January 2014 Philippine Supreme Court Rulings on PoliticalLawPosted onFebruary 14, 2014byPhilbert E. Varona Posted inConstitutional Law,Philippines - Cases,Philippines - Law Here are select January 2014 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on political law:Absence of motion of reconsideration; effect of. The omission of the filing of a motion for reconsideration poses no obstacle for the Courts review of its ruling on the whole case since a serious constitutional question has been raised and is one of the underlying bases for the validity or invalidity of the presidential action. If the President does not have any constitutional authority to discipline a Deputy Ombudsman and/or a Special Prosecutor in the first place, then any ruling on the legal correctness of the OPs decision on the merits will be an empty one. In other words, since the validity of the OPs decision on the merits of the dismissal is inextricably anchored on the final and correct ruling on the constitutional issue, the whole case including the constitutional issue remains alive for the Courts consideration on motion for reconsideration.Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al.,G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.Congress; power to determine modes of removal from office of public officers; must be consistent with the core constitutional principle of independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. The intent of the framers of the Constitution in providing that all other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment in the second sentence of Section 2, Article XI is to prevent Congress from extending the more stringent rule of removal only by impeachment to favoured public officers. Contrary to the implied view of the minority, in no way can this provision be regarded as blanket authority for Congress to provide for any ground of removal it deems fit. While the manner and cause of removal are left to congressional determination, this must still be consistent with constitutional guarantees and principles, namely: the right to procedural and substantive due process; the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure; the principle of separation of powers; and the principle of checks and balances. The authority granted by the Constitution to Congress to provide for the manner and cause of removal of all other public officers and employees does not mean that Congress can ignore the basic principles and precepts established by the Constitution.Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al.,G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.Constitutional bodies; concept of independence. The independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and by the Constitutional Commissions shares certain characteristics they do not owe their existence to any act of Congress, but are created by the Constitution itself; additionally, they all enjoy fiscal autonomy. In general terms, the framers of the Constitution intended that these independent bodies be insulated from political pressure to the extent that the absence of independence would result in the impairment of their core functions. The deliberative considerations abundantly show that the independent constitutional commissions have been consistently intended by the framers to be independent from executive control or supervision or any form of political influence. At least insofar as these bodies are concerned, jurisprudence is not scarce on how the independence granted to these bodies prevents presidential interference.Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al.,G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.Gross negligence; concept of; not present when Deputy Ombudsman reviews a case for nine days. Gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected. In case of public officials, there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable. The Deputy Ombudsman cannot be guilty of gross neglect of duty and/or inefficiency since he acted on the case forwarded to him within nine days. The OPs ruling that Gonzales had been grossly negligent for taking nine days, instead of five days as required for Hearing Officers, is totally baseless.Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al.,G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.Impeachment; concept of. Impeachment is the most difficult and cumbersome mode of removing a public officer from office. It is, by nature, asui generispolitico-legal process that signals the need for a judicious and careful handling as shown by the process required to initiate the proceeding; the one-year limitation or bar for its initiation; the limited grounds for impeachment; the defined instrumentality given the power to try impeachment cases; and the number of votes required for a finding of guilt.Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al.,G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.Judicial power; issuance of protection orders is in pursuance of the Courts authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights. The provision in R.A. 9262 allowing the issuance of protection orders is not an invalid delegation of legislative power to the court and tobarangayofficials to issue protection orders. Section 2 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof. Hence, the primary judge of the necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness and expediency of any law is primarily the function of the legislature. The act of Congress entrusting us with the issuance of protection orders is in pursuance of our authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights.Ralph P. Tua v. Hon. Cesar A. Mangrobang, Presiding Judge, Branch 22, RTC, Imus, Cavite; and Rossan Honrado-Tua,G.R. No. 170701. January 22, 2014.Just compensation; determination of just compensation is fundamentally a judicial function.In the exercise of the Courts essentially judicial function of determining just compensation, the RTC-SACs are not granted unlimited discretion and must consider and apply the enumerated factors in R.A. No. 6657 and the DAR formula (in AO 5-98) that reflect these factors. These factors and formula provide the uniform framework or structure for the computation of the just compensation for a property subject to agrarian reform. When acting within the parameters set by the law itself, the RTC-SACs, however, are not strictly bound to apply the DAR formula to its minute detail, particularly when faced with situations that do not warrant the formulas strict application; they may, in the exercise of their discretion, relax the formulas application to fit the factual situations before them. They must, however, clearly explain the reason for any deviation from the factors and formula that the law and the rules have provided.Land Bank of the Philippines v. Yatco Agricultural Enterprises,G.R. No. 172551, January 15, 2014.Just compensation; fair market value of the expropriated property is determined as of the time of taking. The time of taking refers to that time when the State deprived the landowner of the use and benefit of his property, as when the State acquires title to the property or as of the filing of the complaint, per Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.Land Bank of the Philippines v. Yatco Agricultural Enterprises,G.R. No. 172551, January 15, 2014.Justiciable question; definition of. A justiciable question is one which is inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized by law, as where the court finds that there are constitutionally-imposed limits on the exercise of the powers conferred on a political branch of the government. Our inquiry is limited to whether such statutory grant of disciplinary authority to the President violates the Constitution, particularly the core constitutional principle of the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al.,G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.Ombudsman; investigative and disciplinary powers; scope. The Ombudsmans broad investigative and disciplinary powers include all acts of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance of all public officials, including Members of the Cabinet and key Executive officers, during their tenure. To support these broad powers, the Constitution saw it fit to insulate the Office of the Ombudsman from the pressures and influences of officialdom and partisan politics and from fear of external reprisal by making it an independent office.Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al.,G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.Ombudsman; powers and functions. Under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is envisioned to be the protector of the people against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in the Government, to function essentially as a complaints and action bureau. This constitutional vision of a Philippine Ombudsman practically intends to make the Ombudsman an authority to directly check and guard against the ills, abuses, and excesses of the bureaucracy. As the Ombudsman is expected to be an activist watchman, the Court has upheld its actions, although not squarely falling under the broad powers granted it by the Constitution and by R.A. No. 6770, if these actions are reasonably in line with its official function and consistent with the law and the Constitution.Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al.,G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.Private lands acquired for agrarian reform; primary jurisdiction. The Land Bank of the Philippines is primarily charged with determining land valuation and compensation for all private lands acquired for agrarian reform purposes. But this determination is only preliminary. The landowner may still take the matter of just compensation to the court for final adjudication. Thus, we clarify and reiterate: the original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation under R.A. No. 6657 rests with the RTC-SAC. But, in its determination, the RTC-SAC must take into consideration the factors laid down by law and the pertinent DAR regulations.Land Bank of the Philippines v. Yatco Agricultural Enterprises,G.R. No. 172551, January 15, 2014.Public officer; discourtesy in the performance of official duties. As a public officer and trustee for the public, it is the ever existing responsibility of respondent sheriff to demonstrate courtesy and civility in his official actuations with the public. Based on the transcript of the altercation, it is readily apparent that respondent has indeed been remiss in the duty of observing courtesy in serving the public. He should have exercised restraint in dealing with the complainant, instead of allowing the quarrel to escalate into a hostile encounter. The balm of a clean conscience should have been sufficient to relieve any hurt or harm respondent felt from complainants criticisms in the performance of his duties. On the contrary, respondents demeanor tarnished the image not only of his office but that of the judiciary as a whole, exposing him to disciplinary measure.Atty. Virgillo P. Alconera v. Alfredo T. Pallanan,A.M. No. P-12-3069, January 20, 2014.Public officer; making untruthful statements. The charge of making untruthful statements must fail. While the statements mentioned in respondents complaint-affidavit were not reflected in the transcript submitted by the complainant, this actuality is not conclusive evidence that such event did not take place. As claimed by respondent, complainants clerk was only able to record a part of the argument. We cannot then discount the probability that there is more to the argument than what was caught on video and there remains the possibility that what respondent narrated and what complainant recorded both actually transpired.Atty. Virgillo P. Alconera v. Alfredo T. Pallanan,A.M. No. P-12-3069, January 20, 2014.Section 8(2) of RA 6770; constitutional; the Office of the Special Prosecutor is not constitutionally within the Office of the Ombudsman; not entitled to the independence the Office of the Ombudsman enjoys under the Constitution. The Court resolved to maintain the validity of Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 insofar as the Special Prosecutor is concerned. The Court does not consider the Office of the Special Prosecutor to be constitutionally within the Office of the Ombudsman and is, hence, not entitled to the independence the latter enjoys under the Constitution.Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al.,G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770; unconstitutional; vesting of disciplinary authority in the President over the Deputy Ombudsman; violation of the independence of the Ombudsman. In more concrete terms, we rule that subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive department are subject to the Ombudsmans disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman itself. Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 intruded upon the constitutionally-granted independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. By so doing, the law directly collided not only with the independence that the Constitution guarantees to the Office of the Ombudsman, but inevitably with the principle of checks and balances that the creation of an Ombudsman office seeks to revitalize. What is true for the Ombudsman must equally and necessarily be true for her Deputies who act as agents of the Ombudsman in the performance of their duties. The Ombudsman can hardly be expected to place her complete trust in her subordinate officials who are not as independent as she is, if only because they are subject to pressures and controls external to her Office. This need for complete trust is true in an ideal setting and truer still in a young democracy like the Philippines where graft and corruption is still a major problem for the government. For these reasons, Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770, providing that the President may remove a Deputy Ombudsman, should be declared void. Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al.,G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.Special Prosecutor; structural relationship with the Ombudsman; the Special Prosecutor is by no means an ordinary subordinate but one who effectively and directly aids the Ombudsman in the exercise of his/her duties, which include investigation and prosecution of officials in the Executive Department. Congress recognized the importance of the Special Prosecutor as a necessary adjunct of the Ombudsman, aside from his or her deputies, by making the Office of the Special Prosecutor and organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman and by granting the Ombudsman control and supervision over that office. This power of control and supervision includes vesting the Office of the Ombudsman with the power to assign duties to the Special Prosecutor as he or she may deem fit. Even if the Office of the Special Prosecutor is not expressly made part of the composition of the Office of the Ombudsman, the role it performs as an organic component of that Office militates against a differential treatment between the Ombudsmans Deputies, on one hand, and the Special Prosecutor himself, on the other. What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally true, not only for her Deputies but, also for other lesser officials of that Office who act directly as agents of the Ombudsman herself in the performance of her duties.Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al.,G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.The invaluable help of Roshni V. Balani in the preparation of this post is gratefully acknowledged.

March 2014 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on CivilLawPosted onApril 2, 2014byRose Marie M. King-Dominguez Posted inCivil Law,Philippines - Cases,Philippines - Law Here are select March 2014 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on civil law:CIVIL CODEAction for quieting of title; trial court had no jurisdiction to determine who among the parties have better right over the disputed property which is admittedly still part of the public domain. Having established that the disputed property is public land, the trial court was therefore correct in dismissing the complaint to quiet title for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court had no jurisdiction to determine who among the parties have better right over the disputed property which is admittedly still part of the public domain. As held inDajunos v. Tandayag(G.R. Nos. L-32651-52, 31 August 1971, 40 SCRA 449):x x x The Tarucs action was for quieting of title and necessitated determination of the respective rights of the litigants, both claimants to a free patent title, over a piece of property, admittedly public land. The law, administration, disposition and alienation of public lands with the Director of Lands subject, of course, to the control of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.In sum, the decision rendered in Civil Case No. 1218 on October 28, 1968 is a patent nullity. The lower court did not have power to determine who (the Firmalos or the Tarucs) were entitled to an award of free patent title over that piece of property that yet belonged to the public domain. Neither did it have power to adjudge the Tarucs as entitled to the true equitable ownership thereof, the latters effect being the same: the exclusion of the Firmalos in favor of the Tarucs.Heirs of Pacifico Pocido, et al. v. Arsenia Avila and Emelinda Chua,G.R. No. 199146, March 19, 2014.Action for quieting of title. In an action for quieting of title, the complainant is seeking for an adjudication that a claim of title or interest in property adverse to the claimant is invalid, to free him from the danger of hostile claim, and to remove a cloud upon or quiet title to land where stale or unenforceable claims or demands exist.Heirs of Pacifico Pocido, et al. v. Arsenia Avila and Emelinda Chua,G.R. No. 199146, March 19, 2014.Action for quieting of title; two indispensable requisites. Under Articles 476 and 477 of the Civil Code, the two indispensable requisites in an action to quiet title are: (1) that the plaintiff has a legal or equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) that there is a cloud on his title by reason of any instrument, record, deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding, which must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity.Heirs of Pacifico Pocido, et al. v. Arsenia Avila and Emelinda Chua,G.R. No. 199146, March 19, 2014.Co-ownership; Article 493 of the Civil Code; rights of a co-owner of a certain property; each one of the co-owners with full ownership of their parts can sell their fully owned part. Article 493 of the Code defines the ownership of the co-owner, clearly establishing that each co-owner shall have full ownership of his part and of its fruits and benefits. Pertinent to this case, Article 493 dictates that each one of the parties herein as co-owners with full ownership of their parts can sell their fully owned part. The sale by the petitioners of their parts shall not affect the full ownership by the respondents of the part that belongs to them. Their part which petitioners will sell shall be that which may be apportioned to them in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. With the full ownership of the respondents remaining unaffected by petitioners sale of their parts, the nature of the property, as co-owned, likewise stays. In lieu of the petitioners, their vendees shall be co-owners with the respondents. The text of Article 493 says so.Raul V. Arambulo and Teresita Dela Cruz v. Genaro Nolasco and Jeremy Spencer Nolasco,G.R. No. 189420, March 26, 2014.Co-ownership; Article 494 of the Civil Code; partition. Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership, and that each co-owner may demand at any time partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned.Raul V. Arambulo and Teresita Dela Cruz v. Genaro Nolasco and Jeremy Spencer Nolasco,G.R. No. 189420, March 26, 2014.Co-ownership; Article 498 of the Civil Code; when this may be resorted to. Article 498 of the Civil Code states that whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly distributed. This is resorted to (a) when the right to partition the property is invoked by any of the co-owners but because of the nature of the property, it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision would prejudice the interests of the co-owners, and (b) the co-owners are not in agreement as to who among them shall be allotted or assigned the entire property upon proper reimbursement of the co-owners.Raul V. Arambulo and Teresita Dela Cruz v. Genaro Nolasco and Jeremy Spencer Nolasco,G.R. No. 189420, March 26, 2014.Damages; actual or compensatory damages. Article 2199 of the Civil Code states that [e]xcept as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him a he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages. Actual damages are compensation for an injury that will put the injured party in the position where it was before the injury. They pertain to such injuries or losses that are actually sustained and susceptible of measurement. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, a party is entitled to adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss as is duly proven. Basic is the rule that to recover actual damages, not only must the amount of loss be capable of proof; it must also be actually proven with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or the best evidence obtainable.International Container Terminal Services, Inc. v. Celeste M. Chua,G.R. No. 195031, March 26, 2014.Damages; Attorneys fees; when allowed. Article 2208 of the Civil Code does not prohibit recovery of attorneys fees if there is a stipulation in the contract for payment of the same. Thus, inAsian Construction and Development Corporation v. Cathay Pacific SteelCorporation (CAPASCO), the Court, citingTitan ConstructionCorporation v. Uni-Field Enterprises, Inc., noted that the law allows a party to recover attorneys fees under a written agreement. InBarons Marketing Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that attorneys fees are in the nature of liquidated damages and the stipulation therefor is aptly called a penal clause. It has been said that so long as such stipulation does not contravene law, morals, or public order, it is strictly binding upon defendant. The attorneys fees so provided areawarded in favor of the litigant, not hiscounsel.Onthe other hand, the law also allows parties to a contract tostipulate on liquidated damages to be paid in case of breach. A stipulationon liquidated damages is a penalty clause where the obligor assumes agreater liability in case of breach of an obligation. The obligor is bound topay the stipulated amount without need for proof on the existence and onthe measure of damages caused by the breach. However, even if such attorneys fees are allowed by law, the courts still have the power to reduce the same if it is unreasonable.Mariano Lim v. Security Bank Corporation,G.R. No. 188539, March 12, 2014.Damages; Attorneys fees; when proper. An award of attorneys fees has always been the exception rather than the rule and there must be some compelling legal reason to bring the case within the exception and justify the award. In this case, none of the exceptions applies. Attorneys fees are not awarded every time a party prevails in a suit. The policy of the Court is that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his rights, still, attorneys fees may not be awarded where no sufficient showing of bad faith could be reflected in a partys persistence in a case other than an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause.International Container Terminal Services, Inc. v. Celeste M. Chua,G.R. No. 195031, March 26, 2014.Damages; moral damages. Certainly, an award of moral damages must be anchored on a clear showing that the party claiming the same actually experienced mental anguish, besmirched reputation, sleepless nights, wounded feelings, or similar injury. In the case herein under consideration, the records are bereft of any proof that respondent in fact suffered moral damages as contemplated in the afore-quoted provision of the Civil Code. The ruling of the trial court provides simply that: [Petitioners] outright denial and unjust refusal to heed [respondents] claim for payment of the value of her lost/damaged shipment caus[ed] the latter to suffer serious anxiety, mental anguish and wounded feelings warranting the award of moral damages x x x. The testimony of respondent, on the other hand, merely states that when she failed to recover damages from petitioner, she was saddened, had sleepless nights and anxiety without providing specific details of the suffering she allegedly went through. Since an award of moral damages is predicated on a categorical showing by the claimant that she actually experienced emotional and mental sufferings, it must be disallowed absent any evidence thereon.International Container Terminal Services, Inc. v. Celeste M. Chua,G.R. No. 195031, March 26, 2014.Damages; Nominal damages; when awarded; Network Bank did not violate any of Barics rights.Nominal damages are recoverable where a legal right is technically violated and must be vindicated against an invasion that has produced no actual present loss of any kind or where there has been a breach of contract and no substantial injury or actual damages whatsoever have been or can be shown.Under Article 2221 of the Civil Code, nominal damages may be awarded to a plaintiff whose right has been violated or invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or recognizing that right, not for indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered. Nominal damages are not for indemnification of loss suffered but for the vindication or recognition of a right violated or invaded.Network Bank did not violate any of Barics rights; it was merely a purchaser or transferee of the property. Surely, it is not prohibited from acquiring the property even while the forcible entry case was pending, because as the registered owner of the subject property, Palado may transfer his title at any time and the lease merely follows the property as a lien or encumbrance. Any invasion or violation of Barics rights as lessee was committed solely by Palado, and Network Bank may not be implicated or found guilty unless it actually took part in the commission of illegal acts, which does not appear to be so from the evidence on record. On the contrary, it appears that Barie was ousted through Palados acts even before Network Bank acquired the subject property or came into the picture. Thus, it was error to hold the bank liable for nominal damages.One Network Rural Bank, Inc. v. Danilo G. Baric,G.R. No. 193684, March 5, 2014.Damages; Temperate damages. In the absence of competent proof on the amount of actual damages suffered, a party is entitled to receive temperate damages. Article 2224 of the New Civil Code provides that: Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty. The amount thereof is usually left to the sound discretion of the courts but the same should be reasonable, bearing in mind that temperate damages should be more than nominal but less than compensatory.International Container Terminal Services, Inc. v. Celeste M. Chua,G.R. No. 195031, March 26, 2014.Fraud; concept of; Article 1338 of the Civil Code. According to Article 1338 of the Civil Code, there is fraud when one of the contracting parties, through insidious words or machinations, induces the other to enter into the contract that, without the inducement, he would not have agreed to. Yet, fraud, to vitiate consent, must be the causal (dolo causante), not merely the incidental (dolo incidente), inducement to the making of the contract. InSamson v. Court of Appeals(G.R. No. 108245, November 25, 1994, 238 SCRA 397), causal fraud is defined as a deception employed by one party prior to or simultaneous to the contract in order to secure the consent of the other.Fraud cannot be presumed but must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Whoever alleges fraud affecting a transaction must substantiate his allegation, because a person is always presumed to take ordinary care of his concerns, and private transactions are similarly presumed to have been fair and regular. To be remembered is that mere allegation is definitely not evidence; hence, it must be proved by sufficient evidence.Metropolitan Fabrics, Inc., et al. v. Prosperity Credit Resources, Inc. et al.,G.R. No. 154390, March 17, 2014.Fraud; Article 1390, in relation to Article 1391 of the Civil Code; consent obtained through fraud; action for annulment; prescriptive period. Article 1390, in relation to Article 1391 of the Civil Code, provides that if the consent of the contracting parties was obtained through fraud, the contract is considered voidable and may be annulled within four years from the time of the discovery of the fraud.Metropolitan Fabrics, Inc., et al. v. Prosperity Credit Resources, Inc. et al.,G.R. No. 154390, March 17, 2014.Mortgage; a higher degree of prudence must be exercised by the mortgagee in cases where he does not directly deal with the registered owner of real property. InBank of Commerce v. Spouses San Pablo, Jr.