the partnership agreement it was planned to establish a comprehensive office to manage production marketing and distribution of the products of all the partners The seven companies intended to jointly adjust and control the output of concrete based on the partnership agreement However because there were disagreements over the allocation of the injected assets and market shares the companies did not implement the partnership agreement The agreement was cancelled in December 2012

Based on the findings Hunan AIC concluded that the seven concrete companies as competitors of each other restricted and eliminated the competition in the relevant market through reaching the partnership agreement and dividing the volumes of sales which violated article 13(3) of the AML in terms of division of sales market Considering that the agreement had not been implemented and the limited influence of the agreement according to article 46 of the AML and article 27 of the Administrative Penalties Law small amount fines were imposed on the involved companies Six companies were fined CNY 30000 each for their illegal behaviour 28 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165504html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 31 of 52

Yongzhou Shuangyuan Building Materials Co Ltd as the first one to actively report the monopolistic agreement and cooperate with the enforcement authority was exempted from the punishment

Outlook

It is expected that the AMLrsquos enforcement on monopolistic agreements will continue in the future Industries such as automobile shipping pharmaceuticals insurance etc will still remain the priority of the antitrust enforcement

The antitrust enforcement authorities have published a series of regulations in order to clarify the substantial and procedural issues relevant to the antitrust enforcement However Chinarsquos current antitrust legislation regime is still immature In the following years we expect that more attention will be paid to the legislative improvements

Another remarkable issue for cartel members is that with more Chinese enterprises attaching increasing importance to the AML the follow-on civil damages actions might become a tendency in the future

C Abuse of Market Dominance

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen a decent increase of abuse of market dominance cases both in public enforcement and private litigation Oftentimes the authorities responsible for public enforcement generally find it difficult to pursue investigations against abuse of market dominance cases The following two main reasons are often cited to explain this standoff first it is hard for the authorities to define the relevant markets and prove the undertaking(s)rsquo dominant market position through economic approaches second it is hard to collect evidence regarding abusive practices

The cases related to IPRs abuse are emerging significantly particularly in the telecommunication media and technology (ldquoTMTrdquo) sectors

The SAICrsquos latest refusal-to-deal probe against a local drug maker shows that the SAIC and its local branches have increasingly acquired a profile as an abuse of dominance regulator

Significant Cases

Cases pursued by the SAIC

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 32 of 52

Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case29

Facts

The local authority in Dongfang city reported to the Hainan provincial branch of SAIC on April 23 2014 of the suspected dominance abuse The SAIC authorized its Hainan bureau to officially investigate the matter on 25 July 2014 according to a decision dated January 9 2015 The AIC concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its market dominance by requiring users to pay a deposit without any legal basis and or justifiable reasons

In terms of the relevant product market the local authority found that in this case it was the urban water supply market in Dongfang city and its surrounding townships where Dongfang Water was the sole public operator in the local water supply market with a 100 market share which made all water users completely reliant on the companyrsquos supply In term of market access the local authority found it very unlikely that there were other operators due to the strict regulations

The Hainan SAIC then concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its dominance as it charged users a deposit by threatening to refuse to register users and also by threatening to restrict the water supply Dongfang Waters charging of deposits lacked a legal basis and hadnt received government approval to the detriment of household consumers and business water users and hampered the improvement of management and services of the company Such conduct was in breach of Chinarsquos Anti-Monopoly Law

Hainan AIC levied a fine of CNY 593208 a lighter penalty equivalent to 2 of the companyrsquos annual sales for the previous year and confiscated illicit gains of CNY 38521 for abuse of market dominance

Analysis

It is noteworthy that although handled by a local authority supervised by the SAIC the antitrust agency detailed the relevant market definition the assessment of the dominant market position the abusive practices and the scrutiny of the justifiable reasons

Although the definition of the relevant market and the reasoning of the Hainan provincial AIC and the SAIC are subject to criticism it is still applausive to see that the antitrust regulators have realized the importance of the application of rule of reason in an abuse case In addition through itrsquos a published decision practitioners may observe the regulatorsrsquo reasoning and thus transparency and legal certainty have been generated

29 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzfcfjd201502t20150212_152066html last visited on October 18 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 33 of 52

Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms30

Facts

In June 2013 the Ningxia AIC under authorization of SAIC opened an antitrust investigation into the alleged tie-in sales by the three major state-owned telecommunications operators China Tietong China Unicom and China Telecom for the tie-in sale of fixed-line telephones with broadband Internet services The Ningxia AIC found that the three companies had bundled fixed-line phone services with Internet services to subscribers

During the investigation all three telecommunications companies admitted the tie-in practice had recognized that such practice had improper influence on competition and deprived the choices of consumers The three companies promised to undertake internal rectification timely and eliminate the ill effects resulting from such practice The parties committed to taking the following corrective measures

1) Taking internal rectifications and conducting training to staff about antitrust laws and stop tie-in sales practices

2) Making public commitments to allow subscribers a free choice of services and strengthening the propaganda through the operating room call centre and other channels

3) Unbundling fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

The Ningxia AIC decided to suspend the probe on 14 May 2015 on the grounds that the three companies had actively worked together with the investigators and proposed workable remedy plans

Analysis

In the official announcement Ningxia AIC concluded that the purpose of antitrust enforcement is to restrain monopolistic conducts the protection of competition and to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of consumers Given that during the investigation process the parties had actively cooperated with the investigation formed a more profound understanding of the dangers of tying behaviour and moreover the parties proposed and implemented positive corrective measures to be able to remove the ill impact of their actions the agency believed that the purpose of antitrust law enforcement was fulfilled

It is worth noting that the Ningxia AIC also required the three companies to implement the commitment by August 30 2015and the submission of the written

30 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158908html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158906html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158910html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 34 of 52

implementation report on July 102015 and August 102015 respectively which is another illustration that an effective commitment by the undertakings shall directly deal with the effect that is brought by the monopolistic behaviour In this case the effect of the monopolistic act was restricted to the choice of the consumers therefore the commitment by the undertaking aimed at allowing the freedom of choice and the unbundling of fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company31

Facts

The Liaoning AIC imposed a fine of approximately CNY 433m on the Fushun Branch of Liaoning Tobacco Co on 1 June 2015 The agency also ordered the company to stop its illicit behaviour

The Liaoning AIC received a tip-off that the accused Liaoning Tobacco Corsquos Fushun branch was conducting tie-in sales of non-high-demand cigarette brands with high-demand cigarette brands After gaining authorization from SAIC the agency officially started an investigation regarding the companyrsquos suspected abuse of market dominance in June 2014

Analysis

According to the announcement the tobacco company argued that the tobacco industry is a state controlled or monopolized industry with a lawful monopolistic position therefore the company shall not be subject to the norms of general market competition rules or the anti-monopoly law

In this regards the agency concluded that in terms of the status of the undertaking admittedly the first paragraph of article 17 of the AML says that the State shall protect the lawful business operations of undertakings in these industries with respect to the industries which are under the control of the State-owned economic sector and have a bearing on the lifeline of the national economy or national security and the industries which exercise monopoly over the production and sale of certain commodities according to law However the second paragraph continues to say that the undertakings mentioned above shall do business according to law be honest faithful and strictly self-disciplined and subject themselves to public supervision and they shall not harm the consumers interests by taking advantage of their position of control or their monopolistic production and sale of certain commodities In particular in the preceding paragraph the ldquolawful businessrdquo and ldquoaccording to lawrdquo imply that the AML shall apply in the business operation The agency therefore believes that

31 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201508t20150813_16

0208html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 35 of 52

there shall be no exemption for the undertaking concerned the defences of the undertaking concerned is not established

Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm32

Facts

The Chongqing AIC fined Chongqing Qingyang Pharmaceutical CNY 439308 for alleged dominance abuse

The investigation was initiated when the company contacted the agency for verification on its potential breach of the AML related to an allopurinol active pharmaceuticals ingredient (API) distribution agreement with its exclusive distributor The company provided the relevant agreement and information and the agency conducted an investigation into the company and some other relevant companies

Analysis

Relevant Market

During the investigation the agency found that pharmaceutical ingredients are a special commodity the API is used to produce the preparations The chemical API is only used for the production of the preparation and could be used as a medicine for clinic use

The preparation is produced according to the requirements of certain form of prepared drugs and for the purpose of treatment and prevention which can be used as medicine

The allopurinol is used for the common treatment of hyperuricemia However the other treatments are different in pharmacological effects or treatment effects as well as in the cost for the patient Furthermore the company is the only manufacturer and supplier in the market nationwide since July 2012 Therefore the agency concluded that the relevant market is the allopurinol API market

Considering that the qualification for manufacturing the allopurinol API is national wide and the normal practice for purchasers and suppliers is domestic the relevant geographic market is the Chinese market

The Market Dominance

During the investigation the agency found that the company is the only supplier and manufacturer of allopurinol API in China there is no other competitor in the

32 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151222_16

5152html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 36 of 52

market and the company has a monopoly in the market The evidence shows that the company has the ability to control the prices the position for the downstream is relatively weak

With respect to the market entry the agency found that the market entry is relatively high in addition other undertakings are dependent on the company Thus the agency believed the company to have market dominance

Refusal to Deal

The agency found that on September 25 2015 the company reached an exclusive agreement and distribution agreement with its distributor Based on these agreements the company didnrsquot supply allopurinol API to the said distributor and other companies despite the fact that those companies requested for allopurinol API but were turned down by the company

Absence of Reasonable Cause

The agency found that the companyrsquos refusal to deal was not in line with the needs of normal business operation or economic efficiency On the other hand the refusal to deal was aimed at increasing the market share of the allopurinol drug product Also the agency found that the stop of supply was a manipulation of market power as to maximize the profit to the most The agency further found that the exclusive distribution agreement with suspension of supply for six months and the refusal to supply was to eliminate and restrict the competition as to gain the monopolistic profit

The Consequence of Refusal to Deal

The agency concluded that the refusal to deal harmed the competition of the allopurinol preparations market Because of the suspension of supply many demanders had to reduce their production or switch to the supply of other products or stop their production The suspension of supply affected the competition of the downstream market Consequently the raising of the price of allopurinol API also raised the cost for other manufacturers of allopurinol preparations

Furthermore the refusal to deal led to capacity loss of the allopurinol preparation industry

Ultimately the refusal to deal increased the burden on consumers as the refusal to supply changed the supply-demand relationship in the market

The agency concluded that the Company abused its dominant position in the allopurinol API market by refusing to deal with intended buyers in the period between October 2013 and March 2014Therefore the Company violated article 17 (1) of the AML which prohibits business operators with a dominant market position from abusing that position such as the refusal to deal without any justifications

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 37 of 52

D Administrative Monopoly

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 witnessed antitrust authoritiesrsquo significant efforts regarding the enforcement against administrative monopoly According to Mr Dong Zhiming the deputy director general of Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly Bureau ever since the AML coming into force six cases in connection with administrative monopoly were investigated by NDRC and among them five cases were handled in the year of 2015 These cases touched abuses of administrative power in terms of designative deal in relation to transportation communication and pharmaceutical industries

The first private litigation related to administrative monopolistic acts was heard in the court which is a milestone case in the enforcement of the AML

Significant Cases

Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC33

Facts

In March 2015 the NDRC released the official letter to Shandong Provincial Department of Transportation (ldquoShandong DOTrdquo) on its website with respect to correct its abuse of administrative power to exclude and restrict competition

During the investigation the NDRC found that since 2011 Shandong DOT had issued multiple relevant government orders in order to require certain types of vehicles to be directly connected to two designated information and service platforms both of which are operated and technically supported by one company namely Shandong Jiutong Internet of Things Technology Co Ltd (ldquoJiutong ITTrdquo) Furthermore according to the orders issued by the competent administrative department all the vehicle satellite positioning terminals entering into Shandong provincial market should be debugged through the said technology service platform which is operated by the mentioned company In addition Shandong DOT released the cap prices of vehicle satellite positioning terminals which is identical to the 2012 bid-winning price in the Ministry of Transportation demonstration project

The NDRC believed that Shandong DOTrsquos behaviour eliminated and restricted the competition in the monitoring platform market and the vehicle terminal market deprived the right of transportation enterprises to choose vehicle terminals and monitoring platform on their owns unreasonably raised the sales prices of vehicle terminals and service fees charged by the platform and increased the costs of transportation enterprises Therefore the antitrust agency concluded that Shandong

33 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201503t20150327_668911html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 38 of 52

DOT violated article 8 of the AML which stipulates that ldquoadministrative organs and the public organizations with an administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude and restrict competitionrdquo Specifically Shandong DOT violated article 3234 in terms of requiring organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any designated operators and violated article 3735 in terms of setting rules with contents which eliminate and restrict competition

Based on article 51 of the AML ldquoWhere administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations abuse administrative powers performing activities which exclude and restrict competition the superior entity shall order it to correct impose administrative penalty on the chief officer and other staffs directly responsible pursuant to the laws The AML enforcement authority may give recommendations on disposal of activities to the relevant superior entityrdquo the NDRC proposed in writing that the Shandong provincial government should order Shandong DOT to rectify its behaviour with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Entirely open up the monitoring platform market by permitting transportation undertakings to freely choose any approved platform

2) Loosen the restrictions on the entry into Shandong vehicle terminals permit the undertakings to independently select the supplier of vehicle terminals and allow the qualified terminals to be connected to the relevant monitoring platform and

3) Revoke the official documentation relevant to the cap price of vehicle terminals in order to promote the price competition

Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 36

Facts

On 26 August 2015 the NDRC published its second decision with regard to the rectification of administrative monopoly since the beginning of this year According to the proposal letter sent to Anhui Provincial Government the investigation against the Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City (Bengbu HFPC) was trigged by third partiesrsquo complaints

34 Article 32 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to require organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any operators designated by them 35 Article 37 of the AML Administrative organs shall not abuse their administrative powers to set rules with contents which eliminate restrict competition 36 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201508t20150826_748682html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 39 of 52

The investigation suggests that Bengbu HFPC published three notices with regard to drugs procurement in April and May of this year

In the No C-2015-CG-X-111 Notice (ldquoNo111 Noticerdquo) released on 10 April2015 the health authority not only provided the dosage form and qualification of the requested drugs but also directly determined the suppliers of relevant drugs which eliminated and restricted the competition among pharmaceutical manufacturers and therefore violated articles 32 and 37 of the AML

In the No C-2015-CG-C-112 Notice (ldquoNo112 Noticerdquo) and No C-2015-CG-C-168 (ldquoNo 168 Noticerdquo) respectively released on 10 April and 22 May 2015 the Bengbu HFPC set discriminative qualification requirements on non-local undertakings in order to restrict their participation in the relevant bidding For instance in accordance with No 112 Notice to be a qualified bidder the turnover of non-local undertakings shall exceed CNY 2 billion which is 50 times as much as the turnover requirements of the local undertakings In the NDRCrsquos opinion the administrative monopoly activities conducted by the local health agency excluded the relevant undertakings from the market maintained the virtual-high prices of drugs and therefore violated articles 3237 and 37 of the AML

The NDRC suggested in a letter that Anhui Provincial Government should urge the Bengbu HFPC to rectify the abuse of monopoly powers with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Stop setting distinguishing restrictions on qualification requirements review standards and numbers of winning bidders as for local and non-local undertakings

2) Stop designating the suppliers of competitive drugs and

3) Take necessary measures to mitigate the negative effects resulting from the previous illegal monopolistic abuses

Outlook

At the beginning of the year the former director general of the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau under the NDRC Xu Kunlin stated that the agency would strengthen antitrust enforcement on abuse of administrative power in 2015

Since then the NDRC has made great efforts to rectify unreasonable abuses of administrative power The currently disclosed two cases investigated by the NDRC re-emphasize the Chinese Governmentrsquos strict scrutiny of antitrust issues in respect of

37 Article 34 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to restrict or reject the participation of operators from other regions in local bidding activities by measures such as prescribing discriminatory qualification requirements or assessment standards or by not publishing information according to law

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 40 of 52

administrative monopoly It reminds the local governments that antitrust compliance is of significant importance

III Private Litigation

A Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen more and more private antitrust litigations

The private antitrust litigation cases have become increasingly complicated especially the issues regarding the intersection areas of IP and antitrust law

Multinational giants and State-Owned Enterprises (the ldquoSOEsrdquo) are increasingly becoming the targets in antitrust civil litigations Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (the ldquoSMEsrdquo) tend to use the antitrust litigation to achieve their commercial goals in the business context

B Significant Cases

Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)38

This is the first-ever private litigation concerning administrative monopoly since the implementation of the AML in 2008

Facts

According to the currently disclosed details the case is relevant for designated trade

The plaintiff Shenzhen Sware Technology Co Ltd (ldquoSwarerdquo) is a software company The press releases suggest that Sware Gloden Software Co Ltd (ldquoGlodenrdquo) and Shanghai Ruban Software Co Ltd (ldquoShanghai Rubanrdquo) are the three main suppliers of construction cost software and possess the major shares of the relevant market An annual provincial vocational ability contest regarding the construction cost hosted by the Guangdong Department of Education (ldquoGuangdong DOE) designated Gloden as the exclusive supplier of the relevant software

After several unsuccessful verbal and written negotiations with Guangdong DOE in April 2014 Sware filed a lawsuit against Guangdong DOE before the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquothe Courtrdquo) alleging that the administrative organ abused its administrative power and violated the AML by designating exclusive software supplier for the contest and claimed a compensation for reasonable expense amounting to CNY 10800 Yuan

The opinions of the Court 38 The story of the case is available at httpfinancesinacomcnchinadfjj20150410074621924997shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 41 of 52

The full text of the judgment has not been disclosed yet In accordance with the information available to the public the Court invoked article 32 of the AML which prohibits an administrative organ from abusing its administrative power to require or in disguised form organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use only the commodities supplied by the entities designated by them The Court concluded that Guangdong DOE failed to prove the legitimacy of the designation and therefore abused its administration power

Currently the case is in appeal before the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court

Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 39

It is the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China

In the first instance ruling Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court ruled against Sinopec holding that the Yunnan branch of Sinopecs trading company was obligated to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its dominance in the sales market of refined oil by refusing to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding without justifiable reasons

In the second instance ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors Currently the case is pending

Facts

The First Trial

The lawsuit was filed before the Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoKunming Courtrdquo) in January 2014 Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy Co Ltd (ldquoYingdingrdquo) a bio-energy manufacturer claimed that Sinopec and the Yunnan branch of Sinopec trading company (ldquoSinopec Yunnan Branchrdquo) had failed to fulfil their obligations stipulated in the Renewable Energy Law and had abused their market dominance in sales market of refined oil by refusing to trade with Yingding without justifiable reasons

Sinopec and Sinopec Yunnan Branch mainly explained four reasons for why they rejected Yingdingrsquos biofuel Firstly Yingding had failed to prove that the biofuel complied with the relevant national standard and was safe to use Secondly Yingding had failed to provide complete trading terms Thirdly the laws and regulations regarding biofuel were incomplete the authorized refined oil sales companies were 39 The details of the case are available at httpnewsxinhuanetcomfortune2014-1217c_1113680039htm httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=9e71db51-6ff6-4d2c-8af6-8eacf023ebdeampKeyWord=E4BA91E58D97E79B88E9BC8E|E4B8ADE79FB3E58C96 httpnewsxinhuanetcomenergy2015-0422c_127721575htm httpwwwnbdcomcnarticles2015-04-23911348html last visited on December 17 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 42 of 52

obligated to purchase biofuel from the biofuel manufacturers if it met certain quality standards but there was a vacancy regarding how to reach the end consumers from the sales companies

On 8 December 2014 the Kunming Intermediate Peoples Court ruled that Sinopec Yunnan Branch bore a legal obligation to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its market dominance in refined oil market by refusing without any justifiable reasons to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding The court ordered Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network within 30 days Both Yingding and Sinopec filed appeals to the Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court

The Appellate Trial

The appeal hearing was held on 22 April 2015 in Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoYunnan Courtrdquo) Sinopec submitted 23 new pieces of evidence and introduced two expert witnesses in a bid to overturn several key elements in the first-instance ruling by Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court

In terms of the determination of the relevant market and the market dominance Sinopec argued that the relevant market in this case was for adipic acid monomethyl ester (ldquoAAMErdquo) the main ingredient of a biofuel additive known as BD100 Yingdingrsquos main product is BD100 which can be blended with fossil diesel to become biofuel In the AAME market Sinopec is a potential buyer instead of a market dominator In support of this argument Sinopec presented an expert witnessmdashGong Jiong a professor of economics at Beijings University of International Business and Economics who testified that AAME should be defined as the relevant product market on the basis of an economic analysis

However Yingding insisted that the first-instance ruling was correct in naming the sales market of refined oil as the relevant market and submitted new evidence an article on Sinopecs website that claimed it had a 67 market share in Yunnan to help establish the claim that Sinopec had market dominance

Another main dispute was whether Yingdingrsquos biofuel product met national standards which would make it mandatory for Sinopec to purchase under Chinas Renewable Energy Law The law stipulates that biofuel producers must sell their products first to an authorized refined oil sales company and the sales companies are obliged to buy the fuel if it meets certain quality standards In order to test the quality Sinopec introduced the second expert witness Lin Jianmin a leading author of Chinarsquos national biofuel standard Lin Jianmin pointed out that there are currently quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology which gives Sinopec a justifiable reason not to trade with Yingding Moreover Sinopec presented some precedents in which consumers had complained about the biofuel quality and also claimed that China didnt have a sound regulatory framework to support biofuel production neither in testing nor in sales

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 43 of 52

Nevertheless to refute this point Yingding referred to an earlier test in co-operation with Sinopec in 2011 where selected buses in Kunming used biofuel blended by Sinopec using BD100 produced by Yingding

On August 13 2015 Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors and now this case is pending In the written appellate ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court did not provide any details regarding its reasoning

Key Issues of the Case

Is there any competition between Yingding and Sinopec

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case the product of Yingding is biofuel while Sinopec does not engage in the business of biofuel From this perspective Yingding and Sinopec are not competitors Thus it is not necessary and not reasonable for Sinopec to eliminate or restrict the competition from Yingding

Relevant Market

The definition of the relevant market is a prerequisite to determine whether competition exists and whether the AML is applicable In accordance with the Judicial Interpretation of Antitrust civil litigation the plaintiff shall take the responsibility to prove the defendantrsquos dominance in the relevant market Also the methods of defining the relevant market are stipulated in the Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition (ldquoGuidelinesrdquo) However both Yingding and Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court defined the relevant market as the sales market of refined oil without sufficient antitrust analysis none of the methods in the Guidelines were used Therefore the definition of the relevant market remains arguable and needs to be sufficiently analysed in the upcoming retrial

Justifiable Reasons

The abuse of market dominance includes the behaviour of refusing to trade without justifiable reasons according to the AML but in the first instance ruling justifiable reasons were not investigated by the court During the appellate trial the expert witness introduced by Sinopec claimed that there were quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology and this was a justifiable reason to refuse to trade with Yingding Even though the first instance court and the appellate court did not reason the justifiable reason it should be discussed and investigated further during the retrial

AML or Renewable Energy Law

The claims of Yingding were based on both the AML and the Renewable Energy Law (ldquoRELrdquo) and the first instance ruling referred to both the AML and the REL as

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 44 of 52

well It seems that the laws the first instance court referred to were comprehensive but in fact the reasoning was not clear and logical In the first instance ruling some disputes regarding the AML were reviewed but all the orders were not based on the AML Specifically the first instance court ordered the Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network based on the REL and dismissed the other claims That the orders were not on account of reasoning is illogical It is anticipated that during the retrial the application of the laws will be clearer

Analysis

A lot of issues have not been clearly analysed by the courts such as the relevant market and the justifiable reasons Since the case is remanded the above-mentioned issues are expected to be resolved in the retrial In addition Yingding was in a disadvantaged position compared to its first instance trial since its claims based on the AML were challenged greatly during the appellate trial In the retrial it is probable that Yingding may switch its litigation strategy and base its claims on the REL Therefore maybe more preparation regarding the REL can give Sinopec a leg up

Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)

Rijing Electric a Chinese distributor seeks CNY 5m compensation

The first hearing was on 9 June 2015 and ended without a ruling

Facts

Rijing Electric (ldquoRijingrdquo) a Shanghai-based company and a former distributor for Panasonic accused Panasonic of abusing its dominance and dividing the market through monopolistic practice in an antitrust lawsuit filed in 2014 with Shanghai No 1 Intermediate Court (ldquoShanghai Courtrdquo) claiming compensation of CNY 5m (USD 815370) Wenzhou Mingda Automation System Co and Shanghai Qingying Automation Equipment as the distributor of Panasonic in China are the co-defendants were accused of conducting monopolistic behaviours by implementing Panasonicrsquos policy

The first hearing for evidence exchange was on June 9 2015 Rijing claimed a policy allegedly introduced by Panasonic in 2009 restricted the competition between distributors Panasonic claims the policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo and has full justifiable reasons It explained that the products in question required customization at considerable cost to distributors before its sale to customers Once carried out however other distributors leaving them open to quote much lower prices than the original distributor could simply and relatively cheap replicate this customization Besides Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and that the plaintiff had failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic said its market share for the four products

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 45 of 52

under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases Also Rijing failed to challenge the policy when it was first introduced instead initially agreeing it was reasonable as e-mail evidence submitted by Panasonic suggests

Key Issues of the Case

Whether Panasonic occupied a market dominant position

It is reported that Rijing claimed that Panasonic had abused its market dominance but Rijing failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and its market share for the four products under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases

Analysis

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case Panasonicrsquos policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo rather than to eliminate or restrict competition

Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals40 (Pending)

It is a battle over patent licensing issues

It is viewed as being among the most complicated antitrust lawsuits in China

The first hearing was on 17 and 18 December 2015

Facts

Four Chinese rare earth companies Ningbo Ketian Magnet Ningbo Permanent Magnetics Ningbo Tongchuang Strong Magnet Material and Ningbo Huahui Magnetic Industry filed antitrust lawsuits against Hitachi Metals over alleged patent licensing issues regarding rare earth magnets on December 11 2014 with the Ningbo Intermediate Peoples Court (ldquoNingbo Courtrdquo) in Zhejiang province As reported four Chinese rare earth companies claimed Hitachi Metals abused its market dominance and hurt the industry competition by refusing to license the patents to them The patents in this case are used in the manufacturing of sintered neodymium iron boron (ldquoNdFeBrdquo) magnets a rare-earth magnet alloy widely used in parts for airplanes automobiles and other products

Hitachi Metals filed a challenge with the Ningbo Court over its jurisdiction in April 2015 After Ningbo Court rejected Hitachi Metals jurisdiction objection on 28 April 2015 Hitachi Metals appealed to the Zhejiang High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoZhejiang

40The details of the story are available at httpwwwzbmagcomnews_viewphpid=80 httpwwwhitachicomcnaboutpress201510-121118_ahtml last visited on December 22 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 46 of 52

Courtrdquo) but Zhejiang Court affirmed the ruling of the Ningbo Court

The first day of a two-day hearing took place on 17 December 2015 during which the two sides cross-examined each otherrsquos evidence The evidence focused on clearing up several key elements in the case including the relevant market whether Hitachi Metals has dominance on that market and whether both sides acted in good faith during the licensing negotiations

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Product Market

The four Chinese rare earth companies claimed that the relevant product market should be the NdFeb-related patent licensing market However Hitachi Metals believed that the physical NdFeb market rather than the patent licensing market should be the relevant product market which is meaningful for assess the real competitive effects on the market

Whether Hitachi Metals occupies a dominant market position

In terms of market dominance Hitachi Metals claimed it does not occupy a dominant position because Hitachi Metalsrsquo patents were not in a standard in this case and there are substitutable technologies in the market SEP holders have the obligation to license on FRAND terms but none-SEP holders do not So while a refusal to license a SEP may constitute abuse of dominance refusal to license a non-SEP mdash even by a patent holder with a dominant position mdash should not be considered as an abuse

Analysis

Hitachi Metals as a patent holder should have the right to decide whether to retain those patents or not or who to license According to the legal theory the purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage and protect innovation by conferring monopoly right mdash that is to give intellectual property owners the proprietary rights which can exclude others from using the intellectual property The SEP holders admittedly need to comply with FRAND terms which can maintain a robust balance between competition and monopoly whereas the further intervention of antitrust law into non-SEP patents may undermine the purpose of intellectual property law To which extent the antitrust law should intervene is yet to be seen

Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei41

A confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the Beijing IP court made by the Beijing High Court

41 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcncpwswbjzscq201511t20151103_12225640htm last visited on December 28 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 47 of 52

Facts

On August 2 2013 the NDRC penalized Abbott for monopolistic price-fixing and then Abbott made a price adjustment in China where the prices of main products were reduced

On December 16 2014 Tian Junwei (ldquoTianrdquo) a Chinese citizen in Beijing sued Carrefour Shuangjing Branch (ldquoCarrefourrdquo) and Abbott (Shanghai) Sales Company (ldquoAbbottrdquo) at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (ldquoIP Courtrdquo) for their monopolistic price-fixing which damaged his interests However Carrefour and Abbott challenged the jurisdiction of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court They claimed there were two reasons Firstly according to the jurisdiction rules of the IP court issued by the Supreme Court the IP court has no jurisdiction over anti-trust cases Secondly if this case is a contractual dispute the court that is in the place of Carrefour should hear it if this case is a tort dispute the Shanghai Intermediate Court should hear it

In the ruling of the IP Court the IP Court decided it has the jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases for the following reasons According to the Provisions On Causes Of Action In Civil Cases issued by Supreme Court (最高人民法院案由规定) antimonopoly dispute is a tertiary cause of action belonging to IP and competition disputes Also according to the Provisions concerning the Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京

市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问题的规定 ) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was an IP and competition dispute and was sued after November 6 2014 Thus the IP Court had jurisdiction

Both Carrefour and Abbott appealed to the Beijing High Court over the jurisdiction ruling but the Beijing High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original ruling Reasons are listed in the written ruling issued on June 18 2015 Firstly the nature of the case was an antimonopoly dispute In accordance with Provisions of the Supreme Peoples Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民

事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) and Civil Litigation Law the monopolistic civil disputes in the first instance shall be under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Peoples Courts and an action involving a contractual dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the peoples court of the place where the defendant is domiciled or where the contract is performed Carrefour as the defendant in this case is domiciled in Chaoyang District Beijing Therefore the courts of Beijing have jurisdiction over this case Secondly according to article 3 of the Notification on the Jurisdiction of Intellectual Property Courts issued by Supreme Court (关于知识产权法院案件管辖

等有关问题的通知) IP courts have jurisdiction over first-instance civil disputes arising from monopolistic practices Lastly according to Provisions concerning the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 16 of 52

3) Seagate shall continue to provide more innovative products and solutions to clients

This announcement will be effective within two years from the date of issuance If Seagate can provide sufficient evidence to prove substantial change in the market environment the company can propose to MOFCOM to remove relevant conditions within the two years

FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM15

MOFCOM deems that this acquisition would induce anti-competitive influence

NXP promises to dispose its radio frequency (ldquoRFrdquo) power transistor business

As the first case approved with structural remedies after the enactment of the Provisions on Imposing Restrictive Conditions MOFCOM conducted a comprehensive evaluation of the viability competitiveness and marketability of the divested business as well as the suitability of potential buyers

Facts

On April 3 2015 NXP filed for its acquisition of Freescale NXP Semiconductor (ldquoNXPrdquo) is a NASDAQ-listed company registered in the Netherlands which engages in the design manufacturing and sale of integration circuits and discrete components

Freescale Semiconductor (ldquoFreescalerdquo) is a New York-listed company registered in Bermuda and based in the US which engages in the manufacturing and RampD of microcontroller and digital networking processors (embedded processors)

According to the agreement between NXP and Freescale after closing Freescale will become the wholly owned subsidiary of NXP On November 25 2015 MOFCOM decided to clear this acquisition with remedies

Relevant Market

As per the announcement the relevant product markets are the general microcontroller automotive power-use analog integrated circuit and RF transistor product markets in which NXP and Freescale have horizontal overlap The relevant geographical markets should be the global market

Competition Analysis

After assessing this proposed deal the agency concluded that

1) The proposed deal would boost NXPrsquos market control power in the RF

15 The original Chinese notice published by MOFCOM is available at httpfldjmofcomgovcnarticleztxx20151120151101196182shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 17 of 52

transistor product market because the global and Chinese RF transistor product markets share a similar structure both featuring few competitors and high concentration levels Freescale and NXP as the number one and number two players are far ahead of their rivals in the market Therefore after closing the market control power of NXP in this market would be strengthened

2) Since Freescale was the fiercest competitor of NXP the proposed deal will remove competition between them

3) The proposed deal would reduce the options for clients and increase procurement risks

In practice the wireless infrastructure suppliers as the main client of the RF transistor product tend to procure products from both NXP and Freescale to prevent them from the risk arising from relying on one supplier

4) The proposed deal may induce an adverse impact on the technology RampD and innovation

Remedies

In accordance with MOFCOMrsquos decision NXP shall follow its written commitment submitted to MOFCOM and completely divest its RF power transistor business to Beijing Jianguang Asset Management At the same time NXP shall strictly fulfil its obligations during the transition period It is worth noting that the NXPFreescale deal shall only be implemented after the divestment deal has been concluded

In addition MOFCOM requires NXP to perform relevant obligations during the transition period from the date of approval announcement until the divestment deal has been concluded NXP shall endeavour

1) not to engage in any lsquounfair trade practicesrsquo relating to the divested business

2) not to implement any acts which may have a significant adverse impact on the value management or competitiveness of the divested business or any acts which may change the nature and scope industry or business strategy or investment policy of the divested business and to take reasonable measures to encourage core employees to stay in the divested business as well as not to seek or transfer employees to NXPrsquos non-divested business

3) to ensure supply to the divested business in a fair reasonable and non-discriminatory manner and

4) to maintain the independence of the divested business and not to exchange competitively sensitive information between the parties and the divested

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 18 of 52

business

B Monopolistic Agreements

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

With respect to the enforcement activities of the NDRC in light of the numbers of the published cases it seems that the law enforcement frequency of the NDRC regarding monopolistic agreements in 2015 is lower in comparison with 2014

The reason behind might be that the outstanding issue of human resource deficit of the antitrust authority still exists Besides the fact that more enterprises gradually attach increasing importance to the antitrust compliance might be another reason for the decrease in the number of cases investigated by the authorities

As to the enforcement activities of the SAIC 4 of 14 cases concluded by the SAIC and its local branches in 2015 are relevant to monopolistic agreements Meanwhile these four cases concern horizontal monopolistic agreements

It is noteworthy however that the Mercedes-Benz case and the Dongfeng Nissan case suggest that vertical agreements especially involving price-related restrictions on the downstream dealers is still the priority of antitrust enforcement Companies shall be very cautious when imposing restrictions on the resale prices or the minimum resale prices of commodities in the distribution agreements

Automobile industry and related industries are observed to be under continuous attention of Chinarsquos antitrust authorities

The industries relating to peoplersquos livelihoods remain to be the enforcement priority

Significant Cases

Enforcement by the NDRC and its local branches

Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC16

The investigation was triggered by a leniency application

The first leniency applicant was exempted from punishment

Eight ocean shipping companies involved were imposed a collective fine of CNY 4067 million

NDRC spent approximately 12 months to investigate and conclude the case 16 NDRCrsquos press release of the case is available at httpjjsndrcgovcngzdt201512t20151228_769084html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 19 of 52

Facts

In December 2015 the NDRC published its official punishment decisions regarding the cartel case in connection with eight ocean shipping companies namely Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha (ldquoNYKrdquo) Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha (ldquoK Linerdquo) Mitsui OSK Lines EUKOR Car Carriers Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics Compantildeiacutea Sud Americana de Vapores Eastern Car Liner and Compantildeiacutea Chilena de Navegacioacuten Interoceaacutenica

According to the official press release of the NDRC the investigation was triggered by a leniency application of NYK The evidence showed that the eight companies reached consensus on non-intrusion of each others existing business to maintain or increase shipping fees when shipping goods such as cars trucks and engineering machinery in the routes between China and other countries and regions

They were also found to frequently conduct bilateral or multilateral communications on the shippersrsquo invitation for bids andor price inquiries via phone conferences dinner parties e-mails visiting etc In addition they also conducted illegal behaviour such as sensitive information exchange price negotiations bidding intention discussion dividing clients and shipping routes reaching agreements on high price bids or non-bidding in order to help certain companies gain shipping orders

To avoid the regulation of the antitrust authority the relevant shipping companies adopted various illicit measures that showed their apparent intention to violate the AML The cartel lasted for at least four years and covered a broad range of shipping routes concerned with the import and export of products between China and other regions such as North America EU South America and so on involving multiple auto brands and engineering machinery brands

The NDRC held the opinion that the eight companies conducts had restricted and eliminated competition in the relevant market raising the international shipping fees and impairing interests of shippers and end consumers The eight companies breached the AML by reaching and implementing monopolistic agreements on fixing prices and dividing the market

All eight investigated companies put forward remedy measures including enhancing the antitrust compliance program arranging more antitrust compliance trainings and developing antitrust compliance technologies

The NDRC imposed fines based on the nature level and duration of their monopolistic volations as well as their respective sales of international freight service sales relevant to the Chinese market The companies involved were collectively fined CNY 4067 million

NYK as the first cartel member voluntarily reporting the illegal conducts to the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 20 of 52

authority and providing significant evidence was entirely exempted from the punishment K Line as the second leniency applicant was imposed a fine amounting to 4 of its 2014 annual sales of international freight services relevant to Chinarsquos import and export market The details of punishments imposed on the involved companies by the NDRC are as follow

Company Name Amount of Fines (RMB million)

Percentage of the Relevant Turnovers

Grounds

Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha

- - First leniency applicant

Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha

2398 4 Second leniency applicant

Mitsui OSK Lines 3812 7 Third leniency applicant

EUKOR Car Carriers 284 9 Lasted over a long period involved many brands and many violations violations were severe

Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics

4506 8 Lasted over a long period involved many brands and many violations violations were severe

Compantildeiacutea Sud Americana de Vapores

308 6 Lasted over a long period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Eastern Car Liner 1127 5 Lasted over a long period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Compantildeiacutea Chilena de 120 4 Lasted over a long

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 21 of 52

Navegacioacuten Interoceaacutenica

period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Total 4067

Analysis

In this case the agency applied the AML instead of the Tenders and Bids Law to collusive bidding Citing article 13 (3) of the AML the NDRC identified that the collusive bidding constituted a division of the sales market

The leading three leniency applicants were granted exemption from fines to a varying degree

According to the official who handled this case dawn raids performed by antitrust enforcement agencies in other jurisdictions drew the attention of the NDRC on the cartels of these shipping companies However there was limited effective evidence to prove that the companies had reached monopolistic agreements Through pressuring the involved parties three members of the shipping cartel actively confessed their illegal conduct This case once again stresses the significance of international cooperation between antitrust enforcement agencies

Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau17

The distribution agreements between Mercedes-Benz and its dealers are determined as vertical monopolistic agreement and Mercedes-Benz violated article 14 of the AML because it restricted the ability of its dealers to decide their own resale prices

Mercedes-Benzrsquos dealers violated article of 13 of the AML due to concluding a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Mercedes-Benz and its dealers were jointly fined CNY 3578 million

Facts

In April 2015 Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau which is the provincial branch of the NDRC released the punishment on its website and announced that it had imposed a fine of CNY 350 million on Mercedes-Benz along with the aggregated fine of CNY 787 million on its dealers The fine came as a result of Mercedes-Benz reaching and implementing resale price maintenance (ldquoRPMrdquo) agreements with dealers to fix the minimum resale price of several car models as well as certain auto parts 17 The original Chinese notice published by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau is available at httpwwwjswjjgovcnoffice_neweo_comm_zxnrxsphp

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 22 of 52

According to the decision the authority found that Mercedes-Benz fixed the minimum resale price of Class E and Class S cars in Nanjing Wuxi Changzhou and Suzhou markets through telephoneverbal communication and dealers meetings from January 2013 to July 2014 Since 2010 Mercedes-Benz had reached agreements with dealers in Jiangsu province to fix the minimum resale prices for auto parts by providing different levels of discounts for insured cars cars involving expired warranty periods and cars within the warranty period

In addition Mercedes-Benz implemented the minimum resale price maintaining agreement by

1) Tightening its monitoring measures on the dealers such as inspecting deals and their sale incentive system on a weekly basis

2) Tracking the sales process flow of cars and increasing the intensity of this assessment

3) Giving warnings and reducing support ndash for example halting the supply of bestselling cars and prohibiting the opening of new stores ndash to dealers if dealers refused to cooperate with the price-fixing related policies and measures and

4) Interviewing personnel of the dealers and requesting terminations if the staff engaged in serious violations of the RPM agreement

Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau concluded that Mercedes-Benz had excluded and eliminated market competition harmed consumer welfare and consequently violated article 1418 of the AML The authority therefore imposed a fine of CNY 350 million representing 7 of the sale revenue of the previous year in the relevant market against Mercedes-Benz and imposed a fine on the dealers amounting to an equivalence of 1 of the annual sales in the previous year

Analysis

Although the agency also addressed the horizontal violation among the dealers in this case the administrative penalty decision mainly focuses on the vertical violation The agency fined dealers involved in the RPM agreement a combined CNY 787 million equal to 1 of the previous-year sales which suggests that the agency decided to give lighter punishments to dealers who took initiative in reporting the activity and provided evidence

The Mercedes-Benz case is the third case where the agency successfully 18 Article 14 of the AML The following monopolistic agreements between operators and trading partners shall be prohibited (i) fixing the resale prices of commodities to third persons (ii) restricting the minimum resale prices of commodities to third persons (iii) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement Authority under the State Council

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 23 of 52

discovered both vertical and horizontal agreements in a case following the Audi case and the Chrysler case All these cases are rooted in the same industry indicating that industrial features play a large role in raising anti-trust concerns In fact it appears that the entire automotive industry is under antitrust scrutiny

Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC19

This case involved both a horizontal agreement and an administrative monopoly

A total fine of CNY 1318 million was imposed on the involved companies

Facts

In June 2015 the NDRC through its website announced the decision made by its regional branch -Yunnan Provincial Development and Reform Commission (ldquoYunnan DRCrdquo) regarding the horizontal monopolistic agreement case involving Yunnan Communications Administration and local subsidiaries of four state-owned telecommunication companies

Through the investigation Yunnan DRC found that Yunnan Communications Administration as a competent government agency had organized several meetings involving Yunnan branches of four state-owned telecoms - China Mobile China Telecom China Unicom and China Tietong in August and September of 2014 At the end of 2009 the four local branches entered into an agreement to regulate their sales promotions in terms of limiting the promotional items amount and frequency

Furthermore the agreement provides certain measures to ensure the implementation of relevant restrictions on promotions Specifically in case any cartel member violates the agreement the others could file complaints with Yunnan Communications Administration and the agency would then issue a rectification notice to the rule-breaker

Yunnan DRC stated that the four telecoms were main competitors in the relevant market and the promotions as a significant competition measure would exert direct influence on the final prices of the products The horizontal agreement organized by Yunnan Communications Administration on sales promotions restricted the competition capacity of telecoms and as a result eliminated the competition in the relevant market Consequently the behaviour of Yunnan Communications Administration violated article 8 20 of the AML and constituted administrative monopoly in terms of ldquoforcing undertakings to conduct monopolistic behaviour prohibited by the AMLrdquo

19 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpwwwsdpcgovcnfzgggzjgjdyfldjjszhdt201506t20150602_694802html 20 Article 8 of the AML Administrative organs and the public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 24 of 52

With respect to the penalties Yunnan DRC fined the local branch of China Tietong CNY 200000 for reaching but not implementing the agreement in regards to the other three telecoms a total fine of CNY 1298 million amounting to 2 of the sales of the relevant business in the previous year were imposed for entering into and implementing the horizontal monopolistic agreement

Analysis

The telecoms industry is still the enforcement priority of the antitrust enforcement authorities A company cannot be exempted from punishment even though it is forced by competent authorities to conduct monopoly behaviour

DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC21

Both a horizontal monopolistic agreement and a vertical monopolistic agreement were involved in this case

A total fine of CNY 14242 million was imposed on DongFeng Nissan and its distributors

Facts

In September 2015 the Guangdong Development and Reform Commission (ldquoGuangdong DRCrdquo) released an announcement regarding the administrative penalties on DongFeng Nissan and its provincial distributors for concluding price-related monopolistic agreements More specifically DongFeng Nissan was imposed a fine of CNY 1233 million for breaching article 14 of the AML in terms of restricting the resale price of certain car models 17 distributors domiciled in Guangdong were collectively fined CNY 1912 million for violating article 1322 of the AML in terms of entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements

According to the published official release the Guangdong DRC launched the investigation in August 2014 The authority discovered that from 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissan had set a rigorous restriction on its distributorsrsquo abilities to determine the resale prices of certain car models including the quoted prices in various platforms and the final resale price In addition DongFeng Nissan punished the distributors that failed to abide by such price restrictions in 2013 The authority 21 The original Chinese notice published by Guangdong DRC is available at httpwwwgddpcgovcnzwgkgzdtgzyw201509t20150910_328993html 22 Article 13 of the AML The following Monopolistic agreements among competing operators shall be prohibited (i) fix or change prices of commodities (ii) limit the outputs or sales volume of commodities (iii) segment the sales markets or the raw material purchasing markets (iv) limit the purchase of new technology new facilities or limit the development of new products new technology (v) jointly boycott transactions (vi) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-Monopoly Law enforcement Authority Monopolistic agreements in this Law refer to agreements decisions or other concerted practices that eliminate restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 25 of 52

believed that the vertical agreement concluded between DongFeng Nissan and its distributors eliminated and restricted the competition in the relevant market and damaged the consumer welfare as well which violates article 14 of the AML

Furthermore from April 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissanrsquos distributors in Guangdong province held multiple meetings to discuss issues relevant to sale price reached and implemented a horizontal monopolistic agreement in terms of fixing the prices of some car models which is prohibited by article 13 of the AML

Considering that both DongFeng Nissan and the involved distributors positively cooperated with the investigation and ceased the illegal behaviour immediately after the investigation Guangdong DRC decided to impose a fine amounting to 3 of its previous yearrsquos turnovers on DongFeng Nissan and a fine ranging from 2 to 4 on the relevant distributors in accordance with articles 4623 and 4924 of the AML

Analysis

This case demonstrates that auto and related industries are still under close attention of the authority Considering the NDRCrsquos successful series of antitrust investigations conducted throughout the auto industry it is observed that the agency currently overseeing price-related antitrust issues in China has accumulated a substantial amount of experience regarding antitrust enforcement in the auto industry Now is the right time to speed up the law-making process by amending the set of rules released earlier and drafting new laws to advise the auto industry on antitrust compliance

Enforcement by the SAIC and its local branches

Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC25

The investigation was triggered by whistle blowerrsquos submission

Cartel members were collectively fined CNY 139 million 23 Article 46 of the AML In case the operators violate the relevant provisions of this Law concluding and implementing Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall order the operators to cease such act impose fines more than 1 but less than 10 of the total turnover in the preceding year and confiscate the illegal gains where the Monopolistic agreement is not implemented a fine less than RMB 500000 can be imposed If the operators involved in Monopolistic agreement on its own initiative report information concerning the conclusion of Monopolistic agreements and provide important evidences to the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority they may be given a mitigated punishment or be exempted from punishment in accordance with the circumstances Where the industrial associations violate this Law organizing the operators in the industry to conclude Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority may impose a fine less than RMB 500000 in serious circumstances the agency of social organization administration and registration may cancel its registration 24 Article 49 of the AML As for the imposition of the fines stipulated by the Article 46 47 and 48 of this Law the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall take elements such as the nature extent and time it lasts of the illegal act into consideration in determining the specific amount of the fines 25 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201506t20150601_156889html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 26 of 52

Facts

In April 2015 the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) issued administrative penalties on several brick manufacturers for entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements This is the first case relevant to monopolistic agreements that has been publicized by the SAIC since the beginning of this year

Ten cartel members were involved in the case including one company and nine individuals Similar with most antitrust cases the investigation started as a result of a whistle blowerrsquos submission After a thorough investigation Hunan AIC found that those local brick manufacturers had reached agreements on controlling production volume and dividing sales areas in the forms of production and sales agreements plans and meeting minutes

The enforcement authority reached the conclusion that these brick manufacturers violated article 13 of the AML and imposed a total fine of CNY 1389400 on them

Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC26

The organizer of the monopolistic agreement the animation association was fined CNY 100000

The antitrust authority did not punish the members of the monopolistic agreement

Facts

In December 2015 the Guangdong Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoGuangdong AICrdquo) published its administrative punishment decision in regards to Guangzhou Panyu Animation amp Game Association (ldquoGAGArdquo) organizing member companies to conclude a monopolistic agreement

According to the decision GAGA drafted the ldquoAgreement of Exhibition Alliancerdquo (ldquoAgreementrdquo) and convened a conference with member companies in order to discuss the content and conclusion of the Agreement 52 member companies entered into the Agreement which actually requested the alliance companies to merely participate in the exhibitions either organized or supported by GAGA in Guangzhou In addition the Agreement prohibited the alliance companies from attending any other exhibition except if they obtained prior approval of GAGA

After a thorough investigation Guangdong AIC believed that the conclusion of the Agreement among GAGA and the 52 member companies violated article 13 (5) of the AML in terms of boycott GAGA who was deeply involved and restricted member companiesrsquo choice of exhibitions through the Agreement could be deemed as

26 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151208_164680html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 27 of 52

the participant and organizer of the monopolistic agreement In accordance with article 46 of the AML Guangdong AIC imposed a fine of CNY 100000 on GAGA for organizing the conclusion of the monopolistic agreement

Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC27

Hubei AIC considered the coinsurance for Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance illegal

Twelve insurance companies were fined CNY 469 million in total

Facts

In December 2015 the Hubei Administrative for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHubei AICrdquo) disclosed its punishment on 12 insurance companies for signing illegal coinsurance agreements

The disclosed punishment decision suggests that the Hubei branch of China Pacific Life Insurance (ldquothe Companyrdquo) 11 other insurance companies and Wuhan Construction Safety Technology Consultation Center (ldquoWCSTCCrdquo) signed a Coinsurance Agreement on Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance (ldquoCoinsurance Agreementrdquo) of which the main contents include

1) The Company and 11 other involved companies as the coinsurers jointly take charge of the personal accident insurance concerned with the construction project directly administered by the Wuhan government WCSTCC is responsible for providing safety professionalism and technology services regarding the relevant personal accident insurance

2) The Company as the chief insurer of the coinsurance occupies 12 of the total amount of the insurance and the other 11 companies respectively occupy 8

3) The Company as the representative of the coinsurance is in charge of collecting the premium signing the standard form insurance policies and issuing the invoice in its own name The Company should share the charged premium with the other companies in accordance with the Coinsurance Agreement

4) Both the Company and the other insurance companies should pay 25 of the actually received premium to WCSTCC as the service fee WCSTCC will assist the coinsurers in providing safety and technology management service to the insured In addition the 11 insurance companies should pay 5 of their premium to the Company as the management fee

27 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165445html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 28 of 52

5) In case an accident happens the 12 companies will jointly bear the damages based on their respective shares in the coinsurance

6) There is a contact mechanism established in the coinsurance The coinsurers will regularly hold coinsurance conferences to discuss existing problems

Furthermore the coinsurers and WCSTCC also signed a self-discipline agreement and established a complete management system to assure the implementation of the Coinsurance Agreement Any party violating the Coinsurance Agreement would be punished

Hubei AIC found that WCSTCC was solely invested by Wuhan Construction Safety Management Association which was under Wuhan Construction Commission The centre helped implement certain functions of the Wuhan Urban Construction Safety Management Station and was responsible for quality supervision and safety supervision of municipal construction projects

It later became a prerequisite for construction companies to purchase insurance from any member of the coinsurance in order to get approval to commence their project According to the decision Hubei AIC launched another separate investigation against WCSTCC

Through the investigation Hubei AIC concluded that the Coinsurance Agreement constituted a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by article 13 of the AML with the following analysis

First coinsurance as a common business model to jointly share and lower risks is widely adopted in the insurance industry A coinsurance arrangement for a specific project in order to avoid high risks faced by one insurer could be legal However coinsurance should not target the entire market In this case prior to the Coinsurance Agreement the risks of the construction projects were unpredictable since the scale of the construction projects the difficulty of the construction and the amount of construction workers could not be available It is impossible to predict the risks of the projects thus it is not necessary to cooperate with other insurers to collectively bear the risks The purpose of the 12 insurance companies to establish the coinsurance is to avoid the competition which demonstrates the Coinsurance Agreement belongs to a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by the AML

Second the companies through entering into the coinsurance agreement actually divided the relevant market of construction project personal accident insurance in Wuhan city which affected the competition in the relevant market and damaged the interests of other competitors and the consumers In particular the Construction Law as amended in 2011 stipulates that the purchase of personal accident insurance is not mandatory and the construction companies have the right to choose whether to buy the said insurance or not As mentioned purchasing insurance from the coinsurance had been the prerequisite for construction companies to obtain administration

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 29 of 52

approval for the project which seriously distorts the fair competition in the market

Citing article 46 of the AML the 12 insurance companies were collectively fined CNY 469 million including fines on the companies and confiscation of illegal gains It is noteworthy that the fines were calculated based on the companiesrsquo 2014 annual sales of the insurance product in connection with the coinsurance The Company as the chief insurer was fined amounting to 6 of its 2014 annual sales of the relevant insurance product in the coinsurance and other companies were fined amounting to 2 of relevant sales For more specific information please see the following table

Company Name (Hubei Branch)

Fines (CNY million)

Percentage of the sales

Illegal Gains (CNY

million)

China Pacific Life Insurance 00653 6 0941

Sino Life 00145 2 04332

Alltrust Insurance 00145 2 04332

Taikang Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Continent Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Pacific Property Insurance

00145 2 04332

China Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

PICC Property and Casualty 00145 2 02599

Taiping General Insurance 00145 2 013

Union Life Insurance 00145 2 01177

Ping An Annuity Insurance Company of China

00145 2 04201

Ping An Property amp Casualty Insurance Company of China

00145 2 -

Subtotal 02248 - 44679

Total 46927

Analysis

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 30 of 52

Coinsurance as an effective approach to lower risks of insurers is widely used in the insurance industry Information sharing and agreements on coinsurance were generally considered efficient and legitimate However from an antitrust perspective coinsurance may raise competition concerns depending on the circumstances of each agreement In the case that there is enough capacity for one insurer to cover the potential risks the coinsurance might be considered as entering into a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC28

The first leniency applicant was exempted from fines

The other concrete companies were imposed a fine of CNY 180000

Facts

In December 2015 the concrete companies monopolistic agreement case investigated by Hunan AIC was published on SAICrsquos website

In accordance with the antitrust enforcement announcement of SAIC this case was triggered by complaints from the Yongzhou City peoplersquos congress After the preliminary review the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) initiated the formal investigation on seven concrete companies domiciled in Yongzhou City Hunan Province which were suspected of being involved in a monopolistic agreement in terms of division of the volumes of the products

After further investigation Hunan AIC found that the seven concrete companies concluded a partnership agreement in 2011 which requested the involved companies to enter into a partnership business with assets In addition according to the partnership agreement it was planned to establish a comprehensive office to manage production marketing and distribution of the products of all the partners The seven companies intended to jointly adjust and control the output of concrete based on the partnership agreement However because there were disagreements over the allocation of the injected assets and market shares the companies did not implement the partnership agreement The agreement was cancelled in December 2012

Based on the findings Hunan AIC concluded that the seven concrete companies as competitors of each other restricted and eliminated the competition in the relevant market through reaching the partnership agreement and dividing the volumes of sales which violated article 13(3) of the AML in terms of division of sales market Considering that the agreement had not been implemented and the limited influence of the agreement according to article 46 of the AML and article 27 of the Administrative Penalties Law small amount fines were imposed on the involved companies Six companies were fined CNY 30000 each for their illegal behaviour 28 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165504html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 31 of 52

Yongzhou Shuangyuan Building Materials Co Ltd as the first one to actively report the monopolistic agreement and cooperate with the enforcement authority was exempted from the punishment

Outlook

It is expected that the AMLrsquos enforcement on monopolistic agreements will continue in the future Industries such as automobile shipping pharmaceuticals insurance etc will still remain the priority of the antitrust enforcement

The antitrust enforcement authorities have published a series of regulations in order to clarify the substantial and procedural issues relevant to the antitrust enforcement However Chinarsquos current antitrust legislation regime is still immature In the following years we expect that more attention will be paid to the legislative improvements

Another remarkable issue for cartel members is that with more Chinese enterprises attaching increasing importance to the AML the follow-on civil damages actions might become a tendency in the future

C Abuse of Market Dominance

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen a decent increase of abuse of market dominance cases both in public enforcement and private litigation Oftentimes the authorities responsible for public enforcement generally find it difficult to pursue investigations against abuse of market dominance cases The following two main reasons are often cited to explain this standoff first it is hard for the authorities to define the relevant markets and prove the undertaking(s)rsquo dominant market position through economic approaches second it is hard to collect evidence regarding abusive practices

The cases related to IPRs abuse are emerging significantly particularly in the telecommunication media and technology (ldquoTMTrdquo) sectors

The SAICrsquos latest refusal-to-deal probe against a local drug maker shows that the SAIC and its local branches have increasingly acquired a profile as an abuse of dominance regulator

Significant Cases

Cases pursued by the SAIC

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 32 of 52

Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case29

Facts

The local authority in Dongfang city reported to the Hainan provincial branch of SAIC on April 23 2014 of the suspected dominance abuse The SAIC authorized its Hainan bureau to officially investigate the matter on 25 July 2014 according to a decision dated January 9 2015 The AIC concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its market dominance by requiring users to pay a deposit without any legal basis and or justifiable reasons

In terms of the relevant product market the local authority found that in this case it was the urban water supply market in Dongfang city and its surrounding townships where Dongfang Water was the sole public operator in the local water supply market with a 100 market share which made all water users completely reliant on the companyrsquos supply In term of market access the local authority found it very unlikely that there were other operators due to the strict regulations

The Hainan SAIC then concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its dominance as it charged users a deposit by threatening to refuse to register users and also by threatening to restrict the water supply Dongfang Waters charging of deposits lacked a legal basis and hadnt received government approval to the detriment of household consumers and business water users and hampered the improvement of management and services of the company Such conduct was in breach of Chinarsquos Anti-Monopoly Law

Hainan AIC levied a fine of CNY 593208 a lighter penalty equivalent to 2 of the companyrsquos annual sales for the previous year and confiscated illicit gains of CNY 38521 for abuse of market dominance

Analysis

It is noteworthy that although handled by a local authority supervised by the SAIC the antitrust agency detailed the relevant market definition the assessment of the dominant market position the abusive practices and the scrutiny of the justifiable reasons

Although the definition of the relevant market and the reasoning of the Hainan provincial AIC and the SAIC are subject to criticism it is still applausive to see that the antitrust regulators have realized the importance of the application of rule of reason in an abuse case In addition through itrsquos a published decision practitioners may observe the regulatorsrsquo reasoning and thus transparency and legal certainty have been generated

29 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzfcfjd201502t20150212_152066html last visited on October 18 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 33 of 52

Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms30

Facts

In June 2013 the Ningxia AIC under authorization of SAIC opened an antitrust investigation into the alleged tie-in sales by the three major state-owned telecommunications operators China Tietong China Unicom and China Telecom for the tie-in sale of fixed-line telephones with broadband Internet services The Ningxia AIC found that the three companies had bundled fixed-line phone services with Internet services to subscribers

During the investigation all three telecommunications companies admitted the tie-in practice had recognized that such practice had improper influence on competition and deprived the choices of consumers The three companies promised to undertake internal rectification timely and eliminate the ill effects resulting from such practice The parties committed to taking the following corrective measures

1) Taking internal rectifications and conducting training to staff about antitrust laws and stop tie-in sales practices

2) Making public commitments to allow subscribers a free choice of services and strengthening the propaganda through the operating room call centre and other channels

3) Unbundling fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

The Ningxia AIC decided to suspend the probe on 14 May 2015 on the grounds that the three companies had actively worked together with the investigators and proposed workable remedy plans

Analysis

In the official announcement Ningxia AIC concluded that the purpose of antitrust enforcement is to restrain monopolistic conducts the protection of competition and to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of consumers Given that during the investigation process the parties had actively cooperated with the investigation formed a more profound understanding of the dangers of tying behaviour and moreover the parties proposed and implemented positive corrective measures to be able to remove the ill impact of their actions the agency believed that the purpose of antitrust law enforcement was fulfilled

It is worth noting that the Ningxia AIC also required the three companies to implement the commitment by August 30 2015and the submission of the written

30 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158908html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158906html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158910html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 34 of 52

implementation report on July 102015 and August 102015 respectively which is another illustration that an effective commitment by the undertakings shall directly deal with the effect that is brought by the monopolistic behaviour In this case the effect of the monopolistic act was restricted to the choice of the consumers therefore the commitment by the undertaking aimed at allowing the freedom of choice and the unbundling of fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company31

Facts

The Liaoning AIC imposed a fine of approximately CNY 433m on the Fushun Branch of Liaoning Tobacco Co on 1 June 2015 The agency also ordered the company to stop its illicit behaviour

The Liaoning AIC received a tip-off that the accused Liaoning Tobacco Corsquos Fushun branch was conducting tie-in sales of non-high-demand cigarette brands with high-demand cigarette brands After gaining authorization from SAIC the agency officially started an investigation regarding the companyrsquos suspected abuse of market dominance in June 2014

Analysis

According to the announcement the tobacco company argued that the tobacco industry is a state controlled or monopolized industry with a lawful monopolistic position therefore the company shall not be subject to the norms of general market competition rules or the anti-monopoly law

In this regards the agency concluded that in terms of the status of the undertaking admittedly the first paragraph of article 17 of the AML says that the State shall protect the lawful business operations of undertakings in these industries with respect to the industries which are under the control of the State-owned economic sector and have a bearing on the lifeline of the national economy or national security and the industries which exercise monopoly over the production and sale of certain commodities according to law However the second paragraph continues to say that the undertakings mentioned above shall do business according to law be honest faithful and strictly self-disciplined and subject themselves to public supervision and they shall not harm the consumers interests by taking advantage of their position of control or their monopolistic production and sale of certain commodities In particular in the preceding paragraph the ldquolawful businessrdquo and ldquoaccording to lawrdquo imply that the AML shall apply in the business operation The agency therefore believes that

31 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201508t20150813_16

0208html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 35 of 52

there shall be no exemption for the undertaking concerned the defences of the undertaking concerned is not established

Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm32

Facts

The Chongqing AIC fined Chongqing Qingyang Pharmaceutical CNY 439308 for alleged dominance abuse

The investigation was initiated when the company contacted the agency for verification on its potential breach of the AML related to an allopurinol active pharmaceuticals ingredient (API) distribution agreement with its exclusive distributor The company provided the relevant agreement and information and the agency conducted an investigation into the company and some other relevant companies

Analysis

Relevant Market

During the investigation the agency found that pharmaceutical ingredients are a special commodity the API is used to produce the preparations The chemical API is only used for the production of the preparation and could be used as a medicine for clinic use

The preparation is produced according to the requirements of certain form of prepared drugs and for the purpose of treatment and prevention which can be used as medicine

The allopurinol is used for the common treatment of hyperuricemia However the other treatments are different in pharmacological effects or treatment effects as well as in the cost for the patient Furthermore the company is the only manufacturer and supplier in the market nationwide since July 2012 Therefore the agency concluded that the relevant market is the allopurinol API market

Considering that the qualification for manufacturing the allopurinol API is national wide and the normal practice for purchasers and suppliers is domestic the relevant geographic market is the Chinese market

The Market Dominance

During the investigation the agency found that the company is the only supplier and manufacturer of allopurinol API in China there is no other competitor in the

32 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151222_16

5152html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 36 of 52

market and the company has a monopoly in the market The evidence shows that the company has the ability to control the prices the position for the downstream is relatively weak

With respect to the market entry the agency found that the market entry is relatively high in addition other undertakings are dependent on the company Thus the agency believed the company to have market dominance

Refusal to Deal

The agency found that on September 25 2015 the company reached an exclusive agreement and distribution agreement with its distributor Based on these agreements the company didnrsquot supply allopurinol API to the said distributor and other companies despite the fact that those companies requested for allopurinol API but were turned down by the company

Absence of Reasonable Cause

The agency found that the companyrsquos refusal to deal was not in line with the needs of normal business operation or economic efficiency On the other hand the refusal to deal was aimed at increasing the market share of the allopurinol drug product Also the agency found that the stop of supply was a manipulation of market power as to maximize the profit to the most The agency further found that the exclusive distribution agreement with suspension of supply for six months and the refusal to supply was to eliminate and restrict the competition as to gain the monopolistic profit

The Consequence of Refusal to Deal

The agency concluded that the refusal to deal harmed the competition of the allopurinol preparations market Because of the suspension of supply many demanders had to reduce their production or switch to the supply of other products or stop their production The suspension of supply affected the competition of the downstream market Consequently the raising of the price of allopurinol API also raised the cost for other manufacturers of allopurinol preparations

Furthermore the refusal to deal led to capacity loss of the allopurinol preparation industry

Ultimately the refusal to deal increased the burden on consumers as the refusal to supply changed the supply-demand relationship in the market

The agency concluded that the Company abused its dominant position in the allopurinol API market by refusing to deal with intended buyers in the period between October 2013 and March 2014Therefore the Company violated article 17 (1) of the AML which prohibits business operators with a dominant market position from abusing that position such as the refusal to deal without any justifications

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 37 of 52

D Administrative Monopoly

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 witnessed antitrust authoritiesrsquo significant efforts regarding the enforcement against administrative monopoly According to Mr Dong Zhiming the deputy director general of Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly Bureau ever since the AML coming into force six cases in connection with administrative monopoly were investigated by NDRC and among them five cases were handled in the year of 2015 These cases touched abuses of administrative power in terms of designative deal in relation to transportation communication and pharmaceutical industries

The first private litigation related to administrative monopolistic acts was heard in the court which is a milestone case in the enforcement of the AML

Significant Cases

Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC33

Facts

In March 2015 the NDRC released the official letter to Shandong Provincial Department of Transportation (ldquoShandong DOTrdquo) on its website with respect to correct its abuse of administrative power to exclude and restrict competition

During the investigation the NDRC found that since 2011 Shandong DOT had issued multiple relevant government orders in order to require certain types of vehicles to be directly connected to two designated information and service platforms both of which are operated and technically supported by one company namely Shandong Jiutong Internet of Things Technology Co Ltd (ldquoJiutong ITTrdquo) Furthermore according to the orders issued by the competent administrative department all the vehicle satellite positioning terminals entering into Shandong provincial market should be debugged through the said technology service platform which is operated by the mentioned company In addition Shandong DOT released the cap prices of vehicle satellite positioning terminals which is identical to the 2012 bid-winning price in the Ministry of Transportation demonstration project

The NDRC believed that Shandong DOTrsquos behaviour eliminated and restricted the competition in the monitoring platform market and the vehicle terminal market deprived the right of transportation enterprises to choose vehicle terminals and monitoring platform on their owns unreasonably raised the sales prices of vehicle terminals and service fees charged by the platform and increased the costs of transportation enterprises Therefore the antitrust agency concluded that Shandong

33 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201503t20150327_668911html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 38 of 52

DOT violated article 8 of the AML which stipulates that ldquoadministrative organs and the public organizations with an administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude and restrict competitionrdquo Specifically Shandong DOT violated article 3234 in terms of requiring organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any designated operators and violated article 3735 in terms of setting rules with contents which eliminate and restrict competition

Based on article 51 of the AML ldquoWhere administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations abuse administrative powers performing activities which exclude and restrict competition the superior entity shall order it to correct impose administrative penalty on the chief officer and other staffs directly responsible pursuant to the laws The AML enforcement authority may give recommendations on disposal of activities to the relevant superior entityrdquo the NDRC proposed in writing that the Shandong provincial government should order Shandong DOT to rectify its behaviour with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Entirely open up the monitoring platform market by permitting transportation undertakings to freely choose any approved platform

2) Loosen the restrictions on the entry into Shandong vehicle terminals permit the undertakings to independently select the supplier of vehicle terminals and allow the qualified terminals to be connected to the relevant monitoring platform and

3) Revoke the official documentation relevant to the cap price of vehicle terminals in order to promote the price competition

Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 36

Facts

On 26 August 2015 the NDRC published its second decision with regard to the rectification of administrative monopoly since the beginning of this year According to the proposal letter sent to Anhui Provincial Government the investigation against the Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City (Bengbu HFPC) was trigged by third partiesrsquo complaints

34 Article 32 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to require organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any operators designated by them 35 Article 37 of the AML Administrative organs shall not abuse their administrative powers to set rules with contents which eliminate restrict competition 36 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201508t20150826_748682html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 39 of 52

The investigation suggests that Bengbu HFPC published three notices with regard to drugs procurement in April and May of this year

In the No C-2015-CG-X-111 Notice (ldquoNo111 Noticerdquo) released on 10 April2015 the health authority not only provided the dosage form and qualification of the requested drugs but also directly determined the suppliers of relevant drugs which eliminated and restricted the competition among pharmaceutical manufacturers and therefore violated articles 32 and 37 of the AML

In the No C-2015-CG-C-112 Notice (ldquoNo112 Noticerdquo) and No C-2015-CG-C-168 (ldquoNo 168 Noticerdquo) respectively released on 10 April and 22 May 2015 the Bengbu HFPC set discriminative qualification requirements on non-local undertakings in order to restrict their participation in the relevant bidding For instance in accordance with No 112 Notice to be a qualified bidder the turnover of non-local undertakings shall exceed CNY 2 billion which is 50 times as much as the turnover requirements of the local undertakings In the NDRCrsquos opinion the administrative monopoly activities conducted by the local health agency excluded the relevant undertakings from the market maintained the virtual-high prices of drugs and therefore violated articles 3237 and 37 of the AML

The NDRC suggested in a letter that Anhui Provincial Government should urge the Bengbu HFPC to rectify the abuse of monopoly powers with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Stop setting distinguishing restrictions on qualification requirements review standards and numbers of winning bidders as for local and non-local undertakings

2) Stop designating the suppliers of competitive drugs and

3) Take necessary measures to mitigate the negative effects resulting from the previous illegal monopolistic abuses

Outlook

At the beginning of the year the former director general of the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau under the NDRC Xu Kunlin stated that the agency would strengthen antitrust enforcement on abuse of administrative power in 2015

Since then the NDRC has made great efforts to rectify unreasonable abuses of administrative power The currently disclosed two cases investigated by the NDRC re-emphasize the Chinese Governmentrsquos strict scrutiny of antitrust issues in respect of

37 Article 34 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to restrict or reject the participation of operators from other regions in local bidding activities by measures such as prescribing discriminatory qualification requirements or assessment standards or by not publishing information according to law

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 40 of 52

administrative monopoly It reminds the local governments that antitrust compliance is of significant importance

III Private Litigation

A Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen more and more private antitrust litigations

The private antitrust litigation cases have become increasingly complicated especially the issues regarding the intersection areas of IP and antitrust law

Multinational giants and State-Owned Enterprises (the ldquoSOEsrdquo) are increasingly becoming the targets in antitrust civil litigations Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (the ldquoSMEsrdquo) tend to use the antitrust litigation to achieve their commercial goals in the business context

B Significant Cases

Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)38

This is the first-ever private litigation concerning administrative monopoly since the implementation of the AML in 2008

Facts

According to the currently disclosed details the case is relevant for designated trade

The plaintiff Shenzhen Sware Technology Co Ltd (ldquoSwarerdquo) is a software company The press releases suggest that Sware Gloden Software Co Ltd (ldquoGlodenrdquo) and Shanghai Ruban Software Co Ltd (ldquoShanghai Rubanrdquo) are the three main suppliers of construction cost software and possess the major shares of the relevant market An annual provincial vocational ability contest regarding the construction cost hosted by the Guangdong Department of Education (ldquoGuangdong DOE) designated Gloden as the exclusive supplier of the relevant software

After several unsuccessful verbal and written negotiations with Guangdong DOE in April 2014 Sware filed a lawsuit against Guangdong DOE before the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquothe Courtrdquo) alleging that the administrative organ abused its administrative power and violated the AML by designating exclusive software supplier for the contest and claimed a compensation for reasonable expense amounting to CNY 10800 Yuan

The opinions of the Court 38 The story of the case is available at httpfinancesinacomcnchinadfjj20150410074621924997shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 41 of 52

The full text of the judgment has not been disclosed yet In accordance with the information available to the public the Court invoked article 32 of the AML which prohibits an administrative organ from abusing its administrative power to require or in disguised form organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use only the commodities supplied by the entities designated by them The Court concluded that Guangdong DOE failed to prove the legitimacy of the designation and therefore abused its administration power

Currently the case is in appeal before the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court

Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 39

It is the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China

In the first instance ruling Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court ruled against Sinopec holding that the Yunnan branch of Sinopecs trading company was obligated to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its dominance in the sales market of refined oil by refusing to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding without justifiable reasons

In the second instance ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors Currently the case is pending

Facts

The First Trial

The lawsuit was filed before the Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoKunming Courtrdquo) in January 2014 Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy Co Ltd (ldquoYingdingrdquo) a bio-energy manufacturer claimed that Sinopec and the Yunnan branch of Sinopec trading company (ldquoSinopec Yunnan Branchrdquo) had failed to fulfil their obligations stipulated in the Renewable Energy Law and had abused their market dominance in sales market of refined oil by refusing to trade with Yingding without justifiable reasons

Sinopec and Sinopec Yunnan Branch mainly explained four reasons for why they rejected Yingdingrsquos biofuel Firstly Yingding had failed to prove that the biofuel complied with the relevant national standard and was safe to use Secondly Yingding had failed to provide complete trading terms Thirdly the laws and regulations regarding biofuel were incomplete the authorized refined oil sales companies were 39 The details of the case are available at httpnewsxinhuanetcomfortune2014-1217c_1113680039htm httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=9e71db51-6ff6-4d2c-8af6-8eacf023ebdeampKeyWord=E4BA91E58D97E79B88E9BC8E|E4B8ADE79FB3E58C96 httpnewsxinhuanetcomenergy2015-0422c_127721575htm httpwwwnbdcomcnarticles2015-04-23911348html last visited on December 17 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 42 of 52

obligated to purchase biofuel from the biofuel manufacturers if it met certain quality standards but there was a vacancy regarding how to reach the end consumers from the sales companies

On 8 December 2014 the Kunming Intermediate Peoples Court ruled that Sinopec Yunnan Branch bore a legal obligation to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its market dominance in refined oil market by refusing without any justifiable reasons to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding The court ordered Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network within 30 days Both Yingding and Sinopec filed appeals to the Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court

The Appellate Trial

The appeal hearing was held on 22 April 2015 in Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoYunnan Courtrdquo) Sinopec submitted 23 new pieces of evidence and introduced two expert witnesses in a bid to overturn several key elements in the first-instance ruling by Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court

In terms of the determination of the relevant market and the market dominance Sinopec argued that the relevant market in this case was for adipic acid monomethyl ester (ldquoAAMErdquo) the main ingredient of a biofuel additive known as BD100 Yingdingrsquos main product is BD100 which can be blended with fossil diesel to become biofuel In the AAME market Sinopec is a potential buyer instead of a market dominator In support of this argument Sinopec presented an expert witnessmdashGong Jiong a professor of economics at Beijings University of International Business and Economics who testified that AAME should be defined as the relevant product market on the basis of an economic analysis

However Yingding insisted that the first-instance ruling was correct in naming the sales market of refined oil as the relevant market and submitted new evidence an article on Sinopecs website that claimed it had a 67 market share in Yunnan to help establish the claim that Sinopec had market dominance

Another main dispute was whether Yingdingrsquos biofuel product met national standards which would make it mandatory for Sinopec to purchase under Chinas Renewable Energy Law The law stipulates that biofuel producers must sell their products first to an authorized refined oil sales company and the sales companies are obliged to buy the fuel if it meets certain quality standards In order to test the quality Sinopec introduced the second expert witness Lin Jianmin a leading author of Chinarsquos national biofuel standard Lin Jianmin pointed out that there are currently quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology which gives Sinopec a justifiable reason not to trade with Yingding Moreover Sinopec presented some precedents in which consumers had complained about the biofuel quality and also claimed that China didnt have a sound regulatory framework to support biofuel production neither in testing nor in sales

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 43 of 52

Nevertheless to refute this point Yingding referred to an earlier test in co-operation with Sinopec in 2011 where selected buses in Kunming used biofuel blended by Sinopec using BD100 produced by Yingding

On August 13 2015 Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors and now this case is pending In the written appellate ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court did not provide any details regarding its reasoning

Key Issues of the Case

Is there any competition between Yingding and Sinopec

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case the product of Yingding is biofuel while Sinopec does not engage in the business of biofuel From this perspective Yingding and Sinopec are not competitors Thus it is not necessary and not reasonable for Sinopec to eliminate or restrict the competition from Yingding

Relevant Market

The definition of the relevant market is a prerequisite to determine whether competition exists and whether the AML is applicable In accordance with the Judicial Interpretation of Antitrust civil litigation the plaintiff shall take the responsibility to prove the defendantrsquos dominance in the relevant market Also the methods of defining the relevant market are stipulated in the Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition (ldquoGuidelinesrdquo) However both Yingding and Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court defined the relevant market as the sales market of refined oil without sufficient antitrust analysis none of the methods in the Guidelines were used Therefore the definition of the relevant market remains arguable and needs to be sufficiently analysed in the upcoming retrial

Justifiable Reasons

The abuse of market dominance includes the behaviour of refusing to trade without justifiable reasons according to the AML but in the first instance ruling justifiable reasons were not investigated by the court During the appellate trial the expert witness introduced by Sinopec claimed that there were quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology and this was a justifiable reason to refuse to trade with Yingding Even though the first instance court and the appellate court did not reason the justifiable reason it should be discussed and investigated further during the retrial

AML or Renewable Energy Law

The claims of Yingding were based on both the AML and the Renewable Energy Law (ldquoRELrdquo) and the first instance ruling referred to both the AML and the REL as

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 44 of 52

well It seems that the laws the first instance court referred to were comprehensive but in fact the reasoning was not clear and logical In the first instance ruling some disputes regarding the AML were reviewed but all the orders were not based on the AML Specifically the first instance court ordered the Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network based on the REL and dismissed the other claims That the orders were not on account of reasoning is illogical It is anticipated that during the retrial the application of the laws will be clearer

Analysis

A lot of issues have not been clearly analysed by the courts such as the relevant market and the justifiable reasons Since the case is remanded the above-mentioned issues are expected to be resolved in the retrial In addition Yingding was in a disadvantaged position compared to its first instance trial since its claims based on the AML were challenged greatly during the appellate trial In the retrial it is probable that Yingding may switch its litigation strategy and base its claims on the REL Therefore maybe more preparation regarding the REL can give Sinopec a leg up

Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)

Rijing Electric a Chinese distributor seeks CNY 5m compensation

The first hearing was on 9 June 2015 and ended without a ruling

Facts

Rijing Electric (ldquoRijingrdquo) a Shanghai-based company and a former distributor for Panasonic accused Panasonic of abusing its dominance and dividing the market through monopolistic practice in an antitrust lawsuit filed in 2014 with Shanghai No 1 Intermediate Court (ldquoShanghai Courtrdquo) claiming compensation of CNY 5m (USD 815370) Wenzhou Mingda Automation System Co and Shanghai Qingying Automation Equipment as the distributor of Panasonic in China are the co-defendants were accused of conducting monopolistic behaviours by implementing Panasonicrsquos policy

The first hearing for evidence exchange was on June 9 2015 Rijing claimed a policy allegedly introduced by Panasonic in 2009 restricted the competition between distributors Panasonic claims the policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo and has full justifiable reasons It explained that the products in question required customization at considerable cost to distributors before its sale to customers Once carried out however other distributors leaving them open to quote much lower prices than the original distributor could simply and relatively cheap replicate this customization Besides Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and that the plaintiff had failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic said its market share for the four products

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 45 of 52

under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases Also Rijing failed to challenge the policy when it was first introduced instead initially agreeing it was reasonable as e-mail evidence submitted by Panasonic suggests

Key Issues of the Case

Whether Panasonic occupied a market dominant position

It is reported that Rijing claimed that Panasonic had abused its market dominance but Rijing failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and its market share for the four products under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases

Analysis

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case Panasonicrsquos policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo rather than to eliminate or restrict competition

Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals40 (Pending)

It is a battle over patent licensing issues

It is viewed as being among the most complicated antitrust lawsuits in China

The first hearing was on 17 and 18 December 2015

Facts

Four Chinese rare earth companies Ningbo Ketian Magnet Ningbo Permanent Magnetics Ningbo Tongchuang Strong Magnet Material and Ningbo Huahui Magnetic Industry filed antitrust lawsuits against Hitachi Metals over alleged patent licensing issues regarding rare earth magnets on December 11 2014 with the Ningbo Intermediate Peoples Court (ldquoNingbo Courtrdquo) in Zhejiang province As reported four Chinese rare earth companies claimed Hitachi Metals abused its market dominance and hurt the industry competition by refusing to license the patents to them The patents in this case are used in the manufacturing of sintered neodymium iron boron (ldquoNdFeBrdquo) magnets a rare-earth magnet alloy widely used in parts for airplanes automobiles and other products

Hitachi Metals filed a challenge with the Ningbo Court over its jurisdiction in April 2015 After Ningbo Court rejected Hitachi Metals jurisdiction objection on 28 April 2015 Hitachi Metals appealed to the Zhejiang High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoZhejiang

40The details of the story are available at httpwwwzbmagcomnews_viewphpid=80 httpwwwhitachicomcnaboutpress201510-121118_ahtml last visited on December 22 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 46 of 52

Courtrdquo) but Zhejiang Court affirmed the ruling of the Ningbo Court

The first day of a two-day hearing took place on 17 December 2015 during which the two sides cross-examined each otherrsquos evidence The evidence focused on clearing up several key elements in the case including the relevant market whether Hitachi Metals has dominance on that market and whether both sides acted in good faith during the licensing negotiations

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Product Market

The four Chinese rare earth companies claimed that the relevant product market should be the NdFeb-related patent licensing market However Hitachi Metals believed that the physical NdFeb market rather than the patent licensing market should be the relevant product market which is meaningful for assess the real competitive effects on the market

Whether Hitachi Metals occupies a dominant market position

In terms of market dominance Hitachi Metals claimed it does not occupy a dominant position because Hitachi Metalsrsquo patents were not in a standard in this case and there are substitutable technologies in the market SEP holders have the obligation to license on FRAND terms but none-SEP holders do not So while a refusal to license a SEP may constitute abuse of dominance refusal to license a non-SEP mdash even by a patent holder with a dominant position mdash should not be considered as an abuse

Analysis

Hitachi Metals as a patent holder should have the right to decide whether to retain those patents or not or who to license According to the legal theory the purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage and protect innovation by conferring monopoly right mdash that is to give intellectual property owners the proprietary rights which can exclude others from using the intellectual property The SEP holders admittedly need to comply with FRAND terms which can maintain a robust balance between competition and monopoly whereas the further intervention of antitrust law into non-SEP patents may undermine the purpose of intellectual property law To which extent the antitrust law should intervene is yet to be seen

Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei41

A confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the Beijing IP court made by the Beijing High Court

41 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcncpwswbjzscq201511t20151103_12225640htm last visited on December 28 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 47 of 52

Facts

On August 2 2013 the NDRC penalized Abbott for monopolistic price-fixing and then Abbott made a price adjustment in China where the prices of main products were reduced

On December 16 2014 Tian Junwei (ldquoTianrdquo) a Chinese citizen in Beijing sued Carrefour Shuangjing Branch (ldquoCarrefourrdquo) and Abbott (Shanghai) Sales Company (ldquoAbbottrdquo) at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (ldquoIP Courtrdquo) for their monopolistic price-fixing which damaged his interests However Carrefour and Abbott challenged the jurisdiction of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court They claimed there were two reasons Firstly according to the jurisdiction rules of the IP court issued by the Supreme Court the IP court has no jurisdiction over anti-trust cases Secondly if this case is a contractual dispute the court that is in the place of Carrefour should hear it if this case is a tort dispute the Shanghai Intermediate Court should hear it

In the ruling of the IP Court the IP Court decided it has the jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases for the following reasons According to the Provisions On Causes Of Action In Civil Cases issued by Supreme Court (最高人民法院案由规定) antimonopoly dispute is a tertiary cause of action belonging to IP and competition disputes Also according to the Provisions concerning the Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京

市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问题的规定 ) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was an IP and competition dispute and was sued after November 6 2014 Thus the IP Court had jurisdiction

Both Carrefour and Abbott appealed to the Beijing High Court over the jurisdiction ruling but the Beijing High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original ruling Reasons are listed in the written ruling issued on June 18 2015 Firstly the nature of the case was an antimonopoly dispute In accordance with Provisions of the Supreme Peoples Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民

事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) and Civil Litigation Law the monopolistic civil disputes in the first instance shall be under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Peoples Courts and an action involving a contractual dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the peoples court of the place where the defendant is domiciled or where the contract is performed Carrefour as the defendant in this case is domiciled in Chaoyang District Beijing Therefore the courts of Beijing have jurisdiction over this case Secondly according to article 3 of the Notification on the Jurisdiction of Intellectual Property Courts issued by Supreme Court (关于知识产权法院案件管辖

等有关问题的通知) IP courts have jurisdiction over first-instance civil disputes arising from monopolistic practices Lastly according to Provisions concerning the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 17 of 52

transistor product market because the global and Chinese RF transistor product markets share a similar structure both featuring few competitors and high concentration levels Freescale and NXP as the number one and number two players are far ahead of their rivals in the market Therefore after closing the market control power of NXP in this market would be strengthened

2) Since Freescale was the fiercest competitor of NXP the proposed deal will remove competition between them

3) The proposed deal would reduce the options for clients and increase procurement risks

In practice the wireless infrastructure suppliers as the main client of the RF transistor product tend to procure products from both NXP and Freescale to prevent them from the risk arising from relying on one supplier

4) The proposed deal may induce an adverse impact on the technology RampD and innovation

Remedies

In accordance with MOFCOMrsquos decision NXP shall follow its written commitment submitted to MOFCOM and completely divest its RF power transistor business to Beijing Jianguang Asset Management At the same time NXP shall strictly fulfil its obligations during the transition period It is worth noting that the NXPFreescale deal shall only be implemented after the divestment deal has been concluded

In addition MOFCOM requires NXP to perform relevant obligations during the transition period from the date of approval announcement until the divestment deal has been concluded NXP shall endeavour

1) not to engage in any lsquounfair trade practicesrsquo relating to the divested business

2) not to implement any acts which may have a significant adverse impact on the value management or competitiveness of the divested business or any acts which may change the nature and scope industry or business strategy or investment policy of the divested business and to take reasonable measures to encourage core employees to stay in the divested business as well as not to seek or transfer employees to NXPrsquos non-divested business

3) to ensure supply to the divested business in a fair reasonable and non-discriminatory manner and

4) to maintain the independence of the divested business and not to exchange competitively sensitive information between the parties and the divested

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 18 of 52

business

B Monopolistic Agreements

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

With respect to the enforcement activities of the NDRC in light of the numbers of the published cases it seems that the law enforcement frequency of the NDRC regarding monopolistic agreements in 2015 is lower in comparison with 2014

The reason behind might be that the outstanding issue of human resource deficit of the antitrust authority still exists Besides the fact that more enterprises gradually attach increasing importance to the antitrust compliance might be another reason for the decrease in the number of cases investigated by the authorities

As to the enforcement activities of the SAIC 4 of 14 cases concluded by the SAIC and its local branches in 2015 are relevant to monopolistic agreements Meanwhile these four cases concern horizontal monopolistic agreements

It is noteworthy however that the Mercedes-Benz case and the Dongfeng Nissan case suggest that vertical agreements especially involving price-related restrictions on the downstream dealers is still the priority of antitrust enforcement Companies shall be very cautious when imposing restrictions on the resale prices or the minimum resale prices of commodities in the distribution agreements

Automobile industry and related industries are observed to be under continuous attention of Chinarsquos antitrust authorities

The industries relating to peoplersquos livelihoods remain to be the enforcement priority

Significant Cases

Enforcement by the NDRC and its local branches

Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC16

The investigation was triggered by a leniency application

The first leniency applicant was exempted from punishment

Eight ocean shipping companies involved were imposed a collective fine of CNY 4067 million

NDRC spent approximately 12 months to investigate and conclude the case 16 NDRCrsquos press release of the case is available at httpjjsndrcgovcngzdt201512t20151228_769084html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 19 of 52

Facts

In December 2015 the NDRC published its official punishment decisions regarding the cartel case in connection with eight ocean shipping companies namely Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha (ldquoNYKrdquo) Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha (ldquoK Linerdquo) Mitsui OSK Lines EUKOR Car Carriers Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics Compantildeiacutea Sud Americana de Vapores Eastern Car Liner and Compantildeiacutea Chilena de Navegacioacuten Interoceaacutenica

According to the official press release of the NDRC the investigation was triggered by a leniency application of NYK The evidence showed that the eight companies reached consensus on non-intrusion of each others existing business to maintain or increase shipping fees when shipping goods such as cars trucks and engineering machinery in the routes between China and other countries and regions

They were also found to frequently conduct bilateral or multilateral communications on the shippersrsquo invitation for bids andor price inquiries via phone conferences dinner parties e-mails visiting etc In addition they also conducted illegal behaviour such as sensitive information exchange price negotiations bidding intention discussion dividing clients and shipping routes reaching agreements on high price bids or non-bidding in order to help certain companies gain shipping orders

To avoid the regulation of the antitrust authority the relevant shipping companies adopted various illicit measures that showed their apparent intention to violate the AML The cartel lasted for at least four years and covered a broad range of shipping routes concerned with the import and export of products between China and other regions such as North America EU South America and so on involving multiple auto brands and engineering machinery brands

The NDRC held the opinion that the eight companies conducts had restricted and eliminated competition in the relevant market raising the international shipping fees and impairing interests of shippers and end consumers The eight companies breached the AML by reaching and implementing monopolistic agreements on fixing prices and dividing the market

All eight investigated companies put forward remedy measures including enhancing the antitrust compliance program arranging more antitrust compliance trainings and developing antitrust compliance technologies

The NDRC imposed fines based on the nature level and duration of their monopolistic volations as well as their respective sales of international freight service sales relevant to the Chinese market The companies involved were collectively fined CNY 4067 million

NYK as the first cartel member voluntarily reporting the illegal conducts to the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 20 of 52

authority and providing significant evidence was entirely exempted from the punishment K Line as the second leniency applicant was imposed a fine amounting to 4 of its 2014 annual sales of international freight services relevant to Chinarsquos import and export market The details of punishments imposed on the involved companies by the NDRC are as follow

Company Name Amount of Fines (RMB million)

Percentage of the Relevant Turnovers

Grounds

Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha

- - First leniency applicant

Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha

2398 4 Second leniency applicant

Mitsui OSK Lines 3812 7 Third leniency applicant

EUKOR Car Carriers 284 9 Lasted over a long period involved many brands and many violations violations were severe

Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics

4506 8 Lasted over a long period involved many brands and many violations violations were severe

Compantildeiacutea Sud Americana de Vapores

308 6 Lasted over a long period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Eastern Car Liner 1127 5 Lasted over a long period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Compantildeiacutea Chilena de 120 4 Lasted over a long

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 21 of 52

Navegacioacuten Interoceaacutenica

period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Total 4067

Analysis

In this case the agency applied the AML instead of the Tenders and Bids Law to collusive bidding Citing article 13 (3) of the AML the NDRC identified that the collusive bidding constituted a division of the sales market

The leading three leniency applicants were granted exemption from fines to a varying degree

According to the official who handled this case dawn raids performed by antitrust enforcement agencies in other jurisdictions drew the attention of the NDRC on the cartels of these shipping companies However there was limited effective evidence to prove that the companies had reached monopolistic agreements Through pressuring the involved parties three members of the shipping cartel actively confessed their illegal conduct This case once again stresses the significance of international cooperation between antitrust enforcement agencies

Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau17

The distribution agreements between Mercedes-Benz and its dealers are determined as vertical monopolistic agreement and Mercedes-Benz violated article 14 of the AML because it restricted the ability of its dealers to decide their own resale prices

Mercedes-Benzrsquos dealers violated article of 13 of the AML due to concluding a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Mercedes-Benz and its dealers were jointly fined CNY 3578 million

Facts

In April 2015 Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau which is the provincial branch of the NDRC released the punishment on its website and announced that it had imposed a fine of CNY 350 million on Mercedes-Benz along with the aggregated fine of CNY 787 million on its dealers The fine came as a result of Mercedes-Benz reaching and implementing resale price maintenance (ldquoRPMrdquo) agreements with dealers to fix the minimum resale price of several car models as well as certain auto parts 17 The original Chinese notice published by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau is available at httpwwwjswjjgovcnoffice_neweo_comm_zxnrxsphp

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 22 of 52

According to the decision the authority found that Mercedes-Benz fixed the minimum resale price of Class E and Class S cars in Nanjing Wuxi Changzhou and Suzhou markets through telephoneverbal communication and dealers meetings from January 2013 to July 2014 Since 2010 Mercedes-Benz had reached agreements with dealers in Jiangsu province to fix the minimum resale prices for auto parts by providing different levels of discounts for insured cars cars involving expired warranty periods and cars within the warranty period

In addition Mercedes-Benz implemented the minimum resale price maintaining agreement by

1) Tightening its monitoring measures on the dealers such as inspecting deals and their sale incentive system on a weekly basis

2) Tracking the sales process flow of cars and increasing the intensity of this assessment

3) Giving warnings and reducing support ndash for example halting the supply of bestselling cars and prohibiting the opening of new stores ndash to dealers if dealers refused to cooperate with the price-fixing related policies and measures and

4) Interviewing personnel of the dealers and requesting terminations if the staff engaged in serious violations of the RPM agreement

Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau concluded that Mercedes-Benz had excluded and eliminated market competition harmed consumer welfare and consequently violated article 1418 of the AML The authority therefore imposed a fine of CNY 350 million representing 7 of the sale revenue of the previous year in the relevant market against Mercedes-Benz and imposed a fine on the dealers amounting to an equivalence of 1 of the annual sales in the previous year

Analysis

Although the agency also addressed the horizontal violation among the dealers in this case the administrative penalty decision mainly focuses on the vertical violation The agency fined dealers involved in the RPM agreement a combined CNY 787 million equal to 1 of the previous-year sales which suggests that the agency decided to give lighter punishments to dealers who took initiative in reporting the activity and provided evidence

The Mercedes-Benz case is the third case where the agency successfully 18 Article 14 of the AML The following monopolistic agreements between operators and trading partners shall be prohibited (i) fixing the resale prices of commodities to third persons (ii) restricting the minimum resale prices of commodities to third persons (iii) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement Authority under the State Council

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 23 of 52

discovered both vertical and horizontal agreements in a case following the Audi case and the Chrysler case All these cases are rooted in the same industry indicating that industrial features play a large role in raising anti-trust concerns In fact it appears that the entire automotive industry is under antitrust scrutiny

Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC19

This case involved both a horizontal agreement and an administrative monopoly

A total fine of CNY 1318 million was imposed on the involved companies

Facts

In June 2015 the NDRC through its website announced the decision made by its regional branch -Yunnan Provincial Development and Reform Commission (ldquoYunnan DRCrdquo) regarding the horizontal monopolistic agreement case involving Yunnan Communications Administration and local subsidiaries of four state-owned telecommunication companies

Through the investigation Yunnan DRC found that Yunnan Communications Administration as a competent government agency had organized several meetings involving Yunnan branches of four state-owned telecoms - China Mobile China Telecom China Unicom and China Tietong in August and September of 2014 At the end of 2009 the four local branches entered into an agreement to regulate their sales promotions in terms of limiting the promotional items amount and frequency

Furthermore the agreement provides certain measures to ensure the implementation of relevant restrictions on promotions Specifically in case any cartel member violates the agreement the others could file complaints with Yunnan Communications Administration and the agency would then issue a rectification notice to the rule-breaker

Yunnan DRC stated that the four telecoms were main competitors in the relevant market and the promotions as a significant competition measure would exert direct influence on the final prices of the products The horizontal agreement organized by Yunnan Communications Administration on sales promotions restricted the competition capacity of telecoms and as a result eliminated the competition in the relevant market Consequently the behaviour of Yunnan Communications Administration violated article 8 20 of the AML and constituted administrative monopoly in terms of ldquoforcing undertakings to conduct monopolistic behaviour prohibited by the AMLrdquo

19 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpwwwsdpcgovcnfzgggzjgjdyfldjjszhdt201506t20150602_694802html 20 Article 8 of the AML Administrative organs and the public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 24 of 52

With respect to the penalties Yunnan DRC fined the local branch of China Tietong CNY 200000 for reaching but not implementing the agreement in regards to the other three telecoms a total fine of CNY 1298 million amounting to 2 of the sales of the relevant business in the previous year were imposed for entering into and implementing the horizontal monopolistic agreement

Analysis

The telecoms industry is still the enforcement priority of the antitrust enforcement authorities A company cannot be exempted from punishment even though it is forced by competent authorities to conduct monopoly behaviour

DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC21

Both a horizontal monopolistic agreement and a vertical monopolistic agreement were involved in this case

A total fine of CNY 14242 million was imposed on DongFeng Nissan and its distributors

Facts

In September 2015 the Guangdong Development and Reform Commission (ldquoGuangdong DRCrdquo) released an announcement regarding the administrative penalties on DongFeng Nissan and its provincial distributors for concluding price-related monopolistic agreements More specifically DongFeng Nissan was imposed a fine of CNY 1233 million for breaching article 14 of the AML in terms of restricting the resale price of certain car models 17 distributors domiciled in Guangdong were collectively fined CNY 1912 million for violating article 1322 of the AML in terms of entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements

According to the published official release the Guangdong DRC launched the investigation in August 2014 The authority discovered that from 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissan had set a rigorous restriction on its distributorsrsquo abilities to determine the resale prices of certain car models including the quoted prices in various platforms and the final resale price In addition DongFeng Nissan punished the distributors that failed to abide by such price restrictions in 2013 The authority 21 The original Chinese notice published by Guangdong DRC is available at httpwwwgddpcgovcnzwgkgzdtgzyw201509t20150910_328993html 22 Article 13 of the AML The following Monopolistic agreements among competing operators shall be prohibited (i) fix or change prices of commodities (ii) limit the outputs or sales volume of commodities (iii) segment the sales markets or the raw material purchasing markets (iv) limit the purchase of new technology new facilities or limit the development of new products new technology (v) jointly boycott transactions (vi) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-Monopoly Law enforcement Authority Monopolistic agreements in this Law refer to agreements decisions or other concerted practices that eliminate restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 25 of 52

believed that the vertical agreement concluded between DongFeng Nissan and its distributors eliminated and restricted the competition in the relevant market and damaged the consumer welfare as well which violates article 14 of the AML

Furthermore from April 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissanrsquos distributors in Guangdong province held multiple meetings to discuss issues relevant to sale price reached and implemented a horizontal monopolistic agreement in terms of fixing the prices of some car models which is prohibited by article 13 of the AML

Considering that both DongFeng Nissan and the involved distributors positively cooperated with the investigation and ceased the illegal behaviour immediately after the investigation Guangdong DRC decided to impose a fine amounting to 3 of its previous yearrsquos turnovers on DongFeng Nissan and a fine ranging from 2 to 4 on the relevant distributors in accordance with articles 4623 and 4924 of the AML

Analysis

This case demonstrates that auto and related industries are still under close attention of the authority Considering the NDRCrsquos successful series of antitrust investigations conducted throughout the auto industry it is observed that the agency currently overseeing price-related antitrust issues in China has accumulated a substantial amount of experience regarding antitrust enforcement in the auto industry Now is the right time to speed up the law-making process by amending the set of rules released earlier and drafting new laws to advise the auto industry on antitrust compliance

Enforcement by the SAIC and its local branches

Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC25

The investigation was triggered by whistle blowerrsquos submission

Cartel members were collectively fined CNY 139 million 23 Article 46 of the AML In case the operators violate the relevant provisions of this Law concluding and implementing Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall order the operators to cease such act impose fines more than 1 but less than 10 of the total turnover in the preceding year and confiscate the illegal gains where the Monopolistic agreement is not implemented a fine less than RMB 500000 can be imposed If the operators involved in Monopolistic agreement on its own initiative report information concerning the conclusion of Monopolistic agreements and provide important evidences to the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority they may be given a mitigated punishment or be exempted from punishment in accordance with the circumstances Where the industrial associations violate this Law organizing the operators in the industry to conclude Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority may impose a fine less than RMB 500000 in serious circumstances the agency of social organization administration and registration may cancel its registration 24 Article 49 of the AML As for the imposition of the fines stipulated by the Article 46 47 and 48 of this Law the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall take elements such as the nature extent and time it lasts of the illegal act into consideration in determining the specific amount of the fines 25 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201506t20150601_156889html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 26 of 52

Facts

In April 2015 the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) issued administrative penalties on several brick manufacturers for entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements This is the first case relevant to monopolistic agreements that has been publicized by the SAIC since the beginning of this year

Ten cartel members were involved in the case including one company and nine individuals Similar with most antitrust cases the investigation started as a result of a whistle blowerrsquos submission After a thorough investigation Hunan AIC found that those local brick manufacturers had reached agreements on controlling production volume and dividing sales areas in the forms of production and sales agreements plans and meeting minutes

The enforcement authority reached the conclusion that these brick manufacturers violated article 13 of the AML and imposed a total fine of CNY 1389400 on them

Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC26

The organizer of the monopolistic agreement the animation association was fined CNY 100000

The antitrust authority did not punish the members of the monopolistic agreement

Facts

In December 2015 the Guangdong Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoGuangdong AICrdquo) published its administrative punishment decision in regards to Guangzhou Panyu Animation amp Game Association (ldquoGAGArdquo) organizing member companies to conclude a monopolistic agreement

According to the decision GAGA drafted the ldquoAgreement of Exhibition Alliancerdquo (ldquoAgreementrdquo) and convened a conference with member companies in order to discuss the content and conclusion of the Agreement 52 member companies entered into the Agreement which actually requested the alliance companies to merely participate in the exhibitions either organized or supported by GAGA in Guangzhou In addition the Agreement prohibited the alliance companies from attending any other exhibition except if they obtained prior approval of GAGA

After a thorough investigation Guangdong AIC believed that the conclusion of the Agreement among GAGA and the 52 member companies violated article 13 (5) of the AML in terms of boycott GAGA who was deeply involved and restricted member companiesrsquo choice of exhibitions through the Agreement could be deemed as

26 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151208_164680html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 27 of 52

the participant and organizer of the monopolistic agreement In accordance with article 46 of the AML Guangdong AIC imposed a fine of CNY 100000 on GAGA for organizing the conclusion of the monopolistic agreement

Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC27

Hubei AIC considered the coinsurance for Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance illegal

Twelve insurance companies were fined CNY 469 million in total

Facts

In December 2015 the Hubei Administrative for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHubei AICrdquo) disclosed its punishment on 12 insurance companies for signing illegal coinsurance agreements

The disclosed punishment decision suggests that the Hubei branch of China Pacific Life Insurance (ldquothe Companyrdquo) 11 other insurance companies and Wuhan Construction Safety Technology Consultation Center (ldquoWCSTCCrdquo) signed a Coinsurance Agreement on Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance (ldquoCoinsurance Agreementrdquo) of which the main contents include

1) The Company and 11 other involved companies as the coinsurers jointly take charge of the personal accident insurance concerned with the construction project directly administered by the Wuhan government WCSTCC is responsible for providing safety professionalism and technology services regarding the relevant personal accident insurance

2) The Company as the chief insurer of the coinsurance occupies 12 of the total amount of the insurance and the other 11 companies respectively occupy 8

3) The Company as the representative of the coinsurance is in charge of collecting the premium signing the standard form insurance policies and issuing the invoice in its own name The Company should share the charged premium with the other companies in accordance with the Coinsurance Agreement

4) Both the Company and the other insurance companies should pay 25 of the actually received premium to WCSTCC as the service fee WCSTCC will assist the coinsurers in providing safety and technology management service to the insured In addition the 11 insurance companies should pay 5 of their premium to the Company as the management fee

27 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165445html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 28 of 52

5) In case an accident happens the 12 companies will jointly bear the damages based on their respective shares in the coinsurance

6) There is a contact mechanism established in the coinsurance The coinsurers will regularly hold coinsurance conferences to discuss existing problems

Furthermore the coinsurers and WCSTCC also signed a self-discipline agreement and established a complete management system to assure the implementation of the Coinsurance Agreement Any party violating the Coinsurance Agreement would be punished

Hubei AIC found that WCSTCC was solely invested by Wuhan Construction Safety Management Association which was under Wuhan Construction Commission The centre helped implement certain functions of the Wuhan Urban Construction Safety Management Station and was responsible for quality supervision and safety supervision of municipal construction projects

It later became a prerequisite for construction companies to purchase insurance from any member of the coinsurance in order to get approval to commence their project According to the decision Hubei AIC launched another separate investigation against WCSTCC

Through the investigation Hubei AIC concluded that the Coinsurance Agreement constituted a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by article 13 of the AML with the following analysis

First coinsurance as a common business model to jointly share and lower risks is widely adopted in the insurance industry A coinsurance arrangement for a specific project in order to avoid high risks faced by one insurer could be legal However coinsurance should not target the entire market In this case prior to the Coinsurance Agreement the risks of the construction projects were unpredictable since the scale of the construction projects the difficulty of the construction and the amount of construction workers could not be available It is impossible to predict the risks of the projects thus it is not necessary to cooperate with other insurers to collectively bear the risks The purpose of the 12 insurance companies to establish the coinsurance is to avoid the competition which demonstrates the Coinsurance Agreement belongs to a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by the AML

Second the companies through entering into the coinsurance agreement actually divided the relevant market of construction project personal accident insurance in Wuhan city which affected the competition in the relevant market and damaged the interests of other competitors and the consumers In particular the Construction Law as amended in 2011 stipulates that the purchase of personal accident insurance is not mandatory and the construction companies have the right to choose whether to buy the said insurance or not As mentioned purchasing insurance from the coinsurance had been the prerequisite for construction companies to obtain administration

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 29 of 52

approval for the project which seriously distorts the fair competition in the market

Citing article 46 of the AML the 12 insurance companies were collectively fined CNY 469 million including fines on the companies and confiscation of illegal gains It is noteworthy that the fines were calculated based on the companiesrsquo 2014 annual sales of the insurance product in connection with the coinsurance The Company as the chief insurer was fined amounting to 6 of its 2014 annual sales of the relevant insurance product in the coinsurance and other companies were fined amounting to 2 of relevant sales For more specific information please see the following table

Company Name (Hubei Branch)

Fines (CNY million)

Percentage of the sales

Illegal Gains (CNY

million)

China Pacific Life Insurance 00653 6 0941

Sino Life 00145 2 04332

Alltrust Insurance 00145 2 04332

Taikang Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Continent Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Pacific Property Insurance

00145 2 04332

China Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

PICC Property and Casualty 00145 2 02599

Taiping General Insurance 00145 2 013

Union Life Insurance 00145 2 01177

Ping An Annuity Insurance Company of China

00145 2 04201

Ping An Property amp Casualty Insurance Company of China

00145 2 -

Subtotal 02248 - 44679

Total 46927

Analysis

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 30 of 52

Coinsurance as an effective approach to lower risks of insurers is widely used in the insurance industry Information sharing and agreements on coinsurance were generally considered efficient and legitimate However from an antitrust perspective coinsurance may raise competition concerns depending on the circumstances of each agreement In the case that there is enough capacity for one insurer to cover the potential risks the coinsurance might be considered as entering into a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC28

The first leniency applicant was exempted from fines

The other concrete companies were imposed a fine of CNY 180000

Facts

In December 2015 the concrete companies monopolistic agreement case investigated by Hunan AIC was published on SAICrsquos website

In accordance with the antitrust enforcement announcement of SAIC this case was triggered by complaints from the Yongzhou City peoplersquos congress After the preliminary review the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) initiated the formal investigation on seven concrete companies domiciled in Yongzhou City Hunan Province which were suspected of being involved in a monopolistic agreement in terms of division of the volumes of the products

After further investigation Hunan AIC found that the seven concrete companies concluded a partnership agreement in 2011 which requested the involved companies to enter into a partnership business with assets In addition according to the partnership agreement it was planned to establish a comprehensive office to manage production marketing and distribution of the products of all the partners The seven companies intended to jointly adjust and control the output of concrete based on the partnership agreement However because there were disagreements over the allocation of the injected assets and market shares the companies did not implement the partnership agreement The agreement was cancelled in December 2012

Based on the findings Hunan AIC concluded that the seven concrete companies as competitors of each other restricted and eliminated the competition in the relevant market through reaching the partnership agreement and dividing the volumes of sales which violated article 13(3) of the AML in terms of division of sales market Considering that the agreement had not been implemented and the limited influence of the agreement according to article 46 of the AML and article 27 of the Administrative Penalties Law small amount fines were imposed on the involved companies Six companies were fined CNY 30000 each for their illegal behaviour 28 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165504html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 31 of 52

Yongzhou Shuangyuan Building Materials Co Ltd as the first one to actively report the monopolistic agreement and cooperate with the enforcement authority was exempted from the punishment

Outlook

It is expected that the AMLrsquos enforcement on monopolistic agreements will continue in the future Industries such as automobile shipping pharmaceuticals insurance etc will still remain the priority of the antitrust enforcement

The antitrust enforcement authorities have published a series of regulations in order to clarify the substantial and procedural issues relevant to the antitrust enforcement However Chinarsquos current antitrust legislation regime is still immature In the following years we expect that more attention will be paid to the legislative improvements

Another remarkable issue for cartel members is that with more Chinese enterprises attaching increasing importance to the AML the follow-on civil damages actions might become a tendency in the future

C Abuse of Market Dominance

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen a decent increase of abuse of market dominance cases both in public enforcement and private litigation Oftentimes the authorities responsible for public enforcement generally find it difficult to pursue investigations against abuse of market dominance cases The following two main reasons are often cited to explain this standoff first it is hard for the authorities to define the relevant markets and prove the undertaking(s)rsquo dominant market position through economic approaches second it is hard to collect evidence regarding abusive practices

The cases related to IPRs abuse are emerging significantly particularly in the telecommunication media and technology (ldquoTMTrdquo) sectors

The SAICrsquos latest refusal-to-deal probe against a local drug maker shows that the SAIC and its local branches have increasingly acquired a profile as an abuse of dominance regulator

Significant Cases

Cases pursued by the SAIC

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 32 of 52

Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case29

Facts

The local authority in Dongfang city reported to the Hainan provincial branch of SAIC on April 23 2014 of the suspected dominance abuse The SAIC authorized its Hainan bureau to officially investigate the matter on 25 July 2014 according to a decision dated January 9 2015 The AIC concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its market dominance by requiring users to pay a deposit without any legal basis and or justifiable reasons

In terms of the relevant product market the local authority found that in this case it was the urban water supply market in Dongfang city and its surrounding townships where Dongfang Water was the sole public operator in the local water supply market with a 100 market share which made all water users completely reliant on the companyrsquos supply In term of market access the local authority found it very unlikely that there were other operators due to the strict regulations

The Hainan SAIC then concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its dominance as it charged users a deposit by threatening to refuse to register users and also by threatening to restrict the water supply Dongfang Waters charging of deposits lacked a legal basis and hadnt received government approval to the detriment of household consumers and business water users and hampered the improvement of management and services of the company Such conduct was in breach of Chinarsquos Anti-Monopoly Law

Hainan AIC levied a fine of CNY 593208 a lighter penalty equivalent to 2 of the companyrsquos annual sales for the previous year and confiscated illicit gains of CNY 38521 for abuse of market dominance

Analysis

It is noteworthy that although handled by a local authority supervised by the SAIC the antitrust agency detailed the relevant market definition the assessment of the dominant market position the abusive practices and the scrutiny of the justifiable reasons

Although the definition of the relevant market and the reasoning of the Hainan provincial AIC and the SAIC are subject to criticism it is still applausive to see that the antitrust regulators have realized the importance of the application of rule of reason in an abuse case In addition through itrsquos a published decision practitioners may observe the regulatorsrsquo reasoning and thus transparency and legal certainty have been generated

29 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzfcfjd201502t20150212_152066html last visited on October 18 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 33 of 52

Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms30

Facts

In June 2013 the Ningxia AIC under authorization of SAIC opened an antitrust investigation into the alleged tie-in sales by the three major state-owned telecommunications operators China Tietong China Unicom and China Telecom for the tie-in sale of fixed-line telephones with broadband Internet services The Ningxia AIC found that the three companies had bundled fixed-line phone services with Internet services to subscribers

During the investigation all three telecommunications companies admitted the tie-in practice had recognized that such practice had improper influence on competition and deprived the choices of consumers The three companies promised to undertake internal rectification timely and eliminate the ill effects resulting from such practice The parties committed to taking the following corrective measures

1) Taking internal rectifications and conducting training to staff about antitrust laws and stop tie-in sales practices

2) Making public commitments to allow subscribers a free choice of services and strengthening the propaganda through the operating room call centre and other channels

3) Unbundling fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

The Ningxia AIC decided to suspend the probe on 14 May 2015 on the grounds that the three companies had actively worked together with the investigators and proposed workable remedy plans

Analysis

In the official announcement Ningxia AIC concluded that the purpose of antitrust enforcement is to restrain monopolistic conducts the protection of competition and to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of consumers Given that during the investigation process the parties had actively cooperated with the investigation formed a more profound understanding of the dangers of tying behaviour and moreover the parties proposed and implemented positive corrective measures to be able to remove the ill impact of their actions the agency believed that the purpose of antitrust law enforcement was fulfilled

It is worth noting that the Ningxia AIC also required the three companies to implement the commitment by August 30 2015and the submission of the written

30 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158908html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158906html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158910html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 34 of 52

implementation report on July 102015 and August 102015 respectively which is another illustration that an effective commitment by the undertakings shall directly deal with the effect that is brought by the monopolistic behaviour In this case the effect of the monopolistic act was restricted to the choice of the consumers therefore the commitment by the undertaking aimed at allowing the freedom of choice and the unbundling of fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company31

Facts

The Liaoning AIC imposed a fine of approximately CNY 433m on the Fushun Branch of Liaoning Tobacco Co on 1 June 2015 The agency also ordered the company to stop its illicit behaviour

The Liaoning AIC received a tip-off that the accused Liaoning Tobacco Corsquos Fushun branch was conducting tie-in sales of non-high-demand cigarette brands with high-demand cigarette brands After gaining authorization from SAIC the agency officially started an investigation regarding the companyrsquos suspected abuse of market dominance in June 2014

Analysis

According to the announcement the tobacco company argued that the tobacco industry is a state controlled or monopolized industry with a lawful monopolistic position therefore the company shall not be subject to the norms of general market competition rules or the anti-monopoly law

In this regards the agency concluded that in terms of the status of the undertaking admittedly the first paragraph of article 17 of the AML says that the State shall protect the lawful business operations of undertakings in these industries with respect to the industries which are under the control of the State-owned economic sector and have a bearing on the lifeline of the national economy or national security and the industries which exercise monopoly over the production and sale of certain commodities according to law However the second paragraph continues to say that the undertakings mentioned above shall do business according to law be honest faithful and strictly self-disciplined and subject themselves to public supervision and they shall not harm the consumers interests by taking advantage of their position of control or their monopolistic production and sale of certain commodities In particular in the preceding paragraph the ldquolawful businessrdquo and ldquoaccording to lawrdquo imply that the AML shall apply in the business operation The agency therefore believes that

31 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201508t20150813_16

0208html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 35 of 52

there shall be no exemption for the undertaking concerned the defences of the undertaking concerned is not established

Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm32

Facts

The Chongqing AIC fined Chongqing Qingyang Pharmaceutical CNY 439308 for alleged dominance abuse

The investigation was initiated when the company contacted the agency for verification on its potential breach of the AML related to an allopurinol active pharmaceuticals ingredient (API) distribution agreement with its exclusive distributor The company provided the relevant agreement and information and the agency conducted an investigation into the company and some other relevant companies

Analysis

Relevant Market

During the investigation the agency found that pharmaceutical ingredients are a special commodity the API is used to produce the preparations The chemical API is only used for the production of the preparation and could be used as a medicine for clinic use

The preparation is produced according to the requirements of certain form of prepared drugs and for the purpose of treatment and prevention which can be used as medicine

The allopurinol is used for the common treatment of hyperuricemia However the other treatments are different in pharmacological effects or treatment effects as well as in the cost for the patient Furthermore the company is the only manufacturer and supplier in the market nationwide since July 2012 Therefore the agency concluded that the relevant market is the allopurinol API market

Considering that the qualification for manufacturing the allopurinol API is national wide and the normal practice for purchasers and suppliers is domestic the relevant geographic market is the Chinese market

The Market Dominance

During the investigation the agency found that the company is the only supplier and manufacturer of allopurinol API in China there is no other competitor in the

32 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151222_16

5152html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 36 of 52

market and the company has a monopoly in the market The evidence shows that the company has the ability to control the prices the position for the downstream is relatively weak

With respect to the market entry the agency found that the market entry is relatively high in addition other undertakings are dependent on the company Thus the agency believed the company to have market dominance

Refusal to Deal

The agency found that on September 25 2015 the company reached an exclusive agreement and distribution agreement with its distributor Based on these agreements the company didnrsquot supply allopurinol API to the said distributor and other companies despite the fact that those companies requested for allopurinol API but were turned down by the company

Absence of Reasonable Cause

The agency found that the companyrsquos refusal to deal was not in line with the needs of normal business operation or economic efficiency On the other hand the refusal to deal was aimed at increasing the market share of the allopurinol drug product Also the agency found that the stop of supply was a manipulation of market power as to maximize the profit to the most The agency further found that the exclusive distribution agreement with suspension of supply for six months and the refusal to supply was to eliminate and restrict the competition as to gain the monopolistic profit

The Consequence of Refusal to Deal

The agency concluded that the refusal to deal harmed the competition of the allopurinol preparations market Because of the suspension of supply many demanders had to reduce their production or switch to the supply of other products or stop their production The suspension of supply affected the competition of the downstream market Consequently the raising of the price of allopurinol API also raised the cost for other manufacturers of allopurinol preparations

Furthermore the refusal to deal led to capacity loss of the allopurinol preparation industry

Ultimately the refusal to deal increased the burden on consumers as the refusal to supply changed the supply-demand relationship in the market

The agency concluded that the Company abused its dominant position in the allopurinol API market by refusing to deal with intended buyers in the period between October 2013 and March 2014Therefore the Company violated article 17 (1) of the AML which prohibits business operators with a dominant market position from abusing that position such as the refusal to deal without any justifications

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

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D Administrative Monopoly

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 witnessed antitrust authoritiesrsquo significant efforts regarding the enforcement against administrative monopoly According to Mr Dong Zhiming the deputy director general of Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly Bureau ever since the AML coming into force six cases in connection with administrative monopoly were investigated by NDRC and among them five cases were handled in the year of 2015 These cases touched abuses of administrative power in terms of designative deal in relation to transportation communication and pharmaceutical industries

The first private litigation related to administrative monopolistic acts was heard in the court which is a milestone case in the enforcement of the AML

Significant Cases

Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC33

Facts

In March 2015 the NDRC released the official letter to Shandong Provincial Department of Transportation (ldquoShandong DOTrdquo) on its website with respect to correct its abuse of administrative power to exclude and restrict competition

During the investigation the NDRC found that since 2011 Shandong DOT had issued multiple relevant government orders in order to require certain types of vehicles to be directly connected to two designated information and service platforms both of which are operated and technically supported by one company namely Shandong Jiutong Internet of Things Technology Co Ltd (ldquoJiutong ITTrdquo) Furthermore according to the orders issued by the competent administrative department all the vehicle satellite positioning terminals entering into Shandong provincial market should be debugged through the said technology service platform which is operated by the mentioned company In addition Shandong DOT released the cap prices of vehicle satellite positioning terminals which is identical to the 2012 bid-winning price in the Ministry of Transportation demonstration project

The NDRC believed that Shandong DOTrsquos behaviour eliminated and restricted the competition in the monitoring platform market and the vehicle terminal market deprived the right of transportation enterprises to choose vehicle terminals and monitoring platform on their owns unreasonably raised the sales prices of vehicle terminals and service fees charged by the platform and increased the costs of transportation enterprises Therefore the antitrust agency concluded that Shandong

33 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201503t20150327_668911html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

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DOT violated article 8 of the AML which stipulates that ldquoadministrative organs and the public organizations with an administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude and restrict competitionrdquo Specifically Shandong DOT violated article 3234 in terms of requiring organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any designated operators and violated article 3735 in terms of setting rules with contents which eliminate and restrict competition

