2007 lecture guide(discussion of tenancy)

LECTURE GUIDE

of

Assistant Secretary AUGUSTO P. QUIJANO

Department of Agrarian Reform

1. Discuss the requisites for the existence of tenancy relations:

a) The parties are the landholder and the tenant; b) The subject is agricultural land; c) There is consent by the landholder for the tenant to work on the land, given either

orally or in writing, expressly or impliedly;

d) The purpose is agricultural production; e) There is personal cultivation or with the help of the immediate farm household;

and

f) There is compensation in terms of payment of a fixed amount in money and/or produce. (Caballes vs. DAR, 168 SCRA 254 [1988]; Gabriel vs. Pangilinan, 58 SCRA 590 (1974); Oarde vs. CA, 280 SCRA 235, [1997]; Qua vs. CA, 198 SCRA 236 [1991].

2. Agricultural leasehold tenancy distinguished from civil law lease.

a) Subject Matter - agricultural leasehold is limited to agricultural land; while a civil law lease may refer to rural or urban property;

b) Attention and Cultivation - leasehold tenant should personally attend to, and cultivate the agricultural land; whereas the civil law lessee need not personally cultivate or work the thing leased;

c) Purpose - In leasehold tenancy, the landholding is devoted to agriculture; whereas in civil law lease, the purpose may be for any other lawful pursuits;

d) Law governing the relationship - Civil law lease is governed by the Civil Code, whereas leasehold tenancy is governed by special law (RA 3844 as amended by RA 6389). (Gabriel vs. Pangilinan, 58 SCRA 590 (1974)

3. An overseer of a coconut plantation was not considered a tenant (Zamoras vs. Su,

Jr., 184 SCRA 248 (1990); Castillo vs. CA, 205 SCRA 529 (1992). 4. The owner tilling his own agricultural land is not a tenant within the contemplation

of law. (Baranda vs. Baguio, 189 SCRA 197 (1990). 5. Certification of tenancy/non-tenancy issued by DAR are not conclusive evidence of

tenancy relationship. (Oarde vs. CA et al., 280 SCRA 235 [1997]). 6. Successor-in-interest of the true and lawful landholder/owner who gave the consent

are bound to recognize the tenancy established before they acquired the agricultural land (Endaya vs. CA, 215 SCRA 109 [1992]).

7. The law is explicit in requiring the tenant and his immediate family to work on the land (Bonifacio vs. Dizon; 177 SCRA 294), and the lessee cannot hire many persons to help him cultivate the land (De Jesus vs. IAC, 175 SCRA 559).

8. We agree with the trial court that We cannot have a case where a landlord is divested

of his landholding and somebody else is installed to became a new landlord. (Oarde, et al., vs. CA, et al., 780 SCRA 235 [1997]).

Lecture Guide ASEC AUGUSTO P. QUIJANO Page 2

9. Tenancy relation was severed when the tenant and/or his immediate farm household

ceased from personally working the fishpond (Gabriel vs. Pangilinan, 58 SCRA 590 (1974).

10. Since there is no sharing arrangement between the parties, the Court held that

Matienzo is merely an overseer and not a tenant (Matienzo vs. Servidad, 107 SCRA 276 (1981).

11. The Supreme Court has consistently ruled that once a leasehold relation has been established, the agricultural lessee is entitled to security of tenure. The tenant has a right to continue working on the land except when he is ejected therefrom for cause as provided by law (De Jesus vs. IAC, 175 SCRA 559 (1989).

12. Security of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees which they value as

life itself and deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to deprivation of their only means of livelihood. (Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, 168 SCRA 439

(1988). 13. Security of tenure afforded the tenant-lessee is constitutional (Primero vs. CIR, 101

Phil. 675 (1957); Pineda vs. de Guzman, 21 SCRA 1450 (1967) Once a tenant, always a tenant.

14. The Supreme Court held that only the tenant-lessee has a right to a homelot and

that members of the immediate family of the tenant are not entitled to a homelot (Cecilleville Realty and Service Corporation vs. CA, 278 SCRA 819 (1997).

15. Causes for Termination of the Leasehold Relation

a) Abandonment of the landholding without the knowledge of the agricultural lessor (Teodoro vs. Macaraeg, 27 SCRA 7 (1969);

b) Voluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee, written notice of which shall be served three months in advance (Nisnisan, et al., vs. CA, 294 SCRA 173 (1998); or

c) Absence of an heir to succeed the lessee in the event of his/her death or permanent incapacity (Section 8, RA 3844)

16. The lessor who ejects his tenant without the courts authorization shall be liable for:

a) Fine or imprisonment; b) Damages suffered by the agricultural lessee in addition to the fine or

imprisonment for unauthorized dispossession;

c) Payment of attorneys fees incurred by the lessee; and d) The reinstatement of the lessee.

17. The Supreme Court in upholding its constitutionality held that there is no legal basis

for declaring LOI No. 474 void on its face on equal protection, due process and taking of property without just compensation grounds. (Zurbano vs. Estrella, 137 SCRA 333 (1989)

18. In the case of Locsin vs. Valenzuela which was promulgated on 19 February 1991,

the Supreme Court explained the legal effect of land being place under OLT as vesting ownership in the tenant. However, in a subsequent case dated 13 September 1991 Vinzons Magana vs. Estrella citing Pagtalunan vs. Tamayo which pre-dated the Locsin case, the High Tribunal ruled that mere issuance of a certificate of land transfer does not vest ownership in the farmer/grantee.


19. The consent of the farmer-beneficiary is not needed in the determination of just compensation pursuant to Section 18 of RA No. 6657 (Land Bank of the Philippines vs. CA and Pascual (G.R. No. 128557, December 29, 1999).

