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Focus Area

"Strategic Communication in Combined Operational Access – Information Activities andEmerging Communication Practices"

APPLIED CONCEPT

"COMMUNICATION MANAGEMENT AT THE MILITARY

OPERATIONAL LEVEL"

Version 2.0

30 September 2014

Concept Leads:

Contributors:



APPLIED CONCEPT "COMMUNICATION MANAGEMENT AT THE MILITARY OPERATIONAL LEVEL" V2.0


2

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

This document was developed and written by the contributing nations and internationalorganizations of the Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MCDC) 2013-14. It

does not necessarily reflect the official views or opinions of any single nation or organization,

but is intended as recommendation for national / international organizational consideration.

Reproduction of this document is authorized for personal and non-commercial use only,

provided that all copies retain the author attribution as specified below. The use of this

work for commercial purposes is prohibited; its translation into other languages and

adaptation / modification requires prior written permission.

Questions or comments can be referred to: [email protected].

Authors: Mr. Carl A. KarlssonSwedish Armed Forces HQ

Försvarsmakten Högkvarteret

Informationstaben

Lidingövägen 24, S-107 85 Stockholm

[email protected]

Lt Col Peter E. Westenkirchner

Bundeswehr Planning Office

Planungsamt der Bundeswehr

Dez ExpEntw/ExpDfg CD&EEinsteinstrasse 20, D-85521 Ottobrunn

[email protected]

DISCLAIMER

This document is gender neutral. Depending on the context and if, when referring to

members of both sexes, the third person singular cannot be avoided or a gender-neutral

noun does not exist, we reserve the right to use the masculine form of the noun and

pronoun. This is to ensure that the document remains comprehensible.

mailto:[email protected]














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VII. EDUCATION AND TRAINING ................................................................................................................... 55

A. Q UALIFICATION OF THE HEAD OF COMMUNICATION ........................................................................................... 55 B. Q UALIFICATION OF THE INFORMATION ANALYSTS ............................................................................................... 55 C. Q UALIFICATION OF THE INFORMATION PLANNERS .............................................................................................. 56 D. INTEGRATION OF COMMUNICATION IN LEADERSHIP AND STAFF DEVELOPMENT ...................................................... .. 56

VIII. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS ..................................................................................................... 57

ANNEX A – INFORMATION STRATEGY FORMAT ............................................................................................ A-1

ANNEX B – NARRATIVE (EXAMPLE) ............................................................................................................... B-1

ANNEX C – INFORMATION OBJECTIVES (EXAMPLES) ..................................................................................... C-1

ANNEX D – COMMUNICATION PLANNING.....................................................................................................D-1

LEXICON AND REFERENCES................................................................................................................ LEXICON-1

PART 1 – ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................. ....................................................... LEXICON-1 PART 2 – GLOSSARY ..................................................... ................................................................. ........... LEXICON-4 PART 3 – BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................................................................... ................................. LEXICON-5

TABLE OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Information Strategy Development ....................................................................................... 13

Figure 2: Information Objectives – A Different Layer to Strategic Objectives ...................................... 14

Figure 3: Roles of the Head of Communication .................................................................................... 17

Figure 4: Generic HQ Organisation (Current) ........................................................................................ 21

Figure 5: Generic HQ Organisation (Recommended) ............................................................................ 30

Figure 6: Integration of the Information Environment in Operations Planning .................................... 31

Figure 7: Operations Planning Products and Communication .............................................................. 42

Figure 8: Communication Input to Existing OPLAN Format .................................................................. 43

Figure 9: Communication Input to Existing OPLAN Format & New Annex ........................................... 44

Figure 10: Communication Input to Existing OPLAN Format & Communication Plan .......................... 44

Figure 11: Campaign Synchronization / Coordination of Mid-Term Planning ..................................... 47

Figure 12: Campaign Synchronization and Joint Functions .................................................................. 48

Figure 13: Joint Coordination Process (Current) .................................................................................. 49

Figure 14: JCB / JCBWG Composition ................................................................................................... 49

Figure 15: JTCB Composition ................................................................................................................ 50

Figure 16: Joint Coordination Process with CCB (Recommended)........................................................ 51

Figure 17: Info Ops in the JTCB .............................................................................................................. 51

Figure 18: CCB Reps in the JCBWG ........................................................................................................ 52

Figure 19: HoC in the JCB ...................................................................................................................... 53

Figure 20: Communication Coordination Board ................................................................................... 53





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PREFACE AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Context & Scope

Recent developments in the international security environment demonstrate the power of

communication: messages and perceptions become predominant of military engagements and

impact the behaviour of people. Orchestrated activities carry messages and have a crucial effect on

public opinions, decision-making processes, and domestic support to missions. This has finally led to

conceptual ideas on integrated communication and communication management – an approach to

adequately respond to and shape developments in the Information Environment.

The Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MCDC) 2013-14 Focus Area "Strategic

Communication in Combined Operational Access – Information Activities and Emerging

Communication Practices" culminates capability development activities in a multinational contextongoing since 2003. Starting with Concept Development and Experimentation (CD&E), more and

more practical experiences and lessons learned from operations have been incorporated and finally

led to a set of best practices recommended for immediate implementation.

Implementation of proposed solutions to operational challenges is actually the key problem: many

concepts have been written on communication issues; policy and doctrine was developed; but very

little actually came into practical existence. This concept proposes detailed modifications to

processes, organisational structures and tools/techniques currently used for the management of

communication at the military operational level.

Although the theme of MCDC 2013-14 is "Combined Operational Access", the recommendations

made in this concept shall be considered for all scenario settings and operation/mission types wherea joint 4* military HQ and force is deployed.

Customers

This concept paper should inter alia attract the attention of communication managers and

practitioners, Joint Force commanders, and military operational-level HQ staff.

It should also be shared and discussed with civilian counterparts of the above involved in mandating,

planning and execution of crisis response missions/operations in order to facilitate integration and a

comprehensive approach.





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Challenge

Every action sends messages through perception and interpretation of others. Therefore,

communication is powerful and many actors effectively exploit its potential in order to achieve their

objectives. The concerted and aligned use of words and deeds is essential for reaching own goals.

Although all this is evident, we are often focused on traditional actions, misunderstandcommunication as only media activity, and consequently overlook the power of communication as a

force multiplier.

Solutions

This concept proposes solutions in order to overcome current deficiencies with a focus on a deployed

Joint Force at the operational-level of command.

Operations should be Narrative-driven, based on an Information Strategy that provides strategic-

political guidance.

Current Strategic Communication (StratCom) policy and doctrine should, where applicable, take on

the idea of integrated communication.StratCom Advisors at the appropriate levels should assume the role of a Head of Communication

(HoC), empowered to provide direction and guidance in addition to coordination and advice.

Information Analysts and Information Planners should be introduced as new staff capabilities, fully

integrated in the Intelligence and Plans divisions.

A Communication Coordination Board should be established as the HoC's tool for communication

management, involving a core of communication capabilities and functions and fully integrated in the

joint coordination process.

Finally, communication planning should be fully integrated with operations planning. Communication

guidance should be nested in the Operations Plan and a Communication Plan should be produced as

an excerpt for the purpose of information sharing with external actors.

In a nutshell, this concept presents a model for integrated communication management at the

military operational level.

__________________________________________________________________________________

The authors would like to thank:

the MCDC partners who contributed to the StratCom Focus Area;

the Exercise VIKING Core Planning Team from the Swedish Armed Forces and the Folke

Bernadotte Academy; and

the NATO ACT StratCom Capability Implementation Team.

Stockholm/Ottobrunn, 30 September 2014





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I. INTRODUCTION

A.

BackgroundWithin the Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MCDC) 2013-14 this concept continues

previous work and results from the Multinational Experiment (MNE) series and the Multinational

Information Operations Experiment (MNIOE) project. Specific source documents are:

MNE 5 / MNIOE ANALYTICAL CONCEPT "DEVELOPMENT OF A MULTINATIONAL INFORMATION STRATEGY"

V1.0 (31 OCTOBER 2008)

MNE 6 FRAMEWORK CONCEPT "INTEGRATED COMMUNICATION IN MULTINATIONAL COALITION OPERATIONS

WITHIN A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH" V1.0 (22 OCTOBER 2010)

The MNE 5 concept was developed and validated through MNIOE Workshops 14-17 (and additional

two Tiger Team Workshops), MNIOE Limited Objective Experiments (LOEs) 3A and 3B, and the MNE 5

Major Integrating Event, Phases 1 and 2, during the September 2007 to October 2008 timeframe.The MNE 6 concept was developed and validated through MNE 6 Strategic Communication

(StratCom) Workshops 1-5, one MNE 6 Integrating Workshop and one Expert Seminar on "Non-

Compliance and Strategic Communication" (StratCom LOE) during the March 2009 to October 2010

timeframe. The conceptual approach was also discussed at the 2009 NATO CD&E Conference in a

sub-session / workshop on NATO's StratCom experimentation program.

Within MCDC 2013-14 – during the June 2013 to May 2014 timeframe – the conceptual approach

was discussed at 3 Tiger Team Workshops, StratCom Focus Area Workshops 1-4, and at the margins

of the 2013 NATO CD&E Conference (StratCom Static Display & Audience Engagement).

Finally, a StratCom LOE was integrated in the exercise CPX/CAX VIKING 14 (VK14) in April 2014.

Findings from this experiment are comprehensively captured in this document. Further details can be

found in:

MCDC STRATCOM LOE / VK14 EXPERIMENT ANALYSIS REPORT (EAR) (25 JULY 2014)

B. Problem Statement

A comprehensive analysis of current and future communication-related operational challenges and

capability gaps is contained in:

MCDC 2013-14 STRATCOM FOCUS AREA "BASELINE ASSESSMENT REPORT" V0.6 (07 OCTOBER 2013)

Coalitions in multinational crisis management operations require versatile, agile capabilities to

project combined forces into an operational area with sufficient freedom of action to accomplish

their mission. Relevant scenarios and operation/mission types range from low-intensity operationsthat assist populations, groups or individuals – such as Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)

or Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) – to high-intensity combat operations against

a broad spectrum of adversaries – from global competitors to belligerent regional powers to

networked violent extremist organizations. Access operations may also involve situations, in which

there are no specific adversaries but where operations take place in highly unstable areas where

little or no governmental or societal authority exists, aside from armed civil populations and criminal

groups.

Multinational force projection in this operational spectrum will almost always include the early

conduct of Information Activities and operations in space and cyberspace, since freedom of action in

those dimensions is increasingly important to all joint and combined operations. Coalition partners,

therefore, need to be able to develop and issue timely, relevant and feasible communication

guidance; implement communication plans in a consistent, transparent and flexible manner; take





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emerging communication practices and technology into account; and gain enhanced situation

awareness in the Information Environment1.

Today's military operations are challenged with a fragmentation of communication capabilities and

insufficient integration of communication with operations planning, resulting in fragmented

Information Activities by multinational partners, insufficiently harmonised for achieving objectives inthe Information Environment that support common strategic objectives. In the last 10-15 years the

multinational community of communication practitioners struggled for overcoming this challenge by

introducing coordination mechanisms. For instance, the military Information Operations (Info Ops)

function and later StratCom were designed to provide an analysis, advice, coordination and oversight

capacity for selected capabilities at various levels.

However, sole coordination of capabilities and actions remains more a cure to the symptom than it

constitutes a solution to the underlying problem. In addition, there is still a lack of consideration of

the comprehensive scope of non-media activities that may help to create desired effects in the

Information Environment.

C.

Conceptual ApproachThe MCDC 2013-14 Focus Area "Strategic Communication in Combined Operational Access –

Information Activities and Emerging Communication Practices" presents a complementary approach

to StratCom and other existing communication capabilities and functions: rather than proposing a

sharp break with organisational structures, processes or skills from the past, MCDC encourages

'incremental change' – a modification / improvement of existing configurations that builds upon the

existing structures, processes and skills, not necessarily suggesting their replacement.2

This approach is based on two fundamental ideas:

(1) Awareness and perception are at the heart of all human communication. All actions bear

information content – "One cannot not communicate!" 3

–, and actions speak louder than words.

Therefore, should be implemented to guide all analysis, planning, execution andA NEW MIND-SET

assessment of operations from a communication perspective. The aim is that the Joint Force

becomes aware of and appropriately considers the 'body language' of operations and their

Information Effects. It is proposed to adopt best practices from civilian business corporations, e.g., in

the area of Integrated Marketing Communication4, and incorporate them in an operational context

across all civil and military dimensions.

(2) High-level, should promote a corporate identity and image ofTOP-DOWN COMMUNICATION GUIDANCE

a coalition, and integrate multinational Information Activities through Information Objectives derived

from a shared mission Narrative and deliberate Information Effects. The concept proposes a common

understanding of the required structure and contents of an Information Strategy and successional

communication planning outputs. The management of communication capabilities and functionsconcentrates on the operationalization of the strategic Narrative and Information Objectives, and the

required contributions to operations planning.

As such, this document presents a business model5 for integrated communication – i.e., enhanced

StratCom – at the military operational level.

1 The 'Information Environment' is the virtual and physical space, in which information is received, processed

and conveyed. It consists of the information itself and information systems. [MNE 6 Framework Concept

v1.0 (2010)]2 [Cf. Osborne/Brown (2005)]

3 [Watzlawick/Beavin/Jackson (1967)]

4

[Cf. Mulder (2007); Schultz/Kitchen (2000)]5 A 'business model' describes the rationale of how an organization creates, delivers, and captures value in

economic, social, cultural or other contexts. The term used for a broad range of informal and formal

descriptions to represent core aspects of a business, including purpose, business process, target customers,





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all areas of activity – and thus, the actual operational context becomes less relevant for the essential

elements of the MCDC StratCom Focus Area approach.