Based on article 51 of the AML ldquoWhere administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations abuse administrative powers performing activities which exclude and restrict competition the superior entity shall order it to correct impose administrative penalty on the chief officer and other staffs directly responsible pursuant to the laws The AML enforcement authority may give recommendations on disposal of activities to the relevant superior entityrdquo the NDRC proposed in writing that the Shandong provincial government should order Shandong DOT to rectify its behaviour with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Entirely open up the monitoring platform market by permitting transportation undertakings to freely choose any approved platform

2) Loosen the restrictions on the entry into Shandong vehicle terminals permit the undertakings to independently select the supplier of vehicle terminals and allow the qualified terminals to be connected to the relevant monitoring platform and

3) Revoke the official documentation relevant to the cap price of vehicle terminals in order to promote the price competition

Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 36

Facts

On 26 August 2015 the NDRC published its second decision with regard to the rectification of administrative monopoly since the beginning of this year According to the proposal letter sent to Anhui Provincial Government the investigation against the Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City (Bengbu HFPC) was trigged by third partiesrsquo complaints

34 Article 32 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to require organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any operators designated by them 35 Article 37 of the AML Administrative organs shall not abuse their administrative powers to set rules with contents which eliminate restrict competition 36 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201508t20150826_748682html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 39 of 52

The investigation suggests that Bengbu HFPC published three notices with regard to drugs procurement in April and May of this year

In the No C-2015-CG-X-111 Notice (ldquoNo111 Noticerdquo) released on 10 April2015 the health authority not only provided the dosage form and qualification of the requested drugs but also directly determined the suppliers of relevant drugs which eliminated and restricted the competition among pharmaceutical manufacturers and therefore violated articles 32 and 37 of the AML

In the No C-2015-CG-C-112 Notice (ldquoNo112 Noticerdquo) and No C-2015-CG-C-168 (ldquoNo 168 Noticerdquo) respectively released on 10 April and 22 May 2015 the Bengbu HFPC set discriminative qualification requirements on non-local undertakings in order to restrict their participation in the relevant bidding For instance in accordance with No 112 Notice to be a qualified bidder the turnover of non-local undertakings shall exceed CNY 2 billion which is 50 times as much as the turnover requirements of the local undertakings In the NDRCrsquos opinion the administrative monopoly activities conducted by the local health agency excluded the relevant undertakings from the market maintained the virtual-high prices of drugs and therefore violated articles 3237 and 37 of the AML

The NDRC suggested in a letter that Anhui Provincial Government should urge the Bengbu HFPC to rectify the abuse of monopoly powers with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Stop setting distinguishing restrictions on qualification requirements review standards and numbers of winning bidders as for local and non-local undertakings

2) Stop designating the suppliers of competitive drugs and

3) Take necessary measures to mitigate the negative effects resulting from the previous illegal monopolistic abuses

Outlook

At the beginning of the year the former director general of the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau under the NDRC Xu Kunlin stated that the agency would strengthen antitrust enforcement on abuse of administrative power in 2015

Since then the NDRC has made great efforts to rectify unreasonable abuses of administrative power The currently disclosed two cases investigated by the NDRC re-emphasize the Chinese Governmentrsquos strict scrutiny of antitrust issues in respect of

37 Article 34 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to restrict or reject the participation of operators from other regions in local bidding activities by measures such as prescribing discriminatory qualification requirements or assessment standards or by not publishing information according to law

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 40 of 52

administrative monopoly It reminds the local governments that antitrust compliance is of significant importance

III Private Litigation

A Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen more and more private antitrust litigations

The private antitrust litigation cases have become increasingly complicated especially the issues regarding the intersection areas of IP and antitrust law

Multinational giants and State-Owned Enterprises (the ldquoSOEsrdquo) are increasingly becoming the targets in antitrust civil litigations Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (the ldquoSMEsrdquo) tend to use the antitrust litigation to achieve their commercial goals in the business context

B Significant Cases

Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)38

This is the first-ever private litigation concerning administrative monopoly since the implementation of the AML in 2008

Facts

According to the currently disclosed details the case is relevant for designated trade

The plaintiff Shenzhen Sware Technology Co Ltd (ldquoSwarerdquo) is a software company The press releases suggest that Sware Gloden Software Co Ltd (ldquoGlodenrdquo) and Shanghai Ruban Software Co Ltd (ldquoShanghai Rubanrdquo) are the three main suppliers of construction cost software and possess the major shares of the relevant market An annual provincial vocational ability contest regarding the construction cost hosted by the Guangdong Department of Education (ldquoGuangdong DOE) designated Gloden as the exclusive supplier of the relevant software

After several unsuccessful verbal and written negotiations with Guangdong DOE in April 2014 Sware filed a lawsuit against Guangdong DOE before the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquothe Courtrdquo) alleging that the administrative organ abused its administrative power and violated the AML by designating exclusive software supplier for the contest and claimed a compensation for reasonable expense amounting to CNY 10800 Yuan

The opinions of the Court 38 The story of the case is available at httpfinancesinacomcnchinadfjj20150410074621924997shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 41 of 52

The full text of the judgment has not been disclosed yet In accordance with the information available to the public the Court invoked article 32 of the AML which prohibits an administrative organ from abusing its administrative power to require or in disguised form organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use only the commodities supplied by the entities designated by them The Court concluded that Guangdong DOE failed to prove the legitimacy of the designation and therefore abused its administration power

Currently the case is in appeal before the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court

Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 39

It is the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China

In the first instance ruling Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court ruled against Sinopec holding that the Yunnan branch of Sinopecs trading company was obligated to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its dominance in the sales market of refined oil by refusing to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding without justifiable reasons

In the second instance ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors Currently the case is pending

Facts

The First Trial

The lawsuit was filed before the Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoKunming Courtrdquo) in January 2014 Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy Co Ltd (ldquoYingdingrdquo) a bio-energy manufacturer claimed that Sinopec and the Yunnan branch of Sinopec trading company (ldquoSinopec Yunnan Branchrdquo) had failed to fulfil their obligations stipulated in the Renewable Energy Law and had abused their market dominance in sales market of refined oil by refusing to trade with Yingding without justifiable reasons

Sinopec and Sinopec Yunnan Branch mainly explained four reasons for why they rejected Yingdingrsquos biofuel Firstly Yingding had failed to prove that the biofuel complied with the relevant national standard and was safe to use Secondly Yingding had failed to provide complete trading terms Thirdly the laws and regulations regarding biofuel were incomplete the authorized refined oil sales companies were 39 The details of the case are available at httpnewsxinhuanetcomfortune2014-1217c_1113680039htm httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=9e71db51-6ff6-4d2c-8af6-8eacf023ebdeampKeyWord=E4BA91E58D97E79B88E9BC8E|E4B8ADE79FB3E58C96 httpnewsxinhuanetcomenergy2015-0422c_127721575htm httpwwwnbdcomcnarticles2015-04-23911348html last visited on December 17 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 42 of 52

obligated to purchase biofuel from the biofuel manufacturers if it met certain quality standards but there was a vacancy regarding how to reach the end consumers from the sales companies

On 8 December 2014 the Kunming Intermediate Peoples Court ruled that Sinopec Yunnan Branch bore a legal obligation to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its market dominance in refined oil market by refusing without any justifiable reasons to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding The court ordered Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network within 30 days Both Yingding and Sinopec filed appeals to the Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court

The Appellate Trial

The appeal hearing was held on 22 April 2015 in Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoYunnan Courtrdquo) Sinopec submitted 23 new pieces of evidence and introduced two expert witnesses in a bid to overturn several key elements in the first-instance ruling by Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court

In terms of the determination of the relevant market and the market dominance Sinopec argued that the relevant market in this case was for adipic acid monomethyl ester (ldquoAAMErdquo) the main ingredient of a biofuel additive known as BD100 Yingdingrsquos main product is BD100 which can be blended with fossil diesel to become biofuel In the AAME market Sinopec is a potential buyer instead of a market dominator In support of this argument Sinopec presented an expert witnessmdashGong Jiong a professor of economics at Beijings University of International Business and Economics who testified that AAME should be defined as the relevant product market on the basis of an economic analysis

However Yingding insisted that the first-instance ruling was correct in naming the sales market of refined oil as the relevant market and submitted new evidence an article on Sinopecs website that claimed it had a 67 market share in Yunnan to help establish the claim that Sinopec had market dominance

Another main dispute was whether Yingdingrsquos biofuel product met national standards which would make it mandatory for Sinopec to purchase under Chinas Renewable Energy Law The law stipulates that biofuel producers must sell their products first to an authorized refined oil sales company and the sales companies are obliged to buy the fuel if it meets certain quality standards In order to test the quality Sinopec introduced the second expert witness Lin Jianmin a leading author of Chinarsquos national biofuel standard Lin Jianmin pointed out that there are currently quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology which gives Sinopec a justifiable reason not to trade with Yingding Moreover Sinopec presented some precedents in which consumers had complained about the biofuel quality and also claimed that China didnt have a sound regulatory framework to support biofuel production neither in testing nor in sales

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 43 of 52

Nevertheless to refute this point Yingding referred to an earlier test in co-operation with Sinopec in 2011 where selected buses in Kunming used biofuel blended by Sinopec using BD100 produced by Yingding

On August 13 2015 Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors and now this case is pending In the written appellate ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court did not provide any details regarding its reasoning

Key Issues of the Case

Is there any competition between Yingding and Sinopec

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case the product of Yingding is biofuel while Sinopec does not engage in the business of biofuel From this perspective Yingding and Sinopec are not competitors Thus it is not necessary and not reasonable for Sinopec to eliminate or restrict the competition from Yingding

Relevant Market

The definition of the relevant market is a prerequisite to determine whether competition exists and whether the AML is applicable In accordance with the Judicial Interpretation of Antitrust civil litigation the plaintiff shall take the responsibility to prove the defendantrsquos dominance in the relevant market Also the methods of defining the relevant market are stipulated in the Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition (ldquoGuidelinesrdquo) However both Yingding and Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court defined the relevant market as the sales market of refined oil without sufficient antitrust analysis none of the methods in the Guidelines were used Therefore the definition of the relevant market remains arguable and needs to be sufficiently analysed in the upcoming retrial

Justifiable Reasons

The abuse of market dominance includes the behaviour of refusing to trade without justifiable reasons according to the AML but in the first instance ruling justifiable reasons were not investigated by the court During the appellate trial the expert witness introduced by Sinopec claimed that there were quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology and this was a justifiable reason to refuse to trade with Yingding Even though the first instance court and the appellate court did not reason the justifiable reason it should be discussed and investigated further during the retrial

AML or Renewable Energy Law

The claims of Yingding were based on both the AML and the Renewable Energy Law (ldquoRELrdquo) and the first instance ruling referred to both the AML and the REL as

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 44 of 52

well It seems that the laws the first instance court referred to were comprehensive but in fact the reasoning was not clear and logical In the first instance ruling some disputes regarding the AML were reviewed but all the orders were not based on the AML Specifically the first instance court ordered the Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network based on the REL and dismissed the other claims That the orders were not on account of reasoning is illogical It is anticipated that during the retrial the application of the laws will be clearer

Analysis

A lot of issues have not been clearly analysed by the courts such as the relevant market and the justifiable reasons Since the case is remanded the above-mentioned issues are expected to be resolved in the retrial In addition Yingding was in a disadvantaged position compared to its first instance trial since its claims based on the AML were challenged greatly during the appellate trial In the retrial it is probable that Yingding may switch its litigation strategy and base its claims on the REL Therefore maybe more preparation regarding the REL can give Sinopec a leg up

Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)

Rijing Electric a Chinese distributor seeks CNY 5m compensation

The first hearing was on 9 June 2015 and ended without a ruling

Facts

Rijing Electric (ldquoRijingrdquo) a Shanghai-based company and a former distributor for Panasonic accused Panasonic of abusing its dominance and dividing the market through monopolistic practice in an antitrust lawsuit filed in 2014 with Shanghai No 1 Intermediate Court (ldquoShanghai Courtrdquo) claiming compensation of CNY 5m (USD 815370) Wenzhou Mingda Automation System Co and Shanghai Qingying Automation Equipment as the distributor of Panasonic in China are the co-defendants were accused of conducting monopolistic behaviours by implementing Panasonicrsquos policy

The first hearing for evidence exchange was on June 9 2015 Rijing claimed a policy allegedly introduced by Panasonic in 2009 restricted the competition between distributors Panasonic claims the policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo and has full justifiable reasons It explained that the products in question required customization at considerable cost to distributors before its sale to customers Once carried out however other distributors leaving them open to quote much lower prices than the original distributor could simply and relatively cheap replicate this customization Besides Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and that the plaintiff had failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic said its market share for the four products

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 45 of 52

under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases Also Rijing failed to challenge the policy when it was first introduced instead initially agreeing it was reasonable as e-mail evidence submitted by Panasonic suggests

Key Issues of the Case

Whether Panasonic occupied a market dominant position

It is reported that Rijing claimed that Panasonic had abused its market dominance but Rijing failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and its market share for the four products under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases

Analysis

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case Panasonicrsquos policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo rather than to eliminate or restrict competition

Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals40 (Pending)

It is a battle over patent licensing issues

It is viewed as being among the most complicated antitrust lawsuits in China

The first hearing was on 17 and 18 December 2015

Facts

Four Chinese rare earth companies Ningbo Ketian Magnet Ningbo Permanent Magnetics Ningbo Tongchuang Strong Magnet Material and Ningbo Huahui Magnetic Industry filed antitrust lawsuits against Hitachi Metals over alleged patent licensing issues regarding rare earth magnets on December 11 2014 with the Ningbo Intermediate Peoples Court (ldquoNingbo Courtrdquo) in Zhejiang province As reported four Chinese rare earth companies claimed Hitachi Metals abused its market dominance and hurt the industry competition by refusing to license the patents to them The patents in this case are used in the manufacturing of sintered neodymium iron boron (ldquoNdFeBrdquo) magnets a rare-earth magnet alloy widely used in parts for airplanes automobiles and other products

Hitachi Metals filed a challenge with the Ningbo Court over its jurisdiction in April 2015 After Ningbo Court rejected Hitachi Metals jurisdiction objection on 28 April 2015 Hitachi Metals appealed to the Zhejiang High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoZhejiang

40The details of the story are available at httpwwwzbmagcomnews_viewphpid=80 httpwwwhitachicomcnaboutpress201510-121118_ahtml last visited on December 22 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 46 of 52

Courtrdquo) but Zhejiang Court affirmed the ruling of the Ningbo Court

The first day of a two-day hearing took place on 17 December 2015 during which the two sides cross-examined each otherrsquos evidence The evidence focused on clearing up several key elements in the case including the relevant market whether Hitachi Metals has dominance on that market and whether both sides acted in good faith during the licensing negotiations

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Product Market

The four Chinese rare earth companies claimed that the relevant product market should be the NdFeb-related patent licensing market However Hitachi Metals believed that the physical NdFeb market rather than the patent licensing market should be the relevant product market which is meaningful for assess the real competitive effects on the market

Whether Hitachi Metals occupies a dominant market position

In terms of market dominance Hitachi Metals claimed it does not occupy a dominant position because Hitachi Metalsrsquo patents were not in a standard in this case and there are substitutable technologies in the market SEP holders have the obligation to license on FRAND terms but none-SEP holders do not So while a refusal to license a SEP may constitute abuse of dominance refusal to license a non-SEP mdash even by a patent holder with a dominant position mdash should not be considered as an abuse

Analysis

Hitachi Metals as a patent holder should have the right to decide whether to retain those patents or not or who to license According to the legal theory the purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage and protect innovation by conferring monopoly right mdash that is to give intellectual property owners the proprietary rights which can exclude others from using the intellectual property The SEP holders admittedly need to comply with FRAND terms which can maintain a robust balance between competition and monopoly whereas the further intervention of antitrust law into non-SEP patents may undermine the purpose of intellectual property law To which extent the antitrust law should intervene is yet to be seen

Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei41

A confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the Beijing IP court made by the Beijing High Court

41 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcncpwswbjzscq201511t20151103_12225640htm last visited on December 28 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 47 of 52

Facts

On August 2 2013 the NDRC penalized Abbott for monopolistic price-fixing and then Abbott made a price adjustment in China where the prices of main products were reduced

On December 16 2014 Tian Junwei (ldquoTianrdquo) a Chinese citizen in Beijing sued Carrefour Shuangjing Branch (ldquoCarrefourrdquo) and Abbott (Shanghai) Sales Company (ldquoAbbottrdquo) at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (ldquoIP Courtrdquo) for their monopolistic price-fixing which damaged his interests However Carrefour and Abbott challenged the jurisdiction of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court They claimed there were two reasons Firstly according to the jurisdiction rules of the IP court issued by the Supreme Court the IP court has no jurisdiction over anti-trust cases Secondly if this case is a contractual dispute the court that is in the place of Carrefour should hear it if this case is a tort dispute the Shanghai Intermediate Court should hear it

In the ruling of the IP Court the IP Court decided it has the jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases for the following reasons According to the Provisions On Causes Of Action In Civil Cases issued by Supreme Court (最高人民法院案由规定) antimonopoly dispute is a tertiary cause of action belonging to IP and competition disputes Also according to the Provisions concerning the Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京

市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问题的规定 ) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was an IP and competition dispute and was sued after November 6 2014 Thus the IP Court had jurisdiction

Both Carrefour and Abbott appealed to the Beijing High Court over the jurisdiction ruling but the Beijing High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original ruling Reasons are listed in the written ruling issued on June 18 2015 Firstly the nature of the case was an antimonopoly dispute In accordance with Provisions of the Supreme Peoples Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民

事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) and Civil Litigation Law the monopolistic civil disputes in the first instance shall be under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Peoples Courts and an action involving a contractual dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the peoples court of the place where the defendant is domiciled or where the contract is performed Carrefour as the defendant in this case is domiciled in Chaoyang District Beijing Therefore the courts of Beijing have jurisdiction over this case Secondly according to article 3 of the Notification on the Jurisdiction of Intellectual Property Courts issued by Supreme Court (关于知识产权法院案件管辖

等有关问题的通知) IP courts have jurisdiction over first-instance civil disputes arising from monopolistic practices Lastly according to Provisions concerning the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 18 of 52

business

B Monopolistic Agreements

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

With respect to the enforcement activities of the NDRC in light of the numbers of the published cases it seems that the law enforcement frequency of the NDRC regarding monopolistic agreements in 2015 is lower in comparison with 2014

The reason behind might be that the outstanding issue of human resource deficit of the antitrust authority still exists Besides the fact that more enterprises gradually attach increasing importance to the antitrust compliance might be another reason for the decrease in the number of cases investigated by the authorities

As to the enforcement activities of the SAIC 4 of 14 cases concluded by the SAIC and its local branches in 2015 are relevant to monopolistic agreements Meanwhile these four cases concern horizontal monopolistic agreements

It is noteworthy however that the Mercedes-Benz case and the Dongfeng Nissan case suggest that vertical agreements especially involving price-related restrictions on the downstream dealers is still the priority of antitrust enforcement Companies shall be very cautious when imposing restrictions on the resale prices or the minimum resale prices of commodities in the distribution agreements

Automobile industry and related industries are observed to be under continuous attention of Chinarsquos antitrust authorities

The industries relating to peoplersquos livelihoods remain to be the enforcement priority

Significant Cases

Enforcement by the NDRC and its local branches

Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC16

The investigation was triggered by a leniency application

The first leniency applicant was exempted from punishment

Eight ocean shipping companies involved were imposed a collective fine of CNY 4067 million

NDRC spent approximately 12 months to investigate and conclude the case 16 NDRCrsquos press release of the case is available at httpjjsndrcgovcngzdt201512t20151228_769084html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 19 of 52

Facts

In December 2015 the NDRC published its official punishment decisions regarding the cartel case in connection with eight ocean shipping companies namely Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha (ldquoNYKrdquo) Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha (ldquoK Linerdquo) Mitsui OSK Lines EUKOR Car Carriers Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics Compantildeiacutea Sud Americana de Vapores Eastern Car Liner and Compantildeiacutea Chilena de Navegacioacuten Interoceaacutenica

According to the official press release of the NDRC the investigation was triggered by a leniency application of NYK The evidence showed that the eight companies reached consensus on non-intrusion of each others existing business to maintain or increase shipping fees when shipping goods such as cars trucks and engineering machinery in the routes between China and other countries and regions

They were also found to frequently conduct bilateral or multilateral communications on the shippersrsquo invitation for bids andor price inquiries via phone conferences dinner parties e-mails visiting etc In addition they also conducted illegal behaviour such as sensitive information exchange price negotiations bidding intention discussion dividing clients and shipping routes reaching agreements on high price bids or non-bidding in order to help certain companies gain shipping orders

To avoid the regulation of the antitrust authority the relevant shipping companies adopted various illicit measures that showed their apparent intention to violate the AML The cartel lasted for at least four years and covered a broad range of shipping routes concerned with the import and export of products between China and other regions such as North America EU South America and so on involving multiple auto brands and engineering machinery brands

The NDRC held the opinion that the eight companies conducts had restricted and eliminated competition in the relevant market raising the international shipping fees and impairing interests of shippers and end consumers The eight companies breached the AML by reaching and implementing monopolistic agreements on fixing prices and dividing the market

All eight investigated companies put forward remedy measures including enhancing the antitrust compliance program arranging more antitrust compliance trainings and developing antitrust compliance technologies

The NDRC imposed fines based on the nature level and duration of their monopolistic volations as well as their respective sales of international freight service sales relevant to the Chinese market The companies involved were collectively fined CNY 4067 million

NYK as the first cartel member voluntarily reporting the illegal conducts to the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 20 of 52

authority and providing significant evidence was entirely exempted from the punishment K Line as the second leniency applicant was imposed a fine amounting to 4 of its 2014 annual sales of international freight services relevant to Chinarsquos import and export market The details of punishments imposed on the involved companies by the NDRC are as follow

Company Name Amount of Fines (RMB million)

Percentage of the Relevant Turnovers

Grounds

Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha

- - First leniency applicant

Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha

2398 4 Second leniency applicant

Mitsui OSK Lines 3812 7 Third leniency applicant

EUKOR Car Carriers 284 9 Lasted over a long period involved many brands and many violations violations were severe

Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics

4506 8 Lasted over a long period involved many brands and many violations violations were severe

Compantildeiacutea Sud Americana de Vapores

308 6 Lasted over a long period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Eastern Car Liner 1127 5 Lasted over a long period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Compantildeiacutea Chilena de 120 4 Lasted over a long

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 21 of 52

Navegacioacuten Interoceaacutenica

period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Total 4067

Analysis

In this case the agency applied the AML instead of the Tenders and Bids Law to collusive bidding Citing article 13 (3) of the AML the NDRC identified that the collusive bidding constituted a division of the sales market

The leading three leniency applicants were granted exemption from fines to a varying degree

According to the official who handled this case dawn raids performed by antitrust enforcement agencies in other jurisdictions drew the attention of the NDRC on the cartels of these shipping companies However there was limited effective evidence to prove that the companies had reached monopolistic agreements Through pressuring the involved parties three members of the shipping cartel actively confessed their illegal conduct This case once again stresses the significance of international cooperation between antitrust enforcement agencies

Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau17

The distribution agreements between Mercedes-Benz and its dealers are determined as vertical monopolistic agreement and Mercedes-Benz violated article 14 of the AML because it restricted the ability of its dealers to decide their own resale prices

Mercedes-Benzrsquos dealers violated article of 13 of the AML due to concluding a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Mercedes-Benz and its dealers were jointly fined CNY 3578 million

Facts

In April 2015 Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau which is the provincial branch of the NDRC released the punishment on its website and announced that it had imposed a fine of CNY 350 million on Mercedes-Benz along with the aggregated fine of CNY 787 million on its dealers The fine came as a result of Mercedes-Benz reaching and implementing resale price maintenance (ldquoRPMrdquo) agreements with dealers to fix the minimum resale price of several car models as well as certain auto parts 17 The original Chinese notice published by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau is available at httpwwwjswjjgovcnoffice_neweo_comm_zxnrxsphp

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 22 of 52

According to the decision the authority found that Mercedes-Benz fixed the minimum resale price of Class E and Class S cars in Nanjing Wuxi Changzhou and Suzhou markets through telephoneverbal communication and dealers meetings from January 2013 to July 2014 Since 2010 Mercedes-Benz had reached agreements with dealers in Jiangsu province to fix the minimum resale prices for auto parts by providing different levels of discounts for insured cars cars involving expired warranty periods and cars within the warranty period

In addition Mercedes-Benz implemented the minimum resale price maintaining agreement by

1) Tightening its monitoring measures on the dealers such as inspecting deals and their sale incentive system on a weekly basis

2) Tracking the sales process flow of cars and increasing the intensity of this assessment

3) Giving warnings and reducing support ndash for example halting the supply of bestselling cars and prohibiting the opening of new stores ndash to dealers if dealers refused to cooperate with the price-fixing related policies and measures and

4) Interviewing personnel of the dealers and requesting terminations if the staff engaged in serious violations of the RPM agreement

Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau concluded that Mercedes-Benz had excluded and eliminated market competition harmed consumer welfare and consequently violated article 1418 of the AML The authority therefore imposed a fine of CNY 350 million representing 7 of the sale revenue of the previous year in the relevant market against Mercedes-Benz and imposed a fine on the dealers amounting to an equivalence of 1 of the annual sales in the previous year

Analysis

Although the agency also addressed the horizontal violation among the dealers in this case the administrative penalty decision mainly focuses on the vertical violation The agency fined dealers involved in the RPM agreement a combined CNY 787 million equal to 1 of the previous-year sales which suggests that the agency decided to give lighter punishments to dealers who took initiative in reporting the activity and provided evidence

The Mercedes-Benz case is the third case where the agency successfully 18 Article 14 of the AML The following monopolistic agreements between operators and trading partners shall be prohibited (i) fixing the resale prices of commodities to third persons (ii) restricting the minimum resale prices of commodities to third persons (iii) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement Authority under the State Council

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 23 of 52

discovered both vertical and horizontal agreements in a case following the Audi case and the Chrysler case All these cases are rooted in the same industry indicating that industrial features play a large role in raising anti-trust concerns In fact it appears that the entire automotive industry is under antitrust scrutiny

Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC19

This case involved both a horizontal agreement and an administrative monopoly

A total fine of CNY 1318 million was imposed on the involved companies

Facts

In June 2015 the NDRC through its website announced the decision made by its regional branch -Yunnan Provincial Development and Reform Commission (ldquoYunnan DRCrdquo) regarding the horizontal monopolistic agreement case involving Yunnan Communications Administration and local subsidiaries of four state-owned telecommunication companies

Through the investigation Yunnan DRC found that Yunnan Communications Administration as a competent government agency had organized several meetings involving Yunnan branches of four state-owned telecoms - China Mobile China Telecom China Unicom and China Tietong in August and September of 2014 At the end of 2009 the four local branches entered into an agreement to regulate their sales promotions in terms of limiting the promotional items amount and frequency

Furthermore the agreement provides certain measures to ensure the implementation of relevant restrictions on promotions Specifically in case any cartel member violates the agreement the others could file complaints with Yunnan Communications Administration and the agency would then issue a rectification notice to the rule-breaker

Yunnan DRC stated that the four telecoms were main competitors in the relevant market and the promotions as a significant competition measure would exert direct influence on the final prices of the products The horizontal agreement organized by Yunnan Communications Administration on sales promotions restricted the competition capacity of telecoms and as a result eliminated the competition in the relevant market Consequently the behaviour of Yunnan Communications Administration violated article 8 20 of the AML and constituted administrative monopoly in terms of ldquoforcing undertakings to conduct monopolistic behaviour prohibited by the AMLrdquo

19 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpwwwsdpcgovcnfzgggzjgjdyfldjjszhdt201506t20150602_694802html 20 Article 8 of the AML Administrative organs and the public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 24 of 52

With respect to the penalties Yunnan DRC fined the local branch of China Tietong CNY 200000 for reaching but not implementing the agreement in regards to the other three telecoms a total fine of CNY 1298 million amounting to 2 of the sales of the relevant business in the previous year were imposed for entering into and implementing the horizontal monopolistic agreement

Analysis

The telecoms industry is still the enforcement priority of the antitrust enforcement authorities A company cannot be exempted from punishment even though it is forced by competent authorities to conduct monopoly behaviour

DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC21

Both a horizontal monopolistic agreement and a vertical monopolistic agreement were involved in this case

A total fine of CNY 14242 million was imposed on DongFeng Nissan and its distributors

Facts

In September 2015 the Guangdong Development and Reform Commission (ldquoGuangdong DRCrdquo) released an announcement regarding the administrative penalties on DongFeng Nissan and its provincial distributors for concluding price-related monopolistic agreements More specifically DongFeng Nissan was imposed a fine of CNY 1233 million for breaching article 14 of the AML in terms of restricting the resale price of certain car models 17 distributors domiciled in Guangdong were collectively fined CNY 1912 million for violating article 1322 of the AML in terms of entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements

According to the published official release the Guangdong DRC launched the investigation in August 2014 The authority discovered that from 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissan had set a rigorous restriction on its distributorsrsquo abilities to determine the resale prices of certain car models including the quoted prices in various platforms and the final resale price In addition DongFeng Nissan punished the distributors that failed to abide by such price restrictions in 2013 The authority 21 The original Chinese notice published by Guangdong DRC is available at httpwwwgddpcgovcnzwgkgzdtgzyw201509t20150910_328993html 22 Article 13 of the AML The following Monopolistic agreements among competing operators shall be prohibited (i) fix or change prices of commodities (ii) limit the outputs or sales volume of commodities (iii) segment the sales markets or the raw material purchasing markets (iv) limit the purchase of new technology new facilities or limit the development of new products new technology (v) jointly boycott transactions (vi) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-Monopoly Law enforcement Authority Monopolistic agreements in this Law refer to agreements decisions or other concerted practices that eliminate restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 25 of 52

believed that the vertical agreement concluded between DongFeng Nissan and its distributors eliminated and restricted the competition in the relevant market and damaged the consumer welfare as well which violates article 14 of the AML

Furthermore from April 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissanrsquos distributors in Guangdong province held multiple meetings to discuss issues relevant to sale price reached and implemented a horizontal monopolistic agreement in terms of fixing the prices of some car models which is prohibited by article 13 of the AML

Considering that both DongFeng Nissan and the involved distributors positively cooperated with the investigation and ceased the illegal behaviour immediately after the investigation Guangdong DRC decided to impose a fine amounting to 3 of its previous yearrsquos turnovers on DongFeng Nissan and a fine ranging from 2 to 4 on the relevant distributors in accordance with articles 4623 and 4924 of the AML

Analysis

This case demonstrates that auto and related industries are still under close attention of the authority Considering the NDRCrsquos successful series of antitrust investigations conducted throughout the auto industry it is observed that the agency currently overseeing price-related antitrust issues in China has accumulated a substantial amount of experience regarding antitrust enforcement in the auto industry Now is the right time to speed up the law-making process by amending the set of rules released earlier and drafting new laws to advise the auto industry on antitrust compliance

Enforcement by the SAIC and its local branches

Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC25

The investigation was triggered by whistle blowerrsquos submission

Cartel members were collectively fined CNY 139 million 23 Article 46 of the AML In case the operators violate the relevant provisions of this Law concluding and implementing Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall order the operators to cease such act impose fines more than 1 but less than 10 of the total turnover in the preceding year and confiscate the illegal gains where the Monopolistic agreement is not implemented a fine less than RMB 500000 can be imposed If the operators involved in Monopolistic agreement on its own initiative report information concerning the conclusion of Monopolistic agreements and provide important evidences to the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority they may be given a mitigated punishment or be exempted from punishment in accordance with the circumstances Where the industrial associations violate this Law organizing the operators in the industry to conclude Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority may impose a fine less than RMB 500000 in serious circumstances the agency of social organization administration and registration may cancel its registration 24 Article 49 of the AML As for the imposition of the fines stipulated by the Article 46 47 and 48 of this Law the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall take elements such as the nature extent and time it lasts of the illegal act into consideration in determining the specific amount of the fines 25 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201506t20150601_156889html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 26 of 52

Facts

In April 2015 the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) issued administrative penalties on several brick manufacturers for entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements This is the first case relevant to monopolistic agreements that has been publicized by the SAIC since the beginning of this year

Ten cartel members were involved in the case including one company and nine individuals Similar with most antitrust cases the investigation started as a result of a whistle blowerrsquos submission After a thorough investigation Hunan AIC found that those local brick manufacturers had reached agreements on controlling production volume and dividing sales areas in the forms of production and sales agreements plans and meeting minutes

The enforcement authority reached the conclusion that these brick manufacturers violated article 13 of the AML and imposed a total fine of CNY 1389400 on them

Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC26

The organizer of the monopolistic agreement the animation association was fined CNY 100000

The antitrust authority did not punish the members of the monopolistic agreement

Facts

In December 2015 the Guangdong Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoGuangdong AICrdquo) published its administrative punishment decision in regards to Guangzhou Panyu Animation amp Game Association (ldquoGAGArdquo) organizing member companies to conclude a monopolistic agreement

According to the decision GAGA drafted the ldquoAgreement of Exhibition Alliancerdquo (ldquoAgreementrdquo) and convened a conference with member companies in order to discuss the content and conclusion of the Agreement 52 member companies entered into the Agreement which actually requested the alliance companies to merely participate in the exhibitions either organized or supported by GAGA in Guangzhou In addition the Agreement prohibited the alliance companies from attending any other exhibition except if they obtained prior approval of GAGA

After a thorough investigation Guangdong AIC believed that the conclusion of the Agreement among GAGA and the 52 member companies violated article 13 (5) of the AML in terms of boycott GAGA who was deeply involved and restricted member companiesrsquo choice of exhibitions through the Agreement could be deemed as

26 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151208_164680html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 27 of 52

the participant and organizer of the monopolistic agreement In accordance with article 46 of the AML Guangdong AIC imposed a fine of CNY 100000 on GAGA for organizing the conclusion of the monopolistic agreement

Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC27

Hubei AIC considered the coinsurance for Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance illegal

Twelve insurance companies were fined CNY 469 million in total

Facts

In December 2015 the Hubei Administrative for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHubei AICrdquo) disclosed its punishment on 12 insurance companies for signing illegal coinsurance agreements

The disclosed punishment decision suggests that the Hubei branch of China Pacific Life Insurance (ldquothe Companyrdquo) 11 other insurance companies and Wuhan Construction Safety Technology Consultation Center (ldquoWCSTCCrdquo) signed a Coinsurance Agreement on Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance (ldquoCoinsurance Agreementrdquo) of which the main contents include

1) The Company and 11 other involved companies as the coinsurers jointly take charge of the personal accident insurance concerned with the construction project directly administered by the Wuhan government WCSTCC is responsible for providing safety professionalism and technology services regarding the relevant personal accident insurance

2) The Company as the chief insurer of the coinsurance occupies 12 of the total amount of the insurance and the other 11 companies respectively occupy 8

3) The Company as the representative of the coinsurance is in charge of collecting the premium signing the standard form insurance policies and issuing the invoice in its own name The Company should share the charged premium with the other companies in accordance with the Coinsurance Agreement

4) Both the Company and the other insurance companies should pay 25 of the actually received premium to WCSTCC as the service fee WCSTCC will assist the coinsurers in providing safety and technology management service to the insured In addition the 11 insurance companies should pay 5 of their premium to the Company as the management fee

27 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165445html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 28 of 52

5) In case an accident happens the 12 companies will jointly bear the damages based on their respective shares in the coinsurance

6) There is a contact mechanism established in the coinsurance The coinsurers will regularly hold coinsurance conferences to discuss existing problems

Furthermore the coinsurers and WCSTCC also signed a self-discipline agreement and established a complete management system to assure the implementation of the Coinsurance Agreement Any party violating the Coinsurance Agreement would be punished

Hubei AIC found that WCSTCC was solely invested by Wuhan Construction Safety Management Association which was under Wuhan Construction Commission The centre helped implement certain functions of the Wuhan Urban Construction Safety Management Station and was responsible for quality supervision and safety supervision of municipal construction projects

It later became a prerequisite for construction companies to purchase insurance from any member of the coinsurance in order to get approval to commence their project According to the decision Hubei AIC launched another separate investigation against WCSTCC

Through the investigation Hubei AIC concluded that the Coinsurance Agreement constituted a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by article 13 of the AML with the following analysis

First coinsurance as a common business model to jointly share and lower risks is widely adopted in the insurance industry A coinsurance arrangement for a specific project in order to avoid high risks faced by one insurer could be legal However coinsurance should not target the entire market In this case prior to the Coinsurance Agreement the risks of the construction projects were unpredictable since the scale of the construction projects the difficulty of the construction and the amount of construction workers could not be available It is impossible to predict the risks of the projects thus it is not necessary to cooperate with other insurers to collectively bear the risks The purpose of the 12 insurance companies to establish the coinsurance is to avoid the competition which demonstrates the Coinsurance Agreement belongs to a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by the AML

Second the companies through entering into the coinsurance agreement actually divided the relevant market of construction project personal accident insurance in Wuhan city which affected the competition in the relevant market and damaged the interests of other competitors and the consumers In particular the Construction Law as amended in 2011 stipulates that the purchase of personal accident insurance is not mandatory and the construction companies have the right to choose whether to buy the said insurance or not As mentioned purchasing insurance from the coinsurance had been the prerequisite for construction companies to obtain administration

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 29 of 52

approval for the project which seriously distorts the fair competition in the market

Citing article 46 of the AML the 12 insurance companies were collectively fined CNY 469 million including fines on the companies and confiscation of illegal gains It is noteworthy that the fines were calculated based on the companiesrsquo 2014 annual sales of the insurance product in connection with the coinsurance The Company as the chief insurer was fined amounting to 6 of its 2014 annual sales of the relevant insurance product in the coinsurance and other companies were fined amounting to 2 of relevant sales For more specific information please see the following table

Company Name (Hubei Branch)

Fines (CNY million)

Percentage of the sales

Illegal Gains (CNY

million)

China Pacific Life Insurance 00653 6 0941

Sino Life 00145 2 04332

Alltrust Insurance 00145 2 04332

Taikang Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Continent Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Pacific Property Insurance

00145 2 04332

China Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

PICC Property and Casualty 00145 2 02599

Taiping General Insurance 00145 2 013

Union Life Insurance 00145 2 01177

Ping An Annuity Insurance Company of China

00145 2 04201

Ping An Property amp Casualty Insurance Company of China

00145 2 -

Subtotal 02248 - 44679

Total 46927

Analysis

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 30 of 52

Coinsurance as an effective approach to lower risks of insurers is widely used in the insurance industry Information sharing and agreements on coinsurance were generally considered efficient and legitimate However from an antitrust perspective coinsurance may raise competition concerns depending on the circumstances of each agreement In the case that there is enough capacity for one insurer to cover the potential risks the coinsurance might be considered as entering into a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC28

The first leniency applicant was exempted from fines

The other concrete companies were imposed a fine of CNY 180000

Facts

In December 2015 the concrete companies monopolistic agreement case investigated by Hunan AIC was published on SAICrsquos website

In accordance with the antitrust enforcement announcement of SAIC this case was triggered by complaints from the Yongzhou City peoplersquos congress After the preliminary review the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) initiated the formal investigation on seven concrete companies domiciled in Yongzhou City Hunan Province which were suspected of being involved in a monopolistic agreement in terms of division of the volumes of the products

After further investigation Hunan AIC found that the seven concrete companies concluded a partnership agreement in 2011 which requested the involved companies to enter into a partnership business with assets In addition according to the partnership agreement it was planned to establish a comprehensive office to manage production marketing and distribution of the products of all the partners The seven companies intended to jointly adjust and control the output of concrete based on the partnership agreement However because there were disagreements over the allocation of the injected assets and market shares the companies did not implement the partnership agreement The agreement was cancelled in December 2012

Based on the findings Hunan AIC concluded that the seven concrete companies as competitors of each other restricted and eliminated the competition in the relevant market through reaching the partnership agreement and dividing the volumes of sales which violated article 13(3) of the AML in terms of division of sales market Considering that the agreement had not been implemented and the limited influence of the agreement according to article 46 of the AML and article 27 of the Administrative Penalties Law small amount fines were imposed on the involved companies Six companies were fined CNY 30000 each for their illegal behaviour 28 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165504html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 31 of 52

Yongzhou Shuangyuan Building Materials Co Ltd as the first one to actively report the monopolistic agreement and cooperate with the enforcement authority was exempted from the punishment

Outlook

It is expected that the AMLrsquos enforcement on monopolistic agreements will continue in the future Industries such as automobile shipping pharmaceuticals insurance etc will still remain the priority of the antitrust enforcement

The antitrust enforcement authorities have published a series of regulations in order to clarify the substantial and procedural issues relevant to the antitrust enforcement However Chinarsquos current antitrust legislation regime is still immature In the following years we expect that more attention will be paid to the legislative improvements

Another remarkable issue for cartel members is that with more Chinese enterprises attaching increasing importance to the AML the follow-on civil damages actions might become a tendency in the future

C Abuse of Market Dominance

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen a decent increase of abuse of market dominance cases both in public enforcement and private litigation Oftentimes the authorities responsible for public enforcement generally find it difficult to pursue investigations against abuse of market dominance cases The following two main reasons are often cited to explain this standoff first it is hard for the authorities to define the relevant markets and prove the undertaking(s)rsquo dominant market position through economic approaches second it is hard to collect evidence regarding abusive practices

The cases related to IPRs abuse are emerging significantly particularly in the telecommunication media and technology (ldquoTMTrdquo) sectors

The SAICrsquos latest refusal-to-deal probe against a local drug maker shows that the SAIC and its local branches have increasingly acquired a profile as an abuse of dominance regulator

Significant Cases

Cases pursued by the SAIC

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 32 of 52

Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case29

Facts

The local authority in Dongfang city reported to the Hainan provincial branch of SAIC on April 23 2014 of the suspected dominance abuse The SAIC authorized its Hainan bureau to officially investigate the matter on 25 July 2014 according to a decision dated January 9 2015 The AIC concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its market dominance by requiring users to pay a deposit without any legal basis and or justifiable reasons

In terms of the relevant product market the local authority found that in this case it was the urban water supply market in Dongfang city and its surrounding townships where Dongfang Water was the sole public operator in the local water supply market with a 100 market share which made all water users completely reliant on the companyrsquos supply In term of market access the local authority found it very unlikely that there were other operators due to the strict regulations

The Hainan SAIC then concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its dominance as it charged users a deposit by threatening to refuse to register users and also by threatening to restrict the water supply Dongfang Waters charging of deposits lacked a legal basis and hadnt received government approval to the detriment of household consumers and business water users and hampered the improvement of management and services of the company Such conduct was in breach of Chinarsquos Anti-Monopoly Law

Hainan AIC levied a fine of CNY 593208 a lighter penalty equivalent to 2 of the companyrsquos annual sales for the previous year and confiscated illicit gains of CNY 38521 for abuse of market dominance

Analysis

It is noteworthy that although handled by a local authority supervised by the SAIC the antitrust agency detailed the relevant market definition the assessment of the dominant market position the abusive practices and the scrutiny of the justifiable reasons

Although the definition of the relevant market and the reasoning of the Hainan provincial AIC and the SAIC are subject to criticism it is still applausive to see that the antitrust regulators have realized the importance of the application of rule of reason in an abuse case In addition through itrsquos a published decision practitioners may observe the regulatorsrsquo reasoning and thus transparency and legal certainty have been generated

29 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzfcfjd201502t20150212_152066html last visited on October 18 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

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Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms30

Facts

In June 2013 the Ningxia AIC under authorization of SAIC opened an antitrust investigation into the alleged tie-in sales by the three major state-owned telecommunications operators China Tietong China Unicom and China Telecom for the tie-in sale of fixed-line telephones with broadband Internet services The Ningxia AIC found that the three companies had bundled fixed-line phone services with Internet services to subscribers

During the investigation all three telecommunications companies admitted the tie-in practice had recognized that such practice had improper influence on competition and deprived the choices of consumers The three companies promised to undertake internal rectification timely and eliminate the ill effects resulting from such practice The parties committed to taking the following corrective measures

1) Taking internal rectifications and conducting training to staff about antitrust laws and stop tie-in sales practices

2) Making public commitments to allow subscribers a free choice of services and strengthening the propaganda through the operating room call centre and other channels

3) Unbundling fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

The Ningxia AIC decided to suspend the probe on 14 May 2015 on the grounds that the three companies had actively worked together with the investigators and proposed workable remedy plans

Analysis

In the official announcement Ningxia AIC concluded that the purpose of antitrust enforcement is to restrain monopolistic conducts the protection of competition and to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of consumers Given that during the investigation process the parties had actively cooperated with the investigation formed a more profound understanding of the dangers of tying behaviour and moreover the parties proposed and implemented positive corrective measures to be able to remove the ill impact of their actions the agency believed that the purpose of antitrust law enforcement was fulfilled

It is worth noting that the Ningxia AIC also required the three companies to implement the commitment by August 30 2015and the submission of the written

30 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158908html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158906html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158910html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 34 of 52

implementation report on July 102015 and August 102015 respectively which is another illustration that an effective commitment by the undertakings shall directly deal with the effect that is brought by the monopolistic behaviour In this case the effect of the monopolistic act was restricted to the choice of the consumers therefore the commitment by the undertaking aimed at allowing the freedom of choice and the unbundling of fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company31

Facts

The Liaoning AIC imposed a fine of approximately CNY 433m on the Fushun Branch of Liaoning Tobacco Co on 1 June 2015 The agency also ordered the company to stop its illicit behaviour

The Liaoning AIC received a tip-off that the accused Liaoning Tobacco Corsquos Fushun branch was conducting tie-in sales of non-high-demand cigarette brands with high-demand cigarette brands After gaining authorization from SAIC the agency officially started an investigation regarding the companyrsquos suspected abuse of market dominance in June 2014

Analysis

According to the announcement the tobacco company argued that the tobacco industry is a state controlled or monopolized industry with a lawful monopolistic position therefore the company shall not be subject to the norms of general market competition rules or the anti-monopoly law

In this regards the agency concluded that in terms of the status of the undertaking admittedly the first paragraph of article 17 of the AML says that the State shall protect the lawful business operations of undertakings in these industries with respect to the industries which are under the control of the State-owned economic sector and have a bearing on the lifeline of the national economy or national security and the industries which exercise monopoly over the production and sale of certain commodities according to law However the second paragraph continues to say that the undertakings mentioned above shall do business according to law be honest faithful and strictly self-disciplined and subject themselves to public supervision and they shall not harm the consumers interests by taking advantage of their position of control or their monopolistic production and sale of certain commodities In particular in the preceding paragraph the ldquolawful businessrdquo and ldquoaccording to lawrdquo imply that the AML shall apply in the business operation The agency therefore believes that

31 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201508t20150813_16

0208html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 35 of 52

there shall be no exemption for the undertaking concerned the defences of the undertaking concerned is not established

Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm32

Facts

The Chongqing AIC fined Chongqing Qingyang Pharmaceutical CNY 439308 for alleged dominance abuse

The investigation was initiated when the company contacted the agency for verification on its potential breach of the AML related to an allopurinol active pharmaceuticals ingredient (API) distribution agreement with its exclusive distributor The company provided the relevant agreement and information and the agency conducted an investigation into the company and some other relevant companies

Analysis

Relevant Market

During the investigation the agency found that pharmaceutical ingredients are a special commodity the API is used to produce the preparations The chemical API is only used for the production of the preparation and could be used as a medicine for clinic use

The preparation is produced according to the requirements of certain form of prepared drugs and for the purpose of treatment and prevention which can be used as medicine

The allopurinol is used for the common treatment of hyperuricemia However the other treatments are different in pharmacological effects or treatment effects as well as in the cost for the patient Furthermore the company is the only manufacturer and supplier in the market nationwide since July 2012 Therefore the agency concluded that the relevant market is the allopurinol API market

Considering that the qualification for manufacturing the allopurinol API is national wide and the normal practice for purchasers and suppliers is domestic the relevant geographic market is the Chinese market

The Market Dominance

During the investigation the agency found that the company is the only supplier and manufacturer of allopurinol API in China there is no other competitor in the

32 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151222_16

5152html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 36 of 52

market and the company has a monopoly in the market The evidence shows that the company has the ability to control the prices the position for the downstream is relatively weak

With respect to the market entry the agency found that the market entry is relatively high in addition other undertakings are dependent on the company Thus the agency believed the company to have market dominance

Refusal to Deal

The agency found that on September 25 2015 the company reached an exclusive agreement and distribution agreement with its distributor Based on these agreements the company didnrsquot supply allopurinol API to the said distributor and other companies despite the fact that those companies requested for allopurinol API but were turned down by the company

Absence of Reasonable Cause

The agency found that the companyrsquos refusal to deal was not in line with the needs of normal business operation or economic efficiency On the other hand the refusal to deal was aimed at increasing the market share of the allopurinol drug product Also the agency found that the stop of supply was a manipulation of market power as to maximize the profit to the most The agency further found that the exclusive distribution agreement with suspension of supply for six months and the refusal to supply was to eliminate and restrict the competition as to gain the monopolistic profit

The Consequence of Refusal to Deal

The agency concluded that the refusal to deal harmed the competition of the allopurinol preparations market Because of the suspension of supply many demanders had to reduce their production or switch to the supply of other products or stop their production The suspension of supply affected the competition of the downstream market Consequently the raising of the price of allopurinol API also raised the cost for other manufacturers of allopurinol preparations

Furthermore the refusal to deal led to capacity loss of the allopurinol preparation industry

Ultimately the refusal to deal increased the burden on consumers as the refusal to supply changed the supply-demand relationship in the market

The agency concluded that the Company abused its dominant position in the allopurinol API market by refusing to deal with intended buyers in the period between October 2013 and March 2014Therefore the Company violated article 17 (1) of the AML which prohibits business operators with a dominant market position from abusing that position such as the refusal to deal without any justifications

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

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D Administrative Monopoly

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 witnessed antitrust authoritiesrsquo significant efforts regarding the enforcement against administrative monopoly According to Mr Dong Zhiming the deputy director general of Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly Bureau ever since the AML coming into force six cases in connection with administrative monopoly were investigated by NDRC and among them five cases were handled in the year of 2015 These cases touched abuses of administrative power in terms of designative deal in relation to transportation communication and pharmaceutical industries

The first private litigation related to administrative monopolistic acts was heard in the court which is a milestone case in the enforcement of the AML

Significant Cases

Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC33

Facts

In March 2015 the NDRC released the official letter to Shandong Provincial Department of Transportation (ldquoShandong DOTrdquo) on its website with respect to correct its abuse of administrative power to exclude and restrict competition

During the investigation the NDRC found that since 2011 Shandong DOT had issued multiple relevant government orders in order to require certain types of vehicles to be directly connected to two designated information and service platforms both of which are operated and technically supported by one company namely Shandong Jiutong Internet of Things Technology Co Ltd (ldquoJiutong ITTrdquo) Furthermore according to the orders issued by the competent administrative department all the vehicle satellite positioning terminals entering into Shandong provincial market should be debugged through the said technology service platform which is operated by the mentioned company In addition Shandong DOT released the cap prices of vehicle satellite positioning terminals which is identical to the 2012 bid-winning price in the Ministry of Transportation demonstration project

The NDRC believed that Shandong DOTrsquos behaviour eliminated and restricted the competition in the monitoring platform market and the vehicle terminal market deprived the right of transportation enterprises to choose vehicle terminals and monitoring platform on their owns unreasonably raised the sales prices of vehicle terminals and service fees charged by the platform and increased the costs of transportation enterprises Therefore the antitrust agency concluded that Shandong

33 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201503t20150327_668911html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

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DOT violated article 8 of the AML which stipulates that ldquoadministrative organs and the public organizations with an administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude and restrict competitionrdquo Specifically Shandong DOT violated article 3234 in terms of requiring organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any designated operators and violated article 3735 in terms of setting rules with contents which eliminate and restrict competition

Based on article 51 of the AML ldquoWhere administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations abuse administrative powers performing activities which exclude and restrict competition the superior entity shall order it to correct impose administrative penalty on the chief officer and other staffs directly responsible pursuant to the laws The AML enforcement authority may give recommendations on disposal of activities to the relevant superior entityrdquo the NDRC proposed in writing that the Shandong provincial government should order Shandong DOT to rectify its behaviour with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Entirely open up the monitoring platform market by permitting transportation undertakings to freely choose any approved platform

2) Loosen the restrictions on the entry into Shandong vehicle terminals permit the undertakings to independently select the supplier of vehicle terminals and allow the qualified terminals to be connected to the relevant monitoring platform and

3) Revoke the official documentation relevant to the cap price of vehicle terminals in order to promote the price competition

Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 36

Facts

On 26 August 2015 the NDRC published its second decision with regard to the rectification of administrative monopoly since the beginning of this year According to the proposal letter sent to Anhui Provincial Government the investigation against the Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City (Bengbu HFPC) was trigged by third partiesrsquo complaints

34 Article 32 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to require organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any operators designated by them 35 Article 37 of the AML Administrative organs shall not abuse their administrative powers to set rules with contents which eliminate restrict competition 36 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201508t20150826_748682html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 39 of 52

The investigation suggests that Bengbu HFPC published three notices with regard to drugs procurement in April and May of this year

In the No C-2015-CG-X-111 Notice (ldquoNo111 Noticerdquo) released on 10 April2015 the health authority not only provided the dosage form and qualification of the requested drugs but also directly determined the suppliers of relevant drugs which eliminated and restricted the competition among pharmaceutical manufacturers and therefore violated articles 32 and 37 of the AML

In the No C-2015-CG-C-112 Notice (ldquoNo112 Noticerdquo) and No C-2015-CG-C-168 (ldquoNo 168 Noticerdquo) respectively released on 10 April and 22 May 2015 the Bengbu HFPC set discriminative qualification requirements on non-local undertakings in order to restrict their participation in the relevant bidding For instance in accordance with No 112 Notice to be a qualified bidder the turnover of non-local undertakings shall exceed CNY 2 billion which is 50 times as much as the turnover requirements of the local undertakings In the NDRCrsquos opinion the administrative monopoly activities conducted by the local health agency excluded the relevant undertakings from the market maintained the virtual-high prices of drugs and therefore violated articles 3237 and 37 of the AML

The NDRC suggested in a letter that Anhui Provincial Government should urge the Bengbu HFPC to rectify the abuse of monopoly powers with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Stop setting distinguishing restrictions on qualification requirements review standards and numbers of winning bidders as for local and non-local undertakings

2) Stop designating the suppliers of competitive drugs and

3) Take necessary measures to mitigate the negative effects resulting from the previous illegal monopolistic abuses

Outlook

At the beginning of the year the former director general of the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau under the NDRC Xu Kunlin stated that the agency would strengthen antitrust enforcement on abuse of administrative power in 2015

Since then the NDRC has made great efforts to rectify unreasonable abuses of administrative power The currently disclosed two cases investigated by the NDRC re-emphasize the Chinese Governmentrsquos strict scrutiny of antitrust issues in respect of

37 Article 34 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to restrict or reject the participation of operators from other regions in local bidding activities by measures such as prescribing discriminatory qualification requirements or assessment standards or by not publishing information according to law

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 40 of 52

administrative monopoly It reminds the local governments that antitrust compliance is of significant importance

III Private Litigation

A Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen more and more private antitrust litigations

The private antitrust litigation cases have become increasingly complicated especially the issues regarding the intersection areas of IP and antitrust law

Multinational giants and State-Owned Enterprises (the ldquoSOEsrdquo) are increasingly becoming the targets in antitrust civil litigations Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (the ldquoSMEsrdquo) tend to use the antitrust litigation to achieve their commercial goals in the business context

B Significant Cases

Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)38

This is the first-ever private litigation concerning administrative monopoly since the implementation of the AML in 2008

Facts

According to the currently disclosed details the case is relevant for designated trade

The plaintiff Shenzhen Sware Technology Co Ltd (ldquoSwarerdquo) is a software company The press releases suggest that Sware Gloden Software Co Ltd (ldquoGlodenrdquo) and Shanghai Ruban Software Co Ltd (ldquoShanghai Rubanrdquo) are the three main suppliers of construction cost software and possess the major shares of the relevant market An annual provincial vocational ability contest regarding the construction cost hosted by the Guangdong Department of Education (ldquoGuangdong DOE) designated Gloden as the exclusive supplier of the relevant software

After several unsuccessful verbal and written negotiations with Guangdong DOE in April 2014 Sware filed a lawsuit against Guangdong DOE before the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquothe Courtrdquo) alleging that the administrative organ abused its administrative power and violated the AML by designating exclusive software supplier for the contest and claimed a compensation for reasonable expense amounting to CNY 10800 Yuan

The opinions of the Court 38 The story of the case is available at httpfinancesinacomcnchinadfjj20150410074621924997shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 41 of 52

The full text of the judgment has not been disclosed yet In accordance with the information available to the public the Court invoked article 32 of the AML which prohibits an administrative organ from abusing its administrative power to require or in disguised form organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use only the commodities supplied by the entities designated by them The Court concluded that Guangdong DOE failed to prove the legitimacy of the designation and therefore abused its administration power

Currently the case is in appeal before the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court

Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 39

It is the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China

In the first instance ruling Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court ruled against Sinopec holding that the Yunnan branch of Sinopecs trading company was obligated to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its dominance in the sales market of refined oil by refusing to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding without justifiable reasons

In the second instance ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors Currently the case is pending

Facts

The First Trial

The lawsuit was filed before the Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoKunming Courtrdquo) in January 2014 Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy Co Ltd (ldquoYingdingrdquo) a bio-energy manufacturer claimed that Sinopec and the Yunnan branch of Sinopec trading company (ldquoSinopec Yunnan Branchrdquo) had failed to fulfil their obligations stipulated in the Renewable Energy Law and had abused their market dominance in sales market of refined oil by refusing to trade with Yingding without justifiable reasons

Sinopec and Sinopec Yunnan Branch mainly explained four reasons for why they rejected Yingdingrsquos biofuel Firstly Yingding had failed to prove that the biofuel complied with the relevant national standard and was safe to use Secondly Yingding had failed to provide complete trading terms Thirdly the laws and regulations regarding biofuel were incomplete the authorized refined oil sales companies were 39 The details of the case are available at httpnewsxinhuanetcomfortune2014-1217c_1113680039htm httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=9e71db51-6ff6-4d2c-8af6-8eacf023ebdeampKeyWord=E4BA91E58D97E79B88E9BC8E|E4B8ADE79FB3E58C96 httpnewsxinhuanetcomenergy2015-0422c_127721575htm httpwwwnbdcomcnarticles2015-04-23911348html last visited on December 17 2015

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Page 42 of 52

obligated to purchase biofuel from the biofuel manufacturers if it met certain quality standards but there was a vacancy regarding how to reach the end consumers from the sales companies

On 8 December 2014 the Kunming Intermediate Peoples Court ruled that Sinopec Yunnan Branch bore a legal obligation to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its market dominance in refined oil market by refusing without any justifiable reasons to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding The court ordered Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network within 30 days Both Yingding and Sinopec filed appeals to the Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court

The Appellate Trial

The appeal hearing was held on 22 April 2015 in Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoYunnan Courtrdquo) Sinopec submitted 23 new pieces of evidence and introduced two expert witnesses in a bid to overturn several key elements in the first-instance ruling by Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court

In terms of the determination of the relevant market and the market dominance Sinopec argued that the relevant market in this case was for adipic acid monomethyl ester (ldquoAAMErdquo) the main ingredient of a biofuel additive known as BD100 Yingdingrsquos main product is BD100 which can be blended with fossil diesel to become biofuel In the AAME market Sinopec is a potential buyer instead of a market dominator In support of this argument Sinopec presented an expert witnessmdashGong Jiong a professor of economics at Beijings University of International Business and Economics who testified that AAME should be defined as the relevant product market on the basis of an economic analysis

However Yingding insisted that the first-instance ruling was correct in naming the sales market of refined oil as the relevant market and submitted new evidence an article on Sinopecs website that claimed it had a 67 market share in Yunnan to help establish the claim that Sinopec had market dominance

Another main dispute was whether Yingdingrsquos biofuel product met national standards which would make it mandatory for Sinopec to purchase under Chinas Renewable Energy Law The law stipulates that biofuel producers must sell their products first to an authorized refined oil sales company and the sales companies are obliged to buy the fuel if it meets certain quality standards In order to test the quality Sinopec introduced the second expert witness Lin Jianmin a leading author of Chinarsquos national biofuel standard Lin Jianmin pointed out that there are currently quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology which gives Sinopec a justifiable reason not to trade with Yingding Moreover Sinopec presented some precedents in which consumers had complained about the biofuel quality and also claimed that China didnt have a sound regulatory framework to support biofuel production neither in testing nor in sales

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Nevertheless to refute this point Yingding referred to an earlier test in co-operation with Sinopec in 2011 where selected buses in Kunming used biofuel blended by Sinopec using BD100 produced by Yingding

On August 13 2015 Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors and now this case is pending In the written appellate ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court did not provide any details regarding its reasoning

Key Issues of the Case

Is there any competition between Yingding and Sinopec

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case the product of Yingding is biofuel while Sinopec does not engage in the business of biofuel From this perspective Yingding and Sinopec are not competitors Thus it is not necessary and not reasonable for Sinopec to eliminate or restrict the competition from Yingding

Relevant Market

The definition of the relevant market is a prerequisite to determine whether competition exists and whether the AML is applicable In accordance with the Judicial Interpretation of Antitrust civil litigation the plaintiff shall take the responsibility to prove the defendantrsquos dominance in the relevant market Also the methods of defining the relevant market are stipulated in the Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition (ldquoGuidelinesrdquo) However both Yingding and Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court defined the relevant market as the sales market of refined oil without sufficient antitrust analysis none of the methods in the Guidelines were used Therefore the definition of the relevant market remains arguable and needs to be sufficiently analysed in the upcoming retrial

Justifiable Reasons

The abuse of market dominance includes the behaviour of refusing to trade without justifiable reasons according to the AML but in the first instance ruling justifiable reasons were not investigated by the court During the appellate trial the expert witness introduced by Sinopec claimed that there were quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology and this was a justifiable reason to refuse to trade with Yingding Even though the first instance court and the appellate court did not reason the justifiable reason it should be discussed and investigated further during the retrial

AML or Renewable Energy Law

The claims of Yingding were based on both the AML and the Renewable Energy Law (ldquoRELrdquo) and the first instance ruling referred to both the AML and the REL as

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

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well It seems that the laws the first instance court referred to were comprehensive but in fact the reasoning was not clear and logical In the first instance ruling some disputes regarding the AML were reviewed but all the orders were not based on the AML Specifically the first instance court ordered the Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network based on the REL and dismissed the other claims That the orders were not on account of reasoning is illogical It is anticipated that during the retrial the application of the laws will be clearer

Analysis

A lot of issues have not been clearly analysed by the courts such as the relevant market and the justifiable reasons Since the case is remanded the above-mentioned issues are expected to be resolved in the retrial In addition Yingding was in a disadvantaged position compared to its first instance trial since its claims based on the AML were challenged greatly during the appellate trial In the retrial it is probable that Yingding may switch its litigation strategy and base its claims on the REL Therefore maybe more preparation regarding the REL can give Sinopec a leg up

Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)

Rijing Electric a Chinese distributor seeks CNY 5m compensation

The first hearing was on 9 June 2015 and ended without a ruling

Facts

Rijing Electric (ldquoRijingrdquo) a Shanghai-based company and a former distributor for Panasonic accused Panasonic of abusing its dominance and dividing the market through monopolistic practice in an antitrust lawsuit filed in 2014 with Shanghai No 1 Intermediate Court (ldquoShanghai Courtrdquo) claiming compensation of CNY 5m (USD 815370) Wenzhou Mingda Automation System Co and Shanghai Qingying Automation Equipment as the distributor of Panasonic in China are the co-defendants were accused of conducting monopolistic behaviours by implementing Panasonicrsquos policy

The first hearing for evidence exchange was on June 9 2015 Rijing claimed a policy allegedly introduced by Panasonic in 2009 restricted the competition between distributors Panasonic claims the policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo and has full justifiable reasons It explained that the products in question required customization at considerable cost to distributors before its sale to customers Once carried out however other distributors leaving them open to quote much lower prices than the original distributor could simply and relatively cheap replicate this customization Besides Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and that the plaintiff had failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic said its market share for the four products

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 45 of 52

under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases Also Rijing failed to challenge the policy when it was first introduced instead initially agreeing it was reasonable as e-mail evidence submitted by Panasonic suggests

Key Issues of the Case

Whether Panasonic occupied a market dominant position

It is reported that Rijing claimed that Panasonic had abused its market dominance but Rijing failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and its market share for the four products under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases

Analysis

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case Panasonicrsquos policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo rather than to eliminate or restrict competition

Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals40 (Pending)

It is a battle over patent licensing issues

It is viewed as being among the most complicated antitrust lawsuits in China

The first hearing was on 17 and 18 December 2015

Facts

Four Chinese rare earth companies Ningbo Ketian Magnet Ningbo Permanent Magnetics Ningbo Tongchuang Strong Magnet Material and Ningbo Huahui Magnetic Industry filed antitrust lawsuits against Hitachi Metals over alleged patent licensing issues regarding rare earth magnets on December 11 2014 with the Ningbo Intermediate Peoples Court (ldquoNingbo Courtrdquo) in Zhejiang province As reported four Chinese rare earth companies claimed Hitachi Metals abused its market dominance and hurt the industry competition by refusing to license the patents to them The patents in this case are used in the manufacturing of sintered neodymium iron boron (ldquoNdFeBrdquo) magnets a rare-earth magnet alloy widely used in parts for airplanes automobiles and other products

Hitachi Metals filed a challenge with the Ningbo Court over its jurisdiction in April 2015 After Ningbo Court rejected Hitachi Metals jurisdiction objection on 28 April 2015 Hitachi Metals appealed to the Zhejiang High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoZhejiang

40The details of the story are available at httpwwwzbmagcomnews_viewphpid=80 httpwwwhitachicomcnaboutpress201510-121118_ahtml last visited on December 22 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 46 of 52

Courtrdquo) but Zhejiang Court affirmed the ruling of the Ningbo Court

The first day of a two-day hearing took place on 17 December 2015 during which the two sides cross-examined each otherrsquos evidence The evidence focused on clearing up several key elements in the case including the relevant market whether Hitachi Metals has dominance on that market and whether both sides acted in good faith during the licensing negotiations

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Product Market

The four Chinese rare earth companies claimed that the relevant product market should be the NdFeb-related patent licensing market However Hitachi Metals believed that the physical NdFeb market rather than the patent licensing market should be the relevant product market which is meaningful for assess the real competitive effects on the market

Whether Hitachi Metals occupies a dominant market position

In terms of market dominance Hitachi Metals claimed it does not occupy a dominant position because Hitachi Metalsrsquo patents were not in a standard in this case and there are substitutable technologies in the market SEP holders have the obligation to license on FRAND terms but none-SEP holders do not So while a refusal to license a SEP may constitute abuse of dominance refusal to license a non-SEP mdash even by a patent holder with a dominant position mdash should not be considered as an abuse

Analysis

Hitachi Metals as a patent holder should have the right to decide whether to retain those patents or not or who to license According to the legal theory the purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage and protect innovation by conferring monopoly right mdash that is to give intellectual property owners the proprietary rights which can exclude others from using the intellectual property The SEP holders admittedly need to comply with FRAND terms which can maintain a robust balance between competition and monopoly whereas the further intervention of antitrust law into non-SEP patents may undermine the purpose of intellectual property law To which extent the antitrust law should intervene is yet to be seen

Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei41

A confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the Beijing IP court made by the Beijing High Court

41 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcncpwswbjzscq201511t20151103_12225640htm last visited on December 28 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 47 of 52

Facts

On August 2 2013 the NDRC penalized Abbott for monopolistic price-fixing and then Abbott made a price adjustment in China where the prices of main products were reduced

On December 16 2014 Tian Junwei (ldquoTianrdquo) a Chinese citizen in Beijing sued Carrefour Shuangjing Branch (ldquoCarrefourrdquo) and Abbott (Shanghai) Sales Company (ldquoAbbottrdquo) at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (ldquoIP Courtrdquo) for their monopolistic price-fixing which damaged his interests However Carrefour and Abbott challenged the jurisdiction of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court They claimed there were two reasons Firstly according to the jurisdiction rules of the IP court issued by the Supreme Court the IP court has no jurisdiction over anti-trust cases Secondly if this case is a contractual dispute the court that is in the place of Carrefour should hear it if this case is a tort dispute the Shanghai Intermediate Court should hear it

In the ruling of the IP Court the IP Court decided it has the jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases for the following reasons According to the Provisions On Causes Of Action In Civil Cases issued by Supreme Court (最高人民法院案由规定) antimonopoly dispute is a tertiary cause of action belonging to IP and competition disputes Also according to the Provisions concerning the Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京

市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问题的规定 ) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was an IP and competition dispute and was sued after November 6 2014 Thus the IP Court had jurisdiction

Both Carrefour and Abbott appealed to the Beijing High Court over the jurisdiction ruling but the Beijing High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original ruling Reasons are listed in the written ruling issued on June 18 2015 Firstly the nature of the case was an antimonopoly dispute In accordance with Provisions of the Supreme Peoples Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民

事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) and Civil Litigation Law the monopolistic civil disputes in the first instance shall be under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Peoples Courts and an action involving a contractual dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the peoples court of the place where the defendant is domiciled or where the contract is performed Carrefour as the defendant in this case is domiciled in Chaoyang District Beijing Therefore the courts of Beijing have jurisdiction over this case Secondly according to article 3 of the Notification on the Jurisdiction of Intellectual Property Courts issued by Supreme Court (关于知识产权法院案件管辖

等有关问题的通知) IP courts have jurisdiction over first-instance civil disputes arising from monopolistic practices Lastly according to Provisions concerning the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 19 of 52

Facts

In December 2015 the NDRC published its official punishment decisions regarding the cartel case in connection with eight ocean shipping companies namely Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha (ldquoNYKrdquo) Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha (ldquoK Linerdquo) Mitsui OSK Lines EUKOR Car Carriers Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics Compantildeiacutea Sud Americana de Vapores Eastern Car Liner and Compantildeiacutea Chilena de Navegacioacuten Interoceaacutenica

According to the official press release of the NDRC the investigation was triggered by a leniency application of NYK The evidence showed that the eight companies reached consensus on non-intrusion of each others existing business to maintain or increase shipping fees when shipping goods such as cars trucks and engineering machinery in the routes between China and other countries and regions

They were also found to frequently conduct bilateral or multilateral communications on the shippersrsquo invitation for bids andor price inquiries via phone conferences dinner parties e-mails visiting etc In addition they also conducted illegal behaviour such as sensitive information exchange price negotiations bidding intention discussion dividing clients and shipping routes reaching agreements on high price bids or non-bidding in order to help certain companies gain shipping orders

To avoid the regulation of the antitrust authority the relevant shipping companies adopted various illicit measures that showed their apparent intention to violate the AML The cartel lasted for at least four years and covered a broad range of shipping routes concerned with the import and export of products between China and other regions such as North America EU South America and so on involving multiple auto brands and engineering machinery brands

The NDRC held the opinion that the eight companies conducts had restricted and eliminated competition in the relevant market raising the international shipping fees and impairing interests of shippers and end consumers The eight companies breached the AML by reaching and implementing monopolistic agreements on fixing prices and dividing the market

All eight investigated companies put forward remedy measures including enhancing the antitrust compliance program arranging more antitrust compliance trainings and developing antitrust compliance technologies

The NDRC imposed fines based on the nature level and duration of their monopolistic volations as well as their respective sales of international freight service sales relevant to the Chinese market The companies involved were collectively fined CNY 4067 million

NYK as the first cartel member voluntarily reporting the illegal conducts to the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 20 of 52

authority and providing significant evidence was entirely exempted from the punishment K Line as the second leniency applicant was imposed a fine amounting to 4 of its 2014 annual sales of international freight services relevant to Chinarsquos import and export market The details of punishments imposed on the involved companies by the NDRC are as follow

Company Name Amount of Fines (RMB million)

Percentage of the Relevant Turnovers

Grounds

Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha

- - First leniency applicant

Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha

2398 4 Second leniency applicant

Mitsui OSK Lines 3812 7 Third leniency applicant

EUKOR Car Carriers 284 9 Lasted over a long period involved many brands and many violations violations were severe

Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics

4506 8 Lasted over a long period involved many brands and many violations violations were severe

Compantildeiacutea Sud Americana de Vapores

308 6 Lasted over a long period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Eastern Car Liner 1127 5 Lasted over a long period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Compantildeiacutea Chilena de 120 4 Lasted over a long

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 21 of 52

Navegacioacuten Interoceaacutenica

period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Total 4067

Analysis

In this case the agency applied the AML instead of the Tenders and Bids Law to collusive bidding Citing article 13 (3) of the AML the NDRC identified that the collusive bidding constituted a division of the sales market

The leading three leniency applicants were granted exemption from fines to a varying degree

According to the official who handled this case dawn raids performed by antitrust enforcement agencies in other jurisdictions drew the attention of the NDRC on the cartels of these shipping companies However there was limited effective evidence to prove that the companies had reached monopolistic agreements Through pressuring the involved parties three members of the shipping cartel actively confessed their illegal conduct This case once again stresses the significance of international cooperation between antitrust enforcement agencies

Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau17

The distribution agreements between Mercedes-Benz and its dealers are determined as vertical monopolistic agreement and Mercedes-Benz violated article 14 of the AML because it restricted the ability of its dealers to decide their own resale prices

Mercedes-Benzrsquos dealers violated article of 13 of the AML due to concluding a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Mercedes-Benz and its dealers were jointly fined CNY 3578 million

Facts

In April 2015 Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau which is the provincial branch of the NDRC released the punishment on its website and announced that it had imposed a fine of CNY 350 million on Mercedes-Benz along with the aggregated fine of CNY 787 million on its dealers The fine came as a result of Mercedes-Benz reaching and implementing resale price maintenance (ldquoRPMrdquo) agreements with dealers to fix the minimum resale price of several car models as well as certain auto parts 17 The original Chinese notice published by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau is available at httpwwwjswjjgovcnoffice_neweo_comm_zxnrxsphp

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 22 of 52

According to the decision the authority found that Mercedes-Benz fixed the minimum resale price of Class E and Class S cars in Nanjing Wuxi Changzhou and Suzhou markets through telephoneverbal communication and dealers meetings from January 2013 to July 2014 Since 2010 Mercedes-Benz had reached agreements with dealers in Jiangsu province to fix the minimum resale prices for auto parts by providing different levels of discounts for insured cars cars involving expired warranty periods and cars within the warranty period

In addition Mercedes-Benz implemented the minimum resale price maintaining agreement by

1) Tightening its monitoring measures on the dealers such as inspecting deals and their sale incentive system on a weekly basis

2) Tracking the sales process flow of cars and increasing the intensity of this assessment

3) Giving warnings and reducing support ndash for example halting the supply of bestselling cars and prohibiting the opening of new stores ndash to dealers if dealers refused to cooperate with the price-fixing related policies and measures and

4) Interviewing personnel of the dealers and requesting terminations if the staff engaged in serious violations of the RPM agreement

Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau concluded that Mercedes-Benz had excluded and eliminated market competition harmed consumer welfare and consequently violated article 1418 of the AML The authority therefore imposed a fine of CNY 350 million representing 7 of the sale revenue of the previous year in the relevant market against Mercedes-Benz and imposed a fine on the dealers amounting to an equivalence of 1 of the annual sales in the previous year

Analysis

Although the agency also addressed the horizontal violation among the dealers in this case the administrative penalty decision mainly focuses on the vertical violation The agency fined dealers involved in the RPM agreement a combined CNY 787 million equal to 1 of the previous-year sales which suggests that the agency decided to give lighter punishments to dealers who took initiative in reporting the activity and provided evidence

The Mercedes-Benz case is the third case where the agency successfully 18 Article 14 of the AML The following monopolistic agreements between operators and trading partners shall be prohibited (i) fixing the resale prices of commodities to third persons (ii) restricting the minimum resale prices of commodities to third persons (iii) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement Authority under the State Council

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 23 of 52

discovered both vertical and horizontal agreements in a case following the Audi case and the Chrysler case All these cases are rooted in the same industry indicating that industrial features play a large role in raising anti-trust concerns In fact it appears that the entire automotive industry is under antitrust scrutiny

Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC19

This case involved both a horizontal agreement and an administrative monopoly

A total fine of CNY 1318 million was imposed on the involved companies

Facts

In June 2015 the NDRC through its website announced the decision made by its regional branch -Yunnan Provincial Development and Reform Commission (ldquoYunnan DRCrdquo) regarding the horizontal monopolistic agreement case involving Yunnan Communications Administration and local subsidiaries of four state-owned telecommunication companies

Through the investigation Yunnan DRC found that Yunnan Communications Administration as a competent government agency had organized several meetings involving Yunnan branches of four state-owned telecoms - China Mobile China Telecom China Unicom and China Tietong in August and September of 2014 At the end of 2009 the four local branches entered into an agreement to regulate their sales promotions in terms of limiting the promotional items amount and frequency

Furthermore the agreement provides certain measures to ensure the implementation of relevant restrictions on promotions Specifically in case any cartel member violates the agreement the others could file complaints with Yunnan Communications Administration and the agency would then issue a rectification notice to the rule-breaker

Yunnan DRC stated that the four telecoms were main competitors in the relevant market and the promotions as a significant competition measure would exert direct influence on the final prices of the products The horizontal agreement organized by Yunnan Communications Administration on sales promotions restricted the competition capacity of telecoms and as a result eliminated the competition in the relevant market Consequently the behaviour of Yunnan Communications Administration violated article 8 20 of the AML and constituted administrative monopoly in terms of ldquoforcing undertakings to conduct monopolistic behaviour prohibited by the AMLrdquo

19 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpwwwsdpcgovcnfzgggzjgjdyfldjjszhdt201506t20150602_694802html 20 Article 8 of the AML Administrative organs and the public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 24 of 52

With respect to the penalties Yunnan DRC fined the local branch of China Tietong CNY 200000 for reaching but not implementing the agreement in regards to the other three telecoms a total fine of CNY 1298 million amounting to 2 of the sales of the relevant business in the previous year were imposed for entering into and implementing the horizontal monopolistic agreement

Analysis

The telecoms industry is still the enforcement priority of the antitrust enforcement authorities A company cannot be exempted from punishment even though it is forced by competent authorities to conduct monopoly behaviour

DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC21

Both a horizontal monopolistic agreement and a vertical monopolistic agreement were involved in this case

A total fine of CNY 14242 million was imposed on DongFeng Nissan and its distributors

Facts

In September 2015 the Guangdong Development and Reform Commission (ldquoGuangdong DRCrdquo) released an announcement regarding the administrative penalties on DongFeng Nissan and its provincial distributors for concluding price-related monopolistic agreements More specifically DongFeng Nissan was imposed a fine of CNY 1233 million for breaching article 14 of the AML in terms of restricting the resale price of certain car models 17 distributors domiciled in Guangdong were collectively fined CNY 1912 million for violating article 1322 of the AML in terms of entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements

According to the published official release the Guangdong DRC launched the investigation in August 2014 The authority discovered that from 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissan had set a rigorous restriction on its distributorsrsquo abilities to determine the resale prices of certain car models including the quoted prices in various platforms and the final resale price In addition DongFeng Nissan punished the distributors that failed to abide by such price restrictions in 2013 The authority 21 The original Chinese notice published by Guangdong DRC is available at httpwwwgddpcgovcnzwgkgzdtgzyw201509t20150910_328993html 22 Article 13 of the AML The following Monopolistic agreements among competing operators shall be prohibited (i) fix or change prices of commodities (ii) limit the outputs or sales volume of commodities (iii) segment the sales markets or the raw material purchasing markets (iv) limit the purchase of new technology new facilities or limit the development of new products new technology (v) jointly boycott transactions (vi) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-Monopoly Law enforcement Authority Monopolistic agreements in this Law refer to agreements decisions or other concerted practices that eliminate restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 25 of 52

believed that the vertical agreement concluded between DongFeng Nissan and its distributors eliminated and restricted the competition in the relevant market and damaged the consumer welfare as well which violates article 14 of the AML

Furthermore from April 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissanrsquos distributors in Guangdong province held multiple meetings to discuss issues relevant to sale price reached and implemented a horizontal monopolistic agreement in terms of fixing the prices of some car models which is prohibited by article 13 of the AML

Considering that both DongFeng Nissan and the involved distributors positively cooperated with the investigation and ceased the illegal behaviour immediately after the investigation Guangdong DRC decided to impose a fine amounting to 3 of its previous yearrsquos turnovers on DongFeng Nissan and a fine ranging from 2 to 4 on the relevant distributors in accordance with articles 4623 and 4924 of the AML

Analysis

This case demonstrates that auto and related industries are still under close attention of the authority Considering the NDRCrsquos successful series of antitrust investigations conducted throughout the auto industry it is observed that the agency currently overseeing price-related antitrust issues in China has accumulated a substantial amount of experience regarding antitrust enforcement in the auto industry Now is the right time to speed up the law-making process by amending the set of rules released earlier and drafting new laws to advise the auto industry on antitrust compliance

Enforcement by the SAIC and its local branches

Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC25

The investigation was triggered by whistle blowerrsquos submission

Cartel members were collectively fined CNY 139 million 23 Article 46 of the AML In case the operators violate the relevant provisions of this Law concluding and implementing Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall order the operators to cease such act impose fines more than 1 but less than 10 of the total turnover in the preceding year and confiscate the illegal gains where the Monopolistic agreement is not implemented a fine less than RMB 500000 can be imposed If the operators involved in Monopolistic agreement on its own initiative report information concerning the conclusion of Monopolistic agreements and provide important evidences to the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority they may be given a mitigated punishment or be exempted from punishment in accordance with the circumstances Where the industrial associations violate this Law organizing the operators in the industry to conclude Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority may impose a fine less than RMB 500000 in serious circumstances the agency of social organization administration and registration may cancel its registration 24 Article 49 of the AML As for the imposition of the fines stipulated by the Article 46 47 and 48 of this Law the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall take elements such as the nature extent and time it lasts of the illegal act into consideration in determining the specific amount of the fines 25 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201506t20150601_156889html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 26 of 52

Facts

In April 2015 the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) issued administrative penalties on several brick manufacturers for entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements This is the first case relevant to monopolistic agreements that has been publicized by the SAIC since the beginning of this year

Ten cartel members were involved in the case including one company and nine individuals Similar with most antitrust cases the investigation started as a result of a whistle blowerrsquos submission After a thorough investigation Hunan AIC found that those local brick manufacturers had reached agreements on controlling production volume and dividing sales areas in the forms of production and sales agreements plans and meeting minutes

The enforcement authority reached the conclusion that these brick manufacturers violated article 13 of the AML and imposed a total fine of CNY 1389400 on them

Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC26

The organizer of the monopolistic agreement the animation association was fined CNY 100000

The antitrust authority did not punish the members of the monopolistic agreement

Facts

In December 2015 the Guangdong Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoGuangdong AICrdquo) published its administrative punishment decision in regards to Guangzhou Panyu Animation amp Game Association (ldquoGAGArdquo) organizing member companies to conclude a monopolistic agreement

According to the decision GAGA drafted the ldquoAgreement of Exhibition Alliancerdquo (ldquoAgreementrdquo) and convened a conference with member companies in order to discuss the content and conclusion of the Agreement 52 member companies entered into the Agreement which actually requested the alliance companies to merely participate in the exhibitions either organized or supported by GAGA in Guangzhou In addition the Agreement prohibited the alliance companies from attending any other exhibition except if they obtained prior approval of GAGA

After a thorough investigation Guangdong AIC believed that the conclusion of the Agreement among GAGA and the 52 member companies violated article 13 (5) of the AML in terms of boycott GAGA who was deeply involved and restricted member companiesrsquo choice of exhibitions through the Agreement could be deemed as

26 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151208_164680html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 27 of 52

the participant and organizer of the monopolistic agreement In accordance with article 46 of the AML Guangdong AIC imposed a fine of CNY 100000 on GAGA for organizing the conclusion of the monopolistic agreement

Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC27

Hubei AIC considered the coinsurance for Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance illegal

Twelve insurance companies were fined CNY 469 million in total

Facts

In December 2015 the Hubei Administrative for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHubei AICrdquo) disclosed its punishment on 12 insurance companies for signing illegal coinsurance agreements

The disclosed punishment decision suggests that the Hubei branch of China Pacific Life Insurance (ldquothe Companyrdquo) 11 other insurance companies and Wuhan Construction Safety Technology Consultation Center (ldquoWCSTCCrdquo) signed a Coinsurance Agreement on Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance (ldquoCoinsurance Agreementrdquo) of which the main contents include

1) The Company and 11 other involved companies as the coinsurers jointly take charge of the personal accident insurance concerned with the construction project directly administered by the Wuhan government WCSTCC is responsible for providing safety professionalism and technology services regarding the relevant personal accident insurance

2) The Company as the chief insurer of the coinsurance occupies 12 of the total amount of the insurance and the other 11 companies respectively occupy 8

3) The Company as the representative of the coinsurance is in charge of collecting the premium signing the standard form insurance policies and issuing the invoice in its own name The Company should share the charged premium with the other companies in accordance with the Coinsurance Agreement

4) Both the Company and the other insurance companies should pay 25 of the actually received premium to WCSTCC as the service fee WCSTCC will assist the coinsurers in providing safety and technology management service to the insured In addition the 11 insurance companies should pay 5 of their premium to the Company as the management fee

27 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165445html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 28 of 52

5) In case an accident happens the 12 companies will jointly bear the damages based on their respective shares in the coinsurance

6) There is a contact mechanism established in the coinsurance The coinsurers will regularly hold coinsurance conferences to discuss existing problems

Furthermore the coinsurers and WCSTCC also signed a self-discipline agreement and established a complete management system to assure the implementation of the Coinsurance Agreement Any party violating the Coinsurance Agreement would be punished

Hubei AIC found that WCSTCC was solely invested by Wuhan Construction Safety Management Association which was under Wuhan Construction Commission The centre helped implement certain functions of the Wuhan Urban Construction Safety Management Station and was responsible for quality supervision and safety supervision of municipal construction projects

It later became a prerequisite for construction companies to purchase insurance from any member of the coinsurance in order to get approval to commence their project According to the decision Hubei AIC launched another separate investigation against WCSTCC

Through the investigation Hubei AIC concluded that the Coinsurance Agreement constituted a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by article 13 of the AML with the following analysis

First coinsurance as a common business model to jointly share and lower risks is widely adopted in the insurance industry A coinsurance arrangement for a specific project in order to avoid high risks faced by one insurer could be legal However coinsurance should not target the entire market In this case prior to the Coinsurance Agreement the risks of the construction projects were unpredictable since the scale of the construction projects the difficulty of the construction and the amount of construction workers could not be available It is impossible to predict the risks of the projects thus it is not necessary to cooperate with other insurers to collectively bear the risks The purpose of the 12 insurance companies to establish the coinsurance is to avoid the competition which demonstrates the Coinsurance Agreement belongs to a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by the AML

Second the companies through entering into the coinsurance agreement actually divided the relevant market of construction project personal accident insurance in Wuhan city which affected the competition in the relevant market and damaged the interests of other competitors and the consumers In particular the Construction Law as amended in 2011 stipulates that the purchase of personal accident insurance is not mandatory and the construction companies have the right to choose whether to buy the said insurance or not As mentioned purchasing insurance from the coinsurance had been the prerequisite for construction companies to obtain administration

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 29 of 52

approval for the project which seriously distorts the fair competition in the market

Citing article 46 of the AML the 12 insurance companies were collectively fined CNY 469 million including fines on the companies and confiscation of illegal gains It is noteworthy that the fines were calculated based on the companiesrsquo 2014 annual sales of the insurance product in connection with the coinsurance The Company as the chief insurer was fined amounting to 6 of its 2014 annual sales of the relevant insurance product in the coinsurance and other companies were fined amounting to 2 of relevant sales For more specific information please see the following table

Company Name (Hubei Branch)

Fines (CNY million)

Percentage of the sales

Illegal Gains (CNY

million)

China Pacific Life Insurance 00653 6 0941

Sino Life 00145 2 04332

Alltrust Insurance 00145 2 04332

Taikang Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Continent Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Pacific Property Insurance

00145 2 04332

China Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

PICC Property and Casualty 00145 2 02599

Taiping General Insurance 00145 2 013

Union Life Insurance 00145 2 01177

Ping An Annuity Insurance Company of China

00145 2 04201

Ping An Property amp Casualty Insurance Company of China

00145 2 -

Subtotal 02248 - 44679

Total 46927

Analysis

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 30 of 52

Coinsurance as an effective approach to lower risks of insurers is widely used in the insurance industry Information sharing and agreements on coinsurance were generally considered efficient and legitimate However from an antitrust perspective coinsurance may raise competition concerns depending on the circumstances of each agreement In the case that there is enough capacity for one insurer to cover the potential risks the coinsurance might be considered as entering into a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC28

The first leniency applicant was exempted from fines

The other concrete companies were imposed a fine of CNY 180000

Facts

In December 2015 the concrete companies monopolistic agreement case investigated by Hunan AIC was published on SAICrsquos website

In accordance with the antitrust enforcement announcement of SAIC this case was triggered by complaints from the Yongzhou City peoplersquos congress After the preliminary review the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) initiated the formal investigation on seven concrete companies domiciled in Yongzhou City Hunan Province which were suspected of being involved in a monopolistic agreement in terms of division of the volumes of the products

After further investigation Hunan AIC found that the seven concrete companies concluded a partnership agreement in 2011 which requested the involved companies to enter into a partnership business with assets In addition according to the partnership agreement it was planned to establish a comprehensive office to manage production marketing and distribution of the products of all the partners The seven companies intended to jointly adjust and control the output of concrete based on the partnership agreement However because there were disagreements over the allocation of the injected assets and market shares the companies did not implement the partnership agreement The agreement was cancelled in December 2012

Based on the findings Hunan AIC concluded that the seven concrete companies as competitors of each other restricted and eliminated the competition in the relevant market through reaching the partnership agreement and dividing the volumes of sales which violated article 13(3) of the AML in terms of division of sales market Considering that the agreement had not been implemented and the limited influence of the agreement according to article 46 of the AML and article 27 of the Administrative Penalties Law small amount fines were imposed on the involved companies Six companies were fined CNY 30000 each for their illegal behaviour 28 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165504html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 31 of 52

Yongzhou Shuangyuan Building Materials Co Ltd as the first one to actively report the monopolistic agreement and cooperate with the enforcement authority was exempted from the punishment

Outlook

It is expected that the AMLrsquos enforcement on monopolistic agreements will continue in the future Industries such as automobile shipping pharmaceuticals insurance etc will still remain the priority of the antitrust enforcement

The antitrust enforcement authorities have published a series of regulations in order to clarify the substantial and procedural issues relevant to the antitrust enforcement However Chinarsquos current antitrust legislation regime is still immature In the following years we expect that more attention will be paid to the legislative improvements

Another remarkable issue for cartel members is that with more Chinese enterprises attaching increasing importance to the AML the follow-on civil damages actions might become a tendency in the future

C Abuse of Market Dominance

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen a decent increase of abuse of market dominance cases both in public enforcement and private litigation Oftentimes the authorities responsible for public enforcement generally find it difficult to pursue investigations against abuse of market dominance cases The following two main reasons are often cited to explain this standoff first it is hard for the authorities to define the relevant markets and prove the undertaking(s)rsquo dominant market position through economic approaches second it is hard to collect evidence regarding abusive practices

The cases related to IPRs abuse are emerging significantly particularly in the telecommunication media and technology (ldquoTMTrdquo) sectors

The SAICrsquos latest refusal-to-deal probe against a local drug maker shows that the SAIC and its local branches have increasingly acquired a profile as an abuse of dominance regulator

Significant Cases

Cases pursued by the SAIC

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 32 of 52

Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case29

Facts

The local authority in Dongfang city reported to the Hainan provincial branch of SAIC on April 23 2014 of the suspected dominance abuse The SAIC authorized its Hainan bureau to officially investigate the matter on 25 July 2014 according to a decision dated January 9 2015 The AIC concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its market dominance by requiring users to pay a deposit without any legal basis and or justifiable reasons

In terms of the relevant product market the local authority found that in this case it was the urban water supply market in Dongfang city and its surrounding townships where Dongfang Water was the sole public operator in the local water supply market with a 100 market share which made all water users completely reliant on the companyrsquos supply In term of market access the local authority found it very unlikely that there were other operators due to the strict regulations

The Hainan SAIC then concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its dominance as it charged users a deposit by threatening to refuse to register users and also by threatening to restrict the water supply Dongfang Waters charging of deposits lacked a legal basis and hadnt received government approval to the detriment of household consumers and business water users and hampered the improvement of management and services of the company Such conduct was in breach of Chinarsquos Anti-Monopoly Law

Hainan AIC levied a fine of CNY 593208 a lighter penalty equivalent to 2 of the companyrsquos annual sales for the previous year and confiscated illicit gains of CNY 38521 for abuse of market dominance

Analysis

It is noteworthy that although handled by a local authority supervised by the SAIC the antitrust agency detailed the relevant market definition the assessment of the dominant market position the abusive practices and the scrutiny of the justifiable reasons

Although the definition of the relevant market and the reasoning of the Hainan provincial AIC and the SAIC are subject to criticism it is still applausive to see that the antitrust regulators have realized the importance of the application of rule of reason in an abuse case In addition through itrsquos a published decision practitioners may observe the regulatorsrsquo reasoning and thus transparency and legal certainty have been generated

29 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzfcfjd201502t20150212_152066html last visited on October 18 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 33 of 52

Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms30

Facts

In June 2013 the Ningxia AIC under authorization of SAIC opened an antitrust investigation into the alleged tie-in sales by the three major state-owned telecommunications operators China Tietong China Unicom and China Telecom for the tie-in sale of fixed-line telephones with broadband Internet services The Ningxia AIC found that the three companies had bundled fixed-line phone services with Internet services to subscribers

During the investigation all three telecommunications companies admitted the tie-in practice had recognized that such practice had improper influence on competition and deprived the choices of consumers The three companies promised to undertake internal rectification timely and eliminate the ill effects resulting from such practice The parties committed to taking the following corrective measures

1) Taking internal rectifications and conducting training to staff about antitrust laws and stop tie-in sales practices

2) Making public commitments to allow subscribers a free choice of services and strengthening the propaganda through the operating room call centre and other channels

3) Unbundling fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

The Ningxia AIC decided to suspend the probe on 14 May 2015 on the grounds that the three companies had actively worked together with the investigators and proposed workable remedy plans

Analysis

In the official announcement Ningxia AIC concluded that the purpose of antitrust enforcement is to restrain monopolistic conducts the protection of competition and to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of consumers Given that during the investigation process the parties had actively cooperated with the investigation formed a more profound understanding of the dangers of tying behaviour and moreover the parties proposed and implemented positive corrective measures to be able to remove the ill impact of their actions the agency believed that the purpose of antitrust law enforcement was fulfilled

It is worth noting that the Ningxia AIC also required the three companies to implement the commitment by August 30 2015and the submission of the written

30 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158908html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158906html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158910html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 34 of 52

implementation report on July 102015 and August 102015 respectively which is another illustration that an effective commitment by the undertakings shall directly deal with the effect that is brought by the monopolistic behaviour In this case the effect of the monopolistic act was restricted to the choice of the consumers therefore the commitment by the undertaking aimed at allowing the freedom of choice and the unbundling of fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company31

Facts

The Liaoning AIC imposed a fine of approximately CNY 433m on the Fushun Branch of Liaoning Tobacco Co on 1 June 2015 The agency also ordered the company to stop its illicit behaviour

The Liaoning AIC received a tip-off that the accused Liaoning Tobacco Corsquos Fushun branch was conducting tie-in sales of non-high-demand cigarette brands with high-demand cigarette brands After gaining authorization from SAIC the agency officially started an investigation regarding the companyrsquos suspected abuse of market dominance in June 2014

Analysis

According to the announcement the tobacco company argued that the tobacco industry is a state controlled or monopolized industry with a lawful monopolistic position therefore the company shall not be subject to the norms of general market competition rules or the anti-monopoly law

In this regards the agency concluded that in terms of the status of the undertaking admittedly the first paragraph of article 17 of the AML says that the State shall protect the lawful business operations of undertakings in these industries with respect to the industries which are under the control of the State-owned economic sector and have a bearing on the lifeline of the national economy or national security and the industries which exercise monopoly over the production and sale of certain commodities according to law However the second paragraph continues to say that the undertakings mentioned above shall do business according to law be honest faithful and strictly self-disciplined and subject themselves to public supervision and they shall not harm the consumers interests by taking advantage of their position of control or their monopolistic production and sale of certain commodities In particular in the preceding paragraph the ldquolawful businessrdquo and ldquoaccording to lawrdquo imply that the AML shall apply in the business operation The agency therefore believes that

31 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201508t20150813_16

0208html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 35 of 52

there shall be no exemption for the undertaking concerned the defences of the undertaking concerned is not established

Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm32

Facts

The Chongqing AIC fined Chongqing Qingyang Pharmaceutical CNY 439308 for alleged dominance abuse

The investigation was initiated when the company contacted the agency for verification on its potential breach of the AML related to an allopurinol active pharmaceuticals ingredient (API) distribution agreement with its exclusive distributor The company provided the relevant agreement and information and the agency conducted an investigation into the company and some other relevant companies

Analysis

Relevant Market

During the investigation the agency found that pharmaceutical ingredients are a special commodity the API is used to produce the preparations The chemical API is only used for the production of the preparation and could be used as a medicine for clinic use

The preparation is produced according to the requirements of certain form of prepared drugs and for the purpose of treatment and prevention which can be used as medicine

The allopurinol is used for the common treatment of hyperuricemia However the other treatments are different in pharmacological effects or treatment effects as well as in the cost for the patient Furthermore the company is the only manufacturer and supplier in the market nationwide since July 2012 Therefore the agency concluded that the relevant market is the allopurinol API market

Considering that the qualification for manufacturing the allopurinol API is national wide and the normal practice for purchasers and suppliers is domestic the relevant geographic market is the Chinese market

The Market Dominance

During the investigation the agency found that the company is the only supplier and manufacturer of allopurinol API in China there is no other competitor in the

32 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151222_16

5152html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 36 of 52

market and the company has a monopoly in the market The evidence shows that the company has the ability to control the prices the position for the downstream is relatively weak

With respect to the market entry the agency found that the market entry is relatively high in addition other undertakings are dependent on the company Thus the agency believed the company to have market dominance

Refusal to Deal

The agency found that on September 25 2015 the company reached an exclusive agreement and distribution agreement with its distributor Based on these agreements the company didnrsquot supply allopurinol API to the said distributor and other companies despite the fact that those companies requested for allopurinol API but were turned down by the company

Absence of Reasonable Cause

The agency found that the companyrsquos refusal to deal was not in line with the needs of normal business operation or economic efficiency On the other hand the refusal to deal was aimed at increasing the market share of the allopurinol drug product Also the agency found that the stop of supply was a manipulation of market power as to maximize the profit to the most The agency further found that the exclusive distribution agreement with suspension of supply for six months and the refusal to supply was to eliminate and restrict the competition as to gain the monopolistic profit

The Consequence of Refusal to Deal

The agency concluded that the refusal to deal harmed the competition of the allopurinol preparations market Because of the suspension of supply many demanders had to reduce their production or switch to the supply of other products or stop their production The suspension of supply affected the competition of the downstream market Consequently the raising of the price of allopurinol API also raised the cost for other manufacturers of allopurinol preparations

Furthermore the refusal to deal led to capacity loss of the allopurinol preparation industry

Ultimately the refusal to deal increased the burden on consumers as the refusal to supply changed the supply-demand relationship in the market

The agency concluded that the Company abused its dominant position in the allopurinol API market by refusing to deal with intended buyers in the period between October 2013 and March 2014Therefore the Company violated article 17 (1) of the AML which prohibits business operators with a dominant market position from abusing that position such as the refusal to deal without any justifications

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 37 of 52

D Administrative Monopoly

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 witnessed antitrust authoritiesrsquo significant efforts regarding the enforcement against administrative monopoly According to Mr Dong Zhiming the deputy director general of Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly Bureau ever since the AML coming into force six cases in connection with administrative monopoly were investigated by NDRC and among them five cases were handled in the year of 2015 These cases touched abuses of administrative power in terms of designative deal in relation to transportation communication and pharmaceutical industries

The first private litigation related to administrative monopolistic acts was heard in the court which is a milestone case in the enforcement of the AML

Significant Cases

Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC33

Facts

In March 2015 the NDRC released the official letter to Shandong Provincial Department of Transportation (ldquoShandong DOTrdquo) on its website with respect to correct its abuse of administrative power to exclude and restrict competition

During the investigation the NDRC found that since 2011 Shandong DOT had issued multiple relevant government orders in order to require certain types of vehicles to be directly connected to two designated information and service platforms both of which are operated and technically supported by one company namely Shandong Jiutong Internet of Things Technology Co Ltd (ldquoJiutong ITTrdquo) Furthermore according to the orders issued by the competent administrative department all the vehicle satellite positioning terminals entering into Shandong provincial market should be debugged through the said technology service platform which is operated by the mentioned company In addition Shandong DOT released the cap prices of vehicle satellite positioning terminals which is identical to the 2012 bid-winning price in the Ministry of Transportation demonstration project

The NDRC believed that Shandong DOTrsquos behaviour eliminated and restricted the competition in the monitoring platform market and the vehicle terminal market deprived the right of transportation enterprises to choose vehicle terminals and monitoring platform on their owns unreasonably raised the sales prices of vehicle terminals and service fees charged by the platform and increased the costs of transportation enterprises Therefore the antitrust agency concluded that Shandong

33 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201503t20150327_668911html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 38 of 52

DOT violated article 8 of the AML which stipulates that ldquoadministrative organs and the public organizations with an administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude and restrict competitionrdquo Specifically Shandong DOT violated article 3234 in terms of requiring organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any designated operators and violated article 3735 in terms of setting rules with contents which eliminate and restrict competition

Based on article 51 of the AML ldquoWhere administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations abuse administrative powers performing activities which exclude and restrict competition the superior entity shall order it to correct impose administrative penalty on the chief officer and other staffs directly responsible pursuant to the laws The AML enforcement authority may give recommendations on disposal of activities to the relevant superior entityrdquo the NDRC proposed in writing that the Shandong provincial government should order Shandong DOT to rectify its behaviour with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Entirely open up the monitoring platform market by permitting transportation undertakings to freely choose any approved platform

2) Loosen the restrictions on the entry into Shandong vehicle terminals permit the undertakings to independently select the supplier of vehicle terminals and allow the qualified terminals to be connected to the relevant monitoring platform and

3) Revoke the official documentation relevant to the cap price of vehicle terminals in order to promote the price competition

Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 36

Facts

On 26 August 2015 the NDRC published its second decision with regard to the rectification of administrative monopoly since the beginning of this year According to the proposal letter sent to Anhui Provincial Government the investigation against the Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City (Bengbu HFPC) was trigged by third partiesrsquo complaints

34 Article 32 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to require organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any operators designated by them 35 Article 37 of the AML Administrative organs shall not abuse their administrative powers to set rules with contents which eliminate restrict competition 36 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201508t20150826_748682html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 39 of 52

The investigation suggests that Bengbu HFPC published three notices with regard to drugs procurement in April and May of this year

In the No C-2015-CG-X-111 Notice (ldquoNo111 Noticerdquo) released on 10 April2015 the health authority not only provided the dosage form and qualification of the requested drugs but also directly determined the suppliers of relevant drugs which eliminated and restricted the competition among pharmaceutical manufacturers and therefore violated articles 32 and 37 of the AML

In the No C-2015-CG-C-112 Notice (ldquoNo112 Noticerdquo) and No C-2015-CG-C-168 (ldquoNo 168 Noticerdquo) respectively released on 10 April and 22 May 2015 the Bengbu HFPC set discriminative qualification requirements on non-local undertakings in order to restrict their participation in the relevant bidding For instance in accordance with No 112 Notice to be a qualified bidder the turnover of non-local undertakings shall exceed CNY 2 billion which is 50 times as much as the turnover requirements of the local undertakings In the NDRCrsquos opinion the administrative monopoly activities conducted by the local health agency excluded the relevant undertakings from the market maintained the virtual-high prices of drugs and therefore violated articles 3237 and 37 of the AML

The NDRC suggested in a letter that Anhui Provincial Government should urge the Bengbu HFPC to rectify the abuse of monopoly powers with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Stop setting distinguishing restrictions on qualification requirements review standards and numbers of winning bidders as for local and non-local undertakings

2) Stop designating the suppliers of competitive drugs and

3) Take necessary measures to mitigate the negative effects resulting from the previous illegal monopolistic abuses

Outlook

At the beginning of the year the former director general of the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau under the NDRC Xu Kunlin stated that the agency would strengthen antitrust enforcement on abuse of administrative power in 2015

Since then the NDRC has made great efforts to rectify unreasonable abuses of administrative power The currently disclosed two cases investigated by the NDRC re-emphasize the Chinese Governmentrsquos strict scrutiny of antitrust issues in respect of

37 Article 34 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to restrict or reject the participation of operators from other regions in local bidding activities by measures such as prescribing discriminatory qualification requirements or assessment standards or by not publishing information according to law

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 40 of 52

administrative monopoly It reminds the local governments that antitrust compliance is of significant importance

III Private Litigation

A Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen more and more private antitrust litigations

The private antitrust litigation cases have become increasingly complicated especially the issues regarding the intersection areas of IP and antitrust law

Multinational giants and State-Owned Enterprises (the ldquoSOEsrdquo) are increasingly becoming the targets in antitrust civil litigations Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (the ldquoSMEsrdquo) tend to use the antitrust litigation to achieve their commercial goals in the business context

B Significant Cases

Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)38

This is the first-ever private litigation concerning administrative monopoly since the implementation of the AML in 2008

Facts

According to the currently disclosed details the case is relevant for designated trade

The plaintiff Shenzhen Sware Technology Co Ltd (ldquoSwarerdquo) is a software company The press releases suggest that Sware Gloden Software Co Ltd (ldquoGlodenrdquo) and Shanghai Ruban Software Co Ltd (ldquoShanghai Rubanrdquo) are the three main suppliers of construction cost software and possess the major shares of the relevant market An annual provincial vocational ability contest regarding the construction cost hosted by the Guangdong Department of Education (ldquoGuangdong DOE) designated Gloden as the exclusive supplier of the relevant software

After several unsuccessful verbal and written negotiations with Guangdong DOE in April 2014 Sware filed a lawsuit against Guangdong DOE before the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquothe Courtrdquo) alleging that the administrative organ abused its administrative power and violated the AML by designating exclusive software supplier for the contest and claimed a compensation for reasonable expense amounting to CNY 10800 Yuan

The opinions of the Court 38 The story of the case is available at httpfinancesinacomcnchinadfjj20150410074621924997shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 41 of 52

The full text of the judgment has not been disclosed yet In accordance with the information available to the public the Court invoked article 32 of the AML which prohibits an administrative organ from abusing its administrative power to require or in disguised form organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use only the commodities supplied by the entities designated by them The Court concluded that Guangdong DOE failed to prove the legitimacy of the designation and therefore abused its administration power

Currently the case is in appeal before the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court

Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 39

It is the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China

In the first instance ruling Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court ruled against Sinopec holding that the Yunnan branch of Sinopecs trading company was obligated to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its dominance in the sales market of refined oil by refusing to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding without justifiable reasons

In the second instance ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors Currently the case is pending

Facts

The First Trial

The lawsuit was filed before the Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoKunming Courtrdquo) in January 2014 Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy Co Ltd (ldquoYingdingrdquo) a bio-energy manufacturer claimed that Sinopec and the Yunnan branch of Sinopec trading company (ldquoSinopec Yunnan Branchrdquo) had failed to fulfil their obligations stipulated in the Renewable Energy Law and had abused their market dominance in sales market of refined oil by refusing to trade with Yingding without justifiable reasons

Sinopec and Sinopec Yunnan Branch mainly explained four reasons for why they rejected Yingdingrsquos biofuel Firstly Yingding had failed to prove that the biofuel complied with the relevant national standard and was safe to use Secondly Yingding had failed to provide complete trading terms Thirdly the laws and regulations regarding biofuel were incomplete the authorized refined oil sales companies were 39 The details of the case are available at httpnewsxinhuanetcomfortune2014-1217c_1113680039htm httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=9e71db51-6ff6-4d2c-8af6-8eacf023ebdeampKeyWord=E4BA91E58D97E79B88E9BC8E|E4B8ADE79FB3E58C96 httpnewsxinhuanetcomenergy2015-0422c_127721575htm httpwwwnbdcomcnarticles2015-04-23911348html last visited on December 17 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 42 of 52

obligated to purchase biofuel from the biofuel manufacturers if it met certain quality standards but there was a vacancy regarding how to reach the end consumers from the sales companies

On 8 December 2014 the Kunming Intermediate Peoples Court ruled that Sinopec Yunnan Branch bore a legal obligation to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its market dominance in refined oil market by refusing without any justifiable reasons to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding The court ordered Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network within 30 days Both Yingding and Sinopec filed appeals to the Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court

The Appellate Trial

The appeal hearing was held on 22 April 2015 in Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoYunnan Courtrdquo) Sinopec submitted 23 new pieces of evidence and introduced two expert witnesses in a bid to overturn several key elements in the first-instance ruling by Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court

In terms of the determination of the relevant market and the market dominance Sinopec argued that the relevant market in this case was for adipic acid monomethyl ester (ldquoAAMErdquo) the main ingredient of a biofuel additive known as BD100 Yingdingrsquos main product is BD100 which can be blended with fossil diesel to become biofuel In the AAME market Sinopec is a potential buyer instead of a market dominator In support of this argument Sinopec presented an expert witnessmdashGong Jiong a professor of economics at Beijings University of International Business and Economics who testified that AAME should be defined as the relevant product market on the basis of an economic analysis

However Yingding insisted that the first-instance ruling was correct in naming the sales market of refined oil as the relevant market and submitted new evidence an article on Sinopecs website that claimed it had a 67 market share in Yunnan to help establish the claim that Sinopec had market dominance

Another main dispute was whether Yingdingrsquos biofuel product met national standards which would make it mandatory for Sinopec to purchase under Chinas Renewable Energy Law The law stipulates that biofuel producers must sell their products first to an authorized refined oil sales company and the sales companies are obliged to buy the fuel if it meets certain quality standards In order to test the quality Sinopec introduced the second expert witness Lin Jianmin a leading author of Chinarsquos national biofuel standard Lin Jianmin pointed out that there are currently quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology which gives Sinopec a justifiable reason not to trade with Yingding Moreover Sinopec presented some precedents in which consumers had complained about the biofuel quality and also claimed that China didnt have a sound regulatory framework to support biofuel production neither in testing nor in sales

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 43 of 52

Nevertheless to refute this point Yingding referred to an earlier test in co-operation with Sinopec in 2011 where selected buses in Kunming used biofuel blended by Sinopec using BD100 produced by Yingding

On August 13 2015 Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors and now this case is pending In the written appellate ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court did not provide any details regarding its reasoning

Key Issues of the Case

Is there any competition between Yingding and Sinopec

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case the product of Yingding is biofuel while Sinopec does not engage in the business of biofuel From this perspective Yingding and Sinopec are not competitors Thus it is not necessary and not reasonable for Sinopec to eliminate or restrict the competition from Yingding

Relevant Market

The definition of the relevant market is a prerequisite to determine whether competition exists and whether the AML is applicable In accordance with the Judicial Interpretation of Antitrust civil litigation the plaintiff shall take the responsibility to prove the defendantrsquos dominance in the relevant market Also the methods of defining the relevant market are stipulated in the Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition (ldquoGuidelinesrdquo) However both Yingding and Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court defined the relevant market as the sales market of refined oil without sufficient antitrust analysis none of the methods in the Guidelines were used Therefore the definition of the relevant market remains arguable and needs to be sufficiently analysed in the upcoming retrial

Justifiable Reasons

The abuse of market dominance includes the behaviour of refusing to trade without justifiable reasons according to the AML but in the first instance ruling justifiable reasons were not investigated by the court During the appellate trial the expert witness introduced by Sinopec claimed that there were quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology and this was a justifiable reason to refuse to trade with Yingding Even though the first instance court and the appellate court did not reason the justifiable reason it should be discussed and investigated further during the retrial

AML or Renewable Energy Law

The claims of Yingding were based on both the AML and the Renewable Energy Law (ldquoRELrdquo) and the first instance ruling referred to both the AML and the REL as

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 44 of 52

well It seems that the laws the first instance court referred to were comprehensive but in fact the reasoning was not clear and logical In the first instance ruling some disputes regarding the AML were reviewed but all the orders were not based on the AML Specifically the first instance court ordered the Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network based on the REL and dismissed the other claims That the orders were not on account of reasoning is illogical It is anticipated that during the retrial the application of the laws will be clearer

Analysis

A lot of issues have not been clearly analysed by the courts such as the relevant market and the justifiable reasons Since the case is remanded the above-mentioned issues are expected to be resolved in the retrial In addition Yingding was in a disadvantaged position compared to its first instance trial since its claims based on the AML were challenged greatly during the appellate trial In the retrial it is probable that Yingding may switch its litigation strategy and base its claims on the REL Therefore maybe more preparation regarding the REL can give Sinopec a leg up

Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)

Rijing Electric a Chinese distributor seeks CNY 5m compensation

The first hearing was on 9 June 2015 and ended without a ruling

Facts

Rijing Electric (ldquoRijingrdquo) a Shanghai-based company and a former distributor for Panasonic accused Panasonic of abusing its dominance and dividing the market through monopolistic practice in an antitrust lawsuit filed in 2014 with Shanghai No 1 Intermediate Court (ldquoShanghai Courtrdquo) claiming compensation of CNY 5m (USD 815370) Wenzhou Mingda Automation System Co and Shanghai Qingying Automation Equipment as the distributor of Panasonic in China are the co-defendants were accused of conducting monopolistic behaviours by implementing Panasonicrsquos policy

The first hearing for evidence exchange was on June 9 2015 Rijing claimed a policy allegedly introduced by Panasonic in 2009 restricted the competition between distributors Panasonic claims the policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo and has full justifiable reasons It explained that the products in question required customization at considerable cost to distributors before its sale to customers Once carried out however other distributors leaving them open to quote much lower prices than the original distributor could simply and relatively cheap replicate this customization Besides Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and that the plaintiff had failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic said its market share for the four products

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 45 of 52

under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases Also Rijing failed to challenge the policy when it was first introduced instead initially agreeing it was reasonable as e-mail evidence submitted by Panasonic suggests

Key Issues of the Case

Whether Panasonic occupied a market dominant position

It is reported that Rijing claimed that Panasonic had abused its market dominance but Rijing failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and its market share for the four products under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases

Analysis

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case Panasonicrsquos policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo rather than to eliminate or restrict competition

Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals40 (Pending)

It is a battle over patent licensing issues

It is viewed as being among the most complicated antitrust lawsuits in China

The first hearing was on 17 and 18 December 2015

Facts

Four Chinese rare earth companies Ningbo Ketian Magnet Ningbo Permanent Magnetics Ningbo Tongchuang Strong Magnet Material and Ningbo Huahui Magnetic Industry filed antitrust lawsuits against Hitachi Metals over alleged patent licensing issues regarding rare earth magnets on December 11 2014 with the Ningbo Intermediate Peoples Court (ldquoNingbo Courtrdquo) in Zhejiang province As reported four Chinese rare earth companies claimed Hitachi Metals abused its market dominance and hurt the industry competition by refusing to license the patents to them The patents in this case are used in the manufacturing of sintered neodymium iron boron (ldquoNdFeBrdquo) magnets a rare-earth magnet alloy widely used in parts for airplanes automobiles and other products

Hitachi Metals filed a challenge with the Ningbo Court over its jurisdiction in April 2015 After Ningbo Court rejected Hitachi Metals jurisdiction objection on 28 April 2015 Hitachi Metals appealed to the Zhejiang High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoZhejiang

40The details of the story are available at httpwwwzbmagcomnews_viewphpid=80 httpwwwhitachicomcnaboutpress201510-121118_ahtml last visited on December 22 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 46 of 52

Courtrdquo) but Zhejiang Court affirmed the ruling of the Ningbo Court

The first day of a two-day hearing took place on 17 December 2015 during which the two sides cross-examined each otherrsquos evidence The evidence focused on clearing up several key elements in the case including the relevant market whether Hitachi Metals has dominance on that market and whether both sides acted in good faith during the licensing negotiations

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Product Market

The four Chinese rare earth companies claimed that the relevant product market should be the NdFeb-related patent licensing market However Hitachi Metals believed that the physical NdFeb market rather than the patent licensing market should be the relevant product market which is meaningful for assess the real competitive effects on the market

Whether Hitachi Metals occupies a dominant market position

In terms of market dominance Hitachi Metals claimed it does not occupy a dominant position because Hitachi Metalsrsquo patents were not in a standard in this case and there are substitutable technologies in the market SEP holders have the obligation to license on FRAND terms but none-SEP holders do not So while a refusal to license a SEP may constitute abuse of dominance refusal to license a non-SEP mdash even by a patent holder with a dominant position mdash should not be considered as an abuse

Analysis

Hitachi Metals as a patent holder should have the right to decide whether to retain those patents or not or who to license According to the legal theory the purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage and protect innovation by conferring monopoly right mdash that is to give intellectual property owners the proprietary rights which can exclude others from using the intellectual property The SEP holders admittedly need to comply with FRAND terms which can maintain a robust balance between competition and monopoly whereas the further intervention of antitrust law into non-SEP patents may undermine the purpose of intellectual property law To which extent the antitrust law should intervene is yet to be seen

Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei41

A confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the Beijing IP court made by the Beijing High Court

41 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcncpwswbjzscq201511t20151103_12225640htm last visited on December 28 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 47 of 52

Facts

On August 2 2013 the NDRC penalized Abbott for monopolistic price-fixing and then Abbott made a price adjustment in China where the prices of main products were reduced

On December 16 2014 Tian Junwei (ldquoTianrdquo) a Chinese citizen in Beijing sued Carrefour Shuangjing Branch (ldquoCarrefourrdquo) and Abbott (Shanghai) Sales Company (ldquoAbbottrdquo) at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (ldquoIP Courtrdquo) for their monopolistic price-fixing which damaged his interests However Carrefour and Abbott challenged the jurisdiction of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court They claimed there were two reasons Firstly according to the jurisdiction rules of the IP court issued by the Supreme Court the IP court has no jurisdiction over anti-trust cases Secondly if this case is a contractual dispute the court that is in the place of Carrefour should hear it if this case is a tort dispute the Shanghai Intermediate Court should hear it

In the ruling of the IP Court the IP Court decided it has the jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases for the following reasons According to the Provisions On Causes Of Action In Civil Cases issued by Supreme Court (最高人民法院案由规定) antimonopoly dispute is a tertiary cause of action belonging to IP and competition disputes Also according to the Provisions concerning the Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京

市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问题的规定 ) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was an IP and competition dispute and was sued after November 6 2014 Thus the IP Court had jurisdiction

Both Carrefour and Abbott appealed to the Beijing High Court over the jurisdiction ruling but the Beijing High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original ruling Reasons are listed in the written ruling issued on June 18 2015 Firstly the nature of the case was an antimonopoly dispute In accordance with Provisions of the Supreme Peoples Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民

事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) and Civil Litigation Law the monopolistic civil disputes in the first instance shall be under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Peoples Courts and an action involving a contractual dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the peoples court of the place where the defendant is domiciled or where the contract is performed Carrefour as the defendant in this case is domiciled in Chaoyang District Beijing Therefore the courts of Beijing have jurisdiction over this case Secondly according to article 3 of the Notification on the Jurisdiction of Intellectual Property Courts issued by Supreme Court (关于知识产权法院案件管辖

等有关问题的通知) IP courts have jurisdiction over first-instance civil disputes arising from monopolistic practices Lastly according to Provisions concerning the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 20 of 52

authority and providing significant evidence was entirely exempted from the punishment K Line as the second leniency applicant was imposed a fine amounting to 4 of its 2014 annual sales of international freight services relevant to Chinarsquos import and export market The details of punishments imposed on the involved companies by the NDRC are as follow

Company Name Amount of Fines (RMB million)

Percentage of the Relevant Turnovers

Grounds

Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha

- - First leniency applicant

Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha

2398 4 Second leniency applicant

Mitsui OSK Lines 3812 7 Third leniency applicant

EUKOR Car Carriers 284 9 Lasted over a long period involved many brands and many violations violations were severe

Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics

4506 8 Lasted over a long period involved many brands and many violations violations were severe

Compantildeiacutea Sud Americana de Vapores

308 6 Lasted over a long period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Eastern Car Liner 1127 5 Lasted over a long period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Compantildeiacutea Chilena de 120 4 Lasted over a long

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 21 of 52

Navegacioacuten Interoceaacutenica

period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Total 4067

Analysis

In this case the agency applied the AML instead of the Tenders and Bids Law to collusive bidding Citing article 13 (3) of the AML the NDRC identified that the collusive bidding constituted a division of the sales market

The leading three leniency applicants were granted exemption from fines to a varying degree

