2009 nipp public review draft

Public Review Draft

Public Review Draft 1

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2009 National Infrastructure 6

Protection Plan 7

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September 18, 2008 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

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Preface 1 Risk in the 21st century results from a complex mix of manmade and naturally occurring 2 threats and hazards, including terrorist attacks, hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, power 3 outages, hazardous materials spills, and industrial accidents. Within this context, our 4 critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) are inherently vulnerable both within and 5 across sectors, due to the nature of their physical, geographical, and virtual 6 interconnections. 7

Within the CIKR protection mission area, national priorities must include preventing 8 catastrophic loss of life and managing cascading, disruptive impacts to the U.S. and global 9 economies across multiple threat scenarios. Achieving this goal requires a strategy 10 appropriately balancing resiliency—a traditional American strength in adverse times—with 11 focused, risk-informed prevention, protection, and preparedness activities so that we can 12 manage and reduce the most serious risks we face. 13

These concepts represent the pillars of our National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) 14 and its 18 supporting Sector-Specific Plans (SSPs). They are carried out in practice by an 15 integrated network of Federal departments, State and local government agencies, private 16 sector entities, and a growing number of regional consortia—all operating together with a 17 largely voluntary CIKR protection framework. This multi-dimensional public-private sector 18 partnership is the key to success in this inherently complex mission area. Integrating 19 multi-jurisdictional and multi-sector authorities, capacities, and resources in a unified 20 approach that is also tailored to specific sector and regional risk landscapes and operating 21 environments is the path to successfully enhancing our Nation’s CIKR protection. 22

The NIPP meets the requirements that the President set forth in Homeland Security 23 Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7), Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and 24 Protection, and provides the overarching approach for integrating the Nation’s many CIKR 25 protection initiatives into a single national effort. It sets forth a comprehensive risk 26 management framework and clearly defined roles and responsibilities for the Department 27 of Homeland Security; Federal Sector-Specific Agencies; and other Federal, State, local, 28 tribal, territorial, regional, and private sector partners. 29

The 2009 NIPP captures the evolution and maturation of the processes and programs first 30 outlined in 2006. The current document was developed collaboratively with CIKR partners 31 at all levels of government and the private sector. Participation in the implementation of 32 the NIPP provides the government and the private sector the opportunity to use collective 33 expertise and experience to more clearly define CIKR protection issues and practical 34 solutions and to ensure that existing CIKR protection planning efforts, including business 35 continuity and resiliency planning, are recognized. 36

I ask for your continued commitment and cooperation in the implementation of both the 37 NIPP and the supporting SSPs so that we continue to enhance the protection of the 38 Nation’s CIKR. 39

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Table of Contents 1 Preface .........................................................................................................................................2 2 Executive Summary....................................................................................................................5 3

1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................5 4 2 Authorities, Roles, and Responsibilities ................................................................................................6 5 3 The CIKR Protection Program Strategy: Managing Risk ......................................................................8 6 4 Organizing and Partnering for CIKR Protection.....................................................................................8 7 5 CIKR Protection: An Integral Part of the Homeland Security Mission.................................................10 8 6 Ensuring an Effective, Efficient Program Over the Long Term............................................................11 9 7 Providing Resources for the CIKR Protection Program ......................................................................11 10

1. Introduction ...........................................................................................................................13 11 1.1 Purpose.............................................................................................................................................14 12 1.2 Scope................................................................................................................................................15 13 1.3 Applicability .......................................................................................................................................15 14 1.4 Threats to the Nation’s CIKR............................................................................................................18 15 1.5 All-Hazards and CIKR Protection .....................................................................................................20 16 1.6 Planning Assumptions ......................................................................................................................21 17 1.7 Special Considerations .....................................................................................................................22 18 1.8 Achieving the Goal of the NIPP ........................................................................................................24 19

2. Authorities, Roles, and Responsibilities ............................................................................27 20 2. Authorities, Roles, and Responsibilities ............................................................................28 21

2.1 Authorities .........................................................................................................................................28 22 2.2 Roles and Responsibilities................................................................................................................29 23

3. The Strategy: Managing Risk...............................................................................................43 24 3.1 Set Goals and Objectives .................................................................................................................44 25 3.2 Identify Assets, Systems, and Networks ..........................................................................................46 26 3.3 Assess Risks ....................................................................................................................................52 27 3.4 Prioritize ............................................................................................................................................64 28 3.5 Implement Protective Programs and Resiliency Strategies .............................................................66 29 3.6 Measure Effectiveness .....................................................................................................................73 30 3.7 Using Metrics and Performance Measurement for Continuous Improvement .................................76 31

4. Organizing and Partnering for CIKR Protection.................................................................77 32 4.1 Leadership and Coordination Mechanisms ......................................................................................77 33 4.2 Information Sharing: A Network Approach .......................................................................................87 34 4.3 Protection of Sensitive CIKR Information .......................................................................................101 35 4.4 Privacy and Constitutional Freedoms.............................................................................................106 36

5. CIKR Protection as Part of the Homeland Security Mission...........................................107 37 5.1 A Coordinated National Approach to the Homeland Security Mission ...........................................107 38 5.2 The CIKR Protection Component of the Homeland Security Mission ............................................113 39 5.3 Relationship of the NIPP and SSPs to Other CIKR Plans and Programs......................................114 40 5.4 CIKR Protection and Incident Management ...................................................................................117 41

6. Ensuring an Effective, Efficient Program Over the Long Term ......................................119 42 6.1 Building National Awareness..........................................................................................................119 43 6.2 Conducting Research and Development and Using Technology...................................................129 44 6.3 Building, Protecting, and Maintaining Databases, Simulations, and Other Tools ..........................135 45 6.4 Continuously Improving the NIPP and the SSPs............................................................................139 46

7. Providing Resources for the CIKR Protection Program..................................................141 47 7.1 The Risk-informed Resource Allocation Process ...........................................................................141 48 7.2 Federal Resource Allocation Process for DHS, the SSAs, and Other Federal Agencies ..............145 49 7.3 Federal Resources for State and Local Government Preparedness .............................................148 50 7.4 Other Federal Grant Programs That Contribute to CIKR Protection..............................................149 51 7.5 Setting an Agenda in Collaboration with CIKR Protection Partners...............................................150 52

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations ....................................................................................153 53

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Glossary of Key Terms...........................................................................................................157 1 Appendix 1: Special Considerations.....................................................................................162 2 Appendix 1A: Cross-Sector Cybersecurity ..........................................................................162 3

1A.1 Introduction...................................................................................................................................162 4 1A.2 Cybersecurity Responsibilities .....................................................................................................164 5 1A.3 Managing Cyber Risk ...................................................................................................................167 6 1A.4 Ensuring Long-Term Cybersecurity .............................................................................................175 7

Appendix 1B: International CIKR Protection........................................................................181 8 1B.1 Introduction and Purpose of This Appendix .................................................................................181 9 1B.2 Responsibilities for International Cooperation on CIKR Protection .............................................182 10 1B.3 Managing the International Dimension of CIKR Risk...................................................................183 11 1B.4 Organizing International CIKR Protection Cooperation ...............................................................188 12 1B.5 Integration With Other Plans ........................................................................................................191 13 1B.6 Ensuring International Cooperation Over the Long Term ............................................................192 14

Appendix 2: Authorities, Roles, and Responsibilities.........................................................193 15 Appendix 2A: Summary of Relevant Statutes, Strategies, and Directives........................193 16

2A.1 Statutes ........................................................................................................................................193 17 2A.2 National Strategies .......................................................................................................................199 18 2A.3 Homeland Security Presidential Directives ..................................................................................200 19 2A.4 Other Authorities ..........................................................................................................................205 20

Appendix 2B: NIPP Implementation Initiatives and Actions...............................................207 21 Appendix 3: The Protection Program ...................................................................................208 22 Appendix 3A: Risk Assessment Essential Features and Core Elements..........................208 23 Appendix 3B: Existing Protective Programs and Other In-Place Measures .....................210 24

3B.1 Protective Programs and Initiatives..............................................................................................210 25 3B.2 Guidelines, Reports, and Planning...............................................................................................213 26 3B.3 Information-Sharing Programs That Support CIKR Protection ....................................................213 27

Appendix 3C: Infrastructure Data Warehouse .....................................................................216 28 3C.1 Why Do We Need a National CIKR Inventory?............................................................................216 29 3C.2 How Does the Inventory Support the NIPP?................................................................................216 30 3C.3 What Is the Current Content of the Inventory? ............................................................................217 31 3C.4 How Will the Current Inventory Remain Accurate? .....................................................................217 32 3C.5 How Will the Infrastructure Data Warehouse Be Maintained?.....................................................217 33 3C.6 What Are the CIKR Partner Roles and Responsibilities? ............................................................218 34 3C.7 What Are the Plans for IDW Expansion? .....................................................................................218 35

Appendix 3D: Effectiveness...................................................................................................220 36 Appendix 4: Organizing and Partnering for CIKR Protection: Existing Coordination 37 Mechanisms ............................................................................................................................222 38 Appendix 5: Integrating CIKR Protection as Part of the Homeland Security Mission......224 39 Appendix 5A: State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Government Considerations ..............224 40

5A.1 CIKR Roles and Responsibilities .................................................................................................224 41 5A.2 Building Partnerships and Information Sharing............................................................................225 42 5A.3 Implementing the Risk Management Framework ........................................................................226 43 5A.4 CIKR Data Use and Protection ....................................................................................................226 44 5A.5 Leveraging Ongoing Emergency Preparedness Activities for CIKR Protection...........................227 45 5A.6 Integrating Federal CIKR Protection Activities .............................................................................227 46

Appendix 5B: Recommended Homeland Security Practices for Use by the Private Sector47 ..................................................................................................................................................229 48 Appendix 6: DHS S&T Plans, Programs and Research & Development............................232 49

6.1 DHS S&T Organization and Investment Process...........................................................................232 50 6.2 Requirements .................................................................................................................................234 51 6.3 Progress..........................................................................................................................................235 52 6.4 Five Year Strategy/Technology Roadmap......................................................................................237 53

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Executive Summary 1 Protecting the critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) of the United States is 2 essential to the Nation’s security, public health and safety, economic vitality, and way of 3 life. Attacks on CIKR could significantly disrupt the functioning of government and 4 business alike and produce cascading effects far beyond the targeted sector and physical 5 location of the incident. Direct terrorist attacks and natural, manmade, or technological 6 hazards could produce catastrophic losses in terms of human casualties, property 7 destruction, and economic effects, as well as profound damage to public morale and 8 confidence. Attacks using components of the Nation’s CIKR as weapons of mass destruction 9 could have even more devastating physical and psychological consequences. 10

1 Introduction 11

The overarching goal of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) is to: 12

Build a safer, more secure, and more resilient America by enhancing protection of the Nation’s CIKR to 13 prevent, deter, neutralize, or mitigate the effects of deliberate efforts by terrorists to destroy, 14 incapacitate, or exploit them; and to strengthen national preparedness, timely response, and rapid 15 recovery in the event of an attack, natural disaster, or other emergency. 16

The NIPP provides the unifying structure for the integration of existing and future CIKR 17 protection efforts and resiliency strategies into a single national program to achieve this 18 goal. The NIPP framework will enable the prioritization of protection initiatives and 19 investments across sectors to ensure that government and private sector resources are 20 applied where they offer the most benefit for mitigating risk by lessening vulnerabilities, 21 deterring threats, and minimizing the consequences of terrorist attacks and other 22 manmade and natural disasters. The NIPP risk management framework recognizes and 23 builds on existing protective programs and initiatives. 24

Protection includes actions to mitigate the overall risk to CIKR assets, systems, networks, 25 functions, or their interconnecting links resulting from exposure, injury, destruction, 26 incapacitation, or exploitation. In the context of the NIPP, this includes actions to deter the 27 threat, mitigate vulnerabilities, or minimize consequences associated with a terrorist attack 28 or other incident (see figure S-1). Protection can include a wide range of activities, such as 29 hardening facilities, building resiliency and redundancy, incorporating hazard resistance 30 into initial facility design, initiating active or passive countermeasures, installing security 31 systems, promoting workforce surety programs, implementing cybersecurity measures, 32 training and exercises, and business continuity planning, among various others. 33

Achieving the NIPP goal requires 34 actions to address a series of objectives 35 that include: 36

Understanding and sharing 37 information about terrorist threats 38 and other hazards; 39

Building partnerships to share 40 information and implement CIKR 41 protection programs; 42

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Implementing a long-term risk management program; and 1 Maximizing efficient use of resources for CIKR protection. 2

These objectives require a collaborative partnership among a diverse set of partners, 3 including the Federal Government; State, territorial, local, and tribal governments; 4 regional coalitions; the private sector; international entities; and nongovernmental 5 organizations. The NIPP provides the framework that defines the processes and 6 mechanisms that these CIKR partners will use to develop and implement the national 7 program to protect CIKR across all sectors over the long term. 8

2 Authorities, Roles, and Responsibilities 9

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 provides the basis for Department of Homeland 10 Security (DHS) responsibilities in the protection of the Nation’s CIKR. The act assigns DHS 11 the responsibility to develop a comprehensive national plan for securing CIKR and for 12 recommending “measures necessary to protect the key resources and critical infrastructure 13 of the United States in coordination with other agencies of the Federal Government and in 14 cooperation with State and local government agencies and authorities, the private sector, 15 and other entities.” 16

The national approach for CIKR protection is provided through the unifying framework 17 established in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7). This directive 18 establishes the U.S. policy for “enhancing protection of the Nation’s CIKR” and mandates a 19 national plan to actuate that policy. In HSPD-7, the President designates the Secretary of 20 Homeland Security as the “principal Federal official to lead CIKR protection efforts among 21 Federal departments and agencies, State and local governments, and the private sector” 22 and assigns responsibility for CIKR sectors to specific Sector-Specific Agencies (SSAs) (see 23 table S-1). It also provides the criteria for establishing or recognizing additional sectors. In 24 accordance with HSPD-7, the NIPP delineates roles and responsibilities for partners in 25 carrying out CIKR protection activities while respecting and integrating the authorities, 26 jurisdictions, and prerogatives of these partners. 27

Primary roles for CIKR partners include: 28

Department of Homeland Security: Manage the Nation’s overall CIKR protection framework 29 and oversee NIPP development and implementation. 30

Sector-Specific Agencies: Implement the NIPP framework and guidance as tailored to the 31 specific characteristics and risk landscapes of each of the CIKR sectors. 32

Other Federal Departments, Agencies, and Offices: Implement specific CIKR protection roles 33 designated in HSPD-7 or other relevant statutes, executive orders, and policy directives. 34

State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Develop and implement a CIKR protection program as 35 a component of their overarching homeland security programs. 36

Regional Partners: Use partnerships that cross jurisdictional and sector boundaries to 37 address CIKR protection within a defined geographical area. 38

Boards, Commissions, Authorities, Councils, and Other Entities: Perform regulatory, advisory, 39 policy, or business oversight functions related to various aspects of CIKR operations and 40 protection within and across sectors and jurisdictions. 41

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Private Sector Owners and Operators: Undertake CIKR protection, restoration, coordination, 1 and cooperation activities, and provide advice, recommendations, and subject matter 2 expertise to the Federal Government; 3

Homeland Security Advisory Councils: Provide advice, recommendations, and expertise to 4 the government regarding protection policy and activities. 5

Academia and Research Centers: Provide CIKR protection subject matter expertise, 6 independent analysis, research and development (R&D), and educational programs. 7

8 Table S-1: Sector-Specific Agencies and Assigned CIKR Sectors1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9

10 1The Department of Agriculture is responsible for agriculture and food (meat, poultry, and egg products). 2 The Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration is responsible for food other than meat, poultry, and egg products. 3 Nothing in this plan impairs or otherwise affects the authority of the Secretary of Defense over the Department of Defense (DOD), including the chain of command for military forces from the President as Commander in Chief, to the Secretary of Defense, to the commander of military forces, or military command and control procedures. 4 The Energy Sector includes the production, refining, storage, and distribution of oil, gas, and electric power, except for nuclear power facilities. 5The U.S. Coast Guard is the SSA for the maritime transportation mode. 6As stated in HSPD-7, the Department of Transportation and the Department of Homeland Security will collaborate on all matters relating to transportation security and transportation infrastructure protection. 7The Department of Education is the SSA for the Education Facilities Subsector of the Government Facilities Sector

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3 The CIKR Protection Program Strategy: Managing Risk 1

The cornerstone of the NIPP is its risk management framework (see figure S-2) that 2 establishes the processes for combining consequence, vulnerability, and threat information 3 to produce a sufficient, systematic, and rational assessment of national or sector risk. The 4 risk management framework is structured to promote continuous improvement to enhance 5 CIKR protection by focusing activities on efforts to: set goals and objectives; identify assets, 6 systems, and networks; assess risk based on consequences, vulnerabilities and threats; 7 establish priorities based on risk assessments and, increasingly, on return-on-investment 8 for mitigating risk; implement protective programs and resiliency strategies; and measure 9 effectiveness. The results of these processes drive CIKR risk-reduction and risk-10 management activities. The framework applies to the strategic threat environment that 11 shapes program planning, as well as to specific threats or incident situations. DHS, the 12 SSAs, and other CIKR partners share responsibilities for implementing the risk 13 management framework. 14

DHS, in collaboration with other CIKR partners, measures the effectiveness of CIKR 15 protection efforts to provide constant feedback. This allows continuous refinement of the 16 national CIKR protection program in a dynamic process to efficiently achieve NIPP goals 17 and objectives. 18

The risk management framework is tailored and applied on an asset, system, or network 19 basis, depending on the fundamental characteristics of the individual CIKR sectors. Sectors 20 that are primarily dependent on fixed assets and physical facilities may use a bottom-up, 21 asset-by-asset approach, while sectors (such as Communications, Information Technology, 22 and Agriculture and Food) with very open and adaptive systems may use a top-down 23 business or mission continuity approach or systems-based risk assessments. Each sector 24 chooses the approach that produces the most actionable results for the sector and works 25 with DHS to ensure that the relevant risk analysis procedures are compatible with the 26 criteria established in the NIPP and can contribute to sound comparisons across sectors. 27 Figure S-2: NIPP Risk Management Framework 28

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4 Organizing and Partnering for CIKR Protection 30

The enormity and complexity of the Nation’s CIKR, the distributed nature of those entities 31 with the responsibility, authority, and resources to contribute to managing its risk, and the 32 uncertain nature of the terrorist threat and other manmade and natural disasters make the 33 effective implementation of protection efforts a great challenge. To be effective, the NIPP 34

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must be implemented using organizational structures and partnerships committed to 1 developing, sharing, and protecting the information needed to achieve the NIPP goal and 2 supporting objectives. 3

The NIPP defines the organizational structures that provide the framework for 4 coordination of CIKR protection efforts at all levels of government, as well as within and 5 across sectors. Sector-specific planning and coordination are addressed through private 6 sector and government coordinating councils that are established for each sector. Sector 7 Coordinating Councils (SCCs) are comprised of private sector representatives. Government 8 Coordinating Councils (GCCs) are comprised of representatives of the SSAs; other Federal 9 departments and agencies; and State, local, and tribal governments. These councils create a 10 structure through which representative groups from all levels of government and the 11 private sector can collaborate or share existing consensus approaches to CIKR protection 12 and work together to advance capabilities. 13

DHS also works with cross-sector entities established to promote coordination, 14 communications, and best practices sharing across CIKR sectors, jurisdictions, or 15 specifically defined geographical areas. Cross-sector issues are challenging to identify and 16 assess comparatively. Interdependency analysis is often so complex that modeling and 17 simulation capabilities must be brought to bear. Cross-sector issues and interdependencies 18 are addressed among the SCCs through the Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security 19 (PCIS). The PCIS membership is comprised of one or more members and their alternates 20 from each of the SCCs. Cross-sector issues and interdependencies between the GCCs will be 21 addressed through the Government Cross-Sector Council, which is comprised of the NIPP 22 Federal Senior Leadership Council (FSLC), and the State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial 23 Government Cross-Sector Council (SLTTGCC). Additionally, the Regional Consortium 24 Coordinating Council provides a forum for those with regionally-based interests in CIKR 25 protection. 26

Efficient information-sharing and information-protection processes based on mutually 27 beneficial, trusted relationships help to ensure implementation of effective, coordinated, 28 and integrated CIKR protective programs and activities. Information sharing enables both 29 government and private sector partners to assess events accurately, formulate risk 30 assessments, and determine appropriate courses of action. The NIPP uses a network 31 approach to information sharing that represents a fundamental change in how CIKR part-32 ners share and protect the information needed to analyze risk and make risk-informed 33 decisions. A network approach enables secure, multidirectional information sharing 34 between and across government and industry. The network approach provides mechanisms, 35 using information protection protocols as required, to support the development and sharing 36 of strategic and specific threat assessments, threat warnings, incident reports, all-hazards 37 consequence assessments, and best practices. This information-sharing approach allows 38 CIKR partners to assess risks, identify and prioritize risk management opportunities, 39 allocate resources, conduct risk management activities, and make continuous 40 improvements to the Nation’s CIKR protection posture. 41

NIPP implementation relies on critical infrastructure information provided by the private 42 sector. Much of this is sensitive business or security information that could cause serious 43 damage to private firms, the economy, public safety, or security through unauthorized 44 disclosure or access. The Federal Government has a statutory responsibility to safeguard 45 CIKR protection-related information. DHS and other Federal agencies use a number of 46

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programs and procedures, such as the Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII) 1 Program, to ensure that security-related information is properly safeguarded. Other 2 relevant programs and procedures include Sensitive Security Information for 3 transportation activities, Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information, contractual 4 provisions, classified national provisions, Classified National Security Information, Law 5 Enforcement Sensitive Information, Federal Security Information Guidelines, Federal 6 Security Classification Guidelines, and other requirements established by law. 7

The CIKR protection activities defined in the NIPP are guided by legal requirements such 8 as those described in the Privacy Act of 1974, and are designed to achieve a balance 9 between an appropriate level of security and protection of civil rights and liberties. 10

5 CIKR Protection: An Integral Part of the Homeland Security 11 Mission 12

The Homeland Security Act; other statutes and executive orders; the National Strategies 13 for Homeland Security, for the Physical Protection of CIKR, and for Securing Cyberspace; 14 and a series of Homeland Security Presidential directives—most importantly HSPD-7—15 collectively provide the authority for the component elements outlined in the NIPP. These 16 documents work together to provide a coordinated national approach to homeland security 17 that is based on a common framework for CIKR protection, preparedness, and incident 18 management. 19

The NIPP defines the CIKR protection component of the homeland security mission. 20 Implementing CIKR protection requires partnerships, coordination, and collaboration 21 among all levels of government and the private sector. To enable this, the NIPP provides 22 guidance on the structure and content of each sector’s CIKR plan, as well as the CIKR 23 protection-related aspects of State and local homeland security plans. This provides a 24 baseline framework that informs the tailored development, implementation, and updating 25 of Sector-Specific Plans; State and local homeland security strategies; and partner CIKR 26 protection programs and resiliency strategies. 27

To be effective, the NIPP must complement other plans designed to help prevent, prepare 28 for, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and 29 other emergencies. Homeland security plans and strategies at the Federal, State, local, and 30 tribal levels of government address CIKR protection within their respective jurisdictions. 31 Similarly, private sector owners and operators have responded to the post-9/11 32 environment by instituting a range of CIKR protection-related plans and programs, 33 including business continuity and resilience measures. Implementation of the NIPP will be 34 fully coordinated between CIKR partners to ensure that it does not result in the creation of 35 duplicative or costly risk management requirements that offer little enhancement of CIKR 36 protection. 37

The NIPP and the National Response Framework (NRF) together provide a comprehensive, 38 integrated approach to the homeland security mission. The NIPP establishes the overall 39 risk-informed approach that defines the Nation’s CIKR steady-state protection posture, 40 while the NRF provides the approach for domestic incident management. Increases in 41 CIKR protective measures in the context of specific threats or that correspond to the threat 42 conditions established in the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) provide an 43

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important bridge between NIPP steady-state protection and incident management 1 activities using the NRF. 2

The NRF is implemented to guide overall coordination of domestic incident management 3 activities. NIPP partnerships and processes provide the foundation for the CIKR dimension 4 of the NRF, facilitating NRF threat and incident management across a spectrum of 5 activities including incident prevention, response, restoration, and recovery. 6

6 Ensuring an Effective, Efficient Program Over the Long Term 7

To ensure an effective, efficient CIKR protection program over the long term, the NIPP 8 relies on the following mechanisms: 9

Building national awareness to support the CIKR protection program, related protection 10 investments, and protection activities by ensuring a focused understanding of the all-11 hazards threat environment and of what is being done to protect and enable the timely 12 restoration of the Nation’s CIKR in light of such threats; 13

Enabling education, training, and exercise programs to ensure that skilled and knowledgeable 14 professionals and experienced organizations are able to undertake NIPP-related 15 responsibilities in the future; 16

Conducting R&D and using technology to improve CIKR protection-related capabilities or to 17 lower the costs of existing capabilities so that CIKR partners can afford to do more with 18 limited budgets; 19

Developing, safeguarding, and maintaining data systems and simulations to enable continuously 20 refined risk assessment within and across sectors and to ensure preparedness for 21 domestic incident management; and 22

Continuously improving the NIPP and associated plans and programs through ongoing 23 management and revision, as required. 24

7 Providing Resources for the CIKR Protection Program 25

Chapter 7 describes an integrated, risk-informed approach used to establish priorities, 26 determine requirements, and fund the national CIKR protection program; focus Federal 27 grant assistance to State, local, and tribal entities; and complement relevant private sector 28 activities. This integrated resource approach coordinates CIKR protection programs and 29 activities conducted by DHS, the SSAs, and other Federal entities, and focuses Federal 30 grant funds to support national CIKR protection efforts conducted at the State, local, and 31 tribal levels. At the Federal level, DHS provides recommendations regarding CIKR 32 protection priorities and requirements to the Executive Office of the President through the 33 National CIKR Protection Annual Report. This report is based on information about 34 priorities, requirements, and related program funding information that is submitted to 35 DHS by the SSA of each sector, and assessed in the context of the National Risk Profile and 36 national priorities. The process for allocating Federal resources through grants to State, 37 local, and tribal governments uses a similar approach. DHS aggregates information 38 regarding State, local, and tribal CIKR protection priorities, requirements, and funding. 39 DHS uses this data to inform the establishment of national priorities for CIKR protection 40 and to help ensure that funding is made available for protective programs that have the 41 greatest potential for mitigating risk. This resource approach also includes mechanisms to 42

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involve private sector partners in the planning process, and supports collaboration among 1 CIKR partners to establish priorities, define requirements, share information, and 2 maximize the use of finite resources. 3

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1. Introduction 1 Protecting and ensuring the continuity of the critical infrastructure and key resources 2 (CIKR) of the United States is essential to the Nation’s security, public health and safety, 3 economic vitality, and way of life. CIKR includes assets, systems, and networks, whether 4 physical or virtual, so vital that their failure or destruction would have a debilitating 5 impact on security, continuity of government, continuity of operations, public health and 6 safety, public confidence, or any combination of these effects. Terrorist attacks as well as 7 manmade or natural disasters could significantly disrupt the functioning of government 8 and business alike, and produce cascading effects far beyond the affected CIKR and 9 physical location of the incident. Direct and indirect impacts could result in large-scale 10 human casualties, property destruction, and economic disruption, and also significantly 11 damage national morale and public confidence. Terrorist attacks using components of the 12 Nation’s CIKR as weapons of mass destruction (WMD)8 could have even more devastating 13 physical, psychological, and economic consequences. 14

The protection of the Nation’s CIKR is essential 15 for making America safer, more secure, and 16 more resilient in the context of terrorist attacks 17 and other natural and manmade hazards. 18 Protection includes actions to mitigate the 19 overall risk to physical, cyber, and human 20 CIKR assets, systems, networks, functions, or 21 their interconnecting links resulting from 22 exposure, injury, destruction, incapacitation, or 23 exploitation. In the context of the National 24 Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), this 25 includes actions to deter the threat, mitigate 26 vulnerabilities, or minimize consequences 27 associated with a terrorist attack or manmade 28 or natural disaster (see figure 1-1). Protection 29 can include a wide range of activities such as 30 improving business protocols, hardening 31 facilities, building resiliency and redundancy, incorporating hazard resistance into initial 32 facility design, initiating active or passive countermeasures, installing security systems, 33 leveraging “self-healing” technologies, promoting workforce surety programs, implementing 34 cybersecurity measures, training and exercises, and business continuity planning, among 35 various others. The NIPP (June 2006; revised ___ 2009) and its complementary Sector-36 Specific Plans (SSPs) (May 2007; to be reissued in 2010) provide a consistent, unifying 37 structure for integrating both existing and future CIKR protection efforts. The NIPP also 38 provides the core processes and mechanisms that enable all levels of government and 39 private sector partners to work together to implement CIKR protection in an effective and 40 efficient manner. 41

8(1) Any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas (i) bomb, (ii) grenade, (iii) rocket having a propellant charge of more than 4 ounces, (iv) missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than one-quarter ounce, or (v) mine or (vi) similar device; (2) any weapon that is designed or intended to cause death or serious bodily injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors; (3) any weapon involving a disease organism; or (4) any weapon that is designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human life (18 U.S.C. 2332a).

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The NIPP was developed through extensive coordination with partners at all levels of 1 government and the private sector. NIPP processes are designed to be adapted and tailored 2 to individual sector and partner requirements, including State, local, or regional issues. 3 Participation in the implementation of the NIPP provides the government and the private 4 sector the opportunity to use collective expertise and experience to more clearly define 5 CIKR protection issues and practical solutions, and to ensure that existing CIKR protection 6 approaches and efforts, including business continuity and resiliency planning, are 7 recognized. 8

Since the NIPP and the SSPs were first released, the processes and programs outlined in 9 those documents have continued to evolve and mature. This update to the NIPP reflects 10 many of those advances, including: 11

The release of the SSPs, which followed the release of the NIPP 12 Establishment of Critical Manufacturing as the 18th CIKR sector and designation of 13

Education as a subsector of Government Facilities 14 Expansion of the sector partnership model to include the geographically focused 15

Regional Consortium Coordinating Council 16 Integration with State and local fusion centers 17 Evolution of the National Asset Database to the Infrastructure Information Collection 18

System and the Infrastructure Data Warehouse 19 Developments in the programs, approaches, and tools used to implement the NIPP risk 20

management framework 21 Updates on risk methodologies, information sharing mechanisms, and other DHS-led 22

programs 23 Inclusion of robust measurement and reporting processes 24 Description of additional Homeland Security Presidential Directives, National 25

Strategies, and legislation 26 Release of the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, regulating a segment of 27

those industries that involve the production, use, and storage of high-risk chemicals 28 Discussion of expanded education, training, outreach, and exercise programs 29 Evolution from the National Response Plan to the National Response Framework 30 Inclusion of further information on research and development and modeling, simulation, 31

and analysis efforts 32 Additionally, the revised NIPP integrates the concepts of resiliency and protection and 33 broadens the focus of NIPP-related programs and activities to the all-hazards environment. 34

1.1 Purpose 35

The NIPP provides the framework for the unprecedented cooperation that is needed to 36 develop, implement, and maintain a coordinated national effort that brings together 37 government at all levels, the private sector, nongovernmental organizations, and 38 international partners. The NIPP depends on supporting SSPs for full implementation of 39 this framework within and across each CIKR sector. SSPs are developed by the Federal 40 Sector-Specific Agencies (SSAs) designated in HSPD-7 in close collaboration with sector 41 partners. 42

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Together, the NIPP and SSPs provide the mechanisms for identifying critical assets, 1 systems, and networks and their associated functions; understanding threats to CIKR; 2 assessing vulnerabilities and consequences; prioritizing protection initiatives and 3 investments based on costs and benefits so that they are applied where they offer the 4 greatest mitigation of risk; and enhancing information-sharing mechanisms and protective 5 measures within and across CIKR sectors. The NIPP and SSPs will evolve in accordance 6 with changes to the Nation’s CIKR and the risk environment, as well as evolving strategies 7 and technologies for protecting against and responding to threats and incidents. 8 Implementation of the NIPP and the SSPs occurs at all levels by all parties from Federal 9 agencies to State, regional, and local organizations, to individual CIKR owners and 10 operators. 11

1.2 Scope 12

The NIPP considers a full range of physical, cyber, and human security factors within and 13 across all of the Nation’s CIKR sectors. In accordance with the policy direction established 14 in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7), the National Strategy for the 15 Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets, and the National Strategy to 16 Secure Cyberspace, the NIPP includes an augmented focus on the protection of CIKR from 17 the unique and potentially catastrophic impacts of terrorist attacks. At the same time, the 18 NIPP builds on and is structured to be consistent with and supportive of the Nation’s all-19 hazards approach to homeland security preparedness and domestic incident management. 20 Many of the benefits of enhanced CIKR protection are most sustainable when protective 21 programs and resiliency strategies are designed to address all hazards. 22

The NIPP addresses ongoing and future activities within each of the CIKR sectors 23 identified in HSPD-7 and across the sectors regionally, nationally, and within individual 24 States or communities. It defines processes and mechanisms used to prioritize protection of 25 U.S. CIKR (including territories and territorial seas) and to address the interconnected 26 global networks upon which the Nation’s CIKR depend. The processes outlined in the NIPP 27 and the SSPs recognize that protective measures do not end at a facility’s fence line or at a 28 national border, and are often a component of a larger business continuity approach. Also 29 considered are the implications of cross-border infrastructures, international 30 vulnerabilities, and cross-sector dependencies and interdependencies. 31

1.3 Applicability 32

While the NIPP covers the full range of CIKR sectors as defined in HSPD-7 it is applicable 33 to the various public and private sector CIKR partners in different ways. The framework 34 generally is applicable to all partners with CIKR protection responsibilities and includes 35 explicit roles and responsibilities for the Federal Government, including CIKR under the 36 control of independent regulatory agencies, and the legislative, executive, or judicial 37 branches. Federal departments and agencies with specific responsibilities for CIKR 38 protection are required to take actions consistent with HSPD-7. The NIPP also provides an 39 organizational structure, guidelines, and recommended activities for other partners to help 40 ensure consistent implementation of the national framework and the most effective use of 41

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resources. State,9 local,10 and tribal government partners are required to establish CIKR 1 protection programs consistent with the National Preparedness Guidelines and as a 2 condition of eligibility for certain Federal grant programs. 3

Private sector owners and operators are encouraged to participate in the NIPP partnership 4 model and to initiate measures to augment existing plans for risk management, resiliency, 5 business continuity, and incident management and emergency response in line with the 6 NIPP framework. 7

1.3.1 Goal 8 The overarching goal of the NIPP is to: 9

Build a safer, more secure, and more resilient America by enhancing protection of the Nation’s CIKR to 10 prevent, deter, neutralize, or mitigate the effects of deliberate efforts by terrorists to destroy, 11 incapacitate, or exploit them; and to strengthen national preparedness, timely response, and rapid 12 recovery in the event of an attack, natural disaster, or other emergency. 13

Achieving this goal requires meeting a series of objectives that include: understanding and 14 sharing information about terrorist threats and other hazards, building partnerships, 15 implementing a long-term risk management program, and maximizing the efficient use of 16 resources. Measuring progress toward achieving the NIPP goal requires that CIKR 17 partners strive toward: 18

Coordinated, CIKR risk management plans and programs in place addressing known 19 and potential threats and hazards; 20

Structures and processes that are flexible and adaptable both to incorporate operational 21 lessons learned and best practices and also to quickly adapt to a changing threat or 22 incident environment; 23

Processes in place to identify and address dependencies and interdependencies to allow 24 for more timely and effective implementation of short-term protective actions and more 25 rapid response and recovery; and 26

Access to robust information-sharing networks that include relevant intelligence and 27 threat analysis and real-time incident reporting. 28

9 Consistent with the definition of “State” in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, all references to States within the NIPP are applicable to Territories and include by reference any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and any possession of the United States (Homeland Security Act). 10A county, municipality, city, town, township, local public authority, school district, special district, intrastate district, council of governments (regardless of whether the council of governments is incorporated as a nonprofit corporation under State law), regional or interstate government entity, or agency or instrumentality of a local government; an Indian tribe or authorized tribal organization, or, in Alaska, a Native village or Alaska Regional Native Corporation; and a rural community, unincorporated town or village, or other public entity (Homeland Security Act).

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1.3.2 The Value Proposition 1 The public-private partnership called for in the NIPP provides the foundation for effective 2 CIKR protection. Prevention, response, mitigation, and recovery efforts are most efficient 3 and effective when there is full participation of government and industry partners; the 4 mission suffers (e.g., full benefits are not realized) without the full participation of all 5 partners. 6

The success of the partnership depends on articulating the mutual benefits to government 7 and private sector partners. Industry capabilities that add value to the government include: 8

Visibility into CIKR assets, networks, facilities, functions, and other capabilities 9 through its ownership and management of a vast majority of CIKR in most sectors; 10

Ability to take actions to respond to and recover from incidents; 11 Ability to innovate and to provide products, services, and technologies to quickly focus 12

on mission needs; and 13 Robust mechanisms useful for sharing and protecting sensitive information regarding 14

threats, vulnerabilities, countermeasures, and best practices. 15 While articulating the value proposition to the government typically is clear, it is often 16 more difficult to articulate the direct benefits of participation for the private sector. In 17 assessing the value proposition for the private sector, there is a clear national security and 18 homeland security interest in ensuring the collective protection of the Nation’s CIKR. More 19 specific benefits that have been realized during the first few years of the partnership 20 include: 21

Participation in a risk analysis and management framework that helps focus both 22 corporate and government resource allocation; 23

Greater information sharing regarding specific threats enabled by issuing security 24 clearances to private sector partners; 25

Leveraged application of preparedness guidelines and self-assessment tools within and 26 across sectors so that risks can be managed more effectively and efficiently from the 27 corporate down to the individual facility level; 28

Targeted allocation of limited resources to the highest risk issues; 29 Coordination across multiple agencies for those assets and facilities which are 30

considered to be of greatest risk; 31 Joint research and development and modeling, simulation, and analysis programs; 32 Participation in national level and cross-sector training and exercise programs; 33 Cross-sector interdependency analyses; 34 Established informal networks among private sector partners and between the private 35

sector and various Federal agencies that can by used for all-hazards planning and 36 response; and 37

Identification of potential improvements in regulations. 38 Government can encourage industry to go beyond efforts already justified by their corporate 39 business needs to assist in broad-scale CIKR protection through activities such as: 40

Providing owners and operators timely, analytical, accurate, and useful information on 41 threats to CIKR; 42

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Ensuring industry is engaged as early as possible in the development of initiatives and 1 policies related to NIPP implementation and, as needed, revision of the NIPP Base 2 Plan; 3

Ensuring industry is engaged as early as possible in the revision of the SSPs, 4 contingency planning, and other CIKR protection initiatives; 5

Articulating to corporate leaders, through the use of public platforms and private 6 communications, both the business and national security benefits of investing in 7 security measures that exceed their business case; 8

Creating an environment that encourages and supports incentives for companies to 9 voluntarily adopt widely accepted, sound security practices; 10

Working with industry to develop and clearly prioritize key missions and enable their 11 protection and/or restoration; 12

Providing support for research needed to enhance future CIKR protection efforts; 13 Developing the resources to engage in cross-sector interdependency studies, through 14

exercises, symposiums, training sessions, and computer modeling, that result in guided 15 decision support for business continuity planning; and 16

Enabling time-sensitive information sharing and restoration and recovery support to 17 priority CIKR facilities and services during incidents in accordance with the provisions 18 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. 19

The above examples illustrate some of the ways in which the government can partner with 20 the private sector to add value to industry’s ability to assess its own risk and refine its 21 business continuity and security plans, as well as contribute to the security and sustained 22 economic vitality of the Nation. The NIPP outlines the high-level value in the overall 23 public-private partnership for CIKR protection. The SSPs outline specific activities and 24 initiatives that articulate the corresponding value to those sector-specific CIKR 25 partnerships and protection activities. 26

1.4 Threats to the Nation’s CIKR 27

Presidential guidance and national strategies issued in the aftermath of the September 11th 28 attacks focused initial CIKR protection efforts on addressing the emerging terrorist threat 29 environment. The emergence of the terrorist threat as a reality in the 21st century pres-30 ented new challenges and required new approaches focused on intelligence-driven analyses, 31 information sharing, and unprecedented partnerships between the government and the 32 private sector at all levels. As a result of decades of experience responding to natural 33 disasters, industrial accidents, and the deliberate acts of malicious individuals, the Nation’s 34 CIKR owners and operators already apply methods for preventing, mitigating, and 35 responding to these incidents as a matter of business continuity. However, government and 36 business continuity, incident, and emergency response plans and preparedness efforts must 37 continue to adapt to a changing threat and hazard environment, and continually address 38 vulnerabilities and gaps in CIKR protection, whether from natural hazards, terrorism, 39 major industrial accidents, or other emergencies. 40

1.4.1 The Vulnerability of the U.S. Infrastructure to 21st Century Threats 41 America is an open, technologically sophisticated, highly interconnected, and complex 42 Nation with a wide array of infrastructure that spans important aspects of the U.S. 43 government, economy, and society. The majority of the CIKR-related assets, systems, and 44

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networks are owned and operated by the private sector. However, in sectors such as Water 1 and Government Facilities, the majority of owners and operators are government or quasi-2 governmental entities. The great diversity and redundancy of the Nation’s CIKR provide for 3 significant physical and economic resilience in the face of terrorist attacks, natural 4 disasters, or other emergencies, and contribute to the unprecedented strength of the 5 Nation’s economy. However, this vast and diverse aggregation of highly interconnected 6 assets, systems, and networks may also present an attractive array of targets to domestic 7 and international terrorists and magnify greatly the potential for cascading failure in the 8 wake of catastrophic natural or manmade disasters. Improvements in protection and 9 resilience focusing on elements of CIKR deemed nationally critical (through 10 implementation of the NIPP risk management framework) can make it more difficult for 11 terrorists to launch very destructive attacks, as well as lessen the impacts of any attack or 12 other disaster that does occur. 13

1.4.2 The Nature of Possible Terrorist Attacks 14 The number and high profile of international and domestic terrorist attacks during the last 15 two decades underscore the determination and persistence of terrorist organizations. 16 Extremist organizations have proven to be relentless, patient, opportunistic, and flexible, 17 learning from experience and modifying tactics and targets to exploit perceived 18 vulnerabilities and avoid observed strengths. Analysis of terrorist goals and motivations 19 points to domestic and international CIKR as potentially prime targets for terrorist attacks. 20 As security measures around more predictable targets increase, terrorists are likely to shift 21 their focus to less protected targets. Enhancing countermeasures to address any one 22 terrorist tactic or target may increase the likelihood that terrorists will shift to another, 23 which underscores the necessity for a balanced, comparative approach that focuses on 24 managing risk commensurately across all sectors and scenarios of concern. 25

Terrorist organizations have shown an understanding of the potential consequences of 26 carefully planned attacks on economic, transportation, and symbolic targets both within the 27 United States and abroad. Future terrorist attacks against CIKR located inside the United 28 States and those located abroad could seriously threaten national security, result in mass 29 casualties, weaken the economy, and damage public morale and confidence. 30

The NIPP considers a broad range of terrorist objectives, intentions, and capabilities to 31 assess the threat to various components of the Nation’s CIKR. Based on that assessment, 32 terrorists may contemplate attacks against the Nation’s CIKR to achieve three general 33 types of effects: 34

Direct Infrastructure Effects: Disruption or arrest of critical functions through direct 35 attacks on an asset, system, or network. 36

Indirect Infrastructure Effects: Cascading disruption and financial consequences for the 37 government, society, and economy through public and private sector reactions to an 38 attack. An operation could reflect an appreciation of interdependencies between 39 different elements of CIKR, as well as the psychological importance of demonstrating 40 the ability to strike effectively inside the United States. 41

Exploitation of Infrastructure: Exploitation of elements of a particular infrastructure to 42 disrupt or destroy another target or produce cascading consequences. Attacks using 43 CIKR elements as a weapon to strike other targets, allowing terrorist organizations to 44

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magnify their capabilities far beyond what could be achieved using their own limited 1 resources. 2

The NIPP outlines the ways in which the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its 3 partners use threat analysis to inform comprehensive risk assessments and risk-mitigation 4 activities. The risk management framework discussed in chapter 3 strikes a balance 5 between ways to mitigate specific and general threats. It ensures that the range of 6 plausible attack scenarios considered is broad enough to avoid a “failure of imagination,” 7 yet contains sufficient detail to enable quantitative and qualitative risk assessment and 8 definable actions and programs to enhance resiliency, reduce vulnerabilities, deter threats, 9 and mitigate potential consequences. 10

1.5 All-Hazards and CIKR Protection 11

In addition to addressing CIKR protection related to terrorist threats, the NIPP also 12 describes activities relevant to CIKR protection and preparedness in an all-hazards context. 13 The direct impacts, disruptions, and cascading effects of natural disasters (e.g., Hurricanes 14 Katrina and Rita, the Northridge earthquake, etc.) and manmade incidents (e.g., the Three 15 Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant accident or the Exxon Valdez oil spill) are well 16 documented and underscore the vulnerabilities and interdependencies of the Nation’s 17 CIKR. 18

Many owners and operators, government emergency managers, and first-responders have 19 developed strategies, plans, policies, and procedures to prepare for, mitigate, respond to, 20 and recover from a variety of natural and manmade incidents. The NIPP framework 21 recognizes these efforts and, additionally, provides an augmented focus on the protection of 22 America’s CIKR against international and domestic terrorist attacks. In fact, the day-to-day 23 public-private coordination structures, information-sharing network, and risk management 24 framework used to implement NIPP steady-state CIKR protection efforts continue to 25 function and provide the CIKR protection dimension for incident management activities 26 under the National Response Framework (NRF). The NIPP, and the public and private 27 sector partnership that it represents, works in conjunction with other plans and initiatives 28 to provide a strong foundation for preparedness in an all-hazards context. 29

NIPP elements include: 30

A comprehensive approach that integrates authorities, capabilities, and resources on a 31 national, regional, and local scale; 32

A framework for sufficient and accurate assessment of the Nation’s CIKR that not only 33 helps inform the prioritization of protection activities, but also enables response and 34 recovery efforts; 35

Structures, processes, and protocols to support the NRF for integrated response and 36 recovery activities; 37

An organization and coordinating structure to enable effective partnership between and 38 among Federal, State, local, and tribal governments, regional and international entities, 39 as well as the private sector; 40

An integrated approach to reducing the vulnerability of the physical, cyber, and human 41 elements of the Nation’s CIKR in which individual preparedness measures complement 42 one another; and 43

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The development and use of sophisticated analytical and modeling tools to help inform 1 effective risk-mitigation programs in an all-hazards context. 2

1.6 Planning Assumptions 3

The NIPP is based on the following planning assumptions that relate to the sector-specific 4 and cross-sector nature of the CIKR protection mission, the adaptive nature of the terrorist 5 threat, and the most effective approaches to all-hazards CIKR protection. 6

1.6.1 Sector-Specific Nature of CIKR Protection 7 Approaches to CIKR protection and risk management vary based on sector business 8

characteristics, risk landscape, protection authorities, requirements, and maturity; 9 Assets, systems, and networks vary in criticality within and across CIKR sectors; 10 Successful CIKR protection requires robust baseline information on assets, systems, and 11

networks, and the functions they enable, within and across CIKR sectors, regions, and 12 specific localities; 13

Owners and operators conduct risk management planning and invest in security from a 14 business perspective and may look for various types of incentives to elicit maximum 15 participation in CIKR protection; 16

In the majority of sectors, private firms own the vast majority of CIKR; 17 Some regulatory agencies may already impose protective measure requirements on 18

private sector owners and operators. Coordination between the private sector, DHS, and 19 the SSAs and their Government Coordinating Council partners is required to address 20 measures for threats beyond the regulatory baseline; and 21

Strong relationships among partners are essential to meet the overarching goal and 22 supporting objectives set forth in the NIPP. 23

1.6.2 Cross-Sector Dependencies and Interdependencies 24 Relevant sector dependencies and interdependencies must be considered when developing 25 risk management approaches and implementing the SSPs. 26

In some cases, a failure in a portion of one sector may significantly impact another 27 sector’s ability to perform necessary and critical functions—making that second sector 28 dependent on the first. For instance, many CIKR sectors rely on the service grids of the 29 Energy, Information Technology, Communications, and Transportation sectors. Failures 30 in these sectors can prevent others from functioning properly. 31

In other cases, two sectors have very interdependent relationships. The Chemical sector 32 needs water for many of its processes and operations; the Water sector needs chemicals 33 for treating drinking and waste water. 34

1.6.3 Adaptive Nature of the Terrorist Threat 35 CIKR protection activities take place in a highly dynamic threat environment. The 36

general threat environment changes as the capabilities and the intentions of terrorists 37 evolve; 38

It is not practical or feasible to protect all assets, systems, and networks against every 39 possible terrorist attack vector. A risk-informed approach enhanced by intelligence and 40 information analysis and reporting provides the basis for an effective risk management 41 strategy and efficient resource allocation; 42

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CIKR protection planning at the national and sector levels must address the full range 1 of plausible threats and hazards, not just those most frequently reported or considered 2 to be the most likely to occur; and 3

A proactive approach is required to enhance decision-making processes, provide advance 4 warning to potentially targeted or vulnerable CIKR, and assist owners and operators in 5 taking protective steps to enhance CIKR protection in an all-hazards context. 6

1.6.4 All-Hazards Nature of CIKR Protection 7 Natural disasters such as floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, wildfires, pandemics, 8

earthquakes, and unintentional manmade disasters such as oil spills or radiological 9 accidents, also pose threats to the Nation’s CIKR; and 10

Efforts to enhance the protection of CIKR from international and domestic terrorist 11 attacks should support all-hazards preparedness and response whenever possible and 12 vice versa. 13

1.7 Special Considerations 14

CIKR protection planning involves special consideration for protection of sensitive 15 infrastructure information, the unique cyber and human elements of infrastructure, and 16 complex international relationships. 17

18

1.7.1 Protection of Sensitive Information 19

20

Partnership with the private sector requires the establishment of mutually beneficial, 21 trusted relationships supported by a network approach to providing access to 22 information and a business continuity approach to minimizing or managing risk; 23

Great care must be taken by the government to ensure that sensitive infrastructure 24 information is protected and used appropriately to enhance the protection of the 25 Nation’s CIKR; 26

Assets, systems, and networks include one or more of the following elements:

Physical—tangible property;

Cyber—electronic information and communications systems, and the information contained therein; and

Human—critical knowledge of functions or people uniquely susceptible to attack.

Protection of sensitive information involves:

Protection from unauthorized access and public disclosure; Security to guard against damage, theft, modification, or exploitation (e.g., firewalls, physical

security); and Detection to identify malicious activity affecting and electronic information or

communications system.

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Information on specific industry assets and vulnerabilities is particularly sensitive 1 because public release may lead to breaches in security, competitive advantage, and/or 2 adverse impacts on an industry’s position in the marketplace; and 3

DHS does not have broad regulatory authority over CIKR and cannot compel private 4 sector entities to submit infrastructure or operational information. Rather, DHS works 5 in partnership with industry and the SSAs and GCCs to identify the necessary 6 information and promote the trusted exchange of such data. 7

1.7.2 The Cyber Dimension 8

9 The U.S. economy and national security depend highly upon the global cyber 10

infrastructure. Cyber infrastructure enables all sectors’ functions and services, resulting 11 in a highly interconnected and interdependent global network of CIKR; 12

A spectrum of malicious actors could conduct attacks against the cyber infrastructure 13 using cyber attack tools. Because of the interconnected nature of the cyber infra-14 structure, these attacks could spread quickly and have a debilitating impact; 15

The use of innovative technology and interconnected networks in operations improves 16 productivity and efficiency, but also increases the Nation’s risk to cyber threats if 17 cybersecurity is not addressed and integrated appropriately; 18

The interconnected and interdependent nature of the Nation’s CIKR makes it 19 problematic to address the protection of physical and cyber assets independently; 20

Cybersecurity includes preventing damage to, unauthorized use of, or exploitation of 21 electronic information and communications systems and the information contained 22 therein to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Cybersecurity also includes 23 restoring electronic information and communications systems in the event of a terrorist 24 attack or natural disaster; and 25

The NIPP addresses reducing cyber risk and enhancing cybersecurity in two ways: (1) 26 as a cross-sector cyber element that involves DHS, SSAs and GCCs, and private sector 27 owners and operators; and (2) as a major component of the Information Technology 28 sector’s responsibility in partnership with the Communications sector. 29

1.7.3 The Human Element 30 The NIPP recognizes that each CIKR asset, system, and network is made up of physical 31

and cyber components, and human elements; 32

Cyber infrastructure includes electronic information and communications systems, and the information contained in those systems. Computer systems, control systems such as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, and networks such as the Internet are all part of cyber infrastructure.

Information and communications systems are composed of hardware and software the process, store, and communicate. Processing includes the creation, access, modification, and destruction of information. Storage includes paper, magnetic, electronic, and all other media types. Communications include sharing and distribution of information.

Information Technology (IT) critical functions are sets of processes that produce, provide, and maintain products and services. IT critical functions encompass the full set of processes (e.g., research and development, manufacturing, distribution, upgrades, and maintenance) involved in transforming supply inputs into IT products and services.

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The human element requires: 1 Identifying and preventing the insider threat resulting from infiltration or 2

individual employees determined to do harm; 3 Identifying, protecting, and supporting (e.g., through cross-training) employees and 4

other persons with critical knowledge or functions; 5 Screening worksite personnel; and 6 Identifying and mitigating tactics used by terrorist agents to exploit disaffected 7

insiders; 8 Assessing human element vulnerabilities is more subjective than assessing the physical 9

or cyber vulnerabilities of corresponding assets, systems, and networks; and 10 Diverse protective programs and actions to address threats posed by employees, 11

contractors, and other personnel able to access critical facilities need to be put into place 12 across all sectors. 13

1.7.4 International CIKR Protection 14 The NIPP addresses international CIKR protection, including interdependencies and 15

vulnerabilities based on threats that originate outside the country or transit through it; 16 The Federal Government and the private sector work with foreign governments and 17

international/multinational organizations to enhance the confidentiality, integrity, and 18 availability of cyber infrastructure and products; 19

Protection of assets, systems, and networks that operate across or near the borders with 20 Canada and Mexico, or rely on other international aspects to enable critical 21 functionality, requires coordination with, and planning and/or sharing resources among, 22 neighboring governments at all levels, as well as private sector CIKR owners and 23 operators; 24

The Federal Government and private sector corporations have a significant number of 25 facilities located outside the United States that may be considered CIKR; 26

Special consideration is required when CIKR is extensively integrated into an 27 international or global market (e.g., financial services, agriculture, energy, 28 transportation, telecommunications, or information technology) or when a sector relies 29 on inputs that are not within the control of U.S. entities; 30

Special consideration is required when government facilities and functions are directly 31 affected by foreign-owned and -operated commercial facilities; and 32

The Federal government, working in close coordination and cooperation with the private 33 sector, launched the Critical Foreign Dependencies Initiative in 2007 to identify assets 34 and systems located outside the United States that if disrupted or destroyed, would 35 critically impact the public health and safety, economic, or national security of the 36 United States. The resulting National Critical Foreign Dependencies List now serves as 37 a strategic compendium capable of guiding engagement with foreign countries in the 38 field of critical infrastructure protection. 39

1.8 Achieving the Goal of the NIPP 40

Achieving the NIPP goal of building a safer, more secure, and more resilient America 41 requires actions that address the following principal objectives: 42

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Understanding and sharing information about terrorist threats and other hazards; 1 Building partnerships to share information and implement CIKR protection programs; 2 Implementing a long-term risk management program that includes: 3

Hardening, distributing, diversifying, and otherwise ensuring the resiliency of CIKR 4 against known threats and hazards, as well as other potential contingencies; 5

Processes to interdict human threats to prevent potential attacks; 6 Planning for rapid response to CIKR disruptions to limit the impacts on public 7

health and safety, the economy, and government functions; and 8 Planning for rapid CIKR restoration and recovery for those events that are not 9

preventable; and 10 Maximizing efficient use of resources for CIKR protection. 11

This section provides a summary of the actions needed to address these objectives. More 12 detailed discussions of these actions are included in the chapters that follow. 13

1.8.1 Understanding and Sharing Information 14 One of the essential elements needed to achieve the Nation’s CIKR protection goals is to 15 ensure the availability and flow of accurate, timely, and relevant information and/or intel-16 ligence about terrorist threats and other hazards, information analysis, and incident 17 reporting. This includes actions to: 18

Establish effective information-sharing processes and protocols among C partners; 19 Provide intelligence and information to SSAs and other CIKR sector partners as 20

permitted by law; 21 Analyze, warehouse, and share risk assessment data in a secure manner consistent with 22

relevant legal requirements and information protection responsibilities; 23 Provide protocols for real-time threat and incident reporting, alert, and warning; and 24 Provide protocols for the protection of sensitive information. 25

Chapter 3 details the risk and threat analysis processes and products aimed at better 26 understanding and characterizing terrorist threats. Chapter 4 describes the NIPP network 27 approach to information sharing and the process for protecting sensitive CIKR-related 28 information. 29

1.8.2 Building Partnerships 30 Building partnerships represents the foundation of the national CIKR protection effort. 31 These partnerships provide a framework to: 32

Exchange ideas, approaches, and best practices; 33 Facilitate security planning and resource allocation; 34 Establish effective coordinating structures among partners; 35 Enhance coordination with the international community; and 36 Build public awareness. 37

Chapters 2 and 4 detail partner roles and responsibilities related to CIKR protection, as 38 well as specific mechanisms for governance, coordination, and information sharing 39 necessary to enable effective partnerships. 40

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1.8.3 Implementing a Long-Term CIKR Risk Management Program 1 The long-term risk management program detailed in the NIPP includes processes to: 2

Establish a risk management framework to guide CIKR protection programs and 3 activities; 4

Identify and regularly update the status of CIKR protection programs within and across 5 sectors; 6

Conduct and update risk assessments at the asset, system, network, sector, cross-sector, 7 regional, national, and international levels; 8

Develop and deploy new technologies to enable more effective and efficient CIKR 9 protection; and 10

Provide a system for continuous measurement and improvement of CIKR protection, 11 including: 12

Establishing performance metrics to assess the effectiveness of protective programs 13 and resiliency strategies; 14

Developing a methodology to gauge the effectiveness of activities that sustain the 15 CIKR protection mission; and 16

Updating the NIPP and SSPs as required. 17 The NIPP also specifies the processes, key initiatives, and milestones necessary to 18 implement an effective long-term CIKR risk management program. Chapter 3 provides 19 details regarding the NIPP risk management framework and the measurement and 20 analysis process that support its continuous improvement loop; chapter 6 addresses issues 21 important for sustaining and improving CIKR protection over the long term. 22

1.8.4 Maximizing Efficient Use of Resources for CIKR Protection 23 Maximizing the efficient use of resources for CIKR protection includes a coordinated and 24 integrated annual process for program implementation that: 25

Supports prioritization of programs and activities within and across sectors; 26 Informs the annual Federal process regarding planning, programming, and budgeting 27

for national-level CIKR protection; 28 Helps to align the resources of the Federal budget to the CIKR protection mission and 29

goals, and enables tracking and accountability for expending public funds; 30 Accounts for State, local, and tribal government and private sector considerations 31

related to planning, programming, and budgeting; 32 Draws on expertise across organizational and national boundaries; 33 Shares expertise and speeds implementation of best practices; 34 Recognizes the need to build a business case based on the NIPP value proposition for 35

further private sector CIKR protection investments; and 36 Identifies potential incentives for security-related activities where they do not naturally 37

exist in the marketplace. 38 Chapter 5 explains how a coordinated national approach to the CIKR protection mission 39 enables the efficient use of resources. Efficient use of resources requires a deliberate 40 process to continuously improve the technology, databases, data systems, and other 41 approaches used to protect CIKR and manage risk. These processes are detailed in chapter 42 6. Chapter 7 describes the annual processes required to establish investment mechanisms 43

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for CIKR protection that reflect appropriate coordination with SSAs and other partners 1 regarding resource prioritization and allocation. Also discussed are processes to utilize 2 grants and other funding authorities to maximize and focus the use of resources to support 3 program priorities. 4

More information about NIPP is available on the Internet at: www.dhs.gov/nipp or by contacting DHS at: [email protected]

http://www.dhs.gov/nipp

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2. Authorities, Roles, and Responsibilities 1 Improving the protection and resilience of the Nation’s CIKR in an all-hazards environment 2 requires a comprehensive, unifying organization; clearly defined roles and responsibilities; 3 and close cooperation across all levels of government and the private sector. Protection 4 authorities, requirements, resources, capacities, and risk landscapes vary widely across 5 governmental jurisdictions, sectors, and individual industries and enterprises. This reality 6 presents a complex set of challenges in terms of NIPP compliance and performance 7 measurement. Hence, successful implementation of the NIPP and supporting SSPs depends 8 on an effective partnership framework that fosters integrated, collaborative engagement 9 and interaction; establishes a clear division of responsibilities among diverse Federal, 10 State, local, tribal, territorial, regional, and private sector partners; and efficiently allocates 11 the Nation’s protection resources based on risk and need. 12

This chapter includes a brief overview of the relevant authorities and outlines the principal 13 roles and responsibilities of DHS; SSAs and GCCs; other Federal departments and 14 agencies; State, local, tribal, and territorial jurisdictions; private sector owners and 15 operators; and other partners who share responsibility in protecting the Nation’s CIKR 16 under the NIPP. A comprehensive and unequivocal understanding of these roles and 17 responsibilities provides the foundation for an effective and sustainable national CIKR 18 protection effort. 19

2.1 Authorities 20

The roles and responsibilities described in this chapter are derived from a series of 21 authorities, including the Homeland Security Act of 2002, other CIKR protection-related 22 legislation, executive orders, Homeland Security Presidential directives, and Presidential 23 strategies. The National Strategy for Homeland Security established the national CIKR 24 vision with a charge to “forge an unprecedented level of cooperation throughout all levels of 25 government, with private industry and institutions, and with the American people to 26 protect our critical infrastructures and key assets from terrorist attack.”11 HSPD-7, Critical 27 Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection, provided the direction to 28 implement this vision. More detailed information on these and other CIKR protection-29 related authorities is included in chapter 5 and appendix 2A. 30

The Homeland Security Act provides the primary authority for the overall homeland 31 security mission and outlines DHS responsibilities in the protection of the Nation’s CIKR. 32 It established the DHS mission, including “reducing the Nation’s vulnerability to terrorist 33 attacks,” major disasters, and other emergencies, and charged the department with the 34 responsibility for evaluating vulnerabilities and ensuring that steps are implemented to 35 protect the high-risk elements of America’s CIKR, including food and water systems, 36 agriculture, health systems and emergency services, information technology, 37 telecommunications, banking and finance, energy (electrical, nuclear, gas and oil, and 38 dams), transportation (air, highways, rail, ports, and waterways), the chemical and defense 39

11The National Strategy for Homeland Security uses the term “key assets,” defined as individual targets whose destruction would not endanger vital systems, but could create local disaster or profoundly damage the Nation’s morale or confidence. The Homeland Security Act and HSPD-7 use the term “key resources,” defined more generally to capture publicly or privately controlled resources essential to the minimal operations of the economy or government. “Key resources” is the current terminology.