20. Just Compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken

from its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court, that the measure is not the takers gain but the owners loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample. (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343 (1989).

21. It is error to think that, because of Rule XIII, Section II, the original and exclusive

jurisdiction given to the courts to decide petition for determination of just compensation has already been transformed into an appellate jurisdiction. It only means that, in accordance with settled principle of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR as an administrative agency to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid for the lands taken under the CARP, but such determination is subject to challenge in the courts.

The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts is not any less original and exclusive, because the question is first passed upon by the DAR, as the judicial proceedings are not a continuation of the administrative determination. For the matter, the law

may provide that the decision of the DAR is final and unappealable. Nevertheless, resort to courts cannot be foreclosed on the theory that courts are the guarantors of the legality of administrative action (Phil. Veterans Bank vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 132767, January 18, 2000).

22. The Supreme Court decided not to apply that 6% increment to the valuation because

the Court of Appeals affirmed the PARADs use of the 1992 Gross Selling Price in the valuation of the private respondents land (following the ruling in the Court of Appeals case of Galeon vs. Pastoral, CA-G.R. No. 23168; Rollo, p. 36) (LBP vs. CA and Jose Pascual, G.R. No. 128557, Dec. 29, 1999)

23. The DAR must first resolve the issues raised in a protest/application before the

distribution of covered lands to farmer-beneficiaries may be effected. (Roxas & Co., Inc. vs Court of Appeals, G.R. 127876, 17 December, 1999).

24. The CREATION and JURISDICTION of the DARAB was discussed by the Supreme

Court in the case of Machete vs. CA, 250 SCRA 176 (1995). The Supreme Court held

that:

Section 17 of EO 229 vested the DAR with quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters as well as exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform except those following under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources in accordance with law. Executive Order 129-A, while in the process of reorganizing and strengthening the DAR, created the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) to assume the powers and functions with respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases. (Also Quismundo vs. CA, 201 SCRA 609 (1991).

25. In Ualat vs. Judge Ramos, 265 SCRA 345 (1996), complainant filed an

administrative case against the respondent Judge for taking cognizance of the ILLEGAL DETAINER case filed by their landowner against them notwithstanding knowledge of previously filed DARAB case and the fact that the illegal detainer case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR. Despite the separate affidavits of the complainants containing allegation of landlord-tenant relationship, the respondent


judge took cognizance of the illegal detainer case. Knowledge of existing agrarian legislation and prevailing jurisprudence on the subject, together with an ordinary degree of prudence, would have prompted respondent Judge to refer the case to the

DAR for preliminary determination of the parties relationship, as required by law.

However, DARAB has no jurisdiction with respect to agrarian matters involving the prosecution of all criminal offenses under RA 6657 and the determination of just compensation for landowners (Rep. Act No. 6657 (1988), Sec. 57). Jurisdiction over said matters are lodged with the Special Agrarian Courts (SACs). The Court of Appeals and Supreme Court maintain their appellate jurisdiction over agrarian cases decided by DARAB. (Vda. de Tangub vs. Ca, 191 SCRA 885 (1990).

26. DARABs Jurisdiction over Agrarian Disputes was also resolved in Central Mindanao University vs. DARAB, 215 SCRA 86.

27. Agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements,

whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under RA 6657 and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee (Isidro vs. CA, 228 SCRA 503 (1993).

28. In the case of Vda. de Areiola vs. Camarines Sur Reg. Agricultural School, et al.,

110 SCRA 517 (1960), the Supreme Court explained the phrase by a third party in Section 21 of RA 1199 (Ejectment; Violation; Jurisdiction. ---all cases involving the dispossession of a tenant by the landholder or by a third party - - -) The Supreme Court held that when no tenancy relationship between the contending parties exist,

the Court of Agrarian Relations has no jurisdiction, The law governing agricultural tenancy, RA 1199 explains that tenancy relationship is a juridical tie which arises between a landholder and a tenant once they agree expressly or impliedly to undertake

jointly the cultivation of land belonging to the former, etc.

Necessarily, the law contemplated a legal relationship between landowner and tenant. This does not exist where one is owner or possessor and the other a squatter or deforciant.

29. Section 57 of RA 6657 provides that the Special Agrarian Court (SACs) shall have

original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation and all criminal offenses. The Supreme held that any effort to

transfer the original and exclusive jurisdiction to the DAR Adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to Section 57 of RA 6657 and therefore would be void. (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 758 SCRA 263 (1996).

30. It should be stressed that the motion in Fortich were denied on the ground that the win-win resolution is void and has no legal effect because the decision approving the concession has already become final and executory. This is the ratio decidendi or reason of the decision. The statement that LGUs have authority to convert or reclassify agricultural lands without DAR approval is merely a dictum or expression of the individual views of the ponente or writer of the Resolution of August 19, 1997. It does not embody the Courts determination and is not binding (Fortich, et al., vs. Corona, et al., G.R. No. 131457 (August 19, 1999).

