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The impact of changes in state identity

on alliance cohesion in Northeast Asia

Koo, Boncheul.

Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School

http://hdl.handle.net/10945/4412

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NAVAL

POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

THE IMPACT OF CHANGES IN STATE IDENTITY ON ALLIANCE COHESION IN NORTHEAST ASIA

by

Boncheul Koo

December 2009

Thesis Advisor: James Clay Moltz Second Reader: Jeffrey W. Knopf

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

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3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master’s Thesis

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The Impact of Changes in State Identity on Alliance Cohesion in Northeast Asia 6. AUTHOR(S) Boncheul Koo

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13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) This thesis addresses the importance of ideational determinants of cohesion or discord in the Northeast Asian alliances in which the United States has major security interests. Numerous studies have explored the rationale, substance and purpose of these alliances. However, previous studies have been dominated by realists and related balance of power/threat/self-interest approaches and do not provide a clear explanation for unexpected developments among existing alliances. In explaining recent changes within the alliances, relatively little attention has been given to alternative approaches, such as social constructivism. By applying social constructivist theory to the PRC-DPRK and U.S.-ROK alliances in a comparative study, this thesis finds that the increasing divergence of PRC and DPRK identity, values, perception of common interests, and security concerns has led to growing discord and mistrust in their alliance, while the increasing convergence of thinking and common values between Washington and Seoul has become a stronger foundation for their alliance. The thesis concludes with some theoretical and practical implications, as well as policy recommendations for enhancing alliance cohesion.

15. NUMBER OF PAGES

147

14. SUBJECT TERMS

State Identity, Collective Identity, Alliance, Alliance Cohesion, Constructivism, U.S.-ROK alliance, PRC-DPRK alliance, Common Values 16. PRICE CODE

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT

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Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

THE IMPACT OF CHANGES IN STATE IDENTITY ON ALLIANCE COHESION IN NORTHEAST ASIA

Boncheul Koo

Lieutenant, Republic of Korea Navy B.S., United States Naval Academy, 2004

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES (FAR EAST, SOUTHEAST ASIA, PACIFIC)

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL December 2009

Author: Boncheul Koo

Approved by: James Clay Moltz Thesis Advisor

Jeffrey W. Knopf Second Reader

Harold A. Trinkunas, PhD Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs

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ABSTRACT

This thesis addresses the importance of ideational determinants of cohesion or

discord in the Northeast Asian alliances in which the United States has major security

interests. Numerous studies have explored the rationale, substance and purpose of these

alliances. However, previous studies have been dominated by realists and related balance

of power/threat/self-interest approaches and do not provide a clear explanation for

unexpected developments among existing alliances. In explaining recent changes within

the alliances, relatively little attention has been given to alternative approaches, such as

social constructivism. By applying social constructivist theory to the PRC-DPRK and

U.S.-ROK alliances in a comparative study, this thesis finds that the increasing

divergence of PRC and DPRK identity, values, perception of common interests, and

security concerns has led to growing discord and mistrust in their alliance, while the

increasing convergence of thinking and common values between Washington and Seoul

has become a stronger foundation for their alliance. The thesis concludes with some

theoretical and practical implications, as well as policy recommendations for enhancing

alliance cohesion.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 A. PURPOSE.........................................................................................................1 B. IMPORTANCE................................................................................................2 C. LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................3

1. The PRC-DPRK and U.S.-ROK Alliances ........................................3 2. State Identity ........................................................................................7 3. Alliance Cohesion...............................................................................10 4. Existing IR Theories on Alliances ....................................................13

a. Power-Based Theory ...............................................................13 b. Threat-Based Theory ..............................................................14 c. Self-Interest-Based Theory .....................................................16 d. Collective Identity-Based Theory............................................17

D. METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................19

II. REALIST PERSPECTIVES OF THE PRC-DPRK AND U.S.-ROK ALLIANCES ..............................................................................................................24 A. BALANCE OF POWER IN NORTHEAST ASIA .....................................24 B. DEGREE OF PERCEIVED EXTERNAL THREAT ................................29 C. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................32

III. CHINESE IDENTITY AND THE PRC-DPRK ALLIANCE................................34 A. CHINESE “SELF-PERCEPTION”.............................................................34

1. Growing Self-Confidence and “Responsible Great Power” Mentality.............................................................................................34

2. The Public’s Greater Awareness ......................................................37 3. The Public’s Louder Voice and Activism in Politics.......................39

B. CHINESE PERCEPTIONS OF “OTHERS”..............................................41 1. Chinese Pro-Western Attitudes and Increasing Involvement in

International Institutions ..................................................................41 2. Chinese Perceptions of the DPRK....................................................45 3. Chinese Perceptions of the United States and ROK.......................49

C. PRC-DPRK ALLIANCE COHESION........................................................51 1. Compromise on Security Issues........................................................51 2. Military Exchanges and Assistance..................................................54 3. The PRC’s Food and Energy Aid to the DPRK..............................62

D. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................65

IV. SOUTH KOREAN IDENTITY AND THE U.S.-ROK ALLIANCE ....................68 A. SOUTH KOREAN “SELF-PERCEPTION” ..............................................68

1. Growing Self-Confidence and Nationalism .....................................68 2. Democratization and the Growing Influence of Public Opinion...71 3. From a Weak Country to a Major Player in the Region................73

B. SOUTH KOREAN PERCEPTIONS OF “OTHERS” ...............................75 1. South Korean Perceptions of the DPRK..........................................75

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2. South Korean Attitudes Toward the PRC.......................................80 3. South Korean Attitudes Toward the United States and the

U.S.-ROK Alliance .............................................................................83 C. U.S.-ROK ALLIANCE COHESION ...........................................................96

1. Compromise on Security Issues........................................................97 2. Military Exchanges and Assistance................................................100 3. Economic Contribution to Mutual Security ..................................104

D. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................108

V. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................112

LIST OF REFERENCES....................................................................................................118

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .......................................................................................130

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Military expenditures of the ROK and DPRK; military spending for arms import of the ROK and DPRK.........................................................................26

Figure 2. U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) agreement to major East Asian allies. .....28 Figure 3. Numbers of DPRK terrorist incidents and violations of armistice treaty. .......31 Figure 4. Frequency of articles using the term “responsible major power” in the

People’s Daily and in Chinese academic articles, 1994–2004. .......................36 Figure 5. The PRC’s Media Growth in Comparative Perspective, 1985–2002. .............39 Figure 6. The PRC’s International Organizational Membership, 1966-2000;

Frequency of the term of “hegemonism,” “multipolartity,” and “win-win” in the People’s Daily, 1978–2005....................................................................43

Figure 7. Frequency of PRC-DPRK political and military contact, 1989–2008.............58 Figure 8. Frequency of military contacts between the PRC and United States/ROK. ....61 Figure 9. Frequency of the most prevalent news frames regarding inter-Korean

issues in Chosun Ilbo, before the Kim Dae-jung administration (1992–1997) compared with during and after his administration (1998–2003). ........79

Figure 10. Frequency of North Korean Provocative Actions, 1990–2006........................79 Figure 11. Trends in South Korean attitudes toward the United States and the U.S.-

ROK alliance....................................................................................................87 Figure 12. The ROK’s Contribution to Defense Cost Sharing, 1989–2005....................106

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Military expenditures of the U.S., ROK, PRC, and DPRK, 1990–2008. ........25 Table 2. The PRC’s arms control treaty accessions, signature, and ratification............44 Table 3. Transfers of major conventional weapons in comparative perspective, the

USSR-DPRK and PRC-DPRK. .......................................................................57 Table 4. The PRC-DPRK military-to-military contacts, 1989–2008.............................59 Table 5. Amount of the PRC’s oil and grain aid............................................................63 Table 6. The PRC’s annual grant-type aid to the DPRK, 1994–2004. ..........................64 Table 7. Values of key material and ideational variables and expectations of the

PRC-DPRK alliance cohesion in comparative perspective. ............................67 Table 8. The ROK’s membership in international governmental and civilian

organization, 1960–1998..................................................................................74 Table 9. Changing South Korean perceptions of the United States...............................90 Table 10. Values of key material and ideational variables and expectations of the

U.S.-ROK alliance cohesion in comparative perspective. .............................110

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADB Asian Development Bank

APEC Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation

BBS Bulletin Board System

CCP Chinese Communist Party

CDIP Combined Defense Improvement Project

CENTRIX-K Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange-Korea

CFC Combined Forces Command

CPX Command Post Exercise

CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

CWC Chemical Weapons Convention

DCT Defense Consultative Talks

DPRK Democratic People’s of Republic of Korea

FDI Foreign Direct Investment

FDO Flexible Deterrence Option

FE Foal Eagle

FOTA Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative

FTA Free Trade Agreement

FMP Force Module Package

FMS Foreign Military Sales

GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GCC Ground Component Command

GPR Global Posture Review

IMF International Monetary Fund

INGO International Non-Government Organization

IR International Relations

KORUS Korea-United States

KPA Korean People’s Army

MCM Military Committee Meeting

MD Missile Defense

MOA Memorandum of Agreement

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MRL Multiple Rocket Launcher

MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime

NSC National Security Council

NPT Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

OPLAN Operational Plan

PACOM Pacific Command

PKO Peace Keeping Operation

PLA People’s Liberation Army

PRC People’s Republic of China

PSI Proliferation Security Initiative

QDR Quadrennial Defense Review

ROC Republic of China

ROK Republic of Korea

RSOI Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration

SCAP Strategic Consultation for Allied Partnership

SCM Security Consultative Meeting

SIGINT Signal Intelligence

SMA Special Measures Agreement

SOFA Status of Forces Agreement

SPI Security Policy Initiative

TPFDD Time=Phased Forces Deployment Data

TS Team Spirit

UFL Ulchi Focus Lens

USFK United States Forces in Korea

WFP World Food Programme

WEI Weighted Effectiveness Index

WHNS Wartime Host Nation Support

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

WRSA-K War Reserve Stocks for Allies-Korea

WTO World Trade Organization

WUI Weighted Unit Value

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Thank you, Lord, for giving me wisdom and health and fulfilling my wishes in the

United States. I would also like to express my special thanks, appreciation and gratitude

to Professor James Clay Moltz and Professor Jeffrey W. Knopf for their time,

discernment, knowledge, pointed guidance, and inexhaustible patience through the thesis

experience, as well as for nominating this thesis as an outstanding thesis of this year.

I also wish to thank and acknowledge Professor Han, Yong-sup, Professor Kimi,

Tae-joon, and Professor Park, Chang-hee from the Korea National Defense University for

instilling passion and confidence in me and providing their time and invaluable assistance

in my efforts to study at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School.

Finally, this thesis would not have been possible without the love, support,

encouragement, humor, patience, prayers, and wisdom of my beautiful wife Jihye, my

cute son Joonmo, and numerous other family members and friends in the Republic of

Korea and United States. I thank you all.

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1

I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE

The research question addressed in this thesis emerged from unexpected

developments among the post-Cold War alliances within the Northeast Asian region. The

U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance, which was created to defend the ROK, has

become stronger in recent years, even as the Democratic People’s of Republic of Korea’s

(DPRK) relative power has declined and its nuclear program frozen. At the same time,

the People’s Republic of China (PRC)-DPRK alliance, which defends the DPRK, has

faced far greater threats from the formidable United States and ROK. Yet this alliance

has weakened since the mid-1990s.

Existing International Relations (IR) theories on alliances, especially realism

(which sees alliance formation and dissolution as based on the balance of power or the

balance of threat), do not explain why new alliances were not formed against the U.S.,

the sole remaining superpower since the Soviet Union collapsed. Similarly, such theories

cannot explain why existing alliances against the U.S. and its allies, such as the PRC-

DPRK alliance, have been weakening. Many different schools suggest that a state’s self-

interest is the main motivation for its alliances. However, few theories provide a clear

explanation of why Beijing seems to be recalculating its interests and why its bonds with

the DPRK are steadily loosening.

The expectation of realists—that when opposition power weakens or disappears,

old disagreements among allies resurface, causing either “dissension in the alliance or

coalition breakdown”1—cannot explain existing alliances, such as the NATO, U.S.-ROK,

and U.S.-Japan alliances. These continue to be rated as firm alliances, even though no

superpower has threatened the allies or the United States since 1991. At the same time,

neither the U.S.-ROK nor PRC-DPRK alliance has followed the expectations of liberal

1 Barry B. Hughes, Continuity and Change in World Politics: Competing Perspectives (Upper Saddle

River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1997), 556.

2

theory that alliances should have a continuous process of “debate, competitions, and even

conflict over the limited sources and attention” to maximize benefits of international

arrangements while minimizing costs.2

The inability of existing IR theories to explain changes in the PRC-DPRK and

U.S.-ROK alliances requires discovering new determinants of the strength or weakness of

alliance cohesion, rather than focusing exclusively on power, threat, and interests. This

thesis does not deny the relevance of factors emphasized by existing IR theories.

However, this thesis claims that alliance cohesion in Northeast Asia is not solely a

product of the “externalities of material and individualistic properties,”3 and that the

explanation of alliance cohesion must be supplemented by “ideational factors and

processes,”4 such as collective identity, culture, and norms. Specifically, this thesis calls

attention to significant changes in both Chinese and South Korean collective identities

that have increasingly affected their security policies, external threat perceptions,

expectations regarding their alliances, and attitudes toward their allies.

B. IMPORTANCE

The changes in cohesiveness of the existing alliances and their determinants are

worth studying for three reasons. First, in contrast to previous studies of alliances focused

on European alliance formation and dissolution, changes in existing alliances in

Northeast Asia have received less attention despite the increasing importance of U.S.

interests in Asia. Second, in order to supplement the deficit of existing IR theories

explaining the anomalies of the U.S.-ROK and the PRC-DPRK alliances, analysts need to

consider determinants other than power, threat, and self-interest for the changes in those

alliances. Third, from a practical standpoint, it is important for the Obama administration

2 Jae-Jung Suh, Power, Interest, and Identity in Military Alliance (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 6.

3 Ramzy A. Mardini, “Socializing Realism’s Balance of Power: Collective Identity as Alliance Formation in Iraq” (Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 2008), 1.

4 Jae-Jung Suh, Peter J. Katzenstein, and Allen Carlson, Rethinking Security in East Asian: Identity, Power, and Efficiency (Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press, 2004), 9.

3

to recognize the current changes and their determinants in U.S. alliances, as well as the

alliances of its potential competitors, in order to take appropriate measures to preserve

U.S. interests in Northeast Asia.

In this respect, Northeast Asia’s two anomalous alliances are good illustrations of

dynamic changes in states’ collective identities and the impact of collective identity on

alliance cohesion. In other words, these two case studies can contribute to constructing a

cause-and-effect relationship between an ideational factor (as an independent variable)

and alliance cohesion (as a dependent variable). The main hypothesis examined in this

thesis is that the PRC and ROK have gone through significant changes in their collective

identities since the late 1970s and mid-1980s, respectively, and these changes have led to

shifts in the cohesion of their respect alliances with the DPRK and United States.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

Three bodies of literature are relevant for this thesis and are introduced in this

section. Research on the main alliances of the two Koreas provides the empirical raw

materials for this thesis. Research on collective identity and alliance cohesion is used to

identify the main independent and dependent variables for the study. Finally, theories of

alliances supply potential alternative explanations for the changes in alliance cohesion

studied here.

1. The PRC-DPRK and U.S.-ROK Alliances

The PRC and DPRK, as communist neighbors with ideological and cultural

affinity, fought shoulder-to-shoulder against the “imperialist American invasion”5 from

1950 to 1953, without having an official alliance treaty. This relationship of “flesh and

blood” was officially upgraded through the “PRC-DPRK Treaty of Friendship,

Cooperation and Mutual Assistance” in 1961. During the Cold War, the DPRK provided

the PRC with a “crucial buffer”6 against U.S. military intervention, and sometimes with

ideological support against the Soviet Union’s revisionism. At the same time, the value of

5 Immanuel Hsu, The Rise of Modern China (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2000), 661–662.

6 You Ji, “China and North Korea: a fragile relationship of strategic convenience,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 10, No. 28 (August 2001), 387.

4

the PRC to the DPRK was enormous; the DPRK received legitimacy for ruling the

northern part of the Korean Peninsula from its communist ally, and was able to protect its

regime against formidable U.S.-led alliances thanks to the PRC’s patronage.7

However, following the death of Mao Zedong in September 1976, the PRC, led

by Deng Xiaoping, started to recognize the extent of changes in the non-socialist world

and the revolution in science and technology that began in the previous decades. This led

Deng and the other Chinese leaders to instigate an “era of reform,”8 focused on political,

economic, and social reform, and the “open-door policy,” based on a new Chinese

ideational platform characterized as “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” 9 These

ideational changes were continued by Deng’s successors. The Chinese had reflected on

and altered their “broadly accepted representation of the state,” which this thesis refers to

as “collective identity,” with increasing effects on their foreign policies and relationships

with their allies. As a result, Beijing signed a peace treaty with Tokyo in 1978,

normalized diplomatic relations with Washington in 1979, restored friendly relations with

the Soviet Union in 1989, and officially recognized the ROK in 1992, while urging

Pyongyang to follow the Chinese style of reform. In addition, since the mid-1990s,

Beijing has worked to counter the “China threat” perception and convince its neighbors

that the PRC is a “benign and peaceful rising power.” 10 The Chinese have put an

emphasis on their nation’s reputation as a responsible power.

Since the reform policies launched in the late 1970s by Deng Xiaoping, the PRC-

DPRK alliance has cooled, as witnessed by a variety of military and diplomatic

developments. The North Korean leadership criticized almost every element of Deng’s

reform policy and sometimes called Deng a “traitor to socialism.”11 This is because

7 Ji, “China and North Korea: a fragile relationship of strategic convenience,” 387–388.

8 Peter R. Moody, “The Evolution of China’s National Interest: Implications for Taiwan,” in Identity and Change in East Asian Conflicts: The Cases of China, Taiwan, and the Koreas, eds., Shale A. Horowitz, Uk Heo and Alexander C. Tan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 32.

9 Alan Lawrence, China Under Communism (London, UK: Routledge, 2008), 107–122.

10 Susan L. Shirk, China, Fragile Superpower (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2007), 105–112.

11 Gregory, J. Moore, “How North Korea threatens China’s interests: Understanding Chinese ‘duplicity’ on the North Korean nuclear issue,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 8, No.1 (January 2008), 7.

5

Deng’s new reform policies, based on socialism with Chinese characteristics, were

conceived as threats to the ideology of “Juche (independence and self-reliance)” and

“genuine Marxism-Leninism,” which have been the central to the DPRK’s collective

identity.12 Specifically, the chaos of the 1989 democracy movement and the Tiananmen

crisis in the PRC, motivated by economic and social interaction with the outside world,

gave a shock to Pyongyang and complicated the relationship with the PRC.

Moreover, Beijing has upgraded its fast-growing economic, political, and military

ties with the ROK since 1992. Chinese leaders clearly no longer regard South Korea as a

potential enemy and think that the older commitment, especially from the DPRK side,

has been unreliable.13 In addition, although the PRC, unlike Russia, did not revise its

alliance treaty, many Chinese and Western analysts doubt whether the PRC-DPRK

military obligations could be fulfilled in case of war against the U.S.-ROK alliance. In

fact, at present, the PRC and the DPRK rarely agree on historical ties, ideological stances,

political and diplomatic programs, or military exchanges.14

On the other hand, the United States and ROK did not share a common ideology,

culture, political system, or common interests in the region until the outbreak of the

Korean War in 1950. Right before the war occurred in June 1950, statements by President

Truman and Secretary of State Acheson that Korea was outside the U.S. defense

perimeter in Asia indicated that Korea lacked significant value in terms of U.S. interests.

However, during the Korean War, both countries started recognizing the necessity of an

alliance, resulting in the U.S.-ROK mutual defense treaty of October 1, 1953.15 However,

their initial perspectives on the alliance were different. From the ROK’s perspective, the

alliance was essential to help recover from the war, build up its strength in the contest

with its rival, and defend itself against strong physical threats from North Korea. The

12 Charles K. Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press,

2003), 2; Ji, “China and North Korea: a fragile relationship of strategic convenience,” 390.

13 Scott Zhou, “All teeth and lips – for now,” Asia Times, October 21. 2006, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HJ21Ad01.html (accessed March 12, 2009).

14 Ibid., 388.

15 ROK Ministry of National Defense, ROK-U.S. Alliance and USFK (Seoul: ROK Ministry of National Defense Press, 2003), 37.

6

United States saw the alliance not only as a useful means of defending the ROK against

the DPRK, but also as a meaningful signal to the rest of world of its commitment to

supporting peace and democracy.

Domestic political instability in the ROK that led to the assassination of President

Park Chung-hee in 1979, and international pressure with the “Third Wave” of

democratization, pushed South Korea to adopt rapid democratization and globalization.16

Since the mid-1980s, this transition to democracy and globalization not only improved

South Korean human rights and brought about its political development, but also

established healthy grounds for its relationships with democratic allies and the

international community.

As the ROK economy continued to enjoy remarkable growth during the 1970s

and 1980s, with a rapid expansion in middle-class and highly educated citizens, public

hope for democracy, human rights, and equality started to receive attention. The ROK

democratic movement peaked in 1988 with the Seoul Olympic Games. 17 The

democratization and globalization movements in the ROK brought both challenges and

opportunities to the U.S.-ROK alliance. A series of temporary turbulent moments arose in

the U.S.-ROK alliance in the late 1990s through early 2000s, caused by fluctuations in

South Korean collective identity, including growing anti-American sentiment as an

extension of South Korean nationalism, progressive ideas in government policies,

divisions in South Korean public opinion, and the younger generation’s changing

perceptions of North Korea and the United States.18

Nevertheless, through the transition of democratization and globalization, the

ROK has become more inclined to get involved in regional and international affairs and

encourage domestic political debates over their government policies. Today, both

16 Uk Heo and Jung-Yeop Woo, “South Korea’s Response: Democracy, Identity, and Strategy,” in

Identity and Change in East Asian Conflicts: The Cases of China, Taiwan, and the Koreas, eds., Horowitz, Heo, and Tan, 150–151.

17 Heo and Woo, “South Korea’s Response: Democracy, Identity, and Strategy,” 151.

18 Chung-in Moon and Seung-Won Suh, “Identity Politics, Nationalism, and the Future of Northeast Asian Order,” in The United States and Northeast Asia: Debate, Issues, and New Order, eds., G. John Ikenberry and Chung-In Moon (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2008), 203–206.

7

countries seek to strengthen the U.S.-ROK alliance as strategically crucial in the twenty-

first century, while simultaneously pursuing “common values, interests, and norms.”19 In

fact, Washington and Seoul agreed to expand the role of the alliance into regional and

global security issues as well as non-traditional security issues beyond the theater of the

Korean peninsula. Subsequently, they have attempted to upgrade and diversify military

cooperation, joint exercises, diplomatic and military communication channels, U.S.

military bases in Korean territory, and the ROK’s international responsibilities. For these

reasons, the U.S.-ROK alliance is still rated among the most formidable, durable alliances

in the world.

2. State Identity

This thesis examines the importance of state identity (a state’s collective identity)

as an independent variable for explaining alliance dynamics. Collective identity has been

comprehensively analyzed by the school of social constructivism, which argues that

identity, norms, and culture influence state action and behavior. Although constructivists’

definitions of collective identity are not constant, depending on “issue, time, and place,

and whether they are bilateral, regional, or global,” 20 and they are frequently

interchanged with similar concepts of state/national identity, norms, and culture,21 it is

not a key point of this thesis to distinguish each definition of these terms. Instead, this

thesis focuses on general ideas concerning collective identity and its formation and

influence on a nation and its alliances.

Alexander Wendt defines collective identity as a “basis for feelings of solidarity,

community, and loyalty and thus for collective definitions of interest.” 22 From his

perspective, collective identity creates representations of self, others, enemies, and allies,

19 Alexander A. Arvizu, “A New Beginning for the U.S.-South Korea Strategic Alliance,” statement

before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in Washington D.C. on April 23, 2008, http://seoul.usembassy.gov/rok_042308.html.

20 Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 2 (June 1994), 6.

21 Maxym Alexandrov, “The Concept of State Identity in International Relations: A Theoretical Analysis,” Journal of International Development and Cooperation, Vol. 10, No. 1 (September 2003), 34.

22 Ibid., 3.

8

, such as national crises.30

while being shaped and reshaped by “inter-subjective internal and external structures,”23

and it promotes people’s willingness to act on “generalized principles of conduct.” 24

Hence, changes in the collective identity of a nation mean that the nation’s view of both

its domestic and international contexts has changed and, consequently, its government

policies are expected to be changed. 25 On the other hand, Peter Katzenstein—who

defines identity as a “shorthand label for varying constructions of nation- and

statehood” 26 —argues that collective identities are “produced, reproduced, and

transformed as they affect the prospects for social learning and the diffusion of collective

norms and individual beliefs.”27 He also argues that a state is a social actor, and thus it is

embedded in “social rules and conventions” that constitute its collective identity, which

also interacts with different social environments domestically and internationally. 28

Similarly, Marc Lynch uses the term “identity” in a broader context of collective

definitions of self. He defines identity as “not only the concepts held by a state’s leaders,

but the set of beliefs about the nature and purpose of the state expressed in public

articulations of state actions and ideals.” 29 From his perspective, a state’s “public

sphere,” formed through public contestation, can influence the state’s identity and

behavior because huge public discussions or debates on identity, values, and interests in

many countries are seen at certain moments

More recently, Maxym Alexandrov defines collective identity as a set of broadly

accepted representations of a state, particularly in its relation to another state, together

23 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press,

1999), 21, 342.

24 Ibid., 4.

25 Ibid., 429.

26 Peter J. Katzenstein, “Introduction,” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed., Katzenstein (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1996), 3–9.

27 Suh, Katzenstein, and Carlson, Rethinking Security in East Asian: Identity, Power, and Efficiency, 9.

28 Katzenstein, “Introduction,” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, 9–11.

29 Marc Lynch, “Abandoning Iraq: Jordan’s alliances and the politics of state identity,” Security Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2, (December 1998), 349.

30 Ibid., 349–351.

9

uestions of

with “corresponding beliefs about the appropriate behavior, rights or responsibilities.”31

Sheldon Stryker also argues that collective identity is frequently conceptualized culturally

and is equivalent to the “ideas, beliefs, and practices of a society.”32 Chung-in Moon and

Seung-Won Suh assert that the significance of national collective identity is its strong

influence on shared norms, interests, and images of other countries, which ultimately

affects a state’s behavior.33 In a similar vein, Shale Horowitz, Uk Heo, and Alexander

Tan define national identity in Identity and Changes in East Asian Conflicts as “the group

that the state is supposed to serve and protect,” which is associated with “national cultural,

economic, political, and geopolitical goals” that the state is supposed to promote.34 They

believe that national identity has strong implications for defining national interests when

looking for the reasons for continuing conflicts between the ROK and DRRK, and

between the PRC and the Republic of China (ROC), despite the transformation of each

state’s national identity since the end of the Cold War. From their perspective, changing

national identities interact with changing external conditions to influence “political

competition and leadership outcomes,” and thus national security objectives. 35 In

addition, Brad Glosserman and Scott Snyder, who reveal that Northeast Asian states’

identity crises affect their alliance system, view national identity as “values” that the

majority of a state’s people want to preserve, which can be measured by public opinion

on self-perception or other-perception.36 They emphasize the function of state identity in

foreign and security policy formulation, because today, political issues related to

q

31 Alexandrov, “The Concept of State Identity in International Relations: A Theoretical Analysis,” 39.

32 Sheldon Stryker, “Identity Competition: Key to Differential Social Movement Participation,” in Sheldon Stryker, Timothy J. Owens, and Robert W. White, eds., Self, Identity, and Social Movements (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 22.

33 Moon and Suh, “Identity Politics, Nationalism, and the Future of Northeast Asian Order,” 194.

34 Horowitz, Heo and Tan, eds., Identity and Change in East Asian Conflicts: The Cases of China, Taiwan, and the Koreas, 3.

35 Ibid.

36 Brad Glosserman and Scott Snyder, “Confidence and Confusion: National Identity and Security Alliances in Northeast Asia,” Issues and Insights, Vol. 8, No. 16 (September 2008), 1–3.

10

ry for politicians to consider public perceptions as they

influence policy formulation.37

pective of “collective power, ideology, communication, and national security

issues.”

state identity have emerged as “irresistible tools for politicians to gain domestic political

support,” and thus it is necessa

3. Alliance Cohesion

Analysts have advanced both broad and narrow definitions of alliances. George

Liska, a pioneer of the study of alliances, defines an alliance as “an event in politics as is

conflict,” arguing that an alliance associates “like-minded actors in the hope of

overcoming their rivals.”38 From his view, an alliance, as a military coalition, is essential

in explaining international relations. Donald Zagoria, Christopher Bladen, Ole Hosti,

Terrence Hopmann and John Sullivan are other scholars who interpret alliances in a

wider pers39

In contrast, Robert Osgood, who studies alliance politics through NATO, limits

his definition of an alliance to the military aspect, arguing that an alliance is common

defense through the use of military power.40 According to his later definition, an alliance

refers to “a formal agreement that pledges states to cooperate in using their military

resources against a specific state or states and usually obligates one or more of the

signatories to use force, or to consider the use of force, in specified circumstances.”41 In

criticizing Liska’s and Zagoria’s broader definitions, George Modelski distinguishes

between alliances and alignment. Modelski argues that alliances are directly concerned

37 Glosserman and Snyder, “Confidence and Confusion: National Identity and Security Alliances in

Northeast Asia.”