According to the official who handled this case dawn raids performed by antitrust enforcement agencies in other jurisdictions drew the attention of the NDRC on the cartels of these shipping companies However there was limited effective evidence to prove that the companies had reached monopolistic agreements Through pressuring the involved parties three members of the shipping cartel actively confessed their illegal conduct This case once again stresses the significance of international cooperation between antitrust enforcement agencies

Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau17

The distribution agreements between Mercedes-Benz and its dealers are determined as vertical monopolistic agreement and Mercedes-Benz violated article 14 of the AML because it restricted the ability of its dealers to decide their own resale prices

Mercedes-Benzrsquos dealers violated article of 13 of the AML due to concluding a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Mercedes-Benz and its dealers were jointly fined CNY 3578 million

Facts

In April 2015 Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau which is the provincial branch of the NDRC released the punishment on its website and announced that it had imposed a fine of CNY 350 million on Mercedes-Benz along with the aggregated fine of CNY 787 million on its dealers The fine came as a result of Mercedes-Benz reaching and implementing resale price maintenance (ldquoRPMrdquo) agreements with dealers to fix the minimum resale price of several car models as well as certain auto parts 17 The original Chinese notice published by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau is available at httpwwwjswjjgovcnoffice_neweo_comm_zxnrxsphp

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 22 of 52

According to the decision the authority found that Mercedes-Benz fixed the minimum resale price of Class E and Class S cars in Nanjing Wuxi Changzhou and Suzhou markets through telephoneverbal communication and dealers meetings from January 2013 to July 2014 Since 2010 Mercedes-Benz had reached agreements with dealers in Jiangsu province to fix the minimum resale prices for auto parts by providing different levels of discounts for insured cars cars involving expired warranty periods and cars within the warranty period

In addition Mercedes-Benz implemented the minimum resale price maintaining agreement by

1) Tightening its monitoring measures on the dealers such as inspecting deals and their sale incentive system on a weekly basis

2) Tracking the sales process flow of cars and increasing the intensity of this assessment

3) Giving warnings and reducing support ndash for example halting the supply of bestselling cars and prohibiting the opening of new stores ndash to dealers if dealers refused to cooperate with the price-fixing related policies and measures and

4) Interviewing personnel of the dealers and requesting terminations if the staff engaged in serious violations of the RPM agreement

Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau concluded that Mercedes-Benz had excluded and eliminated market competition harmed consumer welfare and consequently violated article 1418 of the AML The authority therefore imposed a fine of CNY 350 million representing 7 of the sale revenue of the previous year in the relevant market against Mercedes-Benz and imposed a fine on the dealers amounting to an equivalence of 1 of the annual sales in the previous year

Analysis

Although the agency also addressed the horizontal violation among the dealers in this case the administrative penalty decision mainly focuses on the vertical violation The agency fined dealers involved in the RPM agreement a combined CNY 787 million equal to 1 of the previous-year sales which suggests that the agency decided to give lighter punishments to dealers who took initiative in reporting the activity and provided evidence

The Mercedes-Benz case is the third case where the agency successfully 18 Article 14 of the AML The following monopolistic agreements between operators and trading partners shall be prohibited (i) fixing the resale prices of commodities to third persons (ii) restricting the minimum resale prices of commodities to third persons (iii) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement Authority under the State Council

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 23 of 52

discovered both vertical and horizontal agreements in a case following the Audi case and the Chrysler case All these cases are rooted in the same industry indicating that industrial features play a large role in raising anti-trust concerns In fact it appears that the entire automotive industry is under antitrust scrutiny

Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC19

This case involved both a horizontal agreement and an administrative monopoly

A total fine of CNY 1318 million was imposed on the involved companies

Facts

In June 2015 the NDRC through its website announced the decision made by its regional branch -Yunnan Provincial Development and Reform Commission (ldquoYunnan DRCrdquo) regarding the horizontal monopolistic agreement case involving Yunnan Communications Administration and local subsidiaries of four state-owned telecommunication companies

Through the investigation Yunnan DRC found that Yunnan Communications Administration as a competent government agency had organized several meetings involving Yunnan branches of four state-owned telecoms - China Mobile China Telecom China Unicom and China Tietong in August and September of 2014 At the end of 2009 the four local branches entered into an agreement to regulate their sales promotions in terms of limiting the promotional items amount and frequency

Furthermore the agreement provides certain measures to ensure the implementation of relevant restrictions on promotions Specifically in case any cartel member violates the agreement the others could file complaints with Yunnan Communications Administration and the agency would then issue a rectification notice to the rule-breaker

Yunnan DRC stated that the four telecoms were main competitors in the relevant market and the promotions as a significant competition measure would exert direct influence on the final prices of the products The horizontal agreement organized by Yunnan Communications Administration on sales promotions restricted the competition capacity of telecoms and as a result eliminated the competition in the relevant market Consequently the behaviour of Yunnan Communications Administration violated article 8 20 of the AML and constituted administrative monopoly in terms of ldquoforcing undertakings to conduct monopolistic behaviour prohibited by the AMLrdquo

19 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpwwwsdpcgovcnfzgggzjgjdyfldjjszhdt201506t20150602_694802html 20 Article 8 of the AML Administrative organs and the public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 24 of 52

With respect to the penalties Yunnan DRC fined the local branch of China Tietong CNY 200000 for reaching but not implementing the agreement in regards to the other three telecoms a total fine of CNY 1298 million amounting to 2 of the sales of the relevant business in the previous year were imposed for entering into and implementing the horizontal monopolistic agreement

Analysis

The telecoms industry is still the enforcement priority of the antitrust enforcement authorities A company cannot be exempted from punishment even though it is forced by competent authorities to conduct monopoly behaviour

DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC21

Both a horizontal monopolistic agreement and a vertical monopolistic agreement were involved in this case

A total fine of CNY 14242 million was imposed on DongFeng Nissan and its distributors

Facts

In September 2015 the Guangdong Development and Reform Commission (ldquoGuangdong DRCrdquo) released an announcement regarding the administrative penalties on DongFeng Nissan and its provincial distributors for concluding price-related monopolistic agreements More specifically DongFeng Nissan was imposed a fine of CNY 1233 million for breaching article 14 of the AML in terms of restricting the resale price of certain car models 17 distributors domiciled in Guangdong were collectively fined CNY 1912 million for violating article 1322 of the AML in terms of entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements

According to the published official release the Guangdong DRC launched the investigation in August 2014 The authority discovered that from 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissan had set a rigorous restriction on its distributorsrsquo abilities to determine the resale prices of certain car models including the quoted prices in various platforms and the final resale price In addition DongFeng Nissan punished the distributors that failed to abide by such price restrictions in 2013 The authority 21 The original Chinese notice published by Guangdong DRC is available at httpwwwgddpcgovcnzwgkgzdtgzyw201509t20150910_328993html 22 Article 13 of the AML The following Monopolistic agreements among competing operators shall be prohibited (i) fix or change prices of commodities (ii) limit the outputs or sales volume of commodities (iii) segment the sales markets or the raw material purchasing markets (iv) limit the purchase of new technology new facilities or limit the development of new products new technology (v) jointly boycott transactions (vi) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-Monopoly Law enforcement Authority Monopolistic agreements in this Law refer to agreements decisions or other concerted practices that eliminate restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 25 of 52

believed that the vertical agreement concluded between DongFeng Nissan and its distributors eliminated and restricted the competition in the relevant market and damaged the consumer welfare as well which violates article 14 of the AML

Furthermore from April 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissanrsquos distributors in Guangdong province held multiple meetings to discuss issues relevant to sale price reached and implemented a horizontal monopolistic agreement in terms of fixing the prices of some car models which is prohibited by article 13 of the AML

Considering that both DongFeng Nissan and the involved distributors positively cooperated with the investigation and ceased the illegal behaviour immediately after the investigation Guangdong DRC decided to impose a fine amounting to 3 of its previous yearrsquos turnovers on DongFeng Nissan and a fine ranging from 2 to 4 on the relevant distributors in accordance with articles 4623 and 4924 of the AML

Analysis

This case demonstrates that auto and related industries are still under close attention of the authority Considering the NDRCrsquos successful series of antitrust investigations conducted throughout the auto industry it is observed that the agency currently overseeing price-related antitrust issues in China has accumulated a substantial amount of experience regarding antitrust enforcement in the auto industry Now is the right time to speed up the law-making process by amending the set of rules released earlier and drafting new laws to advise the auto industry on antitrust compliance

Enforcement by the SAIC and its local branches

Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC25

The investigation was triggered by whistle blowerrsquos submission

Cartel members were collectively fined CNY 139 million 23 Article 46 of the AML In case the operators violate the relevant provisions of this Law concluding and implementing Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall order the operators to cease such act impose fines more than 1 but less than 10 of the total turnover in the preceding year and confiscate the illegal gains where the Monopolistic agreement is not implemented a fine less than RMB 500000 can be imposed If the operators involved in Monopolistic agreement on its own initiative report information concerning the conclusion of Monopolistic agreements and provide important evidences to the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority they may be given a mitigated punishment or be exempted from punishment in accordance with the circumstances Where the industrial associations violate this Law organizing the operators in the industry to conclude Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority may impose a fine less than RMB 500000 in serious circumstances the agency of social organization administration and registration may cancel its registration 24 Article 49 of the AML As for the imposition of the fines stipulated by the Article 46 47 and 48 of this Law the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall take elements such as the nature extent and time it lasts of the illegal act into consideration in determining the specific amount of the fines 25 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201506t20150601_156889html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 26 of 52

Facts

In April 2015 the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) issued administrative penalties on several brick manufacturers for entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements This is the first case relevant to monopolistic agreements that has been publicized by the SAIC since the beginning of this year

Ten cartel members were involved in the case including one company and nine individuals Similar with most antitrust cases the investigation started as a result of a whistle blowerrsquos submission After a thorough investigation Hunan AIC found that those local brick manufacturers had reached agreements on controlling production volume and dividing sales areas in the forms of production and sales agreements plans and meeting minutes

The enforcement authority reached the conclusion that these brick manufacturers violated article 13 of the AML and imposed a total fine of CNY 1389400 on them

Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC26

The organizer of the monopolistic agreement the animation association was fined CNY 100000

The antitrust authority did not punish the members of the monopolistic agreement

Facts

In December 2015 the Guangdong Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoGuangdong AICrdquo) published its administrative punishment decision in regards to Guangzhou Panyu Animation amp Game Association (ldquoGAGArdquo) organizing member companies to conclude a monopolistic agreement

According to the decision GAGA drafted the ldquoAgreement of Exhibition Alliancerdquo (ldquoAgreementrdquo) and convened a conference with member companies in order to discuss the content and conclusion of the Agreement 52 member companies entered into the Agreement which actually requested the alliance companies to merely participate in the exhibitions either organized or supported by GAGA in Guangzhou In addition the Agreement prohibited the alliance companies from attending any other exhibition except if they obtained prior approval of GAGA

After a thorough investigation Guangdong AIC believed that the conclusion of the Agreement among GAGA and the 52 member companies violated article 13 (5) of the AML in terms of boycott GAGA who was deeply involved and restricted member companiesrsquo choice of exhibitions through the Agreement could be deemed as

26 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151208_164680html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 27 of 52

the participant and organizer of the monopolistic agreement In accordance with article 46 of the AML Guangdong AIC imposed a fine of CNY 100000 on GAGA for organizing the conclusion of the monopolistic agreement

Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC27

Hubei AIC considered the coinsurance for Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance illegal

Twelve insurance companies were fined CNY 469 million in total

Facts

In December 2015 the Hubei Administrative for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHubei AICrdquo) disclosed its punishment on 12 insurance companies for signing illegal coinsurance agreements

The disclosed punishment decision suggests that the Hubei branch of China Pacific Life Insurance (ldquothe Companyrdquo) 11 other insurance companies and Wuhan Construction Safety Technology Consultation Center (ldquoWCSTCCrdquo) signed a Coinsurance Agreement on Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance (ldquoCoinsurance Agreementrdquo) of which the main contents include

1) The Company and 11 other involved companies as the coinsurers jointly take charge of the personal accident insurance concerned with the construction project directly administered by the Wuhan government WCSTCC is responsible for providing safety professionalism and technology services regarding the relevant personal accident insurance

2) The Company as the chief insurer of the coinsurance occupies 12 of the total amount of the insurance and the other 11 companies respectively occupy 8

3) The Company as the representative of the coinsurance is in charge of collecting the premium signing the standard form insurance policies and issuing the invoice in its own name The Company should share the charged premium with the other companies in accordance with the Coinsurance Agreement

4) Both the Company and the other insurance companies should pay 25 of the actually received premium to WCSTCC as the service fee WCSTCC will assist the coinsurers in providing safety and technology management service to the insured In addition the 11 insurance companies should pay 5 of their premium to the Company as the management fee

27 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165445html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 28 of 52

5) In case an accident happens the 12 companies will jointly bear the damages based on their respective shares in the coinsurance

6) There is a contact mechanism established in the coinsurance The coinsurers will regularly hold coinsurance conferences to discuss existing problems

Furthermore the coinsurers and WCSTCC also signed a self-discipline agreement and established a complete management system to assure the implementation of the Coinsurance Agreement Any party violating the Coinsurance Agreement would be punished

Hubei AIC found that WCSTCC was solely invested by Wuhan Construction Safety Management Association which was under Wuhan Construction Commission The centre helped implement certain functions of the Wuhan Urban Construction Safety Management Station and was responsible for quality supervision and safety supervision of municipal construction projects

It later became a prerequisite for construction companies to purchase insurance from any member of the coinsurance in order to get approval to commence their project According to the decision Hubei AIC launched another separate investigation against WCSTCC

Through the investigation Hubei AIC concluded that the Coinsurance Agreement constituted a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by article 13 of the AML with the following analysis

First coinsurance as a common business model to jointly share and lower risks is widely adopted in the insurance industry A coinsurance arrangement for a specific project in order to avoid high risks faced by one insurer could be legal However coinsurance should not target the entire market In this case prior to the Coinsurance Agreement the risks of the construction projects were unpredictable since the scale of the construction projects the difficulty of the construction and the amount of construction workers could not be available It is impossible to predict the risks of the projects thus it is not necessary to cooperate with other insurers to collectively bear the risks The purpose of the 12 insurance companies to establish the coinsurance is to avoid the competition which demonstrates the Coinsurance Agreement belongs to a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by the AML

Second the companies through entering into the coinsurance agreement actually divided the relevant market of construction project personal accident insurance in Wuhan city which affected the competition in the relevant market and damaged the interests of other competitors and the consumers In particular the Construction Law as amended in 2011 stipulates that the purchase of personal accident insurance is not mandatory and the construction companies have the right to choose whether to buy the said insurance or not As mentioned purchasing insurance from the coinsurance had been the prerequisite for construction companies to obtain administration

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 29 of 52

approval for the project which seriously distorts the fair competition in the market

Citing article 46 of the AML the 12 insurance companies were collectively fined CNY 469 million including fines on the companies and confiscation of illegal gains It is noteworthy that the fines were calculated based on the companiesrsquo 2014 annual sales of the insurance product in connection with the coinsurance The Company as the chief insurer was fined amounting to 6 of its 2014 annual sales of the relevant insurance product in the coinsurance and other companies were fined amounting to 2 of relevant sales For more specific information please see the following table

Company Name (Hubei Branch)

Fines (CNY million)

Percentage of the sales

Illegal Gains (CNY

million)

China Pacific Life Insurance 00653 6 0941

Sino Life 00145 2 04332

Alltrust Insurance 00145 2 04332

Taikang Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Continent Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Pacific Property Insurance

00145 2 04332

China Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

PICC Property and Casualty 00145 2 02599

Taiping General Insurance 00145 2 013

Union Life Insurance 00145 2 01177

Ping An Annuity Insurance Company of China

00145 2 04201

Ping An Property amp Casualty Insurance Company of China

00145 2 -

Subtotal 02248 - 44679

Total 46927

Analysis

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 30 of 52

Coinsurance as an effective approach to lower risks of insurers is widely used in the insurance industry Information sharing and agreements on coinsurance were generally considered efficient and legitimate However from an antitrust perspective coinsurance may raise competition concerns depending on the circumstances of each agreement In the case that there is enough capacity for one insurer to cover the potential risks the coinsurance might be considered as entering into a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC28

The first leniency applicant was exempted from fines

The other concrete companies were imposed a fine of CNY 180000

Facts

In December 2015 the concrete companies monopolistic agreement case investigated by Hunan AIC was published on SAICrsquos website

In accordance with the antitrust enforcement announcement of SAIC this case was triggered by complaints from the Yongzhou City peoplersquos congress After the preliminary review the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) initiated the formal investigation on seven concrete companies domiciled in Yongzhou City Hunan Province which were suspected of being involved in a monopolistic agreement in terms of division of the volumes of the products

After further investigation Hunan AIC found that the seven concrete companies concluded a partnership agreement in 2011 which requested the involved companies to enter into a partnership business with assets In addition according to the partnership agreement it was planned to establish a comprehensive office to manage production marketing and distribution of the products of all the partners The seven companies intended to jointly adjust and control the output of concrete based on the partnership agreement However because there were disagreements over the allocation of the injected assets and market shares the companies did not implement the partnership agreement The agreement was cancelled in December 2012

Based on the findings Hunan AIC concluded that the seven concrete companies as competitors of each other restricted and eliminated the competition in the relevant market through reaching the partnership agreement and dividing the volumes of sales which violated article 13(3) of the AML in terms of division of sales market Considering that the agreement had not been implemented and the limited influence of the agreement according to article 46 of the AML and article 27 of the Administrative Penalties Law small amount fines were imposed on the involved companies Six companies were fined CNY 30000 each for their illegal behaviour 28 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165504html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 31 of 52

Yongzhou Shuangyuan Building Materials Co Ltd as the first one to actively report the monopolistic agreement and cooperate with the enforcement authority was exempted from the punishment

Outlook

It is expected that the AMLrsquos enforcement on monopolistic agreements will continue in the future Industries such as automobile shipping pharmaceuticals insurance etc will still remain the priority of the antitrust enforcement

The antitrust enforcement authorities have published a series of regulations in order to clarify the substantial and procedural issues relevant to the antitrust enforcement However Chinarsquos current antitrust legislation regime is still immature In the following years we expect that more attention will be paid to the legislative improvements

Another remarkable issue for cartel members is that with more Chinese enterprises attaching increasing importance to the AML the follow-on civil damages actions might become a tendency in the future

C Abuse of Market Dominance

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen a decent increase of abuse of market dominance cases both in public enforcement and private litigation Oftentimes the authorities responsible for public enforcement generally find it difficult to pursue investigations against abuse of market dominance cases The following two main reasons are often cited to explain this standoff first it is hard for the authorities to define the relevant markets and prove the undertaking(s)rsquo dominant market position through economic approaches second it is hard to collect evidence regarding abusive practices

The cases related to IPRs abuse are emerging significantly particularly in the telecommunication media and technology (ldquoTMTrdquo) sectors

The SAICrsquos latest refusal-to-deal probe against a local drug maker shows that the SAIC and its local branches have increasingly acquired a profile as an abuse of dominance regulator

Significant Cases

Cases pursued by the SAIC

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 32 of 52

Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case29

Facts

The local authority in Dongfang city reported to the Hainan provincial branch of SAIC on April 23 2014 of the suspected dominance abuse The SAIC authorized its Hainan bureau to officially investigate the matter on 25 July 2014 according to a decision dated January 9 2015 The AIC concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its market dominance by requiring users to pay a deposit without any legal basis and or justifiable reasons

In terms of the relevant product market the local authority found that in this case it was the urban water supply market in Dongfang city and its surrounding townships where Dongfang Water was the sole public operator in the local water supply market with a 100 market share which made all water users completely reliant on the companyrsquos supply In term of market access the local authority found it very unlikely that there were other operators due to the strict regulations

The Hainan SAIC then concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its dominance as it charged users a deposit by threatening to refuse to register users and also by threatening to restrict the water supply Dongfang Waters charging of deposits lacked a legal basis and hadnt received government approval to the detriment of household consumers and business water users and hampered the improvement of management and services of the company Such conduct was in breach of Chinarsquos Anti-Monopoly Law

Hainan AIC levied a fine of CNY 593208 a lighter penalty equivalent to 2 of the companyrsquos annual sales for the previous year and confiscated illicit gains of CNY 38521 for abuse of market dominance

Analysis

It is noteworthy that although handled by a local authority supervised by the SAIC the antitrust agency detailed the relevant market definition the assessment of the dominant market position the abusive practices and the scrutiny of the justifiable reasons

Although the definition of the relevant market and the reasoning of the Hainan provincial AIC and the SAIC are subject to criticism it is still applausive to see that the antitrust regulators have realized the importance of the application of rule of reason in an abuse case In addition through itrsquos a published decision practitioners may observe the regulatorsrsquo reasoning and thus transparency and legal certainty have been generated

29 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzfcfjd201502t20150212_152066html last visited on October 18 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 33 of 52

Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms30

Facts

In June 2013 the Ningxia AIC under authorization of SAIC opened an antitrust investigation into the alleged tie-in sales by the three major state-owned telecommunications operators China Tietong China Unicom and China Telecom for the tie-in sale of fixed-line telephones with broadband Internet services The Ningxia AIC found that the three companies had bundled fixed-line phone services with Internet services to subscribers

During the investigation all three telecommunications companies admitted the tie-in practice had recognized that such practice had improper influence on competition and deprived the choices of consumers The three companies promised to undertake internal rectification timely and eliminate the ill effects resulting from such practice The parties committed to taking the following corrective measures

1) Taking internal rectifications and conducting training to staff about antitrust laws and stop tie-in sales practices

2) Making public commitments to allow subscribers a free choice of services and strengthening the propaganda through the operating room call centre and other channels

3) Unbundling fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

The Ningxia AIC decided to suspend the probe on 14 May 2015 on the grounds that the three companies had actively worked together with the investigators and proposed workable remedy plans

Analysis

In the official announcement Ningxia AIC concluded that the purpose of antitrust enforcement is to restrain monopolistic conducts the protection of competition and to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of consumers Given that during the investigation process the parties had actively cooperated with the investigation formed a more profound understanding of the dangers of tying behaviour and moreover the parties proposed and implemented positive corrective measures to be able to remove the ill impact of their actions the agency believed that the purpose of antitrust law enforcement was fulfilled

It is worth noting that the Ningxia AIC also required the three companies to implement the commitment by August 30 2015and the submission of the written

30 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158908html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158906html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158910html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 34 of 52

implementation report on July 102015 and August 102015 respectively which is another illustration that an effective commitment by the undertakings shall directly deal with the effect that is brought by the monopolistic behaviour In this case the effect of the monopolistic act was restricted to the choice of the consumers therefore the commitment by the undertaking aimed at allowing the freedom of choice and the unbundling of fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company31

Facts

The Liaoning AIC imposed a fine of approximately CNY 433m on the Fushun Branch of Liaoning Tobacco Co on 1 June 2015 The agency also ordered the company to stop its illicit behaviour

The Liaoning AIC received a tip-off that the accused Liaoning Tobacco Corsquos Fushun branch was conducting tie-in sales of non-high-demand cigarette brands with high-demand cigarette brands After gaining authorization from SAIC the agency officially started an investigation regarding the companyrsquos suspected abuse of market dominance in June 2014

Analysis

According to the announcement the tobacco company argued that the tobacco industry is a state controlled or monopolized industry with a lawful monopolistic position therefore the company shall not be subject to the norms of general market competition rules or the anti-monopoly law

In this regards the agency concluded that in terms of the status of the undertaking admittedly the first paragraph of article 17 of the AML says that the State shall protect the lawful business operations of undertakings in these industries with respect to the industries which are under the control of the State-owned economic sector and have a bearing on the lifeline of the national economy or national security and the industries which exercise monopoly over the production and sale of certain commodities according to law However the second paragraph continues to say that the undertakings mentioned above shall do business according to law be honest faithful and strictly self-disciplined and subject themselves to public supervision and they shall not harm the consumers interests by taking advantage of their position of control or their monopolistic production and sale of certain commodities In particular in the preceding paragraph the ldquolawful businessrdquo and ldquoaccording to lawrdquo imply that the AML shall apply in the business operation The agency therefore believes that

31 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201508t20150813_16

0208html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 35 of 52

there shall be no exemption for the undertaking concerned the defences of the undertaking concerned is not established

Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm32

Facts

The Chongqing AIC fined Chongqing Qingyang Pharmaceutical CNY 439308 for alleged dominance abuse

The investigation was initiated when the company contacted the agency for verification on its potential breach of the AML related to an allopurinol active pharmaceuticals ingredient (API) distribution agreement with its exclusive distributor The company provided the relevant agreement and information and the agency conducted an investigation into the company and some other relevant companies

Analysis

Relevant Market

During the investigation the agency found that pharmaceutical ingredients are a special commodity the API is used to produce the preparations The chemical API is only used for the production of the preparation and could be used as a medicine for clinic use

The preparation is produced according to the requirements of certain form of prepared drugs and for the purpose of treatment and prevention which can be used as medicine

The allopurinol is used for the common treatment of hyperuricemia However the other treatments are different in pharmacological effects or treatment effects as well as in the cost for the patient Furthermore the company is the only manufacturer and supplier in the market nationwide since July 2012 Therefore the agency concluded that the relevant market is the allopurinol API market

Considering that the qualification for manufacturing the allopurinol API is national wide and the normal practice for purchasers and suppliers is domestic the relevant geographic market is the Chinese market

The Market Dominance

During the investigation the agency found that the company is the only supplier and manufacturer of allopurinol API in China there is no other competitor in the

32 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151222_16

5152html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 36 of 52

market and the company has a monopoly in the market The evidence shows that the company has the ability to control the prices the position for the downstream is relatively weak

With respect to the market entry the agency found that the market entry is relatively high in addition other undertakings are dependent on the company Thus the agency believed the company to have market dominance

Refusal to Deal

The agency found that on September 25 2015 the company reached an exclusive agreement and distribution agreement with its distributor Based on these agreements the company didnrsquot supply allopurinol API to the said distributor and other companies despite the fact that those companies requested for allopurinol API but were turned down by the company

Absence of Reasonable Cause

The agency found that the companyrsquos refusal to deal was not in line with the needs of normal business operation or economic efficiency On the other hand the refusal to deal was aimed at increasing the market share of the allopurinol drug product Also the agency found that the stop of supply was a manipulation of market power as to maximize the profit to the most The agency further found that the exclusive distribution agreement with suspension of supply for six months and the refusal to supply was to eliminate and restrict the competition as to gain the monopolistic profit

The Consequence of Refusal to Deal

The agency concluded that the refusal to deal harmed the competition of the allopurinol preparations market Because of the suspension of supply many demanders had to reduce their production or switch to the supply of other products or stop their production The suspension of supply affected the competition of the downstream market Consequently the raising of the price of allopurinol API also raised the cost for other manufacturers of allopurinol preparations

Furthermore the refusal to deal led to capacity loss of the allopurinol preparation industry

Ultimately the refusal to deal increased the burden on consumers as the refusal to supply changed the supply-demand relationship in the market

The agency concluded that the Company abused its dominant position in the allopurinol API market by refusing to deal with intended buyers in the period between October 2013 and March 2014Therefore the Company violated article 17 (1) of the AML which prohibits business operators with a dominant market position from abusing that position such as the refusal to deal without any justifications

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 37 of 52

D Administrative Monopoly

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 witnessed antitrust authoritiesrsquo significant efforts regarding the enforcement against administrative monopoly According to Mr Dong Zhiming the deputy director general of Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly Bureau ever since the AML coming into force six cases in connection with administrative monopoly were investigated by NDRC and among them five cases were handled in the year of 2015 These cases touched abuses of administrative power in terms of designative deal in relation to transportation communication and pharmaceutical industries

The first private litigation related to administrative monopolistic acts was heard in the court which is a milestone case in the enforcement of the AML

Significant Cases

Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC33

Facts

In March 2015 the NDRC released the official letter to Shandong Provincial Department of Transportation (ldquoShandong DOTrdquo) on its website with respect to correct its abuse of administrative power to exclude and restrict competition

During the investigation the NDRC found that since 2011 Shandong DOT had issued multiple relevant government orders in order to require certain types of vehicles to be directly connected to two designated information and service platforms both of which are operated and technically supported by one company namely Shandong Jiutong Internet of Things Technology Co Ltd (ldquoJiutong ITTrdquo) Furthermore according to the orders issued by the competent administrative department all the vehicle satellite positioning terminals entering into Shandong provincial market should be debugged through the said technology service platform which is operated by the mentioned company In addition Shandong DOT released the cap prices of vehicle satellite positioning terminals which is identical to the 2012 bid-winning price in the Ministry of Transportation demonstration project

The NDRC believed that Shandong DOTrsquos behaviour eliminated and restricted the competition in the monitoring platform market and the vehicle terminal market deprived the right of transportation enterprises to choose vehicle terminals and monitoring platform on their owns unreasonably raised the sales prices of vehicle terminals and service fees charged by the platform and increased the costs of transportation enterprises Therefore the antitrust agency concluded that Shandong

33 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201503t20150327_668911html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 38 of 52

DOT violated article 8 of the AML which stipulates that ldquoadministrative organs and the public organizations with an administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude and restrict competitionrdquo Specifically Shandong DOT violated article 3234 in terms of requiring organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any designated operators and violated article 3735 in terms of setting rules with contents which eliminate and restrict competition

Based on article 51 of the AML ldquoWhere administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations abuse administrative powers performing activities which exclude and restrict competition the superior entity shall order it to correct impose administrative penalty on the chief officer and other staffs directly responsible pursuant to the laws The AML enforcement authority may give recommendations on disposal of activities to the relevant superior entityrdquo the NDRC proposed in writing that the Shandong provincial government should order Shandong DOT to rectify its behaviour with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Entirely open up the monitoring platform market by permitting transportation undertakings to freely choose any approved platform

2) Loosen the restrictions on the entry into Shandong vehicle terminals permit the undertakings to independently select the supplier of vehicle terminals and allow the qualified terminals to be connected to the relevant monitoring platform and

3) Revoke the official documentation relevant to the cap price of vehicle terminals in order to promote the price competition

Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 36

Facts

On 26 August 2015 the NDRC published its second decision with regard to the rectification of administrative monopoly since the beginning of this year According to the proposal letter sent to Anhui Provincial Government the investigation against the Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City (Bengbu HFPC) was trigged by third partiesrsquo complaints

34 Article 32 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to require organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any operators designated by them 35 Article 37 of the AML Administrative organs shall not abuse their administrative powers to set rules with contents which eliminate restrict competition 36 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201508t20150826_748682html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 39 of 52

The investigation suggests that Bengbu HFPC published three notices with regard to drugs procurement in April and May of this year

In the No C-2015-CG-X-111 Notice (ldquoNo111 Noticerdquo) released on 10 April2015 the health authority not only provided the dosage form and qualification of the requested drugs but also directly determined the suppliers of relevant drugs which eliminated and restricted the competition among pharmaceutical manufacturers and therefore violated articles 32 and 37 of the AML

In the No C-2015-CG-C-112 Notice (ldquoNo112 Noticerdquo) and No C-2015-CG-C-168 (ldquoNo 168 Noticerdquo) respectively released on 10 April and 22 May 2015 the Bengbu HFPC set discriminative qualification requirements on non-local undertakings in order to restrict their participation in the relevant bidding For instance in accordance with No 112 Notice to be a qualified bidder the turnover of non-local undertakings shall exceed CNY 2 billion which is 50 times as much as the turnover requirements of the local undertakings In the NDRCrsquos opinion the administrative monopoly activities conducted by the local health agency excluded the relevant undertakings from the market maintained the virtual-high prices of drugs and therefore violated articles 3237 and 37 of the AML

The NDRC suggested in a letter that Anhui Provincial Government should urge the Bengbu HFPC to rectify the abuse of monopoly powers with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Stop setting distinguishing restrictions on qualification requirements review standards and numbers of winning bidders as for local and non-local undertakings

2) Stop designating the suppliers of competitive drugs and

3) Take necessary measures to mitigate the negative effects resulting from the previous illegal monopolistic abuses

Outlook

At the beginning of the year the former director general of the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau under the NDRC Xu Kunlin stated that the agency would strengthen antitrust enforcement on abuse of administrative power in 2015

Since then the NDRC has made great efforts to rectify unreasonable abuses of administrative power The currently disclosed two cases investigated by the NDRC re-emphasize the Chinese Governmentrsquos strict scrutiny of antitrust issues in respect of

37 Article 34 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to restrict or reject the participation of operators from other regions in local bidding activities by measures such as prescribing discriminatory qualification requirements or assessment standards or by not publishing information according to law

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 40 of 52

administrative monopoly It reminds the local governments that antitrust compliance is of significant importance

III Private Litigation

A Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen more and more private antitrust litigations

The private antitrust litigation cases have become increasingly complicated especially the issues regarding the intersection areas of IP and antitrust law

Multinational giants and State-Owned Enterprises (the ldquoSOEsrdquo) are increasingly becoming the targets in antitrust civil litigations Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (the ldquoSMEsrdquo) tend to use the antitrust litigation to achieve their commercial goals in the business context

B Significant Cases

Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)38

This is the first-ever private litigation concerning administrative monopoly since the implementation of the AML in 2008

Facts

According to the currently disclosed details the case is relevant for designated trade

The plaintiff Shenzhen Sware Technology Co Ltd (ldquoSwarerdquo) is a software company The press releases suggest that Sware Gloden Software Co Ltd (ldquoGlodenrdquo) and Shanghai Ruban Software Co Ltd (ldquoShanghai Rubanrdquo) are the three main suppliers of construction cost software and possess the major shares of the relevant market An annual provincial vocational ability contest regarding the construction cost hosted by the Guangdong Department of Education (ldquoGuangdong DOE) designated Gloden as the exclusive supplier of the relevant software

After several unsuccessful verbal and written negotiations with Guangdong DOE in April 2014 Sware filed a lawsuit against Guangdong DOE before the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquothe Courtrdquo) alleging that the administrative organ abused its administrative power and violated the AML by designating exclusive software supplier for the contest and claimed a compensation for reasonable expense amounting to CNY 10800 Yuan

The opinions of the Court 38 The story of the case is available at httpfinancesinacomcnchinadfjj20150410074621924997shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 41 of 52

The full text of the judgment has not been disclosed yet In accordance with the information available to the public the Court invoked article 32 of the AML which prohibits an administrative organ from abusing its administrative power to require or in disguised form organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use only the commodities supplied by the entities designated by them The Court concluded that Guangdong DOE failed to prove the legitimacy of the designation and therefore abused its administration power

Currently the case is in appeal before the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court

Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 39

It is the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China

In the first instance ruling Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court ruled against Sinopec holding that the Yunnan branch of Sinopecs trading company was obligated to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its dominance in the sales market of refined oil by refusing to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding without justifiable reasons

In the second instance ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors Currently the case is pending

Facts

The First Trial

The lawsuit was filed before the Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoKunming Courtrdquo) in January 2014 Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy Co Ltd (ldquoYingdingrdquo) a bio-energy manufacturer claimed that Sinopec and the Yunnan branch of Sinopec trading company (ldquoSinopec Yunnan Branchrdquo) had failed to fulfil their obligations stipulated in the Renewable Energy Law and had abused their market dominance in sales market of refined oil by refusing to trade with Yingding without justifiable reasons

Sinopec and Sinopec Yunnan Branch mainly explained four reasons for why they rejected Yingdingrsquos biofuel Firstly Yingding had failed to prove that the biofuel complied with the relevant national standard and was safe to use Secondly Yingding had failed to provide complete trading terms Thirdly the laws and regulations regarding biofuel were incomplete the authorized refined oil sales companies were 39 The details of the case are available at httpnewsxinhuanetcomfortune2014-1217c_1113680039htm httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=9e71db51-6ff6-4d2c-8af6-8eacf023ebdeampKeyWord=E4BA91E58D97E79B88E9BC8E|E4B8ADE79FB3E58C96 httpnewsxinhuanetcomenergy2015-0422c_127721575htm httpwwwnbdcomcnarticles2015-04-23911348html last visited on December 17 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 42 of 52

obligated to purchase biofuel from the biofuel manufacturers if it met certain quality standards but there was a vacancy regarding how to reach the end consumers from the sales companies

On 8 December 2014 the Kunming Intermediate Peoples Court ruled that Sinopec Yunnan Branch bore a legal obligation to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its market dominance in refined oil market by refusing without any justifiable reasons to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding The court ordered Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network within 30 days Both Yingding and Sinopec filed appeals to the Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court

The Appellate Trial

The appeal hearing was held on 22 April 2015 in Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoYunnan Courtrdquo) Sinopec submitted 23 new pieces of evidence and introduced two expert witnesses in a bid to overturn several key elements in the first-instance ruling by Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court

In terms of the determination of the relevant market and the market dominance Sinopec argued that the relevant market in this case was for adipic acid monomethyl ester (ldquoAAMErdquo) the main ingredient of a biofuel additive known as BD100 Yingdingrsquos main product is BD100 which can be blended with fossil diesel to become biofuel In the AAME market Sinopec is a potential buyer instead of a market dominator In support of this argument Sinopec presented an expert witnessmdashGong Jiong a professor of economics at Beijings University of International Business and Economics who testified that AAME should be defined as the relevant product market on the basis of an economic analysis

However Yingding insisted that the first-instance ruling was correct in naming the sales market of refined oil as the relevant market and submitted new evidence an article on Sinopecs website that claimed it had a 67 market share in Yunnan to help establish the claim that Sinopec had market dominance

Another main dispute was whether Yingdingrsquos biofuel product met national standards which would make it mandatory for Sinopec to purchase under Chinas Renewable Energy Law The law stipulates that biofuel producers must sell their products first to an authorized refined oil sales company and the sales companies are obliged to buy the fuel if it meets certain quality standards In order to test the quality Sinopec introduced the second expert witness Lin Jianmin a leading author of Chinarsquos national biofuel standard Lin Jianmin pointed out that there are currently quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology which gives Sinopec a justifiable reason not to trade with Yingding Moreover Sinopec presented some precedents in which consumers had complained about the biofuel quality and also claimed that China didnt have a sound regulatory framework to support biofuel production neither in testing nor in sales

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 43 of 52

Nevertheless to refute this point Yingding referred to an earlier test in co-operation with Sinopec in 2011 where selected buses in Kunming used biofuel blended by Sinopec using BD100 produced by Yingding

On August 13 2015 Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors and now this case is pending In the written appellate ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court did not provide any details regarding its reasoning

Key Issues of the Case

Is there any competition between Yingding and Sinopec

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case the product of Yingding is biofuel while Sinopec does not engage in the business of biofuel From this perspective Yingding and Sinopec are not competitors Thus it is not necessary and not reasonable for Sinopec to eliminate or restrict the competition from Yingding

Relevant Market

The definition of the relevant market is a prerequisite to determine whether competition exists and whether the AML is applicable In accordance with the Judicial Interpretation of Antitrust civil litigation the plaintiff shall take the responsibility to prove the defendantrsquos dominance in the relevant market Also the methods of defining the relevant market are stipulated in the Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition (ldquoGuidelinesrdquo) However both Yingding and Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court defined the relevant market as the sales market of refined oil without sufficient antitrust analysis none of the methods in the Guidelines were used Therefore the definition of the relevant market remains arguable and needs to be sufficiently analysed in the upcoming retrial

Justifiable Reasons

The abuse of market dominance includes the behaviour of refusing to trade without justifiable reasons according to the AML but in the first instance ruling justifiable reasons were not investigated by the court During the appellate trial the expert witness introduced by Sinopec claimed that there were quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology and this was a justifiable reason to refuse to trade with Yingding Even though the first instance court and the appellate court did not reason the justifiable reason it should be discussed and investigated further during the retrial

AML or Renewable Energy Law

The claims of Yingding were based on both the AML and the Renewable Energy Law (ldquoRELrdquo) and the first instance ruling referred to both the AML and the REL as

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 44 of 52

well It seems that the laws the first instance court referred to were comprehensive but in fact the reasoning was not clear and logical In the first instance ruling some disputes regarding the AML were reviewed but all the orders were not based on the AML Specifically the first instance court ordered the Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network based on the REL and dismissed the other claims That the orders were not on account of reasoning is illogical It is anticipated that during the retrial the application of the laws will be clearer

Analysis

A lot of issues have not been clearly analysed by the courts such as the relevant market and the justifiable reasons Since the case is remanded the above-mentioned issues are expected to be resolved in the retrial In addition Yingding was in a disadvantaged position compared to its first instance trial since its claims based on the AML were challenged greatly during the appellate trial In the retrial it is probable that Yingding may switch its litigation strategy and base its claims on the REL Therefore maybe more preparation regarding the REL can give Sinopec a leg up

Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)

Rijing Electric a Chinese distributor seeks CNY 5m compensation

The first hearing was on 9 June 2015 and ended without a ruling

Facts

Rijing Electric (ldquoRijingrdquo) a Shanghai-based company and a former distributor for Panasonic accused Panasonic of abusing its dominance and dividing the market through monopolistic practice in an antitrust lawsuit filed in 2014 with Shanghai No 1 Intermediate Court (ldquoShanghai Courtrdquo) claiming compensation of CNY 5m (USD 815370) Wenzhou Mingda Automation System Co and Shanghai Qingying Automation Equipment as the distributor of Panasonic in China are the co-defendants were accused of conducting monopolistic behaviours by implementing Panasonicrsquos policy

The first hearing for evidence exchange was on June 9 2015 Rijing claimed a policy allegedly introduced by Panasonic in 2009 restricted the competition between distributors Panasonic claims the policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo and has full justifiable reasons It explained that the products in question required customization at considerable cost to distributors before its sale to customers Once carried out however other distributors leaving them open to quote much lower prices than the original distributor could simply and relatively cheap replicate this customization Besides Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and that the plaintiff had failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic said its market share for the four products

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 45 of 52

under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases Also Rijing failed to challenge the policy when it was first introduced instead initially agreeing it was reasonable as e-mail evidence submitted by Panasonic suggests

Key Issues of the Case

Whether Panasonic occupied a market dominant position

It is reported that Rijing claimed that Panasonic had abused its market dominance but Rijing failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and its market share for the four products under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases

Analysis

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case Panasonicrsquos policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo rather than to eliminate or restrict competition

Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals40 (Pending)

It is a battle over patent licensing issues

It is viewed as being among the most complicated antitrust lawsuits in China

The first hearing was on 17 and 18 December 2015

Facts

Four Chinese rare earth companies Ningbo Ketian Magnet Ningbo Permanent Magnetics Ningbo Tongchuang Strong Magnet Material and Ningbo Huahui Magnetic Industry filed antitrust lawsuits against Hitachi Metals over alleged patent licensing issues regarding rare earth magnets on December 11 2014 with the Ningbo Intermediate Peoples Court (ldquoNingbo Courtrdquo) in Zhejiang province As reported four Chinese rare earth companies claimed Hitachi Metals abused its market dominance and hurt the industry competition by refusing to license the patents to them The patents in this case are used in the manufacturing of sintered neodymium iron boron (ldquoNdFeBrdquo) magnets a rare-earth magnet alloy widely used in parts for airplanes automobiles and other products

Hitachi Metals filed a challenge with the Ningbo Court over its jurisdiction in April 2015 After Ningbo Court rejected Hitachi Metals jurisdiction objection on 28 April 2015 Hitachi Metals appealed to the Zhejiang High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoZhejiang

40The details of the story are available at httpwwwzbmagcomnews_viewphpid=80 httpwwwhitachicomcnaboutpress201510-121118_ahtml last visited on December 22 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 46 of 52

Courtrdquo) but Zhejiang Court affirmed the ruling of the Ningbo Court

The first day of a two-day hearing took place on 17 December 2015 during which the two sides cross-examined each otherrsquos evidence The evidence focused on clearing up several key elements in the case including the relevant market whether Hitachi Metals has dominance on that market and whether both sides acted in good faith during the licensing negotiations

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Product Market

The four Chinese rare earth companies claimed that the relevant product market should be the NdFeb-related patent licensing market However Hitachi Metals believed that the physical NdFeb market rather than the patent licensing market should be the relevant product market which is meaningful for assess the real competitive effects on the market

Whether Hitachi Metals occupies a dominant market position

In terms of market dominance Hitachi Metals claimed it does not occupy a dominant position because Hitachi Metalsrsquo patents were not in a standard in this case and there are substitutable technologies in the market SEP holders have the obligation to license on FRAND terms but none-SEP holders do not So while a refusal to license a SEP may constitute abuse of dominance refusal to license a non-SEP mdash even by a patent holder with a dominant position mdash should not be considered as an abuse

Analysis

Hitachi Metals as a patent holder should have the right to decide whether to retain those patents or not or who to license According to the legal theory the purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage and protect innovation by conferring monopoly right mdash that is to give intellectual property owners the proprietary rights which can exclude others from using the intellectual property The SEP holders admittedly need to comply with FRAND terms which can maintain a robust balance between competition and monopoly whereas the further intervention of antitrust law into non-SEP patents may undermine the purpose of intellectual property law To which extent the antitrust law should intervene is yet to be seen

Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei41

A confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the Beijing IP court made by the Beijing High Court

41 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcncpwswbjzscq201511t20151103_12225640htm last visited on December 28 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 47 of 52

Facts

On August 2 2013 the NDRC penalized Abbott for monopolistic price-fixing and then Abbott made a price adjustment in China where the prices of main products were reduced

On December 16 2014 Tian Junwei (ldquoTianrdquo) a Chinese citizen in Beijing sued Carrefour Shuangjing Branch (ldquoCarrefourrdquo) and Abbott (Shanghai) Sales Company (ldquoAbbottrdquo) at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (ldquoIP Courtrdquo) for their monopolistic price-fixing which damaged his interests However Carrefour and Abbott challenged the jurisdiction of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court They claimed there were two reasons Firstly according to the jurisdiction rules of the IP court issued by the Supreme Court the IP court has no jurisdiction over anti-trust cases Secondly if this case is a contractual dispute the court that is in the place of Carrefour should hear it if this case is a tort dispute the Shanghai Intermediate Court should hear it

In the ruling of the IP Court the IP Court decided it has the jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases for the following reasons According to the Provisions On Causes Of Action In Civil Cases issued by Supreme Court (最高人民法院案由规定) antimonopoly dispute is a tertiary cause of action belonging to IP and competition disputes Also according to the Provisions concerning the Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京

市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问题的规定 ) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was an IP and competition dispute and was sued after November 6 2014 Thus the IP Court had jurisdiction

Both Carrefour and Abbott appealed to the Beijing High Court over the jurisdiction ruling but the Beijing High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original ruling Reasons are listed in the written ruling issued on June 18 2015 Firstly the nature of the case was an antimonopoly dispute In accordance with Provisions of the Supreme Peoples Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民

事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) and Civil Litigation Law the monopolistic civil disputes in the first instance shall be under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Peoples Courts and an action involving a contractual dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the peoples court of the place where the defendant is domiciled or where the contract is performed Carrefour as the defendant in this case is domiciled in Chaoyang District Beijing Therefore the courts of Beijing have jurisdiction over this case Secondly according to article 3 of the Notification on the Jurisdiction of Intellectual Property Courts issued by Supreme Court (关于知识产权法院案件管辖

等有关问题的通知) IP courts have jurisdiction over first-instance civil disputes arising from monopolistic practices Lastly according to Provisions concerning the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 21 of 52

Navegacioacuten Interoceaacutenica

period involved less brands violations and shipping routes

Total 4067

Analysis

In this case the agency applied the AML instead of the Tenders and Bids Law to collusive bidding Citing article 13 (3) of the AML the NDRC identified that the collusive bidding constituted a division of the sales market

The leading three leniency applicants were granted exemption from fines to a varying degree

According to the official who handled this case dawn raids performed by antitrust enforcement agencies in other jurisdictions drew the attention of the NDRC on the cartels of these shipping companies However there was limited effective evidence to prove that the companies had reached monopolistic agreements Through pressuring the involved parties three members of the shipping cartel actively confessed their illegal conduct This case once again stresses the significance of international cooperation between antitrust enforcement agencies

Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau17

The distribution agreements between Mercedes-Benz and its dealers are determined as vertical monopolistic agreement and Mercedes-Benz violated article 14 of the AML because it restricted the ability of its dealers to decide their own resale prices

Mercedes-Benzrsquos dealers violated article of 13 of the AML due to concluding a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Mercedes-Benz and its dealers were jointly fined CNY 3578 million

Facts

In April 2015 Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau which is the provincial branch of the NDRC released the punishment on its website and announced that it had imposed a fine of CNY 350 million on Mercedes-Benz along with the aggregated fine of CNY 787 million on its dealers The fine came as a result of Mercedes-Benz reaching and implementing resale price maintenance (ldquoRPMrdquo) agreements with dealers to fix the minimum resale price of several car models as well as certain auto parts 17 The original Chinese notice published by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau is available at httpwwwjswjjgovcnoffice_neweo_comm_zxnrxsphp

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 22 of 52

According to the decision the authority found that Mercedes-Benz fixed the minimum resale price of Class E and Class S cars in Nanjing Wuxi Changzhou and Suzhou markets through telephoneverbal communication and dealers meetings from January 2013 to July 2014 Since 2010 Mercedes-Benz had reached agreements with dealers in Jiangsu province to fix the minimum resale prices for auto parts by providing different levels of discounts for insured cars cars involving expired warranty periods and cars within the warranty period

In addition Mercedes-Benz implemented the minimum resale price maintaining agreement by

1) Tightening its monitoring measures on the dealers such as inspecting deals and their sale incentive system on a weekly basis

2) Tracking the sales process flow of cars and increasing the intensity of this assessment

3) Giving warnings and reducing support ndash for example halting the supply of bestselling cars and prohibiting the opening of new stores ndash to dealers if dealers refused to cooperate with the price-fixing related policies and measures and

4) Interviewing personnel of the dealers and requesting terminations if the staff engaged in serious violations of the RPM agreement

Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau concluded that Mercedes-Benz had excluded and eliminated market competition harmed consumer welfare and consequently violated article 1418 of the AML The authority therefore imposed a fine of CNY 350 million representing 7 of the sale revenue of the previous year in the relevant market against Mercedes-Benz and imposed a fine on the dealers amounting to an equivalence of 1 of the annual sales in the previous year

Analysis

Although the agency also addressed the horizontal violation among the dealers in this case the administrative penalty decision mainly focuses on the vertical violation The agency fined dealers involved in the RPM agreement a combined CNY 787 million equal to 1 of the previous-year sales which suggests that the agency decided to give lighter punishments to dealers who took initiative in reporting the activity and provided evidence

The Mercedes-Benz case is the third case where the agency successfully 18 Article 14 of the AML The following monopolistic agreements between operators and trading partners shall be prohibited (i) fixing the resale prices of commodities to third persons (ii) restricting the minimum resale prices of commodities to third persons (iii) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement Authority under the State Council

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 23 of 52

discovered both vertical and horizontal agreements in a case following the Audi case and the Chrysler case All these cases are rooted in the same industry indicating that industrial features play a large role in raising anti-trust concerns In fact it appears that the entire automotive industry is under antitrust scrutiny

Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC19

This case involved both a horizontal agreement and an administrative monopoly

A total fine of CNY 1318 million was imposed on the involved companies

Facts

In June 2015 the NDRC through its website announced the decision made by its regional branch -Yunnan Provincial Development and Reform Commission (ldquoYunnan DRCrdquo) regarding the horizontal monopolistic agreement case involving Yunnan Communications Administration and local subsidiaries of four state-owned telecommunication companies

Through the investigation Yunnan DRC found that Yunnan Communications Administration as a competent government agency had organized several meetings involving Yunnan branches of four state-owned telecoms - China Mobile China Telecom China Unicom and China Tietong in August and September of 2014 At the end of 2009 the four local branches entered into an agreement to regulate their sales promotions in terms of limiting the promotional items amount and frequency

Furthermore the agreement provides certain measures to ensure the implementation of relevant restrictions on promotions Specifically in case any cartel member violates the agreement the others could file complaints with Yunnan Communications Administration and the agency would then issue a rectification notice to the rule-breaker

Yunnan DRC stated that the four telecoms were main competitors in the relevant market and the promotions as a significant competition measure would exert direct influence on the final prices of the products The horizontal agreement organized by Yunnan Communications Administration on sales promotions restricted the competition capacity of telecoms and as a result eliminated the competition in the relevant market Consequently the behaviour of Yunnan Communications Administration violated article 8 20 of the AML and constituted administrative monopoly in terms of ldquoforcing undertakings to conduct monopolistic behaviour prohibited by the AMLrdquo

19 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpwwwsdpcgovcnfzgggzjgjdyfldjjszhdt201506t20150602_694802html 20 Article 8 of the AML Administrative organs and the public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 24 of 52

With respect to the penalties Yunnan DRC fined the local branch of China Tietong CNY 200000 for reaching but not implementing the agreement in regards to the other three telecoms a total fine of CNY 1298 million amounting to 2 of the sales of the relevant business in the previous year were imposed for entering into and implementing the horizontal monopolistic agreement

Analysis

The telecoms industry is still the enforcement priority of the antitrust enforcement authorities A company cannot be exempted from punishment even though it is forced by competent authorities to conduct monopoly behaviour

DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC21

Both a horizontal monopolistic agreement and a vertical monopolistic agreement were involved in this case

A total fine of CNY 14242 million was imposed on DongFeng Nissan and its distributors

Facts

In September 2015 the Guangdong Development and Reform Commission (ldquoGuangdong DRCrdquo) released an announcement regarding the administrative penalties on DongFeng Nissan and its provincial distributors for concluding price-related monopolistic agreements More specifically DongFeng Nissan was imposed a fine of CNY 1233 million for breaching article 14 of the AML in terms of restricting the resale price of certain car models 17 distributors domiciled in Guangdong were collectively fined CNY 1912 million for violating article 1322 of the AML in terms of entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements

According to the published official release the Guangdong DRC launched the investigation in August 2014 The authority discovered that from 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissan had set a rigorous restriction on its distributorsrsquo abilities to determine the resale prices of certain car models including the quoted prices in various platforms and the final resale price In addition DongFeng Nissan punished the distributors that failed to abide by such price restrictions in 2013 The authority 21 The original Chinese notice published by Guangdong DRC is available at httpwwwgddpcgovcnzwgkgzdtgzyw201509t20150910_328993html 22 Article 13 of the AML The following Monopolistic agreements among competing operators shall be prohibited (i) fix or change prices of commodities (ii) limit the outputs or sales volume of commodities (iii) segment the sales markets or the raw material purchasing markets (iv) limit the purchase of new technology new facilities or limit the development of new products new technology (v) jointly boycott transactions (vi) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-Monopoly Law enforcement Authority Monopolistic agreements in this Law refer to agreements decisions or other concerted practices that eliminate restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 25 of 52

believed that the vertical agreement concluded between DongFeng Nissan and its distributors eliminated and restricted the competition in the relevant market and damaged the consumer welfare as well which violates article 14 of the AML

Furthermore from April 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissanrsquos distributors in Guangdong province held multiple meetings to discuss issues relevant to sale price reached and implemented a horizontal monopolistic agreement in terms of fixing the prices of some car models which is prohibited by article 13 of the AML

Considering that both DongFeng Nissan and the involved distributors positively cooperated with the investigation and ceased the illegal behaviour immediately after the investigation Guangdong DRC decided to impose a fine amounting to 3 of its previous yearrsquos turnovers on DongFeng Nissan and a fine ranging from 2 to 4 on the relevant distributors in accordance with articles 4623 and 4924 of the AML

Analysis

This case demonstrates that auto and related industries are still under close attention of the authority Considering the NDRCrsquos successful series of antitrust investigations conducted throughout the auto industry it is observed that the agency currently overseeing price-related antitrust issues in China has accumulated a substantial amount of experience regarding antitrust enforcement in the auto industry Now is the right time to speed up the law-making process by amending the set of rules released earlier and drafting new laws to advise the auto industry on antitrust compliance

Enforcement by the SAIC and its local branches

Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC25

The investigation was triggered by whistle blowerrsquos submission

Cartel members were collectively fined CNY 139 million 23 Article 46 of the AML In case the operators violate the relevant provisions of this Law concluding and implementing Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall order the operators to cease such act impose fines more than 1 but less than 10 of the total turnover in the preceding year and confiscate the illegal gains where the Monopolistic agreement is not implemented a fine less than RMB 500000 can be imposed If the operators involved in Monopolistic agreement on its own initiative report information concerning the conclusion of Monopolistic agreements and provide important evidences to the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority they may be given a mitigated punishment or be exempted from punishment in accordance with the circumstances Where the industrial associations violate this Law organizing the operators in the industry to conclude Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority may impose a fine less than RMB 500000 in serious circumstances the agency of social organization administration and registration may cancel its registration 24 Article 49 of the AML As for the imposition of the fines stipulated by the Article 46 47 and 48 of this Law the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall take elements such as the nature extent and time it lasts of the illegal act into consideration in determining the specific amount of the fines 25 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201506t20150601_156889html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 26 of 52

Facts

In April 2015 the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) issued administrative penalties on several brick manufacturers for entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements This is the first case relevant to monopolistic agreements that has been publicized by the SAIC since the beginning of this year

Ten cartel members were involved in the case including one company and nine individuals Similar with most antitrust cases the investigation started as a result of a whistle blowerrsquos submission After a thorough investigation Hunan AIC found that those local brick manufacturers had reached agreements on controlling production volume and dividing sales areas in the forms of production and sales agreements plans and meeting minutes

The enforcement authority reached the conclusion that these brick manufacturers violated article 13 of the AML and imposed a total fine of CNY 1389400 on them

Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC26

The organizer of the monopolistic agreement the animation association was fined CNY 100000

The antitrust authority did not punish the members of the monopolistic agreement

Facts

In December 2015 the Guangdong Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoGuangdong AICrdquo) published its administrative punishment decision in regards to Guangzhou Panyu Animation amp Game Association (ldquoGAGArdquo) organizing member companies to conclude a monopolistic agreement

According to the decision GAGA drafted the ldquoAgreement of Exhibition Alliancerdquo (ldquoAgreementrdquo) and convened a conference with member companies in order to discuss the content and conclusion of the Agreement 52 member companies entered into the Agreement which actually requested the alliance companies to merely participate in the exhibitions either organized or supported by GAGA in Guangzhou In addition the Agreement prohibited the alliance companies from attending any other exhibition except if they obtained prior approval of GAGA

After a thorough investigation Guangdong AIC believed that the conclusion of the Agreement among GAGA and the 52 member companies violated article 13 (5) of the AML in terms of boycott GAGA who was deeply involved and restricted member companiesrsquo choice of exhibitions through the Agreement could be deemed as

26 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151208_164680html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 27 of 52

the participant and organizer of the monopolistic agreement In accordance with article 46 of the AML Guangdong AIC imposed a fine of CNY 100000 on GAGA for organizing the conclusion of the monopolistic agreement

Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC27

Hubei AIC considered the coinsurance for Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance illegal

Twelve insurance companies were fined CNY 469 million in total

Facts

In December 2015 the Hubei Administrative for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHubei AICrdquo) disclosed its punishment on 12 insurance companies for signing illegal coinsurance agreements

The disclosed punishment decision suggests that the Hubei branch of China Pacific Life Insurance (ldquothe Companyrdquo) 11 other insurance companies and Wuhan Construction Safety Technology Consultation Center (ldquoWCSTCCrdquo) signed a Coinsurance Agreement on Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance (ldquoCoinsurance Agreementrdquo) of which the main contents include

1) The Company and 11 other involved companies as the coinsurers jointly take charge of the personal accident insurance concerned with the construction project directly administered by the Wuhan government WCSTCC is responsible for providing safety professionalism and technology services regarding the relevant personal accident insurance

2) The Company as the chief insurer of the coinsurance occupies 12 of the total amount of the insurance and the other 11 companies respectively occupy 8

3) The Company as the representative of the coinsurance is in charge of collecting the premium signing the standard form insurance policies and issuing the invoice in its own name The Company should share the charged premium with the other companies in accordance with the Coinsurance Agreement

4) Both the Company and the other insurance companies should pay 25 of the actually received premium to WCSTCC as the service fee WCSTCC will assist the coinsurers in providing safety and technology management service to the insured In addition the 11 insurance companies should pay 5 of their premium to the Company as the management fee

27 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165445html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 28 of 52

5) In case an accident happens the 12 companies will jointly bear the damages based on their respective shares in the coinsurance

6) There is a contact mechanism established in the coinsurance The coinsurers will regularly hold coinsurance conferences to discuss existing problems

Furthermore the coinsurers and WCSTCC also signed a self-discipline agreement and established a complete management system to assure the implementation of the Coinsurance Agreement Any party violating the Coinsurance Agreement would be punished

Hubei AIC found that WCSTCC was solely invested by Wuhan Construction Safety Management Association which was under Wuhan Construction Commission The centre helped implement certain functions of the Wuhan Urban Construction Safety Management Station and was responsible for quality supervision and safety supervision of municipal construction projects

It later became a prerequisite for construction companies to purchase insurance from any member of the coinsurance in order to get approval to commence their project According to the decision Hubei AIC launched another separate investigation against WCSTCC

Through the investigation Hubei AIC concluded that the Coinsurance Agreement constituted a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by article 13 of the AML with the following analysis

First coinsurance as a common business model to jointly share and lower risks is widely adopted in the insurance industry A coinsurance arrangement for a specific project in order to avoid high risks faced by one insurer could be legal However coinsurance should not target the entire market In this case prior to the Coinsurance Agreement the risks of the construction projects were unpredictable since the scale of the construction projects the difficulty of the construction and the amount of construction workers could not be available It is impossible to predict the risks of the projects thus it is not necessary to cooperate with other insurers to collectively bear the risks The purpose of the 12 insurance companies to establish the coinsurance is to avoid the competition which demonstrates the Coinsurance Agreement belongs to a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by the AML

Second the companies through entering into the coinsurance agreement actually divided the relevant market of construction project personal accident insurance in Wuhan city which affected the competition in the relevant market and damaged the interests of other competitors and the consumers In particular the Construction Law as amended in 2011 stipulates that the purchase of personal accident insurance is not mandatory and the construction companies have the right to choose whether to buy the said insurance or not As mentioned purchasing insurance from the coinsurance had been the prerequisite for construction companies to obtain administration

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 29 of 52

approval for the project which seriously distorts the fair competition in the market

Citing article 46 of the AML the 12 insurance companies were collectively fined CNY 469 million including fines on the companies and confiscation of illegal gains It is noteworthy that the fines were calculated based on the companiesrsquo 2014 annual sales of the insurance product in connection with the coinsurance The Company as the chief insurer was fined amounting to 6 of its 2014 annual sales of the relevant insurance product in the coinsurance and other companies were fined amounting to 2 of relevant sales For more specific information please see the following table

Company Name (Hubei Branch)

Fines (CNY million)

Percentage of the sales

Illegal Gains (CNY

million)

China Pacific Life Insurance 00653 6 0941

Sino Life 00145 2 04332

Alltrust Insurance 00145 2 04332

Taikang Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Continent Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Pacific Property Insurance

00145 2 04332

China Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

PICC Property and Casualty 00145 2 02599

Taiping General Insurance 00145 2 013

Union Life Insurance 00145 2 01177

Ping An Annuity Insurance Company of China

00145 2 04201

Ping An Property amp Casualty Insurance Company of China

00145 2 -

Subtotal 02248 - 44679

Total 46927

Analysis

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 30 of 52

Coinsurance as an effective approach to lower risks of insurers is widely used in the insurance industry Information sharing and agreements on coinsurance were generally considered efficient and legitimate However from an antitrust perspective coinsurance may raise competition concerns depending on the circumstances of each agreement In the case that there is enough capacity for one insurer to cover the potential risks the coinsurance might be considered as entering into a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC28

The first leniency applicant was exempted from fines

The other concrete companies were imposed a fine of CNY 180000

Facts

In December 2015 the concrete companies monopolistic agreement case investigated by Hunan AIC was published on SAICrsquos website

In accordance with the antitrust enforcement announcement of SAIC this case was triggered by complaints from the Yongzhou City peoplersquos congress After the preliminary review the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) initiated the formal investigation on seven concrete companies domiciled in Yongzhou City Hunan Province which were suspected of being involved in a monopolistic agreement in terms of division of the volumes of the products

After further investigation Hunan AIC found that the seven concrete companies concluded a partnership agreement in 2011 which requested the involved companies to enter into a partnership business with assets In addition according to the partnership agreement it was planned to establish a comprehensive office to manage production marketing and distribution of the products of all the partners The seven companies intended to jointly adjust and control the output of concrete based on the partnership agreement However because there were disagreements over the allocation of the injected assets and market shares the companies did not implement the partnership agreement The agreement was cancelled in December 2012

Based on the findings Hunan AIC concluded that the seven concrete companies as competitors of each other restricted and eliminated the competition in the relevant market through reaching the partnership agreement and dividing the volumes of sales which violated article 13(3) of the AML in terms of division of sales market Considering that the agreement had not been implemented and the limited influence of the agreement according to article 46 of the AML and article 27 of the Administrative Penalties Law small amount fines were imposed on the involved companies Six companies were fined CNY 30000 each for their illegal behaviour 28 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165504html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 31 of 52

Yongzhou Shuangyuan Building Materials Co Ltd as the first one to actively report the monopolistic agreement and cooperate with the enforcement authority was exempted from the punishment

Outlook

It is expected that the AMLrsquos enforcement on monopolistic agreements will continue in the future Industries such as automobile shipping pharmaceuticals insurance etc will still remain the priority of the antitrust enforcement

The antitrust enforcement authorities have published a series of regulations in order to clarify the substantial and procedural issues relevant to the antitrust enforcement However Chinarsquos current antitrust legislation regime is still immature In the following years we expect that more attention will be paid to the legislative improvements

Another remarkable issue for cartel members is that with more Chinese enterprises attaching increasing importance to the AML the follow-on civil damages actions might become a tendency in the future

C Abuse of Market Dominance

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen a decent increase of abuse of market dominance cases both in public enforcement and private litigation Oftentimes the authorities responsible for public enforcement generally find it difficult to pursue investigations against abuse of market dominance cases The following two main reasons are often cited to explain this standoff first it is hard for the authorities to define the relevant markets and prove the undertaking(s)rsquo dominant market position through economic approaches second it is hard to collect evidence regarding abusive practices

The cases related to IPRs abuse are emerging significantly particularly in the telecommunication media and technology (ldquoTMTrdquo) sectors

The SAICrsquos latest refusal-to-deal probe against a local drug maker shows that the SAIC and its local branches have increasingly acquired a profile as an abuse of dominance regulator

Significant Cases

Cases pursued by the SAIC

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 32 of 52

Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case29

Facts

The local authority in Dongfang city reported to the Hainan provincial branch of SAIC on April 23 2014 of the suspected dominance abuse The SAIC authorized its Hainan bureau to officially investigate the matter on 25 July 2014 according to a decision dated January 9 2015 The AIC concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its market dominance by requiring users to pay a deposit without any legal basis and or justifiable reasons

In terms of the relevant product market the local authority found that in this case it was the urban water supply market in Dongfang city and its surrounding townships where Dongfang Water was the sole public operator in the local water supply market with a 100 market share which made all water users completely reliant on the companyrsquos supply In term of market access the local authority found it very unlikely that there were other operators due to the strict regulations

The Hainan SAIC then concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its dominance as it charged users a deposit by threatening to refuse to register users and also by threatening to restrict the water supply Dongfang Waters charging of deposits lacked a legal basis and hadnt received government approval to the detriment of household consumers and business water users and hampered the improvement of management and services of the company Such conduct was in breach of Chinarsquos Anti-Monopoly Law

Hainan AIC levied a fine of CNY 593208 a lighter penalty equivalent to 2 of the companyrsquos annual sales for the previous year and confiscated illicit gains of CNY 38521 for abuse of market dominance

Analysis

It is noteworthy that although handled by a local authority supervised by the SAIC the antitrust agency detailed the relevant market definition the assessment of the dominant market position the abusive practices and the scrutiny of the justifiable reasons

Although the definition of the relevant market and the reasoning of the Hainan provincial AIC and the SAIC are subject to criticism it is still applausive to see that the antitrust regulators have realized the importance of the application of rule of reason in an abuse case In addition through itrsquos a published decision practitioners may observe the regulatorsrsquo reasoning and thus transparency and legal certainty have been generated

29 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzfcfjd201502t20150212_152066html last visited on October 18 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 33 of 52

Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms30

Facts

In June 2013 the Ningxia AIC under authorization of SAIC opened an antitrust investigation into the alleged tie-in sales by the three major state-owned telecommunications operators China Tietong China Unicom and China Telecom for the tie-in sale of fixed-line telephones with broadband Internet services The Ningxia AIC found that the three companies had bundled fixed-line phone services with Internet services to subscribers

During the investigation all three telecommunications companies admitted the tie-in practice had recognized that such practice had improper influence on competition and deprived the choices of consumers The three companies promised to undertake internal rectification timely and eliminate the ill effects resulting from such practice The parties committed to taking the following corrective measures

1) Taking internal rectifications and conducting training to staff about antitrust laws and stop tie-in sales practices

2) Making public commitments to allow subscribers a free choice of services and strengthening the propaganda through the operating room call centre and other channels

3) Unbundling fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

The Ningxia AIC decided to suspend the probe on 14 May 2015 on the grounds that the three companies had actively worked together with the investigators and proposed workable remedy plans

Analysis

In the official announcement Ningxia AIC concluded that the purpose of antitrust enforcement is to restrain monopolistic conducts the protection of competition and to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of consumers Given that during the investigation process the parties had actively cooperated with the investigation formed a more profound understanding of the dangers of tying behaviour and moreover the parties proposed and implemented positive corrective measures to be able to remove the ill impact of their actions the agency believed that the purpose of antitrust law enforcement was fulfilled

It is worth noting that the Ningxia AIC also required the three companies to implement the commitment by August 30 2015and the submission of the written

30 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158908html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158906html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158910html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 34 of 52

implementation report on July 102015 and August 102015 respectively which is another illustration that an effective commitment by the undertakings shall directly deal with the effect that is brought by the monopolistic behaviour In this case the effect of the monopolistic act was restricted to the choice of the consumers therefore the commitment by the undertaking aimed at allowing the freedom of choice and the unbundling of fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company31

Facts

The Liaoning AIC imposed a fine of approximately CNY 433m on the Fushun Branch of Liaoning Tobacco Co on 1 June 2015 The agency also ordered the company to stop its illicit behaviour

The Liaoning AIC received a tip-off that the accused Liaoning Tobacco Corsquos Fushun branch was conducting tie-in sales of non-high-demand cigarette brands with high-demand cigarette brands After gaining authorization from SAIC the agency officially started an investigation regarding the companyrsquos suspected abuse of market dominance in June 2014

Analysis

According to the announcement the tobacco company argued that the tobacco industry is a state controlled or monopolized industry with a lawful monopolistic position therefore the company shall not be subject to the norms of general market competition rules or the anti-monopoly law

In this regards the agency concluded that in terms of the status of the undertaking admittedly the first paragraph of article 17 of the AML says that the State shall protect the lawful business operations of undertakings in these industries with respect to the industries which are under the control of the State-owned economic sector and have a bearing on the lifeline of the national economy or national security and the industries which exercise monopoly over the production and sale of certain commodities according to law However the second paragraph continues to say that the undertakings mentioned above shall do business according to law be honest faithful and strictly self-disciplined and subject themselves to public supervision and they shall not harm the consumers interests by taking advantage of their position of control or their monopolistic production and sale of certain commodities In particular in the preceding paragraph the ldquolawful businessrdquo and ldquoaccording to lawrdquo imply that the AML shall apply in the business operation The agency therefore believes that

31 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201508t20150813_16

0208html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 35 of 52

there shall be no exemption for the undertaking concerned the defences of the undertaking concerned is not established

Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm32

Facts

The Chongqing AIC fined Chongqing Qingyang Pharmaceutical CNY 439308 for alleged dominance abuse

The investigation was initiated when the company contacted the agency for verification on its potential breach of the AML related to an allopurinol active pharmaceuticals ingredient (API) distribution agreement with its exclusive distributor The company provided the relevant agreement and information and the agency conducted an investigation into the company and some other relevant companies

Analysis

Relevant Market

During the investigation the agency found that pharmaceutical ingredients are a special commodity the API is used to produce the preparations The chemical API is only used for the production of the preparation and could be used as a medicine for clinic use

The preparation is produced according to the requirements of certain form of prepared drugs and for the purpose of treatment and prevention which can be used as medicine

The allopurinol is used for the common treatment of hyperuricemia However the other treatments are different in pharmacological effects or treatment effects as well as in the cost for the patient Furthermore the company is the only manufacturer and supplier in the market nationwide since July 2012 Therefore the agency concluded that the relevant market is the allopurinol API market

Considering that the qualification for manufacturing the allopurinol API is national wide and the normal practice for purchasers and suppliers is domestic the relevant geographic market is the Chinese market

The Market Dominance

During the investigation the agency found that the company is the only supplier and manufacturer of allopurinol API in China there is no other competitor in the

32 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151222_16

5152html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 36 of 52

market and the company has a monopoly in the market The evidence shows that the company has the ability to control the prices the position for the downstream is relatively weak

With respect to the market entry the agency found that the market entry is relatively high in addition other undertakings are dependent on the company Thus the agency believed the company to have market dominance

Refusal to Deal

The agency found that on September 25 2015 the company reached an exclusive agreement and distribution agreement with its distributor Based on these agreements the company didnrsquot supply allopurinol API to the said distributor and other companies despite the fact that those companies requested for allopurinol API but were turned down by the company

Absence of Reasonable Cause

The agency found that the companyrsquos refusal to deal was not in line with the needs of normal business operation or economic efficiency On the other hand the refusal to deal was aimed at increasing the market share of the allopurinol drug product Also the agency found that the stop of supply was a manipulation of market power as to maximize the profit to the most The agency further found that the exclusive distribution agreement with suspension of supply for six months and the refusal to supply was to eliminate and restrict the competition as to gain the monopolistic profit

The Consequence of Refusal to Deal

The agency concluded that the refusal to deal harmed the competition of the allopurinol preparations market Because of the suspension of supply many demanders had to reduce their production or switch to the supply of other products or stop their production The suspension of supply affected the competition of the downstream market Consequently the raising of the price of allopurinol API also raised the cost for other manufacturers of allopurinol preparations

Furthermore the refusal to deal led to capacity loss of the allopurinol preparation industry

Ultimately the refusal to deal increased the burden on consumers as the refusal to supply changed the supply-demand relationship in the market

The agency concluded that the Company abused its dominant position in the allopurinol API market by refusing to deal with intended buyers in the period between October 2013 and March 2014Therefore the Company violated article 17 (1) of the AML which prohibits business operators with a dominant market position from abusing that position such as the refusal to deal without any justifications

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 37 of 52

D Administrative Monopoly

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 witnessed antitrust authoritiesrsquo significant efforts regarding the enforcement against administrative monopoly According to Mr Dong Zhiming the deputy director general of Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly Bureau ever since the AML coming into force six cases in connection with administrative monopoly were investigated by NDRC and among them five cases were handled in the year of 2015 These cases touched abuses of administrative power in terms of designative deal in relation to transportation communication and pharmaceutical industries

The first private litigation related to administrative monopolistic acts was heard in the court which is a milestone case in the enforcement of the AML

Significant Cases

Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC33

Facts

In March 2015 the NDRC released the official letter to Shandong Provincial Department of Transportation (ldquoShandong DOTrdquo) on its website with respect to correct its abuse of administrative power to exclude and restrict competition

During the investigation the NDRC found that since 2011 Shandong DOT had issued multiple relevant government orders in order to require certain types of vehicles to be directly connected to two designated information and service platforms both of which are operated and technically supported by one company namely Shandong Jiutong Internet of Things Technology Co Ltd (ldquoJiutong ITTrdquo) Furthermore according to the orders issued by the competent administrative department all the vehicle satellite positioning terminals entering into Shandong provincial market should be debugged through the said technology service platform which is operated by the mentioned company In addition Shandong DOT released the cap prices of vehicle satellite positioning terminals which is identical to the 2012 bid-winning price in the Ministry of Transportation demonstration project

The NDRC believed that Shandong DOTrsquos behaviour eliminated and restricted the competition in the monitoring platform market and the vehicle terminal market deprived the right of transportation enterprises to choose vehicle terminals and monitoring platform on their owns unreasonably raised the sales prices of vehicle terminals and service fees charged by the platform and increased the costs of transportation enterprises Therefore the antitrust agency concluded that Shandong

33 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201503t20150327_668911html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 38 of 52

DOT violated article 8 of the AML which stipulates that ldquoadministrative organs and the public organizations with an administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude and restrict competitionrdquo Specifically Shandong DOT violated article 3234 in terms of requiring organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any designated operators and violated article 3735 in terms of setting rules with contents which eliminate and restrict competition

Based on article 51 of the AML ldquoWhere administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations abuse administrative powers performing activities which exclude and restrict competition the superior entity shall order it to correct impose administrative penalty on the chief officer and other staffs directly responsible pursuant to the laws The AML enforcement authority may give recommendations on disposal of activities to the relevant superior entityrdquo the NDRC proposed in writing that the Shandong provincial government should order Shandong DOT to rectify its behaviour with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Entirely open up the monitoring platform market by permitting transportation undertakings to freely choose any approved platform

2) Loosen the restrictions on the entry into Shandong vehicle terminals permit the undertakings to independently select the supplier of vehicle terminals and allow the qualified terminals to be connected to the relevant monitoring platform and

3) Revoke the official documentation relevant to the cap price of vehicle terminals in order to promote the price competition

Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 36

Facts

On 26 August 2015 the NDRC published its second decision with regard to the rectification of administrative monopoly since the beginning of this year According to the proposal letter sent to Anhui Provincial Government the investigation against the Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City (Bengbu HFPC) was trigged by third partiesrsquo complaints

34 Article 32 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to require organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any operators designated by them 35 Article 37 of the AML Administrative organs shall not abuse their administrative powers to set rules with contents which eliminate restrict competition 36 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201508t20150826_748682html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 39 of 52

The investigation suggests that Bengbu HFPC published three notices with regard to drugs procurement in April and May of this year

In the No C-2015-CG-X-111 Notice (ldquoNo111 Noticerdquo) released on 10 April2015 the health authority not only provided the dosage form and qualification of the requested drugs but also directly determined the suppliers of relevant drugs which eliminated and restricted the competition among pharmaceutical manufacturers and therefore violated articles 32 and 37 of the AML

In the No C-2015-CG-C-112 Notice (ldquoNo112 Noticerdquo) and No C-2015-CG-C-168 (ldquoNo 168 Noticerdquo) respectively released on 10 April and 22 May 2015 the Bengbu HFPC set discriminative qualification requirements on non-local undertakings in order to restrict their participation in the relevant bidding For instance in accordance with No 112 Notice to be a qualified bidder the turnover of non-local undertakings shall exceed CNY 2 billion which is 50 times as much as the turnover requirements of the local undertakings In the NDRCrsquos opinion the administrative monopoly activities conducted by the local health agency excluded the relevant undertakings from the market maintained the virtual-high prices of drugs and therefore violated articles 3237 and 37 of the AML

The NDRC suggested in a letter that Anhui Provincial Government should urge the Bengbu HFPC to rectify the abuse of monopoly powers with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Stop setting distinguishing restrictions on qualification requirements review standards and numbers of winning bidders as for local and non-local undertakings

2) Stop designating the suppliers of competitive drugs and

3) Take necessary measures to mitigate the negative effects resulting from the previous illegal monopolistic abuses

Outlook

At the beginning of the year the former director general of the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau under the NDRC Xu Kunlin stated that the agency would strengthen antitrust enforcement on abuse of administrative power in 2015

Since then the NDRC has made great efforts to rectify unreasonable abuses of administrative power The currently disclosed two cases investigated by the NDRC re-emphasize the Chinese Governmentrsquos strict scrutiny of antitrust issues in respect of

37 Article 34 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to restrict or reject the participation of operators from other regions in local bidding activities by measures such as prescribing discriminatory qualification requirements or assessment standards or by not publishing information according to law

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 40 of 52

administrative monopoly It reminds the local governments that antitrust compliance is of significant importance

III Private Litigation

A Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen more and more private antitrust litigations

The private antitrust litigation cases have become increasingly complicated especially the issues regarding the intersection areas of IP and antitrust law

Multinational giants and State-Owned Enterprises (the ldquoSOEsrdquo) are increasingly becoming the targets in antitrust civil litigations Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (the ldquoSMEsrdquo) tend to use the antitrust litigation to achieve their commercial goals in the business context

B Significant Cases

Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)38

This is the first-ever private litigation concerning administrative monopoly since the implementation of the AML in 2008

Facts

According to the currently disclosed details the case is relevant for designated trade

The plaintiff Shenzhen Sware Technology Co Ltd (ldquoSwarerdquo) is a software company The press releases suggest that Sware Gloden Software Co Ltd (ldquoGlodenrdquo) and Shanghai Ruban Software Co Ltd (ldquoShanghai Rubanrdquo) are the three main suppliers of construction cost software and possess the major shares of the relevant market An annual provincial vocational ability contest regarding the construction cost hosted by the Guangdong Department of Education (ldquoGuangdong DOE) designated Gloden as the exclusive supplier of the relevant software

After several unsuccessful verbal and written negotiations with Guangdong DOE in April 2014 Sware filed a lawsuit against Guangdong DOE before the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquothe Courtrdquo) alleging that the administrative organ abused its administrative power and violated the AML by designating exclusive software supplier for the contest and claimed a compensation for reasonable expense amounting to CNY 10800 Yuan

The opinions of the Court 38 The story of the case is available at httpfinancesinacomcnchinadfjj20150410074621924997shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 41 of 52

The full text of the judgment has not been disclosed yet In accordance with the information available to the public the Court invoked article 32 of the AML which prohibits an administrative organ from abusing its administrative power to require or in disguised form organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use only the commodities supplied by the entities designated by them The Court concluded that Guangdong DOE failed to prove the legitimacy of the designation and therefore abused its administration power

Currently the case is in appeal before the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court

Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 39

It is the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China

In the first instance ruling Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court ruled against Sinopec holding that the Yunnan branch of Sinopecs trading company was obligated to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its dominance in the sales market of refined oil by refusing to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding without justifiable reasons

In the second instance ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors Currently the case is pending

Facts

The First Trial

The lawsuit was filed before the Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoKunming Courtrdquo) in January 2014 Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy Co Ltd (ldquoYingdingrdquo) a bio-energy manufacturer claimed that Sinopec and the Yunnan branch of Sinopec trading company (ldquoSinopec Yunnan Branchrdquo) had failed to fulfil their obligations stipulated in the Renewable Energy Law and had abused their market dominance in sales market of refined oil by refusing to trade with Yingding without justifiable reasons

Sinopec and Sinopec Yunnan Branch mainly explained four reasons for why they rejected Yingdingrsquos biofuel Firstly Yingding had failed to prove that the biofuel complied with the relevant national standard and was safe to use Secondly Yingding had failed to provide complete trading terms Thirdly the laws and regulations regarding biofuel were incomplete the authorized refined oil sales companies were 39 The details of the case are available at httpnewsxinhuanetcomfortune2014-1217c_1113680039htm httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=9e71db51-6ff6-4d2c-8af6-8eacf023ebdeampKeyWord=E4BA91E58D97E79B88E9BC8E|E4B8ADE79FB3E58C96 httpnewsxinhuanetcomenergy2015-0422c_127721575htm httpwwwnbdcomcnarticles2015-04-23911348html last visited on December 17 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 42 of 52

obligated to purchase biofuel from the biofuel manufacturers if it met certain quality standards but there was a vacancy regarding how to reach the end consumers from the sales companies

On 8 December 2014 the Kunming Intermediate Peoples Court ruled that Sinopec Yunnan Branch bore a legal obligation to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its market dominance in refined oil market by refusing without any justifiable reasons to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding The court ordered Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network within 30 days Both Yingding and Sinopec filed appeals to the Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court

The Appellate Trial

The appeal hearing was held on 22 April 2015 in Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoYunnan Courtrdquo) Sinopec submitted 23 new pieces of evidence and introduced two expert witnesses in a bid to overturn several key elements in the first-instance ruling by Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court

In terms of the determination of the relevant market and the market dominance Sinopec argued that the relevant market in this case was for adipic acid monomethyl ester (ldquoAAMErdquo) the main ingredient of a biofuel additive known as BD100 Yingdingrsquos main product is BD100 which can be blended with fossil diesel to become biofuel In the AAME market Sinopec is a potential buyer instead of a market dominator In support of this argument Sinopec presented an expert witnessmdashGong Jiong a professor of economics at Beijings University of International Business and Economics who testified that AAME should be defined as the relevant product market on the basis of an economic analysis

However Yingding insisted that the first-instance ruling was correct in naming the sales market of refined oil as the relevant market and submitted new evidence an article on Sinopecs website that claimed it had a 67 market share in Yunnan to help establish the claim that Sinopec had market dominance

Another main dispute was whether Yingdingrsquos biofuel product met national standards which would make it mandatory for Sinopec to purchase under Chinas Renewable Energy Law The law stipulates that biofuel producers must sell their products first to an authorized refined oil sales company and the sales companies are obliged to buy the fuel if it meets certain quality standards In order to test the quality Sinopec introduced the second expert witness Lin Jianmin a leading author of Chinarsquos national biofuel standard Lin Jianmin pointed out that there are currently quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology which gives Sinopec a justifiable reason not to trade with Yingding Moreover Sinopec presented some precedents in which consumers had complained about the biofuel quality and also claimed that China didnt have a sound regulatory framework to support biofuel production neither in testing nor in sales

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 43 of 52

Nevertheless to refute this point Yingding referred to an earlier test in co-operation with Sinopec in 2011 where selected buses in Kunming used biofuel blended by Sinopec using BD100 produced by Yingding

On August 13 2015 Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors and now this case is pending In the written appellate ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court did not provide any details regarding its reasoning

Key Issues of the Case

Is there any competition between Yingding and Sinopec

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case the product of Yingding is biofuel while Sinopec does not engage in the business of biofuel From this perspective Yingding and Sinopec are not competitors Thus it is not necessary and not reasonable for Sinopec to eliminate or restrict the competition from Yingding

Relevant Market

The definition of the relevant market is a prerequisite to determine whether competition exists and whether the AML is applicable In accordance with the Judicial Interpretation of Antitrust civil litigation the plaintiff shall take the responsibility to prove the defendantrsquos dominance in the relevant market Also the methods of defining the relevant market are stipulated in the Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition (ldquoGuidelinesrdquo) However both Yingding and Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court defined the relevant market as the sales market of refined oil without sufficient antitrust analysis none of the methods in the Guidelines were used Therefore the definition of the relevant market remains arguable and needs to be sufficiently analysed in the upcoming retrial

Justifiable Reasons

The abuse of market dominance includes the behaviour of refusing to trade without justifiable reasons according to the AML but in the first instance ruling justifiable reasons were not investigated by the court During the appellate trial the expert witness introduced by Sinopec claimed that there were quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology and this was a justifiable reason to refuse to trade with Yingding Even though the first instance court and the appellate court did not reason the justifiable reason it should be discussed and investigated further during the retrial

AML or Renewable Energy Law

The claims of Yingding were based on both the AML and the Renewable Energy Law (ldquoRELrdquo) and the first instance ruling referred to both the AML and the REL as

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 44 of 52

well It seems that the laws the first instance court referred to were comprehensive but in fact the reasoning was not clear and logical In the first instance ruling some disputes regarding the AML were reviewed but all the orders were not based on the AML Specifically the first instance court ordered the Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network based on the REL and dismissed the other claims That the orders were not on account of reasoning is illogical It is anticipated that during the retrial the application of the laws will be clearer

Analysis

A lot of issues have not been clearly analysed by the courts such as the relevant market and the justifiable reasons Since the case is remanded the above-mentioned issues are expected to be resolved in the retrial In addition Yingding was in a disadvantaged position compared to its first instance trial since its claims based on the AML were challenged greatly during the appellate trial In the retrial it is probable that Yingding may switch its litigation strategy and base its claims on the REL Therefore maybe more preparation regarding the REL can give Sinopec a leg up

Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)

Rijing Electric a Chinese distributor seeks CNY 5m compensation

The first hearing was on 9 June 2015 and ended without a ruling

Facts

Rijing Electric (ldquoRijingrdquo) a Shanghai-based company and a former distributor for Panasonic accused Panasonic of abusing its dominance and dividing the market through monopolistic practice in an antitrust lawsuit filed in 2014 with Shanghai No 1 Intermediate Court (ldquoShanghai Courtrdquo) claiming compensation of CNY 5m (USD 815370) Wenzhou Mingda Automation System Co and Shanghai Qingying Automation Equipment as the distributor of Panasonic in China are the co-defendants were accused of conducting monopolistic behaviours by implementing Panasonicrsquos policy

The first hearing for evidence exchange was on June 9 2015 Rijing claimed a policy allegedly introduced by Panasonic in 2009 restricted the competition between distributors Panasonic claims the policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo and has full justifiable reasons It explained that the products in question required customization at considerable cost to distributors before its sale to customers Once carried out however other distributors leaving them open to quote much lower prices than the original distributor could simply and relatively cheap replicate this customization Besides Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and that the plaintiff had failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic said its market share for the four products

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 45 of 52

under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases Also Rijing failed to challenge the policy when it was first introduced instead initially agreeing it was reasonable as e-mail evidence submitted by Panasonic suggests

Key Issues of the Case

Whether Panasonic occupied a market dominant position

It is reported that Rijing claimed that Panasonic had abused its market dominance but Rijing failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and its market share for the four products under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases

Analysis

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case Panasonicrsquos policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo rather than to eliminate or restrict competition

Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals40 (Pending)

It is a battle over patent licensing issues

It is viewed as being among the most complicated antitrust lawsuits in China

The first hearing was on 17 and 18 December 2015

Facts

Four Chinese rare earth companies Ningbo Ketian Magnet Ningbo Permanent Magnetics Ningbo Tongchuang Strong Magnet Material and Ningbo Huahui Magnetic Industry filed antitrust lawsuits against Hitachi Metals over alleged patent licensing issues regarding rare earth magnets on December 11 2014 with the Ningbo Intermediate Peoples Court (ldquoNingbo Courtrdquo) in Zhejiang province As reported four Chinese rare earth companies claimed Hitachi Metals abused its market dominance and hurt the industry competition by refusing to license the patents to them The patents in this case are used in the manufacturing of sintered neodymium iron boron (ldquoNdFeBrdquo) magnets a rare-earth magnet alloy widely used in parts for airplanes automobiles and other products

Hitachi Metals filed a challenge with the Ningbo Court over its jurisdiction in April 2015 After Ningbo Court rejected Hitachi Metals jurisdiction objection on 28 April 2015 Hitachi Metals appealed to the Zhejiang High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoZhejiang

40The details of the story are available at httpwwwzbmagcomnews_viewphpid=80 httpwwwhitachicomcnaboutpress201510-121118_ahtml last visited on December 22 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 46 of 52

Courtrdquo) but Zhejiang Court affirmed the ruling of the Ningbo Court

The first day of a two-day hearing took place on 17 December 2015 during which the two sides cross-examined each otherrsquos evidence The evidence focused on clearing up several key elements in the case including the relevant market whether Hitachi Metals has dominance on that market and whether both sides acted in good faith during the licensing negotiations

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Product Market

The four Chinese rare earth companies claimed that the relevant product market should be the NdFeb-related patent licensing market However Hitachi Metals believed that the physical NdFeb market rather than the patent licensing market should be the relevant product market which is meaningful for assess the real competitive effects on the market

Whether Hitachi Metals occupies a dominant market position

In terms of market dominance Hitachi Metals claimed it does not occupy a dominant position because Hitachi Metalsrsquo patents were not in a standard in this case and there are substitutable technologies in the market SEP holders have the obligation to license on FRAND terms but none-SEP holders do not So while a refusal to license a SEP may constitute abuse of dominance refusal to license a non-SEP mdash even by a patent holder with a dominant position mdash should not be considered as an abuse

Analysis

Hitachi Metals as a patent holder should have the right to decide whether to retain those patents or not or who to license According to the legal theory the purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage and protect innovation by conferring monopoly right mdash that is to give intellectual property owners the proprietary rights which can exclude others from using the intellectual property The SEP holders admittedly need to comply with FRAND terms which can maintain a robust balance between competition and monopoly whereas the further intervention of antitrust law into non-SEP patents may undermine the purpose of intellectual property law To which extent the antitrust law should intervene is yet to be seen

Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei41

A confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the Beijing IP court made by the Beijing High Court

41 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcncpwswbjzscq201511t20151103_12225640htm last visited on December 28 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 47 of 52

Facts

On August 2 2013 the NDRC penalized Abbott for monopolistic price-fixing and then Abbott made a price adjustment in China where the prices of main products were reduced

On December 16 2014 Tian Junwei (ldquoTianrdquo) a Chinese citizen in Beijing sued Carrefour Shuangjing Branch (ldquoCarrefourrdquo) and Abbott (Shanghai) Sales Company (ldquoAbbottrdquo) at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (ldquoIP Courtrdquo) for their monopolistic price-fixing which damaged his interests However Carrefour and Abbott challenged the jurisdiction of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court They claimed there were two reasons Firstly according to the jurisdiction rules of the IP court issued by the Supreme Court the IP court has no jurisdiction over anti-trust cases Secondly if this case is a contractual dispute the court that is in the place of Carrefour should hear it if this case is a tort dispute the Shanghai Intermediate Court should hear it

In the ruling of the IP Court the IP Court decided it has the jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases for the following reasons According to the Provisions On Causes Of Action In Civil Cases issued by Supreme Court (最高人民法院案由规定) antimonopoly dispute is a tertiary cause of action belonging to IP and competition disputes Also according to the Provisions concerning the Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京

市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问题的规定 ) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was an IP and competition dispute and was sued after November 6 2014 Thus the IP Court had jurisdiction

Both Carrefour and Abbott appealed to the Beijing High Court over the jurisdiction ruling but the Beijing High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original ruling Reasons are listed in the written ruling issued on June 18 2015 Firstly the nature of the case was an antimonopoly dispute In accordance with Provisions of the Supreme Peoples Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民

事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) and Civil Litigation Law the monopolistic civil disputes in the first instance shall be under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Peoples Courts and an action involving a contractual dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the peoples court of the place where the defendant is domiciled or where the contract is performed Carrefour as the defendant in this case is domiciled in Chaoyang District Beijing Therefore the courts of Beijing have jurisdiction over this case Secondly according to article 3 of the Notification on the Jurisdiction of Intellectual Property Courts issued by Supreme Court (关于知识产权法院案件管辖

等有关问题的通知) IP courts have jurisdiction over first-instance civil disputes arising from monopolistic practices Lastly according to Provisions concerning the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 22 of 52

According to the decision the authority found that Mercedes-Benz fixed the minimum resale price of Class E and Class S cars in Nanjing Wuxi Changzhou and Suzhou markets through telephoneverbal communication and dealers meetings from January 2013 to July 2014 Since 2010 Mercedes-Benz had reached agreements with dealers in Jiangsu province to fix the minimum resale prices for auto parts by providing different levels of discounts for insured cars cars involving expired warranty periods and cars within the warranty period

In addition Mercedes-Benz implemented the minimum resale price maintaining agreement by

1) Tightening its monitoring measures on the dealers such as inspecting deals and their sale incentive system on a weekly basis

2) Tracking the sales process flow of cars and increasing the intensity of this assessment

3) Giving warnings and reducing support ndash for example halting the supply of bestselling cars and prohibiting the opening of new stores ndash to dealers if dealers refused to cooperate with the price-fixing related policies and measures and

4) Interviewing personnel of the dealers and requesting terminations if the staff engaged in serious violations of the RPM agreement

Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau concluded that Mercedes-Benz had excluded and eliminated market competition harmed consumer welfare and consequently violated article 1418 of the AML The authority therefore imposed a fine of CNY 350 million representing 7 of the sale revenue of the previous year in the relevant market against Mercedes-Benz and imposed a fine on the dealers amounting to an equivalence of 1 of the annual sales in the previous year

Analysis

Although the agency also addressed the horizontal violation among the dealers in this case the administrative penalty decision mainly focuses on the vertical violation The agency fined dealers involved in the RPM agreement a combined CNY 787 million equal to 1 of the previous-year sales which suggests that the agency decided to give lighter punishments to dealers who took initiative in reporting the activity and provided evidence

The Mercedes-Benz case is the third case where the agency successfully 18 Article 14 of the AML The following monopolistic agreements between operators and trading partners shall be prohibited (i) fixing the resale prices of commodities to third persons (ii) restricting the minimum resale prices of commodities to third persons (iii) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement Authority under the State Council

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 23 of 52

discovered both vertical and horizontal agreements in a case following the Audi case and the Chrysler case All these cases are rooted in the same industry indicating that industrial features play a large role in raising anti-trust concerns In fact it appears that the entire automotive industry is under antitrust scrutiny

Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC19

This case involved both a horizontal agreement and an administrative monopoly

A total fine of CNY 1318 million was imposed on the involved companies

Facts

In June 2015 the NDRC through its website announced the decision made by its regional branch -Yunnan Provincial Development and Reform Commission (ldquoYunnan DRCrdquo) regarding the horizontal monopolistic agreement case involving Yunnan Communications Administration and local subsidiaries of four state-owned telecommunication companies

Through the investigation Yunnan DRC found that Yunnan Communications Administration as a competent government agency had organized several meetings involving Yunnan branches of four state-owned telecoms - China Mobile China Telecom China Unicom and China Tietong in August and September of 2014 At the end of 2009 the four local branches entered into an agreement to regulate their sales promotions in terms of limiting the promotional items amount and frequency

Furthermore the agreement provides certain measures to ensure the implementation of relevant restrictions on promotions Specifically in case any cartel member violates the agreement the others could file complaints with Yunnan Communications Administration and the agency would then issue a rectification notice to the rule-breaker

Yunnan DRC stated that the four telecoms were main competitors in the relevant market and the promotions as a significant competition measure would exert direct influence on the final prices of the products The horizontal agreement organized by Yunnan Communications Administration on sales promotions restricted the competition capacity of telecoms and as a result eliminated the competition in the relevant market Consequently the behaviour of Yunnan Communications Administration violated article 8 20 of the AML and constituted administrative monopoly in terms of ldquoforcing undertakings to conduct monopolistic behaviour prohibited by the AMLrdquo

19 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpwwwsdpcgovcnfzgggzjgjdyfldjjszhdt201506t20150602_694802html 20 Article 8 of the AML Administrative organs and the public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 24 of 52

With respect to the penalties Yunnan DRC fined the local branch of China Tietong CNY 200000 for reaching but not implementing the agreement in regards to the other three telecoms a total fine of CNY 1298 million amounting to 2 of the sales of the relevant business in the previous year were imposed for entering into and implementing the horizontal monopolistic agreement

Analysis

The telecoms industry is still the enforcement priority of the antitrust enforcement authorities A company cannot be exempted from punishment even though it is forced by competent authorities to conduct monopoly behaviour

DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC21

Both a horizontal monopolistic agreement and a vertical monopolistic agreement were involved in this case

A total fine of CNY 14242 million was imposed on DongFeng Nissan and its distributors

Facts

In September 2015 the Guangdong Development and Reform Commission (ldquoGuangdong DRCrdquo) released an announcement regarding the administrative penalties on DongFeng Nissan and its provincial distributors for concluding price-related monopolistic agreements More specifically DongFeng Nissan was imposed a fine of CNY 1233 million for breaching article 14 of the AML in terms of restricting the resale price of certain car models 17 distributors domiciled in Guangdong were collectively fined CNY 1912 million for violating article 1322 of the AML in terms of entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements

According to the published official release the Guangdong DRC launched the investigation in August 2014 The authority discovered that from 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissan had set a rigorous restriction on its distributorsrsquo abilities to determine the resale prices of certain car models including the quoted prices in various platforms and the final resale price In addition DongFeng Nissan punished the distributors that failed to abide by such price restrictions in 2013 The authority 21 The original Chinese notice published by Guangdong DRC is available at httpwwwgddpcgovcnzwgkgzdtgzyw201509t20150910_328993html 22 Article 13 of the AML The following Monopolistic agreements among competing operators shall be prohibited (i) fix or change prices of commodities (ii) limit the outputs or sales volume of commodities (iii) segment the sales markets or the raw material purchasing markets (iv) limit the purchase of new technology new facilities or limit the development of new products new technology (v) jointly boycott transactions (vi) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-Monopoly Law enforcement Authority Monopolistic agreements in this Law refer to agreements decisions or other concerted practices that eliminate restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 25 of 52

believed that the vertical agreement concluded between DongFeng Nissan and its distributors eliminated and restricted the competition in the relevant market and damaged the consumer welfare as well which violates article 14 of the AML

Furthermore from April 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissanrsquos distributors in Guangdong province held multiple meetings to discuss issues relevant to sale price reached and implemented a horizontal monopolistic agreement in terms of fixing the prices of some car models which is prohibited by article 13 of the AML

Considering that both DongFeng Nissan and the involved distributors positively cooperated with the investigation and ceased the illegal behaviour immediately after the investigation Guangdong DRC decided to impose a fine amounting to 3 of its previous yearrsquos turnovers on DongFeng Nissan and a fine ranging from 2 to 4 on the relevant distributors in accordance with articles 4623 and 4924 of the AML

Analysis

This case demonstrates that auto and related industries are still under close attention of the authority Considering the NDRCrsquos successful series of antitrust investigations conducted throughout the auto industry it is observed that the agency currently overseeing price-related antitrust issues in China has accumulated a substantial amount of experience regarding antitrust enforcement in the auto industry Now is the right time to speed up the law-making process by amending the set of rules released earlier and drafting new laws to advise the auto industry on antitrust compliance

Enforcement by the SAIC and its local branches

Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC25

The investigation was triggered by whistle blowerrsquos submission

Cartel members were collectively fined CNY 139 million 23 Article 46 of the AML In case the operators violate the relevant provisions of this Law concluding and implementing Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall order the operators to cease such act impose fines more than 1 but less than 10 of the total turnover in the preceding year and confiscate the illegal gains where the Monopolistic agreement is not implemented a fine less than RMB 500000 can be imposed If the operators involved in Monopolistic agreement on its own initiative report information concerning the conclusion of Monopolistic agreements and provide important evidences to the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority they may be given a mitigated punishment or be exempted from punishment in accordance with the circumstances Where the industrial associations violate this Law organizing the operators in the industry to conclude Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority may impose a fine less than RMB 500000 in serious circumstances the agency of social organization administration and registration may cancel its registration 24 Article 49 of the AML As for the imposition of the fines stipulated by the Article 46 47 and 48 of this Law the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall take elements such as the nature extent and time it lasts of the illegal act into consideration in determining the specific amount of the fines 25 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201506t20150601_156889html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 26 of 52

Facts

In April 2015 the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) issued administrative penalties on several brick manufacturers for entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements This is the first case relevant to monopolistic agreements that has been publicized by the SAIC since the beginning of this year

Ten cartel members were involved in the case including one company and nine individuals Similar with most antitrust cases the investigation started as a result of a whistle blowerrsquos submission After a thorough investigation Hunan AIC found that those local brick manufacturers had reached agreements on controlling production volume and dividing sales areas in the forms of production and sales agreements plans and meeting minutes

The enforcement authority reached the conclusion that these brick manufacturers violated article 13 of the AML and imposed a total fine of CNY 1389400 on them

Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC26

The organizer of the monopolistic agreement the animation association was fined CNY 100000

The antitrust authority did not punish the members of the monopolistic agreement

Facts

In December 2015 the Guangdong Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoGuangdong AICrdquo) published its administrative punishment decision in regards to Guangzhou Panyu Animation amp Game Association (ldquoGAGArdquo) organizing member companies to conclude a monopolistic agreement

According to the decision GAGA drafted the ldquoAgreement of Exhibition Alliancerdquo (ldquoAgreementrdquo) and convened a conference with member companies in order to discuss the content and conclusion of the Agreement 52 member companies entered into the Agreement which actually requested the alliance companies to merely participate in the exhibitions either organized or supported by GAGA in Guangzhou In addition the Agreement prohibited the alliance companies from attending any other exhibition except if they obtained prior approval of GAGA

After a thorough investigation Guangdong AIC believed that the conclusion of the Agreement among GAGA and the 52 member companies violated article 13 (5) of the AML in terms of boycott GAGA who was deeply involved and restricted member companiesrsquo choice of exhibitions through the Agreement could be deemed as

26 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151208_164680html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 27 of 52

the participant and organizer of the monopolistic agreement In accordance with article 46 of the AML Guangdong AIC imposed a fine of CNY 100000 on GAGA for organizing the conclusion of the monopolistic agreement

Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC27

Hubei AIC considered the coinsurance for Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance illegal

Twelve insurance companies were fined CNY 469 million in total

Facts

In December 2015 the Hubei Administrative for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHubei AICrdquo) disclosed its punishment on 12 insurance companies for signing illegal coinsurance agreements

The disclosed punishment decision suggests that the Hubei branch of China Pacific Life Insurance (ldquothe Companyrdquo) 11 other insurance companies and Wuhan Construction Safety Technology Consultation Center (ldquoWCSTCCrdquo) signed a Coinsurance Agreement on Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance (ldquoCoinsurance Agreementrdquo) of which the main contents include

1) The Company and 11 other involved companies as the coinsurers jointly take charge of the personal accident insurance concerned with the construction project directly administered by the Wuhan government WCSTCC is responsible for providing safety professionalism and technology services regarding the relevant personal accident insurance

2) The Company as the chief insurer of the coinsurance occupies 12 of the total amount of the insurance and the other 11 companies respectively occupy 8

3) The Company as the representative of the coinsurance is in charge of collecting the premium signing the standard form insurance policies and issuing the invoice in its own name The Company should share the charged premium with the other companies in accordance with the Coinsurance Agreement

4) Both the Company and the other insurance companies should pay 25 of the actually received premium to WCSTCC as the service fee WCSTCC will assist the coinsurers in providing safety and technology management service to the insured In addition the 11 insurance companies should pay 5 of their premium to the Company as the management fee

27 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165445html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 28 of 52

5) In case an accident happens the 12 companies will jointly bear the damages based on their respective shares in the coinsurance

6) There is a contact mechanism established in the coinsurance The coinsurers will regularly hold coinsurance conferences to discuss existing problems

Furthermore the coinsurers and WCSTCC also signed a self-discipline agreement and established a complete management system to assure the implementation of the Coinsurance Agreement Any party violating the Coinsurance Agreement would be punished

Hubei AIC found that WCSTCC was solely invested by Wuhan Construction Safety Management Association which was under Wuhan Construction Commission The centre helped implement certain functions of the Wuhan Urban Construction Safety Management Station and was responsible for quality supervision and safety supervision of municipal construction projects

It later became a prerequisite for construction companies to purchase insurance from any member of the coinsurance in order to get approval to commence their project According to the decision Hubei AIC launched another separate investigation against WCSTCC

Through the investigation Hubei AIC concluded that the Coinsurance Agreement constituted a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by article 13 of the AML with the following analysis

First coinsurance as a common business model to jointly share and lower risks is widely adopted in the insurance industry A coinsurance arrangement for a specific project in order to avoid high risks faced by one insurer could be legal However coinsurance should not target the entire market In this case prior to the Coinsurance Agreement the risks of the construction projects were unpredictable since the scale of the construction projects the difficulty of the construction and the amount of construction workers could not be available It is impossible to predict the risks of the projects thus it is not necessary to cooperate with other insurers to collectively bear the risks The purpose of the 12 insurance companies to establish the coinsurance is to avoid the competition which demonstrates the Coinsurance Agreement belongs to a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by the AML

Second the companies through entering into the coinsurance agreement actually divided the relevant market of construction project personal accident insurance in Wuhan city which affected the competition in the relevant market and damaged the interests of other competitors and the consumers In particular the Construction Law as amended in 2011 stipulates that the purchase of personal accident insurance is not mandatory and the construction companies have the right to choose whether to buy the said insurance or not As mentioned purchasing insurance from the coinsurance had been the prerequisite for construction companies to obtain administration

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 29 of 52

approval for the project which seriously distorts the fair competition in the market

Citing article 46 of the AML the 12 insurance companies were collectively fined CNY 469 million including fines on the companies and confiscation of illegal gains It is noteworthy that the fines were calculated based on the companiesrsquo 2014 annual sales of the insurance product in connection with the coinsurance The Company as the chief insurer was fined amounting to 6 of its 2014 annual sales of the relevant insurance product in the coinsurance and other companies were fined amounting to 2 of relevant sales For more specific information please see the following table

Company Name (Hubei Branch)

Fines (CNY million)

Percentage of the sales

Illegal Gains (CNY

million)

China Pacific Life Insurance 00653 6 0941

Sino Life 00145 2 04332

Alltrust Insurance 00145 2 04332

Taikang Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Continent Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Pacific Property Insurance

00145 2 04332

China Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

PICC Property and Casualty 00145 2 02599

Taiping General Insurance 00145 2 013

Union Life Insurance 00145 2 01177

Ping An Annuity Insurance Company of China

00145 2 04201

Ping An Property amp Casualty Insurance Company of China

00145 2 -

Subtotal 02248 - 44679

Total 46927

Analysis

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 30 of 52

Coinsurance as an effective approach to lower risks of insurers is widely used in the insurance industry Information sharing and agreements on coinsurance were generally considered efficient and legitimate However from an antitrust perspective coinsurance may raise competition concerns depending on the circumstances of each agreement In the case that there is enough capacity for one insurer to cover the potential risks the coinsurance might be considered as entering into a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC28

The first leniency applicant was exempted from fines

The other concrete companies were imposed a fine of CNY 180000

Facts

In December 2015 the concrete companies monopolistic agreement case investigated by Hunan AIC was published on SAICrsquos website

In accordance with the antitrust enforcement announcement of SAIC this case was triggered by complaints from the Yongzhou City peoplersquos congress After the preliminary review the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) initiated the formal investigation on seven concrete companies domiciled in Yongzhou City Hunan Province which were suspected of being involved in a monopolistic agreement in terms of division of the volumes of the products

After further investigation Hunan AIC found that the seven concrete companies concluded a partnership agreement in 2011 which requested the involved companies to enter into a partnership business with assets In addition according to the partnership agreement it was planned to establish a comprehensive office to manage production marketing and distribution of the products of all the partners The seven companies intended to jointly adjust and control the output of concrete based on the partnership agreement However because there were disagreements over the allocation of the injected assets and market shares the companies did not implement the partnership agreement The agreement was cancelled in December 2012

Based on the findings Hunan AIC concluded that the seven concrete companies as competitors of each other restricted and eliminated the competition in the relevant market through reaching the partnership agreement and dividing the volumes of sales which violated article 13(3) of the AML in terms of division of sales market Considering that the agreement had not been implemented and the limited influence of the agreement according to article 46 of the AML and article 27 of the Administrative Penalties Law small amount fines were imposed on the involved companies Six companies were fined CNY 30000 each for their illegal behaviour 28 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165504html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 31 of 52

Yongzhou Shuangyuan Building Materials Co Ltd as the first one to actively report the monopolistic agreement and cooperate with the enforcement authority was exempted from the punishment

Outlook

It is expected that the AMLrsquos enforcement on monopolistic agreements will continue in the future Industries such as automobile shipping pharmaceuticals insurance etc will still remain the priority of the antitrust enforcement

The antitrust enforcement authorities have published a series of regulations in order to clarify the substantial and procedural issues relevant to the antitrust enforcement However Chinarsquos current antitrust legislation regime is still immature In the following years we expect that more attention will be paid to the legislative improvements

Another remarkable issue for cartel members is that with more Chinese enterprises attaching increasing importance to the AML the follow-on civil damages actions might become a tendency in the future

C Abuse of Market Dominance

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen a decent increase of abuse of market dominance cases both in public enforcement and private litigation Oftentimes the authorities responsible for public enforcement generally find it difficult to pursue investigations against abuse of market dominance cases The following two main reasons are often cited to explain this standoff first it is hard for the authorities to define the relevant markets and prove the undertaking(s)rsquo dominant market position through economic approaches second it is hard to collect evidence regarding abusive practices

The cases related to IPRs abuse are emerging significantly particularly in the telecommunication media and technology (ldquoTMTrdquo) sectors

The SAICrsquos latest refusal-to-deal probe against a local drug maker shows that the SAIC and its local branches have increasingly acquired a profile as an abuse of dominance regulator

Significant Cases

Cases pursued by the SAIC

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 32 of 52

Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case29

Facts

The local authority in Dongfang city reported to the Hainan provincial branch of SAIC on April 23 2014 of the suspected dominance abuse The SAIC authorized its Hainan bureau to officially investigate the matter on 25 July 2014 according to a decision dated January 9 2015 The AIC concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its market dominance by requiring users to pay a deposit without any legal basis and or justifiable reasons

In terms of the relevant product market the local authority found that in this case it was the urban water supply market in Dongfang city and its surrounding townships where Dongfang Water was the sole public operator in the local water supply market with a 100 market share which made all water users completely reliant on the companyrsquos supply In term of market access the local authority found it very unlikely that there were other operators due to the strict regulations

The Hainan SAIC then concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its dominance as it charged users a deposit by threatening to refuse to register users and also by threatening to restrict the water supply Dongfang Waters charging of deposits lacked a legal basis and hadnt received government approval to the detriment of household consumers and business water users and hampered the improvement of management and services of the company Such conduct was in breach of Chinarsquos Anti-Monopoly Law

Hainan AIC levied a fine of CNY 593208 a lighter penalty equivalent to 2 of the companyrsquos annual sales for the previous year and confiscated illicit gains of CNY 38521 for abuse of market dominance

Analysis

It is noteworthy that although handled by a local authority supervised by the SAIC the antitrust agency detailed the relevant market definition the assessment of the dominant market position the abusive practices and the scrutiny of the justifiable reasons

Although the definition of the relevant market and the reasoning of the Hainan provincial AIC and the SAIC are subject to criticism it is still applausive to see that the antitrust regulators have realized the importance of the application of rule of reason in an abuse case In addition through itrsquos a published decision practitioners may observe the regulatorsrsquo reasoning and thus transparency and legal certainty have been generated

29 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzfcfjd201502t20150212_152066html last visited on October 18 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 33 of 52

Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms30

Facts

In June 2013 the Ningxia AIC under authorization of SAIC opened an antitrust investigation into the alleged tie-in sales by the three major state-owned telecommunications operators China Tietong China Unicom and China Telecom for the tie-in sale of fixed-line telephones with broadband Internet services The Ningxia AIC found that the three companies had bundled fixed-line phone services with Internet services to subscribers

During the investigation all three telecommunications companies admitted the tie-in practice had recognized that such practice had improper influence on competition and deprived the choices of consumers The three companies promised to undertake internal rectification timely and eliminate the ill effects resulting from such practice The parties committed to taking the following corrective measures

1) Taking internal rectifications and conducting training to staff about antitrust laws and stop tie-in sales practices

2) Making public commitments to allow subscribers a free choice of services and strengthening the propaganda through the operating room call centre and other channels

3) Unbundling fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

The Ningxia AIC decided to suspend the probe on 14 May 2015 on the grounds that the three companies had actively worked together with the investigators and proposed workable remedy plans

Analysis

In the official announcement Ningxia AIC concluded that the purpose of antitrust enforcement is to restrain monopolistic conducts the protection of competition and to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of consumers Given that during the investigation process the parties had actively cooperated with the investigation formed a more profound understanding of the dangers of tying behaviour and moreover the parties proposed and implemented positive corrective measures to be able to remove the ill impact of their actions the agency believed that the purpose of antitrust law enforcement was fulfilled

It is worth noting that the Ningxia AIC also required the three companies to implement the commitment by August 30 2015and the submission of the written

30 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158908html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158906html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158910html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 34 of 52

implementation report on July 102015 and August 102015 respectively which is another illustration that an effective commitment by the undertakings shall directly deal with the effect that is brought by the monopolistic behaviour In this case the effect of the monopolistic act was restricted to the choice of the consumers therefore the commitment by the undertaking aimed at allowing the freedom of choice and the unbundling of fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company31

Facts

The Liaoning AIC imposed a fine of approximately CNY 433m on the Fushun Branch of Liaoning Tobacco Co on 1 June 2015 The agency also ordered the company to stop its illicit behaviour

The Liaoning AIC received a tip-off that the accused Liaoning Tobacco Corsquos Fushun branch was conducting tie-in sales of non-high-demand cigarette brands with high-demand cigarette brands After gaining authorization from SAIC the agency officially started an investigation regarding the companyrsquos suspected abuse of market dominance in June 2014

Analysis

According to the announcement the tobacco company argued that the tobacco industry is a state controlled or monopolized industry with a lawful monopolistic position therefore the company shall not be subject to the norms of general market competition rules or the anti-monopoly law

In this regards the agency concluded that in terms of the status of the undertaking admittedly the first paragraph of article 17 of the AML says that the State shall protect the lawful business operations of undertakings in these industries with respect to the industries which are under the control of the State-owned economic sector and have a bearing on the lifeline of the national economy or national security and the industries which exercise monopoly over the production and sale of certain commodities according to law However the second paragraph continues to say that the undertakings mentioned above shall do business according to law be honest faithful and strictly self-disciplined and subject themselves to public supervision and they shall not harm the consumers interests by taking advantage of their position of control or their monopolistic production and sale of certain commodities In particular in the preceding paragraph the ldquolawful businessrdquo and ldquoaccording to lawrdquo imply that the AML shall apply in the business operation The agency therefore believes that

31 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201508t20150813_16

0208html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 35 of 52

there shall be no exemption for the undertaking concerned the defences of the undertaking concerned is not established

Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm32

Facts

The Chongqing AIC fined Chongqing Qingyang Pharmaceutical CNY 439308 for alleged dominance abuse

The investigation was initiated when the company contacted the agency for verification on its potential breach of the AML related to an allopurinol active pharmaceuticals ingredient (API) distribution agreement with its exclusive distributor The company provided the relevant agreement and information and the agency conducted an investigation into the company and some other relevant companies

Analysis

Relevant Market

During the investigation the agency found that pharmaceutical ingredients are a special commodity the API is used to produce the preparations The chemical API is only used for the production of the preparation and could be used as a medicine for clinic use

The preparation is produced according to the requirements of certain form of prepared drugs and for the purpose of treatment and prevention which can be used as medicine

The allopurinol is used for the common treatment of hyperuricemia However the other treatments are different in pharmacological effects or treatment effects as well as in the cost for the patient Furthermore the company is the only manufacturer and supplier in the market nationwide since July 2012 Therefore the agency concluded that the relevant market is the allopurinol API market

Considering that the qualification for manufacturing the allopurinol API is national wide and the normal practice for purchasers and suppliers is domestic the relevant geographic market is the Chinese market

The Market Dominance

During the investigation the agency found that the company is the only supplier and manufacturer of allopurinol API in China there is no other competitor in the

32 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151222_16

5152html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 36 of 52

market and the company has a monopoly in the market The evidence shows that the company has the ability to control the prices the position for the downstream is relatively weak

With respect to the market entry the agency found that the market entry is relatively high in addition other undertakings are dependent on the company Thus the agency believed the company to have market dominance

Refusal to Deal

The agency found that on September 25 2015 the company reached an exclusive agreement and distribution agreement with its distributor Based on these agreements the company didnrsquot supply allopurinol API to the said distributor and other companies despite the fact that those companies requested for allopurinol API but were turned down by the company

Absence of Reasonable Cause

The agency found that the companyrsquos refusal to deal was not in line with the needs of normal business operation or economic efficiency On the other hand the refusal to deal was aimed at increasing the market share of the allopurinol drug product Also the agency found that the stop of supply was a manipulation of market power as to maximize the profit to the most The agency further found that the exclusive distribution agreement with suspension of supply for six months and the refusal to supply was to eliminate and restrict the competition as to gain the monopolistic profit

The Consequence of Refusal to Deal

The agency concluded that the refusal to deal harmed the competition of the allopurinol preparations market Because of the suspension of supply many demanders had to reduce their production or switch to the supply of other products or stop their production The suspension of supply affected the competition of the downstream market Consequently the raising of the price of allopurinol API also raised the cost for other manufacturers of allopurinol preparations

Furthermore the refusal to deal led to capacity loss of the allopurinol preparation industry

Ultimately the refusal to deal increased the burden on consumers as the refusal to supply changed the supply-demand relationship in the market

The agency concluded that the Company abused its dominant position in the allopurinol API market by refusing to deal with intended buyers in the period between October 2013 and March 2014Therefore the Company violated article 17 (1) of the AML which prohibits business operators with a dominant market position from abusing that position such as the refusal to deal without any justifications

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 37 of 52

D Administrative Monopoly

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 witnessed antitrust authoritiesrsquo significant efforts regarding the enforcement against administrative monopoly According to Mr Dong Zhiming the deputy director general of Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly Bureau ever since the AML coming into force six cases in connection with administrative monopoly were investigated by NDRC and among them five cases were handled in the year of 2015 These cases touched abuses of administrative power in terms of designative deal in relation to transportation communication and pharmaceutical industries

The first private litigation related to administrative monopolistic acts was heard in the court which is a milestone case in the enforcement of the AML

