2015 abri - roussefs brazil and arab countries

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5º Encontro Nacional da ABRI Redefinindo a Diplomacia em um Mundo em Transformação 29 a 31 de Julho de 2015 Belo Horizonte MG Brasil Análise de Política Externa DILMA ROUSSEFF’S PRESIDENCY AND ARAB COUNTRIES: AN OVERLOOKED FOREIGN POLICY? Danillo Alarcon Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Goiás

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  • 5 Encontro Nacional da ABRI

    Redefinindo a Diplomacia em um Mundo em Transformao

    29 a 31 de Julho de 2015

    Belo Horizonte MG Brasil

    Anlise de Poltica Externa

    DILMA ROUSSEFFS PRESIDENCY AND ARAB COUNTRIES:

    AN OVERLOOKED FOREIGN POLICY?

    Danillo Alarcon

    Pontifcia Universidade Catlica de Gois

  • 2

    Dilma Rousseffs Presidency and Arab Countries: an overlooked foreign policy?

    ABSTRACT: Despite her poor results in terms of foreign policy, Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff has been applying the constitutional principles of the countrys international relations. Nonetheless, in a country such as Brazil, where the president usually has a great amount of power, particularly because of the presidential diplomacy of both Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Lula da Silva, Rousseff has had problems to operationalize her foreign policy objectives, if there are any critics could argue on. One exemplificative case happened in the second half of 2014, when she openly criticized the United States and its allies attacks against the Islamic State. Brazilian media was not sympathetic to her. It is clear, from a Foreign Policy Analysis standpoint, that her speech was not aimed at denying the horrific acts of the so-called terrorist organization, but at trying to bring back respect for international law and the United Nations role in those situations. However, according to Christopher Hill, the decision-making process in a democracy has to bear in mind a great amount of constituencies, from the media, that has a huge influence on public opinion, to the finance donors of elections and all other kinds of activities. In this sense, the objective of this paper is to analyze Rousseffs administration relations with Arab Countries, specially focusing on the countrys view on the Arab Spring movements and its subsequent consequences. The presidents speeches at the opening of the United Nations General Assemblies (and other deemed necessary) and data from think tanks and governmental institutes about trade between Brazil and Arab Countries will be useful in the research. The hypothesis here presented is that the Brazilian positions did not dramatically change, but what lacked was leadership in foreign affairs as the country, pledging the status of a global power, didnt have the resources to do so.

    Keywords: Brazil; Rousseff; Foreign Policy; Arab Countries

  • 3

    Introduction

    President Lula da Silvas Foreign Policy (FP) was remarkably outstanding in some

    aspects. He developed, together with his Chancellor Celso Amorim, an active foreign policy

    aimed at the international insertion of Brazilian companies together with a South-South

    emphasis on the global political agenda. However, his successor, Dilma Rousseff, from the

    same party (Partido dos Trabalhadores PT, in Portuguese) has been criticized for being

    lofty and clumsy when it comes to operationalizing her foreign policy principles developed

    first with Antonio Patriota, and later with Luiz Alberto Figueiredo as Ministers of External

    Relations , both due to internal and external constraints (CERVO; LESSA, 2014.

    CORNETET, 2014).

    In that sense, it is imperative to analyze how the country has been dealing with its

    various partners. With regard to the Arab Countries, Brazilian relations have as a remarking

    point the 1970s. There were obvious economic needs in both sides, but they managed to

    work on a political agenda as well. Already in the XXI century, President Lula launched in

    2004 the initiative to host an Arab and South American countries Summit in Brazil, which was

    held in Braslia in 20051. The ASPA Summits (Amrica do Sul Pases rabes, in

    Portuguese) were an important occasion for political understanding, but they also were a

    good opportunity for business. Pragmatism has always been, in that sense, the key to

    understand Brazils relations towards its Arabs counterparts.

    Dilma Rousseff, however, had to face more difficulties when dealing with these

    partners. The Arab Spring erupted in December 2010 in Tunisia and lead to a political

    overturn in the region. Ben Ali (Tunisia), Hosni Mubarak (Egypt) and Muammar al-Qaddafi

    (Libya) were ousted from power. Bashar Al-Assad (Syria) is facing a deadly civil war,

    followed by the rise in mid-2014 of the so-called Islamic State, that not only grabbed the

    opportunity to raise itself from the dust left of the Iraq War (2003) but also seized the moment

    to gather important gains in the civil war scenario. In the second half of 2014, when Dilma

    openly criticized the United States and its allies attacks against the Islamic State, Brazilian

    media was not sympathetic to her. It is clear, from a Foreign Policy Analysis standpoint, that

    her speech was not meant to deny the horrific acts of the so-called terrorist organization, but

    it aimed at trying to bring back respect for international law and the United Nations role in

    those situations, which are the principles Brazil stands for.