38 George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), 301.

39 Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956–1961 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962), 484; Ole R. Holsti, Terrence P. Hopmann and John D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Studies (Toronto, Canada: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1973), 4; Friedman, Bladen and Rosen, Alliance in International Politics (Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 1970), 121.

40 Robert Endicott Osgood, NATO, the Entangling Alliance (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 416.

41 Robert E. Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), 171.

11

due to their

commit

r plans, or the amount of support to

be prov

with defense matters and military collaboration, while “alignments” can be regarded as

referring to “all type of international political cooperation.” 42 Julian Friedman,

Christopher Bladen, Steven Rosen, K. Holsti and Glenn Snyder also distinguish alliances

from other experiences of diplomatic coalitions and international cooperation, such as

integration, multinational community building, and economic partnerships,

ments by treaty and the degree of military integration among allies.43

In a similar manner, definitions of alliance cohesion vary from narrow to much

broader interpretations, depending on the definitions of an alliance. Liska sees alliance

cohesion as the degree to which allies stay together and act together, which is determined

by “ideologies and diplomatic style, consultations and compromise, capabilities and

pressure, and pretensions and coercion within the alliance.” 44 On the other hand,

Freidman, Bladen, and Rosen argue that the degree of cohesion is relative to “its vitality

rather than durability” and that agreement among allies regarding the sharing of costs and

rewards is the most important determinant of the degree of alliance cohesion. 45 In

addition, Holsti, who distinguishes alliances from other forms of international

cooperation, asserts that alliance cohesion can be altered by three factors: changes in the

essential purpose of the alliance, incompatibility of the major social and political values

of the allies, and development of nuclear weapons.46 From Snyder’s perspective, because

alliance cohesion is determined by conflict and common interests of allies, allying states

continue bargaining over levels of preparedness, wa

ided in crisis confrontations with enemies.47

42 George Modelski, “The Study of Alliances: A Review,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 7,

No. 4 (December 1963), 769–776.

43 Julian R. Friedman, Christopher Bladen and Steven Rosen, Alliance in International Politics (Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 1970), 383; K. J. Holsti, “Diplomatic Coalitions and Military Alliances” in Alliance in International Politics (Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 1970), 93–103; Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 3–4.

44 Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence, 61–116.

45 Friedman, Bladen and Rosen, Alliance in International Politics, 288.

46 Holsti, “Diplomatic Coalitions and Military Alliances,” 99-103.

47 Snyder, Alliance Politics, 3.

12

s, whether allies facilitate cooperation in production and

develop

ture draws attention to three core elements of

cohesion: agreement on alliance purpose, extent of military cooperation, and extent of

econom

Although alliance cohesion is constantly changing, which makes it difficult to

measure at any given time, some scholars have sought to evaluate alliance cohesion in a

quantitative manner. Notable are Henry Teune and Sig Synnestvedt, who developed

fourteen variables as indices to measure international alignment in 1965, such as military

alliances, military presence, military aid, visits by heads of state and of government,

important visitors other than heads of state and of government, protests and expulsions of

diplomatic personnel, educational and cultural exchanges, and anti-ally state riots.48 More

recently, Charles Kupchan, in examining intra-alliance behavior of the states within

NATO and of the Persian Gulf states, asserts that alliance cohesion can be measured

along three dimensions: joint operations or military assistance to each other, forms of

compromise on policy issues through official statements and documents, and economic

contributions to collective defense capability.49 Victor Cha suggests that an alliance’s

success is measured by six aspects: how much an alliance serves as a facilitator of power

accretion and projection, whether allies operate under a unified command, how much

allies share common tactics and doctrine through joint training, how much allies promote

a division of security role

ment of military equipment, and how much allies create political support among

domestic constituencies.50

Taken as a whole, this litera

ic contribution to the alliance.

48 Henry Teune and Sig Synnestvedt, “Diplomatic Coalitions and Military Alliance.” in Friedman,

Bladen, and Rosen, Alliance in International Politics, 321.

49 Charles A. Kupchan, “NATO and the Persian Gulf: Examining Intra-Alliance Behavior,” International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 2 (Spring 1988), 317–326.

50 Kurt Campbell, Victor Cha, Lindsey Ford, Nirav Patel, Randy Schriver, and Vikram Singh, Going Global: The Future of the U.S.-South Korea Alliance (Washington D.C.: Center for a New American Security, 2009), 12.

13

, Kenneth Waltz defines

egemonic bid” and

bandwagoning

ater the global imbalance of power is, the greater the

motive to form

no other superpower threatens the allies or the United States, shows the limitations of

4. Existing IR Theories on Alliances

a. Power-Based Theory

Most previous studies on alliances are dominated by the classical realist

perspective, i.e., the argument that changes in the balance of power influence alliance

politics. From the balance of power perspective, balance means actual or constructed

equality of military capability among the great powers, to prevent one state/alliance from

achieving dominance. In Theory of International Politics

balancing as “joining with the weaker side in an effort to prevent a h

as “joining [a] stronger coalition.” Waltz argues that balancing should be

more common in the anarchical international system. 51 Similarly, Hans Morgenthau

argues that alliances are often formed based on the “function of preserving the status

quo.”52 John Mearsheimer adds that balance of power logic often causes great powers to

form alliances and cooperate against common enemies.53

Using the balance of power logic, alliance cohesion is relatively flexible

and weak because alliances can be formed or dissolved by great powers depending on

their needs. In other words, the gre

and maintain alliances. For this reason, Robert Kann argues that, based on

balance of power, allies need to maintain a minimum level of alliance cohesion in order

to sustain the alliance.54 Barry Hughes expects that when opposition power weakens, old

disagreements among alliance partners will resurface, causing either dissension in the

alliance or coalition breakdown.55

However, the fact that numerous alliances, such as NATO, the U.S.-ROK

and the U.S.-Japan alliances, continue to be evaluated as very firm alliances even though

51 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 263–265.

52 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Knopf, 1972), 43.

53 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), 52–53.

54 Robert A. Kann, “Alliance versus Ententes,” World Politics, Vol. 28, No. 4 (July 1976), 612.

55 Hughes, Continuity and Change in World Politics: Competing Perspectives, 556.

14

er

South Korea. Moreover, a realist perspective does not provide an answer to questions

such as, “Wh rmed against the United States as a

superpower af

andwagoning as

“alignment wi

mphasize self-interest as the motive of alliances. Critics such as Randall Schweller

rgue that Walt defines bandwagoning too narrowly, to encompass only the coercive or

balance of power theory. In actuality, the U.S.-ROK alliance was created not only by the

demand of a strong power, the United States, but also by the strong demand of the weak

y has no new alliance yet been fo

ter the demise of the Soviet Union?” For these reasons, this perspective is

criticized by other schools of thought for focusing only on material variables and

downplaying the importance of domestic and ideational factors in alliance decisions.56

b. Threat-Based Theory

In addition to using the concept of power to explain alliances and alliance

cohesion, some realists argue that the motivation to form alliances come not from

imbalances of power due to the sudden advent of a superpower, but from a state’s threat

perception.57

58

Walt argues that a state’s alliance choice is driven by an “imbalance of

threat,” which is evaluated by the other side’s “aggregate power, geographic proximity,

offensive capability, and the perceived aggressiveness of its intentions.” By recasting

the previous balance of power theory as the balance of threat theory, Walt redefines

balancing as “allying with others against the prevailing threat,” and b

th the source of danger,” and concludes that states usually balance and

rarely bandwagon.59 In such threat-based alliance theory, the greater the threat perceived

by a weaker state, the stronger the motive for alliance formation and cohesion. In other

words, a weaker state perceiving a strong threat has a greater motive to ally with a

stronger power to balance against the perceived threat from its enemies.

However, the balance of threat theory is criticized by realists who

e

a

56 Randall L. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back in,”

Inte

Y: Cornell Univ. Press, 1987), 21–26.

ry of International Politics, 263–265.

rnational Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), 74.

57 Stephan M. Walt, The Origin of Alliance (Ithaca, N

58 Waltz, Theo

59 Ibid., 265.

15

yo in 1945. These two cases show that, to some extent, these

iables, such as aggregate power,

military capabilities, and geographic distance. Ji Hyo-Keun claims that the temporary

deterioration of the U.S. e to changes in the

DPRK’s physi

compulsory aspect of the concept.60 From Schweller’s perspective, the balance of threat

theory does not explain why Italy declared war against France in 1940 or why Moscow

declared war against Tok

states neither chose to balance against a stronger side nor acted based on threats from the

other states.61 Instead, they bandwagoned with the strongest side, in the hopes of making

territorial or other gains.

In addition, most realists in the 1990s, including Mearsheimer, Wesson,

Cohen and Snyder, expected that as the bipolar confrontation and threats diminished,

NATO would lose its importance and internal cohesion.62 However, reality did not turn

out the way the realists expected. Since the Cold War, NATO has expanded its influence

into the Eastern European countries and accepted many of them as NATO members.

Numerous research studies have analyzed why the realists’ expectations did not match

reality. One significant reason is that although threat-based theory emphasizes threat

perception, which involves cognitive perspectives such as state’s intention, history, and

identity, the theory focuses mainly on material var

-ROK alliance in the early 2000s was not du

cal threats, but because of domestic growth in South Korean nationalism,

autonomy, and self-confidence, as well as Washington’s new perspective toward its allies

and partners after the September 11 terrorist attacks.63

60 Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” 81.

61 Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” 82.

62 Eliot A. Cohen, “The Long-Term Crisis of the Alliance,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 2 (Winter 1982/1983), 325–343; John J. Mearsheimer, “Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War,” The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 266, No. 2 (August 1990), 35–50; Glenn H. Synder, “Alliances, Balance, and Stability,” International Organization, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Winter 1991); Robert G. Wesson, International Relations in Transition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1990), 306.

63 Ji Hyo-Keun, “Alliance Security Culture and Alliance Cohesion” (Ph.D. diss., Yonsei University, 2006), 38.

16

rm an asymmetric alliance with a stronger state. In Morrow’s view, some

states would re

t numerous security benefits of

alliances, including deterrence of attack, defense capability against attack, preclusion of

alli r

c. Self-Interest-Based Theory

In rejecting power or threat-based theories, some realists criticize these

approaches for focusing only on security issues and failing to consider other interests that

might incline a nation to ally with the stronger side. For instance, Schweller, Sweeney

and Fritz reveal that bandwagoning, or allying with the stronger side, is more common in

the international system because alliances are actually formed on the basis of common

interests rather than power distribution alone.64 By allying, states achieve their particular

goals in security and non-security issues relatively easily. In other words, most states

would rather not pursue balancing because it imposes high costs on them. Instead,

through bandwagoning, an alliance becomes a “means to profit,” as Schweller remarks.65

In addition, James Morrow, who studies asymmetric alliances, argues that security

concerns like balancing power or threat are not the only determinants of a weaker state’s

decision to fo

linquish their autonomy to gain security by allying with the stronger side,

while other states would relinquish security to gain autonomy by allying with the weaker

side.66 Michael Barnett and Jack Levy also find that, particularly for countries in the

Third World, the realist perspectives undervalue the “role of state-society relations and

internal threats and constraints,” such as political and economic problems, in alliance

formation.67

David Lalman, David Newman, and Glenn Snyder enumerate the costs

and benefits of alliances. 68 For example, Snyder lis s

ance or alignment between the partner and the opponent, and increased control o

64 Kevin Sweeney and Paul Fritz, “Jumping on the Bandwagon: An Interest-Based Explanation for

Grea

the Revisionist State Back in,” 72.

Summer 1991), 369–379.

, “Alliance Formation and National Security,” International Inte ol. 16, No. 4 (January 1991), 240.

t Power Alliances,” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 66, No. 2 (May 2004), 429.

65 Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing

66 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and James D. Morrow, “Sorting Through the Wealth of Notions,” International Security, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Fall 1999), 61.

67 Michael Barnett and Jack Levy, “Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt,” International Organization, Vol. 45, No. 3 (

68 David Lalman and David Newmanraction, V

17

influence over

o omic calculations. In addition, from an

interest-based ory to have continuous “debates,

competitions, and even conflict over the limited resources and attention” to determine the

best institutional arr

the allied state.69 He also enumerates the costs of alliance, including the

risk of having to aid of the ally, the risk of entrapment in war by the ally, the risk of a

counter-alliance, foreclosure of alternative alliance options, and the general constraints on

free action inherent in coordinating policies with allies.70

In interest-based theories, alliance cohesion depends on how much allies

share common interests compared with the costs they have to pay. Thus, if they want to

maintain the alliance, allies try to keep it alive by advancing their own interests within it.

In Snyder’s view, after the alliance-formation phase, allies may bargain over “levels of

preparedness, war plans, or the amount of support to be provided in crisis confrontations

with the adversary, or they may entirely renegotiate the original contract.”71 However,

one weakness of this interest-based theory is that the interest of a state or alliance is

measured by material variables, especially ec n

the perspective, allies are supposed

angements for the future, but both the U.S.-ROK and PRC-DPRK

alliances lacked such discussions in the 1990s.72

d. Collective Identity-Based Theory

Since the late 1980s, constructivists have tried to point out deficiencies in

realist interpretations of alliance persistence, highlighting instead the role of identity,

norms or culture in state actions.73 They argue that previous theories focused only on

material factors, and ignored ideational factors and processes that create the basis of the

arguments that realists advocate (in fact, most realists believe that ideational variables

69 Snyder, Alliance Politics, 43–44.

70 Ibid.

71 Snyder, Alliance Politics, 3.

72 Suh, Power, Interest, and Identity in Military Alliance, 6.

fic: A nal Studies Association 41st Annual Conference, Mar. 14–18, 2000,

http et.org/isa/nas01/index.html#txt22.

73 Peter J. Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 32; Shaun Narine, “Economic and Security in the Asia PaciConstructivist Analysis” (Internatio

://www.ciaon

18

e PRC’s participation in international institutions between 1980

and 2000—arg

may help explain only “deviant cases,” but they “cannot explain non-deviant cases”).74

From their perspective, ideational structures mediate how actors “perceive, construct, and

reproduce the institutional and material structures they inhabit,” as well as their own roles

and identities within them.75 This is because different peoples, groups, and government

agents can interact intensively and exchange specialized information, corporate identities,

missions and normative cores inside institutions. For example, Alastair Johnston—who

studies the pattern of th

ues that “microprocesses of socialization (i.e., mimicking, social influence,

and persuasion)” within Chinese society helps explain the Chinese attitude and Beijing’s

policy of “more cooperative and potentially self-constraining commitments” to major

security institutions.76

In constructivist analyses of state behavior and relations between states,

ideational factors and processes are important for tracing “whether collective actors are

likely to form enmity or amity.”77 Hence, an alliance is formed based on shared identity,

norms, and cultures, which ultimately promote common interests. In contrast to power-,

threat-, and interest-based theories that emphasize external material factors in alliance

formation, constructivists emphasize the meanings and values embedded in those factors.

From their perspective, even threat perception is socially constructed and reproduced in

both domestic and international context. In other words, the standard for individuals and

societies distinguishing between the self and the other—and what constitutes threats to

the self, and how to respond—determines which factors get priority in threat

assessments. 78 From this perspective, Peter Katzenstein theorizes that, although the

balancing of power or threat is somewhat applicable to some Asian countries, realist

approaches, by disregarding the long legacies of Chinese influence, anti-Japanese enmity,

74 Suh, Katzenstein, and Carlson, Rethinking Security in East Asian: Identity, Power, and Efficiency,

6; A rinceton, NJ: Princet

9.

lastair I. Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980–2000 (Pon Univ. Press, 2008), xix.

75 Ibid.,

76 Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980–2000, 197.

77 Ibid.

78 Rousseau, Identifying Threats and Threa10ing Identities : The Social Construction of Realism and Liberalism, 4.

19

e U.S.-

Israeli alliance.82 In contrast, some constructivists, including Wendt and Katzenstein, try

broader concept of collective identity. They argue that

collecti

and deep-rooted Confucianism, fail to explain the current situation in the region. 79

Similarly, David Kang argues that East Asian state alignments are not necessarily

determined by the material variables realists use to explain European state alignments,

but are affected also by historical experiences or cultural influences like the long legacy

of China’s predominance in East Asia.80 In studying PRC-DPRK relations during the

second half of the twentieth century, You Ji concludes that strong alliance cohesion

cannot be “built upon shared strategic interest [based on logics of power and threat]”

alone, but must be “nurtured by common value judgment and social and political

systems.”81 Michael Barnett attempts to verify the relationships between state identity

and alliance formation by examining various cases of inter-Arab relations and th

to explain alliances based on the

ve identity within alliances shapes states’ interests and behavior; thus, the more

collective identities are shared among allies, the greater the alliance’s cohesion.83

D. METHODOLOGY

This research attempts to discover the ideational determinants of cohesion or

discord, besides power, threat, and self-interest, in the PRC-DPRK and U.S.-ROK

alliances, beginning, respectively, with the Deng reform era and the ROK’s transition to

democracy and globalization. This thesis focuses on the changes in collective identities of

the Chinese and the South Koreans in these periods because the United States and DPRK

arguably did not undergo major changes in their collective identities, while their allies,

the PRC and the ROK, experienced significant changes. The United States has

79 Katzenstein, “Conclusion: National Security in a Changing World,” in The Culture of National

Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed., Peter J. Katzenstein, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 521.

80 David C. Kang, “Hierarchy, Balancing, and Empirical Puzzles in Asia International Relations,” International Security, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Winter 2003/2004), 174–180.

81 Ji, “China and North Korea: a fragile relationship of strategic convenience,” Journal of Contemporary China, 390.

82 Michael N. Barnett, “Identity and Alliance in the Middle East,” in The Culture of National Security, ed., Katzenstein, 400–401.

83 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 429.

20

thesis

examin

hich have been expanding despite their still antagonistic

relation

direction in alliance cohesion.

maintained its commitment to defend democracy and free markets in the ROK from the

DPRK since the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, while the DPRK retains a

consistent political, historical, and cultural identity and continues to see its alliance with

the PRC as necessary for survival in an uncertain regional context. The main hypo

ed in the thesis is that the PRC and the ROK underwent significant changes in

their collective identities during these periods and that the changes in their collective

identities led to shifts in the cohesion of their respective alliances with the DPRK and the

United States. To test this hypothesis, the thesis presents two cases studies, treating the

changing Chinese and South Korean collective identities as independent variables, and

the cohesion of the PRC-DPRK, and U.S.-ROK4 alliances as dependent variables.

Exploring the relationship between collective identity and alliance cohesion is a

challenging task. This is not only because of the relatively small number of prior research

studies that have touched on the relevant issues, but also because it is difficult to define

and measure the concepts that make up the ambiguous variables involved in collective

identity and alliance cohesion. For this reason, this thesis uses the narrow interpretation

of alliance as a formal agreement between two or more nation-states that pledge military

cooperation for security purposes against an actual or anticipated enemy. Similarly, this

thesis defines alliance cohesion as the degree to which allies stay together and cooperate

to defend and promote their common security interests under their mutual obligations and

commitments, and the thesis measures alliance cohesion mainly by its military aspects.

These narrow interpretations are necessary because broader definitions are difficult to

distinguish from current economic relations between the PRC and the ROK, and/or the

United States and the PRC, w

s in the military field. In addition, it is important to remember that in measuring

the ideational independent variable (collective identity) and dependent variable (alliance

cohesion) the aim of the research is not to quantify each variable, but to study the trend of

qualitative changes in different periods. The goal is to assess whether qualitative changes

in ideational factors toward greater or lesser-shared identity produce changes in the same

21

ted by official statements or

politica

For the purpose of study, this thesis evaluated collective identity by examining the

PRC’s and the ROK’s political and economic transformations, their roles in and

commitments to the international community, their nationalism and self-confidence (as

shown by public polls, mass media commentary, official government publications, and

statements by political elites, who are the “primary creators and reproducers of a state’s

collective identity”84). Simultaneously, the cohesion of each alliance investigated in this

study is measured by both quantitative and qualitative data in order to overcome the

limitations in the lack of reliable information about the PRC-DPRK alliance and in

calculating relative military capability. In other words, there is not enough information

available about the PRC-DPRK military alliance, so this thesis measures the changes in

that alliance with information from secondary sources, such as national newspapers,

government statements, and Chinese and foreign analysts’ comments and predictions. In

addition, although there is sufficient reliable information about the U.S.-ROK alliance to

evaluate its cohesion quantitatively, some statistical data used in many previous studies

are not applicable to current changes in alliance cohesion. For example, changes in the

absolute number of U.S. military forces in the ROK, which Tenue, Synnestvedt and Ji use

for measuring alliance cohesion, does not reflect qualitative changes in today’s slimmer

but powerfully integrated military forces inside and outside the ROK territory. For these

reasons, alliance cohesion in this thesis is gauged according to three dimensions: (1) the

level of consensus on military security issues as indica

l support among domestic constituencies for these issues, (2) the frequency, level,

and nature of military exchanges and assistance, such as arms transfer, military-to-

military contacts, and joint/combined operations, and (3) economic contributions to

mutual defense security for the U.S.-ROK alliance, as well as the PRC’s food and energy

aid to the DPRK that could be used for military purposes.

This thesis contains five chapters. This first chapter has briefly explained the

research questions and methodology, and defined the two key terms “collective identity”

and “alliance cohesion,” as the independent and dependent variables of the study. The

84 Anne L. Clunan, The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins

Univ. Press, 2009), 227.

22

s driving changes in the South Korean collective identity through the

transitions of democratization and globalization, and then analyzes how these changes

have affected the U.S.-ROK alliance cohesion. Chapter V concludes the thesis by

verifying the overall causal relationship between the variables and summarizing the

theoretical and practical implications, as well as policy recommendations for enhancing

alliance cohesion.

first chapter has also discussed existing IR explanations of alliances, such as power,

threat, self-interest, and state identity-based theories, and the research tools used in this

thesis to measure the variables and reveal the relationships between them. Chapter II

briefly summarizes realist perspectives on the PRC-DPRK and U.S.-ROK alliances and

highlights their deficiencies to call attention to the ideational determinant of cohesion in

the alliances. Chapter III examines changes in Chinese collective identity since Deng’s

reform era, focusing on their self-perception and their perceptions of others, including the

United States, ROK, and DPRK. It then assesses the cohesion of the PRC-DPRK alliance

in terms of the three dimensions, mentioned above. In a similar manner, Chapter IV first

describes the force

24

II. REALIST PERSPECTIVES OF THE PRC-DPRK AND U.S.-ROK ALLIANCES

Realists argue that greater imbalances of power and/or threat result in greater

motives to form and maintain alliances. In Northeast Asia, in particular on the Korean

peninsula, the imbalance of power between the PRC-DPRK alliance and the U.S.-ROK

alliances and the level of perceived threat to Beijing and Pyongyang has increased rapidly

RK

allianc

Focusing exclusively on the military aspect, there is substantial evidence of a power

imbala

info e

te of

PRC

since the end of the Cold War. The realist perspective predicts that the PRC-DP

e will remain as strong as it was during the Cold War era to balance against the

formidable United States and growing ROK, while the U.S.-ROK alliance will lose its

original rationale and purpose for the alliance and become weaker. However, this realist

prediction does not provide a clear explanation for why the cohesion of the two alliances

does not match their prediction and why Chinese and South Korean perception of threat

and the enemy have changed independent of the shift of balance of power/threat in the

region. This chapter discusses realist perspectives on the PRC-DPRK and U.S.-ROK

alliances and points out their deficiencies, focusing on the impact of changes in Chinese

and South Korean collective identities on the cohesion of the two alliances.

A. BALANCE OF POWER IN NORTHEAST ASIA

To understand the balance of power in East Asia, in particular between the PRC-

DPRK and U.S.-ROK, the military balance in the region should be assessed first.

nce between the PRC-DPRK alliance and the U.S.-ROK alliance. First, data

presented in Table 1 on military expenditures of the United States, ROK, PRC, and

DPRK show a huge gap. Although it is believed that the PRC does not release reliable

rmation about its military spending, and outside estimates are controversial (and th

gap is gradually narrowing as PRC’s economy has grown), the maximum estima

’s military expenditure is still far behind the United States’.

25

Yr 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008

U.S. 306,170 331,280 296,188 263,727 256,051 342,167 387,297 480,444 511,171 548,531

ROK 11,666 13,130 13,625 15,481 15,182 16,652 17,605 19,004 21,224 23,773

PRC 10,800 13,800 12,200 13,700 16,900 23,800 33,400 40,600 52,200 63,600

DPRK 1,998 2,112 2,220 - 2,000 1,300 1,400 1,790 - -

Table 1. Military expenditures of the U.S., ROK, PRC, and DPRK, 1990–2008.85

For this reason, Chinese government and scholars frequently assert that even after

the Cold War, Washington’s military expenditures are more than the combined totals of

eight other major military powers in the world, which is about two times the military

spending of NATO and over 10 times that of the PRC.86 In addition, the capabilities of

U.S. forces throughout East Asia have improved, although the number of the U.S.

military forces in East Asia has decreased since the end of the Cold War. Specifically,

U.S. military assets in Guam have been upgraded quantitatively and qualitatively, and the

U.S. military bases there can serve as both strategic and tactical forward bases against the

PRC. Combat aircraft (e.g., B-1, B-2, and B-52 bombers) as well as naval ships deployed

to the Guam military bases can reach Taiwan and Japan in two to five hours, and the

Philippines and the ROK in two to five days.87 The strategic and tactical importance of

Guam led U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates to visit Guam in 2008; he notes that

Guam’s build-up will be “one of the largest movements of military assets in decades.”88

the ROK Armed Force cantly attenuated, even

without con

Moreover, the overwhelming numerical superiority of DPRK military forces over

s on the Korean peninsula has been signifi

sidering U.S. forces on the peninsula, by the ROK’s advanced military

85 Figures from 1990–1998 are in million of US dollars at constant 1995 prices and exchange rates,

and figures from 1999–2008 are in million of US dollars at constant 2005 prices and exchange rates. Sources are the SIPRI Yearbook 2000, 2009; The Military Balance 1997/1998, 2000, 2004, 2008.

004.” Asian Survey, Vol. 45, No. 5 (Sep

arch

86 Biwu Zhang, “Chinese Perceptions of American Power, 1991–2tember/October 2005), 673.

87 Shirley A. Kan and Larry A. Niksch, “Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments,” Congressional ReseService (CRS) Report for Congress, RL22570 (May 22, 2009), 4.

88 Ibid., 1.

26

g Hamm has analyzed the dynamics of military balance between the two

Koreas

technology—in particular, air and naval power, mobility, C4ISR, logistics—and its

economic growth throughout the 1990s and 2000s. In fact, although the force-to-force

ratios on the Korean peninsula between the DPRK and the ROK as of 2006 is almost 3 to

1, the balance between the two countries in terms of weighted effectiveness index (WEI)

/weighted unit value (WUI)—which considers capabilities of firepower, mobility, and

survivability of weapons—is only 1.4 to 1 and continues to decrease significantly.89

Taik-youn

in terms of the “military capital stocks (i.e., the depreciated cumulative spending

on defense)” from the Korean War period to the early 2000s (see Figure 1).

Military expenditures ofFigure 1. the ROK and DPRK; military spending for arms import of the ROK and DPRK.90

n the two

He says that it is the conventional wisdom that the DPRK maintains military

superiority over the ROK because “bean counts” of the military balance betwee

89 Suh, Power, Interest, and Identity in Military Alliance, 32–36.

90 Units are U.S. dollars in millions. “DPRK 1, 2, 3” are DPRK military spending measured by different institutions, including RAND (DPRK 1), Dr. Lee Sangwoo (DPRK 2), and ROK Ministry of National Defense (DPRK 3). “ROK” and “DPRK” are assessed by Hamm. Taik-young Hamm, Bukhangunsamunjaewi Jaejomyong [Reevaluation of North Korea’s Military Affairs] (Seoul, ROK: Hanwool, 2006), 363.

27

Koreas have critical flaws, arguing that ROK defense expenditures have surpassed the

DPRK since 1979 and its conventional military power caught up with the DPRK in the

early 1980s. 91 In fact, by 2005, the ROK annual defense budget was larger than the

entire DPRK economy, while ROK’s spending on force improvement plans alone was

larger than the total DPRK defense budget.92 This means that, if one factors in the U.S.

forces on the peninsula, the overall military balance is more favorable to the U.S.-ROK

alliance.