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industries, postal and shipping entities, and national monuments and icons. Title II, section 1 201, of the act assigned primary responsibility to DHS to develop a comprehensive national 2 plan for securing CIKR and for recommending “the measures necessary to protect the key 3 resources and critical infrastructure of the United States in coordination with other 4 agencies of the Federal Government and in cooperation with State and local government 5 agencies and authorities, the private sector, and other entities.” 6

A number of other statutes provide authorities both for cross-sector and sector-specific 7 CIKR protection efforts. Some examples of other CIKR protection-related legislation 8 include: The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 9 2002, which was intended to improve the ability of the United States to prevent, prepare 10 for, and respond to acts of bioterrorism and other public health emergencies; the Maritime 11 Transportation Security Act; the Energy Policy and Conservation Act; the Critical 12 Infrastructure Information Act; the Federal Information Security Management Act; 13 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007; and various others. 14

Many different HSPDs are also relevant to CIKR protection, including: 15

HSPD-3, Homeland Security Advisory System; 16 HSPD-5, Management of Domestic Incidents: addresses the national approach to 17

domestic incident management; 18 HSPD-8, National Preparedness; 19 HSPD-9, Defense of the United States Agriculture and Food; 20 HSPD-10, Biodefense for the 21st Century; 21 HSPD-19, Combating Terrorist Use of Explosives in the United States: and 22 HSPD-20, National Continuity Policy. 23

These separate authorities and directives are tied together as part of the national approach 24 for CIKR protection through the unifying framework established in HSPD-7. HSPD-7, 25 issued in December 2003, established the U.S. policy for “enhancing protection of the 26 Nation’s CIKR.” HSPD-7 establishes a framework for public and private sector partners to 27 identify, prioritize, and protect the Nation’s CIKR from terrorist attacks, with an emphasis 28 on protecting against catastrophic health effects and mass casualties. The directive sets 29 forth the roles and responsibilities for DHS; SSAs; other Federal departments and agencies; 30 State, local, tribal, and territorial governments; regional partners; the private sector; and 31 other CIKR partners. The following sections address roles and responsibilities under this 32 integrated approach. 33

2.2 Roles and Responsibilities 34

Given the fact that terrorist attacks and certain natural or manmade disasters can have 35 national-level impact, it is incumbent upon the Federal Government to provide overarching 36 leadership and coordination in the CIKR protection mission area. 37

2.2.1 Department of Homeland Security 38 Under HSPD-7, DHS is responsible for leading, integrating, and coordinating the overall 39 national effort to enhance CIKR protection, including collaborative development of the 40 NIPP and supporting SSPs; developing and implementing comprehensive, multi-tiered risk 41 management programs and methodologies; developing cross-sector and cross-jurisdictional 42

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protection guidance, guidelines, and protocols; and recommending risk management and 1 performance criteria and metrics within and across sectors. Per HSPD-7, DHS is also a 2 focal point for the security of cyberspace. HSPD-7 establishes a central source for 3 coordinating uniform security practices and harmonizing security programs across and 4 within government agencies. In the directive, the President designates the Secretary of 5 Homeland Security as the “principal Federal official to lead, integrate, and coordinate 6 implementation of efforts among Federal departments and agencies, State and local 7 governments, and the private sector to protect critical infrastructure and key resources.” 8 The Secretary of Homeland Security is responsible for addressing the complexities of the 9 Nation’s Federal system of government and its multifaceted and interdependent economy, 10 as well as for establishing structures to enhance the close cooperation between the private 11 sector and government at all levels to initiate and sustain an effective CIKR protection 12 program. 13

In addition to these overarching leadership and cross-sector responsibilities, DHS serves as 14 the SSA for 11 of the CIKR sectors identified in HSPD-7 or subsequently established using 15 the criteria set out in HSPD-7: Information Technology; Communications; Transportation; 16 Chemical; Emergency Services; Nuclear Reactors, Material, and Waste; Postal and 17 Shipping; Dams; Critical Manufacturing Government Facilities; and Commercial Facilities. 18 Specific SSA responsibilities are discussed in section 2.2.2. DHS, in the person of the 19 Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection or his/her designee, serves as the co-chair 20 of each of the GCCs with the respective SSA for that sector. 21

Additional DHS CIKR protection roles and responsibilities include: 22

Identifying, prioritizing, and coordinating Federal action in support of the protection of 23 nationally critical assets, systems, and networks, with a particular focus on CIKR that 24 could be exploited to cause catastrophic health effects or mass casualties comparable to 25 those produced by a WMD; 26

Coordinating, facilitating, and supporting the overall process for building partnerships 27 and leveraging sector-specific security expertise, relationships, and resources across 28 CIKR sectors, including oversight and support of the sector partnership model described 29 in chapter 4 through several internal Office of Infrastructure Protection branches and 30 offices; cooperation with Federal, State, local, tribal, territorial, and regional partners; 31 and collaborating with the Department of State to reach out to foreign countries and 32 international organizations to strengthen the protection of U.S. CIKR; 33

Support the formation and development of regional partnerships, including promoting 34 new partnerships, enabling information sharing, and sponsoring clearances. 35

Establishing and maintaining a comprehensive, multi-tiered, dynamic information-36 sharing network designed to provide timely and actionable threat information, assess-37 ments, and warnings to public and private sector partners. This responsibility includes 38 protecting sensitive information voluntarily provided by the private sector and 39 facilitating the development of sector-specific and cross-sector information-sharing and 40 analysis systems, mechanisms, and processes; 41

Coordinating national efforts for the security of cyber infrastructure, including 42 precursors and indicators of an attack, and understanding those threats in terms of 43 CIKR vulnerabilities; 44

Coordinating, facilitating, and supporting comprehensive risk assessment programs for 45 high-risk CIKR, identifying protection priorities across sectors and jurisdictions, and 46

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integrating CIKR protective programs with the all-hazards approach to domestic 1 incident management described in HSPD-5; 2

Facilitating the sharing of CIKR protection best practices and processes, and risk 3 assessment methodologies and tools across sectors and jurisdictions; 4

Sponsoring CIKR protection-related research and development (R&D), demonstration 5 projects, and pilot programs; 6

Seeding development and transfer of advanced technologies while leveraging private 7 sector expertise and competencies, including participation in the development of 8 voluntary consensus standards or best practices as appropriate; 9

Promoting national-level CIKR protection education, training, and awareness in 10 cooperation with State, local, tribal, territorial, regional, and private sector partners; 11

Identifying and implementing plans and processes for step-ups in protective measures 12 that align to all-hazards warnings, specific threat vectors as appropriate, and each level 13 of the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS); 14

Providing real-time (24/7) threat and incident reporting; 15 Conducting modeling and simulations to analyze sector, cross-sector, and regional 16

dependencies and interdependencies, to include cyber, and sharing the results with 17 CIKR partners, as appropriate; 18

Informing the annual Federal budget process based on CIKR risk and need in 19 coordination with SSAs, GCCs, and other partners; 20

Monitoring performance measures for the national CIKR protection program and NIPP 21 implementation process to enable continuous improvement, and providing annual CIKR 22 protection reports to the Executive Office of the President that include current status, 23 priorities, progress, and gaps in program authorities or resources, and recommended 24 corrective actions; 25

Integrating national efforts for the protection and recovery of critical information 26 systems and cyber components of physical CIKR, including analysis, warning, 27 information-sharing, vulnerability reduction, and mitigation activities and programs; 28

Evaluating preparedness for CIKR protection across sectors and jurisdictions as a 29 component of the National Exercise Program; 30

Documenting lessons learned from exercises, actual incidents, and pre-disaster 31 mitigation efforts, and applying those lessons, where applicable, to CIKR protection 32 efforts; 33

Working with the Department of State, SSAs, and other partners to ensure that U.S. 34 CIKR protection efforts are fully coordinated with international partners; and 35

Evaluating the need for and coordinating the protection of additional CIKR categories 36 over time, as appropriate. 37

2.2.2 Sector-Specific Agencies 38 Recognizing that each CIKR sector possesses its own unique characteristics, operating 39 models, and risk landscape, HSPD-7 designates Federal Government SSAs for each of the 40 CIKR sectors (see table 2-1). SSAs are responsible for working with DHS and their 41 respective GCCs to implement the NIPP sector partnership model and risk management 42 framework; develop protective programs, resiliency strategies, and related requirements; 43 and provide sector-level CIKR protection guidance in line with the overarching guidance 44 established by DHS pursuant to HSPD-7. Working in collaboration with partners, they are 45

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responsible for developing or revising and then submitting SSPs and sector-level 1 performance feedback to DHS to enable national cross-sector CIKR protection program gap 2 assessments. 3

In accordance with HSPD-7, SSAs are also responsible for collaborating with private sector 4 partners and encouraging the development of appropriate information-sharing and analysis 5 mechanisms within the sector. This includes supporting sector coordinating mechanisms to 6 facilitate sharing of information on physical and cyber threats, vulnerabilities, incidents, 7 recommended protective measures, and security-related best practices. This also includes 8 encouraging voluntary security-related information sharing, where possible, among private 9 entities within the sector, as well as among public and private entities. 10

Table 2-1: Sector-Specific Agencies and Assigned CIKR Sectors12 13 14 15 16 17 18 11

12 12 The Department of Agriculture is responsible for agriculture and food (meat, poultry, and egg products). 13 The Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration is responsible for food other than meat, poultry, and egg products. 14 Nothing in this plan impairs or otherwise affects the authority of the Secretary of Defense over the Department of Defense (DOD), including the chain of command for military forces from the President as Commander in Chief, to the Secretary of Defense, to the commander of military forces, or military command and control procedures. 15 The Energy Sector includes the production, refining, storage, and distribution of oil, gas, and electric power, except for nuclear power facilities. 16 The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) is the SSA for the maritime transportation mode. 17As stated in HSPD-7, the Department of Transportation and the Department of Homeland Security will collaborate on all matters relating to transportation security and transportation infrastructure protection. 18The Department of Education is the SSA for the Education Facilities Subsector of the Government Facilities Sector

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SSAs perform the activities above, as appropriate and consistent with existing authorities 1 (including regulatory authorities in some instances), in close cooperation with other sector 2 partners, including their GCCs. HSPD-7 requires SSAs to provide an annual report to the 3 Secretary of Homeland Security on their efforts to identify, prioritize, and coordinate CIKR 4 protection in their respective sectors. Consistent with this requirement, DHS provides 5 reporting guidance and templates that include requests for specific information, such as 6 sector CIKR protection priorities, requirements, and resources. SSAs also are responsible 7 for outlining these sector-specific CIKR protection requirements and related budget 8 projections as a component of their annual budget submissions to the Office of Management 9 and Budget (OMB). 10

Additional SSA responsibilities include: 11

Identifying, prioritizing, and coordinating the protection of sector-level CIKR with a 12 particular focus on CIKR that could be exploited to cause catastrophic health effects or 13 mass casualties comparable to those produced by a WMD; 14

Managing the overall process for building partnerships and leveraging CIKR security 15 expertise, relationships, and resources within the sector, including sector-level oversight 16 and support of the sector partnership model described in chapter 4; 17

Coordinating, facilitating, and supporting comprehensive risk assessment/management 18 programs for high-risk CIKR, identifying protection priorities, and incorporating CIKR 19 protection activities as a key component of the all-hazards approach to domestic 20 incident management within the sector; 21

Facilitating the sharing of real-time incident notification, as well as CIKR protection 22 best practices and processes, and risk assessment methodologies and tools within the 23 sector; 24

Promoting sector-level CIKR protection education, training, and awareness in 25 coordination with State, local, tribal, territorial, regional, and private sector partners; 26

Informing the annual Federal budget process based on CIKR risk and protection needs 27 in coordination with partners and allocating resources for CIKR protection accordingly; 28

Monitoring performance measures for sector-level CIKR protection and NIPP 29 implementation activities to enable continuous improvement, and reporting progress 30 and gaps to DHS; 31

Contributing to the annual National Critical Infrastructure Protection Research and 32 Development (NCIP R&D) Plan; 33

Identifying/recommending appropriate strategies to encourage private sector 34 participation; 35

Supporting DHS-initiated data calls to populate the Infrastructure Data Warehouse 36 (IDW), enable national-level risk assessment, and inform national-level resource 37 allocation; 38

Supporting protocols for the Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII) 39 Program; 40

Working with DHS to develop, evaluate, validate, or modify sector-specific risk 41 assessment tools; 42

Supporting sector-level dependency, interdependency, consequence, and other analysis 43 as required; 44

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Coordinating sector-level participation in the National Exercise Program, Homeland 1 Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP), and other sector-level activities; 2

Assisting sector partners in their efforts to: 3 Organize and conduct protection and continuity-of-operations planning, and elevate 4

awareness and understanding of threats and vulnerabilities to their assets, systems, 5 and networks; and 6

Identify and promote effective sector-specific CIKR protection practices and 7 methodologies; 8

Identifying and implementing plans and processes for step-ups in protective measures 9 that align to all-hazards warnings, specific threat vectors as appropriate, and each level 10 of the HSAS; 11

Understanding and mitigating sector-specific cyber risk by developing or encouraging 12 appropriate protective measures, information-sharing mechanisms, and emergency 13 recovery plans for cyber assets, systems, and networks within the sector and 14 interdependent sectors; and 15

Supporting DHS and Department of State efforts to integrate U.S. CIKR protection 16 programs into the international and global markets, and address relevant dependency, 17 interdependency, and cross-border issues. 18

2.2.3 Other Federal Departments, Agencies, and Offices 19 All Federal departments and agencies function as CIKR partners in coordination with DHS 20 and the SSAs. In accordance with HSPD-7, they are required to cooperate with DHS in 21 implementing CIKR protection efforts, consistent with the Homeland Security Act and 22 other applicable legal authorities. In this capacity, they support implementation of the 23 NIPP and SSPs, as appropriate, and are responsible for identification, prioritization, 24 assessment, remediation, and enhancing the protection of CIKR under their control. HSPD-25 7 also requires that all departments and agencies work with the sectors relevant to their 26 responsibilities to reduce the consequences of catastrophic failures not caused by acts of 27 terrorism. 28

Federal departments and agencies that are not designated as SSAs, but have unique 29 responsibilities, functions, or expertise in a particular CIKR sector (such as GCC members) 30 will: 31

Assist in assessing risk, prioritizing CIKR, and enabling protective actions and 32 programs within that sector; 33

Support the national goal of enhancing CIKR protection through their roles as the 34 regulatory agencies for owners and operators represented within specific sectors when 35 so designated by statute; and 36

Collaborate with all relevant partners to share security-related information within the 37 sector, as appropriate. 38

Depending on their regulatory roles and their relationships with the SSAs, these agencies 39 may play a supporting role in developing and implementing SSPs and related protective 40 activities within the sector. 41

Under HSPD-7, a number of Federal departments and agencies and components of the 42 Executive Office of the President have special functions related to CIKR protection. The fol-43 lowing section addresses Federal departments, agencies, and commissions specifically 44

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identified in HSPD-7. Many other Federal entities have sector-specific or cross-sector 1 authorities and responsibilities that are more appropriately addressed in the SSPs. 2

The Department of State, in coordination with DHS and the Departments of Justice 3 (DOJ), Commerce, Defense, and Treasury, works with foreign governments and interna-4 tional organizations to strengthen U.S. CIKR protection efforts. 5

The Department of Justice, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), acts to 6 reduce terrorist threats, and investigates and prosecutes actual or attempted attacks 7 on, sabotage of, or disruptions of CIKR in collaboration with DHS. 8

The Department of Commerce works with DHS, the private sector, and research, 9 academic, and government organizations to improve technology for cyber systems and 10 promote other critical infrastructure efforts, including using its authority under the 11 Defense Production Act to ensure the timely availability of industrial products, 12 materials, and services to meet homeland security requirements, and to address 13 economic security issues. 14

The Department of Transportation (DOT) collaborates with DHS on all matters related 15 to transportation security and transportation infrastructure protection, and is addi-16 tionally responsible for operating the National Airspace System. DOT and DHS 17 collaborate on regulating the transportation of hazardous materials by all modes 18 (including pipelines). 19

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) works with DHS and the Department of 20 Energy (DOE), as appropriate, to ensure the protection of commercial nuclear reactors 21 for generating electric power and non-power nuclear reactors used for research, testing, 22 and training; nuclear materials in medical, industrial, and academic settings and 23 facilities that fabricate nuclear fuel; and the transportation, storage, and disposal of 24 nuclear materials and waste. In addition, the NRC collaborates with DHS on any 25 changes in the protective measures for this sector and the approval of any new reactors. 26

The Intelligence Community, the Department of Defense, and other appropriate Federal 27 departments, such as the Department of the Interior and DOT, are collaborating with 28 DHS on the development and implementation of a geospatial program to map, image, 29 analyze, and sort CIKR data using commercial satellite and airborne systems, as well as 30 associated agency capabilities. DHS works with these Federal departments and 31 agencies to identify and help protect those positioning, navigation, and timing services, 32 such as global positioning systems (GPS), that are critical enablers for CIKR sectors 33 such as Banking and Finance and Communications. DHS and the intelligence 34 community also collaborate with other agencies, such as the Environmental Protection 35 Agency, that manage data addressed by geographic information systems. 36

The Homeland Security Council ensures the coordination of interagency policy related 37 to physical and cyber CIKR protection based on advice from the Critical Infrastructure 38 Protection Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC). This PCC is chaired by a Federal 39 officer or employee designated by the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security. 40

The Office of Science and Technology Policy coordinates with DHS to further 41 interagency R&D related to CIKR protection. 42

The Office of Management and Budget oversees the implementation of government-wide 43 policies, principles, standards, and guidelines for Federal Government computer 44 security programs. 45

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2.2.4 State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Governments 1 State, local, tribal, and territorial governments are responsible for implementing the 2 homeland security mission, protecting public safety and welfare, and ensuring the provision 3 of essential services to communities and industries within their jurisdictions. They also 4 play a very important and direct role in enabling the protection of the Nation’s CIKR, 5 including CIKR under their control, as well as CIKR owned and operated by other NIPP 6 partners within their jurisdictions. The efforts of these public entities are critical to the 7 effective implementation of the NIPP, SSPs, and various jurisdictionally focused protection 8 and resiliency plans. They are equally critical in terms of enabling time-sensitive, post-9 event CIKR response, restoration, and recovery activities. 10

CIKR partners at all levels of government have developed homeland security strategies 11 that align with and support the priorities established in the National Preparedness 12 Guidelines. With the inclusion of NIPP implementation as one of these national priorities, 13 CIKR protection programs form an essential component of State, local, tribal, and 14 territorial homeland security strategies, particularly with regard to establishing funding 15 priorities and informing security investment decisions. To permit effective NIPP 16 implementation and performance measurement at each jurisdictional level, these protection 17 programs should reference all core elements of the NIPP framework, including key cross-18 jurisdictional security and information-sharing linkages, as well as specific CIKR protective 19 programs focused on risk management. These programs play a primary role in the 20 identification and protection of CIKR locally and also support DHS and SSA efforts to 21 identify, ensure connectivity with, and enable the protection of CIKR of national-level 22 criticality within the jurisdiction. 23

2.2.4.1 State and Territorial Governments 24 State (and territorial, where applicable) governments are responsible for establishing 25 partnerships, facilitating coordinated information sharing, and enabling planning and 26 preparedness for CIKR protection within their jurisdictions. They serve as crucial 27 coordination hubs, bringing together prevention, protection, response, and recovery 28 authorities; capacities; and resources among local jurisdictions, across sectors, and between 29 regional entities. States and territories also act as conduits for requests for Federal 30 assistance when the threat or incident situation exceeds the capabilities of public and 31 private sector partners at lower jurisdictional levels. States receive CIKR information from 32 the Federal Government to support the national and State CIKR protection and resiliency 33 programs. 34

State and territorial governments are responsible for developing and implementing State or 35 territory-wide CIKR protection programs that reflect the full range of NIPP-related 36 activities. State/territorial programs should address all relevant aspects of CIKR protection, 37 leverage support from homeland security assistance programs that apply across the 38 homeland security mission area, and reflect priority activities in their strategies to ensure 39 that resources are effectively allocated. Effective statewide and regional CIKR protection 40 efforts should be integrated into the overarching homeland security program framework at 41 the State or territory level to ensure that prevention, protection, response, and recovery 42 efforts are synchronized and mutually supportive. CIKR protection at the State/territory 43 level must cut across all sectors present within the State/territory and support national, 44 State, and local priorities. The program also should explicitly address unique geographical 45

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issues, including trans-border concerns, as well as interdependencies among sectors and 1 jurisdictions within those geographical boundaries. 2

Specific CIKR protection-related activities at the State and territorial level include: 3

Acting as a focal point for and promoting the coordination of protective and emergency 4 response activities, preparedness programs, and resource support among local 5 jurisdictions and regional partners; 6

Developing a consistent approach to CIKR identification, risk determination, mitigation 7 planning, and prioritized security investment, and exercising preparedness among all 8 relevant stakeholders within their jurisdictions; 9

Identifying, implementing, and monitoring a risk management plan and taking 10 corrective actions as appropriate; 11

Participating in significant national, regional, and local awareness programs to 12 encourage appropriate management and security of cyber systems; 13

Acting as conduits for requests for Federal assistance when the threat or current 14 situation exceeds the capabilities of State and local jurisdictions and private entities 15 resident within them; 16

Facilitating the exchange of security information, including threat assessments and 17 other analyses, attack indications and warnings, and advisories, within and across 18 jurisdictions and sectors therein; 19

Participating in the NIPP sector partnership model, including Government 20 Coordinating Councils (GCCs) including the State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial GCC; 21 Sector Coordinating Councils (SCCs); and other CIKR governance efforts and SSP 22 planning efforts relevant to the given jurisdiction to include the State or jurisdiction’s 23 customized version of a sector partnership model, such as combined GCCs/SCCs, which 24 demand less support; 25

Ensuring that funding priorities are addressed and that resources are allocated 26 efficiently and effectively to achieve the CIKR protection mission in accordance with 27 relevant plans and strategies; 28

Sharing information on CIKR deemed critical from national, State, regional, local, 29 tribal, and/or territorial perspectives to enable prioritized protection and restoration of 30 critical public services, facilities, utilities, and processes within the jurisdiction; 31

Addressing unique geographical issues, including trans-border concerns, dependencies, 32 and interdependencies among the sectors within the jurisdiction; 33

▪ Identifying and implementing plans and processes for increases in protective measures that align to 34 all-hazards warnings, specific threat vectors as appropriate, and each level of the Homeland Security 35 Alert System (HSAS); 36

Documenting lessons learned from pre-disaster mitigation efforts, exercises, and actual 37 incidents, and applying that learning, where applicable, to the CIKR protection context; 38

Providing response and protection where there are gaps and local entities lack resources 39 to address these gaps; 40

Identifying and communicating requirements for CIKR-related R&D to DHS; and 41 Providing information, as part of the grants process and/or homeland security strategy 42

updates, regarding State priorities, requirements, and CIKR-related funding 43 projections. 44

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2.2.4.2 Regional Organizations 1 Regional partnerships include a variety of public-private sector initiatives that cross 2 jurisdictional and/or sector boundaries and focus on homeland security preparedness, 3 protection, response, and recovery within or serving the population of a defined 4 geographical area. Specific regional initiatives range in scope from organizations that 5 include multiple jurisdictions and industry partners within a single State to groups that 6 involve jurisdictions and enterprises in more than one State and across international 7 borders. In many cases, State governments also collaborate through the adoption of 8 interstate compacts to formalize regionally based partnerships regarding CIKR protection. 9

Partners leading or participating in regional initiatives are encouraged to capitalize on the 10 larger area- and sector-specific expertise and relationships to: 11

Promote collaboration among partners in implementing NIPP-related CIKR risk 12 assessment and protection activities; 13

Facilitate education and awareness of CIKR protection efforts occurring within their 14 geographical areas; 15

Coordinate regional exercise and training programs, including a focus on CIKR 16 protection collaboration across jurisdictional and sector boundaries; 17

Support threat-initiated as well as ongoing operations-based activities to enhance 18 protection and preparedness, as well as to support mitigation, response, and recovery; 19

Work with State, local, tribal, territorial, and international governments and the 20 private sector, as appropriate, to evaluate regional and cross-sector CIKR 21 interdependencies, including cyber considerations; 22

Conduct appropriate regional planning efforts and undertake appropriate partnership 23 agreements to enable regional CIKR protection activities and enhanced response to 24 emergencies; 25

Facilitate information sharing and data collection between and among regional 26 initiative members and external partners; 27

Share information on progress and CIKR protection requirements with DHS, the SSAs, 28 the States, and other CIKR partners, as appropriate; and 29

Participate in the NIPP sector partnership model, as appropriate. 30 2.2.4.3 Local Governments 31 Local governments represent the front lines for homeland security and, more specifically, 32 for CIKR protection and implementation of the NIPP partnership model. They provide 33 critical public services and functions in conjunction with private sector owners and 34 operators. In some sectors, local government entities own and operate CIKR such as water, 35 stormwater, and electric utilities. Most disruptions or malevolent acts that impact CIKR 36 begin and end as local situations. Local authorities typically shoulder the weight of initial 37 prevention, response, and recovery operations until coordinated support from other sources 38 becomes available, regardless of who owns or operates the affected asset, system, or 39 network. As a result, local governments are critical partners under the NIPP framework. 40 They drive emergency preparedness, as well as local participation in NIPP and SSP 41 implementation across a variety of jurisdictional partners, including government agencies, 42 owners and operators, and private citizens in the communities they serve. 43

CIKR protection focus at the local level should include, but is not limited to: 44

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Acting as a focal point for and promoting the coordination of protective and emergency 1 response activities, preparedness programs, and resource support among local agencies, 2 businesses, and citizens; 3

Developing a consistent approach at the local level to CIKR identification, risk 4 determination, mitigation planning, and prioritized security investment, and exercising 5 preparedness among all relevant partners within the jurisdiction; 6

Identifying, implementing, and monitoring a risk management plan, and taking 7 corrective actions as appropriate; 8

Participating in significant national, regional, and local awareness programs to 9 encourage appropriate management and security of cyber systems; 10

Facilitating the exchange of security information, including threat assessments, attack 11 indications and warnings, and advisories, among partners within the jurisdiction; 12

Participating in the NIPP sector partnership model, including GCCs, SCCs, SLTTGCC, 13 and other CIKR governance efforts and SSP planning efforts relevant to the given 14 jurisdiction; 15

Ensuring that funding priorities are addressed and that resources are allocated 16 efficiently and effectively to achieve the CIKR protection mission in accordance with 17 relevant plans and strategies; 18

Sharing information with partners, as appropriate, on CIKR deemed critical from the 19 local perspective to enable prioritized protection and restoration of critical public 20 services, facilities, utilities, and processes within the jurisdiction; 21

Addressing unique geographical issues, including trans-border concerns, dependencies, 22 and interdependencies among agencies and enterprises within the jurisdiction; 23

Identifying and implementing plans and processes for step-ups in protective measures 24 that align to all-hazards warnings, specific threat vectors as appropriate, and each level 25 of the HSAS; 26

Documenting lessons learned from pre-disaster mitigation efforts, exercises, and actual 27 incidents, and applying that learning, where applicable, to the CIKR protection context; 28 and 29

Conducting CIKR protection public awareness activities. 30 2.2.4.4 Tribal Governments 31 Tribal government roles and responsibilities regarding CIKR protection generally mirror 32 those of State and local governments as detailed above. Tribal governments are accountable 33 for the public health, welfare, and safety of tribal members, as well as the protection of 34 CIKR and continuity of essential services under their jurisdiction. Under the NIPP 35 partnership model, tribal governments must ensure close coordination with Federal, State, 36 local, and international counterparts to achieve synergy in the implementation of the NIPP 37 and SSP frameworks within their jurisdictions. This is particularly important in the 38 context of information sharing, risk analysis and management, awareness, preparedness 39 planning, protective program investments and initiatives, and resource allocation. 40

2.2.4.5 Boards, Commissions, Authorities, Councils, and Other Entities 41 An array of boards, commissions, authorities, councils, and other entities at the State, local, 42 tribal, and regional levels perform regulatory, advisory, policy, or business oversight 43 functions related to various aspects of CIKR operations and protection within and across 44 sectors and jurisdictions. Some of these entities are established through State- or local-level 45

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executive or legislative mandates with elected, appointed, or voluntary membership. These 1 groups include, but are not limited to: transportation authorities, public utility commis-2 sions, water and sewer boards, park commissions, housing authorities, public health 3 agencies, and many others. These entities may serve as SSAs within a State and contribute 4 expertise, assist with regulatory authorities, or help to facilitate investment decisions 5 related to CIKR protection efforts within a given jurisdiction or geographical region. 6

2.2.5 Private Sector Owners and Operators 7 Owners and operators generally develop and implement the protective programs and 8 resiliency strategies for the CIKR under their control. Private sector owners and operators 9 take action to support risk management planning and investments in security as a 10 necessary component of prudent business planning and operations. In today’s risk 11 environment, these activities generally include reassessing and adjusting continuity-of-12 business and emergency management plans, building increased resiliency and redundancy 13 into business processes and systems, protecting facilities against physical and cyber attacks 14 and natural disasters, guarding against the insider threat, and increasing coordination 15 with external organizations to avoid or minimize the impacts on surrounding communities 16 or other industry partners. 17

For many private sector enterprises, the level of investment in security reflects risk versus 18 consequence tradeoffs that are based on two factors: (1) what is known about the risk 19 environment, and (2) what is economically justifiable and sustainable in a competitive 20 marketplace or in an environment of limited resources. In the context of the first factor, the 21 Federal Government is uniquely postured to help inform critical security investment 22 decisions and operational planning. For example, owners and operators generally look to 23 the government as a source of security-related best practices and for attack or natural 24 hazard indications, warnings, and threat assessments. In relationship to the second factor, 25 owners and operators also generally rely on government entities to address risks outside of 26 their property or in situations in which the current threat exceeds an enterprise’s capability 27 to protect itself or requires an unreasonable level of additional investment to mitigate risk. 28 In this situation, public and private sector partners at all levels must collaborate to address 29 the protection of national-level CIKR, provide timely warnings, and promote an 30 environment in which CIKR owners and operators can better carry out their specific 31 protection responsibilities. Additionally, CIKR owners and operators may be required to 32 invest in security as a result of Federal, State, and/or local regulations. 33

The CIKR protection responsibilities of specific owners or operators vary widely within and 34 across sectors. Some sectors have regulatory or statutory frameworks that govern private 35 sector security operations within the sector; however, most are guided by voluntary security 36 regimes or adherence to industry-promoted best practices. Within this diverse protective 37 landscape, private sector entities can better secure the CIKR under their control by: 38

Performing comprehensive risk assessments tailored to their specific sector, enterprise, 39 or facility risk landscape; 40

Developing an awareness of critical dependencies and interdependencies at the sector, 41 enterprise, and facility levels; 42

Implementing protective actions and programs to reduce identified vulnerabilities 43 appropriate to the level of risk presented; 44

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Establishing cybersecurity programs and associated awareness training within the 1 organization; 2

Adhering to recognized industry best business practices and standards, including those 3 with a cybersecurity nexus (see appendix 5B); 4

Developing and coordinating CIKR protective and emergency response actions, plans, 5 and programs with appropriate Federal, State, and local government authorities; 6

Participating in the NIPP sector partnership model (including SCCs and information-7 sharing mechanisms), as appropriate; 8

Assisting and supporting Federal, State, local, and tribal government CIKR data 9 collection and protection efforts, as appropriate; 10

Participating in Federal, State, local, and tribal government emergency management 11 programs and coordinating structures; 12

Establishing resilient, robust, and/or redundant operational systems or capabilities 13 associated with critical functions where appropriate; 14

Promoting CIKR protection education, training, and awareness programs; 15 Adopting and implementing effective workforce security assurance programs to mitigate 16

potential insider threats; 17 Providing technical expertise to SSAs and DHS when appropriate; 18 Participating in regular CIKR protection-focused exercise programs with other public 19

and private sector partners; 20 Identifying and communicating requirements to DHS and/or SSAs or States for CIKR 21

protection-related R&D; 22 Sharing security-related best practices and entering into operational mutual-aid 23

agreements with other industry partners; and 24 Working to identify and help remove barriers to public-private partnerships. 25

2.2.6 Advisory Councils 26 Advisory councils provide advice, recommendations, and expertise to the government (e.g., 27 DHS, SSAs, and State or local agencies) regarding CIKR protection policy and activities. 28 These entities also help enhance public-private partnerships and information sharing. They 29 often provide an additional mechanism to engage with a pre-existing group of private sector 30 leaders to obtain feedback on CIKR protection policy and programs, and to make 31 suggestions to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of specific government programs. 32 Examples of CIKR protection-related advisory councils and their associated responsibilities 33 include: 34

Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC): CIPAC is a partnership 35 between government and private sector CIKR owners and operators that facilitates 36 effective coordination of Federal CIKR protection programs. CIPAC engages in a range 37 of CIKR protection activities such as planning, coordination, NIPP implementation, and 38 operational activities, including incident response, recovery, and reconstitution. DHS 39 published a Federal Register Notice on March 24, 2006, announcing the establishment 40 of CIPAC as a Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA)19 -exempt body pursuant to 41 section 871 of the Homeland Security Act (see chapter 4). 42

19FACA authorized the establishment of a system governing the creation and operation of advisory committees in the executive branch of the Federal Government and for other purposes. The act, when it applies, generally requires advisory committees to meet in open session and make publicly available

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Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC): The HSAC provides advice and 1 recommendations to the Secretary of Homeland Security on relevant issues. The Council 2 members, appointed by the DHS Secretary, include experts from State and local 3 governments, public safety, security and first-responder communities, academia, and 4 the private sector. 5

Private Sector Senior Advisory Committee (PVTSAC): The Secretary of Homeland 6 Security established the PVTSAC as a subcommittee of the HSAC to provide the 7 HSAC with expert advice from leaders in the private sector. 8

National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC): The NIAC provides the President, 9 through the Secretary of Homeland Security, with advice on the security of physical and 10 cyber systems across all CIKR sectors. The Council is comprised of up to 30 members 11 appointed by the President. Members are selected from the private sector, academia, 12 and State and local governments. The Council was established (and amended) under 13 Executive Orders 13231, 13286, and 13385. 14

National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC): The NSTAC 15 provides industry-based advice and expertise to the President on issues and problems 16 related to implementing National Security and Emergency Preparedness (NS/EP) 17 communications policy. The NSTAC is comprised of up to 30 industry chief executives 18 representing the major communications and network service providers and information 19 technology, finance, and aerospace companies. It was created under Executive Order 20 12382. 21

2.2.7 Academia and Research Centers 22 The academic and research center communities play an important role in enabling 23 national-level CIKR protection and implementation of the NIPP, including: 24

Establishing Centers of Excellence (i.e., university-based partnerships or federally 25 funded R&D centers) to provide independent analysis of CIKR protection issues; 26

Supporting the research, development, testing, evaluation, and deployment of CIKR 27 protection technologies; 28

Analyzing, developing, and sharing best practices related to CIKR protection efforts; 29 Researching and providing innovative thinking and perspective on threats and the 30

behavioral aspects of terrorism; 31 Preparing or disseminating guidelines, courses, and descriptions of best practices for 32

physical security and cybersecurity; 33 Developing and providing suitable security risk analysis and risk management courses 34

for CIKR protection professionals; 35 Establishing undergraduate and graduate curricula and degree programs; and 36 Conducting research to identify new technologies and analytical methods that can be 37

applied by partners to support NIPP efforts. 38

associated written materials. It also requires a 15-day notice before any meeting may be closed to public attendance, a requirement which could prevent a meeting on short notice to discuss sensitive information in an appropriate setting.

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3. The Strategy: Managing Risk 1 The cornerstone of the NIPP is its risk management framework. Risk is the potential for an 2 unwanted outcome resulting from an incident, event, or occurrence, as determined by its 3 likelihood and the associated consequences. This considers threat as the likelihood an event 4 will happen and vulnerability as the likelihood that the event is successful in causing harm 5 via disruption, destruction, or exploitation. This approach allows us to see potential losses 6 in the context of the likelihood that they will occur, making risk an important means of 7 prioritizing mitigation efforts for partners ranging from facility owners and operators to 8 Federal agencies. The NIPP risk management framework (see Figure 3-1) integrates and 9 coordinates strategy, capability, and governance to enable risk-informed decision making 10 related to the nation’s CIKR. This framework is applicable to threats ranging from natural 11 disasters and manmade safety hazards, as well as terrorism, although different information 12 and methodologies may be used to understand each. 13

This chapter addresses the use of the NIPP risk management framework as part of the 14 overall effort to ensure the steady-state protection and resiliency of our Nation’s CIKR. 15 DHS, the SSAs, and their public and private sector partners share responsibility for 16 implementation of the NIPP risk management framework. SSAs are responsible for leading 17 sector-specific risk management programs and for ensuring that the tailored, sector-specific 18 application of the risk management framework is addressed in their respective SSPs. DHS 19 supports these efforts by providing guidance and analytical support to SSAs and other 20 partners. DHS, in collaboration with other CIKR partners, is responsible for using the best 21 available information to conduct cross-sector risk analysis and risk management activities. 22 This includes the assessment of dependencies, interdependencies, and cascading effects; 23 identification of common vulnerabilities; development and sharing of common threat 24 scenarios; assessment and comparison of risk across sectors; identification and 25 prioritization of risk management opportunities across sectors; development and sharing of 26 cross-sector measures to reduce or manage risk; and identification of specific cross-sector 27 R&D needs. 28

Figure 3-1: NIPP Risk Management Framework 29 30

31 32 The NIPP risk management framework is tailored to and applied on an asset, system, 33 network, or functional basis, depending on the fundamental characteristics of the 34 individual CIKR sectors. For those sectors primarily dependent on fixed assets and physical 35 facilities, a bottom-up, asset-by-asset approach may be most appropriate. For sectors such 36 as Communications, Information Technology, and Food and Agriculture, with accessible 37

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and distributed systems, a top-down, business or mission continuity approach or risk 1 assessments that focus on networks and systems may be more effective. Each sector must 2 pursue the approach that produces the most actionable results for the sector and maximizes 3 their ability to contribute to cross-sector comparative risk analyses conducted by DHS. 4

The NIPP risk management framework includes the following activities: 5

Set goals and objectives: Define specific outcomes, conditions, end points, or 6 performance targets that collectively constitute an effective risk management posture. 7 By defining a desirable end state for each cycle of risk management, the CIKR partners 8 can understand and agree upon the protective posture that they are striving for with 9 their risk management activities. 10

Identify assets, systems, and networks: Develop an inventory of the assets, systems, 11 and networks, including those located outside the U.S,, that comprise the Nation’s CIKR 12 and the critical functionality therein; collect information pertinent to risk management 13 that takes into account the fundamental characteristics of each sector. 14

Assess risks: Evaluate the risk considering the potential direct and indirect 15 consequences of a terrorist attack or other hazards (including, as capabilities mature, 16 seasonal changes in consequences and dependencies and interdependencies associated 17 with each identified asset, system, or network), known vulnerabilities to various 18 potential attack methods or other significant hazards, and general or specific threat 19 information. 20

Prioritize: Aggregate and compare risk assessment results to develop an appropriate 21 view of asset, system, and/or network risks and associated mission continuity, where 22 applicable; establish priorities based on risk; and determine protection, resilience, or 23 business continuity initiatives that provide the greatest return on investment for the 24 mitigation of risk. 25

Implement protective programs and resiliency strategies: Select appropriate 26 actions or programs to reduce or manage the risk identified; secure the resources needed 27 to address priorities. 28

Measure effectiveness: Use metrics and other evaluation procedures at the national, 29 regional, State, local, and sector levels to measure progress and assess the effectiveness 30 of the national CIKR protection program in improving protection, managing risk, and 31 increasing resiliency in the most cost-effective way. 32

This process features a continuous feedback loop, which allows the Federal Government 33 and its CIKR partners to track progress and implement actions to improve national CIKR 34 protection and resiliency over time. The physical, cyber, and human elements of CIKR 35 should be considered during each step of the risk management framework. The sector 36 partnership model discussed in chapter 4 provides the structure for coordination and 37 management of risk management activities that are tailored to different sectors and 38 jurisdictions of government. 39

3.1 Set Goals and Objectives 40

Achieving robust, protected, and resilient infrastructure requires national, State, local, and 41 sector-specific CIKR protection goals and objectives that collectively represent the desired 42

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risk management posture. These goals and objectives should consider the physical, cyber, 1 and human elements of CIKR protection. Goals and objectives may vary across and within 2 sectors and jurisdictions of government, depending on the internal structure and 3 composition of a specific industry, resource, or other aspect of CIKR. 4

Nationally, the overall goal of CIKR-related risk management is an enhanced state of 5 protection and resilience achieved through the implementation of focused risk-reduction 6 strategies within and across sectors and levels of government. The risk management 7 framework supports this goal by:8

Enabling the development of the National, sector, regional, and State risk profiles that 9 serve as the foundation for the National CIKR Protection Annual Report described in 10 Chapter 7. These risk profiles outline the highest risks facing different sectors and 11 geographical regions, and identify cross-sector or regional issues of concern appropriate 12 for Federal CIKR protection focus, as well as opportunities for sector-, State-, and 13 regionally based initiatives. 14

Figure 3-2: NIPP Risk Management Framework: Set Security Goals 15

16 Enabling DHS, SSAs, and other partners to determine the best courses of action to 17

reduce potential consequences, threats, or vulnerabilities. Some available options 18 include encouraging voluntary implementation of focused risk management strategies 19 (e.g., through public-private partnerships), pursuing economic incentive-related policies 20 and programs, and undertaking regulatory action if appropriate; and 21

Allowing the identification of risk management and resource allocation options at 22 various jurisdictional levels, as well as those under the authority of CIKR owners and 23 operators. 24

From a sector or jurisdictional perspective, CIKR protection goals or their related sup-25 porting objectives: 26

Define the risk management posture that CIKR partners seek to attain within the 27 planning horizon; 28

Express this posture in terms of the outcomes and objective metrics and the time 29 required to attain it through focused program implementation; 30

Consider distinct assets, systems, networks, functions, operational processes, business 31 environments, and risk management approaches; and 32

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Vary according to the business characteristics and security landscape of the affected 1 sector, jurisdiction, or locality. 2

Taken collectively, these goals guide all levels of government and the private sector in 3 tailoring risk management programs and activities to address CIKR protection and 4 resilience needs. 5

3.2 Identify Assets, Systems, and Networks 6

To meet its responsibilities under the Homeland Security Act and HSPD-7, DHS 7 continuously engages partner agencies and other infrastructure partners to build, manage, 8 and refine a comprehensive inventory of the assets, systems, and networks that comprise 9 the Nation’s CIKR. This inventory provides a common baseline of knowledge that can 10 inform CIKR partners at various levels of government and the private sector regarding 11 infrastructure dependencies and interdependencies as well as enable national, regional, 12 and sector-based risk assessment, prioritization, and management. 13

Given the Nation’s vast and varied infrastructure, developing an inventory of critical 14 assets, systems, and networks is a process that requires an examination specific to the 15 types of CIKR and the sector to which they belong. 16

Figure 3-3: NIPP Risk Management Framework: Identify Assets, Systems, and Networks 17

18 Screening is the initial process to identify the assets, systems, networks, and functions of 19 concern. It is an important step at every level of risk-informed decision making, as it helps 20 define a subset of scenarios (both CIKR elements and the events that may produce risk) to 21 focus further analysis and risk management. Concerns that are critical to one decision 22 maker may be less so to other partners, so screening by different parties for different 23 purposes will yield alternate results. Specific programs to identify and prioritize nationally 24 and regionally significant CIKR allow DHS’ focus for risk management to be shared with 25 other partners 26

3.2.1 National Infrastructure Inventory 27 DHS maintains a national database of the assets, systems, and networks that make up the 28 Nation’s CIKR. The Nation’s infrastructure includes assets, systems, and networks that are 29

Sample Goal – Communications Sector Build networks and systems that provide secure and resilient communications for the Nation and that can be rapidly restored after a natural or manmade disaster.

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nationally significant and those that may not be significant on a national level but are, 1 nonetheless, important to State, regional, or local CIKR protection, incident management, 2 and response and recovery efforts. The principal national database of CIKR systems and 3 assets is the Infrastructure Data Warehouse (IDW). The IDW comprises a federated data 4 architecture that provides a single virtual view of one or more infrastructure data sources. 5 DHS uses this database to provide all relevant Federal, State, local, and private-sector CIKR 6 partners with access to the most current and complete view of the Nation’s infrastructure 7 information allowed under applicable Federal, State, or local regulation. 8

The goal for the IDW is to also provide access to relevant assessments for natural disasters, 9 industrial accidents, and other incidents and maintain basic information about the 10 relationships, dependencies, and interdependencies among various assets, systems, and 11 networks, including foreign CIKR upon which the U.S. may rely. The inventory will also 12 include a cyber data framework to characterize each sector’s unique and significant cyber 13 assets, systems, or networks. 14

This information is needed not only to help manage steady-state CIKR protection and 15 resiliency approaches, but also to inform and support the response to a wide array of 16 incidents and emergencies. Risk may change based on many factors including damage 17 resulting from a natural disaster; seasonal or cyclic dependencies; and changes in 18 technology, the economy, or the terrorist threat. The inventory supports domestic incident 19 management by helping to prioritize and focus preparedness planning; inform decision-20 making; establish strategies for response; and identify priorities for restoration, 21 remediation, and reconstruction. 22

Currently, this inventory and associated attributes are maintained through the 23 Infrastructure Information Collection System (IICS), a federated IDW, accessible in a 24 geospatial context using the tools provided by the Integrated Common Analytical Viewer 25 (iCAV). SSAs and DHS work together and in concert with State, local, territorial, and tribal 26 governments, and private sector partners to ensure that the inventory data structure is 27 accurate, current, and secure. DHS provides guidelines concerning information needed to 28 develop and maintain the inventory. Within this inventory, the set of nationally and 29 regionally significant infrastructure is maintained and constantly improved. 30

Owners, operators, and managers of infrastructure databases, together with other CIKR 31 partners, generally have the best knowledge of their assets, systems, networks, and related 32 data. These subject matter experts work with DHS, Federal departments and agencies, 33 State and local government entities, and the private sector to determine the specific 34 information needed in addition to core requirements to reflect their sectors and 35 jurisdictions in national-level risk analysis. Judgments about information provided to DHS 36 are informed by a screening process that considers the consequences that would result if an 37 asset, system, or network were lost, exploited, damaged, or disrupted. 38

For those sectors whose risk is dominated by fixed assets and systems with relatively 39 constant functions, a bottom-up, asset-based approach often is most appropriate for 40 collecting and organizing inventory information. A bottom-up approach normally includes 41 an aggregate assessment of expected losses for relevant scenarios at the individual facility 42 level. This must consider both on-site and off-site consequences to the facility’s function and 43

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the surrounding population and environment that could result from natural disasters, 1 accidents, or terrorist attacks. 2

For sectors with open adaptive systems, virtual- or information-based core processes, or a 3 principal focus on sustaining a level of service, a top-down system- or network- based 4 approach may be more appropriate. A top-down approach normally includes an assessment 5 of key missions and the identification of the high-level processes, capabilities, and functions 6 on which those missions depend. It considers dependencies on other sectors to evaluate 7 resiliency, redundancy, and recoverability. 8

9

Information to be included in the IDW will come from a variety of sources, such as: 10

Sector inventories: SSAs and GCCs maintain close working relationships with 11 owners and operators, SCCs, and other sources that maintain inventories necessary for 12 the sector’s business or mission. SSAs provide relevant information to DHS and update 13 it on a periodic basis to ensure that sector assets and critical functions are adequately 14 represented, and that sector and cross-sector dependencies and interdependencies can 15 be identified and analyzed;16

Voluntary submittals from CIKR partners: Owners and operators; State, local, 17 territorial, and tribal governments; and Federal departments and agencies voluntarily 18 submit information and previously completed inventories and analyses for DHS to 19 consider; 20

Tier1/Tier 2 Program

The Tier 1 and Tier 2 Program identifies nationally significant, high consequence assets and systems in order to enhance decision-making related to CIKR protection. Assets and systems identified through the program include those that, if destroyed or disrupted, could cause some combination of significant casualties, major economic losses, or widespread and long-term disruptions to national well-being and governance capacity.

The overwhelming majority of the assets and systems identified through this effort will be classified as Tier 2. Only a small sub-set of assets, which would cause major national or regional impacts similar to those experienced during Hurricane Katrina and 9/11, will meet the Tier 1 consequence threshold established by DHS senior leadership. The process of identifying these nationally significant assets and systems is conducted on an annual basis and relies heavily upon the insights and knowledge of public and private sector security partners.

The Tier 1 and 2 assets and systems resulting from this annual process provide a common basis on which DHS and its security partners can implement important CIKR protection programs and initiatives, such as various grant programs, buffer zone protection efforts, facility assessments and training, and other activities. Specifically, the list of Tier 1 and Tier 2 assets and systems is used to support eligibility determinations for Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI), State Homeland Security and Buffer Zone Protection Grant Programs. Through the Tier 1 and Tier 2 prioritization process, the NIPP community can ensure that those assets and systems capable of creating nationally significant consequences are the primary focus of the Nation’s ongoing risk management efforts..

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Results of studies: Various government or commercially owned databases developed 1 as the result of studies undertaken by trade associations, advocacy groups, and regula-2 tory agencies may contain relevant information; 3

Annual data calls: DHS, in cooperation with SSAs and other CIKR partners, conducts 4 an annual data call to States, territories, and Federal partners. This data call process 5 allows States, territories, and Federal partners to propose assets meeting specified 6 criteria; and 7

Ongoing reviews of particular locations where risk is believed to be higher: 8 DHS- and SSA-initiated site assessments to provide information on vulnerability; help 9 to identify assets, systems, and networks and their dependencies, interdependencies, 10 and critical functionality; and provide information that will help quantify their value in 11 risk analyses. 12

DHS, in coordination with SSAs, State and local governments, private sector owners and 13 operators, and other partners, works to build from and correct existing inventories at the 14 State and local levels to avoid duplication of past efforts. 15

3.2.2 Protecting and Accessing Inventory Information 16 The Federal Government recognizes the sensitive, business, or proprietary nature of much 17 of the information accessed through the IDW. DHS is responsible for protecting this 18 information from unauthorized disclosure or use. Information in the IDW is protected from 19 unauthorized disclosure or misuse to the maximum extent allowed under applicable 20 Federal, State, or local regulation, including PCII and security classification rules (see 21 section 4.3). Additionally, DHS ensures that all data and licensing restrictions are enforced. 22 DHS is implementing resilient and redundant security measures that apply to the IDW and 23 provide system integrity and security, software security, and data protection. 24

Access to the IDW is both controlled using relevant security clearances and classification 25 guidelines, and with extensive regard to maximizing the ability of partners to share 26 appropriate information. 27

3.2.3 SSA Role in Inventory Development and Maintenance 28 SSAs have a leading role in several phases of CIKR inventory development and 29 maintenance, including nominating assets and systems and adjudication of Tier 2 assets 30 and systems proposed by States/territories in response to the annual data call. 31

The specific methods by which SSAs collect sector-specific asset, system, and network data 32 are described in the individual SSPs. The SSPs include descriptions of mechanisms for 33 making data collection efforts more manageable, such as: 34

Prioritizing the approach for data outreach to different partners; 35 Identifying assets, systems, networks, or functions of potential national-, regional-, or 36

sector-level importance; and 37 Identifying, reviewing, and leveraging existing sector infrastructure data sources. 38

SSAs enable sector-specific asset, system, and network awareness, data collection, and 39 information sharing primarily by understanding existing sector-based data sources and by 40 facilitating information-sharing agreements with data owners. For example, DHS, in its 41

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capacity as the SSA, works closely with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) in the 1 Dams Sector to facilitate data discovery within the National Inventory of Dams (NID). 2 Although owned and maintained by USACE, shared access to the NID provides 3 infrastructure protection partners in Federal, State, and local governments and the private 4 sector with a comprehensive understanding of the national dams landscape, as well as an 5 understanding of how risk in the Dams Sector impacts the national risk profile. 6

More detail on SSA roles and responsibilities in facilitating sector awareness and 7 understanding related to the national CIKR library is included in appendix 3C. 8

3.2.4 State and Local Government Role in Inventory Development and 9 Maintenance 10 State and local government agencies play an important role in understanding the national 11 infrastructure landscape by enabling the identification of assets, systems, and networks at 12 the State and local levels. State and local first responders, emergency managers, public 13 health officials, and others involved in homeland security missions frequently interact with 14 infrastructure owners and operators in their jurisdictions to plan for and respond to all 15 manner of natural and man-made hazards. These relationships form the core of the 16 public/private partnership model and translate into first-hand knowledge of the 17 infrastructure landscape at the State and local level, as well as an understanding of those 18 infrastructure assets, systems, and networks that are considered critical from a State and 19 local perspective. 20

DHS provides a number of tools and resources to help State and local officials leverage their 21 knowledge to create infrastructure inventories that contribute to the federated IDW. This 22 includes the Constellation/Automated Critical Asset Management System (C/ACAMS) that 23 help State and local officials leverage their knowledge to create infrastructure inventories, 24 implement practical CIKR protection programs, and facilitate information-sharing within 25 and across State and local boundaries, as well as with DHS and other Federal partners. By 26

Constellation/Automated Critical Asset Management System

C/ACAMS is a Web-enabled information services portal that helps State and local governments build CIKR protection programs in their local jurisdictions. Specifically, C/ACAMS provides a set of tools and resources that help law enforcement, public safety, and emergency response personnel to:

Collect and use CIKR asset data, Assess CIKR asset vulnerabilities, Develop all-hazards incident response and recovery plans, and Build public/private partnerships.

The Constellation portion of C/ACAMS is an information gathering and analysis tool that allows users to search a range of free and subscription reporting sources to find relevant information tailored to their jurisdiction's needs. ACAMS is a secure, online database and database management platform that allows for the collection and management of CIKR asset data; the cataloguing, screening and sorting of this data; the production of tailored infrastructure reports; and the development of a variety of pre- and post-incident response plans useful to strategic and operational planners and tactical commanders. Email [email protected] for additional information.

mailto:[email protected]

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sharing first-hand knowledge and understanding through tools such as C/ACAMS, State 1 and local partners contribute directly to the national CIKR protection mission. 2

Additional information on State roles and responsibilities in this area is contained in 3 appendix 3C. 4

3.2.5 Identifying Cyber Infrastructure 5 The NIPP addresses the protection of the cyber elements of CIKR in an integrated manner 6 rather than as a separate consideration. As a component of the sector-specific risk assess-7 ment process, cyber infrastructure (assets, systems, and networks) should be identified 8 individually or included as a cyber element of a larger asset, system, or network’s 9 description if they are associated with one. The identification process should include 10 information on international cyber infrastructure with cross-border implications, 11 interdependencies, or cross-sector ramifications. The following list provides examples of 12 cyber assets, systems, or networks that exist in most, if not all, sectors: 13

Business Systems: Cyber systems used to manage or support common business 14 processes and operations. Examples of business systems include Enterprise Resource 15 Planning, e-commerce, e-mail, and R&D systems. 16

Control Systems: Cyber systems used within many infrastructure and industries to 17 monitor and control sensitive processes and physical functions. Control systems 18 typically collect measurement and operational data from the field, process and display 19 the information, and relay control commands to local or remote equipment or human-20 machine interfaces (operators). Examples of control systems include SCADA, Process 21 Control Systems, and Distributed Control Systems. 22

Access Control Systems: Cyber systems allowing only authorized personnel and 23 visitors physical access to defined areas of a facility. Access control systems provide 24 monitoring and control of personnel passing throughout a facility by various means, 25 including electronic card readers, biometrics, and radio frequency identification. 26

Warning and Alert Systems: Cyber systems are used for alert and notification 27 purposes in many security missions, including homeland security. These systems pass 28 critical information that triggers protection and response actions for organizations and 29 individual citizens. Examples include local phone-based hazard alerting systems used 30 by some local governments and the Emergency Alert System established by the Federal 31 Communications Commission (FCC), and its National Oceanic and Atmospheric 32 Administration Weather Radio, which is an all-hazards alerting system provided by the 33 Department of Commerce. 34

The Internet has been identified as a key resource comprised of domestic and international 35 assets within both the Information Technology and Communications sectors, and is used by 36 all sectors to varying degrees. While the availability of the service is the responsibility of 37 both the Information Technology and Communications sectors, the need for access to and 38 reliance on the Internet is common to all sectors. 39

DHS supports SSAs and other CIKR partners by developing tools and methodologies to 40 assist in identifying cyber assets, systems, and networks, including those that involve 41 multiple sectors. As needed, DHS works with sector representatives to help identify cyber 42 infrastructure within the NIPP risk management framework. For example, DHS 43

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collaborates with the Department of Education in addressing cyber protection and 1 resiliency for schools. 2

Additionally, DHS, in collaboration with other CIKR partners, provides cross-sector cyber 3 methodologies that, when applied, enable sectors to identify cyber assets, systems, and 4 networks that may have nationally significant consequences if destroyed, incapacitated, or 5 exploited. These methodologies also characterize the reliance of a sector’s business and 6 operational functionality on cyber assets, systems, and networks. Also, if an appropriate 7 cyber asset identification methodology is already being used within the sector, DHS will 8 work with the sector to ensure alignment of that methodology with the NIPP risk 9 management framework. 10

3.2.6 Identifying Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Services 11 Space-based and terrestrial positioning, navigation, and timing services are a component of 12 multiple CIKR sectors. These services underpin almost every aspect of transportation 13 across all its various modes. Additionally, the Banking and Finance, Communications, 14 Energy, and Water sectors rely on GPS as their primary timing source. The systems that 15 support or enable critical functions in the CIKR sectors should be identified, either as part 16 of, or independent of the infrastructure, as appropriate. Examples of CIKR functions that 17 depend on positioning, navigation, and timing services include: aviation (navigation, air 18 traffic control, surface guidance); maritime (harbor, inland waterway vessel movement); 19 surface transportation (rail, hazmat tracking); communications networks (global fiber and 20 wireless networks); and power grids. 21

3.3 Assess Risks 22

Common definitions, scenarios, assumptions, metrics and processes are needed to ensure 23 CIKR risk assessments contribute to a shared understanding among CIKR partners. The 24 approach outlined by the NIPP risk management framework results in a sound, scenario-25 based consequence estimate, along with an assessment of the vulnerabilities to that 26 scenario and the likelihood that this threat scenario would occur. 27

Figure 3-4: NIPP Risk Management Framework: Assess Risks 28

29 30

The NIPP framework calls for CIKR partners to assess risk from any scenario as a function 31 of consequence, vulnerability, and threat, as defined below. 32

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R = f (C,V,T) 1

Consequence: The result of a terrorist attack or other hazard that reflects the level, 2 duration, and nature of the loss resulting from the incident. For the purposes of the 3 NIPP, consequences are divided into four main categories: public health and safety (i.e., 4 loss of life and illness); economic (direct and indirect), psychological and 5 governance/mission impacts. 6

Vulnerability: Weakness, condition, or quality of being open to exploitation or exposed 7 to natural or man-made threats, harm or attack. When vulnerability is assessed for risk 8 estimates, it is an estimate of the likelihood that a threat or hazard, if initiated, would 9 adversely impact an asset, system, or network. 10

Threat: An entity, action, or occurrence, whether natural or man-made, that has or 11 indicates the potential to pose violence or danger to life, information, operations, and/or 12 property. When threat is assessed to contribute to risk estimates, it is an estimate of the 13 likelihood that the hazardous action or occurrence will happen. In the case of natural 14 hazards, the threat likelihood is estimated based on an analysis of past incidents of that 15 hazard type at a given location. In the case of terrorist attacks, the threat likelihood is 16 estimated based on the intent and capability of the adversary. 17

18

Risk assessments for CIKR protection consider all three components of risk and are 19 conducted on assets, systems, or networks, depending on the characteristics of the 20 infrastructure being examined. Once the three components of risk have been assessed for 21 one or more given assets, systems, or networks, they must be integrated with a defensible 22 model to produce a site, sector, region, national, or international risk estimate. 23

DHS uses geospatial tools to visualize consequence, vulnerabilities and threats to CIKR. The iCAV system is a Web-based geospatial analytical and situational awareness system consisting of imagery, government-owned and licensed data, and dynamic, mission-specific information integrating threats, weather, and situation awareness information. Imagery fused with data layers and information feeds provides users with a rapid, common situational awareness of threats, events (natural or man-made), CIKR, population centers that are impacted to support coordinated preparedness, response and recovery activities. iCAV unites partners at Federal, State, local, tribal, territorial and other non-government partners through an integrated geographic Common Operating Picture (COP) for information-sharing, analysis, visualization, and dissemination

One program that provides a key synthesizing assessment for the Federal NIPP community is the Strategic Homeland Infrastructure Risk Assessment (SHIRA). This is an annual collaborative process conducted in coordination with interested members of the CIKR protection community to assess and analyze the risks to the Nation’s infrastructure from terrorism as well as natural and manmade hazards. The information derived through the SHIRA process feeds a number of analytic products, including the National Risk Profile, the foundation of the congressionally mandated National CIKR Protection Annual Report, as well as individual Sector Risk Profiles. As this process matures, the general approach for producing a shared risk assessment with a common risk model for CIKR will begin to produce multiple, tailored Homeland Infrastructure Risk Assessments (HIRAs), with SHIRA focusing on a strategic, cross-sector perspective, supported by a set of regional, State, and local HIRAs.

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DHS conducts risk analyses for each of the 18 CIKR sectors, working in close collaboration 1 with SSAs, State and local authorities, and private sector owners and operators. This 2 includes execution of the SHIRA data call that provides input to risk analysis programs and 3 projects and considers data collected more broadly through other IP program activities as 4 well. 5

DHS has identified a number of core risk assessment characteristics and data requirements 6 to produce results that will support consistent cross-sector risk comparisons; these are 7 termed Essential Features. These features provide a guide for improving existing 8 methodologies or modifying them so the investment and expertise they represent can be 9 used to support national-level, comparative risk assessment, investments, and incident 10 response planning, and resource prioritization. The Essential Features are summarized in 11 Appendix 3A in checklist form and discussed below. 12

3.3.1 NIPP Risk Assessment Essential Features20 13 Risk assessments are conducted by many CIKR partners to meet their own decision needs, 14 and not all of these assessments will require the Essential Features specified here. 15 Whenever possible, however, DHS seeks to use information from partners’ assessments to 16 contribute to an understanding of risks across sectors and throughout the Nation, to 17 increase clear understanding among affected CIKR partners. Recognizing that many risk 18 assessment methodologies are under development and others evolve in a dynamic 19 environment, these Essential Features provide a guide to future adaptations and are 20 designed to assure utility to national cross-sector risk comparisons: 21

Documented: The methodology and the assessment must clearly document what 22 information is used and how it is synthesized to generate a risk estimate. Any 23 assumptions, weighting factors and subjective judgments need to be clear to the user of 24 the methodology, its audience, and others who are expected to use the results. A 25 description should be provided of the decisions the risk assessment is designed to 26 support and the timeframe (e.g., current, next year, next five years) considered in the 27 assessment. 28

Objective: The methodology must produce comparable, repeatable results, even 29 though assessments of different CIKR will be performed by different analysts or teams 30 of analysts. It must minimize the number and impact of subjective judgments, leaving 31 policy and value judgments to be applied by decision makers. 32

Defensible: The risk methodology must logically integrate its components, making 33 appropriate use of the professional disciplines relevant to the analysis, as well as be free 34 from significant errors or omissions. The uncertainty associated with consequence 35 estimates and confidence in the vulnerability and threat estimates should be 36 communicated. 37

20 The phrase “Baseline Criteria”, used in the 2006 edition of the NIPP has been adjusted to reflect our partners’ path toward maturity. Baseline Criteria is most often understood as a minimal standard. In implementing the NIPP it was discovered that, since the need to assess and compare risks across infrastructure sectors in a voluntary collaboration was a substantially new requirement, very few existing approaches fulfill the need. The phrase “Essential Features” and the strong correlation with the cross-sector comparison purposes of the NIPP is meant to clarify that these are necessary design characteristics to support the goals of the NIPP. They should be pursued. Not having already incorporated these features, however, does not constitute a failure to exercise reasonable risk management for owners and operators.

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Complete21: The methodology must assess consequence, vulnerability and threat for 1 every defined scenario and include the specific Core Elements for each. Core Elements 2 are featured throughout this chapter and include steps or considerations that should be 3 addressed when analyzing consequences, vulnerabilities, or threat. 4

3.3.2 Risk Scenario Identification 5 All risk is assessed with respect to a specific scenario or set of scenarios. Simply put, the 6 risk scenario answers the question “the risk of what?” A risk scenario has three parts – 7 what the risk is to, what the risk is from, and the relevant conditions, such as “during peak 8 occupancy” or “during maximum load when alternate components are in maintenance”. All 9 consequence, vulnerability, and threat estimates are specific to the risk scenario. Risks can 10 be assessed for assets, networks, systems, and defined combinations of these. In the case of 11 risks from terrorism, the subject of the risk assessment is commonly called the target. 12

The risk scenario also identifies the potential source of harm. For terrorism, the risk 13 scenario must include the means of attack and delivery, such as a 4000 pound TNT-14 equivalent vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED). In the case of natural 15 hazards, the risk scenario must include the type and magnitude of the hazard (e.g., a 16 Category 5 Hurricane or an earthquake of 6.5 on the Richter scale). 17

Last, the scenario must identify the conditions that are relevant to calculating consequence, 18 vulnerability, and threat. DHS uses reasonable worst-case conditions to assess terrorism 19 risks because intelligent adversaries can choose circumstances where targets are 20 vulnerable and consequences are maximized. The concept of worst case (that combination of 21 conditions that would make the most harmful results the ones that occur) is moderated by 22 reason. Scenarios should not compound in complexity to include numerous unlikely 23 conditions, unless the focus of the contingency and other planning is on extremely rare 24 events. Neither should scenarios be based simply on average conditions. Each type of target 25 will have different characteristics needed to accurately describe reasonable worst-case 26 conditions, such as a stadium’s maximum capacity, the storage volume of a particularly 27 hazardous material at a chemical facility, or the height and duration of a high water level 28 at a dam. 29

3.3.3 Consequence Assessment 30 The consequences that are considered for the national-level comparative risk assessment 31 are based on the criteria set forth in HSPD-7. These criteria can be divided into four main 32 categories: 33

Public Health and Safety Impact: Effect on human life and physical well-being (e.g., 34 fatalities, injuries/illness); 35

Economic Impact: Direct and indirect economic losses (e.g., cost to rebuild asset, cost 36 to respond to and recover from attack, downstream costs resulting from disruption of 37 product or service, long-term costs due to environmental damage); 38

21 The completeness of a risk analytic methodology is dependent on the access and authority of the organization conducting the assessment. When an organization lacks the information to assess particular points, the lack of this information should be noted as part of the assessment, so that other organizations which have the information may contribute to closing the gap.

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Psychological Impact: Effect on public morale and confidence in national economic 1 and political institutions; this encompasses those changes in perceptions emerging after 2 a significant incident that affect the public’s sense of safety and well-being and can 3 manifest in aberrant behavior; and 4

Impact on Government: Effect on the government’s ability to maintain order, deliver 5 minimum essential public services, ensure public health and safety, and carry out 6 national security-related missions. 7

Under the general rubric of “impact on government” are several discrete, federally 8 mandated missions that may be disrupted. Although many of these missions are directly 9 fulfilled by government agencies, some are fulfilled by the private sector and government 10 actions can serve to either foster a healthy environment for them, or inadvertently disrupt 11 them. These include the responsibility to ensure national security, perform other Federal 12 missions; ensure public health; maintain order; enable the provision of essential public 13 services; and ensure an orderly economy. 14

There are indirect and cascading impacts of disruptions that are difficult to understand, 15 and may be more difficult to value. Some may already be accounted for in estimates of 16 economic losses, while others may require further metrics development to enable them to be 17 considered in a more comprehensive risk assessment. Ongoing work with NIPP partners 18 will pursue solutions to these challenges, aiming to improve our ability to compare and 19 prioritize mission-disruption losses in addition to the other types of consequences of 20 concern. 21

A full consequence assessment takes into consideration all four consequence criteria; 22 however, estimating potential indirect impacts requires the use of numerous assumptions 23 and other complex variables. An assessment of all categories of consequence may be beyond 24 the capabilities available (or precision needed) for a given risk assessment. At a minimum, 25 assessments should focus on the two most fundamental impacts—the human consequences 26 and the most relevant direct economic consequences. 27

3.3.3.1 Consequence Assessment Methodologies that Enable National Risk Analysis 28 DHS works with CIKR partners to develop or improve consequence assessment 29 methodologies that can be applied to a variety of asset, system, or network types and 30 produce comparable quantitative consequence estimates. Consequence analysis should 31 ideally address both direct and indirect effects. Many assets, systems, and networks depend 32 on connections to other CIKR to function. For example, nearly all sectors share 33 relationships with elements of the Energy, Information Technology, Communications, 34 Banking and Finance, and Transportation sectors. In many cases, the failure of an asset or 35 system in one sector will impact the ability of inter-related assets or systems in the same or 36 another sector to perform necessary functions. Furthermore, cyber interdependencies 37 present unique challenges for all sectors because of the borderless nature of cyberspace. 38 Interdependencies are dual in nature (e.g., the Energy Sector relies on computer-based 39 control systems to manage the electric power grid, while those same control systems require 40 electric power to operate). As a result, complete consequence analysis addresses both CIKR 41 dependencies and interdependencies for the purposes of NIPP risk assessment. 42

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Various Federal and State entities, including national laboratories, are developing 1 sophisticated models and simulations to identify dependencies and interdependencies 2 within and across sectors. The Federal Government established the National Infrastructure 3 Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC) to support these efforts (see Section 6.4.2). The 4 NISAC is chartered to develop advanced modeling, simulation, and analysis capabilities for 5 the Nation’s CIKR. These tools and analyses address dependencies and interdependencies, 6 both physical and cyber, in an all-hazards context. These sophisticated models enhance the 7 Nation’s understanding of CIKR dependencies and interdependencies to better inform 8 decision-makers, especially for cross-sector priorities in the areas of policy analysis, 9 investment, prevention and mitigation planning, education, training, and crisis response. 10

The level of detail and specificity achieved by using the most sophisticated models and 11 simulations may not be practical or necessary for all assets, systems, or networks. In these 12 circumstances, a simplified dependency and interdependency analysis based on expert 13 judgment may provide sufficient insight to make informed risk management decisions in a 14 timely manner. 15

3.3.3.2 Consequence Uncertainty 16 There is an element of uncertainty in consequence estimates. Even when a scenario with 17 reasonable worst-case conditions is clearly stated and consistently applied, there is often a 18 range of outcomes that could occur. For some incidents, the consequence range is small and 19 a single estimate may provide sufficient information to support decisions. If the range of 20 outcomes is large, the scenario may require more specificity about conditions to obtain 21 appropriate estimates of outcomes. However, if the scenario is broken down to a reasonable 22 level of granularity and there is still a significant uncertainty, the single estimate should be 23 accompanied by the uncertainty range to support more informed decisionmaking. The best 24 way to communicate uncertainty will depend on the factors that make the outcome 25 uncertain as well as the amount and type of information that is available. 26

27 3.3.4 Vulnerability Assessment 28 Vulnerabilities are the characteristics of asset, system, or network design, location, CIKR 29 protection posture, process, or operation that render it susceptible to destruction, 30 incapacitation, or exploitation by mechanical failures, natural hazards, terrorist attacks, or 31 other malicious acts. Vulnerabilities may be associated with physical (e.g., broken fence), 32 cyber (e.g., lack of a firewall), or human (e.g., untrained guard force) factors. 33

Core Elements – Consequence Assessment Document the scenarios assessed, tools used, and any key assumptions made Estimate fatalities, injuries, and illnesses (where applicable and feasible) Assess psychological impacts and mission disruption where feasible Estimate the economic loss in dollars, stating which costs are included and what duration was

considered If monetizing human health consequences, document the value(s) used and assumptions made Consider and document any protective or consequence mitigation measures that have their

effect after the incident has occurred such as the rerouting of systems or HAZMAT or fire and rescue response

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1

A vulnerability assessment can be a stand-alone process or be part of a full risk assessment. 2 The vulnerability assessment involves the evaluation of specific threats to the asset, 3 system, or network under review to identify areas of weakness that could result in 4 consequences of concern. 5

3.3.4.1 Vulnerability Assessment Methodologies that Enable National Risk Analysis 6 Many different vulnerability assessment approaches are used in the different CIKR sectors 7 and by various government authorities. The primary vulnerability assessment 8 methodologies used in each sector are described in the respective SSPs. The SSPs also 9 provide specific detail regarding how the assessments can be carried out (e.g., by whom and 10 how often). The results of vulnerability assessments need to be comparable in order to 11 contribute to national-level, cross-12 sector risk analysis. As with risk 13 assessments, vulnerability 14 assessments should have the same 15 Essential Features (i.e., be 16 documented, objective, defensible, 17 and complete) if the results are to 18 be compared at a national, cross-19 sector level. In addition, 20 vulnerability-specific Core 21 Elements are provided at the end 22 of this section, below. 23

3.3.4.2 SSA and DHS Analysis 24 Responsibilities 25 SSAs and their sector partners are 26 responsible for collecting and 27 documenting the vulnerability 28 assessment approaches used 29 within their sectors. Owners or 30 operators typically perform the 31 vulnerability assessments, 32 sometimes with facilitation by government authorities. SSAs are also responsible for 33 compiling, where possible, vulnerability assessment results for use in sector and national 34 risk analysis efforts. In addition, SSAs are responsible for identifying and working with 35 DHS to validate the results of assessments for assets, systems, and networks that are of the 36 greatest concern from the SSA’s perspective. SSAs should involve owners and operators in 37 this effort whenever possible. Vulnerability assessment information may be submitted by 38 owner/operators for validation as PCII under the PCII Program (see Section 4.3, Protection 39 of Sensitive CIKR Information). The PCII Program Manager may designate some 40 information as "categorically included" PCII (See Section 4.3.1 below “Protected Critical 41 Infrastructure Information Program”). This designation provides the SSA with the option to 42 receive the categorically included CII directly from the submitter. This arrangement is 43

California Water System Comprehensive Review

Federal, State, and local stakeholders collaborated successfully to complete the first systems-based Comprehensive Review (CR). A systems-based CR is a cooperative government–led analysis of CIKR facilities. The California Water System CR required extensive coordination, planning, research, data collection, and outreach to State and local partners to identify critical assets and system interdependencies. DHS, in conjunction with Federal and California State partners worked with facility owners and operators to identify critical water system assets. This system consists of 161 assets spanning 33 counties. The review determined that 40 of the 161 assets were critical assets. DHS completed 32 on site vulnerability assessments and six Emergency Services Capabilities Assessments. DHS met with site owners and operators, California State and local law enforcement and emergency management entities to analyze and track the gaps, potential enhancements, and the protective measures that were identified and evaluate vulnerability mitigation and grant funding effectiveness.

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based on pre-approval from the PCII Program Office and is approved on a case-by-case 1 basis. 2

DHS is responsible for ensuring that appropriate vulnerability assessments are performed 3 for nationally critical CIKR. DHS works with CIKR owners and operators, the SSAs, and 4 sometimes State and local authorities, to either perform the assessment or to verify the 5 sufficiency and applicability of previously performed assessments to support risk 6 management decisions. 7

DHS also conducts or supports vulnerability assessments that address the specific needs of 8 the NIPP’s approach to CIKR protection and risk management. Such assessments may: 9

More fully investigate dependencies and interdependencies; 10 Serve as a basis for developing common vulnerability reports that can help identify 11

strategic needs for protective programs or R&D across sectors or subsectors; 12 Fill gaps when sectors or owners or operators have not yet completed assessments, even 13

though decision-making requires such studies immediately; and 14 Test and validate new methodologies or streamlined approaches for assessing 15

vulnerability. 16 In some sectors and subsectors, vulnerability assessments have never been performed or 17 may have been performed for only a small number of high-profile or high-value assets, 18 systems, or networks. To help assist in closing this gap, DHS works with SSAs, owners and 19 operators, and other CIKR partners to provide the following: 20

Vulnerability assessment tools that may be 21 used as part of self-assessment processes; 22

Informative reports for industrial sectors, 23 classes of activities, and high-consequence 24 or at-risk special event sites; 25

Generally accepted risk assessment 26 principles for major classes of activities and 27 high-consequence or at-risk special event 28 sites; 29

Assistance in the development and sharing 30 of industry-based standards and tools; 31

Recommendations regarding the frequency 32 of assessments, particularly in light of 33 emergent threats; 34

Site assistance visits and vulnerability 35 assessments of specific CIKR as requested 36 by owners and operators, when resources 37 allow; and 38

Cyber vulnerability assessment best 39 practices. (DHS works to leverage established methodologies that have traditionally 40 focused on physical vulnerabilities by enhancing them to better address cyber 41 elements). 42

NCSD has developed the Cyber Security Vulnerability Assessment (CSVA), a flexible and scalable approach that analyzes an entity’s cyber security posture and describes gaps and targeted considerations that can reduce overall cyber risks. It assesses the policies, plans, and procedures in place to reduce cyber vulnerability in 10 categories (e.g., access control, configuration management, physical security of cyber assets, etc.) and leverages various recognized standards, guidance, and methodologies (e.g., International Organization for Standardization 27001, Information Systems Audit and Control Association Control Objects for Information and related Technology, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800 series).