    Thus, the objective of this paper is to analyze Rousseffs administration relations with

    Arab Countries, specially focusing on the countrys view on the Arab Spring movements and

    1 Two other summits were held: the second, in Doha (2009); the third, in Lima (2012). According to

    information at the Brazilian Foreign Affairs Ministry website, the fourth is going to happen in Riyadh (Saudi Arabia), in 2015.

  • 4

    its subsequent consequences. The presidents speeches at the opening of the United

    Nations General Assemblies (and other documents deemed necessary) and data from think

    tanks and governmental institutes will be useful in the research. The hypothesis here

    presented is that Brazils positions did not dramatically change, but what lacked was

    leadership in foreign affairs as the country, pledging the status of a global power, didnt have

    the resources to do so.

    Brazil even attempted, with Minister Antonio Patriota (2011), to launch the principle of

    responsibility while protecting (RwP). It will be discussed in the paper that, even though it

    was well received by some part of the international community, there were other factors that

    overshadowed it. Brazil is facing the maturation of its democracy, and, as it will be advanced

    further in the next pages, that ought to bring more interest groups into the foreign policy

    debate. However, this is not a setback for the countrys FP, but it will bring considerable

    challenges.

    As democracy was mentioned above, a few considerations regarding it and foreign

    policy are going to be made. It is important to notice that Brazils international relations are

    determined by fundamental principles established in its 1988 constitution. The document was

    the result of a long process towards the democratization of the country. According to Juan

    Linz and Alfred Stepan (1999), president Sarney, who was in power when the 1988

    constitution was drafted, still had to deal with the armed forces meddling in the government

    issues, as he was the first civil president to serve after the military regime. For instance, he

    had six military ministers which influenced at the Constitutional Assembly. The president and

    the Army, in the end, agreed not to support parliamentarism and that strongly affected how

    the countrys international relations would be conducted in the 1990s and beginning of the

    2000s.

    However, the aforementioned 1988 constitution clearly and irrevocably brought in its

    fourth article the commanding principles of the countrys international relations:

    I national independence; II prevalence of human rights; III self-determination of the peoples; IV non-intervention; V equality among the states; VI defense of peace; VII peaceful settlement of conflicts; VIII repudiation of terrorism and racism; IX cooperation among peoples for the progress of mankind; X granting of political asylum (BRASIL, 1988, p. 13).

    What this article expresses is in accordance with the countrys tradition in foreign

    policy. Thus, Dilma Rousseffs choices and actions in foreign policy, even though they were

    somehow criticized, were in accordance with these principles. Her position towards the

    Islamic State issue in 2014 is symbolic in that sense. A critical analysis of it as it is here

  • 5

    presented, goes hand in hand with what Charles Lister (2014, p. 3) pointed out: the key to

    undermining ISs [Islamic State] long-term sustainability () is to solve the socio-political

    failures within its areas of operation. It seems that even though there has been less Brazilian

    proactivity in the international arena, the country does not seem to have lost its enduring

    constitutional international relations principles and its sensitivity towards the need for

    development and self-determination of the Global South.

    1. Brazils Foreign Policy towards Arab Countries: from the 1970s to the ASPA

    Summits

    The approximation between Brazil and the Arab countries, with the exception of the

    large migration flows, mainly of Syrians and Lebanese in the late XIX century, deepened in

    the 1970s. Already in 1969, Itamaraty (as the Brazilian Foreign Ministry office is called)

    started to shape itself to deal better with the opportunities presented by those far, but

    possible, partners (CERVO; BUENO, 2008, p. 423). Despite the dynamics of the region (the

    Gulf, for example only became effectively independent from the United Kingdom in the late

    1960s), Brazil remained attentive to the possibilities of economic and diplomatic relations

    with the area in question. At the end of 1973, Brazil had already opened embassies in Iraq,

    which would become an important partner in the following years, and in Saudi Arabia.

    As lodie Brun (2012) mentioned, Brazil only began seeking true partnership with

    Arab Countries during the 1970s, mainly for economic reasons. The country was dependent

    on oil imports from Iraq and Saudi Arabia due to its fast growing GDP rate (at least until the

    beginning of the 1980s). Those years, when Brazil was ruled by military presidents, were

    unambiguously marked by a pragmatic view of the countrys foreign policy, which forced the

    opening of new opportunities in the international arena, both for financing the process of

    industrialization Brazil was facing and to sell its surplus.

    This is connected to the pragmatism President Emlio Mdici tried to bring to the

    countrys foreign policy. As Cervo and Bueno (2008, p. 387) pointed out, [p]ragmatism

    would have to be guided by circumstances, without dichotomies and straightjackets. There

    would be no exclusionary choice between bilateralism and multilateralism, neither between

    the West nor the Third World, nor the alignment or disagreement, for this or that ideology2.

