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tionary forces. It has rich revolutionary experienceand all-round strength gained from more than 40

years of people's war for fulfilling the political re-quirements for people's war.

Third, the people's army under the leadership ofthe CPP has the correct strategy and tactics set forthby the Party for advancing the people's war. The Red

commanders and fighters have high morale and aredetermined to inflict blows on the enemy and carryout the strategic plan.

O

n the occasion of the 41st founding anniversa-

ry of the New People's Army (NPA), we salute

the Red commanders and fighters and pay ourhighest respects to our revolutionary martyrs and he-

roes. We congratulate the rank and file for the victo-ries won in the past year and urge them on to garnerfurther victories in the revolutionary struggle for na-tional liberation and democracy.

Since we announced our strategic plan to advancefrom the stage of strategic defensive to that of stra-tegic stalemate in the protracted people's war, our

Party cadres and members, Red commandersand fighters, mass activists, allies and thebroad masses of the people have been

enthusiastically discussing the basis,political requirements and strategyand tactics for the advance. Why andhow shall we succeed?

First, the chronic crisis conditions

of the world capitalist system andthose of the domestic ruling systemserve as the basis for our strategic

plan and its implementation in thenext five years. They continue to wors-en and are increas-

ingly favorableconditions for ad-vancing the people'swar.

Second, the CPP

has maintained thecorrect ideological,political and organi-

zational line and ef-fectively leads thepeople and the revolu-

Pahayagan ng Partido Komunista ng PilipinasPinapatnubayan ng Marxismo-Leninismo-MaoismoANG

Special IssueMarch 29, 2010

www.philippinerevolution.net

Advance from strategic defensiveto strategic stalemateMessage to the New People's Army

from the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Philippines

March 29, 2010

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The world capitalist system hasbeen shaken from base to raft-

ers by one serious economic and fi-nancial crisis after another sincethe mid-1970s. The policy shiftfrom Keynesianism to neoliberalism

has merely deepened and aggravat-ed the recurrent crisis.

The full restoration of capital-ism in several revisionist-ruled

countries has been touted by themonopoly bourgeoisie as proof thatthe socialist cause is hopeless and

that the world capitalist system isstronger than ever before. But infact, the increase of industrial cap-italist countries has made the

world more cramped for capitalismand has aggravated the crisis ofthe world capitalist system.

The economic and financial cri-sis has become extremely destruc-tive in the imperialist countriesand more so in the less developed

and underdeveloped countries. It ispushing the imperialist powers tobecome more plunderous, more re-pressive and more aggressive than

ever before. The crisis is generating

I. Crisis conditions in the world capitalist system

Ang Bayan is published fortnightly

by the Central Committee of the

Communist Party of the Philippines

Ang Bayan is published in Pilipino,

Bisaya, Iloko, Hiligaynon, Waray and

English editions.

It is available for downloading at

the Philippine Revolution Web Central

located at:

www.philippinerevolution.org.

Ang Bayan welcomes contributions

in the form of articles and news.

Readers are likewise enjoined to send

in their comments and suggestions for

the betterment of our publication. You

can reach us by email at:

[email protected]

Vol. XLI March 29, 2010

ANG

2 ANG BAYAN March 29, 2010

conditions similar to those thatbrought about the two world warsof the 20th century, with the dif-ference that there is far higher po-

tential for peoples to wage revolu-tion, nations to fight for liberation

and non-imperialist countries toassert independence.

The class struggle between themonopoly bourgeoisie and the pro-letariat is surfacing in

the imperialist coun-tries. The imperialistpowers have become

frenzied in their compe-tition for economic ter-ritory and for spheres ofinfluence. The inter-

imperialist contradictionsare becoming more intenseand more violent.

However, the imper-

ialist powers are stillavoiding direct violentclashes among themselves

and are directing their violence to-wards oppressed peoples in theneocolonial and underdevelopedcountries. Even as China has be-

come the main US global partner incarrying out the US policy of neo-liberal globalization, the bank-ruptcy of this policy is pressing

China to secure its own markets;sources of fuel and other raw mate-rials; and fields of investments.

This tends to upset the balance offorces among the imperialist pow-ers.

