2014 icn cartel workshop bos 11 daeyoung kim director, int’l cartel div. korea fair trade...
TRANSCRIPT
2014 ICN Cartel Work-shop
BOS 11
Daeyoung KimDirector, Int’l Cartel Div.
Korea Fair Trade Commission
2014. 10. 3
Should jurisdictions seek to allocate cases to prevent
double penalisation?
* The views and opinions expressed in this presentation are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the KFTC
2
contents
Ⅰ. Background
Ⅱ. Issues Raised
III. KFTC’s Approach
IV. Conclusion
3
Ⅰ. Background
1. Globalization of economy and competition lawEconomic activities are globally interdependent
Trade liberalization, various economic reforms, increased foreign di-
rect investment and offshoring are main reasons for horizontal and
vertical economic globalization
More and more jurisdictions are introducing competition
law Over 120 countries have competition authority and law in place, and
most of them have the law provision on extraterritoriality
U.S. China
Korea
Germany
France
Japan
Others
Intermediary: 24.63Intermediary: 80.05
Intermediary: 16.08
Intermediary: 3.25Intermediary: 0.7Intermediary:
62.79Value added: 6.54
Producer sale price: 194.04 (retail price in U.S: 600)
Global production network of iPhone 4(2011)
4
2. Example cases of overlapping jurisdictionMore jurisdictions are engaging in extraterritorial
application of competition law and law enforce-
ments are interconnected
Early 2000’s -> finished goods
• Graphite Electrode Cartel (1992-1998): Sanctioned by 4 ju-
risdictions(US, EU, Canada, Korea)
• Vitamin Cartel (1989-1999): Sanctioned by 5
jurisdictions(US, EU, Canada, Australia, Korea)
Recent Cases-> intermediaries
• LCD panel (2001-2006): Sanctioned by 5 jurisdictions(US,
EU, Japan, China, Korea) and other investigations continue
• Automobile parts (1996-2012): Sanctioned by 6
jurisdictions(US, EU, Canada, Australia, Japan, Korea) and
other investigations continue
Ⅰ. Background
5
Ⅱ. Issues Raised
6
Ⅱ. Issues Raised
General principle of extraterritorial application Anticompetitive behavior(cartel) + Effect to the domestic com-
petition order + Causal link(direct and uninterrupted) between
two
Consumer protection vs. Protection of competition “Competition law aims at consumer protection”
• All types of import of cartelized goods (whether finished or in-
termediary) can be target of cartel enforcement
Possibilities of overlapping jurisdictions are high
“Protection of competition is the primary purpose of competition
law”
• Extraterritorial enforcement should be limited to jurisdictions
where first “trade”(delivery or invoice) takes place
Slim possibilities of double penalization
1. What is the purpose of competition law?
7
Ⅱ. Issues Raised U.S. Alcoa case(1945): Effect doctrine
Timberlane case(1976): Jurisdictional rule of reason(balancing
theory)
Hartford case(1993): Effect doctrine (w/ consideration of comity)
EU Dyestuff case(1972): Single Economic unit doctrine
Woodpulp case(1988): Place of implementation doctrine
Japan CRT case(2009): Single Economic unit (of victim) doctrine
⇒ With absence of international hard law regulating extraterritori-
ality
and the standard evaluating the effect to domestic market,
each
jurisdiction has developed its own legal theories
⇒ Risks of double penalisation are growing
2. There exists universally accepted legal principle?
88
Ⅱ. Issues Raised
Indirect Sale
International Benchmark Price
3. Tricky Issues
Cartel(Intermedi-
ary)1st sanction
Effect(Assembled in subsidiary
A’ )2nd sanction
Headquarter of A
3rd sanction
Indirect import
4th sanction
Indirect import
5th sanction
Indirect import6th sanc-
tion…
Export
Single unitExport of finished goods
Global oligopo-
lists
International price insti-
tute
Cartelized info
Companies in country 1
Companies in country 2
Companies in country
3…
Make reference in setting prices: Effect
9
III. KFTC’s Approach
101010
III. KFTC’s Approach Korea’s Competition Law Article 2-2: The Act shall apply to activities carried out overseas
when they are deemed to have effect on the domestic market
Case Law Supreme Court(2014, Air cargo case): “domestic effect” means
“direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect”
Practices Invoice(bill to) or Delivery(ship to) Standard
• Refrain from claiming jurisdiction in indirect sale case
Comity
• Respect jurisdiction where direct sale took place
International cooperation
• Close coordination with other agencies in calculating relevant
turnover Aircargo case: reduce 50% of total out/in-bound shipments between
Europe and Korea considering the possibility of double counting after
consultation
11
IV. Conclusion
121212
IV. Conclusion
Active utilization of bilateral agreement Coordination and consultation of enforcement activities with re-
spect to a specific case Korea-Canada FTA Competition Chapter: “The Parties shall consult
from time to time about the effectiveness of measures undertaken by
each Party”
Close cooperation throughout all stages of investigation includ-
ing calculation of affected commerce
Information sharing plays a pivotal role in revealing the factual
issues and thus contributes to harmonized enforcement among
authorities
Endeavor to apply laws in “clear effect” cases Extraterritorial application based on indirect, secondary, abstract
effects on domestic markets can result in multiple penalisation
Comity and respect to more directly affected jurisdiction
1. In the short term
13131313
IV. Conclusion
Establishment of universally acceptable rule Common ground of case laws on extraterritoriality -> soft law
Active discussion in international fora (OECD, ICN) and consensus
building required
Introduction of optimal sanction designing system To prevent over-deterrent level of sanction, simultaneously inves-
tigating authorities should check others’ penalties and reflect
them accordingly
Mutual trust is of utmost importance and more proactive co-op-
erational mechanism(e.g., confidential information exchange) re-
quired
2. In the long term