    Nonetheless, as Brun (2012, p. 76) affirmed, Brasilia had to make political

    concessions in order to gain advantages from the trade with Arab partners. Positioning itself

    with the Palestinian cause was one of those. That, however, should not be read as a pure

    2 From the original: O pragmatismo haveria de guiar-se pelas circunstncias, sem admitir dicotomias

    e camisas-de-fora. Sem opes exclusivistas pelo bilateralismo ou multilateralismo, pelo Ocidente ou pelo Terceiro Mundo, pelo alinhamento ou divergncia, por essa ou aquela ideologia (CERVO; BUENO, 2008, p. 387).

  • 6

    exception. Brazilian foreign policy during the Military Regime was mostly nationalistic3 and

    considering national interest as a whole. It was more of a learning moment for the country

    requiring bargains than a submission to the decision or impositions of a group or single

    country. Actually, that was precisely what Brazil was trying to avoid during the 1970s,

    especially because, as Cervo and Bueno (2008) indicated, its relation with the United States

    (USA) was not in good shape.

    The 1980s witnessed more creativity from the Brazilian foreign policy-makers. The

    Iraq-Iran war was going on and Braslia continued selling products to Bagdad, including

    weapons. According to Cervo and Bueno (2008, p. 447), the Brazilian engineering services

    were asked to interpose with renewed assurance, in oil exploration, road construction,

    military assistance, and entered some countries like Iraq, Libya and Saudi Arabia, paving the

    way for major contracts and large arms deals4. The commercial flow between the regions

    saw a drop to very low levels from the end of the 1980s to the end of the 1990s. During the

    democratic transition there was actually short interest in the region (BRUN, 2012; CERVO;

    BUENO, 2008).

    In the early 2000s, with the terrorist attacks and the subsequent US invasion of Iraq in

    2003, for a brief moment it seemed that the Arab political agenda was once again going to be

    imposed by the United States. However, with the political weight of then Brazilian president,

    Lula da Silva, with the anti-American speech coming from Iran, Syria and Libya, and the less

    submissive position of even the most traditional USA partners, dissatisfied with the Iraq

    invasion (2003) and its consequences, the path was opened for a more proactive Brazilian

    foreign policy.

    Lula da Silva and Celso Amorim, accordingly, were responsible for this. The latter

    considered its FP to be active and proud, in Portuguese ativa e altiva. The country should

    not only keep pushing towards the reforms of the multilateral forums but also seek new

    partners both through strengthening South-South Cooperation and bilateral relations

    (CASARES, 2012). Amado Cervo (2008) called that move the Logistic Paradigm, in which

    the State would walk hand-in-hand with new constituencies of foreign and economic policy in

    the task of internationally inserting the countrys products.

    The ASPA Summits, mentioned above, were a success both economically and

    politically. Despite the major focus on these summits being the increase of trade between the

    regions, it has also led to cooperation in other areas, as, for instance, the recognition of a

    3 According to Cervo and Bueno (2008, p. 384), Diante da Escola Superior de Guerra, (...) Gibson

    Barbosa, ministro das Relaes Exteriores, reconhecia, naquele mesmo ano, que a poltica exterior se guiava pelo exclusivo interesse nacional, a servio do desenvolvimento, e que a isto, no Brasil, se convencionou chamar de nacionalismo. 4 From the original: os servios de engenharia brasileira foram convidados a intervir com redobrado

    empenho, na prospeco de petrleo, construo de estradas, assistncia militar, e penetraram alguns pases como Iraque, Lbia, Arbia Saudita, abrindo o caminho para importantes contratos e grandes negcios com armamentos (CERVO; BUENO, 2008, p. 447).

  • 7

    Palestinian state with the 1967 borders and with East Jerusalem as its capital, by president

    Lula in 2010, a gesture copied all over South America.

    It is important to notice, as Carlos Lujn and Camilo Burian (2013) pointed out, that

    Brazil is the sole actor in South America that could lead such an enterprise. According to the

    authors, Brazil is inserted in a region, South America, that grants it with a power base that it

    could not have on its own (...). In fact, Brazils stances on strategic security and defense

    issues is both global and regional5 (p. 8). This expresses well Lulas foreign policy toward

    the consolidation of Brazil as an important regional player aiming at the countrys

    international aggrandizement. In this sense, Brazils position relies on its capabilities to rally

    not only its internal constituencies towards the Arab world but also, somehow, and

    paradoxically, to carry its neighboring countries towards assuring its position in other regions.

    This is precisely an expression of the countrys soft power.

    The results are quite positive in general. Trade between Brazil and the Arab countries

    has been growing. Products like sugar, frozen meat, iron and other services are leading the

    agenda, while smaller industrial products still face the Sino-Indian competition and the

    logistics costs. On the other hand, there are some important areas that are seen as assets

    for Arab investment. Namely, with the increased concern with food security in the region,

    Brazils food production is viewed with great interest by Arab states. Furthermore, increasing

    tourism has also being discussed during the ASPA Summits.