The ongoing economic and fi-

nancial crisis of the US and theworld capitalist system is not be-ing solved as the imperialist pow-ers stick to their neoliberal dogma.

The bailout money from public cof-fers is being used merely to im-prove the balance sheets of the big

banks and corporations in the mil-itary-industrial complex instead ofreviving production and employ-ment. Thus, the crisis of global

capitalism is protracting and deep-ening.

Having become a big debtor,the US is vulnerable to efforts of

China to adopt economic, tradeand finance policies serving its na-

tional interest. Of long term impor-tance to the Philippines are ASE-AN-China economic relations as adeparture from the sole domi-nance of US imperialism in East

Asia. The Shanghai CooperationOrganization can be a counter-weight to US hegemonism in

the whole of Asia.The US continues to

be sucked in by thequagmires made by its

wars of aggression in Iraqand Afghanistan. Its mili-

tary interventions in theMiddle East, Africa, Cen-

tral Asia and South Asiaare adversely affecting

its overall dominance. Certain

countries have been asserting theirnational independence in EastAsia, Latin America and Africa.

The people continue to wage

armed resistance against the USand its puppets. In other countrieslike India, the Philippines, PeruTurkey and Colombia, the people

persevere in armed struggle for na-tional liberation and democracyRevolutionary parties of the prole-

tariat are waging or preparing towage people's war in a growingnumber of countries in Asia, Africaand Latin America.

The social and political turmoiand the rise of revolutionary armedstruggles in the world capitalistsystem will favor the advance of

the new democratic revolution inthe Philippines. The high propensi-ty of the US and other imperialist

powers to unleash wars of aggres-sion and state terrorism againstthe people drive the people to en-gage in revolutionary war.

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II. Crisis conditions in the domestic ruling system

3ANG BAYAN March 29, 2010

The Arroyo regime has been ex-tremely reactionary and obscur-

antist in misrepresenting the char-acter of the ruling system in thePhilippines. It has brought upon

the people the crushing weight of

foreign monopoly capitalism, do-mestic feudalism and bureaucratcapitalism under such US-dictated

policies as neoliberal globaliza-tion and global war on terror.

And yet the regime has harpedon turning the Philippines into a

first world country and perverse-ly puts the blame on the people'sresistance to oppression and ex-

ploitation as the cause of underde-

velopment and poverty. And it isusing such a big lie as the ration-ale for seeking to destroy or reduce

the revolutionary movement to in-consequentiality through brutalcampaigns of military suppressionsince 2001.

Oplan Bantay Laya (OBL) hasutterly failed in all its counterrev-olutionary objectives. The New

People's Army has successfullylaunched tactical offensives na-

tionwide, thus belying the regime'spsywar claims and demonstrating

the growing strength of the armedrevolutionary movement.

The people dismiss the psywar

claims of the reactionary militaryabout so many NPA camps over-

run, NPA mass surrenders, so-cial integration of rebel returnees

and the like. Abductions, tortureand extrajudicial killings of socialactivists and ordinary people arepassed off as legitimate actions

against the enemies of the stateand the perpetrators rewarded andcited as heroes.

The chronic crisis of the semi-

colonial and semifeudal ruling sys-tem in the Philippines will persistand continue to worsen. Nothing in

sight indicates that a new adminis-tration would arise from the cur-rent presidential elections to makethe Philippines truly independent

and take the path of industrial de-velopment through land reform andnational industrialization. Those in

power at the highest level tend tomonopolize bureaucrat looting andincrease their take by further ex-ploiting and oppressing the people,

especially the toiling masses.The abject semicolonial agrari-

an character of the Philippines pro-vides the conditions for the devel-

opment of people's war. The ab-

sence of genuine thoroughgoingland reform guarantees that the

peasant masses follow the leader-ship of the Communist Party of thePhilippines in carrying out agrarianrevolution and participating in the

people's war.The chronic socioeconomic cri-

sis of the ruling system will gener-ate an unprecedentedly worse

political crisis enough to rend-er the ruling classes of bigcompradors and landlords

incapable of ruling in theold way. Factions of theruling classes have be-come more violent

against each otheras spoils of

political power are reduced as a re-

sult of the worsening crisis.As exposed by the Ampatuan

massacre, the reactionary factions

can use parts of the military, policeand paramilitary forces as their pri-

vate armed groups and build theirown undisguised private armies by

taking military supplies from thearmories of the state. The rampan-cy of private armies has been gen-

erated by the US-Arroyo policy ofstate terrorism against the people.