31. Agricultural lands expropriated by LGUs pursuant to the power of eminent domain need not be subject of DAR conversion clearance prior to change in use. (Province of Camarines Sur vs. CA, 222 SCRA 173 (1993)


32. Respondent DARs failure to observe due process in the acquisition of petitioners landholding does not ipso facto give this Court the power to adjudicate over petitioners application for conversion of its haciendas from agricultural to non-agricultural. (Roxas vs. CA, G.R. No. 127876, (December 16, 1999)

33. The issue of ownership cannot be settled by the DARAB since it is definitely

outside its jurisdiction. Whatever findings made by the DARAB regarding the ownership of the land are not conclusive to settle the matter. The issue of ownership shall be resolved in a separate proceedings before the appropriate trial court

between the claimants thereof. (Jaime Morta, Sr., et al., vs. Jaime Occidental, et al., G. R. No. 123417, (June 10, 1999) (Note the Dissenting Opinion of Chief Justice Davide Jr.,)

34. P.D. No. 27, which implemented the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) program, covers

tenanted rice or corn lands. The requisites for coverage under the OLT program are the following: (1) the land must be devoted to rice or corn crops: and (2) there must be a system of share crop or lease-tenancy obtaining therein. If either of these requisites is absent, the land is not covered under OLT. Hence, a landowner need not apply for retention where his ownership over the entire landholding is intact and

undisturbed. On the other hand, the requisites for the exercise by the landowner of his right of

retention are the following: (1) the land must be devoted to rice or corn crops; (2)

there must be a system of share-crop or lease tenancy obtaining therein; and (3) the size of the landholding must not exceed twenty-four (24) hectares or it could be more than twenty-four (24) hectares provided that at least seven (7) hectares thereof are covered lands and more than seven (7) hectares of it consist of other agricultural lands.

In the landmark case of Association of Small Landowners in the Phil., Inc. vs.

Secretary of Agrarian Reform, we held that landowners who have not yet exercised their retention rights under P.D. No. 27 are entitled to the new retention rights under R.A. No. 6657. We disregarded the August 27, 1985 deadline imposed by DAR

Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1985 on landowners covered by OLT. However, if a landowner filed his application for retention after August 27, 1985 but he had previously filed the sworn statements required by LOI Nos. 41, 45 and 52, he is still entitled to the retention limit of seven (7) hectares under P.D. No. 27. Otherwise, he is only entitled to retain five (5) hectares under R.A. No. 6657. (Eudosia Daez and/or Her Heirs presented by Edriano D. Daez, vs. The Hon. C.A. et. al., 325 SCRA 857).

35. Evidently, quasi-judicial agencies that have the power to cite persons for indirect

contempt pursuant to Rule 71 of the Rules of Court can only do so by initiating them in the proper Regional Trial Court. It is not within their jurisdiction and competence to

decide the indirect contempt cases. These matters are still within the province of the Regional Trial Courts. In the present case, the indirect contempt charge was filed, not with the Regional Trial Court, but with the PARAD, and it was the PARAD that cited Mr. Lorayes with indirect contempt (LBP vs. Severino Listana, Sr., G.R. No. 152611. (August 5, 2003)

There are only two ways a person can be charged with indirect contempt, namely, (1)

though a verified petition; and (2) by order or formal charge initiated by the court MOTU PROPRIO.

36. We hold that our decision, declaring a petition for review as the proper mode of

appeal from judgments of Special Agrarian Courts is a rule of procedure which affects substantive rights. If our ruling is given retroactive application, it will prejudice

LBPs right to appeal because pending appeals in the Court of Appeals will be dismissed outright in mere technicality thereby sacrificing the substantial merits thereof. It would be unjust to apply a new doctrine to a pending case involving a party who already invoked a contrary view and who acted in good faith thereon prior to the


issuance of said doctrine. (Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Arlene de Leon, et al., G.R. No. 143275 (March 20, 2003)(Note: Sec. 60 in relation to Sec. 61 of R.A. 6657).

37. The Supreme Court ruled that if landowners are called to sacrifice in the interest of

land reform, their acceptance of Land Bank bonds in payment of their agricultural lands, government lending institutions should share in the sacrifice by accepting the same Land Bank bonds at their face value (Ramirez vs. CA, 194 SCRA 81)

38. The Supreme Court granted the petition for mandamus seeking to compel respondent

GSIS to accept Land Bank bonds at their face value as payment for a pre-existing obligation (Maddumba vs. GSIS, 182 SCRA 281).

39. It is the DARAB which has the authority to determine the initial valuation of lands

involving agrarian reform although such valuation may only be considered preliminary as the final determination of just compensation is vested in the courts. (Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 629).

40. Court applied the provisions of Republic Act 6657 to rice and corn lands when it upheld

the constitutionality of the payment of just compensation for Presidential Decree 27 lands through the different modes stated in Sec. 18. R.A. 6657. (Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 629).

41. Nothing contradictory between the provisions of Sec. 50, R.A. 6657 granting the

Department of Agrarian Reform primary jurisdiction (administrative proceeding) to

determine and adjudicate "agrarian reform matters" and exclusive original jurisdiction over "all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform" which includes the determination of questions of just compensation, and the provisions of Sec. 57, R.A. 6657 granting Regional Trial Courts "original and exclusive jurisdiction (judicial proceeding) over (1) all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowner, and (2) prosecutions of criminal offenses under Republic Act No. 6657.

(Philippine Veterans Bank vs. CA, 322 SCRA 139). 42. It is error to think that, because of Rule XIII, Sec. 11, the original and exclusive

jurisdiction given to the courts to decide petitions for determination of just compensation has thereby been transformed into an appellate jurisdiction. (Philippine Veterans Bank vs. CA, 322 SCRA 139).

43. The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts is not any less "original and exclusive"

because the question is first passed upon by the DAR, as the judicial proceedings are not a continuation of the administrative determination. For that matter, the law may provide that the decision of the DAR is final and unappealable. Nevertheless, resort to the courts cannot be foreclosed on the theory that courts are the guarantors of the legality of administrative action. (Philippine Veterans Bank vs. CA, 322 SCRA 139).

44. In Vda. De Tangub vs. Court of Appeals, we held that the jurisdiction of the Department

of Agrarian Reform is limited to the following: a) adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform; b) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land-tenure related problems; and c) approval and disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial, and other non-agricultural uses. (Morta, Sr. vs. Occidental, 308 SCRA

167). 45. The findings of fact of the Court of Agrarian Relations, supported by substantial

evidence, is well-nigh conclusive on an appellate tribunal. ( De Chavez vs. Zobel, 55 SCRA 26).