Second, the U.S. military presence in the region, foreign military sales (FMS),

and high technology arms transfers to its allies (Japan, the ROK, Taiwan, the Philippines,

and Australia) and new partners (India and some Central Asian countries) have increased

Chinese fears of U.S. containment policy against them. The future use of U.S. military

modernization—such as

power to maintain dominance over the region and plans for military procurement and

strategic flexibility, forward operating military bases, and global

strike programs shown in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and Global Posture

Review (GPR)—have increased the Chinese threat perception of the United States and its

allies.93 While the total amount of the U.S. FMS to its East Asian allies declined rapidly

in 1993 due to the demise of Cold War sentiment and subsequent changes in the security

environment, the decline was only temporary. In fact, the U.S. FMS to the region was

relatively higher than to any other region in the 1990s, and increased in 2002, 2006, and

2007, as shown in Figure 2. In addition, the United States has granted Japan and the ROK

the privilege status for purchasing U.S. defense goods under relatively less restrictions, so

called the “NATO Plus Four group.”94

91 T

Somi Seong, Pacific Currents: The ResponRise

ing

ctober 10, 2009).

aik-young Hamm, Arming the Two Koreas: State, Capital and Military Power (New York: Routledge, 1999), 2–3, 136, 162–166; Taik-young Hamm, Bukhangunsamunjaewi Jaejomyong [Reevaluation of North Korea’s Military Affairs] (Seoul, ROK: Hanwool, 2006), 344.

92 Evan Medeiros, Keith Crane, Eric Heginbotham, Norman Levin, Julia Lowell, Angel Rabasa, and ses of U.S. Allies and Security Partners in East Asia to China’s

(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), 65.

93 Christopher P. Twomey, “Missing Strategic Opportunity in U.S. China Policy since 9/11: GraspTactical Success.” Asian Survey, Vol. 47, No. 4 (July/August 2007), 555–556.

94 Jeff Abramson, “U.S. Arms Notifications Spike in 2008,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 39 (March 2009), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_03/arms_2008 (accessed O

Figure 2. U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) agreement to major East Asian allies.95

st Asia.

On the other hand, in assessing the threats to a unified Korea in the near future,

the ROK’s middle- and long-term military planners have considered not only the explicit

thre he

Although the U.S. FMS to Taiwan were the most significantly reduced among the

allies in East Asia, Washington’s strategic decision in 2001 to offer huge, and

qualitatively advanced arms sales to Taiwan was an enormous shock to Beijing, not only

because of the size of the arms package (over U.S. $20 billion), but also because of the

items in the package, including eight diesel-electric submarines, twelve P-3C anti-

submarine patrol aircrafts, thirty anti-tank helicopters (such as AH-64D Apache and AH-

17 Cobra), and the most capable U.S. missile defense system, PAC-3.96 Moreover, the

Chinese perceive that Washington’s attempt to establish missile defense systems with

U.S. allies close to the PRC and the DPRK is intended to weaken the PRC’s nuclear

deterrence capabilities, and thus increases the imbalance of military power between the

superpower and the rising powers in Ea

at from the North, but also potential threats from neighbors beyond the theater of t

95 The author created the figure, based on the data from U.S. Department of Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Other Security Cooperation Historical Facts (as of September 30, 2007),” http://www.dsca.mil (accessed July 30, 2009).

.

96 Michael S. Chase, “Taiwan’s Arms Procurement Debate and the Demise of the Special Budget Proposal.” Asian Survey, Vol. 48, No. 4 (July/August 2008), 705–706

28

29

Korean

B. DEGREE OF PERCEIVED EXTERNAL THREAT

s—near

the Korean peninsula and the Strait.

peninsula, such as the PRC and Japan. This thrust has been reflected in the

ROK’s military modernization programs since the mid-1990s. Its future force

improvement programs, shown in Defense Reform 2020 (behind schedule due to budget

shortfalls), include advanced C4ISR, unmanned aerial surveillance vehicles, cruise

missiles, space programs, long-range strike capabilities, a blue-water navy, naval air-

defense (AEGIS system) capabilities, nuclear-powered submarines, and strategically

placed naval bases.97 Although the ROK has never officially addressed the potential

threat from the PRC, many Korean experts and military analysts believe that the ROK’s

military modernization programs are driven by the South Korean desire to be a mid-level

power and prepared for any potential conflict with the PRC or Japan.

Threat-based theories of alliances would predict that since the end of the Cold

War, the PRC-DPRK alliance faces a new threat which it needs to balance (i.e., the U.S.-

ROK/Japan alliances). From Beijing’s perspective, the presence of U.S. forces in the

ROK and Japan and the U.S. commitment to Taiwan pose an immense threat to the PRC

and DPRK. Realists have highlighted a number of primary sources of U.S. threat to the

PRC. First, during the two DPRK nuclear crises in 1994 and 2003 and the Taiwan Strait

crisis in 1995-1996, Beijing was very anxious about Washington’s preparation for a

military strike to destroy the DPRK’s nuclear facilities, which became the central security

concern of the PRC. 98 In these crises, Washington deployed air and naval assets—

including two aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, B-1 and B-52 bombers, and F-117

stealth fighters on alert for deployment, as well as various surveillance platform

99

97 Evan S. Medeiros et al., Pacific Currents: The Responses of U.S. Allies and Security Partners in

East Asia to China’s Rise (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2008), 86–87.

rean Peninsula,” in Alastair John ds., New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy (Stanford, CA: Stan s, 2006), 33–34.

.S. Defense Deployments,” Congressional Research Serv

98 Robert S. Ross, “Comparative Deterrence: The Taiwan Strait and the Koson and Robert Ross e

Univ. Presford

99 Shirley A. Kan and Larry A. Niksch, “Guam: U ice (CRS) Report for Congress, RL22570 (May 22, 2009), 5–6.

30

u III-class frigate and reconnaissance plane in March 2001.100 More recently,

in March 2009, the PLA sent Y-12 maritime surveillance aircraft, a frigate and a couple

of patrol ships, as well as fishery patrol ships to monitor two U.S. ocean surveillance

ships, the USNS Victorious and USNA Impeccable.101

Third, the May 7, 1999 bombing of the PRC embassy and the Chinese collateral

damage (three Chinese diplomats killed and 20 injured) in Belgrade, Yugoslavia by U.S.-

led NATO forces, despite President Clinton’s “immediate and profuse” apology, caused

Chinese anger at the United States to boil over and increased U.S. threat perceptions and

anti-American sentiment in the PRC. Beijing allowed the Chinese protesters to violently

attack U.S. diplomatic facilities and American restaurants in the PRC and cancelled all

scheduled diplomatic meetings with the United States for the rest of the year.102 This

kind of anti-American sentiment and their threat perception of U.S. containment policy

against the PRC became more severe a couple of weeks after the bombing incident, when

Options for the Asian-Pacific Region” and argued that this option could be transferred to

“key U

Second, Beijing was very concerned about U.S. intelligence and surveillance

activities in the PRC territories, and frequently criticized them as provocative actions.

Even before the 2001 EP-3 incident, there were many cases when Beijing sent PLA Navy

ships and Air Force aircraft to search and intercept U.S. surveillance ships, aircraft, and

even carrier groups, and expelled U.S. diplomats from the PRC after accusing them of

collecting military intelligence. For instance, the USS Bowditch, a U.S. surveillance ship

operating in the Yellow Sea (the West Sea of the ROK), was closely tracked by a PLA

Navy Jiangh

U.S. Secretary of Defense Cohen introduced “Theater Missile Defense Architecture

.S. allies,” including Japan, the ROK, and Taiwan.103

On the other hand, threat-based theories argue that the U.S.-ROK alliance has

become weaker since the post-Cold War, even though the presence of highly militarized

North Korean forces near the DMZ continues to be perceived as a major threat to the

100 Kan, “U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress,” 30, 43, 50.

101 Ibid., 54.

tacts: Issues for Congress,” 39.

102 Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower, 212–214.

103 Kan, “U.S.-China Military Con

31

4 and 2002-2005, DPRK’s

submarine infiltration in 1998, and naval clashes on the Yellow Sea in 1999 and 2002.

K alliance has faced lessening perceived threat from the

declinin

ROK. A number of provocative actions by the DPRK temporary increased tension in the

Korean peninsula, such as DPRK’s nuclear crises in 1993-199

This is because the U.S.-RO

g DPRK in terms of its economy, political stability, conventional military

capabilities, and even its nuclear capabilities. The United States has enjoyed hegemonic

power in the region and the power of the ROK has significantly improved and surpassed

the North.

ure 3. Numbers of DPRK terrorist incidents and violations of armistice treaty.104

Threat-based realists highlight the fact that the numbers of the armistice

agreement violations and support for terrorist incidents by the DPRK have gradually

declined since the 1980s, as shown in Figure 3. They argue that those provocative actions

could not change the imbalance of power and/or threat between the ROK (U.S.-ROK

Fig

alliance) and DPRK (PRC-DPRK alliance). As a result, during Kim Dae-jung and Roh

104 Yongho Kim, “North Korea: A Perpetual Rogue State?” in John Ikenberry and Chung-In Moon eds,

The United States and Northeast Asia: Debate, Issues, and New Order (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2008), 151.

32

ion and

international support. The PRC-DPRK alliance has attempted to increase its power in

order to deter or defeat the U.S.-ROK alliance. For this reason, realists believe that

Beijing would accept Pyongyang and its material capabilities, including nuclear weapons

and ballistic missiles (weapons of mass destruction, or WMDs), as an effective tool to

balance against the U.S.-led alliances in North East Asia.106 At the same time, realists

argue that the United States and ROK will lose their shared rationale for the alliance (i.e.,

ROK’s defense against North Korean aggression) and thus become weaker than during

the Cold War era.

However, these realist views do not provide a convincing explanation for why the

PRC-DPRK alliance has actually weakened since the end of the Cold War era in the face

of greater threats from the United States and ROK. Nor do these theories explain why the

actual U.S.-ROK alliance cohesion has become stronger than it was during the Cold War.

In addition, few realists have attempted to study the reasons that Chinese and South

Korean public attitudes toward threat and enemy have changed independently of the shift

in the balance of power/threat in the region. For instance, the majority of the South

Korean public no longer see DPRK’s nuclear capability as a direct threat to themselves,

Moo-hyun’s administrations, Seoul changed its view of the DPRK from a major source of

threat to a “long-lost brother in need of ROK’s assistance.”105

C. CONCLUSION

To summarize, realists argue that in Northeast Asia, especially in the Korean

peninsula, the imbalance of power/threat between the PRC-DPRK alliance and the U.S.-

ROK alliance and the level of perceived threat to the PRC and DPRK has grown. This

suggests that the PRC-DPRK alliance will remain as strong as it was during the Cold War

to balance against the formidable power and growing threat of the U.S.-ROK alliance,

with its superior military technology, economy, resources for mobilizat


Northeast Asia,” 2–3.

106 Christopher P. Twomey, “Explaining Chinese Foreign Policy toward North

Korea: Navigating between the Scylla and Charybdis of proliferation and instability.” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 17, No. 56 (August 2008), 419–420.

33

and K

Defense White Paper at a time when the DPRK’s second nuclear crisis was a hot

interna

the characterization of the DPRK as “the main threat” was removed from the RO

tional issue. Furthermore, balance of power/threat logic still has some limitations

in explaining why many Chinese analysts doubt if Beijing’s military obligation could be

fulfilled in case of war on the Korean peninsula, and why Washington and Seoul have

sought to transform their alliance from the singularly focused mission of defending the

ROK against the DPRK to a more robust values-based one that looks beyond the Korean

peninsula. The following chapters focus on ideational factors influencing the Chinese and

South Korean leadership and public and explain how these factors have changed

Beijing’s attitudes toward Pyongyang and Seoul’s attitudes toward Washington.

34

singly attempted to counter the “China threat” perception, accepted the values

and no

reat Power” Mentality

Deng’s reform and subsequent economic growth are the most significant

indigenous factors that have instilled self-confidence into China’s identity. The Chinese

peo of

III. CHINESE IDENTITY AND THE PRC-DPRK ALLIANCE

With the powerful momentum of Deng’s reform policy that coincided with the

end of the Cold War, China has faced rapid economic development, the need for political

transformation, and subsequent changes in Chinese identity. As the PRC’s economy has

grown and the quality of life in the PRC has improved, the Chinese people have become

confident, leaving behind their long legacy of a “victim mentality (shouhaizhe

xintai),”107 and have embraced the PRC’s new international status as a regional and

global “responsible great power.” These evolving ideational changes have been continued

by Deng’s successors and the new Chinese generations, who apply pragmatic standards

to themselves, their allies and their enemies. Simultaneously, the Chinese people have

begun to consider not only their self-image but also other’s perceptions of them. In order

to convince its neighbors that the PRC is a “benign and peaceful rising power,” the PRC

has increa

rms of the international system, and acted in support of existing international

arrangements. 108 This section explains the main factors that have shaken up the

traditional characteristics of Chinese collective identity, and analyzes how changes in

Chinese self-perception and their perceptions of others, including its traditional ally, the

DPRK, have impacted the Chinese view of the Sino-DPRK alliance and shifted Beijing’s

policy with regard to Pyongyang.

A. CHINESE “SELF-PERCEPTION”

1. Growing Self-Confidence and “Responsible G

ple, having experienced rapid economic growth and improvement in their quality

life, are now the most optimistic people in the world. Growing Chinese self-confidence is

edeiros and M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s New Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No.

6 (N

107 Evan S. Movember/December 2003), 23.

108 Shirk, China, Fragile Superpower, 138.

35

reflecte

rom

the perceived success of the PRC’s economic and social development over the past two

decades.

Diplomatically and socially, a century-old Chinese “victim mentality,” based on

humiliation originating with the Western powers’ colonization of Chinese territory in the

nineteenth century, is slowly disappearing. During Mao’s era, Chinese schoolchildren

were taught about “China’s century of humiliation” and Chinese politicians frequently

used the term to provoke nationalistic public sentiment. However, in the past 10 years,

Chinese politicians and mass media have used the term “century of humiliation” much

less than during Mao’s era.112 For this reason, Evan Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel argue

that for over a decade, the PRC has exhibited a “stark departure” from the tradition of

Chinese passivity and isolation and the “victim mentality.”113

d in various aspects of Chinese collective identity. Politically and economically,

as China’s economy has grown since the early 1980s, more Chinese people have

indicated satisfaction with Deng’s reform and the Chinese political and economic models.

The Hoover Institution’s 1999 survey of six Chinese cities found that the greatest number

of the Chinese respondents choose their political system as the best model.109 According

to the Pew Global Attitude Project’s 47-nation survey from 2002 to 2007, the PRC had

the most optimistic prospects for the next generation. A full 84 percent of Chinese

people—compared to 30 percent of Americans, 17 percent of the French, and 10 percent

of the Japanese—say that when their country’s children grow up, they will be better off

than people are today.110 Furthermore, 83 percent of Chinese people express satisfaction

with the national condition in 2007, up from 48 percent in the 2002 survey and the

biggest increase among the 47 nations studied.111 This sense of satisfaction derives f

109 Wenfang Tang, Public Opinion and Political Change in China (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford Univ.

Pres

Global Attitudes Project, “Global Opinion Trends 2002–2007: 47-Nation Pew Global Atti ).

s, 2005), 74.

110 The Pew tudes Survey,” July 24, 2007, 4, http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/257.pdf (assessed July 28, 2009

111 Ibid., 5.

112 Goldstein, “Parsing China’s Rise,” 75.

113 Medeiros and Fravel, “China’s New Diplomacy,” 22.

On the other hand, ever since the term “responsible major power” was first used

by PRC’s Foreign Minister Qian Qichen in 1992, many Chinese scholars and politicians

have openly discussed what roles a responsible major power should play to “self-

confidently” transform the PRC and the Chinese away from their tragic history of

victimization.114 As a result, the meaning of “responsibility” in the eyes of the Chinese

leadership and people has changed over time. The term, which meant “responsibility to

support and promote international struggles” in Mao’s revolutionary era, now means the

responsibility of a world power, which implies active and constructive participation in

multilateral institutions, supporting international laws and norms, and contributing to

regional and world “peace and development.”115 Figure 4 shows that references to the

PRC’s self-categorization, or emergent identity, as a “responsible major power” in

official statements and media by Chinese leaders and scholars has increased rapidly.

Frequency of articles using the term “responsible major power” in the People’s Daily and in Chinese academic articles, 1994–2004.

Figure 4.

116

114 Goldstein, “Parsing China’s Rise,” 75; Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutio

1980–2000, 146.

115 Gerald Chan, China’s Compliance in Global Affairs: Trade, Arms Control, Environmental Pro blishing Company

ns,

, 2006), 28–32; Andrew Sco l Rise?” Parameters, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Summer 2009

itutions, 1980–2000, 147.

tection, Human Rights (Singapore: World Scientific Pubell, “Is There a Civil-Military Gap in China’s Peacefu

), 4.

116 Johnston, Social States: China in International Inst

36

37

ave declined in most non-

African

The more the Chinese people are exposed to the new norm of a free market and to

regional and international communities, the more they consider not only awareness of

themselves, their governance, and their state, but also other’s perception of themselves.

In addition, the more the PRC pursues economic prosperity, the greater its commitment

to securing the norms of free trade, capital flow, and transparency. At present, Chinese

political and economic elites are well aware that reliable economic growth cannot be

sustained without interaction with other regional and international actors with a wary eye

on the PRC’s rapid economic and military growth. Specifically, the majority of Japanese,

South Koreans, Taiwanese, and Americans see the PRC’s rapid military and economic

growth as a potential threat. The 2007 Pew Global Attitude Project’s 47-nation survey

indicates that overall assessment of the rise of the PRC h

countries since 2002, due to growing concerns with the PRC’s military

modernization that attenuate positive perspectives on the PRC’s economic growth.117 For

this reason, Beijing has worked hard since the 1990s to counter the “Chinese threat”

perception prevailing among its neighbors and sought to build its reputation as a “good

global citizen and regional neighbor.”118

2. The Public’s Greater Awareness

China’s growing self-confidence has played a significant role in increasing

Chinese nationalism and public activism in domestic and international affairs,

encouraging the Chinese public to raise political, historical, and even economic demands

in the name of patriotism.119 For the CCP, it is hard to be free of nationalistic public

demands when making foreign policy, because patriotism or nationalism is a major

ideological factor that the CCP has encouraged to consolidate its regime legitimacy. For

this reason, Yinan He argues that patriotism or nationalism has gradually replaced

001–2008),”

Decem ; “Rising Env

essed July 30, 2009), 39–46.

117 The Pew Global Attitudes Project, “Global Public Opinion in the Bush Years (2er 18, 2008, http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/263.pdf (assessed July 28, 2009), 2b

ironmental Concern in 47-Nation Survey: Global Unease with Major World Powers,” July 27, 2007, http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/256.pdf (ass

118 Susan L. Shirk, China, Fragile Superpower, 11.

119 Yinan He, “History, Chinese Nationalism and the Emerging Sino-Japan Conflict,” Journal ofContemporary China, Vol. 16, No. 50 (February 2007), 3.

38

foreign policy. Unlike the Chinese public under

Mao’s rule, today’s Chinese public is exposed to better and more varied sources of

information through the Internet, newspapers and magazines. With these information

sources, the Chinese people are more aware and more engaged in domestic and

international affairs.121 For instance, according to the 1999 Six-Chinese Cities survey

conducted by the Hoover Institution, 43 percent of respondents disagree with the idea that

the government should decide whether an idea or a theory can be published, and 54

percent say the government should not constrain political dissent.122

Although the PRC’s authoritarian political system exercises strong censorship

over its people, Chinese officials and politicians have gradually realized that the state and

party cannot completely control, monitor, or distort all the information, ideas and

opinions available in the media, and in particular the Internet. For instance, the 1999

Belgrade Embassy bombing, the 2001 U.S. EP-3 incident, the spread of SARS epidemic

9 are

good examples of how fast and profoundly Chinese “netizens” can share information

about sensitive political and di

communism as the “ideological foundation of the CCP’s regime legitimacy.” 120

Although the PRC’s leadership and politicians are less susceptible to public opinion than

their counterparts in democracies, the Chinese public has become more capable of

influencing Beijing’s domestic and

in south China in 2003, and the Uighur-Han Chinese ethnic conflict in 2008 and 200

plomatic issues using discussion groups such as bulletin

board systems (BBS) and instant messages. It is increasingly difficult for the 30,000

Chinese cyber-cops to monitor and block such messages. In addition to the Internet, the

number of newspapers and magazines published in the PRC has increased dramatically,

from under a hundred government- and CCP-run newspapers in 1979, to approximately

2,000 newspapers, 9,000 magazines, 273 radio stations and 352 TV stations in 2007 (see

Figure 5). 123 Susan Shirk describes the newly commercialized Chinese media and

120 He, “History, Chinese Nationalism and the Emerging Sino-Japan Conflict,” 6.

121 Jongpil Chung, “Comparing Online Activities in China and South Korea,” Asian Survey, Vol. 48, No.

essed July 14, 2009).

5 (September/October 2008), 740–741.

122 Tang, Public Opinion and Political Change in China, 71.

123 Cheng Li, “Democracy Gaining Momentum in China,” Brookings Newsletter, June 4, 2009,http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/0604_china_democracy_li.aspx (acc

Internet and the growing population of the Chinese netizens as a “media revolution,”

arguing that the media revolution has spread rapidly and widely, loosened the CCP’s

censorship, and “radically transformed domestic politics and complicated the domestic

context for making foreign policy in China.”124

F

ten

ape

igure 5. The PRC’s Media Growth in Comparative Perspective, 1985–2002.125

3. The Public’s Louder Voice and Activism in Politics

There has been growing public discussion of domestic and global affairs and these

have influenced Beijing’s policymaking process. Open debates on sensitive issues, such

as human rights, democracy, nonproliferation, and missile defense, were unheard of even

years ago. Today, Chinese intellectuals and the official media have engaged all these

issues in nationwide TV talk shows, books, and websites, seeking to influence and sh

Beijing’s policy.126 Meanwhile, many cases demonstrate how the Chinese public uses the

Internet and web-based petitions to share prohibited information, coordinate online-

movements, and organize street protests. Although many of these cases have not changed



126 Cheng Li, “Assessing China’s Political Development,” in Cheng Li ed., China’s Changing Poli 2008), 3. tical Landscape (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution,

39

40

greater attention from the central

govern

and anti-American protest on Chinese websites, the case of Sun Zhigang and the “BMW

inciden

PRC domestic policy, they have successfully attracted

ment and from party and local officials. For instance, in addition to anti-Japanese

t” illustrate how the Chinese people have created much louder public voices using

the Internet and have criticized corrupt government officials and major domestic policies,

including the migrant permit system and judicial system.127 Currently, Chinese netizens

use a strategy called the “Internet manhunt” to gather information on corrupt officials’

misconduct and activities. This information is posted to websites in order to protect

people’s rights, and the netizens have frequently called on the CCP to prosecute these

corrupt officials.128 In addition, Chinese netizens have criticized the “Green Dam,” a new

government policy that prevents children from accessing pornographic and other harmful

Internet content. Critics claim that the policy is aimed at consolidating the central

government’s heavy censorship of the Internet. On July 1, 2009, Beijing postponed the

installation of the Green Dam software in response to growing criticism by both Chinese

netizens and Western governments and corporations.129

As the PRC’s economy has grown, the mostly middle class and college educated

netizen-base has also expanded. One of the greatest risks to the CCP is political

instability that might be amplified by netizens interested in various social issues,

including unemployment, social inequality between the rich and poor and between urban

(coastal) and rural (hinterland) areas, fraud and corruption, the democratic movement,

nationalism, ethnic unrest, environmental degradation, and public health issues.130

127 The S

beaten to deathun Zhigang Incident occurred in spring 2003 when a Chinese man named Sun Zhigang was in the Custody and Repatriation Center of Guangzhou City after being detained as a

suspected illegal migrant. After this incident was first reported by the Southern Metropolitan Daily on April 25, 2003, and later on Sina.com, the Chinese people (including students, scholars, and lawyers) gene o

high mer ber 2003. Jongpil Chung, “Comparing Online

Manhunts,” The World Today, Vol. 65, No. 8/9 (August 2009), 16–17.

y Lam, “The Net Revolution: Chinese Netizens vs. Green Dam,” China Brief, Vol. 9, No.

rated over 4,000 comments on it within only two hours. Eventually, the PRC State Council decided tabolish the migrant permit system and transform the detention centers into relief care centers. Similarly, the “BMW Incident” resulted in huge web-based petitions to the PRC government when a woman relative of a

-ranking Chinese government official was given very light sentence for intentionally killing one farand wounding 12 onlookers with a BMW car in OctoActivities in China and South Korea,” 743–744.

128 Yiyi Lu, “Internet

129 Ibid.; Will14 (July 2009), 2–3.


41

B.

i countries to continue

their ed

CHINESE PERCEPTIONS OF “OTHERS”

1. Chinese Pro-Western Attitudes and Increasing Involvement in International Institutions

The more Chinese people become satisfied and confident in their own political

and economic systems, the more open-minded they become to Western ideologies and

systems. The 2001–2008 Pew Global Attitude Project’s global public opinion survey

shows that 89 percent of the Chinese have strong enthusiasm for globalization, compared

to 53 percent of Americans and 71 percent of the Japanese, and more than a half of the

Chinese respondents have a positive view of U.S. culture, technology, and ideas.131 Since

the early 1980s, the Beijing looked for a new model from foreign countries, one with a

greater emphasis on efficiency, individualism, pragmatism and global standards. The

more Chinese students and scholars leave for developed fore gn

ucation, the more foreign-educated “returnees” will join the numerous official and

private think-tanks in the PRC that have played a crucial role in shaping public discourse

and Beijing’s foreign policy. 132 According to Xinhua, a PRC state news agency,

1,360,000 Chinese nationals have studied abroad in the past three decades (approximately

37 percent in the United States). Some 370,000 foreign-educated Chinese students and

scholars had returned to the PRC by the end of 2008.133 Of the upcoming generation

“Fifth Generation” of PRC leaders who will replace Hu Jintao’s ruling group in 2012,

16.5 percent (i.e., 17 leaders) had undertaken foreign study in the United States, Japan,

and other Western countries.134 A significant fact is that the better-educated people are,

either in the PRC or in foreign countries, the more a pro-Western culture and institutions

develop.135

131 The Pew Global Attitudes Project, “Global Public Opinion in the Bush Years (2001–2008),” 9;

The Pew Global Attitudes Project, “Rising Environmental Concern in 47-Nation Survey,” July 24, 2007, 10.

du/~/media/Files/rc/articles/2009/summer_china_li/summer_china_li.pdf (accessed Aug

, 77.

132 Cheng Li, “China’s New Think Tank: Where Officials, Entrepreneurs, and Scholars Interact,” China Leadership Monitor No. 29 (Summer 2009), http://www.brookings.e

ust 15, 2009), 3–6.

133 Ibid., 15.

134 Li, “China’s Lost Generation,” 106.

135 Tang, Public Opinion and Political Change in China

42

of others, and especially of

Western powers and their institutions, have changed from antagonistic to moderate and

even friendly. For example, the PRC’s membership in international institutions and

organizations increased steadily and dramatically since the beginning of Deng’s reform

era. In addition, the PRC’s membership in international non-government organizations

(INGOs) also has increased steadily, from 71 in 1977 to 403 in 1986, 1,136 in 1997, and

1,275 in 2000.136 Figure 6 and Table 2 illustrate that the PRC became progressively more

involved in international organizations, including arms control regimes, and particularly

after the death of Mao in 1979. The amount of PRC official rhetoric about “hegemony”

is remarkably reduced since Deng’s era (except for periods immediately after the 1999

Belgrade Embassy bombing and the 2001 U.S. EP-3 incident).137

The PRC also joined the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and applied for

membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World

C s

(NPT) and the Nuclear Suppliers G by the Chemical Weapons

onvention (CWC) in 1993 and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996.138

urthermore, Beijing has reached bilateral agreements with Washington pledging

dherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines. Alastair

hnston, in examining Chinese perceptions of international institutions, concludes that

creasing participation by Beijing in international arms control institutions established

n a “non-realpolitik, and even anti-realpolitik ideology” beginning in the early 1980s

With increasing interaction since the 1980s between Chinese and Westerners in

bilateral and multilateral institutions, Chinese perceptions

Trade Organization (WTO) in 1989. Beijing joined the Asian-Pacific Economic

ooperation (APEC) and signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon

roup in 1991, followed

C

F

a

Jo

in

o

136 Chan, China’s Compliance in Global Affairs: Trade, Arms Control, Environmental Protection,

uman Rights, 46–47.

137 Suh, Katzenstein, and Carlson, Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power, and Efficiency, 39, 43; nd Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower, 99.

ies (inc

1, 2009).

H

a

138 As of 2009, the PRC has not yet ratified the CTBT, along with the other nine signatorluding the United States and Israel). CTBTO Preparatory Commission,

http://www.ctbto.org/?textonly=1 (accessed Nov

43

rove that the PRC has become “more cooperative and [has made] potentially self-

constraining commitm security institution

p

ents” to major s. 139

Figure 6 RC’s International Organizational Mem p, 1966- 00; Frequ cy of the term of “hegemonism,” “multipolartity,” and “win-win” in the People’s

Daily, 1978–2005.14

. The P bershi 20 en

0

139 Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980–2000, 32–44, 197.