The current presidential elec-tions will not muffle but will inten-

sify the contradictions among thereactionaries. The periodic elec-

tions for officials of the reactionarygovernment have served to ensure

the dominance of the politicianswho are pro-imperialist and arerepresentatives of the big com-

pradors and landlords and havebeen a process for excluding therepresentatives of the working peo-ple and for redistributing and ro-

tating power among the politicadynasties and factions.

But the current presidentia

elections are becoming the gate-way to further crisis of the systemand further violence among the re-actionaries. The competing politi-

cal factions are spending moreheavily than ever before on theelectoral campaign. The winnerswill try to recoup and profit from

their government positions. Thelosers will become bitter with dis-appointment.

Whichever reactionary faction

captures the presidency in May wilcontinue the US-dictated policy ofstate terrorism against the people

and the revolutionary forces. Notone among the four major presiden-tial candidates is expressing a de-termination to carry out peace ne-

gotiations to address the roots ofthe armed conflict through social,economic and political reforms.

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The No. 1 political requirementfor the new democratic revolu-

tion in the Philippines and for theadvance from the strategic defen-

sive to the strategic stalemate inthe protracted people's war is therevolutionary political leadership

of the Communist Party of the Phil-ippines. The Party has laid out thegeneral line of new democratic rev-olution against the semicolonial

and semifeudal ruling system.Under the guidance of Marxism-

Leninism-Maoism, the Party hasaccumulated experience and

achievements in leading the newdemocratic revolution. By carryingout the Second Great RectificationMovement from 1992 to 1998, it

has recovered the mass base it pre-viously lost through grave errors ofLeft and Right opportunism in

the 1980s and has revitalized thearmed revolutionary movementsince the 1990s.

The key task of the Party in the

next five years is to recruit at least200,000 Party members in order tostrengthen the revolutionary lead-

The resistance of the reactionaries, especially thepro-imperialist militarists and clerico-fascists, to seri-ous peace negotiations is a good thing. It serves to

cast away false illusions about peace negotiations andto drive the revolutionary forces further on to thegreat task of waging people's war.

The worst among the reactionaries and their pseu-

do-progressive followers, including the renegades ex-

posed by the Second Great Rectification Movement,have long claimed that the people and forces in thenew democratic revolution have been undercut and

debilitated by the unarmed people's uprisings in 1986and 2001 and the succession of pseudo-democraticpost-Marcos regimes.

The detractors of the new democratic revolutionthrough protracted people's war obscure the fact thatthe revolutionary forces have contributed greatly tothe success of the unarmed people's uprisings and

that the NPA has not only preserved but has also ex-

panded its revolutionary armed strength to stand out

in Philippine history as the largest ever revolutionaryarmy of the people.

Oplan Bantay Laya I and II have failed to suppress

the armed revolutionary movement. The reactionariesunwittingly admit the significant strength of the peo-ple's army every time they declare that it remains thebiggest threat to the ruling system. They merely make

fools of themselves by endlessly repeating the lie that

the NPA had 25,000 fighters in the mid-1980s and isnow reduced to a few thousands.

From week to week, from month to month and

from year to year, the NPA has demonstrated its capa-bility to wipe out enemy units and will continue to doso under the policy and strategic plan of advancing

from the stage of strategic defensive to that of thestrategic stalemate. The NPA is bound to grow instrength ever more rapidly by continuing to apply thespecific line of extensive and intensive guerrilla war-

fare on the basis of an ever expanding and deepening

mass base.

III. Political requirements of people's warership and core of the revolution-ary mass movement. The Partymembership is an adequate basefor reaching this goal within two

years under the policy of expand-ing the Party membership boldlywithout letting in a single undesir-

able. The Party must recruit andswear in as Party candidate-mem-bers the activists in the mass or-ganizations who accept the Consti-

tution and Program of the Party.Candidate-members of worker

and peasant origin become fullmembers within six months and

those of petty-bourgeois origin,within one year. During the periodof candidature, the concerned Par-ty organ or unit must verify the

good character and militancy ofthe candidate members in the massmovement and must provide to

them the basic Party education. Allleading Party organs and unitsmust work fast to elevate to fullmembership both the backlog and

the new crop of Party candidate-members.