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Some vulnerability assessments will include both vulnerability analysis and consequence 1 analysis for specified scenarios. 2

3 3.3.5 Threat Assessment 4 The remaining factor to be considered in the NIPP risk assessment process is the 5 assessment of threat. A threat is a natural or man-made occurrence, individual, entity, or 6 action that has or indicates the potential to harm life, information, operations, the 7 environment, and/or property. In evaluating threats as part of a risk assessment, the factor 8 of importance is the likelihood that this threat will materialize. The severity of the threat, 9 in the context of terrorism risk assessment, is estimated based on an analysis of intent and 10 capability of a defined adversary, such as a terrorist group. 11

Assessment of the current terrorist threat to the United States is derived from extensive 12 study and understanding of terrorists and terrorist organizations, and frequently is 13 dependent on analysis of classified information. DHS provides its partners with Federal 14 Government-coordinated unclassified assessments of potential terrorist threats and 15 appropriate access to classified assessments where necessary and authorized. These threat 16 assessments are derived from analyses of adversary intent and capability, and describe 17 what is known about terrorist interest in particular CIKR sectors, as well as specific attack 18 methods. Since international terrorists, in particular, have continually demonstrated 19 flexibility and unpredictability, DHS and its partners in the Intelligence Community also 20 analyze known terrorist goals and developing capabilities to provide CIKR owners and 21 operators with a broad view of the potential threat and postulated terrorist attack methods. 22

3.3.5.1 Key Aspects of the Terrorist Threat to CIKR 23 Analysis of terrorist goals and motivations reveals that domestic and international CIKR 24 are potentially prime targets for terrorist attack; given the deeply rooted nature of these 25 goals and motivations, CIKR likely will remain highly attractive targets for terrorists. 26 Threat assessments must address the various elements of CIKR – physical, cyber, and 27 human – depending on the attack type and target. Physical attacks, including the 28 exploitation of physical elements of CIKR, represent the attack method most frequently 29 used overtly by terrorists. 30

There are increasing indicators that potential adversaries intend to conduct cyber attacks 31 and are actively acquiring cyber attack capabilities. Cyber attacks may not only target the 32 Internet, but rather they may use it as a means of attack or for other purposes that support 33

Core Elements – Vulnerability Assessment Identify vulnerabilities associated with physical, cyber, or human factors (openness to both

insider and outsider threats), critical dependencies, and physical proximity to hazards. Collect sufficient information to form an estimate for each attack scenario

Account for the protective measures in place and how they reduce the vulnerability for each attack type

In evaluating security vulnerabilities, estimate the relative strength of collective protective measures

In evaluating security vulnerabilities, develop estimates of the likelihood of adversaries’ success for each attack scenario

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terrorist activities. Additionally, the increasing ease with which powerful cyber attack tools 1 can be obtained and used puts the capability of conducting cyber attacks within reach of 2 most groups or individuals who wish to do harm to the United States. However, credible 3 information on specific adversaries is often not available. As such, DHS collaborates with 4 the law enforcement and intelligence communities and the private sector to more accurately 5 portray the possible ways in which the cyber threat may affect CIKR, including the 6 exploitation of the Internet as a weapon. 7

Another important aspect in this element of risk is the long-standing threat posed by 8 insiders, or persons who have access to sensitive information and facilities. Insider threats 9 can result from intentional actions, such as infiltration of the organization by terrorists, or 10 unintentional actions, such as employees who are exploited or unknowingly manipulated to 11 provide access to, or information about, CIKR. Insiders can intentionally compromise the 12 security of CIKR through espionage, sabotage, or other harmful acts motivated by the 13 rewards offered to them by a terrorist or other party. Others may provide unwitting 14 assistance to an adversary through lack of awareness of the need for or methods to protect 15 assets or employees (e.g., by leaving security badges and uniforms in open areas). CIKR 16 owners and operators, as well as authorities with protection responsibilities, can screen and 17 monitor employees in sensitive positions. These efforts often benefit from the support of 18 Federal regulations and programs that relate to security clearances and employment-19 related screening. 20

21

22 23

3.3.6 Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center 24 The DHS Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC) conducts 25 integrated threat and risk analyses for CIKR sectors. HITRAC is a joint fusion center that 26 spans both the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)—a member of the Intelligence 27 Community—and IP. As called for in section 201 of the Homeland Security Act, HITRAC 28 brings together intelligence and infrastructure specialists to ensure a sufficient 29 understanding of the risks to the Nation’s CIKR from foreign and domestic threats. 30 HITRAC works in partnership with the U.S. Intelligence Community and national law 31 enforcement to integrate and analyze intelligence and law enforcement information in 32

Core Elements – Threat Assessment For adversary-specific threat assessments:

Account for the access to the target and the opportunity to attack it Identify attack methods that may be employed Consider the level of capability that an adversary demonstrates for an attack method Consider the degree of the adversaries’ intent to attack the target Estimate threat as the likelihood that the adversary would attempt a given attack method at the

target For natural disasters and accidental hazards:

Use best-available analytic tools and historical data to estimate the likelihood of these events affecting CIKR

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threat and risk analysis products. HITRAC also works in partnership with the SSAs and 1 owners and operators to ensure that their expertise on infrastructure operations is 2 integrated into HITRAC’s analysis. 3

HITRAC develops analytical products by combining threat assessments based on all source 4 information and intelligence analysis with vulnerability and consequence assessments. This 5 process provides an understanding of the threat, CIKR vulnerabilities, and potential 6 consequences of attacks. When identified, the analyses also include potential options for 7 managing the risk. This combination of intelligence and practical CIKR knowledge allows 8 DHS to provide products that contain strategically relevant and actionable information. It 9 also allows DHS to identify intelligence collection requirements in conjunction with CIKR 10 partners so that the intelligence community can provide the type of information necessary 11 to support the CIKR risk management and protection missions. HITRAC coordinates 12 closely with partners outside the Federal Government through the SCCs, GCCs, ISACs, 13 and State and Local Fusion Centers to ensure that its products are relevant to partner 14 needs and accessible. 15

3.3.6.1 Threat and Incident Information 16 DHS leverages 24/7 intelligence and operations monitoring and reporting from multiple 17 sources to provide analysis based on the most current information available on threats, 18 incidents, and infrastructure status. The real-time analysis of information provided by DHS 19 is of unique value to CIKR partners and helps them determine if changes are needed in 20 steady-state CIKR risk management measures. 21

DHS uses a variety of tools and systems to capture incident and threat warnings within the 22 24/7 intelligence and operation centers. iCAV ingests and visualizes these incident reports 23 and threat warnings allowing analysts to deliver a geospatial context to numerous 24 information systems. It facilitates fusing information from suspicious activity sources, and 25 provides situational awareness tracking for disasters such as hurricanes and other real-26 time events. This fusion provides DHS, States, and local jurisdictions and the private sector 27 with a rapid, common understanding of the relationships between these events to support 28 coordinated event risk mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery activities. 29

Specialized products that directly support the NIPP and SSPs include incident reports and 30 threat warnings, which are made available to appropriate partners. 31

Incident Reports: DHS monitors information on incidents to provide reports that CIKR 32 owners and operators and other decision makers can use when considering how evolving 33 incidents might affect their CIKR protection posture. This reporting provides a responsive 34 and credible source to verify or expand on information that CIKR partners may receive 35 initially through news media, the Internet, or other sources. DHS works with multiple 36 government and private sector operations and watch centers to combine situation reports 37 from law enforcement, intelligence, and private sector sources with infrastructure status 38 and operational expertise to rapidly produce reports from a trusted source. These help 39 inform the decisions of owners and operators regarding changes in risk-mitigation 40 measures that are needed to respond to incidents in progress, such as rail or subway 41 bombings overseas that may call for precautionary actions domestically. 42

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Strategic Threat Assessments: HITRAC works with the Intelligence Community and 1 with DHS’ partners to collect information on adversaries that pose a threat to CIKR, their 2 capabilities, and intent to attack. HITRAC provides a high-level assessment of terrorist 3 groups and other adversaries to the SSAs in order to inform their SSPs and prioritization 4 efforts. 5

Threat Warnings: DHS fuses all-source information to provide analysis of emergent 6 threats on a timely basis. Many of the indicators that are reported by intelligence or law 7 enforcement are not associated with an incident in progress, but are the product of careful 8 intelligence collection. Such indicators also may be of significance only when interpreted in 9 the context of infrastructure operational or status information. DHS monitors the flows of 10 intelligence, law enforcement, and private sector security information on a 24/7 basis in 11 light of the business, operational, and status expertise provided by its owner and operator 12 partners to produce relevant threat warnings for CIKR protection. This analysis clarifies 13 the implications of intelligence reporting about targeted locations or sectors, potential 14 attack methods and timing, or the specific nature of an emerging threat.15

3.3.6.2 Risk Analysis 16 HITRAC uses risk analysis and other 17 approaches to aid CIKR partners in 18 identifying, assessing, and prioritizing 19 risk management approaches. HITRAC 20 also develops specialized products for 21 strategic planning that directly support 22 the NIPP and SSPs. In addition to 23 these specific products, HITRAC 24 produces strategic assessments and 25 trend analyses that help define the 26 evolving risk to the Nation’s CIKR. 27

Requirements-Based 28 Infrastructure Risk Analysis: 29 National, cross-sector, sector-30 specific, regional, state, and site-specific risk analyses and assessments aid decision-31 makers with planning and prioritizing risk-reduction measures within and across the 32 CIKR sectors. These analyses and assessments leverage a number of analytic 33 approaches, including the SHIRA process, which are tailored to the particular decision 34 support needs of its partners. 35

CIKR Prioritization: HITRAC works with CIKR partners to identify and prioritize 36 the assets, systems, and networks most critical to the Nation through the Tier 1/Tier 2 37 Program for critical assets, systems, networks, nodes, and functions within the United 38 States, and the Critical Foreign Dependencies Initiative (CFDI) for those same CIKR 39 outside of the United States. The prioritized lists of CIKR are used to guide the 40 Nation’s protective and incident management responses, such as the various homeland 41 security grant programs. 42

Infrastructure Risk Analysis Partnership Program (IRAPP): IRAPP assists 43 partners interested in pursuing their own CIKR risk analysis, whether in the Federal, 44

TRIPwire Community Gateway

The TRIPwire Community Gateway (TWCG) is a new TRIPwire web portal designed specifically for the Nation’s CIKR owners, operators, and private security personnel. TWCG provides expert threat analyses, reports, and relevant planning documents to help key private sector partners anticipate, identify, and prevent IED incidents. TWCG shares IED related information tailored to each of the 18 sectors of CIKR. Sector partners benefit from increased communication, improved awareness of emerging threats, and access to resources and guidance on specific IED preventive and protective measures for their facilities and requirements.

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State, local, or private sector CIKR protection communities. IRAPP involves customized 1 support to interested partners, and the sharing of best practices across the CIKR 2 protection community. 3

CFIUS Support: The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) 4 is an inter-agency committee of the United States Government that reviews the 5 national security implications of foreign investments of U.S. companies or operations. 6 HITRAC provides support to CFIUS by developing written threat and risk assessments 7 of foreign direct investment in the United States and evaluating the potential risks 8 posed by foreign acquisition of U.S. infrastructure. HITRAC also supports DHS efforts 9 to manage those risks through the interagency CFIUS process. 10

Critical Infrastructure Red Team (CIRT): The CIRT program focuses its analysis 11 on high-risk sectors/sub-sectors and high-risk attack methods from the perspective of 12 our nation’s adversaries by conducting open source analysis, developing operational 13 plans, and exercising these scenarios through tabletop exercises and developing lessons 14 learned from those activities. These efforts identify gaps in current strategies and risk 15 reduction programs for the Nation’s CIKR, and support the development of 16 recommendations for closing or managing the identified gaps. 17

Risk Analysis Development: The Risk Analysis Development Program works to 18 improve the capabilities available to CIKR risk analysts and risk managers both in 19 DHS and among the rest of the NIPP stakeholders. The program conducts research and 20 development to establish and extend a common risk model for CIKR allowing sound 21 cross-sector comparisons supporting the full range of risk management decisions, and 22 new approaches that contribute to common understanding of risk and good risk 23 management. 24

3.4 Prioritize 25

Prioritizing risk management efforts on the most significant CIKR helps focus planning, 26 increase coordination, and support effective resource allocation and incident management, 27 response, and restoration decisions. 28

Figure 3-5: NIPP Risk Management Framework: Prioritize 29

30 The NIPP risk management framework is applicable to risk assessments on an asset, 31 system, network, function, sector, State, regional, or national basis. Comparing the risk 32 faced by different entities helps identify where risk mitigation is needed, and to 33 subsequently determine and help justify the most cost-effective risk management options. 34 This identifies which CIKR should be given priority for risk management activities and 35 which alternative options represent the best investment based on their risk-reduction 36

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return on investment. The prioritization process also develops information that can be used 1 during incident response to help inform decision makers regarding issues associated with 2 CIKR restoration. 3

3.4.1 The Prioritization Process 4 The prioritization process involves aggregating, combining, and analyzing risk assessment 5 results to determine which assets, systems, networks, sectors, or combinations of these face 6 the highest risk so that risk management priorities can be established. It also provides the 7 basis for understanding the risk-mitigation benefits that, along with costs, are used to 8 support planning and the informed allocation of resources. 9

This process involves two related activities: The first determines which sectors, regions, or 10 other aggregation of CIKR assets, systems, or networks have the highest risk from relevant 11 incidents or events. Of those with similar risk levels, the CIKR with the highest expected 12 losses are accorded the highest priority in risk management program development. The 13 second activity determines which actions are expected to provide the greatest mitigation of 14 risk for any given investment. The risk management initiatives that result in the greatest 15 risk mitigation for the investment proposed are accorded the highest priority in program 16 design, resource allocation, budgeting, and implementation. This approach ensures that 17 programs make the greatest contribution possible to overall CIKR risk mitigation given the 18 available resources. 19

Assessments become more complex at different aggregations, such as when comparisons are 20 necessary across sectors, across different geographic areas, or against different types of 21 events. Using a common approach with consistent assumptions and metrics increases the 22 defensibility of such comparisons. Without this, such assessments are much more 23 challenging. Less informed assessments rely heavily on the subjective interpretation of 24 estimates derived from whatever data can be collected, as well as successful resolution of 25 differences in assumptions. 26

3.4.2 Tailoring Prioritization Approaches to Sector and Decisionmakers’ Needs 27 CIKR partners rely on different approaches to prioritize risk management activities 28 according to their authorities, specific sector needs, risk landscapes, security approaches, 29 and business environment. For example, owners and operators, federal agencies, and State 30 and local authorities all have different options available to them to help reduce risk. Asset-31 focused priorities may be appropriate for CIKR whose risk is predominately associated with 32 facilities, the local environment, and physical attacks, especially those that can be exploited 33 and used as weapons. Function-focused priorities may more effectively ensure continuity of 34 operations in the event of a terrorist attack or natural disaster in sectors where CIKR 35 resilience may be more important than CIKR hardening. Programs to reduce CIKR risk 36 give priority to investments that protect physical assets or ensure resilience in virtual 37 systems depending on which option best enables cost-effective CIKR risk management. 38

To ensure a consistent approach to risk analysis for CIKR protection, partners establish 39 priorities using on risk analysis that are consistent with the parameters of risk assessment 40 methodologies set out in appendix 3A. For quick-response decisions, lacking sound risk 41 assessments for reference, some priorities will be informed by top-down assessments using 42 surrogate data or data at high levels of CIKR aggregation (e.g., population density as a 43 surrogate for casualties). As both the NIPP partnership and the knowledgebase of risk 44 assessments grow, decisions can be increasingly informed by both top-down and bottom-up 45

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analyses using detailed data and assessments on specific individual facilities, with a 1 prioritization on how much is reduced for the investment. 2

3.4.3 The Uses of Prioritization 3 A primary use of prioritization is to inform resource allocation decisions, such as where risk 4 management programs should be instituted; the appropriate level of investment in these 5 programs; and which measures offer the greatest return on investment. The result of the 6 prioritization process is information on CIKR risk management requirements and provides 7 the rationale and justification for implementing specific programs or actions. Although for 8 some specific purposes, a master inventory of facilities or sites in priority order may be 9 useful, the results of the prioritization process are primarily used in other ways, such as 10 general guidance on improving security, or the decisions underpinning department budget 11 requests. Given the vast number of CIKR partners that have varied roles and 12 responsibilities in helping to manage risks, it is critical that each authority work to 13 increase the consistency, comparability and utility of their efforts to helping defend the best 14 risk management decisions as worth the investments being considered. 15

At the national level, DHS is responsible for overall national risk-informed CIKR 16 prioritization in close collaboration with the SSAs, States, and other CIKR partners. SSA 17 responsibilities include managing the government interaction with the sector and helping 18 to cultivate an environment of trusted information sharing and collaboration to identify, 19 prioritize, and manage risk. They must also extend their sector focus to include maximizing 20 the ability for cross-sector comparisons of risk to be made that considers the best knowledge 21 available within each sector, and in metrics that allow such comparisons to support 22 evaluations of the risk-reduction return on various investments. At the State level, DHS is 23 working to develop a collaborative relationship with state and local authorities through the 24 Infrastructure Risk Analysis Partnership Program. This effort to work with state 25 authorities to foster the capability to develop, evaluate and support the implementation of 26 CIKR risk management decisions in a state/local environment will be piloted with a limited 27 group of CIKR partners, and then rolled out more broadly as the roles, responsibilities and 28 approaches are tested and refined at this level. 29

3.5 Implement Protective Programs and Resiliency Strategies 30

The risk assessment and prioritization process at the sector and jurisdictional levels will 31 help identify requirements for near-term and future protective programs and resiliency 32 strategies. Some of the identified shortfalls or opportunities for improvement will be filled 33 by owner/operators, either voluntarily or based on various forms of incentives. Other 34 shortfalls will be addressed through the protective programs each sector develops under the 35 SSP, in State CIKR protection plans, or through cross-sector or national initiatives 36 undertaken by DHS. 37

Infrastructure Risk Analysis Partnership Program (IRAPP)

IRAPP is an effort that helps DHS learn about State-level decision requirements and risk analysis capabilities, to better tailor the transition and transfer of tools and approaches to State and local partners. By using a common risk model, the burden for information sharing begins to shift from repeated and duplicative asset and system assessments to responsible sharing of risk knowledge that is built off of these assessments, allowing the owner/operator to focus more on their primary responsibilities and reducing costs all around.

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Figure 3-6: NIPP Risk Management Framework: Implement Protective Programs 1

2 The Nation’s CIKR is widely distributed in both a physical and logical sense. Effective 3 CIKR protection requires both distributed implementation of protective programs by 4 partners, and focused national leadership to ensure implementation of a comprehensive, 5 coordinated, and cost-effective approach that helps to reduce or manage the risks to the 6 Nation’s most critical assets, systems, and networks. At the implementation level, 7 protective programs and resiliency strategies consist of diverse actions undertaken by 8 various CIKR partners. From the leadership perspective, programs are structured to 9 address coordination and cost-effectiveness. 10

The following sections describe the nature and characteristics of best practice protective 11 programs and resiliency strategies, as well as some existing programs that could be applied 12 to specific assets, systems, and networks. 13

3.5.1 Risk Management Actions 14 Risk management actions involve measures designed to prevent, deter, and mitigate the 15 threat; reduce vulnerability to an attack or other disaster; minimize consequences; and 16 enable timely, efficient response and restoration in a post-event situation, whether a 17 terrorist attack, natural disaster, or other incident. The NIPP risk management framework 18 focuses attention on those activities that bring the greatest return on investment, not 19 simply the vulnerability reduction. Protective programs and resiliency strategies vary 20 across a wide spectrum of activities, designed to: 21

Deter: Cause the potential attacker to perceive that the risk of failure is greater than 22 that which they find acceptable. Examples include improved awareness and security 23 (e.g., restricted access, vehicle checkpoints) and enhanced police and/or security officer 24 presence; 25

Devalue: Reduce the attacker’s incentive by reducing the target’s value. Examples 26 include developing redundancies and maintaining backup systems or key personnel to 27 improve overall resilience; 28

Detect: Identify potential attacks and validate and/or communicate the information, as 29 appropriate. General detection activities include intelligence gathering, analysis of 30 surveillance activities, and trend analysis of law enforcement reporting. For specific 31 assets, examples include intrusion-detection systems, network monitoring systems, 32 operation alarms, surveillance, detection and reporting, and employee security 33 awareness programs; and 34

Defend: Protect assets by preventing or delaying the actual attack, or reducing an 35 attack’s effect on an asset, system, or network. Examples include perimeter hardening 36

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by enhancing buffer zones, fencing, structural integrity, and cyber defense tools such as 1 antivirus software. 2

Risk management actions also may include means of mitigating the consequences of an 3 attack or incident. These actions are focused on the following aspects of preparedness: 4

Mitigate: Lessen the potential impacts of an attack, natural disaster, or accident by 5 introducing system redundancy and resiliency, reducing asset dependency, or isolating 6 downstream assets; 7

Respond: Activities designed to enable rapid reaction and emergency response to an 8 incident, such as conducting exercises and having adequate crisis response plans, train-9 ing, and equipment; and 10

Recover: Allow businesses and government organizations to resume operations quickly 11 and efficiently, such as using comprehensive mission and business continuity and 12 resiliency-based plans that have been developed through prior planning. 13

Generally, it is considered more cost-effective to build security into assets, systems, and 14 networks than to retrofit them with security measures after initial development. 15 Accordingly, CIKR partners should consider how risk management, robustness, resiliency, 16 and appropriate physical and cybersecurity enhancements could be incorporated into the 17 design and construction of new CIKR. 18

In situations where robustness and resiliency are keys to CIKR protection, providing 19 protection at the system level rather than at the individual asset level may be more 20 effective and efficient (e.g., if there are many similar facilities, it may be easier to allow 21 other facilities to provide the infrastructure service rather than to protect each facility). 22

3.5.2 Characteristics of Effective Protective Programs and Resiliency Strategies 23 Characteristics of effective CIKR protective programs and resiliency strategies include, but 24 are not limited to, the following: 25

Comprehensive: Effective programs must address the physical, cyber, and human 26 elements of CIKR, as appropriate, and consider long-term, short-term, and sustainable 27 activities. SSPs describe programs and initiatives to protect CIKR within the sector 28 (e.g., operational changes, physical protection, equipment hardening, cyber protection, 29 system resiliency, backup communications, training, response plans, and security 30 system upgrades). 31

Coordinated: Because of the highly distributed and complex nature of the various 32 CIKR sectors, the responsibility for protecting CIKR must be coordinated: 33

CIKR owners and operators (public or private sector) are responsible for protecting 34 property, information, and people through measures that manage risk to help 35 ensure more resilient operations and more effective loss prevention. These measures 36 include increased awareness of terrorist threats and implementation of operational 37 responses to reduce vulnerability (e.g., changing daily routines, keeping computer 38 software and virus-checking applications up to date, and applying fixes for known 39 software defects). 40

State, local, and tribal authorities are responsible for providing or augmenting 41 protective actions for assets, systems, and networks that are critical to the public 42 within their jurisdiction and authority. They develop protective programs, 43 supplement Federal guidance and expertise, implement relevant Federal programs 44

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such as the Buffer Zone Protection Program (BZPP), and provide specific law 1 enforcement capability as needed. When appropriate, they have access to Federal 2 resources to meet jurisdictional protection priorities. 3

Federal agencies are responsible for enabling or augmenting protection for CIKR 4 that is nationally critical or coordinating the efforts of CIKR partners and the use of 5 resources from different funding sources. DHS, SSAs, and other Federal 6 departments and agencies carry out these responsibilities while respecting the 7 authorities of State, local, and tribal governments, and the prerogatives of the 8 private sector. 9

SSAs, in conjunction with sector partners, provide information on the most effective 10 long-term protective strategies, develop protective programs, and coordinate the 11 implementation of programs for their sectors. For some sectors, this includes the 12 development and sharing of best practices and related criteria, guidance documents, 13 and tools. 14

DHS, in collaboration with SSAs and other public and private sector partners, 15 serves as the national focal point for the development, implementation, and 16 coordination risk management approaches and tools and of protective programs and 17 resiliency strategies (including cybersecurity efforts) for those assets that are 18 deemed nationally critical. 19

Cost-Effective: Effective CIKR programs and strategies seek to use resources 20 efficiently by focusing on actions that offer the greatest mitigation of risk for any given 21 expenditure. The following is a discussion of factors that should be considered when 22 assessing the cost-effectiveness and public benefits derived through implementation of 23 CIKR protection initiatives: 24

Operating with full information and lowering coordination costs: The NIPP describes 25 the mechanisms that enable the use of information regarding threats and 26 corresponding protective actions. It includes information sharing; provision of a 27 dedicated communications network; and the use of established, interoperable 28 industry and trade association communications mechanisms. The NIPP also helps to 29 lower the cost of coordination through such mechanisms as partnership 30 arrangements and, where appropriate, the use of a regulatory or incentives-based 31 framework to encourage or drive action. 32

Addressing the present-future tradeoff in long lead-time investments: The NIPP 33 provides the processes and coordinating structures that allow State, local, and tribal 34 governments and private sector partners to effectively use long lead-time approaches 35 to CIKR protection. 36

Providing for NIPP-related roles and responsibilities: Appropriate roles for CIKR 37 protection reflect basic responsibilities and shared risks and burdens. CIKR owners 38 and operators are responsible for protecting property, information, and people 39 through measures that manage risk and help ensure more resilient operations and 40 more effective loss prevention. State, local, and tribal authorities are responsible for 41 providing or augmenting protective actions for assets, systems, and networks that 42 are critical to the public within their jurisdiction and authority. Federal agencies are 43 responsible for coordinating and enabling protection for CIKR that is nationally 44 critical. They coordinate with regulatory agencies to help ensure that CIKR 45 protection issues are fully understood and considered in their deliberations. As 46 discussed in chapter 7, they may make Federal resources available for selected 47

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State, local, or tribal CIKR protection efforts through grant programs in certain 1 circumstances. 2

Matching the underlying economic incentives of each CIKR partner to the extent 3 possible: The NIPP supports market-based economic incentives wherever possible by 4 relying on CIKR partners to undertake those efforts that are in their own interest 5 and complementing those efforts with additional resources where necessary and 6 appropriate. This coordinated approach builds on efforts that have proven to be 7 effective and that are consistent with best business practices, such as owners and 8 operators selecting the measures that are best suited to their particular risk profile 9 and needs. 10

Addressing the public-interest aspects associated with CIKR protection: Risk 11 management actions for CIKR that provide benefits to the public at large go beyond 12 the actions that benefit owners and operators, or even those that benefit the public 13 residing in a particular State, region, or locality. Such additional actions reflect 14 different levels of the public interest—some CIKR are critical to the national 15 economy and to national well-being; some CIKR are critical to a State, region, or 16 locality; some CIKR are critical only to the individual owner/operator or direct 17 customer base. Actions to protect the public’s interest that require investment 18 beyond the level that those directly responsible for protection are willing and able to 19 provide must be of sufficient priority to warrant the use of the limited resources that 20 can be provided from public funding or may require regulatory action or appropriate 21 incentives to encourage the private sector to undertake them. 22

Risk-Informed: Protective programs and resiliency strategies focus on mitigating risk. 23 Associated actions should be designed to allow measurement, evaluation, and feedback 24 based on risk mitigation. This allows owners, operators, and SSAs to reevaluate risk 25 after the program has been implemented. These programs and strategies use different 26 mechanisms for addressing each element of risk and combine their effects to achieve 27 overall risk mitigation. These mechanisms include: 28

Consequences: Protective programs and resiliency strategies may limit or manage 29 consequences by reducing the possible loss resulting from a terrorist attack or other 30 disaster through redundant system design, backup systems, and alternative sources 31 for raw materials or information. 32

Vulnerability: Protective programs may reduce vulnerability by decreasing the 33 susceptibility to destruction, incapacitation, or exploitation by correcting flaws or 34 strengthening weaknesses in assets, systems, and networks. 35

Threat: Protective programs and resiliency strategies indirectly reduce threat by 36 making assets, systems, or networks less attractive targets to terrorists by lessening 37 vulnerability and lowering consequences. As a result, terrorists may be less likely to 38 achieve their objectives and, therefore, less likely to focus on the CIKR in question. 39

3.5.3 Risk Management Activities, Initiatives, and Reports 40 DHS, in collaboration with SSAs and other sector partners, undertakes a number of 41 protective programs, resiliency strategies, initiatives, activities, and reports that support 42 CIKR protection. Many of these are available to or provide resources for CIKR partners. 43 These activities span a wide range of efforts that include, but are not limited to, the 44 following: 45

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Buffer Zone Protection Program: A Federal 1 grant program designed to provide 2 resources to State and local law 3 enforcement to enhance the protection of a 4 given critical facility. 5

Assistance Visits: Facility security 6 assessments jointly conducted by a 7 federally led team and facility owners and 8 operators that are designed to facilitate 9 vulnerability identification and mitigation 10 discussions with individual owners and 11 operators. 12

Training Programs: Training programs are 13 designed to provide CIKR partners a 14 source from which they can obtain 15 specialized training to enhance CIKR 16 protection. Subject matter, course length, 17 and location of training can be tailored to 18 partner needs. 19

Control Systems Security: DHS coordinates 20 efforts among Federal, State, local, and 21 tribal governments, as well as control 22 system owners, operators, and vendors to improve control system security within and 23 across all CIKR sectors. 24

Multi-Jurisdiction Improvised Explosive Devices Security Plans: DHS assists high-risk 25 urban environments with developing thorough IED Security plans that efficiently 26 integrate assets and capabilities from multiple jurisdictions and emergency service 27 disciplines. The plan that results from this process can help determine what actions are 28 necessary to enhance IED prevention and protection capabilities of the multi-29

East Coast Nuclear Power Plant

In October 2007, with PSA support, State Police and LLE collaborated to develop and enhance a combined response capability for the protection of a nuclear facility site. The BZP process required the close coordination and work of the team of professionals, which included a DHS assault planner, law enforcement, the PSA, and the security staff of the nuclear power plant, all working toward developing a comprehensive buffer zone protection plan specific to that facility and locality. In addition to the development and activation of specific plan response procedures, a significant improvement to the security of the site was addressed by the acquisition of much needed equipment including, interoperable communications equipment for both State and LLE, bomb squad support and incident scene support equipment.

DHS/IP Vulnerability Assessment Project

The DHS/IP Vulnerability Assessment (VA) Project serves as the focal point for strategic planning, coordination and information sharing in conducting vulnerability assessments of the Nation’s Tier 1 and Tier 2 CIKR. Through the development and deployment of a scalable assessment methodology, the VA Project supports the implementation of the NIPP through identifying vulnerabilities, supporting collaborative security planning, and recommending protective measures strategies. IP VA Project initiatives include the Buffer Zone Protection Program (BZPP), Site Assistance Visits (SAVs), Comprehensive Reviews (CRs), and the Computer-Based Assessment Tool (C-BAT). The VA Project provides vulnerability assessment methodologies that enhance DHS’ and CIKR stakeholders’ ability to prevent, protect, and respond to terrorist attacks and all-hazards incidents. The VA Project: brings together Federal, State, local and territorial and tribal governments, local law enforcement, emergency responders, and CIKR owner and operators to conduct assessments to identify critical assets, vulnerabilities, consequences, and protective measures and resiliency strategies. The VA Project also provides analysis of CIKR facilities to include potential terrorist actions for an attack, consequences of such an attack, and integrated preparedness and response capabilities of the Federal, State, local, tribal and territorial and private sector partners. The results are used to enhance the overall CIKR protection posture of the facilities, surrounding communities, and the geographic region using short-term enhancements and long-term risk-informed investments in training, processes, procedures, equipment, and resources.

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jurisdictional area; which ultimately culminates in the development of a NRF and 1 NIMS compliant multi-jurisdiction plan. 2

A detailed discussion of DHS-supported programs is provided in appendix 3B. 3

SSAs and other Federal departments and agencies also oversee protective programs, 4 initiatives, and activities that support CIKR protection. Many of these are also available or 5 provide resources for CIKR partners. Examples include: 6

The Department of Veterans Affairs created a methodology also used by the 7 Smithsonian Institution and adapted by Federal Emergency Management Agency 8 (FEMA) Manual 452, Risk Management: A How-To Guide to Mitigate Potential 9 Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings, to assess the risk to and mitigation for hundreds of 10 buildings and museums. 11

DOT manages a Pipeline Safety grant program that supports efforts to develop and 12 maintain State natural gas, liquefied natural gas, and hazardous liquid pipeline safety 13 programs. 14

HHS is conducting pilot tests that include a tribal hospital, a local substance abuse 15 treatment center, and an owner/operator administrative office in preparation for a 16 vulnerability assessment of more than 4,000 health care-related facilities. 17

Other risk management activities include developing and providing informational reports, 18 such as the DHS Characteristics of Common Vulnerabilities Reports and the Indicators of 19 Terrorist Activity Reports, which are available to all State and territorial homeland 20 security offices. In addition to threat and vulnerability information, informational reports 21 also include best practices for protection measures. One report in particular, FEMA’s Risk 22 Management Series, addresses the protection of buildings and is applicable across sectors. 23

Enhanced Critical Infrastructure Protection (ECIP) Program

PSAs were directed to form partnerships with the owners and operators of the Nation’s identified high-priority CIKR, known as Tier 1 and Tier 2 CIKR and conduct site visits (Enhanced Critical Infrastructure Protection) for all of these assets during the period of political transition in 2008 - 2009. PSAs coordinate site visits with owners and operators, HSAs, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Local Law Enforcement (LLE) and other CIKR partners, as necessary. During the visit, PSAs document information on the facility’s current CIKR protection posture and overall security awareness. The primary goals fro ECIP site visits are to:

Inform facility owners and operators of the importance of their facilities as an identified high-priority CIKR and the need to be vigilant in light of the ever-present threat of terrorism;

Identify protective measures currently in place at Tier 1/Tier 2 facilities, provide comparison across like assets of CIKR protection posture, and track the implementation of new protective measures;

Enhance existing relationships between Tier 1/Tier 2 facility owners and operators, DHS, and Federal, State, and LLE personnel in order to:

Provide increased situational awareness regarding potential threats Maintain an in-depth knowledge of the current CIKR protection posture at each facility Provide a constant Federal resource to facility owners and operators

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3.6 Measure Effectiveness 1

Measuring effectiveness drives continuous improvement of CIKR risk-mitigation programs 2 at the sector level and overall program performance at the national level. The NIPP uses a 3 metrics-based system to provide feedback on efforts to attain the goal and supporting 4 objectives articulated in chapter 1. The metrics also provide a basis for establishing 5 accountability, documenting actual performance, facilitating diagnoses, promoting effective 6 management, and reassessing goals and objectives. Metrics offer an assessment to affirm 7 that specific objectives are being met or to articulate gaps in the national effort or 8 supporting sector efforts. They enable identification of corrective actions and provide 9 decision-makers with a feedback mechanism to help them make appropriate adjustments. 10 They can also provide qualitative insights to help make informed decisions. 11

3.6.1 NIPP Metrics and Measures 12 3.6.1.1 Measuring Performance 13 The NIPP risk management framework uses three types of indicators to measure program 14 performance: 15

Descriptive Measures are used to understand sector resources and activities; they do not 16 reflect CIKR protection performance. Examples include the number of facilities in a 17 jurisdiction; the population resident or working within typical incident effects 18 footprints; and the number, nature, and location of suppliers in an infrastructure 19 service provider’s supply chain. 20

Process (or Output) Measures are used to measure whether specific activities were 21 performed as planned, tracking the progression of a task, or reporting on the output of a 22 process such as inventorying assets. Process measures show progress toward performing 23 the activities necessary to achieve CIKR protection goals. They also help build a 24 comprehensive picture of CIKR protection status and activities. Examples include the 25 number of protective programs implemented in a specific fiscal year and the level of 26 investment for each, the number of detection systems installed at facilities in a given 27 sector, the proportion of a facility’s workforce that has completed training, and the level 28 of response to a data call for asset information. 29

Outcome Measures track progress toward a strategic goal by beneficial results rather 30 than level of activity. As the NIPP is implemented, process measures will be deempha-31 sized in favor of outcome measures. Examples include the reduction of risk measured by 32 comparing one year of comparative analysis for a specific sector to another, and the 33 overall risk mitigation achieved nationally by a particular CIKR protection initiative. 34

These indicators span a wide range with respect to ease of collection and relationship to the 35 actual performance of CIKR protection efforts. Measuring performance of the NIPP risk 36 management framework relies on a mix of these indicators, the composition of which will 37 change over time as the framework matures and as CIKR partners learn which measures 38 are the most useful in actual practice. 39

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Figure 3-7: NIPP Risk Management Framework: Measure Effectiveness 1

2 3.6.1.2 Metrics 3 Quantitative indicators are used for different groups of metrics to support national 4 assessments. The CIKR Protection Reporting and Analysis Program is following an arc of 5 increasing maturity along several dimensions. The program is consistent with the risk 6 framework set forth in the NIPP and comprises six components that together provide DHS 7 with an overall picture of CIKR protection performance. The components are: 8

NIPP Core Metrics are measures of progress in NIPP Risk Management Framework 9 implementation that are common across the 18 CIKR Sectors. They provide a basis for 10 establishing accountability, documenting performance, identifying issues, promoting 11 effective management, and reassessing goals and objectives. 12

SSA Programmatic Metrics are measures of effectiveness of SSA activities, programs, 13 and initiatives that are identified in the individual Sector SSPs and SARs. 14

National Coordinator Programmatic Metrics are measures of effectiveness of the 15 programs, products, and tools developed by DHS IP to support NIPP- and SSP-related 16 activities 17

Partnership Metrics are used to gauge the effectiveness of the sector partnership in 18 contributing to enhanced risk management and CIKR protection. The partnership metrics 19 provide a point of reference for individual CIKR sectors to reflect their distinctive 20 characteristics and requirements. 21

CIKR Information Sharing Environment Metrics measure the effectiveness of the 22 processes that enable the sharing of CIKR information among security partners. 23

Sector-Specific Metrics are measures of the status of CIKR protection efforts unique to 24 individual Sectors or sub-Sectors as viewed by the owners and operators. 25

Collectively, these six types of metrics provide a holistic picture of the health and 26 effectiveness (see appendix 3D) of the national CIKR protection effort and help drive future 27 investments and resource decisions. 28

3.6.2 Gathering Performance Information 29 DHS works with the SSAs and sector partners to gather the information necessary to 30 measure the level of performance associated with each set of metrics. Given the inherent 31 differences in CIKR sectors, a one-size-fits-all approach to gathering this information is not 32 appropriate. DHS also works with SSAs and sector partners to determine the appropriate 33

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measurement approach to be included in the sector’s SSP and to help ensure that partners 1 engaged with multiple sectors or in cross-sector matters are not subject to unnecessary 2 redundancy or conflicting guidance in information collection. Information collected as part 3 of this effort is protected as discussed in detail in chapter 4. 4

SSAs identify and, as appropriate, share or facilitate the sharing of best practices based on 5 the effective use of metrics to improve program performance. 6

3.6.3 Assessing Performance and Reporting on Progress 7 HSPD-7 requires each SSA to provide the Secretary of Homeland Security with an annual 8 report on their efforts to identify, prioritize, and coordinate the protection of CIKR in their 9 respective sectors. The report from each SSA will be sent to DHS annually. The reports are 10 due no later than June 1 of each year. 11

The Sector CIKR Annual Protection Reports provide the following information: 12

Provide a common vehicle across all CIKR sectors for communicating CIKR protection 13 performance and progress to partners and government entities; 14

Establish a baseline of existing sector-specific CIKR protection priorities, programs, and 15 initiatives against which future improvements will be assessed; 16

Identify sector priorities and out-year requirements with a focus on projected shortfalls 17 in resources for sector-specific CIKR protection and for protection of CIKR within the 18 sector that is deemed to be critical at the national level; 19

Determine and explain how sector efforts support the national effort; 20 Provide an overall progress report for the CIKR sector and measure that progress 21

against the CIKR protection goals and objectives for that sector as described in the SSP; 22 Provide feedback to DHS, the CIKR sectors, and other government entities to provide 23

the basis for the continuous improvement of the CIKR protection program; and 24 Help identify best practices from successful programs and share these within and 25

among sectors. 26 SSAs work in close collaboration with sector partners, the respective SCCs and the GCCs, 27 and other organizations in developing this report. DHS works with SSAs to assess progress 28 made toward goals in each sector based on these reports. 29

Similar reports are now prepared for the SLTTGCC and the Regional Consortium 30 Coordinating Council (RCCC) and included as appendixes to the National Annual Report. 31 Additional appendixes to the National Annual Report address the year’s accomplishments 32 for DHS IP, the Office of Cybersecurity & Communications, the Tier 1 and 2 Program, and 33 the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC). 34

DHS compiles all of these reports into a national cross-sector report that describes annual 35 progress toward CIKR protection goals on a national basis and makes recommendations to 36 the Executive Office of the President for prioritized resource allocation across the Federal 37 Government to meet national CIKR protection requirements. A more detailed discussion of 38 the national resource allocation process for CIKR protection is included in chapter 7. 39

In addition to these annual reports, SSAs regularly update their measurements of CIKR 40 status and protection levels to support DHS status tracking and comprehensive inventory 41 update. By maintaining a regularly updated knowledge base, DHS is able to quickly 42

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compile real-time CIKR status and protection posture to respond to changing circumstances 1 as indicated by tactical intelligence assessments of terrorist threats or natural disaster 2 damage assessments. This helps inform resource allocation decisions during incident 3 response and other critical operations supporting the homeland security mission. 4

3.7 Using Metrics and Performance Measurement for Continuous 5 Improvement 6

By using NIPP metrics to evaluate the effectiveness of efforts in achieving goals, CIKR 7 partners adjust and adapt the Nation’s CIKR protection approach to account for progress 8 achieved, as well as for changes in the threat and other relevant environments. At the 9 national level, NIPP metrics are used to focus attention on areas of CIKR protection that 10 warrant additional resources or other changes. If an evaluation of the effectiveness of 11 efforts to achieving goals using NIPP metrics reveals that there is insufficient progress 12 (e.g., information-sharing mechanisms have not been established and risk assessments 13 have not been conducted, or one or more sectors have a significant portion of their assets 14 rated as high risk), DHS and its CIKR partners will undertake actions to focus efforts on 15 addressing those particular areas of concern. 16

Information gathered in support of the risk management framework process helps 17 determine adjustments to specific CIKR protection activities. For instance, as protective 18 programs are implemented, the consequences and vulnerabilities associated with the asset, 19 system, or network change. Accordingly, the national risk profile is reviewed routinely to 20 help inform current and prospective allocation of resources in light of recently implemented 21 protective actions or other factors, such as increased understanding of potential system-22 wide cascading consequences, new threat intelligence, etc. 23

In addition to quantitative measures, the NIPP provides mechanisms for qualitative 24 feedback that can be applied to augment and improve the effectiveness and efficiency of 25 public and private sector CIKR protective programs. DHS works with CIKR partners to 26 identify and share lessons learned and best practices for all aspects of the risk management 27 process. DHS also works with SSAs to share relevant input from sector partners and other 28 sources that can be used as part of the national effort to continuously improve CIKR 29 protection. 30

Figure 3-8: NIPP Risk Management Framework: Feedback Loop for Continuous Improvement of 31 CIKR Protection 32

33 34

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4. Organizing and Partnering for CIKR 1

Protection 2 The enormity and complexity of the Nation’s CIKR, the distributed character of our 3 national protective architecture, and the uncertain nature of the terrorist threat and 4 manmade or natural disasters make the effective implementation of protection efforts a 5 great challenge. To be effective, the NIPP must be implemented using organizational 6 structures and partnerships committed to sharing and protecting the information needed to 7 achieve the NIPP goal and supporting objectives described in chapter 1. DHS, in close 8 collaboration with the SSAs, is responsible for overall coordination of the NIPP partnership 9 organization and information-sharing network. 10

4.1 Leadership and Coordination Mechanisms 11

The coordination mechanisms described below establish linkages among CIKR protection 12 efforts at the Federal, State, regional, local, tribal, territorial, and international levels, as 13 well as between public and private sector partners. In addition to direct coordination, the 14 structures described below provide a national framework that fosters relationships and 15 facilitates coordination within and across CIKR sectors: 16

National-Level Coordination: The DHS Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) 17 facilitates overall development of the NIPP and SSPs, provides overarching guidance, 18 and monitors the full range of associated coordination activities and performance 19 metrics. Chapter 2 details specific roles for DHS—many of these roles are carried out by 20 IP. 21

Sector Partnership Coordination: The Private Sector Cross-Sector Council (i.e., the 22 Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security (PCIS)), the Government Cross-Sector 23 Council (made up of two subcouncils: the NIPP Federal Senior Leadership Council 24 (FSLC) and the State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Government Coordinating Council 25 (SLTTGCC)), and individual SCCs and GCCs create a structure through which 26 representative groups from Federal, State, local, and tribal governments and the 27 private sector can collaborate and develop consensus approaches to CIKR protection. 28

Regional Coordination: Regional partnerships, groupings, and governance bodies 29 enable CIKR protection coordination within and across geographical areas and sectors. 30 Such bodies are composed of representatives from industry and State, local, and tribal 31 entities located in whole or in part within the planning area for an aggregation of high-32 risk targets, urban areas, or cross-sector groupings. They facilitate enhanced 33 coordination between jurisdictions within a State where CIKR cross multiple 34 jurisdictions, and help sectors coordinate with multiple States that rely on a common 35 set of CIKR. They also are organized to address common approaches to a wide variety of 36 natural or manmade hazards. The Regional Consortium Coordinating Council was 37 established in 2008 to help enhance the engagement of regionally-based partners and to 38 leverage the CIKR protection activities and resiliency strategies that they lead. 39

International Coordination: The United States-Canada-Mexico Security and Prosperity 40 Partnership; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) Senior Civil Emergency 41 Planning Committee; certain government councils, such as the Committee on Foreign 42 Investment in the United States (CFIUS); and consensus-based nongovernmental or 43

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public-private organizations, such as the global Forum of Incident Response and 1 Security Teams (FIRST), enable a range of CIKR protection coordination activities 2 associated with established international agreements. 3

4.1.1 National-Level Coordination 4 DHS, in collaboration with the SSAs and the GCCs, oversees the coordination and 5 integration of national-level CIKR protection activities through DHS/IP. In support of CIKR 6 partner coordination, DHS: 7

Leads, integrates, and coordinates the execution of the NIPP, in part by acting as a 8 central clearinghouse for the information-sharing and coordination activities of the 9 individual sector governance structures; 10

Facilitates the development and ongoing support of governance and coordination 11 structures or models; 12

Facilitates NIPP revisions and updates using a comprehensive national review process; 13 Ensures that effective policies, approaches, guidelines, and methodologies regarding 14

partner coordination are developed and disseminated to enable SSAs and other partners 15 to carry out NIPP responsibilities; 16

Facilitates the sharing of CIKR protection-related best practices and lessons learned; 17 Facilitates participation in preparedness activities, planning, readiness exercises, and 18

public awareness efforts; and 19 Ensures cross-sector coordination of SSPs to avoid duplicative requirements and 20

reporting, and conflicting guidance. 21 4.1.2 Sector Partnership Coordination 22 The goal of NIPP-related organizational structures, partnerships, and information-sharing 23 networks is to establish the context, framework, and support for activities required to 24 implement and sustain the national CIKR protection effort. DHS, in collaboration with 25 SSAs and sector partners, will issue coordinated guidance on the framework for CIKR 26 public-private partnerships, as well as metrics to measure their effectiveness. 27

The NIPP relies on the sector partnership model, illustrated in figure 4-1, as the primary 28 organizational structure for coordinating CIKR efforts and activities. The sector part-29 nership model encourages formation of SCCs and GCCs as described below. DHS also 30 provides guidance, tools, and support to enable these groups to work together to carry out 31 their respective roles and responsibilities. SCCs and corresponding GCCs work in tandem 32 to create a coordinated national framework for CIKR protection within and across sectors. 33

4.1.2.1 Private Sector Cross-Sector Council 34 Cross-sector issues and interdependencies between the SCCs will be addressed through a 35 Private Sector Cross-Sector Council (i.e., the PCIS): 36

Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security: The PCIS membership is comprised of 37 one or more members and their alternates from each of the SCCs. The partnership 38 coordinates cross-sector initiatives to support CIKR protection by identifying legislative 39 issues that affect such initiatives and by raising awareness of issues in CIKR protection. 40 The primary activities of the PCIS include: 41

Providing senior-level, cross-sector strategic coordination through partnership with 42 DHS and the SSAs; 43

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Ientifying and disseminating CIKR protection best practices across the sectors; 1 Participating in coordinated planning efforts related to the development, 2

implementation, and revision of the NIPP and SSPs; and 3 Coordinating with DHS to support efforts to plan and execute the Nation’s CIKR 4

protection mission. 5 4.1.2.2 Government Cross-Sector Council 6 Cross-sector issues and interdependencies between the GCCs will be addressed through the 7 Government Cross-Sector Council, which is comprised of two subcouncils: the NIPP FSLC 8 and the SLTTGCC: 9

NIPP Federal Senior Leadership Council: The objective of the NIPP FSLC is to drive 10 enhanced communications and coordination between and among Federal departments 11 and agencies with a role in implementing the NIPP and HSPD-7. The Council’s primary 12 activities include: 13

Forging consensus on CIKR risk management strategies; 14 Evaluating and promoting implementation of risk management-based CIKR 15

protection programs; 16 Advancing CIKR protection collaboration within and across sectors; 17 Advancing CIKR protection collaboration with the international community; and 18 Evaluating and reporting on the progress of Federal CIKR protection activities. 19

State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Government Coordinating Council: The SLTTGCC 20 serves as a forum to ensure that State, local, and tribal homeland security advisors or 21 their designated representatives are fully integrated as active participants in national 22 CIKR protection efforts and to provide an organizational structure to coordinate across 23 jurisdictions on State- and local-level CIKR protection guidance, strategies, and 24 programs. The SLTTGCC will provide the State, local, tribal, or territorial perspective 25 or feedback on a wide variety of CIKR issues. The primary functions of the SLTTGCC 26 include the following: 27

Providing senior-level, cross-jurisdictional strategic communications and 28 coordination through partnership with DHS, the SSAs, and private sector owners 29 and operators; 30

Participating in planning efforts related to the development, implementation, 31 update, and revision of the NIPP and SSPs; 32

Coordinating strategic issues and issue management resolution among State, local, 33 tribal, and territorial partners; 34

Coordinating with DHS to support efforts to plan, implement, and execute the 35 Nation’s CIKR protection mission; and 36

Providing DHS with information on State-, local-, tribal-, and territorial-level CIKR 37 protection initiatives; activities; and best practices. 38

39

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Figure 4-1: Sector Partnership Model 1

2 The cross-sector bodies described in sections 4.1.2.1 and 4.1.2.2 will convene in joint session 3 and/or working groups, as appropriate, to address cross-cutting CIKR protection issues. The 4 NIPP-related functions of the cross-sector bodies include activities to: 5

Provide or facilitate coordination, communications, and strategic-level information 6 sharing across sectors and between and among DHS, the SSAs, the GCCs and other 7 supporting Federal departments and agencies, and other public and private sector 8 partners; 9

Identify issues shared by multiple sectors that would benefit from common 10 investigations and/or solutions; 11

Identify and promote best practices from individual sectors that have applicability to 12 other sectors; 13

Contribute to cross-sector planning and prioritization efforts, as appropriate; and 14 Provide input to the government on R&D efforts that would benefit multiple sectors. 15

4.1.2.3 Sector Coordinating Councils 16 The sector partnership model encourages CIKR owners and operators to create or identify 17 an SCC as the principal entity for coordinating with the government on a wide range of 18 CIKR protection activities and issues. SCCs should be self-organized, self-run, and self-19 governed, with a spokesperson designated by the sector membership. Specific membership 20 will vary from sector to sector, reflecting the unique composition of each sector; however, 21 membership should be representative of a broad base of owners, operators, associations, 22 and other entities—both large and small—within a sector. 23

The SCCs enable owners and operators to interact on a wide range of sector-specific 24 strategies, policies, activities, and issues. SCCs serve as principal sector policy coordination 25 and planning entities. Sectors also rely on ISACs, or other information-sharing 26

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mechanisms, which provide operational and tactical capabilities for information sharing 1 and, in some cases, support for incident response activities. (A more detailed discussion of 2 ISAC roles and responsibilities is included in section 4.2.7.) 3

The primary functions of an SCC include the following: 4

Represent a primary point of entry for government into the sector for addressing the 5 entire range of CIKR protection activities and issues for that sector; 6

Serve as a strategic communications and coordination mechanism between CIKR 7 owners, operators, and suppliers, and with the government during response and 8 recovery as determined by the sector; 9

Identify, implement, and support the information-sharing capabilities and mechanisms 10 that are most appropriate for the sector. ISACs may perform this role if so designated 11 by the SCC; 12

Facilitate inclusive organization and coordination of the sector’s policy development 13 regarding CIKR protection planning and preparedness, exercises and training, public 14 awareness, and associated plan implementation activities and requirements; 15

Advise on integration of Federal, State, regional, and local planning with private sector 16 initiatives; and 17

Provide input to the government on sector R&D efforts and requirements. 18 SCCs are encouraged to participate in voluntary consensus standards development efforts 19 to ensure that sector perspectives are included in standards that affect CIKR protection.22 20

4.1.2.4 Government Coordinating Councils 21 A GCC is formed as the government counterpart for each SCC to enable interagency and 22 cross-jurisdictional coordination. The GCC is comprised of representatives across various 23 levels of government (Federal, State, local, or tribal) as appropriate to the security 24 landscape of each individual sector. Each GCC is co-chaired by a representative from the 25 designated SSA with responsibility for ensuring appropriate representation on the GCC 26 and providing cross-sector coordination with State, local, and tribal governments. Each 27 GCC is co-chaired by the DHS Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection or his/her 28 designee. 29

The GCC coordinates strategies, activities, policy, and communications across government 30 entities within each sector. The primary functions of a GCC include the following: 31

Provide interagency strategic communications and coordination at the sector level 32 through partnership with DHS, the SSA, and other supporting Federal departments 33 and agencies; 34

Participate in planning efforts related to the development, implementation, update, and 35 revision of the NIPP and SSPs; 36

Coordinate strategic communications, and issue management and resolution among 37 government entities within the sector; and 38

22Voluntary consensus standards are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies, both domestic and international. These organizations plan, develop, establish, or coordinate standards through an agreed-upon procedure that relies on consensus, though not necessarily on unanimity. Federal law encourages Federal participation in these bodies to increase the likelihood that standards meet both public and private sector needs. Examples of other standards that are distinct from voluntary consensus standards include non-consensus standards, industry standards, company standards, or de facto standards developed in the private sector but not in the full consensus process, government-unique standards developed by government for its own uses, and standards mandated by law.

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Coordinate with and support the efforts of the SCC to plan, implement, and execute the 1 Nation’s CIKR protection mission. 2

4.1.2.5 Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council 3 The CIPAC directly supports the sector partnership model by providing a legal framework 4 for members of the SCCs and GCCs to engage in joint CIKR protection-related activities. 5 The CIPAC serves as a forum for government and private sector partners to engage in a 6 broad spectrum of activities, such as: 7

Planning, coordination, implementation, and operational issues; 8 Implementation of security programs; 9 Operational activities related to CIKR protection, including incident response, recovery, 10

and reconstitution; and 11 Development and support of national plans, including the NIPP and the SSPs. 12

The CIPAC membership consists of private sector CIKR owners and operators, or their 13 representative trade or equivalent associations, from the respective sector’s recognized 14 SCC; and representatives of Federal, State, local, and tribal government entities (including 15 their representative trade or equivalent associations) that comprise the corresponding GCC 16 for each sector. DHS published a Federal Register Notice on March 24, 2006, announcing 17 the establishment of CIPAC as a FACA-exempt body, pursuant to section 871 of the 18 Homeland Security Act. 19

4.1.3 Regional Coordination and the Partnership Model 20 Regional partnerships, organizations, and governance bodies enable CIKR protection 21 coordination among CIKR partners within and across certain geographical areas, as well as 22 planning and program implementation aimed at a common hazard or threat environment. 23 These groupings include public-private partnerships that cross jurisdictional, sector, and 24 international boundaries and take into account dependencies and interdependencies. They 25 are typically self-organizing and self-governing. 26

Regional organizations, whether interstate or intrastate, vary widely in terms of mission, 27 composition, and functionality. Regardless of the variations, these organizations provide 28 structures at the strategic and/or operational levels that help to address cross-sector CIKR 29 planning and protection program implementation. They may also provide enhanced 30 coordination between jurisdictions within a State where CIKR cross multiple jurisdictions 31 and help sectors coordinate with multiple States that rely on a common set of CIKR. In 32 many instances, State homeland security advisors serve as focal points for regional 33 initiatives and provide linkages between the regional organizations and the sector partner-34 ship model. Based on the nature or focus of the regional initiative, these organizations may 35 link into the sector partnership model, as appropriate, through individual SCCs or GCCs or 36 cross-sector councils. Additionally, DHS assisted in the formation of a national-level RCCC 37 to address issues that cross sectors and/or jurisdictions of government within a defined 38 geographic area. 39

4.1.4 International CIKR Protection Cooperation 40 Many CIKR assets, systems, and networks, both physical and cyber, are interconnected 41 with a global infrastructure that has evolved to support modern economies. Each of the 42 CIKR sectors is linked in varying degrees to global energy, transportation, 43 telecommunications, cyber, and other infrastructure. This global system creates benefits 44

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and efficiencies, but also brings interdependencies, vulnerabilities, and challenges in the 1 context of CIKR protection. The Nation’s safety, security, prosperity, and way of life depend 2 on these “systems of systems,” which must be protected both at home and abroad. 3

The NIPP strategy for international CIKR protection coordination and cooperation is 4 focused on: 5

Instituting effective cooperation with international CIKR partners, as well as high-6 priority cross-border protective programs. Specific protective actions are developed 7 through the sector planning process and specified in SSPs; 8

Implementing current agreements that affect CIKR protection; and 9 Addressing cross-sector and global issues such as cybersecurity and foreign investment. 10

International CIKR protection activities require coordination with the Department of State 11 and must be designed and implemented to benefit the United States and its international 12 partners. 13

4.1.4.1 Cooperation with International Partners 14 DHS, in coordination with the Department of State, works with international partners and 15 other entities involved in the international aspects of CIKR protection to exchange 16 experiences, share information, and develop a cooperative environment to materially 17 improve U.S. CIKR protection. DHS, the Department of State, and the SSAs work with 18 foreign governments to identify international interdependencies, vulnerabilities, and risk-19 mitigation strategies, and through international organizations, such as the Group of Eight 20 (G8), NATO, the European Union, the Organization of American States (OAS), and the 21 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), to enhance CIKR 22 protection. 23

While SSAs and owners and operators are responsible for developing CIKR protection 24 programs to address risks that arise from or include international sources or 25 considerations, DHS manages specific programs to enhance the cooperation and 26 coordination needed to address the unique challenges and opportunities posed by the 27 international aspects of CIKR protection: 28

Critical Foreign Dependencies Initiative (CFDI): In response to the NIPP requirement 29 for the Federal Government to create a comprehensive inventory of infrastructure 30 located outside the United States that if disrupted or destroyed, would lead to loss of life 31 in the United States, or critically affect the Nation’s economic, industrial, or defensive 32 capabilities, DHS, working with the Department of State, developed the CFDI, a process 33 designed to ensure the resulting classified National Critical Foreign Dependencies List 34 is inclusive, representative, and leveraged in a coordinated and responsible manner. 35 The Initiative involves three phases: 36

Phase I – Identification: DHS working with Federal infrastructure protection 37 community partners developed the first ever National Critical Foreign Dependencies 38 List in FY2008, reflecting the critical foreign dependencies of the initial 17 CIKR 39 sectors, as well as critical foreign dependencies of interest to the Nation as a whole. 40 The identification process is conducted on a yearly basis, and includes input from 41 public and private sector infrastructure protection community partners. 42

Phase II – Prioritization: DHS, working with infrastructure protection community 43 partners, and in particular DOS, prioritized the National Critical Foreign 44

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Dependencies List based upon factors such as overall criticality of the element to the 1 United States, risk to the element, and foreign partner willingness and capability to 2 engage in risk management activities. The prioritization process is conducted on a 3 yearly basis. 4

Phase III – Engagement: Phase III involves leveraging the prioritized National 5 Critical Foreign Dependencies List to guide current and future U.S. bilateral and 6 multilateral incident and risk management activities with foreign partners. DHS 7 and DOS established mechanisms to ensure coordinated engagement domestic 8 coordination and collaboration by public sector entities. 9

International Outreach Program: DHS, in cooperation with the Department of State 10 and other Federal agencies, carries out international outreach activities to engage 11 foreign governments and international/multinational organizations to promote a global 12 culture of physical and cybersecurity. These outreach activities enable international 13 cooperation and engage constituencies that often do not traditionally address CIKR 14 protection. This outreach encourages the development and adoption of best practices, 15 training, and other programs designed to improve the protection of U.S. CIKR overseas, 16 as well as the reliability of international CIKR on which this country depends. Other 17 Federal, State, local, tribal, and private sector entities also engage in international 18 outreach that may be related to CIKR risk mitigation in situations where they work 19 directly with their foreign counterparts. 20

The National Exercise Program: DHS provides overarching coordination for the 21 National Exercise Program to ensure the Nation’s readiness to respond in an all-22 hazards environment and to practice and evaluate the steady-state protection plans and 23 programs put in place by the NIPP. This exercise program engages international 24 partners to address cooperation and cross-border issues, including those related to 25 CIKR protection. DHS and other CIKR partners also participate in exercises sponsored 26 by international partners. 27

National Cyber Exercises: DHS and its partners conduct exercises to identify, test, and 28 improve coordination of the cyber incident response community, including Federal, 29 State, regional, local, tribal, and international government elements, as well as private 30 sector corporations and coordinating councils. 31

Where applicable, DHS encourages the use of PCII protections to safeguard private sector 32 CIKR information when sharing it with international partners. The PCII Program will 33 solicit the submitter’s express permission before sharing the submitter’s proprietary CIKR 34 information with international partners. 35

4.1.4.2 Implementing Current Agreements 36 Existing agreements with international partners include bilateral and multilateral 37 partnerships that have been entered into with the assistance of the Department of State. 38 The key partners involved in existing agreements include: 39

Canada and Mexico: CIKR interconnectivity between the United States and its 40 immediate neighbors makes the borders virtually transparent. Electricity, natural gas, 41 oil, roads, rail, food, water, minerals, and finished products cross our borders with 42 Canada and Mexico as a routine component of commerce and infrastructure operations. 43 The importance of this trade, and the infrastructures that support it, was highlighted 44 after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, nearly closed both borders. The United 45 States entered into the 2001 Smart Border Declaration with Canada and the 2002 46

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Border Partnership Declaration with Mexico, in part, to address bilateral CIKR issues. 1 In addition, the 2005 Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP) 2 established a common approach to security to protect North America from external 3 threats, prevent and respond to threats, and further streamline the secure and efficient 4 movement of legitimate, low-risk traffic across the shared borders. 5

United Kingdom: DHS has formed a Joint Contact Group (JCG) with the United 6 Kingdom that brings officials into regular, formal contact to discuss and resolve a range 7 of bilateral homeland security issues. 8

Group of Eight: The G8 underscored its determination to combat all forms of terrorism 9 and to strengthen international cooperation when heads of government attending the 10 July 2005 meeting in Scotland issued a Statement on Counter-Terrorism, citing three 11 areas of focus related to CIKR protection: 12

To improve the sharing of information on the movement of terrorists across 13 international borders; 14

To assess and address the threat to the transportation infrastructure; and 15 To promote best practices for rail and metro security. 16

North Atlantic Treaty Organization: NATO addresses CIKR protection issues through 17 the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee, the senior policy and advisory body to 18 the North Atlantic Council on civil emergency planning and disaster relief matters. The 19 committee is responsible for policy direction and coordination of planning boards and 20 committees in the NATO environment. It has developed considerable expertise that 21 applies to CIKR protection and has planning boards and committees covering ocean 22 shipping, inland surface transport, civil aviation, food and agriculture, industrial 23 preparedness, civil communications planning, civil protection, and civil-military medical 24 issues. 25

4.1.4.3 Approach to International Cybersecurity 26 The United States proactively integrates its intelligence capabilities to protect the country 27 from cyber attack; its diplomatic outreach, advocacy, and operational capabilities to build 28 awareness, preparedness, capacity, and partnerships in the global community; and its law 29 enforcement capabilities to combat cyber crime wherever it originates. The private sector, 30 international industry associations, and companies with global interests and operations 31 also are engaged to address cybersecurity internationally. For example, the U.S.-based 32 Information Technology Association of America participates in international cybersecurity 33 conferences and forums, such as the India-based National Association for Software and 34 Service Companies Joint Conference. These efforts require interaction between policy and 35 operations functions to coordinate national and international activity that is mutually 36 supportive across the globe: 37

International Cybersecurity Outreach: DHS, in cooperation with the Department of 38 State, other Federal departments and agencies and the private sector, engages in mul-39 tilateral and bilateral discussions to further international computer security awareness 40 and policy development, as well as incident response team information-sharing and 41 capacity-building objectives. DHS engages in bilateral discussions on cybersecurity 42 issues with various international partners, such as India, Italy, Japan, and Norway. 43 DHS also works with international partners in multilateral and regional forums to 44 address cybersecurity and critical information infrastructure protection. For example, 45 the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Telecommunications Working Group recently 46

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engaged in a capacity-building program to help member countries develop computer 1 emergency response teams. The OAS has approved a framework proposal by its Cyber 2 Security Working Group to create an OAS regional computer incident response contact 3 network for information sharing and capacity building. Multilateral collaboration to 4 build a global culture of security includes participation in the OECD, G8, and the 5 United Nations. Many of these countries and organizations have developed mechanisms 6 for engaging the private sector in dialogue and program efforts. 7

Collaboration on Cyber Crime: The U.S. outreach strategy for comprehensive cyber laws 8 and procedures draws on the Council of Europe Convention on Cyber Crime, as well as: 9 (1) G8 High-Tech Crime Working Group’s principles for fighting cyber crime and 10 protecting critical information infrastructure, (2) OECD guidelines on information and 11 network security, and (3) United Nations General Assembly resolutions based on the G8 12 and OECD efforts. The goal of this outreach strategy is to encourage foreign 13 governments and regional organizations to join the United States in efforts to protect 14 internationally interconnected systems. 15

Collaborative Efforts for Cyber Watch Warning and Incident Response: The United 16 States works with key allies on cybersecurity policy and operational cooperation. 17 Leveraging pre-existing relationships among Computer Security Incident Response 18 Teams (CSIRTs), DHS has established a preliminary framework for cooperation on 19 cybersecurity policy, watch and warning, and incident response with Australia, Canada, 20 New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. The framework also incorporates efforts on 21 strategic issues as agreed upon by these allies. DHS is also participating in the 22 establishment of an International Watch and Warning Network (IWWN) among 23 cybersecurity policy, computer emergency response, and law enforcement participants 24 from 15 countries. The IWWN will provide a mechanism for the participating countries 25 to share information to build global cyber situational awareness and coordinate incident 26 response. 27

Partnerships to Address Cyber Aspects of CIKR Protection: The Federal Government 28 leverages existing agreements such as the SPP and the JCG with the United Kingdom 29 to address the Information Technology sector and cross-cutting cybersecurity as part of 30 CIKR protection. The trilateral SPP builds on existing bilateral agreements between the 31 United States and Canada and the United States and Mexico by providing a forum to 32 address issues on a dual bi-national basis. In the context of the JCG, DHS established 33 an action plan to address cybersecurity, watch, warning, and incident response, and 34 other strategic initiatives. 35

4.1.4.4 Foreign Investment in CIKR 36 CIKR protection may be affected by foreign investment and ownership of sector assets. This 37 issue is monitored at the Federal level by the CFIUS. The committee provides a forum for 38 assessing the impacts of proposed foreign investments on CIKR protection, government 39 monitoring activities aimed at ensuring compliance with agreements that result from 40 CFIUS rulings, and supporting executive branch reviews of telecommunications 41 applications to the FCC from foreign entities to assess if they pose any national security 42 threat to CIKR (see appendix 1B.4.4). 43

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4.2 Information Sharing: A Network Approach 1

The effective implementation of the NIPP is predicated on active participation by 2 government and private sector partners in robust multi-directional information sharing. 3 When owners and operators are provided with a comprehensive picture of threats or 4 hazards to CIKR and participate in ongoing multi-directional information flow, their ability 5 to assess risks, make prudent security investments, and take protective actions is 6 substantially enhanced. Similarly, when the government is equipped with an 7 understanding of private sector information needs, it can adjust its information collection, 8 analysis, synthesis, and dissemination activities accordingly. 9

The NIPP information-sharing approach constitutes a shift from a strictly hierarchical to a 10 networked model, allowing distribution and access to information both vertically and 11 horizontally, as well as the ability to enable decentralized decisionmaking and actions. The 12 objectives of the network approach are to: 13

Enable secure multi-directional information sharing between and across government 14 and industry that focuses, streamlines, and reduces redundant reporting to the greatest 15 extent possible; 16