Significant Cases

Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC33

Facts

In March 2015 the NDRC released the official letter to Shandong Provincial Department of Transportation (ldquoShandong DOTrdquo) on its website with respect to correct its abuse of administrative power to exclude and restrict competition

During the investigation the NDRC found that since 2011 Shandong DOT had issued multiple relevant government orders in order to require certain types of vehicles to be directly connected to two designated information and service platforms both of which are operated and technically supported by one company namely Shandong Jiutong Internet of Things Technology Co Ltd (ldquoJiutong ITTrdquo) Furthermore according to the orders issued by the competent administrative department all the vehicle satellite positioning terminals entering into Shandong provincial market should be debugged through the said technology service platform which is operated by the mentioned company In addition Shandong DOT released the cap prices of vehicle satellite positioning terminals which is identical to the 2012 bid-winning price in the Ministry of Transportation demonstration project

The NDRC believed that Shandong DOTrsquos behaviour eliminated and restricted the competition in the monitoring platform market and the vehicle terminal market deprived the right of transportation enterprises to choose vehicle terminals and monitoring platform on their owns unreasonably raised the sales prices of vehicle terminals and service fees charged by the platform and increased the costs of transportation enterprises Therefore the antitrust agency concluded that Shandong

33 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201503t20150327_668911html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 38 of 52

DOT violated article 8 of the AML which stipulates that ldquoadministrative organs and the public organizations with an administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude and restrict competitionrdquo Specifically Shandong DOT violated article 3234 in terms of requiring organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any designated operators and violated article 3735 in terms of setting rules with contents which eliminate and restrict competition

Based on article 51 of the AML ldquoWhere administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations abuse administrative powers performing activities which exclude and restrict competition the superior entity shall order it to correct impose administrative penalty on the chief officer and other staffs directly responsible pursuant to the laws The AML enforcement authority may give recommendations on disposal of activities to the relevant superior entityrdquo the NDRC proposed in writing that the Shandong provincial government should order Shandong DOT to rectify its behaviour with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Entirely open up the monitoring platform market by permitting transportation undertakings to freely choose any approved platform

2) Loosen the restrictions on the entry into Shandong vehicle terminals permit the undertakings to independently select the supplier of vehicle terminals and allow the qualified terminals to be connected to the relevant monitoring platform and

3) Revoke the official documentation relevant to the cap price of vehicle terminals in order to promote the price competition

Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 36

Facts

On 26 August 2015 the NDRC published its second decision with regard to the rectification of administrative monopoly since the beginning of this year According to the proposal letter sent to Anhui Provincial Government the investigation against the Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City (Bengbu HFPC) was trigged by third partiesrsquo complaints

34 Article 32 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to require organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any operators designated by them 35 Article 37 of the AML Administrative organs shall not abuse their administrative powers to set rules with contents which eliminate restrict competition 36 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201508t20150826_748682html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 39 of 52

The investigation suggests that Bengbu HFPC published three notices with regard to drugs procurement in April and May of this year

In the No C-2015-CG-X-111 Notice (ldquoNo111 Noticerdquo) released on 10 April2015 the health authority not only provided the dosage form and qualification of the requested drugs but also directly determined the suppliers of relevant drugs which eliminated and restricted the competition among pharmaceutical manufacturers and therefore violated articles 32 and 37 of the AML

In the No C-2015-CG-C-112 Notice (ldquoNo112 Noticerdquo) and No C-2015-CG-C-168 (ldquoNo 168 Noticerdquo) respectively released on 10 April and 22 May 2015 the Bengbu HFPC set discriminative qualification requirements on non-local undertakings in order to restrict their participation in the relevant bidding For instance in accordance with No 112 Notice to be a qualified bidder the turnover of non-local undertakings shall exceed CNY 2 billion which is 50 times as much as the turnover requirements of the local undertakings In the NDRCrsquos opinion the administrative monopoly activities conducted by the local health agency excluded the relevant undertakings from the market maintained the virtual-high prices of drugs and therefore violated articles 3237 and 37 of the AML

The NDRC suggested in a letter that Anhui Provincial Government should urge the Bengbu HFPC to rectify the abuse of monopoly powers with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Stop setting distinguishing restrictions on qualification requirements review standards and numbers of winning bidders as for local and non-local undertakings

2) Stop designating the suppliers of competitive drugs and

3) Take necessary measures to mitigate the negative effects resulting from the previous illegal monopolistic abuses

Outlook

At the beginning of the year the former director general of the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau under the NDRC Xu Kunlin stated that the agency would strengthen antitrust enforcement on abuse of administrative power in 2015

Since then the NDRC has made great efforts to rectify unreasonable abuses of administrative power The currently disclosed two cases investigated by the NDRC re-emphasize the Chinese Governmentrsquos strict scrutiny of antitrust issues in respect of

37 Article 34 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to restrict or reject the participation of operators from other regions in local bidding activities by measures such as prescribing discriminatory qualification requirements or assessment standards or by not publishing information according to law

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 40 of 52

administrative monopoly It reminds the local governments that antitrust compliance is of significant importance

III Private Litigation

A Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen more and more private antitrust litigations

The private antitrust litigation cases have become increasingly complicated especially the issues regarding the intersection areas of IP and antitrust law

Multinational giants and State-Owned Enterprises (the ldquoSOEsrdquo) are increasingly becoming the targets in antitrust civil litigations Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (the ldquoSMEsrdquo) tend to use the antitrust litigation to achieve their commercial goals in the business context

B Significant Cases

Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)38

This is the first-ever private litigation concerning administrative monopoly since the implementation of the AML in 2008

Facts

According to the currently disclosed details the case is relevant for designated trade

The plaintiff Shenzhen Sware Technology Co Ltd (ldquoSwarerdquo) is a software company The press releases suggest that Sware Gloden Software Co Ltd (ldquoGlodenrdquo) and Shanghai Ruban Software Co Ltd (ldquoShanghai Rubanrdquo) are the three main suppliers of construction cost software and possess the major shares of the relevant market An annual provincial vocational ability contest regarding the construction cost hosted by the Guangdong Department of Education (ldquoGuangdong DOE) designated Gloden as the exclusive supplier of the relevant software

After several unsuccessful verbal and written negotiations with Guangdong DOE in April 2014 Sware filed a lawsuit against Guangdong DOE before the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquothe Courtrdquo) alleging that the administrative organ abused its administrative power and violated the AML by designating exclusive software supplier for the contest and claimed a compensation for reasonable expense amounting to CNY 10800 Yuan

The opinions of the Court 38 The story of the case is available at httpfinancesinacomcnchinadfjj20150410074621924997shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 41 of 52

The full text of the judgment has not been disclosed yet In accordance with the information available to the public the Court invoked article 32 of the AML which prohibits an administrative organ from abusing its administrative power to require or in disguised form organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use only the commodities supplied by the entities designated by them The Court concluded that Guangdong DOE failed to prove the legitimacy of the designation and therefore abused its administration power

Currently the case is in appeal before the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court

Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 39

It is the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China

In the first instance ruling Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court ruled against Sinopec holding that the Yunnan branch of Sinopecs trading company was obligated to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its dominance in the sales market of refined oil by refusing to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding without justifiable reasons

In the second instance ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors Currently the case is pending

Facts

The First Trial

The lawsuit was filed before the Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoKunming Courtrdquo) in January 2014 Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy Co Ltd (ldquoYingdingrdquo) a bio-energy manufacturer claimed that Sinopec and the Yunnan branch of Sinopec trading company (ldquoSinopec Yunnan Branchrdquo) had failed to fulfil their obligations stipulated in the Renewable Energy Law and had abused their market dominance in sales market of refined oil by refusing to trade with Yingding without justifiable reasons

Sinopec and Sinopec Yunnan Branch mainly explained four reasons for why they rejected Yingdingrsquos biofuel Firstly Yingding had failed to prove that the biofuel complied with the relevant national standard and was safe to use Secondly Yingding had failed to provide complete trading terms Thirdly the laws and regulations regarding biofuel were incomplete the authorized refined oil sales companies were 39 The details of the case are available at httpnewsxinhuanetcomfortune2014-1217c_1113680039htm httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=9e71db51-6ff6-4d2c-8af6-8eacf023ebdeampKeyWord=E4BA91E58D97E79B88E9BC8E|E4B8ADE79FB3E58C96 httpnewsxinhuanetcomenergy2015-0422c_127721575htm httpwwwnbdcomcnarticles2015-04-23911348html last visited on December 17 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 42 of 52

obligated to purchase biofuel from the biofuel manufacturers if it met certain quality standards but there was a vacancy regarding how to reach the end consumers from the sales companies

On 8 December 2014 the Kunming Intermediate Peoples Court ruled that Sinopec Yunnan Branch bore a legal obligation to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its market dominance in refined oil market by refusing without any justifiable reasons to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding The court ordered Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network within 30 days Both Yingding and Sinopec filed appeals to the Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court

The Appellate Trial

The appeal hearing was held on 22 April 2015 in Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoYunnan Courtrdquo) Sinopec submitted 23 new pieces of evidence and introduced two expert witnesses in a bid to overturn several key elements in the first-instance ruling by Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court

In terms of the determination of the relevant market and the market dominance Sinopec argued that the relevant market in this case was for adipic acid monomethyl ester (ldquoAAMErdquo) the main ingredient of a biofuel additive known as BD100 Yingdingrsquos main product is BD100 which can be blended with fossil diesel to become biofuel In the AAME market Sinopec is a potential buyer instead of a market dominator In support of this argument Sinopec presented an expert witnessmdashGong Jiong a professor of economics at Beijings University of International Business and Economics who testified that AAME should be defined as the relevant product market on the basis of an economic analysis

However Yingding insisted that the first-instance ruling was correct in naming the sales market of refined oil as the relevant market and submitted new evidence an article on Sinopecs website that claimed it had a 67 market share in Yunnan to help establish the claim that Sinopec had market dominance

Another main dispute was whether Yingdingrsquos biofuel product met national standards which would make it mandatory for Sinopec to purchase under Chinas Renewable Energy Law The law stipulates that biofuel producers must sell their products first to an authorized refined oil sales company and the sales companies are obliged to buy the fuel if it meets certain quality standards In order to test the quality Sinopec introduced the second expert witness Lin Jianmin a leading author of Chinarsquos national biofuel standard Lin Jianmin pointed out that there are currently quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology which gives Sinopec a justifiable reason not to trade with Yingding Moreover Sinopec presented some precedents in which consumers had complained about the biofuel quality and also claimed that China didnt have a sound regulatory framework to support biofuel production neither in testing nor in sales

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 43 of 52

Nevertheless to refute this point Yingding referred to an earlier test in co-operation with Sinopec in 2011 where selected buses in Kunming used biofuel blended by Sinopec using BD100 produced by Yingding

On August 13 2015 Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors and now this case is pending In the written appellate ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court did not provide any details regarding its reasoning

Key Issues of the Case

Is there any competition between Yingding and Sinopec

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case the product of Yingding is biofuel while Sinopec does not engage in the business of biofuel From this perspective Yingding and Sinopec are not competitors Thus it is not necessary and not reasonable for Sinopec to eliminate or restrict the competition from Yingding

Relevant Market

The definition of the relevant market is a prerequisite to determine whether competition exists and whether the AML is applicable In accordance with the Judicial Interpretation of Antitrust civil litigation the plaintiff shall take the responsibility to prove the defendantrsquos dominance in the relevant market Also the methods of defining the relevant market are stipulated in the Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition (ldquoGuidelinesrdquo) However both Yingding and Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court defined the relevant market as the sales market of refined oil without sufficient antitrust analysis none of the methods in the Guidelines were used Therefore the definition of the relevant market remains arguable and needs to be sufficiently analysed in the upcoming retrial

Justifiable Reasons

The abuse of market dominance includes the behaviour of refusing to trade without justifiable reasons according to the AML but in the first instance ruling justifiable reasons were not investigated by the court During the appellate trial the expert witness introduced by Sinopec claimed that there were quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology and this was a justifiable reason to refuse to trade with Yingding Even though the first instance court and the appellate court did not reason the justifiable reason it should be discussed and investigated further during the retrial

AML or Renewable Energy Law

The claims of Yingding were based on both the AML and the Renewable Energy Law (ldquoRELrdquo) and the first instance ruling referred to both the AML and the REL as

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 44 of 52

well It seems that the laws the first instance court referred to were comprehensive but in fact the reasoning was not clear and logical In the first instance ruling some disputes regarding the AML were reviewed but all the orders were not based on the AML Specifically the first instance court ordered the Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network based on the REL and dismissed the other claims That the orders were not on account of reasoning is illogical It is anticipated that during the retrial the application of the laws will be clearer

Analysis

A lot of issues have not been clearly analysed by the courts such as the relevant market and the justifiable reasons Since the case is remanded the above-mentioned issues are expected to be resolved in the retrial In addition Yingding was in a disadvantaged position compared to its first instance trial since its claims based on the AML were challenged greatly during the appellate trial In the retrial it is probable that Yingding may switch its litigation strategy and base its claims on the REL Therefore maybe more preparation regarding the REL can give Sinopec a leg up

Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)

Rijing Electric a Chinese distributor seeks CNY 5m compensation

The first hearing was on 9 June 2015 and ended without a ruling

Facts

Rijing Electric (ldquoRijingrdquo) a Shanghai-based company and a former distributor for Panasonic accused Panasonic of abusing its dominance and dividing the market through monopolistic practice in an antitrust lawsuit filed in 2014 with Shanghai No 1 Intermediate Court (ldquoShanghai Courtrdquo) claiming compensation of CNY 5m (USD 815370) Wenzhou Mingda Automation System Co and Shanghai Qingying Automation Equipment as the distributor of Panasonic in China are the co-defendants were accused of conducting monopolistic behaviours by implementing Panasonicrsquos policy

The first hearing for evidence exchange was on June 9 2015 Rijing claimed a policy allegedly introduced by Panasonic in 2009 restricted the competition between distributors Panasonic claims the policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo and has full justifiable reasons It explained that the products in question required customization at considerable cost to distributors before its sale to customers Once carried out however other distributors leaving them open to quote much lower prices than the original distributor could simply and relatively cheap replicate this customization Besides Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and that the plaintiff had failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic said its market share for the four products

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 45 of 52

under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases Also Rijing failed to challenge the policy when it was first introduced instead initially agreeing it was reasonable as e-mail evidence submitted by Panasonic suggests

Key Issues of the Case

Whether Panasonic occupied a market dominant position

It is reported that Rijing claimed that Panasonic had abused its market dominance but Rijing failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and its market share for the four products under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases

Analysis

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case Panasonicrsquos policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo rather than to eliminate or restrict competition

Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals40 (Pending)

It is a battle over patent licensing issues

It is viewed as being among the most complicated antitrust lawsuits in China

The first hearing was on 17 and 18 December 2015

Facts

Four Chinese rare earth companies Ningbo Ketian Magnet Ningbo Permanent Magnetics Ningbo Tongchuang Strong Magnet Material and Ningbo Huahui Magnetic Industry filed antitrust lawsuits against Hitachi Metals over alleged patent licensing issues regarding rare earth magnets on December 11 2014 with the Ningbo Intermediate Peoples Court (ldquoNingbo Courtrdquo) in Zhejiang province As reported four Chinese rare earth companies claimed Hitachi Metals abused its market dominance and hurt the industry competition by refusing to license the patents to them The patents in this case are used in the manufacturing of sintered neodymium iron boron (ldquoNdFeBrdquo) magnets a rare-earth magnet alloy widely used in parts for airplanes automobiles and other products

Hitachi Metals filed a challenge with the Ningbo Court over its jurisdiction in April 2015 After Ningbo Court rejected Hitachi Metals jurisdiction objection on 28 April 2015 Hitachi Metals appealed to the Zhejiang High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoZhejiang

40The details of the story are available at httpwwwzbmagcomnews_viewphpid=80 httpwwwhitachicomcnaboutpress201510-121118_ahtml last visited on December 22 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 46 of 52

Courtrdquo) but Zhejiang Court affirmed the ruling of the Ningbo Court

The first day of a two-day hearing took place on 17 December 2015 during which the two sides cross-examined each otherrsquos evidence The evidence focused on clearing up several key elements in the case including the relevant market whether Hitachi Metals has dominance on that market and whether both sides acted in good faith during the licensing negotiations

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Product Market

The four Chinese rare earth companies claimed that the relevant product market should be the NdFeb-related patent licensing market However Hitachi Metals believed that the physical NdFeb market rather than the patent licensing market should be the relevant product market which is meaningful for assess the real competitive effects on the market

Whether Hitachi Metals occupies a dominant market position

In terms of market dominance Hitachi Metals claimed it does not occupy a dominant position because Hitachi Metalsrsquo patents were not in a standard in this case and there are substitutable technologies in the market SEP holders have the obligation to license on FRAND terms but none-SEP holders do not So while a refusal to license a SEP may constitute abuse of dominance refusal to license a non-SEP mdash even by a patent holder with a dominant position mdash should not be considered as an abuse

Analysis

Hitachi Metals as a patent holder should have the right to decide whether to retain those patents or not or who to license According to the legal theory the purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage and protect innovation by conferring monopoly right mdash that is to give intellectual property owners the proprietary rights which can exclude others from using the intellectual property The SEP holders admittedly need to comply with FRAND terms which can maintain a robust balance between competition and monopoly whereas the further intervention of antitrust law into non-SEP patents may undermine the purpose of intellectual property law To which extent the antitrust law should intervene is yet to be seen

Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei41

A confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the Beijing IP court made by the Beijing High Court

41 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcncpwswbjzscq201511t20151103_12225640htm last visited on December 28 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 47 of 52

Facts

On August 2 2013 the NDRC penalized Abbott for monopolistic price-fixing and then Abbott made a price adjustment in China where the prices of main products were reduced

On December 16 2014 Tian Junwei (ldquoTianrdquo) a Chinese citizen in Beijing sued Carrefour Shuangjing Branch (ldquoCarrefourrdquo) and Abbott (Shanghai) Sales Company (ldquoAbbottrdquo) at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (ldquoIP Courtrdquo) for their monopolistic price-fixing which damaged his interests However Carrefour and Abbott challenged the jurisdiction of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court They claimed there were two reasons Firstly according to the jurisdiction rules of the IP court issued by the Supreme Court the IP court has no jurisdiction over anti-trust cases Secondly if this case is a contractual dispute the court that is in the place of Carrefour should hear it if this case is a tort dispute the Shanghai Intermediate Court should hear it

In the ruling of the IP Court the IP Court decided it has the jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases for the following reasons According to the Provisions On Causes Of Action In Civil Cases issued by Supreme Court (最高人民法院案由规定) antimonopoly dispute is a tertiary cause of action belonging to IP and competition disputes Also according to the Provisions concerning the Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京

市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问题的规定 ) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was an IP and competition dispute and was sued after November 6 2014 Thus the IP Court had jurisdiction

Both Carrefour and Abbott appealed to the Beijing High Court over the jurisdiction ruling but the Beijing High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original ruling Reasons are listed in the written ruling issued on June 18 2015 Firstly the nature of the case was an antimonopoly dispute In accordance with Provisions of the Supreme Peoples Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民

事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) and Civil Litigation Law the monopolistic civil disputes in the first instance shall be under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Peoples Courts and an action involving a contractual dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the peoples court of the place where the defendant is domiciled or where the contract is performed Carrefour as the defendant in this case is domiciled in Chaoyang District Beijing Therefore the courts of Beijing have jurisdiction over this case Secondly according to article 3 of the Notification on the Jurisdiction of Intellectual Property Courts issued by Supreme Court (关于知识产权法院案件管辖

等有关问题的通知) IP courts have jurisdiction over first-instance civil disputes arising from monopolistic practices Lastly according to Provisions concerning the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 23 of 52

discovered both vertical and horizontal agreements in a case following the Audi case and the Chrysler case All these cases are rooted in the same industry indicating that industrial features play a large role in raising anti-trust concerns In fact it appears that the entire automotive industry is under antitrust scrutiny

Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC19

This case involved both a horizontal agreement and an administrative monopoly

A total fine of CNY 1318 million was imposed on the involved companies

Facts

In June 2015 the NDRC through its website announced the decision made by its regional branch -Yunnan Provincial Development and Reform Commission (ldquoYunnan DRCrdquo) regarding the horizontal monopolistic agreement case involving Yunnan Communications Administration and local subsidiaries of four state-owned telecommunication companies

Through the investigation Yunnan DRC found that Yunnan Communications Administration as a competent government agency had organized several meetings involving Yunnan branches of four state-owned telecoms - China Mobile China Telecom China Unicom and China Tietong in August and September of 2014 At the end of 2009 the four local branches entered into an agreement to regulate their sales promotions in terms of limiting the promotional items amount and frequency

Furthermore the agreement provides certain measures to ensure the implementation of relevant restrictions on promotions Specifically in case any cartel member violates the agreement the others could file complaints with Yunnan Communications Administration and the agency would then issue a rectification notice to the rule-breaker

Yunnan DRC stated that the four telecoms were main competitors in the relevant market and the promotions as a significant competition measure would exert direct influence on the final prices of the products The horizontal agreement organized by Yunnan Communications Administration on sales promotions restricted the competition capacity of telecoms and as a result eliminated the competition in the relevant market Consequently the behaviour of Yunnan Communications Administration violated article 8 20 of the AML and constituted administrative monopoly in terms of ldquoforcing undertakings to conduct monopolistic behaviour prohibited by the AMLrdquo

19 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpwwwsdpcgovcnfzgggzjgjdyfldjjszhdt201506t20150602_694802html 20 Article 8 of the AML Administrative organs and the public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 24 of 52

With respect to the penalties Yunnan DRC fined the local branch of China Tietong CNY 200000 for reaching but not implementing the agreement in regards to the other three telecoms a total fine of CNY 1298 million amounting to 2 of the sales of the relevant business in the previous year were imposed for entering into and implementing the horizontal monopolistic agreement

Analysis

The telecoms industry is still the enforcement priority of the antitrust enforcement authorities A company cannot be exempted from punishment even though it is forced by competent authorities to conduct monopoly behaviour

DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC21

Both a horizontal monopolistic agreement and a vertical monopolistic agreement were involved in this case

A total fine of CNY 14242 million was imposed on DongFeng Nissan and its distributors

Facts

In September 2015 the Guangdong Development and Reform Commission (ldquoGuangdong DRCrdquo) released an announcement regarding the administrative penalties on DongFeng Nissan and its provincial distributors for concluding price-related monopolistic agreements More specifically DongFeng Nissan was imposed a fine of CNY 1233 million for breaching article 14 of the AML in terms of restricting the resale price of certain car models 17 distributors domiciled in Guangdong were collectively fined CNY 1912 million for violating article 1322 of the AML in terms of entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements

According to the published official release the Guangdong DRC launched the investigation in August 2014 The authority discovered that from 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissan had set a rigorous restriction on its distributorsrsquo abilities to determine the resale prices of certain car models including the quoted prices in various platforms and the final resale price In addition DongFeng Nissan punished the distributors that failed to abide by such price restrictions in 2013 The authority 21 The original Chinese notice published by Guangdong DRC is available at httpwwwgddpcgovcnzwgkgzdtgzyw201509t20150910_328993html 22 Article 13 of the AML The following Monopolistic agreements among competing operators shall be prohibited (i) fix or change prices of commodities (ii) limit the outputs or sales volume of commodities (iii) segment the sales markets or the raw material purchasing markets (iv) limit the purchase of new technology new facilities or limit the development of new products new technology (v) jointly boycott transactions (vi) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-Monopoly Law enforcement Authority Monopolistic agreements in this Law refer to agreements decisions or other concerted practices that eliminate restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 25 of 52

believed that the vertical agreement concluded between DongFeng Nissan and its distributors eliminated and restricted the competition in the relevant market and damaged the consumer welfare as well which violates article 14 of the AML

Furthermore from April 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissanrsquos distributors in Guangdong province held multiple meetings to discuss issues relevant to sale price reached and implemented a horizontal monopolistic agreement in terms of fixing the prices of some car models which is prohibited by article 13 of the AML

Considering that both DongFeng Nissan and the involved distributors positively cooperated with the investigation and ceased the illegal behaviour immediately after the investigation Guangdong DRC decided to impose a fine amounting to 3 of its previous yearrsquos turnovers on DongFeng Nissan and a fine ranging from 2 to 4 on the relevant distributors in accordance with articles 4623 and 4924 of the AML

Analysis

This case demonstrates that auto and related industries are still under close attention of the authority Considering the NDRCrsquos successful series of antitrust investigations conducted throughout the auto industry it is observed that the agency currently overseeing price-related antitrust issues in China has accumulated a substantial amount of experience regarding antitrust enforcement in the auto industry Now is the right time to speed up the law-making process by amending the set of rules released earlier and drafting new laws to advise the auto industry on antitrust compliance

Enforcement by the SAIC and its local branches

Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC25

The investigation was triggered by whistle blowerrsquos submission

Cartel members were collectively fined CNY 139 million 23 Article 46 of the AML In case the operators violate the relevant provisions of this Law concluding and implementing Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall order the operators to cease such act impose fines more than 1 but less than 10 of the total turnover in the preceding year and confiscate the illegal gains where the Monopolistic agreement is not implemented a fine less than RMB 500000 can be imposed If the operators involved in Monopolistic agreement on its own initiative report information concerning the conclusion of Monopolistic agreements and provide important evidences to the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority they may be given a mitigated punishment or be exempted from punishment in accordance with the circumstances Where the industrial associations violate this Law organizing the operators in the industry to conclude Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority may impose a fine less than RMB 500000 in serious circumstances the agency of social organization administration and registration may cancel its registration 24 Article 49 of the AML As for the imposition of the fines stipulated by the Article 46 47 and 48 of this Law the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall take elements such as the nature extent and time it lasts of the illegal act into consideration in determining the specific amount of the fines 25 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201506t20150601_156889html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 26 of 52

Facts

In April 2015 the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) issued administrative penalties on several brick manufacturers for entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements This is the first case relevant to monopolistic agreements that has been publicized by the SAIC since the beginning of this year

Ten cartel members were involved in the case including one company and nine individuals Similar with most antitrust cases the investigation started as a result of a whistle blowerrsquos submission After a thorough investigation Hunan AIC found that those local brick manufacturers had reached agreements on controlling production volume and dividing sales areas in the forms of production and sales agreements plans and meeting minutes

The enforcement authority reached the conclusion that these brick manufacturers violated article 13 of the AML and imposed a total fine of CNY 1389400 on them

Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC26

The organizer of the monopolistic agreement the animation association was fined CNY 100000

The antitrust authority did not punish the members of the monopolistic agreement

Facts

In December 2015 the Guangdong Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoGuangdong AICrdquo) published its administrative punishment decision in regards to Guangzhou Panyu Animation amp Game Association (ldquoGAGArdquo) organizing member companies to conclude a monopolistic agreement

According to the decision GAGA drafted the ldquoAgreement of Exhibition Alliancerdquo (ldquoAgreementrdquo) and convened a conference with member companies in order to discuss the content and conclusion of the Agreement 52 member companies entered into the Agreement which actually requested the alliance companies to merely participate in the exhibitions either organized or supported by GAGA in Guangzhou In addition the Agreement prohibited the alliance companies from attending any other exhibition except if they obtained prior approval of GAGA

After a thorough investigation Guangdong AIC believed that the conclusion of the Agreement among GAGA and the 52 member companies violated article 13 (5) of the AML in terms of boycott GAGA who was deeply involved and restricted member companiesrsquo choice of exhibitions through the Agreement could be deemed as

26 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151208_164680html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 27 of 52

the participant and organizer of the monopolistic agreement In accordance with article 46 of the AML Guangdong AIC imposed a fine of CNY 100000 on GAGA for organizing the conclusion of the monopolistic agreement

Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC27

Hubei AIC considered the coinsurance for Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance illegal

Twelve insurance companies were fined CNY 469 million in total

Facts

In December 2015 the Hubei Administrative for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHubei AICrdquo) disclosed its punishment on 12 insurance companies for signing illegal coinsurance agreements

The disclosed punishment decision suggests that the Hubei branch of China Pacific Life Insurance (ldquothe Companyrdquo) 11 other insurance companies and Wuhan Construction Safety Technology Consultation Center (ldquoWCSTCCrdquo) signed a Coinsurance Agreement on Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance (ldquoCoinsurance Agreementrdquo) of which the main contents include

1) The Company and 11 other involved companies as the coinsurers jointly take charge of the personal accident insurance concerned with the construction project directly administered by the Wuhan government WCSTCC is responsible for providing safety professionalism and technology services regarding the relevant personal accident insurance

2) The Company as the chief insurer of the coinsurance occupies 12 of the total amount of the insurance and the other 11 companies respectively occupy 8

3) The Company as the representative of the coinsurance is in charge of collecting the premium signing the standard form insurance policies and issuing the invoice in its own name The Company should share the charged premium with the other companies in accordance with the Coinsurance Agreement

4) Both the Company and the other insurance companies should pay 25 of the actually received premium to WCSTCC as the service fee WCSTCC will assist the coinsurers in providing safety and technology management service to the insured In addition the 11 insurance companies should pay 5 of their premium to the Company as the management fee

27 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165445html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 28 of 52

5) In case an accident happens the 12 companies will jointly bear the damages based on their respective shares in the coinsurance

6) There is a contact mechanism established in the coinsurance The coinsurers will regularly hold coinsurance conferences to discuss existing problems

Furthermore the coinsurers and WCSTCC also signed a self-discipline agreement and established a complete management system to assure the implementation of the Coinsurance Agreement Any party violating the Coinsurance Agreement would be punished

Hubei AIC found that WCSTCC was solely invested by Wuhan Construction Safety Management Association which was under Wuhan Construction Commission The centre helped implement certain functions of the Wuhan Urban Construction Safety Management Station and was responsible for quality supervision and safety supervision of municipal construction projects

It later became a prerequisite for construction companies to purchase insurance from any member of the coinsurance in order to get approval to commence their project According to the decision Hubei AIC launched another separate investigation against WCSTCC

Through the investigation Hubei AIC concluded that the Coinsurance Agreement constituted a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by article 13 of the AML with the following analysis

First coinsurance as a common business model to jointly share and lower risks is widely adopted in the insurance industry A coinsurance arrangement for a specific project in order to avoid high risks faced by one insurer could be legal However coinsurance should not target the entire market In this case prior to the Coinsurance Agreement the risks of the construction projects were unpredictable since the scale of the construction projects the difficulty of the construction and the amount of construction workers could not be available It is impossible to predict the risks of the projects thus it is not necessary to cooperate with other insurers to collectively bear the risks The purpose of the 12 insurance companies to establish the coinsurance is to avoid the competition which demonstrates the Coinsurance Agreement belongs to a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by the AML

Second the companies through entering into the coinsurance agreement actually divided the relevant market of construction project personal accident insurance in Wuhan city which affected the competition in the relevant market and damaged the interests of other competitors and the consumers In particular the Construction Law as amended in 2011 stipulates that the purchase of personal accident insurance is not mandatory and the construction companies have the right to choose whether to buy the said insurance or not As mentioned purchasing insurance from the coinsurance had been the prerequisite for construction companies to obtain administration

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 29 of 52

approval for the project which seriously distorts the fair competition in the market

Citing article 46 of the AML the 12 insurance companies were collectively fined CNY 469 million including fines on the companies and confiscation of illegal gains It is noteworthy that the fines were calculated based on the companiesrsquo 2014 annual sales of the insurance product in connection with the coinsurance The Company as the chief insurer was fined amounting to 6 of its 2014 annual sales of the relevant insurance product in the coinsurance and other companies were fined amounting to 2 of relevant sales For more specific information please see the following table

Company Name (Hubei Branch)

Fines (CNY million)

Percentage of the sales

Illegal Gains (CNY

million)

China Pacific Life Insurance 00653 6 0941

Sino Life 00145 2 04332

Alltrust Insurance 00145 2 04332

Taikang Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Continent Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Pacific Property Insurance

00145 2 04332

China Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

PICC Property and Casualty 00145 2 02599

Taiping General Insurance 00145 2 013

Union Life Insurance 00145 2 01177

Ping An Annuity Insurance Company of China

00145 2 04201

Ping An Property amp Casualty Insurance Company of China

00145 2 -

Subtotal 02248 - 44679

Total 46927

Analysis

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 30 of 52

Coinsurance as an effective approach to lower risks of insurers is widely used in the insurance industry Information sharing and agreements on coinsurance were generally considered efficient and legitimate However from an antitrust perspective coinsurance may raise competition concerns depending on the circumstances of each agreement In the case that there is enough capacity for one insurer to cover the potential risks the coinsurance might be considered as entering into a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC28

The first leniency applicant was exempted from fines

The other concrete companies were imposed a fine of CNY 180000

Facts

In December 2015 the concrete companies monopolistic agreement case investigated by Hunan AIC was published on SAICrsquos website

In accordance with the antitrust enforcement announcement of SAIC this case was triggered by complaints from the Yongzhou City peoplersquos congress After the preliminary review the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) initiated the formal investigation on seven concrete companies domiciled in Yongzhou City Hunan Province which were suspected of being involved in a monopolistic agreement in terms of division of the volumes of the products

After further investigation Hunan AIC found that the seven concrete companies concluded a partnership agreement in 2011 which requested the involved companies to enter into a partnership business with assets In addition according to the partnership agreement it was planned to establish a comprehensive office to manage production marketing and distribution of the products of all the partners The seven companies intended to jointly adjust and control the output of concrete based on the partnership agreement However because there were disagreements over the allocation of the injected assets and market shares the companies did not implement the partnership agreement The agreement was cancelled in December 2012

Based on the findings Hunan AIC concluded that the seven concrete companies as competitors of each other restricted and eliminated the competition in the relevant market through reaching the partnership agreement and dividing the volumes of sales which violated article 13(3) of the AML in terms of division of sales market Considering that the agreement had not been implemented and the limited influence of the agreement according to article 46 of the AML and article 27 of the Administrative Penalties Law small amount fines were imposed on the involved companies Six companies were fined CNY 30000 each for their illegal behaviour 28 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165504html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 31 of 52

Yongzhou Shuangyuan Building Materials Co Ltd as the first one to actively report the monopolistic agreement and cooperate with the enforcement authority was exempted from the punishment

Outlook

It is expected that the AMLrsquos enforcement on monopolistic agreements will continue in the future Industries such as automobile shipping pharmaceuticals insurance etc will still remain the priority of the antitrust enforcement

The antitrust enforcement authorities have published a series of regulations in order to clarify the substantial and procedural issues relevant to the antitrust enforcement However Chinarsquos current antitrust legislation regime is still immature In the following years we expect that more attention will be paid to the legislative improvements

Another remarkable issue for cartel members is that with more Chinese enterprises attaching increasing importance to the AML the follow-on civil damages actions might become a tendency in the future

C Abuse of Market Dominance

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen a decent increase of abuse of market dominance cases both in public enforcement and private litigation Oftentimes the authorities responsible for public enforcement generally find it difficult to pursue investigations against abuse of market dominance cases The following two main reasons are often cited to explain this standoff first it is hard for the authorities to define the relevant markets and prove the undertaking(s)rsquo dominant market position through economic approaches second it is hard to collect evidence regarding abusive practices

The cases related to IPRs abuse are emerging significantly particularly in the telecommunication media and technology (ldquoTMTrdquo) sectors

The SAICrsquos latest refusal-to-deal probe against a local drug maker shows that the SAIC and its local branches have increasingly acquired a profile as an abuse of dominance regulator

Significant Cases

Cases pursued by the SAIC

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 32 of 52

Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case29

Facts

The local authority in Dongfang city reported to the Hainan provincial branch of SAIC on April 23 2014 of the suspected dominance abuse The SAIC authorized its Hainan bureau to officially investigate the matter on 25 July 2014 according to a decision dated January 9 2015 The AIC concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its market dominance by requiring users to pay a deposit without any legal basis and or justifiable reasons

In terms of the relevant product market the local authority found that in this case it was the urban water supply market in Dongfang city and its surrounding townships where Dongfang Water was the sole public operator in the local water supply market with a 100 market share which made all water users completely reliant on the companyrsquos supply In term of market access the local authority found it very unlikely that there were other operators due to the strict regulations

The Hainan SAIC then concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its dominance as it charged users a deposit by threatening to refuse to register users and also by threatening to restrict the water supply Dongfang Waters charging of deposits lacked a legal basis and hadnt received government approval to the detriment of household consumers and business water users and hampered the improvement of management and services of the company Such conduct was in breach of Chinarsquos Anti-Monopoly Law

Hainan AIC levied a fine of CNY 593208 a lighter penalty equivalent to 2 of the companyrsquos annual sales for the previous year and confiscated illicit gains of CNY 38521 for abuse of market dominance

Analysis

It is noteworthy that although handled by a local authority supervised by the SAIC the antitrust agency detailed the relevant market definition the assessment of the dominant market position the abusive practices and the scrutiny of the justifiable reasons

Although the definition of the relevant market and the reasoning of the Hainan provincial AIC and the SAIC are subject to criticism it is still applausive to see that the antitrust regulators have realized the importance of the application of rule of reason in an abuse case In addition through itrsquos a published decision practitioners may observe the regulatorsrsquo reasoning and thus transparency and legal certainty have been generated

29 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzfcfjd201502t20150212_152066html last visited on October 18 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 33 of 52

Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms30

Facts

In June 2013 the Ningxia AIC under authorization of SAIC opened an antitrust investigation into the alleged tie-in sales by the three major state-owned telecommunications operators China Tietong China Unicom and China Telecom for the tie-in sale of fixed-line telephones with broadband Internet services The Ningxia AIC found that the three companies had bundled fixed-line phone services with Internet services to subscribers

During the investigation all three telecommunications companies admitted the tie-in practice had recognized that such practice had improper influence on competition and deprived the choices of consumers The three companies promised to undertake internal rectification timely and eliminate the ill effects resulting from such practice The parties committed to taking the following corrective measures

1) Taking internal rectifications and conducting training to staff about antitrust laws and stop tie-in sales practices

2) Making public commitments to allow subscribers a free choice of services and strengthening the propaganda through the operating room call centre and other channels

3) Unbundling fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

The Ningxia AIC decided to suspend the probe on 14 May 2015 on the grounds that the three companies had actively worked together with the investigators and proposed workable remedy plans

Analysis

In the official announcement Ningxia AIC concluded that the purpose of antitrust enforcement is to restrain monopolistic conducts the protection of competition and to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of consumers Given that during the investigation process the parties had actively cooperated with the investigation formed a more profound understanding of the dangers of tying behaviour and moreover the parties proposed and implemented positive corrective measures to be able to remove the ill impact of their actions the agency believed that the purpose of antitrust law enforcement was fulfilled

It is worth noting that the Ningxia AIC also required the three companies to implement the commitment by August 30 2015and the submission of the written

30 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158908html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158906html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158910html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 34 of 52

implementation report on July 102015 and August 102015 respectively which is another illustration that an effective commitment by the undertakings shall directly deal with the effect that is brought by the monopolistic behaviour In this case the effect of the monopolistic act was restricted to the choice of the consumers therefore the commitment by the undertaking aimed at allowing the freedom of choice and the unbundling of fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company31

Facts

The Liaoning AIC imposed a fine of approximately CNY 433m on the Fushun Branch of Liaoning Tobacco Co on 1 June 2015 The agency also ordered the company to stop its illicit behaviour

The Liaoning AIC received a tip-off that the accused Liaoning Tobacco Corsquos Fushun branch was conducting tie-in sales of non-high-demand cigarette brands with high-demand cigarette brands After gaining authorization from SAIC the agency officially started an investigation regarding the companyrsquos suspected abuse of market dominance in June 2014

Analysis

According to the announcement the tobacco company argued that the tobacco industry is a state controlled or monopolized industry with a lawful monopolistic position therefore the company shall not be subject to the norms of general market competition rules or the anti-monopoly law

In this regards the agency concluded that in terms of the status of the undertaking admittedly the first paragraph of article 17 of the AML says that the State shall protect the lawful business operations of undertakings in these industries with respect to the industries which are under the control of the State-owned economic sector and have a bearing on the lifeline of the national economy or national security and the industries which exercise monopoly over the production and sale of certain commodities according to law However the second paragraph continues to say that the undertakings mentioned above shall do business according to law be honest faithful and strictly self-disciplined and subject themselves to public supervision and they shall not harm the consumers interests by taking advantage of their position of control or their monopolistic production and sale of certain commodities In particular in the preceding paragraph the ldquolawful businessrdquo and ldquoaccording to lawrdquo imply that the AML shall apply in the business operation The agency therefore believes that

31 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201508t20150813_16

0208html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 35 of 52

there shall be no exemption for the undertaking concerned the defences of the undertaking concerned is not established

Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm32

Facts

The Chongqing AIC fined Chongqing Qingyang Pharmaceutical CNY 439308 for alleged dominance abuse

The investigation was initiated when the company contacted the agency for verification on its potential breach of the AML related to an allopurinol active pharmaceuticals ingredient (API) distribution agreement with its exclusive distributor The company provided the relevant agreement and information and the agency conducted an investigation into the company and some other relevant companies

Analysis

Relevant Market

During the investigation the agency found that pharmaceutical ingredients are a special commodity the API is used to produce the preparations The chemical API is only used for the production of the preparation and could be used as a medicine for clinic use

The preparation is produced according to the requirements of certain form of prepared drugs and for the purpose of treatment and prevention which can be used as medicine

The allopurinol is used for the common treatment of hyperuricemia However the other treatments are different in pharmacological effects or treatment effects as well as in the cost for the patient Furthermore the company is the only manufacturer and supplier in the market nationwide since July 2012 Therefore the agency concluded that the relevant market is the allopurinol API market

Considering that the qualification for manufacturing the allopurinol API is national wide and the normal practice for purchasers and suppliers is domestic the relevant geographic market is the Chinese market

The Market Dominance

During the investigation the agency found that the company is the only supplier and manufacturer of allopurinol API in China there is no other competitor in the

32 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151222_16

5152html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 36 of 52

market and the company has a monopoly in the market The evidence shows that the company has the ability to control the prices the position for the downstream is relatively weak

With respect to the market entry the agency found that the market entry is relatively high in addition other undertakings are dependent on the company Thus the agency believed the company to have market dominance

Refusal to Deal

The agency found that on September 25 2015 the company reached an exclusive agreement and distribution agreement with its distributor Based on these agreements the company didnrsquot supply allopurinol API to the said distributor and other companies despite the fact that those companies requested for allopurinol API but were turned down by the company

Absence of Reasonable Cause

The agency found that the companyrsquos refusal to deal was not in line with the needs of normal business operation or economic efficiency On the other hand the refusal to deal was aimed at increasing the market share of the allopurinol drug product Also the agency found that the stop of supply was a manipulation of market power as to maximize the profit to the most The agency further found that the exclusive distribution agreement with suspension of supply for six months and the refusal to supply was to eliminate and restrict the competition as to gain the monopolistic profit

The Consequence of Refusal to Deal

The agency concluded that the refusal to deal harmed the competition of the allopurinol preparations market Because of the suspension of supply many demanders had to reduce their production or switch to the supply of other products or stop their production The suspension of supply affected the competition of the downstream market Consequently the raising of the price of allopurinol API also raised the cost for other manufacturers of allopurinol preparations

Furthermore the refusal to deal led to capacity loss of the allopurinol preparation industry

Ultimately the refusal to deal increased the burden on consumers as the refusal to supply changed the supply-demand relationship in the market

The agency concluded that the Company abused its dominant position in the allopurinol API market by refusing to deal with intended buyers in the period between October 2013 and March 2014Therefore the Company violated article 17 (1) of the AML which prohibits business operators with a dominant market position from abusing that position such as the refusal to deal without any justifications

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 37 of 52

D Administrative Monopoly

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 witnessed antitrust authoritiesrsquo significant efforts regarding the enforcement against administrative monopoly According to Mr Dong Zhiming the deputy director general of Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly Bureau ever since the AML coming into force six cases in connection with administrative monopoly were investigated by NDRC and among them five cases were handled in the year of 2015 These cases touched abuses of administrative power in terms of designative deal in relation to transportation communication and pharmaceutical industries

The first private litigation related to administrative monopolistic acts was heard in the court which is a milestone case in the enforcement of the AML

Significant Cases

Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC33

Facts

In March 2015 the NDRC released the official letter to Shandong Provincial Department of Transportation (ldquoShandong DOTrdquo) on its website with respect to correct its abuse of administrative power to exclude and restrict competition

During the investigation the NDRC found that since 2011 Shandong DOT had issued multiple relevant government orders in order to require certain types of vehicles to be directly connected to two designated information and service platforms both of which are operated and technically supported by one company namely Shandong Jiutong Internet of Things Technology Co Ltd (ldquoJiutong ITTrdquo) Furthermore according to the orders issued by the competent administrative department all the vehicle satellite positioning terminals entering into Shandong provincial market should be debugged through the said technology service platform which is operated by the mentioned company In addition Shandong DOT released the cap prices of vehicle satellite positioning terminals which is identical to the 2012 bid-winning price in the Ministry of Transportation demonstration project

The NDRC believed that Shandong DOTrsquos behaviour eliminated and restricted the competition in the monitoring platform market and the vehicle terminal market deprived the right of transportation enterprises to choose vehicle terminals and monitoring platform on their owns unreasonably raised the sales prices of vehicle terminals and service fees charged by the platform and increased the costs of transportation enterprises Therefore the antitrust agency concluded that Shandong

33 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201503t20150327_668911html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 38 of 52

DOT violated article 8 of the AML which stipulates that ldquoadministrative organs and the public organizations with an administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude and restrict competitionrdquo Specifically Shandong DOT violated article 3234 in terms of requiring organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any designated operators and violated article 3735 in terms of setting rules with contents which eliminate and restrict competition

Based on article 51 of the AML ldquoWhere administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations abuse administrative powers performing activities which exclude and restrict competition the superior entity shall order it to correct impose administrative penalty on the chief officer and other staffs directly responsible pursuant to the laws The AML enforcement authority may give recommendations on disposal of activities to the relevant superior entityrdquo the NDRC proposed in writing that the Shandong provincial government should order Shandong DOT to rectify its behaviour with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Entirely open up the monitoring platform market by permitting transportation undertakings to freely choose any approved platform

2) Loosen the restrictions on the entry into Shandong vehicle terminals permit the undertakings to independently select the supplier of vehicle terminals and allow the qualified terminals to be connected to the relevant monitoring platform and

3) Revoke the official documentation relevant to the cap price of vehicle terminals in order to promote the price competition

Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 36

Facts

On 26 August 2015 the NDRC published its second decision with regard to the rectification of administrative monopoly since the beginning of this year According to the proposal letter sent to Anhui Provincial Government the investigation against the Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City (Bengbu HFPC) was trigged by third partiesrsquo complaints

34 Article 32 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to require organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any operators designated by them 35 Article 37 of the AML Administrative organs shall not abuse their administrative powers to set rules with contents which eliminate restrict competition 36 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201508t20150826_748682html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 39 of 52

The investigation suggests that Bengbu HFPC published three notices with regard to drugs procurement in April and May of this year

In the No C-2015-CG-X-111 Notice (ldquoNo111 Noticerdquo) released on 10 April2015 the health authority not only provided the dosage form and qualification of the requested drugs but also directly determined the suppliers of relevant drugs which eliminated and restricted the competition among pharmaceutical manufacturers and therefore violated articles 32 and 37 of the AML

In the No C-2015-CG-C-112 Notice (ldquoNo112 Noticerdquo) and No C-2015-CG-C-168 (ldquoNo 168 Noticerdquo) respectively released on 10 April and 22 May 2015 the Bengbu HFPC set discriminative qualification requirements on non-local undertakings in order to restrict their participation in the relevant bidding For instance in accordance with No 112 Notice to be a qualified bidder the turnover of non-local undertakings shall exceed CNY 2 billion which is 50 times as much as the turnover requirements of the local undertakings In the NDRCrsquos opinion the administrative monopoly activities conducted by the local health agency excluded the relevant undertakings from the market maintained the virtual-high prices of drugs and therefore violated articles 3237 and 37 of the AML

The NDRC suggested in a letter that Anhui Provincial Government should urge the Bengbu HFPC to rectify the abuse of monopoly powers with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Stop setting distinguishing restrictions on qualification requirements review standards and numbers of winning bidders as for local and non-local undertakings

2) Stop designating the suppliers of competitive drugs and

3) Take necessary measures to mitigate the negative effects resulting from the previous illegal monopolistic abuses

Outlook

At the beginning of the year the former director general of the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau under the NDRC Xu Kunlin stated that the agency would strengthen antitrust enforcement on abuse of administrative power in 2015

Since then the NDRC has made great efforts to rectify unreasonable abuses of administrative power The currently disclosed two cases investigated by the NDRC re-emphasize the Chinese Governmentrsquos strict scrutiny of antitrust issues in respect of

37 Article 34 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to restrict or reject the participation of operators from other regions in local bidding activities by measures such as prescribing discriminatory qualification requirements or assessment standards or by not publishing information according to law

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 40 of 52

administrative monopoly It reminds the local governments that antitrust compliance is of significant importance

III Private Litigation

A Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen more and more private antitrust litigations

The private antitrust litigation cases have become increasingly complicated especially the issues regarding the intersection areas of IP and antitrust law

Multinational giants and State-Owned Enterprises (the ldquoSOEsrdquo) are increasingly becoming the targets in antitrust civil litigations Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (the ldquoSMEsrdquo) tend to use the antitrust litigation to achieve their commercial goals in the business context

B Significant Cases

Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)38

This is the first-ever private litigation concerning administrative monopoly since the implementation of the AML in 2008

Facts

According to the currently disclosed details the case is relevant for designated trade

The plaintiff Shenzhen Sware Technology Co Ltd (ldquoSwarerdquo) is a software company The press releases suggest that Sware Gloden Software Co Ltd (ldquoGlodenrdquo) and Shanghai Ruban Software Co Ltd (ldquoShanghai Rubanrdquo) are the three main suppliers of construction cost software and possess the major shares of the relevant market An annual provincial vocational ability contest regarding the construction cost hosted by the Guangdong Department of Education (ldquoGuangdong DOE) designated Gloden as the exclusive supplier of the relevant software

After several unsuccessful verbal and written negotiations with Guangdong DOE in April 2014 Sware filed a lawsuit against Guangdong DOE before the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquothe Courtrdquo) alleging that the administrative organ abused its administrative power and violated the AML by designating exclusive software supplier for the contest and claimed a compensation for reasonable expense amounting to CNY 10800 Yuan

The opinions of the Court 38 The story of the case is available at httpfinancesinacomcnchinadfjj20150410074621924997shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 41 of 52

The full text of the judgment has not been disclosed yet In accordance with the information available to the public the Court invoked article 32 of the AML which prohibits an administrative organ from abusing its administrative power to require or in disguised form organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use only the commodities supplied by the entities designated by them The Court concluded that Guangdong DOE failed to prove the legitimacy of the designation and therefore abused its administration power

Currently the case is in appeal before the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court

Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 39

It is the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China

In the first instance ruling Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court ruled against Sinopec holding that the Yunnan branch of Sinopecs trading company was obligated to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its dominance in the sales market of refined oil by refusing to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding without justifiable reasons

In the second instance ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors Currently the case is pending

Facts

The First Trial

The lawsuit was filed before the Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoKunming Courtrdquo) in January 2014 Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy Co Ltd (ldquoYingdingrdquo) a bio-energy manufacturer claimed that Sinopec and the Yunnan branch of Sinopec trading company (ldquoSinopec Yunnan Branchrdquo) had failed to fulfil their obligations stipulated in the Renewable Energy Law and had abused their market dominance in sales market of refined oil by refusing to trade with Yingding without justifiable reasons

Sinopec and Sinopec Yunnan Branch mainly explained four reasons for why they rejected Yingdingrsquos biofuel Firstly Yingding had failed to prove that the biofuel complied with the relevant national standard and was safe to use Secondly Yingding had failed to provide complete trading terms Thirdly the laws and regulations regarding biofuel were incomplete the authorized refined oil sales companies were 39 The details of the case are available at httpnewsxinhuanetcomfortune2014-1217c_1113680039htm httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=9e71db51-6ff6-4d2c-8af6-8eacf023ebdeampKeyWord=E4BA91E58D97E79B88E9BC8E|E4B8ADE79FB3E58C96 httpnewsxinhuanetcomenergy2015-0422c_127721575htm httpwwwnbdcomcnarticles2015-04-23911348html last visited on December 17 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 42 of 52

obligated to purchase biofuel from the biofuel manufacturers if it met certain quality standards but there was a vacancy regarding how to reach the end consumers from the sales companies

On 8 December 2014 the Kunming Intermediate Peoples Court ruled that Sinopec Yunnan Branch bore a legal obligation to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its market dominance in refined oil market by refusing without any justifiable reasons to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding The court ordered Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network within 30 days Both Yingding and Sinopec filed appeals to the Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court

The Appellate Trial

The appeal hearing was held on 22 April 2015 in Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoYunnan Courtrdquo) Sinopec submitted 23 new pieces of evidence and introduced two expert witnesses in a bid to overturn several key elements in the first-instance ruling by Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court

In terms of the determination of the relevant market and the market dominance Sinopec argued that the relevant market in this case was for adipic acid monomethyl ester (ldquoAAMErdquo) the main ingredient of a biofuel additive known as BD100 Yingdingrsquos main product is BD100 which can be blended with fossil diesel to become biofuel In the AAME market Sinopec is a potential buyer instead of a market dominator In support of this argument Sinopec presented an expert witnessmdashGong Jiong a professor of economics at Beijings University of International Business and Economics who testified that AAME should be defined as the relevant product market on the basis of an economic analysis

However Yingding insisted that the first-instance ruling was correct in naming the sales market of refined oil as the relevant market and submitted new evidence an article on Sinopecs website that claimed it had a 67 market share in Yunnan to help establish the claim that Sinopec had market dominance

Another main dispute was whether Yingdingrsquos biofuel product met national standards which would make it mandatory for Sinopec to purchase under Chinas Renewable Energy Law The law stipulates that biofuel producers must sell their products first to an authorized refined oil sales company and the sales companies are obliged to buy the fuel if it meets certain quality standards In order to test the quality Sinopec introduced the second expert witness Lin Jianmin a leading author of Chinarsquos national biofuel standard Lin Jianmin pointed out that there are currently quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology which gives Sinopec a justifiable reason not to trade with Yingding Moreover Sinopec presented some precedents in which consumers had complained about the biofuel quality and also claimed that China didnt have a sound regulatory framework to support biofuel production neither in testing nor in sales

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 43 of 52

Nevertheless to refute this point Yingding referred to an earlier test in co-operation with Sinopec in 2011 where selected buses in Kunming used biofuel blended by Sinopec using BD100 produced by Yingding

On August 13 2015 Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors and now this case is pending In the written appellate ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court did not provide any details regarding its reasoning

Key Issues of the Case

Is there any competition between Yingding and Sinopec

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case the product of Yingding is biofuel while Sinopec does not engage in the business of biofuel From this perspective Yingding and Sinopec are not competitors Thus it is not necessary and not reasonable for Sinopec to eliminate or restrict the competition from Yingding

Relevant Market

The definition of the relevant market is a prerequisite to determine whether competition exists and whether the AML is applicable In accordance with the Judicial Interpretation of Antitrust civil litigation the plaintiff shall take the responsibility to prove the defendantrsquos dominance in the relevant market Also the methods of defining the relevant market are stipulated in the Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition (ldquoGuidelinesrdquo) However both Yingding and Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court defined the relevant market as the sales market of refined oil without sufficient antitrust analysis none of the methods in the Guidelines were used Therefore the definition of the relevant market remains arguable and needs to be sufficiently analysed in the upcoming retrial

Justifiable Reasons

The abuse of market dominance includes the behaviour of refusing to trade without justifiable reasons according to the AML but in the first instance ruling justifiable reasons were not investigated by the court During the appellate trial the expert witness introduced by Sinopec claimed that there were quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology and this was a justifiable reason to refuse to trade with Yingding Even though the first instance court and the appellate court did not reason the justifiable reason it should be discussed and investigated further during the retrial

AML or Renewable Energy Law

The claims of Yingding were based on both the AML and the Renewable Energy Law (ldquoRELrdquo) and the first instance ruling referred to both the AML and the REL as

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 44 of 52

well It seems that the laws the first instance court referred to were comprehensive but in fact the reasoning was not clear and logical In the first instance ruling some disputes regarding the AML were reviewed but all the orders were not based on the AML Specifically the first instance court ordered the Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network based on the REL and dismissed the other claims That the orders were not on account of reasoning is illogical It is anticipated that during the retrial the application of the laws will be clearer

Analysis

A lot of issues have not been clearly analysed by the courts such as the relevant market and the justifiable reasons Since the case is remanded the above-mentioned issues are expected to be resolved in the retrial In addition Yingding was in a disadvantaged position compared to its first instance trial since its claims based on the AML were challenged greatly during the appellate trial In the retrial it is probable that Yingding may switch its litigation strategy and base its claims on the REL Therefore maybe more preparation regarding the REL can give Sinopec a leg up

Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)

Rijing Electric a Chinese distributor seeks CNY 5m compensation

The first hearing was on 9 June 2015 and ended without a ruling

Facts

Rijing Electric (ldquoRijingrdquo) a Shanghai-based company and a former distributor for Panasonic accused Panasonic of abusing its dominance and dividing the market through monopolistic practice in an antitrust lawsuit filed in 2014 with Shanghai No 1 Intermediate Court (ldquoShanghai Courtrdquo) claiming compensation of CNY 5m (USD 815370) Wenzhou Mingda Automation System Co and Shanghai Qingying Automation Equipment as the distributor of Panasonic in China are the co-defendants were accused of conducting monopolistic behaviours by implementing Panasonicrsquos policy

The first hearing for evidence exchange was on June 9 2015 Rijing claimed a policy allegedly introduced by Panasonic in 2009 restricted the competition between distributors Panasonic claims the policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo and has full justifiable reasons It explained that the products in question required customization at considerable cost to distributors before its sale to customers Once carried out however other distributors leaving them open to quote much lower prices than the original distributor could simply and relatively cheap replicate this customization Besides Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and that the plaintiff had failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic said its market share for the four products

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 45 of 52

under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases Also Rijing failed to challenge the policy when it was first introduced instead initially agreeing it was reasonable as e-mail evidence submitted by Panasonic suggests

Key Issues of the Case

Whether Panasonic occupied a market dominant position

It is reported that Rijing claimed that Panasonic had abused its market dominance but Rijing failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and its market share for the four products under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases

Analysis

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case Panasonicrsquos policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo rather than to eliminate or restrict competition

Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals40 (Pending)

It is a battle over patent licensing issues

It is viewed as being among the most complicated antitrust lawsuits in China

The first hearing was on 17 and 18 December 2015

Facts

Four Chinese rare earth companies Ningbo Ketian Magnet Ningbo Permanent Magnetics Ningbo Tongchuang Strong Magnet Material and Ningbo Huahui Magnetic Industry filed antitrust lawsuits against Hitachi Metals over alleged patent licensing issues regarding rare earth magnets on December 11 2014 with the Ningbo Intermediate Peoples Court (ldquoNingbo Courtrdquo) in Zhejiang province As reported four Chinese rare earth companies claimed Hitachi Metals abused its market dominance and hurt the industry competition by refusing to license the patents to them The patents in this case are used in the manufacturing of sintered neodymium iron boron (ldquoNdFeBrdquo) magnets a rare-earth magnet alloy widely used in parts for airplanes automobiles and other products

Hitachi Metals filed a challenge with the Ningbo Court over its jurisdiction in April 2015 After Ningbo Court rejected Hitachi Metals jurisdiction objection on 28 April 2015 Hitachi Metals appealed to the Zhejiang High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoZhejiang

40The details of the story are available at httpwwwzbmagcomnews_viewphpid=80 httpwwwhitachicomcnaboutpress201510-121118_ahtml last visited on December 22 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 46 of 52

Courtrdquo) but Zhejiang Court affirmed the ruling of the Ningbo Court

The first day of a two-day hearing took place on 17 December 2015 during which the two sides cross-examined each otherrsquos evidence The evidence focused on clearing up several key elements in the case including the relevant market whether Hitachi Metals has dominance on that market and whether both sides acted in good faith during the licensing negotiations

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Product Market

The four Chinese rare earth companies claimed that the relevant product market should be the NdFeb-related patent licensing market However Hitachi Metals believed that the physical NdFeb market rather than the patent licensing market should be the relevant product market which is meaningful for assess the real competitive effects on the market

Whether Hitachi Metals occupies a dominant market position

In terms of market dominance Hitachi Metals claimed it does not occupy a dominant position because Hitachi Metalsrsquo patents were not in a standard in this case and there are substitutable technologies in the market SEP holders have the obligation to license on FRAND terms but none-SEP holders do not So while a refusal to license a SEP may constitute abuse of dominance refusal to license a non-SEP mdash even by a patent holder with a dominant position mdash should not be considered as an abuse

Analysis

Hitachi Metals as a patent holder should have the right to decide whether to retain those patents or not or who to license According to the legal theory the purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage and protect innovation by conferring monopoly right mdash that is to give intellectual property owners the proprietary rights which can exclude others from using the intellectual property The SEP holders admittedly need to comply with FRAND terms which can maintain a robust balance between competition and monopoly whereas the further intervention of antitrust law into non-SEP patents may undermine the purpose of intellectual property law To which extent the antitrust law should intervene is yet to be seen

Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei41

A confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the Beijing IP court made by the Beijing High Court

41 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcncpwswbjzscq201511t20151103_12225640htm last visited on December 28 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 47 of 52

Facts

On August 2 2013 the NDRC penalized Abbott for monopolistic price-fixing and then Abbott made a price adjustment in China where the prices of main products were reduced

On December 16 2014 Tian Junwei (ldquoTianrdquo) a Chinese citizen in Beijing sued Carrefour Shuangjing Branch (ldquoCarrefourrdquo) and Abbott (Shanghai) Sales Company (ldquoAbbottrdquo) at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (ldquoIP Courtrdquo) for their monopolistic price-fixing which damaged his interests However Carrefour and Abbott challenged the jurisdiction of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court They claimed there were two reasons Firstly according to the jurisdiction rules of the IP court issued by the Supreme Court the IP court has no jurisdiction over anti-trust cases Secondly if this case is a contractual dispute the court that is in the place of Carrefour should hear it if this case is a tort dispute the Shanghai Intermediate Court should hear it

In the ruling of the IP Court the IP Court decided it has the jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases for the following reasons According to the Provisions On Causes Of Action In Civil Cases issued by Supreme Court (最高人民法院案由规定) antimonopoly dispute is a tertiary cause of action belonging to IP and competition disputes Also according to the Provisions concerning the Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京

市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问题的规定 ) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was an IP and competition dispute and was sued after November 6 2014 Thus the IP Court had jurisdiction

Both Carrefour and Abbott appealed to the Beijing High Court over the jurisdiction ruling but the Beijing High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original ruling Reasons are listed in the written ruling issued on June 18 2015 Firstly the nature of the case was an antimonopoly dispute In accordance with Provisions of the Supreme Peoples Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民

事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) and Civil Litigation Law the monopolistic civil disputes in the first instance shall be under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Peoples Courts and an action involving a contractual dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the peoples court of the place where the defendant is domiciled or where the contract is performed Carrefour as the defendant in this case is domiciled in Chaoyang District Beijing Therefore the courts of Beijing have jurisdiction over this case Secondly according to article 3 of the Notification on the Jurisdiction of Intellectual Property Courts issued by Supreme Court (关于知识产权法院案件管辖

等有关问题的通知) IP courts have jurisdiction over first-instance civil disputes arising from monopolistic practices Lastly according to Provisions concerning the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 24 of 52

With respect to the penalties Yunnan DRC fined the local branch of China Tietong CNY 200000 for reaching but not implementing the agreement in regards to the other three telecoms a total fine of CNY 1298 million amounting to 2 of the sales of the relevant business in the previous year were imposed for entering into and implementing the horizontal monopolistic agreement

Analysis

The telecoms industry is still the enforcement priority of the antitrust enforcement authorities A company cannot be exempted from punishment even though it is forced by competent authorities to conduct monopoly behaviour

DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC21

Both a horizontal monopolistic agreement and a vertical monopolistic agreement were involved in this case

A total fine of CNY 14242 million was imposed on DongFeng Nissan and its distributors

Facts

In September 2015 the Guangdong Development and Reform Commission (ldquoGuangdong DRCrdquo) released an announcement regarding the administrative penalties on DongFeng Nissan and its provincial distributors for concluding price-related monopolistic agreements More specifically DongFeng Nissan was imposed a fine of CNY 1233 million for breaching article 14 of the AML in terms of restricting the resale price of certain car models 17 distributors domiciled in Guangdong were collectively fined CNY 1912 million for violating article 1322 of the AML in terms of entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements

According to the published official release the Guangdong DRC launched the investigation in August 2014 The authority discovered that from 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissan had set a rigorous restriction on its distributorsrsquo abilities to determine the resale prices of certain car models including the quoted prices in various platforms and the final resale price In addition DongFeng Nissan punished the distributors that failed to abide by such price restrictions in 2013 The authority 21 The original Chinese notice published by Guangdong DRC is available at httpwwwgddpcgovcnzwgkgzdtgzyw201509t20150910_328993html 22 Article 13 of the AML The following Monopolistic agreements among competing operators shall be prohibited (i) fix or change prices of commodities (ii) limit the outputs or sales volume of commodities (iii) segment the sales markets or the raw material purchasing markets (iv) limit the purchase of new technology new facilities or limit the development of new products new technology (v) jointly boycott transactions (vi) other monopolistic agreements determined by the Anti-Monopoly Law enforcement Authority Monopolistic agreements in this Law refer to agreements decisions or other concerted practices that eliminate restrict competition

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 25 of 52

believed that the vertical agreement concluded between DongFeng Nissan and its distributors eliminated and restricted the competition in the relevant market and damaged the consumer welfare as well which violates article 14 of the AML

Furthermore from April 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissanrsquos distributors in Guangdong province held multiple meetings to discuss issues relevant to sale price reached and implemented a horizontal monopolistic agreement in terms of fixing the prices of some car models which is prohibited by article 13 of the AML

Considering that both DongFeng Nissan and the involved distributors positively cooperated with the investigation and ceased the illegal behaviour immediately after the investigation Guangdong DRC decided to impose a fine amounting to 3 of its previous yearrsquos turnovers on DongFeng Nissan and a fine ranging from 2 to 4 on the relevant distributors in accordance with articles 4623 and 4924 of the AML

Analysis

This case demonstrates that auto and related industries are still under close attention of the authority Considering the NDRCrsquos successful series of antitrust investigations conducted throughout the auto industry it is observed that the agency currently overseeing price-related antitrust issues in China has accumulated a substantial amount of experience regarding antitrust enforcement in the auto industry Now is the right time to speed up the law-making process by amending the set of rules released earlier and drafting new laws to advise the auto industry on antitrust compliance

Enforcement by the SAIC and its local branches

Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC25

The investigation was triggered by whistle blowerrsquos submission

Cartel members were collectively fined CNY 139 million 23 Article 46 of the AML In case the operators violate the relevant provisions of this Law concluding and implementing Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall order the operators to cease such act impose fines more than 1 but less than 10 of the total turnover in the preceding year and confiscate the illegal gains where the Monopolistic agreement is not implemented a fine less than RMB 500000 can be imposed If the operators involved in Monopolistic agreement on its own initiative report information concerning the conclusion of Monopolistic agreements and provide important evidences to the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority they may be given a mitigated punishment or be exempted from punishment in accordance with the circumstances Where the industrial associations violate this Law organizing the operators in the industry to conclude Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority may impose a fine less than RMB 500000 in serious circumstances the agency of social organization administration and registration may cancel its registration 24 Article 49 of the AML As for the imposition of the fines stipulated by the Article 46 47 and 48 of this Law the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall take elements such as the nature extent and time it lasts of the illegal act into consideration in determining the specific amount of the fines 25 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201506t20150601_156889html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 26 of 52

Facts

In April 2015 the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) issued administrative penalties on several brick manufacturers for entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements This is the first case relevant to monopolistic agreements that has been publicized by the SAIC since the beginning of this year

Ten cartel members were involved in the case including one company and nine individuals Similar with most antitrust cases the investigation started as a result of a whistle blowerrsquos submission After a thorough investigation Hunan AIC found that those local brick manufacturers had reached agreements on controlling production volume and dividing sales areas in the forms of production and sales agreements plans and meeting minutes

The enforcement authority reached the conclusion that these brick manufacturers violated article 13 of the AML and imposed a total fine of CNY 1389400 on them

Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC26

The organizer of the monopolistic agreement the animation association was fined CNY 100000

The antitrust authority did not punish the members of the monopolistic agreement

Facts

In December 2015 the Guangdong Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoGuangdong AICrdquo) published its administrative punishment decision in regards to Guangzhou Panyu Animation amp Game Association (ldquoGAGArdquo) organizing member companies to conclude a monopolistic agreement

According to the decision GAGA drafted the ldquoAgreement of Exhibition Alliancerdquo (ldquoAgreementrdquo) and convened a conference with member companies in order to discuss the content and conclusion of the Agreement 52 member companies entered into the Agreement which actually requested the alliance companies to merely participate in the exhibitions either organized or supported by GAGA in Guangzhou In addition the Agreement prohibited the alliance companies from attending any other exhibition except if they obtained prior approval of GAGA

After a thorough investigation Guangdong AIC believed that the conclusion of the Agreement among GAGA and the 52 member companies violated article 13 (5) of the AML in terms of boycott GAGA who was deeply involved and restricted member companiesrsquo choice of exhibitions through the Agreement could be deemed as

26 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151208_164680html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 27 of 52

the participant and organizer of the monopolistic agreement In accordance with article 46 of the AML Guangdong AIC imposed a fine of CNY 100000 on GAGA for organizing the conclusion of the monopolistic agreement

Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC27

Hubei AIC considered the coinsurance for Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance illegal

Twelve insurance companies were fined CNY 469 million in total

Facts

In December 2015 the Hubei Administrative for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHubei AICrdquo) disclosed its punishment on 12 insurance companies for signing illegal coinsurance agreements

The disclosed punishment decision suggests that the Hubei branch of China Pacific Life Insurance (ldquothe Companyrdquo) 11 other insurance companies and Wuhan Construction Safety Technology Consultation Center (ldquoWCSTCCrdquo) signed a Coinsurance Agreement on Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance (ldquoCoinsurance Agreementrdquo) of which the main contents include

1) The Company and 11 other involved companies as the coinsurers jointly take charge of the personal accident insurance concerned with the construction project directly administered by the Wuhan government WCSTCC is responsible for providing safety professionalism and technology services regarding the relevant personal accident insurance

2) The Company as the chief insurer of the coinsurance occupies 12 of the total amount of the insurance and the other 11 companies respectively occupy 8

3) The Company as the representative of the coinsurance is in charge of collecting the premium signing the standard form insurance policies and issuing the invoice in its own name The Company should share the charged premium with the other companies in accordance with the Coinsurance Agreement

4) Both the Company and the other insurance companies should pay 25 of the actually received premium to WCSTCC as the service fee WCSTCC will assist the coinsurers in providing safety and technology management service to the insured In addition the 11 insurance companies should pay 5 of their premium to the Company as the management fee

27 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165445html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 28 of 52

5) In case an accident happens the 12 companies will jointly bear the damages based on their respective shares in the coinsurance

6) There is a contact mechanism established in the coinsurance The coinsurers will regularly hold coinsurance conferences to discuss existing problems

Furthermore the coinsurers and WCSTCC also signed a self-discipline agreement and established a complete management system to assure the implementation of the Coinsurance Agreement Any party violating the Coinsurance Agreement would be punished

Hubei AIC found that WCSTCC was solely invested by Wuhan Construction Safety Management Association which was under Wuhan Construction Commission The centre helped implement certain functions of the Wuhan Urban Construction Safety Management Station and was responsible for quality supervision and safety supervision of municipal construction projects

It later became a prerequisite for construction companies to purchase insurance from any member of the coinsurance in order to get approval to commence their project According to the decision Hubei AIC launched another separate investigation against WCSTCC

Through the investigation Hubei AIC concluded that the Coinsurance Agreement constituted a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by article 13 of the AML with the following analysis

First coinsurance as a common business model to jointly share and lower risks is widely adopted in the insurance industry A coinsurance arrangement for a specific project in order to avoid high risks faced by one insurer could be legal However coinsurance should not target the entire market In this case prior to the Coinsurance Agreement the risks of the construction projects were unpredictable since the scale of the construction projects the difficulty of the construction and the amount of construction workers could not be available It is impossible to predict the risks of the projects thus it is not necessary to cooperate with other insurers to collectively bear the risks The purpose of the 12 insurance companies to establish the coinsurance is to avoid the competition which demonstrates the Coinsurance Agreement belongs to a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by the AML

Second the companies through entering into the coinsurance agreement actually divided the relevant market of construction project personal accident insurance in Wuhan city which affected the competition in the relevant market and damaged the interests of other competitors and the consumers In particular the Construction Law as amended in 2011 stipulates that the purchase of personal accident insurance is not mandatory and the construction companies have the right to choose whether to buy the said insurance or not As mentioned purchasing insurance from the coinsurance had been the prerequisite for construction companies to obtain administration

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 29 of 52

approval for the project which seriously distorts the fair competition in the market

Citing article 46 of the AML the 12 insurance companies were collectively fined CNY 469 million including fines on the companies and confiscation of illegal gains It is noteworthy that the fines were calculated based on the companiesrsquo 2014 annual sales of the insurance product in connection with the coinsurance The Company as the chief insurer was fined amounting to 6 of its 2014 annual sales of the relevant insurance product in the coinsurance and other companies were fined amounting to 2 of relevant sales For more specific information please see the following table

Company Name (Hubei Branch)

Fines (CNY million)

Percentage of the sales

Illegal Gains (CNY

million)

China Pacific Life Insurance 00653 6 0941

Sino Life 00145 2 04332

Alltrust Insurance 00145 2 04332

Taikang Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Continent Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Pacific Property Insurance

00145 2 04332

China Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

PICC Property and Casualty 00145 2 02599

Taiping General Insurance 00145 2 013

Union Life Insurance 00145 2 01177

Ping An Annuity Insurance Company of China

00145 2 04201

Ping An Property amp Casualty Insurance Company of China

00145 2 -

Subtotal 02248 - 44679

Total 46927

Analysis

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 30 of 52

Coinsurance as an effective approach to lower risks of insurers is widely used in the insurance industry Information sharing and agreements on coinsurance were generally considered efficient and legitimate However from an antitrust perspective coinsurance may raise competition concerns depending on the circumstances of each agreement In the case that there is enough capacity for one insurer to cover the potential risks the coinsurance might be considered as entering into a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC28

The first leniency applicant was exempted from fines

The other concrete companies were imposed a fine of CNY 180000

Facts

In December 2015 the concrete companies monopolistic agreement case investigated by Hunan AIC was published on SAICrsquos website

In accordance with the antitrust enforcement announcement of SAIC this case was triggered by complaints from the Yongzhou City peoplersquos congress After the preliminary review the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) initiated the formal investigation on seven concrete companies domiciled in Yongzhou City Hunan Province which were suspected of being involved in a monopolistic agreement in terms of division of the volumes of the products

After further investigation Hunan AIC found that the seven concrete companies concluded a partnership agreement in 2011 which requested the involved companies to enter into a partnership business with assets In addition according to the partnership agreement it was planned to establish a comprehensive office to manage production marketing and distribution of the products of all the partners The seven companies intended to jointly adjust and control the output of concrete based on the partnership agreement However because there were disagreements over the allocation of the injected assets and market shares the companies did not implement the partnership agreement The agreement was cancelled in December 2012

Based on the findings Hunan AIC concluded that the seven concrete companies as competitors of each other restricted and eliminated the competition in the relevant market through reaching the partnership agreement and dividing the volumes of sales which violated article 13(3) of the AML in terms of division of sales market Considering that the agreement had not been implemented and the limited influence of the agreement according to article 46 of the AML and article 27 of the Administrative Penalties Law small amount fines were imposed on the involved companies Six companies were fined CNY 30000 each for their illegal behaviour 28 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165504html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 31 of 52

Yongzhou Shuangyuan Building Materials Co Ltd as the first one to actively report the monopolistic agreement and cooperate with the enforcement authority was exempted from the punishment

Outlook

It is expected that the AMLrsquos enforcement on monopolistic agreements will continue in the future Industries such as automobile shipping pharmaceuticals insurance etc will still remain the priority of the antitrust enforcement

The antitrust enforcement authorities have published a series of regulations in order to clarify the substantial and procedural issues relevant to the antitrust enforcement However Chinarsquos current antitrust legislation regime is still immature In the following years we expect that more attention will be paid to the legislative improvements

Another remarkable issue for cartel members is that with more Chinese enterprises attaching increasing importance to the AML the follow-on civil damages actions might become a tendency in the future

C Abuse of Market Dominance

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen a decent increase of abuse of market dominance cases both in public enforcement and private litigation Oftentimes the authorities responsible for public enforcement generally find it difficult to pursue investigations against abuse of market dominance cases The following two main reasons are often cited to explain this standoff first it is hard for the authorities to define the relevant markets and prove the undertaking(s)rsquo dominant market position through economic approaches second it is hard to collect evidence regarding abusive practices

The cases related to IPRs abuse are emerging significantly particularly in the telecommunication media and technology (ldquoTMTrdquo) sectors

The SAICrsquos latest refusal-to-deal probe against a local drug maker shows that the SAIC and its local branches have increasingly acquired a profile as an abuse of dominance regulator

Significant Cases

Cases pursued by the SAIC

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 32 of 52

Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case29

Facts

The local authority in Dongfang city reported to the Hainan provincial branch of SAIC on April 23 2014 of the suspected dominance abuse The SAIC authorized its Hainan bureau to officially investigate the matter on 25 July 2014 according to a decision dated January 9 2015 The AIC concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its market dominance by requiring users to pay a deposit without any legal basis and or justifiable reasons

In terms of the relevant product market the local authority found that in this case it was the urban water supply market in Dongfang city and its surrounding townships where Dongfang Water was the sole public operator in the local water supply market with a 100 market share which made all water users completely reliant on the companyrsquos supply In term of market access the local authority found it very unlikely that there were other operators due to the strict regulations

The Hainan SAIC then concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its dominance as it charged users a deposit by threatening to refuse to register users and also by threatening to restrict the water supply Dongfang Waters charging of deposits lacked a legal basis and hadnt received government approval to the detriment of household consumers and business water users and hampered the improvement of management and services of the company Such conduct was in breach of Chinarsquos Anti-Monopoly Law

Hainan AIC levied a fine of CNY 593208 a lighter penalty equivalent to 2 of the companyrsquos annual sales for the previous year and confiscated illicit gains of CNY 38521 for abuse of market dominance

Analysis

It is noteworthy that although handled by a local authority supervised by the SAIC the antitrust agency detailed the relevant market definition the assessment of the dominant market position the abusive practices and the scrutiny of the justifiable reasons

Although the definition of the relevant market and the reasoning of the Hainan provincial AIC and the SAIC are subject to criticism it is still applausive to see that the antitrust regulators have realized the importance of the application of rule of reason in an abuse case In addition through itrsquos a published decision practitioners may observe the regulatorsrsquo reasoning and thus transparency and legal certainty have been generated

29 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzfcfjd201502t20150212_152066html last visited on October 18 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 33 of 52

Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms30

Facts

In June 2013 the Ningxia AIC under authorization of SAIC opened an antitrust investigation into the alleged tie-in sales by the three major state-owned telecommunications operators China Tietong China Unicom and China Telecom for the tie-in sale of fixed-line telephones with broadband Internet services The Ningxia AIC found that the three companies had bundled fixed-line phone services with Internet services to subscribers

During the investigation all three telecommunications companies admitted the tie-in practice had recognized that such practice had improper influence on competition and deprived the choices of consumers The three companies promised to undertake internal rectification timely and eliminate the ill effects resulting from such practice The parties committed to taking the following corrective measures

1) Taking internal rectifications and conducting training to staff about antitrust laws and stop tie-in sales practices

2) Making public commitments to allow subscribers a free choice of services and strengthening the propaganda through the operating room call centre and other channels

3) Unbundling fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

The Ningxia AIC decided to suspend the probe on 14 May 2015 on the grounds that the three companies had actively worked together with the investigators and proposed workable remedy plans

Analysis

In the official announcement Ningxia AIC concluded that the purpose of antitrust enforcement is to restrain monopolistic conducts the protection of competition and to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of consumers Given that during the investigation process the parties had actively cooperated with the investigation formed a more profound understanding of the dangers of tying behaviour and moreover the parties proposed and implemented positive corrective measures to be able to remove the ill impact of their actions the agency believed that the purpose of antitrust law enforcement was fulfilled

It is worth noting that the Ningxia AIC also required the three companies to implement the commitment by August 30 2015and the submission of the written

30 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158908html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158906html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158910html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 34 of 52

implementation report on July 102015 and August 102015 respectively which is another illustration that an effective commitment by the undertakings shall directly deal with the effect that is brought by the monopolistic behaviour In this case the effect of the monopolistic act was restricted to the choice of the consumers therefore the commitment by the undertaking aimed at allowing the freedom of choice and the unbundling of fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company31

Facts

The Liaoning AIC imposed a fine of approximately CNY 433m on the Fushun Branch of Liaoning Tobacco Co on 1 June 2015 The agency also ordered the company to stop its illicit behaviour

The Liaoning AIC received a tip-off that the accused Liaoning Tobacco Corsquos Fushun branch was conducting tie-in sales of non-high-demand cigarette brands with high-demand cigarette brands After gaining authorization from SAIC the agency officially started an investigation regarding the companyrsquos suspected abuse of market dominance in June 2014

Analysis

According to the announcement the tobacco company argued that the tobacco industry is a state controlled or monopolized industry with a lawful monopolistic position therefore the company shall not be subject to the norms of general market competition rules or the anti-monopoly law

In this regards the agency concluded that in terms of the status of the undertaking admittedly the first paragraph of article 17 of the AML says that the State shall protect the lawful business operations of undertakings in these industries with respect to the industries which are under the control of the State-owned economic sector and have a bearing on the lifeline of the national economy or national security and the industries which exercise monopoly over the production and sale of certain commodities according to law However the second paragraph continues to say that the undertakings mentioned above shall do business according to law be honest faithful and strictly self-disciplined and subject themselves to public supervision and they shall not harm the consumers interests by taking advantage of their position of control or their monopolistic production and sale of certain commodities In particular in the preceding paragraph the ldquolawful businessrdquo and ldquoaccording to lawrdquo imply that the AML shall apply in the business operation The agency therefore believes that

31 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201508t20150813_16

0208html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 35 of 52

there shall be no exemption for the undertaking concerned the defences of the undertaking concerned is not established

Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm32

Facts

The Chongqing AIC fined Chongqing Qingyang Pharmaceutical CNY 439308 for alleged dominance abuse

The investigation was initiated when the company contacted the agency for verification on its potential breach of the AML related to an allopurinol active pharmaceuticals ingredient (API) distribution agreement with its exclusive distributor The company provided the relevant agreement and information and the agency conducted an investigation into the company and some other relevant companies

Analysis

Relevant Market

During the investigation the agency found that pharmaceutical ingredients are a special commodity the API is used to produce the preparations The chemical API is only used for the production of the preparation and could be used as a medicine for clinic use

The preparation is produced according to the requirements of certain form of prepared drugs and for the purpose of treatment and prevention which can be used as medicine

The allopurinol is used for the common treatment of hyperuricemia However the other treatments are different in pharmacological effects or treatment effects as well as in the cost for the patient Furthermore the company is the only manufacturer and supplier in the market nationwide since July 2012 Therefore the agency concluded that the relevant market is the allopurinol API market

Considering that the qualification for manufacturing the allopurinol API is national wide and the normal practice for purchasers and suppliers is domestic the relevant geographic market is the Chinese market

The Market Dominance

During the investigation the agency found that the company is the only supplier and manufacturer of allopurinol API in China there is no other competitor in the

32 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151222_16

5152html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 36 of 52

market and the company has a monopoly in the market The evidence shows that the company has the ability to control the prices the position for the downstream is relatively weak

With respect to the market entry the agency found that the market entry is relatively high in addition other undertakings are dependent on the company Thus the agency believed the company to have market dominance

Refusal to Deal

The agency found that on September 25 2015 the company reached an exclusive agreement and distribution agreement with its distributor Based on these agreements the company didnrsquot supply allopurinol API to the said distributor and other companies despite the fact that those companies requested for allopurinol API but were turned down by the company

Absence of Reasonable Cause

The agency found that the companyrsquos refusal to deal was not in line with the needs of normal business operation or economic efficiency On the other hand the refusal to deal was aimed at increasing the market share of the allopurinol drug product Also the agency found that the stop of supply was a manipulation of market power as to maximize the profit to the most The agency further found that the exclusive distribution agreement with suspension of supply for six months and the refusal to supply was to eliminate and restrict the competition as to gain the monopolistic profit

The Consequence of Refusal to Deal

The agency concluded that the refusal to deal harmed the competition of the allopurinol preparations market Because of the suspension of supply many demanders had to reduce their production or switch to the supply of other products or stop their production The suspension of supply affected the competition of the downstream market Consequently the raising of the price of allopurinol API also raised the cost for other manufacturers of allopurinol preparations

Furthermore the refusal to deal led to capacity loss of the allopurinol preparation industry

Ultimately the refusal to deal increased the burden on consumers as the refusal to supply changed the supply-demand relationship in the market

The agency concluded that the Company abused its dominant position in the allopurinol API market by refusing to deal with intended buyers in the period between October 2013 and March 2014Therefore the Company violated article 17 (1) of the AML which prohibits business operators with a dominant market position from abusing that position such as the refusal to deal without any justifications

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 37 of 52

D Administrative Monopoly

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 witnessed antitrust authoritiesrsquo significant efforts regarding the enforcement against administrative monopoly According to Mr Dong Zhiming the deputy director general of Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly Bureau ever since the AML coming into force six cases in connection with administrative monopoly were investigated by NDRC and among them five cases were handled in the year of 2015 These cases touched abuses of administrative power in terms of designative deal in relation to transportation communication and pharmaceutical industries

The first private litigation related to administrative monopolistic acts was heard in the court which is a milestone case in the enforcement of the AML

Significant Cases

Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC33

Facts

In March 2015 the NDRC released the official letter to Shandong Provincial Department of Transportation (ldquoShandong DOTrdquo) on its website with respect to correct its abuse of administrative power to exclude and restrict competition

During the investigation the NDRC found that since 2011 Shandong DOT had issued multiple relevant government orders in order to require certain types of vehicles to be directly connected to two designated information and service platforms both of which are operated and technically supported by one company namely Shandong Jiutong Internet of Things Technology Co Ltd (ldquoJiutong ITTrdquo) Furthermore according to the orders issued by the competent administrative department all the vehicle satellite positioning terminals entering into Shandong provincial market should be debugged through the said technology service platform which is operated by the mentioned company In addition Shandong DOT released the cap prices of vehicle satellite positioning terminals which is identical to the 2012 bid-winning price in the Ministry of Transportation demonstration project

The NDRC believed that Shandong DOTrsquos behaviour eliminated and restricted the competition in the monitoring platform market and the vehicle terminal market deprived the right of transportation enterprises to choose vehicle terminals and monitoring platform on their owns unreasonably raised the sales prices of vehicle terminals and service fees charged by the platform and increased the costs of transportation enterprises Therefore the antitrust agency concluded that Shandong

33 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201503t20150327_668911html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 38 of 52

DOT violated article 8 of the AML which stipulates that ldquoadministrative organs and the public organizations with an administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude and restrict competitionrdquo Specifically Shandong DOT violated article 3234 in terms of requiring organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any designated operators and violated article 3735 in terms of setting rules with contents which eliminate and restrict competition

Based on article 51 of the AML ldquoWhere administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations abuse administrative powers performing activities which exclude and restrict competition the superior entity shall order it to correct impose administrative penalty on the chief officer and other staffs directly responsible pursuant to the laws The AML enforcement authority may give recommendations on disposal of activities to the relevant superior entityrdquo the NDRC proposed in writing that the Shandong provincial government should order Shandong DOT to rectify its behaviour with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Entirely open up the monitoring platform market by permitting transportation undertakings to freely choose any approved platform

2) Loosen the restrictions on the entry into Shandong vehicle terminals permit the undertakings to independently select the supplier of vehicle terminals and allow the qualified terminals to be connected to the relevant monitoring platform and

3) Revoke the official documentation relevant to the cap price of vehicle terminals in order to promote the price competition

Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 36

Facts

On 26 August 2015 the NDRC published its second decision with regard to the rectification of administrative monopoly since the beginning of this year According to the proposal letter sent to Anhui Provincial Government the investigation against the Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City (Bengbu HFPC) was trigged by third partiesrsquo complaints

34 Article 32 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to require organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any operators designated by them 35 Article 37 of the AML Administrative organs shall not abuse their administrative powers to set rules with contents which eliminate restrict competition 36 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201508t20150826_748682html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 39 of 52

The investigation suggests that Bengbu HFPC published three notices with regard to drugs procurement in April and May of this year

In the No C-2015-CG-X-111 Notice (ldquoNo111 Noticerdquo) released on 10 April2015 the health authority not only provided the dosage form and qualification of the requested drugs but also directly determined the suppliers of relevant drugs which eliminated and restricted the competition among pharmaceutical manufacturers and therefore violated articles 32 and 37 of the AML

In the No C-2015-CG-C-112 Notice (ldquoNo112 Noticerdquo) and No C-2015-CG-C-168 (ldquoNo 168 Noticerdquo) respectively released on 10 April and 22 May 2015 the Bengbu HFPC set discriminative qualification requirements on non-local undertakings in order to restrict their participation in the relevant bidding For instance in accordance with No 112 Notice to be a qualified bidder the turnover of non-local undertakings shall exceed CNY 2 billion which is 50 times as much as the turnover requirements of the local undertakings In the NDRCrsquos opinion the administrative monopoly activities conducted by the local health agency excluded the relevant undertakings from the market maintained the virtual-high prices of drugs and therefore violated articles 3237 and 37 of the AML

The NDRC suggested in a letter that Anhui Provincial Government should urge the Bengbu HFPC to rectify the abuse of monopoly powers with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Stop setting distinguishing restrictions on qualification requirements review standards and numbers of winning bidders as for local and non-local undertakings

2) Stop designating the suppliers of competitive drugs and

3) Take necessary measures to mitigate the negative effects resulting from the previous illegal monopolistic abuses

Outlook

At the beginning of the year the former director general of the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau under the NDRC Xu Kunlin stated that the agency would strengthen antitrust enforcement on abuse of administrative power in 2015

Since then the NDRC has made great efforts to rectify unreasonable abuses of administrative power The currently disclosed two cases investigated by the NDRC re-emphasize the Chinese Governmentrsquos strict scrutiny of antitrust issues in respect of

37 Article 34 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to restrict or reject the participation of operators from other regions in local bidding activities by measures such as prescribing discriminatory qualification requirements or assessment standards or by not publishing information according to law

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 40 of 52

administrative monopoly It reminds the local governments that antitrust compliance is of significant importance

III Private Litigation

A Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen more and more private antitrust litigations

The private antitrust litigation cases have become increasingly complicated especially the issues regarding the intersection areas of IP and antitrust law

Multinational giants and State-Owned Enterprises (the ldquoSOEsrdquo) are increasingly becoming the targets in antitrust civil litigations Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (the ldquoSMEsrdquo) tend to use the antitrust litigation to achieve their commercial goals in the business context

B Significant Cases

Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)38

This is the first-ever private litigation concerning administrative monopoly since the implementation of the AML in 2008

Facts

According to the currently disclosed details the case is relevant for designated trade

The plaintiff Shenzhen Sware Technology Co Ltd (ldquoSwarerdquo) is a software company The press releases suggest that Sware Gloden Software Co Ltd (ldquoGlodenrdquo) and Shanghai Ruban Software Co Ltd (ldquoShanghai Rubanrdquo) are the three main suppliers of construction cost software and possess the major shares of the relevant market An annual provincial vocational ability contest regarding the construction cost hosted by the Guangdong Department of Education (ldquoGuangdong DOE) designated Gloden as the exclusive supplier of the relevant software

After several unsuccessful verbal and written negotiations with Guangdong DOE in April 2014 Sware filed a lawsuit against Guangdong DOE before the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquothe Courtrdquo) alleging that the administrative organ abused its administrative power and violated the AML by designating exclusive software supplier for the contest and claimed a compensation for reasonable expense amounting to CNY 10800 Yuan

The opinions of the Court 38 The story of the case is available at httpfinancesinacomcnchinadfjj20150410074621924997shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 41 of 52

The full text of the judgment has not been disclosed yet In accordance with the information available to the public the Court invoked article 32 of the AML which prohibits an administrative organ from abusing its administrative power to require or in disguised form organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use only the commodities supplied by the entities designated by them The Court concluded that Guangdong DOE failed to prove the legitimacy of the designation and therefore abused its administration power

Currently the case is in appeal before the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court

Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 39

It is the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China

In the first instance ruling Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court ruled against Sinopec holding that the Yunnan branch of Sinopecs trading company was obligated to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its dominance in the sales market of refined oil by refusing to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding without justifiable reasons

In the second instance ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors Currently the case is pending

Facts

The First Trial

The lawsuit was filed before the Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoKunming Courtrdquo) in January 2014 Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy Co Ltd (ldquoYingdingrdquo) a bio-energy manufacturer claimed that Sinopec and the Yunnan branch of Sinopec trading company (ldquoSinopec Yunnan Branchrdquo) had failed to fulfil their obligations stipulated in the Renewable Energy Law and had abused their market dominance in sales market of refined oil by refusing to trade with Yingding without justifiable reasons

Sinopec and Sinopec Yunnan Branch mainly explained four reasons for why they rejected Yingdingrsquos biofuel Firstly Yingding had failed to prove that the biofuel complied with the relevant national standard and was safe to use Secondly Yingding had failed to provide complete trading terms Thirdly the laws and regulations regarding biofuel were incomplete the authorized refined oil sales companies were 39 The details of the case are available at httpnewsxinhuanetcomfortune2014-1217c_1113680039htm httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=9e71db51-6ff6-4d2c-8af6-8eacf023ebdeampKeyWord=E4BA91E58D97E79B88E9BC8E|E4B8ADE79FB3E58C96 httpnewsxinhuanetcomenergy2015-0422c_127721575htm httpwwwnbdcomcnarticles2015-04-23911348html last visited on December 17 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 42 of 52

obligated to purchase biofuel from the biofuel manufacturers if it met certain quality standards but there was a vacancy regarding how to reach the end consumers from the sales companies

On 8 December 2014 the Kunming Intermediate Peoples Court ruled that Sinopec Yunnan Branch bore a legal obligation to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its market dominance in refined oil market by refusing without any justifiable reasons to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding The court ordered Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network within 30 days Both Yingding and Sinopec filed appeals to the Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court

The Appellate Trial

The appeal hearing was held on 22 April 2015 in Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoYunnan Courtrdquo) Sinopec submitted 23 new pieces of evidence and introduced two expert witnesses in a bid to overturn several key elements in the first-instance ruling by Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court

In terms of the determination of the relevant market and the market dominance Sinopec argued that the relevant market in this case was for adipic acid monomethyl ester (ldquoAAMErdquo) the main ingredient of a biofuel additive known as BD100 Yingdingrsquos main product is BD100 which can be blended with fossil diesel to become biofuel In the AAME market Sinopec is a potential buyer instead of a market dominator In support of this argument Sinopec presented an expert witnessmdashGong Jiong a professor of economics at Beijings University of International Business and Economics who testified that AAME should be defined as the relevant product market on the basis of an economic analysis

However Yingding insisted that the first-instance ruling was correct in naming the sales market of refined oil as the relevant market and submitted new evidence an article on Sinopecs website that claimed it had a 67 market share in Yunnan to help establish the claim that Sinopec had market dominance

Another main dispute was whether Yingdingrsquos biofuel product met national standards which would make it mandatory for Sinopec to purchase under Chinas Renewable Energy Law The law stipulates that biofuel producers must sell their products first to an authorized refined oil sales company and the sales companies are obliged to buy the fuel if it meets certain quality standards In order to test the quality Sinopec introduced the second expert witness Lin Jianmin a leading author of Chinarsquos national biofuel standard Lin Jianmin pointed out that there are currently quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology which gives Sinopec a justifiable reason not to trade with Yingding Moreover Sinopec presented some precedents in which consumers had complained about the biofuel quality and also claimed that China didnt have a sound regulatory framework to support biofuel production neither in testing nor in sales

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 43 of 52

Nevertheless to refute this point Yingding referred to an earlier test in co-operation with Sinopec in 2011 where selected buses in Kunming used biofuel blended by Sinopec using BD100 produced by Yingding

On August 13 2015 Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors and now this case is pending In the written appellate ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court did not provide any details regarding its reasoning

Key Issues of the Case

Is there any competition between Yingding and Sinopec

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case the product of Yingding is biofuel while Sinopec does not engage in the business of biofuel From this perspective Yingding and Sinopec are not competitors Thus it is not necessary and not reasonable for Sinopec to eliminate or restrict the competition from Yingding

Relevant Market

The definition of the relevant market is a prerequisite to determine whether competition exists and whether the AML is applicable In accordance with the Judicial Interpretation of Antitrust civil litigation the plaintiff shall take the responsibility to prove the defendantrsquos dominance in the relevant market Also the methods of defining the relevant market are stipulated in the Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition (ldquoGuidelinesrdquo) However both Yingding and Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court defined the relevant market as the sales market of refined oil without sufficient antitrust analysis none of the methods in the Guidelines were used Therefore the definition of the relevant market remains arguable and needs to be sufficiently analysed in the upcoming retrial

Justifiable Reasons

The abuse of market dominance includes the behaviour of refusing to trade without justifiable reasons according to the AML but in the first instance ruling justifiable reasons were not investigated by the court During the appellate trial the expert witness introduced by Sinopec claimed that there were quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology and this was a justifiable reason to refuse to trade with Yingding Even though the first instance court and the appellate court did not reason the justifiable reason it should be discussed and investigated further during the retrial

AML or Renewable Energy Law

The claims of Yingding were based on both the AML and the Renewable Energy Law (ldquoRELrdquo) and the first instance ruling referred to both the AML and the REL as

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 44 of 52

well It seems that the laws the first instance court referred to were comprehensive but in fact the reasoning was not clear and logical In the first instance ruling some disputes regarding the AML were reviewed but all the orders were not based on the AML Specifically the first instance court ordered the Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network based on the REL and dismissed the other claims That the orders were not on account of reasoning is illogical It is anticipated that during the retrial the application of the laws will be clearer

Analysis

A lot of issues have not been clearly analysed by the courts such as the relevant market and the justifiable reasons Since the case is remanded the above-mentioned issues are expected to be resolved in the retrial In addition Yingding was in a disadvantaged position compared to its first instance trial since its claims based on the AML were challenged greatly during the appellate trial In the retrial it is probable that Yingding may switch its litigation strategy and base its claims on the REL Therefore maybe more preparation regarding the REL can give Sinopec a leg up

Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)

Rijing Electric a Chinese distributor seeks CNY 5m compensation

The first hearing was on 9 June 2015 and ended without a ruling

Facts

Rijing Electric (ldquoRijingrdquo) a Shanghai-based company and a former distributor for Panasonic accused Panasonic of abusing its dominance and dividing the market through monopolistic practice in an antitrust lawsuit filed in 2014 with Shanghai No 1 Intermediate Court (ldquoShanghai Courtrdquo) claiming compensation of CNY 5m (USD 815370) Wenzhou Mingda Automation System Co and Shanghai Qingying Automation Equipment as the distributor of Panasonic in China are the co-defendants were accused of conducting monopolistic behaviours by implementing Panasonicrsquos policy

The first hearing for evidence exchange was on June 9 2015 Rijing claimed a policy allegedly introduced by Panasonic in 2009 restricted the competition between distributors Panasonic claims the policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo and has full justifiable reasons It explained that the products in question required customization at considerable cost to distributors before its sale to customers Once carried out however other distributors leaving them open to quote much lower prices than the original distributor could simply and relatively cheap replicate this customization Besides Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and that the plaintiff had failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic said its market share for the four products

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 45 of 52

under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases Also Rijing failed to challenge the policy when it was first introduced instead initially agreeing it was reasonable as e-mail evidence submitted by Panasonic suggests

Key Issues of the Case

Whether Panasonic occupied a market dominant position

It is reported that Rijing claimed that Panasonic had abused its market dominance but Rijing failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and its market share for the four products under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases

Analysis

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case Panasonicrsquos policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo rather than to eliminate or restrict competition

Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals40 (Pending)

It is a battle over patent licensing issues

It is viewed as being among the most complicated antitrust lawsuits in China

The first hearing was on 17 and 18 December 2015

Facts

Four Chinese rare earth companies Ningbo Ketian Magnet Ningbo Permanent Magnetics Ningbo Tongchuang Strong Magnet Material and Ningbo Huahui Magnetic Industry filed antitrust lawsuits against Hitachi Metals over alleged patent licensing issues regarding rare earth magnets on December 11 2014 with the Ningbo Intermediate Peoples Court (ldquoNingbo Courtrdquo) in Zhejiang province As reported four Chinese rare earth companies claimed Hitachi Metals abused its market dominance and hurt the industry competition by refusing to license the patents to them The patents in this case are used in the manufacturing of sintered neodymium iron boron (ldquoNdFeBrdquo) magnets a rare-earth magnet alloy widely used in parts for airplanes automobiles and other products

Hitachi Metals filed a challenge with the Ningbo Court over its jurisdiction in April 2015 After Ningbo Court rejected Hitachi Metals jurisdiction objection on 28 April 2015 Hitachi Metals appealed to the Zhejiang High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoZhejiang

40The details of the story are available at httpwwwzbmagcomnews_viewphpid=80 httpwwwhitachicomcnaboutpress201510-121118_ahtml last visited on December 22 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 46 of 52

Courtrdquo) but Zhejiang Court affirmed the ruling of the Ningbo Court

The first day of a two-day hearing took place on 17 December 2015 during which the two sides cross-examined each otherrsquos evidence The evidence focused on clearing up several key elements in the case including the relevant market whether Hitachi Metals has dominance on that market and whether both sides acted in good faith during the licensing negotiations

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Product Market

The four Chinese rare earth companies claimed that the relevant product market should be the NdFeb-related patent licensing market However Hitachi Metals believed that the physical NdFeb market rather than the patent licensing market should be the relevant product market which is meaningful for assess the real competitive effects on the market

Whether Hitachi Metals occupies a dominant market position

In terms of market dominance Hitachi Metals claimed it does not occupy a dominant position because Hitachi Metalsrsquo patents were not in a standard in this case and there are substitutable technologies in the market SEP holders have the obligation to license on FRAND terms but none-SEP holders do not So while a refusal to license a SEP may constitute abuse of dominance refusal to license a non-SEP mdash even by a patent holder with a dominant position mdash should not be considered as an abuse

Analysis

Hitachi Metals as a patent holder should have the right to decide whether to retain those patents or not or who to license According to the legal theory the purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage and protect innovation by conferring monopoly right mdash that is to give intellectual property owners the proprietary rights which can exclude others from using the intellectual property The SEP holders admittedly need to comply with FRAND terms which can maintain a robust balance between competition and monopoly whereas the further intervention of antitrust law into non-SEP patents may undermine the purpose of intellectual property law To which extent the antitrust law should intervene is yet to be seen

Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei41

A confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the Beijing IP court made by the Beijing High Court

41 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcncpwswbjzscq201511t20151103_12225640htm last visited on December 28 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 47 of 52

Facts

On August 2 2013 the NDRC penalized Abbott for monopolistic price-fixing and then Abbott made a price adjustment in China where the prices of main products were reduced

On December 16 2014 Tian Junwei (ldquoTianrdquo) a Chinese citizen in Beijing sued Carrefour Shuangjing Branch (ldquoCarrefourrdquo) and Abbott (Shanghai) Sales Company (ldquoAbbottrdquo) at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (ldquoIP Courtrdquo) for their monopolistic price-fixing which damaged his interests However Carrefour and Abbott challenged the jurisdiction of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court They claimed there were two reasons Firstly according to the jurisdiction rules of the IP court issued by the Supreme Court the IP court has no jurisdiction over anti-trust cases Secondly if this case is a contractual dispute the court that is in the place of Carrefour should hear it if this case is a tort dispute the Shanghai Intermediate Court should hear it

In the ruling of the IP Court the IP Court decided it has the jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases for the following reasons According to the Provisions On Causes Of Action In Civil Cases issued by Supreme Court (最高人民法院案由规定) antimonopoly dispute is a tertiary cause of action belonging to IP and competition disputes Also according to the Provisions concerning the Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京

市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问题的规定 ) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was an IP and competition dispute and was sued after November 6 2014 Thus the IP Court had jurisdiction

Both Carrefour and Abbott appealed to the Beijing High Court over the jurisdiction ruling but the Beijing High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original ruling Reasons are listed in the written ruling issued on June 18 2015 Firstly the nature of the case was an antimonopoly dispute In accordance with Provisions of the Supreme Peoples Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民

事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) and Civil Litigation Law the monopolistic civil disputes in the first instance shall be under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Peoples Courts and an action involving a contractual dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the peoples court of the place where the defendant is domiciled or where the contract is performed Carrefour as the defendant in this case is domiciled in Chaoyang District Beijing Therefore the courts of Beijing have jurisdiction over this case Secondly according to article 3 of the Notification on the Jurisdiction of Intellectual Property Courts issued by Supreme Court (关于知识产权法院案件管辖

等有关问题的通知) IP courts have jurisdiction over first-instance civil disputes arising from monopolistic practices Lastly according to Provisions concerning the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 25 of 52

believed that the vertical agreement concluded between DongFeng Nissan and its distributors eliminated and restricted the competition in the relevant market and damaged the consumer welfare as well which violates article 14 of the AML

Furthermore from April 2012 until July 2014 DongFeng Nissanrsquos distributors in Guangdong province held multiple meetings to discuss issues relevant to sale price reached and implemented a horizontal monopolistic agreement in terms of fixing the prices of some car models which is prohibited by article 13 of the AML

Considering that both DongFeng Nissan and the involved distributors positively cooperated with the investigation and ceased the illegal behaviour immediately after the investigation Guangdong DRC decided to impose a fine amounting to 3 of its previous yearrsquos turnovers on DongFeng Nissan and a fine ranging from 2 to 4 on the relevant distributors in accordance with articles 4623 and 4924 of the AML

Analysis

This case demonstrates that auto and related industries are still under close attention of the authority Considering the NDRCrsquos successful series of antitrust investigations conducted throughout the auto industry it is observed that the agency currently overseeing price-related antitrust issues in China has accumulated a substantial amount of experience regarding antitrust enforcement in the auto industry Now is the right time to speed up the law-making process by amending the set of rules released earlier and drafting new laws to advise the auto industry on antitrust compliance

Enforcement by the SAIC and its local branches

Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC25

The investigation was triggered by whistle blowerrsquos submission

Cartel members were collectively fined CNY 139 million 23 Article 46 of the AML In case the operators violate the relevant provisions of this Law concluding and implementing Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall order the operators to cease such act impose fines more than 1 but less than 10 of the total turnover in the preceding year and confiscate the illegal gains where the Monopolistic agreement is not implemented a fine less than RMB 500000 can be imposed If the operators involved in Monopolistic agreement on its own initiative report information concerning the conclusion of Monopolistic agreements and provide important evidences to the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority they may be given a mitigated punishment or be exempted from punishment in accordance with the circumstances Where the industrial associations violate this Law organizing the operators in the industry to conclude Monopolistic agreements the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority may impose a fine less than RMB 500000 in serious circumstances the agency of social organization administration and registration may cancel its registration 24 Article 49 of the AML As for the imposition of the fines stipulated by the Article 46 47 and 48 of this Law the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall take elements such as the nature extent and time it lasts of the illegal act into consideration in determining the specific amount of the fines 25 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201506t20150601_156889html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 26 of 52

Facts

In April 2015 the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) issued administrative penalties on several brick manufacturers for entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements This is the first case relevant to monopolistic agreements that has been publicized by the SAIC since the beginning of this year

Ten cartel members were involved in the case including one company and nine individuals Similar with most antitrust cases the investigation started as a result of a whistle blowerrsquos submission After a thorough investigation Hunan AIC found that those local brick manufacturers had reached agreements on controlling production volume and dividing sales areas in the forms of production and sales agreements plans and meeting minutes

The enforcement authority reached the conclusion that these brick manufacturers violated article 13 of the AML and imposed a total fine of CNY 1389400 on them

Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC26

The organizer of the monopolistic agreement the animation association was fined CNY 100000

The antitrust authority did not punish the members of the monopolistic agreement

Facts

In December 2015 the Guangdong Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoGuangdong AICrdquo) published its administrative punishment decision in regards to Guangzhou Panyu Animation amp Game Association (ldquoGAGArdquo) organizing member companies to conclude a monopolistic agreement

According to the decision GAGA drafted the ldquoAgreement of Exhibition Alliancerdquo (ldquoAgreementrdquo) and convened a conference with member companies in order to discuss the content and conclusion of the Agreement 52 member companies entered into the Agreement which actually requested the alliance companies to merely participate in the exhibitions either organized or supported by GAGA in Guangzhou In addition the Agreement prohibited the alliance companies from attending any other exhibition except if they obtained prior approval of GAGA

After a thorough investigation Guangdong AIC believed that the conclusion of the Agreement among GAGA and the 52 member companies violated article 13 (5) of the AML in terms of boycott GAGA who was deeply involved and restricted member companiesrsquo choice of exhibitions through the Agreement could be deemed as

26 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151208_164680html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 27 of 52

the participant and organizer of the monopolistic agreement In accordance with article 46 of the AML Guangdong AIC imposed a fine of CNY 100000 on GAGA for organizing the conclusion of the monopolistic agreement

Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC27

Hubei AIC considered the coinsurance for Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance illegal

Twelve insurance companies were fined CNY 469 million in total

Facts

In December 2015 the Hubei Administrative for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHubei AICrdquo) disclosed its punishment on 12 insurance companies for signing illegal coinsurance agreements

The disclosed punishment decision suggests that the Hubei branch of China Pacific Life Insurance (ldquothe Companyrdquo) 11 other insurance companies and Wuhan Construction Safety Technology Consultation Center (ldquoWCSTCCrdquo) signed a Coinsurance Agreement on Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance (ldquoCoinsurance Agreementrdquo) of which the main contents include

1) The Company and 11 other involved companies as the coinsurers jointly take charge of the personal accident insurance concerned with the construction project directly administered by the Wuhan government WCSTCC is responsible for providing safety professionalism and technology services regarding the relevant personal accident insurance

2) The Company as the chief insurer of the coinsurance occupies 12 of the total amount of the insurance and the other 11 companies respectively occupy 8

3) The Company as the representative of the coinsurance is in charge of collecting the premium signing the standard form insurance policies and issuing the invoice in its own name The Company should share the charged premium with the other companies in accordance with the Coinsurance Agreement

4) Both the Company and the other insurance companies should pay 25 of the actually received premium to WCSTCC as the service fee WCSTCC will assist the coinsurers in providing safety and technology management service to the insured In addition the 11 insurance companies should pay 5 of their premium to the Company as the management fee

27 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165445html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

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5) In case an accident happens the 12 companies will jointly bear the damages based on their respective shares in the coinsurance

6) There is a contact mechanism established in the coinsurance The coinsurers will regularly hold coinsurance conferences to discuss existing problems

Furthermore the coinsurers and WCSTCC also signed a self-discipline agreement and established a complete management system to assure the implementation of the Coinsurance Agreement Any party violating the Coinsurance Agreement would be punished

Hubei AIC found that WCSTCC was solely invested by Wuhan Construction Safety Management Association which was under Wuhan Construction Commission The centre helped implement certain functions of the Wuhan Urban Construction Safety Management Station and was responsible for quality supervision and safety supervision of municipal construction projects

It later became a prerequisite for construction companies to purchase insurance from any member of the coinsurance in order to get approval to commence their project According to the decision Hubei AIC launched another separate investigation against WCSTCC

Through the investigation Hubei AIC concluded that the Coinsurance Agreement constituted a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by article 13 of the AML with the following analysis

First coinsurance as a common business model to jointly share and lower risks is widely adopted in the insurance industry A coinsurance arrangement for a specific project in order to avoid high risks faced by one insurer could be legal However coinsurance should not target the entire market In this case prior to the Coinsurance Agreement the risks of the construction projects were unpredictable since the scale of the construction projects the difficulty of the construction and the amount of construction workers could not be available It is impossible to predict the risks of the projects thus it is not necessary to cooperate with other insurers to collectively bear the risks The purpose of the 12 insurance companies to establish the coinsurance is to avoid the competition which demonstrates the Coinsurance Agreement belongs to a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by the AML

Second the companies through entering into the coinsurance agreement actually divided the relevant market of construction project personal accident insurance in Wuhan city which affected the competition in the relevant market and damaged the interests of other competitors and the consumers In particular the Construction Law as amended in 2011 stipulates that the purchase of personal accident insurance is not mandatory and the construction companies have the right to choose whether to buy the said insurance or not As mentioned purchasing insurance from the coinsurance had been the prerequisite for construction companies to obtain administration

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 29 of 52

approval for the project which seriously distorts the fair competition in the market

Citing article 46 of the AML the 12 insurance companies were collectively fined CNY 469 million including fines on the companies and confiscation of illegal gains It is noteworthy that the fines were calculated based on the companiesrsquo 2014 annual sales of the insurance product in connection with the coinsurance The Company as the chief insurer was fined amounting to 6 of its 2014 annual sales of the relevant insurance product in the coinsurance and other companies were fined amounting to 2 of relevant sales For more specific information please see the following table

Company Name (Hubei Branch)

Fines (CNY million)

Percentage of the sales

Illegal Gains (CNY

million)

China Pacific Life Insurance 00653 6 0941

Sino Life 00145 2 04332

Alltrust Insurance 00145 2 04332

Taikang Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Continent Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Pacific Property Insurance

00145 2 04332

China Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

PICC Property and Casualty 00145 2 02599

Taiping General Insurance 00145 2 013

Union Life Insurance 00145 2 01177

Ping An Annuity Insurance Company of China

00145 2 04201

Ping An Property amp Casualty Insurance Company of China

00145 2 -

Subtotal 02248 - 44679

Total 46927

Analysis

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 30 of 52

Coinsurance as an effective approach to lower risks of insurers is widely used in the insurance industry Information sharing and agreements on coinsurance were generally considered efficient and legitimate However from an antitrust perspective coinsurance may raise competition concerns depending on the circumstances of each agreement In the case that there is enough capacity for one insurer to cover the potential risks the coinsurance might be considered as entering into a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC28

The first leniency applicant was exempted from fines

The other concrete companies were imposed a fine of CNY 180000

Facts

In December 2015 the concrete companies monopolistic agreement case investigated by Hunan AIC was published on SAICrsquos website

In accordance with the antitrust enforcement announcement of SAIC this case was triggered by complaints from the Yongzhou City peoplersquos congress After the preliminary review the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) initiated the formal investigation on seven concrete companies domiciled in Yongzhou City Hunan Province which were suspected of being involved in a monopolistic agreement in terms of division of the volumes of the products

After further investigation Hunan AIC found that the seven concrete companies concluded a partnership agreement in 2011 which requested the involved companies to enter into a partnership business with assets In addition according to the partnership agreement it was planned to establish a comprehensive office to manage production marketing and distribution of the products of all the partners The seven companies intended to jointly adjust and control the output of concrete based on the partnership agreement However because there were disagreements over the allocation of the injected assets and market shares the companies did not implement the partnership agreement The agreement was cancelled in December 2012

Based on the findings Hunan AIC concluded that the seven concrete companies as competitors of each other restricted and eliminated the competition in the relevant market through reaching the partnership agreement and dividing the volumes of sales which violated article 13(3) of the AML in terms of division of sales market Considering that the agreement had not been implemented and the limited influence of the agreement according to article 46 of the AML and article 27 of the Administrative Penalties Law small amount fines were imposed on the involved companies Six companies were fined CNY 30000 each for their illegal behaviour 28 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165504html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 31 of 52

Yongzhou Shuangyuan Building Materials Co Ltd as the first one to actively report the monopolistic agreement and cooperate with the enforcement authority was exempted from the punishment

Outlook

It is expected that the AMLrsquos enforcement on monopolistic agreements will continue in the future Industries such as automobile shipping pharmaceuticals insurance etc will still remain the priority of the antitrust enforcement

The antitrust enforcement authorities have published a series of regulations in order to clarify the substantial and procedural issues relevant to the antitrust enforcement However Chinarsquos current antitrust legislation regime is still immature In the following years we expect that more attention will be paid to the legislative improvements

Another remarkable issue for cartel members is that with more Chinese enterprises attaching increasing importance to the AML the follow-on civil damages actions might become a tendency in the future

C Abuse of Market Dominance

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen a decent increase of abuse of market dominance cases both in public enforcement and private litigation Oftentimes the authorities responsible for public enforcement generally find it difficult to pursue investigations against abuse of market dominance cases The following two main reasons are often cited to explain this standoff first it is hard for the authorities to define the relevant markets and prove the undertaking(s)rsquo dominant market position through economic approaches second it is hard to collect evidence regarding abusive practices

The cases related to IPRs abuse are emerging significantly particularly in the telecommunication media and technology (ldquoTMTrdquo) sectors

The SAICrsquos latest refusal-to-deal probe against a local drug maker shows that the SAIC and its local branches have increasingly acquired a profile as an abuse of dominance regulator

Significant Cases

Cases pursued by the SAIC

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 32 of 52

Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case29

Facts

The local authority in Dongfang city reported to the Hainan provincial branch of SAIC on April 23 2014 of the suspected dominance abuse The SAIC authorized its Hainan bureau to officially investigate the matter on 25 July 2014 according to a decision dated January 9 2015 The AIC concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its market dominance by requiring users to pay a deposit without any legal basis and or justifiable reasons

In terms of the relevant product market the local authority found that in this case it was the urban water supply market in Dongfang city and its surrounding townships where Dongfang Water was the sole public operator in the local water supply market with a 100 market share which made all water users completely reliant on the companyrsquos supply In term of market access the local authority found it very unlikely that there were other operators due to the strict regulations

The Hainan SAIC then concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its dominance as it charged users a deposit by threatening to refuse to register users and also by threatening to restrict the water supply Dongfang Waters charging of deposits lacked a legal basis and hadnt received government approval to the detriment of household consumers and business water users and hampered the improvement of management and services of the company Such conduct was in breach of Chinarsquos Anti-Monopoly Law

Hainan AIC levied a fine of CNY 593208 a lighter penalty equivalent to 2 of the companyrsquos annual sales for the previous year and confiscated illicit gains of CNY 38521 for abuse of market dominance

Analysis

It is noteworthy that although handled by a local authority supervised by the SAIC the antitrust agency detailed the relevant market definition the assessment of the dominant market position the abusive practices and the scrutiny of the justifiable reasons

Although the definition of the relevant market and the reasoning of the Hainan provincial AIC and the SAIC are subject to criticism it is still applausive to see that the antitrust regulators have realized the importance of the application of rule of reason in an abuse case In addition through itrsquos a published decision practitioners may observe the regulatorsrsquo reasoning and thus transparency and legal certainty have been generated

29 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzfcfjd201502t20150212_152066html last visited on October 18 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 33 of 52

Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms30

Facts

In June 2013 the Ningxia AIC under authorization of SAIC opened an antitrust investigation into the alleged tie-in sales by the three major state-owned telecommunications operators China Tietong China Unicom and China Telecom for the tie-in sale of fixed-line telephones with broadband Internet services The Ningxia AIC found that the three companies had bundled fixed-line phone services with Internet services to subscribers

During the investigation all three telecommunications companies admitted the tie-in practice had recognized that such practice had improper influence on competition and deprived the choices of consumers The three companies promised to undertake internal rectification timely and eliminate the ill effects resulting from such practice The parties committed to taking the following corrective measures

1) Taking internal rectifications and conducting training to staff about antitrust laws and stop tie-in sales practices

2) Making public commitments to allow subscribers a free choice of services and strengthening the propaganda through the operating room call centre and other channels

3) Unbundling fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

The Ningxia AIC decided to suspend the probe on 14 May 2015 on the grounds that the three companies had actively worked together with the investigators and proposed workable remedy plans

Analysis

In the official announcement Ningxia AIC concluded that the purpose of antitrust enforcement is to restrain monopolistic conducts the protection of competition and to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of consumers Given that during the investigation process the parties had actively cooperated with the investigation formed a more profound understanding of the dangers of tying behaviour and moreover the parties proposed and implemented positive corrective measures to be able to remove the ill impact of their actions the agency believed that the purpose of antitrust law enforcement was fulfilled

It is worth noting that the Ningxia AIC also required the three companies to implement the commitment by August 30 2015and the submission of the written