    Graphic 1 Trade Balance with Arab Countries

    Source: LUJN; BURIAN, 2013, p. 15.

    In the graphic above, Lujn and Burian (2013), showd the trade balance between

    Brazil and Arab Countries compared to other South American countries, between 2000 to

    2010.

    5 From the original: Brasil est inserido en una regin, Sudamrica, que lo dota de una base de poder

    que por s solo no podra tener. (...) De hecho, el posicionamiento de Brasil en temas estratgicos de seguridad y defensa se da tanto a nivel global como regional.

  • 8

    Brazil noticeably did not always have a surplus (with special attention to 2008, the

    year the international crisis erupted) in the years analyzed in the figure, but did have an

    important trade increase with Arab countries growing larger, although gradual. In 2010, Brazil

    traded more with these countries than all its neighbors in South America. Nonetheless, in

    2011, Brazil experienced a trade deficit. In the section below, the constraints for the relation

    between both Brazil and Arab Countries will be explored.

    2. Dilmas FP Towards Arab Countries and the setbacks of the Arab Spring

    Guilherme Stolle Paixao e Casares (2012) argued that, with Dilma Rousseff,

    Brazilian Foreign Policy towards Arab Countries suffered two major inflexions. Firstly,

    Antonio Patriota was nominated Minister of Foreign Affairs. He is considered a very talented

    diplomat, but with a lower profile than his predecessor. Besides, the presidential diplomacy

    would somehow be discouraged by Dilmas own historic: she didnt have previous political

    experiences. The fact that best represents that is that Dilma Rousseff did not visit any Arab

    Country during her first term (CORNETET, 2014). It is important to notice, however, that

    Dilma kept key figures beside her: Marco Aurlio Garcia, who was the Special Adviser to the

    President during Lula two terms, and Celso Amorim was appointed as Defense Minister.

    The second inflection was the Arab Spring itself and the paradox Brazil would have to face

    between supporting or not its partners, especially Qaddafis Libya and Assads Syria.

    Accordingly, there is no doubt for some analysts that Brazilian foreign policy has been

    hapless during Rousseffs first term in power. However, this section aims at mitigating some

    miscomprehensions about this statement in order to reevaluate Rousseffs first term in power

    (2011-2014). Cervo and Lessa (2014) defend that there has been a relative fall in Brazilian

    position in many important issues during those years. For them, the lack of key ideas (in

    Portuguese, ideias fora) and internal problems, such as the inefficiency of the State in

    inserting internationally its nations companies, are the main causes of the above mentioned

    descent.

    There is not an explicit (nor implicit) choice towards the dismantling of Lula da Silvas

    gains in terms of foreign policy. For Cervo and Lessa (2014, p. 135), two main domestic

    variables that account for the relative fall of Brazil internationally are: low innovation and low

    competitiveness within its economy and its political system of partisan coalition. The frail

    results in the economy are more than enough proof for them. Two main concerns, the

    deindustrialization and the reprimarization of the economy, are still to be tackled by the

    government agents, especially after Rousseff was reelected in the October 2014 elections.

    Some critics of Rousseffs government are more emphatic. According to Ben Tavener

    (2014), writing for Al Jazeera America, Brazil tried to show some strength in its foreign policy

  • 9

    in mid-2014. Chancellor Luiz Alberto Figueiredo6, dwelling into the Middle Eastern issues,

    strongly condemned the disproportionate use of force by Israel in the Gaza Strip. The

    accusations made by an Israeli official that Brazil was in fact a diplomatic dwarf caused

    constraints in the government.

    However, Tavener (2014) indicated that [e]ven in regions where it wields tangible

    influence South America and Africa Brazil has done very little. [The country] has been

    silent on many cases of human right abuses in African countries where Brazil has been

    expanding its diplomatic and commercial presence. This is something that should have been

    (and should be) questioned. Even during Lulas government ties with many African (and

    Arab, the main concern in this article) countries were reinforced. Amorim used to summarize

    in his declarations that Brazil, as a State, was cooperating with other States, not particularly

    governments. It is important to note that, according to what was discussed at the beginning

    of this article, the Brazilian FP principle of non-intervention is adamant to both Lula and

    Rousseff administrations.

    If the government was acting according to the tenets of realism in the situation above

    discussed, for many analysts, in South America, ideology is decisively an important variable

    in Brazils foreign policy. One example is the recent crisis in Venezuela. For Javier Cirulizza

    (2014), the ideological choices of the Partido dos Trabalhadores foreign policy are not

    helping the crisis, despite Venezuelan stability being crucial for Brazil. However, there could

    be another interpretation to this: by acting in a restrained manner, Brasilia is still advancing

    its agenda. Obviously, it does so not in the same pace it did during Rousseffs predecessor,

    but it is still acting.