(550 Phil. 805, 821 (2007)), the court declared that a mortgagee has a right to rely in good faith on the certificate of title of the mortgagor of the property offered as security, and in the absence of any sign that might arouse suspicion, the mortgagee has no obligation to undertake further investigation.However, inBank of Commerce v. Spouses San Pablo, Jr. (550 Phil. 805, 821 (2007)), the court also ruled that [i]n cases where the mortgagee does not directly deal with the registered owner of real property, the law requires that a higher degree of prudence be exercised by the mortgagee. Specifically, the court citedAbad v. Sps. Guimba(503 Phil. 321, 331-332 (2005)), where it held,x x x While one who buys from the registered owner does not need to look behind the certificate of title, one who buys from one who is not the registered owner is expected to examine not only the certificate of title but all factual circumstances necessary for [one] to determine if there are any flaws in the title of the transferor, or in [the] capacity to transfer the land.Although the instant case does not involve a sale but only a mortgage, the same rule applies inasmuch as the law itself includes a mortgagee in the term purchaser.Thus, where the mortgagor is not the registered owner of the property but is merely an attorney-in-fact of the same, it is incumbent upon the mortgagee to exercise greater care and a higher degree of prudence in dealing with such mortgagor.Macaria Arguelles and the Heirs of the Deceased Petronio Arguelles v. Malarayat Rural Bank, Inc.,G.R. No. 200468, March 19, 2014.Mortgage; banks are enjoined to exert a higher degree of diligence, care, and prudence than individuals in handling real estate transactions; it cannot rely merely on the certificate of title.InUrsal v. Court of Appeals(509 Phil. 628, 642 (2005)), the court held that where the mortgagee is a bank, it cannot rely merely on the certificate of title offered by the mortgagor in ascertaining the status of mortgaged properties. Since its business is impressed with public interest, the mortgagee-bank is duty-bound to be more cautious even in dealing with registered lands. Indeed, the rule that person dealing with registered lands can rely solely on the certificate of title does not apply to banks. Thus, before approving a loan application, it is a standard operating practice for these institutions to conduct an ocular inspection of the property offered for mortgage and to verify the genuineness of the title to determine the real owners thereof. The apparent purpose of an ocular inspection is to protect the true owner of the property as well as innocent third parties with a right, interest or claim thereon from a usurper who may have acquired a fraudulent certificate of title thereto.Macaria Arguelles and the Heirs of the Deceased Petronio Arguelles v. Malarayat Rural Bank, Inc.,G.R. No. 200468, March 19, 2014.1. Negligence, the Court said in Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court (G.R. No. L-73998, November 14, 1988), is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do, or as Judge Cooley defines it, (t)he failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. In order that a party may be held liable for damages for any injury brought about by the negligence of another, the claimant must prove that the negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of the injury.BJDC Construction, represented by its Manager/Proprieto Janet S. Dela Cruz v. Nena E. Lanuzo, et al.,G.R. No. 161151, March 24, 2014.Negligence; Medical negligence; four elements the plaintiff must prove by competent evidence. An action upon medical negligence whether criminal, civil or administrative calls for the plaintiff to prove by competent evidence each of the following four elements, namely: (a) the duty owed by the physician to the patient, as created by the physician-patient relationship, to act in accordance with the specific norms or standards established by his profession; (b) the breach of the duty by the physicians failing to act in accordance with the applicable standard of care; (3) the causation,i.e., there must be a reasonably close and causal connection between the negligent act or omission and the resulting injury; and (4) the damages suffered by thepatient.Dr. Fernando P. Solidum v. People of the Philippines,G.R. No. 192123, March 10, 2014.Negligence; Medical Negligence; standard of care of the medical profession; standard of care observed by other members of the profession in good standing under similar circumstances. Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance that the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. Reckless imprudence, on the other hand, consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from which material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act.The Court aptly explained inCruz v. Court of Appealsthat: Whether or not a physician has committed an inexcusable lack of precaution in the treatment of his patient is to be determined according to the standard of care observed by other members of the profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or the present state of medical science. In the recent case ofLeonila Garcia-Rueda v. Wilfred L. Pacasio,et. al., this Court stated that in accepting a case, a doctor in effect represents that, having the needed training and skill possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing in the same field, he will employ such training, care and skill in the treatment of his patients. He therefore has a duty to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances. It is in this aspect of medical malpractice that expert testimony is essential to establish not only the standard of care of the profession but also that the physicians conduct in the treatment and care falls below such standard. Further, inasmuch as the causes of the injuries involved in malpractice actions are determinable only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has been recognized that expert testimony is usually necessary to support the conclusion as to causation.Dr. Fernando P. Solidum v. People of the Philippines,G.R. No. 192123, March 10, 2014.Negligence; Medical negligence; standard of care; an objective standard by which the conduct of a physician sued for negligence or malpractice may be measured.In the medical profession, specific norms or standards to protect the patient against unreasonable risk, commonly referred to asstandards of care, set the duty of the physician to act in respect of the patient. Unfortunately, no clear definition of the duty of a particular physician in a particular case exists. Because most medical malpractice cases are highly technical, witnesses with special medical qualifications must provide guidance by giving the knowledge necessary to render a fair and just verdict. As a result, the standard of medical care of aprudent physicianmust be determined from expert testimony in most cases; and in the case of a specialist (like an anesthesiologist), the standard of care by which the specialist is judged is the care and skillcommonly possessed and exercised by similar specialists under similar circumstances. The specialty standard ofcare may be higher than that required of the general practitioner.Dr. Fernando P. Solidum v. People of the Philippines,G.R. No. 192123, March 10, 2014.Negligence, test to determine its existence. The test by which the existence of negligence in a particular case is determined is aptly stated in the leading case of Picart v. Smith (G.R. No. 12219, March 15, 1918).According to this case, the test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows:Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case. Abstract speculation cannot here be of much value but this much can be profitably said: Reasonable men govern their conduct by the circumstances which are before them or known to them. They are not, and are not supposed to be, omniscient of the future. Hence they can be expected to take care only when there is something before them to suggest or warn of danger. Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its consequences.BJDC Construction, represented by its Manager/Proprieto Janet S. Dela Cruz v. Nena E. Lanuzo, et al.,G.R. No. 161151, March 24, 2014.Property; Recovery of possession of real property; three kinds of actions available. InSps. Bonifacio R. Valdez, Jr. et al. vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al.(523 Phil. 39 (2006)), the Court is instructive anent the three kinds of actions available to recover possession of real property, viz: (a)accion interdictal; (b)accion publiciana; and (c)accion reivindicatoria.Accion interdictalcomprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry (detentacion) and unlawful detainer (desahuico) [sic]. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of real property by means of force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The two are distinguished from each other in that in forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the issue is which party has prior de facto possession while in unlawful detainer, possession of the defendant is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court. Both actions must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer. The issue in said cases is the right to physical possession.Accion publicianais the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. In other words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint more than one year had elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendants possession had become illegal, the action will be, not one of the forcible entry or illegal detainer, but anaccion publiciana. On the other hand,accion reivindicatoriais an action to recover ownership also brought in the proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil proceeding.Carmencita Suarez v. Mr. and Mrs. Felix E. Emboy, Jr. and Marilou P. Emboy-Delantar,G.R. No. 187944, March 12, 2014.Res ipsa loquitor; a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience.InJarcia, Jr. v. People,the court has underscored that the doctrine is not a rule of substantive law, but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. The doctrine, when applicable to the facts and circumstances of a given case, is not meant to and does not dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence against the party charged. It merely determines and regulates what shall beprima facieevidence thereof, and helps the plaintiff in proving a breach of the duty. The doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily available.Dr. Fernando P. Solidum v. People of the Philippines,G.R. No. 192123, March 10, 2014.Res ipsa loquitor; applicability in medical negligence cases. The applicability of the doctrine ofres ipsa loquiturin medical negligence cases was significantly and exhaustively explained inRamos v. Court of Appeals, where the Court saidMedical malpractice cases do not escape the application of this doctrine. Thus,res ipsa loquiturhas been applied when the circumstances attendant upon the harm are themselves of such a character as to justify an inference of negligence as the cause of that harm. The application ofresipsa loquiturin medical negligence cases presents a question of law since it is a judicial function to determine whether a certain set of circumstances does, as a matter of law, permit a given inference. Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits to prove that a physician has done a negligent act or that he has deviated from the standard medical procedure, when the doctrine ofres ipsa loquituris availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof of negligence. The reason is that the general rule on the necessity of expert testimony applies only to such matters clearly within the domain of medical science, and not to matters that are within the common knowledge of mankind which may be testified to by anyone familiar with the facts. Ordinarily, only physicians and surgeons of skill and experience are competent to testify as to whether a patient has been treated or operated upon with a reasonable degree of skill and care. However, testimony as to the statements and acts of physicians and surgeons, external appearances, and manifest conditions which are observable by any one may be given by non-expert witnesses. Hence, in cases where theres ipsa loquituris applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the court from its fund of common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care. Where common knowledge and experience teach that a resulting injury would not have occurred to the patient if due care had been exercised, an inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise to an application of the doctrine ofres ipsa loquiturwithout medical evidence, which is ordinarily required to show not only what occurred but how and why it occurred. When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a nexus between the particular act or omission complained of and the injury sustained while under the custody and management of the defendant without need to produce expert medical testimony to establish the standard of care. Resort tores ipsa loquituris allowed because there is no other way, under usual and ordinary conditions, by which the patient can obtain redress for injury suffered by him.Dr. Fernando P. Solidum v. People of the Philippines,G.R. No. 192123, March 10, 2014.Res ipsa loquitur; applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge.It is simply a recognition of the postulate that, as a matter of common knowledge and experience, the very nature of certain types of occurrences may justify an inference of negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrumentality causing the injury in the absence of some explanation by the defendant who is charged with negligence. It is grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human experience and on the basis of such experience or common knowledge, negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself. Hence,res ipsa loquituris applied in conjunction with the doctrine ofcommon knowledge.Dr. Fernando P. Solidum v. People of the Philippines,G.R. No. 192123, March 10, 2014.Res ipsa loquitor.Res ipsa loquituris literally translated as the thing or the transaction speaks for itself. The doctrineres ipsa loquiturmeans that where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, thatthe accident arose from want of care.Dr. Fernando P. Solidum v. People of the Philippines,G.R. No. 192123, March 10, 2014.Res ipsa loquitur. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is based on the theory that the defendant either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and the plaintiff, having no knowledge thereof, is compelled to allege negligence in general terms. In such instance, the plaintiff relies on proof of the happening of the accident alone to establish negligence. The principle, furthermore, provides a means by which a plaintiff can hold liable a defendant who, if innocent, should be able to prove that he exercised due care to prevent the accident complained of from happening. It is, consequently, the defendants responsibility to show that there was no negligence on his part. International Container Terminal Services, Inc. v. Celeste M. Chua,G.R. No. 195031, March 26, 2014.Res ipsa loquitur; concept of; requirements for the doctrine to apply. InTan v. JAM Transit, Inc. (G.R. No. 183198, November 25, 2009), the Court noted thatres ipsa loquituris a Latin phrase that literally means the thing or the transaction speaks for itself. It is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiffs prima facie case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. Where the thing that caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants; and the accident, in the ordinary course of things, would not happen if those who had management or control used proper care, it affords reasonable evidencein the absence of a sufficient, reasonable and logical explanation by defendantthat the accident arose from or was caused by the defendants want of care. This rule is grounded on the superior logic of ordinary human experience, and it is on the basis of such experience or common knowledge that negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself. Hence, the rule is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge.For the doctrine to apply, the following requirements must be shown to exist, namely: (a) the accident is of a kind that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someones negligence; (b) it is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and (c) the possibility of contributing conduct that would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated.BJDC Construction, represented by its Manager/Proprieto Janet S. Dela Cruz v. Nena E. Lanuzo, et al.,G.R. No. 161151, March 24, 2014.Res ipsa loquitor; doctrine does not automatically apply to all cases of medical negligence as to mechanically shift the burden of proof to the defendant.Despite the fact that the scope ofres ipsa loquiturhas been measurably enlarged, it does not automatically apply to all cases of medical negligence as to mechanically shift the burden of proof to the defendant to show that he is not guilty of the ascribed negligence.Res ipsa loquituris not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously applied, depending upon the circumstances of each case. It is generally restricted to situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able to say, as a matter of common knowledge and observation, that the consequences of professional care were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if due care had been exercised. A distinction must be made between the failure to secure results, and the occurrence of something more unusual and not ordinarily found if the service or treatment rendered followed the usual procedure of those skilled in that particular practice. It must be conceded that the doctrine ofres ipsa loquiturcan have no application in a suit against a physician or surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment. The physician or surgeon is not required at his peril to