F. Customers

Primary customers of this concept are in nationalCOMMUNICATION PRACTITIONERS AND SENIOR LEADERSand multinational, coalition and alliance military organisations to include (but not limited to):

military-strategic level communication managers and practitioners;

the Command Group of a military operational-level HQ;

members of the HQ Advisory Group / Special Staff of a military operational-level HQ;

the Chief of Staff, his deputy and assistants of a military operational-level HQ;

practitioners of PA, Info Ops and other communication disciplines at all levels;

J2 Intelligence (INTEL) staff of a military operational-level HQ;

J3 Operations staff of a military operational-level HQ;

J5 Plans staff of a military operational-level HQ;

J9 Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) staff of a military operational-level HQ.

The concept may also inform civilian counterparts of the above involved in mandating, planning and

execution of crisis response missions/operations.





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II. HYPOTHESES

A.

INFORMATION STRATEGYIf strategic-political communication guidance is provided in the form of an INFORMATION STRATEGY

, thenBUILT AROUND A NARRATIVE

consistent messaging by words and deeds of multinational partners related to a common

mission will be enhanced. A-1

a comprehensive approach – the coordination and collaboration of civil and military actors –

will be promoted. A-2

successional communication planning will be enabled to consider a corporate approach and

integrate internal and external communication. A-3

B.

HEAD OF COMMUNICATION

If the are consolidated inRESPONSIBILITIES FOR ADVICE, DIRECTION AND GUIDANCE ON COMMUNICATION ISSUES

the role of a Head of Communication (HoC) in military organisations, then

the commander's impact on the awareness and accountability of his staff and subordinate

units will be enhanced. B-1

the acceptance of communication as a leadership responsibility will be promoted. B-2

communication guidance will be harmonised and clarified, and deviating interpretations and

tasking minimised. B-3

communication management based on superior communication guidance will be facilitated.

B-4

If selected information disciplines and communication-related CAPABILITIES AND FUNCTIONS ARE

, thenORGANISED UNDER THE DIRECTIVE OF A HOC

essential capabilities will be made available permanently to HQ activities as required for the

integration of communication in analysis, planning, execution and assessment of operations.

B-5

the consistent implementation of communication guidance will be improved. B-6

stovepipe activity, isolation and separation of capabilities will be reduced. B-7

C. COMMUNICATION PLANNING

If superior-level communication guidance is TRANSLATED INTO SUCCESSIONAL COMMUNICATION PLANNING

, thenAND INTEGRATED IN OPERATIONS PLANNING

communication efforts can be focused to meet the requirements at subordinate levels. C-1

consistent and comprehensive implementation of strategic-political guidance will be

promoted. C-2

the awareness and understanding of communication as an integral part of all activity will be

promoted. C-3

consistent messaging by words and deeds will be enhanced. C-4





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III. INFORMATION STRATEGY

A.

PurposeAn Information Strategy outlines the interagency and multinational approach to crisis/conflict

prevention and resolution in the Information Environment. It constitutes mission-specific strategic

and political guidance for all mission-related, multi-agency activity of coalition partners or alliance

members across all levers of power.

An Information Strategy prompts leadership at all levels to understand how activities will be / should

be perceived by key audiences, ensuring alignment with overarching strategic objectives. It shall be

used as guidance to fully integrate communication in operations planning.

B. Scope

The development of an Information Strategy informs strategic planning and, vice versa, is integratedwith and guided by the development of strategic plans and objectives. The first version of an

Information Strategy should be ready and approved by the political authorities prior to strategic

operations/mission planning is concluded to ensure that strategic planning appropriately considers

effects in the Information Environment. On the other hand, development of an Information Strategy

needs to await the approval of strategic objectives for integration with Information Objectives.

Figure 1: Information Strategy Development

Figure 1 shows a generic example of the analysis and planning process that leads to a multinational

Information Strategy. The process of developing an Information Strategy may start even before a

mandate is agreed on. On the other hand, the strategic Narrative needs to refer to the mandate and,

therefore, an Information Strategy cannot be formally issued prior to the mandate. Thus, the

mandating process may inform the development of the strategic Narrative.





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It takes into account available national and multinational assessments of the crisis situation, and

builds on relevant political agreements and strategic planning directives. In order to meet situation

requirements in theatre as well as consider possible adjustments to the mandate and mission, an

Information Strategy must be periodically reviewed – in line with strategic plan review.

The scope of required guidance from the strategic-political level demands that an InformationStrategy be produced as an internal document in the first place, with no pro-active external

distribution. However, in order to meet the principles of transparency, credibility and authenticity, it

should only contain unclassified information and should be written in a way that it could be shared

with partners and public disclosure would not jeopardise mission accomplishment. An unclassified,

sharable Information Strategy is the ideal situation. However, there may be instances that require

classified content in order to conform to operational security and/or maintain diplomatic options.

C. Required Content

The core element of an Information Strategy is the – the statement of identity, cause andNARRATIVE

intent around which people can unite. It provides the overall concept ("Leitbild") and guiding theme

("Leitmotiv") for an organisation and its mission, and supports the development of a corporate

identity and corporate image. The pursuit of a corporate idea is a prerequisite for integrating words

and deeds, and thus creating desired effects. In order to achieve this corporate idea, the Narrative

should – in simple language: easy to remember, easy to understand, and easy to communicate –

provide answers to three fundamental questions: (1) Who are we / where are we coming from? (2)

What benefits are we bringing to whom? and (3) Where are we going to / what is next?8 The

strategic Narrative of an Information Strategy builds on the organisational or institutional Narrative

of the related standing organisation, such as the NATO alliance, and directly refers to the mission

mandate, for instance a UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR). It is by nature a mission Narrative

to support a specific set of operations and provide consistency in messaging over time.

With , an Information Strategy should offer a clear description of the desiredINFORMATION OBJECTIVESconditions to be created in the Information Environment linked to the Narrative and strategic

objectives. As the Information Factor is relevant for all activity and because the Information

Environment is an integral part of the operational environment, Information Objectives cannot be

isolated from strategic objectives nor be considered strategic objectives themselves. Information

Objectives propose a different layer for looking at desired system states and must be fully integrated

and supportive to strategic objectives (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: Information Objectives – A Different Layer to Strategic Objectives

8 NATO StratCom suggests: (1) Why are NATO forces engaged? (2) What are NATO's objectives? and (3) What

would transition and termination look like? [NATO AJP-5(E) (2013), Para 0107.l]





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The Information Strategy should also provide a list of , considering politicalAUDIENCES AND TARGETS

sensitivities of mission partners and the public. Internal and domestic audiences, as well as

multinational organisations (such as NATO, the EU, UN, etc.) with a leading representation of partner

nations, may be addressed by multinational Information Activities. Identification of these audiences

will require political consent amongst partners or allies. International Community audiences include

other countries and individual actors abroad, in particular from neighbouring countries to the host

country, local influential countries, IOs and NGOs involved in the region, to whom the messages sent

by a coalition or alliance need to be coordinated. Another category of audiences covers the wider

population of the host country, local media, formal and informal authorities, including the local

government(s) and affiliated opinion leaders and opinion formers. Information Activities against

targets, i.e., (kinetic) actions to create a deliberate effect on adversary key leaders, physical

components of information systems, or the Internet, may have strategic impact as well and must,

therefore, be subject to strategic-political guidance.

provide the unifying subject or idea of a message or set of messages and InformationTHEMES

Activities. They express the context for messages to be conveyed to audiences and activities to affect

targets. Themes are 'headlines' that indicate the issue of concern for associated master messages.

Messages express the substance of communication – the intended content of information exchange.

listed in the Information Strategy present initial, immediate guidance for nationalMASTER MESSAGES

initiatives and Information Activities at higher multinational levels.

Operation planners and operators should be aware of master messages (and other Information

Strategy content) in order to support the alignment of messaging by Joint Force operations.

For a complete overview of suggested content, see Annex A – Information Strategy Format.





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INTENTIONALLY BLANK





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IV. HEAD OF COMMUNICATION This chapter introduces the Head of Communication (HoC) and his staff as functions and capabilities

to a Joint Force HQ in order to enhance the traditional StratCom function

9

beyond its doctrinalcoordination role.

A. Roles and Responsibilities

The Head of Communication (HoC) the senior leadership in all aspects of integratedASSISTS

communication. He communication guidance with strategic authorities and allCOORDINATES DIRECTS

internal and external communication processes of the Joint Force at the operational level on behalf

of the commander. The HoC communication efforts with neighbouring commands andCOORDINATES

other organisations and stakeholders in theatre, and respective communication efforts ofGUIDES

subordinate commands.

Figure 3: Roles of the Head of Communication

The role of the HoC is multinational by nature, as he should be representing the coordinated

functional expertise on the Information Environment of participating nations and organisations – not

any national perspective, be it that of his own country or that of the lead nation.

The HoC should be appointed by the Strategic Commander, in close consultation with the designated

Joint Force Commander, to act as the Joint Force's principal assistant on all communication issues. He

then oversees and directs all Information Activities at his level and guides planning, execution and

assessment of Joint Force activity from a communication perspective. He also directs and guides the

Joint Force's spokesperson at the operational level.10

Detailed responsibilities of the HoC include:

9 In NATO, StratCom is defined as a process. The HoC would then become the process manager.

10

If a HoC is not installed, PA practitioners are in the best position to manage the integrated communicationprocess because within the scope of their task they should be involved in every facet of the organisation.

The Chief, Public Affairs (CPA) would then act as the entry point for superior communication guidance and

Single Point of Contact (SPOC) for coordinating communication issues at subordinate levels.





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with superior and mission partner communication leads;LIAISE

expert advice in the decision-making process;INTEGRATE

communication planning;LEAD

the group effort of distinct staff functions and capabilities;MODERATE

with relevant stakeholders, horizontally and vertically;NETWORK

corporate identity campaigns, including training and education efforts.MANAGE

The HoC should be granted the authority to assign tasks and require consultation between the

agencies involved (organisations or commands and their representatives) for all issues related to

Joint Force communication. Within his responsibility for integrating internal and external

communication processes the HoC should also be authorised to directly address all members of the

Joint Force HQ. Using relevant working groups, boards, centres and cells, and their meetings in the

HQ's staff routine / battle rhythm for coordination with communication capabilities and functions,

the HoC should be equipped with coordinating authority.11

In order to cope with these responsibilities, the HoC should be supported by a team of assistants anda staff organisation capable to perform basic communication management

12 tasks. This concept will

later introduce the Communication Coordination Board as the HoC's tool for communication

management in a Joint Force HQ (see Section VI.C).

B. Military Communication Management Tasks

For the implementation of an integrated and corporate approach to communication at a military

operational-level HQ, a set of management tasks needs to be performed by different staff elements.

The HoC will have to tie all these together in order to achieve the added value that is expected from

the implementation of this concept.

1.

Command and Control

Communication is a leadership function to support unity of effort of the Joint Force. Those involved

in communication management should be authorised to issue direction and guidance to

communication capabilities and functions, as required to promote their integration with operations

analysis, planning, execution and assessment. The commanders are the supreme communicators and

champions of integrated communication of the Joint Force.

2. Analysis of the Information Environment

Situation awareness is the prerequisite for understanding the Information Environment. It enables

the identification of action requirements, opportunities and risks, and provides the baseline for the

assessment of effects. Analysis of the Information Environment is a cross-dimensional,

transdisciplinary and continuous task, which needs to be performed by a highly qualified staff.

Analysis results must be translated and operationalized in order to benefit communication

capabilities and functions as well as operations planners, operators, and – finally – the commander.

11 Within the scope of the HoC's coordinating authority it is important to understand who the appropriate

problem-solving authorities are once an issue needs to be referred to someone else for decision. This may

not necessarily always be the direct superior at the operational level, but could, e.g., involve the strategic

authorities as well as a Component Commander in case of tactical urgency or functional responsibility

(principle of 'subsidiarity').12

The term 'communication management' is used here in the broadest sense to include planning, approvaland implementation of communication guidance. It corresponds with the terms 'operational design' and

'operational management' introduced in NATO's Allied Joint Doctrine to embrace analysis, planning,

execution and assessment [NATO AJP-01(D) (2010), Para 0525 and 526].





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3. Effects Development

The development of Information Effects in support of operational objectives and, in particular,

Information Objectives is a key task that collectively involves analysts, planners and operators. It

must be based on a profound understanding of the Information Environment, the mandate and

mission objectives, as well as the available capabilities able to create respective effects. Thedevelopment of effects in the Information Environment needs to be guided from a commander's

perspective and fully integrated with the development of operational effects.

4. Contribution to Targeting

All actions, lethal and non-lethal, have an effect on the Information Environment, either in a positive

manner, in closing the say-do gap, or negatively by contradicting the Joint Force's message to

audiences within and outside the Joint Operations Area (JOA). Negative effects from such things as

collateral damage, and especially civilian casualties, have the potential to do significant damage to

support for the Joint Force's mission. For this reason, the potential effect of actions should be taken

into consideration from the outset of the joint targeting cycle. Information Analysts and Planners, as

well as Info Ops and PA staffs should be included at every level of the targeting process.13

5. Activity Planning

Planning of Information Activities is an original task and competence of capabilities that are able to

create Information Effects themselves. Planning may be guided by the HoC and advised by

communication functions (such as Info Ops); the ultimate responsibility, however, to decide on the

concrete employment of means and assets rests with the force capabilities that are cognizant,

trained and equipped for their specific scope of activities.