30 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158908html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158906html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158910html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 34 of 52

implementation report on July 102015 and August 102015 respectively which is another illustration that an effective commitment by the undertakings shall directly deal with the effect that is brought by the monopolistic behaviour In this case the effect of the monopolistic act was restricted to the choice of the consumers therefore the commitment by the undertaking aimed at allowing the freedom of choice and the unbundling of fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company31

Facts

The Liaoning AIC imposed a fine of approximately CNY 433m on the Fushun Branch of Liaoning Tobacco Co on 1 June 2015 The agency also ordered the company to stop its illicit behaviour

The Liaoning AIC received a tip-off that the accused Liaoning Tobacco Corsquos Fushun branch was conducting tie-in sales of non-high-demand cigarette brands with high-demand cigarette brands After gaining authorization from SAIC the agency officially started an investigation regarding the companyrsquos suspected abuse of market dominance in June 2014

Analysis

According to the announcement the tobacco company argued that the tobacco industry is a state controlled or monopolized industry with a lawful monopolistic position therefore the company shall not be subject to the norms of general market competition rules or the anti-monopoly law

In this regards the agency concluded that in terms of the status of the undertaking admittedly the first paragraph of article 17 of the AML says that the State shall protect the lawful business operations of undertakings in these industries with respect to the industries which are under the control of the State-owned economic sector and have a bearing on the lifeline of the national economy or national security and the industries which exercise monopoly over the production and sale of certain commodities according to law However the second paragraph continues to say that the undertakings mentioned above shall do business according to law be honest faithful and strictly self-disciplined and subject themselves to public supervision and they shall not harm the consumers interests by taking advantage of their position of control or their monopolistic production and sale of certain commodities In particular in the preceding paragraph the ldquolawful businessrdquo and ldquoaccording to lawrdquo imply that the AML shall apply in the business operation The agency therefore believes that

31 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201508t20150813_16

0208html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 35 of 52

there shall be no exemption for the undertaking concerned the defences of the undertaking concerned is not established

Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm32

Facts

The Chongqing AIC fined Chongqing Qingyang Pharmaceutical CNY 439308 for alleged dominance abuse

The investigation was initiated when the company contacted the agency for verification on its potential breach of the AML related to an allopurinol active pharmaceuticals ingredient (API) distribution agreement with its exclusive distributor The company provided the relevant agreement and information and the agency conducted an investigation into the company and some other relevant companies

Analysis

Relevant Market

During the investigation the agency found that pharmaceutical ingredients are a special commodity the API is used to produce the preparations The chemical API is only used for the production of the preparation and could be used as a medicine for clinic use

The preparation is produced according to the requirements of certain form of prepared drugs and for the purpose of treatment and prevention which can be used as medicine

The allopurinol is used for the common treatment of hyperuricemia However the other treatments are different in pharmacological effects or treatment effects as well as in the cost for the patient Furthermore the company is the only manufacturer and supplier in the market nationwide since July 2012 Therefore the agency concluded that the relevant market is the allopurinol API market

Considering that the qualification for manufacturing the allopurinol API is national wide and the normal practice for purchasers and suppliers is domestic the relevant geographic market is the Chinese market

The Market Dominance

During the investigation the agency found that the company is the only supplier and manufacturer of allopurinol API in China there is no other competitor in the

32 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151222_16

5152html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 36 of 52

market and the company has a monopoly in the market The evidence shows that the company has the ability to control the prices the position for the downstream is relatively weak

With respect to the market entry the agency found that the market entry is relatively high in addition other undertakings are dependent on the company Thus the agency believed the company to have market dominance

Refusal to Deal

The agency found that on September 25 2015 the company reached an exclusive agreement and distribution agreement with its distributor Based on these agreements the company didnrsquot supply allopurinol API to the said distributor and other companies despite the fact that those companies requested for allopurinol API but were turned down by the company

Absence of Reasonable Cause

The agency found that the companyrsquos refusal to deal was not in line with the needs of normal business operation or economic efficiency On the other hand the refusal to deal was aimed at increasing the market share of the allopurinol drug product Also the agency found that the stop of supply was a manipulation of market power as to maximize the profit to the most The agency further found that the exclusive distribution agreement with suspension of supply for six months and the refusal to supply was to eliminate and restrict the competition as to gain the monopolistic profit

The Consequence of Refusal to Deal

The agency concluded that the refusal to deal harmed the competition of the allopurinol preparations market Because of the suspension of supply many demanders had to reduce their production or switch to the supply of other products or stop their production The suspension of supply affected the competition of the downstream market Consequently the raising of the price of allopurinol API also raised the cost for other manufacturers of allopurinol preparations

Furthermore the refusal to deal led to capacity loss of the allopurinol preparation industry

Ultimately the refusal to deal increased the burden on consumers as the refusal to supply changed the supply-demand relationship in the market

The agency concluded that the Company abused its dominant position in the allopurinol API market by refusing to deal with intended buyers in the period between October 2013 and March 2014Therefore the Company violated article 17 (1) of the AML which prohibits business operators with a dominant market position from abusing that position such as the refusal to deal without any justifications

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 37 of 52

D Administrative Monopoly

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 witnessed antitrust authoritiesrsquo significant efforts regarding the enforcement against administrative monopoly According to Mr Dong Zhiming the deputy director general of Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly Bureau ever since the AML coming into force six cases in connection with administrative monopoly were investigated by NDRC and among them five cases were handled in the year of 2015 These cases touched abuses of administrative power in terms of designative deal in relation to transportation communication and pharmaceutical industries

The first private litigation related to administrative monopolistic acts was heard in the court which is a milestone case in the enforcement of the AML

Significant Cases

Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC33

Facts

In March 2015 the NDRC released the official letter to Shandong Provincial Department of Transportation (ldquoShandong DOTrdquo) on its website with respect to correct its abuse of administrative power to exclude and restrict competition

During the investigation the NDRC found that since 2011 Shandong DOT had issued multiple relevant government orders in order to require certain types of vehicles to be directly connected to two designated information and service platforms both of which are operated and technically supported by one company namely Shandong Jiutong Internet of Things Technology Co Ltd (ldquoJiutong ITTrdquo) Furthermore according to the orders issued by the competent administrative department all the vehicle satellite positioning terminals entering into Shandong provincial market should be debugged through the said technology service platform which is operated by the mentioned company In addition Shandong DOT released the cap prices of vehicle satellite positioning terminals which is identical to the 2012 bid-winning price in the Ministry of Transportation demonstration project

The NDRC believed that Shandong DOTrsquos behaviour eliminated and restricted the competition in the monitoring platform market and the vehicle terminal market deprived the right of transportation enterprises to choose vehicle terminals and monitoring platform on their owns unreasonably raised the sales prices of vehicle terminals and service fees charged by the platform and increased the costs of transportation enterprises Therefore the antitrust agency concluded that Shandong

33 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201503t20150327_668911html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 38 of 52

DOT violated article 8 of the AML which stipulates that ldquoadministrative organs and the public organizations with an administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude and restrict competitionrdquo Specifically Shandong DOT violated article 3234 in terms of requiring organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any designated operators and violated article 3735 in terms of setting rules with contents which eliminate and restrict competition

Based on article 51 of the AML ldquoWhere administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations abuse administrative powers performing activities which exclude and restrict competition the superior entity shall order it to correct impose administrative penalty on the chief officer and other staffs directly responsible pursuant to the laws The AML enforcement authority may give recommendations on disposal of activities to the relevant superior entityrdquo the NDRC proposed in writing that the Shandong provincial government should order Shandong DOT to rectify its behaviour with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Entirely open up the monitoring platform market by permitting transportation undertakings to freely choose any approved platform

2) Loosen the restrictions on the entry into Shandong vehicle terminals permit the undertakings to independently select the supplier of vehicle terminals and allow the qualified terminals to be connected to the relevant monitoring platform and

3) Revoke the official documentation relevant to the cap price of vehicle terminals in order to promote the price competition

Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 36

Facts

On 26 August 2015 the NDRC published its second decision with regard to the rectification of administrative monopoly since the beginning of this year According to the proposal letter sent to Anhui Provincial Government the investigation against the Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City (Bengbu HFPC) was trigged by third partiesrsquo complaints

34 Article 32 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to require organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any operators designated by them 35 Article 37 of the AML Administrative organs shall not abuse their administrative powers to set rules with contents which eliminate restrict competition 36 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201508t20150826_748682html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 39 of 52

The investigation suggests that Bengbu HFPC published three notices with regard to drugs procurement in April and May of this year

In the No C-2015-CG-X-111 Notice (ldquoNo111 Noticerdquo) released on 10 April2015 the health authority not only provided the dosage form and qualification of the requested drugs but also directly determined the suppliers of relevant drugs which eliminated and restricted the competition among pharmaceutical manufacturers and therefore violated articles 32 and 37 of the AML

In the No C-2015-CG-C-112 Notice (ldquoNo112 Noticerdquo) and No C-2015-CG-C-168 (ldquoNo 168 Noticerdquo) respectively released on 10 April and 22 May 2015 the Bengbu HFPC set discriminative qualification requirements on non-local undertakings in order to restrict their participation in the relevant bidding For instance in accordance with No 112 Notice to be a qualified bidder the turnover of non-local undertakings shall exceed CNY 2 billion which is 50 times as much as the turnover requirements of the local undertakings In the NDRCrsquos opinion the administrative monopoly activities conducted by the local health agency excluded the relevant undertakings from the market maintained the virtual-high prices of drugs and therefore violated articles 3237 and 37 of the AML

The NDRC suggested in a letter that Anhui Provincial Government should urge the Bengbu HFPC to rectify the abuse of monopoly powers with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Stop setting distinguishing restrictions on qualification requirements review standards and numbers of winning bidders as for local and non-local undertakings

2) Stop designating the suppliers of competitive drugs and

3) Take necessary measures to mitigate the negative effects resulting from the previous illegal monopolistic abuses

Outlook

At the beginning of the year the former director general of the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau under the NDRC Xu Kunlin stated that the agency would strengthen antitrust enforcement on abuse of administrative power in 2015

Since then the NDRC has made great efforts to rectify unreasonable abuses of administrative power The currently disclosed two cases investigated by the NDRC re-emphasize the Chinese Governmentrsquos strict scrutiny of antitrust issues in respect of

37 Article 34 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to restrict or reject the participation of operators from other regions in local bidding activities by measures such as prescribing discriminatory qualification requirements or assessment standards or by not publishing information according to law

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 40 of 52

administrative monopoly It reminds the local governments that antitrust compliance is of significant importance

III Private Litigation

A Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen more and more private antitrust litigations

The private antitrust litigation cases have become increasingly complicated especially the issues regarding the intersection areas of IP and antitrust law

Multinational giants and State-Owned Enterprises (the ldquoSOEsrdquo) are increasingly becoming the targets in antitrust civil litigations Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (the ldquoSMEsrdquo) tend to use the antitrust litigation to achieve their commercial goals in the business context

B Significant Cases

Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)38

This is the first-ever private litigation concerning administrative monopoly since the implementation of the AML in 2008

Facts

According to the currently disclosed details the case is relevant for designated trade

The plaintiff Shenzhen Sware Technology Co Ltd (ldquoSwarerdquo) is a software company The press releases suggest that Sware Gloden Software Co Ltd (ldquoGlodenrdquo) and Shanghai Ruban Software Co Ltd (ldquoShanghai Rubanrdquo) are the three main suppliers of construction cost software and possess the major shares of the relevant market An annual provincial vocational ability contest regarding the construction cost hosted by the Guangdong Department of Education (ldquoGuangdong DOE) designated Gloden as the exclusive supplier of the relevant software

After several unsuccessful verbal and written negotiations with Guangdong DOE in April 2014 Sware filed a lawsuit against Guangdong DOE before the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquothe Courtrdquo) alleging that the administrative organ abused its administrative power and violated the AML by designating exclusive software supplier for the contest and claimed a compensation for reasonable expense amounting to CNY 10800 Yuan

The opinions of the Court 38 The story of the case is available at httpfinancesinacomcnchinadfjj20150410074621924997shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 41 of 52

The full text of the judgment has not been disclosed yet In accordance with the information available to the public the Court invoked article 32 of the AML which prohibits an administrative organ from abusing its administrative power to require or in disguised form organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use only the commodities supplied by the entities designated by them The Court concluded that Guangdong DOE failed to prove the legitimacy of the designation and therefore abused its administration power

Currently the case is in appeal before the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court

Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 39

It is the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China

In the first instance ruling Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court ruled against Sinopec holding that the Yunnan branch of Sinopecs trading company was obligated to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its dominance in the sales market of refined oil by refusing to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding without justifiable reasons

In the second instance ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors Currently the case is pending

Facts

The First Trial

The lawsuit was filed before the Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoKunming Courtrdquo) in January 2014 Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy Co Ltd (ldquoYingdingrdquo) a bio-energy manufacturer claimed that Sinopec and the Yunnan branch of Sinopec trading company (ldquoSinopec Yunnan Branchrdquo) had failed to fulfil their obligations stipulated in the Renewable Energy Law and had abused their market dominance in sales market of refined oil by refusing to trade with Yingding without justifiable reasons

Sinopec and Sinopec Yunnan Branch mainly explained four reasons for why they rejected Yingdingrsquos biofuel Firstly Yingding had failed to prove that the biofuel complied with the relevant national standard and was safe to use Secondly Yingding had failed to provide complete trading terms Thirdly the laws and regulations regarding biofuel were incomplete the authorized refined oil sales companies were 39 The details of the case are available at httpnewsxinhuanetcomfortune2014-1217c_1113680039htm httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=9e71db51-6ff6-4d2c-8af6-8eacf023ebdeampKeyWord=E4BA91E58D97E79B88E9BC8E|E4B8ADE79FB3E58C96 httpnewsxinhuanetcomenergy2015-0422c_127721575htm httpwwwnbdcomcnarticles2015-04-23911348html last visited on December 17 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 42 of 52

obligated to purchase biofuel from the biofuel manufacturers if it met certain quality standards but there was a vacancy regarding how to reach the end consumers from the sales companies

On 8 December 2014 the Kunming Intermediate Peoples Court ruled that Sinopec Yunnan Branch bore a legal obligation to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its market dominance in refined oil market by refusing without any justifiable reasons to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding The court ordered Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network within 30 days Both Yingding and Sinopec filed appeals to the Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court

The Appellate Trial

The appeal hearing was held on 22 April 2015 in Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoYunnan Courtrdquo) Sinopec submitted 23 new pieces of evidence and introduced two expert witnesses in a bid to overturn several key elements in the first-instance ruling by Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court

In terms of the determination of the relevant market and the market dominance Sinopec argued that the relevant market in this case was for adipic acid monomethyl ester (ldquoAAMErdquo) the main ingredient of a biofuel additive known as BD100 Yingdingrsquos main product is BD100 which can be blended with fossil diesel to become biofuel In the AAME market Sinopec is a potential buyer instead of a market dominator In support of this argument Sinopec presented an expert witnessmdashGong Jiong a professor of economics at Beijings University of International Business and Economics who testified that AAME should be defined as the relevant product market on the basis of an economic analysis

However Yingding insisted that the first-instance ruling was correct in naming the sales market of refined oil as the relevant market and submitted new evidence an article on Sinopecs website that claimed it had a 67 market share in Yunnan to help establish the claim that Sinopec had market dominance

Another main dispute was whether Yingdingrsquos biofuel product met national standards which would make it mandatory for Sinopec to purchase under Chinas Renewable Energy Law The law stipulates that biofuel producers must sell their products first to an authorized refined oil sales company and the sales companies are obliged to buy the fuel if it meets certain quality standards In order to test the quality Sinopec introduced the second expert witness Lin Jianmin a leading author of Chinarsquos national biofuel standard Lin Jianmin pointed out that there are currently quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology which gives Sinopec a justifiable reason not to trade with Yingding Moreover Sinopec presented some precedents in which consumers had complained about the biofuel quality and also claimed that China didnt have a sound regulatory framework to support biofuel production neither in testing nor in sales

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 43 of 52

Nevertheless to refute this point Yingding referred to an earlier test in co-operation with Sinopec in 2011 where selected buses in Kunming used biofuel blended by Sinopec using BD100 produced by Yingding

On August 13 2015 Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors and now this case is pending In the written appellate ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court did not provide any details regarding its reasoning

Key Issues of the Case

Is there any competition between Yingding and Sinopec

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case the product of Yingding is biofuel while Sinopec does not engage in the business of biofuel From this perspective Yingding and Sinopec are not competitors Thus it is not necessary and not reasonable for Sinopec to eliminate or restrict the competition from Yingding

Relevant Market

The definition of the relevant market is a prerequisite to determine whether competition exists and whether the AML is applicable In accordance with the Judicial Interpretation of Antitrust civil litigation the plaintiff shall take the responsibility to prove the defendantrsquos dominance in the relevant market Also the methods of defining the relevant market are stipulated in the Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition (ldquoGuidelinesrdquo) However both Yingding and Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court defined the relevant market as the sales market of refined oil without sufficient antitrust analysis none of the methods in the Guidelines were used Therefore the definition of the relevant market remains arguable and needs to be sufficiently analysed in the upcoming retrial

Justifiable Reasons

The abuse of market dominance includes the behaviour of refusing to trade without justifiable reasons according to the AML but in the first instance ruling justifiable reasons were not investigated by the court During the appellate trial the expert witness introduced by Sinopec claimed that there were quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology and this was a justifiable reason to refuse to trade with Yingding Even though the first instance court and the appellate court did not reason the justifiable reason it should be discussed and investigated further during the retrial

AML or Renewable Energy Law

The claims of Yingding were based on both the AML and the Renewable Energy Law (ldquoRELrdquo) and the first instance ruling referred to both the AML and the REL as

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 44 of 52

well It seems that the laws the first instance court referred to were comprehensive but in fact the reasoning was not clear and logical In the first instance ruling some disputes regarding the AML were reviewed but all the orders were not based on the AML Specifically the first instance court ordered the Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network based on the REL and dismissed the other claims That the orders were not on account of reasoning is illogical It is anticipated that during the retrial the application of the laws will be clearer

Analysis

A lot of issues have not been clearly analysed by the courts such as the relevant market and the justifiable reasons Since the case is remanded the above-mentioned issues are expected to be resolved in the retrial In addition Yingding was in a disadvantaged position compared to its first instance trial since its claims based on the AML were challenged greatly during the appellate trial In the retrial it is probable that Yingding may switch its litigation strategy and base its claims on the REL Therefore maybe more preparation regarding the REL can give Sinopec a leg up

Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)

Rijing Electric a Chinese distributor seeks CNY 5m compensation

The first hearing was on 9 June 2015 and ended without a ruling

Facts

Rijing Electric (ldquoRijingrdquo) a Shanghai-based company and a former distributor for Panasonic accused Panasonic of abusing its dominance and dividing the market through monopolistic practice in an antitrust lawsuit filed in 2014 with Shanghai No 1 Intermediate Court (ldquoShanghai Courtrdquo) claiming compensation of CNY 5m (USD 815370) Wenzhou Mingda Automation System Co and Shanghai Qingying Automation Equipment as the distributor of Panasonic in China are the co-defendants were accused of conducting monopolistic behaviours by implementing Panasonicrsquos policy

The first hearing for evidence exchange was on June 9 2015 Rijing claimed a policy allegedly introduced by Panasonic in 2009 restricted the competition between distributors Panasonic claims the policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo and has full justifiable reasons It explained that the products in question required customization at considerable cost to distributors before its sale to customers Once carried out however other distributors leaving them open to quote much lower prices than the original distributor could simply and relatively cheap replicate this customization Besides Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and that the plaintiff had failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic said its market share for the four products

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 45 of 52

under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases Also Rijing failed to challenge the policy when it was first introduced instead initially agreeing it was reasonable as e-mail evidence submitted by Panasonic suggests

Key Issues of the Case

Whether Panasonic occupied a market dominant position

It is reported that Rijing claimed that Panasonic had abused its market dominance but Rijing failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and its market share for the four products under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases

Analysis

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case Panasonicrsquos policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo rather than to eliminate or restrict competition

Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals40 (Pending)

It is a battle over patent licensing issues

It is viewed as being among the most complicated antitrust lawsuits in China

The first hearing was on 17 and 18 December 2015

Facts

Four Chinese rare earth companies Ningbo Ketian Magnet Ningbo Permanent Magnetics Ningbo Tongchuang Strong Magnet Material and Ningbo Huahui Magnetic Industry filed antitrust lawsuits against Hitachi Metals over alleged patent licensing issues regarding rare earth magnets on December 11 2014 with the Ningbo Intermediate Peoples Court (ldquoNingbo Courtrdquo) in Zhejiang province As reported four Chinese rare earth companies claimed Hitachi Metals abused its market dominance and hurt the industry competition by refusing to license the patents to them The patents in this case are used in the manufacturing of sintered neodymium iron boron (ldquoNdFeBrdquo) magnets a rare-earth magnet alloy widely used in parts for airplanes automobiles and other products

Hitachi Metals filed a challenge with the Ningbo Court over its jurisdiction in April 2015 After Ningbo Court rejected Hitachi Metals jurisdiction objection on 28 April 2015 Hitachi Metals appealed to the Zhejiang High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoZhejiang

40The details of the story are available at httpwwwzbmagcomnews_viewphpid=80 httpwwwhitachicomcnaboutpress201510-121118_ahtml last visited on December 22 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 46 of 52

Courtrdquo) but Zhejiang Court affirmed the ruling of the Ningbo Court

The first day of a two-day hearing took place on 17 December 2015 during which the two sides cross-examined each otherrsquos evidence The evidence focused on clearing up several key elements in the case including the relevant market whether Hitachi Metals has dominance on that market and whether both sides acted in good faith during the licensing negotiations

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Product Market

The four Chinese rare earth companies claimed that the relevant product market should be the NdFeb-related patent licensing market However Hitachi Metals believed that the physical NdFeb market rather than the patent licensing market should be the relevant product market which is meaningful for assess the real competitive effects on the market

Whether Hitachi Metals occupies a dominant market position

In terms of market dominance Hitachi Metals claimed it does not occupy a dominant position because Hitachi Metalsrsquo patents were not in a standard in this case and there are substitutable technologies in the market SEP holders have the obligation to license on FRAND terms but none-SEP holders do not So while a refusal to license a SEP may constitute abuse of dominance refusal to license a non-SEP mdash even by a patent holder with a dominant position mdash should not be considered as an abuse

Analysis

Hitachi Metals as a patent holder should have the right to decide whether to retain those patents or not or who to license According to the legal theory the purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage and protect innovation by conferring monopoly right mdash that is to give intellectual property owners the proprietary rights which can exclude others from using the intellectual property The SEP holders admittedly need to comply with FRAND terms which can maintain a robust balance between competition and monopoly whereas the further intervention of antitrust law into non-SEP patents may undermine the purpose of intellectual property law To which extent the antitrust law should intervene is yet to be seen

Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei41

A confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the Beijing IP court made by the Beijing High Court

41 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcncpwswbjzscq201511t20151103_12225640htm last visited on December 28 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 47 of 52

Facts

On August 2 2013 the NDRC penalized Abbott for monopolistic price-fixing and then Abbott made a price adjustment in China where the prices of main products were reduced

On December 16 2014 Tian Junwei (ldquoTianrdquo) a Chinese citizen in Beijing sued Carrefour Shuangjing Branch (ldquoCarrefourrdquo) and Abbott (Shanghai) Sales Company (ldquoAbbottrdquo) at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (ldquoIP Courtrdquo) for their monopolistic price-fixing which damaged his interests However Carrefour and Abbott challenged the jurisdiction of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court They claimed there were two reasons Firstly according to the jurisdiction rules of the IP court issued by the Supreme Court the IP court has no jurisdiction over anti-trust cases Secondly if this case is a contractual dispute the court that is in the place of Carrefour should hear it if this case is a tort dispute the Shanghai Intermediate Court should hear it

In the ruling of the IP Court the IP Court decided it has the jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases for the following reasons According to the Provisions On Causes Of Action In Civil Cases issued by Supreme Court (最高人民法院案由规定) antimonopoly dispute is a tertiary cause of action belonging to IP and competition disputes Also according to the Provisions concerning the Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京

市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问题的规定 ) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was an IP and competition dispute and was sued after November 6 2014 Thus the IP Court had jurisdiction

Both Carrefour and Abbott appealed to the Beijing High Court over the jurisdiction ruling but the Beijing High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original ruling Reasons are listed in the written ruling issued on June 18 2015 Firstly the nature of the case was an antimonopoly dispute In accordance with Provisions of the Supreme Peoples Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民

事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) and Civil Litigation Law the monopolistic civil disputes in the first instance shall be under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Peoples Courts and an action involving a contractual dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the peoples court of the place where the defendant is domiciled or where the contract is performed Carrefour as the defendant in this case is domiciled in Chaoyang District Beijing Therefore the courts of Beijing have jurisdiction over this case Secondly according to article 3 of the Notification on the Jurisdiction of Intellectual Property Courts issued by Supreme Court (关于知识产权法院案件管辖

等有关问题的通知) IP courts have jurisdiction over first-instance civil disputes arising from monopolistic practices Lastly according to Provisions concerning the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 26 of 52

Facts

In April 2015 the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) issued administrative penalties on several brick manufacturers for entering into horizontal monopolistic agreements This is the first case relevant to monopolistic agreements that has been publicized by the SAIC since the beginning of this year

Ten cartel members were involved in the case including one company and nine individuals Similar with most antitrust cases the investigation started as a result of a whistle blowerrsquos submission After a thorough investigation Hunan AIC found that those local brick manufacturers had reached agreements on controlling production volume and dividing sales areas in the forms of production and sales agreements plans and meeting minutes

The enforcement authority reached the conclusion that these brick manufacturers violated article 13 of the AML and imposed a total fine of CNY 1389400 on them

Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC26

The organizer of the monopolistic agreement the animation association was fined CNY 100000

The antitrust authority did not punish the members of the monopolistic agreement

Facts

In December 2015 the Guangdong Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoGuangdong AICrdquo) published its administrative punishment decision in regards to Guangzhou Panyu Animation amp Game Association (ldquoGAGArdquo) organizing member companies to conclude a monopolistic agreement

According to the decision GAGA drafted the ldquoAgreement of Exhibition Alliancerdquo (ldquoAgreementrdquo) and convened a conference with member companies in order to discuss the content and conclusion of the Agreement 52 member companies entered into the Agreement which actually requested the alliance companies to merely participate in the exhibitions either organized or supported by GAGA in Guangzhou In addition the Agreement prohibited the alliance companies from attending any other exhibition except if they obtained prior approval of GAGA

After a thorough investigation Guangdong AIC believed that the conclusion of the Agreement among GAGA and the 52 member companies violated article 13 (5) of the AML in terms of boycott GAGA who was deeply involved and restricted member companiesrsquo choice of exhibitions through the Agreement could be deemed as

26 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151208_164680html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 27 of 52

the participant and organizer of the monopolistic agreement In accordance with article 46 of the AML Guangdong AIC imposed a fine of CNY 100000 on GAGA for organizing the conclusion of the monopolistic agreement

Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC27

Hubei AIC considered the coinsurance for Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance illegal

Twelve insurance companies were fined CNY 469 million in total

Facts

In December 2015 the Hubei Administrative for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHubei AICrdquo) disclosed its punishment on 12 insurance companies for signing illegal coinsurance agreements

The disclosed punishment decision suggests that the Hubei branch of China Pacific Life Insurance (ldquothe Companyrdquo) 11 other insurance companies and Wuhan Construction Safety Technology Consultation Center (ldquoWCSTCCrdquo) signed a Coinsurance Agreement on Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance (ldquoCoinsurance Agreementrdquo) of which the main contents include

1) The Company and 11 other involved companies as the coinsurers jointly take charge of the personal accident insurance concerned with the construction project directly administered by the Wuhan government WCSTCC is responsible for providing safety professionalism and technology services regarding the relevant personal accident insurance

2) The Company as the chief insurer of the coinsurance occupies 12 of the total amount of the insurance and the other 11 companies respectively occupy 8

3) The Company as the representative of the coinsurance is in charge of collecting the premium signing the standard form insurance policies and issuing the invoice in its own name The Company should share the charged premium with the other companies in accordance with the Coinsurance Agreement

4) Both the Company and the other insurance companies should pay 25 of the actually received premium to WCSTCC as the service fee WCSTCC will assist the coinsurers in providing safety and technology management service to the insured In addition the 11 insurance companies should pay 5 of their premium to the Company as the management fee

27 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165445html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 28 of 52

5) In case an accident happens the 12 companies will jointly bear the damages based on their respective shares in the coinsurance

6) There is a contact mechanism established in the coinsurance The coinsurers will regularly hold coinsurance conferences to discuss existing problems

Furthermore the coinsurers and WCSTCC also signed a self-discipline agreement and established a complete management system to assure the implementation of the Coinsurance Agreement Any party violating the Coinsurance Agreement would be punished

Hubei AIC found that WCSTCC was solely invested by Wuhan Construction Safety Management Association which was under Wuhan Construction Commission The centre helped implement certain functions of the Wuhan Urban Construction Safety Management Station and was responsible for quality supervision and safety supervision of municipal construction projects

It later became a prerequisite for construction companies to purchase insurance from any member of the coinsurance in order to get approval to commence their project According to the decision Hubei AIC launched another separate investigation against WCSTCC

Through the investigation Hubei AIC concluded that the Coinsurance Agreement constituted a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by article 13 of the AML with the following analysis

First coinsurance as a common business model to jointly share and lower risks is widely adopted in the insurance industry A coinsurance arrangement for a specific project in order to avoid high risks faced by one insurer could be legal However coinsurance should not target the entire market In this case prior to the Coinsurance Agreement the risks of the construction projects were unpredictable since the scale of the construction projects the difficulty of the construction and the amount of construction workers could not be available It is impossible to predict the risks of the projects thus it is not necessary to cooperate with other insurers to collectively bear the risks The purpose of the 12 insurance companies to establish the coinsurance is to avoid the competition which demonstrates the Coinsurance Agreement belongs to a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by the AML

Second the companies through entering into the coinsurance agreement actually divided the relevant market of construction project personal accident insurance in Wuhan city which affected the competition in the relevant market and damaged the interests of other competitors and the consumers In particular the Construction Law as amended in 2011 stipulates that the purchase of personal accident insurance is not mandatory and the construction companies have the right to choose whether to buy the said insurance or not As mentioned purchasing insurance from the coinsurance had been the prerequisite for construction companies to obtain administration

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 29 of 52

approval for the project which seriously distorts the fair competition in the market

Citing article 46 of the AML the 12 insurance companies were collectively fined CNY 469 million including fines on the companies and confiscation of illegal gains It is noteworthy that the fines were calculated based on the companiesrsquo 2014 annual sales of the insurance product in connection with the coinsurance The Company as the chief insurer was fined amounting to 6 of its 2014 annual sales of the relevant insurance product in the coinsurance and other companies were fined amounting to 2 of relevant sales For more specific information please see the following table

Company Name (Hubei Branch)

Fines (CNY million)

Percentage of the sales

Illegal Gains (CNY

million)

China Pacific Life Insurance 00653 6 0941

Sino Life 00145 2 04332

Alltrust Insurance 00145 2 04332

Taikang Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Continent Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Pacific Property Insurance

00145 2 04332

China Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

PICC Property and Casualty 00145 2 02599

Taiping General Insurance 00145 2 013

Union Life Insurance 00145 2 01177

Ping An Annuity Insurance Company of China

00145 2 04201

Ping An Property amp Casualty Insurance Company of China

00145 2 -

Subtotal 02248 - 44679

Total 46927

Analysis

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 30 of 52

Coinsurance as an effective approach to lower risks of insurers is widely used in the insurance industry Information sharing and agreements on coinsurance were generally considered efficient and legitimate However from an antitrust perspective coinsurance may raise competition concerns depending on the circumstances of each agreement In the case that there is enough capacity for one insurer to cover the potential risks the coinsurance might be considered as entering into a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC28

The first leniency applicant was exempted from fines

The other concrete companies were imposed a fine of CNY 180000

Facts

In December 2015 the concrete companies monopolistic agreement case investigated by Hunan AIC was published on SAICrsquos website

In accordance with the antitrust enforcement announcement of SAIC this case was triggered by complaints from the Yongzhou City peoplersquos congress After the preliminary review the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) initiated the formal investigation on seven concrete companies domiciled in Yongzhou City Hunan Province which were suspected of being involved in a monopolistic agreement in terms of division of the volumes of the products

After further investigation Hunan AIC found that the seven concrete companies concluded a partnership agreement in 2011 which requested the involved companies to enter into a partnership business with assets In addition according to the partnership agreement it was planned to establish a comprehensive office to manage production marketing and distribution of the products of all the partners The seven companies intended to jointly adjust and control the output of concrete based on the partnership agreement However because there were disagreements over the allocation of the injected assets and market shares the companies did not implement the partnership agreement The agreement was cancelled in December 2012

Based on the findings Hunan AIC concluded that the seven concrete companies as competitors of each other restricted and eliminated the competition in the relevant market through reaching the partnership agreement and dividing the volumes of sales which violated article 13(3) of the AML in terms of division of sales market Considering that the agreement had not been implemented and the limited influence of the agreement according to article 46 of the AML and article 27 of the Administrative Penalties Law small amount fines were imposed on the involved companies Six companies were fined CNY 30000 each for their illegal behaviour 28 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165504html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 31 of 52

Yongzhou Shuangyuan Building Materials Co Ltd as the first one to actively report the monopolistic agreement and cooperate with the enforcement authority was exempted from the punishment

Outlook

It is expected that the AMLrsquos enforcement on monopolistic agreements will continue in the future Industries such as automobile shipping pharmaceuticals insurance etc will still remain the priority of the antitrust enforcement

The antitrust enforcement authorities have published a series of regulations in order to clarify the substantial and procedural issues relevant to the antitrust enforcement However Chinarsquos current antitrust legislation regime is still immature In the following years we expect that more attention will be paid to the legislative improvements

Another remarkable issue for cartel members is that with more Chinese enterprises attaching increasing importance to the AML the follow-on civil damages actions might become a tendency in the future

C Abuse of Market Dominance

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen a decent increase of abuse of market dominance cases both in public enforcement and private litigation Oftentimes the authorities responsible for public enforcement generally find it difficult to pursue investigations against abuse of market dominance cases The following two main reasons are often cited to explain this standoff first it is hard for the authorities to define the relevant markets and prove the undertaking(s)rsquo dominant market position through economic approaches second it is hard to collect evidence regarding abusive practices

The cases related to IPRs abuse are emerging significantly particularly in the telecommunication media and technology (ldquoTMTrdquo) sectors

The SAICrsquos latest refusal-to-deal probe against a local drug maker shows that the SAIC and its local branches have increasingly acquired a profile as an abuse of dominance regulator

Significant Cases

Cases pursued by the SAIC

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 32 of 52

Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case29

Facts

The local authority in Dongfang city reported to the Hainan provincial branch of SAIC on April 23 2014 of the suspected dominance abuse The SAIC authorized its Hainan bureau to officially investigate the matter on 25 July 2014 according to a decision dated January 9 2015 The AIC concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its market dominance by requiring users to pay a deposit without any legal basis and or justifiable reasons

In terms of the relevant product market the local authority found that in this case it was the urban water supply market in Dongfang city and its surrounding townships where Dongfang Water was the sole public operator in the local water supply market with a 100 market share which made all water users completely reliant on the companyrsquos supply In term of market access the local authority found it very unlikely that there were other operators due to the strict regulations

The Hainan SAIC then concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its dominance as it charged users a deposit by threatening to refuse to register users and also by threatening to restrict the water supply Dongfang Waters charging of deposits lacked a legal basis and hadnt received government approval to the detriment of household consumers and business water users and hampered the improvement of management and services of the company Such conduct was in breach of Chinarsquos Anti-Monopoly Law

Hainan AIC levied a fine of CNY 593208 a lighter penalty equivalent to 2 of the companyrsquos annual sales for the previous year and confiscated illicit gains of CNY 38521 for abuse of market dominance

Analysis

It is noteworthy that although handled by a local authority supervised by the SAIC the antitrust agency detailed the relevant market definition the assessment of the dominant market position the abusive practices and the scrutiny of the justifiable reasons

Although the definition of the relevant market and the reasoning of the Hainan provincial AIC and the SAIC are subject to criticism it is still applausive to see that the antitrust regulators have realized the importance of the application of rule of reason in an abuse case In addition through itrsquos a published decision practitioners may observe the regulatorsrsquo reasoning and thus transparency and legal certainty have been generated

29 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzfcfjd201502t20150212_152066html last visited on October 18 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

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Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms30

Facts

In June 2013 the Ningxia AIC under authorization of SAIC opened an antitrust investigation into the alleged tie-in sales by the three major state-owned telecommunications operators China Tietong China Unicom and China Telecom for the tie-in sale of fixed-line telephones with broadband Internet services The Ningxia AIC found that the three companies had bundled fixed-line phone services with Internet services to subscribers

During the investigation all three telecommunications companies admitted the tie-in practice had recognized that such practice had improper influence on competition and deprived the choices of consumers The three companies promised to undertake internal rectification timely and eliminate the ill effects resulting from such practice The parties committed to taking the following corrective measures

1) Taking internal rectifications and conducting training to staff about antitrust laws and stop tie-in sales practices

2) Making public commitments to allow subscribers a free choice of services and strengthening the propaganda through the operating room call centre and other channels

3) Unbundling fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

The Ningxia AIC decided to suspend the probe on 14 May 2015 on the grounds that the three companies had actively worked together with the investigators and proposed workable remedy plans

Analysis

In the official announcement Ningxia AIC concluded that the purpose of antitrust enforcement is to restrain monopolistic conducts the protection of competition and to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of consumers Given that during the investigation process the parties had actively cooperated with the investigation formed a more profound understanding of the dangers of tying behaviour and moreover the parties proposed and implemented positive corrective measures to be able to remove the ill impact of their actions the agency believed that the purpose of antitrust law enforcement was fulfilled

It is worth noting that the Ningxia AIC also required the three companies to implement the commitment by August 30 2015and the submission of the written

30 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158908html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158906html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158910html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 34 of 52

implementation report on July 102015 and August 102015 respectively which is another illustration that an effective commitment by the undertakings shall directly deal with the effect that is brought by the monopolistic behaviour In this case the effect of the monopolistic act was restricted to the choice of the consumers therefore the commitment by the undertaking aimed at allowing the freedom of choice and the unbundling of fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company31

Facts

The Liaoning AIC imposed a fine of approximately CNY 433m on the Fushun Branch of Liaoning Tobacco Co on 1 June 2015 The agency also ordered the company to stop its illicit behaviour

The Liaoning AIC received a tip-off that the accused Liaoning Tobacco Corsquos Fushun branch was conducting tie-in sales of non-high-demand cigarette brands with high-demand cigarette brands After gaining authorization from SAIC the agency officially started an investigation regarding the companyrsquos suspected abuse of market dominance in June 2014

Analysis

According to the announcement the tobacco company argued that the tobacco industry is a state controlled or monopolized industry with a lawful monopolistic position therefore the company shall not be subject to the norms of general market competition rules or the anti-monopoly law

In this regards the agency concluded that in terms of the status of the undertaking admittedly the first paragraph of article 17 of the AML says that the State shall protect the lawful business operations of undertakings in these industries with respect to the industries which are under the control of the State-owned economic sector and have a bearing on the lifeline of the national economy or national security and the industries which exercise monopoly over the production and sale of certain commodities according to law However the second paragraph continues to say that the undertakings mentioned above shall do business according to law be honest faithful and strictly self-disciplined and subject themselves to public supervision and they shall not harm the consumers interests by taking advantage of their position of control or their monopolistic production and sale of certain commodities In particular in the preceding paragraph the ldquolawful businessrdquo and ldquoaccording to lawrdquo imply that the AML shall apply in the business operation The agency therefore believes that

31 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201508t20150813_16

0208html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 35 of 52

there shall be no exemption for the undertaking concerned the defences of the undertaking concerned is not established

Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm32

Facts

The Chongqing AIC fined Chongqing Qingyang Pharmaceutical CNY 439308 for alleged dominance abuse

The investigation was initiated when the company contacted the agency for verification on its potential breach of the AML related to an allopurinol active pharmaceuticals ingredient (API) distribution agreement with its exclusive distributor The company provided the relevant agreement and information and the agency conducted an investigation into the company and some other relevant companies

Analysis

Relevant Market

During the investigation the agency found that pharmaceutical ingredients are a special commodity the API is used to produce the preparations The chemical API is only used for the production of the preparation and could be used as a medicine for clinic use

The preparation is produced according to the requirements of certain form of prepared drugs and for the purpose of treatment and prevention which can be used as medicine

The allopurinol is used for the common treatment of hyperuricemia However the other treatments are different in pharmacological effects or treatment effects as well as in the cost for the patient Furthermore the company is the only manufacturer and supplier in the market nationwide since July 2012 Therefore the agency concluded that the relevant market is the allopurinol API market

Considering that the qualification for manufacturing the allopurinol API is national wide and the normal practice for purchasers and suppliers is domestic the relevant geographic market is the Chinese market

The Market Dominance

During the investigation the agency found that the company is the only supplier and manufacturer of allopurinol API in China there is no other competitor in the

32 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151222_16

5152html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 36 of 52

market and the company has a monopoly in the market The evidence shows that the company has the ability to control the prices the position for the downstream is relatively weak

With respect to the market entry the agency found that the market entry is relatively high in addition other undertakings are dependent on the company Thus the agency believed the company to have market dominance

Refusal to Deal

The agency found that on September 25 2015 the company reached an exclusive agreement and distribution agreement with its distributor Based on these agreements the company didnrsquot supply allopurinol API to the said distributor and other companies despite the fact that those companies requested for allopurinol API but were turned down by the company

Absence of Reasonable Cause

The agency found that the companyrsquos refusal to deal was not in line with the needs of normal business operation or economic efficiency On the other hand the refusal to deal was aimed at increasing the market share of the allopurinol drug product Also the agency found that the stop of supply was a manipulation of market power as to maximize the profit to the most The agency further found that the exclusive distribution agreement with suspension of supply for six months and the refusal to supply was to eliminate and restrict the competition as to gain the monopolistic profit

The Consequence of Refusal to Deal

The agency concluded that the refusal to deal harmed the competition of the allopurinol preparations market Because of the suspension of supply many demanders had to reduce their production or switch to the supply of other products or stop their production The suspension of supply affected the competition of the downstream market Consequently the raising of the price of allopurinol API also raised the cost for other manufacturers of allopurinol preparations

Furthermore the refusal to deal led to capacity loss of the allopurinol preparation industry

Ultimately the refusal to deal increased the burden on consumers as the refusal to supply changed the supply-demand relationship in the market

The agency concluded that the Company abused its dominant position in the allopurinol API market by refusing to deal with intended buyers in the period between October 2013 and March 2014Therefore the Company violated article 17 (1) of the AML which prohibits business operators with a dominant market position from abusing that position such as the refusal to deal without any justifications

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

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D Administrative Monopoly

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 witnessed antitrust authoritiesrsquo significant efforts regarding the enforcement against administrative monopoly According to Mr Dong Zhiming the deputy director general of Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly Bureau ever since the AML coming into force six cases in connection with administrative monopoly were investigated by NDRC and among them five cases were handled in the year of 2015 These cases touched abuses of administrative power in terms of designative deal in relation to transportation communication and pharmaceutical industries

The first private litigation related to administrative monopolistic acts was heard in the court which is a milestone case in the enforcement of the AML

Significant Cases

Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC33

Facts

In March 2015 the NDRC released the official letter to Shandong Provincial Department of Transportation (ldquoShandong DOTrdquo) on its website with respect to correct its abuse of administrative power to exclude and restrict competition

During the investigation the NDRC found that since 2011 Shandong DOT had issued multiple relevant government orders in order to require certain types of vehicles to be directly connected to two designated information and service platforms both of which are operated and technically supported by one company namely Shandong Jiutong Internet of Things Technology Co Ltd (ldquoJiutong ITTrdquo) Furthermore according to the orders issued by the competent administrative department all the vehicle satellite positioning terminals entering into Shandong provincial market should be debugged through the said technology service platform which is operated by the mentioned company In addition Shandong DOT released the cap prices of vehicle satellite positioning terminals which is identical to the 2012 bid-winning price in the Ministry of Transportation demonstration project

The NDRC believed that Shandong DOTrsquos behaviour eliminated and restricted the competition in the monitoring platform market and the vehicle terminal market deprived the right of transportation enterprises to choose vehicle terminals and monitoring platform on their owns unreasonably raised the sales prices of vehicle terminals and service fees charged by the platform and increased the costs of transportation enterprises Therefore the antitrust agency concluded that Shandong

33 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201503t20150327_668911html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

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DOT violated article 8 of the AML which stipulates that ldquoadministrative organs and the public organizations with an administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude and restrict competitionrdquo Specifically Shandong DOT violated article 3234 in terms of requiring organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any designated operators and violated article 3735 in terms of setting rules with contents which eliminate and restrict competition

Based on article 51 of the AML ldquoWhere administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations abuse administrative powers performing activities which exclude and restrict competition the superior entity shall order it to correct impose administrative penalty on the chief officer and other staffs directly responsible pursuant to the laws The AML enforcement authority may give recommendations on disposal of activities to the relevant superior entityrdquo the NDRC proposed in writing that the Shandong provincial government should order Shandong DOT to rectify its behaviour with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Entirely open up the monitoring platform market by permitting transportation undertakings to freely choose any approved platform

2) Loosen the restrictions on the entry into Shandong vehicle terminals permit the undertakings to independently select the supplier of vehicle terminals and allow the qualified terminals to be connected to the relevant monitoring platform and

3) Revoke the official documentation relevant to the cap price of vehicle terminals in order to promote the price competition

Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 36

Facts

On 26 August 2015 the NDRC published its second decision with regard to the rectification of administrative monopoly since the beginning of this year According to the proposal letter sent to Anhui Provincial Government the investigation against the Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City (Bengbu HFPC) was trigged by third partiesrsquo complaints

34 Article 32 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to require organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any operators designated by them 35 Article 37 of the AML Administrative organs shall not abuse their administrative powers to set rules with contents which eliminate restrict competition 36 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201508t20150826_748682html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 39 of 52

The investigation suggests that Bengbu HFPC published three notices with regard to drugs procurement in April and May of this year

In the No C-2015-CG-X-111 Notice (ldquoNo111 Noticerdquo) released on 10 April2015 the health authority not only provided the dosage form and qualification of the requested drugs but also directly determined the suppliers of relevant drugs which eliminated and restricted the competition among pharmaceutical manufacturers and therefore violated articles 32 and 37 of the AML

In the No C-2015-CG-C-112 Notice (ldquoNo112 Noticerdquo) and No C-2015-CG-C-168 (ldquoNo 168 Noticerdquo) respectively released on 10 April and 22 May 2015 the Bengbu HFPC set discriminative qualification requirements on non-local undertakings in order to restrict their participation in the relevant bidding For instance in accordance with No 112 Notice to be a qualified bidder the turnover of non-local undertakings shall exceed CNY 2 billion which is 50 times as much as the turnover requirements of the local undertakings In the NDRCrsquos opinion the administrative monopoly activities conducted by the local health agency excluded the relevant undertakings from the market maintained the virtual-high prices of drugs and therefore violated articles 3237 and 37 of the AML

The NDRC suggested in a letter that Anhui Provincial Government should urge the Bengbu HFPC to rectify the abuse of monopoly powers with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Stop setting distinguishing restrictions on qualification requirements review standards and numbers of winning bidders as for local and non-local undertakings

2) Stop designating the suppliers of competitive drugs and

3) Take necessary measures to mitigate the negative effects resulting from the previous illegal monopolistic abuses

Outlook

At the beginning of the year the former director general of the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau under the NDRC Xu Kunlin stated that the agency would strengthen antitrust enforcement on abuse of administrative power in 2015

Since then the NDRC has made great efforts to rectify unreasonable abuses of administrative power The currently disclosed two cases investigated by the NDRC re-emphasize the Chinese Governmentrsquos strict scrutiny of antitrust issues in respect of

37 Article 34 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to restrict or reject the participation of operators from other regions in local bidding activities by measures such as prescribing discriminatory qualification requirements or assessment standards or by not publishing information according to law

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 40 of 52

administrative monopoly It reminds the local governments that antitrust compliance is of significant importance

III Private Litigation

A Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen more and more private antitrust litigations

The private antitrust litigation cases have become increasingly complicated especially the issues regarding the intersection areas of IP and antitrust law

Multinational giants and State-Owned Enterprises (the ldquoSOEsrdquo) are increasingly becoming the targets in antitrust civil litigations Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (the ldquoSMEsrdquo) tend to use the antitrust litigation to achieve their commercial goals in the business context

B Significant Cases

Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)38

This is the first-ever private litigation concerning administrative monopoly since the implementation of the AML in 2008

Facts

According to the currently disclosed details the case is relevant for designated trade

The plaintiff Shenzhen Sware Technology Co Ltd (ldquoSwarerdquo) is a software company The press releases suggest that Sware Gloden Software Co Ltd (ldquoGlodenrdquo) and Shanghai Ruban Software Co Ltd (ldquoShanghai Rubanrdquo) are the three main suppliers of construction cost software and possess the major shares of the relevant market An annual provincial vocational ability contest regarding the construction cost hosted by the Guangdong Department of Education (ldquoGuangdong DOE) designated Gloden as the exclusive supplier of the relevant software

After several unsuccessful verbal and written negotiations with Guangdong DOE in April 2014 Sware filed a lawsuit against Guangdong DOE before the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquothe Courtrdquo) alleging that the administrative organ abused its administrative power and violated the AML by designating exclusive software supplier for the contest and claimed a compensation for reasonable expense amounting to CNY 10800 Yuan

The opinions of the Court 38 The story of the case is available at httpfinancesinacomcnchinadfjj20150410074621924997shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 41 of 52

The full text of the judgment has not been disclosed yet In accordance with the information available to the public the Court invoked article 32 of the AML which prohibits an administrative organ from abusing its administrative power to require or in disguised form organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use only the commodities supplied by the entities designated by them The Court concluded that Guangdong DOE failed to prove the legitimacy of the designation and therefore abused its administration power

Currently the case is in appeal before the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court

Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 39

It is the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China

In the first instance ruling Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court ruled against Sinopec holding that the Yunnan branch of Sinopecs trading company was obligated to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its dominance in the sales market of refined oil by refusing to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding without justifiable reasons

In the second instance ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors Currently the case is pending

Facts

The First Trial

The lawsuit was filed before the Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoKunming Courtrdquo) in January 2014 Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy Co Ltd (ldquoYingdingrdquo) a bio-energy manufacturer claimed that Sinopec and the Yunnan branch of Sinopec trading company (ldquoSinopec Yunnan Branchrdquo) had failed to fulfil their obligations stipulated in the Renewable Energy Law and had abused their market dominance in sales market of refined oil by refusing to trade with Yingding without justifiable reasons

Sinopec and Sinopec Yunnan Branch mainly explained four reasons for why they rejected Yingdingrsquos biofuel Firstly Yingding had failed to prove that the biofuel complied with the relevant national standard and was safe to use Secondly Yingding had failed to provide complete trading terms Thirdly the laws and regulations regarding biofuel were incomplete the authorized refined oil sales companies were 39 The details of the case are available at httpnewsxinhuanetcomfortune2014-1217c_1113680039htm httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=9e71db51-6ff6-4d2c-8af6-8eacf023ebdeampKeyWord=E4BA91E58D97E79B88E9BC8E|E4B8ADE79FB3E58C96 httpnewsxinhuanetcomenergy2015-0422c_127721575htm httpwwwnbdcomcnarticles2015-04-23911348html last visited on December 17 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 42 of 52

obligated to purchase biofuel from the biofuel manufacturers if it met certain quality standards but there was a vacancy regarding how to reach the end consumers from the sales companies

On 8 December 2014 the Kunming Intermediate Peoples Court ruled that Sinopec Yunnan Branch bore a legal obligation to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its market dominance in refined oil market by refusing without any justifiable reasons to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding The court ordered Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network within 30 days Both Yingding and Sinopec filed appeals to the Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court

The Appellate Trial

The appeal hearing was held on 22 April 2015 in Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoYunnan Courtrdquo) Sinopec submitted 23 new pieces of evidence and introduced two expert witnesses in a bid to overturn several key elements in the first-instance ruling by Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court

In terms of the determination of the relevant market and the market dominance Sinopec argued that the relevant market in this case was for adipic acid monomethyl ester (ldquoAAMErdquo) the main ingredient of a biofuel additive known as BD100 Yingdingrsquos main product is BD100 which can be blended with fossil diesel to become biofuel In the AAME market Sinopec is a potential buyer instead of a market dominator In support of this argument Sinopec presented an expert witnessmdashGong Jiong a professor of economics at Beijings University of International Business and Economics who testified that AAME should be defined as the relevant product market on the basis of an economic analysis

However Yingding insisted that the first-instance ruling was correct in naming the sales market of refined oil as the relevant market and submitted new evidence an article on Sinopecs website that claimed it had a 67 market share in Yunnan to help establish the claim that Sinopec had market dominance

Another main dispute was whether Yingdingrsquos biofuel product met national standards which would make it mandatory for Sinopec to purchase under Chinas Renewable Energy Law The law stipulates that biofuel producers must sell their products first to an authorized refined oil sales company and the sales companies are obliged to buy the fuel if it meets certain quality standards In order to test the quality Sinopec introduced the second expert witness Lin Jianmin a leading author of Chinarsquos national biofuel standard Lin Jianmin pointed out that there are currently quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology which gives Sinopec a justifiable reason not to trade with Yingding Moreover Sinopec presented some precedents in which consumers had complained about the biofuel quality and also claimed that China didnt have a sound regulatory framework to support biofuel production neither in testing nor in sales

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 43 of 52

Nevertheless to refute this point Yingding referred to an earlier test in co-operation with Sinopec in 2011 where selected buses in Kunming used biofuel blended by Sinopec using BD100 produced by Yingding

On August 13 2015 Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors and now this case is pending In the written appellate ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court did not provide any details regarding its reasoning

Key Issues of the Case

Is there any competition between Yingding and Sinopec

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case the product of Yingding is biofuel while Sinopec does not engage in the business of biofuel From this perspective Yingding and Sinopec are not competitors Thus it is not necessary and not reasonable for Sinopec to eliminate or restrict the competition from Yingding

Relevant Market

The definition of the relevant market is a prerequisite to determine whether competition exists and whether the AML is applicable In accordance with the Judicial Interpretation of Antitrust civil litigation the plaintiff shall take the responsibility to prove the defendantrsquos dominance in the relevant market Also the methods of defining the relevant market are stipulated in the Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition (ldquoGuidelinesrdquo) However both Yingding and Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court defined the relevant market as the sales market of refined oil without sufficient antitrust analysis none of the methods in the Guidelines were used Therefore the definition of the relevant market remains arguable and needs to be sufficiently analysed in the upcoming retrial

Justifiable Reasons

The abuse of market dominance includes the behaviour of refusing to trade without justifiable reasons according to the AML but in the first instance ruling justifiable reasons were not investigated by the court During the appellate trial the expert witness introduced by Sinopec claimed that there were quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology and this was a justifiable reason to refuse to trade with Yingding Even though the first instance court and the appellate court did not reason the justifiable reason it should be discussed and investigated further during the retrial

AML or Renewable Energy Law

The claims of Yingding were based on both the AML and the Renewable Energy Law (ldquoRELrdquo) and the first instance ruling referred to both the AML and the REL as

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

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well It seems that the laws the first instance court referred to were comprehensive but in fact the reasoning was not clear and logical In the first instance ruling some disputes regarding the AML were reviewed but all the orders were not based on the AML Specifically the first instance court ordered the Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network based on the REL and dismissed the other claims That the orders were not on account of reasoning is illogical It is anticipated that during the retrial the application of the laws will be clearer

Analysis

A lot of issues have not been clearly analysed by the courts such as the relevant market and the justifiable reasons Since the case is remanded the above-mentioned issues are expected to be resolved in the retrial In addition Yingding was in a disadvantaged position compared to its first instance trial since its claims based on the AML were challenged greatly during the appellate trial In the retrial it is probable that Yingding may switch its litigation strategy and base its claims on the REL Therefore maybe more preparation regarding the REL can give Sinopec a leg up

Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)

Rijing Electric a Chinese distributor seeks CNY 5m compensation

The first hearing was on 9 June 2015 and ended without a ruling

Facts

Rijing Electric (ldquoRijingrdquo) a Shanghai-based company and a former distributor for Panasonic accused Panasonic of abusing its dominance and dividing the market through monopolistic practice in an antitrust lawsuit filed in 2014 with Shanghai No 1 Intermediate Court (ldquoShanghai Courtrdquo) claiming compensation of CNY 5m (USD 815370) Wenzhou Mingda Automation System Co and Shanghai Qingying Automation Equipment as the distributor of Panasonic in China are the co-defendants were accused of conducting monopolistic behaviours by implementing Panasonicrsquos policy

The first hearing for evidence exchange was on June 9 2015 Rijing claimed a policy allegedly introduced by Panasonic in 2009 restricted the competition between distributors Panasonic claims the policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo and has full justifiable reasons It explained that the products in question required customization at considerable cost to distributors before its sale to customers Once carried out however other distributors leaving them open to quote much lower prices than the original distributor could simply and relatively cheap replicate this customization Besides Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and that the plaintiff had failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic said its market share for the four products

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 45 of 52

under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases Also Rijing failed to challenge the policy when it was first introduced instead initially agreeing it was reasonable as e-mail evidence submitted by Panasonic suggests

Key Issues of the Case

Whether Panasonic occupied a market dominant position

It is reported that Rijing claimed that Panasonic had abused its market dominance but Rijing failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and its market share for the four products under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases

Analysis

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case Panasonicrsquos policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo rather than to eliminate or restrict competition

Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals40 (Pending)

It is a battle over patent licensing issues

It is viewed as being among the most complicated antitrust lawsuits in China

The first hearing was on 17 and 18 December 2015

Facts

Four Chinese rare earth companies Ningbo Ketian Magnet Ningbo Permanent Magnetics Ningbo Tongchuang Strong Magnet Material and Ningbo Huahui Magnetic Industry filed antitrust lawsuits against Hitachi Metals over alleged patent licensing issues regarding rare earth magnets on December 11 2014 with the Ningbo Intermediate Peoples Court (ldquoNingbo Courtrdquo) in Zhejiang province As reported four Chinese rare earth companies claimed Hitachi Metals abused its market dominance and hurt the industry competition by refusing to license the patents to them The patents in this case are used in the manufacturing of sintered neodymium iron boron (ldquoNdFeBrdquo) magnets a rare-earth magnet alloy widely used in parts for airplanes automobiles and other products

Hitachi Metals filed a challenge with the Ningbo Court over its jurisdiction in April 2015 After Ningbo Court rejected Hitachi Metals jurisdiction objection on 28 April 2015 Hitachi Metals appealed to the Zhejiang High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoZhejiang

40The details of the story are available at httpwwwzbmagcomnews_viewphpid=80 httpwwwhitachicomcnaboutpress201510-121118_ahtml last visited on December 22 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 46 of 52

Courtrdquo) but Zhejiang Court affirmed the ruling of the Ningbo Court

The first day of a two-day hearing took place on 17 December 2015 during which the two sides cross-examined each otherrsquos evidence The evidence focused on clearing up several key elements in the case including the relevant market whether Hitachi Metals has dominance on that market and whether both sides acted in good faith during the licensing negotiations

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Product Market

The four Chinese rare earth companies claimed that the relevant product market should be the NdFeb-related patent licensing market However Hitachi Metals believed that the physical NdFeb market rather than the patent licensing market should be the relevant product market which is meaningful for assess the real competitive effects on the market

Whether Hitachi Metals occupies a dominant market position

In terms of market dominance Hitachi Metals claimed it does not occupy a dominant position because Hitachi Metalsrsquo patents were not in a standard in this case and there are substitutable technologies in the market SEP holders have the obligation to license on FRAND terms but none-SEP holders do not So while a refusal to license a SEP may constitute abuse of dominance refusal to license a non-SEP mdash even by a patent holder with a dominant position mdash should not be considered as an abuse

Analysis

Hitachi Metals as a patent holder should have the right to decide whether to retain those patents or not or who to license According to the legal theory the purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage and protect innovation by conferring monopoly right mdash that is to give intellectual property owners the proprietary rights which can exclude others from using the intellectual property The SEP holders admittedly need to comply with FRAND terms which can maintain a robust balance between competition and monopoly whereas the further intervention of antitrust law into non-SEP patents may undermine the purpose of intellectual property law To which extent the antitrust law should intervene is yet to be seen

Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei41

A confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the Beijing IP court made by the Beijing High Court

41 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcncpwswbjzscq201511t20151103_12225640htm last visited on December 28 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 47 of 52

Facts

On August 2 2013 the NDRC penalized Abbott for monopolistic price-fixing and then Abbott made a price adjustment in China where the prices of main products were reduced

On December 16 2014 Tian Junwei (ldquoTianrdquo) a Chinese citizen in Beijing sued Carrefour Shuangjing Branch (ldquoCarrefourrdquo) and Abbott (Shanghai) Sales Company (ldquoAbbottrdquo) at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (ldquoIP Courtrdquo) for their monopolistic price-fixing which damaged his interests However Carrefour and Abbott challenged the jurisdiction of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court They claimed there were two reasons Firstly according to the jurisdiction rules of the IP court issued by the Supreme Court the IP court has no jurisdiction over anti-trust cases Secondly if this case is a contractual dispute the court that is in the place of Carrefour should hear it if this case is a tort dispute the Shanghai Intermediate Court should hear it

In the ruling of the IP Court the IP Court decided it has the jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases for the following reasons According to the Provisions On Causes Of Action In Civil Cases issued by Supreme Court (最高人民法院案由规定) antimonopoly dispute is a tertiary cause of action belonging to IP and competition disputes Also according to the Provisions concerning the Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京

市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问题的规定 ) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was an IP and competition dispute and was sued after November 6 2014 Thus the IP Court had jurisdiction

Both Carrefour and Abbott appealed to the Beijing High Court over the jurisdiction ruling but the Beijing High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original ruling Reasons are listed in the written ruling issued on June 18 2015 Firstly the nature of the case was an antimonopoly dispute In accordance with Provisions of the Supreme Peoples Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民

事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) and Civil Litigation Law the monopolistic civil disputes in the first instance shall be under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Peoples Courts and an action involving a contractual dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the peoples court of the place where the defendant is domiciled or where the contract is performed Carrefour as the defendant in this case is domiciled in Chaoyang District Beijing Therefore the courts of Beijing have jurisdiction over this case Secondly according to article 3 of the Notification on the Jurisdiction of Intellectual Property Courts issued by Supreme Court (关于知识产权法院案件管辖

等有关问题的通知) IP courts have jurisdiction over first-instance civil disputes arising from monopolistic practices Lastly according to Provisions concerning the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 27 of 52

the participant and organizer of the monopolistic agreement In accordance with article 46 of the AML Guangdong AIC imposed a fine of CNY 100000 on GAGA for organizing the conclusion of the monopolistic agreement

Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC27

Hubei AIC considered the coinsurance for Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance illegal

Twelve insurance companies were fined CNY 469 million in total

Facts

In December 2015 the Hubei Administrative for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHubei AICrdquo) disclosed its punishment on 12 insurance companies for signing illegal coinsurance agreements

The disclosed punishment decision suggests that the Hubei branch of China Pacific Life Insurance (ldquothe Companyrdquo) 11 other insurance companies and Wuhan Construction Safety Technology Consultation Center (ldquoWCSTCCrdquo) signed a Coinsurance Agreement on Construction Project Personal Accident Insurance (ldquoCoinsurance Agreementrdquo) of which the main contents include

1) The Company and 11 other involved companies as the coinsurers jointly take charge of the personal accident insurance concerned with the construction project directly administered by the Wuhan government WCSTCC is responsible for providing safety professionalism and technology services regarding the relevant personal accident insurance

2) The Company as the chief insurer of the coinsurance occupies 12 of the total amount of the insurance and the other 11 companies respectively occupy 8

3) The Company as the representative of the coinsurance is in charge of collecting the premium signing the standard form insurance policies and issuing the invoice in its own name The Company should share the charged premium with the other companies in accordance with the Coinsurance Agreement

4) Both the Company and the other insurance companies should pay 25 of the actually received premium to WCSTCC as the service fee WCSTCC will assist the coinsurers in providing safety and technology management service to the insured In addition the 11 insurance companies should pay 5 of their premium to the Company as the management fee

27 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165445html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 28 of 52

5) In case an accident happens the 12 companies will jointly bear the damages based on their respective shares in the coinsurance

6) There is a contact mechanism established in the coinsurance The coinsurers will regularly hold coinsurance conferences to discuss existing problems

Furthermore the coinsurers and WCSTCC also signed a self-discipline agreement and established a complete management system to assure the implementation of the Coinsurance Agreement Any party violating the Coinsurance Agreement would be punished

Hubei AIC found that WCSTCC was solely invested by Wuhan Construction Safety Management Association which was under Wuhan Construction Commission The centre helped implement certain functions of the Wuhan Urban Construction Safety Management Station and was responsible for quality supervision and safety supervision of municipal construction projects

It later became a prerequisite for construction companies to purchase insurance from any member of the coinsurance in order to get approval to commence their project According to the decision Hubei AIC launched another separate investigation against WCSTCC

Through the investigation Hubei AIC concluded that the Coinsurance Agreement constituted a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by article 13 of the AML with the following analysis

First coinsurance as a common business model to jointly share and lower risks is widely adopted in the insurance industry A coinsurance arrangement for a specific project in order to avoid high risks faced by one insurer could be legal However coinsurance should not target the entire market In this case prior to the Coinsurance Agreement the risks of the construction projects were unpredictable since the scale of the construction projects the difficulty of the construction and the amount of construction workers could not be available It is impossible to predict the risks of the projects thus it is not necessary to cooperate with other insurers to collectively bear the risks The purpose of the 12 insurance companies to establish the coinsurance is to avoid the competition which demonstrates the Coinsurance Agreement belongs to a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by the AML

Second the companies through entering into the coinsurance agreement actually divided the relevant market of construction project personal accident insurance in Wuhan city which affected the competition in the relevant market and damaged the interests of other competitors and the consumers In particular the Construction Law as amended in 2011 stipulates that the purchase of personal accident insurance is not mandatory and the construction companies have the right to choose whether to buy the said insurance or not As mentioned purchasing insurance from the coinsurance had been the prerequisite for construction companies to obtain administration

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 29 of 52

approval for the project which seriously distorts the fair competition in the market

Citing article 46 of the AML the 12 insurance companies were collectively fined CNY 469 million including fines on the companies and confiscation of illegal gains It is noteworthy that the fines were calculated based on the companiesrsquo 2014 annual sales of the insurance product in connection with the coinsurance The Company as the chief insurer was fined amounting to 6 of its 2014 annual sales of the relevant insurance product in the coinsurance and other companies were fined amounting to 2 of relevant sales For more specific information please see the following table

Company Name (Hubei Branch)

Fines (CNY million)

Percentage of the sales

Illegal Gains (CNY

million)

China Pacific Life Insurance 00653 6 0941

Sino Life 00145 2 04332

Alltrust Insurance 00145 2 04332

Taikang Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Continent Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Pacific Property Insurance

00145 2 04332

China Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

PICC Property and Casualty 00145 2 02599

Taiping General Insurance 00145 2 013

Union Life Insurance 00145 2 01177

Ping An Annuity Insurance Company of China

00145 2 04201

Ping An Property amp Casualty Insurance Company of China

00145 2 -

Subtotal 02248 - 44679

Total 46927

Analysis

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 30 of 52

Coinsurance as an effective approach to lower risks of insurers is widely used in the insurance industry Information sharing and agreements on coinsurance were generally considered efficient and legitimate However from an antitrust perspective coinsurance may raise competition concerns depending on the circumstances of each agreement In the case that there is enough capacity for one insurer to cover the potential risks the coinsurance might be considered as entering into a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC28

The first leniency applicant was exempted from fines

The other concrete companies were imposed a fine of CNY 180000

Facts

In December 2015 the concrete companies monopolistic agreement case investigated by Hunan AIC was published on SAICrsquos website

In accordance with the antitrust enforcement announcement of SAIC this case was triggered by complaints from the Yongzhou City peoplersquos congress After the preliminary review the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) initiated the formal investigation on seven concrete companies domiciled in Yongzhou City Hunan Province which were suspected of being involved in a monopolistic agreement in terms of division of the volumes of the products

After further investigation Hunan AIC found that the seven concrete companies concluded a partnership agreement in 2011 which requested the involved companies to enter into a partnership business with assets In addition according to the partnership agreement it was planned to establish a comprehensive office to manage production marketing and distribution of the products of all the partners The seven companies intended to jointly adjust and control the output of concrete based on the partnership agreement However because there were disagreements over the allocation of the injected assets and market shares the companies did not implement the partnership agreement The agreement was cancelled in December 2012

Based on the findings Hunan AIC concluded that the seven concrete companies as competitors of each other restricted and eliminated the competition in the relevant market through reaching the partnership agreement and dividing the volumes of sales which violated article 13(3) of the AML in terms of division of sales market Considering that the agreement had not been implemented and the limited influence of the agreement according to article 46 of the AML and article 27 of the Administrative Penalties Law small amount fines were imposed on the involved companies Six companies were fined CNY 30000 each for their illegal behaviour 28 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165504html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 31 of 52

Yongzhou Shuangyuan Building Materials Co Ltd as the first one to actively report the monopolistic agreement and cooperate with the enforcement authority was exempted from the punishment

Outlook

It is expected that the AMLrsquos enforcement on monopolistic agreements will continue in the future Industries such as automobile shipping pharmaceuticals insurance etc will still remain the priority of the antitrust enforcement

The antitrust enforcement authorities have published a series of regulations in order to clarify the substantial and procedural issues relevant to the antitrust enforcement However Chinarsquos current antitrust legislation regime is still immature In the following years we expect that more attention will be paid to the legislative improvements

Another remarkable issue for cartel members is that with more Chinese enterprises attaching increasing importance to the AML the follow-on civil damages actions might become a tendency in the future

C Abuse of Market Dominance

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen a decent increase of abuse of market dominance cases both in public enforcement and private litigation Oftentimes the authorities responsible for public enforcement generally find it difficult to pursue investigations against abuse of market dominance cases The following two main reasons are often cited to explain this standoff first it is hard for the authorities to define the relevant markets and prove the undertaking(s)rsquo dominant market position through economic approaches second it is hard to collect evidence regarding abusive practices

The cases related to IPRs abuse are emerging significantly particularly in the telecommunication media and technology (ldquoTMTrdquo) sectors

The SAICrsquos latest refusal-to-deal probe against a local drug maker shows that the SAIC and its local branches have increasingly acquired a profile as an abuse of dominance regulator

Significant Cases

Cases pursued by the SAIC

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 32 of 52

Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case29

Facts

The local authority in Dongfang city reported to the Hainan provincial branch of SAIC on April 23 2014 of the suspected dominance abuse The SAIC authorized its Hainan bureau to officially investigate the matter on 25 July 2014 according to a decision dated January 9 2015 The AIC concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its market dominance by requiring users to pay a deposit without any legal basis and or justifiable reasons

In terms of the relevant product market the local authority found that in this case it was the urban water supply market in Dongfang city and its surrounding townships where Dongfang Water was the sole public operator in the local water supply market with a 100 market share which made all water users completely reliant on the companyrsquos supply In term of market access the local authority found it very unlikely that there were other operators due to the strict regulations

The Hainan SAIC then concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its dominance as it charged users a deposit by threatening to refuse to register users and also by threatening to restrict the water supply Dongfang Waters charging of deposits lacked a legal basis and hadnt received government approval to the detriment of household consumers and business water users and hampered the improvement of management and services of the company Such conduct was in breach of Chinarsquos Anti-Monopoly Law

Hainan AIC levied a fine of CNY 593208 a lighter penalty equivalent to 2 of the companyrsquos annual sales for the previous year and confiscated illicit gains of CNY 38521 for abuse of market dominance

Analysis

It is noteworthy that although handled by a local authority supervised by the SAIC the antitrust agency detailed the relevant market definition the assessment of the dominant market position the abusive practices and the scrutiny of the justifiable reasons

Although the definition of the relevant market and the reasoning of the Hainan provincial AIC and the SAIC are subject to criticism it is still applausive to see that the antitrust regulators have realized the importance of the application of rule of reason in an abuse case In addition through itrsquos a published decision practitioners may observe the regulatorsrsquo reasoning and thus transparency and legal certainty have been generated

29 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzfcfjd201502t20150212_152066html last visited on October 18 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 33 of 52

Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms30

Facts

In June 2013 the Ningxia AIC under authorization of SAIC opened an antitrust investigation into the alleged tie-in sales by the three major state-owned telecommunications operators China Tietong China Unicom and China Telecom for the tie-in sale of fixed-line telephones with broadband Internet services The Ningxia AIC found that the three companies had bundled fixed-line phone services with Internet services to subscribers

During the investigation all three telecommunications companies admitted the tie-in practice had recognized that such practice had improper influence on competition and deprived the choices of consumers The three companies promised to undertake internal rectification timely and eliminate the ill effects resulting from such practice The parties committed to taking the following corrective measures

1) Taking internal rectifications and conducting training to staff about antitrust laws and stop tie-in sales practices

2) Making public commitments to allow subscribers a free choice of services and strengthening the propaganda through the operating room call centre and other channels

3) Unbundling fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

The Ningxia AIC decided to suspend the probe on 14 May 2015 on the grounds that the three companies had actively worked together with the investigators and proposed workable remedy plans

Analysis

In the official announcement Ningxia AIC concluded that the purpose of antitrust enforcement is to restrain monopolistic conducts the protection of competition and to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of consumers Given that during the investigation process the parties had actively cooperated with the investigation formed a more profound understanding of the dangers of tying behaviour and moreover the parties proposed and implemented positive corrective measures to be able to remove the ill impact of their actions the agency believed that the purpose of antitrust law enforcement was fulfilled

It is worth noting that the Ningxia AIC also required the three companies to implement the commitment by August 30 2015and the submission of the written

30 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158908html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158906html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158910html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 34 of 52

implementation report on July 102015 and August 102015 respectively which is another illustration that an effective commitment by the undertakings shall directly deal with the effect that is brought by the monopolistic behaviour In this case the effect of the monopolistic act was restricted to the choice of the consumers therefore the commitment by the undertaking aimed at allowing the freedom of choice and the unbundling of fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company31

Facts

The Liaoning AIC imposed a fine of approximately CNY 433m on the Fushun Branch of Liaoning Tobacco Co on 1 June 2015 The agency also ordered the company to stop its illicit behaviour

The Liaoning AIC received a tip-off that the accused Liaoning Tobacco Corsquos Fushun branch was conducting tie-in sales of non-high-demand cigarette brands with high-demand cigarette brands After gaining authorization from SAIC the agency officially started an investigation regarding the companyrsquos suspected abuse of market dominance in June 2014

Analysis

According to the announcement the tobacco company argued that the tobacco industry is a state controlled or monopolized industry with a lawful monopolistic position therefore the company shall not be subject to the norms of general market competition rules or the anti-monopoly law

In this regards the agency concluded that in terms of the status of the undertaking admittedly the first paragraph of article 17 of the AML says that the State shall protect the lawful business operations of undertakings in these industries with respect to the industries which are under the control of the State-owned economic sector and have a bearing on the lifeline of the national economy or national security and the industries which exercise monopoly over the production and sale of certain commodities according to law However the second paragraph continues to say that the undertakings mentioned above shall do business according to law be honest faithful and strictly self-disciplined and subject themselves to public supervision and they shall not harm the consumers interests by taking advantage of their position of control or their monopolistic production and sale of certain commodities In particular in the preceding paragraph the ldquolawful businessrdquo and ldquoaccording to lawrdquo imply that the AML shall apply in the business operation The agency therefore believes that

31 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201508t20150813_16

0208html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 35 of 52

there shall be no exemption for the undertaking concerned the defences of the undertaking concerned is not established

Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm32

Facts

The Chongqing AIC fined Chongqing Qingyang Pharmaceutical CNY 439308 for alleged dominance abuse

The investigation was initiated when the company contacted the agency for verification on its potential breach of the AML related to an allopurinol active pharmaceuticals ingredient (API) distribution agreement with its exclusive distributor The company provided the relevant agreement and information and the agency conducted an investigation into the company and some other relevant companies

Analysis

Relevant Market

During the investigation the agency found that pharmaceutical ingredients are a special commodity the API is used to produce the preparations The chemical API is only used for the production of the preparation and could be used as a medicine for clinic use

The preparation is produced according to the requirements of certain form of prepared drugs and for the purpose of treatment and prevention which can be used as medicine

The allopurinol is used for the common treatment of hyperuricemia However the other treatments are different in pharmacological effects or treatment effects as well as in the cost for the patient Furthermore the company is the only manufacturer and supplier in the market nationwide since July 2012 Therefore the agency concluded that the relevant market is the allopurinol API market

Considering that the qualification for manufacturing the allopurinol API is national wide and the normal practice for purchasers and suppliers is domestic the relevant geographic market is the Chinese market

The Market Dominance

During the investigation the agency found that the company is the only supplier and manufacturer of allopurinol API in China there is no other competitor in the

32 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151222_16

5152html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 36 of 52

market and the company has a monopoly in the market The evidence shows that the company has the ability to control the prices the position for the downstream is relatively weak

With respect to the market entry the agency found that the market entry is relatively high in addition other undertakings are dependent on the company Thus the agency believed the company to have market dominance

Refusal to Deal

The agency found that on September 25 2015 the company reached an exclusive agreement and distribution agreement with its distributor Based on these agreements the company didnrsquot supply allopurinol API to the said distributor and other companies despite the fact that those companies requested for allopurinol API but were turned down by the company

Absence of Reasonable Cause

The agency found that the companyrsquos refusal to deal was not in line with the needs of normal business operation or economic efficiency On the other hand the refusal to deal was aimed at increasing the market share of the allopurinol drug product Also the agency found that the stop of supply was a manipulation of market power as to maximize the profit to the most The agency further found that the exclusive distribution agreement with suspension of supply for six months and the refusal to supply was to eliminate and restrict the competition as to gain the monopolistic profit

The Consequence of Refusal to Deal

The agency concluded that the refusal to deal harmed the competition of the allopurinol preparations market Because of the suspension of supply many demanders had to reduce their production or switch to the supply of other products or stop their production The suspension of supply affected the competition of the downstream market Consequently the raising of the price of allopurinol API also raised the cost for other manufacturers of allopurinol preparations

Furthermore the refusal to deal led to capacity loss of the allopurinol preparation industry

Ultimately the refusal to deal increased the burden on consumers as the refusal to supply changed the supply-demand relationship in the market

The agency concluded that the Company abused its dominant position in the allopurinol API market by refusing to deal with intended buyers in the period between October 2013 and March 2014Therefore the Company violated article 17 (1) of the AML which prohibits business operators with a dominant market position from abusing that position such as the refusal to deal without any justifications

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 37 of 52

D Administrative Monopoly

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 witnessed antitrust authoritiesrsquo significant efforts regarding the enforcement against administrative monopoly According to Mr Dong Zhiming the deputy director general of Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly Bureau ever since the AML coming into force six cases in connection with administrative monopoly were investigated by NDRC and among them five cases were handled in the year of 2015 These cases touched abuses of administrative power in terms of designative deal in relation to transportation communication and pharmaceutical industries

The first private litigation related to administrative monopolistic acts was heard in the court which is a milestone case in the enforcement of the AML

Significant Cases

Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC33

Facts

In March 2015 the NDRC released the official letter to Shandong Provincial Department of Transportation (ldquoShandong DOTrdquo) on its website with respect to correct its abuse of administrative power to exclude and restrict competition

During the investigation the NDRC found that since 2011 Shandong DOT had issued multiple relevant government orders in order to require certain types of vehicles to be directly connected to two designated information and service platforms both of which are operated and technically supported by one company namely Shandong Jiutong Internet of Things Technology Co Ltd (ldquoJiutong ITTrdquo) Furthermore according to the orders issued by the competent administrative department all the vehicle satellite positioning terminals entering into Shandong provincial market should be debugged through the said technology service platform which is operated by the mentioned company In addition Shandong DOT released the cap prices of vehicle satellite positioning terminals which is identical to the 2012 bid-winning price in the Ministry of Transportation demonstration project

The NDRC believed that Shandong DOTrsquos behaviour eliminated and restricted the competition in the monitoring platform market and the vehicle terminal market deprived the right of transportation enterprises to choose vehicle terminals and monitoring platform on their owns unreasonably raised the sales prices of vehicle terminals and service fees charged by the platform and increased the costs of transportation enterprises Therefore the antitrust agency concluded that Shandong

33 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201503t20150327_668911html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 38 of 52

DOT violated article 8 of the AML which stipulates that ldquoadministrative organs and the public organizations with an administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude and restrict competitionrdquo Specifically Shandong DOT violated article 3234 in terms of requiring organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any designated operators and violated article 3735 in terms of setting rules with contents which eliminate and restrict competition

Based on article 51 of the AML ldquoWhere administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations abuse administrative powers performing activities which exclude and restrict competition the superior entity shall order it to correct impose administrative penalty on the chief officer and other staffs directly responsible pursuant to the laws The AML enforcement authority may give recommendations on disposal of activities to the relevant superior entityrdquo the NDRC proposed in writing that the Shandong provincial government should order Shandong DOT to rectify its behaviour with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Entirely open up the monitoring platform market by permitting transportation undertakings to freely choose any approved platform

2) Loosen the restrictions on the entry into Shandong vehicle terminals permit the undertakings to independently select the supplier of vehicle terminals and allow the qualified terminals to be connected to the relevant monitoring platform and

3) Revoke the official documentation relevant to the cap price of vehicle terminals in order to promote the price competition

Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 36

Facts

On 26 August 2015 the NDRC published its second decision with regard to the rectification of administrative monopoly since the beginning of this year According to the proposal letter sent to Anhui Provincial Government the investigation against the Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City (Bengbu HFPC) was trigged by third partiesrsquo complaints

34 Article 32 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to require organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any operators designated by them 35 Article 37 of the AML Administrative organs shall not abuse their administrative powers to set rules with contents which eliminate restrict competition 36 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201508t20150826_748682html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 39 of 52

The investigation suggests that Bengbu HFPC published three notices with regard to drugs procurement in April and May of this year

In the No C-2015-CG-X-111 Notice (ldquoNo111 Noticerdquo) released on 10 April2015 the health authority not only provided the dosage form and qualification of the requested drugs but also directly determined the suppliers of relevant drugs which eliminated and restricted the competition among pharmaceutical manufacturers and therefore violated articles 32 and 37 of the AML

In the No C-2015-CG-C-112 Notice (ldquoNo112 Noticerdquo) and No C-2015-CG-C-168 (ldquoNo 168 Noticerdquo) respectively released on 10 April and 22 May 2015 the Bengbu HFPC set discriminative qualification requirements on non-local undertakings in order to restrict their participation in the relevant bidding For instance in accordance with No 112 Notice to be a qualified bidder the turnover of non-local undertakings shall exceed CNY 2 billion which is 50 times as much as the turnover requirements of the local undertakings In the NDRCrsquos opinion the administrative monopoly activities conducted by the local health agency excluded the relevant undertakings from the market maintained the virtual-high prices of drugs and therefore violated articles 3237 and 37 of the AML

The NDRC suggested in a letter that Anhui Provincial Government should urge the Bengbu HFPC to rectify the abuse of monopoly powers with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Stop setting distinguishing restrictions on qualification requirements review standards and numbers of winning bidders as for local and non-local undertakings

2) Stop designating the suppliers of competitive drugs and

3) Take necessary measures to mitigate the negative effects resulting from the previous illegal monopolistic abuses

Outlook

At the beginning of the year the former director general of the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau under the NDRC Xu Kunlin stated that the agency would strengthen antitrust enforcement on abuse of administrative power in 2015

Since then the NDRC has made great efforts to rectify unreasonable abuses of administrative power The currently disclosed two cases investigated by the NDRC re-emphasize the Chinese Governmentrsquos strict scrutiny of antitrust issues in respect of

37 Article 34 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to restrict or reject the participation of operators from other regions in local bidding activities by measures such as prescribing discriminatory qualification requirements or assessment standards or by not publishing information according to law

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 40 of 52

administrative monopoly It reminds the local governments that antitrust compliance is of significant importance

III Private Litigation

A Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen more and more private antitrust litigations

The private antitrust litigation cases have become increasingly complicated especially the issues regarding the intersection areas of IP and antitrust law

Multinational giants and State-Owned Enterprises (the ldquoSOEsrdquo) are increasingly becoming the targets in antitrust civil litigations Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (the ldquoSMEsrdquo) tend to use the antitrust litigation to achieve their commercial goals in the business context

B Significant Cases

Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)38

This is the first-ever private litigation concerning administrative monopoly since the implementation of the AML in 2008

Facts

According to the currently disclosed details the case is relevant for designated trade

The plaintiff Shenzhen Sware Technology Co Ltd (ldquoSwarerdquo) is a software company The press releases suggest that Sware Gloden Software Co Ltd (ldquoGlodenrdquo) and Shanghai Ruban Software Co Ltd (ldquoShanghai Rubanrdquo) are the three main suppliers of construction cost software and possess the major shares of the relevant market An annual provincial vocational ability contest regarding the construction cost hosted by the Guangdong Department of Education (ldquoGuangdong DOE) designated Gloden as the exclusive supplier of the relevant software

After several unsuccessful verbal and written negotiations with Guangdong DOE in April 2014 Sware filed a lawsuit against Guangdong DOE before the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquothe Courtrdquo) alleging that the administrative organ abused its administrative power and violated the AML by designating exclusive software supplier for the contest and claimed a compensation for reasonable expense amounting to CNY 10800 Yuan

The opinions of the Court 38 The story of the case is available at httpfinancesinacomcnchinadfjj20150410074621924997shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 41 of 52

The full text of the judgment has not been disclosed yet In accordance with the information available to the public the Court invoked article 32 of the AML which prohibits an administrative organ from abusing its administrative power to require or in disguised form organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use only the commodities supplied by the entities designated by them The Court concluded that Guangdong DOE failed to prove the legitimacy of the designation and therefore abused its administration power

Currently the case is in appeal before the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court

Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 39

It is the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China

In the first instance ruling Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court ruled against Sinopec holding that the Yunnan branch of Sinopecs trading company was obligated to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its dominance in the sales market of refined oil by refusing to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding without justifiable reasons

In the second instance ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors Currently the case is pending

Facts

The First Trial

The lawsuit was filed before the Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoKunming Courtrdquo) in January 2014 Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy Co Ltd (ldquoYingdingrdquo) a bio-energy manufacturer claimed that Sinopec and the Yunnan branch of Sinopec trading company (ldquoSinopec Yunnan Branchrdquo) had failed to fulfil their obligations stipulated in the Renewable Energy Law and had abused their market dominance in sales market of refined oil by refusing to trade with Yingding without justifiable reasons

Sinopec and Sinopec Yunnan Branch mainly explained four reasons for why they rejected Yingdingrsquos biofuel Firstly Yingding had failed to prove that the biofuel complied with the relevant national standard and was safe to use Secondly Yingding had failed to provide complete trading terms Thirdly the laws and regulations regarding biofuel were incomplete the authorized refined oil sales companies were 39 The details of the case are available at httpnewsxinhuanetcomfortune2014-1217c_1113680039htm httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=9e71db51-6ff6-4d2c-8af6-8eacf023ebdeampKeyWord=E4BA91E58D97E79B88E9BC8E|E4B8ADE79FB3E58C96 httpnewsxinhuanetcomenergy2015-0422c_127721575htm httpwwwnbdcomcnarticles2015-04-23911348html last visited on December 17 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 42 of 52

obligated to purchase biofuel from the biofuel manufacturers if it met certain quality standards but there was a vacancy regarding how to reach the end consumers from the sales companies

On 8 December 2014 the Kunming Intermediate Peoples Court ruled that Sinopec Yunnan Branch bore a legal obligation to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its market dominance in refined oil market by refusing without any justifiable reasons to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding The court ordered Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network within 30 days Both Yingding and Sinopec filed appeals to the Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court

The Appellate Trial

The appeal hearing was held on 22 April 2015 in Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoYunnan Courtrdquo) Sinopec submitted 23 new pieces of evidence and introduced two expert witnesses in a bid to overturn several key elements in the first-instance ruling by Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court

In terms of the determination of the relevant market and the market dominance Sinopec argued that the relevant market in this case was for adipic acid monomethyl ester (ldquoAAMErdquo) the main ingredient of a biofuel additive known as BD100 Yingdingrsquos main product is BD100 which can be blended with fossil diesel to become biofuel In the AAME market Sinopec is a potential buyer instead of a market dominator In support of this argument Sinopec presented an expert witnessmdashGong Jiong a professor of economics at Beijings University of International Business and Economics who testified that AAME should be defined as the relevant product market on the basis of an economic analysis

However Yingding insisted that the first-instance ruling was correct in naming the sales market of refined oil as the relevant market and submitted new evidence an article on Sinopecs website that claimed it had a 67 market share in Yunnan to help establish the claim that Sinopec had market dominance

Another main dispute was whether Yingdingrsquos biofuel product met national standards which would make it mandatory for Sinopec to purchase under Chinas Renewable Energy Law The law stipulates that biofuel producers must sell their products first to an authorized refined oil sales company and the sales companies are obliged to buy the fuel if it meets certain quality standards In order to test the quality Sinopec introduced the second expert witness Lin Jianmin a leading author of Chinarsquos national biofuel standard Lin Jianmin pointed out that there are currently quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology which gives Sinopec a justifiable reason not to trade with Yingding Moreover Sinopec presented some precedents in which consumers had complained about the biofuel quality and also claimed that China didnt have a sound regulatory framework to support biofuel production neither in testing nor in sales

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 43 of 52

Nevertheless to refute this point Yingding referred to an earlier test in co-operation with Sinopec in 2011 where selected buses in Kunming used biofuel blended by Sinopec using BD100 produced by Yingding

On August 13 2015 Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors and now this case is pending In the written appellate ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court did not provide any details regarding its reasoning

Key Issues of the Case

Is there any competition between Yingding and Sinopec

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case the product of Yingding is biofuel while Sinopec does not engage in the business of biofuel From this perspective Yingding and Sinopec are not competitors Thus it is not necessary and not reasonable for Sinopec to eliminate or restrict the competition from Yingding

Relevant Market

The definition of the relevant market is a prerequisite to determine whether competition exists and whether the AML is applicable In accordance with the Judicial Interpretation of Antitrust civil litigation the plaintiff shall take the responsibility to prove the defendantrsquos dominance in the relevant market Also the methods of defining the relevant market are stipulated in the Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition (ldquoGuidelinesrdquo) However both Yingding and Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court defined the relevant market as the sales market of refined oil without sufficient antitrust analysis none of the methods in the Guidelines were used Therefore the definition of the relevant market remains arguable and needs to be sufficiently analysed in the upcoming retrial

Justifiable Reasons

The abuse of market dominance includes the behaviour of refusing to trade without justifiable reasons according to the AML but in the first instance ruling justifiable reasons were not investigated by the court During the appellate trial the expert witness introduced by Sinopec claimed that there were quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology and this was a justifiable reason to refuse to trade with Yingding Even though the first instance court and the appellate court did not reason the justifiable reason it should be discussed and investigated further during the retrial

AML or Renewable Energy Law

The claims of Yingding were based on both the AML and the Renewable Energy Law (ldquoRELrdquo) and the first instance ruling referred to both the AML and the REL as

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 44 of 52

well It seems that the laws the first instance court referred to were comprehensive but in fact the reasoning was not clear and logical In the first instance ruling some disputes regarding the AML were reviewed but all the orders were not based on the AML Specifically the first instance court ordered the Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network based on the REL and dismissed the other claims That the orders were not on account of reasoning is illogical It is anticipated that during the retrial the application of the laws will be clearer

Analysis

A lot of issues have not been clearly analysed by the courts such as the relevant market and the justifiable reasons Since the case is remanded the above-mentioned issues are expected to be resolved in the retrial In addition Yingding was in a disadvantaged position compared to its first instance trial since its claims based on the AML were challenged greatly during the appellate trial In the retrial it is probable that Yingding may switch its litigation strategy and base its claims on the REL Therefore maybe more preparation regarding the REL can give Sinopec a leg up

Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)

Rijing Electric a Chinese distributor seeks CNY 5m compensation

The first hearing was on 9 June 2015 and ended without a ruling

Facts

Rijing Electric (ldquoRijingrdquo) a Shanghai-based company and a former distributor for Panasonic accused Panasonic of abusing its dominance and dividing the market through monopolistic practice in an antitrust lawsuit filed in 2014 with Shanghai No 1 Intermediate Court (ldquoShanghai Courtrdquo) claiming compensation of CNY 5m (USD 815370) Wenzhou Mingda Automation System Co and Shanghai Qingying Automation Equipment as the distributor of Panasonic in China are the co-defendants were accused of conducting monopolistic behaviours by implementing Panasonicrsquos policy

The first hearing for evidence exchange was on June 9 2015 Rijing claimed a policy allegedly introduced by Panasonic in 2009 restricted the competition between distributors Panasonic claims the policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo and has full justifiable reasons It explained that the products in question required customization at considerable cost to distributors before its sale to customers Once carried out however other distributors leaving them open to quote much lower prices than the original distributor could simply and relatively cheap replicate this customization Besides Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and that the plaintiff had failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic said its market share for the four products

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 45 of 52

under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases Also Rijing failed to challenge the policy when it was first introduced instead initially agreeing it was reasonable as e-mail evidence submitted by Panasonic suggests

Key Issues of the Case

Whether Panasonic occupied a market dominant position

It is reported that Rijing claimed that Panasonic had abused its market dominance but Rijing failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and its market share for the four products under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases

Analysis

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case Panasonicrsquos policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo rather than to eliminate or restrict competition

Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals40 (Pending)

It is a battle over patent licensing issues

It is viewed as being among the most complicated antitrust lawsuits in China

The first hearing was on 17 and 18 December 2015

Facts

Four Chinese rare earth companies Ningbo Ketian Magnet Ningbo Permanent Magnetics Ningbo Tongchuang Strong Magnet Material and Ningbo Huahui Magnetic Industry filed antitrust lawsuits against Hitachi Metals over alleged patent licensing issues regarding rare earth magnets on December 11 2014 with the Ningbo Intermediate Peoples Court (ldquoNingbo Courtrdquo) in Zhejiang province As reported four Chinese rare earth companies claimed Hitachi Metals abused its market dominance and hurt the industry competition by refusing to license the patents to them The patents in this case are used in the manufacturing of sintered neodymium iron boron (ldquoNdFeBrdquo) magnets a rare-earth magnet alloy widely used in parts for airplanes automobiles and other products

Hitachi Metals filed a challenge with the Ningbo Court over its jurisdiction in April 2015 After Ningbo Court rejected Hitachi Metals jurisdiction objection on 28 April 2015 Hitachi Metals appealed to the Zhejiang High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoZhejiang

40The details of the story are available at httpwwwzbmagcomnews_viewphpid=80 httpwwwhitachicomcnaboutpress201510-121118_ahtml last visited on December 22 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 46 of 52

Courtrdquo) but Zhejiang Court affirmed the ruling of the Ningbo Court

The first day of a two-day hearing took place on 17 December 2015 during which the two sides cross-examined each otherrsquos evidence The evidence focused on clearing up several key elements in the case including the relevant market whether Hitachi Metals has dominance on that market and whether both sides acted in good faith during the licensing negotiations

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Product Market

The four Chinese rare earth companies claimed that the relevant product market should be the NdFeb-related patent licensing market However Hitachi Metals believed that the physical NdFeb market rather than the patent licensing market should be the relevant product market which is meaningful for assess the real competitive effects on the market

Whether Hitachi Metals occupies a dominant market position

In terms of market dominance Hitachi Metals claimed it does not occupy a dominant position because Hitachi Metalsrsquo patents were not in a standard in this case and there are substitutable technologies in the market SEP holders have the obligation to license on FRAND terms but none-SEP holders do not So while a refusal to license a SEP may constitute abuse of dominance refusal to license a non-SEP mdash even by a patent holder with a dominant position mdash should not be considered as an abuse

Analysis

Hitachi Metals as a patent holder should have the right to decide whether to retain those patents or not or who to license According to the legal theory the purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage and protect innovation by conferring monopoly right mdash that is to give intellectual property owners the proprietary rights which can exclude others from using the intellectual property The SEP holders admittedly need to comply with FRAND terms which can maintain a robust balance between competition and monopoly whereas the further intervention of antitrust law into non-SEP patents may undermine the purpose of intellectual property law To which extent the antitrust law should intervene is yet to be seen

Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei41

A confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the Beijing IP court made by the Beijing High Court

41 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcncpwswbjzscq201511t20151103_12225640htm last visited on December 28 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 47 of 52

Facts

On August 2 2013 the NDRC penalized Abbott for monopolistic price-fixing and then Abbott made a price adjustment in China where the prices of main products were reduced

On December 16 2014 Tian Junwei (ldquoTianrdquo) a Chinese citizen in Beijing sued Carrefour Shuangjing Branch (ldquoCarrefourrdquo) and Abbott (Shanghai) Sales Company (ldquoAbbottrdquo) at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (ldquoIP Courtrdquo) for their monopolistic price-fixing which damaged his interests However Carrefour and Abbott challenged the jurisdiction of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court They claimed there were two reasons Firstly according to the jurisdiction rules of the IP court issued by the Supreme Court the IP court has no jurisdiction over anti-trust cases Secondly if this case is a contractual dispute the court that is in the place of Carrefour should hear it if this case is a tort dispute the Shanghai Intermediate Court should hear it

In the ruling of the IP Court the IP Court decided it has the jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases for the following reasons According to the Provisions On Causes Of Action In Civil Cases issued by Supreme Court (最高人民法院案由规定) antimonopoly dispute is a tertiary cause of action belonging to IP and competition disputes Also according to the Provisions concerning the Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京

市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问题的规定 ) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was an IP and competition dispute and was sued after November 6 2014 Thus the IP Court had jurisdiction

Both Carrefour and Abbott appealed to the Beijing High Court over the jurisdiction ruling but the Beijing High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original ruling Reasons are listed in the written ruling issued on June 18 2015 Firstly the nature of the case was an antimonopoly dispute In accordance with Provisions of the Supreme Peoples Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民

事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) and Civil Litigation Law the monopolistic civil disputes in the first instance shall be under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Peoples Courts and an action involving a contractual dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the peoples court of the place where the defendant is domiciled or where the contract is performed Carrefour as the defendant in this case is domiciled in Chaoyang District Beijing Therefore the courts of Beijing have jurisdiction over this case Secondly according to article 3 of the Notification on the Jurisdiction of Intellectual Property Courts issued by Supreme Court (关于知识产权法院案件管辖

等有关问题的通知) IP courts have jurisdiction over first-instance civil disputes arising from monopolistic practices Lastly according to Provisions concerning the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 28 of 52

5) In case an accident happens the 12 companies will jointly bear the damages based on their respective shares in the coinsurance

6) There is a contact mechanism established in the coinsurance The coinsurers will regularly hold coinsurance conferences to discuss existing problems

Furthermore the coinsurers and WCSTCC also signed a self-discipline agreement and established a complete management system to assure the implementation of the Coinsurance Agreement Any party violating the Coinsurance Agreement would be punished

Hubei AIC found that WCSTCC was solely invested by Wuhan Construction Safety Management Association which was under Wuhan Construction Commission The centre helped implement certain functions of the Wuhan Urban Construction Safety Management Station and was responsible for quality supervision and safety supervision of municipal construction projects

It later became a prerequisite for construction companies to purchase insurance from any member of the coinsurance in order to get approval to commence their project According to the decision Hubei AIC launched another separate investigation against WCSTCC

Through the investigation Hubei AIC concluded that the Coinsurance Agreement constituted a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by article 13 of the AML with the following analysis

First coinsurance as a common business model to jointly share and lower risks is widely adopted in the insurance industry A coinsurance arrangement for a specific project in order to avoid high risks faced by one insurer could be legal However coinsurance should not target the entire market In this case prior to the Coinsurance Agreement the risks of the construction projects were unpredictable since the scale of the construction projects the difficulty of the construction and the amount of construction workers could not be available It is impossible to predict the risks of the projects thus it is not necessary to cooperate with other insurers to collectively bear the risks The purpose of the 12 insurance companies to establish the coinsurance is to avoid the competition which demonstrates the Coinsurance Agreement belongs to a monopolistic agreement as prohibited by the AML

Second the companies through entering into the coinsurance agreement actually divided the relevant market of construction project personal accident insurance in Wuhan city which affected the competition in the relevant market and damaged the interests of other competitors and the consumers In particular the Construction Law as amended in 2011 stipulates that the purchase of personal accident insurance is not mandatory and the construction companies have the right to choose whether to buy the said insurance or not As mentioned purchasing insurance from the coinsurance had been the prerequisite for construction companies to obtain administration

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 29 of 52

approval for the project which seriously distorts the fair competition in the market

Citing article 46 of the AML the 12 insurance companies were collectively fined CNY 469 million including fines on the companies and confiscation of illegal gains It is noteworthy that the fines were calculated based on the companiesrsquo 2014 annual sales of the insurance product in connection with the coinsurance The Company as the chief insurer was fined amounting to 6 of its 2014 annual sales of the relevant insurance product in the coinsurance and other companies were fined amounting to 2 of relevant sales For more specific information please see the following table

Company Name (Hubei Branch)

Fines (CNY million)

Percentage of the sales

Illegal Gains (CNY

million)

China Pacific Life Insurance 00653 6 0941

Sino Life 00145 2 04332

Alltrust Insurance 00145 2 04332

Taikang Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Continent Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Pacific Property Insurance

00145 2 04332

China Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

PICC Property and Casualty 00145 2 02599

Taiping General Insurance 00145 2 013

Union Life Insurance 00145 2 01177

Ping An Annuity Insurance Company of China

00145 2 04201

Ping An Property amp Casualty Insurance Company of China

00145 2 -

Subtotal 02248 - 44679

Total 46927

Analysis

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 30 of 52

Coinsurance as an effective approach to lower risks of insurers is widely used in the insurance industry Information sharing and agreements on coinsurance were generally considered efficient and legitimate However from an antitrust perspective coinsurance may raise competition concerns depending on the circumstances of each agreement In the case that there is enough capacity for one insurer to cover the potential risks the coinsurance might be considered as entering into a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC28

The first leniency applicant was exempted from fines

The other concrete companies were imposed a fine of CNY 180000

Facts

In December 2015 the concrete companies monopolistic agreement case investigated by Hunan AIC was published on SAICrsquos website

In accordance with the antitrust enforcement announcement of SAIC this case was triggered by complaints from the Yongzhou City peoplersquos congress After the preliminary review the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) initiated the formal investigation on seven concrete companies domiciled in Yongzhou City Hunan Province which were suspected of being involved in a monopolistic agreement in terms of division of the volumes of the products

After further investigation Hunan AIC found that the seven concrete companies concluded a partnership agreement in 2011 which requested the involved companies to enter into a partnership business with assets In addition according to the partnership agreement it was planned to establish a comprehensive office to manage production marketing and distribution of the products of all the partners The seven companies intended to jointly adjust and control the output of concrete based on the partnership agreement However because there were disagreements over the allocation of the injected assets and market shares the companies did not implement the partnership agreement The agreement was cancelled in December 2012

Based on the findings Hunan AIC concluded that the seven concrete companies as competitors of each other restricted and eliminated the competition in the relevant market through reaching the partnership agreement and dividing the volumes of sales which violated article 13(3) of the AML in terms of division of sales market Considering that the agreement had not been implemented and the limited influence of the agreement according to article 46 of the AML and article 27 of the Administrative Penalties Law small amount fines were imposed on the involved companies Six companies were fined CNY 30000 each for their illegal behaviour 28 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165504html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 31 of 52

Yongzhou Shuangyuan Building Materials Co Ltd as the first one to actively report the monopolistic agreement and cooperate with the enforcement authority was exempted from the punishment

Outlook

It is expected that the AMLrsquos enforcement on monopolistic agreements will continue in the future Industries such as automobile shipping pharmaceuticals insurance etc will still remain the priority of the antitrust enforcement

The antitrust enforcement authorities have published a series of regulations in order to clarify the substantial and procedural issues relevant to the antitrust enforcement However Chinarsquos current antitrust legislation regime is still immature In the following years we expect that more attention will be paid to the legislative improvements

Another remarkable issue for cartel members is that with more Chinese enterprises attaching increasing importance to the AML the follow-on civil damages actions might become a tendency in the future

C Abuse of Market Dominance

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen a decent increase of abuse of market dominance cases both in public enforcement and private litigation Oftentimes the authorities responsible for public enforcement generally find it difficult to pursue investigations against abuse of market dominance cases The following two main reasons are often cited to explain this standoff first it is hard for the authorities to define the relevant markets and prove the undertaking(s)rsquo dominant market position through economic approaches second it is hard to collect evidence regarding abusive practices

The cases related to IPRs abuse are emerging significantly particularly in the telecommunication media and technology (ldquoTMTrdquo) sectors

The SAICrsquos latest refusal-to-deal probe against a local drug maker shows that the SAIC and its local branches have increasingly acquired a profile as an abuse of dominance regulator

Significant Cases

Cases pursued by the SAIC

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 32 of 52

Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case29

Facts

The local authority in Dongfang city reported to the Hainan provincial branch of SAIC on April 23 2014 of the suspected dominance abuse The SAIC authorized its Hainan bureau to officially investigate the matter on 25 July 2014 according to a decision dated January 9 2015 The AIC concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its market dominance by requiring users to pay a deposit without any legal basis and or justifiable reasons

In terms of the relevant product market the local authority found that in this case it was the urban water supply market in Dongfang city and its surrounding townships where Dongfang Water was the sole public operator in the local water supply market with a 100 market share which made all water users completely reliant on the companyrsquos supply In term of market access the local authority found it very unlikely that there were other operators due to the strict regulations

The Hainan SAIC then concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its dominance as it charged users a deposit by threatening to refuse to register users and also by threatening to restrict the water supply Dongfang Waters charging of deposits lacked a legal basis and hadnt received government approval to the detriment of household consumers and business water users and hampered the improvement of management and services of the company Such conduct was in breach of Chinarsquos Anti-Monopoly Law

Hainan AIC levied a fine of CNY 593208 a lighter penalty equivalent to 2 of the companyrsquos annual sales for the previous year and confiscated illicit gains of CNY 38521 for abuse of market dominance

Analysis

It is noteworthy that although handled by a local authority supervised by the SAIC the antitrust agency detailed the relevant market definition the assessment of the dominant market position the abusive practices and the scrutiny of the justifiable reasons

Although the definition of the relevant market and the reasoning of the Hainan provincial AIC and the SAIC are subject to criticism it is still applausive to see that the antitrust regulators have realized the importance of the application of rule of reason in an abuse case In addition through itrsquos a published decision practitioners may observe the regulatorsrsquo reasoning and thus transparency and legal certainty have been generated

29 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzfcfjd201502t20150212_152066html last visited on October 18 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 33 of 52

Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms30

Facts

In June 2013 the Ningxia AIC under authorization of SAIC opened an antitrust investigation into the alleged tie-in sales by the three major state-owned telecommunications operators China Tietong China Unicom and China Telecom for the tie-in sale of fixed-line telephones with broadband Internet services The Ningxia AIC found that the three companies had bundled fixed-line phone services with Internet services to subscribers

During the investigation all three telecommunications companies admitted the tie-in practice had recognized that such practice had improper influence on competition and deprived the choices of consumers The three companies promised to undertake internal rectification timely and eliminate the ill effects resulting from such practice The parties committed to taking the following corrective measures

1) Taking internal rectifications and conducting training to staff about antitrust laws and stop tie-in sales practices

2) Making public commitments to allow subscribers a free choice of services and strengthening the propaganda through the operating room call centre and other channels

3) Unbundling fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

The Ningxia AIC decided to suspend the probe on 14 May 2015 on the grounds that the three companies had actively worked together with the investigators and proposed workable remedy plans

Analysis

In the official announcement Ningxia AIC concluded that the purpose of antitrust enforcement is to restrain monopolistic conducts the protection of competition and to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of consumers Given that during the investigation process the parties had actively cooperated with the investigation formed a more profound understanding of the dangers of tying behaviour and moreover the parties proposed and implemented positive corrective measures to be able to remove the ill impact of their actions the agency believed that the purpose of antitrust law enforcement was fulfilled

It is worth noting that the Ningxia AIC also required the three companies to implement the commitment by August 30 2015and the submission of the written

30 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158908html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158906html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158910html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 34 of 52

implementation report on July 102015 and August 102015 respectively which is another illustration that an effective commitment by the undertakings shall directly deal with the effect that is brought by the monopolistic behaviour In this case the effect of the monopolistic act was restricted to the choice of the consumers therefore the commitment by the undertaking aimed at allowing the freedom of choice and the unbundling of fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company31

Facts

The Liaoning AIC imposed a fine of approximately CNY 433m on the Fushun Branch of Liaoning Tobacco Co on 1 June 2015 The agency also ordered the company to stop its illicit behaviour

The Liaoning AIC received a tip-off that the accused Liaoning Tobacco Corsquos Fushun branch was conducting tie-in sales of non-high-demand cigarette brands with high-demand cigarette brands After gaining authorization from SAIC the agency officially started an investigation regarding the companyrsquos suspected abuse of market dominance in June 2014

Analysis

According to the announcement the tobacco company argued that the tobacco industry is a state controlled or monopolized industry with a lawful monopolistic position therefore the company shall not be subject to the norms of general market competition rules or the anti-monopoly law

In this regards the agency concluded that in terms of the status of the undertaking admittedly the first paragraph of article 17 of the AML says that the State shall protect the lawful business operations of undertakings in these industries with respect to the industries which are under the control of the State-owned economic sector and have a bearing on the lifeline of the national economy or national security and the industries which exercise monopoly over the production and sale of certain commodities according to law However the second paragraph continues to say that the undertakings mentioned above shall do business according to law be honest faithful and strictly self-disciplined and subject themselves to public supervision and they shall not harm the consumers interests by taking advantage of their position of control or their monopolistic production and sale of certain commodities In particular in the preceding paragraph the ldquolawful businessrdquo and ldquoaccording to lawrdquo imply that the AML shall apply in the business operation The agency therefore believes that

31 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201508t20150813_16

0208html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 35 of 52

there shall be no exemption for the undertaking concerned the defences of the undertaking concerned is not established

Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm32

Facts

The Chongqing AIC fined Chongqing Qingyang Pharmaceutical CNY 439308 for alleged dominance abuse

The investigation was initiated when the company contacted the agency for verification on its potential breach of the AML related to an allopurinol active pharmaceuticals ingredient (API) distribution agreement with its exclusive distributor The company provided the relevant agreement and information and the agency conducted an investigation into the company and some other relevant companies

Analysis

Relevant Market

During the investigation the agency found that pharmaceutical ingredients are a special commodity the API is used to produce the preparations The chemical API is only used for the production of the preparation and could be used as a medicine for clinic use

The preparation is produced according to the requirements of certain form of prepared drugs and for the purpose of treatment and prevention which can be used as medicine

The allopurinol is used for the common treatment of hyperuricemia However the other treatments are different in pharmacological effects or treatment effects as well as in the cost for the patient Furthermore the company is the only manufacturer and supplier in the market nationwide since July 2012 Therefore the agency concluded that the relevant market is the allopurinol API market

Considering that the qualification for manufacturing the allopurinol API is national wide and the normal practice for purchasers and suppliers is domestic the relevant geographic market is the Chinese market

The Market Dominance

During the investigation the agency found that the company is the only supplier and manufacturer of allopurinol API in China there is no other competitor in the

32 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151222_16

5152html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 36 of 52

market and the company has a monopoly in the market The evidence shows that the company has the ability to control the prices the position for the downstream is relatively weak

With respect to the market entry the agency found that the market entry is relatively high in addition other undertakings are dependent on the company Thus the agency believed the company to have market dominance

Refusal to Deal

The agency found that on September 25 2015 the company reached an exclusive agreement and distribution agreement with its distributor Based on these agreements the company didnrsquot supply allopurinol API to the said distributor and other companies despite the fact that those companies requested for allopurinol API but were turned down by the company

Absence of Reasonable Cause

The agency found that the companyrsquos refusal to deal was not in line with the needs of normal business operation or economic efficiency On the other hand the refusal to deal was aimed at increasing the market share of the allopurinol drug product Also the agency found that the stop of supply was a manipulation of market power as to maximize the profit to the most The agency further found that the exclusive distribution agreement with suspension of supply for six months and the refusal to supply was to eliminate and restrict the competition as to gain the monopolistic profit

The Consequence of Refusal to Deal

The agency concluded that the refusal to deal harmed the competition of the allopurinol preparations market Because of the suspension of supply many demanders had to reduce their production or switch to the supply of other products or stop their production The suspension of supply affected the competition of the downstream market Consequently the raising of the price of allopurinol API also raised the cost for other manufacturers of allopurinol preparations

Furthermore the refusal to deal led to capacity loss of the allopurinol preparation industry

Ultimately the refusal to deal increased the burden on consumers as the refusal to supply changed the supply-demand relationship in the market

The agency concluded that the Company abused its dominant position in the allopurinol API market by refusing to deal with intended buyers in the period between October 2013 and March 2014Therefore the Company violated article 17 (1) of the AML which prohibits business operators with a dominant market position from abusing that position such as the refusal to deal without any justifications

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 37 of 52

D Administrative Monopoly

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 witnessed antitrust authoritiesrsquo significant efforts regarding the enforcement against administrative monopoly According to Mr Dong Zhiming the deputy director general of Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly Bureau ever since the AML coming into force six cases in connection with administrative monopoly were investigated by NDRC and among them five cases were handled in the year of 2015 These cases touched abuses of administrative power in terms of designative deal in relation to transportation communication and pharmaceutical industries

The first private litigation related to administrative monopolistic acts was heard in the court which is a milestone case in the enforcement of the AML

Significant Cases

Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC33

Facts

In March 2015 the NDRC released the official letter to Shandong Provincial Department of Transportation (ldquoShandong DOTrdquo) on its website with respect to correct its abuse of administrative power to exclude and restrict competition

During the investigation the NDRC found that since 2011 Shandong DOT had issued multiple relevant government orders in order to require certain types of vehicles to be directly connected to two designated information and service platforms both of which are operated and technically supported by one company namely Shandong Jiutong Internet of Things Technology Co Ltd (ldquoJiutong ITTrdquo) Furthermore according to the orders issued by the competent administrative department all the vehicle satellite positioning terminals entering into Shandong provincial market should be debugged through the said technology service platform which is operated by the mentioned company In addition Shandong DOT released the cap prices of vehicle satellite positioning terminals which is identical to the 2012 bid-winning price in the Ministry of Transportation demonstration project

The NDRC believed that Shandong DOTrsquos behaviour eliminated and restricted the competition in the monitoring platform market and the vehicle terminal market deprived the right of transportation enterprises to choose vehicle terminals and monitoring platform on their owns unreasonably raised the sales prices of vehicle terminals and service fees charged by the platform and increased the costs of transportation enterprises Therefore the antitrust agency concluded that Shandong

33 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201503t20150327_668911html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 38 of 52

DOT violated article 8 of the AML which stipulates that ldquoadministrative organs and the public organizations with an administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude and restrict competitionrdquo Specifically Shandong DOT violated article 3234 in terms of requiring organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any designated operators and violated article 3735 in terms of setting rules with contents which eliminate and restrict competition

Based on article 51 of the AML ldquoWhere administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations abuse administrative powers performing activities which exclude and restrict competition the superior entity shall order it to correct impose administrative penalty on the chief officer and other staffs directly responsible pursuant to the laws The AML enforcement authority may give recommendations on disposal of activities to the relevant superior entityrdquo the NDRC proposed in writing that the Shandong provincial government should order Shandong DOT to rectify its behaviour with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Entirely open up the monitoring platform market by permitting transportation undertakings to freely choose any approved platform

2) Loosen the restrictions on the entry into Shandong vehicle terminals permit the undertakings to independently select the supplier of vehicle terminals and allow the qualified terminals to be connected to the relevant monitoring platform and

3) Revoke the official documentation relevant to the cap price of vehicle terminals in order to promote the price competition

Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 36

Facts

On 26 August 2015 the NDRC published its second decision with regard to the rectification of administrative monopoly since the beginning of this year According to the proposal letter sent to Anhui Provincial Government the investigation against the Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City (Bengbu HFPC) was trigged by third partiesrsquo complaints

34 Article 32 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to require organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any operators designated by them 35 Article 37 of the AML Administrative organs shall not abuse their administrative powers to set rules with contents which eliminate restrict competition 36 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201508t20150826_748682html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 39 of 52

The investigation suggests that Bengbu HFPC published three notices with regard to drugs procurement in April and May of this year

In the No C-2015-CG-X-111 Notice (ldquoNo111 Noticerdquo) released on 10 April2015 the health authority not only provided the dosage form and qualification of the requested drugs but also directly determined the suppliers of relevant drugs which eliminated and restricted the competition among pharmaceutical manufacturers and therefore violated articles 32 and 37 of the AML

In the No C-2015-CG-C-112 Notice (ldquoNo112 Noticerdquo) and No C-2015-CG-C-168 (ldquoNo 168 Noticerdquo) respectively released on 10 April and 22 May 2015 the Bengbu HFPC set discriminative qualification requirements on non-local undertakings in order to restrict their participation in the relevant bidding For instance in accordance with No 112 Notice to be a qualified bidder the turnover of non-local undertakings shall exceed CNY 2 billion which is 50 times as much as the turnover requirements of the local undertakings In the NDRCrsquos opinion the administrative monopoly activities conducted by the local health agency excluded the relevant undertakings from the market maintained the virtual-high prices of drugs and therefore violated articles 3237 and 37 of the AML

The NDRC suggested in a letter that Anhui Provincial Government should urge the Bengbu HFPC to rectify the abuse of monopoly powers with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Stop setting distinguishing restrictions on qualification requirements review standards and numbers of winning bidders as for local and non-local undertakings

2) Stop designating the suppliers of competitive drugs and

3) Take necessary measures to mitigate the negative effects resulting from the previous illegal monopolistic abuses

Outlook

At the beginning of the year the former director general of the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau under the NDRC Xu Kunlin stated that the agency would strengthen antitrust enforcement on abuse of administrative power in 2015

Since then the NDRC has made great efforts to rectify unreasonable abuses of administrative power The currently disclosed two cases investigated by the NDRC re-emphasize the Chinese Governmentrsquos strict scrutiny of antitrust issues in respect of

37 Article 34 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to restrict or reject the participation of operators from other regions in local bidding activities by measures such as prescribing discriminatory qualification requirements or assessment standards or by not publishing information according to law

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 40 of 52

administrative monopoly It reminds the local governments that antitrust compliance is of significant importance

III Private Litigation

A Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen more and more private antitrust litigations

The private antitrust litigation cases have become increasingly complicated especially the issues regarding the intersection areas of IP and antitrust law

Multinational giants and State-Owned Enterprises (the ldquoSOEsrdquo) are increasingly becoming the targets in antitrust civil litigations Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (the ldquoSMEsrdquo) tend to use the antitrust litigation to achieve their commercial goals in the business context

B Significant Cases

Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)38

This is the first-ever private litigation concerning administrative monopoly since the implementation of the AML in 2008

Facts

According to the currently disclosed details the case is relevant for designated trade

The plaintiff Shenzhen Sware Technology Co Ltd (ldquoSwarerdquo) is a software company The press releases suggest that Sware Gloden Software Co Ltd (ldquoGlodenrdquo) and Shanghai Ruban Software Co Ltd (ldquoShanghai Rubanrdquo) are the three main suppliers of construction cost software and possess the major shares of the relevant market An annual provincial vocational ability contest regarding the construction cost hosted by the Guangdong Department of Education (ldquoGuangdong DOE) designated Gloden as the exclusive supplier of the relevant software

After several unsuccessful verbal and written negotiations with Guangdong DOE in April 2014 Sware filed a lawsuit against Guangdong DOE before the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquothe Courtrdquo) alleging that the administrative organ abused its administrative power and violated the AML by designating exclusive software supplier for the contest and claimed a compensation for reasonable expense amounting to CNY 10800 Yuan

The opinions of the Court 38 The story of the case is available at httpfinancesinacomcnchinadfjj20150410074621924997shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 41 of 52

The full text of the judgment has not been disclosed yet In accordance with the information available to the public the Court invoked article 32 of the AML which prohibits an administrative organ from abusing its administrative power to require or in disguised form organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use only the commodities supplied by the entities designated by them The Court concluded that Guangdong DOE failed to prove the legitimacy of the designation and therefore abused its administration power

Currently the case is in appeal before the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court

Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 39

It is the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China

In the first instance ruling Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court ruled against Sinopec holding that the Yunnan branch of Sinopecs trading company was obligated to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its dominance in the sales market of refined oil by refusing to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding without justifiable reasons

In the second instance ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors Currently the case is pending