46. The promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos in the exercise of his powers

under martial law has already been sustained in Gonzales vs. Estrella and we find no reason to modify or reverse it on that issue. As for the power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, the same was authorized under


Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, quoted above. (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343).

47. That fund, as earlier noted, is itself being questioned on the ground that it does not

conform to the requirements of a valid appropriation as specified in the Constitution. Clearly, however, Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure even if it does provide for the creation of said fund, for that is not its principal purpose. An appropriation law is one the primary and specific purpose of which is to authorize the release of public funds from the treasury. The creation of the fund is only incidental to the main

objective of the proclamation, which is agrarian reform. (Ibid.) 48. The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be

invalidated because they do not provide for retention limits as required by Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution is no longer tenable. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its most controversial provisions. (Ibid.)

49. In other words, mandamus can issue to require action only but not specific action.

Whenever a duty is imposed upon a public official and an unnecessary and unreasonable delay in the exercise of such duty occurs, if it is a clear duty imposed by law, the courts will intervene by the extraordinary legal remedy of mandamus to compel action. If the duty is purely discretionary, the courts by mandamus will require action

only. (Ibid.) 50. With these assumptions, the Court hereby declares that the content and manner of the

just compensation provided for in the afore-quoted Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution. We do not mind admitting that a certain degree of pragmatism has influenced our decision on this issue, but after all this Court is not a cloistered institution removed from the realities and demands of society or oblivious as the rest of our people to see the goal of agrarian reform achieved at last after the frustrations and deprivations of our peasant masses during all these disappointing decades. We are aware that invalidation of the said section will result in the nullification of the entire program, killing the farmer's hopes even as they approach realization and resurrecting the spectre of discontent and dissent in the restless countryside. That is not in our view the intention of the Constitution, and that is not what we shall decree today. (Ibid.)

51. Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required

to be made fully in money, we find further that the proportion of cash payment to the

other things of value constituting the total payment, as determined on the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. It is noted that the smaller the land, the bigger the payment in money, primarily because

the small landowner will be needing it more than the big landowners, who can afford a bigger balance in bonds and other things of value. No less importantly, the government financial instruments making up the balance of the payment are "negotiable at any time." The other modes, which are likewise available to the landowner at his option, are

also not unreasonable because payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or assets, tax credits, and other things of value equivalent to the amount of just compensation. (Ibid.)

52. The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the

owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation.

Jurisprudence on this settled principle is consistent both here and in other democratic jurisdictions. (Ibid.)

53. CARP Law (R.A. 6657) is more liberal than those granted by P.D. No. 27 as to retention

limits. (Ibid.) 54. The rule is settled that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in

force at the time of the commencement of an action. There can be no question that


at the time the complaints in CAR Cases Nos. 760-802-UP'78 and 806-810-UP'78 were filed, the RTC of Pangasinan had no jurisdiction over them pursuant to Section 12 (a) and (b) of P.D. No. 946 which is vested the then Court of Agrarian Relations with

original exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving rights granted and obligations imposed by presidential issuances promulgated in relation to the agrarian reform program. However, when Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, took effect, the Courts of Agrarian Relations

were integrated into the Regional Trial Courts and the jurisdiction of the former was vested in the latter courts. It can thus be seen that at the time Branch 46 of the RTC of Pangasinan dismissed the agrarian cases on 29 October 1985, Regional Trial Courts already had jurisdiction over agrarian disputes. The issue that logically crops up then is whether Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 automatically conferred upon the aforesaid Branch 46 jurisdiction over the subject agrarian cases considering that these cases were filed seven (7) years earlier at a time when only the Courts of Agrarian Relations had exclusive original jurisdiction over them. We rule that it did not, for such a defect is fatal. Besides, the grant of jurisdiction to the Regional Trial Courts over agrarian cases was not meant to have any retroactive effect. Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 does not provide for such retroactivity. The trial court did not then err in dismissing the cases. ( Tiongson vs. CA, 214 SCRA 197).

55. On 22 July 1987, the President of the Republic of the Philippines promulgated

Executive Order (E.O.) No. 229 providing for the mechanisms for the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program instituted by Proclamation No. 131 dated 22 July 1987. Section 17 thereof provides: "SEC. 17. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR.- The DAR is hereby vested with quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction

over all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the DENR and the Department of Agriculture (DA). x x x The decisions of the DAR may, in proper cases, be appealed to the Regional Trial Courts but shall be immediately executory notwithstanding such appeal." This provision not only repealed Section 12 (a) and (b) of B.P. Blg. 129. The above-quoted Section 17 of E.O. No. 229 was the governing law at the time the challenged decision was promulgated. Then, too, Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, substantially reiterates said Section 17 while Sections 56 and 57 provide for the designation by this Court of at least one (1) branch of the Regional Trial Court in each province to act as a special agrarian court which shall have exclusive original jurisdiction only over petitions for the determination of just compensation and the prosecution of criminal offenses under said Act. (Tiongson vs. CA, 214 SCRA 197).

56. The constitutionality of P.D. No. 27 from which Letter of Instructions No. 474 and

Memorandum Circular No. 11, Series of 1978 are derived, is now well settled. More specifically, this Court also upheld the validity and constitutionality of Letter of

Instructions No. 474 which directed then Secretary of Agrarian Reform Conrado

Estrella to "undertake to place under the Land Transfer Program of the government pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27, all tenanted rice/corn lands with areas of seven hectares or less belonging to landowners who own other agricultural lands of more

than seven hectares in aggregate areas or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes from which they derive adequate income to support themselves and their families". (Vinzons-Magana vs. Estrella, 201 SCRA 536).