There should be no unnecessary

delays for Party candidate-mem-bers to become full members. Thedelays in elevating someone from

candidature to full membership areoften caused by negligence andlack of concern for the desire ofcandidate members to become ful

members. It suffices that the can-didate-member gets the basic Party

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education and proves serious incarrying out his/her assigned tasksin the Party unit and mass organi-

zation.To be able to build the Party

rapidly, we must accelerate thebuilding of the mass organizations

for peasants, workers, youth, wom-

en, children, cultural activists andother sectors. It suffices at thestart for the applicants/recruits to

become members by accepting theprogram and constitution of themass organization. Without a

growing mass movement fromwhich it can recruit candidate-members, the Party cannot expandand perform the task of arousing,

organizing and mobilizing a still

greater number of people. Relativeto the strategic task of advancing

from the strategic defensive to thestrategic stalemate, both our Partyorganization and organized massbase are small. But they are more

than adequate for us to aim for thelevel of strength necessary forreaching the threshold of the stra-tegic stalemate in less than five

years if we sum up well the causesof the slow growth of the Party and

the organized mass base and if weset the tasks for maximizing ourstrength and overcoming errorsand weaknesses.

The expansion of the Party or-

ganization and organized massbase in both urban and rural areascan run ahead of the expansion ofthe people's army. The Party and

the organized mass base can growin all congressional districts of thereactionary state. Wherever they

exist, their membership must beincreased. Subsequently, some ofthe Party members and mass activ-ists can be redeployed from time to

time in order to cover areas wherethe Party and mass organizationsdo not yet exist and are too small.

In the next five years, Party

branches must be built in at least20,000 villages and Party cadres

Under the leadership of the

Party, the organs of political powercan form and administer the peo-ple's militia and barrio self-defense

corps for the purpose of internasecurity and police work. The massorganizations can also form andadminister their own self-defense

units. The members of the people'smilitia and barrio self-defensecorps should run into tens of thou-

sands, with every village having amilitia platoon and a self-defensecorps platoon. The self-defenseunits should run into hundreds of

thousands, with every mass organ-ization in every village having aself-defense platoon.

The NPA must put its units

through distinct periods of politi-co-military training, combat, masswork and production. It must pro-vide politico-military training to

its combat units as well as to in-structors for the people's militiaand the self-defense units. NPA

units may be rotated and deployedfor battles for three to six monthsdepending on the situation. Thepoint is to accelerate the seizure of

weapons from the enemy forcesNPA units must also be rotated inmass work and production so that

must be developed at the region-

al, subregional, provincial, districtor guerrilla front and section lev-els through various levels of Party

education and through work in themass movement. The Party cadresand members in the localitiesmust be able to lead the work of

the mass organizations, organs ofpolitical power, people's militia,barrio self-defense corps, and self-

defense units of mass organiza-tions. The peoples militia assumethe role of serving as the principalforces in launching local guerrilla

warfare and standing as centers ofgravity of the barrio self-defensecorps and the self-defense units ofthe local mass organizations.

They must enable the units ofthe NPA to carry out tactical offen-sives. Thus, new fighting units canbe created with the firearms seized

from the enemy. We must departfrom the old practice of overload-ing units of the people's army with

tasks that can be performed by thelocal Party branches, the mass or-ganizations and the local organs ofpolitical power that take charge of

public education, economic affairs,health, self-defense, cultural activ-ities and arbitration.

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tional total of 5,600 automatic ri-

fles in 1985. Since 1985, however,it had become obvious that theNPA was being debilitated by such

Left opportunist lines as thestrategic counteroffensive andthe Red area-white area line.

These Left opportunist lines

undermined the strength of theNPA and wrought havoc on the rev-olutionary mass base and caused

they remain close to the people and produce part ofwhat they consume.