6. Coordination

Coordination is a key task and main responsibility of the HoC to promote the integration ofcommunication in all aspects of operations planning, execution and assessment. Therefore, the HoC

needs to manage the appropriate involvement of all communication capabilities and functions in the

Joint Force HQ staff routine.

Effective and efficient communication requires harmonisation and synchronisation of Information

Activities. Furthermore, activities designed to create Information Effects need to be coordinated with

other force activities and manoeuvre operations that – through human perception – affect the

Information Environment as well. The Info-Ops-led Information Activities Coordination Board (IACB)14

is considered the best suitable forum for this task.

7. Direct Communication

Direct communication promotes the principles of transparency, credibility and authenticity.

Therefore, opportunities to directly address internal and external audiences should be sought and

planned for whenever and wherever possible. In principle, the personal commitment of the senior

leadership is the preferred option. Because communication managers are communicators at the

same time, the HQ's communication capabilities and functions need to act carefully synchronized to

convey the right messages to their colleagues and counterparts.

8. Media Communication

Larger audiences can be best reached by using media channels with wider reach. The Joint Force

disposes of own media capabilities (such as PA and Psychological Operations, PSYOPS) and may also

13 [Based on: NATO AJP-3.9(B) (2014), Para 0118]

14 [Cf. NATO AJP-3.10(A) (2014)]





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employ public or commercial media – e.g., by contracting, buying news time and newspaper inserts;

by giving selected information at compulsory media opportunities; or through embedded journalists.

Once released into the public domain, the original information is no longer under Joint Force control.

Therefore, in order to sustain the principles of transparency, credibility and authenticity, media

outlets need to be coordinated and documented.

9. Assessment of Effects

Driving and shaping Joint Force communication requires dynamic and prompt measurement of

effectiveness in order to design and appropriately adjust Information Effects and Activities. This task

needs to be closely linked to the continuous analysis of the Information Environment, which provides

the baseline for change assessment, and to effects development and activity planning.

10. Education and Training

Integration of communication in all plans and activities, and advancing the new mind-set towards

awareness and perception of the Information Environment, requires the assistance of

communication experts during staff processes and working routines as well as generalcommunication training for all (which constitutes a communication management function itself).

Internal leadership and staff development programs should enhance the accountability of all

members of the Joint Force as communicators, promote the mission Narrative, evolve the corporate

identity and image of the Joint Force, and in turn contribute to overall mission success. It is the

Commander's responsibility to ensure that properly trained personnel are empowered through

training and education opportunities in order to facilitate these requirements (see Chapter VII).





21

C. HQ Staff Organisation

In current crisis response operations there are several options for organising a military operational-

level HQ. For the purpose of this concept, a generic HQ organisation is applied as a starting-point for

further elaborations on the appropriate integration of communication (see Figure 4)15

.

Figure 4: Generic HQ Organisation (Current)

1. Staff Elements to be involved in Communication Management

a) Initial Organisational Considerations

Communication management involves a number of traditional staff elements, which should be

complemented by a HoC, Information Analysts and Information Planners.

Role of the : see Section IV.A. HOC

assist the analysis and assessment / INTEL / Knowledge Development (KD)INFORMATION ANALYSTS

processes from a communication perspective.assist the operations planning process and provide advice based on theINFORMATION PLANNERS

analysis and assessment of the Information Environment, and on the knowledge about potential

Information Effects and Activities.

It is suggested that a HoC (with assistants) forms a staff element of an operational-level HQ.

Alternatives for manning and positioning will be discussed later on in this chapter.

The PA staff should remain unchanged as part of the HQ Advisory Group16

and perform their

doctrinal role in conjunction and fully integrated with the HoC function.

15 This generic example is derived from NATO AJP-3(B) (2011), Annex 2A "Joint Staff Functions", and current

organisational designs of JFC HQ Brunssum, ISAF HQ and IJC 2014; for abbreviations see Lexicon and

References, Part 1 – Abbreviations.





22

The Info Ops staff should remain unchanged within the J3 Operations staff division and also perform

their doctrinal role in conjunction and fully integrated with the HoC function.

b) Key Staff Elements for Communication Management

Implementing and managing integrated and corporate communication at the military operational

level requires clear assignment of tasks to staff elements. Although the proposed new mind-set

applies to all members of a HQ's command group and staff, there are some key actors who should

play a distinctive part in the overall process.

The following chart relates command group and key staff elements to the communication

management tasks outlined in Section IV.B. Details are discussed below.17

C2 AnalysisEffects

Develop.Targeting

Activity

PlanningCoord

Face-to-

faceMedia

Assess-

mentTraining

COM* X X X

COS* X X

LEGAD X

POLAD X X X X X

DOS XLNO X

HoC X X X X X X X X X X

Info An. X X X

Info Plan. X X X

PAO X X X X X

CULAD X X X X

J2 INTEL X X X

J3 OPS X X X X X X

Info Ops X X X X X X

J5 PLANS X X X X

J9 CIMIC X X X

* incl. Deputy

The leads all Joint Force communication. He is the face of the operation and givesCOMMANDER

distinction to its corporate identity and image. Face-to-face communication is his primary means to

provide direction and guidance, and convey messages to marquee figures of the operation. The

Commander is ultimately responsible for education and training of his staff and the Joint Force.

The is a principal advisor to the Commander. He coordinates the work of the staffCHIEF OF STAFF

divisions to ensure that the staff pulls together as a team. In this respect, he assists the building of a

corporate identity and enables the appropriate involvement of key staff elements in the

communication management process.

The is the principal advisor to the Commander concerning national and internationalLEGAL ADVISOR

law and mandates, Rules of Engagement (ROE), and all legal matters arising from the presence of the

Joint Force in the JOA. He also advises the targeting process in concert with Information Analysts and

Planners, and the Info Ops and PA staffs.

The is the Commander's principal advisor on policy, and local, national, regionalPOLITICAL ADVISOR

and international political issues, including the Joint Force's relationship with coalition partner

nations, the HN, and IOs and NGOs. In this respect, the POLAD may closely coordinate with relevant

stakeholders on behalf of the Commander. He supports the targeting process and contributes to

analysis and assessment of the Information Environment.

16 The term 'HQ Advisory Group' is used synonymous with 'special staff', indicating that its members perform

their tasks beneficial to the whole HQ.17

[Based on NATO AJP-3(B) (2011), Annex 2A "Joint Staff Functions"]





23

The inter alia is responsible for Information Management (IM) and, therefore, has aDIRECTOR OF STAFF

key role in ensuring an effective flow of information in support of all staff activities and

communication management.

The assist cooperation and information exchange between the JFC, higher command,LIAISON OFFICERS

adjacent units, the Host Nation (HN), troops contributing nations, International Organisations (IOs)involved in the operation, and supporting forces / commands assigned to the JFC.

The support the Commander by communicating accurate information in aPUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS

timely manner in order to improve public awareness and understanding of the operation and the

Joint Force's mission, thereby enhancing their credibility. The media are PA's primary communication

means. PA also contributes to analysis and assessment of the Information Environment.

The provides expertise on local languages, customs, religion, art, symbols, etc.CULTURAL ADVISOR

relevant to the Joint Force operation. He offers a conduit to better understand foreign societies and

communicate effectively. The CULAD supports the targeting process and contributes to analysis and

assessment of the Information Environment. He also contributes to cross-cultural awareness and,

through cultural knowledge education and foreign language training, enhanced interculturalcommunicative competence of the Joint Force.

The division is responsible for the provision of accurate, timely and relevantJ2 INTELLIGENCE

intelligence to meet the JFC's operational and security requirements, and maintain situation

awareness. J2 supports the targeting process and contributes to analysis and assessment of the

Information Environment.

The division acts as the focal point through which the Commander directs the conductJ3 OPERATIONS

of an operation, ensuring unity of effort and the most effective use of resources. J3 assesses the

status and capabilities of assigned forces, specifies tasks for subordinate units based on the OPLAN,

and leads campaign synchronisation. J3 – with J2 and J5 – manages the targeting process and

contributes to analysis and assessment of the Information Environment.

The staff is the J3's tool for effects development and activity planningINFORMATION OPERATIONS

regarding the Information Environment. Info Ops is a staff function to analyse, plan, assess and

integrate Information Activities to create desired Information Effects. The Info Ops staff is also the

HoC’s tool for coordinating contributions of communication capabilities and functions – at the Joint

Force HQ and from subordinate commands – to the operations planning process.

The division leads the planning for future operations and coordinates these efforts withinJ5 PLANS

the Joint Force HQ and with higher, subordinate and adjacent commands and civil authorities. J5

supports activity planning and the assessment of the Information Environment.

The division is responsible for civil-military liaison activities andJ9 CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

advising the Commander on the implications of all activities undertaken that concern the relations

between the armed forces, local governments, civil population, IOs, NGOs, and other agencies of the

countries where the Joint Force is deployed, employed and supported. When performing its liaison

function, J9 becomes an important communication agent to directly convey Joint Force messages

and contribute to the assessment of the Information Environment.





24

2. Options for Establishing the Head of Communication Function

This Section describes and discusses several possibilities for establishing the HoC function at an

operational-level Joint Force HQ. The three dimensions analysed for this purpose are:

of HoC postsNUMBER

of HoC postsPOSITIONING

of the HoC to Information Analysts and PlannersRELATIONSHIP

Furthermore, options were selected based on an assessment of their practicality and feasibility, and

regarding their potential contribution to the MCDC conceptual approach, i.e., some theoretical

options were discarded upfront and not further explicated. These unrealistic and/or undesired

options inter alia are:

Having only one civilian HoC (without a military Deputy): In a military HQ organisation the

provision of direction and guidance – to the operational HQ staff and to the tactical /

Component Command levels – can unlikely be performed by a person without substantial

military competence, and experience in and understanding of military Command and Control

(C2) mechanisms. Furthermore, the subjective take of some soldiery on the role of civilians in

directing the force should be considered.

The HoC as Deputy Commander (DCOM): The additional HoC post/function can only provide

substantial added value if the incumbent is able to fully concentrate on communication

management. Therefore, he must be relieved from any administrative C2 and general staff

advisory burden. Also – and maybe even more important – a DCOM HoC could negatively

affect the awareness of communication as a leadership responsibility, i.e., promote the idea

of the Commander having his Deputy deal with communication and care less himself.

The HoC as a member of a J-Division: This positioning would contradict the approach to

promote communication as a leadership function and would disable the HoC's assistance and

advisory role to the commander. Furthermore, his responsibility for providing direction andguidance to the staff and subordinate commands would be hampered, and his integrating

function in relation to, for instance, the division heads and the HQ Advisory Group (including

PA) be undermined.

Information Analysts and/or Information Planners as members of the HQ Advisory Group:

These capabilities must not be de-linked from neither of their primary customers, which

clearly are the HoC, the Info Ops staff, and the J2 INTEL and J5 Plans Divisions. However, they

cannot report to all at the same time and contribute their work to all at the same level of

quality. Therefore, it is suggested to assign them to either one of their primary customers

and not pool them for general assistance in the HQ Advisory Group.

a)

One or Two HoC Posts

This Section discusses options for equipping the HoC function in a military HQ organisation. The

options that consider a second post for a Deputy HoC basically introduce a civilian post for the HoC

function in a military HQ and are based on a differentiation of roles of civilian and military

incumbents, not on the workload of the HoC or his 24 hrs availability to the Commander and his

staff 18

. In principle, a civilian HoC (regardless of leading or Deputy) would take care of coordination

and dialogue with civilian stakeholders and mission partners, whereas a military HoC would primarily

deal with HQ internal tasks and guidance to subordinate commands.

18

In all options, the HoC would be supported by an appropriate number of assistants and a staff organisationto perform basic communication management tasks. In assisting the Commander to lead the

communication process of the Joint Force, the HoC would consequently follow the Commander's battle

rhythm, and thus his availability for decision-making would be ensured.





25

(1) A Military Head of Communication with a Civilian Deputy

The Joint Force HQ HoC is a military post in the rank of a 2* flag officer. He is assisted by a civilian

Deputy in the rank of Secretary or Attaché (compares to 1* flag officer or equivalent). Rationale: The

Deputy HoC should have sufficient seniority to act on par with Division Branch Heads and be

accepted by the ACOS when delivering direction and guidance, in particular to the J3 Info Ops staff.

(2) A Civilian Head of Communication with a Military Deputy

The Joint Force HQ HoC is a civilian post in the rank of Director or Counsellor. He is assisted by a

military Deputy (field-grade or senior officer) in the rank of Brigadier (1*) or Colonel (or equivalent).

Rationale: as above.

(3) One Military Head of Communication

The Joint Force HQ HoC is a military post in the rank of a 2* flag officer. Rationale: The HoC must not

outrank the COM (4*) or DCOM (3*), but should have sufficient seniority to act on par with the COS,

DCOS and ACOS.