140 Suh, Katzenstein, and Carlson, Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power, and Efficiency39; and Shirk, China: Fragile Super Power, 99.

,

44

Name of Treaty Accession Signature Ratification

Geneva Protocol - 1952 1952

Latin America Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone - 1973 1974*

Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCCW) - 1981 1982

Antarctic Treaty 1983 - -

Outer Space Treaty - 1983 1983

Biological Weapons Convention - 1984 1984

Convention on Assistance in Case of Nuclear Accident 1986 - -

Convention on Early Notification of Nuclear Accident 1986 - -

South Pacific Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone - 1987 1998*

IAEA Application of Safeguard in the PRC - 1988 1989

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 1989 - -

Seabed Treaty 1991 - -

Non-Proliferation Treaty 1992 - -

Chemical Weapons Convention - 1993 1997*

Convention on Nuclear Safety - 1994 1996

London Convention on Nuclear Dumping 1994 - -

CCCW Protocol II (landmines) and Protocol IV (lasers) - 1996 1998*

Africa Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone - 1996 1997*

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) - 1996 -

Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone - 1999 -

Table 2. The PRC’s arms control treaty accessions, signature, and ratification.141

141 The author created the table based on the sources from Johnston, Social States: China in

International Institutions, 36; Arms Control Association, “Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: China,http://www.armscon

” trol.org/factsheets/chinaprofile (accessed November 1, 2009); The Government of the

Peop

ssed November 1, 2009). * means the year of the instrument of ratification deposited.

le’s Republic of China, China’s Endeavors for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (Beijing, PRC: Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, 2005), ( http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/index.htm (acce

45

ed

rnational community and to stop threatening regional stability.

Nevertheless, the DPRK’s response was much more aggressive, threatening the ROK

with a

visit to Pyongyang by a PRC president since Beijing normalized relations with Seoul in

2. Chinese Perceptions of the DPRK

Unlike Mao, who shared revolutionary and ideological values with Kim Il Sung

and his army from the Japanese colonial era to the Cold War era, Deng and his successors

have undertaken pragmatic and reformative policies and increasingly respected the values

and norms of the international institutions that Beijing has been involv in. A majority

of the Chinese now believe that their nation is transforming from a weak, developing

country to a regionally and globally responsible power.142 As a responsible great power,

Beijing has begun to express clear disdain for illegal and irrational practices of foreign

countries and has worked proactively with the international community since the late

1990s to defeat terrorism, the illegal drug trade, and the production of counterfeit U.S.

and PRC currency.

Despite its traditional relationship of alliance with the DPRK, Beijing has come to

oppose allowing Pyongyang to act freely in violation of the norms and rules of the

international community. For instance, Beijing condemned the DPRK’s interest in

terrorism, including the 1983 Rangoon bombing that killed 21 ROK officials, including

four Cabinet members, and the 1987 explosion of a Korean civil airliner that killed all

115 passengers.143 Although Beijing undertook passive measures and also prepared to

support the DPRK in case of attack by the United States during the first DPRK nuclear

crisis in 1994, it did seek to maintain stability in the region and urged Pyongyang to

cooperate with the inte

harsh rhetoric of “Bulbada (sea of fire)” in Seoul. Escalated tensions with

Washington, Seoul, and Japan aroused Beijing’s concern.144

Despite Jiang Zemin’s successful visit to the DPRK in 2001—the first official

142 Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower, 107.

143 Gregory, J. Moore, “How North Korea threatety’ on the North Korean nuclear issue,” Interna

ns China’s interests: Understanding Chinese ‘dup tional Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 8, No.1 (Jan

iwan,

liciuary 2008), 6.

144 Horowitz, Heo and Tan, Identity and Change in East Asian Conflicts: The Cases of China, Taand the Koreas, 140.

46

t North

Korea.]”148

A number of signs indicate significant changes in the perception of Pyongyang

nounced that it supports Pyongyang, “Beijing’s

port” is no longer “unconditional,” as it was during the Cold War era, but only

1992—the DPRK’s second nuclear crisis in 2002 badly damaged the PRC’s interests and

reputation again. This contributed to the increasingly negative image of the DPRK in

Chinese minds. In particular, Beijing has been furious with Pyongyang’s public disregard

of Beijing’s “wishes and advices” since the early 2000s and its continuing provocative

behavior and rhetoric toward the United States and South Korea. 145 Almost every

Chinese person took great national pride in China’s playing an “unprecedented leadership

role in the historic event” of the Six-Party Talks begun in August 2003 to resolve a

controversial regional security issue. Pyongyang’s embarrassing and distrustful behavior

both inside and outside the Six-Party Talks has frequently damaged Beijing’s leadership

role and disappointed international expectations of Beijing. 146 Despite significant

achievements from the “September 2005 Joint Statement of Principle” and the “February

2007 Agreement” of the Six-Party Talks, the DPRK’s detonation of a nuclear device in

October 2006 and its second nuclear test in May 2009 seriously damaged the situation.

After the DPRK nuclear test, Beijing immediately criticized Kim Jong-il, using the term

“brazen” which it has only used five times in the past, and against the United States,

Japan, and Taiwan. 147 Former U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice called this

response to the DPRK’s nuclear test a “significant turn” of its policy toward the DPRK

and stated “I cannot conceive of even a short time ago China agreeing to call North

Korea’s behavior a threat to international peace and security…and I think it’s very

unusual and quite significant that China has decided to [support sanctions agains

and Sino-DPRK ties at all levels of Chinese government and society. At the government

levels, although Beijing has officially an

sup

145 Tania Branigan, “North Korea’s nuclear test puts China in a tight spot,” Guardian (May 29, 2009),

http 7,

26.

te.gov/secretary/rm/2006/74892.htm (accessed March 1, 2009).

://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/may/29/china-beijing-north-korea-nuclear-test (accessed August 22009).


147 Ibid., 1

148 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice En Route Moscow, Russia,” October 21, 2008, http://www.sta

47

“condit

academic journals from publicly raising doubts about DPRK policy.154

ional.” 149 Many Chinese officials recall that Pyongyang frustrated Beijing by

siding with the Soviet Union during the Sino-Soviet conflict in the 1960s and 1970s, and

threatened Beijing by establishing contact with Taipei and making a deal to take waste

from Taiwan’s nuclear power program in response to Beijing’s recognition of Seoul and

its rejection of aid to Pyongyang in the 1990s. After a series of such incidents between

the two countries, Chinese officials and think-tanks mentioned indirectly that the main

source of instability on the peninsula would come not from the United States, the ROK,

or Japan, but from its traditional ally, the DPRK, which has greater chances of a political

coup, economic collapse, missile test, development of nuclear weapons, and social

unrest.150 Even Jiang Zemin, who visited Pyongyang to restore Sino-DPRK relations and

revitalize the DPRK’s economy in 2001, said in his Crawford, Texas summit with

President Bush in 2002 that he did not know if Kim Jong-il was a peaceful man.151

Similarly, Hu Jintao told U.S. officials in private meetings in 2005 that he was impatient

with Kim Jong-il and frustrated with the DPRK’s self-defeating policies.152 Moreover,

after the DPRK’s second nuclear test in May 2009, the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs

spokesman referred the DPRK as a mere “neighbor” and Sino-DPRK ties as “normal

relations between states.” 153 The PRC’s state-run media have cautiously begun to

criticize the DPRK’s behavior as “irrational” and intended to increase tension in the

region. Alternative policies are sometimes proposed, although Beijing still restricts the

private press and

149 Evgeniy P. Bazhanov and James Clay Moltz, “China and the Korean Peninsula,” in Moltz and

Alexandre Mansourov eds., The North Korean Nuclear Program: Security, Strategy, and New Perspectives from Russia (New York: Routledge, 2000), 178.

150 Suh, Katzenstein and Carlson, Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power, and Efficiency, 58

151 Scott Snyder, “China-Korea Relations: Regime Change and Another Nuclear Crisis,” Comparative Connections, Vol. 5, No.1 (April 2003), 95.

152 International Crisis Group, “China and North Korea: Comrades Forever?” Asia Report N °112. Seou ussels. February 1, 2006, 7.

,” China Brief, Vol. 9, No. 12 (Jun

,

l/Br

153 Willy Lam, “Beijing Mulling Tougher Tactics Against Pyongyange 2009), 3.

154 International Crisis Group, “China and North Korea: Comrades Forever?” 7; Medeiros and Fravel“China’s New Diplomacy,” 30.

48

DPRK as a “nuclear state” to foreign and domestic

media like Reuters, CCTV, China Daily, and Global Times. These scholars say that the

DPRK’s opaque intentions and ns, are not merely

a poke

in their economic and social achievements, China’s younger generation has adopted a

of o ker in

At the intellectual level, many liberal Chinese scholars have frequently suggested

that Beijing take tougher measures, such as cutting aid to and trade with the DPRK,

abrogating the mutual defense treaty (as Russia did in the mid-1990s), and enhancing

relationships and military ties with Washington, Seoul and Japan.155 They argue that the

PRC should no longer side with internationally recognized bad regimes, such as Kim

Jong-il’s, because the international community is watching and assessing its leading role

as a responsible great power. In 2009, the “year of the Sino-DPRK friendship,” many

influential Chinese scholars, including Zhang Liangui at the Central Party School, Sun

Zhe at Tsinghua University, and Zhan Debin at Fudan University, began to publicly

express their new perceptions of the

capabilities, including its nuclear weapo

in the eye to the United States, the ROK, or Japan. The DPRK also places

economic, diplomatic, and military burdens on Beijing to such extent that it will become

a “grave national security threat” to the PRC, and particularly to the northeastern

industrialized Chinese provinces.156 A survey of 20 top Chinese foreign policy experts

conducted by the state-run Global Times after the DPRK’s nuclear test in May 2009

shows that exactly half of the Chinese experts supported Beijing’s involvement in harsher

UN sanctions against the DPRK, reflecting a great shift in Chinese expert perception of

the DPRK.157

Changes in Chinese perceptions of the DPRK are found not only among political

and economic elite groups, but also in common public opinion. As the Chinese gain pride

more pragmatic and nationalistic, less ideological and historical standard in its perception

ther countries. From the young people’s perspective, the DPRK is a trouble-ma

155 Lam, “Beijing Mulling Tougher Tactics Against Pyongyang,” 3.

156 Ibid., 2.

157 Scott Snyder, See-won Byun, “China-Korea Relations: Pyongyang Tests Beijing’s Patience,” Comparative Connections, Vol.11, No.2 (July 2009), 104.

49

gyang, do not want to become involved

again in

and more than 30,000 South Koreans were studying in the PRC as of 2003, while 53,000

Chinese live in the ROK as of 2005. The Sino-ROK relationship was upgraded from a

the region.158 For instance, when asked if they were interested in visiting the DPRK, most

Chinese college students answered “No.”159 In addition, the rapidly growing number of

young, vocal Chinese netizens also clearly follows the trend of being anti-Kim Jong-il

with criticism and personal opinions posted on chat rooms, blogs, instant messages and

bulletin boards. After informal conversations about the DPRK with numerous middle and

lower-level Chinese officials, scholars, journalists, businessmen and common people,

Russian experts conclude that many Chinese do not expect a bright future for Kim Jong-

il’s regime, no longer feel a commitment to Pyon

any conflict on the Korean peninsula, and do not consider the DPRK as a brother

to be supported unconditionally.160

3. Chinese Perceptions of the United States and ROK

In contrast to its decreasing emphasis on relations with the DPRK, Beijing has put

a greater value on its fast-growing economic, political, and military ties with the United

States and the ROK, showing clearly that it no longer regards them as enemies. Since

Beijing’s recognition of Washington in 1979 and of Seoul in 1992, Sino-American and

Sino-ROK ties have improved remarkably in literally every respect, including military-

to-military contacts. Sino-DPRK ties, meanwhile, have become more complicated, with

decreasing Chinese commitment to Pyongyang. In addition to the remarkable growth of

the PRC-ROK economic relationship, more than 200,000 South Koreans live in the PRC,

161

158 Andrew Horvat, “Overcoming the Negative Legacy of the Past: Why Europe is a Positive

Exa for East Asia,” The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Summer/Fall 2004), 143–146.

ann ew

hina: Accommodation and Balancing in E se and the Balance of Influence in AsiaServ(acc

mple

159 Bazhnov and Moltz, “China and the Korean Peninsula,” 175; Jih-Un Kim, “Neighbors Are Cha g to Each Other?: A Study of South Korea-China Mutual Perception,” paper presented at the rmin

ual meeting of the ISA’s 50th Annual Convention, “Exploring the Past, Anticipating the Future,” in NYork, February 15, 2009, 3.

160 Bazhanov and Moltz, “China and the Korean Peninsula,” 176–177.

161 Robert S. Ross, “Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of Cast Asia,” in William Keller and Thomas Rawski eds., China’s Ri (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007), 130–136; Korean Statistical Information

, “Foreign Residence Statistics in 2005,” http://www.kosis.kr/planstic/stat_theme/use_index.jsp iceessed Sep 1, 2009).

50

y,

more Chinese people (31 percent) have an unfavorable view of the DPRK, while only 18

force deployments, as long as it provides regional stability, helps prevent arms races, and

keep K behavior.167

“cooperative partnership” to a “comprehensive cooperative partnership” in July 2003,

and to a “strategic cooperative partnership” in 2008. 162 For this reason, Sino-ROK

relations are regarded as among the most successful cases of PRC engagement, and many

China experts argue that the PRC is now at the “breaking point” with the DPRK.163 This

change in Chinese perspectives on the two Koreas is also reflected in Chinese public

opinion polls. According to the 2006 Pew Global Attitude Project’s 6-nation surve

percent have a negative view over the ROK.164

On the other hand, Chinese attitudes toward the world’s dominant power, the

United States, have also become moderate, although the majority of Chinese still consider

the United States as the greatest threat to themselves. According to the 1999 Hoover

Institution survey, Chinese respondents picked the U.S. and Japan’s economic models as

the first (40 percent) and second (29 percent) best models in the world, and choose the

U.S. political model as the second best model, after to China’s own political system.165

The Pew Global Attitude Project’s 2007 public opinion survey also indicates that 44

percent of the Chinese believe that the United States, like the PRC, considers the interests

of other nations when setting its foreign policy, while only 24 percent of the British and

35 percent of the Japanese agree.166 Most of the time Chinese security thinkers and

decision-makers are satisfied with U.S. policy toward the Korean peninsula, including

im Jong-il from provocative and aggressive

In sum, the PRC faced a series of major domestic and international changes in the

1980s and 1990s. These changes affected the PRC’s collective identity. The Chinese no

162 “China and South Korea agree to expand ties,” The New York Times, August 25, 2008,

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/25/world/asia/25iht-seoul.1.15606743.html (accessed June 1, 2009).

163 Tkacik, “Sea of Blood, Year of Friendship: China-North Korean Relations in 2009,” 6; Jae Ho Chun hina’s “Soft” Clash with South Korea,” Asian Survey, Vol. 49, No. 3 (May/June 2009), 481.

ilitary Stre

perational Contingencies in South Asia, Central Asia, and Korea,” 347.

g, “C

164 The Pew Global Attitudes Project, “China’s Neighbors Worry About Its Growing Mngth” 6-National Pew Global Attitudes Survey, July 24, 2007, 4.


166 The Pew Global Attitudes Project, “Rising Environmental Concern in 47-Nation Survey,” 20.

167 Wortzel, “PLA ‘Joint’ O

51

r common security interests under the “1961 PRC-DPRK Treaty

of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistan

proper international status for the PRC. In

m

longer maintain the traditional “lips and teeth” relationship with the DPRK. Scott Snyder

argues that “there is no question that the lips and teeth relationship between Pyongyang

and Beijing has been obscured by the dynamic double-digit growth in Sino-South Korean

trade and investment over the past decade.”168 The lack of a mutually beneficial agenda,

the DPRK’s domestic problems, nuclear uncertainties, and improving Sino-ROK and

Sino-American relations have prevented the PRC-DPRK alliance from improving.169

C. PRC-DPRK ALLIANCE COHESION

Using a narrow, military-focused definition of alliance cohesion, this thesis

examines how much Beijing and Pyongyang have stayed together and cooperated to

defend and promote thei

ce.” The treaty explicitly states that “in

case one of the contracting parties should be exposed to an armed attack by one or several

states and thereby involved in war, the other party must immediately and through all

means grant military and other assistance.”170 Despite a lack of reliable information

about the Sino-DPRK alliance, this thesis attempts to measure its cohesion according to

three dimensions: (1) the level of consensus on security issues between the two allies, (2)

the frequency, level, and nature of military exchanges and assistances, such as arms

transfers, military-to-military contacts, and joint operations, and (3) PRC food and energy

aid to the DPRK, which could be used for military purposes.

1. Compromise on Security Issues

Deng and his successor Jiang Zemin set the aim of the PRC’s foreign policy as

establishing a favorable security environment for stable economic growth and obtaining a

order to do so, both leaders put economic

prosperity at the top of the national agenda. Domestically enhancing Chinese socialis

168 Snyder, “China-Korea Relations: Regime Change and Another Nuclear Crisis,” 95.

169 Taeho Kim, “Strategic Relations Between Beijing and Pyongyang: Growing Strains and LingerTies,” in James Lilley and David Shambaugh eds., China’s Military Faces the Future (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999

ing

), 304.

ol. 170 Kay Moller, “China and Korea: the Godfather, Part Three,” Journal of Northeast Asia Studies, V15, No. 4 (December 1996), 36.

52

rity policy

toward

997 the DPRK as only “one of [China’s] neighbors” and stated Beijing

and diplomatically improving its relations with many Western countries are included

under the “five principles of peaceful coexistence” and Deng’s 24 Character Strategy

(meaning “observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our

capacities and bide our time; be good at and maintain a low profile; and never claim

leadership”).171 Given this framework for PRC foreign policy, Beijing’s secu

the Korean peninsula has shifted to maintaining the status quo on the Korean

peninsula, rejecting Korean forced or coerced reunification.172 As a consequence, there is

significant evidence of an increasing gap in the perspectives of the security environment

between Beijing and Pyongyang. First, despite Pyongyang’s request, in 1991 Beijing

supported United Nations representation for both Koreas and opened diplomatic relations

with the ROK in 1992.

Second, while Beijing has frequently used supportive rhetoric for Pyongyang, that

rhetoric has not increased Beijing’s substantive commitment. In fact, the spokesman for

the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing in 1995 said that “China does not believe

the friendship treaty between Beijing and Pyongyang is a treaty requiring the dispatch of

military force,” after Russian President Boris Yeltsin declared the Soviet-North Korean

treaty had little value and indicated his desire to renegotiate the pact.173 In addition, PRC

Vice Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan said at a public forum in Seoul in 1997 that the PRC

was not willing to intervene automatically if the DPRK were to start a war.174 This kind

of official Chinese rhetoric indicates Beijing’s reluctant attitude to enhance its military

relationship with Pyongyang. Their position became even clearer when Premier Li Peng,

the second most powerful politician in the PRC under Deng and Jiang, explicitly

emphasized in 1

171 U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic

of C 2007, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/070523-China-Military-Power-final.pdf (accessed July

, Heo and Tan, Identity and Change in East Asian Conflicts: The Cases of China, Taiwan, and

don, “Chinese Military Strategy for the Korean Peninsula,” 280; Lee Jong Sok, Bukhan-Joon tions], 1945–2000 (Seoul: Joongshim, 2000), 120.

hina 20, 2009), 7.

172 Bazhanov and Moltz, “China and the Korean Peninsula,” 173.

173 Horowitz the Koreas, 138–139; Eric A. McVadon, “Chinese Military Strategy for the Korean Peninsula,” in

James Lilley and David Shambaugh eds., China’s Military Faces the Future (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), 280.

174 McVagkook Gwangyeo[North Korea-China Rela

53

Jintao and

Beijing’s ambassadors to the UN, frequently mention both officially and unofficially that

the DP wi eps engaging in bad behavior and

threaten

would not expand its political and military ties with Pyongyang, approve any kind of

secret contacts between them, or provide the DPRK with the newest weapons and

equipment.175 More recently, in 2003, Beijing proposed to Pyongyang again that they

renegotiate the “mutual assistance” terms of the 1961 treaty. (Pyongyang refused

Beijing’s proposal, stating that the “time is not good” to discuss the matter).176

Third, during 1995 and 1998, when the DPRK underwent its worst famines

(which raised international attention to the country’s situation and led to a serious

infusion of international humanitarian support and aid), Beijing did not resume senior-

level mutual visits used as a major channel between Beijing and Pyongyang to discuss

security issues, but rather pursued friendly, cooperative relations with other Western and

neighboring countries.177

Fourth, the PRC seems to have been frustrated by Pyongyang’s unexpectedly

extreme behavior and decision to ignore constant warnings by the PRC. These factors

produced “grave concern” for the Chinese, especially when the DPRK conducted a series

of missile and nuclear tests in the 2000s. 178 Eventually Beijing undertook tougher

measures against Pyongyang, including voting for UN Resolution 1695 in 2006 and UN

Resolution 1874 in 2009. In addition, high level PRC officials, including Hu

RK ll face serious consequences if it ke

ing regional stability.179 Today, many Chinese analysts expect that if Pyongyang

continues with further nuclear tests and keeps ignoring tough warnings from Beijing and

other countries, Beijing might revoke its barely-maintained mutual defense treaty with

Pyongyang.180

175 McVadon, “Chinese Military Strategy for the Korean Peninsula,” 280.

176 International Crisis Group, “China and North Korea: Comrades Forever?” 16.

177 Ibid., 3.

– for now.”

178 Moore, “How North Korea threatens China’s interest: Understanding Chinese ‘duplicity’ on the North Korean nuclear issue,” 10.

179 Ibid.

180 Zhou, “All teeth and lips

54

that the PRC’s unilateral preparation of military operations in the vicinity

of the

exchanges and assistance, such as arms transfers, military-to-military contacts and joint

ope

“flesh and blood” or “brother-in-

Lastly, Beijing reportedly has unilateral contingency plans in the event of

instability in the DPRK without sharing them with Pyongyang. As not much information

has been released about the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) contingency plans, it is

difficult to interpret Beijing’s real intentions toward the DPRK regime. Many Chinese

experts believe

DPRK as well as within DPRK territory shows that Beijing lacks confidence in

Kim Jong-il’s regime.181 Beijing reportedly prepared approximately 50,000-75,000 PLA

troops to support the DPRK when tensions between Washington and Pyongyang peaked

in May 1994. However, Western analysts assert that Beijing’s primary intention was not

to defend the DPRK against a possible U.S. strike in accordance with the 1961 Sino-

DPRK treaty, but rather to stabilize northeastern regions in the PRC, prevent North

Korean refugees from flooding its borders, and prevent U.S.-DPRK military actions from

escalating into war. Unclear movements by PLA troops near the Sino-DPRK border in

2003, when U.S.-DPRK tension increased again due to the DPRK’s second nuclear crisis,

also raise questions about the current state of the Sino-DPRK military alliance. In this

regard, foreign newspapers recently asserted that some of the PLA’s major military

exercises, such as the Peace Mission, an annual Sino-Russian exercise conducted in

northeastern China since 2005, “may be intended to intimidate the DPRK.”182

2. Military Exchanges and Assistance

The gap between Beijing’s and Pyongyang’s perspectives on ideology, politics,

economics and geostrategy has widened since the end of the Cold War. One of the most

critical changes in the PRC-DPRK alliance is the frequency, level, and nature of military

rations. Today, the distant and limited relationship between the PLA and North

Korean People’s Army (KPA) no longer resembles their

arms” relationship of the 1950s to the 1970s. Indeed, the precise amount of cooperation

181 Michael Horowitz, “Who’s Behind That Curtain? Unveiling Potential Leverage over Pyongyang,”

The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Winter 2004/2005), 27.

eace-Mission 2009: A Military Scenario Beyond Central Asia,” China Brief, Vol

182 Stephen Blank, “P. 9, No. 17 (August 2009), 8.

55

ue that the PLA-KPA

“military exchange, joint operations, and substance” relationship has been weakening

since Kim Il Sung died in 1994 and the two countries’ leaders walked farther in opposite

directions.184

egard sfers, s Tra se from 8

in Table 3 shows that Soviet w d technologies were available and more

attractive to Pyongyang than those available from the PRC during the Cold W ra. For

he D mostly on the Soviets for advanced weapon systems, including

MiG-29s, Su-25s, SA-7/16s, and T-62/72s, with relatively little reliance on the PRC.185

While contributing a relatively small a nt compared to the USSR, the PRC stopped its

“official” transfer of conventional weapons to the DPRK in the mid-1980s “in

consideration o toward milit y stability on the Korean peninsula.”186 This is

arguably a no r of disco e PRC-D Even after the Soviet

Union collapse rejected a n er of Pyongyang’s requests to transfer whole

weapon sys rovidin e parts, repair tools, and other logistics

materials.187 For instance, in March 2003 the PRC turned down the DPRK’s request for

weapons to prepare for a U.S. milita and even rejected Kim Jong-il’s request for

military aid a ense systems during his visit that same year. Instead,

Beijing has agreed to “sell” military hardware, such as trucks and naval components, to

the DPRK.188 often bee astic about Pyongyang’s absurd requests for

large quantities of advanced arms and software, much of which it cannot afford. For

between them remains uncertain, although the 1961 Sino-DPRK Treaty persists.183 Many

China experts, such as Andrew Scobell and Taeho Kim, arg

R ing arms tran the SIPRI Arm

eapons an

nsfer Databa 1950 to 200

ar e

instance, t PRK relied

mou

f its policy ar

table indicato rd in th PRK alliance.

d, Beijing umb

tems, instead p g spar

ry t eat,hr

nd anti-missile def

Beijing has n c sar

183 McVadon, “Ch Strategy he Korean Peninsula,” 288; Horowitz, “Who’s Behind

That Curtain? Unveiling Potential Leverage over Pyongyang,” 27.

184 Andrew Scobell, China and North Korea: Comrades-In-Arms to Allies at Arm’s Length (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institution, 2004), 8–9.

185 SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, http://armstrade.sipri.org/ (accessed July 1, 2009).

186 Kim, “Strategic Relations Between Beijing and Pyongyang: Growing Strains and Lingering Ties,” 305.

187 Ibid.,” 304–309.

?” 18.

inese Military for t

188 International Crisis Group, “China and North Korea: Comrades Forever

56

example, KPA Marshal O Chin U requested more Luda-class destroyers and diesel

submarines than the PLA Navy itself had in the early 1990s.189

ussia) to DP to DPRK USSR (R RK PRC

Year

designation

No. of delivered or produced

(license)


Weapon Weapon designation

(license)

1950s (after

Korean War, 1953)

M

MiG-17 (fighter) Yak-18 (trainer) Il-28 (bomber)

200 50 40

iG-15UTI (trainer) P-10 (radar)

Artillerist (patrol) Il ) -28 (bomberak-11 (trainerY )

Tral (minesweeper) 240mm MRL 200mm MRL

M iG-17 (fighter)P-20 (radar)

Il-12 (transport) P-4/ C) 6 (FA

1 (patroSO- l)

50 20 2 47 10 8

200 200 100

5 10

29/27 8

An-2 (transport) MiG-15 (fighter)

100 80

1960s

1 T

B

S )

S ) S )

15

17

25 0

2

30

7

250

Ty l) HY e)

IS-2 (tank) 140/122mm MRL W-class submarine

S-75 (SAM) SA-2 (SAM)

Mi-4A (helicopter) 30/ un122mm towed g

-43 (minesweeper) T ) op Bow (radarAn-24 (transport)

TR-152/50/40 (APC)Il-14 (transport)

M ) iG-19/21 (fighterPT-76 (tank)

R-13S (SRAAM) -75/SA-2B (SAM

SU-100 (anti-tank) A ) SU-57 (anti-tank

T-54/55 (tank) KS-1 SL) (anti-ship M

Osa (FAC) tyx (anti-ship MSL

S-C-2 (coast defenseZSU-57 (AAV) SO-1 (patrol)

P-4 (FAC)

60 0/500 4 15

450 25 2/500 2 3 10

0/50/2515

0 0 /15100 882 /1,500 100 200

0 00/25108 12

136 9

(11) ( 10)

P-6 (FAC) pe-062 (patro

-1 (coast defens

15 23 6

” 288. 189 McVadon, “Chinese Military Strategy for the Korean Peninsula,

57

USSR (Russia) to DPRK PRC to DPRK

Year Weapon designation


(license)

Weapon designation

No. of deli red or produced

(license)

ve

1970s SSM launcher An-2 (transport) Komar (FAC) Su-7B (FGA)

AT-1 (anti-tank) T-55/62 (tank)

ZSU-23-4 (AAV) MR-104 (radar)

Square Tie (radar) BMP-1 (IFV)

152mm towed gun Osa (FAC)

BTR-60PB (APC) MiG-21 (fighter)

19 20 6 28

400 50/500

100 2 2

100 200

2

Type-62 (tank) Type-59 (tank)

Cross slot (radar) Type-037 (patrol) BT-6A (trainer) Type-021 (FAC) YW-531 (APC) Anti-ship MSL

R-class submarine

50 50 10 6 50 4

(500) until 1992 (112) until 1989 (23) until 1995

R-13R (SRAAM) Shershen (FAC) Scud-B (SSM) SA-7 (SAM)

Mi-2 (helicopter)

100 24

144 4

(16) 2,500 108

1980s T-62 MR-104 (radar)

Styx (anti-ship MSL) Square Tie (radar) Mi-8T (helicopter)

Osa (FCM) 5V27 (SAM)

Scud TEL (launcher) Scud-B (SSM)

Big Back (radar) BMP-1 (IFV)

MiG-23 (fighter) R-17/S-200 (SSM) R-23R (BVRAAM)

ZSU-23 (AAV) Mi-8/14/24 (helicopter)

ST-68 (radar) MiG-29 (FGA)

R-23R (BVRAAM) R-60 (SRAAM)

Su-25 (ground attacker) SA-7 (SAM)

(470) 15 85 18 20 2

176 12 48 2

122 60

48/48 250 48

50/5/47 3

(25) 200 450 36

(1,500)

130mm towed gun 130mm MRL

A-5 (FGA) F-6 (fighter)

F-7B (fighter) HN-5A (SAM)

50 100 40

100 30

(500) until 1994

AT-4 (anti-tank) (1,000)

1990s R-27 (BVRAAM) 50 N/A N/A MR-104 (radar)

Styx anti-ship MSL Square Tie (radar)

Anti-tank MSL SA-7 (SAM) SA-16 (SAM)

6 35 4

(7,050) (500)

(1,450)

2000s BTR-80A (IFV) 32 N/A N/A

Table 3. Transfers of major conventional weapons in comparative perspective, the USSR-DPRK and PRC-DPRK.190

190 Based on the information from SIPRI Arms Transfer Database.

58

ining the f ature, and level o l and m tacts

between the PRC and DPRK is also a 191 As

shown u n 1989 and 2008 th n 10 mutual v ts every

year, except during 2006 when the PRC was engaged in the Six Party Talks. During 1998

and before Jia 2001, both count cussion of mutual

securi es number of

Chinese delegations focused on dealing with the DPRK’s nuclear weapons programs. In

those s, PRC-DPRK military-to ts between major

officials like presid s, and high-ranking officers of the PLA and

KPA in fact decreased (see Table 4).