Implement a common set of communications, coordination, and information-sharing 17 capabilities for all CIKR partners; 18

Provide CIKR partners with a robust communications framework tailored to their 19 specific information-sharing requirements, risk landscape, and protective architecture; 20

Provide CIKR partners with a comprehensive common operating picture that includes 21 timely and accurate information about natural hazards, general and specific terrorist 22 threats, incidents and events, impact assessments, and best practices; 23

Provide CIKR partners with timely incident reporting and verification of related facts 24 that owners and operators can use with confidence when considering how evolving 25 incidents might affect their risk posture; 26

Provide a means for State, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector partners to be 27 integrated, as appropriate, into the intelligence cycle, to include providing inputs to the 28 intelligence requirements development process; 29

Enable the flow of information required for CIKR partners to assess risks, conduct risk 30 management activities, invest in security measures, and allocate resources; and 31

Protect the integrity and confidentiality of sensitive information. 32 An important tool that DHS uses to facilitate networked-based information sharing is iCAV 33 and the underlying Geospatial Information Infrastructure (GII). Both iCAV and the GII 34 provide mechanisms for industry, Federal, State, local, and other partners to exchange 35 static and real-time information supporting situational and strategic awareness using 36 standards-based information exchange mechanisms. While iCAV permits viewing this 37 information in a dynamic map, the GII and IDW provide additional capabilities allowing 38 that data to be shared, stored and archived in federally compliant standard formats. iCAV 39 also provides the ability to integrate or link a variety of systems and numerous users, 40 ranging from local first responders to interested agencies within the Federal government. 41 Through iCAV, DHS connects previously stove-piped systems, providing consistent, 42 mission-specific COPs across organizational boundaries, fostering horizontal and vertical 43 CIKR information sharing with mission partners. 44

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The information-sharing process is designed to communicate both actionable information on 1 threats and incidents and information pertaining to overall CIKR status (e.g., plausible 2 threats, vulnerabilities, potential consequences, incident situation, and recovery progress) 3 so that owners and operators, States, localities, tribal governments, and other partners can 4 assess risks, make appropriate security investments, and take effective and efficient 5 protective actions. 6

4.2.1 Information Sharing Between NIPP Partners 7 The primary objective of the NIPP network approach to information sharing is to enhance 8 situational awareness and maximize the ability of government and private sector partners 9 at all levels to assess risks and execute risk-mitigation programs and activities. 10 Implementation of the Nation’s CIKR protection mission depends on the ability of the 11 government to receive and provide timely, actionable information on emerging threats to 12 CIKR owners and operators and security professionals so that they can take the necessary 13 steps to mitigate risk. 14

Ongoing and future initiatives generally fall within one of three overarching categories: 15

Planning: All partners have a stake in setting the individual information requirements 16 that best suit the needs of each CIKR sector. DHS, in conjunction with SSAs and other 17 State, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector partners, will collaboratively develop 18 and disseminate an Annual CIKR Protection Information Requirements Report that 19 summarizes the sectors’ input and makes recommendations for collecting information 20 requirements. The Information Requirements Report will be disseminated to the sectors 21 through the SCCs and included in the National CIKR Protection Annual Report. In 22 addition to this process, DHS will coordinate with the Intelligence Community to 23 support information collection that reflects the emerging requirements provided by 24 SSAs and State, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector partners. 25

Information Collection: Private sector participation in information collection is 26 voluntary and includes providing subject matter expertise and operational, vulner-27 ability, and consequence data. Private sector partners also report suspicious activity 28 that could signal pre-operational terrorist activity to the DHS National Operations 29 Center (NOC) through the National Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC). 30 Information shared by the private sector, including that which is protected by PCII or 31 other approaches, is integrated with government-collected information to produce 32 comprehensive threat assessments and threat warning products. DHS assessments, 33 such as SAVs and BZPs, which may include information protected as PCII, are shared 34 across the sectors through electronic dissemination, posting to Homeland Security 35 Information Network (HSIN) portals, and direct outreach by DHS/IP and 36 DHS/HITRAC. These efforts provide the private sector with timely, actionable 37 information to enhance situational awareness and enable security planning activities. 38

Analysis and Decisionmaking: DHS/HITRAC is responsible for integrating CIKR 39 specific vulnerability and consequence data with threat information to produce 40 actionable risk assessments used to inform CIKR risk-mitigation activities at all levels. 41 DHS/HITRAC analysts work closely with CIKR sector subject matter experts to ensure 42 that these products address the individual requirements of each sector and help actuate 43 corresponding security activities. 44

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4.2.2 Information-Sharing Life Cycle 1 Planning, information collection, analyses, and decisionmaking are key elements of the 2 CIKR information life cycle. Protection of sensitive information and dissemination of 3 actionable information are central tenets that are maintained throughout each stage of the 4 life cycle. 5

4.2.2.1 Information Requirement 6 The information-sharing process begins with defining the information collection 7 requirements to be adopted by field entities, analytic entities, and all other partners that 8 collect and disseminate intelligence and other security-related information. 9

4.2.2.2 Balancing the Sharing and Protection of Information 10 Effective information sharing relies on the balance between making information available, 11 and the ability to protect information that may be sensitive, proprietary, or that the 12 disclosure of which might compromise ongoing law enforcement, intelligence, or military 13 operations or methods. 14

Distribution of information is based on using appropriate protocols for information 15 protection. Whether the sharing is top-down (by partners working with national-level infor-16 mation such as system-wide aggregate data or the results of emergent threat analysis from 17 the Intelligence Community) or bottom-up (by field officers or facility operators sharing 18 detailed and location-specific information), the network approach places shared 19 responsibility on all CIKR partners to maintain appropriate and protected information-20 sharing practices. 21

4.2.2.3 Top-Down and Bottom-Up Sharing 22 During incident situations, DHS monitors risk management activities and CIKR status at 23 the functional/operations level, the local law enforcement level, and at the cross-sector 24 level. Information sharing may also incorporate information that comes from pre- and post-25 event natural disaster warnings and reports. 26

Top-Down Sharing: Under this approach, information regarding a potential terrorist threat 27 originates at the national level through domestic and/or overseas collection and fused 28 analysis, and subsequently is routed to State and local governments, CIKR owners and 29 operators, and other Federal agencies for immediate attention and/or action. This type of 30 information is generally assessed against DHS analysis reports and integrated with CIKR-31 related information and data from a variety of government and private sector sources. The 32 result of this integration is the development of timely information products, often produced 33 within hours that are available for appropriate dissemination to CIKR partners, based on 34 previously specified reporting processes and data formats. 35

Bottom-Up Sharing: State, local, tribal, private sector, and nongovernmental organizations 36 report a variety of security- and incident-related information from the field using estab-37 lished communications and reporting channels. This bottom-up information is assessed by 38 DHS and its partners in the intelligence and law enforcement communities in the context of 39 threat, vulnerability, consequence, and other information to illustrate a comprehensive risk 40 landscape. 41

Threat information that is received from local law enforcement or private sector suspicious 42 activity reporting is routed to DHS through the NICC and the NOC. The information is 43 then routed to intelligence and operations personnel, as appropriate, to support further 44

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analysis or action as required. In the context of evolving threat or incident situations, 1 further national-level analyses may result in the development and dissemination of a 2 variety of HITRAC products as discussed in chapter 3. Further information-sharing and 3 incident management activities are based on the specific analysis and needs of these 4 operations personnel. 5

DHS also monitors operational information such as changes in local risk management 6 measures, pre- and post-incident disaster or emergency response information, and local law 7 enforcement activities. Monitoring local incidents contributes to a comprehensive picture 8 that supports incident-related damage assessment, restoration prioritization, and other 9 national- or regional-level planning or resource allocation efforts. Written products and 10 reports that result from the ongoing monitoring are shared with relevant CIKR partners 11 according to appropriate information protection protocols. 12

4.2.2.4 Decisions and Actions 13 Information sharing, whether top-down or bottom-up, is a means to an end. The objective of 14 the information-sharing life cycle is to provide timely and relevant information that 15 partners can use to make decisions and take necessary actions to manage CIKR risk. 16

17 4.2.3 The Information-Sharing Approach 18 Figure 4.2 illustrates the broad concept of the NIPP multidirectional networked 19 information-sharing approach. This information-sharing network consists of components 20 that are connected by a national communications platform, the Homeland Security 21 Information Network (HSIN). HSIN is a counterterrorism communications system 22

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developed by State and local authorities and connecting all 50 States, 5 territories, 1 Washington, DC, and 50 major urban areas. HSIN is one of the key DHS technology tools 2 for strengthening the protection and ensuring reliable performance of the nation's critical 3 infrastructure through communication, coordination, and information sharing. It is an 4 Internet-based platform that enables secure, encrypted sensitive but unclassified (SBU) 5 and for official use only (FOUO) communication between DHS and vetted members within 6 and across CIKR sectors so that partners can obtain, analyze, and share information. The 7 diagram illustrates how the HSIN is used for two-way and multi-directional information 8 sharing between DHS; the Federal Intelligence Community; Federal departments and 9 agencies; State, local, and tribal jurisdictions; and the private sector. The connectivity of 10 the network also allows these partners to share information and coordinate among them-11 selves (e.g., State-to-State coordination). CIKR partners are grouped into nodes in the 12 information-sharing network approach. 13 4.2.3.1 Information Sharing Environment 14 As specified in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the Federal 15 Government is working with State and local partners and the private sector to create the 16 information-sharing environment (ISE) for terrorism information, in which access to such 17 information is matched to the roles, responsibilities, and missions of all organizations 18 engaged in countering terrorism and is timely and relevant to their needs. CIKR ISE has 19 been adopted as the private sector component, with the Assistant Secretary for 20 Infrastructure Protection as the designated Federal government lead. It is important to 21 note that most of the information shared day-to-day with the CIKR ISE consists of 22 information necessary for coordination and management of risks resulting from natural 23 hazards and accidents. Consequently, for information sharing to be efficient and 24 sustainable for the CIKR owners and operators, the same environment should be used to 25 share terrorism information. 26

CIKR information sharing breaks new ground. It also creates business risks for the owners 27 and operators. Significant questions are raised, such as: What information is required for a 28 productive two-way exchange? How is information most efficiently delivered and to whom 29 to elicit effective action? How is information–both proprietary and government–30 appropriately protected? How will the sectors effect appropriate action in coordination with 31 all levels of government? How can business risks be mitigated when an exchange takes 32 place? 33

Of particular criticality is the coordination of CIKR information sharing at the national 34 level with that at the local level, where most decisions are made and actions taken to 35 support the CIKR protection mission. The integration of the CIKR ISE into the national 36 ISE as its private sector component, in recognition of its comprehensiveness and 37 engagement with all levels of government, strengthens the foundation for effective 38 coordination. 39

The CIKR ISE supports three levels of decision making and action: 1) strategic planning 40 and investment; 2) situational awareness and preparedness; and 3) operational planning 41 and response. It provides for policy, governance, planning, and coordination of information 42 sharing, as well as forums for developing effective, tailored forms and identifying the types 43 of information necessary for partners to make appropriate decisions and take necessary 44 actions for effective risk management. 45

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The CIKR ISE also encompasses a number of mechanisms that facilitate the flow of 1 information, mitigate obstacles to voluntary information sharing by CIKR owners and 2 operators, and provide feedback and continuous improvement for structures and processes. 3 The CIKR ISE accommodates a broad range of sector cultures, operations, and risk 4 management approaches and recognizes the unique policy and legal challenges for full two-5 way sharing of information between the CIKR owners and operators and various levels of 6 government. 7

4.2.3.2 Information Sharing With HSIN 8 When fully deployed, the HSIN will constitute a robust and significant information-sharing 9 system that supports NIPP-related steady-state CIKR protection and NRF-related incident 10 management activities, as well as serving the information-sharing processes that form the 11 bridge between these two homeland security missions. The linkage between the nodes 12 results in a dynamic view of the strategic risk and evolving incident landscape. HSIN 13 functions as one of a number of mechanisms that enable DHS, SSAs, and other partners to 14 share information. Other supporting technologies and more traditional methods of 15 communications will continue to support CIKR protection, as appropriate, and will be fully 16 integrated into the network approach. 17

DHS and the SSAs work with other partners to measure the efficacy of the network and to 18 identify areas in which new mechanisms or supporting technologies are required. The 19 HSIN and the key nodes of the NIPP information-sharing approach are detailed in the 20 subsequent sections. By offering a user-friendly, efficient conduit for information sharing, 21 HSIN enhances the combined effectiveness in an all-hazards environment. HSIN network 22 architecture design is informed by experience gained by DOD and other Federal agencies in 23 developing networks to support similar missions. It supports a secure common operating 24 picture for all command or watch centers, including those of supporting emergency manage-25 ment and public health activities. 26

HSIN will be one part of the ISE, and when fully developed, users of HSIN will be able to 27 access ISE terrorism information based on their roles, responsibilities, and missions. The 28 HSIN is composed of multiple, non-hierarchal communities of interest (COIs) that offer 29 CIKR partners the means to share information based on secure access. COIs provide virtual 30 areas where groups of participants with common concerns, such as law enforcement, 31 counterterrorism, critical infrastructure, emergency management, intelligence, 32 international, and other topics, can share information. This structure allows government 33 and industry partners to engage in collaborative exchanges, based on specific sector-34 generated information requirements, mission emphasis, or interest level. Within the 35 Homeland Security Information Network for Critical Sectors (HSIN-CS) COI, each sector 36 establishes rules for participation, including vetting and verification processes that are 37 appropriate for the sector CIKR landscape and requirements for information protection. For 38 example, in some sectors, applicants are vetted through the SCC or ISAC; others may 39 require participants to be documented members of a specific profession, such as law 40 enforcement. 41

4.2.3.3 Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network 42 Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network (CWIN) is a relatively new 43 mechanism that facilitates the flow of information, mitigates obstacles to voluntary 44 information sharing by CIKR owners and operators, and provides feedback and continuous 45 improvement for structures and processes. CWIN is the critical, survivable network 46

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connecting DHS with vital sector partners that are essential to restoring the Nation's core 1 infrastructure. Those sectors/subsectors are communications, IT, and electricity as well as 2 their Federal and State official counterparts. In the circumstance where all or a major part 3 of telecommunications and Internet connectivity are lost or disrupted, CWIN is designed to 4 provide a survivable “out of band” communications and information-sharing capability to 5 coordinate and support infrastructure restoration. Once the core capabilities of 6 telecommunications, the Internet, and electricity are restored, normal communication 7 channels can be utilized and other critical infrastructures can begin the process of 8 restoration. 9

4.2.4 The Federal Intelligence Node 10 The Federal Intelligence Node, comprised of national Intelligence Community agencies, 11 SSA intelligence offices, and the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (DHS/OI&A), 12 identifies and establishes the credibility of general and specific threats. This node also 13 includes national, regional, and field-level information-sharing and intelligence fusion 14 center entities that contribute to information sharing in the context of the CIKR protection 15 mission. 16

At the national level, these centers include, but are not limited to, the DHS/HITRAC, the 17 FBI-led National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF), the National Counterterrorism 18 Center (NCTC), and the National Maritime Intelligence Center. 19

DHS/HITRAC analyzes and 20 integrates threat information and 21 works closely with components of the 22 Federal Infrastructure Node to 23 generate and disseminate threat 24 warning products to CIKR partners, 25 both internal and external to the 26 network, as appropriate. 27

The NJTTF mission is to enhance 28 communications, coordination, and 29 cooperation among Federal, State, 30 local, and tribal agencies 31 representing the intelligence, law 32 enforcement, defense, diplomatic, 33 public safety, and homeland security 34 communities by providing a point of 35 fusion for terrorism intelligence and 36 by supporting Joint Terrorism Task 37 Forces (JTTFs) throughout the 38 United States. 39

The NCTC serves as the primary 40 Federal organization for analyzing 41 and integrating all intelligence 42 possessed or acquired by the U.S. 43 Government pertaining to terrorism 44 and counterterrorism, except purely 45 domestic counterterrorism 46

Project Seahawk is a taskforce comprised of 40 Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies that enhances intermodal transportation and port security by sharing jurisdictional responsibility for the Port of Charleston and its metropolitan area. Other examples of information-sharing and intelligence fusion center entities include:

DHS/USCG operates a Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center (MIFC)—Pacific (Alameda, CA) and an MIFC—Atlantic (Dam Neck, VA). These centers serve as resources for intelligence support for the DHS/USCG, as well as for local and international maritime, intelligence, and law enforcement partners;

DHS/Immigration and Customs Enforcement operates the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center, an inter-agency joint intelligence fusion center focused specifically on human smuggling and human trafficking. Other DHS entities, the Department of State, DOJ, and other members of the Intelligence Community participate in the Center; and

The Defense Intelligence Agency operates analytic fusion centers in the various overseas areas of operation (i.e., EUCOM, PACOM, CENTCOM, SOUTHCOM, NORTHCOM). These fusion cells support production coordination and targeting/operational activities, as well as ongoing area operations or special programs.

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information. The NCTC may, consistent with applicable law, receive, retain, and 1 disseminate information from any Federal, State, or local government or other source 2 necessary to fulfill its responsibilities. 3

The National Maritime Intelligence Center serves as the central point of connectivity to 4 fuse, analyze, and disseminate information and intelligence for shared situational 5 awareness across classification boundaries. 6

At the regional and field levels, Federal information-sharing and intelligence fusion centers 7 include entities such as the local JTTFs, the DHS/DOJ-sponsored Project Seahawk, and 8 FBI Field Intelligence Groups that provide the centralized intelligence/information-sharing 9 component in every FBI field office. 10

4.2.5 The Federal Infrastructure Node 11 The Federal Infrastructure Node, comprised of DHS, SSAs, GCCs, and other Federal 12 departments and agencies, gathers and receives threat, incident, and other operational 13 information from a variety of sources (including a wide range of watch/operations centers). 14 This information enables assessment of the status of CIKR and facilitates the development 15 and dissemination of appropriate real-time threat and warning products and corresponding 16 protective measures recommendations to CIKR partners (see chapter 3). Participants in the 17 Federal node collaborate with CIKR owners and operators to gain input during the 18 development of threat and warning products and corresponding protective measures 19 recommendations. 20

4.2.6 State, Local, Tribal, Territorial, and Regional Node 21 This node provides links between DHS, the SSAs, and partners at the State, local, regional, 22 tribal, and territorial levels. Several established communications channels provide 23 protocols for passing information from the local to the State to the Federal level and 24 disseminating information from the Federal Government to other partners. The NIPP 25 network approach augments these established communications channels by facilitating 26 two-way and multi-directional information sharing. Members of this node provide incident 27 response, first-responder information, and reports of suspicious activity to the FBI and 28 DHS for purposes of awareness and analysis. Homeland security advisors receive and 29 further disseminate coordinated DHS/FBI threat and warning products, as appropriate. 30

Numerous States and urban area jurisdictions also have established fusion centers or 31 terrorism early warning centers to facilitate a collaborative process between law 32 enforcement, public safety, other first-responders, and private entities to collect, integrate, 33 evaluate, analyze, and disseminate criminal intelligence and other information that relates 34 to CIKR protection. 35

4.2.6.1 Fusion Centers 36 Another key mechanism for information 37 exchange at the local level is SLFCs. SLFCs 38 are developing or integrating operational 39 capabilities that focus on securing CIKR 40 and advancing Federal, State, local, and 41 private sector CIKR protection efforts. The 42 operational capability will include the 43 development of analytical products, such as 44 risk and trend analysis, and the 45

Information exchange between fusion centers and local partners

Site-specific risk information Interdependency information Suspicious activity reports Communications capability information Adversary tactics, techniques, and procedures Best practices Standard operating procedures for incident

response Emergency contact/alert information

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dissemination of those products to appropriate CIKR partners. SLFCs will provide a 1 comprehensive understanding of the threat, local CIKR vulnerabilities, the potential 2 consequences of attacks, and the effects of risk-mitigation actions on not only the risk, but 3 also on ongoing CIKR operations within the footprint or jurisdiction of the fusion center. 4 CIKR protection capabilities in an SLFC will assist State, regional, and local partners in 5 the mitigation and response to terrorist threats as well as man-made or natural hazards. 6

When fully equipped with CIKR protection capabilities, SLFCs will assist with both 7 information sharing and broad-based data collection. The collection process for CIKR 8 information should draw on various mechanisms and sources, such as existing SLFC 9 records or databases, open-source searches, site-assistance visits, technical systems, 10 Federal and State resources, subject matter experts, utilization of associations (including 11 SCCs), and information shared by owners and operators. 12

4.2.6.2 Protective Security Advisors 13 The mission of the Protective Security Advisor (PSA) is to represent DHS and IP in local 14 communities throughout the US. PSAs work with State HSAs, serving as liaisons between 15 DHS, the private sector, and Federal, State, territorial, local, and tribal entities; acting as 16 DHS’ on-site critical infrastructure and vulnerability assessment specialists. As a result of 17 their locations throughout the United States, PSAs are often the first Department 18 personnel to respond to incidents. Consequently, PSAs are uniquely able to provide early 19 situational awareness to DHS and IP leadership during an incident or contingency 20 operations. During natural disasters and contingencies, PSAs deploy to state and local 21 Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) and State and Local Fusion Centers (SLFCs) to 22 provide situational awareness and facilitate information exchange to and from the field. 23 During incidents, upon designation by the Assistant Secretary of Infrastructure Protection, 24 PSAs perform duties as Infrastructure Liaisons (ILs) at Joint Field Offices (JFOs) in 25 support of the Principal Federal Officials (PFOs) and Federal Coordinating Officers (FCOs) 26 under the National Response Framework. PSAs also provide support to officials responsible 27 for special events planning and exercises. The PSA Duty Desk serves as the 24/7 conduit 28 between the PSAs, DHS headquarters, and other CIKR stakeholders to facilitate 24/7 29 coordination and collaboration between the PSAs, their State, local, and private sector 30 counterparts, and DHS during steady state and incident operations. 31

Additionally, PSAs provide support to officials responsible for special events planning and 32 exercises, and provide real-time information on facility significance and protective 33 measures to facility owners and operators, as well as State and local representatives. PSAs 34 assist and facilitate IP efforts to identify, assess, monitor, and minimize risk to CIKR at the 35 state, regional, and local level. As the liaison between the field and DHS, PSAs coordinate 36 requests for DHS assistance including training and vulnerability assessments (VAs): Site 37 Assistance Visits (SAVs), Buffer Zone Plans (BZPs), Comprehensive Reviews (CRs); 38 Characteristics and Common Vulnerabilities, Potential Indicators for Terrorist Attack, and 39 Protective Measures Reports; Risk Mitigation Courses: Surveillance Detection and Soft 40 Target Awareness, Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Awareness and Counter Terrorism 41 Awareness; CIKR verification; and technical assistance visits. PSAs assist owners and 42 operators with the development of plans to address the vulnerabilities identified during 43 VAs. 44

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4.2.7 Private Sector Node 1 The Private Sector Node includes CIKR owners and operators, SCCs, ISACs, and trade 2 associations that provide incident information, as well as reports of suspicious activity that 3 may indicate actual or potential criminal intent or terrorist activity. DHS, in return, 4 provides all-hazards warning products, recommended protective measures, and alert 5 notification to a variety of industry coordination and information-sharing mechanisms, as 6 well as directly to affected CIKR owners and operators. 7

The NIPP network approach connects and augments existing information-sharing 8 mechanisms, where appropriate, to reach the widest possible population of CIKR owners 9 and operators and other partners. Owners and operators need accurate and timely incident 10 and threat-related information in order to effectively manage risk; enable post-event 11 restoration and recovery; and make decisions regarding protective strategies, partnerships, 12 mitigation plans, security measures, and investments for addressing risk. 13

ISACs provide an example of an effective private sector information-sharing and analysis 14 mechanism. Originally recommended by Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63) in 15 1998, ISACs are sector-specific entities that advance physical and cyber CIKR protection 16 efforts by establishing and maintaining frameworks for operational interaction between 17 and among members and external partners. ISACs typically serve as the tactical and 18 operational arms for sector information-sharing efforts. 19

ISAC functions include, but are not limited to, supporting sector-specific 20 information/intelligence requirements for incidents, threats, and vulnerabilities; providing 21 secure capability for members to exchange and share information on cyber, physical, or 22 other threats; establishing and maintaining operational-level dialogue with appropriate 23 governmental agencies; identifying and disseminating knowledge and best practices; and 24 promoting education and awareness. 25

The sector partnership model recognizes that not all CIKR sectors have established ISACs. 26 Each sector has the ability to implement a tailored information-sharing solution that may 27 include ISACs; voluntary standards development organizations; or other mechanisms, such 28 as trade associations, security organizations, and industry-wide or corporate operations 29 centers, working in concert to expand the flow of knowledge exchange to all infrastructure 30 owners and operators. Most ISACs are members of the ISAC Council, which provides the 31 mechanism for the inter-sector sharing of operational information. Sectors that do not have 32 ISACs per se use other mechanisms that participate in the HSIN and other CIKR 33 protection information-sharing arrangements. For the purposes of the NIPP, these 34 operationally oriented groups are also referred to collectively as ISACs. 35

ISACs vary greatly in composition (i.e., membership), scope (e.g., focus and coverage within 36 a sector), and capabilities (e.g., 24/7 staffing and analytical capacity), as do the sectors they 37 serve. As the sectors define and implement their unique information-sharing mechanisms 38 for CIKR protection, the ISACs will remain an important information-sharing mechanism 39 for many sectors under the NIPP partnership model. 40

4.2.8 DHS Operations Node 41 The DHS Operations Node maintains close working relationships with other government 42 and private sector partners to enable and coordinate an integrated operational picture, 43 provide operational and situational awareness, and facilitate CIKR information sharing 44

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within and across sectors. DHS and other Federal watch/operations centers provide the 1 24/7 capability required to enable the real-time alerts and warnings, incident reporting, 2 situational awareness, and assessments needed to support CIKR protection. 3

The principal purpose of a watch/operations center is to collect and share information. 4 Therefore, the value and effectiveness of such centers is largely dependent upon a timely, 5 accurate, and extensive population of information sources. The NIPP information-sharing 6 network approach virtually integrates numerous primary watch/operations centers at 7 various levels to enhance information exchange, providing a far-reaching network of 8 awareness and coordination. 9

4.2.8.1 National Operations Center23 10

The NOC, formerly known as the Homeland Security Operations Center, serves as the 11 Nation’s hub for domestic incident management operational coordination and situational 12 awareness. The NOC is a standing 24/7 interagency organization fusing law enforcement, 13 national intelligence, emergency response, and private sector reporting. The NOC 14 facilitates homeland security information-sharing and operational coordination among 15 Federal, State, local, tribal, and private sector partners, as well as select members of the 16 international community. As such, it is at the center of the NIPP information-sharing 17 network. 18

The NOC information-sharing and coordination functions include: 19

Information Collection and Analysis: The NOC maintains national-level situational 20 awareness and provides a centralized, real-time flow of information. An NOC common 21 operating picture is generated using data collected from across the country to provide a 22 broad view of the Nation’s current overall risk and preparedness status. Using the 23 common operating picture, NOC personnel, in coordination with the FBI and other 24 agencies, as appropriate, perform initial assessments to gauge the terrorism nexus and 25 track actions taking place across the country in response to a threat, natural disaster, or 26 accident. The information compiled by the NOC is distributed to partners, as 27 appropriate, and is accessible to affected CIKR partners through the HSIN. 28

Situational Awareness and Incident Response Coordination: The NOC provides the all-29 hazards information needed to help make decisions and define courses of action. 30

Threat Warning Products: DHS jointly reviews threat information with the FBI, 31 Intelligence Community, and other Federal departments and agencies on a continuous 32 basis. When a threat is determined to be credible and actionable, DHS is responsible for 33 coordinating with these Federal partners in the development and dissemination of 34 threat warning products. This coordination ensures, to the greatest extent possible, the 35 accuracy and timeliness of the information, as well as concurrence by Federal partners. 36

37 DHS disseminates threat warning products to Federal, State, local, and tribal governments, 38 as well as to private sector organizations and international partners as COI members 39 through the HSIN, established e-mail distribution lists, and other methods, as required: 40

23The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, issued by the Homeland Security Council, February 2006, recommended the establishment of the NOC as a single entity to unify situational awareness and response, recovery, and mitigation functions. The NOC replaces the DHS Homeland Security Operations Center.

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Threat Advisories: Contain actionable threat information and provide recommended 1 protective actions based on the nature of the threat. They also may communicate a 2 national, regional, or sector-specific change in the level of the HSAS. 3

Homeland Security Assessments: Communicate threat information that does not meet 4 the timeliness, specificity, or criticality criteria of an advisory, but is pertinent to the 5 security of U.S. CIKR. 6

The NOC is comprised of four sub-elements: the NOC Headquarters Element (NOC-HQE), 7 the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC), the intelligence and analysis element, 8 and the NICC. 9

NOC Headquarters Element: The NOC-HQE is a multi-agency center that provides 10 overall Federal prevention, protection, and preparedness coordination. The NOC-HQE 11 integrates representatives from DHS and other Federal departments and agencies to 12 support steady-state threat-monitoring requirements and situational awareness, as well 13 as operational incident management planning and coordination. The organizational 14 structure of the NOC-HQE is designed to integrate a full spectrum of interagency 15 subject matter expertise, operational planning capability, and reach-back capability to 16 meet the demands of a wide range of potential incident scenarios. 17

National Response Coordination Center: The NRCC is a multi-agency center housed 18 within FEMA that provides overall coordination of Federal response, recovery, and 19 mitigation activities, and emergency management program implementation. 20

Intelligence and Analysis Element: The intelligence and analysis element is responsible 21 for interagency intelligence collection requirements, analysis, production, and product 22 dissemination for DHS, to include homeland security threat warnings, advisory 23 bulletins, and other information pertinent to national incident management (see section 24 4.2.4). 25

National Infrastructure Coordinating Center: The NICC is a 24/7 watch/operations 26 center that maintains ongoing operational and situational awareness of the Nation’s 27 CIKR sectors. As a CIKR-focused element of the NOC, the NICC provides a centralized 28 mechanism and process for information sharing and coordination between the 29 government, SCCs, GCCs, and other industry partners. The NICC receives situational, 30 operational, and incident information from the CIKR sectors, in accordance with 31 information-sharing protocols established in the NRF. The NICC also disseminates 32 products originated by HITRAC that contain all-hazards warning, threat, and CIKR 33 protection information: 34

Alerts and Warnings: The NICC disseminates threat-related and other all-hazards 35 information products to an extensive customer base of private sector partners. 36

Suspicious Activity and Potential Threat Reporting: The NICC receives and 37 processes reports from the private sector on suspicious activities or potential threats 38 to the Nation’s CIKR. The NICC documents the information provided, compiles 39 additional details surrounding the suspicious activity or potential threat, and 40 forwards the report to DHS sector specialists, the NOC, HITRAC, and the FBI. 41

Incidents and Events: When an incident or event occurs, the NICC coordinates with 42 DHS sector specialists, industry partners, and other established information-sharing 43 mechanisms to communicate pertinent information. As needed, the NICC generates 44 reports detailing the incident, as well as the sector impacts (or potential impacts), 45 and disseminates them to the NOC. 46

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National Response Planning and Execution: The NICC supports the NRF by 1 facilitating information sharing among SCCs, GCCs, ISACs, and other partners 2 during CIKR mitigation, response, and recovery activities. 3

4.2.8.2 National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications 4 Pursuant to Executive Order 12472, the National Communications System (NCS) assists 5 the President, National Security Council, Homeland Security Council, Office of Science and 6 Technology Policy (OSTP) and OMB in the coordination and provision of NS/EP 7 communications for the Federal Government under all circumstances, including crisis or 8 emergency, attack, recovery, and reconstitution. As called for in the Executive order, the 9 NCS has established the NCC, which is a joint industry-government entity. Under the 10 Executive order, the NCC assists the NCS in the initiation, coordination, restoration, and 11 reconstitution of national security or emergency preparedness communications services or 12 facilities under all conditions of crisis or emergency. The NCC regularly monitors the status 13 of communications systems. It collects situational and operational information on a regular 14 basis, as well as during a crisis, and provides information to the NCS. The NCS, in turn, 15 shares information with the White House and other DHS components. 16

4.2.8.3 United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team 17 The United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) is a 24/7 single point 18 of contact for cyberspace analysis, warning, information sharing, and incident response and 19 recovery for CIKR partners. It is a partnership between DHS and the public and private 20 sectors designed to enable protection of cyber infrastructure and to coordinate the 21 prevention of and response to cyber attacks across the Nation. 22

US-CERT coordinates with CIKR partners to disseminate reasoned and actionable 23 cybersecurity information through a Web site, accessible through the HSIN, and through 24 mailing lists. Among the products it provides are: 25

Cybersecurity Bulletins: Weekly bulletins written for systems administrators and other 26 technical users that summarize published information concerning new security issues 27 and vulnerabilities. 28

Technical Cybersecurity Alerts: Written for system administrators and experienced 29 users, technical alerts provide timely information on current security issues, 30 vulnerabilities, and exploits. 31

Cybersecurity Alerts: Written in a language for home, corporate, and new users, these 32 alerts are published in conjunction with technical alerts when there are security issues 33 that affect the general public. 34

Cybersecurity Tips: Tips provide information and advice on a variety of common 35 security topics. They are published biweekly and are primarily intended for home, 36 corporate, and new users. 37

National Web Cast Initiative: DHS, through US-CERT and the Multi-State Information 38 Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC), has initiated a joint partnership to develop a 39 series of national Web casts that will examine critical and timely cybersecurity issues. 40 The purpose of the initiative is to strengthen the Nation’s cyber readiness and 41 resilience. 42

US-CERT also provides a method for citizens, businesses, and other important institutions 43 to communicate and coordinate directly with the Federal Government on matters of 44

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cybersecurity. The private sector can use the protections afforded by the Critical 1 Infrastructure Information Act to electronically submit proprietary data to US-CERT. 2

4.2.10 Other Information-Sharing Nodes 3 DHS, other Federal agencies, and the law enforcement community provide additional 4 services and programs that share information supporting CIKR protection with a broad 5 range of partners. These include, but are not limited to, the following: 6

Sharing National Security Information: DHS sponsors security clearances for 7 designated private sector owners and operators to promote the sharing of classified 8 information using currently available methods and systems. 9

FBI Law Enforcement Online (LEO): LEO can be accessed by any approved employee of 10 a Federal, State, or local law enforcement agency, or approved member of an authorized 11 law enforcement special interest group. LEO provides a communications mechanism to 12 link all levels of law enforcement throughout the United States. 13

RISSNET™ is a secure nationwide law enforcement and information-sharing network 14 that operates as part of the Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS) Program. 15 RISS is composed of six regional centers that share intelligence and coordinate efforts 16 targeted against criminal networks, terrorism, cyber crime, and other unlawful activi-17 ties that cross jurisdictional lines. RISSNET features include online access to a RISS 18 electronic bulletin board, databases, RISS center Web pages, secure e-mail, a RISS 19 search engine, and other center resources. The RISS program is federally funded and 20 administered by the DOJ/Bureau of Justice Assistance. 21

FBI InfraGard: InfraGard is a partnership between the FBI, other government entities, 22 and the private sector. The InfraGard National Membership Alliance is an association 23 of businesses, academic institutions, State and local law enforcement agencies, and 24 other participants that enables the sharing of knowledge, expertise, information, and 25 intelligence related to the protection of U.S. CIKR from physical and cyber threats. 26

Interagency Cybersecurity Efforts: The intelligence and law enforcement communities 27 have various information-sharing mechanisms in place. Examples include: 28

– U.S. Secret Service’s Electronic Crimes Task Forces: U.S. Secret Service’s Electronic 29 Crimes Task Forces (ECTFs) prevent, detect, and investigate electronic crimes, cyber-30 based attacks, and intrusions against CIKR and electronic payment systems, and 31 provide interagency information sharing on related issues. 32

– Cybercop Portal: The DHS-sponsored Cybercop portal is a secure Internet-based 33 information-sharing mechanism that connects more than 5,300 members of the law 34 enforcement community, bank investigators, and the network security specialists 35 involved in electronic crimes investigations. 36

CEO COM LINKSM: The Critical Emergency Operations Communications Link (CEO 37 COM LINK) is a telephone communications system that will enable the Nation’s top 38 chief executive officers (CEOs) to enhance the protection of employees, communities, 39 and the Nation’s CIKR by communicating with government officials and each other 40 about specific threats or during national crises. The calls, which are restricted to 41 authorized participants, allow top government officials to brief CEOs on developments 42 and threats, and allow CEOs to ask questions or share information with government 43 leaders and with each other. 44

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4.3 Protection of Sensitive CIKR Information 1

NIPP implementation will rely greatly on critical infrastructure information provided by 2 the private sector. Much of this is sensitive business or security information that could 3 cause serious damage to companies, the economy, and public safety or security through 4 unauthorized disclosure or access to this information. 5

The Federal Government has a statutory responsibility to safeguard information collected 6 from or about CIKR activities. Section 201(d)(12)(a) of the Homeland Security Act requires 7 DHS to “ensure that any material received pursuant to this Act is protected from 8 unauthorized disclosure and handled and used only for the performance of official duties.” 9 DHS and other Federal agencies use a number of programs and procedures, such as the 10 PCII Program, to ensure that CIKR information is properly safeguarded. In addition to the 11 PCII Program, other programs and procedures used to protect sensitive information include 12 Sensitive Security Information for transportation activities, Unclassified Controlled 13 Nuclear Information (UCNI), contractual provisions, classified national provisions, 14 Classified National Security Information, Law Enforcement Sensitive Information, Federal 15 Security Information Guidelines, Federal Security Classification Guidelines, and other 16 requirements established by law. 17

4.3.1 Protected Critical Infrastructure Information Program 18 The PCII Program was established pursuant to the Critical Infrastructure Information 19 (CII) Act of 2002. The Program institutes a means for sharing private sector CIKR 20 information voluntarily with the government while providing assurances that the infor-21 mation will be exempt from public disclosure and will be properly safeguarded. 22

The PCII Program, which operates under the authority of the CII Act and the 23 implementing regulation (6 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 29 (the Final Rule)), 24 defines both the requirements for submitting CII and those that government entities must 25 meet for accessing and safeguarding PCII. DHS remains committed to making PCII an 26 effective tool for robust information sharing between critical infrastructure owners and 27 operators and the government. For more information, contact the PCII Program Office at 28 [email protected]. Additional PCII Program information may also be found at 29 www.dhs.gov/pcii. 30

4.3.1.1 PCII Program Office 31 The PCII Program Office is responsible for managing PCII Program requirements, 32 developing protocols for handling PCII, raising awareness of the need for protected informa-33 tion sharing between government and the private sector, and ensuring that programs 34 receiving voluntary CII submissions that have been validated as PCII use approved 35 procedures to continuously safeguard submitted information. The Program Office 36 collaborates with governmental organizations and the private sector to develop 37 information-sharing partnerships that promote greater homeland security. 38

4.3.1.2 Critical Infrastructure Information Protection 39 The following processes and procedures apply to all CII submissions: 40

Individuals or collaborative groups may submit information for protection to either the 41 PCII Program Office or a Federal PCII Program Manager Designee; 42

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The PCII Program Office validates the information as PCII if it qualifies for protection 1 under the CII Act; 2

All PCII is stored in a secure data management system and CIKR partners follow PCII 3 Program safeguarding, handling, dissemination and storage requirements established 4 in the Final Rule and promulgated by the PCII Program Office; 5

Secure methods are used for disseminating PCII, which may only be accessed by 6 authorized PCII users who have taken the PCII Program training (see Section 6.2 for 7 PCII training offerings), have homeland security duties as well as a need-to-know for 8 the specific PCII; 9

Authorized users must comply with safeguarding requirements defined by the PCII 10 Program Office; and 11

Any suspected disclosure of PCII will be promptly investigated. 12 The Final Rule invested the PCII Program Manager with the authority and flexibility to 13 designate certain types of CII as presumptively valid PCII to accelerate the validation 14 process and to facilitate submissions directly to SSAs. This is known as a “categorical 15 inclusion.” Specifically, categorical inclusions allow: 16

The PCII Program Manager to establish categories of information for which PCII status 17 will automatically apply; 18

Indirect submissions to DHS through DHS field representatives and other SSAs; 19 The PCII Program Office to designate DHS field representatives and SSAs other than 20

DHS to receive CII indirectly on behalf of DHS, but only the PCII Program Manager is 21 authorized to make the decision to validate a submission as PCII. 22

The Final Rule enables submitters to submit their CII directly to a PCII Program Manager 23 Designee within a given SSA. Interested submitters should contact the PCII Program Office 24 at [email protected] to determine whether an SSA has an appropriate PCII categorical 25 inclusion program established. If the SSA does not have one, the PCII Program Office will 26 work with the submitter and the SSA to establish a program and facilitate the application 27 of PCII protections to the submitter’s CIKR information. 28

4.3.1.3 Uses of PCII 29 PCII may be shared with accredited government entities, including authorized Federal, 30 State, or local government employees or contractors supporting Federal agencies, only for 31 the purposes of securing CIKR and protected systems. PCII will be used for analysis, 32 prevention, response, recovery, or reconstitution of CIKR threatened by terrorism or other 33 hazards. 34

Accredited government entities may generate advisories, alerts, and warnings relevant to 35 the private sector based on the PCII. Communications available to the public, however, will 36 not contain any actual PCII. PCII can be combined with other information, including 37 classified information to support CIKR protection activities, but must be marked 38 accordingly. 39

The CII Act specifically authorizes disclosure of PCII without the permission of the 40 submitter to: 41

Further an investigation or prosecute a criminal act; 42


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Either House of Congress, or to the extent they address matters within their 1 jurisdiction, or any related committee, subcommittee, or joint committee; 2

The Comptroller General or any authorized representative of the Comptroller General, 3 while performing the duties of the General Accounting Office. 4

4.3.1.4 PCII Protections and Authorized Users 5 The PCII Program has established policies and procedures to ensure that PCII is properly 6 accessed, used, and safeguarded throughout its life cycle. These safeguards ensure that 7 submitted information is: 8

Used appropriately for homeland security purposes; 9 Accessed only by authorized and properly trained government employees and 10

contractors with homeland security duties who have a need to know and for non-Federal 11 government employees who have signed a Non-Disclosure Agreement; 12

Protected from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and similar 13 State and local disclosure laws, and from use in civil litigation and regulatory actions; 14 and 15

Protected and handled in a secure manner. 16 The law and rule prescribe criminal penalties for intentional unauthorized access, 17 distribution, and misuse of PCII including the following provisions: 18

Federal employees may be subject to disciplinary action, including criminal and civil 19 penalties and loss of employment; 20

Contract employees may face termination, and the contractor may have its contract 21 terminated; and 22

The CII Act sanctions for unauthorized disclosure of PCII apply only to Federal 23 personnel. In order to become accredited, State and local participating entities must 24 demonstrate that they can apply appropriate State and local penalties for improperly 25 handling sensitive information such as PCII. 26

PCII is actively used by numerous DHS information collection and assessment tools, 27 including the Constellation/Automated Critical Asset Management System (C/ACAMS), 28 Buffer Zone Plans (BZPs), and Site Assistance Visits (SAVs). PCII also partners with many 29 Federal agencies, notably the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the 30 Department of Defense (DoD). In addition, the PCII Program actively partners with all 31 States and territories interested in becoming accredited. 32

4.3.2 Other Information Protection Protocols 33 Information protection protocols may impose requirements for access or other standard 34 processes for safeguarding information. Information need not be validated as PCII to 35 receive security protection and disclosure restrictions. Several categories of information 36 related to CIKR are considered to be sensitive but unclassified and require protection. 37 Examples include sector-specific information, such as sensitive transportation or nuclear 38 information, or information determined to be classified information based on the analysis of 39 unclassified information. The major categories that apply to CIKR are discussed below. 40

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4.3.2.1 Sensitive Security Information 1 The Maritime Transportation Security Act, the Aviation Transportation Security Act, and 2 the Homeland Security Act establish protection for Sensitive Security Information (SSI). 3 TSA and the USCG may designate information as SSI when disclosure would: 4

Be detrimental to security; 5 Reveal trade secrets or privileged or confidential information; or 6 Constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. 7

Parties accessing SSI must demonstrate a need to know. Holders of SSI must protect such 8 information from unauthorized disclosure and must destroy the information when it is no 9 longer needed. SSI protection pertains to government officials as well as to transportation 10 sector owners and operators. 11

4.3.2.2 Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information 12 DOD and DOE may designate certain information as UCNI. Such information relates to the 13 production, processing, or use of nuclear material; nuclear facility design information; and 14 security plans and measures for the physical protection of nuclear materials. This 15 designation is used when disclosure could affect public health and safety or national 16 security by enabling illegal production or diversion of nuclear materials or weapons. Access 17 to UCNI is restricted to those who have a need to know. Procedures are specified for 18 marking and safeguarding UCNI. 19

4.3.2.3 Freedom of Information Act Exemptions and Exclusions 20 FOIA was enacted in 1966 and amended and modified by congressional legislation, 21 including the Electronic Freedom of Information Act of 1996 and the Privacy Act of 1974. 22 The act established a statutory right of public access to executive branch information in the 23 Federal Government and generally provides that any person has a right, enforceable in 24 court, to obtain access to Federal agency records. Certain records may be protected from 25 public disclosure under the act if they fall into one of three special law enforcement 26 exclusions that protect information, such as informants’ names. They may also be protected 27 from public disclosure under the act if they are in one of nine exemption categories that 28 protect such information as classified national security data, trade secrets, or financial 29 information obtained by the government from individuals, personnel and medical files, and 30 CIKR information. 31

4.3.2.4 Classified Information 32 Under amended Executive Order 12958and amended Executive Order 12829, the 33 Information Security Oversight Office of the National Archives is responsible to the 34 President for overseeing the security classification programs in both government and 35 industry that safeguard National Security Information (NSI), including information related 36 to defense against transnational terrorism. 37

Classified information is a special category of sensitive information that is accorded special 38 protections and access controls. Specific characteristics distinguish it from other sensitive 39 information. These include: 40

Information that can only be designated as classified by a duly empowered authority; 41 Information that must be owned by, produced by or for, or under the control of the 42

Federal Government; 43

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Unauthorized disclosure of the information that reasonably could be expected to result 1 in identifiable damage to U.S. national security; and 2

Only information related to the following that may be classified as: 3 Military plans, weapons systems, or operations; 4 Foreign government information; 5 Intelligence activities (including special activities), intelligence sources or methods, 6

or cryptology; 7 Foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential 8

sources; 9 Scientific, technological, or economic matters related to national security, which 10

includes defense against transnational terrorism; 11 Federal Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities; 12 Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructure, projects, 13

plans, or protection services related to national security, which includes defense 14 against transnational terrorism; or 15

Weapons of mass destruction. 16 Many forms of information related to CIKR protection have these characteristics. This 17 information may be determined to be classified information and protected accordingly. 18

4.3.2.5 Physical and Cybersecurity Measures 19 DHS uses strict information security protocols for the access, use, and storage of sensitive 20 information, including that related to CIKR. These protocols include both physical security 21 measures and cybersecurity measures. Physical security protocols for DHS facilities require 22 access control and risk-mitigation measures. Information security protocols include access 23 controls, login restrictions, session tracking, and data labeling. Appendix 3C provides a 24 discussion of these protections as applied to the IDW. 25

4.3.2.6 Chemical-Terrorism Vulnerability Information 26 On April 9, 2007, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued the Chemical 27 Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS). Congress authorized these interim final 28 regulations (IFR) under Section 550 of the Department of Homeland Security 29 Appropriations Act of 2007, directing the Department to identify, assess, and ensure 30 effective security at high risk chemical facilities. In Section 550, Congress also 31 acknowledged DHS’s need to both protect and share chemical facility security information. 32 Consequently, DHS included provisions in the IFR to create and explain Chemical-33 terrorism Vulnerability Information (CVI), a new category of protected information to 34 protect extremely sensitive information that facilities develop for purposes of complying 35 with the CFATS that could be exploited by terrorists. At the same time, CVI allows sharing 36 relevant information with state and local government officials who have a “need to know” 37 CVI to carry out chemical facility security activities. Before being authorized to access CVI, 38 individuals will have to complete training to ensure that the individuals understand and 39 comply with the various safeguarding and handling requirements for CVI. 40

More information on CFATS and CVI, including the CVI Procedures Manual, can be found 41 at: www.dhs.gov/chemicalsecurity. 42

http://www.dhs.gov/chemicalsecurity

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4.4 Privacy and Constitutional Freedoms 1

Mechanisms detailed in the NIPP are designed to provide a balance between achieving a 2 high level of security and protecting the civil rights and liberties that form an integral part 3 of America’s national character. Achieving this balance requires acceptance of some level of 4 risk. In providing for effective protective programs, the processes outlined in the NIPP 5 respect privacy, freedom of expression, freedom of movement, freedom from unlawful 6 discrimination, and other liberties that define the American way of life. 7

Compliance with the Privacy Act and governmental privacy regulations and procedures is a 8 key factor that is considered when collecting, maintaining, using, and disseminating 9 personal information. The following DHS offices support the NIPP processes: 10

DHS Privacy Office: Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act, DHS has designated a 11 privacy officer to ensure that it appropriately balances the mission with civil liberty and 12 privacy concerns. The officer consults regularly with privacy advocates, industry 13 experts, and the public at large to ensure broad input and consideration of privacy 14 issues so that DHS achieves solutions that protect privacy while enhancing security. 15

DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties: Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act, 16 DHS has established an Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties to review and assess 17 allegations of abuse of civil rights or civil liberties, racial or ethnic profiling, and to 18 provide advice to DHS components. 19

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5. CIKR Protection as Part of the 1

Homeland Security Mission 2 This chapter describes the linkages between the NIPP, the SSPs, and other CIKR 3 protection strategies, plans, and initiatives that are most relevant to the overarching 4 national homeland security and CIKR protection missions. It also describes how the unified 5 national CIKR protection effort integrates elements of the homeland security mission 6 including preparedness and activities to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover 7 from terrorist attacks, major disasters and other emergencies. Sector-specific linkages to 8 these other national frameworks are addressed in the SSPs. 9

5.1 A Coordinated National Approach to the Homeland Security 10 Mission 11

The NIPP provides the structure needed to coordinate, integrate, and synchronize activities 12 derived from various relevant statutes, national strategies and Presidential directives into 13 the unified national approach to implementing the CIKR protection mission. The relevant 14 authorities include those that address the overarching homeland security and CIKR 15 protection missions, as well as those that address a wide range of sector-specific CIKR 16 protection-related functions, programs, and responsibilities. This section describes how 17 overarching homeland security legislation, strategies, HSPDs, and related initiatives work 18 together (see figure 5-1). Information regarding sector-specific CIKR-related authorities is 19 addressed in the respective SSPs. 20

5.1.1 Legislation 21 The Homeland Security Act (figure 5-1, column 1) provides the primary authority for the 22 overall homeland security mission and establishes the basis for the NIPP, the SSPs, and 23 related CIKR protection efforts and activities. A number of other statutes (as described in 24 chapter 2 and appendix 2A) provide authorities for cross-sector and sector-specific CIKR 25 protection activities. Individual SSPs address relevant sector-specific authorities. 26

5.1.2 Strategies 27 The National Strategy for Homeland Security, the National Strategy for the Physical 28 Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets, and the National Strategy to Secure 29 Cyberspace together provide the vision and strategic direction for the CIKR protection 30 elements of the homeland security mission (see figure 5-1, columns 1 and 2). A number of 31 other Presidential strategies, such as the National Intelligence Strategy, provide direction 32 and guidance related to CIKR protection on a national or sector-specific basis (see appendix 33 2A). 34

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (figure 5-1, column 1) provides the primary authority 35 for the overall homeland security mission and establishes the basis for the NIPP, the SSPs, 36 and related CIKR protection efforts and activities. Public Law 110-53, Implementing 37 Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, further refines and enumerates 38 those authorities specified in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and formally assigns key 39 infrastructure protection responsibilities to DHS, including the creation of a database of all 40 national infrastructures to support cross-sector risk assessment and management. 41

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5.1.2.1 The National Strategy for Homeland Security 1 The President’s National Strategy for Homeland Security (2002) established protection of 2 America’s CIKR as a core homeland security mission and as a key element of the 3 comprehensive approach to homeland security and domestic incident management. This 4 strategy articulated the vision for a unified “American Infrastructure Protection effort” to 5 “ensure we address vulnerabilities that involve more than one infrastructure sector or 6 require action by more than one agency,” and to “assess threats and vulnerabilities 7 comprehensively across all infrastructure sectors to ensure we reduce the overall risk to the 8 country, instead of inadvertently shifting risk from one potential set of targets to another.” 9

This strategy called for the development of “interconnected and complementary homeland 10 security systems that are reinforcing rather than duplicative, and that ensure essential 11 requirements are met … [and] provide a framework to align the resources of the Federal 12 budget directly to the task of securing the homeland.” 13

The 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security builds on the first National Strategy for 14 Homeland Security and complements both the National Security Strategy issued in March 15 2006 and the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, issued in September 2006. It 16 reflects the increased understanding of threats confronting the United States, incorporates 17 lessons learned from exercises and real-world catastrophes, and addresses ways to ensure 18 long-term success by strengthening the homeland security foundation that has been built. 19

Figure 5-1: National Framework for Homeland Security 20

21

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5.1.2.2 The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key 1 Assets 2 The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key 3 Assets identifies national policy, goals, objectives, and principles needed to “secure the 4 infrastructures and assets vital to national security, governance, public health and safety, 5 economy, and public confidence.” The strategy identifies specific initiatives to drive near-6 term national protection priorities and inform the resource allocation process; identifies key 7 initiatives needed to secure each of the CIKR sectors; and addresses specific cross-sector 8 security priorities. Additionally, it establishes a foundation for building and fostering the 9 cooperative environment in which government, industry, and private citizens can carry out 10 their respective protection responsibilities more effectively and efficiently. 11

5.1.2.3 The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace 12 The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace sets forth objectives and specific actions 13 needed to prevent cyber attacks against America’s CIKR; identifies and appropriately 14 responds to those responsible for cyber attacks; reduces nationally identified 15 vulnerabilities; and minimizes damage and recovery time from cyber attacks. This strategy 16 articulates five national priorities, including the establishment of a security response 17 system, a threat and vulnerability reduction program, awareness and training programs, 18 efforts to secure government cyberspace, and international cooperation. 19

Priority in this strategy is focused on improving the national response to cyber incidents; 20 reducing threats from and vulnerabilities to cyber attacks; preventing cyber attacks that 21 could affect national security assets; and improving the international management of and 22 response to such attacks. 23

5.1.2.4 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 24 This act requires the implementation of some of the recommendations made by the 9/11 25 Commission, to include requiring the Secretary of Homeland Security to: 1) establish 26 department-wide procedures to receive and analyze intelligence from State, local, and tribal 27 governments and the private sector; and 2) establish a system that screens 100 percent of 28 maritime and passenger cargo. The Act also established grants to support high-risk urban 29 areas and State, local, and tribal governments in preventing, preparing for, protecting 30 against, and responding to acts of terrorism; and to assist States in carrying out initiatives 31 to improve international emergency communications. 32

5.1.3 Homeland Security Presidential Directives and National Initiatives 33 Homeland Security Presidential directives set national policies and executive mandates for 34 specific programs and activities (see figure 5-1, column 3). The first was issued on October 35 29, 2001, shortly after the attacks on September 11, 2001, establishing the Homeland 36 Security Council. It was followed by a series of directives regarding the full spectrum of 37 actions required to “prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; reduce America’s 38 vulnerability to terrorism, major disasters, and other emergencies; and minimize the 39 damage and recover from incidents that do occur.” A number of these are relevant to CIKR 40 protection. HSPD-3, Homeland Security Advisory System, provides the requirement for the 41 dissemination of information regarding terrorist acts to Federal, State, and local 42 authorities, and the American people. HSPD-5 addresses the national approach to domestic 43 incident management; HSPD-7 focuses on the CIKR protection mission; and HSPD-8 44

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focuses on ensuring the optimal level of preparedness to protect, prevent, respond to, and 1 recover from terrorist attacks and the full range of natural and manmade hazards. 2

This section addresses the Homeland Security Presidential directives that are most 3 relevant to the overarching CIKR protection component of the homeland security mission 4 (e.g., HSPDs 3, 5, 7, and 8). Other Presidential directives, such as HSPD-9, Defense of the 5 United States Agriculture and Food, and HSPD-10, Biodefense for the 21st Century, are 6 relevant to CIKR protection in specific sectors and are addressed in further detail in the 7 appropriate SSPs. 8

5.1.3.1 HSPD-3, Homeland Security Advisory System 9 HSPD-3 (March 2002) established the policy for the creation of the HSAS to provide 10 warnings to Federal, State, and local authorities, and the American people in the form of a 11 set of graduated Threat Conditions that escalate as the risk of the threat increases. At each 12 threat level, Federal departments and agencies are required to implement a corresponding 13 set of protective measures to further reduce vulnerability or increase response capabilities 14 during a period of heightened alert. The threat conditions also serve as guideposts for the 15 implementation of tailored protective measures by State, local, tribal, and private sector 16 partners. 17

5.1.3.2 HSPD-5, Management of Domestic Incidents 18 HSPD-5 (February 2003) required DHS to lead a coordinated national effort with other 19 Federal departments and agencies; State, local, and tribal governments; and the private 20 sector to develop and implement a National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the 21 NRF (see figure 5-1, column 4). 22

The NIMS (March 2004) provides a nationwide template enabling Federal, State, local, and 23 tribal governments; the private sector; and nongovernmental organizations to work 24 together effectively and efficiently to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from 25 incidents regardless of cause, size, and complexity. The NIMS provides a uniform doctrine 26 for command and management, including Incident Command, Multiagency Coordination, 27 and Joint Information Systems; resource, communications, and information management; 28 and application of supporting technologies. 29

The NRP (December 2004) was superseded by the National Response Framework (January 30 of 2008) Both the NRP and the NRF were built on the NIMS template to establish a single, 31 comprehensive framework for the management of domestic incidents (including threats) 32 that require DHS coordination and effective response and engaged partnership by an 33 appropriate combination of Federal, State, local, and tribal governments; the private sector; 34 and nongovernmental organizations. The NRF includes a CIKR Support Annex that 35 provides the policies and protocols for integrating the CIKR protection mission as an 36 essential element of domestic incident management, and establishes the Infrastructure 37 Liaison function to serve as a focal point for CIKR coordination at the field level. 38

5.1.3.3 HSPD-7, Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection 39 HSPD-7 (December 2003) established the U.S. policy for “enhancing protection of the 40 Nation’s CIKR.” It mandated development of the NIPP as the primary vehicle for imple-41 menting the CIKR protection policy. HSPD-7 directed the Secretary of Homeland Security 42 to lead development of the plan, including, but not limited to, the following four key 43 elements: 44

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A strategy to identify and coordinate the protection of CIKR; 1 A summary of activities to be undertaken to prioritize, reduce the vulnerability of, and 2

coordinate protection of CIKR; 3 A summary of initiatives for sharing information and for providing threat and warning 4

data to State, local, and tribal governments and the private sector; and 5 Coordination and integration, as appropriate, with other Federal emergency 6

management and preparedness activities, including the NRP and guidance provided in 7 the National Preparedness Guidelines. 8

HSPD-7 also directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to maintain an organization to 9 serve as a focal point for the security of cyberspace. The NIPP is supported by a series of 10 SSPs, developed by the SSAs in coordination with their public and private sector partners, 11 which detail the approach to CIKR protection goals, initiatives, processes, and 12 requirements for each sector. 13

5.1.3.4 HSPD-8, National Preparedness 14 HSPD-8 (December 2003) mandates development of a national preparedness goal, which 15 was finalized in the National Preparedness Guidelines (see figure 5-1, column 4), aimed at 16 helping entities at all levels of government build and maintain the capabilities to prevent, 17 protect against, respond to, and recover from major events “to minimize the impact on lives, 18 property, and the economy.” 19

To do this, the National Preparedness Guidelines provide readiness targets, priorities, 20 standards for assessments and strategies, and a system for assessing the Nation’s overall 21 level of preparedness across four mission areas: prevention, protection, response, and 22 recovery. There are four critical elements of the National Preparedness Guidelines: 23

The National Preparedness Vision, which provides a concise statement of the core 24 preparedness goal for the Nation. 25

The National Planning Scenarios, which depict a diverse set of high-consequence 26 threat scenarios of both potential terrorist attacks and natural disasters. Collectively, 27 the 15 scenarios are designed to focus contingency planning for homeland security 28 preparedness work at all levels of government and with the private sector. The 29 scenarios form the basis for coordinated Federal planning, training, exercises, and grant 30 investments needed to prepare for emergencies of all types. 31

The Universal Task List (UTL), which is a menu of some 1,600 unique tasks that can 32 facilitate efforts to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from the major 33 events that are represented by the National Planning Scenarios. It presents a common 34 vocabulary and identifies key tasks that support development of essential capabilities 35 among organizations at all levels. No entity is expected to perform every task. 36

The Target Capabilities List (TCL), which defines 37 specific capabilities that 37 communities, the private sector, and all levels of government should collectively possess 38 in order to respond effectively to disasters. 39

The National Preparedness Guidelines uses capabilities-based planning processes and 40 enables Federal, State, local, and tribal entities to prioritize needs, update strategies, 41 allocate resources, and deliver programs. The guidelines reference standard planning tools 42 that are applicable to implementation of the NIPP, including the UTL and the TCL. Like 43 the NIPP, the UTL and TCL are living documents that will be enhanced and refined over 44 time. 45

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Annex 1 to HSPD-8 established a standard and comprehensive approach to National 1 Planning intended to enhance the preparedness of the Nation. The Annex articulated the 2 U.S. Government policy “to integrate and effective policy and operational objectives to 3 prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from all hazards, and comprises: (a) a 4 standardized Federal planning process; (b) national planning doctrine; (c) strategic 5 guidance, strategic plans, concepts of operations, and operations plans and as appropriate, 6 tactical plans; and (e) a system for integrating plans among all levels of government.” 7

5.1.3.5 HSPD-19, Combating Terrorist Use of Explosives in the United States 8 In February 2007, the President signed Homeland Security Presidential Directive 19 9 (HSPD-19), ‘Combating Terrorist Use of Explosives in the US’ requiring the Attorney 10 General to develop a report to the President, including a national strategy and 11 recommendations, on how more effectively to deter, prevent, detect, protect against, and 12 respond to explosive attacks, including the coordination of Federal Government efforts 13 with State, local, territorial, and tribal governments, first responders, and private sector 14 organizations. HSPD-19 required that the “Attorney General, in coordination with the 15 Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security and the heads of other Sector-Specific 16 Agencies (as defined in HSPD-7) and agencies that conduct explosive attack detection, 17 prevention, protection, or response activities…develop an implementation plan.” HSPD-19 18 required that the plan implement its policy and any approved recommendations in the 19 report and “include measures to (a) coordinate the efforts of Federal, State, local, territorial, 20 and tribal government entities to develop related capabilities, (b) allocate Federal grant 21 funds effectively, (c) coordinate training and exercise activities, and (d) incorporate, and 22 strengthen as appropriate, existing plans and procedures to communicate accurate, 23 coordinated, and timely information regarding a potential or actual explosive attack to the 24 public, the media, and the private sector.” 25

The HSPD-19 Report presents a holistic approach to improve the Nation’s ability to deter, 26 prevent, detect, protect against, and respond to the threat of terrorist explosive and IED 27 attacks to the homeland. The Report provides 35 recommendations to enhance and align 28 our current counter-IED capabilities and concludes that in order to improve our national 29 CIKR protection posture, there must be a systematic approach in which all deterrence, 30 prevention, detection, protection, and response efforts are unified. The strategy and 31 recommendations provide a way forward that streamlines and enhances current activities, 32 reducing conflict, confusion, and duplication of effort among interagency partners. The 33 Implementation Plan builds upon the policies, strategy, and guidance set forth by the 34 President in HSPD-19 and outlined by the Attorney General and interagency partners in 35 the HSPD-19 Report to the President. 36

The Secretary of Homeland Security designated IP to lead the Department’s HSPD-19 37 efforts and represent DHS in the DOJ-led implementation of HSPD-19. IP efforts to 38 enhance and coordinate the Nation’s ability to detect, deter, prevent, and respond to IED 39 attacks against critical infrastructure, key resources, and soft targets include: coordinating 40 national and intergovernmental IED security efforts; conducting requirements, capabilities, 41 and gap analyses; and promoting information-sharing and IED security awareness. 42

HSPD-19 also assigns DHS specific roles and responsibilities for information sharing and 43 counter-IED research, development, testing, and evaluation. HSPD-19 states that the 44 Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Attorney General, the Director of 45 National Intelligence, and the Secretaries of State and Defense, will establish and maintain 46

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secure information-sharing systems to provide law enforcement agencies and other first 1 responders with access to detailed information that enhances the preparedness of 2 Federal, State, local, territorial, and tribal government personnel to deter, prevent, detect, 3 protect against, and respond to explosive attacks in the US. The information-sharing 4 systems will include lessons learned and best practices regarding the use of explosives 5 as a terrorist weapon and related insurgent war fighting tactics employed both domestically 6 and internationally. 7

Additionally, HSPD-19 states that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination 8 with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the Office of 9 Science and Technology Policy, is responsible for coordinating Federal Government 10 research, development, testing, and evaluation activities related to the detection and 11 prevention of, protection against, and response to explosive attacks and the development 12 of explosives render-safe tools and technologies. 13

5.2 The CIKR Protection Component of the Homeland Security 14 Mission 15

The result of this interrelated set of national authorities, strategies, and initiatives is a 16 common, holistic approach to achieving the homeland security mission that includes an 17 emphasis on preparedness across the board, and on the protection of America’s CIKR as a 18 steady-state component of routine, day-to-day business operations for government and 19 private sector partners. 20

The NIPP and NRF are complementary plans that span a spectrum of prevention, 21 protection, response, and recovery activities to enable this coordinated approach on a day-22 to-day basis, as well as during periods of heightened threat. The NIPP and its associated 23 SSPs establish the Nation’s steady-state level of protection by helping to focus resources 24 where investment yields the greatest return in terms of national risk management. The 25 NRF addresses prevention, protection, response, and recovery in the context of domestic 26 threat and incident management. The National Preparedness Guidelines support 27 implementation of both the NIPP and the NRF by establishing national priorities and 28 guidance for building the requisite capabilities to support both plans at all levels of 29 government. 30

Each of the guiding elements includes specific requirements for DHS and other Federal 31 departments and agencies to build engaged partnerships and work in cooperation and 32 collaboration with State, local, tribal, and private sector partners. This cooperation and 33 collaboration between government and private sector owners and operators is specifically 34 applicable to the CIKR protection efforts outlined in the NIPP. 35

The NIPP risk management framework, sector partnership model, and information-sharing 36 mechanisms are structured to support coordination and cooperation with private sector 37 owners and operators while recognizing the differences between and within sectors, 38 acknowledging the need to protect sensitive information, establishing processes for 39 information sharing, and providing for smooth transitions from steady-state operations to 40 incident response. 41

HSPD-19 Implementation efforts seek to coordinate and enhance the Nation’s capabilities to deter, prevent, detect protect against, and respond to a terrorist attack using explosives or IEDs.