(4) Discussion of Selection Criteria

In a military organisation, the HoC function of assisting the Commander and providing direction and

guidance on his behalf is best performed by a military service member. Depending on the type, scope

and phase of operations/missions, the introduction of a civilian post – either in the lead or as Deputy

HoC – may be considered. An illustrative comparison of advantages and disadvantages includes:

Option Advantages / PROs Disadvantages / CONs

(1) enhanced military C2 (military to

military)

demonstration of a comprehensive

approach

acceptance by military and civilian actors

low- to high-intensity conflict

requirements (e.g., stability operations)

different backgrounds and networks are

complementary

coordination requirement between two

HoCs (unity of effort)

manning challenge for two posts

(2) demonstration of a comprehensive

approach

acceptance by civilian actors

low-intensity conflict requirements (e.g.,

HA/DR and peacekeeping operations)

different backgrounds and networks are

complementary

limited military C2

coordination requirement between two

HoCs (unity of effort)

manning challenge for two posts

(3) enhanced military C2 (military to

military)

high-intensity conflict requirements (e.g.,

combat operations, NEO, entry

operations)

no coordination between two HoCs

required (unity of effort)

less focus on a comprehensive approach

lack of civilian perspective/background

potential reluctance of civilian

counterparts to cooperate

b) Positioning of the HoC Function

This Section discusses options for positioning the HoC function in a HQ organisation. The options

include all three above alternatives (see Paragraph IV.C.2.a). In the case of two posts for the HoC

function it is proposed that both posts are positioned in the same organisational staff element in





26

order to ensure equal C2 authority for both and avoid additional coordination effort amongst the

two. Common to all options below is the requirement for the HoC having direct access to the

Commander.

(1) The Head of Communication as Member of the Command Group

The HoC function is represented as part of the Command Group, next to the COM and DCOM.

(2) The Head of Communication as Member of the HQ Advisory Group

The HoC function is represented as part of the HQ Advisory Group, next to the PAO.

(3) The Head of Communication as Deputy Chief of Staff

The HoC function is represented as a DCOS position with specific functional assignment. This option

is also valid for HQ designs with additional functional DCOS positions (such as DCOS Operations,

DCOS Support, etc.).





27


In principle, for providing direct support to the Commander, emphasizing the importance of

communication as a leadership responsibility, and promoting the HoC's authority to provide direction

and guidance on behalf of the Commander, positioning of the HoC in the Command Group is the

preferred option. However, depending on command and staff management requirements (e.g., for

high-intensity warfighting vs. low-intensity peacekeeping or stabilisation operations), other options

may be considered as well. An illustrative comparison of advantages and disadvantages includes:


(1) highest visibility of communication as a

leadership responsibility

personal advice / direct support to the

Commander

potentially emphasised representation

for coordination with external actors

better distinction of roles between the

HoC and PA (compared to option 2) enhanced C2 authority (direction and

guidance on communication issues)

perceived distance to staff routine

potential to impede the COS

management function (ref. to the HoC's

tasking authority towards staff elements)

potentially perceived diluted command

group

(2) closer to decision-making level

(compared to option 3)

unhampered working relationship of the

HoC with the HQ Advisory Group

enhanced advisory role

integration in staff routine

less change to current HQ organisation

(in NATO)

potential of limited visibility of

communication as a leadership

responsibility

potential misperception of roles of PA

and the HoC (ref. to the HoC's tasking

authority and rank)

perceived role of the HoC potentially

reduced to advisor (C2 authority of the

HoC questioned)(3) integrated with the COS management

function

integration in staff routine

enhanced HQ internal coordinating role

less change to current HQ organisation

(in NATO)

larger distance to decision-making level

(compared to options 1 and 2)

difficult working relationship of the HoC

with the HQ Advisory Group

limited visibility of communication as a

leadership responsibility

In case of Info Ops being established at

DCOS level19

(Chief Info Ops as DCOS,

Info Ops staff represented in J2, J3 and

J5): potential misperception of roles of

the HoC and Chief Info Ops

c) Options for Establishing Information Analysts and Planners

In order to meet operational shift system requirements, a minimum number of 2 Information

Analysts and 2 Information Planners should be assigned to the HQ staff, assigned to either of their

primary customers.

(1) Information Analysts and Planners as Members of J2 and J5 Divisions

The J2 Intelligence Division is permanently augmented with Information Analysts and the J5 Plans

Division is permanently augmented with Information Planners.

19 [Cf. NATO AJP-3.10(A) (2014)]





29


Information Analysts and Information Planners are introduced as new, additional capabilities to

existing HQ organisations20

to promote the wider integration of communication expertise in the

analysis, planning, execution and assessment of operations. Therefore, these capabilities should

ideally not be centralised or pooled, but assigned to those staff elements the primary responsibility

of which rests with analysis and planning, i.e., the J2 and the J5. Other alternatives may be

considered in the light of advantages and disadvantages discussed below:


(1) integration in staff routine

enhanced capacity of the J2 and J5

divisions for considering the Information

Environment in all respects (incl.

targeting and assessment)

increased oversight of the HoC

(comprehensive awareness of staff

activities) direct input of HoC direction and

guidance

acceptance of analysis/planning

contributions (by 'team members')

consideration of the full spectrum of

operations planning and conduct (short,

medium and long-term)

enhanced coordination and C2 effort for

the HoC (matrix organisation)

risk of full working capacity to be

absorbed by J-Heads

less or indirect availability for J3-led

effects development and activity

planning (compared to option 3)

(2) direct coordination and C2 of the HoC

augmentation of HoC assistants

full availability for communication

management tasks

potential risk of separation

potential distance to staff routine

reduced capacity of the J2 and J5

divisions for considering the InformationEnvironment in all respects (compared to

option 1, i.e., less added value)

representation of communication

experts to J divisions upon request / on a

temporary basis only

HoCs oversight reduced by losing

'sensors'

impeded acceptance of analysis/planning

contributions (by 'non-team members')

(3) enhanced capacity of the J3 for

considering the Information Environment

(e.g., in effects development and activity

planning)

risk of narrowing the focus on short-term

operations planning and conduct

enhanced coordination and C2 effort for

the HoC (matrix organisation)

reduced capacity of the J2 and J5

divisions for considering the Information

Environment (compared to option 1)

impeded acceptance of analysis/planning

contributions (by 'non-team members')

20 If there are Information Analysts and Information Planners already installed in J2 and J5 as specialists

allocated by Info Ops, there would not be a need to offer additional personnel – provided that these Info

Ops specialists qualify as described in this concept (see Chapter VII EDUCATION AND TRAINING).





30

d) Recommended HQ Staff Organisation

The HoC function should be positioned in the Command Group. Information Analysts and

Information Planners should be assigned to the J2 and the J5, respectively.

Figure 5: Generic HQ Organisation (Recommended)





31

V. COMMUNICATION PLANNING

A.

Introductioninvolves the development of direction and guidance to communicationCOMMUNICATION PLANNING

capabilities and functions, and the provision of advice to the decision-making process on how to

consider the Information Environment in plans and operations.

is the planning of military operations at the strategic, operational or tacticalOPERATIONS PLANNING

levels. is the military planning at the operational level to design, conductOPERATIONAL-LEVEL PLANNING

and sustain campaigns and major operations in order to accomplish strategic objectives within given

theatres or areas of operation.21

The integrated and corporate approach to communication suggests that operations planning without

consideration of the Information Environment would be pointless, and that in turn communication

planning separated from operations planning would rather provoke an opening of the say-do gap

than supporting its closure. Therefore, in order to fully integrate communication planning and

operations planning at the operational level, THERE MUST NOT BE A PARALLEL, SEGREGATED PLANNING

. Rather is it required that communication capabilities and functions playPROCESS FOR COMMUNICATION

an integral part in the operational-level planning process.

Figure 6: Integration of the Information Environment in Operations Planning

21 [NATO AJP-5(E) (2013), Para 0116 and Lex-14]





32

The integrated and corporate approach to communication further suggests that an INFORMATION

– developed at the earliest stage of crisis response planning as strategic-political guidanceSTRATEGY

for activities to affect the Information Environment – be considered as additional planning guidance

at the operational level. The Information Strategy initially serves to complement the Strategic

Planning Directive (SPD) and the strategic Concept of Operations (CONOPS), and would be further

developed and updated during the subsequent planning process and the conduct of operations, as

required by changes in the mandate, mission or situation. See Chapter III.

An Information Strategy contains , which support strategic objectives byINFORMATION OBJECTIVES

providing the focused view on the Information Environment . Information Objectives will later be

translated into at all levels. Information Effects at the operational-level willINFORMATION EFFECTS

support the achievement of operational objectives and correlate with operational effects.

Operational-level Information Effects equal operational effects in the Operation Plan (OPLAN),

concentrating expressively on desired changes in the Information Environment. The term

Information Effect, however, is proposed to be retained for two reasons: first, to clearly indicate the

operating direction of the effect; second, to anchor the requirement to translate (strategic)

Information Objectives into (operational) effects. Information Effects may also be developed fromother strategic, operational and tactical objectives, as appropriate.

This Chapter discusses implications of principles of multinational operations and planning for

integrated and corporate communication in order to focus the attention of communication

practitioners involved in communication planning; takes NATO's Operations Planning Process (OPP)

as an example for multinational operations planning22

; examines the OPP for required contributions

from a communication perspective; outlines the proposed participation of the key staff elements for

communication management (from Section IV.C.1.b) in the OPP; and presents options for capturing

communication contributions in planning products.

B.

Principles

1. Principles of Joint and Multinational Operations

The fundamental principles of joint and multinational operations23

guide operations planning and

hence the respective contributions from a communication perspective.

a) Definition of Objectives

Joint multinational operations must be focused towards clearly defined and commonly understood

objectives that contribute to the achievement of the desired end-state.

Information Objectives must be phrased to support strategic objectives and provide a focus on the

Information Environment. The Narrative supports the building of a corporate identity of the Joint

Force and enables a widespread understanding of its mandate and mission.

b) Unity of Purpose

Multinational operations depend on cooperation and coordination to realize maximum combined

effect.

Alignment of words and deeds to achieve a common end state is the overall goal of all operations.

Communication advice must, therefore, be provided to operations planning from the early beginning

of the process. The Information Environment must be considered throughout effects development,

activity planning and conduct of operations.

22

Although related NATO doctrine is intended primarily for use by NATO forces, it could also be applied tooperations conducted in other formats, such as NATO-led coalition operations or operations with NATO in a

supporting or participatory role. [NATO AJP-5(E) (2013), Para 0113.c and 0121]23

[Based on: NATO AJP-01(D) (2010), Para 0118]





33

c) Sustainment

Planning for sustainment encompasses strategy, tactics and administration. Ensuring a sound

administrative baseline should be part of operations planning from the outset.

Communication must be coherent and consistent. This requires foresighted strategic-political

guidance (Information Strategy) and appropriate documentation mechanisms that enablecomprehension of past activity and anticipation of future trends.

d) Concentration of Force

Combat power should be concentrated at a pre-selected time and place designed to achieve decisive

results.

Targeted messaging entails effective communication; a sound analysis of potential audiences'

receptivity, susceptibility and vulnerability is a prerequisite.

e) Economy of Effort

In the absence of unlimited resources, it will be necessary to take risks in some areas. This implies the

balance of available resources, given acceptable risk, against a commander's priorities.

The application of the principles of subsidiarity and empowerment will support the employment of

communication means where they are available and best fit. Furthermore, pooling and sharing of

capabilities (e.g., media assets) at higher levels may facilitate a shift of emphasis, as required.

f)

Flexibility

Plans should be sufficiently flexible to respond to the unexpected and to empower commanders with

maximum freedom of action.

Analysis and assessment of the Information Environment is a continuous and essential task to detect

changes and trends that require the attention of communication practitioners. An appropriate

variety of communication means and techniques should be held available for expeditious reaction on

situation requirements.

g) Initiative

Initiative is about recognizing and seizing opportunities and solving problems in an original manner. It

usually requires command authorities to be delegated to the lowest level possible.

Generally, communication must be proactive rather than reactive. Activities of the Joint Force should

be self-explanatory and not require parallel or later comment. The application of the principles of

subsidiarity and empowerment will support active communication.

h) Maintenance of Morale

Commanders should give their command an identity, promote self-esteem, inspire it with a sense of

common purpose and unity of effort, and give it achievable aims.

i)

Surprise

Surprise is built on speed, secrecy and deception, and if successful, achieves results disproportionate

to the effort expended.

It is not necessarily required that the Joint Force communicates everything on a subject issue. The

selective messaging of truthful information (or even temporary silence) may serve deceptive purpose

while not compromising the Joint Force's credibility.

j) Security

Security enhances freedom of action by limiting vulnerability to hostile activities and threats.

Truthful information promotes authenticity and credibility, and reduces the risk of wrongful

accusation. Situation awareness and an appropriate level of operational knowledge limit the Joint

Force's vulnerability to adversarial misinformation.





34

k) Simplicity

Simple plans and clear orders minimize misunderstanding and confusion.

l) Multinationality

Command of multinational forces demands an attitude of mind that is not only international, but also

able to understand differing national perspectives and how they relate to the common purpose.

Cross-cultural awareness and intercultural communicative competence both have an internal and

external dimension.

2. Principles of Operations Planning

The principles for operations planning24

reflect the challenges for both civilian and military actors

involved in planning for operations in a complex and uncertain security environment. They need to

be considered for planning contributions from a communication perspective.

a) Coherence

Every plan must positively contribute towards the accomplishment of the approved strategic

objectives for addressing the crisis.

Information Effects developed at the operational level must support the achievement of Information

Objectives. Information Objectives must be clearly related to strategic objectives.

b) Comprehensive Understanding of the Environment

Achieving the desired strategic outcomes must be understood at all echelons during planning and

conduct of operations.

Understanding the Information Environment is a prerequisite for purposeful effects development,

activity planning and assessment of effects.

c) Mutual Respect, Trust, Transparency and Understanding

Operations planning in support of the Joint Force's contribution to a comprehensive approach shouldallow collaboration and cooperation across multinational and national bodies, among civil and

military actors, and with other relevant actors and local authorities.