It is necessary for the Party to sum up its experi-ence and current situation and to draw up the guide-lines and plans for the NPA in every regional, subre-gional, provincial and district or guerrilla front level

with definite reasonable targets for the number ofweapons to seize from the enemy forces. What is rea-

sonable is based on previous experience and currentcapabilities of the NPA units. An NPA command, forinstance, may recommend to the Party committee a10% increase in the number of weapons every threemonths.

Soft targets for raids, ambushes and disarming op-erations abound. These include police stations, smallarmy detachments, paramilitary units, private securi-

ty agencies, private armed groups and armed individ-ual reactionaries. There are even softer targets for at-tritive actions to sap the strength and morale of the

enemy forces, force them to do guard duty and com-

mit mistakes in deploying troops and resources. Oper-ations can be easily launched on the basis of intelli-

gence buildup and timely reconnaissance.It is by entrusting mass work and the mass move-

ment to local Party branches, local organs of politicapower and the mass organizations, that the NPA can

be confident that the mass base is being maintainedand developed while it is concentrated on fighting

and destroying the power and apparatuses of the re-actionary state on a wide scale in the localities. Thusthe NPA can inspire and enable the people in the lo-calities to take revolutionary power.

The revolutionary organs of political power grow

stronger and more secure when reactionary power isdestroyed and the reactionaries flee or are deprived oftheir local power and authority. The organs of politi-

cal power should be based mainly on the mass organ-izations of the working people and are augmentedthrough united front relations at various levels

against the worst reactionaries.

IV. Strategy and tactics

The Party has correctly set thepolitico-military strategic line

of protracted people's war. Thismeans encircling the cities from

the countryside and accumulatingstrength over a long period of timeuntil enough strength and capabil-

ity have been accumulated to seizethe cities on a nationwide scale inthe stage of strategic offensive.

This line is based on the reali-

ty of the Philippines where the ma- jority of the people are peasants,and the countryside offers the so-cial and physical terrain for build-

ing the people's army and carryingout the people's war in stages.

The correctness of the strategicline is well proven by the fact that

the New People's Army has beenable to preserve itself and hasgrown from small to big and from

weak to strong against brutal ene-my attacks. Such attacks includecampaigns of division-size task for-ces to nip the people's army in the

bud from 1969 to 1972, the 14-year fascist dictatorship of Marcosand the series of national counter-

revolutionary military campaign

plans launched by the successivepseudo-democratic regimes afterMarcos.

In the long course of the Mar-cos fascist dictatorship, we wereable to build the people's armythat started with only nine auto-

matic rifles and 26 inferior firearms(single-shot rifles and handguns)in early 1969 and reached the na-

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the reduction of the mass base bymore than 60% in the 1980s. Theyplayed into the hands of the enemy

that carried out Oplan Lambat-Bi-tag (OLB) I, II and III designed toput the NPA units under strategicencirclement and gradual con-

striction, and hunted them down

with special operations teams.The Second Great Rectification

Movement criticized and repudiat-

ed the Left opportunist lines asengaging in self-constriction andseparation from the masses under

the guise of strengthening the NPAthrough unwarranted verticaliza-tion and premature formation oflarger units. In areas where the

Left opportunist lines took hold,

the need for the horizontal spreadof NPA units was laid aside, thus

undermining and destroying ourclose links with the masses. The or-ganized mass base of the revolu-tionary movement shrank even as

the prematurely formed companieshad bigger logistical demands.

Under the direction of the Par-ty in the rectification movement,

the NPA had to go back to the ba-sics of guerrilla warfare. It was re-

oriented, reorganized and rede-ployed to carry out intensive andextensive guerrilla warfare on thebasis of an ever widening anddeepening mass base. The enemy

knew about the return to smallunits and was emboldened to de-ploy its scout ranger teams againstthese units. But the NPA was able

to preserve itself and recover themass base precisely by adhering toits correct line during the entire

period of the Ramos and Estradaregimes.

The stress on the horizontalspread of small NPA units in order

to counter the harmful results ofthe premature verticalization andto recover the mass base was notwithout any negative aspect. It en-

gendered guerrilla-ism or the rov-ing rebel mentality and conserva-

tism, especially where there wereno conscious and resolute efforts

to develop the revolutionary forcesin a balanced way and the necessa-ry correlation of the center of grav-ity and dispersed units in the work

of the people's army. However, solong as the mass base was growing,it was much easier for the Party to

rectify conservatism and guerrilla-ism.