    The Arab World has also gone through formidable changes in the last years, and, in

    fact, no leading country can be found in the region nowadays. Egypt, Libya and Syria, that

    were once the strongest countries in the region, have all in some way fallen apart (LUJN;

    BURIAN, 2013). For Lujn and Burian (2013, p. 11), Rousseff maintained what Lula had

    already started, of course, but with some reservations. In one hand, she kept pushing for the

    reform of the international system towards multilateralism (especially through the United

    Nations). On the other hand, Brazil has retained its focus towards dealing with specific

    regions. Thus, Dilma Rousseff continued valuing the ASPA Summits.

    She participated in the Third Summit in Lima, Peru, where she defended the principle

    of responsibility while protecting and ranted against islamophobia (ROUSSEFF, 2012). She

    expressed how the ASPA Summits not only brought the two regions together in political and

    social terms, but also how it happened to involve good opportunities for business and

    opening markets of both regions to trade.

    6 He replaced Patriota ahead of the Foreign Affairs Ministry in 2013.

  • 10

    However, there was a backward trend after Dilma Rousseffs first term. In 2011,

    during her first year in government, trade between Brazil and Arab Countries felt the

    backdrop of the 2008 crisis and Braslia had to deal with a commercial deficit of US$ 2,5

    billions, the largest in the last eleven years, as already mentioned above (LUJN; BURIAN,

    2013).

    What Lula and Rousseff have in common, together with their counterparts in other

    Latin American countries, is a rhetoric that emphasizes anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism and

    nationalism (expressed better by left-wing parties). These ideals somehow, according to

    Galindo, Baez and Brun (2014) are, the main factors why even the diasporas in that region

    kept supporting Bashar al-Assad regime.

    Those elements are indeed relevant to explain Brazils foreign policy towards Arab

    Countries during Rousseffs first term. Italian historian Loris Zanatta (2014) clearly expressed

    that Latin American nationalism was crafted from an opposition towards the United States.

    The recurrence of interventions in the region gave rise to anti-American feelings, even

    though the diplomacies were pragmatic enough to understand the USA importance to the

    region. This, of course, did not alienated Brasilia from Washington. The choice has mostly

    been pragmatic.

    Therefore Rousseff and former president Lulas Party have keenly advocated against

    foreign intervention abroad, especially those lead by the United States. It is not as simple as

    it may appears, because Lula and Bush were, for instance, partners in many important

    issues. However, we must acknowledge ideas have power. Of course, no fantastic,

    revolutionary or hasty move was conducted between 2011 to 2014. This situation was also

    valid for some specific situations in the Middle East, as will be discussed in the following

    section.

    3. Libya, Syria, the Islamic State and the Arab quagmire

    As Maria Regina Soares Lima (2000) stressed, power is concentrated in the

    executive in the South Cone countries. This, however, was a trend that, as she pointed out at

    the beginning of the XXI century, was about to fade, because globalization demanded new

    ways to deal with the dilution of the in-out frontier. This perception is accurate. In Brazil,

    Itamaraty is not the sole responsible for international relations (in its broad sense) anymore.

    Neither is the Legislative mute to international changes. Both the Senate and the House of

    Deputies have commissions for external relations, a trend that Hill (2003) already pointed out

    as a sign of a mature democracy. These commissions are not, needless to say, absent from

    the political game, corruption and lobbying. Nevertheless, they function as a way to bring to

    the floor of the Congress specific themes of foreign policy.

  • 11

    It is also important to affirm that, according to Lima (2000), the ontological model of

    realism is long gone when it comes to analyzing foreign policy, which is in accordance with

    what is central in this article. Besides, public opinion must be taken into consideration.

    According to George Kennan (apud LIMA, 2002, p. 273), public opinion was defective

    because it was both concerned with immediate gains and it was drained with emotions. That

    view should be questioned as national interest is no longer seen as unisonous, as public

    opinion is not irrelevant to foreign policy making anymore, since the enlargement of the

    democratic processes has awaken various interests groups.

    The belief that there was a clash between foreign policy and internal policy began

    fading in the 1950s. Many models where developed in what was called the Foreign Policy

    Analysis, a field that lies between the political science and the international relations studies,

    bridging what was considered unnatural boundaries between the external and internal issues

    of politics (ALARCON, 2012). For Lima (2002, p. 277), the incompatibility between external

    politics/democracy faded away, unless a technocratic view of politics tout court is adopted,

    based on the rationality of technical decisions7.

    It has already been stated here that Arab Countries became important to Brazil

    especially after the first ASPA Summit. Economic and political opportunities appeared and

    had to be seized. Yet, as Casares (2012) pointed out, the records of both Muammar

    Qaddafi and Bashar Al-Assad regime were not somehow good enough to boost Brasilias

    soft power. They were both what he called lasting autocracies and the Brazilian and

    international media explicitly blasted the country for that erratic move.