Communication planning should always consider the 'end-user perspective', i.e., how own messages

be understood by intended and unintended audiences in a specific operational context. The

Narrative and its operationalization will be key for promoting the principles of transparency,

credibility and authenticity.

d) Consultation and Compatible Planning

Mutually supportive, compatible, and wherever possible, concerted and harmonised planning is

fundamental for success of a comprehensive approach.

Civilian mission partners need to be involved in communication planning as much as possible, andcommunication planning products need to be prepared in a way that enables appropriate

information exchange.

e) Efficient Use of Resources

Decision-makers should be made aware of the risk of not adequately resourcing an operation.

Planners must allow both military and non-military contributions to focus on and leverage their core

competencies within the international response to a crisis.

Communication planning needs to provide constant feedback to the higher command and identify

potential resources at all levels for creating Information Effects. The application of the principles of

subsidiarity and empowerment will support the employment of communication means where they

best fit.

24 [Based on: NATO AJP-5(E) (2013), Para 0106]





35

f) Flexibility and Adaptability

Planning should accommodate an expanding set of circumstances, allowing due consideration for

likely costs evaluated against benefits gained. Planning should be flexible enough to adjust to

evolving political guidance, civil and military advice needed to facilitate collaborative planning and

adapt to political requirements during a crisis.

Analysis and assessment of the Information Environment is a continuous and essential task to detect

changes and trends that require the attention of communication practitioners. Modified strategic-

political communication guidance must be forwarded to subordinate levels without filtering and as

quickly as possible.

C. Process Integration with Operations Planning

1. Contributions to the Operational-Level Planning Process 25

This section outlines the required contributions to the Operational-Level Planning Process (OLPP)

from a communication perspective and identifies the appropriate participation of communication

managers and practitioners (including the leadership) of an operational Joint Force HQ. See Annex D – Communication Planning for a detailed description and visualisation of the interrelated

communication planning process.

a) Initiation of the Operational-Level Planning Process (OLPP Step 1)

: Understand the strategic situation and the nature of the problem, as well as the proposedPURPOSE

end state and strategic objectives; and contribute operational advice to the Strategic Commander on

his military response options and assess the operational-level viability of these options.

: Initial operational estimate, warning orders to subordinate commands and the documentPRODUCTS

containing the JFC's operational advice.

:COMMUNICATION MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES AND PARTICIPATION

Command and Control: The Commander provides operational advice to the strategic level,

including input to the development of the Information Strategy (if it is not already available).

He provides initial guidance to the Joint Operations Planning Group (JOPG) and authorises

the HoC to directly coordinate with communication managers and practitioners at the

strategic level. The HoC assists and advises the Commander. He also directs HQ staff

elements (communication capabilities and functions) to prepare communication input to

operations planning, and provides guidance to subordinate commands, i.e., he initiates the

communication planning process. For this purpose, the Information Strategy (once available)

needs to be emphasised and conveyed to the HQ staff and subordinate commands.

Furthermore, the HoC prepares lines to take for Joint Force HQ's face-to-face and media

communication activities.

Analysis of the Information Environment: The Information Analysts continue and focus their

analysis on the identified crisis situation. They contribute to the strategic assessment and

provide analysis results to the HoC and the JOPG, as required. Analysis results will feed into

the JFC's operational advice to the Strategic Commander.

Coordination: On behalf of the Commander, the HoC contacts strategic-level communication

managers and practitioners, as well as appropriate counterparts from multinational partners,

including civilian organisations, in order to establish working relationships amongst relevant

Points of Contact (POCs). The HoC coordinates with the CPA what lines to take for

communication to and via the media.

25 [NATO AJP-5(E) (2013), Chapter 3]





36

Direct Communication: The HoC advises, assists and prepares the Commander for meetings

with external stakeholders. The Commander uses lines to take when talking to his

counterparts and representatives of other agencies and organisations.

Media Communication: Media attitudes may reflect or influence public opinion and

ultimately will influence, positively or negatively, popular and political support of Joint Force

activities, and eventual mission success26

. The CPA, based on direction by the HoC, responds

to media enquiries and develops programs to inform the public about the Joint Force's role in

crisis management.

Education and Training: On behalf of the Commander, the HoC continues internal

communication programs to enhance the accountability of all members of the Joint Force as

communicators, promote the mission Narrative, and evolve the corporate identity and image

of the Joint Force.

COMMUNICATION PLANNING OUTPUTS:

Initial estimate of the Information Environment (as part of the initial operational estimate)

with conclusions to inform the JFC's operational advice to the Strategic Commander and his

initial guidance to the JOPG.

Liaison and coordination template for interaction27

of the HoC with other actors.

Lines to take for external communication.

Updated training/education plan for internal communication programs.

b) Problem and Mission Analysis (OLPP Step 2)

: Analyse the crisis situation in depth; determine precisely the operational problem that mustPURPOSE

be solved and the specific operational conditions that must be achieved.

: The operational design; planning guidance for the Joint Force HQ staff; and thePRODUCTS

operational planning directive to subordinate commands, including the Commander's initial intentand his guidance for Course of Action (COA) development and selection (initial COA selection

criteria).


Command and Control: The Commander considers the essence of the Information Strategy

to become part of his initial statement of intent. Advised by the HoC, the Commander

provides direction and guidance to his staff and subordinate commands to further detail and

operationalise the strategic-political provisions contained in the Information Strategy and the

Strategic Planning Guidance. As a key activity of this planning step, the HoC and

communication capabilities and functions, as appropriate, will develop the operational-level

Narrative, coordinate it with the JOPG, and submit it to the Strategic Commander for

approval. The HoC will also advise the Commander and planning staff to consider potential

effects in the Information Environment to become a COA selection criterion.

Analysis of the Information Environment: Led by the HoC, the POLAD, Information Analysts,

PAO, J2 INTEL and the Info Ops staff will analyse the strategic-political assessments from a

communication perspective and relate it to the operational level and the assigned JOA. They

assist the development of a sound common understanding of the mission-specific elements

of the Information Environment.

Coordination: The HoC contacts strategic-level communication managers and practitioners in

order to confirm the appropriate operational-level interpretation of strategic-political

26 [Based on: NATO SHAPE, COPD v2.0 (2013), Page 4-21, Footnote 28]

27 "Interaction" might involve: coordination, cooperation, collaboration, consultation, exchange of

information, toleration. [NATO SHAPE, COPD v2.0 (2013), Page 4-2, Footnote 5]





37

guidance regarding the Information Environment and seek clarification and additional

guidance, as appropriate.

Direct and Media Communication: Continued from previous step. Internal and external

communication needs to be continued throughout the planning process (and conduct of

operations) in order to support situation awareness, transparency, and freedom of

information.

Education and Training: Continued from previous step. Throughout the planning process (and

conduct of operations) the Joint Force needs to gain, maintain and further develop situation

awareness, a common understanding of the importance of communication, and a corporate

identity in order to promote the Joint Forces' synergy and effectiveness.


Refined estimate of the Information Environment (in support of the development of the

operational design and a sound common understanding of the mission-specific elements of

the Information Environment).

A proposed phrasing that highlights communication (as a task) and/or the Information

Environment (and the intended effects in it) in the Commander’s intent statement.

The approved operational-level, mission-specific Narrative (as part of the planning guidance

and directive).

Proposed themes, themes to avoid, and audiences to address (as part of the planning

guidance and directive).

Proposed initial COA selection criteria related to the Information Environment.



c)

Courses of Action Development (OLPP Step 3): Develop a set of tentative COAs

28, all of which will accomplish the mission effectively inPURPOSE

accordance with the Commander's intent (this may be a collaborative planning effort between

strategic and operational-level planners to produce coherent broad COAs for each level in order to

preserve a common context during the further development steps).

: Tentative COAs and the Commander's guidance for the refinement of COAs (refined COAPRODUCTS

selection criteria).


Command and Control: Within the scope of the Information Strategy and the approved

operational-level Narrative, the HoC and communication capabilities and functions, as

appropriate, contribute to the development of tentative COAs in order to incorporatecommunication (as a task) and/or the Information Environment (and the intended effects in

it), as required, to reflect the Commander’s intent. Based on advice by the HoC, the

Commander carries on his attitude towards communication (as stated in his intent) when

providing guidance for COA refinement.

Analysis of the Information Environment: Lead by the HoC, the POLAD, Information Analysts,

PAO, J2 INTEL and the Info Ops staff will continue to analyse the Information Environment

and assist the further development of a common understanding of its mission-specific

elements.

28

COAs should answer the following questions: (1) When does the operation begin and/or when must it becompleted for the required conditions be established? (2) Who will conduct the operation? (3) What

military operations are considered? (4) Where will they be performed? (5) Why is the operation

conducted? (6) How will the operation be conducted? [NATO SHAPE, COPD v2.0 (2013), Page 4-67]





38

Coordination: The HoC, in close coordination with the POLAD, contacts strategic-level

communication managers and practitioners in order to directly harmonise communication

input to COA development.

Direct Communication: Continued from previous step.

Media Communication: Continued from previous step. Education and Training: Continued from previous step.


Refined estimate of the Information Environment (in support of the development of

tentative COAs).

COA refinement guidance that reflects the Commander’s intent regarding communication /

the Information Environment.

Proposed refined COA selection criteria related to the Information Environment.



d) Courses of Action Analysis (OLPP Step 4)

: Refine and analyse the COAs received from the Commander's guidance on tentative COAsPURPOSE

(this will partly be a collaborative planning effort between the operational and tactical-level planners

to produce coordinated COAs for each level).

: A series of COAs derived from comprehensive, logical, cross-functional evaluation andPRODUCTS

synchronisation (war gaming) ready for comparison and validation; COA evaluation criteria29

; a draft

synchronization matrix (to be refined during plan development and later on included in the OPLAN).


Command and Control: The HoC, in close coordination with the COS and J3 Operations,directs the involvement of representatives of subordinate commands and Joint Force HQ

staff elements (communication capabilities and functions) in the war gaming process.

Analysis of the Information Environment: Continued from previous step. In addition, in this

step the Information Analysts will contribute their expertise to the development of COA

evaluation criteria.

Coordination: The HoC will ensure appropriate participation of communication capabilities

and functions in the war gaming process and coordinate their input to meet the

requirements of a realistic representation of the Information Environment. The Info Ops staff

actually conduct this coordination effort, as directed by the HoC. The LNOs represent their

sending organisations / agencies; they should, upon request of the HoC, place an additional

focus on the Information Environment and the particular role of their organisations /

agencies in it30

. The Info Ops staff will also contribute their expertise to the development of

the synchronization matrix.


Media Communication: Continued from previous step.

Education and Training: Continued from previous step.

29 Derived from the principles of joint and multinational operations at Section V.B.1.

30 The same applies to the Joint Force HQ,s LNOs to other organisations / agencies; in addition to their

information gathering function, they also convey Joint Force Commander’s messages.





39


Communication input to the war gaming process (simulation of communication capabilities

and functions).

Proposed COA evaluation criteria focused on the Information Environment.

Communication input to the synchronization matrix (reference to the implementation routeprovided in the Information Strategy).



e) Courses of Action Validation and Comparison (OLPP Step 5)

: Validate and compare the COAs that were analysed during the previous step.PURPOSE

: Evaluated COAs; a recommended COA; the COA selection rationale.PRODUCTS


Command and Control: Based on the results from war gaming and following consultationwith the Joint Force HQ communication capabilities and functions, the HoC recommends to

the Commander how to evaluate COAs from a communication perspective. Once approved,

he provides guidance to the JOPG.

Analysis of the Information Environment: Continued from previous step.

Coordination: Internal coordination amongst the communication capabilities and functions,

as mentioned above. The Info Ops staff will contribute the coordinated input from the

communication capabilities and functions.



Education and Training: Continued from previous steps.


Communication input to COA evaluation, including recommendations and guidance (inter

alia advantages and disadvantages concerning desired effects in the Information

Environment and the achievement of strategic / Information Objectives, and prioritisation of

joint functions, sequencing and phasing).



f) Commander's Courses of Action Decision (OLPP Step 6)

: Gain the Commander's decision on a chosen COA and then refine this COA as the futurePURPOSE

core of the CONOPS.

: The Commander's COA selection; COA modifications; a refined Commander's intent.PRODUCTS


Command and Control: The HoC directs the Info Ops staff to coordinate contributions to the

refinement of the selected COA. He will advise and consult with the Commander on potential

adjustments of his statement of intent.

Analysis of the Information Environment: Continued from previous step.

Coordination: The HoC, in close coordination with the POLAD, contacts strategic-level

communication managers and practitioners – within the OLPP and C2 procedures – in orderto confirm concurrence of the selected COA and the proposed refinement with strategic-

political guidance. The Info Ops staff coordinates contributions to COA refinement with





41

activities and effects – in other words: messages and audiences – PA should participate in

and contribute to target nomination, as appropriate.

Activity Planning: Information Activities will be planned and conducted by the force

capabilities. The Info Ops staff – through the IACB – advises activity planning with a view on

creating desired Information Effects and assists the force generation process, i.e., the

identification of required means and assets.

Coordination: The HoC contacts strategic-level communication managers and practitioners in

order to directly harmonise communication input to CONOPS development. The Info Ops

staff – through the IACB – will involve the Joint Force HQ’s as well as subordinate commands’

communication capabilities and functions to contribute to the development of Information

Effects, and for planning Information Activities.



Education and Training: Continued from previous step.

COMMUNICATION PLANNING OUTPUTS: Modified Commander’s intent regarding communication, if required.

Refined estimate of the Information Environment (in support of CONOPS development).

Proposed desired Information Effects.

Proposed target nomination for creating Information Effects and achieve decisive conditions.

Proposed set of ROEs relevant to the Information Environment.