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5.3 Relationship of the NIPP and SSPs to Other CIKR Plans and 1 Programs 2

The NIPP and SSPs outline the overarching elements of the CIKR protection effort that 3 generally are applicable within and across all sectors. The SSPs are an integral component 4 of the NIPP and exist as independent documents to address the unique perspective, risk 5 landscape, and methodologies associated with each sector. Homeland security plans and 6 strategies at the State, local, and tribal levels of government address CIKR protection 7 within their respective jurisdictions, as well as mechanisms for coordination with various 8 regional efforts and other external entities. The NIPP also is designed to work with the 9 range of CIKR protection-related plans and programs instituted by the private sector, both 10 through voluntary actions and as a result of various regulatory requirements. These plans 11 and programs include business continuity and resilience measures. NIPP processes are 12 designed to enhance coordination, cooperation, and collaboration among CIKR partners 13 within and across sectors to synchronize related efforts and avoid duplicative or 14 unnecessarily costly security requirements. 15

5.3.1 Sector-Specific Plans 16 Based on guidance from DHS, SSPs were developed jointly by SSAs in close collaboration 17 with SCCs, GCCs, and others, including State, local, and tribal homeland partners with key 18 interests or expertise appropriate to the sector. The SSPs provide the means by which the 19 NIPP is implemented across all sectors, as well as a national framework for each sector 20 that guides the development, implementation, and updating of State and local homeland 21 security strategies and CIKR protection programs. The SSPs for the original 17 sectors 22 were all submitted to DHS by December 31, 2006 and were officially released on May 21, 23 2007 after review and comment by the Homeland Security Council’s Critical Infrastructure 24 Protection Policy Coordinating Committee. 25

Those SSPs that are available for general release may be downloaded from: 26 http://www.dhs.gov/nipp (click on Sector-Specific Plans). If an SSP is not posted there, it is 27 marked as For Official Use Only (FOUO). For copies of the FOUO SSPs, please contact the 28 responsible SSA, or the NIPP Program Management Office ([email protected]). 29

SSPs are tailored to address the unique characteristics and risk landscapes of each sector 30 while also providing consistency for protective programs, public and private protection 31 investments, and resources. SSPs serve to: 32

Define sector partners, authorities, regulatory bases, roles and responsibilities, and 33 interdependencies; 34

Establish or institutionalize already existing procedures for sector interaction, 35 information sharing, coordination, and partnership; 36

Establish the goals and objectives, developed collaboratively between sector partners, 37 required to achieve the desired protective posture for the sector; 38

Identify international considerations; 39 Identify areas for government action above and beyond an owner/operator or sector risk 40

model; and 41


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Identify the sector-specific approach or methodology that SSAs, in coordination with 1 DHS and other sector partners, uses to conduct the following activities consistent with 2 the NIPP framework: 3

Identify priority CIKR and functions within the sector, including cyber 4 considerations; 5

Assess sector risks, including potential consequences, vulnerabilities, and threats; 6 Assess and prioritize assets, systems, networks, and functions of national-level 7

significance within the sector; 8 Develop risk-mitigation programs based on detailed knowledge of sector operations 9

and risk landscape; 10 Provide protocols to transition between steady-state CIKR protection and incident 11

response in an all-hazards environment; 12 Use metrics to measure and communicate program effectiveness and risk 13

management within the sector; 14 Address R&D requirements and activities relevant to the sector; and 15 Identify the process used to promote governance and information sharing within the 16

sector. 17 The structure for the SSPs is shown in figure 5-2; it facilitates cross-sector comparisons and 18 coordination by DHS and other SSAs. 19

20 21 5.3.2 State, Regional, Local, Tribal, and Territorial CIKR Protection Programs 22 The National Preparedness Guidelines defines the development and implementation of a 23 CIKR protection program as a key component of State, regional, local, and tribal homeland 24 security programs. Creating and managing a CIKR protection program for a given 25 jurisdiction entails building an organizational structure and mechanisms for coordination 26

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between government and private sector entities that can be used to implement the NIPP 1 risk management framework. This includes taking actions within the jurisdiction to set 2 security goals; identifying assets, systems, and networks; assessing risks; prioritizing CIKR 3 across sectors and jurisdictional levels; implementing protective programs; measuring the 4 effectiveness of risk management efforts; and sharing information between relevant public 5 and private sector partners. These elements form the basis of focused CIKR protection 6 programs and guide the implementation of the relevant CIKR protection-related goals and 7 objectives outlined in State, local, and tribal homeland security strategies. To assist in the 8 development of such CIKR protection programs, DHS issued A Guide to Critical 9 Infrastructure and Key Resources Protection at the State, Regional, Local, Tribal, and 10 Territorial Levels (2008). 11

In a regional context, the NIPP risk management framework and information-sharing 12 processes can be applied through the development of a regional partnership model or the 13 use of existing regional coordinating structures. Effective regional approaches to CIKR 14 protection involve coordinated information sharing, planning, and sharing of costs and risk. 15 Regional approaches also include exercises to bring public and private sector partners 16 together around a shared understanding of the challenges to regional resilience; analytical 17 tools to inform decisionmakers on risk and risk management with the associated benefits 18 and costs; and forums to enable decisionmakers to formulate protective measures and 19 identify funding requirements and resources within and across sectors and jurisdictions. 20

State, regional, local, tribal, and territorial CIKR protection efforts enhance 21 implementation of the NIPP and the SSPs by providing unique geographical focus and 22 cross-sector coordination potential. To ensure that these efforts are consistent with other 23 CIKR protection planning activities, the basic elements to be incorporated in these efforts 24 are provided in appendix 5A. The recommended elements described in this appendix 25 recognize the variations in governance models across the States; recognize that not all 26 sectors are represented in each State or geographical region; and are flexible enough to 27 reflect varying authorities, resources, and issues within each State or region. 28

5.3.3 Other Plans or Programs Related to CIKR Protection 29 Federal partners should review and revise, as necessary, other plans that address elements 30 of CIKR protection to ensure that they support the NIPP in a manner that avoids 31 unnecessary layers of CIKR protection guidance. Examples of government plans or 32 programs that may contain relevant prevention, protection, and response activities that 33 relate to or affect CIKR protection include plans that address: State, local, and tribal 34 hazard mitigation; continuity of operations (COOP); continuity of government (COG); 35 environmental, health, and safety operations; and integrated contingency operations. 36 Review and revision of State, local, and tribal strategies and plans should be completed in 37 accordance with overall homeland security and grant program guidance. 38

Private sector owners and operators develop and maintain plans for business risk 39 management that include steady-state security and facility protection, as well as business 40 continuity and emergency management plans. Many of these plans include heightened 41 security requirements for CIKR protection that address the terrorist threat environment. 42 Coordination with these planning efforts is relevant to effective implementation of the 43 NIPP. Private sector partners are encouraged to consider the NIPP when revising these 44 plans, and to work with government partners to integrate their efforts with Federal, State, 45 local, and tribal CIKR protection efforts as appropriate. 46

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5.4 CIKR Protection and Incident Management 1

Together, the NIPP and the NRF provide a comprehensive, integrated approach to 2 addressing key elements of the Nation’s homeland security mission to prevent terrorist 3 attacks, reduce vulnerabilities, and respond to incidents in an all-hazards context. The 4 NIPP establishes the overall risk-informed approach that defines the Nation’s CIKR 5 steady-state protection posture, while the NRF and NIMS provide the overarching 6 framework, mechanisms, and protocols required for effective and efficient domestic incident 7 management. The NIPP risk management framework, information-sharing network, and 8 sector partnership model provide vital functions that, in turn, inform and enable incident 9 management decisions and activities. 10

5.4.1 The National Response Framework 11 The NRF provides an all-hazards approach that incorporates best practices from a wide 12 variety of disciplines, including fire, rescue, emergency management, law enforcement, 13 public works, and emergency medical services. The operational and resource coordinating 14 structures described in the NRF are designed to support decisionmaking during the 15 response to a specific threat or incident and serve to unify and enhance the incident 16 management capabilities and resources of individual agencies and organizations acting 17 under their own authority. The NRF applies to a wide array of natural disasters, terrorist 18 threats and incidents, and other emergencies. 19

The NRF Base Plan and annexes provide protocols for coordination among various Federal 20 departments and agencies; State, local, and tribal governments; and private sector 21 partners, both for pre-incident prevention and preparedness, and post-incident response, 22 recovery, and mitigation. The NRF specifies incident management roles and responsibili-23 ties, including emergency support functions designed to expedite the flow of resources and 24 program support to the incident area. SSAs and other Federal departments and agencies 25 have roles within the NRF structure that are distinct from, yet complementary to, their 26 responsibilities under the NIPP. Ongoing implementation of the NIPP risk management 27 framework, partnerships, and information-sharing networks sets the stage for CIKR 28 security and restoration activities within the NRF by providing mechanisms to quickly 29 assess the impacts of the incident on both local and national CIKR, assist in establishing 30 priorities for CIKR restoration, and augment incident-related information sharing. 31

5.4.2 Transitioning From NIPP Steady-State to Incident Management 32 A variety of alert and warning systems that exist for natural hazards, technological or 33 industrial accidents, and terrorist incidents provide the bridge between routine steady-state 34 operations using the NIPP risk management framework and incident management 35 activities using the NRF concept of operations for actions related to both pre-incident 36 prevention and post-incident response and recovery. These all-hazards alert and warning 37 mechanisms include programs such as National Weather Services hurricane and tornado 38 warnings, and alert and warning systems established around nuclear power plants and 39 chemical stockpiles, among various others. In the context of terrorist incidents, the HSAS 40 provides a progressive and systematic approach that is used to match protective measures 41 to the Nation’s overall threat environment. This link between the current threat 42 environment and the corresponding protective actions related to specific threat vectors or 43 scenarios and to each HSAS threat level provides the indicators used to transition from the 44

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steady-state processes detailed in the NIPP to the incident management processes 1 described in the NRF. 2

DHS and CIKR partners develop and implement stepped-up, protective actions to match 3 the increased terrorist threat conditions specified by the HSAS, and to address various 4 other all-hazards alerts and warning requirements. As warnings or threat levels increase, 5 NRF coordinating structures are activated to enable incident management. DHS and CIKR 6 partners carry out their NRF responsibilities and also use the NIPP risk management 7 framework to provide the CIKR protection dimension. The NRF CIKR Support Annex 8 describes the concept of operations and details the activities needed to support public-9 private sector incident operations and requirements, as well as to provide situational 10 awareness, analysis, and prioritized recommendations to inform incident management 11 decisions. When an incident occurs, regardless of the cause, the NRF is implemented for 12 overall coordination of domestic incident management activities. The CIKR Support Annex 13 includes a process for considering requests for assistance from CIKR owners and operators. 14 Implementation of the CIKR Support Annex and the NIPP risk management framework 15 facilitates those actions directly related to the current threat status, as well as incident 16 prevention, response, restoration, and recovery. 17

The process for integrating CIKR protection with incident management and transitioning 18 from NIPP steady-state processes to NRF incident management coordination includes the 19 following actions by DHS, SSAs, and other CIKR partners: 20

Increasing protection levels to correlate with the specific threat vectors or threat level 21 communicated through the HSAS or other relevant all-hazards alert and warning 22 systems, or in accordance with sector-specific warnings using the NIPP information-23 sharing networks; 24

Using the NIPP information-sharing networks and risk management framework to 25 review and establish national priorities for CIKR protection; facilitating communica-26 tions between CIKR partners; and informing the NRF processes regarding priorities for 27 response, recovery, and restoration of CIKR within the incident area, as well as on a 28 national scale; 29

Fulfilling roles and responsibilities as defined in the NRF for incident management 30 activities; and 31

Working with sector-level information-sharing entities and owners and operators on 32 information-sharing issues during the active response mode. 33

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6. Ensuring an Effective, Efficient 1

Program Over the Long Term 2 3

This chapter addresses the efforts needed to ensure an effective, efficient CIKR protection 4 program over the long term. It focuses particularly on the long-lead-time elements of CIKR 5 protection that require sustained plans and investments over time, such as generating 6 skilled human capital, developing high-tech systems, and building public awareness. 7

Key activities needed to enhance CIKR protection over the long term include: 8


Enabling education, training, and exercise programs to ensure that skilled and 13 knowledgeable professionals and experienced organizations are able to undertake NIPP-14 related responsibilities in the future; 15

Conducting R&D and using technology to improve protective capabilities or to lower the 16 costs of existing capabilities so that CIKR partners can afford to do more with limited 17 budgets; 18

Developing, protecting, and maintaining data systems and simulations to enable 19 continuously refined risk assessment within and across sectors and to ensure 20 preparedness for domestic incident management; and 21


6.1 Building National Awareness 24

DHS, in conjunction with the SSAs and other CIKR partners, is responsible for 25 implementing a comprehensive national awareness program that focuses on public and 26 private sector understanding of the CIKR all-hazards risk environment and motivates 27 actions that support the sustainability of CIKR protection, security investments, and risk 28 management initiatives. Objectives of the CIKR national awareness program are to: 29

Incorporate CIKR protection and restoration considerations into business planning and 30 operations, including employee and senior manager education and training programs, 31 across all levels of government and the private sector; 32

Support public and private sector decisionmaking; enable relevant and effective 33 strategic planning for CIKR protection and restoration; and inform resource allocation 34 processes; 35

Foster understanding of: 36 CIKR dependencies and interdependencies, and the value of cross-sector CIKR 37

protection and restoration planning down to the community level; 38 Evolving threats to CIKR as assessed by the intelligence community and in the 39

context of the HSAS; and 40

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Efforts to address the threat environment and enhance CIKR protection and rapid 1 restoration. 2

DHS and other Federal agencies also engage in comprehensive national cyberspace security 3 awareness campaigns to remove impediments to sharing vulnerability information among 4 CIKR partners. This campaign includes audience-specific awareness materials, expansion 5 of the Stay Safe Online campaign, and development of awards programs for those making 6 significant contributions to the effort. 7

A Continuum of Capability Development 8 This document establishes a framework to enable awareness, education, training, and 9 exercise programs that allow people and organizations to develop and maintain core 10 competencies and expertise required for effective implementation of the CIKR protection 11 mission. Building the requisite individual and organizational capabilities requires 12 attracting, training, and maintaining sufficient numbers of professionals who have the 13 particular expertise unique or essential to CIKR protection. This, in turn, requires 14 individual education and training to develop and maintain the requisite levels of 15 competency through technical, academic, and professional development programs. It also 16 requires organizational training and exercises to validate process and enhance efficiency 17 and effectiveness of CIKR programs. 18

As illustrated below, outreach and awareness create the foundation upon which a 19 comprehensive CIKR education and training program can be built. Exercises provide an 20 objective assessment of an entity’s or individual’s capabilities thus identifying areas for 21 improvement and highlighting training gaps and needs. 22

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The objectives of NIPP-related training and education programs are to: 32

• Provide an integrated, coordinated approach to NIPP and CIKR-related education 33 and training that energizes and involves all partners 34

• Develop and implement grassroots education and training programs that 35 communicate effectively with key audiences 36

• Maximize coordination, deepen relationships, and broaden participation and 37 practices required for implementing the NIPP and the SSPs 38

The framework for education, training, and exercises is discussed below. 39

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6.1.1 Education and Training 1 CIKR threat mitigation/protection has a broad variety of target audiences. Emphasis, for 2 the purpose of education and training, is placed on these target audiences as collections of 3 individuals rather than organizations or entities, since it is the engagement and 4 decisionmaking of those individuals, operating in their own areas of expertise and 5 responsibility that will determine the success of the public-private CIKR partnership. 6

It is crucial to understand these audiences and the similarities and differences between 7 them in order to ensure the effective and efficient delivery of CIKR education and training. 8 Following is a description of the primary CIKR training target audiences: 9

State, local, tribal, and territorial government officials; SLTTGCC members, State 10 elected officials, Homeland Security Directors/Advisors, emergency managers, program 11 managers, and specialists; 12

DHS Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) personnel, senior executives, program 13 managers/analysts, Protective Security Advisors, training managers, and specialists; 14

SSA and other Federal agency personnel; senior executives, program managers, and 15 specialists; 16

Regional consortium members; 17 Owner/operator executives, security managers, program managers, and specialists; and 18 Others including international partners executives, security managers, program 19

managers, and specialists. 20 6.1.2 Core Competencies for Implementing CIKR Protection 21 The U.S. Office of Personnel Management defines a competency as "a measurable pattern of 22 knowledge, skills, abilities, behaviors, and other characteristics that an individual needs to 23 perform work roles or occupational functions successfully." A competency model is a 24 collection of competencies that together define the elements required for performance. The 25 CIKR competency model provides the information needed to: 26

Define education and training requirements; 27 Organize existing education and training efforts; 28 Identify education and training gaps; 29 Set forth a business case for education and training investments; and, 30 Establish performance metrics. 31

Each competency area is defined in the table that follows the graphic. 32

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1

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12 Area Includes Knowledge and Skills To . . .

Risk Analysis • Perform accurate, thorough, and complete risk-informed analyses (threat, vulnerability, and consequence).

• Design, develop, and conduct analyses that are current, timely, and accurate. • Support executive and managerial decision making related to CIKR programs.

Protective Measures/ Mitigation Strategies

• Establish CIKR program goals and objectives based on risk analysis. • Plan, develop, and implement CIKR-related projects, measures, and activities. Take

advantage of existing emerging and anticipated methods and technologies in order to develop effective strategies, projects, and activities.

• Implement continuous feedback mechanisms.

Partnership Building/ Networking

• Understand the roles and responsibilities of all partners. • Establish mechanisms for interacting with partners and exchanging information

and resources (including best practices).

Information Collection & Reporting (Information Sharing)

• Use systems, tools, and protocols to collect, analyze, organize, report, and evaluate information.

• Communicate and share information with sector partners at each tier of governance including: sector-specific, across sectors, and within the private sector.

Program Management

• Establish sector-specific or jurisdictional CIKR goals and plans. • Identify and prioritize CIKR projects, strategies, and activities for a sector or

jurisdiction. • Manage a CIKR program on schedule, within budget, and in compliance with

performance standards. • Design and implement continuous feedback mechanisms at the program level. • Develop and implement CIKR training plans.

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Area Includes Knowledge and Skills To . . .

Metrics & Program Evaluation

• Define and establish CIKR metrics based on goals and objectives. • Establish data collection and measurement plans, systems, and tools. • Collect and analyze data. • Report findings and conclusions.

Technical & Tactical Expertise (Sector- Specific)

• Note: This area includes the specialized (sector-specific) expertise required to plan, implement, and evaluate technical and tactical activities, measures, and programs.

1 The Training Delivery levels identified in the graphic above represent a cumulative 2 structure that begins with basic awareness and progresses to expert knowledge and skills 3 required to perform specific CIKR related tasks and functions. Training and education 4 programs typically fall into these levels: 5

Awareness Materials: Motivate or inform course participants about CIKR-related 6 concepts, principles, policies, or procedures. 7

College Courses: Present advanced CIKR knowledge, research, and theories to promote 8 professional development. 9

Skill Development Sessions: Focus on improving the performance of specific CIKR 10 functions and tasks both during training and in the workplace. 11

Exercises: Reinforce and test CIKR skill acquisition, processes, and procedures. 12 Job Aids: Include tools or resources (such as guides, checklists, templates, and decision 13

aids) that allows an individual to quickly access the CIKR information he or she needs 14 to perform a task. 15

6.1.3 Individual Education and Training 16 Building and sustaining capabilities to implement the NIPP involves a complex approach to 17 the education and training effort that leverages existing accredited academic programs, 18 professional certification standards, and technical training programs. This requires an 19 effort with a national scope that includes, but is not limited to, the following components: 20

Training to provide individuals with the skills needed to perform their roles and 21 responsibilities under the NIPP and SSPs; 22

Academic and research programs that result in formal degrees from accredited 23 institutions; and 24

Professional continuing education, which incorporates the latest advances in CIKR risk-25 mitigation approaches and, where appropriate, certification based on government, 26 industry, and professional organization standards. 27

To enable each of these components, the specific areas of emphasis are discussed in the 28 subsections that follow. 29

6.2.3.1 CIKR Protection Training 30 DHS, SSAs, and other CIKR partners offer a wide array of training programs designed to 31 enhance core competencies and build capabilities needed to support NIPP and SSP 32 implementation among the various target audiences. The level and content of training 33 programs vary based on sector requirements. Some sectors rely on the use of established 34 training programs while others develop courses to meet specific tactical or technical 35

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objectives. DHS offers NIPP awareness level training through the DHS/FEMA Emergency 1 Management Institute (EMI). The Independent Study Course (IS860) is available online or 2 for classroom delivery. This course provides a foundation of basic principles of the NIPP 3 including the risk management and partnership frameworks, information-sharing, and 4 roles and responsibilities. 5

DHS, SSAs and other CIKR partners offer courses that enhance CIKR protection. One of 6 the ongoing objectives of NIPP and SSP-related training is to identify and align training 7 that enhances the core competencies and provides the appropriate level of training and 8 development opportunities for each of the identified training audiences. 9

NIPP and SSP-related training and education programs, to date, focus on enhancing risk 10 management, information collection, and the tactical and technical competencies required 11 to detect, deter, defend, and mitigate against terrorist activities and other incidents. DHS 12 and other Federal agencies support and provide training resources to local law enforcement 13 and others, with a special focus on urban areas with significant clusters of CIKR, localities 14 where high-profile special events are typically scheduled, or other potentially high-risk 15 geographical areas or jurisdictions. Federally provided technical training covers a range of 16 topics such as buffer zone protection, bombing prevention, workforce terrorism awareness, 17 surveillance detection, high-risk target awareness, and WMD incident training. 18

DHS supports cybersecurity training, education, and awareness programs by educating 19 vendors and manufacturers on the value of pre-configuring security options in products so 20 that they are secure on initial installation; educating users on secure installation and use of 21 cyber products; increasing user awareness and ease of use of the security features in 22 products; and, where feasible, promotion of industry guides. These training efforts also 23 encourage programs that leverage the existing Cyber Corps Scholarship for Service 24 program, as well as various graduate and post-doctoral programs; link Federal 25 cybersecurity and computer forensics training programs; and establish cybersecurity 26 programs for departments and agencies, including awareness, audits, and standards as 27 required. 28

DHS solicits recommendations from national professional organizations and from Federal, 29 State, local, tribal, and private sector partners for additional discipline-specific technical 30 training courses related to CIKR protection, and supports course development as 31 appropriate. 32

6.2.3.2 Academic Programs 33 DHS works with a wide range of academic institutions to incorporate CIKR protection into 34 professional education programs with majors or concentrations in CIKR protection. DHS 35 collaborates with universities to incorporate homeland security-related curriculum, 36 sponsors a post-graduate level program at the Naval Postgraduate School in homeland 37 defense and security, and collaborates with other higher education programs. These 38 programs offer opportunities to incorporate concentrations in various aspects of CIKR 39 protection as part of the multi-disciplinary degree programs. 40

DHS is promoting the development of a long-term higher education program which will 41 include academic degrees and adult education. The program is being developed through a 42 collaborative effort involving the DHS/IP, the DHS/S&T Universities and Centers for 43 Excellence Programs, DHS/TSA, and others. The initial program is being developed in 44 conjunction with the National Transportation Security Center for Excellence (NTSCOE) 45

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that brings together a number of academic institutions with a mandate to build education 1 and training programs relevant to the CIKR protection mission. This initiative provides the 2 framework for the identification, development, and delivery of critical infrastructure 3 courses for the transportation industry. The initiative will lead to the implementation of 4 adult education and academic degree programs as part of a multidisciplinary core 5 curriculum applicable across all critical infrastructure sectors. 6

DHS will examine existing cybersecurity programs within the research and academic 7 communities to determine their applicability as models for CIKR protection education and 8 broad-based research. These programs include: 9

Co-sponsorship of the National Centers of Academic Excellence in Information 10 Assurance Education (CAEIAE) program with the National Security Agency; and 11

Collaboration with the National Science Foundation to co-sponsor the Cyber Corps 12 Scholarship for Service program. The Scholarship for Service program provides grant 13 money to selected CAEIAE and other universities with programs of a similar caliber to 14 fund the final 2 years of student bachelor’s, master’s, or doctoral study in information 15 assurance in exchange for an equal amount of time spent working for the Federal 16 Government. 17

DHS will ensure that the NCIP R&D Plan appropriately considers the human capital needs 18 for protection-related R&D by incorporating analysis of the research community’s future 19 needs for advanced degrees in protection-related disciplines into the plan development 20 process. 21

6.2.3.3 Continuing Education and Professional Competency 22 DHS encourages the use of established professional standards where practicable and, when 23 appropriate, works with CIKR partners to facilitate the development of continuing 24 education, professional competency programs, and professional standards for areas 25 requiring unique and critical CIKR protection expertise. For example DHS is fostering the 26 development of CIKR adult and continuing education programs and leading the 27 development of private sector Preparedness Standards that are relevant to the CIKR 28 protection mission. 29

The adult education initiative focuses on enhancing the skills and ability of the CIKR 30 professionals and employees at all levels, to provide: 31

General awareness and baseline understanding of critical infrastructure, preparedness, 32 and protective measures. 33

Specialized CIKR training for individuals directly engaged in jobs or activities related to 34 CIKR protection (security, business continuity, emergency management, IT, 35 engineering, and others). 36

6.1.4 Organizational Training and Exercises 37 Building and maintaining organizational and sector expertise requires comprehensive 38 exercises to test the interaction between the NIPP and the NRF in the context of terrorist 39 incidents, natural disasters, and other emergencies. Exercises are conducted by private 40 sector owners and operators, and across all levels of government. They may be organized by 41 these entities, on a sector-specific basis, or through the National Exercise Program (NEP). 42

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DHS IP serves as the conduit for all eighteen CIKR sectors’ participation in NEP-sponsored 1 activities and events. As such, the IP exercise program strictly adheres to the tenets of the 2 NEP. Exercise planning and participation is coordinated within IP through its Exercise 3 Working Group (EWG), which consists of representation from all IP projects and the 4 private sector. The EWG allows IP and private sector partners to translate goals and 5 priorities into specific objectives, coordinate exercise activities, and track improvement plan 6 actions against current capabilities, training and exercises. This group is also responsible 7 for maintaining the IP Multi-Year Training and Exercise Plan. This document is assessed 8 and revised, as needed, on an annual basis at the IP Training and Exercise Planning 9 Workshop. 10

National Exercise Program 11 DHS provides overarching coordination for the National Exercise Program (NEP) to ensure 12 the Nation’s readiness to respond in an all-hazards environment and to test the steady-13 state protection plans and programs put in place by the NIPP and their transition to the 14 incident management framework established in the NRF. 15

NEP program components include: 16

National Level Exercise- an annual national security and/or homeland security 17 exercise centered on White House directed, U.S. Government-wide strategy and policy 18

Principal Level Exercise (PLE)- a quarterly cabinet level exercise focused on current 19 U.S. Government-wide strategic issues 20

Five-year schedule of NLE/PLE and significant NEP Tiered exercises with a strategic 21 U.S. Government-wide focus 22

National Exercise Schedule (NEXS)- a schedule of all Federal, State, and local 23 exercises 24

Corrective Action Program (CAP) - administered by DHS in support of the HSC and 25 NSC, involves a system and process for identifying, assigning, and tracking remediation 26 of issues. 27

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) - DHS policy 28 and guidance for designing, developing, conducting, and evaluating exercises. Provides a 29 threat and performance-based exercise process that includes a mix and range of exercise 30 activities through a series of four reference manuals to help States and local 31 jurisdictions establish exercise programs and design, develop, conduct, and evaluate 32 exercises. 33

The NEP categorizes exercise activities into four tiers. These tiers reflect the relative 34 priority for interagency participation, with Tier I as the highest and Tier IV the lowest. 35 USG exercises are assigned to tiers based on a consensus interagency judgment of how 36 closely they align to USG-wide strategic and policy priorities. 37

Tier I Exercises (Required). Tier I exercises are centered on White House directed, 38 U.S. Government-wide strategy and policy-related issues and are executed with the 39 participation of all appropriate Cabinet level Secretaries or their Deputies and all 40 necessary operations centers. NLEs and Cabinet Level Exercises (CLEs) constitute Tier 41 I and there are five NEP Tier I exercises annually. Examples include the Top Officials 42 and Eagle Horizon (COOP) exercises. 43

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Tier II Exercises (Required). Tier II 1 Exercises are focused on strategy and 2 policy issues supported by all 3 appropriate departments and agencies 4 either through the National Simulation 5 Cell (Center) or as determined by each 6 department or agency's leadership. Tier 7 II exercises are endorsed through the 8 NEP process as meriting priority for 9 interagency participation. Tier II 10 exercises take precedence over Tier III 11 exercises in the event of resource 12 conflicts. The PTEE PCC shall 13 recommend no more than three Tier II 14 exercises for interagency participation 15 annually. An example of a Tier II 16 exercise is the Ardent Sentry, an 17 annual terrorism exercise focused on 18 defense support to civil authorities that 19 is jointly sponsored by the North 20 American Aerospace Defense Command 21 (NORAD) and the U.S. Northern 22 Command (NORTHCOM). Ardent Sentry has been integrated with the DHS National 23 Homeland Security Exercise Program and is held concurrently with the TOPOFF 24 exercises 25

Tier III Exercises (Permitted). Tier III Exercises are other Federal exercises focused 26 on operational, tactical, or organization-specific objectives and not requiring broad 27 interagency headquarters-level involvement to achieve their stated exercise or training 28 objectives. 29

Tier IV Exercises. Tier IV Exercises are exercises in which State, territorial, local, 30 and/or tribal governments, and/or private sector entities, are the primary training 31 audience or subject of evaluation. 32

DHS chairs the NEP Executive Steering Committee (ESC). The NEP ESC coordinates 33 Department/Agency, as well as Regional/State/local exercise requirements/objectives and 34 build a recommended NEP NLE Five-Year Exercise Schedule. The NEP ESC also 35 prioritizes recommended lessons learned and corrective action plans. The core members 36 include DOD, DOE, HHS, DOJ, DOS, DOT, ODNI, and FBI. There are up to three rotating 37 members serving one-year terms. HSC, NSC, and OMB representatives serve in a non-38 voting oversight capacity. The recommended NEP NLE 5-Year exercise schedule and 39 Corrective Action Plan are submitted to the Deputies for approval through the Disaster 40 Readiness Group (DRG) Exercise and Evaluation Sub-Group Policy Coordination 41 Committee (EESC) to frame those decisions. 42

Capabilities-Based Planning 43 The NEP emphasizes training and exercising of specific capabilities rather than specific 44 threats. HSEEP is designed to support capabilities-based planning through a cyclical 45 process of planning, training, exercising, and improvement planning, which emphasizes 46 development of priority capabilities. This is different from threat-based planning, where the 47

1 NLE 4 PLEs

3 Interagency Exercises

Regional or Other Federal Exercises

Non-Federal Exercises

Tier I

Tier II

Tier III

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focus is on responding to a specific incident. As 1 planning and training increase in complexity, 2 jurisdictions increase their capability to perform 3 critical tasks. Benefits are achieved through a 4 building-block approach that exposes program 5 participants to gradually increasing levels of 6 complexity, building on lessons learned from 7 previous exercises. As shown in the figure below, 8 HSEEP activities begin with informational 9 seminars and workshops and progress through a 10 series of interactive activities, from tabletop to 11 full-scale exercises. 12

H13 S14 EEP Activities Progression 15

Training and exercise events focus on improving individual and collective ability to 16 perform; however exercises also focus heavily on evaluating capability, or an element of 17 capability such as a plan or policy. The NEP includes exercises, not training events, with 18 the exception of transition training for senior officials. Necessary training takes place prior 19 to the NEP exercise. 20

Training and Exercise Outreach and Coordination 21 DHS, SSAs, SCC, GCC, and the private sector work together to ensure that exercises 22 include adequate testing of steady-state CIKR protection measures and plans, including 23 information sharing; application of the NIPP risk management framework; and the ability 24 for a protected core of life-critical CIKR services, such as power, food and water, and 25 emergency transportation, to withstand attacks or natural disasters and continue to 26 function at an appropriate level. DHS also ensures that the NIMS Integration Center, 27 which serves as the repository and clearinghouse for reports and lessons learned from 28 actual incidents, training, and exercises, regularly compiles and disseminates information 29 on CIKR protection best practices. 30

In an effort to better familiarize its regional, State, local, territorial, tribal and private 31 sector partners with the NIPP, IP hosts an annual series of Tier III, NIPP-related 32 workshops and tabletop exercises. Goals for this series include increasing understanding of 33 the NIPP; increasing understanding of the IP organization, as well as non-IP SSAs; 34 increasing understanding of IP critical points of entry for public and private partners; 35 increasing understanding of regional, state, local, territorial and tribal organizations’ CIKR 36 protection activities; increasing understanding of private sector CIKR protection activities; 37 and identifying gaps and redundancies in these CIKR protection activities. 38

6.1.5 CIKR Partner Role and Approach 39 Given the scope and nature of the education, training, and exercise needs related to CIKR 40 protection, the approach adopted must, to the greatest extent possible, leverage existing 41 education, training, and exercise programs. 42

DHS works through the NIPP partnership structure to provide awareness-level training to 43 introduce public and private sector partners to the NIPP contents and requirements, and 44 other core curriculum that provides a cross-sector basis for CIKR program management, 45

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sector awareness, metrics, and other content relevant for all sectors and jurisdictions. DHS 1 encourages and, where appropriate, facilitates specialized NIPP-related occupational and 2 professional training and education, and development of professional and personnel 3 security guidelines. It also will encourage academic and research programs, and coordinate 4 the design of exercises that test and validate the interaction between the NIPP framework 5 and the NRF. 6

The SSAs and other Federal agencies are responsible for reviewing, updating and, as 7 appropriate, developing new CIKR protection-related training and education programs that 8 align with the NIPP and the compentency model. Other CIKR partners are encouraged to 9 review existing and/or develop new training to align with the competency model and 10 support implementation of the NIPP, the SSPs, and/or identified CIKR protection needs 11 within their jurisdiction. All CIKR partners should work with DHS and the SSAs to 12 identify and fill gaps in current training, education, and exercise programs for those 13 specialized disciplines that are unique to CIKR protection. 14

6.2 Conducting Research and Development and Using 15 Technology 16

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7): Critical Infrastructure 17 Identification, Prioritization, and Protection, released on December 17, 2003, establishes 18 the United States policy for “enhancing protection of the Nation’s critical infrastructure and 19 key resources” and mandates plans to: systematically “harness the Nation’s research and 20 development capabilities”; provide the long-term technology advances needed for more 21 effective and cost-efficient protection of critical infrastructure and key resources; and 22 provide the sustained science, engineering, and technology base needed to prevent or 23 minimize the impact of future attacks on our physical and cyber infrastructure systems. 24

Protection of the Nation’s physical and cyber infrastructure and the people who operate and 25 use these vital systems is an extremely challenging portion of the overall homeland security 26 effort. The frameworks of CIKR assets and systems continually grow more complex and 27 more interdependent. Therefore, plans must cut across a broad range of sectors, Federal 28 and non-Federal government entities, and critical industries. 29

Federal agencies work collaboratory to design and execute R&D programs to help develop 30 knowledge and technology that can be used to more effectively mitigate the risk to CIKR. 31 Congress has provided for liability protections under the Support Anti-Terrorism by 32 Fostering Effective Technologies Act of 2002 (the SAFETY Act) that serve to encourage 33 technology use by CIKR partners. 34

In the near term, risk-informed priorities are designed to address the challenges posed by 35 the limited resources available to meet all CIKR protection needs by allocating protection 36 resources where they can best mitigate risk, and lead to resilient infrastructure which 37 support national continuity of the services provided by this infrastructure. As security is 38 the primary role of all agencies with continuity as a critical duty, the additional 39 consideration of resilience and sustainability is a natural addition to R&D decisions already 40 being pursued. In the long term, R&D holds the key to more effective and cost-efficient 41 CIKR protection through advances in technology. R&D programs work to improve all 42 aspects of CIKR protection—from detection of threats, through protection and performance 43 measures, to inherently secure advanced infrastructure designs. 44

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Because owners and operators play a major role in CIKR protection, research programs 1 that support the NIPP must find effective ways to consider the perspectives of sector 2 professional associations, sector councils, and other sources that understand owner and 3 operator technology needs. 4

Key activities needed to enhance CIKR protection over the long term include: 5


Enabling education, training, and exercise programs to ensure that skilled and 10 knowledgeable professionals and experienced organizations are able to undertake NIPP-11 related responsibilities in the future; 12

Conducting R&D and using technology to improve protective capabilities or to lower the 13 costs of existing capabilities so that CIKR partners can afford to do more with limited 14 budgets; 15

Developing, protecting, and maintaining data systems and simulations to enable 16 continuously refined risk assessment within and across sectors and to ensure 17 preparedness for domestic incident management; and 18


Unique R&D needs associated with CIKR protection include: 21

Conducting development, or re-design, of technology-based equipment to significantly 22 lower the costs of existing capabilities rather than improving technical performance, so 23 that CIKR partners with limited budgets can afford state-of-the-art solutions; 24

Researching issues, such as resiliency and protection in building design, that affect all 25 CIKR and can result in solutions that can provide benefits across sectors if imple-26 mented; and 27

Focusing research on the implementation and operational aspects of technology used for 28 CIKR protection to provide resources that can help inform technology investment 29 decisions, such as technical evaluation of security equipment or technology clearing 30 house information. 31

6.2.1 The SAFETY Act 32 Ingenuity and invention are the lifeblood of robust research and development. But potential 33 liabilities could stifle the entrepreneurial spirit for developing disruptive and enabling 34 technologies and products. As part of the Homeland Security Act, Public Law 107-296, 35 Congress enacted the SAFETY Act, which creates liability protections for sellers of 36 qualified anti-terrorism technologies. The SAFETY Act provides incentives for the develop-37 ment and deployment of anti-terrorism technologies by limiting liability through a system 38 of risk and litigation management. The purpose of the SAFETY Act is to ensure that the 39 threat of liability does not deter potential sellers of anti-terrorism technologies from 40 developing, deploying, and commercializing technologies that could save lives. The SAFETY 41 Act gives liability protection to both sellers of qualified anti-terrorism technology and their 42 customers, and applies to all types of enterprises that develop, sell, or use anti-terrorism 43 technologies. 44

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The SAFETY Act applies to a broad range of technologies, including products, services, and 1 software, or combinations thereof, as well as technology firms and providers of security 2 services. The SAFETY Act protects those businesses and their customers and contractors 3 by providing a series of liability protections if their products or services are found to be 4 effective by the Secretary of Homeland Security. Additionally, if the Secretary certifies the 5 technology under the SAFETY Act (i.e., that the technology actually performs as it is 6 intended to do and conforms to certain seller specifications), the seller is afforded a 7 complete defense in litigation related to the performance of the technology in preventing, 8 detecting, or deterring terrorist acts or deployment to recover from one. Those technologies 9 that have been “certified” are placed on an Approved Product List for Homeland Security 10 that is published at www.safetyact.gov. 11

A clear benefit of the SAFETY Act is that a cause of action may be brought only against the 12 seller of the Qualified Anti-Terrorism Technology and may not be brought against the 13 buyer(s), their contractors, or downstream users of the Qualified Anti-Terrorism 14 Technology, or against the seller’s suppliers or contractors. This stipulation includes CIKR 15 owners and operators. 16

CIKR facility owners and operators are encouraged to examine the SAFETY Act closely 17 because: (1) CIKR owners (if purchasers of qualified technologies) will enjoy the liability 18 protections that flow from using qualified SAFETY Act technologies, and (2) CIKR owners 19 will also have a level of assurance that the qualified products/services they are utilizing 20 have been vetted by DHS. Lower liability insurance burdens for those using qualified 21 technologies are another potential outcome. 22

In these ways, the SAFETY Act is a valuable tool that can enhance the ability of owners 23 and operators to protect our Nation’s CIKR. 24

6.2.2 National Critical Infrastructure Protection R&D Plan 25 As directed by HSPD-7, the Secretary of Homeland Security works with the Director of the 26 OSTP, Executive Office of the President, to develop the National Critical Infrastructure 27 Protection (NCIP) R&D Plan as a vehicle to support implementation of CIKR risk 28 management and supporting protective activities and programs. 29

The NCIP R&D Plan provides the focus and coordination mechanisms required to achieve 30 the vision provided in the President’s Physical and Cyber CIKR Protection Strategies. That 31 vision calls for a “systematic national effort to fully harness the Nation’s research and 32 development capabilities.” The R&D planning process is designed to address common issues 33 faced by the various sector partners and ensure a coordinated R&D program that yields the 34 greatest value across a broad range of interests and requirements. The plan addresses both 35 physical and cyber CIKR protection. The planning process also provides for the revision of 36 research goals and priorities over the long term to respond to changes in the threat, 37 technology, environment, business continuity, and other factors. 38

DHS and OSTP coordinate with Federal and private sector partners, including academic 39 and national laboratory representatives, during the R&D planning cycle. The interagency 40 process used to develop and coordinate this plan is managed through the Infrastructure 41 Subcommittee of the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC), which is co-chaired 42 by DHS and OSTP. The SSAs are responsible for providing input into the plan after 43 coordination with sector representatives and experts through such bodies as the SCCs and 44 GCCs. 45

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The NCIP R&D Plan articulates strategic R&D goals and identifies the R&D areas in which 1 advances in CIKR protection must be made. The goals and cross-sector R&D areas 2 contained in the NCIP R&D Plan are discussed in the following subsections. A final 3 subsection describes coordination of SSP R&D planning with the NCIP R&D Plan. 4

6.2.2.1 CIKR Protection R&D Strategic Goals 5 The NCIP R&D planning process identifies three long-term, strategic R&D goals for CIKR 6 protection: 7

A common operating picture architecture; 8 A next-generation Internet architecture with designed-in security; and 9 Resilient, self-diagnosing, self-healing systems. 10

The strategic goals are used to guide Federal R&D investment decisions and also to provide 11 a coordinated approach to the overall Federal research program. The S&T Directorate and 12 OSTP will work with the OMB to use the R&D Plan as a decision making tool for evalu-13 ation of budget submissions across Federal agencies. These goals also help guide programs 14 of research performers who receive Federal grants and contracts. 15

6.2.2.2 CIKR Protection R&D Areas 16 R&D development projects for CIKR protection programs fall into nine R&D areas or 17 themes that cut across all CIKR sectors: 18

Detection and sensor systems; 19 Protection and prevention systems; 20 Entry and access portals; 21 Insider threats; 22 Analysis and decision support systems; 23 Response, recovery, and reconstitution tools; 24 New and emerging threats and vulnerabilities; 25 Advanced infrastructure architectures and systems design; and 26 Human and social issues. 27

Organizing research in these areas enables the development of effective solutions that may 28 be applied across sectors and disciplines. These themes also provide an organizing frame-29 work for SSA use during the development of R&D requirements for their respective sectors, 30 which will be reflected in the SSPs. These requirements specify the capabilities each sector 31 needs to satisfy CIKR protection needs. By incorporating these requirements into the NCIP 32 R&D Plan, OMB is better able to ensure that agency R&D budget requests are aligned with 33 the National R&D Plan for CIKR Protection. Requirements are refreshed each year through 34 the Sector Annual Reporting process. 35

6.2.2.3 Coordination of NCIP R&D Plan with SSP and Sector Annual Report R&D Planning 36 Each SSP includes a section on sector-specific CIKR protection R&D that explains how the 37 sector will strengthen the linkage between sector-specific and national R&D planning 38 efforts, technology requirements, current R&D initiatives, gaps, and candidate R&D 39 initiatives. New candidate R&D initiatives are developed during the Sector Annual Report 40 writing process. The SSP explains the process for: 41

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Sector Technology Requirements: Identifying and providing a summary of sector 1 technology requirements, and communicating them to IP and the DHS S&T 2 Directorate/OSTP for inclusion in the NCIP R&D Plan on an annual basis; 3

Current R&D Initiatives: Annually soliciting a listing of current Federal R&D initiatives 4 from the DHS S&T Directorate/OSTP that have the potential to meet sector CIKR 5 protection challenges, and providing a description of how this listing will be analyzed to 6 indicate which initiatives have the greatest potential for a positive impact; 7

Gaps: Conducting an analysis of the gaps between the sector’s technology needs and 8 current R&D initiatives from the DHS S&T Directorate/OSTP; and 9

Candidate R&D Initiatives: Determining which candidate R&D initiatives are most 10 relevant for the sector and how these will be summarized and reported to all 11 appropriate stakeholders. 12

Each SSA coordinates the development of the sector R&D planning component of their SSP 13 and SAR so that these documents reflect the SSA’s sector-level R&D investment priorities. 14 Coordination between IP, DHS/S&T and the sectors through the SSAs, GCCs, and SCCs 15 ensures that the R&D information in the SSP and SAR is comprehensive. 16

6.2.3 Other R&D That Supports CIKR Protection 17 Other R&D efforts that may support CIKR protection are conducted by the SSAs and other 18 Federal agencies. These programs address the research requirements set forth in the 19 President’s Physical and Cyber Security CIKR Protection Strategies, which call for: 20

Ensuring the compatibility of communications systems with interoperability standards; 21 Exploring methods to authenticate and verify personal identity; 22 Coordinating the development of CIKR protection consensus standards; and 23 Improving technical surveillance, monitoring, and detection capabilities. 24

For example, the Technical Support Working Group is the U.S. national forum that 25 identifies, prioritizes, and coordinates interagency and international R&D requirements for 26 combating terrorism. The Technical Support Working Group rapidly develops technologies 27 and equipment to meet the high-priority needs of the combating terrorism community, 28 including efforts that can contribute to CIKR protection, and addresses joint international 29 operational requirements through cooperative R&D with major allies. 30

Other examples of R&D that may support CIKR protection include the SAFECOM program 31 conducted by the DHS S&T Directorate Office of Interoperability. This program serves as 32 the Federal umbrella to promote and coordinate initiatives between State, local, and tribal 33 entities to develop interoperable wireless communications. SAFECOM’s primary role is to 34 work with Federal agencies and public safety personnel to define requirements and to 35 create standards, models, and solutions to help meet those requirements. 36

DHS also conducts cooperative R&D programs with other Federal agencies related to 37 authentication and verification of personal identity for the CIKR protection workforce, and 38 works with the American National Standards Institute and the National Institute of 39 Standards and Technology (NIST) through the Homeland Security Standards Panel to help 40 coordinate the development of consensus standards that support CIKR protection. 41

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6.2.4 DHS Science and Technology Strategic Framework 1 The Homeland Security Act of 2002 gave the DHS Science and Technology (S&T) 2 Directorate the responsibility to advise the DHS Secretary on S&T requirements, priorities 3 and programs that support the Department’s vision and mission. The Directorate also has 4 the responsibility to develop and integrate technology with the strategies, policies, 5 procedures to protect the nation’s CIKR. 6

Successful transition of the technologies contained within the Division will substantially 7 improve DHS components’ performance and support the Secretary’s goals of: 8

Protecting the Nation from dangerous people; 9 Protecting the Nation from dangerous goods; 10 Protecting Critical Infrastructure; 11 Building a nimble and responsive emergency response system; and 12 Strengthening and unifying DHS operations and management. 13

The S&T Directorate functions as the nation’s homeland security research, development, 14 test and evaluation manager for science and technology. Six critical objectives inform and 15 shape S&T’s plans, programs, and activities: 16

Develop and deploy state-of-the-art, high-performance, affordable systems to prevent, 17 detect and mitigate the consequences of Chemical, Biological and enhanced Explosive 18 (CBE) attacks and disasters that require a federal response 19

Develop equipment, protocols and training for response to and recovery from CBE 20 attacks and disasters 21

Enhance the technical capabilities of the Department’s operational elements and other 22 Federal, state, and local and tribal agencies to fulfill their homeland security-related 23 roles, missions and tasks 24

Develop methods and capabilities to test and assess threats and vulnerabilities, 25 anticipate emerging threats and prevent technological surprise 26

Develop technical standards and establish certified laboratories to evaluate homeland 27 security and first-response technologies, and evaluate technologies for SAFETY Act 28 protections 29

Support U.S. leadership in science and technology through basic research focused on 30 filling phenomenology gaps that impede development of effective homeland security 31 technologies and systems 32

The organization of S&T results in an improved process to identify, validate and procure 33 new technologies, given its responsibility to develop and integrate technology with the 34 strategies, policies, procedures to protect the nation’s CIKR. The division’s RDT&E 35 program achieves S&T strategic goals in six fundamental disciples: (1) Explosives; (2) 36 Chemical and Biological; (3) Command, Control and Interoperability; (4) Borders and 37 Maritime Security; (5) Human Factors; and (6) Infrastructure and Geophysical, which are 38 also S&T’s six Divisions (see Appendix 6 for a more detailed discussion of the S&T 39 organization as it relates to CIKR technology development). 40

6.2.5 Transitioning Requirements into Reality 41 The Directorate focuses on enabling its customers—the DHS components—and their 42 customers, including Border Patrol agents, Coast Guardsmen, airport baggage screeners, 43

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Federal Air Marshals, and state, local, and Federal emergency responders, as well as the 1 many others teamed and committed to the vital mission of securing the Nation. To reach 2 its goals, the S&T Directorate created a customer-focused, output-oriented, full-service 3 science and technology management organization. 4

S&T established Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) to coordinate the planning and execution 5 of R&D programs together with the eventual hand-off to maintainers and users of project 6 results. The IPTs are critical nodes in the process to determine operational requirements, 7 assess current capabilities to meet operational needs, analyze gaps in capabilities and 8 articulate programs and projects to fill in the gaps an expand competencies. 9

IPTs constitute the Transition portfolio of DHS S&T, targeting deployable capabilities in 10 the near term. IPTs generally include the research and technology perspective, the 11 customer and end user perspective, and an acquisition perspective. The customer and end 12 users monitor and guide the capability being developed; the research and technology 13 representatives inform the discussions with scientific and engineering advances and 14 emerging technologies; and the acquisition staff help transition the results into practice by 15 the maintainers and end-users of the capability. 16

6.3 Building, Protecting, and Maintaining Databases, Simulations, 17 and Other Tools 18

Many data systems, databases, models, simulations, decision support systems, and similar 19 information tools currently exist or are under development to enable the execution of 20 national risk management for CIKR. 21

To keep pace with the constantly evolving threat, technology, and business environments, 22 these tools must be updated and, in some cases, new tools must be developed. Sensitive 23 information associated with these tools must be appropriately protected. Priority efforts in 24 this area will be focused on updating and improving key databases, developing and 25 maintaining simulation and modeling capabilities, and coordinating with CIKR partners on 26 databases and modeling. 27

6.3.1 National CIKR Protection Data Systems 28 HSPD-7 directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to implement plans and programs that 29 identify, catalog, prioritize, and protect CIKR in cooperation with all levels of government 30 and private sector entities. Data systems currently provide the capability to catalog, 31 prioritize, and protect CIKR through such functions as: 32

Maintaining an inventory of asset information and estimating the potential 33 consequences of an attack or incident (e.g., the IDW); 34

Storing information related to terrorist attacks or incidents (e.g., the National Threat 35 and Incident Database); 36

Analyzing dependencies and interdependencies (e.g., the NISAC); 37 Managing the implementation of various protective programs (e.g., the BZPP Request 38

Database); and 39 Providing the continuous maintenance and updating required to enable data in these 40

systems to reflect changes in actual circumstances, using tools such as iCAV. 41

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Properly maintaining systems with current and useful data involves long-term support, 1 coordination, and resource commitments by DHS, the SSAs, the States, private sector 2 entities, and other partners. Important aspects of the support, coordination, and resource 3 commitments required over the long term to sustain the NIPP include: 4

Need for Information Protection: Data accuracy and currency for CIKR protection is 5 dependent upon the ability of the various partners to keep their databases and data 6 systems current. Over the long term, the level of cooperation and commitment needed 7 for this must be sustained by a trusted working relationship. This requires that 8 information regarded as sensitive by providers be protected from unauthorized access, 9 use, or disclosure. Data content, accuracy, and currency must also be protected from 10 tampering or other corruption. 11

Durable Information: The complexity, scope, and magnitude of the U.S. CIKR require 12 reliance on multiple data sources that are acquired over long periods of time. As a 13 result, information pertaining to the characteristics and quality of the data must be 14 provided along with the actual data from each source. This requires the use of a 15 common and standardized format, data scheme, and categorization system (i.e., 16 taxonomy) that is viable over the long term. DHS and the SSAs are responsible for 17 working together to establish and utilize the appropriate data collection format. The 18 DHS taxonomy is the foundation for multiple DHS programs that focus on CIKR 19 information, such as the IDW and the National Threat Incident Database. This 20 taxonomy provides the foundation for a national-level information scheme. 21

Recurring Nature of Information Needs: The process of information identification and 22 additional data collection represents a recurring need. Data requirements and 23 availability are continually reassessed based on the current threat environment, 24 analyses to identify gaps, or other factors. Focused data calls to specific sectors or 25 locales, in coordination with the SSAs and the States, as appropriate, may be required 26 to fill identified information gaps. This imposes a continuing need for resources to build 27 and update the system over the long term. 28

6.3.2 Simulation and Modeling 29 A number of CIKR partners make use of models and simulations to comprehensively 30 examine potential consequences from terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and manmade 31 accidents that impact CIKR, including the effects of sector and cross-sector dependencies 32 and interdependencies. Continuous maintenance and updating are required for these tools 33 to produce reliable projections. Over the long term, new tools are needed to address 34 fundamental changes due to factors such as technology, threats, or the business 35 environment. 36

DHS /IP is the lead for modeling and simulation capabilities regarding CIKR protection. In 37 this capacity, the DHS will: 38

Coordinate with the DHS S&T Directorate on requirements for the development, 39 maintenance, and application of research-related modeling capabilities for CIKR 40 protection; 41

Specify requirements for the development, maintenance, and application of operations-42 related modeling capabilities for CIKR protection in coordination with the DHS S&T 43 Directorate and the SSAs, as appropriate; 44

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Coordinate with the SSAs that have relevant modeling capabilities to develop 1 appropriate mechanisms for the development, maintenance, and use of such for CIKR 2 protection as directed by HSPD-7; 3

Familiarize the SSAs and other CIKR partners with the availability of relevant 4 modeling and simulation capabilities through training and exercises; 5

Work with end-users to design operations-related tools that provide maximum utility 6 and clarity for CIKR protection activities in both emergencies and routine operations; 7

Work with end-users to design appropriate information protection plans for sensitive 8 information used and produced by CIKR protection modeling tools; 9

Provide guidance on the vetting of modeling tools to include the use of private sector 10 operational, technical, and business expertise where appropriate; and 11

Review existing private sector modeling initiatives and opportunities for joint ventures 12 to ensure that DHS and its CIKR partners make maximum use of applicable private 13 sector modeling capabilities. 14

The principal modeling, simulation and analysis capability within the DHS IP is the 15 National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC). NISAC analysts and 16 operational resources are located at the Sandia and Los Alamos National Laboratories, and 17 the program operates under the direction of a small DC-based program office within IP’s 18 Infrastructure Analysis and Strategy Division (IASD). Mandated by Congress to be a 19 “source of National Expertise to address critical infrastructure protection” research and 20 analysis, NISAC prepares and shares analyses of CIKR including their interdependencies, 21 vulnerabilities, consequences of loss, and other complexities. Over a span of several years, 22 NISAC has developed tailored analytical tools, a core of unique expertise, and procedures 23 designed to effectively address the strategic-level analytical needs of CIKR decision makers. 24

While the 2001 PATRIOT (Provide Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 25 Terrorism) Act established the requirement for NISAC, the Homeland Security 26 Appropriations Act of 2007 specifies its current mission. NISAC is required to provide 27 “modeling, simulation, and analysis of the assets and systems comprising CIKR in order to 28 enhance preparedness, protection, response, recovery, and mitigation activities.” The 29 Center is also directed to share information with Federal agencies and departments that 30 have CIKR responsibilities. Information sharing is accomplished through outreach 31 meetings with sectors, analysts, and consumers. NISAC pre-incident studies (e.g, hurricane 32 scenario studies) are posted and available for download on HSIN. Selected products are 33 reproduced for widespread dissemination in hard copy. Products requested from the NISAC 34 program office are usually distributed by email or on electronic media. 35

NISAC’s objectives cover two main areas of focus: 36

Provide operational support to DHS and other Federal Government entities on an 37 as-needed basis in the form of analysis, simulation, and scenario development; and 38

Develop long-term capabilities by maintaining expertise in the application of analysis 39 tools and the development of improved processes and tools in support of longer-term 40 DHS projects. 41

NISAC accomplishes its mission through three types of products: 42

Pre-planned long-term analyses; 43 Pre-planned short-term analyses; and 44

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Unplanned priority analytical projects that are based on higher-level tasking or that are 1 related to current threats to critical infrastructure (e.g., hurricanes). 2

NISAC utilizes CIKR information and data from a variety of government CIKR sector and 3 private sector sources, including other participants in CIKR protection projects and 4 programs. NISAC uses some data that are considered proprietary to a single industry—or 5 even to a specific firm; the data must therefore be protected from unrestricted 6 dissemination in order to maintain the trust of the information providers. NISAC products 7 principally serve government decision makers, who can derive valuable insight into 8 incident consequences at a higher level than the supporting data could provide. In selected 9 cases, NISAC products are made available to the private sector in order to facilitate access 10 to key NISAC recommendations of concern to a wider community of CIKR stakeholders. 11

Although NISAC is the principal resource within the Office of Infrastructure Protection for 12 modeling, simulation, and analysis, it is not the sole source available to CIKR stakeholders 13 in need of these capabilities. NISAC strives to establish joint ventures with other 14 stakeholders and to share critical authoritative data in order to improve overall analytical 15 quality and insure consistency with other providers of CIKR analysis. 16

6.3.3 Coordination on Databases and Modeling 17 Integrating existing databases into DHS databases, such as the IDW, not only reduces 18 duplication of effort, but also ensures that available data are consistent, current, and 19 accurate, and provide users with a consolidated picture across all CIKR sectors. However, 20 this approach is effective only if the source information is protected and maintained prop-21 erly. Maintaining a current and useful database involves the support, coordination, and 22 commitment of the SSAs, private sector entities, and other partners. Because the most 23 current and accurate CIKR-related data are best known by owners and operators, the 24 effectiveness of the effort depends on all CIKR partners keeping their databases and data 25 systems current. 26

As the responsible agent for the identification of assets and existing databases for their 27 sectors, the SSAs: 28

Outline in their SSPs the sector plans and processes for the database, data system, and 29 modeling and simulation development and updates; 30

Work with sector partners to facilitate the collection and protection of accurate 31 information for database, data system, and modeling and simulation use; 32

Specify the timelines and milestones for the initial population of CIKR databases; and 33 Specify a regular schedule for maintenance and updating of the databases. 34

DHS works with the SSAs and other CIKR partners to: 35

Identify databases and other data services that will be integrated with CIKR protection 36 databases and data systems; 37

Facilitate the actual integration of supporting databases or importation of data into 38 CIKR protection databases and data systems, using a common and standardized format, 39 data scheme, and categorization system or taxonomy specified by DHS in coordination 40 with the SSAs; and 41

Define the schedule for integrating data and databases into such systems as the IDW. 42

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6.4 Continuously Improving the NIPP and the SSPs 1

The NIPP uses the SCCs, GCCs, and the Government and Private Sector Cross-Sector 2 Councils as the primary forums for coordination of policy, planning, training, and other 3 requirements needed to ensure efficient implementation and ongoing management and 4 maintenance of the NIPP and the SSPs. 5

6.4.1 Management and Coordination 6 DHS/IP is the Federal executive agent for NIPP management and maintenance. 7

The NIPP is a multi-year plan describing mechanisms for sustaining the Nation’s steady-8 state CIKR protection posture. The NIPP and its component SSPs include a process for 9 annual review; periodic interim updates as required; and regularly scheduled partial 10 reviews and re-issuance every three years, or more frequently, if directed by the Secretary 11 of Homeland Security. 12

DHS/IP oversees the review and maintenance process for the NIPP; the SSAs, in 13 coordination with the GCCs and SCCs, establishes and operates the mechanism(s) 14 necessary to coordinate this review for their respective SSPs. The NIPP and SSP revision 15 processes includes developing or updating any documents necessary to carry out NIPP 16 activities. The NIPP is reviewed at least annually to: 17

Ensure that the NIPP framework is capable of measuring accomplishments in support 18 of CIKR protection goals and objectives and supporting the overall national approach to 19 the homeland security mission; 20

Ensure that the plan adequately reflects the organization of DHS, the SSAs, and the 21 Federal budget process; 22

Ensure that the NIPP is consistent with those Federal plans and activities that it 23 directly supports; 24

Adjust practices and procedures called for in the NIPP based on changes in the national 25 risk management environment; 26

Incorporate lessons learned and best practices from day-to-day operations, exercises, 27 and actual incidents and alerts; and 28

Reflect progress in the Nation’s CIKR protection, as well as changes to national 29 priorities and guidance, critical tasks, sector organization, or national capabilities. 30

As changes are warranted, periodic updates to the NIPP will be issued. Types of 31 developments that merit a periodic update include new laws, executive orders, Presidential 32 directives, or regulations, and procedural changes to NIPP activities based on real-world 33 incidents or exercise experiences. 34

6.4.2 Maintenance and Updating 35 The following paragraphs establish the procedures for posting interim changes and periodic 36 updating of the NIPP: 37

Types of Changes: Changes include additions of new or supplementary material and 38 deletions. No proposed change should contradict or override authorities or other plans 39 contained in statute, executive order, or regulation. 40

Coordination and Approval: While DHS is the Federal executive agent for NIPP 41 management and maintenance, any Federal department or agency with assigned 42

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responsibilities under the NIPP may propose a change to the plan. DHS is responsible 1 for coordinating the review and approval of all proposed modifications to the NIPP with 2 SSAs and other CIKR partners, as appropriate. Policy changes will be coordinated and 3 approved thorough the Homeland Security Council policy process. 4

Notice of Change: DHS will issue an official Notice of Change for each interim revision 5 to the NIPP. After publication, the modifications will be considered part of the NIPP for 6 operational purposes pending a formal revision and re-issuance of the entire document. 7 Interim changes can be further modified or updated using this process. (Periodic 8 updates resulting from the annual review process do not require the formal Notice of 9 Change.) 10

Distribution: DHS will distribute Notices of Change to SCCs, GCCs, and other CIKR 11 partners. Notices of Change to other organizations will be provided upon request. 12

Re-Issuance: DHS will coordinate full reviews and updating of the NIPP every 3 years, 13 or more frequently, if the Secretary deems necessary. The review and updating will 14 consider lessons learned and best practices identified during implementation in each 15 sector and will incorporate the periodic changes and any new information technologies. 16 DHS will distribute revised NIPP documents for interagency review and concurrence 17 through the Homeland Security Council process. 18

The SSAs, in coordination with their GCCs and SCCs, establish and operate the 19 mechanism(s) necessary to coordinate SSP maintenance and update in accordance with the 20 process established for the NIPP. 21

22

23

24

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7. Providing Resources for the CIKR 1

Protection Program 2 Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, government and private sector 3 expenditures to improve CIKR protection and resilience have increased across sectors and 4 jurisdictional levels. With finite resources available to support protection of the Nation’s 5 CIKR, the NIPP serves as the unifying framework to ensure that CIKR investments are 6 coordinated and address the highest priorities, based on risk, to achieve the homeland 7 security mission and ensure continuity of the essential infrastructure and services that 8 support the American government, economy, and way of life. 9

This chapter describes an integrated, risk-informed approach to fund the national CIKR 10 protection program and focus Federal grant assistance to State, local, tribal, and territorial 11 entities, and complement relevant private sector activities. This integrated resource 12 approach coordinates CIKR protection programs and activities conducted by DHS, the 13 SSAs, and other Federal entities through the Federal appropriations process, and focuses 14 Federal grant funds to support national CIKR protection efforts conducted at the State, 15 local, tribal, and territorial levels. This resource approach also includes mechanisms to 16 involve private sector partners in the planning process and supports collaboration among 17 CIKR partners to establish priorities, define requirements, share information, and 18 maximize the use of finite resources. Implementation of this coordinated approach will help 19 ensure that limited resources are applied efficiently and effectively to address the Nation’s 20 most critical CIKR protection needs. 21

7.1 The Risk-informed Resource Allocation Process 22

Funding in support of CIKR protection programs at all levels is guided by a straightforward 23 principle: Resources must be directed to areas of greatest priority to enable effective 24 management of risk. By definition, all CIKR assets, systems, and networks are important 25 to the Nation. However, considering the risk factors of threat, vulnerability, and 26 consequences, some assets, systems, networks, or functions are deemed to be more critical 27 to the Nation, as a whole, than others. This chapter provides a process to ensure that the 28 Nation’s CIKR protection resource requirements are correctly identified and appropriately 29 prioritized to meet the Nation’s most critical protection needs. Using a risk-informed 30 approach, DHS collaborates with CIKR partners to identify those assets, systems, 31 networks, and functions that are most critical from a national perspective, and lead, 32 integrate, and coordinate a cohesive effort to help ensure their protection. Through the 33 NIPP framework, DHS works with the SSAs, States, and other government and private 34 sector partners to gain an understanding of how CIKR protection is being conducted across 35 the country, what priorities and requirements drive these efforts, and how such efforts are 36 funded. This assessment helps DHS to identify duplicative efforts and gaps in CIKR 37 protection across sectors and jurisdictions. DHS then uses the information gained to rec-38 ommend funding targeted at the appropriate CIKR protective programs or activities that 39 help ensure that government resources are allocated to the areas of greatest priority. 40

7.1.1 Sector-Specific Agency Reporting to DHS 41 Given their unique capabilities and individual risk landscapes, CIKR sectors each face 42 different protection challenges. For instance, some sectors have distinct, easily identifiable 43

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assets that can be logically prioritized. Some have thousands of identical assets, not all of 1 which are equally critical. Others are made up of systems or networks, as opposed to 2 distinct assets, for which the identification of specific protective measures may prove to be 3 impossibly complex. Furthermore, interdependencies among sectors can cause duplicative 4 protection efforts or lead to gaps in funding for CIKR protection. To ensure that resources 5 are allocated according to national priorities and are based on national risk and need, DHS 6 must be able to accurately assess priorities, requirements, and efforts across these diverse 7 sectors. 8

As DHS conducts this assessment, the SSAs, supported by their respective SCCs and GCCs, 9 provide information regarding their sectors’ individual CIKR protection efforts. The SCCs 10 participate in the process to ensure that private sector input is reflected in SSA reporting of 11 sector priorities and requirements. The first step for an SSA in the risk-informed resource 12 allocation process is to coordinate with sector partners, including SCCs and GCCs as 13 appropriate, to accurately determine sector priorities, program requirements, and funding 14 needs for CIKR protection. HSPD-7 requires each SSA to provide an annual report to the 15 Secretary of Homeland Security on their efforts to identify, prioritize, and coordinate CIKR 16 protection in their respective sectors. Consistent with this requirement, DHS provides the 17 SSAs with reporting guidance and templates that include requests for specific information, 18 such as CIKR protection priorities, requirements, and resources. The following elements 19 are included in the Sector CIKR Protection Annual Report to help inform prioritization 20 resource allocation recommendations: 21

Priorities and annual goals for CIKR protection and associated gaps; 22 Sector-specific requirements for CIKR protection activities and programs based on risk 23

and need; and 24 Projected CIKR-related resource requirements for the sector, with an emphasis on 25

anticipated gaps or shortfalls in funding for sector-level CIKR protection and/or for 26 protection efforts related to national-level CIKR that exist within the sector. 27

7.1.2 State Government Reporting to DHS 28 Like sectors, State governments face diverse CIKR protection challenges and have different 29 priorities, requirements, and available resources. Furthermore, State CIKR protection 30 efforts are closely intertwined with those of other government and private sector partners. 31 In particular, States work closely with local and tribal governments to address CIKR 32 protection challenges at those levels. To accurately assess the national CIKR protection 33 effort and identify protection needs that warrant attention at a national level, DHS must 34 aggregate information across State jurisdictions as it does across sectors. 35

DHS requires that each State develop a homeland security strategy that establishes goals 36 and objectives for its homeland security program that include CIKR protection as a core 37 element. State administrative agencies develop a Program and Capability Enhancement 38 Plan that prioritizes statewide resource needs to support this program. The State adminis-39 trative agency works with DHS to identify: 40

Priorities and annual goals for CIKR protection; 41 State-specific requirements for CIKR protection activities and programs, based on risk 42

and need; 43

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Mechanisms for coordinated planning and information sharing with government and 1 private sector partners; 2

Unfunded CIKR protection initiatives or requirements that should be considered for 3 funding using Federal grants (described in further detail below); and 4

Other funding sources utilized to implement the NIPP and address identified priorities 5 and annual goals. 6

For consideration in the deliberations related to CIKR protection resources as part of the 7 Federal budget cycle, information on statewide CIKR resources needs must be reported to 8 DHS by the date specified in the appropriate annual DHS/GPD planning guidance. 9 DHS/GPD includes information such as model reports or report templates with the 10 planning guidance to support the States’ reporting efforts. 11

7.1.3 State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Government Coordinating Council 12 (SLTTGCC) Reporting to DHS 13 In 2007, DHS formed the SLTTGCC in order to better support the State, local, tribal, and 14 territorial partners. It provides a forum to ensure that SLTT governments are fully 15 integrated into the CIKR protection process and can actively coordinate across their 16 jurisdictions and with the Federal government on CIKR protection guidance, strategies, 17 and programs. Furthermore, the Council is the second subcouncil of the Government Cross-18 Sector Council, as prescribed in the NIPP, which provides the forum to address cross-sector 19 issues and interdependencies among the Government Coordinating Councils. 20

The SLTTGCC comprises representatives from a broad and diverse group of SLTT 21 governments. The intent of the Council is to provide SLTT input and suggestions for 22 implementation of the NIPP, including sector protection programs and initiatives. These 23 types of engagements foster broad public sector partner involvement in actively developing 24 sector priorities and requirements. Through the SLTTGCC Annual Report, the Council 25 provides annual updates on protection programs and initiatives that are being conducted or 26 planned by the Council, DHS, other Federal partners, or private sector partners. The 27 Council leverages its broad experiential base and apolitical perspective to: 28

Inform implementation and planning efforts related to the NIPP, State-specific, and 29 regional-focused plans; 30

Coordinate strategic communication and achieve resolution among SLTT partners; 31 Facilitate the building and implementation of information-sharing channels to 32

promulgate CIKR plans, programs, and processes; and 33 Develop policy recommendations. 34

7.1.4 Regional Consortium Coordinating Council (RCCC) Reporting to DHS 35 Cross-sector and multijurisdictional CIKR protection challenges provide an opportunity to 36 manage interdependent risks at the regional level Individually, regional consortiums’ 37 activities can enhance the physical security, cybersecurity, emergency preparedness, and 38 overall public/private continuity and resiliency of one or more States, urban areas, or 39 municipalities. 40

Because of the multitude of public and private sector partners involved, specific regional 41 initiatives have a broad-reaching scope. In some cases, initiatives can even cross national 42 borders and become international efforts. To better support these initiatives and further 43 implement the National Infrastructure Implementation Plan, DHS supported the formation 44

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of the RCCC in July 2008. The RCCC provides a unique mechanism to integrate NIPP 1 implementation on a regional scale and details its efforts in the RCCC CIKR Protection 2 Annual Report. 3

The mission of the RCCC is to strengthen regional consortiums that enhance protection, 4 response, recovery, and resilience of the Nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources 5 by working to: 6

Develop a policy framework for regional infrastructure protection, prevention, 7 deterrence, response, recovery, and longer-term restoration; 8

Provide the foundation for regional cross-sector collaboration; 9 Foster the development of risk-informed protection and mitigation measures to enable 10

measurable progress towards robust security and disaster resilience; and 11 Enhance the education and awareness of critical infrastructure interdependencies. 12

7.1.5 Aggregating Submissions to DHS 13 DHS uses the information collected from the Sector CIKR Protection Annual Reports, the 14 SLTTGCC Annual Report, the RCCC Annual Report, and State reports to DHS/GPD to 15 assess CIKR protection status and requirements across the country. As national priorities 16 and requirements are established, DHS will develop funding recommendations for 17 programs and initiatives designed to reduce national-level risk in the CIKR protection 18 mission area. In cases where gaps or duplicative efforts exist, DHS will work with the SSAs 19 and the States to identify strategies or additional funding sources to help ensure that 20 national CIKR protection priorities are efficiently and effectively addressed. 21

Following the collection and aggregation of sector- and State-level reports, DHS 22 summarizes this information in the National CIKR Protection Annual Report. This report 23 provides a summary of national CIKR protection priorities and requirements and makes 24 recommendations for prioritized resource allocation across the Federal Government to meet 25 national-level CIKR protection needs. The National CIKR Protection Annual Report is 26 submitted along with the DHS budget submission to the Executive Office of the President 27 on or before September 1 as part of the annual Federal budget process (see figure 7-1). 28