57. It is settled that mandamus is not available to control discretion but not the discretion

itself. The writ may issue to compel the exercise of discretion but not the discretion itself. Mandamus can require action only but not specific action where

the act sought to be performed involves the exercise of discretion. (Sharp International Marketing vs. CA, 201 SCRA 299).

58. Actions for forfeiture of certificates of land transfer for failure to pay lease rentals for

more than two (2) years fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations. (Curso vs. CA, 128 SCRA 567).


59. Referral of preliminary determination of rights of tenant-farmer and the landowner to Ministry of Agrarian Reform, not necessary, where tenancy relationship between the parties is admitted in the pleadings. ( Curso vs. CA, 128 SCRA 567).

60. Presidential Decree No. 816 imposes the sanction of forfeiture where the "agricultural

lessee x x x deliberately refuses and/or continues to refuse to pay the rentals or amortization payments when they fall due for a period of two (2) years." Petitioners cannot be said to have deliberately refused to pay the lease rentals. They acted in accordance with the MAR Circular, which implements P.D. 816, and in good

faith. Forfeiture of their Certificates of Land Transfer and of their farmholdings as decreed by the CAR and affirmed by the Appellate Court is thus unwarranted. (Curso vs. CA, 128 SCRa 567).

61. Under Section 73 of R.A. 6657, persons guilty of committing prohibited acts of forcible

entry or illegal detainer do not qualify as beneficiaries and may not avail themselves of the rights and benefits of agrarian reform.

Any such person who knowingly and willfully violates the above provisions of the Act

shall be punished with imprisonment or fine at the discretion of the Court. ( Central Mindanao University vs. DARAB, 215 SCRA 86).

62. The DARAB has no power to try, hear and adjudicate the case pending before it

involving a portion of the CMU's titled school site, as the portion of the CMU land reservation ordered segregated is actually, directly and exclusively used and found by

the school to be necessary for its purposes.

There is no doubt that the DARAB has jurisdiction to try and decide any agrarian dispute in the implementation of the CARP.

An agrarian dispute is defined by the same law as any controversy relating to tenurial rights whether leasehold, tenancy stewardship or otherwise over lands devoted to agriculture. ( Central Mindanao University vs. DARAB, 215 SCRA 86).

63. Section 12 (a) and (b) of Presidential Decree No. 946 deemed repealed by Section 17

Executive Order No. 229.- The above quoted provision should be deemed to have

repealed Section 12 (a) and (b) of Presidential Decree No. 946 which invested the then Courts of Agrarian Relations with the original exclusive jurisdiction over cases and questions involving rights granted and obligations imposed by presidential issuances promulgated in relation to the agrarian reform program.

In 1980, upon the passage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the

Judiciary Reorganization Act, the courts of agrarian relations were integrated into the Regional Trial Courts and the jurisdiction of the former was vested in the latter courts. (Quismundo vs. CA, 201 SCRA 609).

64. The Department of Agrarian Reform is vested with quasi-judicial powers to determine

and adjudicate agrarian reform matters as well as exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.

Executive Order 129-A, while in the process of reorganizing and strengthening the DAR, created the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) to assume the powers and functions with respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases. (Machete vs. CA, 250 SCRA 176).

65. Section 56 of R.A. 6657 confers "special jurisdiction" on "Special Agrarian Courts,"

which are Regional trial Courts designated by this Court-at least one (1) branch within each province-to act as such. These Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts have, according to Sec. 57 of the same law, original and exclusive jurisdiction over: (a) all petitions for the determination of just compensation to


landowners, and (b) the prosecution of all criminal offenses under the Act. (Machete vs. CA, 250 SCRA 176).

66. The failure of tenants to pay back rentals pursuant to a leasehold contract is an issue

which is exclusively cognizable by the DARAB and is clearly beyond the legal competence of the Regional Trial Courts to resolve. (Ibid.)

67. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself

authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.

The resolution by the DAR of the agrarian dispute is to the best advantage of the

parties since it is in a better position to resolve agrarian disputes, being the administrative agency presumably possessing the necessary expertise on the matter. (Ibid.)

68. The DAR has original, exclusive jurisdiction over agrarian disputes, except on the

aspects of (a) just compensation; and (b) criminal jurisdiction over which regular courts have jurisdiction. (Vda. De Tangub vs. CA, 191 SCRA 885).

69. Where there are no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian relations whatsoever between

the parties that could bring a controversy under the ambit of the agrarian reform laws, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board has no jurisdiction. (Heirs of

the Late Herman Rey Santos vs. CA, 327 SCRA 293). 70. The CARETAKER of the land may be considered as the cultivator of the land and,

hence, a tenant. (Latag vs. Banog, 16 SCRA 88).

71. The cultivator is necessarily tasked with duties that amount to cultivation.

(COCOMA vs. CA, 164 SCRA 568). 72. There are no squatters in Agricultural lands. Squatters are only found in URBAN

COMMUNITIES, not in RURAL AREAS. (On Presidential Decree No. 772- Illegal

Squatting) (People vs. Echaves, 95 SCRA 663). 73. It bears noting that the Decision, which prescribed for Rule 42 as the correct mode of

appeal from the decisions of the SAC, was promulgated by this Court only on 10 September 2002, while the Resolution of the motion for reconsideration of the said case giving it a prospective application was promulgated on 20 March 2003. Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals on 31 July 1998 via ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of

the Rules of Court. Though appeal under said rule is not the proper mode of appeal, said erroneous course of action cannot be blamed on respondent. It was of the belief that such recourse was the appropriate manner to questioned the decisions of the SAC. In Land Bank v. De Leon, we held:

On account of the absence of jurisprudence interpreting

Sections 60 and 61 of RA 6657 regarding the proper way to appeal decisions of Special Agrarian Courts as well as the conflicting decisions of the Court of Appeals thereon, LBP cannot be blamed for availing of the wrong mode. Based on its own interpretation and reliance on the Buenaventura ruling, LBP acted on the mistaken belief that an ordinary appeal is the appropriate manner to question decisions of Special Agrarian Courts.