Proposed Information Activities to create desired Information Effects.

Proposed force capabilities for conducting Information Activities (as part of the CJSOR).



h) Campaign Assessment and Plan Review / Revision (OLPP Step 8)

: Monitor and assess campaign progress; adapt the OPLAN, as required; and plan for conflictPURPOSE

termination and transition.

: Operational-level assessment reports for the strategic level; revised OPLANs.PRODUCTS


Analysis of the Information Environment: Continued from previous steps.

Assessment of Effects: This activity is considered the most difficult one in the age of "swarm

communication"

31

and Social Media, where simple cause-effect relationships don't exist. Co-led by the Info Ops staff (involving those force capabilities that execute Information Activities

to create desired effects) and J2 INTEL (involving Information Analysts), communication

experts develop recommendations to the HoC for advising the Commander and further

coordination with the HQ's joint assessment staff (usually consisting of the J5 Plans in

cooperation with J2 INTEL and J3 Operations32

).

31

Frequently used term in robotics and elsewhere, meaning many-to-many or omnicast communication. [Cf.http://web.cs.swarthmore.edu/~meeden/cs81/s14/papers/AmyMurphy.pdf ;

http://users.cecs.anu.edu.au/~felix/studies/Publications/Swarm_Communication.pdf and others]32

[See NATO AJP-5(E) (2013), Para 0386; and NATO AJP-3(B) (2011), Para 0422.b.]

http://web.cs.swarthmore.edu/~meeden/cs81/s14/papers/AmyMurphy.pdf


http://users.cecs.anu.edu.au/~felix/studies/Publications/Swarm_Communication.pdf








42


Refined estimate of the Information Environment (in support of campaign assessment).

Communication part of the assessment report(s) (draws from the continued estimate of the

Information Environment).

i) Summary: Integration of Operations Planning and Communication Planning

Figure 7: Operations Planning Products and Communication





43

2. Options for Capturing Communication Planning Outputs

This section proposes options for capturing communication planning outputs in alternative formats.

NATO doctrine is taken as a baseline for the design of an operational-level Operation Plan (OPLAN).

Based on results from experimentation, the theoretical option to produce a stand-alone

Communication Plan with information not contained in the OPLAN was discarded.

a) Integration with Existing Formats

Incorporate operational-level communication guidance in the33

, Main Body, Para 3.dOPLAN

"Concept of Operations" and Para 4.b.(7) "Coordinating Instructions / StratCom and Information

Strategy", and in the Annex A "Concept of Operations"34

. Note that the functional annexes TT (PA),

UU (Info Ops), VV (PSYOPS), and others, such as D (INTEL), Q (CIS) or W (CIMIC), need to be adjusted,

as appropriate. The use of Annex SS (StratCom) is currently not mandated for the operational level.

Figure 8: Communication Input to Existing OPLAN Format

b) Amendment of Existing Formats

Incorporate operational-level communication guidance in the , Main Body, Para 3.d "ConceptOPLAN

of Operations" and Para 4.b.(7) "Coordinating Instructions / StratCom and Information Strategy", in

33 [NATO SHAPE, COPD v2.0 (2013), Appendix D-7]

34 The CONOPS is a formal document, with the same format as the OPLAN; as such, the majority of the detail

of the 'concept of operations' is already contained in the main body of both the CONOPS and the OPLAN. If

the Commander produces a concept of operations synopsis, from which the CONOPS is based, it could be

captured in this Annex. Alternatively, some of the detail of the ‘concept’ could be placed here instead of themain body to keep the main body succinct, for example a detailed description of the phases. Finally, it could

be used only to introduce the attached appendices: Synchronization Matrix and Operational Design

Graphic. [NATO SHAPE, COPD v2.0 (2013), Appendix C, Page C-1, Footnote 3]





44

the Annex A "Concept of Operations", and in an "Mission CommunicationADDITIONAL ANNEX

Management" in a cross-functional format, addressing those functions, capabilities and processes

not covered by the existing annexes (use spare annexes L, O, X or Z)35

. Requirements for adjustment

of functional annexes: as above.

Figure 9: Communication Input to Existing OPLAN Format & New Annex

c) Combination of Existing Formats and a Separate Communication Plan

Produce an operational-level to summarise the major contributions to the OLPPCOMMUNICATION PLAN

from a communication perspective in a format similar to the Information Strategy (see Annex A –

Information Strategy Format), and incorporate communication guidance in the , Main Body,OPLAN

Para 3.d "Concept of Operations" and Para 4.b.(7) "Coordinating Instructions / StratCom and

Information Strategy", in the Annex A "Concept of Operations", and functional annexes.Requirements for adjustment of annexes: as above.

Figure 10: Communication Input to Existing OPLAN Format & Communication Plan

35 [NATO SHAPE, COPD v2.0 (2013), Annex C]





45

d) Discussion of Selection Criteria

For the purpose of integration of communication guidance with the military OPLAN as well as for the

coordination of efforts with other external and civilian counterparts, a combination of existing

military planning products with an additional format for external use is suggested. Situation and

mission requirements may demand the consideration of keeping operational-level communication

guidance internal without intentional public disclosure. An illustrative comparison of advantages and

disadvantages includes:


(a) Best perception of fully integrated

communication planning

Communication-related information is

allocated to all the appropriate text

passages


dispersed; hard to get the complete / big

picture (requirement to read the whole

OPLAN)

Difficult to identify appropriate sections,

paragraphs or annexes to incorporate

new communication management

proposals (such as the HoC, InformationAnalysts and Planners)

Non-availability of an unclassified, stand-

alone document for coordination and

cooperation with external audiences

(such as IOs and NGOs or local actors)

Requirement to de-classify information

and produce another document for

external use

(b) Communication-related information is


passages Highlights communication-related

information (own annex)

Opportunity to capture more

information in a classified annex

Possible duplications / redundancies with

functional annexes

Non-availability of an unclassified, stand-alone document for coordination and



Requirement to de-classify information

and produce another document for

external use

(c) Highlights communication-related

information (communication plan)



passages

Availability of an unclassified, stand-

alone document for coordination and



Potential perception of communication

planning not fully integrated or

separated from operations planning

e) Recommended Option for Capturing Communication Guidance

Communication planning outputs – i.e., inputs to operations planning – should become an integral

part of the . As an UNCLASSIFIED excerpt from that, aOPLAN MAIN BODY AND ANNEXES COMMUNICATION

should highlight the most important parts from a communication perspective, able to be sharedPLAN

with external actors for coordination of communication efforts.





46

INTENTIONALLY BLANK





48

and functions than Info Ops currently does, including PA and internal communication. Hence it will

be represented by the HoC in all Joint Force HQ decision-making processes.

Figure 12: Campaign Synchronization and Joint Functions40

2.

The Joint Coordination ProcessThe JCB conducts regular meetings, prepared by the JCB Working Group (JCBWG, J3-led) and

supported by the Joint Defended Assets Working Group (JDAWG, led by the designated Air Defence

Commander of the Joint Force), the Daily Assets Reconnaissance Board (DARB, led by the Theatre

Collection Manager / J2), the Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB, J2 / J3 co-led), and the

Assessment Working Group (AWG, J5-led). Current NATO doctrine also involves the IACB (J3-led) as a

principal body in support of the JCB.

Additional bodies involved in the joint coordination process are: the Joint Operations Centre (JOC,

J3), the Joint Targeting Working Group (JTWG, usually operated at the Air Force Component / Single

Service Command level), the Target Support Cell (TSC, J2), and the Info Ops Working Group (IOWG,

J3). 41

During conduct of operations, the JTCB integrates joint targeting into the campaign, crossing

functional and component layers at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. The JTCB is typically

responsible for: reviewing target information; developing targeting guidance and priorities; refining

target lists; maintaining a list of restricted targets and areas where Special Operations Forces (SOF)

are operating; ensuring target nominations are consistent with the Commander's intent and concept

of operations; and ensuring that Information Activities are adequately addressed.42

Figure 13 shows the current generic set-up of the joint coordination process at the military

operational level with the major bodies / meetings, working relationships, and related products.

40

[Based on: NATO SHAPE, AD 80-70 (2009), Figure 1, Page I-1-1]41 [For details on the bodies of the current joint coordination process see: NATO AJP-3.9(B) (2014); NATO

SHAPE, AD 80-70 (2009); and NATO AJP-3.10(A) (2014)]42

[Based on: Welton (2003), Page 6]





49

Figure 13: Joint Coordination Process (Current)43

Figure 14 shows a typical composition of a JCB. Its members form an executive level body integrated

within the Joint Force HQ staff and comprise representatives from all functional areas within the HQ

and liaison elements from subordinate commands. The JCBWG mirrors the JCB composition at

working level.

Figure 14: JCB / JCBWG Composition44

43 [Based on: Welton (2003), Figure 2, Page 21]

44 [Based on: NATO SHAPE, AD 80-70 (2009), Figure 3, Page I-2-1]





50

PA and IACB representatives are currently in attendance of both the JCBWG and the JCB. In

accordance with this concept, the (decision-making) JCB should involve the HoC in his primary

responsibility for providing direction and guidance on communication issues. If so, it is suggested to

reconsider the attendance requirement of PA and Info Ops at the JCB.

Figure 15 shows a typical composition of a JTCB. It comprises representatives from the Joint ForceHQ staff, all Component / Single Service Commands (subordinate commands) and, if required,

national liaison representatives. Note that there are representatives of three groups of

communication experts envisioned to attend the JTCB (Info Ops, PA and StratCom), which indicates

some redundancy and should be reconsidered.

Figure 15: JTCB Composition45

3. Integrating Communication in the Joint Coordination Process

In order to promote a common understanding of communication guidance throughout the joint

coordination process, the HoC will have to take on his responsibility and play a visible role. A clear

division of labour needs to be established amongst the staff elements involved in communicationmanagement, distinguishing between preparatory working groups and decision-making bodies.

The HoC should be supported by a team of assistants and a Communication Coordination Board

(CCB) as his tool for communication management.

Figure 16 shows the position and working relationships of a CCB in the joint coordination process.

The CCB should link up with the IACB (to provide communication guidance and coordination to the

targeting process), the JCBWG (to guide the preparation of Joint Coordination Orders, JCOs), and the

JCB (to participate in the decision-making process from a communication perspective).

The subsequent Section VI.C will discuss details on the task and composition of a CCB.

45 [Based on: NATO AJP-3.9(B) (2014), Figure 4.1, Page 4-6]





51

Figure 16: Joint Coordination Process with CCB (Recommended)

As discussed earlier, the attendance requirements for communication capabilities and functions at

the JTCB, JCBWG and JCB need to be reconsidered in order to avoid duplication of effort and to

ensure representation of communication expertise at the appropriate levels.

Figure 17: Info Ops in the JTCB





52

Figure 17 shows the proposed new composition of a JTCB without PA (and StratCom) representation.

Once prepared by the CCB, Info Ops should be in a position to adequately contribute to the targeting

process – based on direction by the HoC and coordinated with PA (considering that PA usually does

not nominate 'targets' as such, but advises on potential public and media issues).

The JCBWG should involve a CCB representative in addition to PA and Info Ops (Figure 18). This is toensure that the HoC (or a deputy or assistant of his choice) has a formal seat in JCBWG meetings to

deliver his opinion. Although PA and Info Ops themselves are part of the CCB (see Section VI.C), their

attendance is necessary to assure situation awareness and avoid misinterpretations, and to provide

ad hoc advice to the HoC / CCB representative, as required.

Figure 18: CCB Reps in the JCBWG

The JCB assists the Joint Force's activity and effects synchronization, specifically to prepare and issue

the Commander's priority guidance across the subordinate commands, and to resolve potential areas

of conflict. The JCB assigns execution responsibilities, prioritises, de-conflicts and synchronizes all

aspects of the employment of lethal and non-lethal means. The Commander provides, through the

medium of the JCB, further amplification to his direction and guidance. JCB representatives must

have the experience, knowledge and authority to take decisions (on behalf of their commanders).46

With respect to the decision-making function of the JCB, its high-level tasking authority, and its role

in support of requests and recommendations to the strategic level, the HoC himself should attend

JCB meetings. PA and Info Ops will be kept involved through the CCB and informed through their

attendance at the JCBWG.

For the proposed (new) composition of the JCB: see Figure 19.

46 [Based on: NATO SHAPE, AD 80-70 (2009), Para I-2-2 and I-2-3, Page I-2-1]





53

Figure 19: HoC in the JCB

C. The Communication Coordination Board

As the HoC's primary tool for communication management (i.e., coordinating and implementing

integrated communication), a CCB should be established and incorporated in the Joint Force HQ staff

routine / battle rhythm. The board may meet on a regular basis and also provide the framework for

bilateral and virtual coordination amongst its members. In this respect, the CCB can be considered asa process and a meeting venue.

Figure 20: Communication Coordination Board





54

The CCB should comprise the core of the Joint Force HQ communication experts, the Director of Staff

(DOS), and communication representatives from superior and subordinate commands as well as

other external representatives, as required (Figure 20).

The purpose of the CCB is:

To develop and maintain a common understanding of Information Strategy and other

communication-related guidance.

To interpret strategic guidance and the Commander's intent, and coordinate their proper

implementation in all relevant planning and coordination processes.

To develop, review and adjust the operational-level Narrative, themes and master messages.

To coordinate communication input to Joint Force HQ working groups, boards, and other

bodies, and the related processes.

To develop and update the communication part(s) of the Joint Force HQ Standing Operating

Procedures (SOP).