The next big test of the NPAhas been Oplan Bantay Laya (OBL)

with its brutal campaign againstlegal social activists and forceddisplacement of peasants and in-digenous people in the country-

side. OBL far exceeded OLB inscope, duration, intensity and bru-tality. The US and the Arroyo re-gime (agitated by militarists and

clerico-fascists who are US CIA as-sets) harped on the line that pro-gressive social activists are NPA

fighters in disguise and calculatedthat the military campaigns wouldbe more effective in the country-side if such social activists were

suppressed through abductions,torture and extrajudicial killings.

OBL has proven the inadequacy

of the reactionary military, policeand paramilitary forces to cove

even only 10% of Philippine terri-tory at every given time. The NPAcan easily move about in 90% ofthe territory. Thus, it has been able

to grow in strength and defeat theobjectives of OBL. With OBL, theArroyo regime has gained notoriety

throughout the world for its grossand systematic violations of humanrights.

But we must learn well the les-

sons from the various tactics theenemy has used in OBL, such as theshock and awe tactics of GeneraPalparan in Oriental Mindoro, East-

ern Visayas and Central Luzon, theconvergence approach of GeneraGomez in Bohol, the center ofgravity approach of Colonel Dagoy

and the sitio approach of ColoneBustillos.

From a strategic view, all these

are paper tigers. But at the tacticalevel, where they pounced uponthe guerrilla fronts and the massesthey were real brutal tigers inflict-

ing a measure of damage, generat-ing real problematic conditions fothe revolution and causing errors

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militias, barrio self-defense corpsand self-defense units of mass or-ganizations at the barrio level, and

the deployment of armed city par-tisans in urban centers withinguerrilla fronts.

The current number of guerrilla

fronts is more than adequate a

base for aiming to cover almost alif not all the 179 rural congressional districts of the reactionary state

with the Party, mass organizationsalliances and units of the people'sarmy within the next two or three

years. The strength of the NPAmust not be divided and dissipated just to cover said congressionadistricts in an absolutely equal and

even way. The NPA must grow in

strength where they are and ad-vance wave upon wave or deploy

advance or seed units in such dis-tricts on the best available terrain

In the next five years, the NPAis bound to deliver more telling le-

thal blows on the reactionary mili-tary, police and paramilitary forcesthat would belie the false claims ofreactionaries, pseudo-progressives

and renegades that the NPA hasbeen undermined and weakened by

the post-Marcos antinational andantidemocratic regimes and bytheir military campaigns. Most im-portantly, the Party and the NPAare determined to increase the

armed strength and political powerof the working people.

The probable stages of develop-ment for the people's war is from

the strategic defensive to the stra-tegic stalemate and from the latterto the strategic offensive. After be-

ing at the strategic defensive forfour decades, we have developedthe basis to aim at and reach thestage of strategic stalemate in the

next five years and then strive tomove onward to the final stage ofstrategic offensive.

We must sum up our fighting

experience and current situationand develop guidelines and plans

actionary forces keep on repeatingthe lie that the NPA had 25,000fighters in 1986 and that they

have succeeded in cutting thenumber down to 5,000 oreven less.

The NPA rifle strength

in 1986 was only 6,100 (an

increase of 500 over the1985 figure of 5,600),

with no accurate ac-

counting of the con-sequence ofthe Left op-

portunist linesand anti-informer hysteria, par-ticularly Kampanyang Ahos inMindanao. From figures of the

1985 Central Committee

plenum, Mindanao had ac-counted for about 50% of

NPA armed strength.The current strength of the NPA

is of critical mass in terms of itsthousands of fighters with high-

powered firearms. With proper de-ployment and employment, it canrapidly grow and advance in wavesand in well-defined phases (middle

and advanced) of the strategic de-fensive and the threshold and ear-

ly phase of the strategic stalemate.Wherever NPA units exist under anylevel of command: barrio, section,guerrilla front, interfront, provin-cial, subregional and regional,

there must be a relatively concen-trated force as center of gravity.The center of gravity must be situ-ated on the best available terrain.