explain why any particular diagnosis was not correct, or why any particular scientific treatment did not produce the desired result. Thus,res ipsa loquituris not available in a malpractice suit if the only showing is that the desired result of an operation or treatment was not accomplished. The real question, therefore, is whether or not in the process of the operation any extraordinary incident or unusual event outside of the routine performance occurred which is beyond the regular scope of customary professional activity in such operations, which, if unexplained would themselves reasonably speak to the average man as the negligent cause or causes of the untoward consequence. If there was such extraneous intervention, the doctrine ofres ipsa loquiturmay be utilized and the defendant is calledupon to explain the matter, by evidence of exculpation, if he could.Dr. Fernando P. Solidum v. People of the Philippines,G.R. No. 192123, March 10, 2014.Res ipsa loquitor; essential requisites.In order to allow resort to the doctrine, therefore, the following essential requisites must first be satisfied, to wit: (1) the accident was of a kind that does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency that caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution of the person injured.Dr. Fernando P. Solidum v. People of the Philippines,G.R. No. 192123, March 10, 2014.Res ipsa loquitur; when may be invoked. The doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily available. Here, there was no evidence as to how or why the fire in the container yard of petitioner started; hence, it was up to petitioner to satisfactorily prove that it exercised the diligence required to prevent the fire from happening.International Container Terminal Services, Inc. v. Celeste M. Chua,G.R. No. 195031, March 26, 2014.Suretyship; Continuing suretyship; nature of; example of.A Continuing Suretyship, which the Court described inSaludo, Jr. v. Security Bank Corporationas follows:The essence of a continuing surety has been highlighted in the case ofTotanes v. China Banking Corporationin this wise: Comprehensive or continuing surety agreements are, in fact, quite commonplace in present day financial and commercial practice. A bank or financing companywhich anticipates entering into a series of credit transactions with a particular company, normallyrequires the projected principal debtor to execute acontinuing surety agreement along with its sureties. Byexecuting such an agreement, the principal places itselfin a position to enter into the projected series oftransactions with its creditor; with such suretyshipagreement, there would be no need to execute a separatesurety contract or bond for each financing or creditaccommodation extended to the principal debtor.The terms of the Continuing Suretyship executed by petitioner are very clear. It states that petitioner, as surety, shall, without need for any notice, demand or any other act or deed, immediately become liable and shall pay all credit accommodationsextended by the Bank to the Debtor, including increases, renewals, roll-overs, extensions, restructurings, amendments or novations thereof, as well as (i) all obligations of theDebtor presently or hereafter owing to the Bank, as appears in theaccounts, books and records of the Bank, whether direct or indirect,and (ii) any and all expenses which the Bank may incur in enforcing any of its rights, powers and remedies under the Credit Instruments as defined hereinbelow.Mariano Lim v. Security Bank Corporation,G.R. No. 188539, March 12, 2014.Suretyship. A contract of suretyship is an agreement whereby a party, called the surety, guarantees the performance by another party, called the principal or obligor, of an obligation or undertaking in favor of another party, called the obligee. Although the contract of a surety is secondary only to a valid principal obligation, the surety becomes liable for the debt or duty of another although it possesses no direct or personal interest over the obligations nor does it receive any benefit therefrom. This was explained in the case ofStronghold Insurance Company, Inc. v. Republic-Asahi Glass Corporation, where it was written: The suretys obligation is not an original and direct one for the performance of his own act, but merely accessory or collateral to the obligation contracted by the principal. Nevertheless,although the contract of a suretyis in essence secondary only to a valid principalobligation, his liability to the creditor or promisee of theprincipal is said to be direct, primary and absolute; inother words, he is directly and equally bound with theprincipal.Thus, suretyship arises upon the solidary binding of a person deemed the surety with the principal debtor for the purpose of fulfilling an obligation.A surety is considered in law as being the same party asthe debtor in relation to whatever is adjudged touching the obligationof the latter, and their liabilities are interwoven as to be inseparable.Mariano Lim v. Security Bank Corporation,G.R. No. 188539, March 12, 2014.SPECIAL LAWSComprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL); Section 65 of R.A. 6657; DAR is empowered to authorize, under certain conditions, the reclassification or conversion of agricultural lands. Under Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657, the DAR is empowered to authorize, under certain conditions, the reclassification or conversion of agricultural lands. Pursuant to this authority and in the exercise of its rulemaking power under Section 49 of R.A. No. 6657, the DAR issued Administrative Order No. 12, series of 1994 (DAR A.O. 12-94) (the then prevailing administrative order), providing the rules and procedure governing agricultural land conversion. Item VII of DAR A.O. 12-94 enumerates the documentary requirements for approval of an application for landconversion.35Notably, Item VI-E provides that no application for conversion shall be given due course if: (1) the DAR has issued a Notice of Acquisition under the compulsory acquisition process; (2) a Voluntary Offer to Sell covering the subject property has been received by the DAR; or (3) there is already a perfected agreement between the landowner and the beneficiaries under Voluntary Land Transfer.Heirs of Teresita Montoya, et al. v. National Housing Authority, et al.,G.R. No. 181055, March 19, 2014.Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL); Section 6 of R.A. 6657; retention limits. Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657 specifically governs retention limits. Under its last paragraph, any sale, disposition, lease, management, contract or transfer of possession of private lands executed by the original landowner in violation of [R.A. No. 6657] is considered null and void. A plain reading of the last paragraph appears to imply that the CARL absolutely prohibits sales or dispositions of private agricultural lands. The interpretation or construction of this prohibitory clause, however, should be made within the context of Section 6, following the basic rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. Notably, nothing in this paragraph, when read with the entire section, discloses any legislative intention to absolutely prohibit the sale or other transfer agreements of private agricultural lands after the effectivity of the Act.In other words, therefore, the sale, disposition, etc. of private lands that Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657 contextually prohibits and considers as null and void are those which the original owner executes in violation of this provision, i.e., sales or dispositions executed with the intention of circumventing the retention limits set by R.A. No. 6657. Consistent with this interpretation, the proscription in Section 6 on sales or dispositions of private agricultural lands does not apply to those that do not violate or were not intended to circumvent the CARLs retention limits.Heirs of Teresita Montoya, et al. v. National Housing Authority, et al.,G.R. No. 181055, March 19, 2014.Emancipation of Tenants; P.D. 27; CLT; legal effects of issuance; tenant-farmer does not acquire full ownership of the covered landholding simply by the issuance of a CLT. A CLT is a document that the government issues to a tenant-farmer of an agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and corn production placed under the coverage of the governments OLT program pursuant to P.D. No. 27. It serves as the tenant-farmers (grantee of the certificate) proof of inchoate right over the land covered thereby.A CLT does not automatically grant a tenant-farmer absolute ownership of the covered landholding. Under PD No. 27, land transfer is effected in two stages: (1) issuance of the CLT to the tenant-farmer in recognition that said person is a deemed owner; and (2) issuance of an Emancipation Patent (EP) as proof of full ownership upon the tenant-farmers full payment of the annual amortizations or lease rentals.As a preliminary step, therefore, the issuance of a CLT merely evinces that the grantee thereof is qualified to avail of the statutory mechanism for the acquisition of ownership of the land tilled by him, as provided under P.D. No. 27. The CLT is not a muniment of title that vests in the tenant-farmer absolute ownership of his tillage. It is only after compliance with the conditions which entitle the tenant-farmer to an EP that the tenant-farmer acquires the vested right of absolute ownership in the landholding. Stated otherwise, the tenant-farmer does not acquire full ownership of the covered landholding simply by the issuance of a CLT. The tenant-farmer must first comply with the prescribed conditions and procedures for acquiring full ownership but until then, the title remains with the landowner.Heirs of Teresita Montoya, et al. v. National Housing Authority, et al.,G.R. No. 181055, March 19, 2014.Land registration; Classification of land; evidence of a positive act from the government reclassifying the lot as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain. Accordingly, jurisprudence has required that an applicant for registration of title acquired through a public land grant must presentincontrovertible evidencethat the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable by establishing the existence of apositive act of the government,such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.Sps. Antonio Fortuna and Erlinda Fortuna v. Republic of the Philippines,G.R. No. 173423, March 5, 2014.Land registration; Classification of land; Executive prerogative.Under Section 6 of the Public Land Act, the classification and the reclassification of public lands are the prerogative of the Executive Department. The President, through a presidential proclamation or executive order, can classify or reclassify a land to be included or excluded from the public domain. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources Secretary is likewise empowered by law to approve a land classification and declare such land as alienable and disposable.Sps. Antonio Fortuna and Erlinda Fortuna v. Republic of the Philippines,G.R. No. 173423, March 5, 2014.Land registration; it is essential for any applicant for registration of title to land derived through a public grant to establish foremost the alienable and disposable nature of the land. The Constitution declares that all lands of the public domain are owned by the State. Of the four classes of public land,i.e., agricultural lands, forest or timber lands, mineral lands, and national parks, only agricultural lands may be alienated. Public land that has not been classified as alienable agricultural land remains part of the inalienable public domain. Thus,it is essential for any applicant for registration of title toland derived through a public grant to establish foremost the alienableand disposable nature of the land. The Public Land Act provisions on the grant and disposition of alienable public lands, specifically, Sections 11 and 48(b), will find application only from the time that a public land has been classified as agricultural and declared as alienable and disposable.Sps. Antonio Fortuna and Erlinda Fortuna v. Republic of the Philippines,G.R. No. 173423, March 5, 2014.Land registration; Judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title; cut-off date for applications. As mentioned, the Public Land Act is the law that governs the grant and disposition of alienable agricultural lands. Under Section 11 of the PLA, alienable lands of the public domain may be disposed of, among others, byjudicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title. This mode of acquisition of title is governed by Section 48(b) of the PLA, theoriginal versionof which states:Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:x x x x(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, except as against the Government,since July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. [emphasis supplied]On June 22, 1957, the cut-off date of July 26, 1894 was replaced by a 30-year period of possession under RA No. 1942. Section 48(b) of the PLA, as amended by RA No. 1942, read:(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,for at least thirty yearsimmediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure.On January 25, 1977, PD No. 1073 replaced the 30-year period of possession by requiring possession since June 12, 1945. Section 4 of PD No. 1073 reads:SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,since June 12, 1945.Under the P.D. No. 1073 amendment, possession of at least32 years from 1945 up to its enactment in 1977 is required. This effectively impairs the vested rights of applicants who had complied with the 30-year possession required under the RA No. 1942 amendment, but whose possession commenced only after the cut-off date of June 12, 1945 was established by the PD No. 1073 amendment. To remedy this, the Court ruled inAbejaron v. Nabasathat Filipino citizens who by themselves or their predecessors-in-interest have been,prior to the effectivity of P.D. 1073on January 25, 1977, in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under abona fideclaim of acquisition of ownership,for at least 30 years, or atleast since January 24, 1947may apply for judicial confirmation of their imperfect or incomplete title under Sec. 48(b) of the [PLA].January 24,1947 was considered as the cut off date as this was exactly 30 yearscounted backward from January 25, 1977 the effectivity date of PDNo. 1073.It appears, however, thatJanuary 25, 1977 was the date PD No. 1073 wasenacted;based on the certification from the National PrintingOffice,PD No. 1073 waspublishedin Vol. 73, No. 19 of the Official Gazette, months later than its enactment or onMay 9, 1977.Thisuncontroverted fact materially affects the cut-off date for applications forjudicial confirmation of incomplete title under Section 48(b) of the PLA.Although Section 6 of PD No. 1073 states that [the] Decree shalltake effect upon its promulgation, the Court has declared inTaada, et al.v. Hon. Tuvera, etc., et al.that the publication of laws is an indispensablerequirement for its effectivity. [A]ll statutes, including those of localapplication and private laws, shall be published as a condition for theireffectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a differenteffectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Accordingly, Section 6 of PDNo. 1073 should be understood to mean that the decree took effect onlyupon its publication, or on May 9, 1977. This, therefore, movesthe cut-off date for applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under Section 48(b) of the PLA to May 8, 1947.In otherwords,applicants must prove that they have been in open, continuous,exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands ofthe public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,for at least 30 years, or at least since May 8, 1947.Sps. Antonio Fortuna and Erlinda Fortuna v. Republic of the Philippines,G.R. No. 173423, March 5, 2014.Land registration; Possession; as a requirement for the application for registration of title.Notably, Section 48(b) of the PLA speaks of possessionandoccupation. Since these words are separated by the conjunctionand, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the wordoccupation, it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the wordoccupationserves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Nothing in Tax Declaration No. 8366 shows that Pastora exercised acts of possession and occupation such as cultivation of or fencing off the land. Indeed, the lot was described as cogonal.Sps. Antonio Fortuna and Erlinda Fortuna v. Republic of the Philippines,G.R. No. 173423, March 5, 2014.Public Land Act; Sec 48(b), as amended by P.D. 1073; requirements for judicial confirmation of title.The requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect title are found in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, as follows:Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:x x x x(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.Republic of the Philippines represented by Aklan National Colleges of Fisheries (ANCF) and Dr. Elenita R. Adrade, in her capacity as ANCF Superintendent v. Heirs of Maxima Lachica Sin, namely: Salvacion L. Sin, Rosario S. Enriquez, Francisco L. Sin, Maria S. Yuchintat, Manuel L. Sin, Jaime Cardinal Sin, Ramon L. Sin, and Ceferina S. Vita,G.R. No. 157485, March 26, 2014.Regalian Doctrine; all lands of the public domain belong to the State and that lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. As this Court held in the fairly recent case of Valiao v. Republic (G.R. No. 170757, November 28, 2011,): Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or disposable to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Property of the public domain is beyond the commerce of man and not susceptible of private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.Republic of the Philippines represented by Aklan National Colleges of Fisheries (ANCF) and Dr. Elenita R. Adrade, in her capacity as ANCF Superintendent v. Heirs of Maxima Lachica Sin, namely: Salvacion L. Sin, Rosario S. Enriquez, Francisco L. Sin, Maria S. Yuchintat, Manuel L. Sin, Jaime Cardinal Sin, Ramon L. Sin, and Ceferina S. Vita,G.R. No. 157485, March 26, 2014.Public Land Act; two requisites for judicial confirmation of title.The two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.Republic of the Philippines represented by Aklan National Colleges of Fisheries (ANCF) and Dr. Elenita R. Adrade, in her capacity as ANCF Superintendent v. Heirs of Maxima Lachica Sin, namely: Salvacion L. Sin, Rosario S. Enriquez, Francisco L. Sin, Maria S. Yuchintat, Manuel L. Sin, Jaime Cardinal Sin, Ramon L. Sin, and Ceferina S. Vita,G.R. No. 157485, March 26, 2014.Regalian Doctrine; failure of Republic to show competent evidence that the subject land was declared a timberland before its formal classification as such in 1960 does not lead to the presumption that said land was alienable and disposable prior to said date. Accordingly, in the case at bar, the failure of petitioner Republic to show competent evidence that the subject land was declared a timberland before its formal classification as such in 1960 does not lead to the presumption that said land was alienable and disposable prior to said date. On the contrary, the presumption is that unclassified lands are inalienable public lands. It is therefore the respondents which have the burden to identify a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. Since respondents failed to do so, the alleged possession by them and by their predecessors-in-interest is inconsequential and could never ripen into ownership.Republic of the Philippines represented by Aklan National Colleges of Fisheries (ANCF) and Dr. Elenita R. Adrade, in her capacity as ANCF Superintendent v. Heirs of Maxima Lachica Sin, namely: Salvacion L. Sin, Rosario S. Enriquez, Francisco L. Sin, Maria S. Yuchintat, Manuel L. Sin, Jaime Cardinal Sin, Ramon L. Sin, and Ceferina S. Vita,G.R. No. 157485, March 26, 2014.