Thus, while the rule is that the appropriate mode of appeal from the decisions of

the SAC is through petition for review under Rule 42, the same rule is inapplicable in the instant case. The Resolution categorically stated that said ruling shall apply only to those cases appealed after 20 March 2003 (Fernando Gabatin, et al., vs. LBP, G.R. No. 148223, November 25 2004)


74. The foregoing clearly shows that there would never be a judicial determination of just compensation absent respondent Land Banks participation. Logically, it follows that respondent is an indispensable party in an action for the determination of just

compensation in cases arising from agrarian reform program.

Assuming arguendo that respondent is not an indispensable party but only a necessary party as is being imposed upon us by the petitioners, we find the argument of the petitioners that only indispensable can appeal to be incorrect.

There is nothing in the Rules of Court that prohibit a party in an action before the

lower court to make an appeal merely on the ground that he is not an indispensable party. The Rules of Court does not distinguish whether the appellant is an indispensable party or not. To avail of the remedy, the only requirement is that the persons appealing must have a present interest in the subject matter of the litigation and must be aggrieved or prejudiced by the judgment. A party, in turn, is deemed aggrieved or prejudiced when his interest, recognized by law in the subject matter of the lawsuit, is injuriously affected by the judgment, order or decree. The fact that a person is made a party to a case before the lower court, and eventually be made liable if the judgment be against him, necessarily entitles him to exercise his right to appeal. To prohibit such party to appeal is nothing less than an outright violation of the rules on fair play.

75. The Rules of Court provides that parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. In BPI v. Court of Appeal, 402 SCRA 449 this Court explained: . . . . . . An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the courts

action in the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be had. The partys interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence there cannot be resolution of the dispute of the parties before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable. Conversely, a party is not indispensable to the suit if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is distinct and divisible from the interest of the other parties and will not necessarily be prejudiced by a judgment which does complete justice to the parties in court. He is not indispensable if his presence would merely permit complete relief between him and those already parties to the action or will simply avoid multiple litigation. (Ibid)

76. In Sharp International Marketing v. Court of Appeals, this Court even went on to say that without the Land Bank, there would be no amount to be established by the government for the payment of just compensation, thus:

As may be gleaned very clearly from EO 229, the LBP is an

essential part of the government sector with regard to the payment of compensation to the landowner. It is, after all, the instrumentality that is charged with the disbursement of public funds for purposes of agrarian reform. It is therefore part, an indispensable cog, in the government

machinery that fixes and determines the amount compensable to the landowner. Were LBP to be excluded from that intricate, if not sensitive, function of establishing the compensable amount, there would be no amount to be established by the government as required in Section 6 of EO 229 (emphasis. supplied). (Ibid)

77. We must stress, at the outset, that the taking of private lands under the agrarian reform program partakes of the nature of an expropriation proceeding. In a number of cases, we have stated that in computing the just compensation for expropriating proceedings, it is the value of the land at the time of the taking not at the time of the rendition of judgment, which should be taken into consideration. This being do,


then in determining the value of the land for the payment of just compensation, the time of taking should be the basis. In the instant case, since the dispute over the

valuation of the land depends on the rate of the GSP used in the equation, it necessarily follows that the GSP should be pegged at the time of the taking of the

properties.

In the instant case, the said taking of the properties was deemed effected on 21 October 1972, when the petitioners were deprived of ownership over their lands in favor of qualified beneficiaries, pursuant to E.O. No. 228 and by the virtue of P.D. No. 27. The GSP for one cavan of palay at that time was at P35. Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, the GSP should be fixed at said rate, which was the GSP at the time of the taking of the subject property . (Ibid)

78. Petitioners are not rendered disadvantage by the computation inasmuch as they are

entitled to receive the increment of six percent (6%) yearly interest compounded annually pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994. As amply

explained by this Court:

The purpose of AO No. 13 is to compensate the landowners for unearned interests. Had they been paid in 1972 when the GSP for

rice and corn was valued at P35.00 and P31.00, respectively, and such amounts were deposited in a bank, they would have earned a compounded interest of 6% per annum. Thus, if the PARAD used

the 1972 GSP, then the product of (2.5 x AGP x P35.00 or P31.00) could be multiplied by (1.06) to determine the value of the land plus the addition 6% compounded interest it would have earned from 1972.

79. Petitioners reliance on Land Bank v. Court of Appeals where we ordered Land

Bank to pay the just compensation based on the GSP at the time the PARAD rendered the decision, and not at the time of the taking, is not well taken. In that case, PARAD, in its decision, used the GSP at the time of payment, in determining the land value. When the decision became final and executory, Land Bank, however, refused to pay the landowner arguing that the PARADs valuation was null and void for want of jurisdiction. We rules therein that the PARAD has the authority to determine the initial valuation of lands involving agrarian reform. Thus, the decision of the PARAD was binding on Land Bank. Land Bank was estopped from questioning the land valuation made by PARAD because it participated in the valuation proceedings and did not appeal the said decision. Hence, Land Bank was compelled to pay the land value based on the GSP at the time of payment. (Ibid)

80. As can clearly be gleaned from the foregoing provision, the remedy of relief from

judgment can only be resorted to on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against.

Measured against this standard, the reason proferred by Land Banks

counsel, i.e., that his heavy workload prevented him from ensuring that the motion for reconsideration included a notice of hearing, was by no means excusable.