The DOS should attend the CCB, as required, to ensure that the integration of communication

experts / expertise is adequately reflected in the Joint Force HQ SOP, and to advise on appropriate

ways and means for HQ internal information exchange, including the staff routine / battle rhythm.

As required, communication experts from the strategic and tactical levels should be invited to attend

the CCB in order to clarify communication guidance.

Furthermore, the CCB may invite other external communication representatives, such as the PA staff

of IOs operating in theatre or HN communication experts in order to promote a comprehensive

approach to integrated communication.





55

VII. EDUCATION AND TRAINING

A.

Qualification of the Head of CommunicationThe HoC has to be a communication expert, a smart consumer of consulting services and a problem-

solver. There must be a comfort level with a range of subject matter, from marketing and media

relations issues to human resources or legal matters. The best person to drive that integration

process is someone with the largest possible view of how the processes should work. The ideal HoC

must be a generalist, with enough experience in several disciplines and able to manage them

effectively when the need arises. Equally, he must be rooted in at least one specialty (e.g., PA or Info

Ops) that will serve him well when the best-laid plans are interrupted by an unexpected crisis.

The HoC should be experienced in helping to preserve and protect the command's reputation on a

number of levels. The individual should have a clear understanding of intended messaging and how

the Joint Force responds to incoming information and inquiries, as some messages may do more

harm (or good) for the command's reputation. He must be able to facilitate open dialogue to buildstrong relationships with important stakeholders and should fully understand the value and role that

third-party endorsements play in managing perceptions of an organisation or in perpetuating

misperceptions.

The HoC has to be a counsellor to senior leadership. He must be proficient at playing the advisory

role to the Commander, and in certain situations as being the organisation's spokesperson – the

voice of the organisation – when necessary.

A HoC with a deep understanding of PA would be in a good position to manage the integrated

communication process. A HoC should be a skilled public speaker, have established relationships with

leaders, and be generally knowledgeable with every facet of the Joint Force organisation, in

particular with the operations planning process.

A HoC will have to recognise opportunities when they are presented and use the process of

integration to advance all communication disciplines. To do so, the HoC needs to be an active listener

and committed to expanding communication related research and measurement capabilities. He will

have to place the highest value on consistency and quality, for the end result of all integrated

communication efforts must be the consistency of all messages. And above all, he should make the

commitment to providing complete communication solutions to operations problems, regardless of

where those problems are rooted in.

B. Qualification of the Information Analysts

The primary qualification requirement for Information Analysts is systemic analysis. They should be

competent to conduct an interdisciplinary analysis and assessment of the Information Environment

across the PMESII47

domains, considering the Information Factor throughout.

Information Analysts need to be familiar with general KD and INTEL procedures, processes and tools

applied by the J2 Intelligence division. A specific contribution from an integrated communication

perspective will be required to the comprehensive preparation of the operational environment

(CPOE). This includes familiarity with and active involvement in the joint targeting process.

Information Analysts also need to be team players, able to fully integrate in various different groups,

and planning and coordination processes within the HQ staff routine. They must understand military

thinking and be able to 'operationalize' academic insight in order to incorporate the Information

Factor in the CPOE, OLPP, targeting and assessment.

47 PMESII = Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure and Information.





56

Training in one or more communication capabilities (such as PA or PSYOPS) would be an optional and

complementary qualification requirement for Information Analysts. Experience in Target Audience

Analysis (TAA) or media analysis may benefit their systemic analysis of the Information Environment.

Information Analysts – provided additional functional training – could also be employed as

Information Planners.

C. Qualification of the Information Planners

Information Planners need to be proficient in all aspects of the OLPP. They contribute their

comprehensive understanding of the Information Environment as core competence to planning and

assessment of operations.

The main function of Information Planners is the development of information effects and related

indicators and metrics in conjunction with Info Ops and force capabilities, as appropriate. In order to

do so, Information Planners should be trained in at least one communication capability or function,

such as PA, PSYOPS or Info Ops.

Information Planners – provided additional functional training – could also be employed as

Information Analysts.

D. Integration of Communication in Leadership and Staff Development

Led by the HoC and based on the Commander's guidance, the Joint Force HQ staff as well as

subordinate commanders need to involve in education and training programs that support the

development of the mind-set of integrated communication. Each and every member of the Joint

Force must acknowledge the fact of not being able to not communicate, and implement this in their

plans and actions – shaping the 'body language' of the Joint Force's operations.

Staff education programs also serve the purpose of promoting situation awareness, information

exchange, transparency, and a common understanding of the Commander's intent related to the

Information Environment. Cross functional individualised training should be considered extremelyimportant as it will help communication and coordination amongst all staff elements. Staff training

will also assist the development of a corporate identity of the Joint Force, and consequently, a

corporate image in the perception of external stakeholders and audiences.

Leadership development efforts should include the commanders and key leaders of the Joint Force. It

is a primary responsibility of the HoC as the senior communication expert to plan and conduct these

activities. In addition, the permanent advice of the HoC to the Commander will contribute to the

achievement of a better understanding of his role in the Information Environment.





57

VIII. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

APPLICABILITY

Although the theme of MCDC 2013-14 is 'Combined Operational Access', the solutions proposed in

this concept should be considered for all scenario settings and operation/mission types.

POLICY AND DOCTRINE

All primary/capstone documents on national and multinational doctrine (such as NATO's AJP-01, the

AJP-3 series, AJP-5, etc.) should be revised to reflect the integration of communication into analysis,

planning, execution and assessment of operations.

STAKEHOLDERS AND CUSTOMERS

Implementation of the proposed solutions should be incorporated in all related policy & doctrine,

SOPs, and training concepts, and involve at a minimum the following:

military-strategic level communication managers and practitioners;

the Command Group of a military operational-level HQ;

members of the HQ Advisory Group / Special Staff of a military operational-level HQ;

the Chief of Staff, his deputy and assistants of a military operational-level HQ;

practitioners of PA, Info Ops and other communication disciplines at all levels;

J2 Intelligence (INTEL) staff of a military operational-level HQ;

J3 Operations staff of a military operational-level HQ;

J5 Plans staff of a military operational-level HQ;

J9 Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) staff of a military operational-level HQ.

The concept should also be shared and discussed with civilian counterparts of the above involved in

mandating, planning and execution of crisis response missions/operations in order to facilitate

integration and a comprehensive approach.

INFORMATION STRATEGY

An Information Strategy should be acknowledged as strategic-political guidance on integrated

communication by all relevant civilian and military instruments of power.

In order to appropriately serve its purpose, an Information Strategy should, at minimum, contain the

following: the strategic Narrative;

Information Objectives as the desired conditions to be created in the Information

Environment, linked to the Narrative and fully integrated and supportive to strategic

objectives;

audiences and targets;

themes and master messages.

Coalition partner nations and organisations should establish processes and bodies for the

development of an Information Strategy at the strategic-political level. The strategic level should not

only be involved as approval authority but needs to authentically provide the vision and end-state as

superior guidance. In order to enable strategic authorities to do so, resources need to be made





58

available, in particular concerning analysis, assessment, strategic political judgement, and military

advice.

The process of developing an Information Strategy may start even before a mandate is agreed on.

However, the strategic Narrative needs to refer to the mandate and, therefore, an Information

Strategy cannot be formally issued prior to the mandate.The first version of an Information Strategy should be ready and approved by the political authorities

prior to strategic operations/mission planning is concluded. This is to ensure that strategic planning

appropriately considers effects in the Information Environment.

An Information Strategy should be produced as an internal document in the first place, with no pro-

active external distribution. However, in order to meet the principles of transparency, credibility and

authenticity, it should ideally contain only unclassified information so that it could be shared with

partners and public disclosure would not jeopardise mission accomplishment.

LEADERSHIP RESPONSIBILITY

Commanders should consider themselves as the supreme communicators and champions ofintegrated communication of the Joint Force. Ideally, the senior leadership should personally commit

themselves in communication rather than delegating messaging to others. Therefore, communicative

competence should become a selection criterion for commanders.

HEAD OF COMMUNICATION

A HoC functionality should be established at a Joint Force HQ to enhance the traditional StratCom

function beyond its doctrinal coordination role. It should be supported by a team of assistants and a

capable staff organisation (with alternatives for manning and positioning).

Based on insights from experimentation, the HoC should be positioned in the Command Group as the

preferred option. However, depending on command and staff management requirements (e.g., for

high-intensity warfighting vs. low-intensity peacekeeping or stabilisation operations), other options

may be considered as well.

The HoC should represent the coordinated functional expertise on the Information Environment of

the participating nations and organisations – not any national perspective, be it that of his own

country or that of the lead nation. Therefore, the HoC should be appointed by the Strategic

Commander, in close consultation with the designated Joint Force Commander, to act as the Joint

Force's principal assistant on all communication issues.

The HoC should be granted the authority to assign tasks and require consultation between the

agencies involved (organisations or commands and their representatives) for all issues related to

Joint Force communication. The HoC should also be authorised to directly address all members of the

Joint Force HQ.

HQ STAFF ORGANISATION AND CAPABILITIES

Information Analysts and Information Planners should be introduced as new, additional capabilities

to existing HQ organisations to promote the wider integration of communication expertise in the

analysis, planning, execution and assessment of operations. These capabilities should ideally not be

centralised or pooled, but assigned to those staff elements the primary responsibility of which rests

with analysis and planning, i.e., the J2 and the J5. Other options may be considered, as appropriate.

Organisationally the PA staff should remain unchanged as part of the HQ's HQ Advisory Group (if so

positioned) and perform their doctrinal role in conjunction and fully integrated with the HoC

function.





59

Organisationally the Info Ops staff should remain unchanged within the J3 Operations staff division

(if so positioned) and also perform their doctrinal role in conjunction and fully integrated with the

HoC function.

COMMUNICATION PLANNING

An Information Strategy should be considered as additional planning guidance at the operational

level. Operation planners and operators should be aware of the Information Strategy content in

order to support the alignment of messaging by Joint Force operations.

In order to fully integrate communication planning and operations planning at the operational level,

there must not be a parallel, segregated planning process for communication. It is required that

communication capabilities and functions play an integral part in the operational-level planning

process.

The development of effects in the Information Environment needs to be guided from a commander's

perspective and fully integrated with the development of operational effects.

Communication planning outputs should become an integral part of the OPLAN main body andannexes. As an UNCLASSIFIED excerpt from that, a Communication Plan should highlight the most

important parts from a communication perspective, able to be shared with external actors for

coordination of communication efforts.

CAMPAIGN SYNCHRONIZATION

Communication as a joint function should comprise a broader scope of capabilities and functions

than Info Ops currently does, including PA and internal communication. Therefore, communication

should replace Info Ops as joint function in the joint coordination process. It should be represented

by the HoC in all Joint Force HQ decision-making processes.

The (decision-making) JCB should involve the HoC in his primary responsibility for providing direction

and guidance on communication issues. It is suggested to remove the attendance requirement of PA

and Info Ops at the JCB.

The JCBWG should involve a CCB representative in addition to PA and Info Ops to ensure that the

HoC (or a deputy or assistant of his choice) has a formal seat in JCBWG meetings to deliver his

opinion. The attendance of PA and Info Ops is necessary to assure situation awareness and avoid

misinterpretations, and to provide ad hoc advice to the HoC / CCB representative, as required.

Info Ops should represent communication management in the JTCB. Once prepared by the CCB, Info

Ops should be in a position to adequately contribute to the targeting process – based on direction by

the HoC and coordinated with PA.

COMMUNICATION COORDINATION BOARD

As the HoC's primary tool for communication management (i.e., coordinating and implementing

integrated communication), a CCB should be established and incorporated in the Joint Force HQ staff

routine / battle rhythm.

The CCB should comprise the core of the Joint Force HQ communication experts, the DOS, and

communication representatives from superior and subordinate commands as well as other external

representatives, as required.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING

Through education and training opportunities all Joint Force personnel should develop the mind-set

of integrated communication, and consequently be empowered to participate in Joint Force

messaging within their scope of tasks and responsibilities.





60

All communication capabilities and functions need to be properly trained and resourced in order to

enable integrated communication and communication management. This requirement goes beyond

the qualification of other capabilities and functions, as mistaken effects in the Information

Environment could potentially do more harm to the overall achievement of mission objectives than

anything else.

Training concepts and education programs should be developed to support the qualification

requirements of the individuals involved in communication management.

Integrated communication and communication management should be an integral part of the pre-

deployment training of the Joint Force, including exercises.

IMPLEMENTATION

In order to promote the desired 'return on investment', practical recommendations from long-term

capability development projects such as MCDC should be finally implemented, as appropriate.