Facts

The First Trial

The lawsuit was filed before the Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoKunming Courtrdquo) in January 2014 Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy Co Ltd (ldquoYingdingrdquo) a bio-energy manufacturer claimed that Sinopec and the Yunnan branch of Sinopec trading company (ldquoSinopec Yunnan Branchrdquo) had failed to fulfil their obligations stipulated in the Renewable Energy Law and had abused their market dominance in sales market of refined oil by refusing to trade with Yingding without justifiable reasons

Sinopec and Sinopec Yunnan Branch mainly explained four reasons for why they rejected Yingdingrsquos biofuel Firstly Yingding had failed to prove that the biofuel complied with the relevant national standard and was safe to use Secondly Yingding had failed to provide complete trading terms Thirdly the laws and regulations regarding biofuel were incomplete the authorized refined oil sales companies were 39 The details of the case are available at httpnewsxinhuanetcomfortune2014-1217c_1113680039htm httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=9e71db51-6ff6-4d2c-8af6-8eacf023ebdeampKeyWord=E4BA91E58D97E79B88E9BC8E|E4B8ADE79FB3E58C96 httpnewsxinhuanetcomenergy2015-0422c_127721575htm httpwwwnbdcomcnarticles2015-04-23911348html last visited on December 17 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 42 of 52

obligated to purchase biofuel from the biofuel manufacturers if it met certain quality standards but there was a vacancy regarding how to reach the end consumers from the sales companies

On 8 December 2014 the Kunming Intermediate Peoples Court ruled that Sinopec Yunnan Branch bore a legal obligation to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its market dominance in refined oil market by refusing without any justifiable reasons to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding The court ordered Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network within 30 days Both Yingding and Sinopec filed appeals to the Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court

The Appellate Trial

The appeal hearing was held on 22 April 2015 in Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoYunnan Courtrdquo) Sinopec submitted 23 new pieces of evidence and introduced two expert witnesses in a bid to overturn several key elements in the first-instance ruling by Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court

In terms of the determination of the relevant market and the market dominance Sinopec argued that the relevant market in this case was for adipic acid monomethyl ester (ldquoAAMErdquo) the main ingredient of a biofuel additive known as BD100 Yingdingrsquos main product is BD100 which can be blended with fossil diesel to become biofuel In the AAME market Sinopec is a potential buyer instead of a market dominator In support of this argument Sinopec presented an expert witnessmdashGong Jiong a professor of economics at Beijings University of International Business and Economics who testified that AAME should be defined as the relevant product market on the basis of an economic analysis

However Yingding insisted that the first-instance ruling was correct in naming the sales market of refined oil as the relevant market and submitted new evidence an article on Sinopecs website that claimed it had a 67 market share in Yunnan to help establish the claim that Sinopec had market dominance

Another main dispute was whether Yingdingrsquos biofuel product met national standards which would make it mandatory for Sinopec to purchase under Chinas Renewable Energy Law The law stipulates that biofuel producers must sell their products first to an authorized refined oil sales company and the sales companies are obliged to buy the fuel if it meets certain quality standards In order to test the quality Sinopec introduced the second expert witness Lin Jianmin a leading author of Chinarsquos national biofuel standard Lin Jianmin pointed out that there are currently quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology which gives Sinopec a justifiable reason not to trade with Yingding Moreover Sinopec presented some precedents in which consumers had complained about the biofuel quality and also claimed that China didnt have a sound regulatory framework to support biofuel production neither in testing nor in sales

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 43 of 52

Nevertheless to refute this point Yingding referred to an earlier test in co-operation with Sinopec in 2011 where selected buses in Kunming used biofuel blended by Sinopec using BD100 produced by Yingding

On August 13 2015 Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors and now this case is pending In the written appellate ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court did not provide any details regarding its reasoning

Key Issues of the Case

Is there any competition between Yingding and Sinopec

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case the product of Yingding is biofuel while Sinopec does not engage in the business of biofuel From this perspective Yingding and Sinopec are not competitors Thus it is not necessary and not reasonable for Sinopec to eliminate or restrict the competition from Yingding

Relevant Market

The definition of the relevant market is a prerequisite to determine whether competition exists and whether the AML is applicable In accordance with the Judicial Interpretation of Antitrust civil litigation the plaintiff shall take the responsibility to prove the defendantrsquos dominance in the relevant market Also the methods of defining the relevant market are stipulated in the Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition (ldquoGuidelinesrdquo) However both Yingding and Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court defined the relevant market as the sales market of refined oil without sufficient antitrust analysis none of the methods in the Guidelines were used Therefore the definition of the relevant market remains arguable and needs to be sufficiently analysed in the upcoming retrial

Justifiable Reasons

The abuse of market dominance includes the behaviour of refusing to trade without justifiable reasons according to the AML but in the first instance ruling justifiable reasons were not investigated by the court During the appellate trial the expert witness introduced by Sinopec claimed that there were quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology and this was a justifiable reason to refuse to trade with Yingding Even though the first instance court and the appellate court did not reason the justifiable reason it should be discussed and investigated further during the retrial

AML or Renewable Energy Law

The claims of Yingding were based on both the AML and the Renewable Energy Law (ldquoRELrdquo) and the first instance ruling referred to both the AML and the REL as

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 44 of 52

well It seems that the laws the first instance court referred to were comprehensive but in fact the reasoning was not clear and logical In the first instance ruling some disputes regarding the AML were reviewed but all the orders were not based on the AML Specifically the first instance court ordered the Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network based on the REL and dismissed the other claims That the orders were not on account of reasoning is illogical It is anticipated that during the retrial the application of the laws will be clearer

Analysis

A lot of issues have not been clearly analysed by the courts such as the relevant market and the justifiable reasons Since the case is remanded the above-mentioned issues are expected to be resolved in the retrial In addition Yingding was in a disadvantaged position compared to its first instance trial since its claims based on the AML were challenged greatly during the appellate trial In the retrial it is probable that Yingding may switch its litigation strategy and base its claims on the REL Therefore maybe more preparation regarding the REL can give Sinopec a leg up

Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)

Rijing Electric a Chinese distributor seeks CNY 5m compensation

The first hearing was on 9 June 2015 and ended without a ruling

Facts

Rijing Electric (ldquoRijingrdquo) a Shanghai-based company and a former distributor for Panasonic accused Panasonic of abusing its dominance and dividing the market through monopolistic practice in an antitrust lawsuit filed in 2014 with Shanghai No 1 Intermediate Court (ldquoShanghai Courtrdquo) claiming compensation of CNY 5m (USD 815370) Wenzhou Mingda Automation System Co and Shanghai Qingying Automation Equipment as the distributor of Panasonic in China are the co-defendants were accused of conducting monopolistic behaviours by implementing Panasonicrsquos policy

The first hearing for evidence exchange was on June 9 2015 Rijing claimed a policy allegedly introduced by Panasonic in 2009 restricted the competition between distributors Panasonic claims the policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo and has full justifiable reasons It explained that the products in question required customization at considerable cost to distributors before its sale to customers Once carried out however other distributors leaving them open to quote much lower prices than the original distributor could simply and relatively cheap replicate this customization Besides Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and that the plaintiff had failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic said its market share for the four products

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 45 of 52

under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases Also Rijing failed to challenge the policy when it was first introduced instead initially agreeing it was reasonable as e-mail evidence submitted by Panasonic suggests

Key Issues of the Case

Whether Panasonic occupied a market dominant position

It is reported that Rijing claimed that Panasonic had abused its market dominance but Rijing failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and its market share for the four products under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases

Analysis

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case Panasonicrsquos policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo rather than to eliminate or restrict competition

Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals40 (Pending)

It is a battle over patent licensing issues

It is viewed as being among the most complicated antitrust lawsuits in China

The first hearing was on 17 and 18 December 2015

Facts

Four Chinese rare earth companies Ningbo Ketian Magnet Ningbo Permanent Magnetics Ningbo Tongchuang Strong Magnet Material and Ningbo Huahui Magnetic Industry filed antitrust lawsuits against Hitachi Metals over alleged patent licensing issues regarding rare earth magnets on December 11 2014 with the Ningbo Intermediate Peoples Court (ldquoNingbo Courtrdquo) in Zhejiang province As reported four Chinese rare earth companies claimed Hitachi Metals abused its market dominance and hurt the industry competition by refusing to license the patents to them The patents in this case are used in the manufacturing of sintered neodymium iron boron (ldquoNdFeBrdquo) magnets a rare-earth magnet alloy widely used in parts for airplanes automobiles and other products

Hitachi Metals filed a challenge with the Ningbo Court over its jurisdiction in April 2015 After Ningbo Court rejected Hitachi Metals jurisdiction objection on 28 April 2015 Hitachi Metals appealed to the Zhejiang High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoZhejiang

40The details of the story are available at httpwwwzbmagcomnews_viewphpid=80 httpwwwhitachicomcnaboutpress201510-121118_ahtml last visited on December 22 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 46 of 52

Courtrdquo) but Zhejiang Court affirmed the ruling of the Ningbo Court

The first day of a two-day hearing took place on 17 December 2015 during which the two sides cross-examined each otherrsquos evidence The evidence focused on clearing up several key elements in the case including the relevant market whether Hitachi Metals has dominance on that market and whether both sides acted in good faith during the licensing negotiations

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Product Market

The four Chinese rare earth companies claimed that the relevant product market should be the NdFeb-related patent licensing market However Hitachi Metals believed that the physical NdFeb market rather than the patent licensing market should be the relevant product market which is meaningful for assess the real competitive effects on the market

Whether Hitachi Metals occupies a dominant market position

In terms of market dominance Hitachi Metals claimed it does not occupy a dominant position because Hitachi Metalsrsquo patents were not in a standard in this case and there are substitutable technologies in the market SEP holders have the obligation to license on FRAND terms but none-SEP holders do not So while a refusal to license a SEP may constitute abuse of dominance refusal to license a non-SEP mdash even by a patent holder with a dominant position mdash should not be considered as an abuse

Analysis

Hitachi Metals as a patent holder should have the right to decide whether to retain those patents or not or who to license According to the legal theory the purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage and protect innovation by conferring monopoly right mdash that is to give intellectual property owners the proprietary rights which can exclude others from using the intellectual property The SEP holders admittedly need to comply with FRAND terms which can maintain a robust balance between competition and monopoly whereas the further intervention of antitrust law into non-SEP patents may undermine the purpose of intellectual property law To which extent the antitrust law should intervene is yet to be seen

Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei41

A confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the Beijing IP court made by the Beijing High Court

41 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcncpwswbjzscq201511t20151103_12225640htm last visited on December 28 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 47 of 52

Facts

On August 2 2013 the NDRC penalized Abbott for monopolistic price-fixing and then Abbott made a price adjustment in China where the prices of main products were reduced

On December 16 2014 Tian Junwei (ldquoTianrdquo) a Chinese citizen in Beijing sued Carrefour Shuangjing Branch (ldquoCarrefourrdquo) and Abbott (Shanghai) Sales Company (ldquoAbbottrdquo) at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (ldquoIP Courtrdquo) for their monopolistic price-fixing which damaged his interests However Carrefour and Abbott challenged the jurisdiction of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court They claimed there were two reasons Firstly according to the jurisdiction rules of the IP court issued by the Supreme Court the IP court has no jurisdiction over anti-trust cases Secondly if this case is a contractual dispute the court that is in the place of Carrefour should hear it if this case is a tort dispute the Shanghai Intermediate Court should hear it

In the ruling of the IP Court the IP Court decided it has the jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases for the following reasons According to the Provisions On Causes Of Action In Civil Cases issued by Supreme Court (最高人民法院案由规定) antimonopoly dispute is a tertiary cause of action belonging to IP and competition disputes Also according to the Provisions concerning the Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京

市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问题的规定 ) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was an IP and competition dispute and was sued after November 6 2014 Thus the IP Court had jurisdiction

Both Carrefour and Abbott appealed to the Beijing High Court over the jurisdiction ruling but the Beijing High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original ruling Reasons are listed in the written ruling issued on June 18 2015 Firstly the nature of the case was an antimonopoly dispute In accordance with Provisions of the Supreme Peoples Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民

事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) and Civil Litigation Law the monopolistic civil disputes in the first instance shall be under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Peoples Courts and an action involving a contractual dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the peoples court of the place where the defendant is domiciled or where the contract is performed Carrefour as the defendant in this case is domiciled in Chaoyang District Beijing Therefore the courts of Beijing have jurisdiction over this case Secondly according to article 3 of the Notification on the Jurisdiction of Intellectual Property Courts issued by Supreme Court (关于知识产权法院案件管辖

等有关问题的通知) IP courts have jurisdiction over first-instance civil disputes arising from monopolistic practices Lastly according to Provisions concerning the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 29 of 52

approval for the project which seriously distorts the fair competition in the market

Citing article 46 of the AML the 12 insurance companies were collectively fined CNY 469 million including fines on the companies and confiscation of illegal gains It is noteworthy that the fines were calculated based on the companiesrsquo 2014 annual sales of the insurance product in connection with the coinsurance The Company as the chief insurer was fined amounting to 6 of its 2014 annual sales of the relevant insurance product in the coinsurance and other companies were fined amounting to 2 of relevant sales For more specific information please see the following table

Company Name (Hubei Branch)

Fines (CNY million)

Percentage of the sales

Illegal Gains (CNY

million)

China Pacific Life Insurance 00653 6 0941

Sino Life 00145 2 04332

Alltrust Insurance 00145 2 04332

Taikang Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Continent Insurance 00145 2 04332

China Pacific Property Insurance

00145 2 04332

China Life Insurance 00145 2 04332

PICC Property and Casualty 00145 2 02599

Taiping General Insurance 00145 2 013

Union Life Insurance 00145 2 01177

Ping An Annuity Insurance Company of China

00145 2 04201

Ping An Property amp Casualty Insurance Company of China

00145 2 -

Subtotal 02248 - 44679

Total 46927

Analysis

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 30 of 52

Coinsurance as an effective approach to lower risks of insurers is widely used in the insurance industry Information sharing and agreements on coinsurance were generally considered efficient and legitimate However from an antitrust perspective coinsurance may raise competition concerns depending on the circumstances of each agreement In the case that there is enough capacity for one insurer to cover the potential risks the coinsurance might be considered as entering into a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC28

The first leniency applicant was exempted from fines

The other concrete companies were imposed a fine of CNY 180000

Facts

In December 2015 the concrete companies monopolistic agreement case investigated by Hunan AIC was published on SAICrsquos website

In accordance with the antitrust enforcement announcement of SAIC this case was triggered by complaints from the Yongzhou City peoplersquos congress After the preliminary review the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) initiated the formal investigation on seven concrete companies domiciled in Yongzhou City Hunan Province which were suspected of being involved in a monopolistic agreement in terms of division of the volumes of the products

After further investigation Hunan AIC found that the seven concrete companies concluded a partnership agreement in 2011 which requested the involved companies to enter into a partnership business with assets In addition according to the partnership agreement it was planned to establish a comprehensive office to manage production marketing and distribution of the products of all the partners The seven companies intended to jointly adjust and control the output of concrete based on the partnership agreement However because there were disagreements over the allocation of the injected assets and market shares the companies did not implement the partnership agreement The agreement was cancelled in December 2012

Based on the findings Hunan AIC concluded that the seven concrete companies as competitors of each other restricted and eliminated the competition in the relevant market through reaching the partnership agreement and dividing the volumes of sales which violated article 13(3) of the AML in terms of division of sales market Considering that the agreement had not been implemented and the limited influence of the agreement according to article 46 of the AML and article 27 of the Administrative Penalties Law small amount fines were imposed on the involved companies Six companies were fined CNY 30000 each for their illegal behaviour 28 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165504html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 31 of 52

Yongzhou Shuangyuan Building Materials Co Ltd as the first one to actively report the monopolistic agreement and cooperate with the enforcement authority was exempted from the punishment

Outlook

It is expected that the AMLrsquos enforcement on monopolistic agreements will continue in the future Industries such as automobile shipping pharmaceuticals insurance etc will still remain the priority of the antitrust enforcement

The antitrust enforcement authorities have published a series of regulations in order to clarify the substantial and procedural issues relevant to the antitrust enforcement However Chinarsquos current antitrust legislation regime is still immature In the following years we expect that more attention will be paid to the legislative improvements

Another remarkable issue for cartel members is that with more Chinese enterprises attaching increasing importance to the AML the follow-on civil damages actions might become a tendency in the future

C Abuse of Market Dominance

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen a decent increase of abuse of market dominance cases both in public enforcement and private litigation Oftentimes the authorities responsible for public enforcement generally find it difficult to pursue investigations against abuse of market dominance cases The following two main reasons are often cited to explain this standoff first it is hard for the authorities to define the relevant markets and prove the undertaking(s)rsquo dominant market position through economic approaches second it is hard to collect evidence regarding abusive practices

The cases related to IPRs abuse are emerging significantly particularly in the telecommunication media and technology (ldquoTMTrdquo) sectors

The SAICrsquos latest refusal-to-deal probe against a local drug maker shows that the SAIC and its local branches have increasingly acquired a profile as an abuse of dominance regulator

Significant Cases

Cases pursued by the SAIC

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 32 of 52

Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case29

Facts

The local authority in Dongfang city reported to the Hainan provincial branch of SAIC on April 23 2014 of the suspected dominance abuse The SAIC authorized its Hainan bureau to officially investigate the matter on 25 July 2014 according to a decision dated January 9 2015 The AIC concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its market dominance by requiring users to pay a deposit without any legal basis and or justifiable reasons

In terms of the relevant product market the local authority found that in this case it was the urban water supply market in Dongfang city and its surrounding townships where Dongfang Water was the sole public operator in the local water supply market with a 100 market share which made all water users completely reliant on the companyrsquos supply In term of market access the local authority found it very unlikely that there were other operators due to the strict regulations

The Hainan SAIC then concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its dominance as it charged users a deposit by threatening to refuse to register users and also by threatening to restrict the water supply Dongfang Waters charging of deposits lacked a legal basis and hadnt received government approval to the detriment of household consumers and business water users and hampered the improvement of management and services of the company Such conduct was in breach of Chinarsquos Anti-Monopoly Law

Hainan AIC levied a fine of CNY 593208 a lighter penalty equivalent to 2 of the companyrsquos annual sales for the previous year and confiscated illicit gains of CNY 38521 for abuse of market dominance

Analysis

It is noteworthy that although handled by a local authority supervised by the SAIC the antitrust agency detailed the relevant market definition the assessment of the dominant market position the abusive practices and the scrutiny of the justifiable reasons

Although the definition of the relevant market and the reasoning of the Hainan provincial AIC and the SAIC are subject to criticism it is still applausive to see that the antitrust regulators have realized the importance of the application of rule of reason in an abuse case In addition through itrsquos a published decision practitioners may observe the regulatorsrsquo reasoning and thus transparency and legal certainty have been generated

29 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzfcfjd201502t20150212_152066html last visited on October 18 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 33 of 52

Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms30

Facts

In June 2013 the Ningxia AIC under authorization of SAIC opened an antitrust investigation into the alleged tie-in sales by the three major state-owned telecommunications operators China Tietong China Unicom and China Telecom for the tie-in sale of fixed-line telephones with broadband Internet services The Ningxia AIC found that the three companies had bundled fixed-line phone services with Internet services to subscribers

During the investigation all three telecommunications companies admitted the tie-in practice had recognized that such practice had improper influence on competition and deprived the choices of consumers The three companies promised to undertake internal rectification timely and eliminate the ill effects resulting from such practice The parties committed to taking the following corrective measures

1) Taking internal rectifications and conducting training to staff about antitrust laws and stop tie-in sales practices

2) Making public commitments to allow subscribers a free choice of services and strengthening the propaganda through the operating room call centre and other channels

3) Unbundling fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

The Ningxia AIC decided to suspend the probe on 14 May 2015 on the grounds that the three companies had actively worked together with the investigators and proposed workable remedy plans

Analysis

In the official announcement Ningxia AIC concluded that the purpose of antitrust enforcement is to restrain monopolistic conducts the protection of competition and to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of consumers Given that during the investigation process the parties had actively cooperated with the investigation formed a more profound understanding of the dangers of tying behaviour and moreover the parties proposed and implemented positive corrective measures to be able to remove the ill impact of their actions the agency believed that the purpose of antitrust law enforcement was fulfilled

It is worth noting that the Ningxia AIC also required the three companies to implement the commitment by August 30 2015and the submission of the written

30 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158908html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158906html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158910html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 34 of 52

implementation report on July 102015 and August 102015 respectively which is another illustration that an effective commitment by the undertakings shall directly deal with the effect that is brought by the monopolistic behaviour In this case the effect of the monopolistic act was restricted to the choice of the consumers therefore the commitment by the undertaking aimed at allowing the freedom of choice and the unbundling of fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company31

Facts

The Liaoning AIC imposed a fine of approximately CNY 433m on the Fushun Branch of Liaoning Tobacco Co on 1 June 2015 The agency also ordered the company to stop its illicit behaviour

The Liaoning AIC received a tip-off that the accused Liaoning Tobacco Corsquos Fushun branch was conducting tie-in sales of non-high-demand cigarette brands with high-demand cigarette brands After gaining authorization from SAIC the agency officially started an investigation regarding the companyrsquos suspected abuse of market dominance in June 2014

Analysis

According to the announcement the tobacco company argued that the tobacco industry is a state controlled or monopolized industry with a lawful monopolistic position therefore the company shall not be subject to the norms of general market competition rules or the anti-monopoly law

In this regards the agency concluded that in terms of the status of the undertaking admittedly the first paragraph of article 17 of the AML says that the State shall protect the lawful business operations of undertakings in these industries with respect to the industries which are under the control of the State-owned economic sector and have a bearing on the lifeline of the national economy or national security and the industries which exercise monopoly over the production and sale of certain commodities according to law However the second paragraph continues to say that the undertakings mentioned above shall do business according to law be honest faithful and strictly self-disciplined and subject themselves to public supervision and they shall not harm the consumers interests by taking advantage of their position of control or their monopolistic production and sale of certain commodities In particular in the preceding paragraph the ldquolawful businessrdquo and ldquoaccording to lawrdquo imply that the AML shall apply in the business operation The agency therefore believes that

31 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201508t20150813_16

0208html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 35 of 52

there shall be no exemption for the undertaking concerned the defences of the undertaking concerned is not established

Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm32

Facts

The Chongqing AIC fined Chongqing Qingyang Pharmaceutical CNY 439308 for alleged dominance abuse

The investigation was initiated when the company contacted the agency for verification on its potential breach of the AML related to an allopurinol active pharmaceuticals ingredient (API) distribution agreement with its exclusive distributor The company provided the relevant agreement and information and the agency conducted an investigation into the company and some other relevant companies

Analysis

Relevant Market

During the investigation the agency found that pharmaceutical ingredients are a special commodity the API is used to produce the preparations The chemical API is only used for the production of the preparation and could be used as a medicine for clinic use

The preparation is produced according to the requirements of certain form of prepared drugs and for the purpose of treatment and prevention which can be used as medicine

The allopurinol is used for the common treatment of hyperuricemia However the other treatments are different in pharmacological effects or treatment effects as well as in the cost for the patient Furthermore the company is the only manufacturer and supplier in the market nationwide since July 2012 Therefore the agency concluded that the relevant market is the allopurinol API market

Considering that the qualification for manufacturing the allopurinol API is national wide and the normal practice for purchasers and suppliers is domestic the relevant geographic market is the Chinese market

The Market Dominance

During the investigation the agency found that the company is the only supplier and manufacturer of allopurinol API in China there is no other competitor in the

32 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151222_16

5152html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 36 of 52

market and the company has a monopoly in the market The evidence shows that the company has the ability to control the prices the position for the downstream is relatively weak

With respect to the market entry the agency found that the market entry is relatively high in addition other undertakings are dependent on the company Thus the agency believed the company to have market dominance

Refusal to Deal

The agency found that on September 25 2015 the company reached an exclusive agreement and distribution agreement with its distributor Based on these agreements the company didnrsquot supply allopurinol API to the said distributor and other companies despite the fact that those companies requested for allopurinol API but were turned down by the company

Absence of Reasonable Cause

The agency found that the companyrsquos refusal to deal was not in line with the needs of normal business operation or economic efficiency On the other hand the refusal to deal was aimed at increasing the market share of the allopurinol drug product Also the agency found that the stop of supply was a manipulation of market power as to maximize the profit to the most The agency further found that the exclusive distribution agreement with suspension of supply for six months and the refusal to supply was to eliminate and restrict the competition as to gain the monopolistic profit

The Consequence of Refusal to Deal

The agency concluded that the refusal to deal harmed the competition of the allopurinol preparations market Because of the suspension of supply many demanders had to reduce their production or switch to the supply of other products or stop their production The suspension of supply affected the competition of the downstream market Consequently the raising of the price of allopurinol API also raised the cost for other manufacturers of allopurinol preparations

Furthermore the refusal to deal led to capacity loss of the allopurinol preparation industry

Ultimately the refusal to deal increased the burden on consumers as the refusal to supply changed the supply-demand relationship in the market

The agency concluded that the Company abused its dominant position in the allopurinol API market by refusing to deal with intended buyers in the period between October 2013 and March 2014Therefore the Company violated article 17 (1) of the AML which prohibits business operators with a dominant market position from abusing that position such as the refusal to deal without any justifications

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

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D Administrative Monopoly

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 witnessed antitrust authoritiesrsquo significant efforts regarding the enforcement against administrative monopoly According to Mr Dong Zhiming the deputy director general of Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly Bureau ever since the AML coming into force six cases in connection with administrative monopoly were investigated by NDRC and among them five cases were handled in the year of 2015 These cases touched abuses of administrative power in terms of designative deal in relation to transportation communication and pharmaceutical industries

The first private litigation related to administrative monopolistic acts was heard in the court which is a milestone case in the enforcement of the AML

Significant Cases

Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC33

Facts

In March 2015 the NDRC released the official letter to Shandong Provincial Department of Transportation (ldquoShandong DOTrdquo) on its website with respect to correct its abuse of administrative power to exclude and restrict competition

During the investigation the NDRC found that since 2011 Shandong DOT had issued multiple relevant government orders in order to require certain types of vehicles to be directly connected to two designated information and service platforms both of which are operated and technically supported by one company namely Shandong Jiutong Internet of Things Technology Co Ltd (ldquoJiutong ITTrdquo) Furthermore according to the orders issued by the competent administrative department all the vehicle satellite positioning terminals entering into Shandong provincial market should be debugged through the said technology service platform which is operated by the mentioned company In addition Shandong DOT released the cap prices of vehicle satellite positioning terminals which is identical to the 2012 bid-winning price in the Ministry of Transportation demonstration project

The NDRC believed that Shandong DOTrsquos behaviour eliminated and restricted the competition in the monitoring platform market and the vehicle terminal market deprived the right of transportation enterprises to choose vehicle terminals and monitoring platform on their owns unreasonably raised the sales prices of vehicle terminals and service fees charged by the platform and increased the costs of transportation enterprises Therefore the antitrust agency concluded that Shandong

33 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201503t20150327_668911html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

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DOT violated article 8 of the AML which stipulates that ldquoadministrative organs and the public organizations with an administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude and restrict competitionrdquo Specifically Shandong DOT violated article 3234 in terms of requiring organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any designated operators and violated article 3735 in terms of setting rules with contents which eliminate and restrict competition

Based on article 51 of the AML ldquoWhere administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations abuse administrative powers performing activities which exclude and restrict competition the superior entity shall order it to correct impose administrative penalty on the chief officer and other staffs directly responsible pursuant to the laws The AML enforcement authority may give recommendations on disposal of activities to the relevant superior entityrdquo the NDRC proposed in writing that the Shandong provincial government should order Shandong DOT to rectify its behaviour with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Entirely open up the monitoring platform market by permitting transportation undertakings to freely choose any approved platform

2) Loosen the restrictions on the entry into Shandong vehicle terminals permit the undertakings to independently select the supplier of vehicle terminals and allow the qualified terminals to be connected to the relevant monitoring platform and

3) Revoke the official documentation relevant to the cap price of vehicle terminals in order to promote the price competition

Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 36

Facts

On 26 August 2015 the NDRC published its second decision with regard to the rectification of administrative monopoly since the beginning of this year According to the proposal letter sent to Anhui Provincial Government the investigation against the Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City (Bengbu HFPC) was trigged by third partiesrsquo complaints

34 Article 32 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to require organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any operators designated by them 35 Article 37 of the AML Administrative organs shall not abuse their administrative powers to set rules with contents which eliminate restrict competition 36 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201508t20150826_748682html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 39 of 52

The investigation suggests that Bengbu HFPC published three notices with regard to drugs procurement in April and May of this year

In the No C-2015-CG-X-111 Notice (ldquoNo111 Noticerdquo) released on 10 April2015 the health authority not only provided the dosage form and qualification of the requested drugs but also directly determined the suppliers of relevant drugs which eliminated and restricted the competition among pharmaceutical manufacturers and therefore violated articles 32 and 37 of the AML

In the No C-2015-CG-C-112 Notice (ldquoNo112 Noticerdquo) and No C-2015-CG-C-168 (ldquoNo 168 Noticerdquo) respectively released on 10 April and 22 May 2015 the Bengbu HFPC set discriminative qualification requirements on non-local undertakings in order to restrict their participation in the relevant bidding For instance in accordance with No 112 Notice to be a qualified bidder the turnover of non-local undertakings shall exceed CNY 2 billion which is 50 times as much as the turnover requirements of the local undertakings In the NDRCrsquos opinion the administrative monopoly activities conducted by the local health agency excluded the relevant undertakings from the market maintained the virtual-high prices of drugs and therefore violated articles 3237 and 37 of the AML

The NDRC suggested in a letter that Anhui Provincial Government should urge the Bengbu HFPC to rectify the abuse of monopoly powers with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Stop setting distinguishing restrictions on qualification requirements review standards and numbers of winning bidders as for local and non-local undertakings

2) Stop designating the suppliers of competitive drugs and

3) Take necessary measures to mitigate the negative effects resulting from the previous illegal monopolistic abuses

Outlook

At the beginning of the year the former director general of the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau under the NDRC Xu Kunlin stated that the agency would strengthen antitrust enforcement on abuse of administrative power in 2015

Since then the NDRC has made great efforts to rectify unreasonable abuses of administrative power The currently disclosed two cases investigated by the NDRC re-emphasize the Chinese Governmentrsquos strict scrutiny of antitrust issues in respect of

37 Article 34 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to restrict or reject the participation of operators from other regions in local bidding activities by measures such as prescribing discriminatory qualification requirements or assessment standards or by not publishing information according to law

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 40 of 52

administrative monopoly It reminds the local governments that antitrust compliance is of significant importance

III Private Litigation

A Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen more and more private antitrust litigations

The private antitrust litigation cases have become increasingly complicated especially the issues regarding the intersection areas of IP and antitrust law

Multinational giants and State-Owned Enterprises (the ldquoSOEsrdquo) are increasingly becoming the targets in antitrust civil litigations Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (the ldquoSMEsrdquo) tend to use the antitrust litigation to achieve their commercial goals in the business context

B Significant Cases

Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)38

This is the first-ever private litigation concerning administrative monopoly since the implementation of the AML in 2008

Facts

According to the currently disclosed details the case is relevant for designated trade

The plaintiff Shenzhen Sware Technology Co Ltd (ldquoSwarerdquo) is a software company The press releases suggest that Sware Gloden Software Co Ltd (ldquoGlodenrdquo) and Shanghai Ruban Software Co Ltd (ldquoShanghai Rubanrdquo) are the three main suppliers of construction cost software and possess the major shares of the relevant market An annual provincial vocational ability contest regarding the construction cost hosted by the Guangdong Department of Education (ldquoGuangdong DOE) designated Gloden as the exclusive supplier of the relevant software

After several unsuccessful verbal and written negotiations with Guangdong DOE in April 2014 Sware filed a lawsuit against Guangdong DOE before the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquothe Courtrdquo) alleging that the administrative organ abused its administrative power and violated the AML by designating exclusive software supplier for the contest and claimed a compensation for reasonable expense amounting to CNY 10800 Yuan

The opinions of the Court 38 The story of the case is available at httpfinancesinacomcnchinadfjj20150410074621924997shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 41 of 52

The full text of the judgment has not been disclosed yet In accordance with the information available to the public the Court invoked article 32 of the AML which prohibits an administrative organ from abusing its administrative power to require or in disguised form organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use only the commodities supplied by the entities designated by them The Court concluded that Guangdong DOE failed to prove the legitimacy of the designation and therefore abused its administration power

Currently the case is in appeal before the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court

Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 39

It is the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China

In the first instance ruling Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court ruled against Sinopec holding that the Yunnan branch of Sinopecs trading company was obligated to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its dominance in the sales market of refined oil by refusing to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding without justifiable reasons

In the second instance ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors Currently the case is pending

Facts

The First Trial

The lawsuit was filed before the Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoKunming Courtrdquo) in January 2014 Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy Co Ltd (ldquoYingdingrdquo) a bio-energy manufacturer claimed that Sinopec and the Yunnan branch of Sinopec trading company (ldquoSinopec Yunnan Branchrdquo) had failed to fulfil their obligations stipulated in the Renewable Energy Law and had abused their market dominance in sales market of refined oil by refusing to trade with Yingding without justifiable reasons

Sinopec and Sinopec Yunnan Branch mainly explained four reasons for why they rejected Yingdingrsquos biofuel Firstly Yingding had failed to prove that the biofuel complied with the relevant national standard and was safe to use Secondly Yingding had failed to provide complete trading terms Thirdly the laws and regulations regarding biofuel were incomplete the authorized refined oil sales companies were 39 The details of the case are available at httpnewsxinhuanetcomfortune2014-1217c_1113680039htm httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=9e71db51-6ff6-4d2c-8af6-8eacf023ebdeampKeyWord=E4BA91E58D97E79B88E9BC8E|E4B8ADE79FB3E58C96 httpnewsxinhuanetcomenergy2015-0422c_127721575htm httpwwwnbdcomcnarticles2015-04-23911348html last visited on December 17 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 42 of 52

obligated to purchase biofuel from the biofuel manufacturers if it met certain quality standards but there was a vacancy regarding how to reach the end consumers from the sales companies

On 8 December 2014 the Kunming Intermediate Peoples Court ruled that Sinopec Yunnan Branch bore a legal obligation to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its market dominance in refined oil market by refusing without any justifiable reasons to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding The court ordered Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network within 30 days Both Yingding and Sinopec filed appeals to the Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court

The Appellate Trial

The appeal hearing was held on 22 April 2015 in Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoYunnan Courtrdquo) Sinopec submitted 23 new pieces of evidence and introduced two expert witnesses in a bid to overturn several key elements in the first-instance ruling by Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court

In terms of the determination of the relevant market and the market dominance Sinopec argued that the relevant market in this case was for adipic acid monomethyl ester (ldquoAAMErdquo) the main ingredient of a biofuel additive known as BD100 Yingdingrsquos main product is BD100 which can be blended with fossil diesel to become biofuel In the AAME market Sinopec is a potential buyer instead of a market dominator In support of this argument Sinopec presented an expert witnessmdashGong Jiong a professor of economics at Beijings University of International Business and Economics who testified that AAME should be defined as the relevant product market on the basis of an economic analysis

However Yingding insisted that the first-instance ruling was correct in naming the sales market of refined oil as the relevant market and submitted new evidence an article on Sinopecs website that claimed it had a 67 market share in Yunnan to help establish the claim that Sinopec had market dominance

Another main dispute was whether Yingdingrsquos biofuel product met national standards which would make it mandatory for Sinopec to purchase under Chinas Renewable Energy Law The law stipulates that biofuel producers must sell their products first to an authorized refined oil sales company and the sales companies are obliged to buy the fuel if it meets certain quality standards In order to test the quality Sinopec introduced the second expert witness Lin Jianmin a leading author of Chinarsquos national biofuel standard Lin Jianmin pointed out that there are currently quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology which gives Sinopec a justifiable reason not to trade with Yingding Moreover Sinopec presented some precedents in which consumers had complained about the biofuel quality and also claimed that China didnt have a sound regulatory framework to support biofuel production neither in testing nor in sales

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 43 of 52

Nevertheless to refute this point Yingding referred to an earlier test in co-operation with Sinopec in 2011 where selected buses in Kunming used biofuel blended by Sinopec using BD100 produced by Yingding

On August 13 2015 Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors and now this case is pending In the written appellate ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court did not provide any details regarding its reasoning

Key Issues of the Case

Is there any competition between Yingding and Sinopec

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case the product of Yingding is biofuel while Sinopec does not engage in the business of biofuel From this perspective Yingding and Sinopec are not competitors Thus it is not necessary and not reasonable for Sinopec to eliminate or restrict the competition from Yingding

Relevant Market

The definition of the relevant market is a prerequisite to determine whether competition exists and whether the AML is applicable In accordance with the Judicial Interpretation of Antitrust civil litigation the plaintiff shall take the responsibility to prove the defendantrsquos dominance in the relevant market Also the methods of defining the relevant market are stipulated in the Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition (ldquoGuidelinesrdquo) However both Yingding and Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court defined the relevant market as the sales market of refined oil without sufficient antitrust analysis none of the methods in the Guidelines were used Therefore the definition of the relevant market remains arguable and needs to be sufficiently analysed in the upcoming retrial

Justifiable Reasons

The abuse of market dominance includes the behaviour of refusing to trade without justifiable reasons according to the AML but in the first instance ruling justifiable reasons were not investigated by the court During the appellate trial the expert witness introduced by Sinopec claimed that there were quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology and this was a justifiable reason to refuse to trade with Yingding Even though the first instance court and the appellate court did not reason the justifiable reason it should be discussed and investigated further during the retrial

AML or Renewable Energy Law

The claims of Yingding were based on both the AML and the Renewable Energy Law (ldquoRELrdquo) and the first instance ruling referred to both the AML and the REL as

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

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well It seems that the laws the first instance court referred to were comprehensive but in fact the reasoning was not clear and logical In the first instance ruling some disputes regarding the AML were reviewed but all the orders were not based on the AML Specifically the first instance court ordered the Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network based on the REL and dismissed the other claims That the orders were not on account of reasoning is illogical It is anticipated that during the retrial the application of the laws will be clearer

Analysis

A lot of issues have not been clearly analysed by the courts such as the relevant market and the justifiable reasons Since the case is remanded the above-mentioned issues are expected to be resolved in the retrial In addition Yingding was in a disadvantaged position compared to its first instance trial since its claims based on the AML were challenged greatly during the appellate trial In the retrial it is probable that Yingding may switch its litigation strategy and base its claims on the REL Therefore maybe more preparation regarding the REL can give Sinopec a leg up

Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)

Rijing Electric a Chinese distributor seeks CNY 5m compensation

The first hearing was on 9 June 2015 and ended without a ruling

Facts

Rijing Electric (ldquoRijingrdquo) a Shanghai-based company and a former distributor for Panasonic accused Panasonic of abusing its dominance and dividing the market through monopolistic practice in an antitrust lawsuit filed in 2014 with Shanghai No 1 Intermediate Court (ldquoShanghai Courtrdquo) claiming compensation of CNY 5m (USD 815370) Wenzhou Mingda Automation System Co and Shanghai Qingying Automation Equipment as the distributor of Panasonic in China are the co-defendants were accused of conducting monopolistic behaviours by implementing Panasonicrsquos policy

The first hearing for evidence exchange was on June 9 2015 Rijing claimed a policy allegedly introduced by Panasonic in 2009 restricted the competition between distributors Panasonic claims the policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo and has full justifiable reasons It explained that the products in question required customization at considerable cost to distributors before its sale to customers Once carried out however other distributors leaving them open to quote much lower prices than the original distributor could simply and relatively cheap replicate this customization Besides Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and that the plaintiff had failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic said its market share for the four products

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 45 of 52

under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases Also Rijing failed to challenge the policy when it was first introduced instead initially agreeing it was reasonable as e-mail evidence submitted by Panasonic suggests

Key Issues of the Case

Whether Panasonic occupied a market dominant position

It is reported that Rijing claimed that Panasonic had abused its market dominance but Rijing failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and its market share for the four products under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases

Analysis

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case Panasonicrsquos policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo rather than to eliminate or restrict competition

Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals40 (Pending)

It is a battle over patent licensing issues

It is viewed as being among the most complicated antitrust lawsuits in China

The first hearing was on 17 and 18 December 2015

Facts

Four Chinese rare earth companies Ningbo Ketian Magnet Ningbo Permanent Magnetics Ningbo Tongchuang Strong Magnet Material and Ningbo Huahui Magnetic Industry filed antitrust lawsuits against Hitachi Metals over alleged patent licensing issues regarding rare earth magnets on December 11 2014 with the Ningbo Intermediate Peoples Court (ldquoNingbo Courtrdquo) in Zhejiang province As reported four Chinese rare earth companies claimed Hitachi Metals abused its market dominance and hurt the industry competition by refusing to license the patents to them The patents in this case are used in the manufacturing of sintered neodymium iron boron (ldquoNdFeBrdquo) magnets a rare-earth magnet alloy widely used in parts for airplanes automobiles and other products

Hitachi Metals filed a challenge with the Ningbo Court over its jurisdiction in April 2015 After Ningbo Court rejected Hitachi Metals jurisdiction objection on 28 April 2015 Hitachi Metals appealed to the Zhejiang High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoZhejiang

40The details of the story are available at httpwwwzbmagcomnews_viewphpid=80 httpwwwhitachicomcnaboutpress201510-121118_ahtml last visited on December 22 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 46 of 52

Courtrdquo) but Zhejiang Court affirmed the ruling of the Ningbo Court

The first day of a two-day hearing took place on 17 December 2015 during which the two sides cross-examined each otherrsquos evidence The evidence focused on clearing up several key elements in the case including the relevant market whether Hitachi Metals has dominance on that market and whether both sides acted in good faith during the licensing negotiations

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Product Market

The four Chinese rare earth companies claimed that the relevant product market should be the NdFeb-related patent licensing market However Hitachi Metals believed that the physical NdFeb market rather than the patent licensing market should be the relevant product market which is meaningful for assess the real competitive effects on the market

Whether Hitachi Metals occupies a dominant market position

In terms of market dominance Hitachi Metals claimed it does not occupy a dominant position because Hitachi Metalsrsquo patents were not in a standard in this case and there are substitutable technologies in the market SEP holders have the obligation to license on FRAND terms but none-SEP holders do not So while a refusal to license a SEP may constitute abuse of dominance refusal to license a non-SEP mdash even by a patent holder with a dominant position mdash should not be considered as an abuse

Analysis

Hitachi Metals as a patent holder should have the right to decide whether to retain those patents or not or who to license According to the legal theory the purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage and protect innovation by conferring monopoly right mdash that is to give intellectual property owners the proprietary rights which can exclude others from using the intellectual property The SEP holders admittedly need to comply with FRAND terms which can maintain a robust balance between competition and monopoly whereas the further intervention of antitrust law into non-SEP patents may undermine the purpose of intellectual property law To which extent the antitrust law should intervene is yet to be seen

Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei41

A confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the Beijing IP court made by the Beijing High Court

41 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcncpwswbjzscq201511t20151103_12225640htm last visited on December 28 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 47 of 52

Facts

On August 2 2013 the NDRC penalized Abbott for monopolistic price-fixing and then Abbott made a price adjustment in China where the prices of main products were reduced

On December 16 2014 Tian Junwei (ldquoTianrdquo) a Chinese citizen in Beijing sued Carrefour Shuangjing Branch (ldquoCarrefourrdquo) and Abbott (Shanghai) Sales Company (ldquoAbbottrdquo) at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (ldquoIP Courtrdquo) for their monopolistic price-fixing which damaged his interests However Carrefour and Abbott challenged the jurisdiction of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court They claimed there were two reasons Firstly according to the jurisdiction rules of the IP court issued by the Supreme Court the IP court has no jurisdiction over anti-trust cases Secondly if this case is a contractual dispute the court that is in the place of Carrefour should hear it if this case is a tort dispute the Shanghai Intermediate Court should hear it

In the ruling of the IP Court the IP Court decided it has the jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases for the following reasons According to the Provisions On Causes Of Action In Civil Cases issued by Supreme Court (最高人民法院案由规定) antimonopoly dispute is a tertiary cause of action belonging to IP and competition disputes Also according to the Provisions concerning the Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京

市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问题的规定 ) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was an IP and competition dispute and was sued after November 6 2014 Thus the IP Court had jurisdiction

Both Carrefour and Abbott appealed to the Beijing High Court over the jurisdiction ruling but the Beijing High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original ruling Reasons are listed in the written ruling issued on June 18 2015 Firstly the nature of the case was an antimonopoly dispute In accordance with Provisions of the Supreme Peoples Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民

事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) and Civil Litigation Law the monopolistic civil disputes in the first instance shall be under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Peoples Courts and an action involving a contractual dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the peoples court of the place where the defendant is domiciled or where the contract is performed Carrefour as the defendant in this case is domiciled in Chaoyang District Beijing Therefore the courts of Beijing have jurisdiction over this case Secondly according to article 3 of the Notification on the Jurisdiction of Intellectual Property Courts issued by Supreme Court (关于知识产权法院案件管辖

等有关问题的通知) IP courts have jurisdiction over first-instance civil disputes arising from monopolistic practices Lastly according to Provisions concerning the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 30 of 52

Coinsurance as an effective approach to lower risks of insurers is widely used in the insurance industry Information sharing and agreements on coinsurance were generally considered efficient and legitimate However from an antitrust perspective coinsurance may raise competition concerns depending on the circumstances of each agreement In the case that there is enough capacity for one insurer to cover the potential risks the coinsurance might be considered as entering into a horizontal monopolistic agreement

Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC28

The first leniency applicant was exempted from fines

The other concrete companies were imposed a fine of CNY 180000

Facts

In December 2015 the concrete companies monopolistic agreement case investigated by Hunan AIC was published on SAICrsquos website

In accordance with the antitrust enforcement announcement of SAIC this case was triggered by complaints from the Yongzhou City peoplersquos congress After the preliminary review the Hunan Administration for Industry and Commerce (ldquoHunan AICrdquo) initiated the formal investigation on seven concrete companies domiciled in Yongzhou City Hunan Province which were suspected of being involved in a monopolistic agreement in terms of division of the volumes of the products

After further investigation Hunan AIC found that the seven concrete companies concluded a partnership agreement in 2011 which requested the involved companies to enter into a partnership business with assets In addition according to the partnership agreement it was planned to establish a comprehensive office to manage production marketing and distribution of the products of all the partners The seven companies intended to jointly adjust and control the output of concrete based on the partnership agreement However because there were disagreements over the allocation of the injected assets and market shares the companies did not implement the partnership agreement The agreement was cancelled in December 2012

Based on the findings Hunan AIC concluded that the seven concrete companies as competitors of each other restricted and eliminated the competition in the relevant market through reaching the partnership agreement and dividing the volumes of sales which violated article 13(3) of the AML in terms of division of sales market Considering that the agreement had not been implemented and the limited influence of the agreement according to article 46 of the AML and article 27 of the Administrative Penalties Law small amount fines were imposed on the involved companies Six companies were fined CNY 30000 each for their illegal behaviour 28 The original Chinese notice published by the SAIC is available at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151229_165504html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 31 of 52

Yongzhou Shuangyuan Building Materials Co Ltd as the first one to actively report the monopolistic agreement and cooperate with the enforcement authority was exempted from the punishment

Outlook

It is expected that the AMLrsquos enforcement on monopolistic agreements will continue in the future Industries such as automobile shipping pharmaceuticals insurance etc will still remain the priority of the antitrust enforcement

The antitrust enforcement authorities have published a series of regulations in order to clarify the substantial and procedural issues relevant to the antitrust enforcement However Chinarsquos current antitrust legislation regime is still immature In the following years we expect that more attention will be paid to the legislative improvements

Another remarkable issue for cartel members is that with more Chinese enterprises attaching increasing importance to the AML the follow-on civil damages actions might become a tendency in the future

C Abuse of Market Dominance

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen a decent increase of abuse of market dominance cases both in public enforcement and private litigation Oftentimes the authorities responsible for public enforcement generally find it difficult to pursue investigations against abuse of market dominance cases The following two main reasons are often cited to explain this standoff first it is hard for the authorities to define the relevant markets and prove the undertaking(s)rsquo dominant market position through economic approaches second it is hard to collect evidence regarding abusive practices

The cases related to IPRs abuse are emerging significantly particularly in the telecommunication media and technology (ldquoTMTrdquo) sectors

The SAICrsquos latest refusal-to-deal probe against a local drug maker shows that the SAIC and its local branches have increasingly acquired a profile as an abuse of dominance regulator

Significant Cases

Cases pursued by the SAIC

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 32 of 52

Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case29

Facts

The local authority in Dongfang city reported to the Hainan provincial branch of SAIC on April 23 2014 of the suspected dominance abuse The SAIC authorized its Hainan bureau to officially investigate the matter on 25 July 2014 according to a decision dated January 9 2015 The AIC concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its market dominance by requiring users to pay a deposit without any legal basis and or justifiable reasons

In terms of the relevant product market the local authority found that in this case it was the urban water supply market in Dongfang city and its surrounding townships where Dongfang Water was the sole public operator in the local water supply market with a 100 market share which made all water users completely reliant on the companyrsquos supply In term of market access the local authority found it very unlikely that there were other operators due to the strict regulations

The Hainan SAIC then concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its dominance as it charged users a deposit by threatening to refuse to register users and also by threatening to restrict the water supply Dongfang Waters charging of deposits lacked a legal basis and hadnt received government approval to the detriment of household consumers and business water users and hampered the improvement of management and services of the company Such conduct was in breach of Chinarsquos Anti-Monopoly Law

Hainan AIC levied a fine of CNY 593208 a lighter penalty equivalent to 2 of the companyrsquos annual sales for the previous year and confiscated illicit gains of CNY 38521 for abuse of market dominance

Analysis

It is noteworthy that although handled by a local authority supervised by the SAIC the antitrust agency detailed the relevant market definition the assessment of the dominant market position the abusive practices and the scrutiny of the justifiable reasons

Although the definition of the relevant market and the reasoning of the Hainan provincial AIC and the SAIC are subject to criticism it is still applausive to see that the antitrust regulators have realized the importance of the application of rule of reason in an abuse case In addition through itrsquos a published decision practitioners may observe the regulatorsrsquo reasoning and thus transparency and legal certainty have been generated

29 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzfcfjd201502t20150212_152066html last visited on October 18 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 33 of 52

Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms30

Facts

In June 2013 the Ningxia AIC under authorization of SAIC opened an antitrust investigation into the alleged tie-in sales by the three major state-owned telecommunications operators China Tietong China Unicom and China Telecom for the tie-in sale of fixed-line telephones with broadband Internet services The Ningxia AIC found that the three companies had bundled fixed-line phone services with Internet services to subscribers

During the investigation all three telecommunications companies admitted the tie-in practice had recognized that such practice had improper influence on competition and deprived the choices of consumers The three companies promised to undertake internal rectification timely and eliminate the ill effects resulting from such practice The parties committed to taking the following corrective measures

1) Taking internal rectifications and conducting training to staff about antitrust laws and stop tie-in sales practices

2) Making public commitments to allow subscribers a free choice of services and strengthening the propaganda through the operating room call centre and other channels

3) Unbundling fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

The Ningxia AIC decided to suspend the probe on 14 May 2015 on the grounds that the three companies had actively worked together with the investigators and proposed workable remedy plans

Analysis

In the official announcement Ningxia AIC concluded that the purpose of antitrust enforcement is to restrain monopolistic conducts the protection of competition and to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of consumers Given that during the investigation process the parties had actively cooperated with the investigation formed a more profound understanding of the dangers of tying behaviour and moreover the parties proposed and implemented positive corrective measures to be able to remove the ill impact of their actions the agency believed that the purpose of antitrust law enforcement was fulfilled

It is worth noting that the Ningxia AIC also required the three companies to implement the commitment by August 30 2015and the submission of the written

30 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158908html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158906html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158910html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 34 of 52

implementation report on July 102015 and August 102015 respectively which is another illustration that an effective commitment by the undertakings shall directly deal with the effect that is brought by the monopolistic behaviour In this case the effect of the monopolistic act was restricted to the choice of the consumers therefore the commitment by the undertaking aimed at allowing the freedom of choice and the unbundling of fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company31

Facts

The Liaoning AIC imposed a fine of approximately CNY 433m on the Fushun Branch of Liaoning Tobacco Co on 1 June 2015 The agency also ordered the company to stop its illicit behaviour

The Liaoning AIC received a tip-off that the accused Liaoning Tobacco Corsquos Fushun branch was conducting tie-in sales of non-high-demand cigarette brands with high-demand cigarette brands After gaining authorization from SAIC the agency officially started an investigation regarding the companyrsquos suspected abuse of market dominance in June 2014

Analysis

According to the announcement the tobacco company argued that the tobacco industry is a state controlled or monopolized industry with a lawful monopolistic position therefore the company shall not be subject to the norms of general market competition rules or the anti-monopoly law

In this regards the agency concluded that in terms of the status of the undertaking admittedly the first paragraph of article 17 of the AML says that the State shall protect the lawful business operations of undertakings in these industries with respect to the industries which are under the control of the State-owned economic sector and have a bearing on the lifeline of the national economy or national security and the industries which exercise monopoly over the production and sale of certain commodities according to law However the second paragraph continues to say that the undertakings mentioned above shall do business according to law be honest faithful and strictly self-disciplined and subject themselves to public supervision and they shall not harm the consumers interests by taking advantage of their position of control or their monopolistic production and sale of certain commodities In particular in the preceding paragraph the ldquolawful businessrdquo and ldquoaccording to lawrdquo imply that the AML shall apply in the business operation The agency therefore believes that

31 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201508t20150813_16

0208html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 35 of 52

there shall be no exemption for the undertaking concerned the defences of the undertaking concerned is not established

Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm32

Facts

The Chongqing AIC fined Chongqing Qingyang Pharmaceutical CNY 439308 for alleged dominance abuse

The investigation was initiated when the company contacted the agency for verification on its potential breach of the AML related to an allopurinol active pharmaceuticals ingredient (API) distribution agreement with its exclusive distributor The company provided the relevant agreement and information and the agency conducted an investigation into the company and some other relevant companies

Analysis

Relevant Market

During the investigation the agency found that pharmaceutical ingredients are a special commodity the API is used to produce the preparations The chemical API is only used for the production of the preparation and could be used as a medicine for clinic use

The preparation is produced according to the requirements of certain form of prepared drugs and for the purpose of treatment and prevention which can be used as medicine

The allopurinol is used for the common treatment of hyperuricemia However the other treatments are different in pharmacological effects or treatment effects as well as in the cost for the patient Furthermore the company is the only manufacturer and supplier in the market nationwide since July 2012 Therefore the agency concluded that the relevant market is the allopurinol API market

Considering that the qualification for manufacturing the allopurinol API is national wide and the normal practice for purchasers and suppliers is domestic the relevant geographic market is the Chinese market

The Market Dominance

During the investigation the agency found that the company is the only supplier and manufacturer of allopurinol API in China there is no other competitor in the

32 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151222_16

5152html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 36 of 52

market and the company has a monopoly in the market The evidence shows that the company has the ability to control the prices the position for the downstream is relatively weak

With respect to the market entry the agency found that the market entry is relatively high in addition other undertakings are dependent on the company Thus the agency believed the company to have market dominance

Refusal to Deal

The agency found that on September 25 2015 the company reached an exclusive agreement and distribution agreement with its distributor Based on these agreements the company didnrsquot supply allopurinol API to the said distributor and other companies despite the fact that those companies requested for allopurinol API but were turned down by the company

Absence of Reasonable Cause

The agency found that the companyrsquos refusal to deal was not in line with the needs of normal business operation or economic efficiency On the other hand the refusal to deal was aimed at increasing the market share of the allopurinol drug product Also the agency found that the stop of supply was a manipulation of market power as to maximize the profit to the most The agency further found that the exclusive distribution agreement with suspension of supply for six months and the refusal to supply was to eliminate and restrict the competition as to gain the monopolistic profit

The Consequence of Refusal to Deal

The agency concluded that the refusal to deal harmed the competition of the allopurinol preparations market Because of the suspension of supply many demanders had to reduce their production or switch to the supply of other products or stop their production The suspension of supply affected the competition of the downstream market Consequently the raising of the price of allopurinol API also raised the cost for other manufacturers of allopurinol preparations

Furthermore the refusal to deal led to capacity loss of the allopurinol preparation industry

Ultimately the refusal to deal increased the burden on consumers as the refusal to supply changed the supply-demand relationship in the market

The agency concluded that the Company abused its dominant position in the allopurinol API market by refusing to deal with intended buyers in the period between October 2013 and March 2014Therefore the Company violated article 17 (1) of the AML which prohibits business operators with a dominant market position from abusing that position such as the refusal to deal without any justifications

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 37 of 52

D Administrative Monopoly

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 witnessed antitrust authoritiesrsquo significant efforts regarding the enforcement against administrative monopoly According to Mr Dong Zhiming the deputy director general of Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly Bureau ever since the AML coming into force six cases in connection with administrative monopoly were investigated by NDRC and among them five cases were handled in the year of 2015 These cases touched abuses of administrative power in terms of designative deal in relation to transportation communication and pharmaceutical industries

The first private litigation related to administrative monopolistic acts was heard in the court which is a milestone case in the enforcement of the AML

Significant Cases

Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC33

Facts

In March 2015 the NDRC released the official letter to Shandong Provincial Department of Transportation (ldquoShandong DOTrdquo) on its website with respect to correct its abuse of administrative power to exclude and restrict competition

During the investigation the NDRC found that since 2011 Shandong DOT had issued multiple relevant government orders in order to require certain types of vehicles to be directly connected to two designated information and service platforms both of which are operated and technically supported by one company namely Shandong Jiutong Internet of Things Technology Co Ltd (ldquoJiutong ITTrdquo) Furthermore according to the orders issued by the competent administrative department all the vehicle satellite positioning terminals entering into Shandong provincial market should be debugged through the said technology service platform which is operated by the mentioned company In addition Shandong DOT released the cap prices of vehicle satellite positioning terminals which is identical to the 2012 bid-winning price in the Ministry of Transportation demonstration project

The NDRC believed that Shandong DOTrsquos behaviour eliminated and restricted the competition in the monitoring platform market and the vehicle terminal market deprived the right of transportation enterprises to choose vehicle terminals and monitoring platform on their owns unreasonably raised the sales prices of vehicle terminals and service fees charged by the platform and increased the costs of transportation enterprises Therefore the antitrust agency concluded that Shandong

33 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201503t20150327_668911html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 38 of 52

DOT violated article 8 of the AML which stipulates that ldquoadministrative organs and the public organizations with an administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude and restrict competitionrdquo Specifically Shandong DOT violated article 3234 in terms of requiring organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any designated operators and violated article 3735 in terms of setting rules with contents which eliminate and restrict competition

Based on article 51 of the AML ldquoWhere administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations abuse administrative powers performing activities which exclude and restrict competition the superior entity shall order it to correct impose administrative penalty on the chief officer and other staffs directly responsible pursuant to the laws The AML enforcement authority may give recommendations on disposal of activities to the relevant superior entityrdquo the NDRC proposed in writing that the Shandong provincial government should order Shandong DOT to rectify its behaviour with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Entirely open up the monitoring platform market by permitting transportation undertakings to freely choose any approved platform

2) Loosen the restrictions on the entry into Shandong vehicle terminals permit the undertakings to independently select the supplier of vehicle terminals and allow the qualified terminals to be connected to the relevant monitoring platform and

3) Revoke the official documentation relevant to the cap price of vehicle terminals in order to promote the price competition

Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 36

Facts

On 26 August 2015 the NDRC published its second decision with regard to the rectification of administrative monopoly since the beginning of this year According to the proposal letter sent to Anhui Provincial Government the investigation against the Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City (Bengbu HFPC) was trigged by third partiesrsquo complaints

34 Article 32 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to require organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any operators designated by them 35 Article 37 of the AML Administrative organs shall not abuse their administrative powers to set rules with contents which eliminate restrict competition 36 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201508t20150826_748682html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 39 of 52

The investigation suggests that Bengbu HFPC published three notices with regard to drugs procurement in April and May of this year

In the No C-2015-CG-X-111 Notice (ldquoNo111 Noticerdquo) released on 10 April2015 the health authority not only provided the dosage form and qualification of the requested drugs but also directly determined the suppliers of relevant drugs which eliminated and restricted the competition among pharmaceutical manufacturers and therefore violated articles 32 and 37 of the AML

In the No C-2015-CG-C-112 Notice (ldquoNo112 Noticerdquo) and No C-2015-CG-C-168 (ldquoNo 168 Noticerdquo) respectively released on 10 April and 22 May 2015 the Bengbu HFPC set discriminative qualification requirements on non-local undertakings in order to restrict their participation in the relevant bidding For instance in accordance with No 112 Notice to be a qualified bidder the turnover of non-local undertakings shall exceed CNY 2 billion which is 50 times as much as the turnover requirements of the local undertakings In the NDRCrsquos opinion the administrative monopoly activities conducted by the local health agency excluded the relevant undertakings from the market maintained the virtual-high prices of drugs and therefore violated articles 3237 and 37 of the AML

The NDRC suggested in a letter that Anhui Provincial Government should urge the Bengbu HFPC to rectify the abuse of monopoly powers with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Stop setting distinguishing restrictions on qualification requirements review standards and numbers of winning bidders as for local and non-local undertakings

2) Stop designating the suppliers of competitive drugs and

3) Take necessary measures to mitigate the negative effects resulting from the previous illegal monopolistic abuses

Outlook

At the beginning of the year the former director general of the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau under the NDRC Xu Kunlin stated that the agency would strengthen antitrust enforcement on abuse of administrative power in 2015

Since then the NDRC has made great efforts to rectify unreasonable abuses of administrative power The currently disclosed two cases investigated by the NDRC re-emphasize the Chinese Governmentrsquos strict scrutiny of antitrust issues in respect of

37 Article 34 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to restrict or reject the participation of operators from other regions in local bidding activities by measures such as prescribing discriminatory qualification requirements or assessment standards or by not publishing information according to law

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 40 of 52

administrative monopoly It reminds the local governments that antitrust compliance is of significant importance

III Private Litigation

A Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen more and more private antitrust litigations

The private antitrust litigation cases have become increasingly complicated especially the issues regarding the intersection areas of IP and antitrust law

Multinational giants and State-Owned Enterprises (the ldquoSOEsrdquo) are increasingly becoming the targets in antitrust civil litigations Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (the ldquoSMEsrdquo) tend to use the antitrust litigation to achieve their commercial goals in the business context

B Significant Cases

Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)38

This is the first-ever private litigation concerning administrative monopoly since the implementation of the AML in 2008

Facts

According to the currently disclosed details the case is relevant for designated trade

The plaintiff Shenzhen Sware Technology Co Ltd (ldquoSwarerdquo) is a software company The press releases suggest that Sware Gloden Software Co Ltd (ldquoGlodenrdquo) and Shanghai Ruban Software Co Ltd (ldquoShanghai Rubanrdquo) are the three main suppliers of construction cost software and possess the major shares of the relevant market An annual provincial vocational ability contest regarding the construction cost hosted by the Guangdong Department of Education (ldquoGuangdong DOE) designated Gloden as the exclusive supplier of the relevant software

After several unsuccessful verbal and written negotiations with Guangdong DOE in April 2014 Sware filed a lawsuit against Guangdong DOE before the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquothe Courtrdquo) alleging that the administrative organ abused its administrative power and violated the AML by designating exclusive software supplier for the contest and claimed a compensation for reasonable expense amounting to CNY 10800 Yuan

The opinions of the Court 38 The story of the case is available at httpfinancesinacomcnchinadfjj20150410074621924997shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 41 of 52

The full text of the judgment has not been disclosed yet In accordance with the information available to the public the Court invoked article 32 of the AML which prohibits an administrative organ from abusing its administrative power to require or in disguised form organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use only the commodities supplied by the entities designated by them The Court concluded that Guangdong DOE failed to prove the legitimacy of the designation and therefore abused its administration power

Currently the case is in appeal before the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court

Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 39

It is the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China

In the first instance ruling Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court ruled against Sinopec holding that the Yunnan branch of Sinopecs trading company was obligated to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its dominance in the sales market of refined oil by refusing to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding without justifiable reasons

In the second instance ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors Currently the case is pending

Facts

The First Trial

The lawsuit was filed before the Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoKunming Courtrdquo) in January 2014 Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy Co Ltd (ldquoYingdingrdquo) a bio-energy manufacturer claimed that Sinopec and the Yunnan branch of Sinopec trading company (ldquoSinopec Yunnan Branchrdquo) had failed to fulfil their obligations stipulated in the Renewable Energy Law and had abused their market dominance in sales market of refined oil by refusing to trade with Yingding without justifiable reasons

Sinopec and Sinopec Yunnan Branch mainly explained four reasons for why they rejected Yingdingrsquos biofuel Firstly Yingding had failed to prove that the biofuel complied with the relevant national standard and was safe to use Secondly Yingding had failed to provide complete trading terms Thirdly the laws and regulations regarding biofuel were incomplete the authorized refined oil sales companies were 39 The details of the case are available at httpnewsxinhuanetcomfortune2014-1217c_1113680039htm httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=9e71db51-6ff6-4d2c-8af6-8eacf023ebdeampKeyWord=E4BA91E58D97E79B88E9BC8E|E4B8ADE79FB3E58C96 httpnewsxinhuanetcomenergy2015-0422c_127721575htm httpwwwnbdcomcnarticles2015-04-23911348html last visited on December 17 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 42 of 52

obligated to purchase biofuel from the biofuel manufacturers if it met certain quality standards but there was a vacancy regarding how to reach the end consumers from the sales companies

On 8 December 2014 the Kunming Intermediate Peoples Court ruled that Sinopec Yunnan Branch bore a legal obligation to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its market dominance in refined oil market by refusing without any justifiable reasons to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding The court ordered Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network within 30 days Both Yingding and Sinopec filed appeals to the Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court

The Appellate Trial

The appeal hearing was held on 22 April 2015 in Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoYunnan Courtrdquo) Sinopec submitted 23 new pieces of evidence and introduced two expert witnesses in a bid to overturn several key elements in the first-instance ruling by Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court

In terms of the determination of the relevant market and the market dominance Sinopec argued that the relevant market in this case was for adipic acid monomethyl ester (ldquoAAMErdquo) the main ingredient of a biofuel additive known as BD100 Yingdingrsquos main product is BD100 which can be blended with fossil diesel to become biofuel In the AAME market Sinopec is a potential buyer instead of a market dominator In support of this argument Sinopec presented an expert witnessmdashGong Jiong a professor of economics at Beijings University of International Business and Economics who testified that AAME should be defined as the relevant product market on the basis of an economic analysis

However Yingding insisted that the first-instance ruling was correct in naming the sales market of refined oil as the relevant market and submitted new evidence an article on Sinopecs website that claimed it had a 67 market share in Yunnan to help establish the claim that Sinopec had market dominance

Another main dispute was whether Yingdingrsquos biofuel product met national standards which would make it mandatory for Sinopec to purchase under Chinas Renewable Energy Law The law stipulates that biofuel producers must sell their products first to an authorized refined oil sales company and the sales companies are obliged to buy the fuel if it meets certain quality standards In order to test the quality Sinopec introduced the second expert witness Lin Jianmin a leading author of Chinarsquos national biofuel standard Lin Jianmin pointed out that there are currently quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology which gives Sinopec a justifiable reason not to trade with Yingding Moreover Sinopec presented some precedents in which consumers had complained about the biofuel quality and also claimed that China didnt have a sound regulatory framework to support biofuel production neither in testing nor in sales

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 43 of 52

Nevertheless to refute this point Yingding referred to an earlier test in co-operation with Sinopec in 2011 where selected buses in Kunming used biofuel blended by Sinopec using BD100 produced by Yingding

On August 13 2015 Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors and now this case is pending In the written appellate ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court did not provide any details regarding its reasoning

Key Issues of the Case

Is there any competition between Yingding and Sinopec

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case the product of Yingding is biofuel while Sinopec does not engage in the business of biofuel From this perspective Yingding and Sinopec are not competitors Thus it is not necessary and not reasonable for Sinopec to eliminate or restrict the competition from Yingding

Relevant Market

The definition of the relevant market is a prerequisite to determine whether competition exists and whether the AML is applicable In accordance with the Judicial Interpretation of Antitrust civil litigation the plaintiff shall take the responsibility to prove the defendantrsquos dominance in the relevant market Also the methods of defining the relevant market are stipulated in the Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition (ldquoGuidelinesrdquo) However both Yingding and Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court defined the relevant market as the sales market of refined oil without sufficient antitrust analysis none of the methods in the Guidelines were used Therefore the definition of the relevant market remains arguable and needs to be sufficiently analysed in the upcoming retrial

Justifiable Reasons

The abuse of market dominance includes the behaviour of refusing to trade without justifiable reasons according to the AML but in the first instance ruling justifiable reasons were not investigated by the court During the appellate trial the expert witness introduced by Sinopec claimed that there were quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology and this was a justifiable reason to refuse to trade with Yingding Even though the first instance court and the appellate court did not reason the justifiable reason it should be discussed and investigated further during the retrial

AML or Renewable Energy Law

The claims of Yingding were based on both the AML and the Renewable Energy Law (ldquoRELrdquo) and the first instance ruling referred to both the AML and the REL as

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 44 of 52

well It seems that the laws the first instance court referred to were comprehensive but in fact the reasoning was not clear and logical In the first instance ruling some disputes regarding the AML were reviewed but all the orders were not based on the AML Specifically the first instance court ordered the Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network based on the REL and dismissed the other claims That the orders were not on account of reasoning is illogical It is anticipated that during the retrial the application of the laws will be clearer

Analysis

A lot of issues have not been clearly analysed by the courts such as the relevant market and the justifiable reasons Since the case is remanded the above-mentioned issues are expected to be resolved in the retrial In addition Yingding was in a disadvantaged position compared to its first instance trial since its claims based on the AML were challenged greatly during the appellate trial In the retrial it is probable that Yingding may switch its litigation strategy and base its claims on the REL Therefore maybe more preparation regarding the REL can give Sinopec a leg up

Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)

Rijing Electric a Chinese distributor seeks CNY 5m compensation

The first hearing was on 9 June 2015 and ended without a ruling

Facts

Rijing Electric (ldquoRijingrdquo) a Shanghai-based company and a former distributor for Panasonic accused Panasonic of abusing its dominance and dividing the market through monopolistic practice in an antitrust lawsuit filed in 2014 with Shanghai No 1 Intermediate Court (ldquoShanghai Courtrdquo) claiming compensation of CNY 5m (USD 815370) Wenzhou Mingda Automation System Co and Shanghai Qingying Automation Equipment as the distributor of Panasonic in China are the co-defendants were accused of conducting monopolistic behaviours by implementing Panasonicrsquos policy

The first hearing for evidence exchange was on June 9 2015 Rijing claimed a policy allegedly introduced by Panasonic in 2009 restricted the competition between distributors Panasonic claims the policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo and has full justifiable reasons It explained that the products in question required customization at considerable cost to distributors before its sale to customers Once carried out however other distributors leaving them open to quote much lower prices than the original distributor could simply and relatively cheap replicate this customization Besides Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and that the plaintiff had failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic said its market share for the four products

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 45 of 52

under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases Also Rijing failed to challenge the policy when it was first introduced instead initially agreeing it was reasonable as e-mail evidence submitted by Panasonic suggests

Key Issues of the Case

Whether Panasonic occupied a market dominant position

It is reported that Rijing claimed that Panasonic had abused its market dominance but Rijing failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and its market share for the four products under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases

Analysis

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case Panasonicrsquos policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo rather than to eliminate or restrict competition

Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals40 (Pending)

It is a battle over patent licensing issues

It is viewed as being among the most complicated antitrust lawsuits in China

The first hearing was on 17 and 18 December 2015

Facts

Four Chinese rare earth companies Ningbo Ketian Magnet Ningbo Permanent Magnetics Ningbo Tongchuang Strong Magnet Material and Ningbo Huahui Magnetic Industry filed antitrust lawsuits against Hitachi Metals over alleged patent licensing issues regarding rare earth magnets on December 11 2014 with the Ningbo Intermediate Peoples Court (ldquoNingbo Courtrdquo) in Zhejiang province As reported four Chinese rare earth companies claimed Hitachi Metals abused its market dominance and hurt the industry competition by refusing to license the patents to them The patents in this case are used in the manufacturing of sintered neodymium iron boron (ldquoNdFeBrdquo) magnets a rare-earth magnet alloy widely used in parts for airplanes automobiles and other products

Hitachi Metals filed a challenge with the Ningbo Court over its jurisdiction in April 2015 After Ningbo Court rejected Hitachi Metals jurisdiction objection on 28 April 2015 Hitachi Metals appealed to the Zhejiang High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoZhejiang

40The details of the story are available at httpwwwzbmagcomnews_viewphpid=80 httpwwwhitachicomcnaboutpress201510-121118_ahtml last visited on December 22 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 46 of 52

Courtrdquo) but Zhejiang Court affirmed the ruling of the Ningbo Court

The first day of a two-day hearing took place on 17 December 2015 during which the two sides cross-examined each otherrsquos evidence The evidence focused on clearing up several key elements in the case including the relevant market whether Hitachi Metals has dominance on that market and whether both sides acted in good faith during the licensing negotiations

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Product Market

The four Chinese rare earth companies claimed that the relevant product market should be the NdFeb-related patent licensing market However Hitachi Metals believed that the physical NdFeb market rather than the patent licensing market should be the relevant product market which is meaningful for assess the real competitive effects on the market

Whether Hitachi Metals occupies a dominant market position

In terms of market dominance Hitachi Metals claimed it does not occupy a dominant position because Hitachi Metalsrsquo patents were not in a standard in this case and there are substitutable technologies in the market SEP holders have the obligation to license on FRAND terms but none-SEP holders do not So while a refusal to license a SEP may constitute abuse of dominance refusal to license a non-SEP mdash even by a patent holder with a dominant position mdash should not be considered as an abuse

Analysis

Hitachi Metals as a patent holder should have the right to decide whether to retain those patents or not or who to license According to the legal theory the purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage and protect innovation by conferring monopoly right mdash that is to give intellectual property owners the proprietary rights which can exclude others from using the intellectual property The SEP holders admittedly need to comply with FRAND terms which can maintain a robust balance between competition and monopoly whereas the further intervention of antitrust law into non-SEP patents may undermine the purpose of intellectual property law To which extent the antitrust law should intervene is yet to be seen

Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei41

A confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the Beijing IP court made by the Beijing High Court

41 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcncpwswbjzscq201511t20151103_12225640htm last visited on December 28 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 47 of 52

Facts

On August 2 2013 the NDRC penalized Abbott for monopolistic price-fixing and then Abbott made a price adjustment in China where the prices of main products were reduced

On December 16 2014 Tian Junwei (ldquoTianrdquo) a Chinese citizen in Beijing sued Carrefour Shuangjing Branch (ldquoCarrefourrdquo) and Abbott (Shanghai) Sales Company (ldquoAbbottrdquo) at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (ldquoIP Courtrdquo) for their monopolistic price-fixing which damaged his interests However Carrefour and Abbott challenged the jurisdiction of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court They claimed there were two reasons Firstly according to the jurisdiction rules of the IP court issued by the Supreme Court the IP court has no jurisdiction over anti-trust cases Secondly if this case is a contractual dispute the court that is in the place of Carrefour should hear it if this case is a tort dispute the Shanghai Intermediate Court should hear it

In the ruling of the IP Court the IP Court decided it has the jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases for the following reasons According to the Provisions On Causes Of Action In Civil Cases issued by Supreme Court (最高人民法院案由规定) antimonopoly dispute is a tertiary cause of action belonging to IP and competition disputes Also according to the Provisions concerning the Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京

市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问题的规定 ) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was an IP and competition dispute and was sued after November 6 2014 Thus the IP Court had jurisdiction

Both Carrefour and Abbott appealed to the Beijing High Court over the jurisdiction ruling but the Beijing High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original ruling Reasons are listed in the written ruling issued on June 18 2015 Firstly the nature of the case was an antimonopoly dispute In accordance with Provisions of the Supreme Peoples Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民

事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) and Civil Litigation Law the monopolistic civil disputes in the first instance shall be under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Peoples Courts and an action involving a contractual dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the peoples court of the place where the defendant is domiciled or where the contract is performed Carrefour as the defendant in this case is domiciled in Chaoyang District Beijing Therefore the courts of Beijing have jurisdiction over this case Secondly according to article 3 of the Notification on the Jurisdiction of Intellectual Property Courts issued by Supreme Court (关于知识产权法院案件管辖

等有关问题的通知) IP courts have jurisdiction over first-instance civil disputes arising from monopolistic practices Lastly according to Provisions concerning the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 31 of 52

Yongzhou Shuangyuan Building Materials Co Ltd as the first one to actively report the monopolistic agreement and cooperate with the enforcement authority was exempted from the punishment

Outlook

It is expected that the AMLrsquos enforcement on monopolistic agreements will continue in the future Industries such as automobile shipping pharmaceuticals insurance etc will still remain the priority of the antitrust enforcement

The antitrust enforcement authorities have published a series of regulations in order to clarify the substantial and procedural issues relevant to the antitrust enforcement However Chinarsquos current antitrust legislation regime is still immature In the following years we expect that more attention will be paid to the legislative improvements

Another remarkable issue for cartel members is that with more Chinese enterprises attaching increasing importance to the AML the follow-on civil damages actions might become a tendency in the future

C Abuse of Market Dominance

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen a decent increase of abuse of market dominance cases both in public enforcement and private litigation Oftentimes the authorities responsible for public enforcement generally find it difficult to pursue investigations against abuse of market dominance cases The following two main reasons are often cited to explain this standoff first it is hard for the authorities to define the relevant markets and prove the undertaking(s)rsquo dominant market position through economic approaches second it is hard to collect evidence regarding abusive practices

The cases related to IPRs abuse are emerging significantly particularly in the telecommunication media and technology (ldquoTMTrdquo) sectors

The SAICrsquos latest refusal-to-deal probe against a local drug maker shows that the SAIC and its local branches have increasingly acquired a profile as an abuse of dominance regulator

Significant Cases

Cases pursued by the SAIC

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 32 of 52

Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case29

Facts

The local authority in Dongfang city reported to the Hainan provincial branch of SAIC on April 23 2014 of the suspected dominance abuse The SAIC authorized its Hainan bureau to officially investigate the matter on 25 July 2014 according to a decision dated January 9 2015 The AIC concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its market dominance by requiring users to pay a deposit without any legal basis and or justifiable reasons

In terms of the relevant product market the local authority found that in this case it was the urban water supply market in Dongfang city and its surrounding townships where Dongfang Water was the sole public operator in the local water supply market with a 100 market share which made all water users completely reliant on the companyrsquos supply In term of market access the local authority found it very unlikely that there were other operators due to the strict regulations

The Hainan SAIC then concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its dominance as it charged users a deposit by threatening to refuse to register users and also by threatening to restrict the water supply Dongfang Waters charging of deposits lacked a legal basis and hadnt received government approval to the detriment of household consumers and business water users and hampered the improvement of management and services of the company Such conduct was in breach of Chinarsquos Anti-Monopoly Law

Hainan AIC levied a fine of CNY 593208 a lighter penalty equivalent to 2 of the companyrsquos annual sales for the previous year and confiscated illicit gains of CNY 38521 for abuse of market dominance

Analysis

It is noteworthy that although handled by a local authority supervised by the SAIC the antitrust agency detailed the relevant market definition the assessment of the dominant market position the abusive practices and the scrutiny of the justifiable reasons

Although the definition of the relevant market and the reasoning of the Hainan provincial AIC and the SAIC are subject to criticism it is still applausive to see that the antitrust regulators have realized the importance of the application of rule of reason in an abuse case In addition through itrsquos a published decision practitioners may observe the regulatorsrsquo reasoning and thus transparency and legal certainty have been generated

29 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzfcfjd201502t20150212_152066html last visited on October 18 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 33 of 52

Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms30

Facts

In June 2013 the Ningxia AIC under authorization of SAIC opened an antitrust investigation into the alleged tie-in sales by the three major state-owned telecommunications operators China Tietong China Unicom and China Telecom for the tie-in sale of fixed-line telephones with broadband Internet services The Ningxia AIC found that the three companies had bundled fixed-line phone services with Internet services to subscribers

During the investigation all three telecommunications companies admitted the tie-in practice had recognized that such practice had improper influence on competition and deprived the choices of consumers The three companies promised to undertake internal rectification timely and eliminate the ill effects resulting from such practice The parties committed to taking the following corrective measures

1) Taking internal rectifications and conducting training to staff about antitrust laws and stop tie-in sales practices

2) Making public commitments to allow subscribers a free choice of services and strengthening the propaganda through the operating room call centre and other channels

3) Unbundling fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

The Ningxia AIC decided to suspend the probe on 14 May 2015 on the grounds that the three companies had actively worked together with the investigators and proposed workable remedy plans

Analysis

In the official announcement Ningxia AIC concluded that the purpose of antitrust enforcement is to restrain monopolistic conducts the protection of competition and to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of consumers Given that during the investigation process the parties had actively cooperated with the investigation formed a more profound understanding of the dangers of tying behaviour and moreover the parties proposed and implemented positive corrective measures to be able to remove the ill impact of their actions the agency believed that the purpose of antitrust law enforcement was fulfilled

It is worth noting that the Ningxia AIC also required the three companies to implement the commitment by August 30 2015and the submission of the written

30 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158908html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158906html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158910html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 34 of 52

implementation report on July 102015 and August 102015 respectively which is another illustration that an effective commitment by the undertakings shall directly deal with the effect that is brought by the monopolistic behaviour In this case the effect of the monopolistic act was restricted to the choice of the consumers therefore the commitment by the undertaking aimed at allowing the freedom of choice and the unbundling of fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company31

Facts

The Liaoning AIC imposed a fine of approximately CNY 433m on the Fushun Branch of Liaoning Tobacco Co on 1 June 2015 The agency also ordered the company to stop its illicit behaviour

The Liaoning AIC received a tip-off that the accused Liaoning Tobacco Corsquos Fushun branch was conducting tie-in sales of non-high-demand cigarette brands with high-demand cigarette brands After gaining authorization from SAIC the agency officially started an investigation regarding the companyrsquos suspected abuse of market dominance in June 2014

Analysis

According to the announcement the tobacco company argued that the tobacco industry is a state controlled or monopolized industry with a lawful monopolistic position therefore the company shall not be subject to the norms of general market competition rules or the anti-monopoly law

In this regards the agency concluded that in terms of the status of the undertaking admittedly the first paragraph of article 17 of the AML says that the State shall protect the lawful business operations of undertakings in these industries with respect to the industries which are under the control of the State-owned economic sector and have a bearing on the lifeline of the national economy or national security and the industries which exercise monopoly over the production and sale of certain commodities according to law However the second paragraph continues to say that the undertakings mentioned above shall do business according to law be honest faithful and strictly self-disciplined and subject themselves to public supervision and they shall not harm the consumers interests by taking advantage of their position of control or their monopolistic production and sale of certain commodities In particular in the preceding paragraph the ldquolawful businessrdquo and ldquoaccording to lawrdquo imply that the AML shall apply in the business operation The agency therefore believes that

31 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201508t20150813_16

0208html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 35 of 52

there shall be no exemption for the undertaking concerned the defences of the undertaking concerned is not established

Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm32

Facts

The Chongqing AIC fined Chongqing Qingyang Pharmaceutical CNY 439308 for alleged dominance abuse

The investigation was initiated when the company contacted the agency for verification on its potential breach of the AML related to an allopurinol active pharmaceuticals ingredient (API) distribution agreement with its exclusive distributor The company provided the relevant agreement and information and the agency conducted an investigation into the company and some other relevant companies

Analysis

Relevant Market

During the investigation the agency found that pharmaceutical ingredients are a special commodity the API is used to produce the preparations The chemical API is only used for the production of the preparation and could be used as a medicine for clinic use

The preparation is produced according to the requirements of certain form of prepared drugs and for the purpose of treatment and prevention which can be used as medicine

The allopurinol is used for the common treatment of hyperuricemia However the other treatments are different in pharmacological effects or treatment effects as well as in the cost for the patient Furthermore the company is the only manufacturer and supplier in the market nationwide since July 2012 Therefore the agency concluded that the relevant market is the allopurinol API market

Considering that the qualification for manufacturing the allopurinol API is national wide and the normal practice for purchasers and suppliers is domestic the relevant geographic market is the Chinese market

The Market Dominance

During the investigation the agency found that the company is the only supplier and manufacturer of allopurinol API in China there is no other competitor in the

32 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151222_16

5152html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 36 of 52

market and the company has a monopoly in the market The evidence shows that the company has the ability to control the prices the position for the downstream is relatively weak

With respect to the market entry the agency found that the market entry is relatively high in addition other undertakings are dependent on the company Thus the agency believed the company to have market dominance

Refusal to Deal

The agency found that on September 25 2015 the company reached an exclusive agreement and distribution agreement with its distributor Based on these agreements the company didnrsquot supply allopurinol API to the said distributor and other companies despite the fact that those companies requested for allopurinol API but were turned down by the company

Absence of Reasonable Cause

The agency found that the companyrsquos refusal to deal was not in line with the needs of normal business operation or economic efficiency On the other hand the refusal to deal was aimed at increasing the market share of the allopurinol drug product Also the agency found that the stop of supply was a manipulation of market power as to maximize the profit to the most The agency further found that the exclusive distribution agreement with suspension of supply for six months and the refusal to supply was to eliminate and restrict the competition as to gain the monopolistic profit

The Consequence of Refusal to Deal

The agency concluded that the refusal to deal harmed the competition of the allopurinol preparations market Because of the suspension of supply many demanders had to reduce their production or switch to the supply of other products or stop their production The suspension of supply affected the competition of the downstream market Consequently the raising of the price of allopurinol API also raised the cost for other manufacturers of allopurinol preparations

Furthermore the refusal to deal led to capacity loss of the allopurinol preparation industry

Ultimately the refusal to deal increased the burden on consumers as the refusal to supply changed the supply-demand relationship in the market

The agency concluded that the Company abused its dominant position in the allopurinol API market by refusing to deal with intended buyers in the period between October 2013 and March 2014Therefore the Company violated article 17 (1) of the AML which prohibits business operators with a dominant market position from abusing that position such as the refusal to deal without any justifications

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 37 of 52

D Administrative Monopoly

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 witnessed antitrust authoritiesrsquo significant efforts regarding the enforcement against administrative monopoly According to Mr Dong Zhiming the deputy director general of Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly Bureau ever since the AML coming into force six cases in connection with administrative monopoly were investigated by NDRC and among them five cases were handled in the year of 2015 These cases touched abuses of administrative power in terms of designative deal in relation to transportation communication and pharmaceutical industries

The first private litigation related to administrative monopolistic acts was heard in the court which is a milestone case in the enforcement of the AML

Significant Cases

Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC33

Facts

In March 2015 the NDRC released the official letter to Shandong Provincial Department of Transportation (ldquoShandong DOTrdquo) on its website with respect to correct its abuse of administrative power to exclude and restrict competition

During the investigation the NDRC found that since 2011 Shandong DOT had issued multiple relevant government orders in order to require certain types of vehicles to be directly connected to two designated information and service platforms both of which are operated and technically supported by one company namely Shandong Jiutong Internet of Things Technology Co Ltd (ldquoJiutong ITTrdquo) Furthermore according to the orders issued by the competent administrative department all the vehicle satellite positioning terminals entering into Shandong provincial market should be debugged through the said technology service platform which is operated by the mentioned company In addition Shandong DOT released the cap prices of vehicle satellite positioning terminals which is identical to the 2012 bid-winning price in the Ministry of Transportation demonstration project

The NDRC believed that Shandong DOTrsquos behaviour eliminated and restricted the competition in the monitoring platform market and the vehicle terminal market deprived the right of transportation enterprises to choose vehicle terminals and monitoring platform on their owns unreasonably raised the sales prices of vehicle terminals and service fees charged by the platform and increased the costs of transportation enterprises Therefore the antitrust agency concluded that Shandong

33 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201503t20150327_668911html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

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DOT violated article 8 of the AML which stipulates that ldquoadministrative organs and the public organizations with an administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude and restrict competitionrdquo Specifically Shandong DOT violated article 3234 in terms of requiring organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any designated operators and violated article 3735 in terms of setting rules with contents which eliminate and restrict competition

Based on article 51 of the AML ldquoWhere administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations abuse administrative powers performing activities which exclude and restrict competition the superior entity shall order it to correct impose administrative penalty on the chief officer and other staffs directly responsible pursuant to the laws The AML enforcement authority may give recommendations on disposal of activities to the relevant superior entityrdquo the NDRC proposed in writing that the Shandong provincial government should order Shandong DOT to rectify its behaviour with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Entirely open up the monitoring platform market by permitting transportation undertakings to freely choose any approved platform

2) Loosen the restrictions on the entry into Shandong vehicle terminals permit the undertakings to independently select the supplier of vehicle terminals and allow the qualified terminals to be connected to the relevant monitoring platform and

3) Revoke the official documentation relevant to the cap price of vehicle terminals in order to promote the price competition

Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 36

Facts

On 26 August 2015 the NDRC published its second decision with regard to the rectification of administrative monopoly since the beginning of this year According to the proposal letter sent to Anhui Provincial Government the investigation against the Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City (Bengbu HFPC) was trigged by third partiesrsquo complaints

34 Article 32 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to require organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any operators designated by them 35 Article 37 of the AML Administrative organs shall not abuse their administrative powers to set rules with contents which eliminate restrict competition 36 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201508t20150826_748682html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 39 of 52

The investigation suggests that Bengbu HFPC published three notices with regard to drugs procurement in April and May of this year

In the No C-2015-CG-X-111 Notice (ldquoNo111 Noticerdquo) released on 10 April2015 the health authority not only provided the dosage form and qualification of the requested drugs but also directly determined the suppliers of relevant drugs which eliminated and restricted the competition among pharmaceutical manufacturers and therefore violated articles 32 and 37 of the AML

In the No C-2015-CG-C-112 Notice (ldquoNo112 Noticerdquo) and No C-2015-CG-C-168 (ldquoNo 168 Noticerdquo) respectively released on 10 April and 22 May 2015 the Bengbu HFPC set discriminative qualification requirements on non-local undertakings in order to restrict their participation in the relevant bidding For instance in accordance with No 112 Notice to be a qualified bidder the turnover of non-local undertakings shall exceed CNY 2 billion which is 50 times as much as the turnover requirements of the local undertakings In the NDRCrsquos opinion the administrative monopoly activities conducted by the local health agency excluded the relevant undertakings from the market maintained the virtual-high prices of drugs and therefore violated articles 3237 and 37 of the AML

The NDRC suggested in a letter that Anhui Provincial Government should urge the Bengbu HFPC to rectify the abuse of monopoly powers with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Stop setting distinguishing restrictions on qualification requirements review standards and numbers of winning bidders as for local and non-local undertakings

2) Stop designating the suppliers of competitive drugs and

3) Take necessary measures to mitigate the negative effects resulting from the previous illegal monopolistic abuses

Outlook

At the beginning of the year the former director general of the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau under the NDRC Xu Kunlin stated that the agency would strengthen antitrust enforcement on abuse of administrative power in 2015

Since then the NDRC has made great efforts to rectify unreasonable abuses of administrative power The currently disclosed two cases investigated by the NDRC re-emphasize the Chinese Governmentrsquos strict scrutiny of antitrust issues in respect of

37 Article 34 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to restrict or reject the participation of operators from other regions in local bidding activities by measures such as prescribing discriminatory qualification requirements or assessment standards or by not publishing information according to law

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 40 of 52

administrative monopoly It reminds the local governments that antitrust compliance is of significant importance

III Private Litigation

A Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen more and more private antitrust litigations

The private antitrust litigation cases have become increasingly complicated especially the issues regarding the intersection areas of IP and antitrust law

Multinational giants and State-Owned Enterprises (the ldquoSOEsrdquo) are increasingly becoming the targets in antitrust civil litigations Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (the ldquoSMEsrdquo) tend to use the antitrust litigation to achieve their commercial goals in the business context

B Significant Cases

Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)38

This is the first-ever private litigation concerning administrative monopoly since the implementation of the AML in 2008

Facts

According to the currently disclosed details the case is relevant for designated trade

The plaintiff Shenzhen Sware Technology Co Ltd (ldquoSwarerdquo) is a software company The press releases suggest that Sware Gloden Software Co Ltd (ldquoGlodenrdquo) and Shanghai Ruban Software Co Ltd (ldquoShanghai Rubanrdquo) are the three main suppliers of construction cost software and possess the major shares of the relevant market An annual provincial vocational ability contest regarding the construction cost hosted by the Guangdong Department of Education (ldquoGuangdong DOE) designated Gloden as the exclusive supplier of the relevant software

After several unsuccessful verbal and written negotiations with Guangdong DOE in April 2014 Sware filed a lawsuit against Guangdong DOE before the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquothe Courtrdquo) alleging that the administrative organ abused its administrative power and violated the AML by designating exclusive software supplier for the contest and claimed a compensation for reasonable expense amounting to CNY 10800 Yuan

The opinions of the Court 38 The story of the case is available at httpfinancesinacomcnchinadfjj20150410074621924997shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 41 of 52

The full text of the judgment has not been disclosed yet In accordance with the information available to the public the Court invoked article 32 of the AML which prohibits an administrative organ from abusing its administrative power to require or in disguised form organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use only the commodities supplied by the entities designated by them The Court concluded that Guangdong DOE failed to prove the legitimacy of the designation and therefore abused its administration power

Currently the case is in appeal before the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court

Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 39

It is the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China

In the first instance ruling Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court ruled against Sinopec holding that the Yunnan branch of Sinopecs trading company was obligated to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its dominance in the sales market of refined oil by refusing to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding without justifiable reasons

In the second instance ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors Currently the case is pending

Facts

The First Trial

The lawsuit was filed before the Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoKunming Courtrdquo) in January 2014 Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy Co Ltd (ldquoYingdingrdquo) a bio-energy manufacturer claimed that Sinopec and the Yunnan branch of Sinopec trading company (ldquoSinopec Yunnan Branchrdquo) had failed to fulfil their obligations stipulated in the Renewable Energy Law and had abused their market dominance in sales market of refined oil by refusing to trade with Yingding without justifiable reasons

Sinopec and Sinopec Yunnan Branch mainly explained four reasons for why they rejected Yingdingrsquos biofuel Firstly Yingding had failed to prove that the biofuel complied with the relevant national standard and was safe to use Secondly Yingding had failed to provide complete trading terms Thirdly the laws and regulations regarding biofuel were incomplete the authorized refined oil sales companies were 39 The details of the case are available at httpnewsxinhuanetcomfortune2014-1217c_1113680039htm httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=9e71db51-6ff6-4d2c-8af6-8eacf023ebdeampKeyWord=E4BA91E58D97E79B88E9BC8E|E4B8ADE79FB3E58C96 httpnewsxinhuanetcomenergy2015-0422c_127721575htm httpwwwnbdcomcnarticles2015-04-23911348html last visited on December 17 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 42 of 52

obligated to purchase biofuel from the biofuel manufacturers if it met certain quality standards but there was a vacancy regarding how to reach the end consumers from the sales companies

On 8 December 2014 the Kunming Intermediate Peoples Court ruled that Sinopec Yunnan Branch bore a legal obligation to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its market dominance in refined oil market by refusing without any justifiable reasons to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding The court ordered Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network within 30 days Both Yingding and Sinopec filed appeals to the Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court

The Appellate Trial

The appeal hearing was held on 22 April 2015 in Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoYunnan Courtrdquo) Sinopec submitted 23 new pieces of evidence and introduced two expert witnesses in a bid to overturn several key elements in the first-instance ruling by Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court

In terms of the determination of the relevant market and the market dominance Sinopec argued that the relevant market in this case was for adipic acid monomethyl ester (ldquoAAMErdquo) the main ingredient of a biofuel additive known as BD100 Yingdingrsquos main product is BD100 which can be blended with fossil diesel to become biofuel In the AAME market Sinopec is a potential buyer instead of a market dominator In support of this argument Sinopec presented an expert witnessmdashGong Jiong a professor of economics at Beijings University of International Business and Economics who testified that AAME should be defined as the relevant product market on the basis of an economic analysis

However Yingding insisted that the first-instance ruling was correct in naming the sales market of refined oil as the relevant market and submitted new evidence an article on Sinopecs website that claimed it had a 67 market share in Yunnan to help establish the claim that Sinopec had market dominance

Another main dispute was whether Yingdingrsquos biofuel product met national standards which would make it mandatory for Sinopec to purchase under Chinas Renewable Energy Law The law stipulates that biofuel producers must sell their products first to an authorized refined oil sales company and the sales companies are obliged to buy the fuel if it meets certain quality standards In order to test the quality Sinopec introduced the second expert witness Lin Jianmin a leading author of Chinarsquos national biofuel standard Lin Jianmin pointed out that there are currently quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology which gives Sinopec a justifiable reason not to trade with Yingding Moreover Sinopec presented some precedents in which consumers had complained about the biofuel quality and also claimed that China didnt have a sound regulatory framework to support biofuel production neither in testing nor in sales

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 43 of 52

Nevertheless to refute this point Yingding referred to an earlier test in co-operation with Sinopec in 2011 where selected buses in Kunming used biofuel blended by Sinopec using BD100 produced by Yingding

On August 13 2015 Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors and now this case is pending In the written appellate ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court did not provide any details regarding its reasoning

Key Issues of the Case

Is there any competition between Yingding and Sinopec

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case the product of Yingding is biofuel while Sinopec does not engage in the business of biofuel From this perspective Yingding and Sinopec are not competitors Thus it is not necessary and not reasonable for Sinopec to eliminate or restrict the competition from Yingding

Relevant Market

The definition of the relevant market is a prerequisite to determine whether competition exists and whether the AML is applicable In accordance with the Judicial Interpretation of Antitrust civil litigation the plaintiff shall take the responsibility to prove the defendantrsquos dominance in the relevant market Also the methods of defining the relevant market are stipulated in the Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition (ldquoGuidelinesrdquo) However both Yingding and Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court defined the relevant market as the sales market of refined oil without sufficient antitrust analysis none of the methods in the Guidelines were used Therefore the definition of the relevant market remains arguable and needs to be sufficiently analysed in the upcoming retrial

Justifiable Reasons

The abuse of market dominance includes the behaviour of refusing to trade without justifiable reasons according to the AML but in the first instance ruling justifiable reasons were not investigated by the court During the appellate trial the expert witness introduced by Sinopec claimed that there were quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology and this was a justifiable reason to refuse to trade with Yingding Even though the first instance court and the appellate court did not reason the justifiable reason it should be discussed and investigated further during the retrial

AML or Renewable Energy Law

The claims of Yingding were based on both the AML and the Renewable Energy Law (ldquoRELrdquo) and the first instance ruling referred to both the AML and the REL as

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 44 of 52

well It seems that the laws the first instance court referred to were comprehensive but in fact the reasoning was not clear and logical In the first instance ruling some disputes regarding the AML were reviewed but all the orders were not based on the AML Specifically the first instance court ordered the Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network based on the REL and dismissed the other claims That the orders were not on account of reasoning is illogical It is anticipated that during the retrial the application of the laws will be clearer

Analysis

A lot of issues have not been clearly analysed by the courts such as the relevant market and the justifiable reasons Since the case is remanded the above-mentioned issues are expected to be resolved in the retrial In addition Yingding was in a disadvantaged position compared to its first instance trial since its claims based on the AML were challenged greatly during the appellate trial In the retrial it is probable that Yingding may switch its litigation strategy and base its claims on the REL Therefore maybe more preparation regarding the REL can give Sinopec a leg up

Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)

Rijing Electric a Chinese distributor seeks CNY 5m compensation

The first hearing was on 9 June 2015 and ended without a ruling

Facts

Rijing Electric (ldquoRijingrdquo) a Shanghai-based company and a former distributor for Panasonic accused Panasonic of abusing its dominance and dividing the market through monopolistic practice in an antitrust lawsuit filed in 2014 with Shanghai No 1 Intermediate Court (ldquoShanghai Courtrdquo) claiming compensation of CNY 5m (USD 815370) Wenzhou Mingda Automation System Co and Shanghai Qingying Automation Equipment as the distributor of Panasonic in China are the co-defendants were accused of conducting monopolistic behaviours by implementing Panasonicrsquos policy

The first hearing for evidence exchange was on June 9 2015 Rijing claimed a policy allegedly introduced by Panasonic in 2009 restricted the competition between distributors Panasonic claims the policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo and has full justifiable reasons It explained that the products in question required customization at considerable cost to distributors before its sale to customers Once carried out however other distributors leaving them open to quote much lower prices than the original distributor could simply and relatively cheap replicate this customization Besides Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and that the plaintiff had failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic said its market share for the four products

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 45 of 52

under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases Also Rijing failed to challenge the policy when it was first introduced instead initially agreeing it was reasonable as e-mail evidence submitted by Panasonic suggests

Key Issues of the Case

Whether Panasonic occupied a market dominant position

It is reported that Rijing claimed that Panasonic had abused its market dominance but Rijing failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and its market share for the four products under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases

Analysis

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case Panasonicrsquos policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo rather than to eliminate or restrict competition

Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals40 (Pending)

It is a battle over patent licensing issues

It is viewed as being among the most complicated antitrust lawsuits in China

The first hearing was on 17 and 18 December 2015

Facts

Four Chinese rare earth companies Ningbo Ketian Magnet Ningbo Permanent Magnetics Ningbo Tongchuang Strong Magnet Material and Ningbo Huahui Magnetic Industry filed antitrust lawsuits against Hitachi Metals over alleged patent licensing issues regarding rare earth magnets on December 11 2014 with the Ningbo Intermediate Peoples Court (ldquoNingbo Courtrdquo) in Zhejiang province As reported four Chinese rare earth companies claimed Hitachi Metals abused its market dominance and hurt the industry competition by refusing to license the patents to them The patents in this case are used in the manufacturing of sintered neodymium iron boron (ldquoNdFeBrdquo) magnets a rare-earth magnet alloy widely used in parts for airplanes automobiles and other products

Hitachi Metals filed a challenge with the Ningbo Court over its jurisdiction in April 2015 After Ningbo Court rejected Hitachi Metals jurisdiction objection on 28 April 2015 Hitachi Metals appealed to the Zhejiang High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoZhejiang

40The details of the story are available at httpwwwzbmagcomnews_viewphpid=80 httpwwwhitachicomcnaboutpress201510-121118_ahtml last visited on December 22 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 46 of 52

Courtrdquo) but Zhejiang Court affirmed the ruling of the Ningbo Court

The first day of a two-day hearing took place on 17 December 2015 during which the two sides cross-examined each otherrsquos evidence The evidence focused on clearing up several key elements in the case including the relevant market whether Hitachi Metals has dominance on that market and whether both sides acted in good faith during the licensing negotiations

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Product Market

The four Chinese rare earth companies claimed that the relevant product market should be the NdFeb-related patent licensing market However Hitachi Metals believed that the physical NdFeb market rather than the patent licensing market should be the relevant product market which is meaningful for assess the real competitive effects on the market

Whether Hitachi Metals occupies a dominant market position

In terms of market dominance Hitachi Metals claimed it does not occupy a dominant position because Hitachi Metalsrsquo patents were not in a standard in this case and there are substitutable technologies in the market SEP holders have the obligation to license on FRAND terms but none-SEP holders do not So while a refusal to license a SEP may constitute abuse of dominance refusal to license a non-SEP mdash even by a patent holder with a dominant position mdash should not be considered as an abuse

Analysis

Hitachi Metals as a patent holder should have the right to decide whether to retain those patents or not or who to license According to the legal theory the purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage and protect innovation by conferring monopoly right mdash that is to give intellectual property owners the proprietary rights which can exclude others from using the intellectual property The SEP holders admittedly need to comply with FRAND terms which can maintain a robust balance between competition and monopoly whereas the further intervention of antitrust law into non-SEP patents may undermine the purpose of intellectual property law To which extent the antitrust law should intervene is yet to be seen

Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei41

A confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the Beijing IP court made by the Beijing High Court

41 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcncpwswbjzscq201511t20151103_12225640htm last visited on December 28 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 47 of 52

Facts

On August 2 2013 the NDRC penalized Abbott for monopolistic price-fixing and then Abbott made a price adjustment in China where the prices of main products were reduced

On December 16 2014 Tian Junwei (ldquoTianrdquo) a Chinese citizen in Beijing sued Carrefour Shuangjing Branch (ldquoCarrefourrdquo) and Abbott (Shanghai) Sales Company (ldquoAbbottrdquo) at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (ldquoIP Courtrdquo) for their monopolistic price-fixing which damaged his interests However Carrefour and Abbott challenged the jurisdiction of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court They claimed there were two reasons Firstly according to the jurisdiction rules of the IP court issued by the Supreme Court the IP court has no jurisdiction over anti-trust cases Secondly if this case is a contractual dispute the court that is in the place of Carrefour should hear it if this case is a tort dispute the Shanghai Intermediate Court should hear it

In the ruling of the IP Court the IP Court decided it has the jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases for the following reasons According to the Provisions On Causes Of Action In Civil Cases issued by Supreme Court (最高人民法院案由规定) antimonopoly dispute is a tertiary cause of action belonging to IP and competition disputes Also according to the Provisions concerning the Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京

市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问题的规定 ) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was an IP and competition dispute and was sued after November 6 2014 Thus the IP Court had jurisdiction

Both Carrefour and Abbott appealed to the Beijing High Court over the jurisdiction ruling but the Beijing High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original ruling Reasons are listed in the written ruling issued on June 18 2015 Firstly the nature of the case was an antimonopoly dispute In accordance with Provisions of the Supreme Peoples Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民

事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) and Civil Litigation Law the monopolistic civil disputes in the first instance shall be under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Peoples Courts and an action involving a contractual dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the peoples court of the place where the defendant is domiciled or where the contract is performed Carrefour as the defendant in this case is domiciled in Chaoyang District Beijing Therefore the courts of Beijing have jurisdiction over this case Secondly according to article 3 of the Notification on the Jurisdiction of Intellectual Property Courts issued by Supreme Court (关于知识产权法院案件管辖

等有关问题的通知) IP courts have jurisdiction over first-instance civil disputes arising from monopolistic practices Lastly according to Provisions concerning the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 32 of 52

Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case29

Facts

The local authority in Dongfang city reported to the Hainan provincial branch of SAIC on April 23 2014 of the suspected dominance abuse The SAIC authorized its Hainan bureau to officially investigate the matter on 25 July 2014 according to a decision dated January 9 2015 The AIC concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its market dominance by requiring users to pay a deposit without any legal basis and or justifiable reasons

In terms of the relevant product market the local authority found that in this case it was the urban water supply market in Dongfang city and its surrounding townships where Dongfang Water was the sole public operator in the local water supply market with a 100 market share which made all water users completely reliant on the companyrsquos supply In term of market access the local authority found it very unlikely that there were other operators due to the strict regulations

The Hainan SAIC then concluded that Dongfang Water had abused its dominance as it charged users a deposit by threatening to refuse to register users and also by threatening to restrict the water supply Dongfang Waters charging of deposits lacked a legal basis and hadnt received government approval to the detriment of household consumers and business water users and hampered the improvement of management and services of the company Such conduct was in breach of Chinarsquos Anti-Monopoly Law

Hainan AIC levied a fine of CNY 593208 a lighter penalty equivalent to 2 of the companyrsquos annual sales for the previous year and confiscated illicit gains of CNY 38521 for abuse of market dominance

Analysis

It is noteworthy that although handled by a local authority supervised by the SAIC the antitrust agency detailed the relevant market definition the assessment of the dominant market position the abusive practices and the scrutiny of the justifiable reasons

Although the definition of the relevant market and the reasoning of the Hainan provincial AIC and the SAIC are subject to criticism it is still applausive to see that the antitrust regulators have realized the importance of the application of rule of reason in an abuse case In addition through itrsquos a published decision practitioners may observe the regulatorsrsquo reasoning and thus transparency and legal certainty have been generated

29 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzfcfjd201502t20150212_152066html last visited on October 18 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 33 of 52

Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms30

Facts

In June 2013 the Ningxia AIC under authorization of SAIC opened an antitrust investigation into the alleged tie-in sales by the three major state-owned telecommunications operators China Tietong China Unicom and China Telecom for the tie-in sale of fixed-line telephones with broadband Internet services The Ningxia AIC found that the three companies had bundled fixed-line phone services with Internet services to subscribers

During the investigation all three telecommunications companies admitted the tie-in practice had recognized that such practice had improper influence on competition and deprived the choices of consumers The three companies promised to undertake internal rectification timely and eliminate the ill effects resulting from such practice The parties committed to taking the following corrective measures

1) Taking internal rectifications and conducting training to staff about antitrust laws and stop tie-in sales practices

2) Making public commitments to allow subscribers a free choice of services and strengthening the propaganda through the operating room call centre and other channels

3) Unbundling fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

The Ningxia AIC decided to suspend the probe on 14 May 2015 on the grounds that the three companies had actively worked together with the investigators and proposed workable remedy plans

Analysis

In the official announcement Ningxia AIC concluded that the purpose of antitrust enforcement is to restrain monopolistic conducts the protection of competition and to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of consumers Given that during the investigation process the parties had actively cooperated with the investigation formed a more profound understanding of the dangers of tying behaviour and moreover the parties proposed and implemented positive corrective measures to be able to remove the ill impact of their actions the agency believed that the purpose of antitrust law enforcement was fulfilled

It is worth noting that the Ningxia AIC also required the three companies to implement the commitment by August 30 2015and the submission of the written

30 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158908html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158906html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158910html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 34 of 52

implementation report on July 102015 and August 102015 respectively which is another illustration that an effective commitment by the undertakings shall directly deal with the effect that is brought by the monopolistic behaviour In this case the effect of the monopolistic act was restricted to the choice of the consumers therefore the commitment by the undertaking aimed at allowing the freedom of choice and the unbundling of fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company31

Facts

The Liaoning AIC imposed a fine of approximately CNY 433m on the Fushun Branch of Liaoning Tobacco Co on 1 June 2015 The agency also ordered the company to stop its illicit behaviour

The Liaoning AIC received a tip-off that the accused Liaoning Tobacco Corsquos Fushun branch was conducting tie-in sales of non-high-demand cigarette brands with high-demand cigarette brands After gaining authorization from SAIC the agency officially started an investigation regarding the companyrsquos suspected abuse of market dominance in June 2014

Analysis

According to the announcement the tobacco company argued that the tobacco industry is a state controlled or monopolized industry with a lawful monopolistic position therefore the company shall not be subject to the norms of general market competition rules or the anti-monopoly law

In this regards the agency concluded that in terms of the status of the undertaking admittedly the first paragraph of article 17 of the AML says that the State shall protect the lawful business operations of undertakings in these industries with respect to the industries which are under the control of the State-owned economic sector and have a bearing on the lifeline of the national economy or national security and the industries which exercise monopoly over the production and sale of certain commodities according to law However the second paragraph continues to say that the undertakings mentioned above shall do business according to law be honest faithful and strictly self-disciplined and subject themselves to public supervision and they shall not harm the consumers interests by taking advantage of their position of control or their monopolistic production and sale of certain commodities In particular in the preceding paragraph the ldquolawful businessrdquo and ldquoaccording to lawrdquo imply that the AML shall apply in the business operation The agency therefore believes that

31 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201508t20150813_16

0208html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 35 of 52

there shall be no exemption for the undertaking concerned the defences of the undertaking concerned is not established

Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm32

Facts

The Chongqing AIC fined Chongqing Qingyang Pharmaceutical CNY 439308 for alleged dominance abuse

The investigation was initiated when the company contacted the agency for verification on its potential breach of the AML related to an allopurinol active pharmaceuticals ingredient (API) distribution agreement with its exclusive distributor The company provided the relevant agreement and information and the agency conducted an investigation into the company and some other relevant companies

Analysis

Relevant Market

During the investigation the agency found that pharmaceutical ingredients are a special commodity the API is used to produce the preparations The chemical API is only used for the production of the preparation and could be used as a medicine for clinic use

The preparation is produced according to the requirements of certain form of prepared drugs and for the purpose of treatment and prevention which can be used as medicine

The allopurinol is used for the common treatment of hyperuricemia However the other treatments are different in pharmacological effects or treatment effects as well as in the cost for the patient Furthermore the company is the only manufacturer and supplier in the market nationwide since July 2012 Therefore the agency concluded that the relevant market is the allopurinol API market

Considering that the qualification for manufacturing the allopurinol API is national wide and the normal practice for purchasers and suppliers is domestic the relevant geographic market is the Chinese market

The Market Dominance

During the investigation the agency found that the company is the only supplier and manufacturer of allopurinol API in China there is no other competitor in the

32 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151222_16

5152html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 36 of 52

market and the company has a monopoly in the market The evidence shows that the company has the ability to control the prices the position for the downstream is relatively weak

With respect to the market entry the agency found that the market entry is relatively high in addition other undertakings are dependent on the company Thus the agency believed the company to have market dominance

Refusal to Deal

The agency found that on September 25 2015 the company reached an exclusive agreement and distribution agreement with its distributor Based on these agreements the company didnrsquot supply allopurinol API to the said distributor and other companies despite the fact that those companies requested for allopurinol API but were turned down by the company

Absence of Reasonable Cause

The agency found that the companyrsquos refusal to deal was not in line with the needs of normal business operation or economic efficiency On the other hand the refusal to deal was aimed at increasing the market share of the allopurinol drug product Also the agency found that the stop of supply was a manipulation of market power as to maximize the profit to the most The agency further found that the exclusive distribution agreement with suspension of supply for six months and the refusal to supply was to eliminate and restrict the competition as to gain the monopolistic profit

The Consequence of Refusal to Deal

The agency concluded that the refusal to deal harmed the competition of the allopurinol preparations market Because of the suspension of supply many demanders had to reduce their production or switch to the supply of other products or stop their production The suspension of supply affected the competition of the downstream market Consequently the raising of the price of allopurinol API also raised the cost for other manufacturers of allopurinol preparations

Furthermore the refusal to deal led to capacity loss of the allopurinol preparation industry

Ultimately the refusal to deal increased the burden on consumers as the refusal to supply changed the supply-demand relationship in the market

The agency concluded that the Company abused its dominant position in the allopurinol API market by refusing to deal with intended buyers in the period between October 2013 and March 2014Therefore the Company violated article 17 (1) of the AML which prohibits business operators with a dominant market position from abusing that position such as the refusal to deal without any justifications

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 37 of 52

D Administrative Monopoly

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 witnessed antitrust authoritiesrsquo significant efforts regarding the enforcement against administrative monopoly According to Mr Dong Zhiming the deputy director general of Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly Bureau ever since the AML coming into force six cases in connection with administrative monopoly were investigated by NDRC and among them five cases were handled in the year of 2015 These cases touched abuses of administrative power in terms of designative deal in relation to transportation communication and pharmaceutical industries

The first private litigation related to administrative monopolistic acts was heard in the court which is a milestone case in the enforcement of the AML

Significant Cases

Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC33

Facts

In March 2015 the NDRC released the official letter to Shandong Provincial Department of Transportation (ldquoShandong DOTrdquo) on its website with respect to correct its abuse of administrative power to exclude and restrict competition

During the investigation the NDRC found that since 2011 Shandong DOT had issued multiple relevant government orders in order to require certain types of vehicles to be directly connected to two designated information and service platforms both of which are operated and technically supported by one company namely Shandong Jiutong Internet of Things Technology Co Ltd (ldquoJiutong ITTrdquo) Furthermore according to the orders issued by the competent administrative department all the vehicle satellite positioning terminals entering into Shandong provincial market should be debugged through the said technology service platform which is operated by the mentioned company In addition Shandong DOT released the cap prices of vehicle satellite positioning terminals which is identical to the 2012 bid-winning price in the Ministry of Transportation demonstration project

The NDRC believed that Shandong DOTrsquos behaviour eliminated and restricted the competition in the monitoring platform market and the vehicle terminal market deprived the right of transportation enterprises to choose vehicle terminals and monitoring platform on their owns unreasonably raised the sales prices of vehicle terminals and service fees charged by the platform and increased the costs of transportation enterprises Therefore the antitrust agency concluded that Shandong

33 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201503t20150327_668911html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 38 of 52

DOT violated article 8 of the AML which stipulates that ldquoadministrative organs and the public organizations with an administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude and restrict competitionrdquo Specifically Shandong DOT violated article 3234 in terms of requiring organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any designated operators and violated article 3735 in terms of setting rules with contents which eliminate and restrict competition

Based on article 51 of the AML ldquoWhere administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations abuse administrative powers performing activities which exclude and restrict competition the superior entity shall order it to correct impose administrative penalty on the chief officer and other staffs directly responsible pursuant to the laws The AML enforcement authority may give recommendations on disposal of activities to the relevant superior entityrdquo the NDRC proposed in writing that the Shandong provincial government should order Shandong DOT to rectify its behaviour with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Entirely open up the monitoring platform market by permitting transportation undertakings to freely choose any approved platform

2) Loosen the restrictions on the entry into Shandong vehicle terminals permit the undertakings to independently select the supplier of vehicle terminals and allow the qualified terminals to be connected to the relevant monitoring platform and

3) Revoke the official documentation relevant to the cap price of vehicle terminals in order to promote the price competition

Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 36

Facts

On 26 August 2015 the NDRC published its second decision with regard to the rectification of administrative monopoly since the beginning of this year According to the proposal letter sent to Anhui Provincial Government the investigation against the Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City (Bengbu HFPC) was trigged by third partiesrsquo complaints

34 Article 32 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to require organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any operators designated by them 35 Article 37 of the AML Administrative organs shall not abuse their administrative powers to set rules with contents which eliminate restrict competition 36 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201508t20150826_748682html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 39 of 52

The investigation suggests that Bengbu HFPC published three notices with regard to drugs procurement in April and May of this year

In the No C-2015-CG-X-111 Notice (ldquoNo111 Noticerdquo) released on 10 April2015 the health authority not only provided the dosage form and qualification of the requested drugs but also directly determined the suppliers of relevant drugs which eliminated and restricted the competition among pharmaceutical manufacturers and therefore violated articles 32 and 37 of the AML

In the No C-2015-CG-C-112 Notice (ldquoNo112 Noticerdquo) and No C-2015-CG-C-168 (ldquoNo 168 Noticerdquo) respectively released on 10 April and 22 May 2015 the Bengbu HFPC set discriminative qualification requirements on non-local undertakings in order to restrict their participation in the relevant bidding For instance in accordance with No 112 Notice to be a qualified bidder the turnover of non-local undertakings shall exceed CNY 2 billion which is 50 times as much as the turnover requirements of the local undertakings In the NDRCrsquos opinion the administrative monopoly activities conducted by the local health agency excluded the relevant undertakings from the market maintained the virtual-high prices of drugs and therefore violated articles 3237 and 37 of the AML

The NDRC suggested in a letter that Anhui Provincial Government should urge the Bengbu HFPC to rectify the abuse of monopoly powers with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Stop setting distinguishing restrictions on qualification requirements review standards and numbers of winning bidders as for local and non-local undertakings

2) Stop designating the suppliers of competitive drugs and

3) Take necessary measures to mitigate the negative effects resulting from the previous illegal monopolistic abuses

Outlook

At the beginning of the year the former director general of the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau under the NDRC Xu Kunlin stated that the agency would strengthen antitrust enforcement on abuse of administrative power in 2015

Since then the NDRC has made great efforts to rectify unreasonable abuses of administrative power The currently disclosed two cases investigated by the NDRC re-emphasize the Chinese Governmentrsquos strict scrutiny of antitrust issues in respect of

37 Article 34 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to restrict or reject the participation of operators from other regions in local bidding activities by measures such as prescribing discriminatory qualification requirements or assessment standards or by not publishing information according to law

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 40 of 52

administrative monopoly It reminds the local governments that antitrust compliance is of significant importance

III Private Litigation

A Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen more and more private antitrust litigations

The private antitrust litigation cases have become increasingly complicated especially the issues regarding the intersection areas of IP and antitrust law

Multinational giants and State-Owned Enterprises (the ldquoSOEsrdquo) are increasingly becoming the targets in antitrust civil litigations Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (the ldquoSMEsrdquo) tend to use the antitrust litigation to achieve their commercial goals in the business context

B Significant Cases

Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)38

This is the first-ever private litigation concerning administrative monopoly since the implementation of the AML in 2008

Facts

According to the currently disclosed details the case is relevant for designated trade

The plaintiff Shenzhen Sware Technology Co Ltd (ldquoSwarerdquo) is a software company The press releases suggest that Sware Gloden Software Co Ltd (ldquoGlodenrdquo) and Shanghai Ruban Software Co Ltd (ldquoShanghai Rubanrdquo) are the three main suppliers of construction cost software and possess the major shares of the relevant market An annual provincial vocational ability contest regarding the construction cost hosted by the Guangdong Department of Education (ldquoGuangdong DOE) designated Gloden as the exclusive supplier of the relevant software