Exam requency, n f politica ilitary con

good way to evaluate alliance cohesion.

in Fig re 7, betwee ere were less tha isi

ng’s visit in ries had almost no dis

ty issu . During the larger visits in 1994-1995 and 2003-2007, most

period the number of -military contac

ents, defense minister

Figure 7 liti ry contact, 1989–2008.192

. Frequency of PRC-DPRK po cal and milita

191 Kim, “Strategic Relations Between Beijing and Pyongyang: Growing Strains and Lingering Ties,”

305–309.

192 The author created the graph based on data from the following sources: Kim, “Strategic Relations Betw

he

02.

een Beijing and Pyongyang: Growing Strains and Lingering Ties,” 303–312; The chronologies in quarterly issues of Comparative Connections published by Pacific Forum-CSIS from 1999 to 2008; Christopher Twomey, “Explaining Chinese Foreign Policy toward North Korea: navigating between tScylla and Charybdis of proliferation and instability,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 17, No. 56(August 2008). No data available for 1998 and 20

59

Year To DPRK To PRC # of visits

1989 GS Zhao Ziyang (Wu Xuequin, Zhu Liang) CMC VC Liu Huaqing

COGS Choe Kwang GS Kim Il-sung 4

1990 GS Jiang Zemin DM Qin Jiwei PLAN PC Li Yaowen

GS Kim Il-sung DCOGS Li Chong Chan 5

1991 Nanjing MRPC Shi Yuxiao PLAN Commander Zhang Lianzhong

DM Oh Jin U 3

1992

SP Yang Shangkun Jinan MRC Zhang Wannian Jinan MRPC Song Qingwei GSD ED Director He Ping PLAN PC Wei Jinshan

KPAN Commander Kim Il Chul DCOGS Chun Jae Sun

7

1993 DM Chi Haotian DCOGS Li Wenqing Gener

General Ok Bong Rin

4 al Hong Xuezhi

1

henyang MRC Wang Ke General Kim Hak Sam

994 DDM Kim Jong Kak COGS Choe Kwang General Oh Yong Bang

5

S

1995 MDN DFAB Sun Qixiang AMS PC Zhang Gong Guangzhou MRPC Shi Yuxia

DDM Kim Jong Kak

4

1996 ILD Deputy Director Dai Bingguo North Sea FC Wang Jiying Shenyang MRPC Jiang Futang

General Jung Chang Yol

4

1997 MNDFAB Col. Li Donghui GLD PC Zhou Kunren

DCOGS Li Bong Juk 3

1998 0 1999 0

2000 NPC Chairman Li Peng DM Chi Haotian

NDC Chairman Kim Jong-il (secret visit) 3

2001 President Jiang Zemin NDC Chairman Kim Jong-il 2 2002 0 2003 Director of GDP DC Gen. Cho Myong-rok 2

2004 Delegation of Chinese People’s Volunteer Army

NDC Chairman Kim Jong-il(secret) 2

2005 0

2006 President Hu Jintao Deputy Dept. Director of AMS Shao Hua

DNC Chairman Kim Jong-il (secret) DCOGS of KPA 4

2007 KPA military delegation

Secretary of KPA Chae Tae-bok 2

2008 0

Table 4. The PRC-DPRK military-to-military contacts, 1989–2008.193

ef of General Staff); DCOGS (Deputy Chief of General Staff); DM (Defense Minister); DDM (Dep r); GLD (General Logi ense); MRC (Military Reg

193 Ibid.; Abbreviation: AMS (Academy of Military Science); CMC (Central Military Commission); COGS (Chi

uty Defense Minister); FAB (Foreign Affair Bureau); FC (Fleet Commandes Department); GS (General Secretary); MND (Ministry of National Defstic

ion Commander); PC (Political Commissar).

60

The majority of regular visits by Chinese officials and PLA officers are symbolic

goodwill visits, not task-oriented meetings on salient military and security issues. 194

There are significantly fewer high-level visits since the early 1990s and Beijing seems to

have been careful not to attach significance to these visits. For example, when Pyongyang

attempted to use the visit of a PLA Navy ship in 1996 as a propaganda tool to exaggerate

its military relationship with Beijing, PRC officials and PLA officers minimized the

significance of their visit, characterizing it as a “normal part of the minimally acceptable

commemoration of the thirty-fifth anniversary of the PRC-DPRK friendship

agreement.”195

In contrast, the PRC has improved its military relationships with the United States,

to-military contacts ranging from working-level to high-level contacts between the PLA

and th

immediately after critical incidents like the 1999 bombing and the 2001 EP-3 collision.

ROK and even Japan since the mid-1990s. Figure 8 indicates the frequency of military-

e United States starting in 1993, when President Clinton reopened military-to-

military ties for the first time since the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre. Except in 1999

and 2001 when the PRC embassy in Belgrade was bombed by NATO and the EP-3

incident occurred, both countries have been actively involved military-to-military

contacts. Since 1997, both countries have participated in the Defense Consultative Talks

(DCT) almost every year, and the U.S. Undersecretary of Defense and Commander of

U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) visits the PRC, while a PLA delegation of recently

promoted generals and flag officers visits the United States. It is significant that U.S.-

PRC military-to-military contact did not decrease during the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1994–

1995, and both sides realize the usefulness of military-to-military contacts as tools of

“communication, conflict avoidance, and crisis management.”196 In fact, the number of

contacts and the range of topics they deal with quickly increased and have expanded

194 Kim, “Strategic Relations Between Beijing and Pyongyang: Growing Strains and Lingering Ties,”

305

n, “U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress,” 16–19.

–309.

195 McVadon, “Chinese Military Strategy for the Korean Peninsula,” 288.

196 Ka

Figure 8.

Chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs

of Staff

Frequency of military contacts between the PRC and United States/ROK.197

The PRC-ROK military relationship also began to deepen in 1999 with an

unprecedented visit to Seoul by PRC Defense Minister Chi Haotian in response to the

ROK Defense Minister Cho Song-tae’s visit to Beijing earlier that year. President Kim

Dae-jung and Premier Zhu Rongji’s agreed to pursue a “full-scale cooperative

partnership” that included military ties in 2000. These visits reflect significant changes in

Beijing’s military relationship with Seoul and a break from its traditional consideration of

Pyongyang.198 The top leaders of the two countries began to discuss military exchange

programs, including naval ship visits and joint military exercises. In 2001, ROK Army

Chief of Staff General Kil Hyoung-bo made the first visit to the PRC since the end of the

Korean War, followed by a precedent-setting visit by

General Cho Yung-kil and his staff.199 Foreign Ministers and Defense Ministers

of each country have met almost every year since 2000, and in 2002 delegations of the

197 The author created the graph based on data from the following sources: Shirley A. Kan, “U.S.-

China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress,” CRS Report for Congress, RL32496 (April 15, 2009); ROK Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper (issued from 2000 to 2008).

198 Scott Snyder, “China-Korea Relations: Upgrading Communication Channels, Messages Are Gettin Comparative Connections, Vol. 2, No.1 (April 2000), 67.

Economic Relationship: Too Muc

g Clear,”

199 Scott Snyder, “China-Korea Relations: The Insatiable Sino-Koreanh for Seoul to Swallow?” Comparative Connections, Vol. 2, No. 3 (October, 2000), 85; “China-Korea

Relations: The Winds of Change: Fresh Air or Pollution?” Comparative Connections, Vol. 3, No.1 (April 2001), 96.

61

62

h Seoul], which will be beneficial to peace, stability and development in

this region.”200

’ o d r i h R

Foreign aid is the most significant factor in m

s y th P M ntr h o d anitari id th P ,

especia ese countries and

observers in the World Food Programme (WFP) suspect that Kim Jong-il used the

foreign

after their recognition of Seoul in 1992, Chinese leaders subsequently decided to cut off

n

199

g

PLA, including Chief of the General Staff of the PLA Army General Fu Zuanyou, visited

Seoul to discuss bilateral military exchanges and regional security issues. In November

2008, both militaries finally decided to establish naval and air force hotlines after holding

discussions for over a year. After the DPRK conducted nuclear tests on May 25, 2009,

ROK Minister of Defense Lee Sang-hee visited Beijing to meet Vice President Xi Jinping,

who is slated to succeed Hu Jintao in 2012, and Defense Minister Liang Guanglie. During

the meeting, Xi stated that “Beijing look[s] forward to boosting friendship and

cooperation [wit

3. The PRC s Fo d an Ene gy A d to t e DP K

aintaining economic and social

tabilit in e D RK. any cou ies ave ffere hum an a to e D RK

lly during and after the 1996-1998 famine. Analysts in th

aid for military purposes, and thus sought to provide North Korean with food

only under specific and strict conditions. However, as Pyongyang’s only traditional,

responsible ally, Beijing has unconditionally provided a huge amount of aid, without

regard for the DPRK’s possible use of the assistance.201 This said, changes in the amount

of the PRC aid to Pyongyang is an important indicator reflecting the cohesion of the

PRC-DPRK alliance. Table 5 shows the amount of PRC energy aid (coal, crude oil,

diesel, and heavy fuel oil) and grain aid since 1991.

Although the PRC provided large amounts of energy and food aid immediately

the supply of food export to the DPRK. This led to a significant decrease in food aid i

4 and 1995. Kim Jong-il threatened to withdraw from the NPT in 1994, instigating

the DPRK’s first nuclear crisis. Aid increased slightly in 1999, mainly due to increasin

200 Lam, “Beijing Mulling Tougher Tactics Against Pyongyang,” 3.

201 Jayshree Bajora, “The China-North Korea Relationship,” Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Newsletter, February 16, 2009, http://www.cfr.org/publication/11097/chinanorth_korea_relationship.html (accessed August 4, 2009).

63

mpt to reduce aid to

Pyongyang in mid-1996, Pyongyang’s reaction was extreme; it threatened Beijing by

redeveloping ties with Taiwan, and eventually received another 100,000 tons of food

from the PRC.

Yr 1994 1996 97 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

food aid during the 1996-98 famine. The famine aroused Chinese concerns about an

influx of North Korean refugee if the DPRK were to collapse. Surprisingly, Beijing

increased only energy aid to the DPRK during the famine, while food aid stayed flat. In

fact, the amount that Beijing initially offered in May 1996 was only 10 percent of the

DPRK’s demand for 200,000 tons of food aid.202 After Beijing’s atte

1991 1992 1993 1995 19

Oil 1100 1100 1050 830 1020 N/A 50 80 400 14 45 47 10 N/A

Food 300 620 740 310 150 120 150 100 150 40 200 330 220 130

WFP1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 50 360 400 600 460 950 350 290 300

Table 5. Amount of the PRC’s oil and grain aid.203

Based on this trend of decreasing and inconstant PRC aid to the DPRK, Eberstadt

argues that a primary reason Kim Jong-il’s regime has not collapsed since North Korea’s

most serious famine is not because of the PRC’s implicit aid—which remained steady

between 1998 (U.S. $339 million) and 2003 (U.S. $341 million)—but because a number

of new sources of capital emerged for Kim Jong-il. These alternative sources include a

huge amount of unconditional aid from the ROK, consistent with its “Sunshine Policy,”

and illicit transactions from the DPRK’s international counterfeiting, weapons trafficking

and drug trafficking.204 In addition, the PRC has decreased free, “grant-type aid” to the

DPRK of the type the USSR provided for its communist allies during the Cold War era.

202 Moore, “How North Korea threatens China’s interest: Understanding Chinese ‘duplicity’ onNorth Korean nuclear issue,” 8.

the

to 1995 fromhttp

, “Assistance to North Korea,” Con es

d units are thousand metric tons (1,000 MT) for both oil and food). WFP mea orld Food Programme’s food aid to the DPRK.

203 The author created the table based on data from the following sources: Data between 1991 Korea Trade Investment Promotion Agency, “North Korea trade factsheet,”

://www.kotra.or.kr/main/trade/nk/material/select/jsp; Data between 1996 to 2005 from Jaewoo Choo, “Mirroring North Korea’s Growing Economic Dependence on China,” Asian Survey, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Ma pril 2008); WFP data from Mark Manyin and Mary Nikitinrch/A

gressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, R40095 (May 20, 2009). Figures include salat a special “friendship price,” an

ns the U.N. W

204 Eberstadt, “Why Hasn’t North Korea Collapsed?” 276–277.

64

The PRC has instead increased sales of strategic goods and direct investment, providing

the DPRK with food, energy and commodities at a “friendship price” or as a long-term

loan, as shown in the Table 6.205 An interesting trend identified in the table is that the

ratio of the PRC’s aid to its overall exports to the DPRK has dropped rapidly since

“pragmatic” leader Hu Jintao assumed the presidency in 2002.

Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

PRC’s export (U.S. $ mil) 329 45 1 467 628 795 1 57

Aid to DPRK (U.S. $ mil) 48.4 27.6 69.1 16.0 10.9 14.6

Ratio (aid/export) 14.7 6.1 12.1 3.4 1.7 1.7

Table 6. The PRC’s annual grant-type aid to the DPRK, 1994–2004.206

In a policy paper presented to the PRC’s Politburo after Pyongyang admitted

for nuclear weapons to U.S. diplomat James Kelly in

2002, C

se currencies.209

developing highly enriched uranium

hinese top-level officials spoke freely about cutting energy and food aid even

more, and discussed opening their border to more North Korean refugees. This

eventually resulted in a three-day shutdown of the Sino-DPRK oil pipeline.207 Similarly,

after Pyongyang declared possession of nuclear weapons and its intention to withdraw

from the PRC-chaired Six-Party Talks in February 2005, Beijing decided not to give “any

further financial aid in the form of cash payments.” The PRC restricted its oil and food

aid to Pyongyang due to “Chinese frustration with North Korea and the lack of

accountability in how the aid was spent.” 208 Moreover, Beijing cooperated with

Washington in freezing North Korean financial assets at Macau China’s Banco Delta

Asia (BDA) which has been designated a “primary money laundering concern” and is

accused of helping Pyongyang launder counterfeit U.S. and Chine

205 Choo, “Mirroring North Korea’s Growing Economic Dependence on China,” 363–364.

206 table comes from Jaewoo Choo, “Mirroring North Korea’s Growing Economic Dependence on C

g Chinese ‘duplicity’ on the Nort ear issue,” 8.

nts,” 9–10 .

Thehina,” Asian Survey, Vol. 48, No. 2 (March/April 2008), 364.

207 Moore, “How North Korea threatens China’s interest: Understandinh Korean nucl

208 Ibid., 9.

209 Kan and Niksch, “Guam: U.S. Defense Deployme

65

Guam, and by improving its allies’ capabilities. The growing capabilities of

potential en

Recently, in response to the DPRK’s 2006 missile and nuclear tests, Beijing cut

off a significant amount of oil to the DPRK, a clear signal of the price of ignoring

Beijing’s warnings. The PRC also ordered Chinese banks to temporarily stop financial

transfers to the DPRK and closed three of the four customs offices in northeastern China

that handled trade with the DPRK.210 Simultaneously, Beijing sided with the UN Security

Council in passing a resolution imposing sanctions on Pyongyang, including bans on

sales to or exports from the DPRK of military goods, nuclear or missile-related items, and

even luxury goods; they also began searching trucks crossing the Sino-DPRK border.211

In 2009, Beijing, along with the ROK and Japan, suspended heavy fuel oil shipments to

Pyongyang, fuel designated as energy assistance to the DPRK in the September 2005 Six

Party Talks. China has not delivered the remaining amount, 55,000 metric tons of heavy

fuel oil equivalent.212

D. CONCLUSION

From a realist perspective, the security environment around the PRC-DPRK

alliance since the end of the Cold War has become more unstable due to an imbalance of

power and increasing threats from the United States and its allies in East Asia. The

United States has attempted to maintain its hegemonic power in the region by improving

both strategic and tactical capabilities of U.S. forces in Japan, the ROK, the Philippines,

Okinawa and

emies and rivals’ military power are constant threats to the PRC and DPRK,

particularly when Sino-U.S./Japan/Taiwan and DPRK-U.S./ROK relationships

deteriorate, as they did during the Taiwan Strait crises, DPRK nuclear crises, the

Belgrade bombing and the EP-3 incidents. For these reasons, realists would expect the

Sino-DPRK alliance to remain as strong as in the Cold War era.

210 Zhou, “All teeth and lips – for now”; Moore, “How North Korea threatens China’s interest:

Understanding Chinese ‘duplicity’ on the North Korean nuclear issue,” 11.

211 Ibid.

212 k Manyin and Mary Nikitin, “Assistance to North Korea,” Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, R40095 (May 20, 2009), 5–8.

Mar

66

contrast, this thesis finds that Chinese self-perceptions, their perceptions of

others, and Beijing’s perspective on Korean peninsula security issues have altered.

Consequently, the PLA’s missions, roles, and strategy in the region have also changed,

based not only on realist material variables but also on ideational variables that have

emerged in the Chinese leadership and public. Since Deng’s era, and particularly since

the end of the Cold War, growing Chinese self-confidence and activism in domestic and

international affairs, the PRC’s increasing commitment to international security and

economic institutions, and China’s increasingly favorable perspective on the United

States and South Korea h sform ing’s ch to issues from

belligerent, c r t te, pra Despi r

limited parti hina itics, e eas rts to

information about domestic and international affairs and the growing influence of public

opinion on Beijing’s decision-making process continue to create new challenges for

Beijing ts all with P to

military assistance to the DPRK, in accordance to the 1996 PRC-DPRK Treaty, and to

side with Pyongyang against the internati omm e e

burden on Beijing. For this reason, substantial cooperation between the PRC and the

DPRK on mutual security issues and military exchanges and assistance, including arms

sa an aid, rt, alliance coh

weakened.

le 7 summarizes the values of the key variables of material (realist) and

of

the PRC-DPRK alliance during the post-Cold War era cannot be explained exclusively by

external threats and interests. It can only be explained by a combination of external

security interests and changes in the Chinese collective identity that result from domestic

and international political and economic conditions.

In

ave tran

evolutionary

’s pol

ed Beij

o modera

the Chines

approa

patient and

public’s incr

Korea

gmatic.

ing effo

oercive and

cipation in C

te thei

acquire

in managing i iance yongyang. The PRC’s obligation provide

onal c unity has b come a hug , growing

les, food

Tab

d energy has declined. In sho the PRC-DPRK esion has

ideational (constructivist) approaches. The table demonstrates that the cohesiveness

67

Period

Military balance b/w PRC-DPRK and US-allies

Degree of perceived

external threat (from

US/ROK

Degree of Chinese self-perception

as “responsible

power”

Degree of Chinese

perceptions of others

(international community, U.S., ROK)

Degree of Chinese attitude toward DPRK

Actual PRC-DPRK alliance cohesion

Cold War Balanced High Low Hostile Favorable Strong

Post-Cold War

In favor of US-led allies

High High Moderate to

friendly Moderate to unfavorable

Moderate to weak

Theoretical prediction of future

PRC-DPRK alliance cohesion

(Realism)

Stronger

(Realism)

Stronger

(Constructivism)

Weaker

(Outcome)

Weaker

T f key material and ideational variables and expectations of the PRC-DPRK alliance cohesion in comparative perspective.

able 7. Values o

68

and enemies (the DRRK

and PR

A. SOUTH KOREAN “SELF-PERCEPTION”

owing Self-Confidence and Nationalism

of t ce of

ssful and

ed

IV. SOUTH KOREAN IDENTITY AND THE U.S.-ROK ALLIANCE

The ROK’s rapid economic development after the 1970s under authoritarian

regimes, democratization beginning in the mid-1980s, and extreme changes in the

international security environment of the Korean peninsula following the collapse of the

Soviet Union in 1991 have significantly affected South Korean collective identity,

altering their self-perceptions and perceptions of others. South Koreans have become

confident of their accomplishments, gradually overcoming their long-held “shrimp

among whales” mentality and embracing their growing stature on the world state as a

major regional player. At the same time, these ideational changes have shifted South

Korean perspectives on its traditional ally (the United States)

C). This creates new challenges and opportunities for the U.S.-ROK alliance. This

chapter first assesses the main factors producing a new, different South Korean collective

identity since the South Koreans have experienced rapid economic growth and vibrant

democratization. It then examines these factors in detail, focusing on how they have

affected South Koreans’ self-perception and their perspective of the United States, the

DPRK, and the PRC, while transforming Seoul’s policy toward the U.S.-ROK alliance.

This chapter argues that rising South Korean self-confidence and nationalism, growing

activism in domestic and international affairs, and increasing commitment to democratic

and free market values have constructively transformed South Korean attitudes toward

the United States, consolidating shared values between the two countries and enhancing

alliance cohesion.

1. Gr

The ROK’s miraculous economic growth since the 1970s, the so-called “miracle

he Han river,” has produced the most significant impact on the self-confiden

South Koreans. The ROK’s economy is rated as one of the world’s most succe

marked the world’s eleventh largest economy; it joined the “rich man’s club,” the

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in 1996 and enjoy

69

flawed practices in its financial

sectors

osture came

with th

an overall growth rate of nine percent for three decades until the 1997-1998 Asian

financial crisis.213 The Asian financial crisis damaged the reputation of ROK’s economy

as an exemplar of development, it revealed a record of

and increased its vulnerability to foreign currencies. However, the ROK economy

recovered from the recession astonishingly quickly compared with other bankrupt

countries. The ROK paid off the International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout loans sooner

than expected and quickly regained its former GDP per capita (as of 2008, the ROK’s

GPD per capita is approximately U.S. $27,600). 214 Since the early 2000s, with the

growing confidence of the South Korean economy in the international markets, the ROK

has sought to create free trade agreements (FTAs) with the United States, PRC, Japan and

NATO, hoping to be a hub of a Northeast Asian economy.215

From a diplomatic standpoint, a turning point in Seoul’s diplomatic p

e 1986 Asian Games and 1988 Olympics. When Seoul hosted its largest-ever

international event in 1998, it expanded its relations with both Western democracies and

communist countries, including the Soviet Union, the PRC, and many socialist countries

in Eastern Europe; the ROK also became increasingly vigorous on the world stage to

project its new national image.216 The ROK received membership in the United Nations,

along with the DPRK, in 1991. Seoul’s peace overtures to Pyongyang, including inter-

Korea exchanges and economic cooperation, resulted in the “1992 Agreement on

Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and

North” and the “Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”217

More recently, the successful inter-Korean summits in 2000 and 2007, the ROK’s “better

213 Medeiros et al., Pacific Currents: The Responses of U.S. Allies and Security Partners in East Asia

to China’s Rise, 65.

04), 22.

alization (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000), 171–172.

y of D Corporation, 2004), 12–15.

214 Woosang Kim, “Korea as a Middle Power in the Northeast Asian Security Environment,” in G. John Ikenberry and Chung-In Moon eds., The United States and Northeast Asia: Debate, Issues, and NewOrder (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2008), 123.

215 Michael H. Armacost, “Introduction,” in Armacost and Daniel Okimoto eds., The Future of America’s Alliances in Northeast Asia (Stanford, CA: Asia-Pacific Research Center, 20

216 Chae-Jin Lee, “South Korean Foreign Relations Faced the Globalization Challenges,” in Samuel S. Kim, ed., Korea’s Glob

217 Eric Larson, Norman Levin, Seonhae Baik, and Bogdan Savych, Ambivalent Allies? A StudSouth Korean Attitudes Toward the U.S. (Santa Monica, CA: RAN

70

capabilities and the decline of

the DP

istic views

of their ture that 95

percent of South Korean respondents say that they are proud of being Korean and expect

that the ROK will be bette

than expected” performance in the 2002 World Cup tournament it co-hosted with Japan,

and the ROK’s hosting of the upcoming G-20 economic summit in 2010 also

significantly shore up South Korean self-confidence.218

From a military perspective, the ROK’s growing economy and technology have

helped the rapid modernization of the ROK Armed Forces with a series of defense

reforms that began in the early 1980s. For two decades, the ROK has been among the top

15 countries with regard to military expenditures.219 Currently, the ROK Ministry of

Defense is pursuing a U.S. $292 billion program to transform its military forces, called

Defense Reform 2020. With the ROK’s advanced military

RK’s relative power, South Koreans have begun to think that they can and should

be more involved in their own defense as well as in global security issues like counter-

terrorism, peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, and nonproliferation.

The ROK’s growing self-confidence is reflected in South Koreans’ self-

perception. Many surveys show that the majority of South Koreans have optim

fu . For instance, a 2007-2008 Pacific Forum CSIS survey indicates

r off in 10 years. 220 In addition, public opinion surveys

conducted by the Pew Global Attitude Project show that most South Koreans believe that

their lives will improve over the next five years (67 percent in 2002 and 68 percent in

2007) while less than 10 percent have pessimistic views in both surveys.221 At the same

time, increased South Korean self-confidence is also reflected in increased nationalistic

sentiment. Testimonials to growing South Korean nationalism include massive anti-

Japanese movements in response to the Japanese nationalistic statements on the issue of


Northeast Asia,” 17; Myo-ja Ser, “Korea to host G-20 summit in 2010,” Joong Ang Ilbo, September 26, 200

19 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), SIPRI Yearbook 2009: Armaments, Disa

ence and Confusion: National Identity and Security Alliances in Nort

lobal Atti al Opinion Trends 2002–2007,” 24.

9, http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2910585 (accessed September 30, 2009).

2

rmament and International Security (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2009), 182.

220 Glosserman and Snyder, “Confidst Asia,” 20. hea

221 The Pew Global Attitude Project, “What the World Thinks in 2002,” 22; The Pew Gtudes Project, “Glob

71

rean peninsula, leading to calls for more

symme

gnificantly. 226 The growing middle class

eagerly sought political freedom

Dokdo/Takeshima and the revision of Japanese history textbooks, anti-American

candlelight vigils protesting accidental incidents and misconduct by U.S. forces in the

ROK, protests against the re-emergence of Chinese historical distortions, and extreme

nationalistic enthusiasm during the Olympics and the World Cup games.222 Nationalism

has grown particularly strong since the 2002 election of Roh Moo-hyun as president with

high levels of support from the nationalistic younger generation, now in their 30s and 40s,

that is assuming a leadership role in South Korean society. In his campaign, Roh

emphasized national pride, restoration of the ROK’s sovereignty, and “Korea first”

sentiments that appealed to the younger generations.223

The new spirit of South Korean nationalism also affects the ROK public’s

perspectives of the United States, the PRC, and the DPRK. It frequently increased

resentment of U.S. security policy on the Ko

trical relations with the United States, greater sympathy for the DPRK, and

interest in enhancing Korean or Asian values.224

2. Democratization and the Growing Influence of Public Opinion

During almost 30 years of South Korean authoritarian rule, public participation in

domestic politics was suppressed and human rights were seriously limited. Presidents

Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan justified their policies by exaggerating the threat

from the DPRK and appealing to people’s concern for social order and continued

economic prosperity via state-controlled public education and the media. 225 However,

since the late 1970s, with the growth in the ROK’s economy, the middle class, the well-

educated and civil society all increased si

and liberty, with violent protests against human rights

abuses and suppression by the authoritarian regimes, especially that of President Chun,

222 Moon and Suh, “Identity Politics, Nationalism, and the Future of Northeast Asian Order,” 203–

204

trategy,” 159.