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Figure 7-1: National CIKR Protection Annual Report Process 1

2 3

7.2 Federal Resource Allocation Process for DHS, the SSAs, and 4 Other Federal Agencies 5

The Federal resource allocation process described in this section is designed to ensure that 6 the collective efforts of DHS, the SSAs, and other Federal departments and agencies 7 support the NIPP and national priorities. It is also designed to be consistent with the DHS 8 responsibility to coordinate overall national CIKR protection and to identify national-level 9 gaps, overlaps, or shortfalls. Driven in large part by existing and well-understood Federal 10 budget process milestones, this approach is integrated with the established Federal budget 11 process and reporting requirements. The resource allocation process for CIKR protection 12 outlined in this chapter recognizes the existing budget authorities and responsibilities of all 13 Federal departments and agencies with CIKR protection-related programs and activities. 14 The NIPP process aims to create synergy between current and future efforts to ensure a 15 unified and effective national CIKR protection effort. The specific roles of DHS and the 16 SSAs are described in further detail below. 17

7.2.1 Department of Homeland Security 18 DHS is responsible for overall coordination of the Nation’s CIKR protection efforts. To carry 19 out this responsibility, DHS must identify and prioritize nationally critical assets, systems, 20 and networks; help ensure that appropriate protective initiatives are implemented; and 21 help address any gaps or shortfalls in the protection of nationally critical CIKR. DHS works 22 closely with the Executive Office of the President to aggregate CIKR protection-related 23 activities and related resource requests from the SSAs and other Federal departments and 24 agencies as a way to make informed tradeoffs in prioritizing Federal investments. 25

DHS works with the Executive Office of the President offices to establish a national CIKR 26 protection strategic approach and priorities, and with the SSAs, supported by their 27

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respective SCCs and GCCs, to develop sector-specific CIKR protection-related 1 requirements. Driven largely by the identification and prioritization of critical assets, sys-2 tems, networks, and functions across sectors and States, the establishment of national 3 protection priorities helps inform resource allocation decisions later in the process. SSAs 4 communicate information about their existing CIKR protection-related programs and 5 outstanding requirements to DHS through their Sector CIKR Protection Annual Reports. 6 DHS uses the sector annual reports to inform the National CIKR Protection Annual Report. 7 The National CIKR Protection Annual Report analyzes information about sector priorities, 8 requirements, and programs in the context of the National Risk Profile, a high-level 9 summary of the aggregate risk and protective status of all sectors. The National Risk 10 Profile drives the development of national priorities, which, in turn, are used to assess 11 existing CIKR programs and to identify existing gaps or shortfalls in national CIKR protec-12 tion efforts. This analysis provides the Executive Office of the President with information 13 that supports both strategic and investment decisions related to CIKR protection. 14

15

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Figure 7-3: DHS and SSA Roles and Responsibilities in Federal Resource Allocation 1

2 3

7.2.2 Sector-Specific Agencies 4 Earlier chapters of the NIPP articulate how DHS and the SSAs work with the respective 5 CIKR sectors to determine risk and set priorities. Based on guidance from DHS, each SSA 6 develops and maintains an SSP that supports the NIPP goal and supporting objectives. 7 Additionally, the SSAs, in partnership with the SCCs and GCCs, determine sector-specific 8 priorities and requirements for CIKR protection. The SSAs submit these priorities and 9 requirements to DHS in their sector annual reports, along with identification of resource 10 needs, to allow for a more comprehensive National CIKR Protection Annual Report. SSAs 11 work within their respective department or agency budget process to determine the CIKR 12 protection-related aspects of their department’s budget submission. SSA annual reports are 13 submitted to DHS on or before June 1 of each year. Resource information contained in the 14 SSA annual reports is based on appropriated funding, as well as the President’s most 15 recent budget. 16

Additionally, the subset of CIKR protection funding requirements directed toward R&D and 17 S&T investments are highlighted by the SSAs, SCCs, and GCCs in the sector annual 18 reports to inform the NCIP R&D Plan and its technology roadmap, while ensuring efficient 19 coordination with the DHS R&D/S&T community and supporting the Federal research and 20 technology base. These R&D and S&T plans and requirements are based on the R&D 21

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planning section of each sector’s SSP. The identified R&D requirements are prioritized 1 based on the potential increase in CIKR protection capabilities for a given investment. 2

7.2.3 Summary of Roles and Responsibilities 3 Figure 7-2 outlines the roles and responsibilities of DHS and the SSAs throughout this 4 process, as well as the annual timelines associated with major activities. 5

The final determination of funding priorities, based on the collaborative efforts of DHS, the 6 SSAs and other Federal departments and agencies, and the Executive Office of the 7 President, guides CIKR protection programs and the allocation of resources in support of 8 the NIPP. These priorities support Federal Government (DHS and SSA) CIKR protection 9 activities, as well as guide and support homeland security and CIKR protection activities 10 across and within State, local, tribal, and territorial jurisdictions. 11

7.3 Federal Resources for State and Local Government 12 Preparedness 13

Federal grants from DHS and Federal agencies, and other programs, such as training and 14 technical assistance, offer key support to State and local jurisdictions for CIKR protection 15 programs. These grants and other programs provide resources to meet CIKR needs that are 16 managed by State and local entities. 17

DHS/GPD is responsible for coordinating Federal homeland security grant programs to help 18 State, local, and tribal governments enhance their ability to prevent, protect against, 19 respond to, and recover from terrorist acts or threats and other hazards. DHS/GPD offers 20 State, local, and tribal partners access to funding through several grant programs that can 21 be leveraged to support CIKR protection requirements based on risk and need. 22

For the purposes of the NIPP, Federal grants available through DHS/GPD can be grouped 23 into two broad categories: (1) overarching homeland security programs that provide funding 24 for a broad set of activities in support of homeland security mission areas and the national 25 priorities outlined in the National Preparedness Guidelines, and (2) targeted infrastructure 26 protection programs for specific CIKR-related protection initiatives and programs within 27 identified jurisdictions. States should leverage the range of available resources, including 28 those from Federal, State, local, and tribal sources, as appropriate, in support of the 29 protection activities needed to reduce vulnerabilities and close identified capability gaps 30 related to CIKR within their jurisdictions. 31

Overarching Homeland Security Programs: The Overarching Homeland Security Grant 32 Program supports activities that are conducted in accordance with the National 33 Preparedness Guidelines. These funds support overall State and local homeland security 34 efforts, and can be leveraged to support State, regional, local, and/or tribal CIKR protection. 35 These funds are intended to complement and be allocated in coordination with national 36 CIKR protection efforts. 37

The primary overarching homeland security grant programs include: 38

State Homeland Security Program: The SHSP supports the implementation of the State 39 Homeland Security Strategy to address identified planning, equipment, training, and 40 exercise needs for acts of terrorism. In addition, SHSP supports the implementation of 41

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the National Preparedness Guideline, the NIMS, the NRF, and the NIPP to support the 1 prevention of, protection against, response to, and recovery from acts of terrorism. 2

Urban Areas Security Initiative: UASI funds address the unique planning, equipment, 3 training, and exercise needs of high-threat, high-density urban areas, and assist them 4 in building an enhanced and sustainable capacity to prevent, protect against, respond 5 to, and recover from acts of terrorism. 6

Targeted Infrastructure Protection Programs: Targeted infrastructure protection programs 7 include grants for specific activities that focus on the protection of CIKR, such as ports, 8 mass transit, rail transportation, etc. These funds support CIKR protection capabilities 9 based on risk and need in coordination with DHS, SSAs, and Federal agencies. Though 10 recent appropriations have been divided among specific sectors, DHS seeks to combine 11 these grants into a program that supports a more integrated risk-informed approach across 12 CIKR sectors. 13

DHS/IP and DHS/GPD work with States to focus targeted infrastructure protection grant 14 programs, such as the BZPP and transportation security grants, to support national-level 15 CIKR protection priorities and to reinforce activities funded through Federal department 16 and agency budgets and other homeland security grant programs. As appropriate, SSAs 17 serve as subject matter experts reviewing and providing recommendations for specific 18 target grant programs. Grantees should apply resources available under the overarching 19 homeland security grant programs, such as SHSP and UASI to address their regionally or 20 locally critical priority CIKR protection initiatives. A further prioritized combination of 21 grant funding across various programs may be necessary to enable the protection of certain 22 assets, systems, networks, and functions deemed to be nationally critical. 23

Available DHS/GPD grant funding is awarded to the Governor-appointed State 24 administrative agency, which serves in each State as the lead for program implementation. 25 Through the State administrative agencies, States will identify and prioritize their 26 homeland security needs, including CIKR protection, and leverage assistance from these 27 funding streams to accomplish the priorities identified in their State Homeland Security 28 Strategies, and Program and Capability Enhancement Plans. These planning processes 29 undertaken at the State level are built on the common framework articulated in the 30 National Preparedness Guideline; the National Priorities, including implementation of the 31 NIPP; and capabilities enhancements based on the TCL. 32

DHS provides State, local, and tribal authorities with additional guidance on how to 33 identify, assess, and prioritize CIKR protection needs and programs in support of the 34 National Preparedness Guidelines as they apply for homeland security grants. Additional 35 information on DHS grant programs, guidelines, allocations, and eligibility is available at: 36 http://www.fema.gov/grants. 37

7.4 Other Federal Grant Programs That Contribute to CIKR 38 Protection 39

Other Federal departments and agencies provide grant programs that can contribute to 40 CIKR protection. These are usually sector- or threat-specific programs; many are related to 41 technology development initiatives. Examples of these grant programs include: 42

http://www.fema.gov/grants

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Department of Energy: DOE manages grant programs for the development of 1 technologies for assurance of the U.S. energy infrastructure. These programs address 2 the development and demonstration of technologies and methodologies to protect 3 physical energy infrastructure assets. Technologies and methodologies of relevance are 4 those that accomplish security and reliability functions such as hardening of assets; 5 surveillance; non-invasive inspection of sealed containers; remote detection; and 6 characterization of damage, entry control, perimeter monitoring, detection of explosives, 7 and improved electricity reliability. 8

Department of the Interior: The Bureau of Indian Affairs manages a grant program for 9 the Safety of Dams on Indian Lands with the objective of improving the structural 10 integrity of dams on Indian lands. Financial awards are specific to a given site; awards 11 are restricted to Indian tribes or tribal organizations. 12

Department of Justice: The National Institute of Justice (NIJ), Office of Justice 13 Programs, manages a grant program for Domestic Anti-Terrorism Technology 14 Development. The objective of the program is to support the development of 15 counterterrorism technologies, assist in the development of standards for those 16 technologies, and work with State and local jurisdictions to identify particular areas of 17 vulnerability to terrorist acts and to be better prepared to respond if such acts occur. 18 The NIJ is authorized to make grants to, or enter into contracts or cooperative 19 agreements with, State and local governments, private nonprofit organizations, public 20 nonprofit organizations, for profit organizations, institutions of higher education, and 21 qualified individuals. Applicants from the Territories of the United States and federally 22 recognized Indian tribal governments are also eligible to participate in this program. 23

Department of Transportation: The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 24 Administration Pipeline Safety grant program supports efforts to develop and maintain 25 State natural gas, liquefied natural gas, and hazardous liquid pipeline safety programs. 26 Grant recipients are typically State government agencies. 27

Department of Transportation: The Federal Transit Administration is a grants-in-aid 28 agency that has several major assistance programs for eligible activities. Funds are 29 provided through legislative formulas or discretionary authority. Funding from these 30 programs is provided on an 80/20 Federal/local funding match basis, unless otherwise 31 specified. These assistance programs can contribute to CIKR protection efforts through 32 funding for metropolitan and State planning and research grants; urban, non-urban, 33 and rural transit assistance programs; bus and railway modernization efforts; major 34 capital investments; and special flexible-funding programs. 35

These programs are available to a wide range of grant recipients, including CIKR owners 36 and operators and State, local, and tribal governments. 37

7.5 Setting an Agenda in Collaboration with CIKR Protection 38 Partners 39

Resource allocation decisions for CIKR protection at all levels of government should align 40 as integral components of the unified national approach established in the NIPP. In 41 accordance with the responsibilities established in HSPD-7, DHS works with the SSAs and 42 other government and private sector partners to set the national agenda that specifies this 43 strategic approach to CIKR protection, articulates associated requirements, supports 44 collaboration among partners, and recognizes the contributions of private sector partners to 45

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the overall effort. While Federal Government funding of programs and initiatives that sup-1 port CIKR protection makes a significant contribution to the security of the Nation, a fully 2 successful effort requires DHS; the SSAs; and State, local, and tribal governments to work 3 closely with the private sector to promote the most effective use of Federal and non-Federal 4 resources. 5

The NIPP uses the risk management framework to support coordination between CIKR 6 partners outside the Federal Government. Each step of the risk management framework 7 presents opportunities for collaboration between and among all CIKR partners. 8 Coordination between State and local agencies and the sectors themselves ensures that 9 cross-sector needs and priorities are more accurately identified and understood. 10 Government coordination with private sector owners and operators at all levels is required 11 throughout the process to ensure a unified national CIKR protection effort; provide 12 accurate, secure identification of CIKR assets and systems; provide and protect risk-related 13 information; ensure implementation of appropriate protective measures; measure program 14 effectiveness; and make required improvements. 15

These opportunities for collaboration allow private sector owners and operators to benefit 16 from CIKR protection investments in a number of ways. First, investments in CIKR 17 protection will enable risk mitigation in a broader, all-hazards context, including common 18 threats posed by malicious individuals or acts of nature, in addition to those posed by 19 terrorist organizations. Second, business continuity planning can facilitate recovery of 20 commercial activity after an incident. Finally, investing in CIKR protection within the 21 NIPP framework will help private sector owners and operators enhance protective 22 measures, and will support decisionmaking with more comprehensive risk-informed 23 information. DHS explores new opportunities to encourage such collaboration through 24 incentives (such as the SAFETY Act), which creates liability protection for sellers of 25 qualified anti-terrorism technologies), regulatory changes, and by providing more useful 26 information on risk assessment and management. While States typically are the eligible 27 applicants for DHS grant programs, certain private sector entities can apply directly for 28 grant funds through programs such as the Port Security Grant Program and the Intercity 29 Bus Security Grant Program. 30

31

32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42

More information about the NIPP is available on the Internet at:

www.dhs.gov/nipp or by contacting DHS at: [email protected]

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1

Example: Leveraging Resources to Support Homeland Security and CIKR Protection Activities of a Mass Transit System

The following example provides an illustration of how the various funding sources described in this chapter can work together in a practical situation to address the CIKR protection needs of a local system that, through implementation of the NIPP risk management framework and SSP processes, is deemed to be critical to the Nation. This example focuses on a mass transit system in a community that participates in the UASI program.

In this situation, the following resources may be applied to support the safety and security of the mass transit system:

Owner/Operator Responsibilities

The local mass transit authority, as the owner and operator of the system, funds system-specific protection and security measures, including resiliency and business continuity planning activities, for the system on a day-to-day basis.

State, Local, and Tribal Government Responsibilities

State, local, and tribal governments support the day-to-day protection of the public; enforce security, protective, and preventive measures around the system’s facilities; and provide response and/or recovery capabilities should an incident occur.

Federal Support and Grant Funding

Assistance from the Federal Government through a variety of resources, including grants (both targeted infrastructure protection grant programs and overarching homeland security grant programs), training, technical assistance, and exercises, further support and enhance ongoing homeland security and CIKR protection activities. In this example, DHS, as the SSA for the Transportation sector; TSA; DOT; and the USCG may contribute to the protection efforts through either appropriated program funds or grants. Based on eligibility, a range of grants may support the overall protection of this system, including:

If the mass transit system is eligible for targeted infrastructure protection program funding, such as the Transit Security Grant Program, this funding source may be leveraged to support security enhancements for the mass transit system.

If the mass transit system is eligible under the BZPP, this funding source may also be leveraged to improve security around the system or enhance preparedness capabilities within the surrounding community.

Homeland Security grant program funding from programs such as the SHSP, UASI, and Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program may be leveraged to enhance prevention, protection, response, and recovery capabilities in and around the mass transit system if the system is deemed critical by the State and/or local authorities within their homeland security strategies and priorities, and in accordance with allowable cost guidance.

The Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program may be leveraged to support preparedness capabilities of the local fire department that are necessary to protect the system within the city.

Federal Transit Administration grant programs to support metropolitan and State planning may be leveraged to provide planning for upgrades to the system, which include more resilient CIKR design, and the major capital investments and special flexible-funding grant programs may be leveraged to help build these improvements.

All of these resources, used in support of the region’s mass transit system, are coordinated with State and urban area homeland security strategies, as well as the applicable Regional Transit Security Strategy. Additionally, other services, training, exercises, and/or technical assistance (for example, the DHS/GPD Mass Transit Technical Assistance Program, which includes a facilitated risk assessment) may be leveraged from a variety of Federal partners.

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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations 1 BZPP Buffer Zone Protection Program 2 C/ACAMS Constellation/Automated Critical Asset Management System 3 CAEIAE Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education 4 CEO Chief Executive Officer 5 CFATS Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards 6 CFIUS Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 7 CFR Code of Federal Regulations 8 CII Critical Infrastructure Information 9 CIKR Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources 10 CIPAC Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council 11 COG Continuity of Government 12 COI Community of Interest 13 COOP Continuity of Operations 14 COP Common Operating Picture 15 CSIA IWG Cyber Security and Information Assurance Interagency Working Group 16 CSIRT Computer Security Incident Response Teams 17 CWIN Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network 18 DHS Department of Homeland Security 19 DOD Department of Defense 20 DOE Department of Energy 21 DOJ Department of Justice 22 DOT Department of Transportation 23 ECTF Electronic Crimes Task Force 24 E.O. Executive Order 25 EOP Executive Office of the President 26 FACA Federal Advisory Committee Act 27 FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 28 FCC Federal Communications Commission 29 FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 30 FIRST Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams 31 FOIA Freedom of Information Act 32 FOUO For Official Use Only 33 FSLC Federal Senior Leadership Council 34 GCC Government Coordinating Council 35

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GFIRST Government Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams 1 GPD FEMA/Grant Programs Directorate (Division of DHS Preparedness Directorate) 2 GPS Global Positioning System 3 GSA General Services Administration 4 HHS Department of Health and Human Services 5 HITRAC Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center 6 HMGP Hazard Mitigation Grant Program 7 HSAC Homeland Security Advisory Council 8 HSAS Homeland Security Advisory System 9 HSEEP Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 10 HSIN Homeland Security Information Network 11 HSIN-CS Homeland Security Information Network for Critical Sectors 12 HSIP Homeland Security Infrastructure Program 13 HSOC Homeland Security Operations Center 14 HSPD Homeland Security Presidential Directive 15 iCAV Integrated Common Analytical Viewer 16 IDW Infrastructure Data Warehouse 17 IED Improvised Explosive Device 18 IICD Infrastructure Information Collection Division 19 IICP Infrastructure Information Collection Program 20 IICS Infrastructure Information Collection System 21 IICV Infrastructure Information Collection and Visualization 22 IDM Infrastructure Data Management 23 IP Office of Infrastructure Protection (Division of DHS National Protection and Programs 24

Directorate) 25 ISAC Information Sharing and Analysis Center 26 ISE Information-Sharing Environment 27 IWWN International Watch and Warning Network 28 IV Infrastructure Visualization 29 JCG Joint Contact Group 30 JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Force 31 LEO Law Enforcement Online 32 MIFC Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center 33 MS-ISAC Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center 34 NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 35 NCC National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications 36

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NCIP R&D National Critical Infrastructure Protection Research and Development 1 NCRCG National Cyber Response Coordination Group 2 NCS National Communications System 3 NCSA National Cyber Security Alliance 4 NCTC National Counterterrorism Center 5 NHC National Hurricane Center 6 NIAC National Infrastructure Advisory Council 7 NIAP National Information Assurance Partnership 8 NICC National Infrastructure Coordinating Center 9 NIJ National Institute of Justice 10 NIMS National Incident Management System 11 NIPP National Infrastructure Protection Plan 12 NISAC National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center 13 NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology 14 NJTTF National Joint Terrorism Task Force 15 NOC National Operations Center 16 NOC-HQE National Operations Center – Headquarters Element 17 NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission 18 NRCC National Response Coordination Center 19 NRF National Response Framework 20 NSA National Security Agency 21 NS/EP National Security and Emergency Preparedness 22 NSTAC National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee 23 NSTC National Science and Technology Council 24 OAS Organization of American States 25 OCA Original Classification Authority 26 OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 27 OI&A Office of Intelligence and Analysis (Division of DHS Preparedness Directorate 28 OMB Office of Management and Budget 29 OSTP Office of Science and Technology Policy 30 PCC Policy Coordinating Committee 31 PCII Protected Critical Infrastructure Information 32 PCIS Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security 33 PDD Presidential Decision Directive 34 PSA Protective Security Advisor 35

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PVTSAC Private Sector Senior Advisory Committee 1 RCCC Regional Consortium Coordinating Council 2 R&D Research and Development 3 RISS Regional Information Sharing Systems 4 SAV Site Assistance Visit 5 SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 6 SCC Sector Coordinating Council 7 SHSP State Homeland Security Program 8 SLTTGCC State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Government Coordinating Council 9 SPP Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America 10 SSA Sector-Specific Agency 11 SSI Sensitive Security Information 12 SSP Sector-Specific Plan 13 S&T Science and Technology Directorate of DHS 14 SVA Security Vulnerability Assessment 15 TCL Target Capabilities List 16 TSA Transportation Security Administration 17 UASI Urban Areas Security Initiative 18 UCNI Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information 19 U.S. United States 20 U.S.C. United States Code 21 US-CERT United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team 22 USCG United States Coast Guard 23 UTL Universal Task List 24 VBIED Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device 25 VISAT Voluntary Identification Self-Assessment Tool 26 WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction 27

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Glossary of Key Terms 1 Many of the definitions in this Glossary are derived from language enacted in Federal laws 2 and/or included in national plans, including the Homeland Security Act of 2002, USA 3 PATRIOT Act of 2001, the National Incident Management System, and the National 4 Response Plan. 5

All-Hazards. An approach for prevention, protection, preparedness, response, and recovery 6 that addresses a full range of threats and hazards, including domestic terrorist attacks, 7 natural and manmade disasters, accidental disruptions, and other emergencies. 8

Asset. Contracts, facilities, property, electronic and non-electronic records and documents, 9 unobligated or unexpended balances of appropriations, and other funds or resources (other 10 than personnel). 11

Business Continuity. The ability of an organization to continue to function before, during, and 12 after a disaster. 13

Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS). Section 550 of the DHS Appropriations 14 Act of 2007 grants the Department of Homeland Security the authority to regulate chemical 15 facilities that “present high levels of security risk.” The CFATS establish a risk-informed 16 approach to screening and securing chemical facilities determined by DHS to be “high risk.” 17

CIRK Partner. Those Federal, State, regional, territorial, local, or tribal government entities, 18 private sector owners and operators and representative organizations, academic and 19 professional entities, and certain not-for-profit and private volunteer organizations that 20 share in the responsibility for protecting the Nation’s CIKR. 21

Consequence. The result of a terrorist attack or other hazard that reflects the level, duration, 22 and nature of the loss resulting from the incident. For the purposes of the NIPP, 23 consequences are divided into four main categories: public health and safety, economic, 24 psychological, and governance impacts. 25

Control Systems. Computer-based systems used within many infrastructure and industries 26 to monitor and control sensitive processes and physical functions. These systems typically 27 collect measurement and operational data from the field, process and display the 28 information, and relay control commands to local or remote equipment or human-machine 29 interfaces (operators). Examples of types of control systems include SCADA systems, 30 Process Control Systems, and Digital Control Systems. 31

Critical Infrastructure. Assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, so vital to 32 the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such assets, systems, or networks 33 would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, public health or 34 safety, or any combination of those matters. 35

Critical Infrastructure Information (CII). Information that is not customarily in the public 36 domain and is related to the security of critical infrastructure or protected systems. CII 37 consists of records and information concerning any of the following: 38 Actual, potential, or threatened interference with, attack on, compromise of, or 39

incapacitation of critical infrastructure or protected systems by either physical or 40 computer-based attack or other similar conduct (including the misuse of or 41 unauthorized access to all types of communications and data transmission systems) that 42

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violates Federal, State, or local law, harms interstate commerce of the United States, or 1 threatens public health or safety. 2

The ability of any critical infrastructure or protected system to resist such interference, 3 compromise, or incapacitation, including any planned or past assessment, projection, or 4 estimate of the vulnerability of critical infrastructure or a protected system, including 5 security testing, risk evaluation thereto, risk management planning, or risk audit. 6

Any planned or past operational problem or solution regarding critical infrastructure or 7 protected systems, including repair, recovery, reconstruction, insurance, or continuity, 8 to the extent it is related to such interference, compromise, or incapacitation. 9

Cybersecurity. The prevention of damage to, unauthorized use of, or exploitation of, and, if 10 needed, the restoration of electronic information and communications systems and the 11 information contained therein to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Includes 12 protection and restoration, when needed, of information networks and wireline, wireless, 13 satellite, public safety answering points, and 911 communications systems and control 14 systems. 15

Dependency. The one-directional reliance of an asset, system, network, or collection thereof, 16 within or across sectors, on input, interaction, or other requirement from other sources in 17 order to function properly. 18

Function. In the context of the NIPP, function is defined as the service, process, capability, 19 or operation performed by specific infrastructure assets, systems, or networks. 20

Government Coordinating Council. The government counterpart to the SCC for each sector 21 established to enable interagency coordination. The GCC is comprised of representatives 22 across various levels of government (Federal, State, territorial, local, and tribal) as 23 appropriate to the security and operational landscape of each individual sector. 24

Hazard. Something that is potentially dangerous or harmful, often the root cause of an 25 unwanted outcome. 26

HSPD-19. This directive establishes a national policy, and calls for the development of a 27 national strategy and implementation plan, on the prevention and detection of, protection 28 against, and response to terrorist use of explosives in the US. 29

Incident. An occurrence or event, natural or human-caused, that requires an emergency 30 response to protect life or property. Incidents can, for example, include major disasters, 31 emergencies, terrorist attacks, terrorist threats, wildland and urban fires, floods, hazardous 32 materials spills, nuclear accidents, aircraft accidents, earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, 33 tropical storms, war-related disasters, public health and medical emergencies, and other 34 occurrences requiring an emergency response. 35

Infrastructure. The framework of interdependent networks and systems comprising 36 identifiable industries, institutions (including people and procedures), and distribution 37 capabilities that provide a reliable flow of products and services essential to the defense and 38 economic security of the United States, the smooth functioning of government at all levels, 39 and society as a whole. Consistent with the definition in the Homeland Security Act, 40 infrastructure includes physical, cyber, and/or human elements. 41

Interdependency. The multi- or bi-directional reliance of an asset, system, network, or 42 collection thereof, within or across sectors, on input, interaction, or other requirement from 43 other sources in order to function properly. 44

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Key Resources. As defined in the Homeland Security Act, “key resources” are publicly or 1 privately controlled resources essential to the minimal operations of the economy and 2 government. 3

Mitigation. Activities designed to reduce or eliminate risks to persons or property or to 4 lessen the actual or potential effects or consequences of an incident. Mitigation measures 5 may be implemented prior to, during, or after an incident. Mitigation measures are often 6 developed in accordance with lessons learned from prior incidents. Mitigation involves 7 ongoing actions to reduce exposure to, probability of, or potential loss from hazards. 8 Measures may include zoning and building codes, floodplain buyouts, and analysis of 9 hazard-related data to determine where it is safe to build or locate temporary facilities. 10 Mitigation can include efforts to educate governments, businesses, and the public on 11 measures they can take to reduce loss and injury. 12

Network. In the context of the NIPP, a group of assets or systems that share information or 13 interact with each other in order to provide infrastructure services within or across sectors. 14

Normalize. In the context of the NIPP, the process of transforming risk-related data into 15 comparable units. 16

Owners/Operators. Those entities responsible for day-to-day operation and investment in a 17 particular asset or system. 18

Preparedness. The range of deliberate critical tasks and activities necessary to build, 19 sustain, and improve the operational capability to prevent, protect against, respond to, and 20 recover from domestic incidents. Preparedness is a continuous process involving efforts at 21 all levels of government and between government and private sector and nongovernmental 22 organizations to identify threats, determine vulnerabilities, and identify required activities 23 and resources to mitigate risk. 24

Prevention. Actions taken to avoid an incident or to intervene to stop an incident from 25 occurring. Prevention involves actions taken to protect lives and property. Involves 26 applying intelligence and other information to a range of activities that may include such 27 countermeasures as deterrence operations; heightened inspections; improved surveillance 28 and security operations; investigations to determine the full nature and source of the 29 threat; immunizations, isolation, or quarantine; public health and agricultural surveillance 30 and testing processes; and, as appropriate, specific law enforcement operations aimed at 31 deterring, preempting, interdicting, or disrupting illegal activity and apprehending 32 potential perpetrators and bringing them to justice. 33

Prioritization. In the context of the NIPP, prioritization is the process of using risk 34 assessment results to identify where risk-reduction or mitigation efforts are most needed 35 and subsequently determine which protective actions should be instituted in order to have 36 the greatest effect. 37

Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII). PCII refers to all critical infrastructure 38 information, including categorical inclusion PCII, that has undergone the validation process 39 and that the PCII Program Office has determined qualifies for protection under the CII Act. 40 All information submitted to the PCII Program Office or Designee with an express 41 statement is presumed to be PCII until the PCII Program Office determines otherwise. 42 43

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Protection. Actions to mitigate the overall risk to CIKR assets, systems, networks, or their 1 interconnecting links resulting from exposure, injury, destruction, incapacitation, or 2 exploitation. In the context of the NIPP, protection includes actions to deter the threat, 3 mitigate vulnerabilities, or minimize consequences associated with a terrorist attack or 4 other incident. Protection can include a wide range of activities, such as hardening 5 facilities, building resiliency and redundancy, incorporating hazard resistance into initial 6 facility design, initiating active or passive countermeasures, installing security systems, 7 promoting workforce surety, and implementing cybersecurity measures, among various 8 others. 9

Protective Security Advisor (PSA) Program. DHS CIKR protection and vulnerability 10 assessment specialists are assigned as liaisons between DHS and the protective community 11 at the State, local, and private sector levels in geographical areas representing major 12 concentrations of CIKR across the United States. PSAs are responsible for sharing risk 13 information and providing technical assistance to local law enforcement and owners and 14 operators of CIKR within their respective areas of responsibility. 15

Recovery. The development, coordination, and execution of service- and site-restoration 16 plans for impacted communities and the reconstitution of government operations and 17 services through individual, private sector, nongovernmental, and public assistance 18 programs that identify needs and define resources; provide housing and promote 19 restoration; address long-term care and treatment of affected persons; implement 20 additional measures for community restoration; incorporate mitigation measures and 21 techniques, as feasible; evaluate the incident to identify lessons learned; and develop 22 initiatives to mitigate the effects of future incidents. 23

Resiliency. In the context of the NIPP, resiliency is the capability of an asset, system, or 24 network to maintain its function during or to recover from a terrorist attack or other 25 incident. 26

Response. Activities that address the short-term, direct effects of an incident, including 27 immediate actions to save lives, protect property, and meet basic human needs. 28

Response also includes the execution of emergency operations plans and incident mitigation 29 activities designed to limit the loss of life, personal injury, property damage, and other 30 unfavorable outcomes. As indicated by the situation, response activities include applying 31 intelligence and other information to lessen the effects or consequences of an incident; 32 increased security operations; continuing investigations into the nature and source of the 33 threat; ongoing surveillance and testing processes; immunizations, isolation, or quarantine; 34 and specific law enforcement operations aimed at preempting, interdicting, or disrupting 35 illegal activity, and apprehending actual perpetrators and bringing them to justice. 36

Risk. A measure of potential harm that encompasses threat, vulnerability, and consequence. 37 In the context of the NIPP, risk is the expected magnitude of loss due to a terrorist attack, 38 natural disaster, or other incident, along with the likelihood of such an event occurring and 39 causing that loss. 40

Risk Management Framework. A planning methodology that outlines the process for setting 41 security goals; identifying assets, systems, networks, and functions; assessing risks; pri-42 oritizing and implementing protective programs; measuring performance; and taking 43 corrective action. Public and private sector entities often include risk management 44 frameworks in their business continuity plans. 45

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Sector. A logical collection of assets, systems, or networks that provide a common function to 1 the economy, government, or society. The NIPP addresses 18 CIKR sectors, as identified by 2 the criteria set forth in HSPD-7. 3

Sector Coordinating Council. The private sector counterpart to the GCCs, these councils are 4 self-organized, self-run, and self-governed organizations that are representative of a 5 spectrum of key stakeholders within a sector. SCCs serve as the government’s principal 6 point of entry into each sector for developing and coordinating a wide range of CIKR 7 protection activities and issues. 8

Sector Partnership Model. The framework used to promote and facilitate sector and cross-9 sector planning, coordination, collaboration, and information sharing for CIKR protection 10 involving all levels of government and private sector entities. 11

Sector-Specific Agency. Federal departments and agencies identified in HSPD-7 as 12 responsible for CIKR protection activities in specified CIKR sectors. 13

Sector-Specific Plan. Augmenting plans that complement and extend the NIPP Base Plan and 14 detail the application of the NIPP framework specific to each CIKR sector. SSPs are 15 developed by the SSAs in close collaboration with other sector partners. 16

Steady-State. In the context of the NIPP, steady-state is the posture for routine, normal, day-17 to-day operations as contrasted with temporary periods of heightened alert or real-time 18 response to threats or incidents. 19

System. In the context of the NIPP, a system is a collection of assets, resources, or elements 20 that performs a process that provides infrastructure services to the Nation. 21

Terrorism. Any activity that: (1) involves an act that is (a) dangerous to human life or 22 potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources, and (b) a violation of the 23 criminal laws of the United States or of any State or other subdivision of the United States; 24 and (2) appears to be intended to (a) intimidate or coerce a civilian population, (b) influence 25 the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or (c) affect the conduct of a 26 government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping. 27

Threat. The intention and capability of an adversary to undertake actions that would be 28 detrimental to CIKR. 29

Value Proposition. A statement that outlines the national and homeland security interest in 30 protecting the Nation’s CIKR and articulates benefits gained by all CIKR partners through 31 the risk management framework and public-private partnership described in the NIPP. 32

Vulnerability. A weakness in the design, implementation, or operation of an asset, system, or 33 network that can be exploited by an adversary, or disrupted by a natural hazard or 34 technological failure. 35

Weapons of Mass Destruction. (1) Any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas (i) bomb, (ii) 36 grenade, (iii) rocket having a propellant charge of more than 4 ounces, (iv) missile having 37 an explosive or incendiary charge of more than one-quarter ounce, or (v) mine or (vi) similar 38 device; (2) any weapon that is designed or intended to cause death or serious bodily injury 39 through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals or their 40 precursors; (3) any weapon involving a disease organism; or (4) any weapon that is designed 41 to release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human life (18 U.S.C. 2332a). 42

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Appendix 1: Special Considerations 1

Appendix 1A: Cross-Sector Cybersecurity 2 This appendix provides additional details on the processes, procedures, and mechanisms 3 needed to achieve NIPP goals and supporting objectives regarding cybersecurity. It specifies 4 cybersecurity roles and responsibilities, coordination processes, initiatives to mitigate risk, 5 and milestones and metrics to measure progress. 6

This appendix provides information concerning the users of cyber infrastructure, including 7 the various CIKR sectors and their associated partners. Matters concerning producers and 8 providers of cyber infrastructure (i.e., the Information Technology and Communications 9 sectors) are addressed in the SSPs. This appendix is organized to align with the 10 corresponding chapters of the NIPP to provide the reader with the context for the 11 additional information as follows: 12

1A.1 Introduction 13 1A.2 Responsibilities 14 1A.3 Managing Cyber Risk 15 1A.4 Ensuring Long-Term Cybersecurity 16

1A.1 Introduction 17

The U.S. economy and national security are highly dependent upon cyber infrastructure. 18 Cyber infrastructure enables the Nation’s essential services, resulting in a highly 19 interconnected and interdependent network of CIKR. This network provides services 20 supporting business processes and financial markets, and also assists in the control of 21 many critical processes, including the electric power grid and chemical processing plants, 22 among various others. 23

A spectrum of malicious actors can and do conduct attacks against critical cyber 24 infrastructure on an ongoing basis. Of primary concern is the risk of organized cyber 25 attacks capable of causing debilitating disruption to the Nation’s CIKR, economy, or 26 national security. Furthermore, while terrorist groups have not yet initiated a major attack 27 against the Internet, there is potential of their using it as a means of attack or for other 28 purposes that support terrorist activities. 29

DHS and the SSAs are committed to working collaboratively with other public, private, 30 academic, and international entities to enhance cybersecurity awareness and preparedness 31 efforts, and ensure that the cyber elements of CIKR are: 32

Robust enough to withstand attacks without incurring catastrophic damage; 33 Responsive enough to recover from attacks in a timely manner; and 34 Resilient enough to sustain nationally critical operations. 35

1A.1.1 Value Proposition for Cybersecurity 36 The value proposition for cybersecurity aligns with that for CIKR protection in general, as 37 discussed in chapter 1 of the NIPP Base Plan, but with a concentrated focus on cyber 38 infrastructure. Many CIKR functions and services are enabled through cyber systems and 39

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services; if cybersecurity is not appropriately addressed, the risk to CIKR is increased. The 1 responsibility for cybersecurity spans all CIKR partners, including public and private sector 2 entities. The NIPP provides a coordinated and collaborative approach to help public and 3 private sector partners understand and manage cyber risk. 4

The NIPP promotes cybersecurity by facilitating participation and partnership in CIKR 5 protection initiatives, leveraging cyber-specific expertise and experience, and improving 6 information exchange and awareness of cybersecurity concerns. It also provides a 7 framework for public and private sector partner efforts to recognize and address 8 similarities and differences between approaches to cyber risk management for business 9 continuity and national security. This framework enables CIKR partners to work 10 collaboratively to make informed cyber risk management decisions, define national cyber 11 priorities, and address cybersecurity as part of an overall national CIKR protection 12 strategy. 13

1A.1.2 Definitions 14 The following definitions explain key terms and concepts related to the cyber dimension of 15 CIKR protection: 16

Cyber infrastructure: Includes electronic information and communications systems and 17 services and the information contained therein. Information and communications 18 systems and services are composed of all hardware and software that process, store, and 19 communicate information, or any combination of all of these elements. Processing 20 includes the creation, access, modification, and destruction of information. Storage 21 includes paper, magnetic, electronic, and all other media types. Communications 22 includes sharing and distribution of information. For example, computer systems; 23 control systems (e.g., SCADA); networks, such as the Internet; and cyber services (e.g., 24 managed security services) are part of cyber infrastructure: 25

Producers and providers of cyber infrastructure represent the information 26 technology industrial base, and comprise the Information Technology sector. The 27 producers and providers of cyber infrastructure play a key role in developing secure 28 and reliable products and services. 29

Consumers of cyber infrastructure must maintain its security as new vulnerabilities 30 are identified and the threat environment evolves. Individuals, whether private 31 citizens or employees with cyber systems administration responsibility, play a 32 significant role in managing the security of computer systems to ensure that they 33 are not used to enable attacks against CIKR. 34

Information Technology (IT) critical functions are sets of processes that produce, 35 provide, and maintain products and services. IT critical functions encompass the full set 36 of processes (e.g., research and development, manufacturing, distribution, upgrades, 37 and maintenance) involved in transforming supply inputs into IT products and services. 38

Cybersecurity: The prevention of damage to, unauthorized use of, exploitation of, and, if 39 needed, the restoration of electronic information and communications systems and 40 services (and the information contained therein) to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and 41 availability. 42

Cross-Sector Cybersecurity: Collaborative efforts between DHS, the SSAs, and other 43 CIKR partners to improve the cybersecurity of the CIKR sectors by facilitating cyber 44 risk-mitigation activities. 45

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1A.1.3 Cyber-Specific Authorities 1 Various Federal strategies, directives, policies, and regulations provide the basis for 2 Federal actions and activities associated with implementing the cyber-specific aspects of 3 the NIPP. The three primary authorities associated with cybersecurity are the National 4 Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, HSPD-7, and the Homeland Security Act. These documents 5 are described in further detail in appendix 2A of the NIPP. 6

1A.2 Cybersecurity Responsibilities 7

The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, HSPD-7, and the Homeland Security Act 8 identify the responsibilities of the various CIKR partners with a role in securing 9 cyberspace. These roles and responsibilities are described in more detail below. 10

1A.2.1 Department of Homeland Security 11 In accordance with HSPD-7, DHS is a principal focal point for the security of cyberspace. 12 DHS has specific responsibilities regarding the coordination of the efforts of CIKR partners 13 to prevent damage to, unauthorized use and exploitation of, and enable the restoration of 14 cyber infrastructure to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability. These 15 responsibilities include: 16

Developing a comprehensive national plan for securing U.S. CIKR; 17 Providing crisis management in response to incidents involving cyber infrastructure; 18 Providing technical assistance to other government entities and the private sector with 19

respect to emergency recovery plans for incidents involving cyber infrastructure; 20 Coordinating with other Federal agencies to provide specific warning information and 21

advice on appropriate protective measures and countermeasures to State, local, and 22 tribal governments; the private sector; academia; and the public; 23

Conducting and funding cybersecurity R&D, in partnership with other agencies, which 24 will lead to new scientific understanding and technologies in support of homeland 25 security; and 26

Assisting SSAs in understanding and mitigating cyber risk and in developing effective 27 and appropriate protective measures. 28

Within the risk management framework described in the NIPP, DHS is also responsible for 29 the following activities: 30

Providing cyber-specific expertise and assistance in addressing the cyber elements of 31 CIKR; 32

Promoting a comprehensive national awareness program to empower businesses, the 33 workforce, and individuals to secure their own segments of cyberspace; 34

Working with CIKR partners to reduce cyber vulnerabilities and minimize the severity 35 of cyber attacks; 36

Coordinating the development and conduct of national cyber threat assessments; 37 Providing input on cyber-related issues for the National Intelligence Estimate of cyber 38

threats to the United States; 39 Facilitating cross-sector cyber analysis to understand and mitigate cyber risk; 40

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Providing guidance, review, and functional advice on the development of effective cyber-1 protective measures; and 2

Coordinating cybersecurity programs and contingency plans, including recovery of 3 Internet functions. 4

1A.2.2 Sector-Specific Agencies 5 Recognizing that each CIKR sector possesses its own unique characteristics and operating 6 models, SSAs provide the subject matter and industry expertise through relationships with 7 the private sector to enable protection of the assets, systems, networks, and functions they 8 provide within each of the sectors. SSAs must understand and mitigate cyber risk by: 9

Identifying subject matter expertise regarding the cyber aspects of their sector; 10 Increasing awareness of how the business and operational aspects of the sector rely on 11

cyber systems and processes; 12 Determining whether approaches for CIKR inventory, risk assessment, and protective 13

measures currently address cyber assets, systems, and networks; require enhancement; 14 or require the use of alternative approaches; 15

Reviewing and modifying existing and future sector efforts to ensure that cyber 16 concerns are fully integrated into sector security strategies and protective activities; 17

Establishing mutual assistance programs for cybersecurity emergencies; and 18 Exchanging cyber-specific information with sector partners, including the international 19

community, as appropriate, to improve the Nation’s overall cybersecurity posture. 20 1A.2.3 Other Federal Departments and Agencies 21 All Federal departments and agencies must manage the security of their cyber 22 infrastructure while maintaining awareness of vulnerabilities and consequences to ensure 23 that the cyber infrastructure is not used to enable attacks against the Nation’s CIKR. A 24 number of Federal agencies have specific additional responsibilities outlined in the 25 National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace: 26

The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission: Working with the sectors 27 to address barriers to mutual assistance programs for cybersecurity emergencies. 28

The Department of Justice and Other Federal Agencies: 29 Developing and implementing efforts to reduce or mitigate cyber threats by 30

acquiring more robust data on victims of cyber crime and intrusions; 31 Leading the national effort to investigate and prosecute those who conduct or 32

attempt to conduct cyber attacks; 33 Exploring means to provide sufficient investigative and forensic resources and 34

training to facilitate expeditious investigation and resolution of CIKR incidents; and 35 Identifying ways to improve cyber information sharing and investigative 36

coordination among Federal, State, local, and tribal law enforcement communities; 37 other agencies; and the private sector. 38

The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Intelligence Community: Ensuring a strong 39 counterintelligence posture to deter intelligence collection against the Federal 40 Government, as well as commercial and educational organizations. 41

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The Intelligence Community, the Department of Defense, and Law Enforcement Agencies: 1 Improving the Nation’s ability to quickly attribute the source of threats or attacks to 2 enable timely and effective response. 3

1A.2.4 State, Local, and Tribal Governments 4 State, local, and tribal governments are encouraged to implement the following cyber 5 recommendations: 6

Managing the security of their cyber infrastructure while maintaining awareness of 7 threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences to ensure that it is not used to enable attacks 8 against CIKR, and ensuring that government offices manage their computer systems 9 accordingly; 10

Participating in significant national, regional, and local awareness programs to 11 encourage local governments and citizens to manage their cyber infrastructure 12 appropriately; and 13

Establishing cybersecurity programs, including policies, plans, procedures, recognized 14 business practices, awareness, and audits. 15

1A.2.5 Private Sector 16 The private sector is encouraged to implement the following recommendations as indicated 17 in the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace: 18

Managing the security of their cyber infrastructure while maintaining awareness of 19 vulnerabilities and consequences to ensure that it is not used to enable attacks against 20 the Nation’s CIKR; 21

Participating in sector-wide programs to share information on cybersecurity; 22 Evaluating the security of networks that affect the security of the Nation’s CIKR, 23

including: 24 Conducting audits to ensure effectiveness and the use of best practices; 25 Developing continuity plans that consider the full spectrum of necessary resources, 26

including off-site staff and equipment; and 27 Participating in industry-wide information sharing and best practices dissemination; 28

Reviewing and exercising continuity plans for cyber infrastructure and examining 29 alternatives (e.g., diversity in service providers, implementation of recognized 30 cybersecurity practices) as a way of improving resiliency and mitigating risk; 31

Identifying near-term R&D priorities that include programs for highly secure and 32 trustworthy hardware, software, and protocols; and 33

Promoting more secure out-of-the-box installation and implementation of software 34 industry products, including increasing user awareness of the security features of 35 products; ease of use for security functions; and, where feasible, promotion of industry 36 guidelines and best practices that support such efforts. 37

1A.2.6 Academia 38 Colleges and universities are encouraged to implement several recommendations as 39 indicated in the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace: 40

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Managing the security of their cyber infrastructure while maintaining awareness of 1 vulnerabilities and consequences to ensure that it is not used to enable attacks against 2 the Nation’s CIKR; 3

Establishing appropriate information-sharing mechanisms to deal with cyber attacks 4 and vulnerabilities; 5

Establishing an on-call point of contact for Internet service providers and law 6 enforcement officials in the event that the institution’s cyber assets, systems, or 7 networks are discovered to be launching cyber attacks; and 8

Establishing model guidelines empowering Chief Information Officers to manage 9 cybersecurity, develop and exchange best practices for cybersecurity, and promote model 10 user awareness programs. 11

1A.3 Managing Cyber Risk 12

Under the NIPP, risk management follows a logical process that is comprised of the 13 following fundamental activities: (1) setting security goals; (2) identifying cyber assets, 14 systems, networks, and functions; (3) assessing risk, which is based on consequences, 15 threats, and vulnerability; (4) prioritizing efforts that maximize risk mitigation; (5) 16 implementing protective programs; and (6) measuring effectiveness and improving 17 programs. Each of these activities is discussed as they pertain to the cyber dimension of 18 CIKR protection in the subsections that follow. 19

1A.3.1 Set Security Goals 20 The goals and objectives set forth in the NIPP provide the overarching direction for CIKR 21 protection. The following cybersecurity objectives support the NIPP: 22

Objective 1: Expand DHS cybersecurity leadership team, personnel, capabilities, and 23 services to public and private sector partners 24

Expanding DHS’ cybersecurity leadership and capabilities will improve the Nation’s ability 25 to prevent, protect against, detect, respond to, and reconstitute rapidly after a cyber 26 incident by enhancing information exchange and analysis, improving situational 27 awareness, and promoting collaboration and coordination among public, private, and 28 international communities. 29

Section 1.A.3.5 of this appendix describes DHS focus areas, initiatives, and programs for 30 cybersecurity that aim to improve the preparedness and resiliency of Federal networks and 31 information systems, and information sharing initiatives that foster improved collaboration 32 and coordination across public and private sectors. 33

Objective 2: Enhance federal cyber situational awareness, intrusion detection, and 34 response capabilities 35

Building and maintaining trusted relationships and enabling information exchange and 36 collaboration with public, private, academic, and international partners will raise 37 cybersecurity awareness. Raising national cybersecurity awareness, in turn, empowers 38 businesses, the workforce, and individuals to secure their own segments of cyberspace. 39 Furthermore, improving and coordinating cyber intelligence and threat detection and 40 deterrence capabilities will help identify and reduce cyber threats. 41

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Section 1A.4.1 of this appendix describes outreach and awareness initiatives to empower 1 CIKR partners at all levels of government and the private sector to secure cyberspace. 2 Additionally, Section 1A.3.5 of this appendix describes various cybersecurity initiatives and 3 programs, as well as exercise programs that promote effective collaborative response to 4 cyber attack while Section 1A.4 of this appendix describes information sharing and inter-5 national efforts to improve collaboration and coordination. 6

Objective 3: Ensure that cybersecurity is integrated into federal, state, private sector and 7 international risk assessment, preparedness, and response efforts 8

Working with the public and private sectors to reduce vulnerabilities and minimize the 9 severity of cyber attacks will help improve the security of CIKR by reducing risks to cyber 10 infrastructure, such as control systems. Section 1A.3.5 of this appendix describes protective 11 programs to reduce vulnerabilities and minimize the severity of cyber attacks. 12

Objective: Develop and promote the adoption of cybersecurity standards and best practices 13 by all levels of government, the private sector, the general public, and the international 14 community. 15

The adoption of cybersecurity standards and best practices strengthens the security of 16 individual systems and the security posture of interconnected infrastructures. Similarly, 17 training and education on standards and best practices are important components of 18 establishing a knowledge base focused on the security of cyberspace. To foster adequate 19 training and education to support the Nation’s cybersecurity needs, a cadre of cybersecurity 20 professionals must be developed and maintained through appropriate training and 21 education programs. 22

Section 1.A.3.5 of this appendix discusses cybersecurity standards and best practices while 23 Section 1A.4.3 of this appendix describes training and education programs designed to help 24 develop cybersecurity professionals. 25

1A.3.2 Identify Cyber Assets, Systems, Networks, and Functions 26 Cyber assets, systems, networks, and functions are examined as a key aspect of risk 27 analysis. The process for identifying cyber assets, systems, networks, and functions should 28 be repeatable, scalable, and distributable, and enable cyber interdependency analysis at 29 both the sector and national levels to facilitate risk prioritization and mitigation. 30

Cyber assets, systems, and networks represent a variety of hardware and software 31 components that perform a particular function. Examples of assets, systems, networks, and 32 functions include networking equipment, database software, security systems, operating 33 systems, local area networks, modeling and simulation, and electronic communications. The 34 following are examples of cyber systems that exist in most, if not all, sectors and should be 35 identified individually or included as a cyber element of a physical asset’s description if the 36 operation of that asset depends on them: 37

Business Systems: Cyber systems used to manage or support common business 38 processes and operations. Examples of business systems include Enterprise Resource 39 Planning, e-commerce, e-mail, and R&D systems. 40

Control Systems: Cyber systems used within many infrastructure and industries to 41 monitor and control sensitive processes and physical functions. Control systems 42 typically collect measurement and operational data from the field, process and display 43

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the information, and relay control commands to local or remote equipment or human-1 machine interfaces (operators). Examples of control systems include SCADA, Process 2 Control Systems, and Distributed Control Systems. 3

Access Control Systems: Cyber systems allowing only authorized personnel and visitors 4 physical access to defined areas of a facility. Access control systems provide monitoring 5 and control of personnel passing throughout a facility by various means, including 6 electronic card readers, biometrics, and radio frequency identification. 7

The Internet is a key resource comprised of domestic and international assets within both 8 the Information Technology and Communications sectors. It is used by all sectors to 9 varying degrees. Availability of Internet service is the responsibility of both the Information 10 Technology and Communications sectors; however, the need for access to and reliance on 11 the Internet are common to all sectors. 12

DHS, in collaboration with other CIKR partners, provides a cross-sector cyber asset 13 identification methodology that, when applied, enables a sector to identify cyber assets, 14 systems, networks, and functions that may have nationally significant consequences if 15 destroyed, incapacitated, or exploited. This methodology also characterizes the reliance of a 16 sector’s business and operational functionality on cyber assets, systems, and networks. 17 Additional documentation on this methodology will be available in the near future. If an 18 appropriate cyber asset identification methodology is already being used within the sector, 19 DHS will work with the sector to ensure alignment of that methodology with the NIPP risk 20 management framework described in chapter 3. 21

1A.3.3 Assess Risks 22 Risk assessment for cyber assets, systems, and networks is an integral part of the risk 23 management framework described in the NIPP. This framework combines consequences, 24 threats, and vulnerabilities to produce systematic, comprehensive, and defensible risk 25 assessments. DHS and the SSAs assess risk for cyber assets, systems, and networks 26 associated with other CIKR at the national and sector levels. 27

DHS and the SSAs will incorporate the results of these risk assessments into their overall 28 risk management processes to prioritize where the Nation’s limited resources for CIKR 29 protection activities should be applied. 30

Consequence Analysis: The first step in the risk assessment process involves determining 31 the consequences of destruction; incapacitation; or exploitation of an asset, system, 32 network, or the functions they provide. 33

To assess whether a given asset may be nationally consequential, physical, cyber, and 34 human asset dependencies and interdependencies need to be assessed. Cyber 35 interdependence presents a unique challenge for all sectors because of the borderless 36 nature of cyberspace. Interdependencies are dual in nature (e.g., the Energy sector relies on 37 computer-based control systems to manage the electric power grid, while those same control 38 systems require electric power to operate). 39

Modeling and simulations through the NISAC will help quantify national and international 40 dependency and interdependency, as well as their resulting consequences. However, this 41 effort is highly complex and may not be appropriate for all assessments. When such 42 advanced capability is not available or required, dependency and interdependency analyses 43 may be carried out in a more subjective manner, with the participation of subject matter 44

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experts who have operational knowledge of the sectors involved, as well as the cross-sector 1 interactions that are likely. 2

The consequences of cyber asset, system, or network destruction, incapacitation, or 3 exploitation should be measured and described using a consistent system of measurements 4 to ensure that the results can be compared across sectors. The NIPP provides essential 5 features and core elements of assessment methodologies to ensure such consistency. DHS 6 also makes consequence analysis tools and processes available for sectors to use at their 7 discretion. The NIPP essential features and DHS tools and processes require that cyber 8 assets, systems, and networks be properly accounted for in the analysis process for the 9 results to accurately reflect the consequences of cyber loss. 10

Vulnerability Assessment: The second step of 11 the risk assessment process is analysis of 12 vulnerability—determining which elements of 13 infrastructure are most susceptible to attack 14 and how attacks against these elements would 15 most likely be carried out. 16

DHS works to identify cross-sector best 17 practices to ensure that existing methodologies 18 used by SSAs and other CIKR partners address 19 cyber vulnerabilities. DHS has taken a broad, 20 inclusive approach by reviewing various 21 existing, publicly available methods across 22 government, industry, and academia to 23 assemble a hybrid of the best practices. For 24 example, DHS not only examines vulnerability 25 standards from the International Organization 26 for Standardization and NIST, but also studies 27 vulnerability assessment methods used in the 28 law enforcement and intelligence communities 29 and the private sector. DHS works to leverage 30 established methodologies that have 31 traditionally focused on physical vulnerabilities by enhancing them to better address cyber 32 elements. 33

There are cyber vulnerabilities that all sectors should consider when conducting their 34 assessments, such as system interconnections. System interconnections (also known as 35 trusted connections) are defined as the direct connection of two or more cyber systems 36 owned by separate organizations. Business or government offices may interconnect for a 37 variety of reasons, depending on the relationship between the interconnected entities. 38 These interconnections may increase the security risk by exposing one system to 39 vulnerabilities associated with another location. 40

Threat Analysis: The third step of the risk assessment process is the analysis of threat, 41 which provides the likelihood that a target will be attacked. There are increasing indicators 42 that potential adversaries intend to conduct cyber attacks and are actively acquiring cyber 43 attack capabilities. Cyber attacks may not only target the Internet, but rather they may use 44 it as a means of attack or for other purposes that support terrorist activities. Additionally, 45

NCSD has developed the Cyber Security Vulnerability Assessment (CSVA), a flexible and scalable approach that analyzes an entity’s cybersecurity posture and describes gaps and targeted considerations that can reduce overall cyber risks. It assesses the policies, plans, and procedures in place to reduce cyber vulnerability in 10 categories (e.g., access control, configuration management, physical security of cyber assets, etc.) and leverages various recognized standards, guidance, and methodologies (e.g., International Organization for Standardization 27001, Information Systems Audit and Control Association Control Objects for Information and related Technology, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800 series).

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the increasing ease with which powerful cyber attack tools can be obtained and used puts 1 the capability of conducting cyber attacks within reach of most groups or individuals who 2 wish to do harm to the United States. However, credible information on specific adversaries 3 is often not available. As such, DHS collaborates with the law enforcement and intelligence 4 communities and the private sector to more accurately portray the possible ways in which 5 the cyber threat may affect CIKR, including the exploitation of the Internet as a weapon. 6

As called for in the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, DHS provides input on cyber-7 related issues for the National Intelligence Estimate of Cyber Threats to the U.S. 8 Information Infrastructure. DHS will update its assessment on an annual basis to inform 9 the general threat scenarios used in risk assessments and provide input to the National 10 Intelligence Estimate as required. 11

The HITRAC conducts integrated threat analysis for CIKR within DHS. HITRAC brings 12 together intelligence and infrastructure specialists to ensure a complete and sophisticated 13 understanding of the risks to U.S. CIKR, including cyber infrastructure. To do this, 14 HITRAC works in partnership with the U.S. Intelligence Community and national law 15 enforcement to integrate and analyze intelligence and law enforcement information on the 16 threat. It also works in partnership with the SSAs and owners and operators to ensure that 17 their expertise on infrastructure operations is integrated into threat analysis. HITRAC 18 combines intelligence, which includes all-source information, threat assessments, and trend 19 analysis, with expert operational and practical knowledge, and an understanding of U.S. 20 CIKR to provide products for CIKR risk assessment that include actionable conclusions 21 regarding terrorist threats and risks. Additional information on HITRAC products can be 22 found in section 3.3.4 of the NIPP Base Plan. 23

1A.3.4 Prioritize 24 NIPP risk assessments provide comparable estimates of the risk faced by each CIKR 25 element and sector. This process allows key elements and sectors to be prioritized according 26 to risk, and protective programs, including those focused on improving cybersecurity, to be 27 designed that can help mitigate the highest priority risks. Those programs that offer the 28 greatest risk mitigation for the dollars spent are afforded the highest priority. Although 29 cyber-specific protective programs are frequently perceived to be costly, the costs of these 30 programs may be significantly lower than the cascading costs associated with a successful 31 cyber attack. 32

Cyber assets, systems, and networks and the functions they provide are prioritized using an 33 overall risk-informed approach. By integrating cyber threats, vulnerabilities, and 34 consequences into risk analysis and by measuring risk in comparable terms for all elements 35 and sectors, cyber assets, systems, networks, and functions are included in the 36 prioritization process in a manner that ensures that they are appropriately considered 37 along with other aspects of CIKR. 38

1A.3.5 Implement Protective Programs 39 Since each sector has a unique reliance on cyber infrastructure, DHS will assist the SSAs in 40 developing a range of effective and appropriate cyber-protective measures. 41

In addition to individual sector-level protective measures, DHS has partnered with other 42 public and private sector entities to develop and implement specific programs to help 43

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improve the security of the cyber infrastructure across sectors, as well as to support 1 national cyber risk-mitigation activities, including: 2

Government Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (GFIRST): Following the 3 model of the global FIRST organization, the Federal interagency community established 4 the GFIRST to facilitate interagency information sharing and cooperation across 5 Federal agencies for readiness and response efforts. GFIRST is a group of technical and 6 tactical security response team practitioners responsible for securing government 7 information technology systems. The members work together to understand and handle 8 computer security incidents and to encourage proactive and preventive security 9 practices. 10

Cross Sector Cybersecurity Working Group (CSCSWG): The CSCSWG serves as a forum 11 to bring government and the private sector together to collaboratively address risk 12 across the CIKR sectors. This cross-sector perspective facilitates the sharing of 13 perspectives and knowledge about various cybersecurity concerns, such as common 14 vulnerabilities and protective measures, and leverages functional cyber expertise in a 15 comprehensive forum. 16

The National Cyber Response Coordination Group: The NCRCG member agencies use 17 their established relationships with the private sector and State, local, and tribal 18 governments to facilitate cyber incident management, develop courses of action, and 19 devise appropriate response and recovery strategies. NCRCG facilitates coordination of 20 the Federal Government’s efforts to prepare for, respond to, and recover from cyber 21 incidents and physical attacks that have significant cyber consequences. Outlined in the 22 NRF Cyber Annex, the NCRCG serves as the Federal Government’s principal 23 interagency mechanism for operational information sharing and coordination of Federal 24 Government response and recovery efforts during a cyber crisis. 25

Programs for Federal Systems Cybersecurity: The Federal Government is continually 26 increasing capabilities to address cyber risk associated with critical networks and 27 information systems. Current measures to prevent future attacks and intrusion 28 attempts include: 29

Increasing personnel support to the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team 30 (US-CERT), DHS’ 24x7 watch and warning center for the Federal Government’s 31 Internet infrastructure. 32

Expanding the EINSTEIN Program to all Federal departments and agencies, 33 providing government officials with an early warning system to gain better 34 situational awareness, earlier identification of malicious activity, and a more 35 comprehensive network defense. The EINSTEIN Program helps identify unusual 36 network traffic patterns and trends which signal unauthorized network traffic so 37 security personnel are able to quickly identify and respond to potential threats. 38

Consolidating the number of external connections including Internet points of 39 presence for the Federal Government Internet infrastructure, as part of the Office of 40 Management and Budget’s (OMB) “Trusted Internet Connections Initiative,” will 41 more efficiently manage and implement security measures to help bring more 42 comprehensive protection across the federal “.gov” domains. 43

Creating a National Cybersecurity Center to further our progress in addressing 44 cyber threats and increasing cybersecurity efforts. This Center will bring together 45 federal cybersecurity organizations, by virtually connecting and in some cases, 46

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physically collocating personnel and resources to gain a clearer understanding of the 1 overall cyber security picture of Federal networks. 2

Expanding the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (NCIJTF), to include 3 representation from the U.S. Secret Service and several other federal agencies. This 4 existing cyber investigation coordination organization overseen by the Federal 5 Bureau of Investigation will serve as a multi-agency national focal point for 6 coordinating, integrating, and sharing pertinent information related to cyber threat 7 investigations. 8

Working towards a stronger supply chain defense to reduce the potential for 9 adversaries to manipulate IT and communications products before they are imported 10 into the U.S. To address this challenge, the Federal Government is exploring 11 protections into our federal acquisition process and developing a multi-faceted 12 strategy to reduce risk at the most appropriate stage of the IT and communications 13 product lifecycle. 14

In addition to the programs listed above, DHS operates the Cyber Exercise Program in 15 coordination with the National Exercise Program. Through this program, DHS and CIKR 16 partners conduct exercises to improve coordination among members of the cyber incident 17 response community. The program includes participation from Federal, State, local, tribal, 18 and international government elements, as well as private sector corporations, coordinating 19 councils, and academic institutions. The main objectives of national cyber exercises are to 20 practice coordinated response to cyber attack scenarios; provide an environment for 21 evaluation of interagency and cross-sector processes, procedures, and tools for 22 communications and response to cyber incidents; and foster improved information sharing 23 among government agencies and between government and private industry. 24

DHS, in collaboration with other CIKR partners, has also established several vulnerability-25 reduction programs under the NIPP risk management framework, including: 26

Critical Infrastructure Protection Cybersecurity (CIP CS) Program: The CIP CS Program 27 strengthens preparedness by partnering with the public and private sectors to improve 28 the security of the IT Sector and cybersecurity across the Nation’s critical 29 infrastructures by facilitating risk management activities that reduce cyber 30 vulnerabilities and minimize the severity of cyber attacks. The program includes 31 responsibilities for development and implementation of the IT SSP; for cross-sector 32 cyber support to SSAs as they maintain and implement their SSPs and reduce cyber 33 risk to their sectors; and support to the NIPP Program Management Office for 34 development of the NIPP’s cyber component, SSP development guidance and technical 35 assistance sessions, and the National CIKR Annual Report. The CIP CS Program also 36 facilitates activities and partnerships to improve the resiliency of the Internet. 37

Software Assurance Program: Public and private sector partners work together to 38 develop best practices and new technologies to promote integrity, security, and 39 reliability in software development. DHS leads the Software Assurance Program, a 40 comprehensive effort that addresses people, processes, technology, and acquisition 41 throughout the software life cycle. Focused on shifting away from the current security 42 paradigm of patch management, these efforts will encourage the production of higher 43 quality, more secure software. These efforts to promote a broader ability to routinely 44 develop and deploy trustworthy software products through public-private partnerships 45 are a significant element of securing cyberspace and the Nation’s critical infrastructure. 46

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DHS also partners with NIST in the National Information Assurance Partnership 1 (NIAP), a Federal Government initiative originated to meet the security testing needs of 2 both information technology consumers and producers. NIAP is operated by NSA to 3 address security testing, evaluation, and validation programs. 4

Control Systems Cybersecurity Program: The DHS Control Systems Cybersecurity 5 Program coordinates efforts among Federal, State, local, and tribal governments, as 6 well as control system owners, operators, and vendors to improve control system 7 security within and across all critical infrastructure sectors. The Control Systems 8 Cybersecurity Program coordinates activities to reduce the likelihood of success and 9 severity of impact of a cyber attack against critical infrastructure control systems 10 through risk-mitigation activities. These activities include assessing and managing 11 control system vulnerabilities, assisting the US-CERT Control Systems Security Center 12 with control system incident management, and providing control system situational 13 awareness through outreach and training initiatives. 14

The Standards and Best 15 Practices Program: As 16 part of its efforts to 17 develop practical 18 guidance and review 19 tools, and promote R&D 20 investment in 21 cybersecurity, DHS and 22 NIST co-sponsor the 23 National Vulnerability 24 Database. This database 25 provides centralized and 26 comprehensive 27 vulnerability mitigation 28 resources for all types of 29 users, including the 30 general public, system 31 administrators, and vendors to assist with incident prevention and management 32 (including links to patches) to mitigate consequences and vulnerabilities. 33

1A.3.6 Measure Effectiveness and Improve Programs 34 The NIPP uses a metrics-based approach as a means to document performance, facilitate 35 diagnoses, promote effective management, and reassess goals. Within the NIPP metrics 36 framework, DHS works with CIKR partners to help ensure that the NIPP core measures 37 include the review, consideration, and integration of common cybersecurity policies, plans, 38 procedures, and sound business practices, as appropriate. Additionally, DHS works with 39 CIKR sectors to develop cybersecurity sector-specific metrics where applicable. Separate 40 sector-specific measures for cybersecurity may not be necessary in all cases; however, the 41 sector-specific measures should strive to consider all sector assets, including cyber assets, 42 systems, and networks when measuring performance against goals. 43

The overall purpose of measuring effectiveness using metrics is to improve cyber CIKR 44 protection by mitigating risk. This means that using metrics as descriptors is not sufficient 45 and that measured effectiveness must be compared to goals and improvements to enable 46 the addressing of priority gaps. 47

Control systems, which are critical components of our Nation’s critical infrastructure, monitor and control sensitive processes and functions upon which our Nation depends (e.g., electricity generation, transmission, and distribution; natural gas production and distribution; transportation systems monitoring and control; water supply and treatment; and chemical processing.

Control systems historically were designed with proprietary solutions for specific uses in isolation, but are now frequently being implemented with remote access and open connectivity, utilizing common operations systems and, thus, are potentially vulnerable to various cyber attacks. Cybersecurity practices commonly implemented in business systems are often difficult to implement in operational control systems environments. As a result, cyber threats to control systems could potentially have devastating impacts on national security, economic security, public health and safety, as well as the environment.