As wide areas are saturated withadjoining company-strength guer-rilla fronts and transformed into

subregional military areas and lat-er further on into fluid war fronts,their centers of gravity developlarger vertical forces.

At the same time, the furtherdevelopment of horizonal forcesconsisting of a full-time guerrillaplatoon at the municipal level

would be beefed up with the prolif-eration of platoon-size peoples

and weaknesses on the part of thesubjective forces of the revolution.

The Party has brought togetherand analyzed the reports from the

regions concerned and has come upwith plans to overcome the prob-lems and to further strengthen the

revolutionary forces. We havelearned valuable lessons in over-coming the attacks of the enemy,preserving and upgrading our for-

ces and mass base, launching full-scale guerrilla warfare and advanc-ing the revolutionary struggle. Ourdifficult experiences have tem-

pered us and we have emergedstronger, continue to inflict morewidespread and heavy blowsagainst the enemy, and are ever

determined to advance and win ourpeoples war.

At present, the NPA stands as

the largest people's army that theFilipino working people have everbeen able to put up, surpassing thenumber of riflemen in the revolu-

tionary army of 1896 to 1902 andthe old people's army of 1942 to1952. To claim false credit, the re-

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at the levels of the Central Commit-tee, the Military Commission and

NPA operational command; at thelevel of the regional Party commit-tees and the regional operationalcommands; and at the subregional,

provincial and district or guerrillafront levels for the purpose of

launching tactical offensives andincreasing the armed strength ofthe NPA to enable us to advancefrom the strategic defensive to thestrategic stalemate.

It is feasible for us in the nextfive years to have a guerrilla frontin each of the 179 rural congres-

sional districts and to deployarmed city partisans in all urbancongressional districts. The cover-

age of a rural congressional districtby a guerrilla front is facilitated bythe existence and growth of guer-rilla fronts in adjoining districts.The emergence and growth of guer-

rilla fronts will be uneven but wemust always strive to realize thestandard requirements and raise

the general level of development.The regional Party committee andNPA operational command mustmake sure that centers of gravity at

the regional, subregional, provin-cial and guerrilla front levels arelocated on terrain favorable formaneuver.

The guerrilla fronts would havemore breadth and depth and be-

come relatively stable as they be-come better coordinated under theinterfront, provincial, subregionalor regional levels of the Party lead-

ership and NPA command. The ene-my forces would still have the ca-

pability to concentrate forces onthe entirety or a part of a particu-lar guerrilla front. But the inter-connection and coordination ofseveral adjoining guerrilla fronts

under commands higher than thatof the guerrilla front and the avail-ability of strike forces for counter-

attacks by regional, subregional,provincial or interfront commandswill be crucial for preserving,

strengthening and expanding theguerrilla fronts and launching coor-dinated tactical operations in theareas covered. Adjoining guerrillafronts would be more easily coordi-

nated than before and have anechelon of commands, such as theregional, subregional and provin-

cial.The enemy will always try to

put our forces on strategic encir-clement and launch strategic of-

fensives. But the NPA would haveincreased initiative and ability inlaunching tactical encirclementsand tactical offensives as the levels

of regional, subregional and pro-vincial commands are developed

Our increased offensives will com-pel the enemy forces to increasepersonnel for the defense ofcamps, police stations and vital in-

stallations and reduce the numberof enemy armed personnel for of-

fensive operations. And yet the en-emy lines of patrols and supplieswill remain vulnerable to NPA tac-tical offensives.

Wherever the enemy forces

choose to encircle our forces, weengage in tactical counterencirle-ments and fight on exterior lines

At the same time, we can take theinitiative of launching tactical of-fensives elsewhere. We maintain a

war of fluid movement. We conti-nue to master and apply the tacticsof concentration, shifting and dis-persal in order to achieve our ob-jectives according to concrete cir

cumstances.Whenever necessary, we trade

space for time. We do not engage

in any hard-headed defense of ter-ritory and allow ourselves to beforced into battles that put at riskany main unit of the NPA in any

guerrilla front, province, subregionor region. At all times, our smalunits that are dispersed for masswork must be vigilant against be-

ing caught by surprise and forcedto fight purely defensive battles orchance encounters.