Introduction,” 19.

nd Woo, “South Korea’s Response: Democracy, Identity, and Strategy,” 151.

.

223 Heo and Woo, “South Korea’s Response: Democracy, Identity, and S

224 Armacost, “

225 Heo a

226 Ibid.

72

l rights and political freedoms and expressing

diverge

s that would

never be revealed under prior authoritarian (central) governments. Such cases include the

death s ce e Korean War,

govern

nment

to

who took power by military coup in 1979 after the assassination of President Park and

authorized the brutal Kwangju Massacre in May 1980. After a series of nationwide

student demonstrations, President Chun agreed to direct elections for president, and in

1987 ROK Army General Roh Tae-woo was elected president in Korea’s first direct

election. (The election was tainted, however, as Roh was nominated by the outgoing

military ruler President Chun, and the polling process of the 1987 presidential election

was marred by corruption.) Five years later, in 1992, Kim Young-sam became the first

civilian president chosen in a free and fair election, thus ending the 30-year legacy of

authoritarian rule. Since then, South Koreans have experienced remarkable and vibrant

democratization, exercising new civi

nt, progressive political viewpoints that would have been suppressed under earlier

regimes. 227

During the rapid democratization of the 1990s, government power became

decentralized with increased public information and institutional accountability.228 For

example, South Korean local governments were established in 1991 and their officials

have been elected by popular vote since 1995, increasing local activism and public

participation.229 In addition, South Koreans started to organize civil society organizations

and request transparent investigations of many politically sensitive case

enten s of alleged DPRK’s spies, the No Gun Ri incident during th

ment-authorized political conspiracies against opposition politicians, and the

Kwangju Massacre. In fact, almost 74 percent of current domestic NGOs in the ROK

were organized between 1987 and 1996.230

In contrast to the Cold War era (in particular under the authoritarian gover

for almost three decades) when it was almost impossible for the ROK’s public

227 Chang Hun Oh and Celeste Arrington, “Democratization and Changing Anti-American Sentimen

in South Korea,” Asian Survey, Vol. 47, No. 2 (March/April 2007), 330–334. t

228 Ibid., 172.

229 Ibid.

230 Katharine H. S. Moon, “Challenging U.S. Military Hegemony,” 177.

73

c and foreign policies. The ROK is one of the most technologically advanced

and Int

estic politics, allowing legalization of numerous

previously prohibited political interest groups. As a result, South Koreans say that their

democratic values have brought significant benefits to them, and the ROK has been rated

as a “stalwart defender of democracy in Asia” by Western democracies.234

om ea un o a or r

global powers trying to maintain their spheres of influence over the Korean peninsula, a

major

influence foreign and security policies, one of the most significant results of the ROK’s

democratization has been the increasing importance of public opinion in the management

of domesti

ernet-connected countries in the world.231 With a large population in a relatively

small territory, increasing sources of media, and particularly the Internet, have given the

South Korean public greater awareness and opportunity for on- and offline participation

in politics. Many examples, including the 2002 presidential election and massive anti-

American candlelight vigils in 2002 and 2008, show the heavy impact of a new form of

grassroots participation by millions of South Korean netizens on government policies,

public opinion and public protests.232

Furthermore, South Koreans have consolidated their democracy with two peaceful

power transitions from the ruling party to the opposition party, in 1997 (President Kim

Dae-jung’s election) and 2007 (President Lee Myung-bak’s election).233 The ROK’s

democratization relaxed political restrictions, extended the ideological spectrum and

expanded public participation in the dom

3. Fr a W k Co try t Maj Playe in the Region

Historically, the ROK suffered from a series of conflicts among regional and

geostrategic point in East Asia. 235 For this reason, many scholars argue that

231 As of 2006, 70 percent of South Korean households have broadband access to the Internet,

compared with 45 percent of Japanese and 33 percent of American households. Medeiros et al., Pacific Currents: The Responses of U.S. Allies and Security Partners in East Asia to China’s Rise, 63.

152.

ion,” Web /www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/wm1859.cfm (acc

Environment,” 124.

232 Ibid., 745.

233 Oh and Arrington, “Democratization and Changing Anti-American Sentiment in South Korea,” 330–334; Heo and Woo, “South Korea’s Response: Democracy, Identity, and Strategy,” 151–

234 Bruce Klingner, “Supporting Our South Korean Ally and Enhancing Defense CooperatMemo No. 1859 (March 2008), http:/essed October 20, 2009), 1.

235 Kim, “Korea as a Middle Power in the Northeast Asian Security

74

ocated that the ROK would become a world-class country through

Segyeh

Yea 19 1995 1996 1997 1998

Korean identity was jeopardized by multiple sources in the twentieth century, including

Japanese colonialism, the Korean War and subsequent national division, and the Cold

War. 236

However, after the 1990s, the ROK’s growing capabilities and self-confidence in

the areas of economy, politics, diplomacy, and military have made South Koreans believe

that their country, as a middle power, would be able to play a greater role of defending

itself and promoting regional and global peace and prosperity. In particular, President

Kim Young-sam adv

wa (globalization). 237 Although the Asian financial crisis encouraged some South

Koreans to oppose further globalization, his successor President Kim Dae-jung believed

that the ROK’s ruined economy could recover by implementing global standards and

continuing to emphasize both democracy and a free market economy, as “two wheels of a

cart” for successful globalization.238 As a result, the ROK’s participation in international

organizations, both at the governmental and popular levels (NGOs), has increased

markedly since the 1980s (see Table 8).

r 60 1977 1984 1987 1989 1994

Gov’t 19 39 37 39 41 47 48 50 51 52

NGO 102 371 642 761 820 1,034 1,072 1,138 1,200 1,250

Table 8.

pinion survey conducted by Pacific Forum CSIS shows that almost 80 percent

The ROK’s membership in international governmental and civilian organization, 1960–1998.239

South Koreans believe that their country should take a more active leadership role

in the regional and world economies and should be open to the international community.

A public o

236 Meredith Woo-Cumings, “Unilateralism and Its Discontents: The Passing of the Cold War

Alli es

muel S. Kim, Korea’s Globalization (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000), 2.

Koh, “Segyehwa, the Republic of Korea, and the United Nation” in Samuel Kim, ed., Kor bridge Univ. Press, 2000), 200.

ance and Changing Public Opinion in the Republic of Korea,” in David Steinberg ed., Korean Attitudtoward the United States: Changing Dynamics (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2005), 65.

237 Sa

238 Kim, Korea’s Globalization, 3.

239 B. C.ea’s Globalization (New York: Cam

75

of the S

icipation in multinational coalitions approved by the

United

outh Korean respondents welcomed foreign investment and influence in the ROK

and 95 percent think that their country should take a more active role in world affairs.

The Pew Global Attitude Project’s poll also indicates that 85 percent show strong

enthusiasm for globalization.240 More recently, President Lee Myung-bak, who declared

“Global Korea” as a foreign policy objective to enhance the ROK’s leadership role in

regional and global security affairs, successfully hosted the ASEAN summit in 2009 and

is preparing the ROK to host the G-20 summit, another big international economic event,

in November 2010.

From a military standpoint, South Koreans increasingly see active participation in

international security issues as their duty as a major player in the international

community. For this reason, over 80 percent of the public strongly supports (and few

oppose) the use of their troops in regional and global security matters like UN

peacekeeping operations and part

Nations.241 In sum, South Koreans largely shared a collective identity as a rising

middle power that strongly supports democracy, a free market economy and globalization.

B. SOUTH KOREAN PERCEPTIONS OF “OTHERS”

1. South Korean Perceptions of the DPRK

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 accelerated the isolation of the DPRK

and shifted the balance of power in the ROK’s favor. South Korean pride and confidence

in their diplomatic, economic, and military superiority vis-à-vis the economically

stagnant DPRK soared in the early 1990s. As a result, their fear of the DPRK diminished

and their sympathy and pity for North Koreans increased.242 These changes in South

Korean perceptions of the DPRK are reflected in Seoul’s DPRK policy and in public

opinion.

240 The Pew Global Attitudes Project, “Global Public Opinion in the Bush Years (2001–2008),” 9;

Glo s in Northeast Asia

evin, The Shape of Korea’s Future (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1999), 20–

sserman and Snyder, “Confidence and Confusion: National Identity and Security Alliance,” 20.

241 Norman D. L21.

242 Armacost, “Introduction,” 18.

76

t” and “Joint Declaration” between the ROK and

DPRK

ent Roh Moo-hyun continued

this po

expanded the range and scope of inter-Korean exchanges. In order to gain public support,

At the governmental level, President Roh Tae-woo’s administration undertook the

policy of “Nordpolitik” and started to implement active engagement toward Pyongyang,

resulting in the 1992 “Basic Agreemen

that institutionalized a Joint Military Commission and Joint Control Commission

to implement substantial, practical commitments by both sides.243 President Kim Young-

sam advocated a more liberal approach to the DPRK than the previous authoritarian

governments. Seoul proposed a summit meeting between President Kim Young-sam and

the DPRK’s leader Kim Il Sung to improve inter-Korean relations in 1994. (However, the

summit was cancelled due to the sudden death of Kim Il-sung.) This misfortune was

followed by Four-Party talks to open a dialogue among regional powers in 1996.

President Kim Young-sam supported direct talks between Washington and Pyongyang

and approved the shipment of 150,000 tons of rice to the North in 1995, the first ROK

direct assistance to the DPRK.244

From President Kim Dae-jung’s and Roh Moo-hyun’s perspectives, it was

impossible to change the DPRK unless South Koreans first changed their perspective on

the DPRK.245 They believed that South Korean fears of the DPRK had been shaped by

the framework of the Cold War, which held them to a containment policy against the

North. President Kim Dae-jung introduced a new, comprehensive approach emphasizing

patience, the “Sunshine Policy,” and his successor Presid

licy. Removing the characterization of the DPRK as “the main threat” from the

ROK Defense White Paper in 2004, President Roh went even further, advocating that

South Korea help Pyongyang resolve the security concerns that motivated its missile tests

and efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.246 Under this new policy, Seoul significantly

these two administrations reinforced optimistic views of the DPRK. They supported

243 Larson et al., Ambivalent Allies? A Study of South Korean Attitudes Toward the U.S., 15.


245 Glosserman and Snyder, “Confidence and Confusion: National Identity and Security AllianceNortheast Asia,” 17.

246 Patrick M. Morgan, “Re-Aligning the Military and Political Dimensions of the ROK-US Alliance: The Possibilities,” International Jou

s in

rnal of Korean Studies, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Fall 2007), 74.

77

provocations, leading to a decline in public support for the engagement policy and more

negative South Korean attitudes toward the North. For example, during the DPRK’s first

tighter inter-Korean relations as essential to national security and to a future role for a

reunified Korea as a stabilizer of the region, all of which encouraged nationalistic

sentiment in the South Korean people.

As a consequence, South Korean public attitudes toward the DPRK have

fluctuated widely since the 1990s. Prior to the 2000 summit, almost half of South

Koreans viewed Kim Jong-il as a dictator. Immediately after the summit, that figure

dropped to less than 10 percent, and over 97 percent indicated that they would welcome a

visit by Kim Jong-il to Seoul.247 This trend accelerated when Pyongyang accepted North-

South family reunions for the first time and the North-South railroad project in 2000. In

addition, the historic scene of both Koreas’ athletes marching together under a single flag

at the opening ceremony of the 2000 Sydney Olympics stirred up the South Koreans’

“brotherhood” attitude toward North Koreans.248 Despite the second DPRK’s nuclear

crisis in the early 2000s, a 2006 Gallup World Poll found that 53 percent of South Korean

respondents did not feel a serious threat from the DPRK’s nuclear weapons, while 43

percent did feel threatened.249 Even after the DPRK’s nuclear test in October 2006,

many progressive South Koreans, including Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun,

argued that the DPRK nuclear test occurred not because of the ROK’s Sunshine Policy

but because of the Bush administration’s coercive DPRK policy that made Pyongyang

consider nuclear weapons as its “last resort to survive.”250

But, Seoul’s friendly approaches to Pyongyang have failed so far due to the

DPRK’s insincere feedback to the ROK’s cooperative gestures and its continued


Northeast Asia,” 22.

e, “Gallup World Poll: South Korea’s Political Dilemma,” Gallup, September 22, 200 w.gallup.com/poll/24679/gallup-world-poll-south-koreas-political-dilemma.aspx (accessed July

nKorea/2008/08Gi-WookBurke.pdf

(acc 17, 2009), 150–151.


249 Cheonleon Le6, http://ww 15, 2009).

250 Gi-wook Shin and Kristin C. Burke, “North Korea and Contending South Korean Identities: Analysis of the South Korean Media; Policy Implications for the United States.” Academic Paper SeriesOn Korea, Vol. 1(February 2008), http://www.keia.org/Publications/O

essed Nov

78

nuclear crisis, Pyongyang frequently brought politically sensitive issues to the negotiating

table to split U.S.-ROK relations. At the same time, only minimal progress was seen on

the most urgent and important issues, like the transparency of the DPRK’s nuclear policy

and its international obligations as a member of the NPT.251 Pyongyang rejected the

South Korean name for the light water reactor that KEDO had promised to install in the

DPRK in return for giving up its nuclear program. Pyongyang also rejected the exchange

of special envoys between the two Koreas, fueling South Korean resentment at being

treated as an outsider and excluded from negotiations on critical Korean security

issues.252 When a South Korean commercial ship bearing rice aid arrived in the DPRK in

1995 and was forced to raise the DPRK flag, South Koreans severely criticized

253

hopes am e

possible, th rinciple of

reciprocity but rather on the idea of “provide first and expect later,” was increasingly

criticized by both the South Korean public and the Bush administration.254 Figure 9

shows how Chosun Ilbo, the most popular South Korean newspaper, framed issues in

their coverage of the DPRK before President Kim Dae-jung's administration (1992-1998)

compared to their coverage during and after his administration (1998-2003). This shows

that the South Korean public had begun to emphasize the need for greater reciprocity in

the relations with the North. 255 During this period, other major progressive and

nationalistic South Korean newspapers, such as Hangyoreh Daily, also toned down their

strong rhetoric toward the ROK’s engagement with the DPRK.256

Pyongyang’s behavior. In addition, despite the fact that inter-Korean summits raised

ong progressives that the cherished vision of a “unified” Korea might finally b

e Sunshine Policy, based not on Kim Dae-jung’s initial p

251

252

sis of the South Kor

Larson et al., Ambivalent Allies? A Study of South Korean Attitudes Toward the U.S., 15–18.

Ibid., 17–22.

253 Ibid.


255 Shin and Burke, “North Korea and Contending South Korean Identities: Analyean Media; Policy Implications for the United States.” 158–162.

256 Ibid.

re 9. Frequency of the most prevalent news frames regarding inter-Korean issues in Chosun Ilbo, before the Kim Dae-jung administration (1992–1997) compared

with during and after his administration (1998–2003).

Figu

257

Figure 10. Frequency of North Korean Provocative Actions, 1990–2006.258

Furthermore, South Koreans lost patience with North Korea’s provocative actions

betw ies of een 1998 and 2006, including the 1998 DPRK’s submarine incident, a ser

257 The figure is from Shin and Burke, “North Korea and Contending South Korean Identities:

Analysis of the South Korean Media; Policy Implications for the United States.” 161.

0–2007,” CRS Report for Congress, RL30004 (April 20, 2007).

258 The author created this graph based on data from Hannah Fischer, “North Korean Provocative Actions, 195

79

80

dialogu

2. South Korean Attitudes Toward the PRC

Like South Korean views of the DPRK, their views of the PRC are ambivalent

nd conflicted because the PRC still looms large as a major uncertainty for security.

From an economic perspective, since the 1992 normalization, the trade between the two

countries increased by a factor of 628 in 26 years, making the PRC South Korea’s

num 261 By 1995, the PRC was the largest single destination for

Taepodong missile and nuclear tests, naval clashes in the Yellow Sea in 1999, 2002, and

2009 in the vicinity of the Northern Limited Line (NLL), and constant DMZ provocations.

In contrast to South Koreans’ expectations, such incidents did not seem to decrease

despite Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun’s warm overtures to the North (see Figure 10).

More recently, South Korean patience was further reduced by the shooting death

of a South Korean female tourist at the Mount Keumgang resort in July 2008. Pyongyang,

claiming the tourist had entered a forbidden area, did not apologize or allow South

Korean investigators to enter the DPRK, but instead blamed Seoul for the incident and

demanded an apology from the South. 259 In addition, at the inter-Korean military

e in October 2008, the Lee administration’s first opportunity to discuss mutual

actions to prevent similar incidents and reopen inter-Korean talks, the meeting time was

taken up with complaints about leaflets disparaging the North Korean leadership

distributed by South Korean NGOs with ties to North Korean refugees.260 Hence, after a

period when views of the North improved, South Korean perceptions of the DPRK have

started returning to their previously negative state.

a

ber one trading partner.

South Korean foreign direct investment (FDI). More than a half of South Korean FDI

since 2003 has flowed into the PRC (ROK’s cumulative investment in the PRC surpassed

259 Jonathan Watts, “South Korea tourist shot dead in North Korea,” Guardian, July 11, 2008,

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jul/11/korea (accessed August 30, 2009)

260 Scott Snyder, “Lee Myung-bak’s foreign policy: a 250-day assessment,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 21, No. 1 (March 2009), 95.

261 Jae Ho Chung, “China’s ‘Soft’ Clash with South Korea.” Asian Survey, Vol. 49, No. 3 (May/June 2009), 470.

81

of advice on intra-Korean issues and the best

commu

that in the United States in 2004).262 From a diplomatic perspective, the PRC grew

steadily more important than other ROK neighbors because the PRC, as the DPRK’s only

ally, has been the best source

nication channel supplementing Seoul’s limited direct contacts with

Pyongyang.263 In social and cultural perspectives, with their geographical proximity and

cultural affinity, the total number of tourists between the two countries also soared up

from 9,000 in 1988 to more than 4.8 million in 2006, surpassing that between the United

States and ROK.264 Based on those increasing interaction, both the ROK and the PRC

continue to seek expansion of their political, economic, social and cultural partnerships.

As a result, South Korean attitudes toward the PRC and Chinese have

significantly improved since the 1992 normalization. For instance, 38 percent of South

Koreans picked the PRC as their most important economic partner in 1996, 43 percent in

1998, 53 percent in 2002, and 67 percent in 2007.265 Many South Korean and Chinese

analysts describe the Seoul-Beijing relationship in the 1990s as a “honeymoon” in which

mutual understanding and physical interaction flourished.266 In 2001, 73 percent of South

Korean respondents had a favorable view of the PRC, while only 66 percent expressed

262 Brian Bridges, “The Political Economy of China-Korea Relations,” in Joseph Chai, Y. Y. Kueh,

and Clement Tisdell eds., China and the Asia Pacific Economy (New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 1997), 214; Ross, “Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing in East

rgan, “Re-Aligning the Military and Political Dimensions of the ROK-US Alliance: The Poss

na’s ‘Soft’ Clash with South Korea.” 470.

aping Changes and Cultivating Ideas in the U.S.-ROK Alliance,” in Armacost and Dani east Asia (Stanford, CA: Asia-Pacific Rese ce and Confusion: National Identity and Secu

Ho Chung, “How China respond to trade sanctions: Decoding the Sino-South Korean ‘Garlic War ew

Asia,” 130.

263 Moibilities,” 75.

264 Chung, “Chi

265 Victor Cha, “Shel Okimoto eds., The Future of America’s Alliances in North

h Center, 2004), 133; Glosserman and Snyder, “Confidenarcrity Alliances in Northeast Asia,” 25.

266 Jae ’,” in David Zweig and Chen Zhimin eds., China’s Reforms and International Political Economy (N

York: Routledge, 2007), 186.

82

e so-called “garlic war” between the

PRC a the

retaliatory tariffs on other South Korean goods in the Chinese markets that caused more

than U.

favorable attitudes toward the United States. 267 For this reason, some analysts have

argued that the ROK will inevitably side with the PRC as its natural ally, forsaking the

alliance with the United States.268

However, South Korean attitudes toward the PRC are greatly affected by a wide

range of issues, such as economic competition, tainted Chinese products, unresolved

historical disputes, domestic identity, and Beijing’s treatment of North Korean

refugees. 269 From an economic standpoint, South Korean business communities are

increasingly concerned about their growing vulnerability to cheap, plentiful Chinese

products in overseas markets and their growing trade dependency on the PRC. For

instance, PRC trade as a portion of ROK’s total trade increased from approximately 3

percent in 1995 to almost 20 percent in 2006. 270 Trade disputes between the two

countries have also increased. For example, during th

nd ROK in 2000, South Korean resentment soared due to massive, unfair,

S. $100 million in losses.271 For this reason, although the ROK has given credit to

the PRC’s role as a world economic powerhouse, 66 percent of South Koreans believe

that a rising China will be an economic competitor to the ROK rather than a partner (31

percent).272

From a historical perspective, Beijing undertook a “Northeast Asia Project” to

incorporate ethnic minority histories, including Korea’s ancient Koguryo kingdom, into

the broader Chinese history. Almost every South Korean saw the project as a hegemonic

attempt by the PRC, and the perception of the PRC as a threat spread rapidly in the

267 Ross, “Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing in East

Asia,” 136.

268 Glosserman and Snyder, “Confidence and Confusion: National Identity and Security Alliances in Nor

commodation and Balancing in East Asia

2009, 14.

theast Asia,” 18.

269 Ibid., 25.

270 Chung, “China’s ‘Soft’ Clash with South Korea.” 471.

271 Ross, “Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Ac,” 129.

272 Weston Konishi and Mark Manyin, “South Korea: Its Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy Outlook,” Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, September 30,

83

eninsula and its DPRK contingency plans.274 A number of South Korean public

opinion

iction over South Korean human right abuses, democratization, and U.S.-ROK trade

ROK.273 Like the PRC during the Korean War, ancient Chinese dynasties (such as the

Tang dynasty), frequently attempted to prevent a united Korean peninsula. In light of this

history, South Koreans keep a wary eye on the PRC’s ambiguous intentions toward the

Korean p

surveys conducted by major South Korean news services indicate that South

Korean attitudes toward the PRC have deteriorated in the 2000s. According to polls in

2002 by the Sisa Journal, in 2005 by Joong-ang Ilbo, and in 2008 by Kyunghyang

Shinmoon, favorable South Korean views of the PRC decreased from 41 percent in 2002,

to 29 percent in 2005, to 15 percent in 2008.275 A 2007 KBS public opinion poll shows

that almost 60 percent of South Koreans say they do not like the PRC, and the Pew

Global Attitude Project found that unfavorable views of the PRC were held by 42 percent

of South Koreans in 2007 and 48 percent in 2008.276

3. South Korean Attitudes Toward the United States and the U.S.-ROK Alliance

During the last half century, the United States and ROK have had prosperous,

successful relations that have brought mutual benefits. Based on their formidable alliance,

the ROK has been able to enhance its security and promote its interests in recovering

from the Korean War, becoming economically and militarily superior to its rival on the

Korean peninsula, and gaining enough power to deter a North Korean threat.

Simultaneously, the United States has been able to maintain regional peace and stability

and promote its supreme values of democracy and free markets in the region. During the

Cold War era, neither Americans nor South Koreans doubted the rationale, substance and

purpose of their alliance, and thus the alliance remained stable and predictable despite

fr


Nor

ns (CFR) Special Report No. 42, January 2009, 18.

008),” 2; T

theast Asia,” 18.

274 Paul B. Stares and Joel S. Wit, “Preparing for Sudden Change in North Korea,” Council on Foreign Relatio

275 Chung, “China’s ‘Soft’ Clash with South Korea,” 473.

276 Ibid; The Pew Global Attitudes Project, “Global Public Opinion in the Bush Years (2001–2he Pew Global Attitudes Project, “Global Unease with Major World Powers,” 39.

84

nd attitudes toward both themselves and the United

States.

as a “protector” against the DPRK during the Korean

War, a

for independence. 280 Other self-interested U.S. actions include tacit support of the South

Korean authoritarian regimes and their coercive suppression, in particular during the

issues.277 However, the end of the Cold War, along with the ROK’s rapid economic

growth and vibrant democratization, has affected the foundation of the alliance, changing

South Korean public perceptions a

Various factors have shaped South Korean attitudes toward the United States and

U.S.-ROK alliance, including history, democratization, South Koreans’ growing self-

confidence, demographic changes in the ROK, inter-Korean relations, and

misunderstandings between Seoul and Washington. First, historically, South Korean

views of the United States were a “complex of mixture of feelings,” from “gratitude,

fondness, and respect” to “lingering sense of resentment and distrust” as the United States

has played a critical role in different stages of Korea’s history, including colonization,

independence, U.S. military rule, the Korean War, military modernization, economic

development, and democratization.278 On the one hand, the United States was perceived

as a “liberator” of Koreans from Japanese colonialism after World War II, as a “sponsor”

of an independent ROK in 1948,

nd as a de facto military, economic, and political “security guarantor” during the

Cold War era.279 On the other hand, the United States was perceived as seeking its own

interests without regard for Korean interests when Washington rejected Korea’s request

for American protection against Japanese colonialism in the early 1900s, made

ambiguous plans for the post-war Korea at the Cairo Conference in 1943, and put Korea

under international trusteeship with the Soviet Union despite the strong Korean demand

277 Tae-Hwan Kwak and Seung-Ho Joo, “Introduction,” in T. Kwak and S. Joo, eds., The United

States and the Korean Peninsula in the 21st Century (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2006), 2.

278 Larson et al., Ambivalent Allies? A Study of South Korean Attitudes Toward the U.S., 7–12.

Ambivalent Allies? A Study of South Korean Attitudes Toward the U.S., 26.

279 Norman Levin, Do the Ties Still Bind? (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2004), 6.

280 Larson et al.,

85

nship from a patron-client relationship to a more

equal, s

Kwangju Massacre in 1980s, Washington’s strong pressure on Seoul to open its

agriculture, financial, and service markets, and the imposition of “Super 301 legislation”

to decrease U.S. trade deficits.281

Second, from a political perspective, democratization has promoted a vigorous

civil society and political freedom, increasing a domestic political divergence between

the ROK’s pro-unification groups and conservatives. This affects the decision making

process in ROK foreign policy toward the United States and the DPRK.282 With the rise

of new, progressive South Korean political elites (the so-called the “386-generation”283),

frictions between Washington and Seoul have become more frequent and the nature of

the U.S.-ROK alliance has become increasingly controversial.284 With growing national

pride and the demographic shift to a younger generation raised in the prosperous,

democratic ROK, South Koreans seek to improve ROK’s status on the international stage,

demand less dependence on foreigners in defending their security interests, and hope to

transform the U.S.-ROK security relatio

ymmetric relationship.285

Third, from a diplomatic standpoint, U.S. foreign policies toward East Asia and

inter-Korean relations have played a critical role in shifting the South Korean perspective

on the United States. For instance, during the DPRK’s first nuclear crisis in 1993-1994,

Washington’s attempt to open direct talks with Pyongyang to find a peaceful, diplomatic

resolution raised South Korean concerns of being excluded from a “process that directly

affected critical South Korean national interests but over which the ROK had little

f the Post-Cold War Era and the U.S.-ROK allia

rm was coined, atten ns of power in K

ha, “Shaping Changes and Cultivating Ideas in the U.S.-ROK Alliance,” 121–122.

Poss


282 Choong Nam Kim, “Changing Korean Perceptions once,” Asia Pacific No. 67 (April 2003), 5.

283 The “386-generation” refers to those who were in their thirties (“3”0s) when the te college in the 1980s (“8”0s), were born in the 1960s (“6”0s), and now serve in positioded

orean society. Double-Tongued Dictionary, http://www.doubletongued.org/index.php/dictionary/386_generation/ (accessed November 19, 2009).