A-1

Annex A – Information Strategy Format

REFERENCES: (to mandating, strategic assessments and planning)

1. INTRODUCTION

A. SLOGAN (name of the operation/mission with reference background or explanation, as required)

B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE (strategic-political dimension: partner nations and populations, all instruments of power, global perspective)

C. CUSTODIAN AND CUSTOMERS (strategic commander; partners/allies, contributing nations, operational/force commander)

D. REVIEW AND APPROVAL (periodical and event-driven; political approval)

2. STRATEGIC CONTEXT

A. ASSESSMENT OF THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (synopsis; reference to separate document(s), as appropriate)

B. MANDATE AND MISSION (summary of relevant UNSCRs; strategic commander's mission)

C. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES (from strategic planning; non-military and military)

3. NARRATIVE AND INFORMATION OBJECTIVES

A. NARRATIVE STATEMENT (strategic-political dimension: partner nations and populations, all instruments of power, global perspective,

derived from mandate)

B. INFORMATION OBJECTIVES (linked to strategic objectives; phrasing: subject focus – quality of change - conclusion)

C. APPROVED AUDIENCES AND TARGETS (bullet list; amended with caveats, as required)

D. THEMES AND MASTER MESSAGES (not linked to specific audiences/targets; general overview; include Contingency Master Messages and Themes

to be avoided)

4. POTENTIAL ACTORS AND CAPABILITIES

(strategic-political level, all instruments of power; national responsibilities)

5. IMPLEMENTATION ROUTE (synopsis)

A. MILESTONES AND KEY EVENTS (milestones = decisive points; key events = important occurrences that happen anyway / periodically, story

events that may lead to milestones or result from them)B. COMMUNICATION APPROACH (broad description / summary: mapping of audiences/targets, Themes and Master Messages for each

Information Objective; continuous text)

6. COORDINATION REQUIREMENTS

(procedures ref. to partners/allies, information sharing arrangements, dialogue and interaction between civilian

and military actors; coordination between military and civil mission components in theatre)

ANNEXES:

A. IMPLEMENTATION ROUTE MATRIX (mapping of audiences/targets, Themes and Master Messages for each Information Objective on a timeline)

B. EVALUATION PLAN (indicators for the achievement of Information Objectives)

C. BUDGET AND FINANCE (financial arrangements based on national commitments)





A-2

Reference to Chapter V, Section C.2: Once a is to be developed at theCOMMUNICATION PLAN

operational level – in a format similar to the Information Strategy – the following principle

adjustments should be made:

REFERENCES (Joint Force HQ OPLAN as the key reference document)

SECTION 2 – "Operational Context"

PARAGRAPH 2.C – "Objectives" (including strategic Information Objectives and operational objectives!)

PARAGRAPH 3.A – "Narrative Statements" (including the strategic Narrative from the Information

Strategy and the operational-level Narrative!)

SECTION 4 – "Potential Capabilities and Actors" (to outline operational-level force capabilities,subordinate commands' capabilities, as required, and other actors within the scope of the Joint

Force)

SECTION 5 – "Implementation Route" (Reference to the OPLAN Synchronization Matrix, Appendix A-1)

ANNEXES (review necessity and remove, as required)





B-1

Annex B – Narrative (Example) The following example is taken from the VK14 exercise and reflects communication guidance

prepared at the military operational level.48

The international interim security assistance force to the Republic of BOGALAND – BFOR – is

mandated by the International Community and operates upon request of the signatories of

the Cease Fire Agreement and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to enforce, monitor and

verify the fulfilment of their commitments.

In the military aspects, NATO has established BFOR to affirm and provide its unwavering

support to the implementation of lasting peace and stability in the North Friendly Sea region.

BFOR's main effort is on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of the former parties

in conflict, and on support to the security sector reform in BOGALAND.

BFOR has the capability and collective will to continue this task. We will embrace thecontribution of all regional parties who demonstrate a willingness to support the BOGALAND

peace process.

Reinforcing cooperation with the Transitional Government of BOGALAND and standing

shoulder to shoulder with UNMIB and EUFOR, BFOR will further improve safety and security

in BOGALAND, and set the conditions that enable the future regular BOGALAND forces to

take on their national responsibilities.

48 [COM BFOR Communication Plan for Peace Support Operations in BOGALAND – VK 14 v2, EXERCISE –

UNMARKED RELEASABLE TO INTERNET]





B-2

INTENTIONALLY BLANK





C-1

Annex C – Information Objectives (Examples) The following examples are taken from the VK14 exercise and reflect communication guidance

prepared at the strategic-political level.49

IO#1 All contributing, regional, and domestic actors understand NATO's mandate,

aims, intent, and scope of action in the BOGALAND mission in order to

promote the international assistance and to ensure the continued willingness

for member partners to continue their participation and maintain cohesion.

IO#2 Relevant actors in BOGALAND and in the North Friendly Sea region are

convinced to promote the positive vision as outlined by the peace agreement

in order to gain active participation and support for the stabilization and

sustainable development of the region and to deter external interventions.

IO#3 All relevant BOGALAND actors and the population accept the central

empowerment of the BOGALAND government and rely on the capability of its

security forces to create a secure and stable environment and to support the

unification process of BOGALAND.

IO#4 All relevant actors are able to access information and actively participate in

the inclusive political, social, and economic development through a

functioning and reliable communications and information infrastructure.

IO#5 Relevant actors in the North Friendly Sea region engage in diplomatic action

and refrain from humiliation and repression of ethnic minorities in support of

sustainable peace and progress.

49 [NATO Information Strategy for BOGALAND – VK 14 v2 - Supplement, EXERCISE – UNMARKED RELEASABLE

TO INTERNET]





C-2

INTENTIONALLY BLANK



D-1

Annex D – Communication Planning

This annex provides a graphical overview for each planning step. It depicts key actors, processes and

products with special emphasis on the role of the Head of Communication (HoC).

For abbreviations see Lexicon and References, Part 1 – Abbreviations.

OLPP STEP 1 – INITIATION OF THE OPERATIONAL-LEVEL PLANNING PROCESS



D-2

OLPP STEP 2 – PROBLEM AND MISSION ANALYSIS

OLPP STEP 3 – COURSES OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT



D-4

OLPP STEP 6 – COMMANDER'S COURSES OF ACTION DECISION

OLPP STEP 7 – OPERATIONAL-LEVEL CONCEPT AND PLAN DEVELOPMENT



D-5

OLPP STEP 8 – CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT AND PLAN REVIEW / REVISION



D-6

INTENTIONALLY BLANK





Lexicon-1

Lexicon and References

Part 1 – Abbreviations

ACO (NATO) Allied Command Operations

ACOS Assistant Chief of Staff

AD (NATO) ACO Directive

ADC Air Defence Commander

AJP Allied Joint Publication

Assmt Assessment

AWG Assessment Working Group

BUDFIN Budget and FinancesC2 Command and Control

CAX Computer Assisted Exercise

CCB Communication Coordination Board

Cdr Commander

cf. confer (compare, consult)

C-IED Counter Improvised Explosive Device

CIMIC Civil-Military Cooperation

CIS Communications and Information Systems

CJSOR Combined Joint Statement of Requirements

COM Commander

Comm Communication

Comm C+F Communication Capabilities and Functions

CONOPS Concept of Operations

COPD Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive

COS Chief of Staff

CPA Chief, Public Affairs

CPOE Comprehensive Preparation of the operational Environment

CPX Command Post Exercise

CSEL Command Senior Enlisted Leader

CULAD Cultural Advisor

DACOS Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff

DARB Daily Assets Reconnaissance Board

DCOM Deputy CommanderDCOS Deputy Chief of Staff





Lexicon-2

DOM Director of Management

DOS Director of Staff

ED / Ed Education

ENG / Eng Engineers

FINCON Financial Controller

FRAGO Fragmentary Order

GENAD Gender Advisor

Geo Geographical

HN Host Nation

HoC Head of Communication

IACB Information Activities Coordination Board

IJC ISAF Joint Command

IM Information Management

Info Information

Info Env Information Environment

Info Ops Information Operations

Info Strat Information Strategy

Infra Infrastructure

INTEL Intelligence (J2)

IO International Organisation

IOWG Information Operations Working Group

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

JCB Joint Coordination Board

JCBWG Joint Coordination Board Working Group

JCO Joint Coordination Order

JDAWG Joint Defended Assets Working Group

JEC Joint Effects Cell

JFC Joint Force Command

JIOS Joint Intelligence Operations Section

JMC Joint Military Commission

JOA Joint Operations Area

JOC Joint Operations Centre

JOPG Joint Operations Planning Group

JTCB Joint Targeting Coordination Board

JTWG Joint Targeting Working GroupKD Knowledge Development





Lexicon-3

LEGAD Legal Advisor

LNO Liaison Officer

LOG Logistics

Mar Maritime

MED / Med Medical

MEDAD Medical Advisor

Mgmt Management

MN Multinational

NGO Non-Governmental Organisation

OLPP Operational-Level Planning Process

OP operational

OPLAN Operation Plan

OPP Operations Planning Process

OPS Operations

PA Public Affairs

PAO Public Affairs Officer

PERS Personnel Management

PM Provost Marshal

PMESII Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure and Information (analysis)

POC Point of Contact

POLAD Political Advisor

Prod Production

PSYOPS Psychological Operations

ref. reference (to)

ROE Rules of Engagement

ROEREQ Rules of Engagement Request

SOF Special Operations Forces

SOFAD Special Operations Forces Advisor

SOP Standing Operating Procedures

SPD Strategic Planning Directive

SPOC Single Point of Contact

SPT / Spt Support

Strat strategic, Strategy

StratCom Strategic Communication

Synch SynchronizationTAA Target Audience Analysis (PSYOPS)





Lexicon-4

TAC tactical

TCM Theatre Collection Manager

TRNG / Trng Training

TSC Targeting Support Cell

UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution

Part 2 – Glossary

: The description of the rationale of how an organization creates, delivers, andBUSINESS MODEL

captures value in economic, social, cultural or other contexts. The term used for a broad range of

informal and formal descriptions to represent core aspects of a business, including purpose, business

process, target customers, offerings, strategies, infrastructure, organizational structures, trading

practices, and operational processes and policies. [Based on: Osterwalder/Pigneur (2010)] [MCDC]

: The process by which information, meanings and feelings are shared by peopleCOMMUNICATION

through an exchange of verbal and non-verbal messages. [Singh (2005)]

: The military capabilities and staff functions the primaryCOMMUNICATION CAPABILITIES AND FUNCTIONS

role of which is to execute communication management tasks, to conduct communication planning

and/or to create Information Effects. [MCDC]

: A term used in the broadest sense to include planning, approval andCOMMUNICATION MANAGEMENT

implementation of communication guidance. It corresponds with the terms 'operational design' and

'operational management' introduced in NATO's Allied Joint Doctrine to embrace analysis, planning,

execution and assessment [NATO AJP-01(D) (2010), Para 0525 and 526]. [MCDC]

: Contributions to the Operations Planning Process from a communicationCOMMUNICATION PLANNING

perspective. [MCDC]

: An action designed to have an effect in the information environment,INFORMATION ACTIVITY

performed by any actor. [MNE 6 Framework Concept v1.0 (2010)]

: Effects in the Information Environment. [MCDC]INFORMATION EFFECTS

: The virtual and physical space, in which information is received,INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

processed and conveyed. It consists of the information itself and information systems. [MNE 6

Framework Concept v1.0 (2010)]

: The actuality of information pervading societies, such as actors and audiencesINFORMATION FACTOR

have become increasingly indistinguishable, and every action sends a message, intended or not. (In

the military, information is meanwhile recognised as a decisive factor per se that will increasinglyaffect the operational factors force, space and time.) [MNE 6 Framework Concept v1.0 (2010)]

: A desired condition to be created in the information environment. It shouldINFORMATION OBJECTIVE

be measurable to enable analysis, planning, execution/management and assessment /evaluation of

related actions and effects. [MNE 6 Framework Concept v1.0 (2010)]

: The interagency and multinational approach to crisis/conflict prevention andINFORMATION STRATEGY

resolution in the information environment. It constitutes mission-specific strategic and political

guidance for information activities across all levers of power in support of mission objectives. [MNE 6

Framework Concept v1.0 (2010)]

: The statement of identity, cause and intent around which people can unite. [Based on:NARRATIVE

Prof. Paul Cornish (2009); GBR Government working definition]





Lexicon-5

Part 3 – Bibliography

MCDC 2013-14 Campaign Plan (19 June 2013)

MCDC 2013-14 StratCom Focus Area "Baseline Assessment Report" v0.6 (07 October 2013)

MCDC StratCom LOE / VK14 Experiment Analysis Report (EAR) (25 July 2014)

MNE 5 Framework Concept "The Information Factor within a Comprehensive approach to

Multinational Crisis Management" v3.0 (03 April 2009)

MNE 5 / MNIOE Analytical Concept "Development of a Multinational Information Strategy" v1.0 (31

October 2008)

MNE 6 Framework Concept "Integrated Communication in Multinational Coalition Operations within

a Comprehensive Approach" v1.0 (22 October 2010)

Mulder: "Driving Integrated Marketing Communication Home for Organisational Effectiveness"

(2007)

NATO AJP-01(D) – "Allied Joint Doctrine" (December 2010)

NATO AJP-3(B) – "Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations" (March 2011)

NATO AJP-3.9(B) "Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Targeting", Study Draft 4 (July 2014)

NATO AJP-3.10(A) – "Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations", Pre-Ratification Draft (July

2014)

NATO AJP-5(E) – "Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational-Level Planning" (June 2013)

NATO SHAPE, "Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive" (COPD) v2.0 (04 October 2013)

NATO SHAPE ACO Directive (AD) 80-70 – "Campaign Synchronization and Joint Targeting in ACO" (12

January 2009)

Osborne/Brown: "Managing Change and Innovation in Public Service Organizations" (2005)

Osterwalder/Pigneur: "Business Model Generation: A Handbook for Visionaries, Game Changers, and

Challengers" (2010)

Schultz/Kitchen: "Communicating Globally – An Integrated Marketing Approach" (2000)

Singh: "Outsourcing: An Observation", PPT Presentation, University of Arizona: Course on Verbal and

Non-Verbal Communication of Americans (2005)

Watzlawick/Beavin/Jackson: "Pragmatics of Human Communication" (1967)

Welton, James G. – "Implementing Effects-Based Operations: Redefining the Role of the JTCB",Professional Studies Paper, USA Air War College / Air University (June 2003)




MCDC 2013-14

Applied Concept

"C i ti M t t th Milit O ti l L l"

2014-09-30_final_apc_op-comm mgmt.pdf

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