After several unsuccessful verbal and written negotiations with Guangdong DOE in April 2014 Sware filed a lawsuit against Guangdong DOE before the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquothe Courtrdquo) alleging that the administrative organ abused its administrative power and violated the AML by designating exclusive software supplier for the contest and claimed a compensation for reasonable expense amounting to CNY 10800 Yuan

The opinions of the Court 38 The story of the case is available at httpfinancesinacomcnchinadfjj20150410074621924997shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 41 of 52

The full text of the judgment has not been disclosed yet In accordance with the information available to the public the Court invoked article 32 of the AML which prohibits an administrative organ from abusing its administrative power to require or in disguised form organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use only the commodities supplied by the entities designated by them The Court concluded that Guangdong DOE failed to prove the legitimacy of the designation and therefore abused its administration power

Currently the case is in appeal before the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court

Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 39

It is the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China

In the first instance ruling Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court ruled against Sinopec holding that the Yunnan branch of Sinopecs trading company was obligated to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its dominance in the sales market of refined oil by refusing to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding without justifiable reasons

In the second instance ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors Currently the case is pending

Facts

The First Trial

The lawsuit was filed before the Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoKunming Courtrdquo) in January 2014 Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy Co Ltd (ldquoYingdingrdquo) a bio-energy manufacturer claimed that Sinopec and the Yunnan branch of Sinopec trading company (ldquoSinopec Yunnan Branchrdquo) had failed to fulfil their obligations stipulated in the Renewable Energy Law and had abused their market dominance in sales market of refined oil by refusing to trade with Yingding without justifiable reasons

Sinopec and Sinopec Yunnan Branch mainly explained four reasons for why they rejected Yingdingrsquos biofuel Firstly Yingding had failed to prove that the biofuel complied with the relevant national standard and was safe to use Secondly Yingding had failed to provide complete trading terms Thirdly the laws and regulations regarding biofuel were incomplete the authorized refined oil sales companies were 39 The details of the case are available at httpnewsxinhuanetcomfortune2014-1217c_1113680039htm httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=9e71db51-6ff6-4d2c-8af6-8eacf023ebdeampKeyWord=E4BA91E58D97E79B88E9BC8E|E4B8ADE79FB3E58C96 httpnewsxinhuanetcomenergy2015-0422c_127721575htm httpwwwnbdcomcnarticles2015-04-23911348html last visited on December 17 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 42 of 52

obligated to purchase biofuel from the biofuel manufacturers if it met certain quality standards but there was a vacancy regarding how to reach the end consumers from the sales companies

On 8 December 2014 the Kunming Intermediate Peoples Court ruled that Sinopec Yunnan Branch bore a legal obligation to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its market dominance in refined oil market by refusing without any justifiable reasons to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding The court ordered Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network within 30 days Both Yingding and Sinopec filed appeals to the Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court

The Appellate Trial

The appeal hearing was held on 22 April 2015 in Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoYunnan Courtrdquo) Sinopec submitted 23 new pieces of evidence and introduced two expert witnesses in a bid to overturn several key elements in the first-instance ruling by Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court

In terms of the determination of the relevant market and the market dominance Sinopec argued that the relevant market in this case was for adipic acid monomethyl ester (ldquoAAMErdquo) the main ingredient of a biofuel additive known as BD100 Yingdingrsquos main product is BD100 which can be blended with fossil diesel to become biofuel In the AAME market Sinopec is a potential buyer instead of a market dominator In support of this argument Sinopec presented an expert witnessmdashGong Jiong a professor of economics at Beijings University of International Business and Economics who testified that AAME should be defined as the relevant product market on the basis of an economic analysis

However Yingding insisted that the first-instance ruling was correct in naming the sales market of refined oil as the relevant market and submitted new evidence an article on Sinopecs website that claimed it had a 67 market share in Yunnan to help establish the claim that Sinopec had market dominance

Another main dispute was whether Yingdingrsquos biofuel product met national standards which would make it mandatory for Sinopec to purchase under Chinas Renewable Energy Law The law stipulates that biofuel producers must sell their products first to an authorized refined oil sales company and the sales companies are obliged to buy the fuel if it meets certain quality standards In order to test the quality Sinopec introduced the second expert witness Lin Jianmin a leading author of Chinarsquos national biofuel standard Lin Jianmin pointed out that there are currently quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology which gives Sinopec a justifiable reason not to trade with Yingding Moreover Sinopec presented some precedents in which consumers had complained about the biofuel quality and also claimed that China didnt have a sound regulatory framework to support biofuel production neither in testing nor in sales

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 43 of 52

Nevertheless to refute this point Yingding referred to an earlier test in co-operation with Sinopec in 2011 where selected buses in Kunming used biofuel blended by Sinopec using BD100 produced by Yingding

On August 13 2015 Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors and now this case is pending In the written appellate ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court did not provide any details regarding its reasoning

Key Issues of the Case

Is there any competition between Yingding and Sinopec

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case the product of Yingding is biofuel while Sinopec does not engage in the business of biofuel From this perspective Yingding and Sinopec are not competitors Thus it is not necessary and not reasonable for Sinopec to eliminate or restrict the competition from Yingding

Relevant Market

The definition of the relevant market is a prerequisite to determine whether competition exists and whether the AML is applicable In accordance with the Judicial Interpretation of Antitrust civil litigation the plaintiff shall take the responsibility to prove the defendantrsquos dominance in the relevant market Also the methods of defining the relevant market are stipulated in the Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition (ldquoGuidelinesrdquo) However both Yingding and Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court defined the relevant market as the sales market of refined oil without sufficient antitrust analysis none of the methods in the Guidelines were used Therefore the definition of the relevant market remains arguable and needs to be sufficiently analysed in the upcoming retrial

Justifiable Reasons

The abuse of market dominance includes the behaviour of refusing to trade without justifiable reasons according to the AML but in the first instance ruling justifiable reasons were not investigated by the court During the appellate trial the expert witness introduced by Sinopec claimed that there were quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology and this was a justifiable reason to refuse to trade with Yingding Even though the first instance court and the appellate court did not reason the justifiable reason it should be discussed and investigated further during the retrial

AML or Renewable Energy Law

The claims of Yingding were based on both the AML and the Renewable Energy Law (ldquoRELrdquo) and the first instance ruling referred to both the AML and the REL as

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 44 of 52

well It seems that the laws the first instance court referred to were comprehensive but in fact the reasoning was not clear and logical In the first instance ruling some disputes regarding the AML were reviewed but all the orders were not based on the AML Specifically the first instance court ordered the Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network based on the REL and dismissed the other claims That the orders were not on account of reasoning is illogical It is anticipated that during the retrial the application of the laws will be clearer

Analysis

A lot of issues have not been clearly analysed by the courts such as the relevant market and the justifiable reasons Since the case is remanded the above-mentioned issues are expected to be resolved in the retrial In addition Yingding was in a disadvantaged position compared to its first instance trial since its claims based on the AML were challenged greatly during the appellate trial In the retrial it is probable that Yingding may switch its litigation strategy and base its claims on the REL Therefore maybe more preparation regarding the REL can give Sinopec a leg up

Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)

Rijing Electric a Chinese distributor seeks CNY 5m compensation

The first hearing was on 9 June 2015 and ended without a ruling

Facts

Rijing Electric (ldquoRijingrdquo) a Shanghai-based company and a former distributor for Panasonic accused Panasonic of abusing its dominance and dividing the market through monopolistic practice in an antitrust lawsuit filed in 2014 with Shanghai No 1 Intermediate Court (ldquoShanghai Courtrdquo) claiming compensation of CNY 5m (USD 815370) Wenzhou Mingda Automation System Co and Shanghai Qingying Automation Equipment as the distributor of Panasonic in China are the co-defendants were accused of conducting monopolistic behaviours by implementing Panasonicrsquos policy

The first hearing for evidence exchange was on June 9 2015 Rijing claimed a policy allegedly introduced by Panasonic in 2009 restricted the competition between distributors Panasonic claims the policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo and has full justifiable reasons It explained that the products in question required customization at considerable cost to distributors before its sale to customers Once carried out however other distributors leaving them open to quote much lower prices than the original distributor could simply and relatively cheap replicate this customization Besides Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and that the plaintiff had failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic said its market share for the four products

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 45 of 52

under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases Also Rijing failed to challenge the policy when it was first introduced instead initially agreeing it was reasonable as e-mail evidence submitted by Panasonic suggests

Key Issues of the Case

Whether Panasonic occupied a market dominant position

It is reported that Rijing claimed that Panasonic had abused its market dominance but Rijing failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and its market share for the four products under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases

Analysis

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case Panasonicrsquos policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo rather than to eliminate or restrict competition

Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals40 (Pending)

It is a battle over patent licensing issues

It is viewed as being among the most complicated antitrust lawsuits in China

The first hearing was on 17 and 18 December 2015

Facts

Four Chinese rare earth companies Ningbo Ketian Magnet Ningbo Permanent Magnetics Ningbo Tongchuang Strong Magnet Material and Ningbo Huahui Magnetic Industry filed antitrust lawsuits against Hitachi Metals over alleged patent licensing issues regarding rare earth magnets on December 11 2014 with the Ningbo Intermediate Peoples Court (ldquoNingbo Courtrdquo) in Zhejiang province As reported four Chinese rare earth companies claimed Hitachi Metals abused its market dominance and hurt the industry competition by refusing to license the patents to them The patents in this case are used in the manufacturing of sintered neodymium iron boron (ldquoNdFeBrdquo) magnets a rare-earth magnet alloy widely used in parts for airplanes automobiles and other products

Hitachi Metals filed a challenge with the Ningbo Court over its jurisdiction in April 2015 After Ningbo Court rejected Hitachi Metals jurisdiction objection on 28 April 2015 Hitachi Metals appealed to the Zhejiang High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoZhejiang

40The details of the story are available at httpwwwzbmagcomnews_viewphpid=80 httpwwwhitachicomcnaboutpress201510-121118_ahtml last visited on December 22 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 46 of 52

Courtrdquo) but Zhejiang Court affirmed the ruling of the Ningbo Court

The first day of a two-day hearing took place on 17 December 2015 during which the two sides cross-examined each otherrsquos evidence The evidence focused on clearing up several key elements in the case including the relevant market whether Hitachi Metals has dominance on that market and whether both sides acted in good faith during the licensing negotiations

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Product Market

The four Chinese rare earth companies claimed that the relevant product market should be the NdFeb-related patent licensing market However Hitachi Metals believed that the physical NdFeb market rather than the patent licensing market should be the relevant product market which is meaningful for assess the real competitive effects on the market

Whether Hitachi Metals occupies a dominant market position

In terms of market dominance Hitachi Metals claimed it does not occupy a dominant position because Hitachi Metalsrsquo patents were not in a standard in this case and there are substitutable technologies in the market SEP holders have the obligation to license on FRAND terms but none-SEP holders do not So while a refusal to license a SEP may constitute abuse of dominance refusal to license a non-SEP mdash even by a patent holder with a dominant position mdash should not be considered as an abuse

Analysis

Hitachi Metals as a patent holder should have the right to decide whether to retain those patents or not or who to license According to the legal theory the purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage and protect innovation by conferring monopoly right mdash that is to give intellectual property owners the proprietary rights which can exclude others from using the intellectual property The SEP holders admittedly need to comply with FRAND terms which can maintain a robust balance between competition and monopoly whereas the further intervention of antitrust law into non-SEP patents may undermine the purpose of intellectual property law To which extent the antitrust law should intervene is yet to be seen

Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei41

A confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the Beijing IP court made by the Beijing High Court

41 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcncpwswbjzscq201511t20151103_12225640htm last visited on December 28 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 47 of 52

Facts

On August 2 2013 the NDRC penalized Abbott for monopolistic price-fixing and then Abbott made a price adjustment in China where the prices of main products were reduced

On December 16 2014 Tian Junwei (ldquoTianrdquo) a Chinese citizen in Beijing sued Carrefour Shuangjing Branch (ldquoCarrefourrdquo) and Abbott (Shanghai) Sales Company (ldquoAbbottrdquo) at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (ldquoIP Courtrdquo) for their monopolistic price-fixing which damaged his interests However Carrefour and Abbott challenged the jurisdiction of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court They claimed there were two reasons Firstly according to the jurisdiction rules of the IP court issued by the Supreme Court the IP court has no jurisdiction over anti-trust cases Secondly if this case is a contractual dispute the court that is in the place of Carrefour should hear it if this case is a tort dispute the Shanghai Intermediate Court should hear it

In the ruling of the IP Court the IP Court decided it has the jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases for the following reasons According to the Provisions On Causes Of Action In Civil Cases issued by Supreme Court (最高人民法院案由规定) antimonopoly dispute is a tertiary cause of action belonging to IP and competition disputes Also according to the Provisions concerning the Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京

市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问题的规定 ) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was an IP and competition dispute and was sued after November 6 2014 Thus the IP Court had jurisdiction

Both Carrefour and Abbott appealed to the Beijing High Court over the jurisdiction ruling but the Beijing High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original ruling Reasons are listed in the written ruling issued on June 18 2015 Firstly the nature of the case was an antimonopoly dispute In accordance with Provisions of the Supreme Peoples Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民

事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) and Civil Litigation Law the monopolistic civil disputes in the first instance shall be under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Peoples Courts and an action involving a contractual dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the peoples court of the place where the defendant is domiciled or where the contract is performed Carrefour as the defendant in this case is domiciled in Chaoyang District Beijing Therefore the courts of Beijing have jurisdiction over this case Secondly according to article 3 of the Notification on the Jurisdiction of Intellectual Property Courts issued by Supreme Court (关于知识产权法院案件管辖

等有关问题的通知) IP courts have jurisdiction over first-instance civil disputes arising from monopolistic practices Lastly according to Provisions concerning the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 33 of 52

Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms30

Facts

In June 2013 the Ningxia AIC under authorization of SAIC opened an antitrust investigation into the alleged tie-in sales by the three major state-owned telecommunications operators China Tietong China Unicom and China Telecom for the tie-in sale of fixed-line telephones with broadband Internet services The Ningxia AIC found that the three companies had bundled fixed-line phone services with Internet services to subscribers

During the investigation all three telecommunications companies admitted the tie-in practice had recognized that such practice had improper influence on competition and deprived the choices of consumers The three companies promised to undertake internal rectification timely and eliminate the ill effects resulting from such practice The parties committed to taking the following corrective measures

1) Taking internal rectifications and conducting training to staff about antitrust laws and stop tie-in sales practices

2) Making public commitments to allow subscribers a free choice of services and strengthening the propaganda through the operating room call centre and other channels

3) Unbundling fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

The Ningxia AIC decided to suspend the probe on 14 May 2015 on the grounds that the three companies had actively worked together with the investigators and proposed workable remedy plans

Analysis

In the official announcement Ningxia AIC concluded that the purpose of antitrust enforcement is to restrain monopolistic conducts the protection of competition and to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of consumers Given that during the investigation process the parties had actively cooperated with the investigation formed a more profound understanding of the dangers of tying behaviour and moreover the parties proposed and implemented positive corrective measures to be able to remove the ill impact of their actions the agency believed that the purpose of antitrust law enforcement was fulfilled

It is worth noting that the Ningxia AIC also required the three companies to implement the commitment by August 30 2015and the submission of the written

30 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158908html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158906html httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201507t20150715_158910html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 34 of 52

implementation report on July 102015 and August 102015 respectively which is another illustration that an effective commitment by the undertakings shall directly deal with the effect that is brought by the monopolistic behaviour In this case the effect of the monopolistic act was restricted to the choice of the consumers therefore the commitment by the undertaking aimed at allowing the freedom of choice and the unbundling of fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company31

Facts

The Liaoning AIC imposed a fine of approximately CNY 433m on the Fushun Branch of Liaoning Tobacco Co on 1 June 2015 The agency also ordered the company to stop its illicit behaviour

The Liaoning AIC received a tip-off that the accused Liaoning Tobacco Corsquos Fushun branch was conducting tie-in sales of non-high-demand cigarette brands with high-demand cigarette brands After gaining authorization from SAIC the agency officially started an investigation regarding the companyrsquos suspected abuse of market dominance in June 2014

Analysis

According to the announcement the tobacco company argued that the tobacco industry is a state controlled or monopolized industry with a lawful monopolistic position therefore the company shall not be subject to the norms of general market competition rules or the anti-monopoly law

In this regards the agency concluded that in terms of the status of the undertaking admittedly the first paragraph of article 17 of the AML says that the State shall protect the lawful business operations of undertakings in these industries with respect to the industries which are under the control of the State-owned economic sector and have a bearing on the lifeline of the national economy or national security and the industries which exercise monopoly over the production and sale of certain commodities according to law However the second paragraph continues to say that the undertakings mentioned above shall do business according to law be honest faithful and strictly self-disciplined and subject themselves to public supervision and they shall not harm the consumers interests by taking advantage of their position of control or their monopolistic production and sale of certain commodities In particular in the preceding paragraph the ldquolawful businessrdquo and ldquoaccording to lawrdquo imply that the AML shall apply in the business operation The agency therefore believes that

31 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201508t20150813_16

0208html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 35 of 52

there shall be no exemption for the undertaking concerned the defences of the undertaking concerned is not established

Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm32

Facts

The Chongqing AIC fined Chongqing Qingyang Pharmaceutical CNY 439308 for alleged dominance abuse

The investigation was initiated when the company contacted the agency for verification on its potential breach of the AML related to an allopurinol active pharmaceuticals ingredient (API) distribution agreement with its exclusive distributor The company provided the relevant agreement and information and the agency conducted an investigation into the company and some other relevant companies

Analysis

Relevant Market

During the investigation the agency found that pharmaceutical ingredients are a special commodity the API is used to produce the preparations The chemical API is only used for the production of the preparation and could be used as a medicine for clinic use

The preparation is produced according to the requirements of certain form of prepared drugs and for the purpose of treatment and prevention which can be used as medicine

The allopurinol is used for the common treatment of hyperuricemia However the other treatments are different in pharmacological effects or treatment effects as well as in the cost for the patient Furthermore the company is the only manufacturer and supplier in the market nationwide since July 2012 Therefore the agency concluded that the relevant market is the allopurinol API market

Considering that the qualification for manufacturing the allopurinol API is national wide and the normal practice for purchasers and suppliers is domestic the relevant geographic market is the Chinese market

The Market Dominance

During the investigation the agency found that the company is the only supplier and manufacturer of allopurinol API in China there is no other competitor in the

32 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151222_16

5152html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 36 of 52

market and the company has a monopoly in the market The evidence shows that the company has the ability to control the prices the position for the downstream is relatively weak

With respect to the market entry the agency found that the market entry is relatively high in addition other undertakings are dependent on the company Thus the agency believed the company to have market dominance

Refusal to Deal

The agency found that on September 25 2015 the company reached an exclusive agreement and distribution agreement with its distributor Based on these agreements the company didnrsquot supply allopurinol API to the said distributor and other companies despite the fact that those companies requested for allopurinol API but were turned down by the company

Absence of Reasonable Cause

The agency found that the companyrsquos refusal to deal was not in line with the needs of normal business operation or economic efficiency On the other hand the refusal to deal was aimed at increasing the market share of the allopurinol drug product Also the agency found that the stop of supply was a manipulation of market power as to maximize the profit to the most The agency further found that the exclusive distribution agreement with suspension of supply for six months and the refusal to supply was to eliminate and restrict the competition as to gain the monopolistic profit

The Consequence of Refusal to Deal

The agency concluded that the refusal to deal harmed the competition of the allopurinol preparations market Because of the suspension of supply many demanders had to reduce their production or switch to the supply of other products or stop their production The suspension of supply affected the competition of the downstream market Consequently the raising of the price of allopurinol API also raised the cost for other manufacturers of allopurinol preparations

Furthermore the refusal to deal led to capacity loss of the allopurinol preparation industry

Ultimately the refusal to deal increased the burden on consumers as the refusal to supply changed the supply-demand relationship in the market

The agency concluded that the Company abused its dominant position in the allopurinol API market by refusing to deal with intended buyers in the period between October 2013 and March 2014Therefore the Company violated article 17 (1) of the AML which prohibits business operators with a dominant market position from abusing that position such as the refusal to deal without any justifications

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 37 of 52

D Administrative Monopoly

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 witnessed antitrust authoritiesrsquo significant efforts regarding the enforcement against administrative monopoly According to Mr Dong Zhiming the deputy director general of Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly Bureau ever since the AML coming into force six cases in connection with administrative monopoly were investigated by NDRC and among them five cases were handled in the year of 2015 These cases touched abuses of administrative power in terms of designative deal in relation to transportation communication and pharmaceutical industries

The first private litigation related to administrative monopolistic acts was heard in the court which is a milestone case in the enforcement of the AML

Significant Cases

Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC33

Facts

In March 2015 the NDRC released the official letter to Shandong Provincial Department of Transportation (ldquoShandong DOTrdquo) on its website with respect to correct its abuse of administrative power to exclude and restrict competition

During the investigation the NDRC found that since 2011 Shandong DOT had issued multiple relevant government orders in order to require certain types of vehicles to be directly connected to two designated information and service platforms both of which are operated and technically supported by one company namely Shandong Jiutong Internet of Things Technology Co Ltd (ldquoJiutong ITTrdquo) Furthermore according to the orders issued by the competent administrative department all the vehicle satellite positioning terminals entering into Shandong provincial market should be debugged through the said technology service platform which is operated by the mentioned company In addition Shandong DOT released the cap prices of vehicle satellite positioning terminals which is identical to the 2012 bid-winning price in the Ministry of Transportation demonstration project

The NDRC believed that Shandong DOTrsquos behaviour eliminated and restricted the competition in the monitoring platform market and the vehicle terminal market deprived the right of transportation enterprises to choose vehicle terminals and monitoring platform on their owns unreasonably raised the sales prices of vehicle terminals and service fees charged by the platform and increased the costs of transportation enterprises Therefore the antitrust agency concluded that Shandong

33 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201503t20150327_668911html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 38 of 52

DOT violated article 8 of the AML which stipulates that ldquoadministrative organs and the public organizations with an administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude and restrict competitionrdquo Specifically Shandong DOT violated article 3234 in terms of requiring organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any designated operators and violated article 3735 in terms of setting rules with contents which eliminate and restrict competition

Based on article 51 of the AML ldquoWhere administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations abuse administrative powers performing activities which exclude and restrict competition the superior entity shall order it to correct impose administrative penalty on the chief officer and other staffs directly responsible pursuant to the laws The AML enforcement authority may give recommendations on disposal of activities to the relevant superior entityrdquo the NDRC proposed in writing that the Shandong provincial government should order Shandong DOT to rectify its behaviour with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Entirely open up the monitoring platform market by permitting transportation undertakings to freely choose any approved platform

2) Loosen the restrictions on the entry into Shandong vehicle terminals permit the undertakings to independently select the supplier of vehicle terminals and allow the qualified terminals to be connected to the relevant monitoring platform and

3) Revoke the official documentation relevant to the cap price of vehicle terminals in order to promote the price competition

Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 36

Facts

On 26 August 2015 the NDRC published its second decision with regard to the rectification of administrative monopoly since the beginning of this year According to the proposal letter sent to Anhui Provincial Government the investigation against the Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City (Bengbu HFPC) was trigged by third partiesrsquo complaints

34 Article 32 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to require organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any operators designated by them 35 Article 37 of the AML Administrative organs shall not abuse their administrative powers to set rules with contents which eliminate restrict competition 36 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201508t20150826_748682html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 39 of 52

The investigation suggests that Bengbu HFPC published three notices with regard to drugs procurement in April and May of this year

In the No C-2015-CG-X-111 Notice (ldquoNo111 Noticerdquo) released on 10 April2015 the health authority not only provided the dosage form and qualification of the requested drugs but also directly determined the suppliers of relevant drugs which eliminated and restricted the competition among pharmaceutical manufacturers and therefore violated articles 32 and 37 of the AML

In the No C-2015-CG-C-112 Notice (ldquoNo112 Noticerdquo) and No C-2015-CG-C-168 (ldquoNo 168 Noticerdquo) respectively released on 10 April and 22 May 2015 the Bengbu HFPC set discriminative qualification requirements on non-local undertakings in order to restrict their participation in the relevant bidding For instance in accordance with No 112 Notice to be a qualified bidder the turnover of non-local undertakings shall exceed CNY 2 billion which is 50 times as much as the turnover requirements of the local undertakings In the NDRCrsquos opinion the administrative monopoly activities conducted by the local health agency excluded the relevant undertakings from the market maintained the virtual-high prices of drugs and therefore violated articles 3237 and 37 of the AML

The NDRC suggested in a letter that Anhui Provincial Government should urge the Bengbu HFPC to rectify the abuse of monopoly powers with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Stop setting distinguishing restrictions on qualification requirements review standards and numbers of winning bidders as for local and non-local undertakings

2) Stop designating the suppliers of competitive drugs and

3) Take necessary measures to mitigate the negative effects resulting from the previous illegal monopolistic abuses

Outlook

At the beginning of the year the former director general of the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau under the NDRC Xu Kunlin stated that the agency would strengthen antitrust enforcement on abuse of administrative power in 2015

Since then the NDRC has made great efforts to rectify unreasonable abuses of administrative power The currently disclosed two cases investigated by the NDRC re-emphasize the Chinese Governmentrsquos strict scrutiny of antitrust issues in respect of

37 Article 34 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to restrict or reject the participation of operators from other regions in local bidding activities by measures such as prescribing discriminatory qualification requirements or assessment standards or by not publishing information according to law

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 40 of 52

administrative monopoly It reminds the local governments that antitrust compliance is of significant importance

III Private Litigation

A Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen more and more private antitrust litigations

The private antitrust litigation cases have become increasingly complicated especially the issues regarding the intersection areas of IP and antitrust law

Multinational giants and State-Owned Enterprises (the ldquoSOEsrdquo) are increasingly becoming the targets in antitrust civil litigations Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (the ldquoSMEsrdquo) tend to use the antitrust litigation to achieve their commercial goals in the business context

B Significant Cases

Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)38

This is the first-ever private litigation concerning administrative monopoly since the implementation of the AML in 2008

Facts

According to the currently disclosed details the case is relevant for designated trade

The plaintiff Shenzhen Sware Technology Co Ltd (ldquoSwarerdquo) is a software company The press releases suggest that Sware Gloden Software Co Ltd (ldquoGlodenrdquo) and Shanghai Ruban Software Co Ltd (ldquoShanghai Rubanrdquo) are the three main suppliers of construction cost software and possess the major shares of the relevant market An annual provincial vocational ability contest regarding the construction cost hosted by the Guangdong Department of Education (ldquoGuangdong DOE) designated Gloden as the exclusive supplier of the relevant software

After several unsuccessful verbal and written negotiations with Guangdong DOE in April 2014 Sware filed a lawsuit against Guangdong DOE before the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquothe Courtrdquo) alleging that the administrative organ abused its administrative power and violated the AML by designating exclusive software supplier for the contest and claimed a compensation for reasonable expense amounting to CNY 10800 Yuan

The opinions of the Court 38 The story of the case is available at httpfinancesinacomcnchinadfjj20150410074621924997shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 41 of 52

The full text of the judgment has not been disclosed yet In accordance with the information available to the public the Court invoked article 32 of the AML which prohibits an administrative organ from abusing its administrative power to require or in disguised form organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use only the commodities supplied by the entities designated by them The Court concluded that Guangdong DOE failed to prove the legitimacy of the designation and therefore abused its administration power

Currently the case is in appeal before the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court

Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 39

It is the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China

In the first instance ruling Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court ruled against Sinopec holding that the Yunnan branch of Sinopecs trading company was obligated to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its dominance in the sales market of refined oil by refusing to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding without justifiable reasons

In the second instance ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors Currently the case is pending

Facts

The First Trial

The lawsuit was filed before the Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoKunming Courtrdquo) in January 2014 Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy Co Ltd (ldquoYingdingrdquo) a bio-energy manufacturer claimed that Sinopec and the Yunnan branch of Sinopec trading company (ldquoSinopec Yunnan Branchrdquo) had failed to fulfil their obligations stipulated in the Renewable Energy Law and had abused their market dominance in sales market of refined oil by refusing to trade with Yingding without justifiable reasons

Sinopec and Sinopec Yunnan Branch mainly explained four reasons for why they rejected Yingdingrsquos biofuel Firstly Yingding had failed to prove that the biofuel complied with the relevant national standard and was safe to use Secondly Yingding had failed to provide complete trading terms Thirdly the laws and regulations regarding biofuel were incomplete the authorized refined oil sales companies were 39 The details of the case are available at httpnewsxinhuanetcomfortune2014-1217c_1113680039htm httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=9e71db51-6ff6-4d2c-8af6-8eacf023ebdeampKeyWord=E4BA91E58D97E79B88E9BC8E|E4B8ADE79FB3E58C96 httpnewsxinhuanetcomenergy2015-0422c_127721575htm httpwwwnbdcomcnarticles2015-04-23911348html last visited on December 17 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 42 of 52

obligated to purchase biofuel from the biofuel manufacturers if it met certain quality standards but there was a vacancy regarding how to reach the end consumers from the sales companies

On 8 December 2014 the Kunming Intermediate Peoples Court ruled that Sinopec Yunnan Branch bore a legal obligation to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its market dominance in refined oil market by refusing without any justifiable reasons to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding The court ordered Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network within 30 days Both Yingding and Sinopec filed appeals to the Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court

The Appellate Trial

The appeal hearing was held on 22 April 2015 in Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoYunnan Courtrdquo) Sinopec submitted 23 new pieces of evidence and introduced two expert witnesses in a bid to overturn several key elements in the first-instance ruling by Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court

In terms of the determination of the relevant market and the market dominance Sinopec argued that the relevant market in this case was for adipic acid monomethyl ester (ldquoAAMErdquo) the main ingredient of a biofuel additive known as BD100 Yingdingrsquos main product is BD100 which can be blended with fossil diesel to become biofuel In the AAME market Sinopec is a potential buyer instead of a market dominator In support of this argument Sinopec presented an expert witnessmdashGong Jiong a professor of economics at Beijings University of International Business and Economics who testified that AAME should be defined as the relevant product market on the basis of an economic analysis

However Yingding insisted that the first-instance ruling was correct in naming the sales market of refined oil as the relevant market and submitted new evidence an article on Sinopecs website that claimed it had a 67 market share in Yunnan to help establish the claim that Sinopec had market dominance

Another main dispute was whether Yingdingrsquos biofuel product met national standards which would make it mandatory for Sinopec to purchase under Chinas Renewable Energy Law The law stipulates that biofuel producers must sell their products first to an authorized refined oil sales company and the sales companies are obliged to buy the fuel if it meets certain quality standards In order to test the quality Sinopec introduced the second expert witness Lin Jianmin a leading author of Chinarsquos national biofuel standard Lin Jianmin pointed out that there are currently quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology which gives Sinopec a justifiable reason not to trade with Yingding Moreover Sinopec presented some precedents in which consumers had complained about the biofuel quality and also claimed that China didnt have a sound regulatory framework to support biofuel production neither in testing nor in sales

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 43 of 52

Nevertheless to refute this point Yingding referred to an earlier test in co-operation with Sinopec in 2011 where selected buses in Kunming used biofuel blended by Sinopec using BD100 produced by Yingding

On August 13 2015 Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors and now this case is pending In the written appellate ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court did not provide any details regarding its reasoning

Key Issues of the Case

Is there any competition between Yingding and Sinopec

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case the product of Yingding is biofuel while Sinopec does not engage in the business of biofuel From this perspective Yingding and Sinopec are not competitors Thus it is not necessary and not reasonable for Sinopec to eliminate or restrict the competition from Yingding

Relevant Market

The definition of the relevant market is a prerequisite to determine whether competition exists and whether the AML is applicable In accordance with the Judicial Interpretation of Antitrust civil litigation the plaintiff shall take the responsibility to prove the defendantrsquos dominance in the relevant market Also the methods of defining the relevant market are stipulated in the Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition (ldquoGuidelinesrdquo) However both Yingding and Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court defined the relevant market as the sales market of refined oil without sufficient antitrust analysis none of the methods in the Guidelines were used Therefore the definition of the relevant market remains arguable and needs to be sufficiently analysed in the upcoming retrial

Justifiable Reasons

The abuse of market dominance includes the behaviour of refusing to trade without justifiable reasons according to the AML but in the first instance ruling justifiable reasons were not investigated by the court During the appellate trial the expert witness introduced by Sinopec claimed that there were quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology and this was a justifiable reason to refuse to trade with Yingding Even though the first instance court and the appellate court did not reason the justifiable reason it should be discussed and investigated further during the retrial

AML or Renewable Energy Law

The claims of Yingding were based on both the AML and the Renewable Energy Law (ldquoRELrdquo) and the first instance ruling referred to both the AML and the REL as

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 44 of 52

well It seems that the laws the first instance court referred to were comprehensive but in fact the reasoning was not clear and logical In the first instance ruling some disputes regarding the AML were reviewed but all the orders were not based on the AML Specifically the first instance court ordered the Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network based on the REL and dismissed the other claims That the orders were not on account of reasoning is illogical It is anticipated that during the retrial the application of the laws will be clearer

Analysis

A lot of issues have not been clearly analysed by the courts such as the relevant market and the justifiable reasons Since the case is remanded the above-mentioned issues are expected to be resolved in the retrial In addition Yingding was in a disadvantaged position compared to its first instance trial since its claims based on the AML were challenged greatly during the appellate trial In the retrial it is probable that Yingding may switch its litigation strategy and base its claims on the REL Therefore maybe more preparation regarding the REL can give Sinopec a leg up

Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)

Rijing Electric a Chinese distributor seeks CNY 5m compensation

The first hearing was on 9 June 2015 and ended without a ruling

Facts

Rijing Electric (ldquoRijingrdquo) a Shanghai-based company and a former distributor for Panasonic accused Panasonic of abusing its dominance and dividing the market through monopolistic practice in an antitrust lawsuit filed in 2014 with Shanghai No 1 Intermediate Court (ldquoShanghai Courtrdquo) claiming compensation of CNY 5m (USD 815370) Wenzhou Mingda Automation System Co and Shanghai Qingying Automation Equipment as the distributor of Panasonic in China are the co-defendants were accused of conducting monopolistic behaviours by implementing Panasonicrsquos policy

The first hearing for evidence exchange was on June 9 2015 Rijing claimed a policy allegedly introduced by Panasonic in 2009 restricted the competition between distributors Panasonic claims the policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo and has full justifiable reasons It explained that the products in question required customization at considerable cost to distributors before its sale to customers Once carried out however other distributors leaving them open to quote much lower prices than the original distributor could simply and relatively cheap replicate this customization Besides Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and that the plaintiff had failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic said its market share for the four products

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 45 of 52

under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases Also Rijing failed to challenge the policy when it was first introduced instead initially agreeing it was reasonable as e-mail evidence submitted by Panasonic suggests

Key Issues of the Case

Whether Panasonic occupied a market dominant position

It is reported that Rijing claimed that Panasonic had abused its market dominance but Rijing failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and its market share for the four products under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases

Analysis

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case Panasonicrsquos policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo rather than to eliminate or restrict competition

Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals40 (Pending)

It is a battle over patent licensing issues

It is viewed as being among the most complicated antitrust lawsuits in China

The first hearing was on 17 and 18 December 2015

Facts

Four Chinese rare earth companies Ningbo Ketian Magnet Ningbo Permanent Magnetics Ningbo Tongchuang Strong Magnet Material and Ningbo Huahui Magnetic Industry filed antitrust lawsuits against Hitachi Metals over alleged patent licensing issues regarding rare earth magnets on December 11 2014 with the Ningbo Intermediate Peoples Court (ldquoNingbo Courtrdquo) in Zhejiang province As reported four Chinese rare earth companies claimed Hitachi Metals abused its market dominance and hurt the industry competition by refusing to license the patents to them The patents in this case are used in the manufacturing of sintered neodymium iron boron (ldquoNdFeBrdquo) magnets a rare-earth magnet alloy widely used in parts for airplanes automobiles and other products

Hitachi Metals filed a challenge with the Ningbo Court over its jurisdiction in April 2015 After Ningbo Court rejected Hitachi Metals jurisdiction objection on 28 April 2015 Hitachi Metals appealed to the Zhejiang High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoZhejiang

40The details of the story are available at httpwwwzbmagcomnews_viewphpid=80 httpwwwhitachicomcnaboutpress201510-121118_ahtml last visited on December 22 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 46 of 52

Courtrdquo) but Zhejiang Court affirmed the ruling of the Ningbo Court

The first day of a two-day hearing took place on 17 December 2015 during which the two sides cross-examined each otherrsquos evidence The evidence focused on clearing up several key elements in the case including the relevant market whether Hitachi Metals has dominance on that market and whether both sides acted in good faith during the licensing negotiations

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Product Market

The four Chinese rare earth companies claimed that the relevant product market should be the NdFeb-related patent licensing market However Hitachi Metals believed that the physical NdFeb market rather than the patent licensing market should be the relevant product market which is meaningful for assess the real competitive effects on the market

Whether Hitachi Metals occupies a dominant market position

In terms of market dominance Hitachi Metals claimed it does not occupy a dominant position because Hitachi Metalsrsquo patents were not in a standard in this case and there are substitutable technologies in the market SEP holders have the obligation to license on FRAND terms but none-SEP holders do not So while a refusal to license a SEP may constitute abuse of dominance refusal to license a non-SEP mdash even by a patent holder with a dominant position mdash should not be considered as an abuse

Analysis

Hitachi Metals as a patent holder should have the right to decide whether to retain those patents or not or who to license According to the legal theory the purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage and protect innovation by conferring monopoly right mdash that is to give intellectual property owners the proprietary rights which can exclude others from using the intellectual property The SEP holders admittedly need to comply with FRAND terms which can maintain a robust balance between competition and monopoly whereas the further intervention of antitrust law into non-SEP patents may undermine the purpose of intellectual property law To which extent the antitrust law should intervene is yet to be seen

Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei41

A confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the Beijing IP court made by the Beijing High Court

41 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcncpwswbjzscq201511t20151103_12225640htm last visited on December 28 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 47 of 52

Facts

On August 2 2013 the NDRC penalized Abbott for monopolistic price-fixing and then Abbott made a price adjustment in China where the prices of main products were reduced

On December 16 2014 Tian Junwei (ldquoTianrdquo) a Chinese citizen in Beijing sued Carrefour Shuangjing Branch (ldquoCarrefourrdquo) and Abbott (Shanghai) Sales Company (ldquoAbbottrdquo) at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (ldquoIP Courtrdquo) for their monopolistic price-fixing which damaged his interests However Carrefour and Abbott challenged the jurisdiction of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court They claimed there were two reasons Firstly according to the jurisdiction rules of the IP court issued by the Supreme Court the IP court has no jurisdiction over anti-trust cases Secondly if this case is a contractual dispute the court that is in the place of Carrefour should hear it if this case is a tort dispute the Shanghai Intermediate Court should hear it

In the ruling of the IP Court the IP Court decided it has the jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases for the following reasons According to the Provisions On Causes Of Action In Civil Cases issued by Supreme Court (最高人民法院案由规定) antimonopoly dispute is a tertiary cause of action belonging to IP and competition disputes Also according to the Provisions concerning the Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京

市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问题的规定 ) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was an IP and competition dispute and was sued after November 6 2014 Thus the IP Court had jurisdiction

Both Carrefour and Abbott appealed to the Beijing High Court over the jurisdiction ruling but the Beijing High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original ruling Reasons are listed in the written ruling issued on June 18 2015 Firstly the nature of the case was an antimonopoly dispute In accordance with Provisions of the Supreme Peoples Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民

事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) and Civil Litigation Law the monopolistic civil disputes in the first instance shall be under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Peoples Courts and an action involving a contractual dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the peoples court of the place where the defendant is domiciled or where the contract is performed Carrefour as the defendant in this case is domiciled in Chaoyang District Beijing Therefore the courts of Beijing have jurisdiction over this case Secondly according to article 3 of the Notification on the Jurisdiction of Intellectual Property Courts issued by Supreme Court (关于知识产权法院案件管辖

等有关问题的通知) IP courts have jurisdiction over first-instance civil disputes arising from monopolistic practices Lastly according to Provisions concerning the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 34 of 52

implementation report on July 102015 and August 102015 respectively which is another illustration that an effective commitment by the undertakings shall directly deal with the effect that is brought by the monopolistic behaviour In this case the effect of the monopolistic act was restricted to the choice of the consumers therefore the commitment by the undertaking aimed at allowing the freedom of choice and the unbundling of fixed-line phone services upon request of subscribers

Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company31

Facts

The Liaoning AIC imposed a fine of approximately CNY 433m on the Fushun Branch of Liaoning Tobacco Co on 1 June 2015 The agency also ordered the company to stop its illicit behaviour

The Liaoning AIC received a tip-off that the accused Liaoning Tobacco Corsquos Fushun branch was conducting tie-in sales of non-high-demand cigarette brands with high-demand cigarette brands After gaining authorization from SAIC the agency officially started an investigation regarding the companyrsquos suspected abuse of market dominance in June 2014

Analysis

According to the announcement the tobacco company argued that the tobacco industry is a state controlled or monopolized industry with a lawful monopolistic position therefore the company shall not be subject to the norms of general market competition rules or the anti-monopoly law

In this regards the agency concluded that in terms of the status of the undertaking admittedly the first paragraph of article 17 of the AML says that the State shall protect the lawful business operations of undertakings in these industries with respect to the industries which are under the control of the State-owned economic sector and have a bearing on the lifeline of the national economy or national security and the industries which exercise monopoly over the production and sale of certain commodities according to law However the second paragraph continues to say that the undertakings mentioned above shall do business according to law be honest faithful and strictly self-disciplined and subject themselves to public supervision and they shall not harm the consumers interests by taking advantage of their position of control or their monopolistic production and sale of certain commodities In particular in the preceding paragraph the ldquolawful businessrdquo and ldquoaccording to lawrdquo imply that the AML shall apply in the business operation The agency therefore believes that

31 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201508t20150813_16

0208html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 35 of 52

there shall be no exemption for the undertaking concerned the defences of the undertaking concerned is not established

Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm32

Facts

The Chongqing AIC fined Chongqing Qingyang Pharmaceutical CNY 439308 for alleged dominance abuse

The investigation was initiated when the company contacted the agency for verification on its potential breach of the AML related to an allopurinol active pharmaceuticals ingredient (API) distribution agreement with its exclusive distributor The company provided the relevant agreement and information and the agency conducted an investigation into the company and some other relevant companies

Analysis

Relevant Market

During the investigation the agency found that pharmaceutical ingredients are a special commodity the API is used to produce the preparations The chemical API is only used for the production of the preparation and could be used as a medicine for clinic use

The preparation is produced according to the requirements of certain form of prepared drugs and for the purpose of treatment and prevention which can be used as medicine

The allopurinol is used for the common treatment of hyperuricemia However the other treatments are different in pharmacological effects or treatment effects as well as in the cost for the patient Furthermore the company is the only manufacturer and supplier in the market nationwide since July 2012 Therefore the agency concluded that the relevant market is the allopurinol API market

Considering that the qualification for manufacturing the allopurinol API is national wide and the normal practice for purchasers and suppliers is domestic the relevant geographic market is the Chinese market

The Market Dominance

During the investigation the agency found that the company is the only supplier and manufacturer of allopurinol API in China there is no other competitor in the

32 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151222_16

5152html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 36 of 52

market and the company has a monopoly in the market The evidence shows that the company has the ability to control the prices the position for the downstream is relatively weak

With respect to the market entry the agency found that the market entry is relatively high in addition other undertakings are dependent on the company Thus the agency believed the company to have market dominance

Refusal to Deal

The agency found that on September 25 2015 the company reached an exclusive agreement and distribution agreement with its distributor Based on these agreements the company didnrsquot supply allopurinol API to the said distributor and other companies despite the fact that those companies requested for allopurinol API but were turned down by the company

Absence of Reasonable Cause

The agency found that the companyrsquos refusal to deal was not in line with the needs of normal business operation or economic efficiency On the other hand the refusal to deal was aimed at increasing the market share of the allopurinol drug product Also the agency found that the stop of supply was a manipulation of market power as to maximize the profit to the most The agency further found that the exclusive distribution agreement with suspension of supply for six months and the refusal to supply was to eliminate and restrict the competition as to gain the monopolistic profit

The Consequence of Refusal to Deal

The agency concluded that the refusal to deal harmed the competition of the allopurinol preparations market Because of the suspension of supply many demanders had to reduce their production or switch to the supply of other products or stop their production The suspension of supply affected the competition of the downstream market Consequently the raising of the price of allopurinol API also raised the cost for other manufacturers of allopurinol preparations

Furthermore the refusal to deal led to capacity loss of the allopurinol preparation industry

Ultimately the refusal to deal increased the burden on consumers as the refusal to supply changed the supply-demand relationship in the market

The agency concluded that the Company abused its dominant position in the allopurinol API market by refusing to deal with intended buyers in the period between October 2013 and March 2014Therefore the Company violated article 17 (1) of the AML which prohibits business operators with a dominant market position from abusing that position such as the refusal to deal without any justifications

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 37 of 52

D Administrative Monopoly

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 witnessed antitrust authoritiesrsquo significant efforts regarding the enforcement against administrative monopoly According to Mr Dong Zhiming the deputy director general of Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly Bureau ever since the AML coming into force six cases in connection with administrative monopoly were investigated by NDRC and among them five cases were handled in the year of 2015 These cases touched abuses of administrative power in terms of designative deal in relation to transportation communication and pharmaceutical industries

The first private litigation related to administrative monopolistic acts was heard in the court which is a milestone case in the enforcement of the AML

Significant Cases

Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC33

Facts

In March 2015 the NDRC released the official letter to Shandong Provincial Department of Transportation (ldquoShandong DOTrdquo) on its website with respect to correct its abuse of administrative power to exclude and restrict competition

During the investigation the NDRC found that since 2011 Shandong DOT had issued multiple relevant government orders in order to require certain types of vehicles to be directly connected to two designated information and service platforms both of which are operated and technically supported by one company namely Shandong Jiutong Internet of Things Technology Co Ltd (ldquoJiutong ITTrdquo) Furthermore according to the orders issued by the competent administrative department all the vehicle satellite positioning terminals entering into Shandong provincial market should be debugged through the said technology service platform which is operated by the mentioned company In addition Shandong DOT released the cap prices of vehicle satellite positioning terminals which is identical to the 2012 bid-winning price in the Ministry of Transportation demonstration project

The NDRC believed that Shandong DOTrsquos behaviour eliminated and restricted the competition in the monitoring platform market and the vehicle terminal market deprived the right of transportation enterprises to choose vehicle terminals and monitoring platform on their owns unreasonably raised the sales prices of vehicle terminals and service fees charged by the platform and increased the costs of transportation enterprises Therefore the antitrust agency concluded that Shandong

33 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201503t20150327_668911html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 38 of 52

DOT violated article 8 of the AML which stipulates that ldquoadministrative organs and the public organizations with an administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude and restrict competitionrdquo Specifically Shandong DOT violated article 3234 in terms of requiring organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any designated operators and violated article 3735 in terms of setting rules with contents which eliminate and restrict competition

Based on article 51 of the AML ldquoWhere administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations abuse administrative powers performing activities which exclude and restrict competition the superior entity shall order it to correct impose administrative penalty on the chief officer and other staffs directly responsible pursuant to the laws The AML enforcement authority may give recommendations on disposal of activities to the relevant superior entityrdquo the NDRC proposed in writing that the Shandong provincial government should order Shandong DOT to rectify its behaviour with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Entirely open up the monitoring platform market by permitting transportation undertakings to freely choose any approved platform

2) Loosen the restrictions on the entry into Shandong vehicle terminals permit the undertakings to independently select the supplier of vehicle terminals and allow the qualified terminals to be connected to the relevant monitoring platform and

3) Revoke the official documentation relevant to the cap price of vehicle terminals in order to promote the price competition

Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 36

Facts

On 26 August 2015 the NDRC published its second decision with regard to the rectification of administrative monopoly since the beginning of this year According to the proposal letter sent to Anhui Provincial Government the investigation against the Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City (Bengbu HFPC) was trigged by third partiesrsquo complaints

34 Article 32 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to require organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any operators designated by them 35 Article 37 of the AML Administrative organs shall not abuse their administrative powers to set rules with contents which eliminate restrict competition 36 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201508t20150826_748682html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 39 of 52

The investigation suggests that Bengbu HFPC published three notices with regard to drugs procurement in April and May of this year

In the No C-2015-CG-X-111 Notice (ldquoNo111 Noticerdquo) released on 10 April2015 the health authority not only provided the dosage form and qualification of the requested drugs but also directly determined the suppliers of relevant drugs which eliminated and restricted the competition among pharmaceutical manufacturers and therefore violated articles 32 and 37 of the AML

In the No C-2015-CG-C-112 Notice (ldquoNo112 Noticerdquo) and No C-2015-CG-C-168 (ldquoNo 168 Noticerdquo) respectively released on 10 April and 22 May 2015 the Bengbu HFPC set discriminative qualification requirements on non-local undertakings in order to restrict their participation in the relevant bidding For instance in accordance with No 112 Notice to be a qualified bidder the turnover of non-local undertakings shall exceed CNY 2 billion which is 50 times as much as the turnover requirements of the local undertakings In the NDRCrsquos opinion the administrative monopoly activities conducted by the local health agency excluded the relevant undertakings from the market maintained the virtual-high prices of drugs and therefore violated articles 3237 and 37 of the AML

The NDRC suggested in a letter that Anhui Provincial Government should urge the Bengbu HFPC to rectify the abuse of monopoly powers with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Stop setting distinguishing restrictions on qualification requirements review standards and numbers of winning bidders as for local and non-local undertakings

2) Stop designating the suppliers of competitive drugs and

3) Take necessary measures to mitigate the negative effects resulting from the previous illegal monopolistic abuses

Outlook

At the beginning of the year the former director general of the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau under the NDRC Xu Kunlin stated that the agency would strengthen antitrust enforcement on abuse of administrative power in 2015

Since then the NDRC has made great efforts to rectify unreasonable abuses of administrative power The currently disclosed two cases investigated by the NDRC re-emphasize the Chinese Governmentrsquos strict scrutiny of antitrust issues in respect of

37 Article 34 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to restrict or reject the participation of operators from other regions in local bidding activities by measures such as prescribing discriminatory qualification requirements or assessment standards or by not publishing information according to law

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 40 of 52

administrative monopoly It reminds the local governments that antitrust compliance is of significant importance

III Private Litigation

A Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen more and more private antitrust litigations

The private antitrust litigation cases have become increasingly complicated especially the issues regarding the intersection areas of IP and antitrust law

Multinational giants and State-Owned Enterprises (the ldquoSOEsrdquo) are increasingly becoming the targets in antitrust civil litigations Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (the ldquoSMEsrdquo) tend to use the antitrust litigation to achieve their commercial goals in the business context

B Significant Cases

Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)38

This is the first-ever private litigation concerning administrative monopoly since the implementation of the AML in 2008

Facts

According to the currently disclosed details the case is relevant for designated trade

The plaintiff Shenzhen Sware Technology Co Ltd (ldquoSwarerdquo) is a software company The press releases suggest that Sware Gloden Software Co Ltd (ldquoGlodenrdquo) and Shanghai Ruban Software Co Ltd (ldquoShanghai Rubanrdquo) are the three main suppliers of construction cost software and possess the major shares of the relevant market An annual provincial vocational ability contest regarding the construction cost hosted by the Guangdong Department of Education (ldquoGuangdong DOE) designated Gloden as the exclusive supplier of the relevant software

After several unsuccessful verbal and written negotiations with Guangdong DOE in April 2014 Sware filed a lawsuit against Guangdong DOE before the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquothe Courtrdquo) alleging that the administrative organ abused its administrative power and violated the AML by designating exclusive software supplier for the contest and claimed a compensation for reasonable expense amounting to CNY 10800 Yuan

The opinions of the Court 38 The story of the case is available at httpfinancesinacomcnchinadfjj20150410074621924997shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 41 of 52

The full text of the judgment has not been disclosed yet In accordance with the information available to the public the Court invoked article 32 of the AML which prohibits an administrative organ from abusing its administrative power to require or in disguised form organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use only the commodities supplied by the entities designated by them The Court concluded that Guangdong DOE failed to prove the legitimacy of the designation and therefore abused its administration power

Currently the case is in appeal before the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court

Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 39

It is the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China

In the first instance ruling Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court ruled against Sinopec holding that the Yunnan branch of Sinopecs trading company was obligated to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its dominance in the sales market of refined oil by refusing to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding without justifiable reasons

In the second instance ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors Currently the case is pending

Facts

The First Trial

The lawsuit was filed before the Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoKunming Courtrdquo) in January 2014 Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy Co Ltd (ldquoYingdingrdquo) a bio-energy manufacturer claimed that Sinopec and the Yunnan branch of Sinopec trading company (ldquoSinopec Yunnan Branchrdquo) had failed to fulfil their obligations stipulated in the Renewable Energy Law and had abused their market dominance in sales market of refined oil by refusing to trade with Yingding without justifiable reasons

Sinopec and Sinopec Yunnan Branch mainly explained four reasons for why they rejected Yingdingrsquos biofuel Firstly Yingding had failed to prove that the biofuel complied with the relevant national standard and was safe to use Secondly Yingding had failed to provide complete trading terms Thirdly the laws and regulations regarding biofuel were incomplete the authorized refined oil sales companies were 39 The details of the case are available at httpnewsxinhuanetcomfortune2014-1217c_1113680039htm httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=9e71db51-6ff6-4d2c-8af6-8eacf023ebdeampKeyWord=E4BA91E58D97E79B88E9BC8E|E4B8ADE79FB3E58C96 httpnewsxinhuanetcomenergy2015-0422c_127721575htm httpwwwnbdcomcnarticles2015-04-23911348html last visited on December 17 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 42 of 52

obligated to purchase biofuel from the biofuel manufacturers if it met certain quality standards but there was a vacancy regarding how to reach the end consumers from the sales companies

On 8 December 2014 the Kunming Intermediate Peoples Court ruled that Sinopec Yunnan Branch bore a legal obligation to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its market dominance in refined oil market by refusing without any justifiable reasons to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding The court ordered Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network within 30 days Both Yingding and Sinopec filed appeals to the Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court

The Appellate Trial

The appeal hearing was held on 22 April 2015 in Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoYunnan Courtrdquo) Sinopec submitted 23 new pieces of evidence and introduced two expert witnesses in a bid to overturn several key elements in the first-instance ruling by Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court

In terms of the determination of the relevant market and the market dominance Sinopec argued that the relevant market in this case was for adipic acid monomethyl ester (ldquoAAMErdquo) the main ingredient of a biofuel additive known as BD100 Yingdingrsquos main product is BD100 which can be blended with fossil diesel to become biofuel In the AAME market Sinopec is a potential buyer instead of a market dominator In support of this argument Sinopec presented an expert witnessmdashGong Jiong a professor of economics at Beijings University of International Business and Economics who testified that AAME should be defined as the relevant product market on the basis of an economic analysis

However Yingding insisted that the first-instance ruling was correct in naming the sales market of refined oil as the relevant market and submitted new evidence an article on Sinopecs website that claimed it had a 67 market share in Yunnan to help establish the claim that Sinopec had market dominance

Another main dispute was whether Yingdingrsquos biofuel product met national standards which would make it mandatory for Sinopec to purchase under Chinas Renewable Energy Law The law stipulates that biofuel producers must sell their products first to an authorized refined oil sales company and the sales companies are obliged to buy the fuel if it meets certain quality standards In order to test the quality Sinopec introduced the second expert witness Lin Jianmin a leading author of Chinarsquos national biofuel standard Lin Jianmin pointed out that there are currently quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology which gives Sinopec a justifiable reason not to trade with Yingding Moreover Sinopec presented some precedents in which consumers had complained about the biofuel quality and also claimed that China didnt have a sound regulatory framework to support biofuel production neither in testing nor in sales

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 43 of 52

Nevertheless to refute this point Yingding referred to an earlier test in co-operation with Sinopec in 2011 where selected buses in Kunming used biofuel blended by Sinopec using BD100 produced by Yingding

On August 13 2015 Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors and now this case is pending In the written appellate ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court did not provide any details regarding its reasoning

Key Issues of the Case

Is there any competition between Yingding and Sinopec

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case the product of Yingding is biofuel while Sinopec does not engage in the business of biofuel From this perspective Yingding and Sinopec are not competitors Thus it is not necessary and not reasonable for Sinopec to eliminate or restrict the competition from Yingding

Relevant Market

The definition of the relevant market is a prerequisite to determine whether competition exists and whether the AML is applicable In accordance with the Judicial Interpretation of Antitrust civil litigation the plaintiff shall take the responsibility to prove the defendantrsquos dominance in the relevant market Also the methods of defining the relevant market are stipulated in the Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition (ldquoGuidelinesrdquo) However both Yingding and Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court defined the relevant market as the sales market of refined oil without sufficient antitrust analysis none of the methods in the Guidelines were used Therefore the definition of the relevant market remains arguable and needs to be sufficiently analysed in the upcoming retrial

Justifiable Reasons

The abuse of market dominance includes the behaviour of refusing to trade without justifiable reasons according to the AML but in the first instance ruling justifiable reasons were not investigated by the court During the appellate trial the expert witness introduced by Sinopec claimed that there were quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology and this was a justifiable reason to refuse to trade with Yingding Even though the first instance court and the appellate court did not reason the justifiable reason it should be discussed and investigated further during the retrial

AML or Renewable Energy Law

The claims of Yingding were based on both the AML and the Renewable Energy Law (ldquoRELrdquo) and the first instance ruling referred to both the AML and the REL as

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 44 of 52

well It seems that the laws the first instance court referred to were comprehensive but in fact the reasoning was not clear and logical In the first instance ruling some disputes regarding the AML were reviewed but all the orders were not based on the AML Specifically the first instance court ordered the Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network based on the REL and dismissed the other claims That the orders were not on account of reasoning is illogical It is anticipated that during the retrial the application of the laws will be clearer

Analysis

A lot of issues have not been clearly analysed by the courts such as the relevant market and the justifiable reasons Since the case is remanded the above-mentioned issues are expected to be resolved in the retrial In addition Yingding was in a disadvantaged position compared to its first instance trial since its claims based on the AML were challenged greatly during the appellate trial In the retrial it is probable that Yingding may switch its litigation strategy and base its claims on the REL Therefore maybe more preparation regarding the REL can give Sinopec a leg up

Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)

Rijing Electric a Chinese distributor seeks CNY 5m compensation

The first hearing was on 9 June 2015 and ended without a ruling

Facts

Rijing Electric (ldquoRijingrdquo) a Shanghai-based company and a former distributor for Panasonic accused Panasonic of abusing its dominance and dividing the market through monopolistic practice in an antitrust lawsuit filed in 2014 with Shanghai No 1 Intermediate Court (ldquoShanghai Courtrdquo) claiming compensation of CNY 5m (USD 815370) Wenzhou Mingda Automation System Co and Shanghai Qingying Automation Equipment as the distributor of Panasonic in China are the co-defendants were accused of conducting monopolistic behaviours by implementing Panasonicrsquos policy

The first hearing for evidence exchange was on June 9 2015 Rijing claimed a policy allegedly introduced by Panasonic in 2009 restricted the competition between distributors Panasonic claims the policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo and has full justifiable reasons It explained that the products in question required customization at considerable cost to distributors before its sale to customers Once carried out however other distributors leaving them open to quote much lower prices than the original distributor could simply and relatively cheap replicate this customization Besides Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and that the plaintiff had failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic said its market share for the four products

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 45 of 52

under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases Also Rijing failed to challenge the policy when it was first introduced instead initially agreeing it was reasonable as e-mail evidence submitted by Panasonic suggests

Key Issues of the Case

Whether Panasonic occupied a market dominant position

It is reported that Rijing claimed that Panasonic had abused its market dominance but Rijing failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and its market share for the four products under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases

Analysis

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case Panasonicrsquos policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo rather than to eliminate or restrict competition

Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals40 (Pending)

It is a battle over patent licensing issues

It is viewed as being among the most complicated antitrust lawsuits in China

The first hearing was on 17 and 18 December 2015

Facts

Four Chinese rare earth companies Ningbo Ketian Magnet Ningbo Permanent Magnetics Ningbo Tongchuang Strong Magnet Material and Ningbo Huahui Magnetic Industry filed antitrust lawsuits against Hitachi Metals over alleged patent licensing issues regarding rare earth magnets on December 11 2014 with the Ningbo Intermediate Peoples Court (ldquoNingbo Courtrdquo) in Zhejiang province As reported four Chinese rare earth companies claimed Hitachi Metals abused its market dominance and hurt the industry competition by refusing to license the patents to them The patents in this case are used in the manufacturing of sintered neodymium iron boron (ldquoNdFeBrdquo) magnets a rare-earth magnet alloy widely used in parts for airplanes automobiles and other products

Hitachi Metals filed a challenge with the Ningbo Court over its jurisdiction in April 2015 After Ningbo Court rejected Hitachi Metals jurisdiction objection on 28 April 2015 Hitachi Metals appealed to the Zhejiang High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoZhejiang

40The details of the story are available at httpwwwzbmagcomnews_viewphpid=80 httpwwwhitachicomcnaboutpress201510-121118_ahtml last visited on December 22 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 46 of 52

Courtrdquo) but Zhejiang Court affirmed the ruling of the Ningbo Court

The first day of a two-day hearing took place on 17 December 2015 during which the two sides cross-examined each otherrsquos evidence The evidence focused on clearing up several key elements in the case including the relevant market whether Hitachi Metals has dominance on that market and whether both sides acted in good faith during the licensing negotiations

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Product Market

The four Chinese rare earth companies claimed that the relevant product market should be the NdFeb-related patent licensing market However Hitachi Metals believed that the physical NdFeb market rather than the patent licensing market should be the relevant product market which is meaningful for assess the real competitive effects on the market

Whether Hitachi Metals occupies a dominant market position

In terms of market dominance Hitachi Metals claimed it does not occupy a dominant position because Hitachi Metalsrsquo patents were not in a standard in this case and there are substitutable technologies in the market SEP holders have the obligation to license on FRAND terms but none-SEP holders do not So while a refusal to license a SEP may constitute abuse of dominance refusal to license a non-SEP mdash even by a patent holder with a dominant position mdash should not be considered as an abuse

Analysis

Hitachi Metals as a patent holder should have the right to decide whether to retain those patents or not or who to license According to the legal theory the purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage and protect innovation by conferring monopoly right mdash that is to give intellectual property owners the proprietary rights which can exclude others from using the intellectual property The SEP holders admittedly need to comply with FRAND terms which can maintain a robust balance between competition and monopoly whereas the further intervention of antitrust law into non-SEP patents may undermine the purpose of intellectual property law To which extent the antitrust law should intervene is yet to be seen

Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei41

A confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the Beijing IP court made by the Beijing High Court

41 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcncpwswbjzscq201511t20151103_12225640htm last visited on December 28 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 47 of 52

Facts

On August 2 2013 the NDRC penalized Abbott for monopolistic price-fixing and then Abbott made a price adjustment in China where the prices of main products were reduced

On December 16 2014 Tian Junwei (ldquoTianrdquo) a Chinese citizen in Beijing sued Carrefour Shuangjing Branch (ldquoCarrefourrdquo) and Abbott (Shanghai) Sales Company (ldquoAbbottrdquo) at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (ldquoIP Courtrdquo) for their monopolistic price-fixing which damaged his interests However Carrefour and Abbott challenged the jurisdiction of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court They claimed there were two reasons Firstly according to the jurisdiction rules of the IP court issued by the Supreme Court the IP court has no jurisdiction over anti-trust cases Secondly if this case is a contractual dispute the court that is in the place of Carrefour should hear it if this case is a tort dispute the Shanghai Intermediate Court should hear it

In the ruling of the IP Court the IP Court decided it has the jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases for the following reasons According to the Provisions On Causes Of Action In Civil Cases issued by Supreme Court (最高人民法院案由规定) antimonopoly dispute is a tertiary cause of action belonging to IP and competition disputes Also according to the Provisions concerning the Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京

市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问题的规定 ) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was an IP and competition dispute and was sued after November 6 2014 Thus the IP Court had jurisdiction

Both Carrefour and Abbott appealed to the Beijing High Court over the jurisdiction ruling but the Beijing High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original ruling Reasons are listed in the written ruling issued on June 18 2015 Firstly the nature of the case was an antimonopoly dispute In accordance with Provisions of the Supreme Peoples Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民

事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) and Civil Litigation Law the monopolistic civil disputes in the first instance shall be under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Peoples Courts and an action involving a contractual dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the peoples court of the place where the defendant is domiciled or where the contract is performed Carrefour as the defendant in this case is domiciled in Chaoyang District Beijing Therefore the courts of Beijing have jurisdiction over this case Secondly according to article 3 of the Notification on the Jurisdiction of Intellectual Property Courts issued by Supreme Court (关于知识产权法院案件管辖

等有关问题的通知) IP courts have jurisdiction over first-instance civil disputes arising from monopolistic practices Lastly according to Provisions concerning the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 35 of 52

there shall be no exemption for the undertaking concerned the defences of the undertaking concerned is not established

Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm32

Facts

The Chongqing AIC fined Chongqing Qingyang Pharmaceutical CNY 439308 for alleged dominance abuse

The investigation was initiated when the company contacted the agency for verification on its potential breach of the AML related to an allopurinol active pharmaceuticals ingredient (API) distribution agreement with its exclusive distributor The company provided the relevant agreement and information and the agency conducted an investigation into the company and some other relevant companies

Analysis

Relevant Market

During the investigation the agency found that pharmaceutical ingredients are a special commodity the API is used to produce the preparations The chemical API is only used for the production of the preparation and could be used as a medicine for clinic use

The preparation is produced according to the requirements of certain form of prepared drugs and for the purpose of treatment and prevention which can be used as medicine

The allopurinol is used for the common treatment of hyperuricemia However the other treatments are different in pharmacological effects or treatment effects as well as in the cost for the patient Furthermore the company is the only manufacturer and supplier in the market nationwide since July 2012 Therefore the agency concluded that the relevant market is the allopurinol API market

Considering that the qualification for manufacturing the allopurinol API is national wide and the normal practice for purchasers and suppliers is domestic the relevant geographic market is the Chinese market

The Market Dominance

During the investigation the agency found that the company is the only supplier and manufacturer of allopurinol API in China there is no other competitor in the

32 See the official press release on the case at httpwwwsaicgovcnzwgkgggsjzzf201512t20151222_16

5152html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 36 of 52

market and the company has a monopoly in the market The evidence shows that the company has the ability to control the prices the position for the downstream is relatively weak

With respect to the market entry the agency found that the market entry is relatively high in addition other undertakings are dependent on the company Thus the agency believed the company to have market dominance

Refusal to Deal

The agency found that on September 25 2015 the company reached an exclusive agreement and distribution agreement with its distributor Based on these agreements the company didnrsquot supply allopurinol API to the said distributor and other companies despite the fact that those companies requested for allopurinol API but were turned down by the company

Absence of Reasonable Cause

The agency found that the companyrsquos refusal to deal was not in line with the needs of normal business operation or economic efficiency On the other hand the refusal to deal was aimed at increasing the market share of the allopurinol drug product Also the agency found that the stop of supply was a manipulation of market power as to maximize the profit to the most The agency further found that the exclusive distribution agreement with suspension of supply for six months and the refusal to supply was to eliminate and restrict the competition as to gain the monopolistic profit

The Consequence of Refusal to Deal

The agency concluded that the refusal to deal harmed the competition of the allopurinol preparations market Because of the suspension of supply many demanders had to reduce their production or switch to the supply of other products or stop their production The suspension of supply affected the competition of the downstream market Consequently the raising of the price of allopurinol API also raised the cost for other manufacturers of allopurinol preparations

Furthermore the refusal to deal led to capacity loss of the allopurinol preparation industry

Ultimately the refusal to deal increased the burden on consumers as the refusal to supply changed the supply-demand relationship in the market

The agency concluded that the Company abused its dominant position in the allopurinol API market by refusing to deal with intended buyers in the period between October 2013 and March 2014Therefore the Company violated article 17 (1) of the AML which prohibits business operators with a dominant market position from abusing that position such as the refusal to deal without any justifications

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 37 of 52

D Administrative Monopoly

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 witnessed antitrust authoritiesrsquo significant efforts regarding the enforcement against administrative monopoly According to Mr Dong Zhiming the deputy director general of Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly Bureau ever since the AML coming into force six cases in connection with administrative monopoly were investigated by NDRC and among them five cases were handled in the year of 2015 These cases touched abuses of administrative power in terms of designative deal in relation to transportation communication and pharmaceutical industries

The first private litigation related to administrative monopolistic acts was heard in the court which is a milestone case in the enforcement of the AML

Significant Cases

Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC33

Facts

In March 2015 the NDRC released the official letter to Shandong Provincial Department of Transportation (ldquoShandong DOTrdquo) on its website with respect to correct its abuse of administrative power to exclude and restrict competition

During the investigation the NDRC found that since 2011 Shandong DOT had issued multiple relevant government orders in order to require certain types of vehicles to be directly connected to two designated information and service platforms both of which are operated and technically supported by one company namely Shandong Jiutong Internet of Things Technology Co Ltd (ldquoJiutong ITTrdquo) Furthermore according to the orders issued by the competent administrative department all the vehicle satellite positioning terminals entering into Shandong provincial market should be debugged through the said technology service platform which is operated by the mentioned company In addition Shandong DOT released the cap prices of vehicle satellite positioning terminals which is identical to the 2012 bid-winning price in the Ministry of Transportation demonstration project

The NDRC believed that Shandong DOTrsquos behaviour eliminated and restricted the competition in the monitoring platform market and the vehicle terminal market deprived the right of transportation enterprises to choose vehicle terminals and monitoring platform on their owns unreasonably raised the sales prices of vehicle terminals and service fees charged by the platform and increased the costs of transportation enterprises Therefore the antitrust agency concluded that Shandong

33 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201503t20150327_668911html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 38 of 52

DOT violated article 8 of the AML which stipulates that ldquoadministrative organs and the public organizations with an administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude and restrict competitionrdquo Specifically Shandong DOT violated article 3234 in terms of requiring organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any designated operators and violated article 3735 in terms of setting rules with contents which eliminate and restrict competition

Based on article 51 of the AML ldquoWhere administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations abuse administrative powers performing activities which exclude and restrict competition the superior entity shall order it to correct impose administrative penalty on the chief officer and other staffs directly responsible pursuant to the laws The AML enforcement authority may give recommendations on disposal of activities to the relevant superior entityrdquo the NDRC proposed in writing that the Shandong provincial government should order Shandong DOT to rectify its behaviour with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Entirely open up the monitoring platform market by permitting transportation undertakings to freely choose any approved platform

2) Loosen the restrictions on the entry into Shandong vehicle terminals permit the undertakings to independently select the supplier of vehicle terminals and allow the qualified terminals to be connected to the relevant monitoring platform and

3) Revoke the official documentation relevant to the cap price of vehicle terminals in order to promote the price competition

Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 36

Facts

On 26 August 2015 the NDRC published its second decision with regard to the rectification of administrative monopoly since the beginning of this year According to the proposal letter sent to Anhui Provincial Government the investigation against the Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City (Bengbu HFPC) was trigged by third partiesrsquo complaints

34 Article 32 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to require organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any operators designated by them 35 Article 37 of the AML Administrative organs shall not abuse their administrative powers to set rules with contents which eliminate restrict competition 36 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201508t20150826_748682html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 39 of 52

The investigation suggests that Bengbu HFPC published three notices with regard to drugs procurement in April and May of this year

In the No C-2015-CG-X-111 Notice (ldquoNo111 Noticerdquo) released on 10 April2015 the health authority not only provided the dosage form and qualification of the requested drugs but also directly determined the suppliers of relevant drugs which eliminated and restricted the competition among pharmaceutical manufacturers and therefore violated articles 32 and 37 of the AML

In the No C-2015-CG-C-112 Notice (ldquoNo112 Noticerdquo) and No C-2015-CG-C-168 (ldquoNo 168 Noticerdquo) respectively released on 10 April and 22 May 2015 the Bengbu HFPC set discriminative qualification requirements on non-local undertakings in order to restrict their participation in the relevant bidding For instance in accordance with No 112 Notice to be a qualified bidder the turnover of non-local undertakings shall exceed CNY 2 billion which is 50 times as much as the turnover requirements of the local undertakings In the NDRCrsquos opinion the administrative monopoly activities conducted by the local health agency excluded the relevant undertakings from the market maintained the virtual-high prices of drugs and therefore violated articles 3237 and 37 of the AML

The NDRC suggested in a letter that Anhui Provincial Government should urge the Bengbu HFPC to rectify the abuse of monopoly powers with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Stop setting distinguishing restrictions on qualification requirements review standards and numbers of winning bidders as for local and non-local undertakings

2) Stop designating the suppliers of competitive drugs and

3) Take necessary measures to mitigate the negative effects resulting from the previous illegal monopolistic abuses

Outlook

At the beginning of the year the former director general of the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau under the NDRC Xu Kunlin stated that the agency would strengthen antitrust enforcement on abuse of administrative power in 2015

Since then the NDRC has made great efforts to rectify unreasonable abuses of administrative power The currently disclosed two cases investigated by the NDRC re-emphasize the Chinese Governmentrsquos strict scrutiny of antitrust issues in respect of

37 Article 34 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to restrict or reject the participation of operators from other regions in local bidding activities by measures such as prescribing discriminatory qualification requirements or assessment standards or by not publishing information according to law

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 40 of 52

administrative monopoly It reminds the local governments that antitrust compliance is of significant importance

III Private Litigation

A Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen more and more private antitrust litigations

The private antitrust litigation cases have become increasingly complicated especially the issues regarding the intersection areas of IP and antitrust law

Multinational giants and State-Owned Enterprises (the ldquoSOEsrdquo) are increasingly becoming the targets in antitrust civil litigations Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (the ldquoSMEsrdquo) tend to use the antitrust litigation to achieve their commercial goals in the business context

B Significant Cases

Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)38

This is the first-ever private litigation concerning administrative monopoly since the implementation of the AML in 2008

Facts

According to the currently disclosed details the case is relevant for designated trade

The plaintiff Shenzhen Sware Technology Co Ltd (ldquoSwarerdquo) is a software company The press releases suggest that Sware Gloden Software Co Ltd (ldquoGlodenrdquo) and Shanghai Ruban Software Co Ltd (ldquoShanghai Rubanrdquo) are the three main suppliers of construction cost software and possess the major shares of the relevant market An annual provincial vocational ability contest regarding the construction cost hosted by the Guangdong Department of Education (ldquoGuangdong DOE) designated Gloden as the exclusive supplier of the relevant software

After several unsuccessful verbal and written negotiations with Guangdong DOE in April 2014 Sware filed a lawsuit against Guangdong DOE before the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquothe Courtrdquo) alleging that the administrative organ abused its administrative power and violated the AML by designating exclusive software supplier for the contest and claimed a compensation for reasonable expense amounting to CNY 10800 Yuan

The opinions of the Court 38 The story of the case is available at httpfinancesinacomcnchinadfjj20150410074621924997shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 41 of 52

The full text of the judgment has not been disclosed yet In accordance with the information available to the public the Court invoked article 32 of the AML which prohibits an administrative organ from abusing its administrative power to require or in disguised form organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use only the commodities supplied by the entities designated by them The Court concluded that Guangdong DOE failed to prove the legitimacy of the designation and therefore abused its administration power

Currently the case is in appeal before the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court

Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 39

It is the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China

In the first instance ruling Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court ruled against Sinopec holding that the Yunnan branch of Sinopecs trading company was obligated to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its dominance in the sales market of refined oil by refusing to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding without justifiable reasons

In the second instance ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors Currently the case is pending

Facts

The First Trial

The lawsuit was filed before the Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoKunming Courtrdquo) in January 2014 Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy Co Ltd (ldquoYingdingrdquo) a bio-energy manufacturer claimed that Sinopec and the Yunnan branch of Sinopec trading company (ldquoSinopec Yunnan Branchrdquo) had failed to fulfil their obligations stipulated in the Renewable Energy Law and had abused their market dominance in sales market of refined oil by refusing to trade with Yingding without justifiable reasons

Sinopec and Sinopec Yunnan Branch mainly explained four reasons for why they rejected Yingdingrsquos biofuel Firstly Yingding had failed to prove that the biofuel complied with the relevant national standard and was safe to use Secondly Yingding had failed to provide complete trading terms Thirdly the laws and regulations regarding biofuel were incomplete the authorized refined oil sales companies were 39 The details of the case are available at httpnewsxinhuanetcomfortune2014-1217c_1113680039htm httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=9e71db51-6ff6-4d2c-8af6-8eacf023ebdeampKeyWord=E4BA91E58D97E79B88E9BC8E|E4B8ADE79FB3E58C96 httpnewsxinhuanetcomenergy2015-0422c_127721575htm httpwwwnbdcomcnarticles2015-04-23911348html last visited on December 17 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 42 of 52

obligated to purchase biofuel from the biofuel manufacturers if it met certain quality standards but there was a vacancy regarding how to reach the end consumers from the sales companies

On 8 December 2014 the Kunming Intermediate Peoples Court ruled that Sinopec Yunnan Branch bore a legal obligation to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its market dominance in refined oil market by refusing without any justifiable reasons to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding The court ordered Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network within 30 days Both Yingding and Sinopec filed appeals to the Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court

The Appellate Trial

The appeal hearing was held on 22 April 2015 in Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoYunnan Courtrdquo) Sinopec submitted 23 new pieces of evidence and introduced two expert witnesses in a bid to overturn several key elements in the first-instance ruling by Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court

In terms of the determination of the relevant market and the market dominance Sinopec argued that the relevant market in this case was for adipic acid monomethyl ester (ldquoAAMErdquo) the main ingredient of a biofuel additive known as BD100 Yingdingrsquos main product is BD100 which can be blended with fossil diesel to become biofuel In the AAME market Sinopec is a potential buyer instead of a market dominator In support of this argument Sinopec presented an expert witnessmdashGong Jiong a professor of economics at Beijings University of International Business and Economics who testified that AAME should be defined as the relevant product market on the basis of an economic analysis

However Yingding insisted that the first-instance ruling was correct in naming the sales market of refined oil as the relevant market and submitted new evidence an article on Sinopecs website that claimed it had a 67 market share in Yunnan to help establish the claim that Sinopec had market dominance

Another main dispute was whether Yingdingrsquos biofuel product met national standards which would make it mandatory for Sinopec to purchase under Chinas Renewable Energy Law The law stipulates that biofuel producers must sell their products first to an authorized refined oil sales company and the sales companies are obliged to buy the fuel if it meets certain quality standards In order to test the quality Sinopec introduced the second expert witness Lin Jianmin a leading author of Chinarsquos national biofuel standard Lin Jianmin pointed out that there are currently quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology which gives Sinopec a justifiable reason not to trade with Yingding Moreover Sinopec presented some precedents in which consumers had complained about the biofuel quality and also claimed that China didnt have a sound regulatory framework to support biofuel production neither in testing nor in sales

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 43 of 52

Nevertheless to refute this point Yingding referred to an earlier test in co-operation with Sinopec in 2011 where selected buses in Kunming used biofuel blended by Sinopec using BD100 produced by Yingding

On August 13 2015 Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors and now this case is pending In the written appellate ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court did not provide any details regarding its reasoning

Key Issues of the Case

Is there any competition between Yingding and Sinopec

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case the product of Yingding is biofuel while Sinopec does not engage in the business of biofuel From this perspective Yingding and Sinopec are not competitors Thus it is not necessary and not reasonable for Sinopec to eliminate or restrict the competition from Yingding

Relevant Market

The definition of the relevant market is a prerequisite to determine whether competition exists and whether the AML is applicable In accordance with the Judicial Interpretation of Antitrust civil litigation the plaintiff shall take the responsibility to prove the defendantrsquos dominance in the relevant market Also the methods of defining the relevant market are stipulated in the Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition (ldquoGuidelinesrdquo) However both Yingding and Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court defined the relevant market as the sales market of refined oil without sufficient antitrust analysis none of the methods in the Guidelines were used Therefore the definition of the relevant market remains arguable and needs to be sufficiently analysed in the upcoming retrial

Justifiable Reasons

The abuse of market dominance includes the behaviour of refusing to trade without justifiable reasons according to the AML but in the first instance ruling justifiable reasons were not investigated by the court During the appellate trial the expert witness introduced by Sinopec claimed that there were quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology and this was a justifiable reason to refuse to trade with Yingding Even though the first instance court and the appellate court did not reason the justifiable reason it should be discussed and investigated further during the retrial

AML or Renewable Energy Law

The claims of Yingding were based on both the AML and the Renewable Energy Law (ldquoRELrdquo) and the first instance ruling referred to both the AML and the REL as

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 44 of 52

well It seems that the laws the first instance court referred to were comprehensive but in fact the reasoning was not clear and logical In the first instance ruling some disputes regarding the AML were reviewed but all the orders were not based on the AML Specifically the first instance court ordered the Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network based on the REL and dismissed the other claims That the orders were not on account of reasoning is illogical It is anticipated that during the retrial the application of the laws will be clearer

Analysis

A lot of issues have not been clearly analysed by the courts such as the relevant market and the justifiable reasons Since the case is remanded the above-mentioned issues are expected to be resolved in the retrial In addition Yingding was in a disadvantaged position compared to its first instance trial since its claims based on the AML were challenged greatly during the appellate trial In the retrial it is probable that Yingding may switch its litigation strategy and base its claims on the REL Therefore maybe more preparation regarding the REL can give Sinopec a leg up

Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)

Rijing Electric a Chinese distributor seeks CNY 5m compensation

The first hearing was on 9 June 2015 and ended without a ruling

Facts

Rijing Electric (ldquoRijingrdquo) a Shanghai-based company and a former distributor for Panasonic accused Panasonic of abusing its dominance and dividing the market through monopolistic practice in an antitrust lawsuit filed in 2014 with Shanghai No 1 Intermediate Court (ldquoShanghai Courtrdquo) claiming compensation of CNY 5m (USD 815370) Wenzhou Mingda Automation System Co and Shanghai Qingying Automation Equipment as the distributor of Panasonic in China are the co-defendants were accused of conducting monopolistic behaviours by implementing Panasonicrsquos policy

The first hearing for evidence exchange was on June 9 2015 Rijing claimed a policy allegedly introduced by Panasonic in 2009 restricted the competition between distributors Panasonic claims the policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo and has full justifiable reasons It explained that the products in question required customization at considerable cost to distributors before its sale to customers Once carried out however other distributors leaving them open to quote much lower prices than the original distributor could simply and relatively cheap replicate this customization Besides Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and that the plaintiff had failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic said its market share for the four products

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 45 of 52

under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases Also Rijing failed to challenge the policy when it was first introduced instead initially agreeing it was reasonable as e-mail evidence submitted by Panasonic suggests

Key Issues of the Case

Whether Panasonic occupied a market dominant position

It is reported that Rijing claimed that Panasonic had abused its market dominance but Rijing failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and its market share for the four products under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases

Analysis

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case Panasonicrsquos policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo rather than to eliminate or restrict competition

Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals40 (Pending)

It is a battle over patent licensing issues

It is viewed as being among the most complicated antitrust lawsuits in China

The first hearing was on 17 and 18 December 2015

Facts

Four Chinese rare earth companies Ningbo Ketian Magnet Ningbo Permanent Magnetics Ningbo Tongchuang Strong Magnet Material and Ningbo Huahui Magnetic Industry filed antitrust lawsuits against Hitachi Metals over alleged patent licensing issues regarding rare earth magnets on December 11 2014 with the Ningbo Intermediate Peoples Court (ldquoNingbo Courtrdquo) in Zhejiang province As reported four Chinese rare earth companies claimed Hitachi Metals abused its market dominance and hurt the industry competition by refusing to license the patents to them The patents in this case are used in the manufacturing of sintered neodymium iron boron (ldquoNdFeBrdquo) magnets a rare-earth magnet alloy widely used in parts for airplanes automobiles and other products

Hitachi Metals filed a challenge with the Ningbo Court over its jurisdiction in April 2015 After Ningbo Court rejected Hitachi Metals jurisdiction objection on 28 April 2015 Hitachi Metals appealed to the Zhejiang High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoZhejiang

40The details of the story are available at httpwwwzbmagcomnews_viewphpid=80 httpwwwhitachicomcnaboutpress201510-121118_ahtml last visited on December 22 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 46 of 52

Courtrdquo) but Zhejiang Court affirmed the ruling of the Ningbo Court

The first day of a two-day hearing took place on 17 December 2015 during which the two sides cross-examined each otherrsquos evidence The evidence focused on clearing up several key elements in the case including the relevant market whether Hitachi Metals has dominance on that market and whether both sides acted in good faith during the licensing negotiations

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Product Market

The four Chinese rare earth companies claimed that the relevant product market should be the NdFeb-related patent licensing market However Hitachi Metals believed that the physical NdFeb market rather than the patent licensing market should be the relevant product market which is meaningful for assess the real competitive effects on the market

Whether Hitachi Metals occupies a dominant market position

In terms of market dominance Hitachi Metals claimed it does not occupy a dominant position because Hitachi Metalsrsquo patents were not in a standard in this case and there are substitutable technologies in the market SEP holders have the obligation to license on FRAND terms but none-SEP holders do not So while a refusal to license a SEP may constitute abuse of dominance refusal to license a non-SEP mdash even by a patent holder with a dominant position mdash should not be considered as an abuse

Analysis

Hitachi Metals as a patent holder should have the right to decide whether to retain those patents or not or who to license According to the legal theory the purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage and protect innovation by conferring monopoly right mdash that is to give intellectual property owners the proprietary rights which can exclude others from using the intellectual property The SEP holders admittedly need to comply with FRAND terms which can maintain a robust balance between competition and monopoly whereas the further intervention of antitrust law into non-SEP patents may undermine the purpose of intellectual property law To which extent the antitrust law should intervene is yet to be seen

Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei41

A confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the Beijing IP court made by the Beijing High Court

41 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcncpwswbjzscq201511t20151103_12225640htm last visited on December 28 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 47 of 52

Facts

On August 2 2013 the NDRC penalized Abbott for monopolistic price-fixing and then Abbott made a price adjustment in China where the prices of main products were reduced

On December 16 2014 Tian Junwei (ldquoTianrdquo) a Chinese citizen in Beijing sued Carrefour Shuangjing Branch (ldquoCarrefourrdquo) and Abbott (Shanghai) Sales Company (ldquoAbbottrdquo) at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (ldquoIP Courtrdquo) for their monopolistic price-fixing which damaged his interests However Carrefour and Abbott challenged the jurisdiction of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court They claimed there were two reasons Firstly according to the jurisdiction rules of the IP court issued by the Supreme Court the IP court has no jurisdiction over anti-trust cases Secondly if this case is a contractual dispute the court that is in the place of Carrefour should hear it if this case is a tort dispute the Shanghai Intermediate Court should hear it

In the ruling of the IP Court the IP Court decided it has the jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases for the following reasons According to the Provisions On Causes Of Action In Civil Cases issued by Supreme Court (最高人民法院案由规定) antimonopoly dispute is a tertiary cause of action belonging to IP and competition disputes Also according to the Provisions concerning the Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京

市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问题的规定 ) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was an IP and competition dispute and was sued after November 6 2014 Thus the IP Court had jurisdiction

Both Carrefour and Abbott appealed to the Beijing High Court over the jurisdiction ruling but the Beijing High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original ruling Reasons are listed in the written ruling issued on June 18 2015 Firstly the nature of the case was an antimonopoly dispute In accordance with Provisions of the Supreme Peoples Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民

事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) and Civil Litigation Law the monopolistic civil disputes in the first instance shall be under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Peoples Courts and an action involving a contractual dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the peoples court of the place where the defendant is domiciled or where the contract is performed Carrefour as the defendant in this case is domiciled in Chaoyang District Beijing Therefore the courts of Beijing have jurisdiction over this case Secondly according to article 3 of the Notification on the Jurisdiction of Intellectual Property Courts issued by Supreme Court (关于知识产权法院案件管辖

等有关问题的通知) IP courts have jurisdiction over first-instance civil disputes arising from monopolistic practices Lastly according to Provisions concerning the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 36 of 52

market and the company has a monopoly in the market The evidence shows that the company has the ability to control the prices the position for the downstream is relatively weak

With respect to the market entry the agency found that the market entry is relatively high in addition other undertakings are dependent on the company Thus the agency believed the company to have market dominance

Refusal to Deal

The agency found that on September 25 2015 the company reached an exclusive agreement and distribution agreement with its distributor Based on these agreements the company didnrsquot supply allopurinol API to the said distributor and other companies despite the fact that those companies requested for allopurinol API but were turned down by the company

Absence of Reasonable Cause

The agency found that the companyrsquos refusal to deal was not in line with the needs of normal business operation or economic efficiency On the other hand the refusal to deal was aimed at increasing the market share of the allopurinol drug product Also the agency found that the stop of supply was a manipulation of market power as to maximize the profit to the most The agency further found that the exclusive distribution agreement with suspension of supply for six months and the refusal to supply was to eliminate and restrict the competition as to gain the monopolistic profit

The Consequence of Refusal to Deal

The agency concluded that the refusal to deal harmed the competition of the allopurinol preparations market Because of the suspension of supply many demanders had to reduce their production or switch to the supply of other products or stop their production The suspension of supply affected the competition of the downstream market Consequently the raising of the price of allopurinol API also raised the cost for other manufacturers of allopurinol preparations

Furthermore the refusal to deal led to capacity loss of the allopurinol preparation industry

Ultimately the refusal to deal increased the burden on consumers as the refusal to supply changed the supply-demand relationship in the market

The agency concluded that the Company abused its dominant position in the allopurinol API market by refusing to deal with intended buyers in the period between October 2013 and March 2014Therefore the Company violated article 17 (1) of the AML which prohibits business operators with a dominant market position from abusing that position such as the refusal to deal without any justifications

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 37 of 52

D Administrative Monopoly

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 witnessed antitrust authoritiesrsquo significant efforts regarding the enforcement against administrative monopoly According to Mr Dong Zhiming the deputy director general of Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly Bureau ever since the AML coming into force six cases in connection with administrative monopoly were investigated by NDRC and among them five cases were handled in the year of 2015 These cases touched abuses of administrative power in terms of designative deal in relation to transportation communication and pharmaceutical industries

The first private litigation related to administrative monopolistic acts was heard in the court which is a milestone case in the enforcement of the AML

Significant Cases

Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC33

Facts

In March 2015 the NDRC released the official letter to Shandong Provincial Department of Transportation (ldquoShandong DOTrdquo) on its website with respect to correct its abuse of administrative power to exclude and restrict competition

During the investigation the NDRC found that since 2011 Shandong DOT had issued multiple relevant government orders in order to require certain types of vehicles to be directly connected to two designated information and service platforms both of which are operated and technically supported by one company namely Shandong Jiutong Internet of Things Technology Co Ltd (ldquoJiutong ITTrdquo) Furthermore according to the orders issued by the competent administrative department all the vehicle satellite positioning terminals entering into Shandong provincial market should be debugged through the said technology service platform which is operated by the mentioned company In addition Shandong DOT released the cap prices of vehicle satellite positioning terminals which is identical to the 2012 bid-winning price in the Ministry of Transportation demonstration project

The NDRC believed that Shandong DOTrsquos behaviour eliminated and restricted the competition in the monitoring platform market and the vehicle terminal market deprived the right of transportation enterprises to choose vehicle terminals and monitoring platform on their owns unreasonably raised the sales prices of vehicle terminals and service fees charged by the platform and increased the costs of transportation enterprises Therefore the antitrust agency concluded that Shandong

33 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201503t20150327_668911html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 38 of 52

DOT violated article 8 of the AML which stipulates that ldquoadministrative organs and the public organizations with an administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude and restrict competitionrdquo Specifically Shandong DOT violated article 3234 in terms of requiring organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any designated operators and violated article 3735 in terms of setting rules with contents which eliminate and restrict competition

Based on article 51 of the AML ldquoWhere administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations abuse administrative powers performing activities which exclude and restrict competition the superior entity shall order it to correct impose administrative penalty on the chief officer and other staffs directly responsible pursuant to the laws The AML enforcement authority may give recommendations on disposal of activities to the relevant superior entityrdquo the NDRC proposed in writing that the Shandong provincial government should order Shandong DOT to rectify its behaviour with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Entirely open up the monitoring platform market by permitting transportation undertakings to freely choose any approved platform

2) Loosen the restrictions on the entry into Shandong vehicle terminals permit the undertakings to independently select the supplier of vehicle terminals and allow the qualified terminals to be connected to the relevant monitoring platform and

3) Revoke the official documentation relevant to the cap price of vehicle terminals in order to promote the price competition

Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 36

Facts

On 26 August 2015 the NDRC published its second decision with regard to the rectification of administrative monopoly since the beginning of this year According to the proposal letter sent to Anhui Provincial Government the investigation against the Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City (Bengbu HFPC) was trigged by third partiesrsquo complaints

34 Article 32 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to require organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any operators designated by them 35 Article 37 of the AML Administrative organs shall not abuse their administrative powers to set rules with contents which eliminate restrict competition 36 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201508t20150826_748682html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 39 of 52

The investigation suggests that Bengbu HFPC published three notices with regard to drugs procurement in April and May of this year

In the No C-2015-CG-X-111 Notice (ldquoNo111 Noticerdquo) released on 10 April2015 the health authority not only provided the dosage form and qualification of the requested drugs but also directly determined the suppliers of relevant drugs which eliminated and restricted the competition among pharmaceutical manufacturers and therefore violated articles 32 and 37 of the AML

In the No C-2015-CG-C-112 Notice (ldquoNo112 Noticerdquo) and No C-2015-CG-C-168 (ldquoNo 168 Noticerdquo) respectively released on 10 April and 22 May 2015 the Bengbu HFPC set discriminative qualification requirements on non-local undertakings in order to restrict their participation in the relevant bidding For instance in accordance with No 112 Notice to be a qualified bidder the turnover of non-local undertakings shall exceed CNY 2 billion which is 50 times as much as the turnover requirements of the local undertakings In the NDRCrsquos opinion the administrative monopoly activities conducted by the local health agency excluded the relevant undertakings from the market maintained the virtual-high prices of drugs and therefore violated articles 3237 and 37 of the AML

The NDRC suggested in a letter that Anhui Provincial Government should urge the Bengbu HFPC to rectify the abuse of monopoly powers with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Stop setting distinguishing restrictions on qualification requirements review standards and numbers of winning bidders as for local and non-local undertakings

2) Stop designating the suppliers of competitive drugs and

3) Take necessary measures to mitigate the negative effects resulting from the previous illegal monopolistic abuses

Outlook

At the beginning of the year the former director general of the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau under the NDRC Xu Kunlin stated that the agency would strengthen antitrust enforcement on abuse of administrative power in 2015

Since then the NDRC has made great efforts to rectify unreasonable abuses of administrative power The currently disclosed two cases investigated by the NDRC re-emphasize the Chinese Governmentrsquos strict scrutiny of antitrust issues in respect of

37 Article 34 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to restrict or reject the participation of operators from other regions in local bidding activities by measures such as prescribing discriminatory qualification requirements or assessment standards or by not publishing information according to law

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 40 of 52

administrative monopoly It reminds the local governments that antitrust compliance is of significant importance

III Private Litigation

A Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen more and more private antitrust litigations

The private antitrust litigation cases have become increasingly complicated especially the issues regarding the intersection areas of IP and antitrust law

Multinational giants and State-Owned Enterprises (the ldquoSOEsrdquo) are increasingly becoming the targets in antitrust civil litigations Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (the ldquoSMEsrdquo) tend to use the antitrust litigation to achieve their commercial goals in the business context

B Significant Cases

Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)38

This is the first-ever private litigation concerning administrative monopoly since the implementation of the AML in 2008

Facts

According to the currently disclosed details the case is relevant for designated trade

The plaintiff Shenzhen Sware Technology Co Ltd (ldquoSwarerdquo) is a software company The press releases suggest that Sware Gloden Software Co Ltd (ldquoGlodenrdquo) and Shanghai Ruban Software Co Ltd (ldquoShanghai Rubanrdquo) are the three main suppliers of construction cost software and possess the major shares of the relevant market An annual provincial vocational ability contest regarding the construction cost hosted by the Guangdong Department of Education (ldquoGuangdong DOE) designated Gloden as the exclusive supplier of the relevant software

After several unsuccessful verbal and written negotiations with Guangdong DOE in April 2014 Sware filed a lawsuit against Guangdong DOE before the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquothe Courtrdquo) alleging that the administrative organ abused its administrative power and violated the AML by designating exclusive software supplier for the contest and claimed a compensation for reasonable expense amounting to CNY 10800 Yuan

The opinions of the Court 38 The story of the case is available at httpfinancesinacomcnchinadfjj20150410074621924997shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 41 of 52

The full text of the judgment has not been disclosed yet In accordance with the information available to the public the Court invoked article 32 of the AML which prohibits an administrative organ from abusing its administrative power to require or in disguised form organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use only the commodities supplied by the entities designated by them The Court concluded that Guangdong DOE failed to prove the legitimacy of the designation and therefore abused its administration power

Currently the case is in appeal before the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court

Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 39

It is the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China

In the first instance ruling Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court ruled against Sinopec holding that the Yunnan branch of Sinopecs trading company was obligated to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its dominance in the sales market of refined oil by refusing to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding without justifiable reasons

In the second instance ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors Currently the case is pending

Facts

The First Trial

The lawsuit was filed before the Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoKunming Courtrdquo) in January 2014 Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy Co Ltd (ldquoYingdingrdquo) a bio-energy manufacturer claimed that Sinopec and the Yunnan branch of Sinopec trading company (ldquoSinopec Yunnan Branchrdquo) had failed to fulfil their obligations stipulated in the Renewable Energy Law and had abused their market dominance in sales market of refined oil by refusing to trade with Yingding without justifiable reasons

Sinopec and Sinopec Yunnan Branch mainly explained four reasons for why they rejected Yingdingrsquos biofuel Firstly Yingding had failed to prove that the biofuel complied with the relevant national standard and was safe to use Secondly Yingding had failed to provide complete trading terms Thirdly the laws and regulations regarding biofuel were incomplete the authorized refined oil sales companies were 39 The details of the case are available at httpnewsxinhuanetcomfortune2014-1217c_1113680039htm httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=9e71db51-6ff6-4d2c-8af6-8eacf023ebdeampKeyWord=E4BA91E58D97E79B88E9BC8E|E4B8ADE79FB3E58C96 httpnewsxinhuanetcomenergy2015-0422c_127721575htm httpwwwnbdcomcnarticles2015-04-23911348html last visited on December 17 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 42 of 52

obligated to purchase biofuel from the biofuel manufacturers if it met certain quality standards but there was a vacancy regarding how to reach the end consumers from the sales companies

On 8 December 2014 the Kunming Intermediate Peoples Court ruled that Sinopec Yunnan Branch bore a legal obligation to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its market dominance in refined oil market by refusing without any justifiable reasons to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding The court ordered Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network within 30 days Both Yingding and Sinopec filed appeals to the Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court

The Appellate Trial

The appeal hearing was held on 22 April 2015 in Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoYunnan Courtrdquo) Sinopec submitted 23 new pieces of evidence and introduced two expert witnesses in a bid to overturn several key elements in the first-instance ruling by Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court

In terms of the determination of the relevant market and the market dominance Sinopec argued that the relevant market in this case was for adipic acid monomethyl ester (ldquoAAMErdquo) the main ingredient of a biofuel additive known as BD100 Yingdingrsquos main product is BD100 which can be blended with fossil diesel to become biofuel In the AAME market Sinopec is a potential buyer instead of a market dominator In support of this argument Sinopec presented an expert witnessmdashGong Jiong a professor of economics at Beijings University of International Business and Economics who testified that AAME should be defined as the relevant product market on the basis of an economic analysis

However Yingding insisted that the first-instance ruling was correct in naming the sales market of refined oil as the relevant market and submitted new evidence an article on Sinopecs website that claimed it had a 67 market share in Yunnan to help establish the claim that Sinopec had market dominance

Another main dispute was whether Yingdingrsquos biofuel product met national standards which would make it mandatory for Sinopec to purchase under Chinas Renewable Energy Law The law stipulates that biofuel producers must sell their products first to an authorized refined oil sales company and the sales companies are obliged to buy the fuel if it meets certain quality standards In order to test the quality Sinopec introduced the second expert witness Lin Jianmin a leading author of Chinarsquos national biofuel standard Lin Jianmin pointed out that there are currently quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology which gives Sinopec a justifiable reason not to trade with Yingding Moreover Sinopec presented some precedents in which consumers had complained about the biofuel quality and also claimed that China didnt have a sound regulatory framework to support biofuel production neither in testing nor in sales

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 43 of 52

Nevertheless to refute this point Yingding referred to an earlier test in co-operation with Sinopec in 2011 where selected buses in Kunming used biofuel blended by Sinopec using BD100 produced by Yingding

On August 13 2015 Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors and now this case is pending In the written appellate ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court did not provide any details regarding its reasoning

Key Issues of the Case

Is there any competition between Yingding and Sinopec

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case the product of Yingding is biofuel while Sinopec does not engage in the business of biofuel From this perspective Yingding and Sinopec are not competitors Thus it is not necessary and not reasonable for Sinopec to eliminate or restrict the competition from Yingding

Relevant Market

The definition of the relevant market is a prerequisite to determine whether competition exists and whether the AML is applicable In accordance with the Judicial Interpretation of Antitrust civil litigation the plaintiff shall take the responsibility to prove the defendantrsquos dominance in the relevant market Also the methods of defining the relevant market are stipulated in the Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition (ldquoGuidelinesrdquo) However both Yingding and Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court defined the relevant market as the sales market of refined oil without sufficient antitrust analysis none of the methods in the Guidelines were used Therefore the definition of the relevant market remains arguable and needs to be sufficiently analysed in the upcoming retrial

Justifiable Reasons

The abuse of market dominance includes the behaviour of refusing to trade without justifiable reasons according to the AML but in the first instance ruling justifiable reasons were not investigated by the court During the appellate trial the expert witness introduced by Sinopec claimed that there were quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology and this was a justifiable reason to refuse to trade with Yingding Even though the first instance court and the appellate court did not reason the justifiable reason it should be discussed and investigated further during the retrial

AML or Renewable Energy Law

The claims of Yingding were based on both the AML and the Renewable Energy Law (ldquoRELrdquo) and the first instance ruling referred to both the AML and the REL as

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 44 of 52

well It seems that the laws the first instance court referred to were comprehensive but in fact the reasoning was not clear and logical In the first instance ruling some disputes regarding the AML were reviewed but all the orders were not based on the AML Specifically the first instance court ordered the Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network based on the REL and dismissed the other claims That the orders were not on account of reasoning is illogical It is anticipated that during the retrial the application of the laws will be clearer

Analysis

A lot of issues have not been clearly analysed by the courts such as the relevant market and the justifiable reasons Since the case is remanded the above-mentioned issues are expected to be resolved in the retrial In addition Yingding was in a disadvantaged position compared to its first instance trial since its claims based on the AML were challenged greatly during the appellate trial In the retrial it is probable that Yingding may switch its litigation strategy and base its claims on the REL Therefore maybe more preparation regarding the REL can give Sinopec a leg up

Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)

Rijing Electric a Chinese distributor seeks CNY 5m compensation

The first hearing was on 9 June 2015 and ended without a ruling

Facts

Rijing Electric (ldquoRijingrdquo) a Shanghai-based company and a former distributor for Panasonic accused Panasonic of abusing its dominance and dividing the market through monopolistic practice in an antitrust lawsuit filed in 2014 with Shanghai No 1 Intermediate Court (ldquoShanghai Courtrdquo) claiming compensation of CNY 5m (USD 815370) Wenzhou Mingda Automation System Co and Shanghai Qingying Automation Equipment as the distributor of Panasonic in China are the co-defendants were accused of conducting monopolistic behaviours by implementing Panasonicrsquos policy

The first hearing for evidence exchange was on June 9 2015 Rijing claimed a policy allegedly introduced by Panasonic in 2009 restricted the competition between distributors Panasonic claims the policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo and has full justifiable reasons It explained that the products in question required customization at considerable cost to distributors before its sale to customers Once carried out however other distributors leaving them open to quote much lower prices than the original distributor could simply and relatively cheap replicate this customization Besides Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and that the plaintiff had failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic said its market share for the four products

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 45 of 52

under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases Also Rijing failed to challenge the policy when it was first introduced instead initially agreeing it was reasonable as e-mail evidence submitted by Panasonic suggests

Key Issues of the Case

Whether Panasonic occupied a market dominant position

It is reported that Rijing claimed that Panasonic had abused its market dominance but Rijing failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and its market share for the four products under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases

Analysis

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case Panasonicrsquos policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo rather than to eliminate or restrict competition

Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals40 (Pending)

It is a battle over patent licensing issues

It is viewed as being among the most complicated antitrust lawsuits in China

The first hearing was on 17 and 18 December 2015

Facts

Four Chinese rare earth companies Ningbo Ketian Magnet Ningbo Permanent Magnetics Ningbo Tongchuang Strong Magnet Material and Ningbo Huahui Magnetic Industry filed antitrust lawsuits against Hitachi Metals over alleged patent licensing issues regarding rare earth magnets on December 11 2014 with the Ningbo Intermediate Peoples Court (ldquoNingbo Courtrdquo) in Zhejiang province As reported four Chinese rare earth companies claimed Hitachi Metals abused its market dominance and hurt the industry competition by refusing to license the patents to them The patents in this case are used in the manufacturing of sintered neodymium iron boron (ldquoNdFeBrdquo) magnets a rare-earth magnet alloy widely used in parts for airplanes automobiles and other products

Hitachi Metals filed a challenge with the Ningbo Court over its jurisdiction in April 2015 After Ningbo Court rejected Hitachi Metals jurisdiction objection on 28 April 2015 Hitachi Metals appealed to the Zhejiang High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoZhejiang

40The details of the story are available at httpwwwzbmagcomnews_viewphpid=80 httpwwwhitachicomcnaboutpress201510-121118_ahtml last visited on December 22 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 46 of 52

Courtrdquo) but Zhejiang Court affirmed the ruling of the Ningbo Court

The first day of a two-day hearing took place on 17 December 2015 during which the two sides cross-examined each otherrsquos evidence The evidence focused on clearing up several key elements in the case including the relevant market whether Hitachi Metals has dominance on that market and whether both sides acted in good faith during the licensing negotiations

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Product Market

The four Chinese rare earth companies claimed that the relevant product market should be the NdFeb-related patent licensing market However Hitachi Metals believed that the physical NdFeb market rather than the patent licensing market should be the relevant product market which is meaningful for assess the real competitive effects on the market

Whether Hitachi Metals occupies a dominant market position

In terms of market dominance Hitachi Metals claimed it does not occupy a dominant position because Hitachi Metalsrsquo patents were not in a standard in this case and there are substitutable technologies in the market SEP holders have the obligation to license on FRAND terms but none-SEP holders do not So while a refusal to license a SEP may constitute abuse of dominance refusal to license a non-SEP mdash even by a patent holder with a dominant position mdash should not be considered as an abuse

Analysis

Hitachi Metals as a patent holder should have the right to decide whether to retain those patents or not or who to license According to the legal theory the purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage and protect innovation by conferring monopoly right mdash that is to give intellectual property owners the proprietary rights which can exclude others from using the intellectual property The SEP holders admittedly need to comply with FRAND terms which can maintain a robust balance between competition and monopoly whereas the further intervention of antitrust law into non-SEP patents may undermine the purpose of intellectual property law To which extent the antitrust law should intervene is yet to be seen

Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei41

A confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the Beijing IP court made by the Beijing High Court

41 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcncpwswbjzscq201511t20151103_12225640htm last visited on December 28 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 47 of 52

Facts

On August 2 2013 the NDRC penalized Abbott for monopolistic price-fixing and then Abbott made a price adjustment in China where the prices of main products were reduced

On December 16 2014 Tian Junwei (ldquoTianrdquo) a Chinese citizen in Beijing sued Carrefour Shuangjing Branch (ldquoCarrefourrdquo) and Abbott (Shanghai) Sales Company (ldquoAbbottrdquo) at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (ldquoIP Courtrdquo) for their monopolistic price-fixing which damaged his interests However Carrefour and Abbott challenged the jurisdiction of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court They claimed there were two reasons Firstly according to the jurisdiction rules of the IP court issued by the Supreme Court the IP court has no jurisdiction over anti-trust cases Secondly if this case is a contractual dispute the court that is in the place of Carrefour should hear it if this case is a tort dispute the Shanghai Intermediate Court should hear it

In the ruling of the IP Court the IP Court decided it has the jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases for the following reasons According to the Provisions On Causes Of Action In Civil Cases issued by Supreme Court (最高人民法院案由规定) antimonopoly dispute is a tertiary cause of action belonging to IP and competition disputes Also according to the Provisions concerning the Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京

市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问题的规定 ) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was an IP and competition dispute and was sued after November 6 2014 Thus the IP Court had jurisdiction

Both Carrefour and Abbott appealed to the Beijing High Court over the jurisdiction ruling but the Beijing High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original ruling Reasons are listed in the written ruling issued on June 18 2015 Firstly the nature of the case was an antimonopoly dispute In accordance with Provisions of the Supreme Peoples Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民

事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) and Civil Litigation Law the monopolistic civil disputes in the first instance shall be under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Peoples Courts and an action involving a contractual dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the peoples court of the place where the defendant is domiciled or where the contract is performed Carrefour as the defendant in this case is domiciled in Chaoyang District Beijing Therefore the courts of Beijing have jurisdiction over this case Secondly according to article 3 of the Notification on the Jurisdiction of Intellectual Property Courts issued by Supreme Court (关于知识产权法院案件管辖

等有关问题的通知) IP courts have jurisdiction over first-instance civil disputes arising from monopolistic practices Lastly according to Provisions concerning the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 37 of 52

D Administrative Monopoly

Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 witnessed antitrust authoritiesrsquo significant efforts regarding the enforcement against administrative monopoly According to Mr Dong Zhiming the deputy director general of Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly Bureau ever since the AML coming into force six cases in connection with administrative monopoly were investigated by NDRC and among them five cases were handled in the year of 2015 These cases touched abuses of administrative power in terms of designative deal in relation to transportation communication and pharmaceutical industries

The first private litigation related to administrative monopolistic acts was heard in the court which is a milestone case in the enforcement of the AML

Significant Cases

Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC33

Facts

In March 2015 the NDRC released the official letter to Shandong Provincial Department of Transportation (ldquoShandong DOTrdquo) on its website with respect to correct its abuse of administrative power to exclude and restrict competition

During the investigation the NDRC found that since 2011 Shandong DOT had issued multiple relevant government orders in order to require certain types of vehicles to be directly connected to two designated information and service platforms both of which are operated and technically supported by one company namely Shandong Jiutong Internet of Things Technology Co Ltd (ldquoJiutong ITTrdquo) Furthermore according to the orders issued by the competent administrative department all the vehicle satellite positioning terminals entering into Shandong provincial market should be debugged through the said technology service platform which is operated by the mentioned company In addition Shandong DOT released the cap prices of vehicle satellite positioning terminals which is identical to the 2012 bid-winning price in the Ministry of Transportation demonstration project

The NDRC believed that Shandong DOTrsquos behaviour eliminated and restricted the competition in the monitoring platform market and the vehicle terminal market deprived the right of transportation enterprises to choose vehicle terminals and monitoring platform on their owns unreasonably raised the sales prices of vehicle terminals and service fees charged by the platform and increased the costs of transportation enterprises Therefore the antitrust agency concluded that Shandong

33 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201503t20150327_668911html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 38 of 52

DOT violated article 8 of the AML which stipulates that ldquoadministrative organs and the public organizations with an administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude and restrict competitionrdquo Specifically Shandong DOT violated article 3234 in terms of requiring organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any designated operators and violated article 3735 in terms of setting rules with contents which eliminate and restrict competition

Based on article 51 of the AML ldquoWhere administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations abuse administrative powers performing activities which exclude and restrict competition the superior entity shall order it to correct impose administrative penalty on the chief officer and other staffs directly responsible pursuant to the laws The AML enforcement authority may give recommendations on disposal of activities to the relevant superior entityrdquo the NDRC proposed in writing that the Shandong provincial government should order Shandong DOT to rectify its behaviour with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Entirely open up the monitoring platform market by permitting transportation undertakings to freely choose any approved platform

2) Loosen the restrictions on the entry into Shandong vehicle terminals permit the undertakings to independently select the supplier of vehicle terminals and allow the qualified terminals to be connected to the relevant monitoring platform and

3) Revoke the official documentation relevant to the cap price of vehicle terminals in order to promote the price competition

Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 36

Facts

On 26 August 2015 the NDRC published its second decision with regard to the rectification of administrative monopoly since the beginning of this year According to the proposal letter sent to Anhui Provincial Government the investigation against the Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City (Bengbu HFPC) was trigged by third partiesrsquo complaints

34 Article 32 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to require organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any operators designated by them 35 Article 37 of the AML Administrative organs shall not abuse their administrative powers to set rules with contents which eliminate restrict competition 36 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201508t20150826_748682html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 39 of 52

The investigation suggests that Bengbu HFPC published three notices with regard to drugs procurement in April and May of this year

In the No C-2015-CG-X-111 Notice (ldquoNo111 Noticerdquo) released on 10 April2015 the health authority not only provided the dosage form and qualification of the requested drugs but also directly determined the suppliers of relevant drugs which eliminated and restricted the competition among pharmaceutical manufacturers and therefore violated articles 32 and 37 of the AML

In the No C-2015-CG-C-112 Notice (ldquoNo112 Noticerdquo) and No C-2015-CG-C-168 (ldquoNo 168 Noticerdquo) respectively released on 10 April and 22 May 2015 the Bengbu HFPC set discriminative qualification requirements on non-local undertakings in order to restrict their participation in the relevant bidding For instance in accordance with No 112 Notice to be a qualified bidder the turnover of non-local undertakings shall exceed CNY 2 billion which is 50 times as much as the turnover requirements of the local undertakings In the NDRCrsquos opinion the administrative monopoly activities conducted by the local health agency excluded the relevant undertakings from the market maintained the virtual-high prices of drugs and therefore violated articles 3237 and 37 of the AML

The NDRC suggested in a letter that Anhui Provincial Government should urge the Bengbu HFPC to rectify the abuse of monopoly powers with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Stop setting distinguishing restrictions on qualification requirements review standards and numbers of winning bidders as for local and non-local undertakings

2) Stop designating the suppliers of competitive drugs and

3) Take necessary measures to mitigate the negative effects resulting from the previous illegal monopolistic abuses

Outlook

At the beginning of the year the former director general of the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau under the NDRC Xu Kunlin stated that the agency would strengthen antitrust enforcement on abuse of administrative power in 2015

Since then the NDRC has made great efforts to rectify unreasonable abuses of administrative power The currently disclosed two cases investigated by the NDRC re-emphasize the Chinese Governmentrsquos strict scrutiny of antitrust issues in respect of

37 Article 34 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to restrict or reject the participation of operators from other regions in local bidding activities by measures such as prescribing discriminatory qualification requirements or assessment standards or by not publishing information according to law

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 40 of 52

administrative monopoly It reminds the local governments that antitrust compliance is of significant importance

III Private Litigation

A Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen more and more private antitrust litigations

The private antitrust litigation cases have become increasingly complicated especially the issues regarding the intersection areas of IP and antitrust law

Multinational giants and State-Owned Enterprises (the ldquoSOEsrdquo) are increasingly becoming the targets in antitrust civil litigations Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (the ldquoSMEsrdquo) tend to use the antitrust litigation to achieve their commercial goals in the business context

B Significant Cases

Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)38

This is the first-ever private litigation concerning administrative monopoly since the implementation of the AML in 2008

Facts

According to the currently disclosed details the case is relevant for designated trade

The plaintiff Shenzhen Sware Technology Co Ltd (ldquoSwarerdquo) is a software company The press releases suggest that Sware Gloden Software Co Ltd (ldquoGlodenrdquo) and Shanghai Ruban Software Co Ltd (ldquoShanghai Rubanrdquo) are the three main suppliers of construction cost software and possess the major shares of the relevant market An annual provincial vocational ability contest regarding the construction cost hosted by the Guangdong Department of Education (ldquoGuangdong DOE) designated Gloden as the exclusive supplier of the relevant software

After several unsuccessful verbal and written negotiations with Guangdong DOE in April 2014 Sware filed a lawsuit against Guangdong DOE before the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquothe Courtrdquo) alleging that the administrative organ abused its administrative power and violated the AML by designating exclusive software supplier for the contest and claimed a compensation for reasonable expense amounting to CNY 10800 Yuan

The opinions of the Court 38 The story of the case is available at httpfinancesinacomcnchinadfjj20150410074621924997shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 41 of 52

The full text of the judgment has not been disclosed yet In accordance with the information available to the public the Court invoked article 32 of the AML which prohibits an administrative organ from abusing its administrative power to require or in disguised form organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use only the commodities supplied by the entities designated by them The Court concluded that Guangdong DOE failed to prove the legitimacy of the designation and therefore abused its administration power

Currently the case is in appeal before the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court

Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 39

It is the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China

In the first instance ruling Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court ruled against Sinopec holding that the Yunnan branch of Sinopecs trading company was obligated to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its dominance in the sales market of refined oil by refusing to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding without justifiable reasons

In the second instance ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors Currently the case is pending

Facts

The First Trial

The lawsuit was filed before the Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoKunming Courtrdquo) in January 2014 Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy Co Ltd (ldquoYingdingrdquo) a bio-energy manufacturer claimed that Sinopec and the Yunnan branch of Sinopec trading company (ldquoSinopec Yunnan Branchrdquo) had failed to fulfil their obligations stipulated in the Renewable Energy Law and had abused their market dominance in sales market of refined oil by refusing to trade with Yingding without justifiable reasons

Sinopec and Sinopec Yunnan Branch mainly explained four reasons for why they rejected Yingdingrsquos biofuel Firstly Yingding had failed to prove that the biofuel complied with the relevant national standard and was safe to use Secondly Yingding had failed to provide complete trading terms Thirdly the laws and regulations regarding biofuel were incomplete the authorized refined oil sales companies were 39 The details of the case are available at httpnewsxinhuanetcomfortune2014-1217c_1113680039htm httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=9e71db51-6ff6-4d2c-8af6-8eacf023ebdeampKeyWord=E4BA91E58D97E79B88E9BC8E|E4B8ADE79FB3E58C96 httpnewsxinhuanetcomenergy2015-0422c_127721575htm httpwwwnbdcomcnarticles2015-04-23911348html last visited on December 17 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 42 of 52

obligated to purchase biofuel from the biofuel manufacturers if it met certain quality standards but there was a vacancy regarding how to reach the end consumers from the sales companies

On 8 December 2014 the Kunming Intermediate Peoples Court ruled that Sinopec Yunnan Branch bore a legal obligation to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its market dominance in refined oil market by refusing without any justifiable reasons to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding The court ordered Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network within 30 days Both Yingding and Sinopec filed appeals to the Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court

The Appellate Trial

The appeal hearing was held on 22 April 2015 in Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoYunnan Courtrdquo) Sinopec submitted 23 new pieces of evidence and introduced two expert witnesses in a bid to overturn several key elements in the first-instance ruling by Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court

In terms of the determination of the relevant market and the market dominance Sinopec argued that the relevant market in this case was for adipic acid monomethyl ester (ldquoAAMErdquo) the main ingredient of a biofuel additive known as BD100 Yingdingrsquos main product is BD100 which can be blended with fossil diesel to become biofuel In the AAME market Sinopec is a potential buyer instead of a market dominator In support of this argument Sinopec presented an expert witnessmdashGong Jiong a professor of economics at Beijings University of International Business and Economics who testified that AAME should be defined as the relevant product market on the basis of an economic analysis

However Yingding insisted that the first-instance ruling was correct in naming the sales market of refined oil as the relevant market and submitted new evidence an article on Sinopecs website that claimed it had a 67 market share in Yunnan to help establish the claim that Sinopec had market dominance

Another main dispute was whether Yingdingrsquos biofuel product met national standards which would make it mandatory for Sinopec to purchase under Chinas Renewable Energy Law The law stipulates that biofuel producers must sell their products first to an authorized refined oil sales company and the sales companies are obliged to buy the fuel if it meets certain quality standards In order to test the quality Sinopec introduced the second expert witness Lin Jianmin a leading author of Chinarsquos national biofuel standard Lin Jianmin pointed out that there are currently quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology which gives Sinopec a justifiable reason not to trade with Yingding Moreover Sinopec presented some precedents in which consumers had complained about the biofuel quality and also claimed that China didnt have a sound regulatory framework to support biofuel production neither in testing nor in sales

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 43 of 52

Nevertheless to refute this point Yingding referred to an earlier test in co-operation with Sinopec in 2011 where selected buses in Kunming used biofuel blended by Sinopec using BD100 produced by Yingding

On August 13 2015 Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors and now this case is pending In the written appellate ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court did not provide any details regarding its reasoning