284 C

285 Morgan, “Re-Aligning the Military and Political Dimensions of the ROK-US Alliance: The ibilities,” 76–77.

86

nited States.”287 As a result, South Korean public opinion toward the

United

orge W. Bush, who characterized North Korea as a “rogue state” and part

of the “axis of evil,” were designed to increase tension on the Korean peninsula. Many

South Koreans, including government officials, blamed the Bush administration for the

stalemate in inter-Korean relations.288

Fourth, these factors have shifted South Korean attitudes toward the United States

more widely, frequently, and effectively since the 1990s, due to the explosive use of the

media and the Internet in particular.289 With access to a variety of media sources, South

Koreans reportedly average approximately five hours a day in media consumption

activities, and the younger they are, the more information they seek from the Internet.290

In the ROK, the Internet has been the catalyst for shaping public opinion and organizing

public group activities, such as massive protests. Seoul, unlike Beijing, has not attempted

to control and censor the Internet and netizens’ online activities. 291 Reporting by

influence.”286 With this feeling, South Koreans criticized both Seoul and Washington for

their lack of diplomatic coordination regarding their DPRK policies. The Kim Young-

sam administration was criticized for its lack of an “independent” South Korean policy

toward the DPRK and for putting “ROK’s national security subordinate to the global

interests of the U

States deteriorated between 1994 and 1995. This is indeed an irony in light of

realist expectations that the ROK would seek close ties with the United States in response

to unstable security conditions during the 1993-1994 DPRK nuclear crisis. Similarly, a

majority of South Koreans believed that the United States’ hawkish DRPK policy after

the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and a series of harsh comments about the DPRK

by President Ge

progressive South Korean media like OhMyNews, PRESSian News, and Hangyoreh

286 Woo-Cumings, “Unilateralism and Its Discontents: The Passing of the Cold War Alliance and

Changin

287 Lars

289 Balbina Y. Hwang, “Minding the Gap: Improving U.S.-ROK Relations,” Backgrounder No. 1814 (De r 10,

g, “Comparing Online Activities in China and South Korea,” 733.

g Public Opinion in the Republic of Korea,” 62–63.

on et al., Ambivalent Allies? A Study of South Korean Attitudes Toward the U.S., 23.

288 Campbell et al., Going Global: The Future of the U.S.-South Korea Alliance, 11.

cember 2004), http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg1814.cfm (accessed Octobe2009), 3.

290 Larson, et al., Ambivalent Allies? A Study of South Korean Attitudes Toward the U.S., 99–100.

291 Chun

Daily often contains strong nationalistic and even sensationalist overtones and distorted

information. Such media reports increase serious misperceptions about both

Washington’s and Seoul’s intentions, and inflame public sentiment.292 These media have

been often misused for political purposes, including anti-government and anti-American

demonstrations.

Taking all these factors into account, South Korean attitudes toward the United

States have changed since the end of the Cold War, fluctuating especially in the late

1990s and the early 2000s. Figure 11 shows South Korean attitudes toward the United

States (left) and the U.S.-ROK alliance (right) between 1988 and 2002, based on surveys

conducted by the U.S. State Department, Gallup Korea, and other major South Korean

news services.

Trends in South Korean attitudes toward the United States and the U.S.-ROK alliance.

Figure 11.

293

The decline of favorable perspectives on the United States in 1994–1995 is

accounted for by increasing South Korean resentment of the unilateral approach to the

292 Hwang, “Minding the Gap: Improving U.S.-ROK Relations,” 1–2; Larson et al., Ambivalent

Allies? Study of South Korean Attitudes Toward the U.S., 100.

he U.S.

A

293 The figures from Larson et al., Ambivalent Allies? A Study of South Korean Attitudes Toward t, 45, 51.

87

88

s in their economic security. For these reasons, South

Korean

Korean summit stirred up South Korean hope for unification, increasing both South

Korean confusion over its national identity and its perceptions of its ally and enemy, and

dom .

Pre to

alte ptions of North Koreans from “enemies seeking to conquer the South” to

“br

DPRK during the nuclear crisis and a confluence of the usual factors of trade frictions

and public outrage over incidents involving U.S. military personnel stationed in the ROK.

This decline was reversed quickly when Washington praised the significance of the

ROK’s role in regional security affairs and confirmed its strong commitment to the

ROK’s defense. In addition, President Kim Dae-jung, whose policy toward the DPRK

differed significantly from his predecessor’s, anticipated that direct talks between

Washington and Pyongyang would become a part of his Sunshine Policy. Thus, his

administration actively encouraged Washington to engage with Pyongyang. President

Clinton and his special advisor and policy coordinator William Perry strongly welcomed

the ROK’s Sunshine Policy, which increased the sense of coherence between Washington

and Seoul regarding their DPRK policies. 294 Moreover, President Kim Dae-jung

repeatedly emphasized the importance of U.S. forces in the ROK (USFK), based on the

U.S.-ROK alliance and its vital role in ROK security even after unification. In addition to

the growing coherence between Washington and Seoul on security issues, South Koreans

hurt by the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis appreciated the key role of the United States

and U.S.-led IMF bailout fund

s with favorable attitudes toward the United States soared from 61 percent in 1998

to 71 percent in 2000.295

However, generally positive South Korean views of the United States throughout

most of the 1990s faced a series of turbulent moments after the inter-Korea summit in

2000 and the U.S.-ROK summit between Bush and Kim Dae-jung in 2001. The inter-

estic divergence over Seoul’s approach toward the United States and DPRK

sident Kim Dae-jung and his successor Roh Moo-hyun persuaded South Koreans

r their perce

others and sisters needing South Korean help” in order to achieve their number one

294 Larson et al., Ambivalent Allies? A Study of South Korean Attitudes Toward the U.S., 45, 51..

295 Ibid.

89

ondents blamed

Bush’s “hawkish and arrogant” attitude more than Kim Jong-il for the inter-Korean

reconciliation deadlock, growing tension on the peninsula, and even the DPRK’s nuclear

tests.298 For example, a Korean Gallup Poll in 2002 reported that some 53.7 percent of

South Koreans held “unfavorable” and “som the

United States, and in the 2003 poll, 62.9 percent of South Korean

respondents said that the Bush adm

l reported

that those with favorable feelings toward the United States had deteriorated from 36

percent

national objective, unification. 296 The 2001 U.S.-ROK summit revealed significant

discord and distrust between the two governments regarding how to deal with the

DPRK.297 As a result, many South Korean public opinion polls conducted by major

South Korean media in the early 2000s indicated a negative shift in South Korean

attitudes toward the United States. Almost half of the South Korean resp

ewhat unfavorable” attitudes toward

Sisa Journal

inistration’s DPRK policy was not helpful for the

stability of the Korean peninsula. A Samsung Economic Research Institute pol

in 2001 to 24.5 percent in 2003.299 A KBS poll showed that 43 percent of South

Koreans blamed the United States for the DPRK’s 2006 nuclear test, while only 37

percent blamed Pyongyang.300

Many scholars and government officials in both countries have argued that these

temporary shifts in South Korean perspectives on the United States in the early 2000s

should not be exaggerated. 301 They assert that the polls can be misleading and the

massive South Korean public disaffection regarding the United States fluctuates widely

within short periods of time, a ubiquitous phenomenon seen in many other nations

296 Larson et al., Ambivalent Allies? A Study of South Korean Attitudes Toward the U.S., 45, 51.39.

297 Kwak and Joo, “Introduction,” 3.

298 Kim, “Changing Korean Perceptions of the Post-Cold War Era and the U.S.-ROK alliance,” 5.

e Possibilities,” 77; Hahm Chaibong, “Anti-Americanism, Kor

harpe, Inc., 2005), 220–221.

299 Ibid., 50.

300 Glosserman and Snyder, “Confidence and Confusion: National Identity and Security Alliances inNortheast Asia,” 23.

301 Woo-Cumings, “Unilateralism and Its Discontents: The Passing of the Cold War Alliance and Changing Public Opinion in the Republic of Korea,” 66–68; Morgan, “Re-Aligning the Military and Political Dimensions of the ROK-US Alliance: Th

ean Style,” in David Steinberg ed., Korean Attitudes toward the United States: Changing Dynamics(Armonk, NY: M.E. S

90

Choice Dec. 1999 Nov. 2000 Jan. 2001 Mar. 2002 Jun. 2003 May 2004

beginning in 2001.302 In fact, in contrast to the negative picture painted by some surveys

that report only “positive” and “negative” choices, many other surveys that offered

additional “neutral” or “don’t know” choices indicate that the majority of South Koreans

have a neutral perspective on the United States, and individuals’ views vary from issue to

issue depending on their personal, internal experiences (see Table 9).303

Positive 38.7 30 15.9 23 25.4 22.8

Neutral 31.6 51 36.7 46 46.9 60.1

Negative 29.6 19 47.6 29.5 27.6 16.2

Don’t Know N/A N/A N/A 1.4 N/A -

Table 9. Changing South Korean perceptions of the United States.304

Moreover, given constant shifts in the ROK’s domestic politics due to the severe

divergence on political, economic, and social issues, the apparent conflict in the U.S.-

ROK alliance in the early 2000s was not due to significant divergence between South

Korean and American national interests. Rather, it resulted from the Bush

administration’s unilateralism, and the lack of mutual understanding of each country’s

new security environment and priorities, and problems that could be resolved by further

deep dialogue and compromise. 305 In fact, under President Kim Dae-jung’s

administration, Washington and Seoul officially answered the question of the future

direction of their alliance, which has been raised by both governments since 1992. The

32nd U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) Joint Communiqué in 2002

explicitly stated that the “[U.S.-ROK] alliance will serve to maintain peace and stability

302 Morgan, “Re-Aligning the Military and Political Dimensions of the ROK-US Alliance: The

Possibilities,” 77.

303 Oh and Arrington, “Democratization and Changing Anti-American Sentiment in South Korea,”332.

nti-Ame

304 The table is from Chang Hun Oh and Celeste Arrington, “Democratization and Changing Arican Sentiment in South Korea,” 332.

305 Morgan, “Re-Aligning the Military and Political Dimensions of the ROK-US Alliance: The Possibilities,” 73–74.

91

pid fluctuation of South Koran

nationa

in Northeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole, even after the immediate threat

to stability has receded on the Korean peninsula.”306 In 2002, despite increasing strain on

U.S.-ROK relations after a series of massive anti-American demonstrations and the

presidential victory of progressive party leader Roh Moo-hyun, a critic of Washington’s

Northeast Asia policies, overall U.S.-ROK relations were cordial and the new South

Korean president quickly changed his attitudes toward the United States and undertook

several significant steps to modernize the U.S.-ROK alliance.307

Many statistical data also show that, despite some negative South Korean

perceptions of the Bush’s administration, South Korean attitudes toward Americans and

the U.S.-ROK alliance have been generally warm. The exception is the years 2001 and

2002, when huge anti-American candlelight vigils were held in the ROK in response to a

regrettable statement by Washington and how the USFK handled the case of two South

Korean schoolgirls who were killed by an U.S. Army armored vehicle.308 A RAND

analysis of South Korean attitudes finds that, despite ra

lism and/or anti-American sentiment in the early 2000s, over the last 15 years

approximately 75 to 90 percent of South Koreans maintain strong support for the U.S.-

ROK alliance.309 Recent figures show that over 90 percent of South Koreans believe that

the presence of U.S. military bases in the Korean peninsula is important to regional

stability, even after unification.310 According to Gallup Korea polls and Chosun Ilbo

polls, the proportion of South Koreans with “very favorable” and “somewhat favorable”

views of the United States rose from 33.6 percent in February 2002 to 37.2 percent in

306 Jae-Jung Suh, “Korean Bases of Concern,” Foreign Policy in Focus (FPIF) Policy Report, April 2,

200

07 Bruce Klingner, “Evolving Military Responsibilities in the U.S.-ROK Alliance,” International Jour

sold

and Strategy,” 159.

for th and Sny al Identity and Security Alliances in Northeast Asia,” 26.

8, http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5111 (accessed July 10, 2009).

3

nal of Korean Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Fall/Winter 2008), 26.

308 Given that President Clinton had officially apologized to the Japanese people when Americaniers raped a Japanese teenage girl a few years earlier, South Korean resentment increased after

Washington and USFK refused to apologize in this case. Heo and Woo, “South Korea’s Response: Democracy, Identity,

309 Larson, et al., Ambivalent Allies? A Study of South Korean Attitudes Toward the U.S., 39.

310 Nae-Young Lee, “Public Opinion about ROK-U.S. Relations,” in Challenges Posed by the DPRKlliance and the Region (Washington, D.C.: Korea Economy Institute, 2005), 3–4; Glossermane A

der, “Confidence and Confusion: Nation

92

Decem

.S. Department of State shows

that 62

ber 2002, and to 53.7 percent in November 2004.311 The U.S. Department of

State’s INR polls also indicate that South Koreans who see the United States as their

closest security partner in five to 10 years increased from 52 percent in 1996, to 60

percent in 2000-2002, to almost 90 percent in 2007.312 In addition, according to the

2007-2008 poll conducted by Pacific Forum CSIS and Asia Foundation, 77.8 percent of

South Korean respondents had positive attitudes toward Americans, and this result is

higher than for the Japanese respondents (63.1 percent). 313 Many other polls conducted

by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs (CCGA), East Asia Institute (EAI), and the

Pew Global Attitude project in 2008 also indicate that recent South Korean perspectives

on the United States have become more favorable, coming close to Cold War-era

figures.314 Moreover, a 2009 survey conducted by the U

percent of South Koreans pick the United States as the most “beneficial political

and diplomatic partner” to their security interests, in comparison to other key regional

powers such as the PRC (19 percent) and Japan (10 percent).315

Interestingly, the younger South Korean generations who experienced rapid

democratization, globalization, the Asian financial crisis, the DPRK nuclear crises,

massive anti-American demonstrations, the emergence of a rising China, continued

conflicts with the PRC and Japan over history, and the global economic downturns in the

1990s and 2000s seem to have adjusted their self-perceptions and views of South Korea’s

neighbors in a more pragmatic manner. In other words, young South Koreans worry less

about the North Korean threat and much more about strategic benefits to their economy

and security from close ties with the United States.316

311 Oh and Arrington, “Democratization and Changing Anti-American Sentiment in South Korea,”

328.

n

e Bush Years (2001–2008),” 3.

312 Cha, “Shaping Changes and Cultivating Ideas in the U.S.-ROK Alliance,” 133; Glosserman and Snyder, “Confidence and Confusion: National Identity and Security Alliances in Northeast Asia,” 25.

313 Glosserman and Snyder, “Confidence and Confusion: National Identity and Security Alliances iNortheast Asia,” 19.

314 Ibid.; The Pew Global Attitudes Project, “Global Public Opinion in th

315 Konishi and Manyin, “South Korea: Its Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy Outlook,” 7.

316 Levin, Do the Ties Still Bind? 15.

93

ly 80 percent of South Korean respondents support the U.S.-ROK agreement

on “stra

le

politica

his contribution to the ROK’s democratization were appreciated by a majority of

Americans. The robust common values of democracy and freedom have helped promote

U.S.-ROK relations. 320 As a result, many U.S. government officials, scholars, and

students have started to emphasize feelings of affinity between the United States and

Another significant change in the South Korean public’s view of the U.S.-ROK

alliance is that the U.S.-ROK alliance is no longer a politically polarizing issue in the

ROK’s domestic politics. Even South Korean progressives recognize that the U.S.

alliance has contributed to national and regional security.317 South Koreans have realized

that a healthy, symmetric relationship in the alliance requires mutual contributions to

common interests, and thus that they should focus not only on what they can receive from

the United States but consider also what its ally demands from them. For this reason,

approximate

tegic flexibility” for USFK and the majority of South Koreans advocate evolution

of the alliance “from a singularly focused mission to a more robust value-based

relationship” that looks beyond the Korean peninsula.318

From the constructivist perspective, numerous factors have developed in

American and South Korean societies over the past decades that promote convergence

between the two countries. Politically, South Koreans strongly support American values

of respect for democracy, the rule of law, and freedom of expression. The ROK, in fact,

has been rated as a model of successful democratization.319 At the same time, remarkab

l improvements in the ROK have changed American perceptions of the ROK as a

small, divided, poor, authoritarian country devastated by war. The ROK is now perceived

as a small but strong and dynamic country, an exemplar of American style

democratization and economic development. President Kim Dae-jung’s life history and

ces in

8 Klingner, “Evolving Military Responsibilities in the U.S.-ROK Alliance,” 25; Glosserman and Sny

Relations,” 2.

ublic of

blic of Korea Alliance (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institutes, 2003), 28.

317 Glosserman and Snyder, “Confidence and Confusion: National Identity and Security AllianNortheast Asia,” 27.

31

der, “Confidence and Confusion: National Identity and Security Alliances in Northeast Asia,” 27.

319 Hwang, “Minding the Gap: Improving U.S.-ROK

320 Victor D. Cha, “America’s Alliances in Asia: The Coming ‘Identity Crisis’ with the RepKorea?” in Donald Boose, Jr., Balbina Hwang, Patrick Morgan, and Andrew Scobell, eds., Recalibrating the U.S.-Repu

94

trading partner for the United States. Both governments signed the

Korean

ROK. For instance, then-Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Kurt Campbell stated

before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in September 1998 that the U.S.-

ROK alliance should be more than a “treaty commitment” as both countries had

maintained a “mutually beneficial partnership built on a shared stake in democracy and

free markets.”321 Similarly, then-Ambassador to the ROK Stephen Bosworth valued the

strong development of ROK’s democracy, noting in 1998 that “democracy ha[d] become

in a real sense the cement of the overall relationship [between the United States and

ROK].”322

Economically, the ROK’s economy, until the Asian financial crisis a powerful

example of the developing state, has since pursued intensive reforms to transform itself

from a Japanese-style state-centric economy into an American-style free market

economy.323 Bilateral trade between the two countries surpassed U.S. $83 billon in 2007,

making the United States the fifth largest trading partner for the ROK, while the ROK is

the seventh largest

-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS-FTA) in 2007, which would increase U.S.

GDP by at least $10 billion and create more than 345,000 jobs in the United States.324

In addition, from the social and cultural perspectives, American values and ways

of thinking have been spread widely and rapidly in the ROK by the hundreds of

thousands of South Korean students with American educations. Currently over 93,000

South Korean students (from elementary school to graduate level) are in the United States

321 Statement by Dr. Kurt Campbell, Hearing on

Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, September 10, 1998.

U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula,

.

23 Hahm, “Anti-Americanism, Korean Style,” 223.

WebMemo No. 2702 (No

322 Cha, “America’s Alliances in Asia: The Coming ‘Identity Crisis’ with the Republic of Korea?” 28

3

324 Bruce Klingner, “Trade Dispute Undercuts Obama’s Korea Trip,”vember 2009), http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/wm2702.cfm (accessed November

22, 2009), 2.

95

mic development, democratization, and

globalization have created a new South Korean collective identity. The people see their

nation as a

to receive American educations. 325 South Korean foreign students in 2002 alone

surpassed Japanese foreign students; South Koreans are the third largest group of foreign

students in the United States, after Indian and Chinese students.326 The large number of

South Korean foreign students in the United States is significant considering the relative

size of the ROK’s population compared to India and China’s. In addition, over one

million ethnic Koreans resided in the United States as of 2003, approximately 1.4 million

American and South Korean tourists visit each other each year, and the number of South

Korean immigrants to the United States continues at a high level. More than 530,000

American tourists visited the ROK in 2003. Approximately 30,000 American soldiers and

their family members, along with 50,000 American civilians employed in the ROK, play

a critical role in introducing Korean values and culture to the United States.327 As a result,

when asked which country has the most similar values, over one-third of the South

Korean respondents chose the United States, while much less than one-third named either

Japan or China.328

In sum, the ROK’s successful econo

confident, democratic, pragmatic and global major player, and have changed

their perspective on their traditional ally and enemies. South Koreans no longer believe

that the North Korean military, ideology, and identity would allow the DPRK to unify the

Korean peninsula. Although the North Korean regime continues as a source of regional

threats and instability, South Koreans treat the North Korean people as brothers and

sisters needing assistance, and see the North Korean leadership as leading their nation

325As of 2009, 103,000 Indian foreign students and 99,000 Chinese foreign students are receiving

American educations. Hahm, “Anti-Americanism, Korean Style,” 221; and “Jaimi Hankoon Yoohaksaeng Sasang Choidea Gkyumo [The Number of Korean Foreign Students in the United States Reached the Hightest Point],” Yonhap News, November 17, 2009, http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/international/2009/11/17/0601090100AKR20091117002000072.HTML?template=2086 (accessed November 17, 2009).

326 Oh and Arrington, “Democratization and Changing Anti-American Sentiment in South Korea,” 328.

tions,” 2.

onal Identity and Security Alliances in Nor

327 Hwang, “Minding the Gap: Improving U.S.-ROK Rela

328 Glosserman and Snyder, “Confidence and Confusion: Natitheast Asia,” 22.

96

outh Korean concerns,

including rivalry in global markets, conflict over ancient histories, territorial disputes, and

the PRC’s increased security and econom

despite

into greater isolation and despair. Since Seoul expanded diplomatic relations with

Communist countries, the economic and cultural relationship between the ROK and PRC

has become increasingly interdependent. Although Seoul and Beijing seek a more stable

and cooperative strategic relationship, many obstacles raise S

ic penetration into the DPRK. On the other hand,

some turbulent moments in the mid-1990s and the early 2000s, South Korean

attitudes toward the United States and the U.S.-ROK alliance have become more stable

and positive in many respects.329 The majority of South Koreans and Americans see such

turbulent moments in the past as opportunities to increase their mutual understanding of

national interests, security priorities, and each other’s domestic constraints.330 In fact, in

contrast to the ROK of the Cold War era that shared few norms and had little basis for a

common identity with the United States, today’s South Koreans share a variety of

common norms and collective identity with Americans.331

C. U.S.-ROK ALLIANCE COHESION

The South Korean leadership and public’s ideational changes since the end of the

Cold War have affected U.S.-ROK alliance cohesion, presenting both challenges and

opportunities. During the Cold War, the U.S.-ROK alliance was a classic “asymmetric,

autonomy-security trade-off alliance” in which the United States provided the ROK with

protection against DPRK aggression in return for influence over the ROK’s military and

foreign policies. 332 However, the rapid transition of the ROK’s domestic politics,

economy and society, key influences on South Korean collective identities, have driven

South Koreans to desire greater respect from Americans and to seek a less asymmetric

and more mature relationship with the United States to further promote the regional and

global interests of the two countries. This section of the thesis examines how the military

aspect of the U.S.-ROK alliance has changed since the end of the Cold War by measuring

329 Konishi and Manyin, “South Korea: Its Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy Outlook,” 14.

t, and Identity in Military Alliance, 7.

Northeast Asian Security Environment,” 134.

330 Hahm, “Anti-Americanism, Korean Style,” 229–230.

331 Suh, Power, Interes

332 Kim, “Korea as a Middle Power in the

97

nology transfer, military-to-military contacts, and combined exercises; and

(3) eco

on March 20, 1970, and

med of the plan during

his Seo

governmental officials, and both countries’ civilian scholars.334 Washington has sought

it in three dimensions: (1) the level of consensus on security issues between the two

allies; (2) the frequency, level, and nature of military exchanges and assistance, such as

arms and tech

nomic contributions to the mutual security of the alliance.

1. Compromise on Security Issues

In contrast to realist expectations that the U.S.-ROK alliance would weaken as

South Koreans became less threatened and more secure, Washington and Seoul have

resolved the problems between them and successfully consolidated their alliance. In

terms of the level of consensus on security issues, there are four pieces of significant

evidence that indicate U.S.-ROK alliance cohesion in the post-Cold War era is stronger

than during the Cold War era. First, Washington and Seoul have emphasized consultation

and bilateral coordination when they deal with major issues of mutual security,

promoting mutual understanding and trust. In the Cold War era, Seoul and the South

Korean public often believed that most critical changes in security issues, such as the

structure and role of USFK, policies toward the DPRK, DPRK nuclear issues, transfer of

operational control, and defense burden-sharing, were initiated unilaterally by

Washington as its foreign policy altered. For instance, Presidents Nixon and Carter

announced specific plans for the reduction of USFK in 1969 and 1977 without full

consultation with Seoul. As a result, most South Koreans were frustrated by

Washington’s sudden announcement of the reduction of USFK

ROK President Park Chung-hee was upset about not being infor

ul meeting with U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers and the San Francisco

summit with President Nixon in August 1969.333 Today, security issues are actively

discussed in an elaborate set of consultative mechanisms, such as the SCM and the

Military Committee Meeting (MCM) by leaders, practitioner-level to high-level

333 Chae Jin Lee, A Troubled Peace: U.S. Policy and the Two Koreas (Baltimore, MD: The Johns

Hopkins Univ. Press, 2006), 68–69; Philip Shabecoff, “Seoul Protests U.S. Plan for Withdrawal,” New York Times, June 17, 1970.

334 Levin, Do the Ties Still Bind? 18-20.

98

alliance was dominated by military affairs.

Thus m

nce development.337

As a result, Washington and Seoul have reached a number of agreements to

consolidate the alliance, including the 1990 U.S.-ROK Special Measures Agreement

(SMA), the 1991 Agreement on Wartime Host Nation Support (WHNS), a 1993

int

to avoid imposing additional strains on the alliance by consulting frequently with ROK

officials, putting the discussion of troop redeployments into regular diplomatic

channels.335

Second, since the 1990s, Washington and Seoul have enhanced mutual

coordination and cooperation by diversifying and upgrading the institutional foundations

of the alliance. Traditionally, the U.S.-ROK

ilitary communication channels, such as the annual SCM, dominated Washington

and Seoul discussions of military affairs for ROK defense.336 Many additional, efficient

communication channels have been facilitated since the late 1990s to properly manage

issues ranging from short-term crises to longer-term strategic plans. These include a

hotline between two National Security Councils (NSCs) of the United States and ROK,

the “Big-Four” meeting between the ROK defense and foreign ministers and the U.S.

ambassador and USFK commander, the Strategic Consultation for Allied Partnership

(SCAP) between the U.S. secretary of state and ROK foreign minister, the Future of the

ROK-U.S. Alliance Policy Initiative (FOTA) between officials from various ministries

and departments (including Defense, State, Foreign Affairs and Trade), and the U.S.-

ROK Security Policy Initiative (SPI). These institutional foundations play a constructive

role in determining the future direction of the U.S.-ROK alliance. Simultaneously, the

scope of already existing military channels, such as the SCM and MCM, has significantly

expanded, focusing not only on reconfirming the U.S. commitment to ROK defense but

also on mutual efforts for long-term allia

agreement on the armistice operational control’s transfer to the Chairman of ROK Jo

335 Armacost, “Introduction,” 17.

336 Jeongwon Yoon, “Alliance Activities: Meetings, Exercises and CFC’s Roles,” in Boose, Hwang, Mor

onal Defense, Defense White Paper 1995–1996 (Seoul: ROK 996), 113; Defense White Paper 2004, 105–106.

gan, and Scobell, eds., Recalibrating the U.S.-Republic of Korea Alliance (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institutes, 2003), 89.

337 The Republic of Korea Ministry of Nati Ministry of National Defense Press, 1

99

Chiefs

ecurity interests

and pri

s since the late 1990s. By 2006,

Roh Moo-Hyun’s administration saw no problem with a U.S. global military posture that

highlig stra y on a global scale, and agreed to

“global

of Staff, revisions in 1991 and 2000 to the original 1967 Status of Forces

Agreement (SOFA), and agreement in 2005 to the transition of wartime operational

control to the ROK. 338 In particular, the SMA and the WHNS show the ROK’s

commitment to the alliance, and the agreement on extending the range and payload of

South Korean missiles and revising the SOFA helped “nurture a greater public sense of

U.S. respect for South Korean interests.”339

Third, both countries have sought to understand the domestic political constraints

and security concerns of the other and to minimize the divergence of s

orities. For example, from Washington’s perspective, as reflected in the 2001

QDR, new types of threat produce new strategic challenges and require more strategic

flexibility and efficiency in U.S. forces overseas, as well as expanded security

cooperation with its allies and partners.340 With the United States leading the global war

on terrorism since 2001, the Pentagon emphasizes changes in its military preparedness

and force-planning paradigm as the most important tasks. For this reason, the United

States has pursued military transformation, improving long-range force projection and

strike capabilities, enhancing joint operations, and restructuring U.S. military bases

overseas. 341 Washington has called for a series of dialogues with Seoul about the

redeployment of USFK and the realignment of USFK base

hts tegic flexibility, agility and efficienc

ize the scope of the alliance.”342

338 The Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, ROK Defense White Paper 2008; Yoon,

“Alliance Activities: Meetings, Exercises and CFC’s Roles,” 90–93.

339 Larson, et al., Ambivalent Allies? A Study of South Korean Attitudes Toward the U.S., 29.

340 Jonathan B. Hunter, “Creating Strategic Agility in Northeast Asia,” in Williamson Murray, ed., Nati 9.

o, “The Realignment of USFK and the US-ROK Alliance in Transition,” in T. Kwa e United States and the Korean Peninsula in the 21st Century (Burlington, VT: Ash

onal Security Challenges for the 21st Century (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institution, 2003), 12

341 Seong-Ryoul Chnd S. Joo, eds., Thk a

gate Publishing Company, 2006), 103–104.