Indeed, counsels admission that he simply scanned and signed the Motion for Reconsideration for Agrarian Case No. 2005, Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 48, not knowing, or unmindful that it had no notice of hearing speaks volumes of his arrant negligence, and cannot in any manner be deemed to constitute excusable negligence. (LBP vs. Hon. Elis G.C. Natividad G.R. No. 127198, May 16, 2005).

81. Indeed, a motion that does not contain the requisite notice of hearing is nothing but

a mere scrap of paper. The clerk of court does not have the duty to accept it, much less to bring it to the attention of the presiding judge. The trial court

therefore correctly considered the motion for reconsideration pro forma. Thus, it


cannot be faulted for denying Land Banks motion for reconsideration and petition for relief from judgment. (Ibid)

82. At any rate, in the Philippines Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals, We declare

that there is nothing contradictory between the DARs primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, which includes jurisdiction of regional trial courts over all petitions for the determination of just compensation. The first refers to administrative proceedings, while the second refers to judicial proceedings.

In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction

is vested in the DAR to determine in a preliminary manner the just compensation for the lands taken under the agrarian reform program, but such determination is subject to challenged before the courts. The resolution of just compensation cases for the taking of lands under agrarian reform is, after all, essentially a judicial function.

83. Land Banks contention that the property was acquired for purposes of agrarian

reform on October 21, 1972, the time of the effectivity of PD 27, ergo just

compensation should be based on the value of the property as of that time and not at the time of possession in 1993, is likewise erroneous. In Office of the President, Malacaang, Manila v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the seizure of the landholding did not take place on the date of effectivity of PD 27 but would take effect on the payment of just compensation.

Under the factual circumstances of this case, the agrarian reform process is still

incomplete as the just compensation to be paid private respondents has yet to be settled. Considering the passage of Republic Act No. 6657 (RA 6657) before the completion of this process, the just compensation should be determined and the process concluded under the said law. Indeed, RA 6657 is the applicable law, with PD 27 and EO 228 having only suppletory effect, conformably with our ruling in Paris v. Alfeche. (Ibid)

84. It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation on the guideline

provided by PD 27 and EO 228 considering the DARs failure to determine the just compensation for a considerable length of time. That just compensation

should be determined in accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is especially imperative considering that just condensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample.

85. All controversies on the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) fall under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), even through they raise questions that are also legal or constitutional in nature. All doubts should be resolved in favor of the DAR, since the law has granted it special and original authority to hear and adjudicate agrarian matter. (DAR vs. Roberto J. Cuenca and Hon. Alfonso B. Combong, Jr., et al. G.R. N. 154112, September 23, 2004).

86. In view of the foregoing, there is no need to address the other points pleaded by

respondent in relation to the jurisdictional issue. We need only to point that in case of doubt, the jurisprudential trend is for courts to refrain from resolving a controversy involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies, even if the question[s] involved [are] also judicial in character, as in this case. (Ibid)

87. Having declared the RTCs to be without jurisdiction over the instant case, it follows that the RTC of La Carlota City (Branch 63) was devoid of authority to issue the assailed Writ of Preliminary Injunction. That Writ must perforce be stricken down as a nullity. Such nullity is particularly true in the light of the express prohibitory provisions of the CARP and this Courts Administrative Circular Nos. 29-2002 and


38-2002. These Circulars enjoin all trial judges to strictly observe Section 68 of RA 6657, which reads:

Section 68. Immunity of Government Agencies from Undue

Interference. No injunction, restraining order, prohibition or mandamus shall be issued by the lower courts against the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the Department of Agriculture (DA), the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in their implementation of the program.(Ibid)

88. It is a well-settled rule that only questions of law may be received by the Supreme

Court in an appeal by certiorari. Findings of fact by the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to the Supreme Court.

The only time this Court will disregard the factual findings of the Court of

Appeals (which are ordinary accorded great respect) is when these are based on speculation, surmises or conjectures or when these are not based on substantial evidence. (Samahan ng Magsasaka San Jose represented by Dominador Maglalang vs. Marietta Valisno, et al., G.R. No. 158314 June 3, 2004).

89. The relevant laws governing the minors redemption in 1973 are the general Civil

Code provisions on legal capacity to enter into contractual relations. Article 1327 of the Civil Code provides that minors are incapable of giving consent to a contract. Article 1390 provides that a contract where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent is viodable or annullable. Thus, the redemption made by the minors in 1973 was merely voidable or annullable, and was not void ab initio, as petitions

argue.

Any action for the annulment of the contracts thus entered into by the minors would require that: (1) the plaintiffs must have an interest in the contract; and (2) the action must be brought by the victim and not the party responsible for the defect. Thus, Article 1397 of the Civil Code provides in part that [t]he action for the annulment of contracts may be instituted by all who are thereby obliged principally or subsidiarily. However, persons who are capable cannot allege the incapacity of those with whom they contracted. The action to annul the minors redemption in 1973, therefore, was one that could only have been initiated by the minors themselves, as the victims or the aggrieved parties in whom the law itself vests the right to file suit. This action was never initiated by the minors. We thus quote

with approval the ratiocination of the Court of Appeals:

Respondent contend that the redemption made by the petitioners was simulated, calculated to avoid the effects of agrarian reform considering that at the time of redemption the latter were still minors and could not have recourse, in their own right, to pay the price thereof.

We are persuaded. While it is true that a transaction entered into by a party who is incapable of consent is viodable, however such transaction is valid until annulled. The redemption made by the four petitioners has never been annulled, thus, it is valid. (Ibid)

90. As owner in their own right of the questioned properties, Redemptioner- Grandchildren enjoyed the right of retention granted to all landowners. This right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right, which is subject to qualification

by the balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant and by implementing the doctrine that social justice was not meant to perpetrate an justice against the landowner. A retained area, as its name denotes, is land which is not supposed to

leave the landowners dominion, thus sparing the government from the inconvenience of taking land only to return it to the landowner afterwards, which would be a pointless process.