Key Issues of the Case

Is there any competition between Yingding and Sinopec

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case the product of Yingding is biofuel while Sinopec does not engage in the business of biofuel From this perspective Yingding and Sinopec are not competitors Thus it is not necessary and not reasonable for Sinopec to eliminate or restrict the competition from Yingding

Relevant Market

The definition of the relevant market is a prerequisite to determine whether competition exists and whether the AML is applicable In accordance with the Judicial Interpretation of Antitrust civil litigation the plaintiff shall take the responsibility to prove the defendantrsquos dominance in the relevant market Also the methods of defining the relevant market are stipulated in the Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition (ldquoGuidelinesrdquo) However both Yingding and Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court defined the relevant market as the sales market of refined oil without sufficient antitrust analysis none of the methods in the Guidelines were used Therefore the definition of the relevant market remains arguable and needs to be sufficiently analysed in the upcoming retrial

Justifiable Reasons

The abuse of market dominance includes the behaviour of refusing to trade without justifiable reasons according to the AML but in the first instance ruling justifiable reasons were not investigated by the court During the appellate trial the expert witness introduced by Sinopec claimed that there were quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology and this was a justifiable reason to refuse to trade with Yingding Even though the first instance court and the appellate court did not reason the justifiable reason it should be discussed and investigated further during the retrial

AML or Renewable Energy Law

The claims of Yingding were based on both the AML and the Renewable Energy Law (ldquoRELrdquo) and the first instance ruling referred to both the AML and the REL as

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 44 of 52

well It seems that the laws the first instance court referred to were comprehensive but in fact the reasoning was not clear and logical In the first instance ruling some disputes regarding the AML were reviewed but all the orders were not based on the AML Specifically the first instance court ordered the Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network based on the REL and dismissed the other claims That the orders were not on account of reasoning is illogical It is anticipated that during the retrial the application of the laws will be clearer

Analysis

A lot of issues have not been clearly analysed by the courts such as the relevant market and the justifiable reasons Since the case is remanded the above-mentioned issues are expected to be resolved in the retrial In addition Yingding was in a disadvantaged position compared to its first instance trial since its claims based on the AML were challenged greatly during the appellate trial In the retrial it is probable that Yingding may switch its litigation strategy and base its claims on the REL Therefore maybe more preparation regarding the REL can give Sinopec a leg up

Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)

Rijing Electric a Chinese distributor seeks CNY 5m compensation

The first hearing was on 9 June 2015 and ended without a ruling

Facts

Rijing Electric (ldquoRijingrdquo) a Shanghai-based company and a former distributor for Panasonic accused Panasonic of abusing its dominance and dividing the market through monopolistic practice in an antitrust lawsuit filed in 2014 with Shanghai No 1 Intermediate Court (ldquoShanghai Courtrdquo) claiming compensation of CNY 5m (USD 815370) Wenzhou Mingda Automation System Co and Shanghai Qingying Automation Equipment as the distributor of Panasonic in China are the co-defendants were accused of conducting monopolistic behaviours by implementing Panasonicrsquos policy

The first hearing for evidence exchange was on June 9 2015 Rijing claimed a policy allegedly introduced by Panasonic in 2009 restricted the competition between distributors Panasonic claims the policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo and has full justifiable reasons It explained that the products in question required customization at considerable cost to distributors before its sale to customers Once carried out however other distributors leaving them open to quote much lower prices than the original distributor could simply and relatively cheap replicate this customization Besides Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and that the plaintiff had failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic said its market share for the four products

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 45 of 52

under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases Also Rijing failed to challenge the policy when it was first introduced instead initially agreeing it was reasonable as e-mail evidence submitted by Panasonic suggests

Key Issues of the Case

Whether Panasonic occupied a market dominant position

It is reported that Rijing claimed that Panasonic had abused its market dominance but Rijing failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and its market share for the four products under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases

Analysis

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case Panasonicrsquos policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo rather than to eliminate or restrict competition

Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals40 (Pending)

It is a battle over patent licensing issues

It is viewed as being among the most complicated antitrust lawsuits in China

The first hearing was on 17 and 18 December 2015

Facts

Four Chinese rare earth companies Ningbo Ketian Magnet Ningbo Permanent Magnetics Ningbo Tongchuang Strong Magnet Material and Ningbo Huahui Magnetic Industry filed antitrust lawsuits against Hitachi Metals over alleged patent licensing issues regarding rare earth magnets on December 11 2014 with the Ningbo Intermediate Peoples Court (ldquoNingbo Courtrdquo) in Zhejiang province As reported four Chinese rare earth companies claimed Hitachi Metals abused its market dominance and hurt the industry competition by refusing to license the patents to them The patents in this case are used in the manufacturing of sintered neodymium iron boron (ldquoNdFeBrdquo) magnets a rare-earth magnet alloy widely used in parts for airplanes automobiles and other products

Hitachi Metals filed a challenge with the Ningbo Court over its jurisdiction in April 2015 After Ningbo Court rejected Hitachi Metals jurisdiction objection on 28 April 2015 Hitachi Metals appealed to the Zhejiang High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoZhejiang

40The details of the story are available at httpwwwzbmagcomnews_viewphpid=80 httpwwwhitachicomcnaboutpress201510-121118_ahtml last visited on December 22 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 46 of 52

Courtrdquo) but Zhejiang Court affirmed the ruling of the Ningbo Court

The first day of a two-day hearing took place on 17 December 2015 during which the two sides cross-examined each otherrsquos evidence The evidence focused on clearing up several key elements in the case including the relevant market whether Hitachi Metals has dominance on that market and whether both sides acted in good faith during the licensing negotiations

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Product Market

The four Chinese rare earth companies claimed that the relevant product market should be the NdFeb-related patent licensing market However Hitachi Metals believed that the physical NdFeb market rather than the patent licensing market should be the relevant product market which is meaningful for assess the real competitive effects on the market

Whether Hitachi Metals occupies a dominant market position

In terms of market dominance Hitachi Metals claimed it does not occupy a dominant position because Hitachi Metalsrsquo patents were not in a standard in this case and there are substitutable technologies in the market SEP holders have the obligation to license on FRAND terms but none-SEP holders do not So while a refusal to license a SEP may constitute abuse of dominance refusal to license a non-SEP mdash even by a patent holder with a dominant position mdash should not be considered as an abuse

Analysis

Hitachi Metals as a patent holder should have the right to decide whether to retain those patents or not or who to license According to the legal theory the purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage and protect innovation by conferring monopoly right mdash that is to give intellectual property owners the proprietary rights which can exclude others from using the intellectual property The SEP holders admittedly need to comply with FRAND terms which can maintain a robust balance between competition and monopoly whereas the further intervention of antitrust law into non-SEP patents may undermine the purpose of intellectual property law To which extent the antitrust law should intervene is yet to be seen

Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei41

A confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the Beijing IP court made by the Beijing High Court

41 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcncpwswbjzscq201511t20151103_12225640htm last visited on December 28 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 47 of 52

Facts

On August 2 2013 the NDRC penalized Abbott for monopolistic price-fixing and then Abbott made a price adjustment in China where the prices of main products were reduced

On December 16 2014 Tian Junwei (ldquoTianrdquo) a Chinese citizen in Beijing sued Carrefour Shuangjing Branch (ldquoCarrefourrdquo) and Abbott (Shanghai) Sales Company (ldquoAbbottrdquo) at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (ldquoIP Courtrdquo) for their monopolistic price-fixing which damaged his interests However Carrefour and Abbott challenged the jurisdiction of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court They claimed there were two reasons Firstly according to the jurisdiction rules of the IP court issued by the Supreme Court the IP court has no jurisdiction over anti-trust cases Secondly if this case is a contractual dispute the court that is in the place of Carrefour should hear it if this case is a tort dispute the Shanghai Intermediate Court should hear it

In the ruling of the IP Court the IP Court decided it has the jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases for the following reasons According to the Provisions On Causes Of Action In Civil Cases issued by Supreme Court (最高人民法院案由规定) antimonopoly dispute is a tertiary cause of action belonging to IP and competition disputes Also according to the Provisions concerning the Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京

市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问题的规定 ) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was an IP and competition dispute and was sued after November 6 2014 Thus the IP Court had jurisdiction

Both Carrefour and Abbott appealed to the Beijing High Court over the jurisdiction ruling but the Beijing High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original ruling Reasons are listed in the written ruling issued on June 18 2015 Firstly the nature of the case was an antimonopoly dispute In accordance with Provisions of the Supreme Peoples Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民

事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) and Civil Litigation Law the monopolistic civil disputes in the first instance shall be under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Peoples Courts and an action involving a contractual dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the peoples court of the place where the defendant is domiciled or where the contract is performed Carrefour as the defendant in this case is domiciled in Chaoyang District Beijing Therefore the courts of Beijing have jurisdiction over this case Secondly according to article 3 of the Notification on the Jurisdiction of Intellectual Property Courts issued by Supreme Court (关于知识产权法院案件管辖

等有关问题的通知) IP courts have jurisdiction over first-instance civil disputes arising from monopolistic practices Lastly according to Provisions concerning the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 38 of 52

DOT violated article 8 of the AML which stipulates that ldquoadministrative organs and the public organizations with an administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to exclude and restrict competitionrdquo Specifically Shandong DOT violated article 3234 in terms of requiring organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any designated operators and violated article 3735 in terms of setting rules with contents which eliminate and restrict competition

Based on article 51 of the AML ldquoWhere administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations abuse administrative powers performing activities which exclude and restrict competition the superior entity shall order it to correct impose administrative penalty on the chief officer and other staffs directly responsible pursuant to the laws The AML enforcement authority may give recommendations on disposal of activities to the relevant superior entityrdquo the NDRC proposed in writing that the Shandong provincial government should order Shandong DOT to rectify its behaviour with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Entirely open up the monitoring platform market by permitting transportation undertakings to freely choose any approved platform

2) Loosen the restrictions on the entry into Shandong vehicle terminals permit the undertakings to independently select the supplier of vehicle terminals and allow the qualified terminals to be connected to the relevant monitoring platform and

3) Revoke the official documentation relevant to the cap price of vehicle terminals in order to promote the price competition

Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 36

Facts

On 26 August 2015 the NDRC published its second decision with regard to the rectification of administrative monopoly since the beginning of this year According to the proposal letter sent to Anhui Provincial Government the investigation against the Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City (Bengbu HFPC) was trigged by third partiesrsquo complaints

34 Article 32 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to require organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use the commodities supplied by any operators designated by them 35 Article 37 of the AML Administrative organs shall not abuse their administrative powers to set rules with contents which eliminate restrict competition 36 The original Chinese notice published by the NDRC is available at httpjjsndrcgovcnfjgld201508t20150826_748682html

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 39 of 52

The investigation suggests that Bengbu HFPC published three notices with regard to drugs procurement in April and May of this year

In the No C-2015-CG-X-111 Notice (ldquoNo111 Noticerdquo) released on 10 April2015 the health authority not only provided the dosage form and qualification of the requested drugs but also directly determined the suppliers of relevant drugs which eliminated and restricted the competition among pharmaceutical manufacturers and therefore violated articles 32 and 37 of the AML

In the No C-2015-CG-C-112 Notice (ldquoNo112 Noticerdquo) and No C-2015-CG-C-168 (ldquoNo 168 Noticerdquo) respectively released on 10 April and 22 May 2015 the Bengbu HFPC set discriminative qualification requirements on non-local undertakings in order to restrict their participation in the relevant bidding For instance in accordance with No 112 Notice to be a qualified bidder the turnover of non-local undertakings shall exceed CNY 2 billion which is 50 times as much as the turnover requirements of the local undertakings In the NDRCrsquos opinion the administrative monopoly activities conducted by the local health agency excluded the relevant undertakings from the market maintained the virtual-high prices of drugs and therefore violated articles 3237 and 37 of the AML

The NDRC suggested in a letter that Anhui Provincial Government should urge the Bengbu HFPC to rectify the abuse of monopoly powers with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Stop setting distinguishing restrictions on qualification requirements review standards and numbers of winning bidders as for local and non-local undertakings

2) Stop designating the suppliers of competitive drugs and

3) Take necessary measures to mitigate the negative effects resulting from the previous illegal monopolistic abuses

Outlook

At the beginning of the year the former director general of the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau under the NDRC Xu Kunlin stated that the agency would strengthen antitrust enforcement on abuse of administrative power in 2015

Since then the NDRC has made great efforts to rectify unreasonable abuses of administrative power The currently disclosed two cases investigated by the NDRC re-emphasize the Chinese Governmentrsquos strict scrutiny of antitrust issues in respect of

37 Article 34 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to restrict or reject the participation of operators from other regions in local bidding activities by measures such as prescribing discriminatory qualification requirements or assessment standards or by not publishing information according to law

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 40 of 52

administrative monopoly It reminds the local governments that antitrust compliance is of significant importance

III Private Litigation

A Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen more and more private antitrust litigations

The private antitrust litigation cases have become increasingly complicated especially the issues regarding the intersection areas of IP and antitrust law

Multinational giants and State-Owned Enterprises (the ldquoSOEsrdquo) are increasingly becoming the targets in antitrust civil litigations Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (the ldquoSMEsrdquo) tend to use the antitrust litigation to achieve their commercial goals in the business context

B Significant Cases

Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)38

This is the first-ever private litigation concerning administrative monopoly since the implementation of the AML in 2008

Facts

According to the currently disclosed details the case is relevant for designated trade

The plaintiff Shenzhen Sware Technology Co Ltd (ldquoSwarerdquo) is a software company The press releases suggest that Sware Gloden Software Co Ltd (ldquoGlodenrdquo) and Shanghai Ruban Software Co Ltd (ldquoShanghai Rubanrdquo) are the three main suppliers of construction cost software and possess the major shares of the relevant market An annual provincial vocational ability contest regarding the construction cost hosted by the Guangdong Department of Education (ldquoGuangdong DOE) designated Gloden as the exclusive supplier of the relevant software

After several unsuccessful verbal and written negotiations with Guangdong DOE in April 2014 Sware filed a lawsuit against Guangdong DOE before the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquothe Courtrdquo) alleging that the administrative organ abused its administrative power and violated the AML by designating exclusive software supplier for the contest and claimed a compensation for reasonable expense amounting to CNY 10800 Yuan

The opinions of the Court 38 The story of the case is available at httpfinancesinacomcnchinadfjj20150410074621924997shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 41 of 52

The full text of the judgment has not been disclosed yet In accordance with the information available to the public the Court invoked article 32 of the AML which prohibits an administrative organ from abusing its administrative power to require or in disguised form organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use only the commodities supplied by the entities designated by them The Court concluded that Guangdong DOE failed to prove the legitimacy of the designation and therefore abused its administration power

Currently the case is in appeal before the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court

Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 39

It is the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China

In the first instance ruling Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court ruled against Sinopec holding that the Yunnan branch of Sinopecs trading company was obligated to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its dominance in the sales market of refined oil by refusing to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding without justifiable reasons

In the second instance ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors Currently the case is pending

Facts

The First Trial

The lawsuit was filed before the Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoKunming Courtrdquo) in January 2014 Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy Co Ltd (ldquoYingdingrdquo) a bio-energy manufacturer claimed that Sinopec and the Yunnan branch of Sinopec trading company (ldquoSinopec Yunnan Branchrdquo) had failed to fulfil their obligations stipulated in the Renewable Energy Law and had abused their market dominance in sales market of refined oil by refusing to trade with Yingding without justifiable reasons

Sinopec and Sinopec Yunnan Branch mainly explained four reasons for why they rejected Yingdingrsquos biofuel Firstly Yingding had failed to prove that the biofuel complied with the relevant national standard and was safe to use Secondly Yingding had failed to provide complete trading terms Thirdly the laws and regulations regarding biofuel were incomplete the authorized refined oil sales companies were 39 The details of the case are available at httpnewsxinhuanetcomfortune2014-1217c_1113680039htm httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=9e71db51-6ff6-4d2c-8af6-8eacf023ebdeampKeyWord=E4BA91E58D97E79B88E9BC8E|E4B8ADE79FB3E58C96 httpnewsxinhuanetcomenergy2015-0422c_127721575htm httpwwwnbdcomcnarticles2015-04-23911348html last visited on December 17 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 42 of 52

obligated to purchase biofuel from the biofuel manufacturers if it met certain quality standards but there was a vacancy regarding how to reach the end consumers from the sales companies

On 8 December 2014 the Kunming Intermediate Peoples Court ruled that Sinopec Yunnan Branch bore a legal obligation to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its market dominance in refined oil market by refusing without any justifiable reasons to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding The court ordered Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network within 30 days Both Yingding and Sinopec filed appeals to the Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court

The Appellate Trial

The appeal hearing was held on 22 April 2015 in Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoYunnan Courtrdquo) Sinopec submitted 23 new pieces of evidence and introduced two expert witnesses in a bid to overturn several key elements in the first-instance ruling by Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court

In terms of the determination of the relevant market and the market dominance Sinopec argued that the relevant market in this case was for adipic acid monomethyl ester (ldquoAAMErdquo) the main ingredient of a biofuel additive known as BD100 Yingdingrsquos main product is BD100 which can be blended with fossil diesel to become biofuel In the AAME market Sinopec is a potential buyer instead of a market dominator In support of this argument Sinopec presented an expert witnessmdashGong Jiong a professor of economics at Beijings University of International Business and Economics who testified that AAME should be defined as the relevant product market on the basis of an economic analysis

However Yingding insisted that the first-instance ruling was correct in naming the sales market of refined oil as the relevant market and submitted new evidence an article on Sinopecs website that claimed it had a 67 market share in Yunnan to help establish the claim that Sinopec had market dominance

Another main dispute was whether Yingdingrsquos biofuel product met national standards which would make it mandatory for Sinopec to purchase under Chinas Renewable Energy Law The law stipulates that biofuel producers must sell their products first to an authorized refined oil sales company and the sales companies are obliged to buy the fuel if it meets certain quality standards In order to test the quality Sinopec introduced the second expert witness Lin Jianmin a leading author of Chinarsquos national biofuel standard Lin Jianmin pointed out that there are currently quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology which gives Sinopec a justifiable reason not to trade with Yingding Moreover Sinopec presented some precedents in which consumers had complained about the biofuel quality and also claimed that China didnt have a sound regulatory framework to support biofuel production neither in testing nor in sales

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 43 of 52

Nevertheless to refute this point Yingding referred to an earlier test in co-operation with Sinopec in 2011 where selected buses in Kunming used biofuel blended by Sinopec using BD100 produced by Yingding

On August 13 2015 Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors and now this case is pending In the written appellate ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court did not provide any details regarding its reasoning

Key Issues of the Case

Is there any competition between Yingding and Sinopec

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case the product of Yingding is biofuel while Sinopec does not engage in the business of biofuel From this perspective Yingding and Sinopec are not competitors Thus it is not necessary and not reasonable for Sinopec to eliminate or restrict the competition from Yingding

Relevant Market

The definition of the relevant market is a prerequisite to determine whether competition exists and whether the AML is applicable In accordance with the Judicial Interpretation of Antitrust civil litigation the plaintiff shall take the responsibility to prove the defendantrsquos dominance in the relevant market Also the methods of defining the relevant market are stipulated in the Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition (ldquoGuidelinesrdquo) However both Yingding and Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court defined the relevant market as the sales market of refined oil without sufficient antitrust analysis none of the methods in the Guidelines were used Therefore the definition of the relevant market remains arguable and needs to be sufficiently analysed in the upcoming retrial

Justifiable Reasons

The abuse of market dominance includes the behaviour of refusing to trade without justifiable reasons according to the AML but in the first instance ruling justifiable reasons were not investigated by the court During the appellate trial the expert witness introduced by Sinopec claimed that there were quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology and this was a justifiable reason to refuse to trade with Yingding Even though the first instance court and the appellate court did not reason the justifiable reason it should be discussed and investigated further during the retrial

AML or Renewable Energy Law

The claims of Yingding were based on both the AML and the Renewable Energy Law (ldquoRELrdquo) and the first instance ruling referred to both the AML and the REL as

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 44 of 52

well It seems that the laws the first instance court referred to were comprehensive but in fact the reasoning was not clear and logical In the first instance ruling some disputes regarding the AML were reviewed but all the orders were not based on the AML Specifically the first instance court ordered the Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network based on the REL and dismissed the other claims That the orders were not on account of reasoning is illogical It is anticipated that during the retrial the application of the laws will be clearer

Analysis

A lot of issues have not been clearly analysed by the courts such as the relevant market and the justifiable reasons Since the case is remanded the above-mentioned issues are expected to be resolved in the retrial In addition Yingding was in a disadvantaged position compared to its first instance trial since its claims based on the AML were challenged greatly during the appellate trial In the retrial it is probable that Yingding may switch its litigation strategy and base its claims on the REL Therefore maybe more preparation regarding the REL can give Sinopec a leg up

Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)

Rijing Electric a Chinese distributor seeks CNY 5m compensation

The first hearing was on 9 June 2015 and ended without a ruling

Facts

Rijing Electric (ldquoRijingrdquo) a Shanghai-based company and a former distributor for Panasonic accused Panasonic of abusing its dominance and dividing the market through monopolistic practice in an antitrust lawsuit filed in 2014 with Shanghai No 1 Intermediate Court (ldquoShanghai Courtrdquo) claiming compensation of CNY 5m (USD 815370) Wenzhou Mingda Automation System Co and Shanghai Qingying Automation Equipment as the distributor of Panasonic in China are the co-defendants were accused of conducting monopolistic behaviours by implementing Panasonicrsquos policy

The first hearing for evidence exchange was on June 9 2015 Rijing claimed a policy allegedly introduced by Panasonic in 2009 restricted the competition between distributors Panasonic claims the policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo and has full justifiable reasons It explained that the products in question required customization at considerable cost to distributors before its sale to customers Once carried out however other distributors leaving them open to quote much lower prices than the original distributor could simply and relatively cheap replicate this customization Besides Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and that the plaintiff had failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic said its market share for the four products

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 45 of 52

under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases Also Rijing failed to challenge the policy when it was first introduced instead initially agreeing it was reasonable as e-mail evidence submitted by Panasonic suggests

Key Issues of the Case

Whether Panasonic occupied a market dominant position

It is reported that Rijing claimed that Panasonic had abused its market dominance but Rijing failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and its market share for the four products under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases

Analysis

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case Panasonicrsquos policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo rather than to eliminate or restrict competition

Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals40 (Pending)

It is a battle over patent licensing issues

It is viewed as being among the most complicated antitrust lawsuits in China

The first hearing was on 17 and 18 December 2015

Facts

Four Chinese rare earth companies Ningbo Ketian Magnet Ningbo Permanent Magnetics Ningbo Tongchuang Strong Magnet Material and Ningbo Huahui Magnetic Industry filed antitrust lawsuits against Hitachi Metals over alleged patent licensing issues regarding rare earth magnets on December 11 2014 with the Ningbo Intermediate Peoples Court (ldquoNingbo Courtrdquo) in Zhejiang province As reported four Chinese rare earth companies claimed Hitachi Metals abused its market dominance and hurt the industry competition by refusing to license the patents to them The patents in this case are used in the manufacturing of sintered neodymium iron boron (ldquoNdFeBrdquo) magnets a rare-earth magnet alloy widely used in parts for airplanes automobiles and other products

Hitachi Metals filed a challenge with the Ningbo Court over its jurisdiction in April 2015 After Ningbo Court rejected Hitachi Metals jurisdiction objection on 28 April 2015 Hitachi Metals appealed to the Zhejiang High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoZhejiang

40The details of the story are available at httpwwwzbmagcomnews_viewphpid=80 httpwwwhitachicomcnaboutpress201510-121118_ahtml last visited on December 22 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 46 of 52

Courtrdquo) but Zhejiang Court affirmed the ruling of the Ningbo Court

The first day of a two-day hearing took place on 17 December 2015 during which the two sides cross-examined each otherrsquos evidence The evidence focused on clearing up several key elements in the case including the relevant market whether Hitachi Metals has dominance on that market and whether both sides acted in good faith during the licensing negotiations

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Product Market

The four Chinese rare earth companies claimed that the relevant product market should be the NdFeb-related patent licensing market However Hitachi Metals believed that the physical NdFeb market rather than the patent licensing market should be the relevant product market which is meaningful for assess the real competitive effects on the market

Whether Hitachi Metals occupies a dominant market position

In terms of market dominance Hitachi Metals claimed it does not occupy a dominant position because Hitachi Metalsrsquo patents were not in a standard in this case and there are substitutable technologies in the market SEP holders have the obligation to license on FRAND terms but none-SEP holders do not So while a refusal to license a SEP may constitute abuse of dominance refusal to license a non-SEP mdash even by a patent holder with a dominant position mdash should not be considered as an abuse

Analysis

Hitachi Metals as a patent holder should have the right to decide whether to retain those patents or not or who to license According to the legal theory the purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage and protect innovation by conferring monopoly right mdash that is to give intellectual property owners the proprietary rights which can exclude others from using the intellectual property The SEP holders admittedly need to comply with FRAND terms which can maintain a robust balance between competition and monopoly whereas the further intervention of antitrust law into non-SEP patents may undermine the purpose of intellectual property law To which extent the antitrust law should intervene is yet to be seen

Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei41

A confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the Beijing IP court made by the Beijing High Court

41 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcncpwswbjzscq201511t20151103_12225640htm last visited on December 28 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 47 of 52

Facts

On August 2 2013 the NDRC penalized Abbott for monopolistic price-fixing and then Abbott made a price adjustment in China where the prices of main products were reduced

On December 16 2014 Tian Junwei (ldquoTianrdquo) a Chinese citizen in Beijing sued Carrefour Shuangjing Branch (ldquoCarrefourrdquo) and Abbott (Shanghai) Sales Company (ldquoAbbottrdquo) at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (ldquoIP Courtrdquo) for their monopolistic price-fixing which damaged his interests However Carrefour and Abbott challenged the jurisdiction of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court They claimed there were two reasons Firstly according to the jurisdiction rules of the IP court issued by the Supreme Court the IP court has no jurisdiction over anti-trust cases Secondly if this case is a contractual dispute the court that is in the place of Carrefour should hear it if this case is a tort dispute the Shanghai Intermediate Court should hear it

In the ruling of the IP Court the IP Court decided it has the jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases for the following reasons According to the Provisions On Causes Of Action In Civil Cases issued by Supreme Court (最高人民法院案由规定) antimonopoly dispute is a tertiary cause of action belonging to IP and competition disputes Also according to the Provisions concerning the Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京

市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问题的规定 ) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was an IP and competition dispute and was sued after November 6 2014 Thus the IP Court had jurisdiction

Both Carrefour and Abbott appealed to the Beijing High Court over the jurisdiction ruling but the Beijing High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original ruling Reasons are listed in the written ruling issued on June 18 2015 Firstly the nature of the case was an antimonopoly dispute In accordance with Provisions of the Supreme Peoples Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民

事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) and Civil Litigation Law the monopolistic civil disputes in the first instance shall be under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Peoples Courts and an action involving a contractual dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the peoples court of the place where the defendant is domiciled or where the contract is performed Carrefour as the defendant in this case is domiciled in Chaoyang District Beijing Therefore the courts of Beijing have jurisdiction over this case Secondly according to article 3 of the Notification on the Jurisdiction of Intellectual Property Courts issued by Supreme Court (关于知识产权法院案件管辖

等有关问题的通知) IP courts have jurisdiction over first-instance civil disputes arising from monopolistic practices Lastly according to Provisions concerning the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 39 of 52

The investigation suggests that Bengbu HFPC published three notices with regard to drugs procurement in April and May of this year

In the No C-2015-CG-X-111 Notice (ldquoNo111 Noticerdquo) released on 10 April2015 the health authority not only provided the dosage form and qualification of the requested drugs but also directly determined the suppliers of relevant drugs which eliminated and restricted the competition among pharmaceutical manufacturers and therefore violated articles 32 and 37 of the AML

In the No C-2015-CG-C-112 Notice (ldquoNo112 Noticerdquo) and No C-2015-CG-C-168 (ldquoNo 168 Noticerdquo) respectively released on 10 April and 22 May 2015 the Bengbu HFPC set discriminative qualification requirements on non-local undertakings in order to restrict their participation in the relevant bidding For instance in accordance with No 112 Notice to be a qualified bidder the turnover of non-local undertakings shall exceed CNY 2 billion which is 50 times as much as the turnover requirements of the local undertakings In the NDRCrsquos opinion the administrative monopoly activities conducted by the local health agency excluded the relevant undertakings from the market maintained the virtual-high prices of drugs and therefore violated articles 3237 and 37 of the AML

The NDRC suggested in a letter that Anhui Provincial Government should urge the Bengbu HFPC to rectify the abuse of monopoly powers with the following remedies to be imposed

1) Stop setting distinguishing restrictions on qualification requirements review standards and numbers of winning bidders as for local and non-local undertakings

2) Stop designating the suppliers of competitive drugs and

3) Take necessary measures to mitigate the negative effects resulting from the previous illegal monopolistic abuses

Outlook

At the beginning of the year the former director general of the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau under the NDRC Xu Kunlin stated that the agency would strengthen antitrust enforcement on abuse of administrative power in 2015

Since then the NDRC has made great efforts to rectify unreasonable abuses of administrative power The currently disclosed two cases investigated by the NDRC re-emphasize the Chinese Governmentrsquos strict scrutiny of antitrust issues in respect of

37 Article 34 of the AML Administrative organs and public organizations with administrative function of public affairs authorized by laws and regulations shall not abuse their administrative powers to restrict or reject the participation of operators from other regions in local bidding activities by measures such as prescribing discriminatory qualification requirements or assessment standards or by not publishing information according to law

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 40 of 52

administrative monopoly It reminds the local governments that antitrust compliance is of significant importance

III Private Litigation

A Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen more and more private antitrust litigations

The private antitrust litigation cases have become increasingly complicated especially the issues regarding the intersection areas of IP and antitrust law

Multinational giants and State-Owned Enterprises (the ldquoSOEsrdquo) are increasingly becoming the targets in antitrust civil litigations Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (the ldquoSMEsrdquo) tend to use the antitrust litigation to achieve their commercial goals in the business context

B Significant Cases

Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)38

This is the first-ever private litigation concerning administrative monopoly since the implementation of the AML in 2008

Facts

According to the currently disclosed details the case is relevant for designated trade

The plaintiff Shenzhen Sware Technology Co Ltd (ldquoSwarerdquo) is a software company The press releases suggest that Sware Gloden Software Co Ltd (ldquoGlodenrdquo) and Shanghai Ruban Software Co Ltd (ldquoShanghai Rubanrdquo) are the three main suppliers of construction cost software and possess the major shares of the relevant market An annual provincial vocational ability contest regarding the construction cost hosted by the Guangdong Department of Education (ldquoGuangdong DOE) designated Gloden as the exclusive supplier of the relevant software

After several unsuccessful verbal and written negotiations with Guangdong DOE in April 2014 Sware filed a lawsuit against Guangdong DOE before the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquothe Courtrdquo) alleging that the administrative organ abused its administrative power and violated the AML by designating exclusive software supplier for the contest and claimed a compensation for reasonable expense amounting to CNY 10800 Yuan

The opinions of the Court 38 The story of the case is available at httpfinancesinacomcnchinadfjj20150410074621924997shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 41 of 52

The full text of the judgment has not been disclosed yet In accordance with the information available to the public the Court invoked article 32 of the AML which prohibits an administrative organ from abusing its administrative power to require or in disguised form organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use only the commodities supplied by the entities designated by them The Court concluded that Guangdong DOE failed to prove the legitimacy of the designation and therefore abused its administration power

Currently the case is in appeal before the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court

Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 39

It is the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China

In the first instance ruling Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court ruled against Sinopec holding that the Yunnan branch of Sinopecs trading company was obligated to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its dominance in the sales market of refined oil by refusing to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding without justifiable reasons

In the second instance ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors Currently the case is pending

Facts

The First Trial

The lawsuit was filed before the Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoKunming Courtrdquo) in January 2014 Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy Co Ltd (ldquoYingdingrdquo) a bio-energy manufacturer claimed that Sinopec and the Yunnan branch of Sinopec trading company (ldquoSinopec Yunnan Branchrdquo) had failed to fulfil their obligations stipulated in the Renewable Energy Law and had abused their market dominance in sales market of refined oil by refusing to trade with Yingding without justifiable reasons

Sinopec and Sinopec Yunnan Branch mainly explained four reasons for why they rejected Yingdingrsquos biofuel Firstly Yingding had failed to prove that the biofuel complied with the relevant national standard and was safe to use Secondly Yingding had failed to provide complete trading terms Thirdly the laws and regulations regarding biofuel were incomplete the authorized refined oil sales companies were 39 The details of the case are available at httpnewsxinhuanetcomfortune2014-1217c_1113680039htm httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=9e71db51-6ff6-4d2c-8af6-8eacf023ebdeampKeyWord=E4BA91E58D97E79B88E9BC8E|E4B8ADE79FB3E58C96 httpnewsxinhuanetcomenergy2015-0422c_127721575htm httpwwwnbdcomcnarticles2015-04-23911348html last visited on December 17 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 42 of 52

obligated to purchase biofuel from the biofuel manufacturers if it met certain quality standards but there was a vacancy regarding how to reach the end consumers from the sales companies

On 8 December 2014 the Kunming Intermediate Peoples Court ruled that Sinopec Yunnan Branch bore a legal obligation to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its market dominance in refined oil market by refusing without any justifiable reasons to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding The court ordered Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network within 30 days Both Yingding and Sinopec filed appeals to the Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court

The Appellate Trial

The appeal hearing was held on 22 April 2015 in Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoYunnan Courtrdquo) Sinopec submitted 23 new pieces of evidence and introduced two expert witnesses in a bid to overturn several key elements in the first-instance ruling by Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court

In terms of the determination of the relevant market and the market dominance Sinopec argued that the relevant market in this case was for adipic acid monomethyl ester (ldquoAAMErdquo) the main ingredient of a biofuel additive known as BD100 Yingdingrsquos main product is BD100 which can be blended with fossil diesel to become biofuel In the AAME market Sinopec is a potential buyer instead of a market dominator In support of this argument Sinopec presented an expert witnessmdashGong Jiong a professor of economics at Beijings University of International Business and Economics who testified that AAME should be defined as the relevant product market on the basis of an economic analysis

However Yingding insisted that the first-instance ruling was correct in naming the sales market of refined oil as the relevant market and submitted new evidence an article on Sinopecs website that claimed it had a 67 market share in Yunnan to help establish the claim that Sinopec had market dominance

Another main dispute was whether Yingdingrsquos biofuel product met national standards which would make it mandatory for Sinopec to purchase under Chinas Renewable Energy Law The law stipulates that biofuel producers must sell their products first to an authorized refined oil sales company and the sales companies are obliged to buy the fuel if it meets certain quality standards In order to test the quality Sinopec introduced the second expert witness Lin Jianmin a leading author of Chinarsquos national biofuel standard Lin Jianmin pointed out that there are currently quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology which gives Sinopec a justifiable reason not to trade with Yingding Moreover Sinopec presented some precedents in which consumers had complained about the biofuel quality and also claimed that China didnt have a sound regulatory framework to support biofuel production neither in testing nor in sales

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 43 of 52

Nevertheless to refute this point Yingding referred to an earlier test in co-operation with Sinopec in 2011 where selected buses in Kunming used biofuel blended by Sinopec using BD100 produced by Yingding

On August 13 2015 Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors and now this case is pending In the written appellate ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court did not provide any details regarding its reasoning

Key Issues of the Case

Is there any competition between Yingding and Sinopec

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case the product of Yingding is biofuel while Sinopec does not engage in the business of biofuel From this perspective Yingding and Sinopec are not competitors Thus it is not necessary and not reasonable for Sinopec to eliminate or restrict the competition from Yingding

Relevant Market

The definition of the relevant market is a prerequisite to determine whether competition exists and whether the AML is applicable In accordance with the Judicial Interpretation of Antitrust civil litigation the plaintiff shall take the responsibility to prove the defendantrsquos dominance in the relevant market Also the methods of defining the relevant market are stipulated in the Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition (ldquoGuidelinesrdquo) However both Yingding and Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court defined the relevant market as the sales market of refined oil without sufficient antitrust analysis none of the methods in the Guidelines were used Therefore the definition of the relevant market remains arguable and needs to be sufficiently analysed in the upcoming retrial

Justifiable Reasons

The abuse of market dominance includes the behaviour of refusing to trade without justifiable reasons according to the AML but in the first instance ruling justifiable reasons were not investigated by the court During the appellate trial the expert witness introduced by Sinopec claimed that there were quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology and this was a justifiable reason to refuse to trade with Yingding Even though the first instance court and the appellate court did not reason the justifiable reason it should be discussed and investigated further during the retrial

AML or Renewable Energy Law

The claims of Yingding were based on both the AML and the Renewable Energy Law (ldquoRELrdquo) and the first instance ruling referred to both the AML and the REL as

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 44 of 52

well It seems that the laws the first instance court referred to were comprehensive but in fact the reasoning was not clear and logical In the first instance ruling some disputes regarding the AML were reviewed but all the orders were not based on the AML Specifically the first instance court ordered the Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network based on the REL and dismissed the other claims That the orders were not on account of reasoning is illogical It is anticipated that during the retrial the application of the laws will be clearer

Analysis

A lot of issues have not been clearly analysed by the courts such as the relevant market and the justifiable reasons Since the case is remanded the above-mentioned issues are expected to be resolved in the retrial In addition Yingding was in a disadvantaged position compared to its first instance trial since its claims based on the AML were challenged greatly during the appellate trial In the retrial it is probable that Yingding may switch its litigation strategy and base its claims on the REL Therefore maybe more preparation regarding the REL can give Sinopec a leg up

Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)

Rijing Electric a Chinese distributor seeks CNY 5m compensation

The first hearing was on 9 June 2015 and ended without a ruling

Facts

Rijing Electric (ldquoRijingrdquo) a Shanghai-based company and a former distributor for Panasonic accused Panasonic of abusing its dominance and dividing the market through monopolistic practice in an antitrust lawsuit filed in 2014 with Shanghai No 1 Intermediate Court (ldquoShanghai Courtrdquo) claiming compensation of CNY 5m (USD 815370) Wenzhou Mingda Automation System Co and Shanghai Qingying Automation Equipment as the distributor of Panasonic in China are the co-defendants were accused of conducting monopolistic behaviours by implementing Panasonicrsquos policy

The first hearing for evidence exchange was on June 9 2015 Rijing claimed a policy allegedly introduced by Panasonic in 2009 restricted the competition between distributors Panasonic claims the policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo and has full justifiable reasons It explained that the products in question required customization at considerable cost to distributors before its sale to customers Once carried out however other distributors leaving them open to quote much lower prices than the original distributor could simply and relatively cheap replicate this customization Besides Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and that the plaintiff had failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic said its market share for the four products

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 45 of 52

under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases Also Rijing failed to challenge the policy when it was first introduced instead initially agreeing it was reasonable as e-mail evidence submitted by Panasonic suggests

Key Issues of the Case

Whether Panasonic occupied a market dominant position

It is reported that Rijing claimed that Panasonic had abused its market dominance but Rijing failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and its market share for the four products under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases

Analysis

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case Panasonicrsquos policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo rather than to eliminate or restrict competition

Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals40 (Pending)

It is a battle over patent licensing issues

It is viewed as being among the most complicated antitrust lawsuits in China

The first hearing was on 17 and 18 December 2015

Facts

Four Chinese rare earth companies Ningbo Ketian Magnet Ningbo Permanent Magnetics Ningbo Tongchuang Strong Magnet Material and Ningbo Huahui Magnetic Industry filed antitrust lawsuits against Hitachi Metals over alleged patent licensing issues regarding rare earth magnets on December 11 2014 with the Ningbo Intermediate Peoples Court (ldquoNingbo Courtrdquo) in Zhejiang province As reported four Chinese rare earth companies claimed Hitachi Metals abused its market dominance and hurt the industry competition by refusing to license the patents to them The patents in this case are used in the manufacturing of sintered neodymium iron boron (ldquoNdFeBrdquo) magnets a rare-earth magnet alloy widely used in parts for airplanes automobiles and other products

Hitachi Metals filed a challenge with the Ningbo Court over its jurisdiction in April 2015 After Ningbo Court rejected Hitachi Metals jurisdiction objection on 28 April 2015 Hitachi Metals appealed to the Zhejiang High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoZhejiang

40The details of the story are available at httpwwwzbmagcomnews_viewphpid=80 httpwwwhitachicomcnaboutpress201510-121118_ahtml last visited on December 22 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 46 of 52

Courtrdquo) but Zhejiang Court affirmed the ruling of the Ningbo Court

The first day of a two-day hearing took place on 17 December 2015 during which the two sides cross-examined each otherrsquos evidence The evidence focused on clearing up several key elements in the case including the relevant market whether Hitachi Metals has dominance on that market and whether both sides acted in good faith during the licensing negotiations

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Product Market

The four Chinese rare earth companies claimed that the relevant product market should be the NdFeb-related patent licensing market However Hitachi Metals believed that the physical NdFeb market rather than the patent licensing market should be the relevant product market which is meaningful for assess the real competitive effects on the market

Whether Hitachi Metals occupies a dominant market position

In terms of market dominance Hitachi Metals claimed it does not occupy a dominant position because Hitachi Metalsrsquo patents were not in a standard in this case and there are substitutable technologies in the market SEP holders have the obligation to license on FRAND terms but none-SEP holders do not So while a refusal to license a SEP may constitute abuse of dominance refusal to license a non-SEP mdash even by a patent holder with a dominant position mdash should not be considered as an abuse

Analysis

Hitachi Metals as a patent holder should have the right to decide whether to retain those patents or not or who to license According to the legal theory the purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage and protect innovation by conferring monopoly right mdash that is to give intellectual property owners the proprietary rights which can exclude others from using the intellectual property The SEP holders admittedly need to comply with FRAND terms which can maintain a robust balance between competition and monopoly whereas the further intervention of antitrust law into non-SEP patents may undermine the purpose of intellectual property law To which extent the antitrust law should intervene is yet to be seen

Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei41

A confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the Beijing IP court made by the Beijing High Court

41 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcncpwswbjzscq201511t20151103_12225640htm last visited on December 28 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 47 of 52

Facts

On August 2 2013 the NDRC penalized Abbott for monopolistic price-fixing and then Abbott made a price adjustment in China where the prices of main products were reduced

On December 16 2014 Tian Junwei (ldquoTianrdquo) a Chinese citizen in Beijing sued Carrefour Shuangjing Branch (ldquoCarrefourrdquo) and Abbott (Shanghai) Sales Company (ldquoAbbottrdquo) at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (ldquoIP Courtrdquo) for their monopolistic price-fixing which damaged his interests However Carrefour and Abbott challenged the jurisdiction of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court They claimed there were two reasons Firstly according to the jurisdiction rules of the IP court issued by the Supreme Court the IP court has no jurisdiction over anti-trust cases Secondly if this case is a contractual dispute the court that is in the place of Carrefour should hear it if this case is a tort dispute the Shanghai Intermediate Court should hear it

In the ruling of the IP Court the IP Court decided it has the jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases for the following reasons According to the Provisions On Causes Of Action In Civil Cases issued by Supreme Court (最高人民法院案由规定) antimonopoly dispute is a tertiary cause of action belonging to IP and competition disputes Also according to the Provisions concerning the Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京

市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问题的规定 ) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was an IP and competition dispute and was sued after November 6 2014 Thus the IP Court had jurisdiction

Both Carrefour and Abbott appealed to the Beijing High Court over the jurisdiction ruling but the Beijing High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original ruling Reasons are listed in the written ruling issued on June 18 2015 Firstly the nature of the case was an antimonopoly dispute In accordance with Provisions of the Supreme Peoples Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民

事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) and Civil Litigation Law the monopolistic civil disputes in the first instance shall be under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Peoples Courts and an action involving a contractual dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the peoples court of the place where the defendant is domiciled or where the contract is performed Carrefour as the defendant in this case is domiciled in Chaoyang District Beijing Therefore the courts of Beijing have jurisdiction over this case Secondly according to article 3 of the Notification on the Jurisdiction of Intellectual Property Courts issued by Supreme Court (关于知识产权法院案件管辖

等有关问题的通知) IP courts have jurisdiction over first-instance civil disputes arising from monopolistic practices Lastly according to Provisions concerning the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 40 of 52

administrative monopoly It reminds the local governments that antitrust compliance is of significant importance

III Private Litigation

A Enforcement Tendency Highlight

The year of 2015 has seen more and more private antitrust litigations

The private antitrust litigation cases have become increasingly complicated especially the issues regarding the intersection areas of IP and antitrust law

Multinational giants and State-Owned Enterprises (the ldquoSOEsrdquo) are increasingly becoming the targets in antitrust civil litigations Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (the ldquoSMEsrdquo) tend to use the antitrust litigation to achieve their commercial goals in the business context

B Significant Cases

Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)38

This is the first-ever private litigation concerning administrative monopoly since the implementation of the AML in 2008

Facts

According to the currently disclosed details the case is relevant for designated trade

The plaintiff Shenzhen Sware Technology Co Ltd (ldquoSwarerdquo) is a software company The press releases suggest that Sware Gloden Software Co Ltd (ldquoGlodenrdquo) and Shanghai Ruban Software Co Ltd (ldquoShanghai Rubanrdquo) are the three main suppliers of construction cost software and possess the major shares of the relevant market An annual provincial vocational ability contest regarding the construction cost hosted by the Guangdong Department of Education (ldquoGuangdong DOE) designated Gloden as the exclusive supplier of the relevant software

After several unsuccessful verbal and written negotiations with Guangdong DOE in April 2014 Sware filed a lawsuit against Guangdong DOE before the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquothe Courtrdquo) alleging that the administrative organ abused its administrative power and violated the AML by designating exclusive software supplier for the contest and claimed a compensation for reasonable expense amounting to CNY 10800 Yuan

The opinions of the Court 38 The story of the case is available at httpfinancesinacomcnchinadfjj20150410074621924997shtml

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 41 of 52

The full text of the judgment has not been disclosed yet In accordance with the information available to the public the Court invoked article 32 of the AML which prohibits an administrative organ from abusing its administrative power to require or in disguised form organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use only the commodities supplied by the entities designated by them The Court concluded that Guangdong DOE failed to prove the legitimacy of the designation and therefore abused its administration power

Currently the case is in appeal before the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court

Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 39

It is the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China

In the first instance ruling Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court ruled against Sinopec holding that the Yunnan branch of Sinopecs trading company was obligated to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its dominance in the sales market of refined oil by refusing to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding without justifiable reasons

In the second instance ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors Currently the case is pending

Facts

The First Trial

The lawsuit was filed before the Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoKunming Courtrdquo) in January 2014 Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy Co Ltd (ldquoYingdingrdquo) a bio-energy manufacturer claimed that Sinopec and the Yunnan branch of Sinopec trading company (ldquoSinopec Yunnan Branchrdquo) had failed to fulfil their obligations stipulated in the Renewable Energy Law and had abused their market dominance in sales market of refined oil by refusing to trade with Yingding without justifiable reasons

Sinopec and Sinopec Yunnan Branch mainly explained four reasons for why they rejected Yingdingrsquos biofuel Firstly Yingding had failed to prove that the biofuel complied with the relevant national standard and was safe to use Secondly Yingding had failed to provide complete trading terms Thirdly the laws and regulations regarding biofuel were incomplete the authorized refined oil sales companies were 39 The details of the case are available at httpnewsxinhuanetcomfortune2014-1217c_1113680039htm httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=9e71db51-6ff6-4d2c-8af6-8eacf023ebdeampKeyWord=E4BA91E58D97E79B88E9BC8E|E4B8ADE79FB3E58C96 httpnewsxinhuanetcomenergy2015-0422c_127721575htm httpwwwnbdcomcnarticles2015-04-23911348html last visited on December 17 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 42 of 52

obligated to purchase biofuel from the biofuel manufacturers if it met certain quality standards but there was a vacancy regarding how to reach the end consumers from the sales companies

On 8 December 2014 the Kunming Intermediate Peoples Court ruled that Sinopec Yunnan Branch bore a legal obligation to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its market dominance in refined oil market by refusing without any justifiable reasons to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding The court ordered Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network within 30 days Both Yingding and Sinopec filed appeals to the Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court

The Appellate Trial

The appeal hearing was held on 22 April 2015 in Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoYunnan Courtrdquo) Sinopec submitted 23 new pieces of evidence and introduced two expert witnesses in a bid to overturn several key elements in the first-instance ruling by Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court

In terms of the determination of the relevant market and the market dominance Sinopec argued that the relevant market in this case was for adipic acid monomethyl ester (ldquoAAMErdquo) the main ingredient of a biofuel additive known as BD100 Yingdingrsquos main product is BD100 which can be blended with fossil diesel to become biofuel In the AAME market Sinopec is a potential buyer instead of a market dominator In support of this argument Sinopec presented an expert witnessmdashGong Jiong a professor of economics at Beijings University of International Business and Economics who testified that AAME should be defined as the relevant product market on the basis of an economic analysis

However Yingding insisted that the first-instance ruling was correct in naming the sales market of refined oil as the relevant market and submitted new evidence an article on Sinopecs website that claimed it had a 67 market share in Yunnan to help establish the claim that Sinopec had market dominance

Another main dispute was whether Yingdingrsquos biofuel product met national standards which would make it mandatory for Sinopec to purchase under Chinas Renewable Energy Law The law stipulates that biofuel producers must sell their products first to an authorized refined oil sales company and the sales companies are obliged to buy the fuel if it meets certain quality standards In order to test the quality Sinopec introduced the second expert witness Lin Jianmin a leading author of Chinarsquos national biofuel standard Lin Jianmin pointed out that there are currently quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology which gives Sinopec a justifiable reason not to trade with Yingding Moreover Sinopec presented some precedents in which consumers had complained about the biofuel quality and also claimed that China didnt have a sound regulatory framework to support biofuel production neither in testing nor in sales

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 43 of 52

Nevertheless to refute this point Yingding referred to an earlier test in co-operation with Sinopec in 2011 where selected buses in Kunming used biofuel blended by Sinopec using BD100 produced by Yingding

On August 13 2015 Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors and now this case is pending In the written appellate ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court did not provide any details regarding its reasoning

Key Issues of the Case

Is there any competition between Yingding and Sinopec

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case the product of Yingding is biofuel while Sinopec does not engage in the business of biofuel From this perspective Yingding and Sinopec are not competitors Thus it is not necessary and not reasonable for Sinopec to eliminate or restrict the competition from Yingding

Relevant Market

The definition of the relevant market is a prerequisite to determine whether competition exists and whether the AML is applicable In accordance with the Judicial Interpretation of Antitrust civil litigation the plaintiff shall take the responsibility to prove the defendantrsquos dominance in the relevant market Also the methods of defining the relevant market are stipulated in the Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition (ldquoGuidelinesrdquo) However both Yingding and Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court defined the relevant market as the sales market of refined oil without sufficient antitrust analysis none of the methods in the Guidelines were used Therefore the definition of the relevant market remains arguable and needs to be sufficiently analysed in the upcoming retrial

Justifiable Reasons

The abuse of market dominance includes the behaviour of refusing to trade without justifiable reasons according to the AML but in the first instance ruling justifiable reasons were not investigated by the court During the appellate trial the expert witness introduced by Sinopec claimed that there were quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology and this was a justifiable reason to refuse to trade with Yingding Even though the first instance court and the appellate court did not reason the justifiable reason it should be discussed and investigated further during the retrial

AML or Renewable Energy Law

The claims of Yingding were based on both the AML and the Renewable Energy Law (ldquoRELrdquo) and the first instance ruling referred to both the AML and the REL as

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 44 of 52

well It seems that the laws the first instance court referred to were comprehensive but in fact the reasoning was not clear and logical In the first instance ruling some disputes regarding the AML were reviewed but all the orders were not based on the AML Specifically the first instance court ordered the Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network based on the REL and dismissed the other claims That the orders were not on account of reasoning is illogical It is anticipated that during the retrial the application of the laws will be clearer

Analysis

A lot of issues have not been clearly analysed by the courts such as the relevant market and the justifiable reasons Since the case is remanded the above-mentioned issues are expected to be resolved in the retrial In addition Yingding was in a disadvantaged position compared to its first instance trial since its claims based on the AML were challenged greatly during the appellate trial In the retrial it is probable that Yingding may switch its litigation strategy and base its claims on the REL Therefore maybe more preparation regarding the REL can give Sinopec a leg up

Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)

Rijing Electric a Chinese distributor seeks CNY 5m compensation

The first hearing was on 9 June 2015 and ended without a ruling

Facts

Rijing Electric (ldquoRijingrdquo) a Shanghai-based company and a former distributor for Panasonic accused Panasonic of abusing its dominance and dividing the market through monopolistic practice in an antitrust lawsuit filed in 2014 with Shanghai No 1 Intermediate Court (ldquoShanghai Courtrdquo) claiming compensation of CNY 5m (USD 815370) Wenzhou Mingda Automation System Co and Shanghai Qingying Automation Equipment as the distributor of Panasonic in China are the co-defendants were accused of conducting monopolistic behaviours by implementing Panasonicrsquos policy

The first hearing for evidence exchange was on June 9 2015 Rijing claimed a policy allegedly introduced by Panasonic in 2009 restricted the competition between distributors Panasonic claims the policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo and has full justifiable reasons It explained that the products in question required customization at considerable cost to distributors before its sale to customers Once carried out however other distributors leaving them open to quote much lower prices than the original distributor could simply and relatively cheap replicate this customization Besides Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and that the plaintiff had failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic said its market share for the four products

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 45 of 52

under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases Also Rijing failed to challenge the policy when it was first introduced instead initially agreeing it was reasonable as e-mail evidence submitted by Panasonic suggests

Key Issues of the Case

Whether Panasonic occupied a market dominant position

It is reported that Rijing claimed that Panasonic had abused its market dominance but Rijing failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and its market share for the four products under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases

Analysis

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case Panasonicrsquos policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo rather than to eliminate or restrict competition

Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals40 (Pending)

It is a battle over patent licensing issues

It is viewed as being among the most complicated antitrust lawsuits in China

The first hearing was on 17 and 18 December 2015

Facts

Four Chinese rare earth companies Ningbo Ketian Magnet Ningbo Permanent Magnetics Ningbo Tongchuang Strong Magnet Material and Ningbo Huahui Magnetic Industry filed antitrust lawsuits against Hitachi Metals over alleged patent licensing issues regarding rare earth magnets on December 11 2014 with the Ningbo Intermediate Peoples Court (ldquoNingbo Courtrdquo) in Zhejiang province As reported four Chinese rare earth companies claimed Hitachi Metals abused its market dominance and hurt the industry competition by refusing to license the patents to them The patents in this case are used in the manufacturing of sintered neodymium iron boron (ldquoNdFeBrdquo) magnets a rare-earth magnet alloy widely used in parts for airplanes automobiles and other products

Hitachi Metals filed a challenge with the Ningbo Court over its jurisdiction in April 2015 After Ningbo Court rejected Hitachi Metals jurisdiction objection on 28 April 2015 Hitachi Metals appealed to the Zhejiang High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoZhejiang

40The details of the story are available at httpwwwzbmagcomnews_viewphpid=80 httpwwwhitachicomcnaboutpress201510-121118_ahtml last visited on December 22 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 46 of 52

Courtrdquo) but Zhejiang Court affirmed the ruling of the Ningbo Court

The first day of a two-day hearing took place on 17 December 2015 during which the two sides cross-examined each otherrsquos evidence The evidence focused on clearing up several key elements in the case including the relevant market whether Hitachi Metals has dominance on that market and whether both sides acted in good faith during the licensing negotiations

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Product Market

The four Chinese rare earth companies claimed that the relevant product market should be the NdFeb-related patent licensing market However Hitachi Metals believed that the physical NdFeb market rather than the patent licensing market should be the relevant product market which is meaningful for assess the real competitive effects on the market

Whether Hitachi Metals occupies a dominant market position

In terms of market dominance Hitachi Metals claimed it does not occupy a dominant position because Hitachi Metalsrsquo patents were not in a standard in this case and there are substitutable technologies in the market SEP holders have the obligation to license on FRAND terms but none-SEP holders do not So while a refusal to license a SEP may constitute abuse of dominance refusal to license a non-SEP mdash even by a patent holder with a dominant position mdash should not be considered as an abuse

Analysis

Hitachi Metals as a patent holder should have the right to decide whether to retain those patents or not or who to license According to the legal theory the purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage and protect innovation by conferring monopoly right mdash that is to give intellectual property owners the proprietary rights which can exclude others from using the intellectual property The SEP holders admittedly need to comply with FRAND terms which can maintain a robust balance between competition and monopoly whereas the further intervention of antitrust law into non-SEP patents may undermine the purpose of intellectual property law To which extent the antitrust law should intervene is yet to be seen

Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei41

A confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the Beijing IP court made by the Beijing High Court

41 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcncpwswbjzscq201511t20151103_12225640htm last visited on December 28 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 47 of 52

Facts

On August 2 2013 the NDRC penalized Abbott for monopolistic price-fixing and then Abbott made a price adjustment in China where the prices of main products were reduced

On December 16 2014 Tian Junwei (ldquoTianrdquo) a Chinese citizen in Beijing sued Carrefour Shuangjing Branch (ldquoCarrefourrdquo) and Abbott (Shanghai) Sales Company (ldquoAbbottrdquo) at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (ldquoIP Courtrdquo) for their monopolistic price-fixing which damaged his interests However Carrefour and Abbott challenged the jurisdiction of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court They claimed there were two reasons Firstly according to the jurisdiction rules of the IP court issued by the Supreme Court the IP court has no jurisdiction over anti-trust cases Secondly if this case is a contractual dispute the court that is in the place of Carrefour should hear it if this case is a tort dispute the Shanghai Intermediate Court should hear it

In the ruling of the IP Court the IP Court decided it has the jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases for the following reasons According to the Provisions On Causes Of Action In Civil Cases issued by Supreme Court (最高人民法院案由规定) antimonopoly dispute is a tertiary cause of action belonging to IP and competition disputes Also according to the Provisions concerning the Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京

市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问题的规定 ) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was an IP and competition dispute and was sued after November 6 2014 Thus the IP Court had jurisdiction

Both Carrefour and Abbott appealed to the Beijing High Court over the jurisdiction ruling but the Beijing High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original ruling Reasons are listed in the written ruling issued on June 18 2015 Firstly the nature of the case was an antimonopoly dispute In accordance with Provisions of the Supreme Peoples Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民

事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) and Civil Litigation Law the monopolistic civil disputes in the first instance shall be under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Peoples Courts and an action involving a contractual dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the peoples court of the place where the defendant is domiciled or where the contract is performed Carrefour as the defendant in this case is domiciled in Chaoyang District Beijing Therefore the courts of Beijing have jurisdiction over this case Secondly according to article 3 of the Notification on the Jurisdiction of Intellectual Property Courts issued by Supreme Court (关于知识产权法院案件管辖

等有关问题的通知) IP courts have jurisdiction over first-instance civil disputes arising from monopolistic practices Lastly according to Provisions concerning the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 41 of 52

The full text of the judgment has not been disclosed yet In accordance with the information available to the public the Court invoked article 32 of the AML which prohibits an administrative organ from abusing its administrative power to require or in disguised form organizations or individuals to deal in purchase or use only the commodities supplied by the entities designated by them The Court concluded that Guangdong DOE failed to prove the legitimacy of the designation and therefore abused its administration power

Currently the case is in appeal before the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court

Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 39

It is the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China

In the first instance ruling Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court ruled against Sinopec holding that the Yunnan branch of Sinopecs trading company was obligated to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its dominance in the sales market of refined oil by refusing to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding without justifiable reasons

In the second instance ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors Currently the case is pending

Facts

The First Trial

The lawsuit was filed before the Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoKunming Courtrdquo) in January 2014 Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy Co Ltd (ldquoYingdingrdquo) a bio-energy manufacturer claimed that Sinopec and the Yunnan branch of Sinopec trading company (ldquoSinopec Yunnan Branchrdquo) had failed to fulfil their obligations stipulated in the Renewable Energy Law and had abused their market dominance in sales market of refined oil by refusing to trade with Yingding without justifiable reasons

Sinopec and Sinopec Yunnan Branch mainly explained four reasons for why they rejected Yingdingrsquos biofuel Firstly Yingding had failed to prove that the biofuel complied with the relevant national standard and was safe to use Secondly Yingding had failed to provide complete trading terms Thirdly the laws and regulations regarding biofuel were incomplete the authorized refined oil sales companies were 39 The details of the case are available at httpnewsxinhuanetcomfortune2014-1217c_1113680039htm httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=9e71db51-6ff6-4d2c-8af6-8eacf023ebdeampKeyWord=E4BA91E58D97E79B88E9BC8E|E4B8ADE79FB3E58C96 httpnewsxinhuanetcomenergy2015-0422c_127721575htm httpwwwnbdcomcnarticles2015-04-23911348html last visited on December 17 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 42 of 52

obligated to purchase biofuel from the biofuel manufacturers if it met certain quality standards but there was a vacancy regarding how to reach the end consumers from the sales companies

On 8 December 2014 the Kunming Intermediate Peoples Court ruled that Sinopec Yunnan Branch bore a legal obligation to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its market dominance in refined oil market by refusing without any justifiable reasons to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding The court ordered Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network within 30 days Both Yingding and Sinopec filed appeals to the Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court

The Appellate Trial

The appeal hearing was held on 22 April 2015 in Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoYunnan Courtrdquo) Sinopec submitted 23 new pieces of evidence and introduced two expert witnesses in a bid to overturn several key elements in the first-instance ruling by Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court

In terms of the determination of the relevant market and the market dominance Sinopec argued that the relevant market in this case was for adipic acid monomethyl ester (ldquoAAMErdquo) the main ingredient of a biofuel additive known as BD100 Yingdingrsquos main product is BD100 which can be blended with fossil diesel to become biofuel In the AAME market Sinopec is a potential buyer instead of a market dominator In support of this argument Sinopec presented an expert witnessmdashGong Jiong a professor of economics at Beijings University of International Business and Economics who testified that AAME should be defined as the relevant product market on the basis of an economic analysis

However Yingding insisted that the first-instance ruling was correct in naming the sales market of refined oil as the relevant market and submitted new evidence an article on Sinopecs website that claimed it had a 67 market share in Yunnan to help establish the claim that Sinopec had market dominance

Another main dispute was whether Yingdingrsquos biofuel product met national standards which would make it mandatory for Sinopec to purchase under Chinas Renewable Energy Law The law stipulates that biofuel producers must sell their products first to an authorized refined oil sales company and the sales companies are obliged to buy the fuel if it meets certain quality standards In order to test the quality Sinopec introduced the second expert witness Lin Jianmin a leading author of Chinarsquos national biofuel standard Lin Jianmin pointed out that there are currently quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology which gives Sinopec a justifiable reason not to trade with Yingding Moreover Sinopec presented some precedents in which consumers had complained about the biofuel quality and also claimed that China didnt have a sound regulatory framework to support biofuel production neither in testing nor in sales

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 43 of 52

Nevertheless to refute this point Yingding referred to an earlier test in co-operation with Sinopec in 2011 where selected buses in Kunming used biofuel blended by Sinopec using BD100 produced by Yingding

On August 13 2015 Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors and now this case is pending In the written appellate ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court did not provide any details regarding its reasoning

Key Issues of the Case

Is there any competition between Yingding and Sinopec

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case the product of Yingding is biofuel while Sinopec does not engage in the business of biofuel From this perspective Yingding and Sinopec are not competitors Thus it is not necessary and not reasonable for Sinopec to eliminate or restrict the competition from Yingding

Relevant Market

The definition of the relevant market is a prerequisite to determine whether competition exists and whether the AML is applicable In accordance with the Judicial Interpretation of Antitrust civil litigation the plaintiff shall take the responsibility to prove the defendantrsquos dominance in the relevant market Also the methods of defining the relevant market are stipulated in the Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition (ldquoGuidelinesrdquo) However both Yingding and Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court defined the relevant market as the sales market of refined oil without sufficient antitrust analysis none of the methods in the Guidelines were used Therefore the definition of the relevant market remains arguable and needs to be sufficiently analysed in the upcoming retrial

Justifiable Reasons

The abuse of market dominance includes the behaviour of refusing to trade without justifiable reasons according to the AML but in the first instance ruling justifiable reasons were not investigated by the court During the appellate trial the expert witness introduced by Sinopec claimed that there were quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology and this was a justifiable reason to refuse to trade with Yingding Even though the first instance court and the appellate court did not reason the justifiable reason it should be discussed and investigated further during the retrial

AML or Renewable Energy Law

The claims of Yingding were based on both the AML and the Renewable Energy Law (ldquoRELrdquo) and the first instance ruling referred to both the AML and the REL as

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 44 of 52

well It seems that the laws the first instance court referred to were comprehensive but in fact the reasoning was not clear and logical In the first instance ruling some disputes regarding the AML were reviewed but all the orders were not based on the AML Specifically the first instance court ordered the Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network based on the REL and dismissed the other claims That the orders were not on account of reasoning is illogical It is anticipated that during the retrial the application of the laws will be clearer

Analysis

A lot of issues have not been clearly analysed by the courts such as the relevant market and the justifiable reasons Since the case is remanded the above-mentioned issues are expected to be resolved in the retrial In addition Yingding was in a disadvantaged position compared to its first instance trial since its claims based on the AML were challenged greatly during the appellate trial In the retrial it is probable that Yingding may switch its litigation strategy and base its claims on the REL Therefore maybe more preparation regarding the REL can give Sinopec a leg up

Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)

Rijing Electric a Chinese distributor seeks CNY 5m compensation

The first hearing was on 9 June 2015 and ended without a ruling

Facts

Rijing Electric (ldquoRijingrdquo) a Shanghai-based company and a former distributor for Panasonic accused Panasonic of abusing its dominance and dividing the market through monopolistic practice in an antitrust lawsuit filed in 2014 with Shanghai No 1 Intermediate Court (ldquoShanghai Courtrdquo) claiming compensation of CNY 5m (USD 815370) Wenzhou Mingda Automation System Co and Shanghai Qingying Automation Equipment as the distributor of Panasonic in China are the co-defendants were accused of conducting monopolistic behaviours by implementing Panasonicrsquos policy

The first hearing for evidence exchange was on June 9 2015 Rijing claimed a policy allegedly introduced by Panasonic in 2009 restricted the competition between distributors Panasonic claims the policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo and has full justifiable reasons It explained that the products in question required customization at considerable cost to distributors before its sale to customers Once carried out however other distributors leaving them open to quote much lower prices than the original distributor could simply and relatively cheap replicate this customization Besides Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and that the plaintiff had failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic said its market share for the four products

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 45 of 52

under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases Also Rijing failed to challenge the policy when it was first introduced instead initially agreeing it was reasonable as e-mail evidence submitted by Panasonic suggests

Key Issues of the Case

Whether Panasonic occupied a market dominant position

It is reported that Rijing claimed that Panasonic had abused its market dominance but Rijing failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and its market share for the four products under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases

Analysis

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case Panasonicrsquos policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo rather than to eliminate or restrict competition

Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals40 (Pending)

It is a battle over patent licensing issues

It is viewed as being among the most complicated antitrust lawsuits in China

The first hearing was on 17 and 18 December 2015

Facts

Four Chinese rare earth companies Ningbo Ketian Magnet Ningbo Permanent Magnetics Ningbo Tongchuang Strong Magnet Material and Ningbo Huahui Magnetic Industry filed antitrust lawsuits against Hitachi Metals over alleged patent licensing issues regarding rare earth magnets on December 11 2014 with the Ningbo Intermediate Peoples Court (ldquoNingbo Courtrdquo) in Zhejiang province As reported four Chinese rare earth companies claimed Hitachi Metals abused its market dominance and hurt the industry competition by refusing to license the patents to them The patents in this case are used in the manufacturing of sintered neodymium iron boron (ldquoNdFeBrdquo) magnets a rare-earth magnet alloy widely used in parts for airplanes automobiles and other products

Hitachi Metals filed a challenge with the Ningbo Court over its jurisdiction in April 2015 After Ningbo Court rejected Hitachi Metals jurisdiction objection on 28 April 2015 Hitachi Metals appealed to the Zhejiang High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoZhejiang

40The details of the story are available at httpwwwzbmagcomnews_viewphpid=80 httpwwwhitachicomcnaboutpress201510-121118_ahtml last visited on December 22 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 46 of 52

Courtrdquo) but Zhejiang Court affirmed the ruling of the Ningbo Court

The first day of a two-day hearing took place on 17 December 2015 during which the two sides cross-examined each otherrsquos evidence The evidence focused on clearing up several key elements in the case including the relevant market whether Hitachi Metals has dominance on that market and whether both sides acted in good faith during the licensing negotiations

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Product Market

The four Chinese rare earth companies claimed that the relevant product market should be the NdFeb-related patent licensing market However Hitachi Metals believed that the physical NdFeb market rather than the patent licensing market should be the relevant product market which is meaningful for assess the real competitive effects on the market

Whether Hitachi Metals occupies a dominant market position

In terms of market dominance Hitachi Metals claimed it does not occupy a dominant position because Hitachi Metalsrsquo patents were not in a standard in this case and there are substitutable technologies in the market SEP holders have the obligation to license on FRAND terms but none-SEP holders do not So while a refusal to license a SEP may constitute abuse of dominance refusal to license a non-SEP mdash even by a patent holder with a dominant position mdash should not be considered as an abuse

Analysis

Hitachi Metals as a patent holder should have the right to decide whether to retain those patents or not or who to license According to the legal theory the purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage and protect innovation by conferring monopoly right mdash that is to give intellectual property owners the proprietary rights which can exclude others from using the intellectual property The SEP holders admittedly need to comply with FRAND terms which can maintain a robust balance between competition and monopoly whereas the further intervention of antitrust law into non-SEP patents may undermine the purpose of intellectual property law To which extent the antitrust law should intervene is yet to be seen

Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei41

A confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the Beijing IP court made by the Beijing High Court

41 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcncpwswbjzscq201511t20151103_12225640htm last visited on December 28 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 47 of 52

Facts

On August 2 2013 the NDRC penalized Abbott for monopolistic price-fixing and then Abbott made a price adjustment in China where the prices of main products were reduced

On December 16 2014 Tian Junwei (ldquoTianrdquo) a Chinese citizen in Beijing sued Carrefour Shuangjing Branch (ldquoCarrefourrdquo) and Abbott (Shanghai) Sales Company (ldquoAbbottrdquo) at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (ldquoIP Courtrdquo) for their monopolistic price-fixing which damaged his interests However Carrefour and Abbott challenged the jurisdiction of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court They claimed there were two reasons Firstly according to the jurisdiction rules of the IP court issued by the Supreme Court the IP court has no jurisdiction over anti-trust cases Secondly if this case is a contractual dispute the court that is in the place of Carrefour should hear it if this case is a tort dispute the Shanghai Intermediate Court should hear it

In the ruling of the IP Court the IP Court decided it has the jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases for the following reasons According to the Provisions On Causes Of Action In Civil Cases issued by Supreme Court (最高人民法院案由规定) antimonopoly dispute is a tertiary cause of action belonging to IP and competition disputes Also according to the Provisions concerning the Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京

市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问题的规定 ) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was an IP and competition dispute and was sued after November 6 2014 Thus the IP Court had jurisdiction

Both Carrefour and Abbott appealed to the Beijing High Court over the jurisdiction ruling but the Beijing High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original ruling Reasons are listed in the written ruling issued on June 18 2015 Firstly the nature of the case was an antimonopoly dispute In accordance with Provisions of the Supreme Peoples Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民

事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) and Civil Litigation Law the monopolistic civil disputes in the first instance shall be under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Peoples Courts and an action involving a contractual dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the peoples court of the place where the defendant is domiciled or where the contract is performed Carrefour as the defendant in this case is domiciled in Chaoyang District Beijing Therefore the courts of Beijing have jurisdiction over this case Secondly according to article 3 of the Notification on the Jurisdiction of Intellectual Property Courts issued by Supreme Court (关于知识产权法院案件管辖

等有关问题的通知) IP courts have jurisdiction over first-instance civil disputes arising from monopolistic practices Lastly according to Provisions concerning the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 42 of 52

obligated to purchase biofuel from the biofuel manufacturers if it met certain quality standards but there was a vacancy regarding how to reach the end consumers from the sales companies

On 8 December 2014 the Kunming Intermediate Peoples Court ruled that Sinopec Yunnan Branch bore a legal obligation to purchase and distribute the biofuel made by Yingding and abused its market dominance in refined oil market by refusing without any justifiable reasons to purchase the biofuel made by Yingding The court ordered Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network within 30 days Both Yingding and Sinopec filed appeals to the Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court

The Appellate Trial

The appeal hearing was held on 22 April 2015 in Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoYunnan Courtrdquo) Sinopec submitted 23 new pieces of evidence and introduced two expert witnesses in a bid to overturn several key elements in the first-instance ruling by Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court

In terms of the determination of the relevant market and the market dominance Sinopec argued that the relevant market in this case was for adipic acid monomethyl ester (ldquoAAMErdquo) the main ingredient of a biofuel additive known as BD100 Yingdingrsquos main product is BD100 which can be blended with fossil diesel to become biofuel In the AAME market Sinopec is a potential buyer instead of a market dominator In support of this argument Sinopec presented an expert witnessmdashGong Jiong a professor of economics at Beijings University of International Business and Economics who testified that AAME should be defined as the relevant product market on the basis of an economic analysis

However Yingding insisted that the first-instance ruling was correct in naming the sales market of refined oil as the relevant market and submitted new evidence an article on Sinopecs website that claimed it had a 67 market share in Yunnan to help establish the claim that Sinopec had market dominance

Another main dispute was whether Yingdingrsquos biofuel product met national standards which would make it mandatory for Sinopec to purchase under Chinas Renewable Energy Law The law stipulates that biofuel producers must sell their products first to an authorized refined oil sales company and the sales companies are obliged to buy the fuel if it meets certain quality standards In order to test the quality Sinopec introduced the second expert witness Lin Jianmin a leading author of Chinarsquos national biofuel standard Lin Jianmin pointed out that there are currently quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology which gives Sinopec a justifiable reason not to trade with Yingding Moreover Sinopec presented some precedents in which consumers had complained about the biofuel quality and also claimed that China didnt have a sound regulatory framework to support biofuel production neither in testing nor in sales

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 43 of 52

Nevertheless to refute this point Yingding referred to an earlier test in co-operation with Sinopec in 2011 where selected buses in Kunming used biofuel blended by Sinopec using BD100 produced by Yingding

On August 13 2015 Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors and now this case is pending In the written appellate ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court did not provide any details regarding its reasoning

Key Issues of the Case

Is there any competition between Yingding and Sinopec

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case the product of Yingding is biofuel while Sinopec does not engage in the business of biofuel From this perspective Yingding and Sinopec are not competitors Thus it is not necessary and not reasonable for Sinopec to eliminate or restrict the competition from Yingding

Relevant Market

The definition of the relevant market is a prerequisite to determine whether competition exists and whether the AML is applicable In accordance with the Judicial Interpretation of Antitrust civil litigation the plaintiff shall take the responsibility to prove the defendantrsquos dominance in the relevant market Also the methods of defining the relevant market are stipulated in the Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition (ldquoGuidelinesrdquo) However both Yingding and Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court defined the relevant market as the sales market of refined oil without sufficient antitrust analysis none of the methods in the Guidelines were used Therefore the definition of the relevant market remains arguable and needs to be sufficiently analysed in the upcoming retrial

Justifiable Reasons

The abuse of market dominance includes the behaviour of refusing to trade without justifiable reasons according to the AML but in the first instance ruling justifiable reasons were not investigated by the court During the appellate trial the expert witness introduced by Sinopec claimed that there were quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology and this was a justifiable reason to refuse to trade with Yingding Even though the first instance court and the appellate court did not reason the justifiable reason it should be discussed and investigated further during the retrial

AML or Renewable Energy Law

The claims of Yingding were based on both the AML and the Renewable Energy Law (ldquoRELrdquo) and the first instance ruling referred to both the AML and the REL as

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 44 of 52

well It seems that the laws the first instance court referred to were comprehensive but in fact the reasoning was not clear and logical In the first instance ruling some disputes regarding the AML were reviewed but all the orders were not based on the AML Specifically the first instance court ordered the Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network based on the REL and dismissed the other claims That the orders were not on account of reasoning is illogical It is anticipated that during the retrial the application of the laws will be clearer

Analysis

A lot of issues have not been clearly analysed by the courts such as the relevant market and the justifiable reasons Since the case is remanded the above-mentioned issues are expected to be resolved in the retrial In addition Yingding was in a disadvantaged position compared to its first instance trial since its claims based on the AML were challenged greatly during the appellate trial In the retrial it is probable that Yingding may switch its litigation strategy and base its claims on the REL Therefore maybe more preparation regarding the REL can give Sinopec a leg up

Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)

Rijing Electric a Chinese distributor seeks CNY 5m compensation

The first hearing was on 9 June 2015 and ended without a ruling

Facts

Rijing Electric (ldquoRijingrdquo) a Shanghai-based company and a former distributor for Panasonic accused Panasonic of abusing its dominance and dividing the market through monopolistic practice in an antitrust lawsuit filed in 2014 with Shanghai No 1 Intermediate Court (ldquoShanghai Courtrdquo) claiming compensation of CNY 5m (USD 815370) Wenzhou Mingda Automation System Co and Shanghai Qingying Automation Equipment as the distributor of Panasonic in China are the co-defendants were accused of conducting monopolistic behaviours by implementing Panasonicrsquos policy

The first hearing for evidence exchange was on June 9 2015 Rijing claimed a policy allegedly introduced by Panasonic in 2009 restricted the competition between distributors Panasonic claims the policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo and has full justifiable reasons It explained that the products in question required customization at considerable cost to distributors before its sale to customers Once carried out however other distributors leaving them open to quote much lower prices than the original distributor could simply and relatively cheap replicate this customization Besides Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and that the plaintiff had failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic said its market share for the four products

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 45 of 52

under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases Also Rijing failed to challenge the policy when it was first introduced instead initially agreeing it was reasonable as e-mail evidence submitted by Panasonic suggests

Key Issues of the Case

Whether Panasonic occupied a market dominant position

It is reported that Rijing claimed that Panasonic had abused its market dominance but Rijing failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and its market share for the four products under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases

Analysis

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case Panasonicrsquos policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo rather than to eliminate or restrict competition

Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals40 (Pending)

It is a battle over patent licensing issues

It is viewed as being among the most complicated antitrust lawsuits in China

The first hearing was on 17 and 18 December 2015

Facts

Four Chinese rare earth companies Ningbo Ketian Magnet Ningbo Permanent Magnetics Ningbo Tongchuang Strong Magnet Material and Ningbo Huahui Magnetic Industry filed antitrust lawsuits against Hitachi Metals over alleged patent licensing issues regarding rare earth magnets on December 11 2014 with the Ningbo Intermediate Peoples Court (ldquoNingbo Courtrdquo) in Zhejiang province As reported four Chinese rare earth companies claimed Hitachi Metals abused its market dominance and hurt the industry competition by refusing to license the patents to them The patents in this case are used in the manufacturing of sintered neodymium iron boron (ldquoNdFeBrdquo) magnets a rare-earth magnet alloy widely used in parts for airplanes automobiles and other products

Hitachi Metals filed a challenge with the Ningbo Court over its jurisdiction in April 2015 After Ningbo Court rejected Hitachi Metals jurisdiction objection on 28 April 2015 Hitachi Metals appealed to the Zhejiang High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoZhejiang

40The details of the story are available at httpwwwzbmagcomnews_viewphpid=80 httpwwwhitachicomcnaboutpress201510-121118_ahtml last visited on December 22 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 46 of 52

Courtrdquo) but Zhejiang Court affirmed the ruling of the Ningbo Court

The first day of a two-day hearing took place on 17 December 2015 during which the two sides cross-examined each otherrsquos evidence The evidence focused on clearing up several key elements in the case including the relevant market whether Hitachi Metals has dominance on that market and whether both sides acted in good faith during the licensing negotiations

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Product Market

The four Chinese rare earth companies claimed that the relevant product market should be the NdFeb-related patent licensing market However Hitachi Metals believed that the physical NdFeb market rather than the patent licensing market should be the relevant product market which is meaningful for assess the real competitive effects on the market

Whether Hitachi Metals occupies a dominant market position

In terms of market dominance Hitachi Metals claimed it does not occupy a dominant position because Hitachi Metalsrsquo patents were not in a standard in this case and there are substitutable technologies in the market SEP holders have the obligation to license on FRAND terms but none-SEP holders do not So while a refusal to license a SEP may constitute abuse of dominance refusal to license a non-SEP mdash even by a patent holder with a dominant position mdash should not be considered as an abuse

Analysis

Hitachi Metals as a patent holder should have the right to decide whether to retain those patents or not or who to license According to the legal theory the purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage and protect innovation by conferring monopoly right mdash that is to give intellectual property owners the proprietary rights which can exclude others from using the intellectual property The SEP holders admittedly need to comply with FRAND terms which can maintain a robust balance between competition and monopoly whereas the further intervention of antitrust law into non-SEP patents may undermine the purpose of intellectual property law To which extent the antitrust law should intervene is yet to be seen

Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei41

A confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the Beijing IP court made by the Beijing High Court

41 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcncpwswbjzscq201511t20151103_12225640htm last visited on December 28 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 47 of 52

Facts

On August 2 2013 the NDRC penalized Abbott for monopolistic price-fixing and then Abbott made a price adjustment in China where the prices of main products were reduced

On December 16 2014 Tian Junwei (ldquoTianrdquo) a Chinese citizen in Beijing sued Carrefour Shuangjing Branch (ldquoCarrefourrdquo) and Abbott (Shanghai) Sales Company (ldquoAbbottrdquo) at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (ldquoIP Courtrdquo) for their monopolistic price-fixing which damaged his interests However Carrefour and Abbott challenged the jurisdiction of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court They claimed there were two reasons Firstly according to the jurisdiction rules of the IP court issued by the Supreme Court the IP court has no jurisdiction over anti-trust cases Secondly if this case is a contractual dispute the court that is in the place of Carrefour should hear it if this case is a tort dispute the Shanghai Intermediate Court should hear it

In the ruling of the IP Court the IP Court decided it has the jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases for the following reasons According to the Provisions On Causes Of Action In Civil Cases issued by Supreme Court (最高人民法院案由规定) antimonopoly dispute is a tertiary cause of action belonging to IP and competition disputes Also according to the Provisions concerning the Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京

市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问题的规定 ) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was an IP and competition dispute and was sued after November 6 2014 Thus the IP Court had jurisdiction

Both Carrefour and Abbott appealed to the Beijing High Court over the jurisdiction ruling but the Beijing High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original ruling Reasons are listed in the written ruling issued on June 18 2015 Firstly the nature of the case was an antimonopoly dispute In accordance with Provisions of the Supreme Peoples Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民

事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) and Civil Litigation Law the monopolistic civil disputes in the first instance shall be under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Peoples Courts and an action involving a contractual dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the peoples court of the place where the defendant is domiciled or where the contract is performed Carrefour as the defendant in this case is domiciled in Chaoyang District Beijing Therefore the courts of Beijing have jurisdiction over this case Secondly according to article 3 of the Notification on the Jurisdiction of Intellectual Property Courts issued by Supreme Court (关于知识产权法院案件管辖

等有关问题的通知) IP courts have jurisdiction over first-instance civil disputes arising from monopolistic practices Lastly according to Provisions concerning the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 43 of 52

Nevertheless to refute this point Yingding referred to an earlier test in co-operation with Sinopec in 2011 where selected buses in Kunming used biofuel blended by Sinopec using BD100 produced by Yingding

On August 13 2015 Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court reversed the first instance ruling and remanded the case on account of unclear facts and procedural errors and now this case is pending In the written appellate ruling Yunnan High Peoplersquos Court did not provide any details regarding its reasoning

Key Issues of the Case

Is there any competition between Yingding and Sinopec

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case the product of Yingding is biofuel while Sinopec does not engage in the business of biofuel From this perspective Yingding and Sinopec are not competitors Thus it is not necessary and not reasonable for Sinopec to eliminate or restrict the competition from Yingding

Relevant Market

The definition of the relevant market is a prerequisite to determine whether competition exists and whether the AML is applicable In accordance with the Judicial Interpretation of Antitrust civil litigation the plaintiff shall take the responsibility to prove the defendantrsquos dominance in the relevant market Also the methods of defining the relevant market are stipulated in the Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition (ldquoGuidelinesrdquo) However both Yingding and Kunming Intermediate Peoplersquos Court defined the relevant market as the sales market of refined oil without sufficient antitrust analysis none of the methods in the Guidelines were used Therefore the definition of the relevant market remains arguable and needs to be sufficiently analysed in the upcoming retrial

Justifiable Reasons

The abuse of market dominance includes the behaviour of refusing to trade without justifiable reasons according to the AML but in the first instance ruling justifiable reasons were not investigated by the court During the appellate trial the expert witness introduced by Sinopec claimed that there were quality hazards in the countryrsquos biofuel technology and this was a justifiable reason to refuse to trade with Yingding Even though the first instance court and the appellate court did not reason the justifiable reason it should be discussed and investigated further during the retrial

AML or Renewable Energy Law

The claims of Yingding were based on both the AML and the Renewable Energy Law (ldquoRELrdquo) and the first instance ruling referred to both the AML and the REL as

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 44 of 52

well It seems that the laws the first instance court referred to were comprehensive but in fact the reasoning was not clear and logical In the first instance ruling some disputes regarding the AML were reviewed but all the orders were not based on the AML Specifically the first instance court ordered the Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network based on the REL and dismissed the other claims That the orders were not on account of reasoning is illogical It is anticipated that during the retrial the application of the laws will be clearer

Analysis

A lot of issues have not been clearly analysed by the courts such as the relevant market and the justifiable reasons Since the case is remanded the above-mentioned issues are expected to be resolved in the retrial In addition Yingding was in a disadvantaged position compared to its first instance trial since its claims based on the AML were challenged greatly during the appellate trial In the retrial it is probable that Yingding may switch its litigation strategy and base its claims on the REL Therefore maybe more preparation regarding the REL can give Sinopec a leg up

Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)

Rijing Electric a Chinese distributor seeks CNY 5m compensation

The first hearing was on 9 June 2015 and ended without a ruling

Facts

Rijing Electric (ldquoRijingrdquo) a Shanghai-based company and a former distributor for Panasonic accused Panasonic of abusing its dominance and dividing the market through monopolistic practice in an antitrust lawsuit filed in 2014 with Shanghai No 1 Intermediate Court (ldquoShanghai Courtrdquo) claiming compensation of CNY 5m (USD 815370) Wenzhou Mingda Automation System Co and Shanghai Qingying Automation Equipment as the distributor of Panasonic in China are the co-defendants were accused of conducting monopolistic behaviours by implementing Panasonicrsquos policy

The first hearing for evidence exchange was on June 9 2015 Rijing claimed a policy allegedly introduced by Panasonic in 2009 restricted the competition between distributors Panasonic claims the policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo and has full justifiable reasons It explained that the products in question required customization at considerable cost to distributors before its sale to customers Once carried out however other distributors leaving them open to quote much lower prices than the original distributor could simply and relatively cheap replicate this customization Besides Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and that the plaintiff had failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic said its market share for the four products

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 45 of 52

under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases Also Rijing failed to challenge the policy when it was first introduced instead initially agreeing it was reasonable as e-mail evidence submitted by Panasonic suggests

Key Issues of the Case

Whether Panasonic occupied a market dominant position

It is reported that Rijing claimed that Panasonic had abused its market dominance but Rijing failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and its market share for the four products under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases

Analysis

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case Panasonicrsquos policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo rather than to eliminate or restrict competition

Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals40 (Pending)

It is a battle over patent licensing issues

It is viewed as being among the most complicated antitrust lawsuits in China

The first hearing was on 17 and 18 December 2015

Facts

Four Chinese rare earth companies Ningbo Ketian Magnet Ningbo Permanent Magnetics Ningbo Tongchuang Strong Magnet Material and Ningbo Huahui Magnetic Industry filed antitrust lawsuits against Hitachi Metals over alleged patent licensing issues regarding rare earth magnets on December 11 2014 with the Ningbo Intermediate Peoples Court (ldquoNingbo Courtrdquo) in Zhejiang province As reported four Chinese rare earth companies claimed Hitachi Metals abused its market dominance and hurt the industry competition by refusing to license the patents to them The patents in this case are used in the manufacturing of sintered neodymium iron boron (ldquoNdFeBrdquo) magnets a rare-earth magnet alloy widely used in parts for airplanes automobiles and other products

Hitachi Metals filed a challenge with the Ningbo Court over its jurisdiction in April 2015 After Ningbo Court rejected Hitachi Metals jurisdiction objection on 28 April 2015 Hitachi Metals appealed to the Zhejiang High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoZhejiang

40The details of the story are available at httpwwwzbmagcomnews_viewphpid=80 httpwwwhitachicomcnaboutpress201510-121118_ahtml last visited on December 22 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 46 of 52

Courtrdquo) but Zhejiang Court affirmed the ruling of the Ningbo Court

The first day of a two-day hearing took place on 17 December 2015 during which the two sides cross-examined each otherrsquos evidence The evidence focused on clearing up several key elements in the case including the relevant market whether Hitachi Metals has dominance on that market and whether both sides acted in good faith during the licensing negotiations

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Product Market

The four Chinese rare earth companies claimed that the relevant product market should be the NdFeb-related patent licensing market However Hitachi Metals believed that the physical NdFeb market rather than the patent licensing market should be the relevant product market which is meaningful for assess the real competitive effects on the market

Whether Hitachi Metals occupies a dominant market position

In terms of market dominance Hitachi Metals claimed it does not occupy a dominant position because Hitachi Metalsrsquo patents were not in a standard in this case and there are substitutable technologies in the market SEP holders have the obligation to license on FRAND terms but none-SEP holders do not So while a refusal to license a SEP may constitute abuse of dominance refusal to license a non-SEP mdash even by a patent holder with a dominant position mdash should not be considered as an abuse

Analysis

Hitachi Metals as a patent holder should have the right to decide whether to retain those patents or not or who to license According to the legal theory the purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage and protect innovation by conferring monopoly right mdash that is to give intellectual property owners the proprietary rights which can exclude others from using the intellectual property The SEP holders admittedly need to comply with FRAND terms which can maintain a robust balance between competition and monopoly whereas the further intervention of antitrust law into non-SEP patents may undermine the purpose of intellectual property law To which extent the antitrust law should intervene is yet to be seen

Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei41

A confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the Beijing IP court made by the Beijing High Court

41 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcncpwswbjzscq201511t20151103_12225640htm last visited on December 28 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 47 of 52

Facts

On August 2 2013 the NDRC penalized Abbott for monopolistic price-fixing and then Abbott made a price adjustment in China where the prices of main products were reduced

On December 16 2014 Tian Junwei (ldquoTianrdquo) a Chinese citizen in Beijing sued Carrefour Shuangjing Branch (ldquoCarrefourrdquo) and Abbott (Shanghai) Sales Company (ldquoAbbottrdquo) at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (ldquoIP Courtrdquo) for their monopolistic price-fixing which damaged his interests However Carrefour and Abbott challenged the jurisdiction of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court They claimed there were two reasons Firstly according to the jurisdiction rules of the IP court issued by the Supreme Court the IP court has no jurisdiction over anti-trust cases Secondly if this case is a contractual dispute the court that is in the place of Carrefour should hear it if this case is a tort dispute the Shanghai Intermediate Court should hear it

In the ruling of the IP Court the IP Court decided it has the jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases for the following reasons According to the Provisions On Causes Of Action In Civil Cases issued by Supreme Court (最高人民法院案由规定) antimonopoly dispute is a tertiary cause of action belonging to IP and competition disputes Also according to the Provisions concerning the Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京

市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问题的规定 ) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was an IP and competition dispute and was sued after November 6 2014 Thus the IP Court had jurisdiction

Both Carrefour and Abbott appealed to the Beijing High Court over the jurisdiction ruling but the Beijing High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original ruling Reasons are listed in the written ruling issued on June 18 2015 Firstly the nature of the case was an antimonopoly dispute In accordance with Provisions of the Supreme Peoples Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民

事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) and Civil Litigation Law the monopolistic civil disputes in the first instance shall be under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Peoples Courts and an action involving a contractual dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the peoples court of the place where the defendant is domiciled or where the contract is performed Carrefour as the defendant in this case is domiciled in Chaoyang District Beijing Therefore the courts of Beijing have jurisdiction over this case Secondly according to article 3 of the Notification on the Jurisdiction of Intellectual Property Courts issued by Supreme Court (关于知识产权法院案件管辖

等有关问题的通知) IP courts have jurisdiction over first-instance civil disputes arising from monopolistic practices Lastly according to Provisions concerning the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 44 of 52

well It seems that the laws the first instance court referred to were comprehensive but in fact the reasoning was not clear and logical In the first instance ruling some disputes regarding the AML were reviewed but all the orders were not based on the AML Specifically the first instance court ordered the Sinopec Yunnan Branch to incorporate the biofuel produced by Yingding into its distribution network based on the REL and dismissed the other claims That the orders were not on account of reasoning is illogical It is anticipated that during the retrial the application of the laws will be clearer

Analysis

A lot of issues have not been clearly analysed by the courts such as the relevant market and the justifiable reasons Since the case is remanded the above-mentioned issues are expected to be resolved in the retrial In addition Yingding was in a disadvantaged position compared to its first instance trial since its claims based on the AML were challenged greatly during the appellate trial In the retrial it is probable that Yingding may switch its litigation strategy and base its claims on the REL Therefore maybe more preparation regarding the REL can give Sinopec a leg up

Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)

Rijing Electric a Chinese distributor seeks CNY 5m compensation

The first hearing was on 9 June 2015 and ended without a ruling

Facts

Rijing Electric (ldquoRijingrdquo) a Shanghai-based company and a former distributor for Panasonic accused Panasonic of abusing its dominance and dividing the market through monopolistic practice in an antitrust lawsuit filed in 2014 with Shanghai No 1 Intermediate Court (ldquoShanghai Courtrdquo) claiming compensation of CNY 5m (USD 815370) Wenzhou Mingda Automation System Co and Shanghai Qingying Automation Equipment as the distributor of Panasonic in China are the co-defendants were accused of conducting monopolistic behaviours by implementing Panasonicrsquos policy

The first hearing for evidence exchange was on June 9 2015 Rijing claimed a policy allegedly introduced by Panasonic in 2009 restricted the competition between distributors Panasonic claims the policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo and has full justifiable reasons It explained that the products in question required customization at considerable cost to distributors before its sale to customers Once carried out however other distributors leaving them open to quote much lower prices than the original distributor could simply and relatively cheap replicate this customization Besides Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and that the plaintiff had failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic said its market share for the four products

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 45 of 52

under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases Also Rijing failed to challenge the policy when it was first introduced instead initially agreeing it was reasonable as e-mail evidence submitted by Panasonic suggests

Key Issues of the Case

Whether Panasonic occupied a market dominant position

It is reported that Rijing claimed that Panasonic had abused its market dominance but Rijing failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and its market share for the four products under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases

Analysis

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case Panasonicrsquos policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo rather than to eliminate or restrict competition

Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals40 (Pending)

It is a battle over patent licensing issues

It is viewed as being among the most complicated antitrust lawsuits in China

The first hearing was on 17 and 18 December 2015

Facts

Four Chinese rare earth companies Ningbo Ketian Magnet Ningbo Permanent Magnetics Ningbo Tongchuang Strong Magnet Material and Ningbo Huahui Magnetic Industry filed antitrust lawsuits against Hitachi Metals over alleged patent licensing issues regarding rare earth magnets on December 11 2014 with the Ningbo Intermediate Peoples Court (ldquoNingbo Courtrdquo) in Zhejiang province As reported four Chinese rare earth companies claimed Hitachi Metals abused its market dominance and hurt the industry competition by refusing to license the patents to them The patents in this case are used in the manufacturing of sintered neodymium iron boron (ldquoNdFeBrdquo) magnets a rare-earth magnet alloy widely used in parts for airplanes automobiles and other products

Hitachi Metals filed a challenge with the Ningbo Court over its jurisdiction in April 2015 After Ningbo Court rejected Hitachi Metals jurisdiction objection on 28 April 2015 Hitachi Metals appealed to the Zhejiang High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoZhejiang

40The details of the story are available at httpwwwzbmagcomnews_viewphpid=80 httpwwwhitachicomcnaboutpress201510-121118_ahtml last visited on December 22 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 46 of 52

Courtrdquo) but Zhejiang Court affirmed the ruling of the Ningbo Court

The first day of a two-day hearing took place on 17 December 2015 during which the two sides cross-examined each otherrsquos evidence The evidence focused on clearing up several key elements in the case including the relevant market whether Hitachi Metals has dominance on that market and whether both sides acted in good faith during the licensing negotiations

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Product Market

The four Chinese rare earth companies claimed that the relevant product market should be the NdFeb-related patent licensing market However Hitachi Metals believed that the physical NdFeb market rather than the patent licensing market should be the relevant product market which is meaningful for assess the real competitive effects on the market

Whether Hitachi Metals occupies a dominant market position

In terms of market dominance Hitachi Metals claimed it does not occupy a dominant position because Hitachi Metalsrsquo patents were not in a standard in this case and there are substitutable technologies in the market SEP holders have the obligation to license on FRAND terms but none-SEP holders do not So while a refusal to license a SEP may constitute abuse of dominance refusal to license a non-SEP mdash even by a patent holder with a dominant position mdash should not be considered as an abuse

Analysis

Hitachi Metals as a patent holder should have the right to decide whether to retain those patents or not or who to license According to the legal theory the purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage and protect innovation by conferring monopoly right mdash that is to give intellectual property owners the proprietary rights which can exclude others from using the intellectual property The SEP holders admittedly need to comply with FRAND terms which can maintain a robust balance between competition and monopoly whereas the further intervention of antitrust law into non-SEP patents may undermine the purpose of intellectual property law To which extent the antitrust law should intervene is yet to be seen

Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei41

A confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the Beijing IP court made by the Beijing High Court

41 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcncpwswbjzscq201511t20151103_12225640htm last visited on December 28 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 47 of 52

Facts

On August 2 2013 the NDRC penalized Abbott for monopolistic price-fixing and then Abbott made a price adjustment in China where the prices of main products were reduced

On December 16 2014 Tian Junwei (ldquoTianrdquo) a Chinese citizen in Beijing sued Carrefour Shuangjing Branch (ldquoCarrefourrdquo) and Abbott (Shanghai) Sales Company (ldquoAbbottrdquo) at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (ldquoIP Courtrdquo) for their monopolistic price-fixing which damaged his interests However Carrefour and Abbott challenged the jurisdiction of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court They claimed there were two reasons Firstly according to the jurisdiction rules of the IP court issued by the Supreme Court the IP court has no jurisdiction over anti-trust cases Secondly if this case is a contractual dispute the court that is in the place of Carrefour should hear it if this case is a tort dispute the Shanghai Intermediate Court should hear it

In the ruling of the IP Court the IP Court decided it has the jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases for the following reasons According to the Provisions On Causes Of Action In Civil Cases issued by Supreme Court (最高人民法院案由规定) antimonopoly dispute is a tertiary cause of action belonging to IP and competition disputes Also according to the Provisions concerning the Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京

市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问题的规定 ) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was an IP and competition dispute and was sued after November 6 2014 Thus the IP Court had jurisdiction

Both Carrefour and Abbott appealed to the Beijing High Court over the jurisdiction ruling but the Beijing High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original ruling Reasons are listed in the written ruling issued on June 18 2015 Firstly the nature of the case was an antimonopoly dispute In accordance with Provisions of the Supreme Peoples Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民

事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) and Civil Litigation Law the monopolistic civil disputes in the first instance shall be under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Peoples Courts and an action involving a contractual dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the peoples court of the place where the defendant is domiciled or where the contract is performed Carrefour as the defendant in this case is domiciled in Chaoyang District Beijing Therefore the courts of Beijing have jurisdiction over this case Secondly according to article 3 of the Notification on the Jurisdiction of Intellectual Property Courts issued by Supreme Court (关于知识产权法院案件管辖

等有关问题的通知) IP courts have jurisdiction over first-instance civil disputes arising from monopolistic practices Lastly according to Provisions concerning the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 45 of 52

under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases Also Rijing failed to challenge the policy when it was first introduced instead initially agreeing it was reasonable as e-mail evidence submitted by Panasonic suggests

Key Issues of the Case

Whether Panasonic occupied a market dominant position

It is reported that Rijing claimed that Panasonic had abused its market dominance but Rijing failed to define the relevant product and the geographical market in this case Panasonic claimed it did not occupy a dominant position in the market and its market share for the four products under scrutiny was less than 10 in all cases

Analysis

According to the AML the behaviour could be determined as abuse of market dominance only when the purpose of the dominator is to eliminate or restrict competition In this case Panasonicrsquos policy was designed to prevent the problem of ldquofree-ridingrdquo rather than to eliminate or restrict competition

Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals40 (Pending)

It is a battle over patent licensing issues

It is viewed as being among the most complicated antitrust lawsuits in China

The first hearing was on 17 and 18 December 2015

Facts

Four Chinese rare earth companies Ningbo Ketian Magnet Ningbo Permanent Magnetics Ningbo Tongchuang Strong Magnet Material and Ningbo Huahui Magnetic Industry filed antitrust lawsuits against Hitachi Metals over alleged patent licensing issues regarding rare earth magnets on December 11 2014 with the Ningbo Intermediate Peoples Court (ldquoNingbo Courtrdquo) in Zhejiang province As reported four Chinese rare earth companies claimed Hitachi Metals abused its market dominance and hurt the industry competition by refusing to license the patents to them The patents in this case are used in the manufacturing of sintered neodymium iron boron (ldquoNdFeBrdquo) magnets a rare-earth magnet alloy widely used in parts for airplanes automobiles and other products

Hitachi Metals filed a challenge with the Ningbo Court over its jurisdiction in April 2015 After Ningbo Court rejected Hitachi Metals jurisdiction objection on 28 April 2015 Hitachi Metals appealed to the Zhejiang High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoZhejiang

40The details of the story are available at httpwwwzbmagcomnews_viewphpid=80 httpwwwhitachicomcnaboutpress201510-121118_ahtml last visited on December 22 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 46 of 52

Courtrdquo) but Zhejiang Court affirmed the ruling of the Ningbo Court

The first day of a two-day hearing took place on 17 December 2015 during which the two sides cross-examined each otherrsquos evidence The evidence focused on clearing up several key elements in the case including the relevant market whether Hitachi Metals has dominance on that market and whether both sides acted in good faith during the licensing negotiations

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Product Market

The four Chinese rare earth companies claimed that the relevant product market should be the NdFeb-related patent licensing market However Hitachi Metals believed that the physical NdFeb market rather than the patent licensing market should be the relevant product market which is meaningful for assess the real competitive effects on the market

Whether Hitachi Metals occupies a dominant market position

In terms of market dominance Hitachi Metals claimed it does not occupy a dominant position because Hitachi Metalsrsquo patents were not in a standard in this case and there are substitutable technologies in the market SEP holders have the obligation to license on FRAND terms but none-SEP holders do not So while a refusal to license a SEP may constitute abuse of dominance refusal to license a non-SEP mdash even by a patent holder with a dominant position mdash should not be considered as an abuse

Analysis

Hitachi Metals as a patent holder should have the right to decide whether to retain those patents or not or who to license According to the legal theory the purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage and protect innovation by conferring monopoly right mdash that is to give intellectual property owners the proprietary rights which can exclude others from using the intellectual property The SEP holders admittedly need to comply with FRAND terms which can maintain a robust balance between competition and monopoly whereas the further intervention of antitrust law into non-SEP patents may undermine the purpose of intellectual property law To which extent the antitrust law should intervene is yet to be seen

Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei41

A confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the Beijing IP court made by the Beijing High Court

41 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcncpwswbjzscq201511t20151103_12225640htm last visited on December 28 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 47 of 52

Facts

On August 2 2013 the NDRC penalized Abbott for monopolistic price-fixing and then Abbott made a price adjustment in China where the prices of main products were reduced

On December 16 2014 Tian Junwei (ldquoTianrdquo) a Chinese citizen in Beijing sued Carrefour Shuangjing Branch (ldquoCarrefourrdquo) and Abbott (Shanghai) Sales Company (ldquoAbbottrdquo) at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (ldquoIP Courtrdquo) for their monopolistic price-fixing which damaged his interests However Carrefour and Abbott challenged the jurisdiction of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court They claimed there were two reasons Firstly according to the jurisdiction rules of the IP court issued by the Supreme Court the IP court has no jurisdiction over anti-trust cases Secondly if this case is a contractual dispute the court that is in the place of Carrefour should hear it if this case is a tort dispute the Shanghai Intermediate Court should hear it

In the ruling of the IP Court the IP Court decided it has the jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases for the following reasons According to the Provisions On Causes Of Action In Civil Cases issued by Supreme Court (最高人民法院案由规定) antimonopoly dispute is a tertiary cause of action belonging to IP and competition disputes Also according to the Provisions concerning the Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京

市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问题的规定 ) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was an IP and competition dispute and was sued after November 6 2014 Thus the IP Court had jurisdiction

Both Carrefour and Abbott appealed to the Beijing High Court over the jurisdiction ruling but the Beijing High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original ruling Reasons are listed in the written ruling issued on June 18 2015 Firstly the nature of the case was an antimonopoly dispute In accordance with Provisions of the Supreme Peoples Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民

事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) and Civil Litigation Law the monopolistic civil disputes in the first instance shall be under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Peoples Courts and an action involving a contractual dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the peoples court of the place where the defendant is domiciled or where the contract is performed Carrefour as the defendant in this case is domiciled in Chaoyang District Beijing Therefore the courts of Beijing have jurisdiction over this case Secondly according to article 3 of the Notification on the Jurisdiction of Intellectual Property Courts issued by Supreme Court (关于知识产权法院案件管辖

等有关问题的通知) IP courts have jurisdiction over first-instance civil disputes arising from monopolistic practices Lastly according to Provisions concerning the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 46 of 52

Courtrdquo) but Zhejiang Court affirmed the ruling of the Ningbo Court

The first day of a two-day hearing took place on 17 December 2015 during which the two sides cross-examined each otherrsquos evidence The evidence focused on clearing up several key elements in the case including the relevant market whether Hitachi Metals has dominance on that market and whether both sides acted in good faith during the licensing negotiations

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Product Market

The four Chinese rare earth companies claimed that the relevant product market should be the NdFeb-related patent licensing market However Hitachi Metals believed that the physical NdFeb market rather than the patent licensing market should be the relevant product market which is meaningful for assess the real competitive effects on the market

Whether Hitachi Metals occupies a dominant market position

In terms of market dominance Hitachi Metals claimed it does not occupy a dominant position because Hitachi Metalsrsquo patents were not in a standard in this case and there are substitutable technologies in the market SEP holders have the obligation to license on FRAND terms but none-SEP holders do not So while a refusal to license a SEP may constitute abuse of dominance refusal to license a non-SEP mdash even by a patent holder with a dominant position mdash should not be considered as an abuse

Analysis

Hitachi Metals as a patent holder should have the right to decide whether to retain those patents or not or who to license According to the legal theory the purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage and protect innovation by conferring monopoly right mdash that is to give intellectual property owners the proprietary rights which can exclude others from using the intellectual property The SEP holders admittedly need to comply with FRAND terms which can maintain a robust balance between competition and monopoly whereas the further intervention of antitrust law into non-SEP patents may undermine the purpose of intellectual property law To which extent the antitrust law should intervene is yet to be seen

Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei41

A confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the Beijing IP court made by the Beijing High Court

41 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcncpwswbjzscq201511t20151103_12225640htm last visited on December 28 2015

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 47 of 52

Facts

On August 2 2013 the NDRC penalized Abbott for monopolistic price-fixing and then Abbott made a price adjustment in China where the prices of main products were reduced

On December 16 2014 Tian Junwei (ldquoTianrdquo) a Chinese citizen in Beijing sued Carrefour Shuangjing Branch (ldquoCarrefourrdquo) and Abbott (Shanghai) Sales Company (ldquoAbbottrdquo) at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (ldquoIP Courtrdquo) for their monopolistic price-fixing which damaged his interests However Carrefour and Abbott challenged the jurisdiction of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court They claimed there were two reasons Firstly according to the jurisdiction rules of the IP court issued by the Supreme Court the IP court has no jurisdiction over anti-trust cases Secondly if this case is a contractual dispute the court that is in the place of Carrefour should hear it if this case is a tort dispute the Shanghai Intermediate Court should hear it

In the ruling of the IP Court the IP Court decided it has the jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases for the following reasons According to the Provisions On Causes Of Action In Civil Cases issued by Supreme Court (最高人民法院案由规定) antimonopoly dispute is a tertiary cause of action belonging to IP and competition disputes Also according to the Provisions concerning the Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京

市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问题的规定 ) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was an IP and competition dispute and was sued after November 6 2014 Thus the IP Court had jurisdiction

Both Carrefour and Abbott appealed to the Beijing High Court over the jurisdiction ruling but the Beijing High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original ruling Reasons are listed in the written ruling issued on June 18 2015 Firstly the nature of the case was an antimonopoly dispute In accordance with Provisions of the Supreme Peoples Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民

事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) and Civil Litigation Law the monopolistic civil disputes in the first instance shall be under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Peoples Courts and an action involving a contractual dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the peoples court of the place where the defendant is domiciled or where the contract is performed Carrefour as the defendant in this case is domiciled in Chaoyang District Beijing Therefore the courts of Beijing have jurisdiction over this case Secondly according to article 3 of the Notification on the Jurisdiction of Intellectual Property Courts issued by Supreme Court (关于知识产权法院案件管辖

等有关问题的通知) IP courts have jurisdiction over first-instance civil disputes arising from monopolistic practices Lastly according to Provisions concerning the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 47 of 52

Facts

On August 2 2013 the NDRC penalized Abbott for monopolistic price-fixing and then Abbott made a price adjustment in China where the prices of main products were reduced

On December 16 2014 Tian Junwei (ldquoTianrdquo) a Chinese citizen in Beijing sued Carrefour Shuangjing Branch (ldquoCarrefourrdquo) and Abbott (Shanghai) Sales Company (ldquoAbbottrdquo) at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (ldquoIP Courtrdquo) for their monopolistic price-fixing which damaged his interests However Carrefour and Abbott challenged the jurisdiction of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court They claimed there were two reasons Firstly according to the jurisdiction rules of the IP court issued by the Supreme Court the IP court has no jurisdiction over anti-trust cases Secondly if this case is a contractual dispute the court that is in the place of Carrefour should hear it if this case is a tort dispute the Shanghai Intermediate Court should hear it

In the ruling of the IP Court the IP Court decided it has the jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases for the following reasons According to the Provisions On Causes Of Action In Civil Cases issued by Supreme Court (最高人民法院案由规定) antimonopoly dispute is a tertiary cause of action belonging to IP and competition disputes Also according to the Provisions concerning the Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京

市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问题的规定 ) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was an IP and competition dispute and was sued after November 6 2014 Thus the IP Court had jurisdiction

Both Carrefour and Abbott appealed to the Beijing High Court over the jurisdiction ruling but the Beijing High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original ruling Reasons are listed in the written ruling issued on June 18 2015 Firstly the nature of the case was an antimonopoly dispute In accordance with Provisions of the Supreme Peoples Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes arising from Monopolistic Practices (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民

事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) and Civil Litigation Law the monopolistic civil disputes in the first instance shall be under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Peoples Courts and an action involving a contractual dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the peoples court of the place where the defendant is domiciled or where the contract is performed Carrefour as the defendant in this case is domiciled in Chaoyang District Beijing Therefore the courts of Beijing have jurisdiction over this case Secondly according to article 3 of the Notification on the Jurisdiction of Intellectual Property Courts issued by Supreme Court (关于知识产权法院案件管辖

等有关问题的通知) IP courts have jurisdiction over first-instance civil disputes arising from monopolistic practices Lastly according to Provisions concerning the

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 48 of 52

Transition of Adjustment to the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property Cases issued by Beijing High Court (北京市高级人民法院关于知识产权案件管辖调整过渡有关问

题的规定) for an intellectual property-related civil or administrative case of first instance where a party concerned filed a lawsuit after November 6 2014 the IP Court shall accept the case This case was sued on December 16 2014 Thus the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction

Key Issues of the Case

Whether the Beijing IP Court has jurisdiction over a first-instance antitrust dispute

The plaintiff argued that the IP court had no jurisdiction regarding antitrust disputes However according to the provisions hereinbefore the IP court shall accept the first-instance antitrust disputes

Analysis

The ruling issued by the Beijing High Peoplersquos Court is undoubtedly a confirmation regarding the jurisdiction of the IP Court over antitrust disputes However this ruling was based on regulations issued by the Supreme Court rather than laws issued by the legislative branch Thus there is uncertainty concerning the jurisdiction of the IP Court because regulations are more likely to be terminated or replaced than laws under Chinese legal background

Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines42

A lawsuit filed by an end consumer against a state-owned airline

Set an example on the definition of relevant market regarding airlines

Facts

On July 24 2013 Gu Fang (ldquoGurdquo) filed an antitrust lawsuit with the Guangzhou Intermediate Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangzhou Courtrdquo) against China Southern Airlines (ldquoCSArdquo) He alleged that CSA abused its market dominance by refusing to trade with him because CSA cancelled his flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen temporarily and thus damaged his interests

In the first-instance judgment the Guangzhou Court found that Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance In addition the conduct of flight cancellation is not an abuse of market dominance according to the AML as Gu is not a competitor of CSA

42 The ruling of this case is available at httpwwwcourtgovcnzgcpwswcontentcontentDocID=c23553f7-f57b-4797-9380-c1488b2480fe last visited on January 4 2016

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 49 of 52

Gu appealed to the Guangdong High Peoplersquos Court (ldquoGuangdong Courtrdquo) and the Guangdong Court issued the written judgment on May 5 2015 According to the written judgment the Guangdong Court dismissed Gursquos appeal and affirmed the first-instance judgment

Key Issues of the Case

The Definition of Relevant Market

Gu held the view that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang to Shenzhen in which CSA is the only service provider However the Guangdong Court found that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Since it only is a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu the two routes are substitutable Thus the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen

Whether CSA has market dominance

Gu presented the development statistics of the civil air transport industry as evidence to prove CSArsquos market dominance Nonetheless the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of market dominance because the statistics included many airlines and CSA was just one of them According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court based on the analysis that the relevant market is the air transport market from Mianyang or Chengdu to Shenzhen Gu had failed to prove CSArsquos market dominance in the relevant market

Whether CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight

Gu claimed that CSA abused its market dominance by cancelling the flight which was a refusal to trade On the contrary CSA held that cancelling the flight was not abusing market dominance Instead it was common in the business of airlines According to the written judgment of the Guangdong Court the court found that the flight cancellation was not aimed at Gu and was not intended to eliminate or restrict competition Therefore the flight cancellation should not be considered a refusal to trade

Analysis

Fungibility analysis was adopted in the definition of the relevant market by the Guangdong Court in this case Even so the analysis was not solid in the following respect The Guangdong Court held that it is only a one-hour ride from Mianyang to Chengdu so that the flight from Mianyang to Shenzhen could be easily substituted by the flight from Chengdu to Shenzhen However the so-called one-hour ride is idealistic Practically there are too many reasons to prove that the consumer cannot arrive at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport within an hour For example the taxies administrated by Mianyang taxi companies can probably not engage in the ride to

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 50 of 52

Chengdu If by coach it would take more than one hour to Chengdu let alone to Chengdu airport Of course a fungibility analysis is good however it needs to be reasonable when considering the alternatives

Outlook

The year of 2015 has seen a significant development of private antitrust litigations The number of private antitrust litigations has increased and the types of these cases have become diversified For instance there was the first ruling in which the court ruled against an administrative monopoly In addition this year also witnessed the first antitrust lawsuit filed against a state-owned oil company in China Lastly the issues in the overlapping field of both IP law and antitrust law have become more complicated

In 2016 it is anticipated that there would be more antitrust litigations against the state-owned companies or the authorities in China Meanwhile the issues regarding the intersection between antitrust and intellectual property would still be a hot topic Court decisions are expected to provide further guidance on the exited issues such as the burden of proof the definition of the relevant market and the limit of the antitrust intervention into IPR protection

IV General Conclusion

In the year of 2015 Chinarsquos antitrust enforcement had entered into the seventh year and has presented an increasingly competent antitrust regime that has already had a significant and compound impact on many transactions and behaviours of multinationals throughout the world

The central government attached increased importance to the antitrust regime of China which can be mirrored in the high appearance rate of the word ldquoanti-monopolyrdquo in the working report of the new government

The antitrust agencies took more aggressive stance in legislation with various regulations and guidelines been issued and some of guidelines are still drafting by agencies which consequently would provide more guidance to the enforcement as well as more certainties to the undertakings

Administrative monopoly was prioritized for enforcement this year and the agency would deepen the enforcement against administrative monopoly moving forward

More and more antitrust litigations had been brought into courts indicating that the private litigation had gradually functioned as the supplementary remedies for the undertakings who suffered from the monopolistic behaviour it is expected more cases would be brought before the court in the future The combination of pubic enforcement and private litigation systems would jointly promote the competition order in the market

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 51 of 52

International cooperation has expanded this year beyond the exchange of work experience and explanations of procedures to active coordination on specific cases and exploration of the feasibility of conducting further joint law enforcement So far the NDRC has signed MoUs with antitrust agencies in seven jurisdictions

The automotive industry and the IPR related issues are definitely the most touched areas this year apart from the industry of peoplersquos livelihoods

The year 2014 had been described as the year of antitrust storms however moving to 2015 the antitrust public enforcement had appeared the tendency of routinization Looking ahead the antitrust would touch more industries with more complicated issues involved

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact

2015 CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY ANNUAL REPORT

Page 52 of 52

Contact

Dr Zhan Hao AnJie Law Firm 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu Chaoyang District Beijing 100600 PRChina Tel86-10-85675966

86-139-1178-1654 Fax86-10-85675999 E-mail zhanhaoanjielawcom

Beijing Office 19F Tower D1 Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Office Building No 19 Dongfangdonglu China Chaoyang District Beijing China Tel (86 10) 8567 5988 Fax (86 10) 8567 5999 wwwanjielawcom

Shanghai Office Room 3305 K Wah Center No1010 Huaihai Road (M) Changning District Shanghai China Tel (86 21) 2422 4888 Fax (86 21) 2422 4800

  • I Legislation
    • A Legislation Tendency Highlight
    • B Legislation of SAIC
      • Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition1F
      • Draft Guidelines on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting Competition
        • C Legislation of NDRC
          • Auto Industry Antitrust Guidelines
          • Draft Antitrust Guidelines on IPR Abuses2F
            • D Legislation of MOFCOM
              • The Guidelines on Standardizing the Names of Notification Cases3F
              • Auto Sales Management Measures
                  • II Public Enforcement
                    • A Merger Control
                    • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                    • Significant Cases
                      • GoogleMotorola MOFCOM partially removed restrictions5F
                      • AB InBevs investment in Guangzhou Zhujiang Brewery6F
                      • MOFCOM issued four administrative decisions to penalize six parties involved in four merger cases
                      • MOFCOM conditionally cleared Nokiarsquos acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent11F
                      • Western DigitalHGST MOFCOM partially removed hold-separate restrictions12F
                      • SeagateSamsungMOFCOM removed hold-separate restrictions13F
                      • FreescaleNXP obtained conditional approval from MOFCOM14F
                        • B Monopolistic Agreements
                        • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                        • Significant Cases
                          • Ocean Shipping Companies case investigated by the NDRC15F
                          • Mercedes-Benz case investigated by Jiangsu Provincial Price Bureau16F
                          • Telecom case investigated by Yunnan DRC18F
                          • DongFeng Nissan case investigated by Guangdong DRC20F
                          • Brick case investigated by Hunan AIC24F
                          • Animation Association case investigated by Guangdong AIC25F
                          • Insurance companies case investigated by Hubei AIC26F
                          • Concrete companies case investigated by Hunan AIC27F
                            • C Abuse of Market Dominance
                            • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                            • Significant Cases
                              • Hainan Dongfang Water Company Case28F
                              • Ningxia AIC suspends tie-in sales investigation of three state telecom firms29F
                              • Liaoning AICrsquos investigation against Tobacco Company30F
                              • Chongqing AICrsquos investigation against pharmacy firm31F
                                • D Administrative Monopoly
                                • Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                • Significant Cases
                                  • Shandong Transportation Department case investigated by the NDRC32F
                                  • Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City case investigated by the NDRC 35F
                                      • III Private Litigation
                                        • A Enforcement Tendency Highlight
                                        • B Significant Cases
                                          • Shenzhen Sware Technology v Guangdong Department of Education (Pending)37F
                                          • Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy v Sinopec (Pending) 38F
                                          • Rijing Electric v Panasonic (Pending)
                                          • Four Chinese Rare Earth Companies v Hitachi Metals39F (Pending)
                                          • Carrefour and Abbott v Tian Junwei40F
                                          • Gu Fang v China Southern Airlines41F
                                              • IV General Conclusion
                                              • Contact