(Rose thanksAnna Katerina Rodriguez for assisting in the preparation of this post.)Changing Rules on the Party ListSystemPosted onMay 1, 2013byVicente D. Gerochi IV Posted inConstitutional Law,Philippines - Cases,Philippines - Law Much like a swinging pendulum, the decision of the Supreme Court on which parties compose the party list system swings from one side to the other. Previously, the Supreme Court limited the party list system to representatives of marginalized and underprivileged sectors. InAtong Paglaum v. COMELEC(G.R. Nos. 203766, et al., April 2, 2013), the latest in the series of party list cases, the pendulum now points to the opposite side.The New RulingAtong Paglauminvolved 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by 52 party-list groups against COMELEC for disqualifying them from participating in the May 13, 2013 party-list elections. One of the main reasons for the disqualification was their failure to represent the marginalized and underrepresented.Two issues were presented:(1) Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the petitioners from participating in the May 2013 elections; and(2) Whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down inAng Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC(ABB) andBANAT v. COMELEC(BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming May 2013 elections.The Supreme Court ruled that COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion because it merely followed the rulings laid down in ABB and BANAT. However, the Court decided to abandon these rulings and adopted new parameters for the upcoming elections; thus, it remanded the case to COMELEC so the latter can determine the status of the petitioners based on the following new guidelines:1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector.3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in partylist elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and underrepresented or lacking in well-defined political constituencies. It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are marginalized and underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack well-defined political constituencies include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack well-defined political constituencies must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and underrepresented, or that represent those who lack well-defined political constituencies, either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must bebona-fidemembers of such parties or organizations.6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.It is clear from the foregoing that a new rule has been set: not all parties in the party-list system have to represent a sector that is marginalized and underrepresented.According to the Supreme Court, the framers of the Constitution never intended the party-list system to be reserved for sectoral parties. The latter were only part of the party-list system not the entirety of it. There were two more groups composing the system national and regional parties. This is evident from the phrasing of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, which states that:The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districtsand those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional,andsectoral parties or organizations.(emphasis supplied)National and regional parties are different from sectoral parties such that the former need not organize along sectoral lines and represent a particular sector. Hence, it is not necessary for these parties to be representative of the marginalized and underrepresented. In fact, Republic Act No. 7941, the enabling law of the party-list elections under the Constitution, does not require these parties to fall under this criterion. The Supreme Court emphasized that the phrase marginalized and underrepresented appeared only once in R.A. No. 7941, particularly in theDeclaration of Policy. The section provides:The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging tomarginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituenciesbut who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provided the simplest scheme possible.The oft-quoted phrase neither appeared in the specific implementing provisions of R.A. No. 7941 nor did it require sectors, organizations, or parties to fall under the criterion as well. In this regard, how then should the broad policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 be harmonized with its specific implementing provisions, bearing in mind the applicable provisions of the 1987 Constitution on the matter?The Supreme Court answered in this wise:The phrase marginalized and underrepresentedshouldrefer only to the sectors in Section 5 that are,by their nature, economically marginalized and underrepresented. These sectors are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other similar sectors.For these sectors, a majority of the members of the sectoral party must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented.The nominees of the sectoral party either must belong to the sector, or must have a track record of advocacy for the sector representedThe recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of professionals, the elderly, women and the youth, need not be marginalized and underrepresented will allow small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack well-defined political constituencies a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. On the other hand, limiting to the marginalized and underrepresented thesectoralparties for labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society, will give the marginalized and underrepresented an opportunity to likewise win seats in the House of Representatives.This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will give rise to a multi-party system where those marginalized and underrepresented,both in economic and ideological status, will have the opportunity to send their own members to the House of Representatives. This interpretation will also make the party-list system honest and transparent, eliminating the need for relatively well-off party-list representatives to masquerade as wallowing in poverty, destitution and infirmity, even as they attend sessions in Congress riding in SUVs.Based on the Courts ratiocination, only sectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society must comply with the criterion of representing the marginalized and underrepresented. For national, regional, and sectoral parties of professionals, the elderly, women and the youth, it is sufficient that they consist of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens.Consequently, since political parties are essentially national and regional parties, the Supreme Court categorically stated that they may participate in the party-list elections. The rules for their participation are found under guideline number three.Evolution of Party-List CasesABB and BANAT were the prevailing jurisprudence prior toAtong Paglaum.In ABB, the Supreme Court recognized that even major political parties may join the party list elections. However, the Supreme Court went on saying that although they may participate, it does not mean that any political party or group for that matter may do so. It is essential for these parties to be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.According to the Supreme Court, the purpose of the party-list system is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only by giving more law to those who have less in life, but more so by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. Essentially, the goal is to give voice to the voiceless to enable Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented to become members of Congress.Hence, only parties representing the marginalized and underrepresented may join the party-list elections. The Supreme Court stressed that the party-list system cannot be exclusive to marginalized and underrepresented because if the rich and overrepresented can participate, it would desecrate the spirit of the party-list system.In BANAT where the Supreme Court again had the opportunity to deal with the matter, it categorically declared, by a vote of 8-7, that major political parties are barred from participating either directly or indirectly from the party-list elections.Clearly, the doctrine inAtong Paglaumis in stark contrast with the former interpretation of the party-list system. The Supreme Courts reasoning in both decisions al