We wage only those battles ofquick decision that we can win. Wegive priority to delivering blows onthe weakest points of the enemy

forces. The enemy is blind and deafbecause it is hated by the peopleThey cannot tell when and whereour forces are poised to strike. We

take the full initiative in wagingbattles of annihilation, whichwould yield weapons for further

strengthening the people's armyand would inflict casualties thatreduce the strength and weakenthe morale of the enemy forces.

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and the top purveyors of prohibit-ed drugs. We must dismantle thereactionary organs of political pow-

er and antipeople enterprises thatgrab land and destroy the environ-ment.

We must remove the incorrigi-

ble oppressors and exploiters from

our guerrilla fronts. We expand andconsolidate Red political power byeliminating or driving them away

from the guerrilla fronts. We mustprepare ourselves against the fur-ther increase of US military inter-

vention forces as we succeed in ad-vancing from the strategic defen-sive to the strategic stalemate. Wemust be prepared against all-out

US military aggression.

Take advantage of the crisisconditions by intensifying the peo-

ple's war!Fulfill the political require-

ments under the leadership of theParty!

Continue extensive and inten-sive guerrilla warfare!

Advance from the strategic de-fensive to the strategic stalemate!

Carry forward the new demo-cratic revolution through people's

war! ~

We have a wide array of tactics,which are more complex and moreunpredictable to the enemy than a

single-occasion ambush, raid andarrest operation, which may haveits own complexity in the deploy-ment of blocking, containing and

close-in units. The complex tactics

we refer to include the following:luring the enemy in deep and lead-ing it to our zone of fire; ambush-

ing or raiding one enemy force andas prelude to a bigger strikeagainst the reinforcements; feign-

ing to attack the east in order toattack the west; inducing an enemyforce to go out of its base and de-stroying the base; tiring the enemy

force by letting it march deep into

our territory and ambushing itwhen it tries to return to base; and

so forth.Our principal objective is to

wage and win battles of annihila-tion against the enemy forces. We

must also wage attritive actionsthat serve to weaken and demoral-ize the forces of the enemy. Theseinclude sniping at enemy personnel

by sniper teams or sparrow units,use of explosives against enemy

vehicles, burning enemy fuel andmotor depots and so on. We canmake the monster bleed to deathfrom battles of annihilation andattritive actions.

The advance of our people's warin stages and phases will mean theadvance of our military tactics andtechnique. We learn our tactics

from the summing up and analysisof our positive and negative expe-riences. We capture weapons, com-

munications equipment and otherforms of logistics from the enemy.

Even now we have access to so-phisticated electronic equipment

for communications and storingand retrieval of information. Wemust be strict in using these prop-erly in our communications, work

and offensives. Used irresponsibly,the same equipment can facilitate

the infliction of harm on us by theenemy. We must never neglect theuse and development of primitive

but more reliable forms of commu-nication such as the courier systemon the basis of organized massbase and alliances.

We must conduct political work

to recruit medical personnel andother professionals and techniciansfor various departments of the peo-

ple's army and to develop alliancesto enable us to have access to var-ious types of professional and

technical services. We must pro-mote production by the people'sarmy for its own needs and by thepeople to support the people's ar-

my and families of our Red fight-

ers. We must gather the contribu-tions of the working people who

have benefited or stand to benefitfrom the policies of the revolution-ary government and movement.

The people's government has

the power of taxation in order tocontrol and regulate enterprisesand assets that earn rent and prof-it and in order to collect the re-

sources for the delivery of socialservices much needed by the mas-

ses, including the administrationand support for the programs ofproduction, education, health, de-fense and cultural development.When certain political groups and

individuals make donations to thepeople's government, these areused for social purposes and arenot payment for the right to cam-

paign or win a position in reaction-ary elections.

Aside from combat operations

to wipe out units of the military,police and paramilitary forces andprivate armed groups, wemust carry out opera-

tions to arrest for trial andpunishment the exploiters andoppressors who have incurredblood debts, violators of human

rights, the plunderers, landgrab-bers, destroyers of the environment

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