    Right-wing Brazilian magazine Veja has been constantly blaming Lula (and Dilma) for

    its moves towards the Middle East. This magazine is particularly cited because it is a direct

    opposition to the government. As Hill (2003, p. 274) pointed out, the power of the media is

    exerted in two distinct ways: over public opinion and then over decision-makers, including

    indirectly via political class. In this sense, what Veja publishes clearly shows that in

    democracies there is, firstly, a multitude of voices that have enough room to express

    themselves. And, secondly, foreign policy making in such situations gets harder, because,

    even though the public opinion is not always aware of international relations issues, the

    media can help shape opinions and create uneasiness.

    Contrary to what critics defend and in favor of his foreign policy, former president

    Lula, when participating at the 2009 Presidential Summit of the African Union, in Libya,

    reinforced principles of international relations that have long been important for Brazil, from

    Getulio Vargas to the militaries, and in accordance to the constitution, as discussed above

    (NETTO, 2009), declared that what he was doing was state policy. The belief that democracy

    7 From the original: A incompatibilidade poltica externa/democracia desaparece, a menos que se adote uma

    viso tecnocrtica da poltica tout court, com base na alegada racionalidade das decises tcnicas.

  • 12

    is a process, so non-interference would apply, and besides, the ideal of reshaping the world

    order, as have been studied here, is strong enough in Brazils foreign policy not to be

    discarded.

    Casares (2012) himself reinforced that regardless of the political connotations of

    relations between Brazil and Libya, the visible expansion of bilateral foreign trade should be

    noticed8. In the Syrian case, Brazil also had economic interests (refer to the Table 1 below),

    notwithstanding the political constraints of dealing with Bashar Al-Assad.

    Table 1 Trade between Brazil and Libya and Syria

    Country 1989-2002 2003-2010

    Libya

    Exports US$ 56 million US$ 232 million

    Imports US$ 8,7 million US$ 468 million

    Syria

    Exports US$ 49 million US$ 240 million

    Imports US$ 4 million US$ 26 million

    Source: Data collected from CASARES (2012).

    The case of Libya is sensitive in the analysis here presented. It was also shaken by

    the Arab Spring and Qaddafi quickly lost control over the country. The crisis was too close

    to Europe to be ignored, as defended Michel Foucher (2013). Something had to be done.

    Brazil was presiding the Security Council of the United Nations when, on February 26, 2011,

    resolution 1970 was approved, which predicted sanctions against Qaddafi regime. However,

    the country abstained together with Germany, China, India and Russia on Resolution

    1973, which predicted that all necessary means should be used to prevent abuses from

    Qaddafis regime.

    The reason for intervening in the Libyan crisis was grounded on the principle of

    responsibility to protect (R2P), crafted in 2001 and accepted (with restraints) by the

    international community in 2005. Nonetheless, the sponsors of the resolution managed to

    open for the possibility of acting nationally or through regional organisations or

    arrangements () to take all necessary measures () to protect civilians populated areas

    under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (UN/RES/1973 apud LEME, 2015, p.

    95). Right after the approval of the resolution, France and its partners managed to start

    bombing targets in Libya. As Brazilian ambassador Joo Marcos Senise Paes Leme (2015,

    p. 99) stated:

    Ironically, the action, strongly driven and carried out by European countries, was taken against a country the European Union had, after Qaddafi

    8 From the original: independentemente das conotaes polticas das relaes entre Brasil e Lbia,

    deve-se ressaltar a visvel ampliao de seu comrcio exterior.

  • 13

    rehabilitation in 2003, granted arms export licenses of 834.5 million euros, between October 2004 and the end of 2009

    9.

    Brazils position in these circumstances was in agreement with its worries over the

    functioning, as well as, in this case, the malfunctioning, of multilateral arrangements. It was

    discussed above that the countrys foreign policy stresses the need for diplomacy,

    negotiation, and for consensus whenever possible. This does not mean that Brazil was in

    favor of the Libyan regimes attitudes. Brasilia actually had an acute awareness that a

    military solution, that excludes some in the dialogues, were not going to bring peace to Libya.

    That seemed accurate. The complete destabilization of the county has as a current blowback

    thousands of migrants crossing the Mediterranean towards Europe.

    For that reason, Antonio de Aguiar Patriota, then Foreign Relations Minister in Brazil,

    articulated the principle of Responsibility while Protecting (RwP) (PATRIOTA, 2011). It is

    important to note that the divulgation of this was on a Brazilian newspaper Folha de S.

    Paulo and only then Dilma Rousseff would reassure it at the General Assembly meeting, in

    New York (September 21st, 2011). According to her, the RwP should walk hand-in-hands

    with R2P. Besides, it is linked to the reform of the Security Council itself (ROUSSEFF, 2011).