342 Suh, “Korean Bases of Concern.”

100

012.

important indicators of alliance cohesiveness. However, given the already intensive

military-to-military interactions and exchanges between the two militaries, simply

On the other hand, South Koreans want greater autonomy in their defense: the so-

called the “Koreanization of ROK defense.”343 A series of consultations between the two

governments and reassessments of the ROK armed forces’ capabilities led Washington

and Seoul to agree to replace the American chief representative of the UN Command

Military Armistice Commission and Commander of the Ground Component Command

(GCC) of the U.S.-ROK CFC with South Korean Army generals in 1991 and 1992,

respectively. 344 In addition, the ROK armed forces took over peacetime operational

control in 1994 and plan to resume wartime operational control in 2

There are many good examples of the improvement of mutual understanding

between the two governments. For example, with lessons learned from the two school

girls’ accident in 2002, when an elderly Korean woman pushing a food cart was hit and

killed by a U.S. military vehicle again in 2005, U.S. officials and agencies dealt with the

issue in a prompt and proper manner and avoided their earlier mistakes.345 Similarly,

Washington and USFK seriously considered the historical and economic factors that had

increased negative South Korean perceptions of the U.S. military bases before making a

final decision of the relocation of U.S. military bases from the center of the ROK capital

to Pyeongtaek (for example, the location of USFK in Seoul had been the Japanese

Imperial Army headquarters between 1910 and 1945).346

2. Military Exchanges and Assistance

The frequency, level, and nature of military exchanges and assistance between the

U.S. and ROK militaries, including U.S. forces stationed on ROK territory, transfer of

military strategies, tactics, and technologies, and combined and joint exercises, are

assessing these factors in a quantitative manner does not fully describe changes in the

343 The Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper 1993–1994, 119.

344 Ibid., 119–220.

345 Campbell et al., Going Global: The Future of the U.S.-South Korea Alliance, 15.


101

U.S.-R

to invest U.S. $11 billion over four

years to

from Alaska to the ROK in less than nine hours and extensive use of ports and air bases

cohesiveness of the relationship. It is necessary to examine the U.S.-ROK military-to-

military ties in a qualitative manner. As General Leon LaPorte, former Commander of

OK Combined Forces Command (CFC), has noted, both Americans and South

Koreans need to look at the U.S. military posture in the ROK “in terms of capabilities

rather than numbers.”347 Despite the decrease in U.S. troop numbers on the Korean

peninsula since the end of the Cold War, the quality, level, and nature of military

exercises and exchanges between the two militaries have increased, resulting in improved

combined forces operational ability and warfighting sustainability.

First, the U.S.-ROK combined forces have improved their operational ability and

warfighting capabilities by intensive modernization. Beginning in the mid-1980s, USFK

modernized its artillery, anti-tank, air strike, and surveillance capabilities by deploying

new high-tech platforms, including the M-1 Abrams Tank, multiple rocket launchers

(MRLs), M-3 Bradley armored vehicles, and F-16, A-10, and OA-37 aircraft.348 At the

2003 FOTA, the U.S. Department of Defense agreed

increase combat capabilities of the U.S.-ROK combined forces.349 Based on this

agreement, the U.S.-ROK CFC announced in 2004 that its force modernization programs

had more than 340 enhancements, a more than U.S. $11 billion investment in the ROK.

The enhancements, intended to increase deterrence against external threats, include

deployment of the PAC-3 Patriot missile system, AH-64D Apache helicopters, FA-18E/F

Super Hornets, high-speed transportation assets, improved precision munitions and

rotational deployment of the U.S. Army’s newest “Stryker” combat unit.350 The Key

Resolve/Foal Eagle exercise in March 2008 demonstrated the improvement of U.S power

projection capabilities, including deployment of Stryker units of armored combat vehicles

apabilities, Not Numbers, General Says,” DefenseLink News,

Sept k.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=25210 (accessed September 24, 200

ategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 1994–1995 (London, UK:

] (Seoul, ROK: Nanam, 1991), 233; The Republic of Korea Mini

347 Jim Garamone, “In Korea, Think Cer 24, 2004, http://www.defenselinemb

9).

348 The International Institute for Str IISS, 1995), 181; Young-sun Ha, Hanbandowi Haekmookiwa Segyejilseo[Nuclear Weapons on the

Korean Peninsula and International Orderstry of National Defense, Defense White Paper 1999, 76.

349 Cha, “Shaping Changes and Cultivating Ideas in the U.S.-ROK Alliance,” 139–140.

350 Garamone, “In Korea, Think Capabilities, Not Numbers, General Says.”

102

r of bilateral agreements and doctrines, such as war plans, military

strategi

rrive in the theater. 355 Meanwhile, in case of war, the TPFDD designates various

flexible deterrence options (FDOs) and force module packages (FMPs), including

in the ROK’s southeast hub, including Pyeongtaek, Busan, Jinhae, Pohang, and

Daegu.351

Second, the U.S.-ROK combined forces have modernized their software as well

as their hardware. In the last two decades, U.S.-ROK combined forces formed an

enormous numbe

es and tactics, standard operating procedures, rules of engagement and many other

field manuals. For instance, U.S.-ROK CFC has produced new variants of the basic

Korean theater war plan (the OPLAN 5027, initially developed in 1973) every other year

since 1994. 352 The war plan includes a variety of possible war scenarios, operational

plans, and procedures. Very recently, Washington and Seoul decided to establish working

groups for the development of OPLAN 5029 in case the DPRK regime collapses.353 At

the same time, the U.S.-ROK combined forces have concentrated on not only operations

that constitute a “rigid test of war plan” but also on activities that would produce the

“greatest benefit for force facing a contingency.”354

In addition to war plans and doctrines related directly to combat, many

agreements on mutual logistics support, like the 1991 Agreement of War Host Nation

Support (WHNS) and Time-Phased Forces Deployment Date (TPFDD), have been added

in the war plan since 1994. According to the WHNS, to counter any imminent North

Korean aggression on the Korean peninsula with a short center of gravity and a short

warning time, U.S. reinforcement troops are immediately deployed in the Korean theater

in case of contingency and the ROK is to support their logistics until U.S. logistics units

a


352 “OPLAN 5027 Major Threat War – West,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oplan-5027.htm (accessed November 2, 2009).

353 “OPLAN 5029 – Collapse of North Korea,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oplan-5029.htm (accessed November 2, 2009).

354 John F. Farrell, “Team Spirit: A Case Study on the Value of Military Exercises as a Show of Forin the Aftermath of Combat Operations,” Air & Space Power Journal, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Fall 2009), 101.

355

ce

The Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper 1995–1996, 110.

103

f U.S. wartime military support in the context of potential

problem

am Spirit

(TS) has been suspended since 1994 for the political purpose of improving inter-Korean

relations, the other exercises on the

Korean

approximately 640,000 U.S. augmentation troops outside the ROK for the U.S.-ROK

combined forces.356 The significance of this agreement is that it diminishes doubts over

the timing and scope o

s associated with U.S. Constitutional procedure and real U.S. power projection

capabilities.357

Third, based on the hardware and software upgrades of the U.S.-ROK combined

forces, the nature and quality of U.S.-ROK combined exercises have improved

significantly, indicating the two allies’ growing commitment to material (military) and

ideational (political) support for common security objectives. The major U.S.-ROK

combined exercises, Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL) and Foal Eagle (FE), have quantitatively

advanced technologies, such as war-gaming tools, C4ISR, common operational pictures,

and Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange-Korea (CENTRIX-

K).358Although the annual combined field training exercise initiated in 1976 Te

in same year, the U.S.-ROK CFC enlarged the

peninsula and began a new, comprehensive large-scale command post exercise

(CPX), the “Reception, Staging, Onward movement and Integration” exercise (RSOI), to

enhance the capability of wartime augmentation. The RSOI has increased TPFDD’s

capabilities from 480,000 augmentation troops in 1994 to 630,000 troops in the late

1990s. Its recent capability includes 690,000 troops, 160 vessels, and 1,600 aircraft,

representing almost 40 percent of total U.S. Navy assets, 50 percent of total U.S. Air

356 The Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper 1999, 77.


ry level (Foc ted in 1978 to improve the

and Seoul's pre- to PLAN 5027 and the

Chu mbined and joint oper perations, and rear area defe e, Defense White Paper 2000, 89–91.

358 The UFL is an annual comprehensive command post exercise (CPX), combining militaus Lens) and government-civilian defense (Ulchi) exercises. It was initia

war fighting capabilities of U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command and Washingtonpost- time crisis management procedure, based on scenarios and procedures in Owar

ngmu Plan. The FE is an annual field training exercise initiated 1961 to improve coational capabilities, including force-on-force maneuver training, special o

operations. The Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defensnse

104

.S.-

ROK C

pating in the

U.S.-led missile defense (MD) programs against the DPRK’s missile threat.362

. Economic Contribution to Mutual Security

xamining the economic contribution to the development of an alliance is also a

good way to evaluate alliance cohesion. The United States maintains a large number of

U.S. troops in the ROK with a total stationing cost of over U.S. $2 billion. The U.S.

security umbrella since the Korean War has certainly given Seoul the ability to invest its

large economic savings in other areas. 363 However, in contrast to the ROK’s small

economic support for the USFK during the Cold War, the ROK has gradually increased

its economic contribution to enhancing the U.S.-ROK alliance cohesion since the late

1980s, as the ROK’s economy and governmental financial capacity have grown. This

trend is mirrored in South Korean public opinion. The majority of South Koreans regard

the U.S.-ROK alliance as important to their security, and thus strongly support the

Force assets, and 70 percent of total U.S. Marine assets.359 Since 2001, the RSOI has

been combined with the FE in order to provide better training opportunities to all U

FC echelons.360

Since the 1990s, the range of U.S.-ROK combined exercises has expanded

coordination beyond the Korean peninsula theater, showing that both countries share

common regional and global security objectives. For instance, the ROK Navy has

participated in periodic bilateral and multinational combat and non-combat maritime

exercises with the U.S. Navy, including the Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) since

1990, Tandem Thrust SLOC protection training since 1999, Pacific Reach submarine

rescue exercise since 2000, Guam anti-submarine warfare exercise since 2007, and the

U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in 2009. 361 In recent years, the Lee

Myung-bak’s administration has also expressed greater interest in partici

3

E

359 The Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper 2000, 82.

360 “Reception, Staging, Onward movement, and Integration [RSOI],” http

FC’s Roles,” 100–101.

in Northeast Asia,” 142–143.

://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/rsoi.htm (accessed November 2, 2009).

361 Yoon, “Alliance Activities: Meetings, Exercises and C

362 Klingner, “Trade Dispute Undercuts Obama’s Korea Trip,” 2.

363 Hunter, “Creating Strategic Agility

105

presence of USFK. Although the actual number of USFK has gradually declined, U.S.

military spending on the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asian region has increased.

First, the ROK has increased its cost sharing contribution to the expenses

associated with USFK. Based on the 1991 SMA, the ROK agreed to increase its cash and

non-cash contributions in the four categories of logistics, labor, ROK funded construction

(ROKFC), and Combined Defense Improvement Projects (CDIP).364 As shown in Figure

12, between 1989 and 2005, the ROK’s burden-sharing cost has soared at an average

growth rate of slightly more than 20 percent, with the exception of 1998.365 The ROK’s

direct financial contribution for 2008 was approximately U.S. $785 million, about 40

omic

contribution to USFK’s stationing cost was welcomed by Washington and the U.S.

Congre

percent of the total cost of stationing USFK.366 The increase in the ROK’s econ

ss as a demonstration of Seoul’s commitment to mutual security.367

ss, RL33567 (July 25, 2008), 17–18.

ang, Morgan, and Scobell, eds., Recalibrating the U.S.-Republic of Korea Alliance (Carlisle, PA:


365 Jong-Sup Lee and Uk Heo, The U.S.-South Korean Alliance, 1961-1988: Free-Riding or Bargaining? (New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2002), 131, 164–165.

366 Larry A. Niksch, “Korea-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congre

367 Tong Whan Park, “Assessing the Costs of the U.S.-Korean Alliance: An American View,” in Boose, Hw

Strategic Studies Institutes, 2003), 58.

Figure 12. The ROK’s Contribution to Defense Cost Sharing, 1989–2005.368

Second, since the 1990s, the ROK has provided political, military, and financial

support for the Gulf war, U.S.-led peacekeeping operations, the U.S. global war on

terrorism, and most recently the U.S.-led war in Iraq. Statistically, between 1990 and

2008 the ROK sent approximately 75,000 South Korean troops to conduct 15 different

UN PKO missions. Between 1948 and 1990, only 7,607 South Korean troops, including

police and civilian contractors, were deployed for five UN PKO missions.369 The ROK

Ministry of National Defense states that it will enhance and diversify military diplomacy

to enable the ROK to take on a larger international role and become a “mature world-

class nation” and that it will increase support to PKO from the current level of 390 troops

to 1,000 or possibly 2,000 by 2012.370 South Korean President Lee Myung-bak says he

will enact a law to facilitate the dispatching of South Korean troops for UN peacekeeping

operations, counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation, disaster relief operations, and

humanitarian operations.371

on data from the Republic of Korea Ministry of National

Defe 2004, 2006, 2008; The ROK Ministry of National Defense, Defe

White Paper 2006, 255; Defense Whi

the U.S.-South Korean Alliance,” Backgrounder No. 2155 (June 2008

368 The author created the graph based Defense White Paper 1997–1998, nse,

nse Policy 1998–2002 (Seoul: ROK Ministry of National Defense Press, 2002).

369 The Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, Defense te Paper 2008, 340.

370 Bruce Klingner, “Transforming ), 6.

371 Klingner, “Evolving Military Responsibilities in the U.S.-ROK Alliance,” 33.

106

107

ROK would provide “all

necessa

States has reduced strains on the ROK’s defense

budget by pledging to provide massive exercise costs, war reserve stocks, and the

SIGINT) and C4ISR assets, that the ROK’s current defense

budget

In a similar manner, right after the September 11 terrorist attacks, President Kim

Dae-jung sent a clear message to President Bush that the

ry cooperation and assistance as a close U.S. ally in the spirit of the ROK-U.S.

Mutual Defense Treaty.” He sent South Korean troops and U.S. $45 million to assist U.S.

military actions in Operation Enduring Freedom.372 Roh Moo-hyun’s administration also

strongly supported the U.S. global war on terrorism, providing additional forces and U.S.

$260 million in Iraq reconstruction funds between 2003 and 2007.373 In October 2009,

two years after 23 South Korean missionaries were taken hostage in Afghanistan, Seoul

made a “bold and courageous” decision to redeploy approximately 100 civilian and 300

military and police personnel to Afghanistan.374

At the same time, the United

advanced signal intelligence (

cannot afford. For instance, the cost of the Team Spirit (TS) exercise to the U.S.

Air Force alone amounted U.S. $30 million in 1984, and its total cost to the U.S.

Department of Defense had reached U.S. $150 million by 1991. 375 Despite the

suspension of TS in 1994, the combined cost of all exercises has continued to increase

since the 1990s. In addition, the U.S. War Reserve Stocks for Allies in the ROK (WRSA-

K) constitutes approximately 60 percent of the ammunition required in wartime. At the

40th SCM in 2008, Washington and Seoul signed the “WRSA-K transfer Memorandum of

Agreement” to enhance ROK’s warfighting sustainability.376 According to this MOA, the

ROK will purchase nearly half of WRSA-K for about one-tenth of the original price, paid

with labor and services for USFK rather than transfer of hard currency.377 Similarly,

USFK maintains extensive surveillance and reconnaissance by military satellites and


373 Klingner, “Evolving Military Responsibilities in the U.S.-ROK Alliance,” 26.

ts Obama’s Korea Trip,” 2.

ite Paper 2008, 340.

374 Klingner, “Trade Dispute Undercu

375 Farrell, “Team Spirit: A Case Study on the Value of Military Exercises as a Show of Force in the Aftermath of Combat Operations,” 101.


377 The Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, Defense Wh

108

undertaken a series of

intensive m

logy, and warfighting sustainability. At the same time,

the decline of DPRK’s overall power has reduced South Koreans’ threat perception. For

reconnaissance aircrafts over the DPRK, and provides “24-hour, all-weather, real-time,

multi-sensor” intelligence information to the ROK military.378

Recently, the U.S. Congress passed the “U.S.-Republic of Korea Defense

Cooperation Improvement Act of 2008” granting the ROK the same treatment in its FMS

status as the “NATO Plus Three group (Australia, Japan, and New Zealand)” that have

lighter scrutiny and higher threshold levels for U.S. defense sales. This creates a new

“NATO Plus Four group.” 379 This bill remedies a long-overdue disparity in

Washington’s characterization of its military allies by recognizing the ROK’s strategic

importance to U.S. security objectives in Asia.380 More recently, the U.S. Department of

Defense announced investments of U.S. $11 million over the next 10 years for joint

development of the ROK military.381

D. CONCLUSION

Realists argue that the balance of power and threat between the ROK and DPRK

in the post-Cold War era has shifted favor of the South, which has achieved rapid military

modernization based on its remarkable economic prosperity, advanced scientific

technologies, and strong ties with the U.S., the world’s most formidable military and

economic power. The ROK Ministry of National Defense has

ilitary reforms since the mid-1970s to improve the ROK’s arms procurement,

indigenous development of sophisticated weapons and capacity for self-reliant defense,

increasing the military power gap between the North and South. Meanwhile, since the

collapse of the Soviet Union the DPRK has suffered a deteriorating economy, diplomatic

isolation and devastating famines. As a result, the DPRK cannot catch up to ROK

military’s modernization, and the KPA has become inferior to the ROK armed forces in

terms of military spending, techno


379 Jeff Abramson, “U.S. Arms Notifications Spike in 2008,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 39 (March 2009), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_03/arms_2008 (accessed October 10, 2009).

380 Klingner, “Supporting Our South Korean Ally and Enhancing Defense Cooperation,” 1.

381 Hwang, “Minding the Gap: Improving U.S.-ROK Relations,” 4.

109

these reasons, realists predict that the U.S.-ROK alliance will lose its common rationale,

substance, and purpose, and thus become weaker than during the Cold War era.

owever, this thesis finds that South Korean self-perception and view of others

has changed, as has Seoul’s perspective on security issues on and off the Korean

peninsula. South Koreans have witnessed a series of sea changes in their economy,

politics, security and society in the 1980s and 1990s. Rising South Korean self-

confidence and activism in domestic and international affairs, incre itment to

democratic and arket sul ro gen al, a

cha nd n sm or ’s

to the DPRK, PRC and United States. Consequently, the ons, trategies of

the U.S.-ROK combined forces and of ROK armed forces inside and outside of the

Korean theater have also changed, based not only on r ial s bu

ideational variables. Despite the decline of the perceived threat from the DPRK and PRC

and increased South Korean feelings of brotherhood toward North Koreans since the

2001 inter-Korean summit, the DPRK and PRC still remain problematic for the ROK’s

interests and security because of their inconsistent and ambiguous behavior. In contrast,

South Korean attitudes toward the United States and U.S.-ROK alliance are clo

w pite nce in

a consequence, both Washington and Seoul have sought to improve the

variety of new, ef

ombined forces have worked more closely and intensively to upgrade both peacetime

and wartime operational capabilities throughout a series of modernizations for not only

hardware but also software of the combined forces, including high-tech assets, doctrines,

and combined exercises.

Taking these factors into account, Table 10 summarizes the values of the key

variables of material (realist) and ideational (constructivist) approaches. The table

demonstrates that the cohesiveness of the U.S.-ROK alliance during the post-Cold War

era cannot be explained by external threats and interests and highlights instead the

influence of ideational factors.

H

asing comm

eration

med Seoul

roles, and s

free m

widespread

values re

pragmatism a

ting from b

d nationali

ad political,

have transf

missi

nd social

approach nges, a

ealist mater variable t also on

ser and

armer des

As

turbule the mid-1990s and the early 2000s.

alliance’s cohesion by emphasizing bilateral consultation and coordination through a

fective institutional mechanisms. In military terms, the U.S.-ROK

c

110

Period

Military balance on the Korean peninsula

Degree of perceived

external threat (from

DPRK/PRC)

Degree of Korean self-perception as a “major

player”

Degree of South Korean perceptions of

American values

Degree of South

Korean perceptions

of U.S.-ROK alliance

Actual U.S.-ROK alliance

cohesion

Cold War (before 1980s)

Balanced High Low Moderate Strong Moderate

Post-Cold War (since

1980s)

In favothe ROK low

High Strong Strong Strong r of Moderate to

Theoretical prediction of future

U.S.-ROK alliance cohesion

(Realism)

Weaker

(Realism)

Weaker

(Constructivism)

Stronger

(Outcome)

Stronger

Table 10. Values of key material and ideational variables and expectations of the U.S.-ROK alliance cohesion in comparative perspective.

111


112

alliances. However, previous studies have been

domina

s state identity with the support of other nations. By

isolationism and brinkmanship, resisting changes in its

identity

V. CONCLUSION

This thesis addresses the determinants of cohesion or discord in the Northeast

Asia alliances in which the United States has major security interests. While the average

duration of alliances is less than ten years, the PRC-DPRK and U.S.-ROK alliances have

both lasted for more than a half century. Numerous studies have explored the rationale,

substance and purpose of these

ted by realists and related balance of power or threat approaches. In explaining

contemporary changes within the alliances, relatively little attention has been given to

alternative approaches such as social constructivism.

By applying social constructivist theory to the PRC-DPRK and U.S.-ROK

alliances in a comparative study, this thesis finds that ideational factors and processes

play a significant role in determining the closeness of the alliances. The thesis defined the

collective identity of a state as a set of broadly accepted representations of the state

shaped by the public’s self-perception and their perceptions of others. The thesis

examined changes in the collective identities of China and South Korea, focusing on their

political, economic and social transformation over the years, increasing self-confidence

and nationalism, and attitudes held by a broad range of ordinary citizens and government

officials toward the international community and traditional allies and enemies.

In the PRC-DPRK alliance, Beijing has taken the domestic and international

challenges and threats of the 1980s and 1990s as an opportunity for modernization,

globalization, and development of it

contrast, Pyongyang has turned to

. The opposing direction of these two states’ identities has a significant impact on

their relations and security strategies, with increasingly large differences emerging in

their perceptions of common interests and security. The divergence in their perception of

their interests has led to growing mistrust and discord in their bilateral political,

diplomatic and military relations. Beijing is reluctant to maintain the old style of

friendship as long as Pyongyang continues to damage the PRC’s interests. The frequency,

level, and nature of the PRC-DPRK military-to-military contacts and mutual exchanges

113

e those between the United States and Japan, the United

States a

and assistances have significantly reduced and weakened. The PRC wants to change the

relationship, provided that revision of the treaty does not create instability in the DPRK.

Unless Beijing or Pyongyang decides to go in a completely new direction, the Sino-

DPRK alliance will be unable to transform the one-way relationship between a reluctant

patron (Beijing) and an aid-seeking client (Pyongyang) to the healthy, reciprocal

relationship found in alliances lik

nd the ROK, and in NATO.

In the U.S.-ROK alliance, Seoul has turned the challenges of the 1980s and 1990s

into an opportunity to democratize, globalize, and develop its state identity with the

support of the United States. At the same time, South Koreans are increasingly willing

and able to proactively engage in regional and global security affairs to support

democracy, free market economics, and human rights. As a result, despite problems in

the U.S.-ROK alliance in the post-Cold War era, such as massive anti-American protests

and politically and socially sensitive issues regarding USFK, both South Koreans and

Americans have managed their problems in ways that allow the alliance to grow stronger

and more prosperous, and have consolidated their understanding in a variety of arenas,

including politics, economics, military affairs, and culture. These ideational changes and

the increasing convergence between American and South Korean thought have

encouraged Washington and Seoul to develop a more equal and mature relationship that

promotes reciprocal and responsible commitments to the common values and interests

underlying the alliance. The result is improvement in the quality of U.S.-ROK

cooperation on mutual security, military exchanges and assistance, and economic

contributions to the alliance.

Notwithstanding some research limitations posed by the absence of additional

comparative case studies, this thesis has two important theoretical implications. First,

current changes in the cohesiveness or discord of the Northeast Asia alliances have been

affected more by ideational variables than by material variables. Although both the PRC-

DPRK and U.S.-ROK alliances were created and maintained by a realist rationale, the

ideational changes in Chinese and South Korean collective identities have direct and

cies, indirect impacts on the decision-making processes of their respective foreign poli

114

changing alliance cohesion. Chinese and South Koreans’ rapidly growing self-confidence,

pragmatism, and activism in domestic and international affairs, their commitment to

regional and international security institutions, and their favorable perspectives of

international political and economic values are increasingly important ideational factors

in their perceptions of power, threat, interests, and values—all of which ultimately affect

PRC and ROK foreign policies.

Second, shared identity, norms, values, cultures, and feelings of affinity between

allies can be constructed and developed through a wide range of political, economic,

social, cultural, and military interactions. Despite the advantages of cultural affinity and

geographical proximity, the PRC-DPRK alliance lacks mutual efforts to build common

values, and thus the gap in government and public attitudes toward the future of the

alliance in the two countries has widened. In contrast, the U.S.-ROK alliance has become

stronger and healthier with the evolution of shared values of democracy, free market

economy, rule of law, and respect for human dignity and freedom, all of which lead to

greater convergence of public opinion on the future of the alliance.

This study offers five policy recommendations for enhancing alliance cohesion in

the future. First, ideational variables should be heavily weighted in foreign policy

decision-making processes. Traditionally dominated by realist theories, the field of

international relations has largely ignored ideational variables. However, in recent years a

growing body of evidence, including the cases of the allies examined in this study,

supports the importance of ideational factors like self-perception and the perceptions of

others in international politics. It is important to recognize that it typically takes a fairly

long time for state identity to be formulated and become visible to outsiders, and thus

once a state identity is consolidated, it is very difficult to change. In light of this, policy

makers should consider the importance of ideational factors and define their long-term

vision and objectives for the alliance to create a favorable environment and at the same

time prevent negative repercussions of policy decisions. The “Joint Vision for the U.S.-

ROK Alliance” 382 proposed by President Obama and Lee Myung-bak in June 2009 is a

382 Office of the Press Secretary of the White House, “Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United

States of America and the Republic of Korea,” June 16, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/.

115

free relationship. However, as the PRC-

DPRK

d

respect

l

emphasize dialogue and consultation, especially when they face difficulties. In addition,

both the U.S. and the ROK have established numerous channels of communication, from

the highest levels down to the level of the working groups; their discussion agendas

good example. It accommodates changes in ideational variables in both countries and

presents a roadmap for a mature alliance with robust public support in the future.

Second, alliances thrive and prosper when they share firm common values. If they

lack common values, or existing values do not suit the new international environment,

both sides of an alliance should put constant effort into constructing new values and

encouraging their people to recognize the importance of common alliance values. There

is no such thing in life as a totally problem-

alliance shows, without firm shared values, it is difficult to overcome problems

and deepen ties. In contrast, despite gloomy predictions in 1994 and 2002 that the U.S.-

ROK alliance was in trouble, Washington and Seoul resolved their issues based on their

strong shared belief in democracy, free market economies, peace and stability in the

region, nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, human rights, and rule of law. When the United

States and the ROK focused on the alliance’s narrow rationale of defending the ROK

against North Korean aggression on the Korean peninsula, they often faced conflicts

between U.S. global security priorities and the ROK’s national security priorities.

Examples include the issues of reducing USFK, the “tripwire” function for USFK, an

ive DPRK policies. Once Americans and South Koreans began to expand their

shared values into areas beyond the military, security and the Korean peninsula—the

future purpose, objectives, missions, roles, and required capabilities of the alliance—

their alliance cohesion strengthened significantly.

Third, allies should focus not only on material alliance management but also on

consolidating the alliance’s ideational foundation by improving the quantity and quality

of dialogue and communication at all levels of government and society and by enhancing

intercultural awareness. A good relationship starts with meeting and associating with

people. When a relationship starts to go bad, more dialogue and communication are

required. The PRC and DPRK suspended regular senior-level meetings a number of times

as a way of condemning each other’s misbehavior. In contrast, Washington and Seou

116

include heavy, sensitive issues as well as lighter topics. Furthermore, increasing the

quantity and quality of physical contact, dialogue, and communication between the

government and the public helps increase cultural awareness, reduce prejudice, and

promote mutual respect between allies. For instance, the governments and civilian

organizations of the United States and the ROK have begun discussing SOFA revisions, a

dialogue that requires a profound understanding of the gaps between the allies’ legal and

jurisdictional systems going back to the 1990s.

Fourth, public support has a critical role in developing alliance cohesion. In the

information era, public awareness of domestic and international affairs and public

participation in politics are growing. Even in authoritarian countries like the PRC, public

opinion has become a critical factor in policy making. Members of an alliance need to

coordinate with each others’ public diplomacy efforts to highlight the significance of the

alliance and their mutual commitment to common interests. At the same time, they need

to listen to public re primary source of

information for younger generations, and take a proactive role by correcting inaccurate

information about and introducing positive perspectives on their allies and the alliance.

Finally, in addition to sharing common values to minimize the gaps in ideas

between allies, demonstrating reciprocal and balanced responsibilities and commitments

to mutual security helps to create the kind of strong alliance cohesion seen in the U.S.-

ROK alliance since the 1990s. Unlike the PRC and the DPRK, the U.S. and the ROK

have successfully transformed a one-way, asymmetric relationship into a more equal

partnership, with the ROK taking more responsibility for regional and global security and

the United States giving more consideration to South Korean security concerns and

domestic political constraints, and supporting South Korea’s potential to play a greater

role on the global stage. Although the United States and South Korea should not take

their alliance for granted, the alliance currently rests on a strong foundation and with a

modest effort at maintaining communication can be kept strong for many years to come.

actions to the media, in particular the Internet, the

117


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