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1A.4 Ensuring Long-Term Cybersecurity 1

The effort to ensure a coherent cyber CIKR protection program over the long term has four 2 components that are described in greater detail below: 3

Information Sharing and Awareness: Ensures implementation of effective, coordinated, 4 and integrated protection of cyber assets, systems, and networks, and the functions they 5 provide, and enables cybersecurity partners to make informed decisions with regard to 6 short- and long-term cybersecurity postures, risk mitigation, and operational continuity. 7

International Cooperation: Promotes a global culture of cybersecurity and improves 8 overall cyber incident preparedness and response posture. 9

Training and Education: Ensures that skilled and knowledgeable cybersecurity 10 professionals are available to undertake NIPP programs in the future. 11

Research and Development: Improves cybersecurity protective capabilities or 12 dramatically lowers the costs of existing capabilities so that State, local, tribal, and 13 private sector partners can afford to do more with their limited budgets. 14

1A.4.1 Information Sharing and Awareness 15 Information sharing and awareness involves sharing programs with agency partners and 16 other CIKR partners, and special sharing arrangements for emergency situations. Each of 17 these is discussed below: 18

Interagency Coordination: Interagency cooperation and information sharing are essential to 19 improving national cyber counterintelligence and law enforcement capabilities. The 20 intelligence and law enforcement communities have both official and informal mechanisms 21 in place for information sharing that DHS supports: 22

FBI’s Cyber Task Forces involve more than 50 law enforcement agency cyber task forces 23 and more than 80 additional cyber working groups throughout the country, 24 collaborating with Federal, State, and local partners to maximize investigative 25 resources to ensure a timely and effective response to cybersecurity threats of both a 26 criminal and national security nature. 27

Cybercop Portal is a secure Internet-based information-sharing mechanism for more 28 than 5,300 law enforcement members involved in the field of electronic crimes 29 investigations. The law enforcement community, including investigators from private 30 industry (e.g., banks and the network security community), is tied together and 31 supported by this secure, Internet-based collaboration portal. 32

FBI’s InfraGard program is a public-private partnership coordinated out of the 56 FBI 33 field offices nationwide. The program brings together law enforcement, academia, and 34 private sector entities on a monthly basis to provide a forum for information sharing 35 and networking. 36

FBI’s Inter-Agency Coordination Cell is a multi-agency group focused on sharing law 37 enforcement information on cyber-related investigations. 38

U.S. Secret Service’s Electronic Crimes Task Forces provide interagency coordination on 39 cyber-based attacks and intrusions. 40

Information Sharing and Analysis Centers: Underscoring effective cybersecurity efforts is 41 the importance of information sharing between and among industry and government. To 42 this end, the Information Technology and Communications ISACs work closely together 43

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and with DHS and the SSAs to maximize resources, coordinate preparedness and response 1 efforts, and maintain situational awareness to enable risk mitigation regarding cyber 2 infrastructure. 3

Cybersecurity Awareness for CIKR Partners: DHS plays an important leadership role in 4 coordinating a public-private partnership to promote and raise cybersecurity awareness 5 among the general public by: 6

Partnering with other Federal and private sector organizations to sponsor the National 7 Cyber Security Alliance (NCSA), including creating a public-private organization, Stay 8 Safe Online, to educate home users, small businesses, and K-12 and higher education 9 audiences on cybersecurity best practices. 10

Engaging with the MS-ISAC to help enhance the Nation’s cybersecurity readiness and 11 response at the State and local levels, and launching a national cybersecurity awareness 12 effort in partnership with the MS-ISAC. The MS-ISAC is an information-sharing 13 organization, with representatives of State and local governments, that analyzes, 14 sanitizes, and disseminates information pertaining to cyber events and vulnerabilities 15 to its constituents and private industry. 16

Collaborating with the NCSA, the MS-ISAC, and the public and private sector to 17 establish October as National Cyber Security Awareness Month and participating in 18 activities to continuously raise cybersecurity awareness nationwide. 19

Cyberspace Emergency Readiness: DHS established the US-CERT, which is a 24/7 single 20 point of contact for cyberspace analysis and warning, information sharing, and incident 21 response and recovery for a broad range of users, including government, enterprises, small 22 businesses, and home users. US-CERT is a partnership between DHS and the public and 23 private sectors designed to help secure the Nation’s Internet infrastructure and to 24 coordinate defenses against and responses to cyber attacks across the Nation. US-CERT is 25 responsible for: 26

Analyzing and reducing cyber threats and vulnerabilities; 27 Disseminating cyber threat warning information; and 28 Coordinating cyber incident response activities. 29

To support the information-sharing requirements of the network approach, US-CERT 30 provides the following information on their Web site, accessible through the HSIN, and 31 through mailing lists: 32

Cybersecurity Alerts: Written in a language for home, corporate, and new users, these 33 alerts are published in conjunction with technical alerts in the context of security issues 34 that affect the general public. 35

Cybersecurity Bulletins: Bulletins summarize information that has been published 36 regarding emergent security issues and vulnerabilities. They are published weekly and 37 are written primarily for systems administrators and other technical users. 38

Cybersecurity Tips: Tips provide information and advice on a variety of common 39 cybersecurity topics. They are published biweekly and are written primarily for home, 40 corporate, and new users. 41

National Web Cast Initiative: In an effort to increase cybersecurity awareness and 42 education among the States, DHS, through US-CERT, and the MS-ISAC have launched 43 a joint partnership to develop a series of national Web casts that will examine critical 44

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and timely cybersecurity issues. The purpose of the initiative is to strengthen the 1 Nation’s cyber readiness and resilience. 2

Technical Cybersecurity Alerts: Written for systems administrators and experienced 3 users, technical alerts provide timely information on current cybersecurity issues, 4 vulnerabilities, and exploits. 5

US-CERT also provides a method for citizens, businesses, and other institutions to 6 communicate and coordinate directly with the Federal Government on matters of 7 cybersecurity. The private sector can use the protections afforded by the Protected Critical 8 Infrastructure Information Act to electronically submit proprietary data to US-CERT. 9

1A.4.2 International Coordination on Cybersecurity 10 The Federal Government proactively uses its intelligence capabilities to protect the country 11 from cyber attack, its diplomatic outreach and operational capabilities to build partnerships 12 in the global community, and its law enforcement capabilities to combat cyber crime 13 wherever it originates. The private sector, international industry associations, and 14 companies with global interests and operations are also engaged in addressing 15 cybersecurity internationally. For example, the U.S.-based Information Technology 16 Association of America participates in international cybersecurity conferences and forums, 17 such as the India-based National Association for Software and Service Companies Joint 18 Conference. These efforts involve interaction with both the policy and operational 19 communities to coordinate national and international activities that are mutually 20 supportive across the globe: 21

International Cybersecurity Outreach: DHS, in conjunction with the Department of 22 State and other Federal agencies, engages in multilateral and bilateral discussions to 23 further international security awareness and policy development, as well as incident 24 response team information-sharing and capacity-building objectives. The United States 25 engages in bilateral discussions on important cybersecurity issues with close allies and 26 others with whom the United States shares networked interdependencies, to include, 27 but not limited to: Australia, Canada, Egypt, Germany, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, 28 the Netherlands, Romania, the United Kingdom, etc. The United States also provides 29 leadership in multilateral and regional forums addressing cybersecurity and CIKR 30 protection to encourage all nations to take systematic steps to secure their networked 31 systems. For example, U.S. initiatives include: the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 32 Telecommunications Working Group capacity-building program to help member 33 countries develop CSIRTs, and the OAS framework proposal to create a regional 34 computer incident response points-of-contact network for information sharing and to 35 help member countries develop CSIRTs. Other U.S. efforts to build a culture of 36 cybersecurity include participation in OECD, G8, and United Nations activities. The 37 U.S. private sector is actively involved in this international outreach in partnership 38 with the Federal Government. 39

Collaboration on Cyber Crime: The U.S. outreach strategy for comprehensive cyber laws 40 and procedures draws on the Council of Europe Convention on Cyber Crime, as well as: 41 (1) the G8 High-Tech Crime Working Group’s principles for fighting cyber crime and 42 protecting critical information infrastructure, (2) the OECD guidelines on information 43 and network security, and (3) the United Nations General Assembly resolutions based 44 on the G8 and OECD efforts. The goal of this outreach strategy is to encourage 45

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individual nations and regional groupings of nations to join DHS in efforts to protect 1 internationally interconnected national systems. 2

Collaborative Efforts for Cyber Watch, Warning, and Incident Response: The Federal 3 Government is working strategically with key allies on cybersecurity policy and 4 operational cooperation. For example, DHS is leveraging pre-existing relationships 5 among CSIRTs. DHS also has established a preliminary framework for cooperation on 6 cybersecurity policy, watch, warning, and incident response with key allies. The 7 framework also incorporates efforts related to key strategic issues as agreed upon by 8 these allies. An IWWN is being established among cybersecurity policy, computer 9 emergency response, and law enforcement participants representing 15 countries. The 10 IWWN will provide a mechanism for the participating countries to share information to 11 build global cyber situational awareness and coordinate incident response. 12

Partnerships to Address Cyber Aspects of Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS and 13 the SSAs are leveraging existing agreements, such as the SPP and the JCG with the 14 United Kingdom, to address the Information Technology sector and cross-cutting cyber 15 components of CIKR protection. The trilateral SPP builds on existing bilateral 16 agreements between the United States and Canada and the United States and Mexico 17 by allowing issues to be addressed on a dual bi-national basis. In the context of the JCG, 18 DHS established a 10-point action plan to address cybersecurity, watch, warning, and 19 incident response and other strategic initiatives. 20

1A.4.3 Training and Education 21 The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace highlights the importance of cyberspace 22 security training and education. Education and training are strategic initiatives in which 23 DHS and other Federal agencies are actively engaged to affect a greater awareness and 24 participation in efforts to promote cybersecurity for the future. 25

The Federal Government has undertaken several initiatives in partnership with the 26 research and academic communities to better educate and train future cybersecurity 27 practitioners: 28

DHS developed the IT Security Essential Body of Knowledge (EBK): A Competency and 29 Functional Framework for IT Security Workforce Development. The EBK is provides a 30 national baseline representing the essential knowledge and skills that IT security 31 practitioners should have to perform specific roles and responsibilities. 32

DHS co-sponsors the National CAEIAE program with NSA. Together, DHS and NSA 33 are working to expand the program nationally. 34

DHS collaborates with the National Science Foundation to co-sponsor and expand the 35 Cyber Corps Scholarship for Service program. The Scholarship for Service program 36 provides grant money to selected CAEIAE and other universities with programs of a 37 similar caliber to fund the final 2 years of bachelor’s, master’s, or doctoral study in 38 information assurance in exchange for an equal amount of time spent working for the 39 Federal Government. 40

In fiscal year 2004, the joint DHS/Treasury Computer Investigative Specialist program 41 trained 48 Federal criminal investigators in basic computer forensics. Agents from ICE, 42 the Internal Revenue Service, and the U.S. Secret Service attended the basic 6½-week 43 course. This training was funded through the Treasury Executive Office of Asset 44 Forfeiture. 45

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DHS is collaborating with DOD to finalize a comprehensive information technology job 1 skills standard to guide development of a national certification program for security 2 professionals within the Federal Government and private industry. 3

Through DHS, DOJ, DOD, and the Department of State, the Federal Government 4 provides cyber-related training to foreign cyber incident responders (incident response 5 management, creation of CSIRTs) and law enforcement personnel and jurists (laws, 6 computer forensics, case handling). 7

1A.4.4 Research and Development 8 The Cyber Security Research and Development Act of 2002 authorized a multi-year effort to 9 create more secure cyber technologies, expand cybersecurity R&D, and improve the 10 cybersecurity workforce. 11

To further address cyber R&D needs, the White House’s OSTP established a CSIA IWG 12 under the NSTC. The CSIA IWG was jointly chartered by NSTC’s Subcommittee on 13 Networking and Information Technology R&D and the Subcommittee on Infrastructure. 14 This interagency working group includes participation from 20 organizations representing 15 11 departments and agencies, as well as from several offices in the White House. 16

The purpose of the working group is to coordinate Federal programs for cybersecurity and 17 information assurance R&D. It also is responsible for developing the Federal Plan for Cyber 18 Security and Information Assurance R&D, which includes near-term, mid-term, and long-19 term cybersecurity research efforts in response to the National Strategy to Secure 20 Cyberspace and HSPD-7. The document includes descriptions of approximately 50 21 cybersecurity R&D topics, such as Automated Attack Detection, Warning, and Response; 22 Forensics, Traceback, and Attribution; Security Technology and Policy Management 23 Methods; Policy Specification Languages; and Integrated, Enterprise-Wide Security 24 Monitoring and Management. The document also identifies the top cybersecurity and 25 information assurance research topics across the Federal Government. Finally, the 26 document includes key findings and recommendations. DHS actively co-chairs the CSIA 27 IWG with OSTP and continues to identify critical cyber R&D requirements for 28 incorporation into Federal R&D planning efforts. 29

1A.4.5 Exploring Private Sector Incentives 30 Awareness and understanding of the need for cybersecurity present a challenge for both 31 government and industry. Although cybersecurity requires significant investments in time 32 and resources, an effective cybersecurity program may reduce the likelihood of a successful 33 cyber attack or the impact if a cyber attack occurs. Network disruptions resulting from 34 cyber attacks can lead to loss of money, time, products, reputation, sensitive information, or 35 even potential loss of life through cascading effects on critical systems and infrastructure. 36 From an economic perspective, cyber attacks have resulted in billions of dollars of business 37 losses and damages in the aggregate. 38

The private sector makes risk management decisions, including those for cybersecurity, 39 based on return on investment and ensuring business continuity. Market-based incentives 40 for cybersecurity investments include protection of intellectual capital, security-influenced 41 procurement, market differentiation, and public confidence. Sometimes, however, cyber 42 assets, systems, networks, or functions may be deemed nationally critical and necessitate 43 additional risk management beyond that which the private sector implements as part of 44 their corporate responsibility. To address this difference, DHS is collaborating with the 45

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public and private sectors through various programs and outreach efforts (e.g., US-CERT, 1 the Control Systems Cybersecurity Program, and the Software Assurance Program) to 2 promote awareness of cybersecurity risks, and create incentives for increased investment in 3 cybersecurity. 4

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Appendix 1B: International CIKR 1

Protection 2

1B.1 Introduction and Purpose of This Appendix 3

This appendix provides guidance for addressing the international aspects of CIKR 4 protection in support of the NIPP. 5

1B.1.1 Scope 6 The NIPP provides the mechanisms, processes, key initiatives, and milestones necessary to 7 enable DHS, the Department of State (DOS), the SSAs, and other partners to address 8 international implications and requirements related to CIKR protection. The NIPP and 9 associated SSPs recognize protective measures do not stop at a facility’s fence line or a 10 national border. Because disruptions in the global infrastructure can ripple and cascade 11 around the world, the NIPP and the SSPs also consider cross-border CIKR, international 12 vulnerabilities, and global dependencies and interdependencies. 13

1B.1.2 Vision 14 The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets 15 identifies “fostering international cooperation” as one of the eight guiding principles of its 16 vision for the future. The strategy underscores the need for a coordinated, comprehensive, 17 and aggressive global action as a key aspect of the NIPP approach to CIKR protection. 18

Furthermore, the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace sets forth strategic objectives for 19 national security and international cyberspace security cooperation that deal directly with 20 the international aspects of CIKR protection, including preventing cyber attacks against 21 America’s critical infrastructure, reducing vulnerabilities, and minimizing damage and 22 recovery time from cyber attacks and incidents that do occur. 23

1B.1.3 Implementing the Vision With a Strategy for Effective Cooperation 24 The NIPP CIKR international coordination and protection strategy outlined in this 25 appendix is focused on establishing effective cooperation with international partners, 26 rather than on discussing specific protective measures. Specific protective measures are 27 tailored to each sector’s particular circumstance and are developed in the SSPs. This 28 appendix also focuses on implementing existing agreements that affect CIKR protection 29 and addressing cross-sector and global issues such as cybersecurity. 30

DOS, DHS, and the SSAs periodically review the international CIKR protection strategy 31 and redraft it, as needed, to ensure it complements and supports specific objectives detailed 32 in the NIPP. 33

On an ongoing basis, DHS, DOS, and other concerned Federal departments and agencies 34 ensure the international CIKR coordination and protection strategy found in the NIPP is 35 incorporated into their strategies for cooperating with other countries and 36 international/multinational organizations. This effort focuses on promoting a global culture 37 of physical and cybersecurity, managing CIKR-related risk as far as possible outside the 38 physical borders of the United States; accelerating international cooperation to develop 39 intellectual infrastructure based on shared assumptions and compatible conceptual tools; 40

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and connecting constituencies not traditionally engaged in security. The broad structure of 1 this approach is outlined in this appendix; it is based on the following high-level 2 considerations. 3

1B.2 Responsibilities for International Cooperation on CIKR 4 Protection 5

In accordance with HSPD-7, DOS, in conjunction with DHS, DOJ, DOD, the Departments 6 of Commerce and Treasury, the NRC, and other appropriate departments and agencies, is 7 responsible for working with foreign countries and international/multinational 8 organizations to strengthen the protection of U.S. CIKR. This section provides further 9 details regarding the responsibilities related to the international dimension of CIKR 10 protection. 11

1B.2.1 Department of Homeland Security 12 Under the CIKR risk management framework described in this plan, DHS, in collaboration 13 with other CIKR partners, is responsible for the following actions, all of which have an 14 international dimension: 15

Building partnerships; 16 Implementing a comprehensive, integrated risk management program; and 17 Implementing protective programs. 18

DHS, in conjunction with DOS and in cooperation with other Federal departments/agencies 19 with foreign affairs components, share with international entities appropriate information 20 and perform outreach functions to enhance information sharing and management of 21 international agreements regarding CIKR protection. 22

Some of the more complex challenges presented by the international aspects of CIKR 23 protection involve analyzing the complex dependencies, interdependencies, and 24 vulnerabilities that require the application of sophisticated and innovative modeling 25 techniques. DHS is responsible for pursuing research and analysis in this area. It will call 26 on a range of outside sources for this work, including those with expertise in the 27 international community and the NISAC. 28

1B.2.2 Department of State 29 The Secretary of State has direct responsibility for policies and activities related to the 30 protection of U.S. citizens and U.S. facilities abroad. The Secretary of State, in conjunction 31 with the Secretary of Homeland Security, is responsible for coordinating with foreign 32 countries and international organizations to strengthen the protection of U.S. CIKR. DOS 33 supports DHS and other Federal department/agency efforts by providing knowledge about 34 and access to foreign governments. DOS leverages bilateral and multilateral relationships 35 around the world to ensure that the Federal Government can act effectively to identify and 36 protect U.S. CIKR. 37

DOS, DHS, and other Federal departments/agencies are engaged in a wide range of 38 activities throughout the world to prevent, disrupt, and deter threats and acts of terrorism 39 directed against the homeland and U.S. interests abroad. The objectives of these efforts are 40 to develop and work with global partners to ensure mutual security and to raise awareness 41 of the terrorist threat. 42

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1B.2.3 Other Federal Departments and Agencies 1 SSAs exchange information, as appropriate, including cyber-specific information, with 2 CIKR partners in other countries, per guidelines established by DHS and DOS and other 3 Federal departments/agencies to improve the Nation’s overall CIKR protection posture. 4

DOC, Treasury, DOJ, DOD, DOE, DOT, and other Federal departments/agencies share 5 responsibility, per HSPD-7, for working through DOS to reach out to foreign countries and 6 international organizations to strengthen the protection of U.S. CIKR. 7

1B.2.4 State, Local, and Tribal Governments 8 State, territorial, local, and tribal governments ensure ongoing cooperation with relevant 9 regional, State, local, and private sector CIKR protection efforts. 10

1B.2.5 Private Sector 11 DHS is working with the private sector, SSAs, private voluntary and nongovernmental 12 organizations, and information-sharing mechanisms and organizations to protect cross-13 border infrastructure and understand international and global vulnerabilities. DHS relies 14 on the private sector for data, expertise, and knowledge of their international operations to 15 identify relevant international assets, systems, and networks, and assess risks and global 16 vulnerabilities, including shared threats and interdependencies. 17

1B.2.6 Academia 18 The academic community provides data, insight, and research into the significance of 19 international interdependencies, modeling, and analysis. 20

1B.3 Managing the International Dimension of CIKR Risk 21

The NIPP addresses international CIKR protection, including interdependencies and the 22 vulnerability to threats that originate outside the country. The NIPP brings a new focus to 23 international security cooperation and provides a risk-informed strategic framework for 24 measuring the effectiveness of international CIKR protection activities. The NIPP also 25 provides tools to assess international vulnerabilities and interdependencies that 26 complement long-standing cooperative agreements with Canada, Mexico, the United 27 Kingdom, NATO, and others, and provides a framework for effective collaborative engage-28 ment with additional international partners. 29

SSPs are required to include international considerations as an integral part of each 30 sector’s planning process rather than instituting a separate layer of planning. Some 31 international aspects of CIKR protection require additional overarching or cross-sector 32 emphasis. These include: 33

U.S. interaction with foreign governments and international organizations to enhance 34 the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of cyber-based infrastructure that often 35 has an international or even global dimension; 36

Protection of physical assets located on, near, or extending across the borders with 37 Canada and Mexico that require cooperation with and/or planning and resource 38 allocation among neighboring countries, States bordering on these countries, and 39 affected local and tribal governments and the private sector; 40

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Sectors with CIKR that are extensively integrated into an international or global 1 market (e.g., Banking and Finance or other information-based sector, Energy, or 2 Transportation) or when the proper functioning of a sector relies on inputs that are not 3 within the control of U.S. entities; and 4

U.S. Government and corporate facilities located overseas may be regarded as CIKR 5 based on implementation of the NIPP framework. Protection for the Government 6 Facilities sector involves careful interagency collaboration, as well as cooperation with 7 foreign CIKR partners. 8

The following subsections discuss issues associated with the international aspects of CIKR 9 protection in the context of the steps of the NIPP risk management process. (See NIPP 10 Chapter 3, The Protection Program Strategy: Managing Risk.) 11

1B.3.1 Setting Security Goals 12 The overarching goal of the NIPP—to enhance the protection of U.S. CIKR—applies to the 13 international “system of systems” that underpins U.S. CIKR. The NIPP and the SSPs 14 provide guidance and risk management approaches to address the international aspects of 15 CIKR protection efforts on both a national and a sector-specific level. In addition, a 16 separate set of goals and priorities guide cross-sector and global efforts to improve 17 protection for CIKR with international linkages. These goals fall into three categories: 18

Identifying and addressing cross-sector and global issues; 19 Implementing existing and developing new agreements that affect CIKR; and 20 Improving the effectiveness of international cooperation. 21

DHS, in conjunction with DOS and other CIKR partners, defines the requirement for a 22 comprehensive international CIKR protection strategy. The integration of international 23 CIKR protection considerations and measures into each SSPs is important for pursuing and 24 achieving these goals in ways that complement each other and are achievable with the 25 resources available. 26

Important considerations in achieving these goals are discussed in this section; actions 27 required to achieve these goals are addressed in the section on key implementation actions. 28

1B.3.2 Identifying CIKR Affected by International Linkages or Located 29 Internationally 30 Once international security goals are set, the next step in the risk management process is 31 to develop and maintain a comprehensive inventory of the Nation’s CIKR outside U.S. 32 borders and of foreign CIKR that may lead to loss of life in the United States, or critically 33 affect the Nation’s economic, industrial, or defensive capabilities. The process for 34 identifying nationally critical CIKR involves working with U.S. industry, SSAs, academia, 35 and international partners to gather and protect information on the foreign infrastructure 36 and resources on which U.S. CIKR rely or which significantly impact U.S. interests as 37 noted above. 38

Dependency, Interdependency and International CIKR Protection Cooperation: The NIPP 39 risk management framework details a structured approach for use in determining 40 dependencies and interdependencies, including physical, cyber, and international 41 considerations. This approach is designed to address CIKR protection needs and 42 vulnerabilities in three areas: 43

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Direct international linkages to U.S. physical and cyber CIKR: 1 Foreign cross-border assets linked to U.S. CIKR (e.g., roads, bridges, rail lines, 2

pipelines, gas lines, telecommunications lines and undersea cables and facilities, and 3 power lines physically connecting U.S. CIKR to Canada and Mexico); 4

Foreign infrastructure whose disruption or destruction could directly harm the U.S. 5 homeland (e.g., a Canadian dam that could flood U.S. territory, a Mexican chemical 6 plant that could affect U.S. territory, or foreign ports where security failures could 7 directly affect U.S. security); and 8

U.S. CIKR that may be located overseas (e.g., non-military government facilities or 9 overseas components of U.S. CIKR; 10

Indirect international linkages to physical and cyber U.S. CIKR: 11 The potential cascading and escalating effects of disruption or destruction of foreign 12

assets, systems, and networks; critical foreign technology; goods; resources; transit 13 routes; and chokepoints; and 14

Foreign ownership, control, or involvement in U.S. CIKR and related issues; 15 Global aspects of physical and cyber U.S. CIKR: 16

Assets, systems, and networks either located around the world or with global 17 mobility that require the efforts of multiple foreign countries to secure. 18

Dependency and interdependency analysis is primarily based on information from each 19 sector and is formulated by the judgments of CIKR owners and operators regarding their 20 supply chains and sources of services from other infrastructure sectors (e.g., Energy and 21 Water). As the capability for sophisticated network analysis grows, these inputs are 22 complemented by assessments that examine less apparent network-based dependencies and 23 interdependencies. The NISAC supports this effort by analyzing and quantifying national 24 and international dependency and interdependency for complex systems and networks that 25 affect specific sectors. 26

1B.3.3 Assessing Risks 27 The risk assessment for CIKR affected by international linkages is an integral part of the 28 risk management framework described in the NIPP. The risk management framework 29 combines consequences, threats, and vulnerabilities to produce systematic and 30 comprehensive risk assessments that can be clearly explained in the following three-step 31 process: 32

Determine the consequences of destruction, incapacitation, or exploitation of CIKR. This 33 is done to assess potential national significance, as well as physical, cyber, and human 34 dependencies and interdependencies that may result from international linkages. 35

Analyze vulnerability, including determining which elements of CIKR are most 36 susceptible to attack or other disruption, and whether attacks against these elements 37 could be a consequence of any international linkages. 38

Conduct a threat analysis to identify the likelihood a target will be attacked. CIKR with 39 international linkages may present greater opportunities for attack and thus increase 40 the likelihood they may be the subject of attacks. 41

Issues important to the other countries may be different from those for the United States. 42 Risk analysis needs to be conducted in coordination with other countries to draw on their 43 analysis, as well as our own. 44

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1B.3.4 Prioritizing 1 Assessing CIKR on a level playing field that adjudicates risk based on a common 2 framework ensures resources are applied where they offer the most benefit for reducing 3 risk; deterring threats; and minimizing the consequences of attacks, natural disasters, and 4 other emergencies. The same prioritization used for domestic CIKR protection is observed 5 to evaluate the risk arising from international linkages and CIKR located in foreign 6 countries. The priority for investment in protecting CIKR could be raised if international 7 linkages/location increase the risk. 8

1B.3.5 Implementing Programs 9 The primary responsibility for developing protective measures that address risks arising 10 from international factors belongs to the SSAs. In addition to sector protective measures, 11 DHS has specific programs to help enhance the cooperation and coordination needed to 12 address the unique challenges posed by the international aspects of CIKR protection: 13

International Outreach Program: DHS works in conjunction with DOS and with other 14 departments/agencies that have foreign affairs coordination responsibilities to conduct 15 international outreach with foreign countries and international organizations to 16 encourage the promotion and adoption of organizational and policymaking structures, 17 information-sharing mechanisms, industry partnerships, best practices, training, and 18 other programs as needed to improve the protection of overseas assets and the 19 reliability of foreign infrastructure on which the United States depends. 20

The National Cyber Response Coordination Group: The NCRCG facilitates coordination 21 of the Federal Government’s efforts to prepare for, respond to, and recover from cyber 22 incidents and physical attacks that have significant cyber consequences (collectively 23 known as cyber incidents). It serves as the Federal Government’s principal interagency 24 mechanism for operational information sharing and coordination of Federal 25 Government response and recovery efforts during a cyber incident. The NCRCG 26 considers and consults with international partners on a regular basis for routine 27 situational awareness and during incidents. NCRCG member agencies integrate their 28 capabilities to facilitate assessment of the domestic and international scope and severity 29 of a cyber incident. 30

The National Exercise Program: DHS provides overarching coordination for the 31 National Exercise Program to ensure the Nation’s readiness to respond in an all-32 hazards environment and to test the steady-state protection plans and programs put in 33 place by the NIPP. The exercise program, as appropriate, engages international 34 partners to address cooperation and cross-border issues, including those related to 35 CIKR protection. DHS and other CIKR partners also participate in exercises sponsored 36 by international partners, including cross-border, multi-sector tabletops. 37

National Cyber Exercises: DHS conducts exercises to identify, test, and improve 38 coordination of the cyber incident response community, including Federal, State, 39 territorial, local, tribal, and international government elements, as well as private 40 sector corporations and coordinating councils. 41

Because of the complex nature of the international dimension of CIKR, a substantial 42 emphasis is placed on best practices that can be used to improve cooperation and 43 coordination. To this end, DHS leads efforts to: 44

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Collaborate to establish best practices and successful protection measures, related to 1 telecommunications, air transportation systems, container shipping, cybersecurity, and 2 other global systems as appropriate; 3

Encourage the development and adoption of, and adherence to, standards of the 4 International Organization for Standards and similar organizations to help reduce 5 insurance premiums and level CIKR protection costs for businesses; and 6

Work with international partners to determine the appropriate threshold for 7 engagement with countries on cyber issues. 8

1B.3.6 Measuring Effectiveness and Making Improvements 9 The NIPP specifies three types of quantitative indicators to measure program effectiveness: 10

Descriptive Metrics are necessary to understand sector resources and activities; they 11 do not reflect CIKR protection performance; 12

Process Metrics measure whether specific activities were performed as planned; these 13 track the progression of a task or report on the completion of an enabling process (e.g., 14 forming a bilateral partnership); and 15

Outcome Metrics track progress toward a strategic goal by measuring beneficial 16 results rather than level of activity. 17

The NIPP also distinguishes between two groups of metrics: core metrics that enable 18 comparison and analysis between and among different sectors and sector-specific metrics 19 that are useful within a sector. 20

Because protective measures are designed, implemented, and evaluated through sector-21 specific mechanisms guided by the SSPs, they deal with the protection challenges that 22 impact a particular facility, network, or sector rather than international issues that may 23 affect protection measures. Conversely, most initiatives that address the international 24 issues affecting CIKR protection are enablers rather than protective measures themselves. 25 As a result, the metrics used to measure the effectiveness of international CIKR protection 26 initiatives are primarily process metrics in the core group of CIKR protection metrics. 27 These measure progress on tasks that enable CIKR protection in situations that have 28 international ramifications. 29

These metrics are used to manage the comprehensive international CIKR protection 30 strategy, which enables SSP protection initiatives, and to track progress toward the 31 strategy’s three goals: 32

Improving the effectiveness of international cooperation; 33 Implementing existing and developing new agreements that affect CIKR; and 34 Addressing cross-sector and global CIKR protection issues. 35

DHS, in cooperation with other Federal departments/agencies, develops the metrics to track 36 progress on international CIKR protection enablers. Examples of such metrics include: 37

The international issues being faced by each sector that affect multiple sectors, and 38 which issues are the most important; 39

The countries that should be involved in protection partnerships for each sector; 40 The number and type of bilateral and multinational agreements affecting CIKR 41

protection; 42

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The nature, level of implementation, and effectiveness of bilateral and multinational 1 agreements; 2

The sectors affected by each international partnership; 3 The number and type of outcomes enabled by an international initiative; and 4 Where possible, the specific CIKR protection enhancements that directly result from a 5

particular international initiative. 6 Once the core metrics have been developed and approved, DHS, the SSAs, and other CIKR 7 partners collaborate to establish a data-gathering and reporting process. This outlines, but 8 is not limited to, responsibilities; data collection, reporting procedures, and timeframes; 9 metrics calculation; and the schedule for computing and updating the metrics on a regular 10 basis. 11

1B.4 Organizing International CIKR Protection Cooperation 12

DHS, in conjunction with DOS and other Federal departments/agencies, works with 13 individual foreign governments, and regional and international organizations in 14 partnership to enhance the protection of the Nation’s CIKR and to deny the exploitation of 15 CIKR assets. Potential partnerships depend on: 16

Physical proximity to the United States or U.S. CIKR; 17 Useful experience and information to be gained from other countries; 18 Existing relationships, alliances, agreements, and high-level commitments; 19 Critical supply chains and vulnerable nodes; and 20 Interdependencies and networked technologies, and the need for a global “culture of 21

security” to protect CIKR. 22 As international CIKR protection partnerships mature, cooperative efforts strengthen in 23 two dimensions: 24

Development of new partnerships with countries possessing useful experience and 25 information regarding CIKR protective efforts, as well as terrorism prevention, 26 preparedness, response, and recovery; and 27

Development of new international relationships and institutions to protect global 28 infrastructure and address international interdependencies, networked technologies, 29 and the need for a global culture of physical and cybersecurity. 30

The coordination mechanisms supporting the NIPP create linkages between CIKR 31 protection efforts at the national, sector, State, regional, local, tribal, and international 32 levels. The entities and bodies that are involved with this coordination are diverse and 33 depend on the specifics of the issues they address, as well as other considerations as 34 discussed in the following subsections. 35

1B.4.1 Domestic Aspects of International CIKR Protection Cooperation 36 Interagency Coordination—DOS and DHS Leadership: DHS works with DOS, international 37 partners, and with U.S. entities involved with the international aspects of CIKR protection 38 to exchange experiences, share information, and develop a cooperative atmosphere to 39 materially improve U.S. CIKR protection, information sharing, cybersecurity, and global 40 telecommunications standards. DHS, DOS, other Federal departments/agencies and SSAs 41 work with specific countries to identify international interdependencies and vulnerabilities. 42

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SSAs consider such international factors as cross-border infrastructure, international 1 vulnerabilities, and global interdependencies in their SSPs. 2

Interagency Coordination—Review of Existing Mechanisms to Support the NIPP: The 3 International Affairs offices in Federal Government departments/agencies maintain 4 existing relationships with foreign counterpart ministries and agencies, and are the 5 primary partners with DOS in coordinating with foreign governments on international 6 CIKR matters. 7

DHS also works with SSAs to ensure that SSPs reflect international factors (e.g., cross-8 border infrastructure, international interdependencies, and global vulnerabilities). 9

1B.4.2 Foreign Aspects of International CIKR Protection 10 International cooperation on cybersecurity and other CIKR protection issues (e.g., energy 11 supplies) of a global nature is necessary because of the cross-border or borderless nature of 12 these infrastructures. These efforts require interaction on both the policy and the 13 operational levels and involve a broad range of entities from both the government and the 14 private sector. Interaction on the international aspects of CIKR protection takes place 15 bilaterally, regionally, and multilaterally: 16

Bilateral: DHS, in conjunction and consultation with DOS, participates in bilateral 17 discussions and programs with countries of interest where issues are best addressed on 18 a country-to-country basis. 19

Regional: DHS and DOS partner to provide leadership in regional groups (e.g., the OAS 20 and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), to raise awareness and develop cooperative 21 programs. The United States engages with Canada and Mexico, as regional neighbors, 22 on CIKR protection to enhance collaboration efforts. Current activities include the 23 North American Security and Prosperity Partnership ( SPP); the U.S.-Canada Critical 24 Infrastructure Protection Framework for Cooperation (Smart Border Action Plan); and 25 the U.S.-Mexico Critical Infrastructure Protection Framework for Cooperation (Border 26 Partnership Action Plan). 27

Multilateral: Multilateral collaboration on this aspect of CIKR involves initiatives on 28 the part of the G8 and the United Nations. For the cybersecurity aspects of global CIKR 29 protection, DHS has established a preliminary framework for cooperation on 30 cybersecurity policy, watch and warning, and incident response for CIKR with key allies 31 such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. DHS is coordinating 32 and participating in the establishment of an IWWN among cybersecurity policy, 33 computer emergency response, and law enforcement participants of 15 countries. The 34 IWWN provides a mechanism for the participating countries to share information to 35 build cyber situational awareness and coordinate incident response. 36

1B.4.3 Working With Specific Countries and International Organizations 37 DHS, SSAs, and other partners work with other countries to promote CIKR protection best 38 practices and they pursue infrastructure security through international/multilateral 39 organizations such as the G8, NATO, European Union, OAS, OSCE, OECD, and Asia-40 Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). The approach to working with some specific 41 countries and organizations is founded on formal agreements that address cooperation on 42 CIKR protection. 43

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Canada and Mexico: The CIKR relationships between the United States and its 1 immediate neighbors are closely interconnected and cover a wide range of sectors. 2 Electricity, natural gas, oil, telecommunications, roads, rail, food, water, minerals, and 3 finished products cross the borders on a regular basis as part of normal commerce. The 4 importance of this trade, and the infrastructure that supports it, was highlighted after 5 the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, nearly closed both borders. The United 6 States entered into the 2001 Smart Border Accord with Canada and the 2002 Border 7 Partnership Plan with Mexico, in part, to address bilateral CIKR issues. In addition, the 8 2005 SPP established a trilateral approach to common security issues. The SPP 9 complements, rather than replaces, existing agreements. 10

United Kingdom: The United Kingdom is a close ally with much experience in fighting 11 terrorism and protecting its CIKR. The United Kingdom developed substantial expertise 12 in law enforcement and intelligence systems, and in the protection of commercial 13 facilities based on its experience in countering terrorism. Like the United States, most 14 of the critical infrastructure in the United Kingdom is privately owned. The government 15 of the United Kingdom developed an effective, sophisticated system of managing public-16 private partnerships. DHS formed a JCG with the United Kingdom that brings officials 17 into regular, formal contact to discuss and resolve a range of bilateral homeland 18 security issues. 19

G8:Since September 11, the infrastructure in several G8 countries has been exploited 20 and used to inflict casualties and fear. As a result, G8 partners underscored their 21 determination to combat all forms of terrorism and to strengthen international 22 cooperation. Counterterrorism work is the focus of a number of initiatives launched at 23 G8 summits. For example, at their meeting in Gleneagles in Scotland, in July 2005, the 24 G8 heads of government issued a Statement on Counterterrorism. In it, they pledged to 25 “commit ourselves to new joint efforts. We will work to improve the sharing of 26 information on the movement of terrorists across international borders, to assess and 27 address the threat to the transportation infrastructure, and to promote best practices 28 for rail and metro security.” DHS works closely with the G8 to address the common 29 threats to CIKR and cyberspace. 30

European Union: The European Union is pursuing CIKR as a matter of policy, noting 31 that an effective strategy should focus on both preparedness and on consequence 32 management. DHS engages the European Union early in this process to share its 33 experience, and to further cooperate on characteristics and common vulnerabilities of 34 critical infrastructure and cyberspace, risk analysis techniques, and strategies to 35 mitigate risk and minimize consequences. 36

North Atlantic Treaty Organization: NATO addresses CIKR issues through the Senior 37 Civil Emergency Planning Committee, the senior policy and advisory body to the North 38 Atlantic Council on civil emergency planning and disaster relief matters. The committee 39 is responsible for policy direction and coordination of Planning Boards and Committees 40 in the NATO environment. It developed considerable expertise that applies to CIKR 41 protection and implemented planning boards and committees covering ocean shipping, 42 inland surface transport, civil aviation, food and agriculture, industrial preparedness, 43 civil communications planning, civil protection, and civil-military medical issues. DHS 44 provides a delegation to the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee at NATO, 45 participates in NATO’s telecommunications working group, and engages with NATO in 46 preparedness exercises. 47

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1B.4.4 Foreign Investment in U.S. CIKR 1 CIKR protection may be affected by foreign investment and ownership of sector assets. At 2 the Federal level, this issue is monitored by the CFIUS. The committee is chaired by the 3 Secretary of the Treasury, with membership including the Secretaries of State, Defense, 4 Commerce, and Homeland Security; the Attorney General; the Directors of the OMB and 5 the OSTP; the U.S. Trade Representative; the Chairman of the Council of Economic 6 Advisers; the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy; and the Assistant to the 7 President for National Security Affairs. 8

DHS has important responsibilities regarding various government commissions that 9 support the NIPP. These include: 10

As a member of the CFIUS, DHS examines the impact of proposed foreign investments 11 on CIKR protection. The committee coordinates the development and negotiation of 12 security agreements with foreign entities that may be necessary to manage the risk to 13 CIKR that a foreign investment may pose. DHS leads government monitoring activities 14 aimed at ensuring compliance with these agreements. 15

DHS acts as a partner with DOJ and other executive branch departments/agencies in 16 supporting executive branch reviews of applications to the FCC from foreign entities 17 pursuant to section 214 of the Communications Act of 1934 to assess if they pose any 18 threat to CIKR protection. 19

1B.4.5 Information Sharing 20 Effective international cooperation of CIKR protection requires a system for information 21 sharing that includes processes and protocols for updates among all partners, mechanisms 22 for systematic sharing of best practices, and frequent opportunities for partners to meet to 23 discuss and address international CIKR issues. 24

The NOC serves as the Nation’s hub for information sharing and situational awareness for 25 domestic incident management and is responsible for increasing coordination (through the 26 NICC) among those members of the international community who are involved because of 27 the role they play in enabling the protection of U.S. CIKR. 28

The HSIN supports ongoing information-sharing efforts by offering COIs for selected 29 international partners requiring close coordination with the NOC. 30

DHS also provides mechanisms (the US-CERT portal), to improve information sharing and 31 coordination among government communities and selected international partners for 32 cybersecurity. In addition, the Cybercop portal is a secure Internet-based information-33 sharing mechanism for law enforcement members involved in the field of electronic crimes 34 investigation. This secure, Internet-based collaborative tool links and supports the law 35 enforcement and investigative community worldwide, serving participants from more than 36 40 countries. 37

1B.5 Integration With Other Plans 38

The NIPP brings a new focus to international security cooperation and provides a risk-39 informed strategic framework for measuring the effectiveness of international activities. 40 The NIPP processes serve as management tools to assess international vulnerabilities and 41 interdependencies. The NIPP process complements long-standing cooperative agreements 42

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with Canada, Mexico, the United Kingdom, NATO, and others, and provides the framework 1 for collaborative engagement with additional international partners. 2

SSPs include descriptions of sector relationships and partner roles and responsibilities that 3 address international/multinational organizations and foreign governments. SSPs also 4 provide a comprehensive view of CIKR, including cross-sector dependencies and 5 interdependencies; international links; and cyber systems needed for the sector to function. 6

1B.6 Ensuring International Cooperation Over the Long Term 7

The effort to ensure a sustainable approach to addressing the international aspects of CIKR 8 protection over the long term requires special consideration in the following areas: 9

Awareness: Awareness of international aspects of CIKR protection issues helps ensure 10 implementation of effective, coordinated, and integrated CIKR protection measures and 11 enables CIKR partners to make informed decisions. Often these issues are not apparent 12 to those who can take the most effective action because of the complexity of the 13 international systems affecting CIKR protection. Awareness programs designed to 14 identify such issues and provide the common framework that allows these issues to be 15 effectively addressed by CIKR partners are required for continued support for protection 16 programs over the long term. 17

Training and Education: NIPP training topics for the managers and staff responsible 18 for CIKR that require emphasis include international considerations for CIKR 19 protection because of the complex considerations that often accompany international 20 linkages and initiatives. Because training and education programs can result in a 21 higher quality workforce for international partners, they provide benefits over entire 22 careers rather than on a one-time basis as direct aid to international partners often 23 does. In addition, DHS ensures the organizational and sector expertise needed to 24 implement the international aspects of the NIPP program over the long term is 25 developed and maintained through exercises that include adequate testing of 26 international CIKR protection measures and plans. 27

Research and Development: Cooperative and coordinated research efforts are one of the 28 most effective ways to improve protective capabilities or to dramatically lower the costs 29 of existing capabilities so that international CIKR partners can afford to do more with 30 their limited budgets. Techniques and designs developed through research can cost very 31 little to share with international CIKR partners and, although the lead times needed for 32 maturation of technology from the laboratory to the field can be decades, such 33 improvements can have wider applicability or much greater effectiveness than available 34 through current methods. 35

Plan Update: NIPP and SSP updates must reflect the current international situation 36 and must be coordinated, as required, with international agreements affecting CIKR 37 protection. 38

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Appendix 2: Authorities, Roles, and 1

Responsibilities 2

Appendix 2A: Summary of Relevant 3

Statutes, Strategies, and Directives 4 This summary provides additional information on a variety of statutes, strategies, and 5 directives referenced in chapters 2 and 5, as applicable to CIKR protection. This list is not 6 inclusive of all authorities related to CIKR protection; rather, it includes the authorities 7 most relevant to national-level, cross-sector CIKR protection. Please note that there are 8 many other authorities that are related to specific sectors that are not discussed in this 9 appendix; these are left for further elaboration in the SSPs. 10

2A.1 Statutes 11

Homeland Security Act of 200224 12

This act establishes a Cabinet-level department headed by a Secretary of Homeland 13 Security with the mandate and legal authority to protect the American people from the 14 continuing threat of terrorism. In the act, Congress assigns DHS the primary missions to: 15

Prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; 16 Reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism at home; 17 Minimize the damage and assist in the recovery from terrorist attacks that occur; and 18 Ensure that the overall economic security of the United States is not diminished by 19

efforts, activities, and programs aimed at securing the homeland. 20 This statutory authority defines the protection of CIKR as one of the primary missions of 21 the department. Among other actions, the act specifically requires DHS: 22

To carry out comprehensive assessments of the vulnerabilities of the CIKR of the 23 United States, including the performance of risk assessments to determine the risks 24 posed by particular types of terrorist attacks; 25

To develop a comprehensive national plan for securing the key resources and critical 26 infrastructure of the United States, including power production, generation, and 27 distribution systems; information technology and telecommunications systems 28 (including satellites); electronic financial and property record storage and transmission 29 systems; emergency preparedness communications systems; and the physical and 30 technological assets that support such systems; and 31

To recommend measures necessary to protect the CIKR of the United States in 32 coordination with other agencies of the Federal Government and in cooperation with 33 State and local government agencies and authorities, the private sector, and other 34 entities. 35

24Public Law 107-296, November 25, 2002, 116 Stat. 2135. It is coded at 6 U.S.C.

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Those requirements, combined with the President’s direction in HSPD-7, mandate the 1 unified approach to CIKR protection taken in the NIPP. 2

Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 200225 3

Enacted as part of the Homeland Security Act, this act creates a framework that enables 4 members of the private sector and others to voluntarily submit sensitive information 5 regarding the Nation’s CIKR to DHS with the assurance that the information, if it satisfies 6 certain requirements, will be protected from public disclosure. 7

The PCII Program, created under the authority of the act, is central to the information-8 sharing and protection strategy of the NIPP. By protecting sensitive information submitted 9 through the program, the private sector is assured that the information will remain secure 10 and only be used to further CIKR protection efforts.26 11

Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 12 This act requires the implementation of some of the recommendations made by the 9/11 13 Commission, to include requiring the Secretary of Homeland Security to: 1) establish 14 department-wide procedures to receive and analyze intelligence from State, local, and tribal 15 governments and the private sector; and 2) establish a system that screens 100 percent of 16 maritime and passenger cargo. 17

This Act establishes the International Border Community Interoperable Communications 18 Demonstration Project, to help identify and implement solutions to cross-border 19 communications and cooperation, and the Interagency Threat Assessment and 20 Coordination Group (ITACG), to improve interagency communications. The establishment 21 of ITACG Advisory Councils allows Federal agencies to set policies to improve 22 communication within the information-sharing environment and supports establishment of 23 an ITACG Detail that gives State, local, and tribal homeland security officials, law 24 enforcement officers, and intelligence analysts the opportunity to work in the National 25 Counterterrorism Center. 26

The Act also established grants to support high-risk urban areas and State, local, and tribal 27 governments in preventing, preparing for, protecting against, and responding to acts of 28 terrorism; and to assist States in carrying out initiatives to improve international 29 emergency communications. 30

National Strategy for Homeland Security (October 2007) 31 The updated strategy serves to guide, organize, and unify our Nation's homeland security 32 efforts. It is a national strategy – not a Federal strategy – that articulates the approach to 33 secure the homeland over the next several years. It builds on the first National Strategy for 34 Homeland Security, issued in July 2002, and complements both the National Security 35 Strategy issued in March 2006 and the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, issued 36 in September 2006. It reflects the increased understanding of threats confronting the 37 United States, incorporates lessons learned from exercises and real-world catastrophes, and 38 addresses ways to ensure long-term success by strengthening the homeland security 39 foundation that has been built. 40

25 The CII Act is presented as subtitle B of title II of the Homeland Security Act (sections 211-215) and is codified at 6 U.S.C. 131 et seq. 26 Procedures for Handling Critical Infrastructure Information, 68 Fed. Reg. 8079 (Feb. 20, 2004), are codified at 6 CFR Part 29.

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Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act)27 1

The Stafford Act provides comprehensive authority for response to emergencies and major 2 disasters—natural disasters, accidents, and intentionally perpetrated events. It provides 3 specific authority for the Federal Government to provide assistance to State and local 4 entities for disaster preparedness and mitigation, and major disaster and emergency 5 assistance. Major disaster and emergency assistance includes such resources and services 6 as: 7

The provision of Federal resources, in general; 8 Medicine, food, and other consumables; 9 Work and services to save lives and restore property, including: 10

Debris removal; 11 Search and rescue; emergency medical care; emergency mass care; emergency 12

shelter; and provision of food, water, medicine, and other essential needs, including 13 movement of supplies or persons; 14

Clearance of roads and construction of temporary bridges; 15 Provision of temporary facilities for schools and other essential community services; 16 Demolition of unsafe structures that endanger the public; 17 Warning of further risks and hazards; 18 Dissemination of public information and assistance regarding health and safety 19

measures; 20 Provision of technical advice to State and local governments on disaster 21

management and control; and 22 Reduction of immediate threats to life, property, and public health and safety; 23

Hazard mitigation; 24 Repair, replacement, and restoration of certain damaged facilities; and 25 Emergency communications, emergency transportation, and fire management 26

assistance. 27 Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 28 This act amends the Stafford Act by repealing the previous mitigation planning provisions 29 (section 409) and replacing them with a new set of requirements (section 322). This new 30 section emphasizes the need for State, Tribal, and local entities to closely coordinate 31 mitigation planning and implementation efforts. 32

Section 322 continues the requirement for a State mitigation plan as a condition of disaster 33 assistance, adding incentives for increased coordination and integration of mitigation 34 activities at the State level through the establishment of requirements for two different 35 levels of State plans—standard and enhanced. States that demonstrate an increased 36 commitment to comprehensive mitigation planning and implementation through the 37 development of an approved Enhanced State Plan can increase the amount of funding 38 available through the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP). Section 322 also 39 established a new requirement for local mitigation plans and authorized up to 7 percent of 40

27Public Law 93-288, as amended, codified at 42 U.S.C. 68.

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HMGP funds available to a State to be used for development of State, local, and tribal 1 mitigation plans. 2

Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002 (also known as the Sarbanes-Oxley 3 Act)28

4 The act applies to entities required to file periodic reports with the Securities and Exchange 5 Commission under the provisions of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. 6 It contains significant changes to the responsibilities of directors and officers, as well as the 7 reporting and corporate governance obligations of affected companies. Among other things, 8 the act requires certification by the company’s CEO and chief financial officer that 9 accompanies each periodic report filed that the report fully complies with the requirements 10 of the securities laws and that the information in the report fairly presents, in all material 11 respects, the financial condition and results of the operations of the company. It also 12 requires certifications regarding internal controls and material misstatements or omissions, 13 and the disclosure on a “rapid and current basis” of information regarding material changes 14 in the financial condition or operations of a public company. The act contains a number of 15 additional provisions dealing with insider accountability and disclosure obligations, and 16 auditor independence. It also provides severe criminal and civil penalties for violations of 17 the act’s provisions. 18

The Defense Production Act of 1950 and the Defense Production Reauthorization Act of 2003 19 This act provides the primary authority to ensure the timely availability of resources for 20 national defense and civil emergency preparedness and response. Among other powers, this 21 act authorizes the President to demand that companies accept and give priority to 22 government contracts that the President “deems necessary or appropriate to promote the 23 national defense,” and allocate materials, services, and facilities, as necessary, to promote 24 the national defense in a major national emergency. This act also authorizes loan 25 guarantees, direct loans, direct purchases, and purchase guarantees for those goods 26 necessary for national defense. It also allows the President to void international mergers 27 that would adversely affect national security. This act defines “national defense” to include 28 critical infrastructure protection and restoration, as well as activities authorized by the 29 emergency preparedness sections of the Stafford Act. Consequently, the authorities 30 stemming from the Defense Production Act are available for activities and measures 31 undertaken in preparation for, during, or following a natural disaster or accidental or 32 malicious event. Under the act and related Presidential orders, the Secretary of Homeland 33 Security has the authority to place and, upon application, authorize State and local 34 governments to place priority-rated contracts in support of Federal, State, and local emer-35 gency preparedness activities. The Defense Production Act has a national security nexus 36 with the NIPP. National emergencies related to CIKR may arise that require the President 37 to use his authority under the Defense Production Act. 38

The Freedom of Information Act29 39

This act generally provides that any person has a right, enforceable in court, to obtain 40 access to Federal agency records, except to the extent that such records are protected from 41 public disclosure by nine listed exemptions or under three law enforcement exclusions. 42

28Public Law 107-204, July 30, 2002. 29Codified as 5 U.S.C. 552.

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Persons who make requests are not required to identify themselves or explain the purpose 1 of the request. The underlying principle of FOIA is that the workings of government are for 2 and by the people and that the benefits of government information should be made broadly 3 available. All Federal Government agencies must adhere to the provisions of FOIA with 4 certain exceptions for work in progress, enforcement confidential information, classified 5 documents, and national security information. FOIA was amended by the Electronic 6 Freedom of Information Act Amendment of 1996. 7

Information Technology Management Reform Act of 199630 8

Under section 5131 of the Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996, NIST 9 develops standards, guidelines, and associated methods and techniques for Federal 10 computer systems. Federal Information Processing Standards are developed by NIST only 11 when there are no existing voluntary standards to address the Federal requirements for the 12 interoperability of different systems, the portability of data and software, and computer 13 security. 14

Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 199931 15

Among other things, this act (title V) provides limited privacy protections on the disclosure 16 by a financial institution of nonpublic personal information. The act also codifies 17 protections against the practice of obtaining personal information through false pretenses. 18

Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 200232 19

This act improves the ability of the United States to prevent, prepare for, and respond to 20 bioterrorism and other public health emergencies. Key provisions of the act, 42 U.S.C. 247d 21 and 300hh among others, address: (1) development of a national preparedness plan by HHS 22 that is designed to provide effective assistance to State and local governments in the event 23 of bioterrorism or other public health emergencies; (2) operation of the National Disaster 24 Medical System to mobilize and address public health emergencies; (3) grant programs for 25 the education and training of public health professionals and the improvement of State, 26 local, and hospital preparedness for and response to bioterrorism and other public health 27 emergencies; (4) streamlining and clarification of communicable disease quarantine 28 provisions; (5) enhancement of controls on dangerous biological agents and toxins; and (6) 29 protection of the safety and security of food and drug supplies. 30

Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 31 Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act)33

32 This act outlines the domestic policy related to deterring and punishing terrorists, and the 33 U.S. policy for CIKR protection. It also provides for the establishment of a national 34 competence for CIKR protection. The act establishes the NISAC and outlines the Federal 35 Government’s commitment to understanding and protecting the interdependencies among 36 critical infrastructure. 37

The Privacy Act of 197434 38

This act provides strict limits on the maintenance and disclosure by any Federal agency of 39 information on individuals that is maintained, including “education, financial transactions, 40 30Public Law 104-106. 31 Public Law 106-102 (1999), codified at 15 U.S.C. 94. 32Public Law 107-188. 33Public Law 107-56, October 26, 2001. 34Codified at 5 U.S.C. 552a.

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medical history, and criminal or employment history and that contains [the] name, or the 1 identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual, such 2 as a finger or voice print or a photograph.” Although there are specific categories for 3 permissible maintenance of records and limited exceptions to the prohibition on disclosure 4 for legitimate law enforcement and other specified purposes, the act requires strict 5 recordkeeping on any disclosure. The act also specifically provides for access by individuals 6 to their own records and for requesting corrections thereto. 7 Federal Information Security Management Act of 200235

8 This act requires that Federal agencies develop a comprehensive information technology 9 security program to ensure the effectiveness of information security controls over 10 information resources that support Federal operations and assets. This legislation is 11 relevant to the part of the NIPP that governs the protection of Federal assets and the 12 implementation of cyber-protective measures under the Government Facilities SSP. 13

Cyber Security Research and Development Act of 200236 14

This act allocates funding to NIST and the National Science Foundation for the purpose of 15 facilitating increased R&D for computer network security and supporting research 16 fellowships and training. The act establishes a means of enhancing basic R&D related to 17 improving the cybersecurity of CIKR. 18

Maritime Transportation Security Act of 200237 19

This act directs initial and continuing assessments of maritime facilities and vessels that 20 may be involved in a transportation security incident. It requires DHS to prepare a 21 National Maritime Transportation Security Plan for deterring and responding to a 22 transportation security incident and to prepare incident response plans for facilities and 23 vessels that will ensure effective coordination with Federal, State, and local authorities. It 24 also requires, among other actions, the establishment of transportation security and 25 crewmember identification cards and processes; maritime safety and security teams; port 26 security grants; and enhancements to maritime intelligence and matters dealing with 27 foreign ports and international cooperation. 28

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 200438 29

This act provides sweeping changes to the U.S. Intelligence Community structure and 30 processes, and creates new systems specially designed to combat terrorism. Among other 31 actions, the act: 32

Establishes a Director of National Intelligence with specific budget, oversight, and 33 programmatic authority over the Intelligence Community; 34

Establishes the National Intelligence Council and redefines “national intelligence”; 35 Requires the establishment of a secure ISE and an information-sharing council; 36 Establishes a National Counterterrorism Center, a National Counter Proliferation 37

Center, National Intelligence Centers, and a Joint Intelligence Community Council; 38 Establishes, within the Executive Office of the President, a Privacy and Civil Liberties 39

Oversight Board; 40 35Public Law 107-347, December 17, 2002. 36Public Law 107-305, November 27, 2002. 37Public Law 107-295, codified at 46 U.S.C. 701. 38Public Law 108-458.

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Requires the Director of the FBI to continue efforts to improve the intelligence 1 capabilities of the FBI and to develop and maintain, within the FBI, a national 2 intelligence workforce; 3

Directs improvements in security clearances and clearance processes; 4 Requires DHS to develop and implement a National Strategy for Transportation 5

Security and transportation modal security plans; enhance identification and 6 credentialing of transportation workers and law enforcement officers; conduct R&D into 7 mass identification technology, including biometrics; enhance passenger screening and 8 terrorist watch lists; improve measures for detecting weapons and explosives; improve 9 security related to the air transportation of cargo; and implement other aviation 10 security measures; 11

Directs enhancements to maritime security; 12 Directs enhancements in border security and immigration matters; 13 Enhances law enforcement authority and capabilities, and expands certain diplomatic, 14

foreign aid, and military authorities and capabilities for combating terrorism; 15 Requires expanded machine-readable visas with biometric data; implementation of a 16

biometric entry and exit system, and a registered traveler program; and implementation 17 of biometric or other secure passports; 18

Requires standards for birth certificates and driver’s licenses or personal identification 19 cards issued by States for use by Federal agencies for identification purposes, and 20 enhanced regulations for social security cards; 21

Requires DHS to improve preparedness nationally, especially measures to enhance 22 interoperable communications, and to report on vulnerability and risk assessments of 23 the Nation’s CIKR; and 24

Directs measures to improve assistance to and coordination with State, local, and 25 private sector entities. 26

2A.2 National Strategies 27

The National Strategy for Homeland Security (July 2002) 28 This strategy establishes the Nation’s strategic homeland security objectives and outlines 29 the six critical mission areas necessary to achieve those objectives. The strategy also 30 provides a framework to align the resources of the Federal budget directly to the task of 31 securing the homeland. The strategy specifies eight major initiatives to protect the Nation’s 32 CIKR, one of which specifically calls for the development of the NIPP. 33

National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets 34 (February 2003) 35 This strategy identifies the policy, goals, objectives, and principles for actions needed to 36 “secure the infrastructures and assets vital to national security, governance, public health 37 and safety, economy, and public confidence.” The strategy provides a unifying 38 organizational structure for CIKR protection and identifies specific initiatives related to the 39 NIPP to drive near-term national protection priorities and inform the resource allocation 40 process. 41

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National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (February 2003) 1 This strategy sets forth objectives and specific actions to prevent cyber attacks against 2 America’s CIKR, reduce nationally identified vulnerabilities to cyber attacks, and minimize 3 damage and recovery time from cyber attacks. The strategy provides the vision for 4 cybersecurity and serves as the foundation for the cybersecurity component of CIKR. 5

The National Strategy for Maritime Security (September 2005) 6 This strategy provides the framework to integrate and synchronize the existing 7 department-level strategies and ensure their effective and efficient implementation, and 8 aligns all Federal Government maritime security programs and initiatives into a 9 comprehensive and cohesive national effort involving appropriate Federal, State, local, and 10 private sector entities. 11

The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (December 2002) 12 This strategy provides policy guidance on combating WMD through three pillars: 13

Counter proliferation to combat WMD use; 14 Strengthened nonproliferation to combat WMD proliferation; and 15 Consequence management to respond to WMD use. 16

The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (February 2003) 17 This strategy provides a comprehensive overview of the terrorist threat and sets specific 18 goals and objectives to combat this threat, including measures to: 19

Defeat terrorists and their organizations; 20 Deny sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists; 21 Diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit; and 22 Defend U.S. citizens and interests at home and abroad. 23

The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America 24 The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America outlines the 25 fundamental values, priorities, and orientation of the Intelligence Community. As directed 26 by the Director of National Intelligence, the strategy outlines the specific mission objectives 27 that relate to efforts to predict, penetrate, and pre-empt threats to national security. To 28 accomplish this, the efforts of the different enterprises of the Intelligence Community are 29 integrated through policy, doctrine, and technology, and by ensuring that intelligence 30 efforts are appropriately coordinated with the Nation’s homeland security mission. 31

2A.3 Homeland Security Presidential Directives 32

HSPD-1: Organization and Operation of the Homeland Security Council (October 2001) 33 HSPD-1 establishes the Homeland Security Council and a committee structure for 34 developing, coordinating, and vetting homeland security policy among executive 35 departments and agencies. The directive provides a mandate for the Homeland Security 36 Council to ensure the coordination of all homeland security-related activities among 37 executive departments and agencies and promotes the effective development and 38 implementation of all homeland security policies. The Homeland Security Council is 39 responsible for arbitrating and coordinating any policy issues that may arise among the 40 different departments and agencies under the NIPP. 41

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HSPD-2: Combating Terrorism Through Immigration Policies (October 2001) 1 HSPD-2 establishes policies and programs to enhance the Federal Government’s 2 capabilities for preventing aliens who engage in or support terrorist activities from entering 3 the country, and for detaining, prosecuting, or deporting any such aliens who are in the 4 United States. 5

HSPD-2 also directs the Attorney General to create the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task 6 Force to ensure that, to the maximum extent permitted by law, Federal agencies coordinate 7 programs to accomplish the following: (1) deny entry into the United States of aliens 8 associated with, suspected of being engaged in, or supporting terrorist activity; and (2) 9 locate, detain, prosecute, or deport any such aliens already present in the United States. 10

HSPD-3: Homeland Security Advisory System (March 2002) 11 HSPD-3 mandates the creation of an alert system for disseminating information regarding 12 the risk of terrorist acts to Federal, State, and local authorities, and the public. It also 13 includes the requirement for a corresponding set of protective measures for Federal, State, 14 and local governments to be implemented, depending on the threat condition. Such a 15 system provides warnings in the form of a set of graduated threat conditions that are 16 elevated as the risk of the threat increases. For each threat condition, Federal departments 17 and agencies are required to implement a corresponding set of protective measures. 18

HSPD-4: National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (December 2002) 19 This directive outlines a strategy that includes three principal pillars: (1) Counter-20 Proliferation to Combat WMD Use, (2) Strengthened Nonproliferation to Combat WMD 21 Proliferation, and (3) Consequence Management to Respond to WMD Use. It also outlines 22 four cross-cutting functions to be pursued on a priority basis: (1) intelligence collection and 23 analysis on WMD, delivery systems, and related technologies; (2) R&D to improve our 24 ability to address evolving threats; (3) bilateral and multilateral cooperation; and (4) 25 targeted strategies against hostile nations and terrorists. 26

HSPD-5: Management of Domestic Incidents (February 2003) 27 HSPD-5 establishes a national approach to domestic incident management that ensures 28 effective coordination among all levels of government, and between the government and the 29 private sector. Central to this approach is the National Incident Management System 30 (NIMS), an organizational framework for all levels of government, and the National 31 Response Framework (NRF), an operational framework for national incident response. 32

In this directive, the President designates the Secretary of Homeland Security as the 33 principal Federal official for domestic incident management and empowers the Secretary to 34 coordinate Federal resources used for prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery 35 related to terrorist attacks, major disasters, or other emergencies. The directive assigns 36 specific responsibilities to the Attorney General, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, 37 and the Assistants to the President for Homeland Security and National Security Affairs, 38 and directs the heads of all Federal departments and agencies to provide their “full and 39 prompt cooperation, resources, and support,” as appropriate and consistent with their own 40 responsibilities for protecting national security, to the Secretary of Homeland Security, 41 Attorney General, Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of State in the exercise of leadership 42 responsibilities and missions assigned in HSPD-5. 43

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HSPD-6: Integration and Use of Screening Information (September 2003) 1 HSPD-6 consolidates the Federal Government’s approach to terrorist screening by 2 establishing a Terrorist Screening Center. Federal departments and agencies are directed 3 to provide terrorist information to the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, which is then 4 required to provide all relevant information and intelligence to the Terrorist Screening 5 Center. In order to protect against terrorism, this directive established the national policy 6 to: (1) develop, integrate, and maintain thorough, accurate, and current information about 7 individuals known or appropriately suspected to be or have been engaged in conduct 8 constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to terrorism (Terrorist Information); 9 and (2) use that information, as appropriate and to the full extent permitted by law, to 10 support (a) Federal, State, local, tribal, territorial, foreign government, and private sector 11 screening processes; and (b) diplomatic, military, intelligence, law enforcement, 12 immigration, visa, and protective processes. 13

HSPD-7: Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection (December 2003) 14 HSPD-7 establishes a framework for Federal departments and agencies to identify, 15 prioritize, and protect CIKR from terrorist attacks, with an emphasis on protecting against 16 catastrophic health effects and mass casualties. HSPD-7 mandates the creation and 17 implementation of the NIPP and sets forth roles and responsibilities for DHS; SSAs; other 18 Federal departments and agencies; and State, local, tribal, territorial, private sector, and 19 other CIKR partners. 20

HSPD-8: National Preparedness (December 2003) 21 HSPD-8 establishes policies to strengthen the preparedness of the United States to prevent, 22 protect, respond to, and recover from threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks, major 23 disasters, and other emergencies by requiring a national domestic all-hazards preparedness 24 goal; establishing mechanisms for improved delivery of Federal preparedness assistance to 25 State and local governments; and outlining actions to strengthen the preparedness 26 capabilities of Federal, State, and local entities. This directive mandates the development of 27 the goal to guide emergency preparedness training, planning, equipment, and exercises, 28 and to ensure that all entities involved adhere to the same standards. The directive calls for 29 an inventory of Federal response capabilities and refines the process by which preparedness 30 grants are administered, disbursed, and utilized at the State and local levels. 31

HSPD-9: Defense of United States Agriculture and Food (January 2004) 32 HSPD-9 establishes an integrated national policy for improving intelligence operations, 33 emergency response capabilities, information-sharing mechanisms, mitigation strategies, 34 and sector vulnerability assessments to defend the agriculture and food system against 35 terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. 36

HSPD-10: Biodefense for the 21st Century (April 2004) 37 HSPD-10 outlines the essential pillars of our national biodefense program as threat 38 awareness, prevention and protection, surveillance and detection, and response and 39 recovery. This directive describes these various disciplines in detail and sets forth objectives 40 for further progress under the national biodefense program, highlighting key roles for 41 Federal departments and agencies. The Secretary of Homeland Security is responsible for 42 coordinating domestic Federal operations to prepare for, respond to, and recover from 43 biological weapons attacks. 44

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HSPD-11: Comprehensive Terrorist-Related Screening Procedures (August 2004) 1 HSPD-11 requires the creation of a strategy and implementation plan for a coordinated and 2 comprehensive approach to terrorist screening to improve and expand procedures to screen 3 people, cargo, conveyances, and other entities and objects that pose a threat. 4

HSPD-12: Policy for a Common Identification for Federal Employees and Contractors (August 5 2004) 6 HSPD-12 establishes a mandatory, government-wide standard for secure and reliable forms 7 of identification issued by the Federal Government to its employees and contractors to 8 enhance security, increase government efficiency, reduce identity fraud, and protect 9 personal privacy. The resulting mandatory standard was issued by NIST as the Federal 10 Information Processing Standard Publication. 11

HSPD-13: Maritime Security Policy (December 2004) 12 HSPD-13 directs the coordination of U.S. Government maritime security programs and 13 initiatives to achieve a comprehensive and cohesive national effort involving the 14 appropriate Federal, State, local, and private sector entities. The directive also establishes 15 a Maritime Security Policy Coordinating Committee to coordinate interagency maritime 16 security policy efforts. 17

HSPD-14: Domestic Nuclear Detection (April 2005) 18 HSPD-14 establishes the effective integration of nuclear and radiological detection 19 capabilities across Federal, State, local, and tribal governments and the private sector for a 20 managed, coordinated response. This directive supports and enhances the effective sharing 21 and use of appropriate information generated by the intelligence community, law 22 enforcement agencies, counterterrorism community, other government agencies, and 23 foreign governments, as well as providing appropriate information to these entities. 24

HSPD-15: War on Terror (March 2006) 25 HSPD-15 is classified but the objective of the directive is to improve government 26 coordination in the global war on terror. 27

HSPD-16: Aviation Security Policy (June 2006) 28 HSPD-16 details a strategic vision for aviation security while recognizing ongoing efforts, 29 and directs the production of a National Strategy for Aviation Security and supporting 30 plans. The supporting plans address the following areas: aviation transportation system 31 security; aviation operational threat response; aviation transportation system recovery; air 32 domain surveillance and intelligence integration; domestic outreach; and international 33 outreach. The Strategy sets forth U.S. Government agency roles and responsibilities, 34 establishes planning and operations coordination requirements, and builds on current 35 strategies, tools, and resources. 36

HSPD-17: Nuclear Materials Information Program (August 2006) 37 The contents of HSPD-17 are classified. The directive addresses an interagency effort 38 managed by the Department of Energy to consolidate information from all sources 39 pertaining to worldwide nuclear materials holdings and their security status into an 40 integrated and continuously updated information management system. 41