    Nevertheless, among all the paradoxes of the Brazilian Foreign Policy has had to face

    because of the sensitive situation in the Arab Countries, one precise situation called national

    and international attention. Right after her opening speech at the 69th General Assembly of

    the United Nations, president Rousseff conceded an interview to a group of journalist in

    which she defended long-term positions of the Brazilian foreign policy, such as the reform of

    the United Nations. However, what stood out was her answer to a question concerning the

    so-called Islamic State. The interviewer asked if she agreed with negotiating with the group

    and if she sought it as a feasible way to solve the crisis. Her answer is as follows:

    () do you believe that bombing ISIS will solve the problem? Because if it did, I think it would have been solved in Iraq. And what we have seen in Iraq is paralysis. Those are not my words, you can read them in the New York Times (). What did they say? That there was stagnation. Why? The ISIS has the support of Sunni communities. So the roots of the problem must be comprehended. () The demons are free, all of them. Let's not forget what happened in Iraq: the Iraqi state was dissolved (). So today, we simply want to bomb ISIS, and to say it will solve it because the dialogue wont. I think bombing wont do [solve the crisis] by itself, because bombing wont lead to peaceful consequences. Why do you want to bomb? Why? Why would someone internally want you to bomb? () To ensure peace?

    10

    (ROUSSEFF, 2014; translated with adaptations).

    9 From the original: Ironicamente, a ao, fortemente impulsionada e levada a cabo por pases

    europeus, dava-se contra um pas ao qual a Unio Europeia, aps relativa reabilitao de Kadafi em 2003, concedera licenas de exportao de armamentos da ordem de 834,5 milhes de euro, entre outubro de 2004 e o fim de 2009 (LEME, 2015, p. 99). 10

    From the original: Gente, vocs acreditam que bombardear o ISIS resolve o problema? Porque se resolvesse, eu acho que estaria resolvido no Iraque. E o que se tem visto no Iraque a paralisia. Isso

  • 14

    In Brazil, the media blasted her for defending dialogue with terrorists. Ricardo Setti

    (2014), a columnist at Veja, attacked the president and said her speech was a shame to all

    Brazilians. As the fact happened during the electoral campaign, even the main oppositionist

    party, PSDB, in the figure of its candidate, Acio Neves, attacked the president declaring that

    her position was numb and that she should never have defend dialogue with a group that

    decapitates people. What she did, according to him, was actually against what the Brazilian

    Foreign Policy preached (FASANO, 2014). The fuss reached such a proportion that even

    Luis Alberto Figueiredo, the Chancellor at the time, had to defend the presidents statement,

    clarifying that Dilma had actually defended negotiation with the international community in

    order to solve the Islamic State issue (MOURA, 2014).

    According to Christopher Hill (2003), the decision-making process in a democracy

    has to bear in mind a great amount of constituencies, from the media, that has a huge

    influence in the public opinion, to the sponsors of elections and all other kinds of activities.

    Another element worth noting, specifically in the case that is analyzed in this article, is the

    role played by the Diasporas. According to Galindo, Baeza and Brun (2014), Brazils (and

    other relevant States in Latin American) strong position against intervention and for a political

    solution of the Syrian conflict is somehow linked to Diasporas organizations11.

    This case particularly demonstrates that Foreign Policy cannot be conducted

    undercover in democracies. Constituencies have become aware of how their everyday lives

    are affected by international arenas. Besides, oppositionist parties, the media, and specific

    economic groups are also mindful of the power they have to shape public opinion.

    In a recent move to get Braslias attention, the Iraqi Prime Minister, Mr. Ibrahim al-

    Jafaari, visited the country in June 2015, pledging cooperation to fight the Islamic State as it

    is a threat to the region and to the whole world. The new Brazilian Foreign Minister, Mr.

    Mauro Vieira, replied that Brazil was sympathetic to the Iraqi peoples cause and that there

    would be further cooperation (FOREQUE, 2015). Now, what we should be following are the

    actions that the country will take during Dilma Rousseffs second term.

    no sou eu que estou dizendo, s vocs lerem o New York Times de ontem. O que o New York Times disse: que houve uma estagnao. Por qu? O ISIS tem apoio de comunidades sunitas. Ento, o que se tem de olhar , de fato, a raiz desse problema. Vocs sabem aquele negcio, quando voc destampa a caixa e sai todos os demnios? Os demnios esto soltos, todos. No vamos esquecer o que ocorreu no Iraque: houve uma dissoluo do Estado iraquiano, uma dissoluo. Ento, hoje, a gente querer simplesmente bombardear o ISIS, dizer que voc resolve porque o dilogo no d. Eu acho que no d, tambm, s o bombardeio, porque o bombardeio no leva a consequncias de paz. Por que voc quer bombardear? Por qu? Por que algum internamente quer que voc bombardeie? Voc vai bombardear para qu? Para garantir a paz?. 11

    Brazilian Vice-president is of Lebanese descent. This article, in Executive Magazines, an important Lebanese economic and business magazine, argues that hes the most powerful Lebanese person alive (DYKE, 2014): .

  • 15

    4. Final Remarks

    Against the realist dogma of International Relations studies, Lima (2002, p. 277)

    argued that in democracies there are mechanisms that actually mitigate the rulers

    opportunism: one of them is the existence of a professionalized and large foreign policy

    bureaucracy; the second is that the leader can (and ought to sometimes) delegate the

    authority to decide. Being so, the problem is not if foreign policy is better operationalized in

    democracies. The fact is that these countries, Brazil included, must deal with the tensions

    aroused from the many constituencies involved with foreign policy.

    Dilma Rousseff has been dealing with the tensions related to the Arab Spring

    regarding and respecting the countrys international relations principles established in the

    1988 constitution. Even though there was a fuss over her statement in 2014, the principle of

    responsibility while protecting caused enough discomfort in some countries that led the

    coalition to intervene in Libya. Besides, as ambassador Leme (2015, p. 111) stressed out,

    the instability in Iraq, Libya and Syria because of foreign intervention seems to corroborate

    Brazilian stance against this kind of action.

    Rousseffs statement was made during election campaigns. It is important to state

    that even though it is difficult to see how elections do give citizens a role in foreign policy

    (HILL, 2003, p. 258), when international events start being part of everyday life and the

    media uses it either to boost or downplay the government, that variable must start to be

    considered.

    The 2008 crisis which PT used for a long a time as a trump because of the fact

    Brazil wasnt being affected by it , migration flows to Brazil (from Haitians to Bengalis), drug

    problems, border security, the revelation that even the president was being spied by the

    United States and the manipulation of political opponents have made Brazilians more aware

    of international issues. The external has become internal. Thus, in democracies, and in a

    globalized world, it is wise to deal with them together. Missing the line would be catastrophic

    in times of crisis, especially because Brazil is an important international actor. The

    consequences of retreat right now would not be wise.

    References

    ALARCON, Danillo. Os meandros da poltica externa dos Estados Unidos para o Afeganisto: o 11 de setembro e a Operao Liberdade Duradoura. Braslia, 2012. 141f. Dissertao (Mestrado em Relaes Internacionais) Instituto de Relaes Internacionais, UnB, 2012. BRASIL [Constituio (1988)]. Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil: constitutional text of October 5, 1988, with the alterations introduced by Constitutional

  • 16

    Amendments no. 1/1992 through 64/2010 and by Revision Constitutional Amendments no. 1/1994 through 6/1994. 3. ed. Braslia: Chamber of Deputies, Documentation and Information Center, 2010. BRUN, lodie. La diplomacia brasilea hacia el Medio Oriente: una estrategia oscilante. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofia, Poltica y Humanidades, ao 14, n. 28. 2012. CASARES, Guilherme Stolle Paixo e. Construindo Pontes? O Brasil diante da Primavera rabe. Cincia e Cultura, vol.64, no.4, So Paulo, Oct./Dec. 2012. CERVO, Amado Luiz. Insero Internacional formao dos conceitos brasileiros. So Paulo: Saraiva, 2008. ________; BUENO, Clodoaldo. Histria da poltica exterior do Brasil. Braslia: Editora da Universidade de Braslia, 2008. ________; LESSA, Antonio Carlos. O declnio: insero internacional do Brasil (2011-2014). Revista Brasileira de Poltica Internacional, 57 (2), p. 133-151, 2014. CIURLIZZA, Javier. Brazils Foreign Policy and Latin America: a new chapter? International Crisis Group In Pursuit of Peace. December, 2014. Available at< http://blog.crisisgroup.org/latin-america/2014/12/01/brazils-foreign-policy-and-latin-america-a-new-chapter/>. CORNETET, Joo Marcelo Conte. A Poltica Externa de Dilma Rousseff: conteno na continuidade. Revista Conjuntura Austral, vol. 5, n. 24, jun-jul 2014. DYKE, Joe. The Most Powerful Lebanese person alive. Executive Magazine On-line, July 2, 2014. Available at: . Accessed in June/2015. FASANO, Bruna. Acio: Dilma prope negociar com um grupo que decapita pessoas. Veja Brasil/Governo, 25 de setembro de 2014. Available at: . Accessed in: February 2015. FOREQUE, Flvia. Chanceler do Iraque pede apoio do Brasil contra Estado Islmico. Folha de So Paulo On-line Mundo, 02 de junho de 2015. Available at: . Accessed in June/2015. FOUCHER, Michel. General comments on external intervention in countries in crisis. In: DANE, Felix (ed.). Brazil Emerging in the Global Security Order. International Security: a European South American Dialogue. Rio de Janeiro: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2013. GALINDO, Alejandra; BAEZA, Cecilia; BRUN, lodie. Diversity behind unity: Latin Americas response to the Arab Spring. IN: MASON, Robert. The International Politics of the Arab Spring Popular unrest and foreign policy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. HILL, Christopher. The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.

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