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HSPD-18: Medical Countermeasures against Weapons of Mass Destruction (January 2007) 1 HSPD-18 builds upon the vision and objectives articulated in the National Strategy 2 to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction and Biodefense for the 21st Century to ensure 3 that the Nation's medical countermeasure research, development, and acquisition efforts 4 target threats for catastrophic impact on public health; yield a rapidly deployable and 5 flexible capability to address existing and evolving threats; are part of an integrated WMD 6 consequence management approach; and include the development of effective, feasible, and 7 pragmatic concepts of operation for responding to and recovering from an attack. The 8 directive designates the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a strategic, integrated 9 all-CBRN risk assessment that integrates the findings of the intelligence and law 10 enforcement communities with input from the scientific, medical, and public health 11 communities. 12

HSPD-19: Combating Terrorist Use of Explosives in the United States (February 2007) 13 HSPD-19 establishes a national policy, and calls for the development of a national strategy 14 and implementation plan, on the prevention and detection of, protection against, and 15 response to terrorist use of explosives in the United States. This directive mandates that 16 the Secretary of Homeland Security coordinate with other Federal agencies to maintain 17 secure information-sharing systems available to law enforcement agencies and other first 18 responders, to include best practices to enhance preparedness across the government. The 19 Secretary of Homeland Security is also responsible, in coordination with other Federal 20 agencies, for Federal Government research, development, testing, and evaluation activities 21 related to explosives attacks and the development of explosive render-safe tools 22 and technologies. 23

HSPD-20: National Continuity Policy (May 2007) 24 HSPD-20 establishes a comprehensive national policy on the continuity of Federal 25 Government structures and operations and designates a single National Continuity 26 Coordinator responsible for leading the development and implementation of Federal 27 continuity policies. This policy establishes "National Essential Functions;" prescribes 28 continuity requirements for all executive departments and agencies; and provides guidance 29 for State, local, tribal, and territorial governments, and private sector organizations. This 30 directive aims to ensure a comprehensive and integrated national continuity program that 31 will enhance the credibility of our national security posture and enable a more rapid and 32 effective response to and recovery from a national emergency. 33

HSPD-21: Public Health and Medical Preparedness (October 2007) 34 HSPD-21 establishes a National Strategy for Public Health and Medical Preparedness. The 35 Strategy draws key principles from the National Strategy for Homeland Security (October 36 2007), the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (December 2002), 37 and Biodefense for the 21st Century (April 2004) that can be generally applied to public 38 health and medical preparedness. Implementation of this strategy will transform our 39 national approach to protecting the health of the American people against all disasters. 40

HSPD-23: Cyber Security and Monitoring (January 2008) 41 The contents of HSPD-23 are classified. The directive establishes a task force, headed by 42 the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, to identify the sources of cyber attacks 43 against government computer systems. The Department of Homeland Security will work to 44

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protect the systems and the Department of Defense will devise strategies for counterattacks 1 against intruders. 2

HSPD-24: Biometrics for Identification and Screening to Enhance National Security (June 3 2008) 4 HSPD-24 establishes a framework to ensure that Federal executive departments and 5 agencies use mutually compatible methods and procedures in the collection, storage, use, 6 analysis, and sharing of biometric and associated biographic and contextual information of 7 individuals in a lawful and appropriate manner, while respecting their information privacy 8 and other legal rights under U.S. law. 9

2A.4 Other Authorities 10

Executive Order 13231, Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age (October 11 2001) (amended by E.O. 13286, February 28, 2003) 12 This Executive order provides specific policy direction to ensure protection of information 13 systems for critical infrastructure, including emergency preparedness communications, and 14 the physical assets that support such systems. It recognizes the important role that 15 networked information systems (critical information infrastructure) play in supporting all 16 aspects of our civil society and economy and the increasing degree to which other critical 17 infrastructure sectors have become dependent upon such systems. It formally establishes as 18 U.S. policy the need to protect against disruption of the operation of these systems and to 19 ensure that any disruptions that do occur are infrequent, of minimal duration, manageable, 20 and cause the least damage possible. The Executive order specifically calls for the 21 implementation of the policy to include “a voluntary public-private partnership, involving 22 corporate and nongovernmental organizations.” The Executive order also reaffirms existing 23 authorities and responsibilities assigned to various executive branch agencies and 24 interagency committees to ensure the security and integrity of Federal information systems 25 generally and of national security information systems in particular. 26

National Infrastructure Advisory Council 27 In addition to the foregoing, Executive Order 13231 (as amended by E.O. 13286 of February 28 28, 2003, and E.O. 13385 of September 29, 2005) also established the NIAC as the 29 President’s principal advisory panel on critical infrastructure protection issues spanning all 30 sectors. The NIAC is composed of not more than 30 members, appointed by the President, 31 who are selected from the private sector, academia, and State and local government, 32 representing senior executive leadership expertise from the critical infrastructure and key 33 resource areas as delineated in HSPD-7. 34

The NIAC provides the President, through the Secretary of Homeland Security, with advice 35 on the security of critical infrastructure, both physical and cyber, supporting important 36 sectors of the economy. It also has the authority to provide advice directly to the heads of 37 other departments that have shared responsibility for critical infrastructure protection, 38 including HHS, DOT, and DOE. The NIAC is charged to improve the cooperation and 39 partnership between the public and private sectors in securing critical infrastructure and 40 advises on policies and strategies that range from risk assessment and management, to 41 information sharing, to protective strategies and clarification on roles and responsibilities 42 between public and private sectors. 43

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Executive Order 12382, President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory 1 Committee (amended by E.O. 13286, February 28, 2003) 2 This Executive order creates the NSTAC, which provides to the President, through the 3 Secretary of Homeland Security, information and advice from the perspective of the 4 telecommunications industry with respect to the implementation of the National Security 5 Telecommunications Policy. 6

Executive Order 12472, Assignment of National Security and Emergency Preparedness 7 Telecommunications Functions (amended by E.O. 13286, February 28, 2003) 8 Executive Order 12472 assigns NS/EP telecommunications functions, including wartime 9 and non-wartime emergency functions, to the National Security Council, OSTP, Homeland 10 Security Council, OMB, and other Federal agencies. The Executive order seeks to ensure 11 that the Federal Government has telecommunications services that will function under all 12 conditions, including emergency situations. This Executive order establishes the NCS with 13 the mission to assist the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security 14 Council, the Director of OSTP, and the Director of the OMB in: (1) the exercise of 15 telecommunications functions and responsibilities set forth in the Executive Order; and (2) 16 the coordination of planning for and provision of NS/EP communications for the Federal 17 Government under all circumstances, including crisis or emergency, attack, recovery, and 18 reconstitution. 19

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Appendix 2B: NIPP Implementation 1

Initiatives and Actions 2 3 [Note: NIPP implementation initiatives and actions are now captured in the National and 4 Sector Annual CIKR Protection Reports. The National CIKR Protection Annual Report 5 includes annual reports from the SLTT and RCCC. Since all of these reports are prepared 6 each year, they are more amenable to being kept current. Detailed implementation actions 7 can also be found in each of the Sector-Specific Plans. As a result, this appendix is being 8 removed from the NIPP.] 9

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Appendix 3: The Protection Program 1

Appendix 3A: Risk Assessment Essential 2

Features and Core Elements 3 The essential features and core elements of a risk assessment identify the characteristics 4 and information needed to produce results that can contribute to cross-sector risk 5 comparisons. This Appendix provides a guide for modifying existing methodologies so the 6 investment and expertise they represent can be used to support national-level comparative 7 risk assessment, investments, incident response planning, and resource prioritization. This 8 Appendix is a checklist summary of information provided in Section 3.3 of the NIPP which 9 can be referenced for further detail on these topics. 10

Many stakeholders conduct risk assessments to meet their own decision needs. 11 Independent risk management may not require the essential features and core elements 12 specified here. Whenever possible, however, DHS seeks to use information from 13 stakeholders’ assessments to contribute to an understanding of risks across sectors and 14 regions throughout the Nation. To do this consistently, the challenge of minimizing 15 disparity of approaches must be addressed. Some of the essential features and core 16 elements apply to the methodologies themselves, while others are addressed in the process 17 of conducting an assessment. 18

Essential Features: 19 Documented: The methodology and the assessment must clearly document what 20

information is used and how it is synthesized to generate a risk estimate. Any 21 assumptions, weighting factors and subjective judgments need to be clear to the user of 22 the methodology, its audience, and others who are expected to use the results. A 23 description should be provided of the decisions the risk assessment is designed to 24 support and the timeframe (e.g., current, next year, next 5 years) considered in the 25 assessment. 26

Objective: The methodology must produce comparable, repeatable results, even 27 though assessments of different CIKR will be performed by different analysts or teams 28 of analysts. It must minimize the number and impact of subjective judgments, leaving 29 policy and value judgments to be applied by decision makers. 30

Defensible: The risk methodology must be technically sound, making appropriate use 31 of the professional disciplines relevant to the analysis, as well as be free from significant 32 errors or omissions. The uncertainty associated with consequence estimates and 33 confidence in the vulnerability and threat estimates must be communicated. 34

Complete: The methodology must assess consequence, vulnerability and threat for 35 every defined scenario and include the specific Core Elements for each. 36

Core Elements: 37 Consequence Assessment 38 Document the scenarios assessed, tools used, and any key assumptions made 39 Estimate fatalities, injuries, and illnesses (where applicable and feasible) 40 Assess psychological impacts and mission disruption where feasible 41

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Estimate the economic loss in dollars, stating which costs are included and what 1 duration was considered 2

If monetizing human health consequences, document the value(s) used and assumptions 3 made 4

Consider and document any protective or consequence mitigation measures that have 5 their effect after the incident has occurred such as the rerouting of systems or HAZMAT 6 or fire and rescue response 7

Vulnerability Assessment 8 Identify vulnerabilities associated with physical, cyber, or human factors (openness to 9

both insider and outsider threats), critical dependencies, and physical proximity to 10 hazards. Collect sufficient information to form an estimate for each attack scenario 11

Account for the protective measures in place and how they reduce the vulnerability for 12 each attack type 13

In evaluating security vulnerabilities, estimate the relative strength of collective 14 protective measures 15

In evaluating security vulnerabilities, develop estimates of the likelihood of adversaries’ 16 success for each attack scenario 17

Threat Assessment 18 For adversary-specific threat assessments: 19

Account for the access to the target and the opportunity to attack it 20 Identify attack methods that may be employed 21 Consider the level of capability that an adversary demonstrates for an attack 22

method 23 Consider the degree of the adversaries’ intent to attack the target 24 Estimate threat as the likelihood that the adversary would attempt a given attack 25

method at the target 26 For natural disasters and accidental hazards: 27

Use best-available analytic tools and historical data to estimate the likelihood of 28 these events affecting CIKR 29

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Appendix 3B: Existing Protective 1

Programs and Other In-Place Measures 2 This appendix provides examples of the Federal protective programs that currently support 3 NIPP implementation. The examples provided herein generally cut across sectors and have 4 national significance. These Federal programs augment the extensive State, local, tribal, 5 territorial, and private sector protective programs that constitute important efforts already 6 being implemented in support of the NIPP. The SSPs address sector-specific programs that 7 are conducted under the leadership of the SSAs, and include selected protection programs 8 undertaken by other CIKR partners that apply broadly across the sector. 9

3B.1 Protective Programs and Initiatives 10

Site Assistance Visits: SAVs are facility vulnerability assessments jointly conducted by DHS 11 in coordination and collaboration with Federal, State, local stakeholders and CIKR owners 12 and operators. The SAV uses a hybrid methodology of dynamic and static vulnerabilities 13 including elements of asset-based approaches (identifying and discussing critical site assets 14 and current CIKR protection postures) and scenario-based approaches (assault planning 15 and likely attack scenarios to ensure current threats are included). Through SAVs, DHS 16 informs CIKR owners and operators of vulnerabilities and provides recommended 17 protective measures that would increase the ability to detect and prevent terrorist attacks, 18 and provides recommendations for reducing vulnerabilities. An SAV can range from a 19 “quick visit” to a full security vulnerability assessment; three to five days to 20 comprehensively assess physical, cyber, and system interdependencies. An SAV identifies 21 consequence and vulnerability information that supports risk analyses. 22

Buffer Zone Protection Program: The BZPP is a DHS-administered grant program designed 23 to support local law enforcement (LLE) and owners and operators of CIKR increase security 24 in the “buffer zone” – the area outside of a facility that can be used by an adversary to 25 conduct surveillance or launch an attack. The Buffer Zone Plan (BZP) is a strategic 26 document developed by the responsible jurisdictions that: identifies significant assets at the 27 site that may be targeted by terrorists; identifies specific threats and vulnerabilities 28 associated with the site and its significant assets; and develops an appropriate buffer zone 29 extending outward from the facility in which protective measures can be employed to make 30 it more difficult for terrorists to conduct site surveillance or launch attacks. 31

Comprehensive Reviews: The Comprehensive Review (CR) is a cooperative government– led 32 analysis of Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR) facilities. The CR considers 33 not only potential terrorist methods of attack, the consequences of such an attack, the 34 integrated preparedness and response capabilities of the owner/operator, local law 35 enforcement (LLE), and emergency response organizations; but also preparedness and 36 response for a natural disaster. The results are used to enhance the overall security and 37 preparedness posture of the facilities, their surrounding communities, the geographic 38 region, and ultimately the nation. The CR provides a forum for candid and open dialogue 39 among all levels of the government and private sector. The CR incorporates a variety of 40 assessment and exercise tools. Information obtained from the CR is used not only to 41 enhance the capabilities of CIKR owner/operators and community first responders, but also 42 to provide risk data to inform Federal investment and research and development decisions. 43

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Characteristics and Common Vulnerabilities (CV), Potential Indicators of Terrorist Activity 1 (PI), and Protective Measures (PM) Reports: These reports identify common vulnerabilities 2 of critical infrastructure, site-specific vulnerabilities, and the types of terrorist activities 3 that likely would be successful in exploiting these vulnerabilities. The VAB has developed 4 Integrated Infrastructure Papers (IIPs) that integrate these reports, which are currently 5 available to over 500 Federal, State, local and private sector partners on a secure website. 6

Computer-Based Assessment Tool (C-BAT): The Computer-Based Assessment Tool (CBAT) 7 is an extension of the technical assistance provided for the DHS’s SAV Program and BZPP, 8 and in support of national and special events. CBAT comprises technology and services 9 that help DHS, owners and operators, local law enforcement, and emergency personnel 10 prepare for, respond to, and manage CIKR and special events. By integrating SAV and 11 BZPP assessment data with geospherical video and geospatial and hypermedia data, CBAT 12 provides planners with a computer-based, cross-platform tool that allows them to present 13 data, make informed decisions quickly, and confidently respond to an incident. The “video 14 walkthrough” of the facility or perimeter provided by CBAT also affords emergency 15 response personnel a first-hand view of what they will encounter. The camera system 16 combines six individual, high-resolution cameras that provide a 360-degree spherical color 17 video of facilities, routes, and specific areas pertaining to a CBAT request. 18

Control Systems Security Initiative: DHS sponsors programs to increase the security of 19 control systems. A control system is an interconnection of components (designed to 20 maintain operation of a process or system) connected or related in such a manner as to 21 command, monitor, direct, or regulate itself or another system. Control systems are 22 embedded throughout the Nation’s CIKR and may be vulnerable to increasing cyber threats 23 that could have a devastating impact on national security, economic security, public health 24 and safety, and the environment. The DHS Control Systems Security Initiative provides 25 coordination among Federal, State, local, and tribal governments, as well as control system 26 owners, operators, and vendors to improve control system security within and across all 27 CIKR sectors. 28

Federal Cyber System Security Programs: DHS established the GFIRST to facilitate 29 interagency information sharing and cooperation across Federal agencies responsible for 30 cyber system readiness and response. The members work together to understand and 31 manage computer security incidents and to encourage proactive and preventive security 32 practices. Other examples of Federal agency cybersecurity access control, certification, and 33 policy enforcement tools include: 34

The General Services Administration (GSA) is responsible for developing and 35 implementing an infrastructure for authentication services, as well as an automated 36 risk assessment tool for government-wide use in certifying and accrediting its 37 eAuthentication gateway. GSA is creating a list of approved solution providers that 38 supply smart cards based on Federal Public Key Infrastructure standards and that 39 include a new electronic authentication policy specification. 40

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency has implemented enterprise-wide 41 vulnerability assessments and virus-detection software, an intrusion-detection system, 42 anti-virus scanning gateways, and a patch management policy. 43

Federal Hazard Mitigation Programs: FEMA administers three programs that provide 44 funds for activities that reduce losses from future disasters or help prevent the occurrence 45 of catastrophes. These hazard mitigation programs include the Flood Mitigation Assistance 46

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Program, the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, and the Pre-Disaster Mitigation Program. 1 These programs enable grant recipients to undertake activities such as the elevation of 2 structures in floodplains, relocation of structures from floodplains, construction of 3 structural enhancements to facilities and buildings in earthquake-prone areas (also known 4 as retrofitting), and modifications to land-use plans to ensure that future construction 5 ameliorates, and does not exacerbate, hazardous conditions. 6

International Outreach Program: DHS works with the Department of State and other CIKR 7 partners to conduct international outreach with foreign countries and international 8 organizations to encourage the promotion and adoption of best practices, training, and 9 other programs, as needed, to improve the protection of overseas assets and the reliability 10 of the foreign infrastructure on which the United States depends. 11

National Cyber Exercises: DHS conducts exercises to identify, test, and improve 12 coordination of the cyber incident response community, including Federal, State, territorial, 13 local, tribal, and international government elements, as well as private sector corporations 14 and coordinating councils. 15

National Cyber Response Coordination Group: This entity facilitates coordination of the 16 Federal Government’s efforts to prepare for, respond to, and recover from cyber incidents 17 and physical attacks that have significant cyber consequences (collectively known as cyber 18 incidents). The NCRCG serves as the Federal Government’s principal interagency 19 mechanism for operational information sharing and coordination of the Federal 20 Government’s response and recovery efforts during a cyber crisis. It uses established 21 relationships with the private sector and State and local governments to help manage a 22 cyber crisis, develop courses of action, and devise appropriate response and recovery 23 strategies. 24

Protective Community Support Program: Specific advisory support is provided to the 25 protective community (e.g., law enforcement, first-responders), including training and 26 exercise support. 27

Protective Security Advisor Program: DHS protection specialists are assigned as liaisons 28 between DHS and the protective community at the State, local, and private sector levels in 29 geographical areas representing major concentrations of CIKR across the United States. 30 The PSAs are responsible for sharing risk information and providing technical assistance to 31 local law enforcement and CIKR owners and operators of CIKR within those areas. 32

Software Assurance: DHS is developing best practices and new technologies to promote 33 integrity, security, and reliability in software development. Focused on shifting away from 34 the current security paradigm of patch management, DHS is leading the Software 35 Assurance Program, a comprehensive strategy that addresses processes, technology, and 36 acquisition throughout the software life cycle to result in secure and reliable software that 37 supports critical mission requirements. 38

Training Programs: DHS training programs are designed to provide CIKR partners with a 39 source from which they can obtain specialized training to enhance CIKR protection. Subject 40 matter, course length, and location of training can be tailored to specific partner needs. 41

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3B.2 Guidelines, Reports, and Planning 1

Cybersecurity Planning: DHS recognizes that each sector will have a unique reliance on 2 cyber systems and will, therefore, assist SSAs in considering a range of effective and 3 appropriate cyber protective measures. The sector-level approaches to cybersecurity will be 4 documented in the respective SSPs. 5

Educational Reports: DHS provides several types of informational reports to support efforts 6 to protect CIKR. They cover subjects such as CIKR common vulnerabilities, potential 7 indicators of terrorist activity, and best practices for protective measures. As they are 8 developed, these reports are distributed to all State and territorial Homeland Security 9 Offices with the guidance that they should be shared with CIKR owners and operators, the 10 law enforcement community, and captains of the ports in their respective jurisdictions. 11

Risk Management Manuals: In response to the September 11, 2001, attacks, FEMA’s role 12 was expanded to include activities to reduce the vulnerability of buildings to terrorist 13 attacks. In support of this, FEMA created the Risk Management Series, a collection of 14 publications directed at providing design guidance to mitigate the consequences of 15 manmade disasters. 16

To date, the series includes the following manuals: 17

FEMA 155, Building Design for Homeland Security 18 FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings 19 FEMA 427, Primer for Design of Commercial Buildings to Mitigate Terrorist Attacks 20 FEMA 428, Primer to Design Safe School Projects in Case of Terrorist Attacks 21 FEMA 429, Insurance, Finance, and Regulation Primer for Terrorism Risk Management 22

in Buildings 23 FEMA 430, Primer for Incorporating Building Security Components in Architectural 24

Design 25 FEMA 452, Risk Assessment: A How-To Guide to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks 26

Against Buildings 27 FEMA 453, Multihazard Shelter (Safe Havens) Design 28

3B.3 Information-Sharing Programs That Support CIKR Protection 29

Federal agencies and the law enforcement community provide information-sharing services 30 and programs that support CIKR protection information sharing. These include: 31

DHS Homeland Security Information Network: HSIN is a national, Web-based 32 communications platform that allows DHS; SSAs; State, local, tribal, and territorial 33 government entities; and other partners to obtain, analyze, and share information based 34 on a common operating picture of strategic risk and the evolving incident landscape. 35 The network is designed to provide a robust, dynamic information-sharing capability 36 that supports both NIPP-related steady-state CIKR protection and NRF-related 37 incident management activities, and to provide the information-sharing processes that 38 form the bridge between these two homeland security missions. HSIN will be one part of 39 the ISE called for by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004; as 40 specified in the act, it will provide users with access to terrorism information that is 41

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matched to their roles, responsibilities, and missions in a timely and responsive 1 manner. HSIN is discussed in detail in chapter 4. 2

FBI’s InfraGard: InfraGard is an information-sharing and analysis effort serving the 3 interests and combining the knowledge base of a wide range of members. At its most 4 basic level, InfraGard is a partnership between the FBI and the private sector. 5 InfraGard is an association of businesses, academic institutions, State and local law 6 enforcement agencies, and other participants dedicated to sharing information and 7 intelligence related to the protection of U.S. CIKR from both physical and cyber threats. 8 InfraGard chapters are geographically linked with FBI Field Office territories. Each 9 InfraGard chapter has an FBI Special Agent Coordinator who works closely with 10 Supervisory Special Agent Program Managers in the Cyber Division at FBI 11 Headquarters. 12

Interagency Cybersecurity Efforts: Interagency cooperation and information sharing are 13 essential to improving national counterintelligence and law enforcement capabilities 14 pertaining to cybersecurity. The intelligence and law enforcement communities have 15 various official and unofficial information-sharing mechanisms in place. Examples 16 include: 17

U.S. Secret Service’s Electronic Crimes Task Forces: U.S. Secret Service’s ECTFs 18 provide interagency coordination on cyber-based attacks and intrusions. At present, 19 15 ECTFs are in operation, with an expansion planned. 20

FBI’s Inter-Agency Coordination Cell: The Inter-Agency Coordination Cell is a 21 multi-agency group focused on sharing law enforcement information on cyber-22 related investigations. 23

Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section: DOJ, Criminal Division, 24 Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section is responsible for prosecuting 25 nationally significant cases of cyber crime and intellectual property crime. In 26 addition to its direct litigation responsibilities, the division formulates and 27 implements criminal enforcement policy and provides advice and assistance. 28

Cybercop Portal: The DHS-sponsored Cybercop portal is a secure Internet-based 29 information-sharing mechanism that connects more than 5,300 members of the law 30 enforcement community worldwide (including bank investigators and the network 31 security community) involved in electronic crimes investigations. 32

Law Enforcement Online: The FBI provides LEO as national focal point for electronic 33 communications, education, and information sharing for the law enforcement 34 community. LEO, which can be accessed by any approved employee of a Federal, State, 35 or local law enforcement agency, or approved member of an authorized law enforcement 36 special interest group, is intended to provide a communications mechanism to link all 37 levels of law enforcement throughout the United States. 38

Regional Information Sharing Systems: The RISS Program is a federally funded 39 program administered by DOJ, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice 40 Assistance. RISS serves more than 7,300 member law enforcement agencies in 50 41 States, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Australia, 42 Canada, and the United Kingdom. The program is comprised of six regional centers that 43 share intelligence and coordinate efforts against criminal networks that operate in 44 many locations across jurisdictional lines. Typical targets of RISS activities are 45 terrorism, drug trafficking, violent crime, cyber crime, gang activity, and organized 46 criminal activities. The majority of the member agencies are at the municipal and 47

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county levels; however, more than 485 State agencies and more than 920 Federal 1 agencies also participate. The Drug Enforcement Administration; FBI; U.S. Attorneys’ 2 Offices; Internal Revenue Service; Secret Service; U.S. Immigration and Customs 3 Enforcement; and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives are among 4 the Federal agencies participating in the RISS Program. 5

Sharing National Security Information: The ability to share relevant classified 6 information poses a number of challenges, particularly when the majority of industry 7 facilities are neither designed for nor accredited to receive, store, and dispose of these 8 materials. Ultimately, HSIN may be used to more efficiently share appropriate 9 classified national security information with cleared private sector owners and 10 operators during incidents, times of heightened threat, or on an as-needed basis. While 11 supporting technologies and policies are identified to satisfy this requirement, DHS will 12 continue to expand its initiative to sponsor security clearances for designated private 13 sector owners and operators, sharing classified information using currently available 14 methods. 15

Web-Based Services for Citizens: A variety of Web-based information services are 16 available to enhance the general awareness and preparedness of American citizens. 17 These include CitizenCorps.gov, FirstGov.gov, Ready.gov, and USAonwatch.org. 18

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Appendix 3C: Infrastructure Data 1

Warehouse 2

3C.1 Why Do We Need a National CIKR Inventory? 3

HSPD-7 directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to lead efforts to reduce the Nation’s 4 vulnerability to terrorism and deny the use of infrastructure as a weapon by developing, 5 coordinating, integrating, and implementing plans and programs that identify, catalog, 6 prioritize, and protect CIKR in cooperation with all levels of government and private sector 7 entities. A central Federal data repository for analysis and integration is required to 8 provide DHS with the capability to identify, collect, catalog, and maintain a national 9 inventory of information on assets, systems, networks, and functions that may be critical to 10 the Nation’s well being, economy, and security. This inventory is also essential to help 11 inform decisionmaking and specific response and recovery activities pertaining to natural 12 disasters and other emergencies. 13

To fulfill this need, DHS has developed the federated IDW, a continually evolving and 14 comprehensive catalog of the assets, systems, and networks that comprise the Nation’s 15 CIKR. The IDW enables access to descriptive information regarding CIKR. Although the 16 IDW is not a listing of prioritized assets, it has the capability to help inform risk-mitigation 17 activities across the CIKR sectors and government jurisdictions. 18

3C.2 How Does the Inventory Support the NIPP? 19

The IDW provides a coordinated and consistent framework to access and display the CIKR 20 data submitted by Federal, State, and local agencies; the private sector; and integrated 21 Federal or commercial databases. The federated framework and structure of the IDW have 22 been constructed to readily integrate other CIKR data sources and provide the required 23 data in a usable and effective manner. Two primary components of this framework are the 24 Infrastructure Protection Taxonomy and the infrastructure type data fields: 25

The IP taxonomy groups CIKR by sector and identifies overlaps between and across 26 sectors. It was developed by DHS in coordination with the SSAs to ensure that every 27 CIKR type is represented. 28

The infrastructure type data fields outline the attributes of interest that are integral to 29 assessment and analysis per a specific category of CIKR making the IDW National 30 Information Exchange Model (NIEM)-compliant. The information contained in these 31 data fields feeds the strategic risk assessment process used to prioritize CIKR in the 32 context of terrorist threats or incidents, natural disasters, or other emergencies. 33

The information accessed through the IDW enables the analysis necessary to determine 34 which assets, systems, and networks comprise the Nation’s CIKR, and to inform security 35 planning and preparedness, resource investments, and post-incident response and recovery 36 activities within and across sectors and governmental jurisdictions. 37

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3C.3 What Is the Current Content of the Inventory? 1

DHS gathers data related to the Nation’s CIKR from a variety of sources. The inventory 2 reflects a collection of information garnered from formal data calls, voluntary additions, and 3 the leveraging of various Federal and commercial databases. Information accessed through 4 the IDW has been received from Federal agencies, State and local submissions, voluntary 5 private sector submissions, commercial demographics products, external data sources, and 6 subject matter experts. The information is used to inform CIKR protection efforts, 7 contingency planning, planning for implementation of initiatives such as the BZPP, and to 8 aid decisionmakers during response, recovery, and restoration following terrorist attacks, 9 natural disasters, or other emergencies. 10

3C.4 How Will the Current Inventory Remain Accurate? 11

DHS continues to seek input from multiple infrastructure sources, including existing 12 databases managed by SSAs, commercial providers, State and local governments, and the 13 private sector. Integrating existing databases using a federated framework will provide a 14 dynamic common operating interface of infrastructure and vulnerability information 15 through a cross flow of data between separate databases, or linked access to other 16 databases. Existing databases being considered for integration are shown in table 3C-1. 17 Ownership and control of the data will be determined according to the circumstances of 18 each database. Classification of the data will be based on Original Classification Authority 19 (OCA) guidance and will be protected as required by OCA guidance and direction. 20

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3C.5 How Will the Infrastructure Data Warehouse Be Maintained? 22

The process of ensuring that the data collected is both current and accurate is continual. 23 Data updates and currency are largely dependent upon the sources of the data and the 24 frequency of the updates that they provide. 25

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Efficiency and reliability are maintained through the implementation by the data steward 1 of various data quality control techniques. Verification and validation efforts by contracted 2 companies or Federal employees will play a key role in ensuring information currency. 3

3C.6 What Are the CIKR Partner Roles and Responsibilities? 4

The CIKR information accessible through the IDW is highly dependent upon the 5 participation and support of the SSAs, the States, and private sector entities: 6 7 SSAs have primary responsibility for providing sector information (through replication 8

of the data or access to the original data source) to DHS for inclusion in the IDW using 9 the format and categorization system employed by the IDW.39 The processes used for 10 sector CIKR and database identification in coordination with partners should be 11 described in the SSPs. 12

Some State governments have either already developed infrastructure databases or 13 have begun the process to identify and assess CIKR within their jurisdictions. State 14 homeland security advisors should work closely with DHS and the SSAs to ensure that 15 data collection efforts are streamlined, coordinated, and reflect the most accurate data 16 possible. 17

The most current and accurate data are best known by CIKR owners and operators. 18 Thus, as the owners and operators of the majority of the Nation’s CIKR, private sector 19 entities are encouraged to be actively involved in the development of CIKR information. 20 Primarily through the voluntary provision of CIKR information and industry-specific 21 subject matter expertise, the private sector is playing an integral role in the expansion 22 of information accessed through the IDW. 23

3C.7 What Are the Plans for IDW Expansion? 24

The current IDW incorporates a flexible service oriented architecture to facilitate evolution, 25 growth, and continued interconnectivity with additional databases and tools. 26 Advancements will include integration with multiple commercial and Federal CIKR 27 databases, vulnerability assessment tools and libraries, intelligence and threat reporting 28 databases, and geospatial tools. 29

DHS is developing the IDW with a more versatile platform to better support integration of 30 DHS and SSA mission-specific applications and mission-specific databases. The goal of this 31 effort is to create a means to access national CIKR information that more efficiently and 32 effectively supports the implementation of NIPP risk management framework activities, 33 including: 34

Integration of vulnerability, consequence, and asset/system/network attribute data into 35 a single portal interface as the foundation for the NIPP risk assessment process; 36

Access to threat data to support the development of asset, system, and network risk 37 scores; 38

39The DHS/IP Taxonomy is the foundation for multiple DHS programs that focus on CIKR, such as the IDW and the National Threat Incident Database, and should provide the foundation for the lexicon used in the SSPs. This common framework will allow more efficient integration and transfer of information, as well as a more effective analytical tool for making comparisons.

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Assessment and, if appropriate, prioritization of assets, systems, and networks across 1 sectors and jurisdictions based on risk to promote the more effective allocation and use 2 of available resources and to inform planning, threat response, and post-incident 3 restoration actions at all levels of government and the private sector; 4

Sharing of consistent information so that all partners involved in CIKR protection 5 operate from a common frame of reference; 6

Acting as a primary information and integration hub for protective security needs 7 throughout the country in support of DHS- and SSA-led activities; 8

Supporting the efforts of law enforcement agencies during National Security Special 9 Events and other high-priority security events; and 10

Supporting the efforts of primary Federal agencies in responding to and recovering from 11 major natural or manmade disasters. 12

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Appendix 3D: Effectiveness 1 The CIKR measurement and analysis process continues to mature as the basis for 2 establishing accountability, documenting performance, identifying issues, promoting 3 effective management, and reassessing CIKR goals and objectives. In FY 2008, the CIKR 4 protection metrics program efficiently captured descriptive and output measures to monitor 5 the progress of risk-mitigation activities, coordination, and information sharing. 6

Figure 3D-1 displays the evolution of the CIKR protection metrics components for the 7 measurement and analysis process from FY 2006 to FY 2009. To capture the effectiveness 8 of protection programs and risk-mitigation activities, the measurement and analysis 9 process will continue to evolve and collect outcome measures in FY 2009 and beyond. 10

Figure 3D-1: Evolution of CIKR Metrics 11 12

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DHS is enhancing its established measurement and analysis capabilities through the 26 collection of data from all CIKR security partners and development of a methodology to 27 gauge effectiveness of activities that sustains the CIKR protection mission. 28

The methodology, metrics, and analysis to date provide a foundation for measuring the 29 efficacy of risk management activities performed under the NIPP and the progress made in 30 reducing the risks to the Nation’s CIKR from terrorist attacks and other hazards. The 31 measurement process supports the continuous improvement loop of the NIPP Risk 32 Management Framework. DHS is further developing the methodology to estimate 33 effectiveness of risk-mitigation activities. This methodology can be applied at different 34 levels of aggregation. In the context of CIKR protection, effectiveness is represented as a 35 function of impact, performance, and quality (see figure 3D-2). 36

Effectiveness (E) can be expressed as a function of its components: 37

Core Metrics (NIPP Risk Management Framework and Governance/ Coordination)


IP Programmatic Metrics

NIPP Core Metrics

SSA Programmatic Metrics

Sector Partnership Metrics

Sector-Specific Metrics

National Coordinator Programmatic Metrics

CIKR Information Sharing Environment Metrics

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E = f(I, P, Q), 1

Where 2

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Figure 3D-2 Model of Effectiveness 7 8

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Effectiveness (E) can be modeled at varying levels of detail depending on the unit of 21 analysis (e.g., effectiveness of an activity, action, project, or initiative) used. Impact (I) 22 refers to the robustness, value, or inherent worth (significance) of an activity, action, 23 project, or initiative associated with the metrics components if it were to fully achieve its 24 intended results: how important is an activity to the overall goals and objectives of CIKR 25 protection? Performance measures (P) are used to gauge program performance and are 26 based on targets that are quantifiable or have an otherwise measurable characteristic: how 27 well does a program meet its performance measures? Performance measures must be 28 meaningful in the context of the specific program and capture the most important aspects of 29 a program’s mission and priorities. Another essential element needed to achieve program 30 goals and objectives and develop a sustainable CIKR protection program is assessment: 31 how well is the work being performed? The quality indicator (Q) captures the completeness, 32 accuracy, timeliness, and reliability of a product or service being developed to meet 33 specified requirements. 34

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Appendix 4: Organizing and Partnering 1

for CIKR Protection: Existing 2

Coordination Mechanisms 3

The coordination mechanisms established under the NIPP serve as the primary means for 4 coordinating CIKR protection activities nationally. However, many other avenues exist for 5 CIKR partners to engage with each other and government at all levels to ensure that their 6 efforts are fully coordinated in accordance with the principles outlined in the NIPP. The 7 following table summarizes many of these available mechanisms. 8

Coordination Mechanism Description Inter-Local Agreements

Cities and towns exchange information and cooperate on any number of projects. Inter-local agreements are a mechanism to do cooperatively anything that can be done as an individual municipality.

Mutual-Aid Agreements

Established means through which one local government can offer assistance and another receive assistance in a time of disaster. These agreements cover logistics, deployment, liability, reimbursement, and many other issues. The intent is to provide assistance in the most efficient manner possible by coordinating the relevant terms and conditions in advance.

Local to Local

County Commissioner Interaction

County commissioners provide leadership, services, and programs to meet the health, safety, and welfare needs of their citizens in an integrated, collaborative network.

Local to State Committees, Commissions, and Boards

Local-to-State legislative- and regulatory-level interactions occur through State committees, commissions, and boards dealing with counter-terrorism, environmental, transportation, community development, retirement, insurance, and many other issues. Interactions also include coordination between the office of the Governor, homeland security advisor, Emergency Management Agency, and National Guard.

Local to Federal Associations National associations of local governments serve as a bridge between local elected officials and the Federal Government to ensure that the public safety and homeland security needs of localities are met. These organizations, such as the National League of Cities, the National Association of Counties, and the U.S. Conference of Mayors, work to ensure that Federal resources are appropriately targeted for disaster planning, mitigation, and recovery.

State to State Intrastate Councils of Government

Councils of State Governments are regional councils that, by law, are political subdivisions of the State with the authority to plan and initiate needed cooperative projects; however, they do not have the power to regulate or tax because these authorities are exclusively assigned to cities and counties. A council’s duties may include comprehensive planning for regional employment and training needs, criminal justice, economic development, homeland security, emergency preparedness, bioterrorism, 911 service, solid waste, aging, transportation, and rural development, among various others.

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Coordination Mechanism Description Interstate or Regional Compacts (including those with cross-border entities)

States face issues that are not confined to geographical boundaries or jurisdictional lines. Interstate compacts are a mechanism that can be used to address sector interdependencies and coordinate protection of CIKR. Compacts are organized in a number of ways: • Sector-based compacts focus on specific CIKR resources that are

shared or are interdependent across State boundaries (e.g., the Western Interstate Energy Compact);

• Preparedness-focused compacts, such as the Interstate Mutual-Aid Compact, establish a means for participating jurisdictions to provide voluntary assistance to other States in response to an event that overwhelms the resources of individual State and local governments; and

• Regional compacts provide a means for participating jurisdictions to coordinate activities within a specific geographical area that spans multiple States. These agreements, such as the Canadian River Compact, define the specific equities of each State within the particular region.

For more information on interstate compacts, contact the National Center for Interstate Compacts: www.csg.org/programs/ncic/default.aspx.

Associations Organizations such as the National Governors Association, National Conference of State Legislatures, and Council of State Governments represent the interests of States in the Federal policymaking process. State-level professional associations, such as the Association of State Drinking Water Administrators and the Association of State Water Pollution Control Administrators, also provide sector-specific coordination mechanisms. Additionally, these groups support State leaders by keeping their members informed of key Federal decisions that impact State government.

State to Federal

State Liaison Offices

Some States have formed specific liaison offices in Washington, DC, to maintain awareness of Federal developments and ensure that their individual State perspective is represented in the Federal policymaking process. These offices report back regularly to their State’s leadership and legislature regarding Federal issues of interest.

Federal to Federal

Memoranda of Understanding or Agreement

Agreements between two or more Federal departments and agencies to cooperate on a specific topic or initiative.

Public-Private Partnerships

Contractual agreement between a public agency (i.e., Federal, State, or local) and a private sector entity. Through this agreement, the skills and assets of each sector (public and private) are shared in delivering a service or facility for the use of the general public.

Advisory Councils, Boards, and Commissions

In addition to the SCCs and ISACs, a variety of private sector organizations exist that focus on homeland security and CIKR protection activities on a sector and geographical basis. These groups are made up of members of the public and subject matter experts, and provide advice and recommendations to governments at all levels.

Private Sector to Government (all levels)

Associations Myriad private sector associations exist that advocate on behalf of their members in the policymaking process at the Federal, State, and local levels. These groups are comprised of individuals or companies with common interests. Because of their ability to communicate with their members, private associations provide an effective means for government to provide information to the public and also learn the concerns of specific groups of CIKR partners.

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Appendix 5: Integrating CIKR Protection 1

as Part of the Homeland Security Mission 2

Appendix 5A: State, Local, Tribal, and 3

Territorial Government Considerations 4 State, local, tribal, and territorial efforts support the implementation of the NIPP and 5 associated SSPs by providing a jurisdictional focus and enabling cross-sector coordination. 6 The NIPP recognizes that there is not a one-size-fits-all approach to CIKR protection 7 planning at the State and local levels. Creating and managing a CIKR protection program 8 for a given jurisdiction entails building an organizational structure and mechanisms for 9 coordination between government and private sector entities that can be used to implement 10 the NIPP risk management framework. This includes taking actions within the jurisdiction 11 to set security goals; identify assets, systems, and networks; assess risks; prioritize CIKR 12 across sectors; implement protective programs; and measure the effectiveness of risk-13 mitigation efforts. These elements form the basis of CIKR protection programs and guide 14 the implementation of relevant CIKR protection-related goals and objectives outlined in 15 State, local, tribal, and territorial homeland security strategies. 16

This appendix provides general guidance that can be tailored to unique jurisdictional 17 characteristics, organizational structures, and operating environments at the State, local, 18 and tribal levels. Additional guidance is available in A Guide to Critical Infrastructure and 19 Key Resources Protection at the State, Regional, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Levels (2008). 20

The NIPP is structured to avoid redundancy and ensure coordination between State, local, 21 and Federal CIKR protection efforts. States or localities are encouraged to focus their 22 efforts in ways that leverage Federal resources and address the relevant CIKR sector’s 23 protection requirements in their particular areas or jurisdictions. This appendix outlines a 24 basic framework to guide the development of CIKR protection strategies, plans, and 25 programs in coordination with the NIPP. 26

To align with the NIPP, State and local CIKR protection plans and programs should 27 explicitly address six broad categories regarding their CIKR protection approach: 28

CIKR protection roles and responsibilities; 29 Building partnerships and information sharing; 30 Implementing the NIPP risk management framework; 31 CIKR data use and protection; 32 Leveraging ongoing emergency preparedness activities for CIKR protection; and 33 Integrating Federal CIKR protection activities. 34

5A.1 CIKR Roles and Responsibilities 35

The NIPP outlines a set of broad roles and responsibilities for State, regional, local, and 36 tribal entities (see chapter 2). State, regional, local, and tribal CIKR protection plans (or 37 elements addressing CIKR in State or local homeland security plans or strategies) should 38

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describe how each jurisdiction intends to implement these roles and responsibilities. In 1 particular, jurisdictions should consider and describe in their plans the following: 2

Which offices or organizations in the jurisdiction perform the roles or responsibilities 3 outlined in the NIPP or supporting SSPs; 4

Whether gaps exist between the jurisdiction’s current approach and those roles and 5 responsibilities outlined in the NIPP or in an SSP, and how the gaps will be addressed; 6

Whether any roles and responsibilities should be revised, modified, or consolidated to 7 accommodate the unique operating attributes of the jurisdiction; 8

How the jurisdiction will maintain operational awareness of the performance of the 9 CIKR protection roles assigned to different offices, agencies, or localities; and 10

How the jurisdiction will coordinate its CIKR protection roles and responsibilities with 11 other jurisdictions and the Federal Government. 12

5A.2 Building Partnerships and Information Sharing 13

Effective CIKR protection requires the development of partnerships, collaboration, and 14 information sharing between government and private sector owners and operators. This 15 includes maintaining awareness of CIKR owner and operator concerns, disseminating 16 relevant information to owners and operators, and maintaining processes for rapid response 17 and decisionmaking in the event of a threat or incident involving CIKR within the 18 jurisdiction. To address partnership building, networking, and information sharing, State 19 and local entities should determine whether the appropriate mechanisms for sharing 20 information and networking with CIKR partners are in place. If mechanisms are not 21 established at all of the relevant levels, State and local entities should identify means for 22 better coordinating and sharing information with CIKR partners. Options to be considered 23 and described in State, regional, local, and tribal CIKR protection plans can include, but 24 are not limited to: 25

Ensuring collaboration with other government entities and the private sector using a 26 process based on the partnership model outlined under the NIPP or an abbreviated form 27 of the model addressing just those sectors that are most relevant to the jurisdiction; 28

Instituting specific information-sharing networks, such as an information-sharing 29 portal, for the jurisdiction. These types of networks allow owners and operators, and 30 governmental entities to share best practices, provide a better understanding of sector 31 and cross-sector needs, and inform collective decisionmaking on how best to utilize 32 resources; 33

Developing standing committees and work groups to discuss relevant CIKR protection 34 issues; 35

Developing a regular newsletter or similar communications tool for CIKR owners and 36 operators on relevant CIKR protection issues and coordination within the jurisdiction; 37 and 38

Participating in existing sector-wide and national information-sharing networks, 39 including those offered by trade associations, ISACs, SCCs, and threat warning and 40 alert notification systems. 41

The information-sharing approach for a given jurisdiction will vary based on CIKR 42 ownership, number and type of CIKR sectors represented in the jurisdiction, and the extent 43

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to which existing mechanisms can be leveraged. The options presented above are merely a 1 description of some available mechanisms that jurisdictions may consider as they develop 2 the organization of their programs and document their processes in a CIKR protection plan. 3

5A.3 Implementing the Risk Management Framework 4

The NIPP risk management framework described in chapter 3 provides a useful model for 5 State, regional, local, and tribal jurisdictions to use in addressing CIKR protection within 6 the given jurisdiction. The model provides a risk-informed approach to identify, prioritize, 7 and protect CIKR assets and systems at the State and local level. This process also allows 8 State and local jurisdictions to enhance coordination with DHS and the SSAs in developing 9 and implementing CIKR protection programs. The following should be considered when 10 developing CIKR protection programs: 11

What are the jurisdiction’s goals and objectives for CIKR protection? How do these goals 12 relate to those of the NIPP and the SSPs that are relevant to the jurisdiction? 13

What are the CIKR assets, systems, networks, and functions within the jurisdiction or 14 that impact the jurisdiction? Are there significant interstate or international 15 dependencies or interdependencies? Are any of the assets, systems, or networks within 16 the jurisdiction deemed to be nationally critical by DHS? 17

Are risk assessments for CIKR within the State being conducted or planned by DHS, 18 SSAs, or owners and operators in accordance with the processes outlined in the NIPP? 19 Is there a need for the jurisdiction to conduct additional or supplemental risk 20 assessments? Do the methodologies for conducting risk assessments address the 21 baseline criteria outlined in chapter 3? 22

What are the CIKR protection priorities within the jurisdiction? How do these priorities 23 correlate with the national priorities established by the Federal Government? How do 24 these priorities correlate with the ongoing CIKR protection priorities established for 25 each sector at the national level? 26

What actions or initiatives are being taken within the jurisdiction to address CIKR 27 protection? How do these relate to the national effort? 28

What types of metrics will be used to measure the progress of CIKR protection efforts? 29

5A.4 CIKR Data Use and Protection 30

States and other jurisdictions may employ a variety of means to collect CIKR data or 31 respond to CIKR data requests. State, regional, local, and tribal plans should outline how 32 the jurisdiction has organized itself to address CIKR data use and protection. The following 33 issues should be considered in developing the CIKR protection plan: 34

Will the jurisdiction maintain a comprehensive database of CIKR in the State, region, 35 or locality? How will the jurisdiction collect such information? What tools are available 36 from DHS or the commercial marketplace to support infrastructure information 37 collection and management? 38

How will sensitive data that may be in the possession of State, local, or tribal 39 governments be legally and physically protected from public disclosure, and what 40 safeguards will be used to control and limit distribution to appropriate individuals? 41

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Will data collection mechanisms be compatible and interoperable with the IDW 1 framework to enable data sharing? 2

How will the jurisdiction ensure that it is maintaining current information? 3 Will data requests from the Federal Government for CIKR data be channeled to the 4

owners and operators through the States? 5 Are there local legal authorities and policy directives related to data collection? Are 6

these authorities adequate? If not, how will the jurisdiction address these issues? 7

5A.5 Leveraging Ongoing Emergency Preparedness Activities for 8 CIKR Protection 9

The emergency management capabilities of each State and local jurisdiction are an 10 important component of improving overall CIKR protection. States and localities should 11 look to existing programs and leverage ways in which CIKR protection can be integrated 12 into ongoing activities. Areas to be considered when drafting a CIKR protection plan 13 include: 14

Does the jurisdiction’s exercise program account for CIKR protection? If not, how will 15 the State or locality incorporate CIKR protection exercise scenarios to increase the level 16 of preparedness? 17

How do CIKR protection efforts relate to initiatives outlined in the jurisdiction’s hazard 18 mitigation plan? How do various hazard modeling or ongoing mitigation efforts relate to 19 the CIKR protection initiatives? 20

How will the jurisdiction share best practices, reports, or other output from emergency 21 preparedness activities with CIKR owners and operators? 22

Have CIKR owners and operators been invited to participate in exercise events, and are 23 CIKR owners and operators linked to existing warning or response systems? 24

What existing education and outreach programs can be leveraged to share information 25 with partners regarding CIKR protection? 26

Are there other outreach or emergency management programs that should include a 27 CIKR component? 28

5A.6 Integrating Federal CIKR Protection Activities 29

State-, local-, and tribal-level CIKR protection programs should complement and draw on 30 Federal efforts to the maximum extent possible to utilize risk management methodologies 31 and avoid duplication of efforts. 32

State, local, and tribal efforts should consider the adequacy of DHS and SSA guidance and 33 resources for their particular situation. For example: 34

Are the existing criteria for risk analysis inclusive of levels of consequence that are of 35 concern to the State or locality, or should the jurisdiction’s criteria be expanded to 36 include additional local assets? 37

Are the self-assessment tools developed by DHS and the SSAs sufficient, or do these 38 tools need additional tailoring to reflect local conditions? 39

Are there additional best practices that should be shared among CIKR partners? 40

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Are there additional authorities that need to be documented? 1

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Appendix 5B: Recommended Homeland 1

Security Practices for Use by the Private 2

Sector 3 This appendix provides a summary of practices that may be adopted by private sector 4 owners and operators to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of their CIKR protection 5 programs. The recommendations herein are based on best practices in use by various 6 sectors and other groupings. The NIPP encourages private sector owners and operators to 7 adopt and implement those practices that are appropriate and applicable at the specific 8 sector enterprise and individual facility levels: 9

Asset, System, Network, and Function Identification: 10 Incorporate the NIPP framework for the assets, systems, and networks under their 11

control; and 12 Voluntarily provide CIKR-related data to DHS to facilitate national CIKR protection 13

program implementation with appropriate information protections. 14 Assessment, Monitoring, and Reduction of Risks/Vulnerabilities: 15

Conduct appropriate risk and vulnerability assessment activities using tools or 16 methods that are rigorous, well-documented, and based on accepted practices in 17 industry or government; 18

Implement measures to reduce risk and mitigate deficiencies and vulnerabilities 19 corresponding to the physical, cyber, and human security elements of CIKR 20 protection; 21

Maintain the tools, capabilities, and protocols necessary to provide an appropriate 22 level of monitoring of networks, systems, or a facility and its immediate 23 surroundings to detect possible insider and external threats; 24

Develop and implement personnel screening programs to the extent feasible for 25 personnel working in sensitive positions; and 26

Manage the security of computer and information systems while maintaining 27 awareness of vulnerabilities and consequences to ensure that systems are not used 28 to enable attacks against CIKR. 29

Information Sharing: 30 Connect with and participate in the appropriate national, State, regional, local, and 31

sector information-sharing mechanisms (e.g., HSIN-CS and the sector information-32 sharing mechanism); 33

Develop and maintain close working relationships with local (and, as appropriate, 34 Federal, State, territorial, and tribal) law enforcement and first-responder 35 organizations relevant to the company’s facilities to promote communications, with 36 appropriate protections, and cooperation related to prevention, remediation, and 37 response to a natural disaster or terrorist event; 38

Provide applicable information on threats, assets, and vulnerabilities to appropriate 39 government authorities, with appropriate information protections; 40

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Share threat and other appropriate information with other CIKR owners and 1 operators; 2

Participate in activities or initiatives developed and sponsored by relevant NIPP 3 SCC or entity that provides the sector coordinating function; 4

Participate in, share information with (with appropriate protections), and support 5 State and local CIKR protection programs, including coordinating and planning with 6 Local Emergency Planning Committees; 7

Collaborate with other CIKR owners and operators on security issues of mutual 8 concern; and 9

Use appropriate measures to safeguard information that could pose a threat and 10 maintain open and effective communications regarding security measures and 11 issues, as appropriate, with employees, suppliers, customers, government officials, 12 and others. 13

Planning and Awareness: 14 Develop and exercise appropriate emergency response, mitigation, and business 15

continuity-of-operations plans; 16 Participate in Federal, State, local, or company exercises and other activities to 17

enhance individual, organization, and sector preparedness; 18 Demonstrate continuous commitment to security and resilience across the entire 19

company; 20 Develop an appropriate security protocol corresponding to each level of the HSAS. 21

These plans and protocols are additive so that as the threat level increases for 22 company facilities, the company can quickly implement its plans to enhance physical 23 or cybersecurity measures in operation at those facilities and modify them as the 24 threat level decreases; 25

Utilize National Fire Protection Association 1600 Standard on Disaster/Emergency 26 Management and Business Continuity Programs, endorsed by DHS and Congress, 27 when developing Emergency Response and Business Continuity-of-Operations Plans 28 if the sector has not developed its own standard; 29

Document the key elements of security programs, actions, and periodic reviews as 30 part of a commitment to sustain a consistent, reliable, and comprehensive program 31 over time; 32

Enhance security awareness and capabilities through periodic training, drills, and 33 guidance that involve all employees annually to some extent and, when appropriate, 34 involve others such as emergency response agencies or neighboring facilities; 35

Perform periodic assessments or audits to measure the effectiveness of planned 36 physical and cybersecurity measures. These audits and verifications should be 37 reported directly to the CEO or his/her designee for review and action; 38

Promote emergency response training, such as the Community Emergency Response 39 Team training offered by the U.S. Citizen Corps,40 for employees; 40

40The U.S. Citizen Corps is a national organization that brings citizen groups together and focuses the efforts of individuals through education, training, and volunteer service to help make communities safer, stronger, and better prepared to address the threats of terrorism, crime, public health issues, and disasters of all kinds. It works through a national network of State, local, and tribal Citizen Corps Councils that include leaders from law enforcement, fire, emergency medical, emergency management, volunteer organizations, local elected officials, the private sector, and other community stakeholders. More information is available on the internet at www.CitizenCorps.gov.

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Consider including programs for developing highly secure and trustworthy operating 1 systems in near-term acquisition or R&D priorities; 2

Create a culture of preparedness, reaching every level of the organization’s 3 workforce, which ingrains in each employee the importance of awareness and 4 empowers those with responsibilities as first-line defenders within the organization 5 and community; 6

As the organization performs R&D or acquires new or upgraded systems, consider 7 only those that are highly secure and trustworthy; 8

Encourage employee participation in community preparedness efforts, such as 9 Citizen Corps, schools, Red Cross, Second Harvest, etc.; 10

Work with others locally, including government, nongovernmental organizations, 11 and private sector entities, both within and outside its sector, to identify and resolve 12 gaps that could occur in the context of a terrorist incident, natural disaster, or other 13 emergency; 14

Work with DHS to improve cooperation regarding personnel screening and 15 information protection; and 16

Identify supply chain and “neighbor” issues that could cause workforce or production 17 disruptions for the company. 18

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Appendix 6: DHS S&T Plans, Programs 1

and Research & Development 2 This appendix provides additional details on DHS S&T programs and initiatives supporting 3 the NIPP and CIKR. It includes details of how S&T is organized to produce and execute its 4 investment strategy, and how that strategy results in developing technology-based 5 solutions to meet customer and end-user requirements. 6

6.1 DHS S&T Organization and Investment Process 7

The organization of S&T results in an improved process to identify, validate and procure 8 new technologies, given its responsibility to develop and integrate technology with the 9 strategies, policies, procedures to protect the nation’s CIKR. The division’s RDT&E 10 program achieves S&T strategic goals in six fundamental disciples: (1) Explosives; (2) 11 Chemical and Biological; (3) Command, Control and Interoperability; (4) Borders and 12 Maritime Security; (5) Human Factors; and (6) Infrastructure and Geophysical, which are 13 also S&T’s six technical Divisions. 14

15 These technical Divisions are linked to three research and development investment 16 portfolio directors in a “matrix management” structure. These three portfolio directors – 17 Director of Research, Director of Transition, and Director of Innovation/Homeland Security 18 Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA) – provide cross-cutting coordination of their 19 respective elements (or thrusts) of the investment strategy within the technical Divisions. 20 Each technical Division is comprised of at least one Section Director of Research who 21 reports to the Director of Research in addition to the Division Director so that a 22

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crosscutting focus on basic and applied research capability is maintained and leveraged, 1 and a Section Director of Transition who reports to the Director of Transition in addition to 2 the Division Director to help the division stay focused on technology transition. 3

The Director of Transition coordinates within the Department to expedite technology 4 transition and transfer to customers. The Director of Innovation/HSARPA sponsors basic 5 and applied homeland security research to promote revolutionary changes in technologies; 6 advance the development, testing and evaluation, and deployment of critical homeland 7 security technologies; and accelerate the prototyping and deployment of technologies that 8 would address homeland security vulnerabilities and works with each of the Division Heads 9 to pursue game-changing, leap-ahead technologies that will significantly lower costs and 10 markedly improve operational capability through technology application. 11

This cross-cutting coordination facilitates unity of effort. The matrix structure also allows 12 the S&T Directorate to provide more comprehensive and integrated technology solutions to 13 its customers by appropriately bringing all of the disciplines together in developing 14 solutions. 15

6.1.1 Investments and Planning 16 Along with the organizational alignment discussed above, the S&T Directorate has also 17 aligned its investment portfolio to create an array of programs that balance project risk, 18 cost, mission impact, and the time it takes to deliver solutions. The S&T Directorate 19 executes projects across the spectrum of technical maturity and transitions them in 20 accordance with our customers needs. Its investment portfolio is balanced across long-term 21 research, product applications, and leap-ahead “game-changing” capabilities while also 22 meeting mandated requirements. This balanced portfolio ensures that the Directorate 23 maintains a self-replenishing pipeline of future capabilities and products to transition to 24 customers. 25

The DHS Transition Program is a formalized, structured process that aligns investments to 26 Agency requirements and is managed by Capstone Integrated Product Teams (IPTs). 27 These teams constitute the Transition portfolio of DHS S&T, targeting deployable 28 capabilities in the near term. S&T established these teams to coordinate the planning and 29 execution of R&D programs together with the eventual hand-off to maintainers and users of 30 project results. They are critical nodes in the process to determine operational 31 requirements, assess current capabilities to meet operational needs, analyze gaps in 32 capabilities and articulate programs and projects to fill in the gaps an expand 33 competencies. 34

IPTs generally include the research and technology perspective, the customer and end user 35 perspective, and an acquisition perspective, and are specifically chartered to ensure that 36 technologies are engineered and integrated into systems scheduled for delivery and made 37 available to DHS customers. The customer and end users monitor and guide the capability 38 being developed; the research and technology representatives inform the discussions with 39 scientific and engineering advances and emerging technologies; and the acquisition staff 40 help transition the results into practice by the maintainers and end-users of the capability. 41

The IPT topic areas reflect the capability requirements of homeland security stakeholders. 42 The current IPTs operated by DHS S&T are listed below. Each sponsors projects that are 43 relevant to the infrastructure protection mission. The three bolded IPTs are co-chaired by 44 the DHS Office of Infrastructure Protection. 45

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1 Information Sharing/Management Counter IED Border Security Cargo Security Chem/Bio Defense People Screening Maritime Security Infrastructure Protection Cyber Security Preparedness & Response: Incident Management Transportation Security Preparedness & Response: Interoperability

2 Each IPT identifies, validates and prioritizes requirements for the S&T Directorate and 3 provides critical input to investments in programs and projects that will ultimately deliver 4 technology solutions that can be developed, matured and delivered to customer acquisition 5 programs for deployment to the field. Investments are competitively selected and focus on 6 DHS’s highest-priority requirements that provide capability to DHS operating components 7 and first responders. A successful transition portfolio requires sustained customer feedback 8 from DHS components to ensure that programs address genuine capability gaps. To gain 9 this insight, S&T established 46 Project IPTs and semi-annually reach out to DHS 10 components to gauge their overall satisfaction with delivered products and capabilities. The 11 results are explicitly tied to outcome-based performance metrics of cost, schedule and 12 technology readiness. 13

6.2 Requirements 14

The Directorate’s top priorities recommended by the S&T capstone IPTs in each of the 15 homeland security functional areas (i.e., Border Security, Cargo Security, CBRNE, 16 Infrastructure Protection, etc.) are consistent with the DHS Strategic roadmap in this 17 document’s NIPP Implementation Initiative and Actions section (Appendix 2 B) to ensure 18 an effective and efficient program over the long term. 19

This requirements map supports several initiatives and actions necessary for NIPP 20 implementation, particularly regarding the initiatives to: 21

Review and revise CIKR-related plans as needed to reinforce linkage between NIPP 22 steady-state CIKR protection and NRP incident management requirements 23

Identify cross-sector vulnerabilities 24 Communicate requirements for CIKR-related R&D to DHS for use in the national R&D 25

planning effort 26

The Office of Infrastructure Protection has developed an R&D Requirements Map showing 27 connections between 2007 Sector Annual Report R&D requirements and ongoing S&T 28 projects in each functional area, which may fully or partially address Sectors needs. The 29 Map shows the Sector priorities in terms of the requirements needed, and how that 30 requirement is being met in S&T by citing the specific projects to meet the requirement. 31 Further, the map crosswalks the projects initiated by each Capstone IPT and the capability 32 gap it addresses. The Map will be regularly updated and undergo a detailed review as the 33 analysis continues. 34

6.2.1 High Priority Technology Needs 35 Each year S&T publishes the high priority technology needs in its functional areas. The 36 following is a representative sample of needs for the nation’s CIKR. 37

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Analytical tools to quantify interdependencies and cascading consequences as 1 disruptions occur across critical infrastructure sectors – In particular, tools for natural 2 and manmade disruptions 3

Effective and affordable blast analysis and protection for critical infrastructure, and an 4 improved understanding of blast-failure mechanisms and protection measures for the 5 most vital CIKR 6

Advanced, automated, and affordable monitoring and surveillance technologies – In 7 particular, decision support systems to prevent disruption, mitigate results, and build in 8 resiliency 9

Rapid mitigation and recovery technologies to quickly reduce the effect of natural and 10 manmade disruptions and cascading effects 11

Critical utility components that are affordable, highly transportable, and provide robust 12 solutions during manmade and natural disruptions 13

6.2.2 Industry Involvement 14 Industry is a valued partner of the S&T Directorate and its continued participation in 15 developing solutions for homeland security applications is vital to our effort to safeguard 16 the nation. Consistent with the Directorate’s new structure, the Innovation/HSARPA 17 portfolio and six technical divisions will proactively seek industry participation to address 18 specific challenges in their respective areas. Additionally, private sector owners and 19 operators, via SCCs, have provided powerful independent validation of the R&D priorities 20 set by the Federal CIKR community. Several Government and Sector Coordinating 21 Councils have established joint R&D working groups to provide course-correcting inputs for 22 future R&D directions. 23

6.3 Progress 24

Critical infrastructure is a widely distributed enterprise across multiple industries, 25 government agencies, and academia, so its R&D program cannot be managed through 26 command and control. Instead, DHS and OSTP are fostering an evolving network of 27 partnerships and coordination groups. These groups have different focuses including 28 sector-specific needs, technology themes of interest to multiple sectors, and committees that 29 coordinate federal agency resources. The National Annual Report, including the National 30 CIP R&D Plan Update, provides the overarching strategy, goals, and plans that allow this 31 distributed R&D enterprise to act in coordinated ways. 32

6.3.1 Partnerships and Collaboration 33 The NIPP Partnership Framework 34 The Critical Infrastructure Protection Advisory Councils (CIPAC), established by DHS, 35 have been very effective in helping federal infrastructure protection groups work with the 36 private sector and with state, local, territorial, and tribal governments. The CIPAC 37 provides a forum in which the sectors have engaged very actively in a broad spectrum of 38 activities to implement their sector protection plans, including planning, prioritizing, and 39 coordinating R&D agendas. 40

Sector and Cross Sector Coordination 41 The Sector R&D Working Groups, typically Joint SCC and GCC, have developed well 42 founded technical R&D agendas essential for their sector to achieve sector security goals for 43

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2008. These R&D agendas coordinate challenges across the spectrum of sector stakeholders 1 and are used to represent sector R&D interests in cross-sector settings. The executive 2 managers of each sector coordinate activities through the Federal Senior Leadership 3 Council (FSLC). The SCCs have formed a cross-sector group, the Partnership for Critical 4 Infrastructure Security (PCIS), to coordinate cross-sector initiatives that promote public 5 and private infrastructure protection initiatives. One of the objectives of the PCIS is to 6 provide cross-sector input regarding R&D priorities. 7

In 2007, the DHS Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) established a group to perform 8 cross-sector R&D analyses and to help sectors coordinate with the CIKR protection R&D 9 community. The R&D Analysis Branch of the Infrastructure Analysis and Strategy 10 Division elicits sector capability gaps in order to establish R&D priorities. This branch is 11 coordinating with each Division of the DHS S&T to relate existing and planned projects to 12 these capability gaps, and to help sectors get involved in DHS-led S&T projects. In 2008, 13 they established an R&D web portal providing a means for sectors to share R&D 14 information and disseminate best practices. 15

Federal Agency Coordination 16 Within a sector, the GCC is the primary mechanism for coordination across government 17 agencies. Government coordination across multiple sectors is accomplished by the NSTC. 18 The NSTC Infrastructure Subcommittee (ISC) of the Committee on Homeland and National 19 Security was established in 2003 by HSPD-7 as the R&D interagency community to 20 examine all forms of protecting the nation’s infrastructure including security. Its primary 21 focus involves R&D that is needed by more than one sector such that economies of scope 22 and scale can be realized. 23

For 2008, the NSTC-ISC recognized the need to address aging infrastructure and new 24 methods of repair or replacement to make future infrastructure more sustainable – 25 economically, environmentally, and safely – and has formed an internal working group to 26 develop the research agenda needed to realizes these objectives. Members of the NSTC-ISC 27 include representatives from almost every federal agency, not just those that are Sector 28 Specific Agencies (SSAs). 29

Coordination Regarding Cybersecurity 30 Because of the ubiquity and importance of information technology across all sectors and 31 agencies, the NSTC created a separate group, the Network and Information Technology 32 R&D Subcommittee (NITRD), which coordinates all R&D related to IT across agencies. In 33 2006, the Cyber Security and Information Assurance Interagency Working Group (CSIA 34 IWG) was established to coordinate cybersecurity as an important subset of IT R&D. 35

Universities 36 Universities and research centers across multiple federal agencies contribute to agency 37 mission accomplishment and CIKR protection in the full spectrum of time from before a 38 disrupting event to after a disrupting event. The DHS Centers of Excellence contribute to 39 the national-level implementation of the NIPP and to CIKR protection; their contributions 40 take different forms, including the following: 41

Provide independent analysis of CIKR protection (full spectrum) issues; 42 Conduct research and provide innovative perspective on threats and the behavioral 43

aspects of terrorism; 44

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Conduct research to identify new technologies and analytical methods that can be 1 applied by CIKR partners to support NIPP efforts; 2

Support research, development, testing, evaluation, and deployment of CIKR protection 3 technologies; 4

Analyze, provide, and share best practices related to CIKR protection efforts; and 5 Develop and provide suitable security risk analysis and risk management courses for 6

CIKR protection professionals. 7 International 8 HS, DoD, DOE, and other federal agencies have undertaken many different outreach efforts 9 to foreign government representatives and organizations that are pursuing similar R&D 10 planning and performance. From the United Kingdom to Scandinavian countries, France, 11 Germany, Japan, Italy, Israel, the Netherlands, Russia, and others, agreements of 12 cooperation and joint pursuit and knowledge sharing have been created. Other 13 organizations such as the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) also have developed 14 successful R&D collaborations with a number of countries. 15

State & Local 16 State, local, territorial, and tribal governments play an important role in the protection of 17 the nation’s CIKR. These government entities not only have CIKR under their direct 18 control but also have CIKR owned and operated by other partners who are within their 19 jurisdictions. The State, Local, Territorial, and Tribal Government Coordination Council 20 (SLTGCC) brings national CIKR protection principles to the local level and is an important 21 source of capability requirements that drive R&D priorities. 22

Industry Organizations 23 In addition to R&D input provided by government organizations, there are major industrial 24 groups that provide input and comment to both influence future R&D by illuminating 25 issues they have surfaced or issues that are likely based on new product development they 26 are doing but cannot discuss openly for competitive reasons. For example, the INFOSEC 27 Research Council has provided valuable input on cybersecurity including publishing a Hard 28 Problems list41 that is an important planning tool used by all R&D contributors. The 29 National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) identified critical 30 gaps that require new cyber and telecommunications R&D. 31

6.4 Five Year Strategy/Technology Roadmap 32

The S&T Directorate implements its business approach through its Planning, 33 Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process which encompasses the 34 development of priorities, program plans, resource requirements, and associated 35 performance metrics. The PPBE process builds the framework to link strategy for the out-36 years to program execution in the present. It ensures the directorate remains mission-37 focused, customer-oriented, threat and risk-informed to prioritize resource allocation and 38 remain accountable in its pursuit to secure the homeland. 39

The five-year execution plan details the S&T investment portfolio, outlines the 40 Directorate’s activities and plans at the division level, and includes each division’s research 41 thrusts, programs, and key milestones. It supports the Department’s strategic plan and 42 41 http://www.cyber.st.dhs.gov/docs/IRC_Hard_Problem_List.pdf

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priorities as well as S&T’s priorities. The five-year plan is the roadmap to achieving 1 success; however, the planning process must be flexible and nimble to adjust to a changing 2 homeland security environment. The plan will be updated annually to ensure it continues 3 to address the correct set of priorities, fills our customer’s homeland security capability 4 gaps, and enables a safer homeland. 5

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2009 nipp public review draft

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