91. On the first assigned error, this Court has consistently held that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a relative one and is flexible depending on the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of

a case. Among others, it is disregarded where, as in this case, (a) there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention; and (b) the administrative action is patently illegal and amounts to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (DAR vs. APEX Investment and Financing Corporation; G.R. No. 149422, April 10, 2003).

92. In Natalia Realty vs. Department of Agrarian Reform, we held that the aggrieved landowners were not supposed to wait until the DAR acted on their letter-protests (after it had sat on them for almost a year) before resorting to judicial process.

Given the official indifference which, under the circumstances could have continued forever, the landowners has to act to assert and protect their interests. Thus, their petition for certiorari was allowed even though the DAR had not yet resolved their protests. In the same vein, respondent here could not be expected to wait for

petitioner DAR to resolve its protest before seeking judicial intervention. Obviously, petitioner might continue to alienate respondents lots during the pendency of its protest. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that on the basis of the circumstances of this case, respondent need not exhaust all administrative

remedies before filing its petition for certiorari and prohibition. (Ibid)

93. In Roxas & Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, we held:

For a valid implementation of the CAR program, two notices are

required: (1) the Notice of Coverage and letter of invitation to preliminary conference sent to the landowner, the representative of the BARC, LBP, farmer beneficiaries and other interested parties pursuant

to DAR A.O. No. 12, series of 1989; and (2) the Notice of Acquisition sent to the landowner under Section 16 of R.A. No. 6657. The importance of the first notice, i.e., the Notice of Coverage and the letter of invitation to the conference, and its actual conduct cannot be understated. They are steps designed to comply with the requirements of administrative due process. The implementation of the

CARL is an exercise of the States police power and the power of eminent domain. To the extent that the CARL prescribes retention limits to the landowners, there is an exercise of police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343, 373-374 [1989]. But where to carry out such regulations, the owners are deprived of land they own in excess of the maximum area allowed there is also a taking under the power of eminent domain. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farm beneficiary (id.). The Bill of Rights provides that [n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without de process of law (Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution). The CARL was not intended to take away property without due process of law (Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 262 SCRA 245, 253 [1996]). The exercise of the power of eminent domain requires that due process be observe in taking of private property. (Ibid)

94. In the instant case, petitioner does not dispute that respondent did not receive the Notice of Acquisition and Notice of Coverage sent to the latters old address. Petitioner explained that its personnel could not effect personal service of those notices upon respondent because it changed its juridical name from Apex Investment and Financing Corporation to SM Investment Corporation. While it is true, that personal service could not be made, however, there is no showing that petitioner


caused the service of the notices via registered mail as required by Section 16(a) of R.A. 6657, On this point, petitioner claimed that the notices were sent not only by registered mail but also by personal delivery and that there was actual receipt by respondent as shown by the signature appearing at the bottom left-hand corner of petitioners copies of the notices. But petitioner could not identify the name of respondents representative who allegedly received the notices. In fact, petitioner admitted that the signature thereon is illegible, It is thus safe to conclude that respondent was not notified of the compulsory acquisition proceedings, Clearly, respondent was deprived of its right to procedural due process. It is elementary

that before a person can be deprived of his property, he should be informed of the claim against him and the theory on which such claim is premised. (Ibid)

95. Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657 provides that the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law

shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands. Section 3 defines agricultural land, as land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. (Ibid)

96. In dismissing outright the petition for certiorari, the CA reasoned that since it

(petitioner LBP) was assailing the writ of execution issued by respondent Provincial Adjudicator, then its recourse was to file a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court. Section 1 thereof provides:

Sec. 1 Scope. This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or

final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among there agencies are the . . . . Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657. . .

Contrary to the ratiocination of the appellate court, however, Rule 43 does not apply to an action to nullify a writ of execution because the same is not a final order within the contemplation of the said rule. As this Court fairly recently explained, a writ of execution is not a final order or resolution, but is issued to

carry out the mandate of the court in the enforcement of a final order or a judgment. It is a judicial process to enforce a final order or judgment against the losing party.

As such an order or execution is generally not appealable. (LBP vs. Hon. Pepito Planta and Faustino Tabla, G.R. No. 152324 April 29, 2005.

97. On the other hand certiorari lies where there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and

adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Section 11, Rule XIII of the 1994

DARAB Rules of Procedure, which was then applicable, expressly provided, in part, that the decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be brought directly to the RTCs designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice hereof. In relation to this provision, Section 16(f) of R.A. No. 6657 prescribed that any party who does not agree with the

decision (in the summary administrative proceedings) may bring the matter to the court for final determination of just compensation. (Ibid)

98. Petitioner LBP urges the Court to reconcile the seeming inconsistency between the

period to file certiorari under Section 54 of R.A. No. 6657 (within fifteen days from receipt of copy of the decision, order, award or ruling) and that under Section 4 of Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court (sixty days from notice of judgment, order or resolution). The Courts holds that Section 54 of RA No. 6657 prevails since it is

a substantive law specially designed for agrarian disputes or cases pertaining to the application, implementation enforcement of interpretation of agrarian reform laws. However, the fifteen-day period provided therein is extendible, but such extension shall not extend the sixty-day period under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.


99. Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion for extension on the grounds that the petition which petitioner intended to file is not the proper remedy. . .

Petitioners contention is well-taken. The Court of Appeals was rather hasty

in concluding that the petitioner was going to file a petition for certiorari solely on the basis of petitioners allegation that he was going to file a petition for certiorari. It should have reserved judgment on the mater until it had actually received the petition especially considering that petitioners motion for extension was filed well within the reglementary period for filing a petition for review. (Ibid) Supreme Court citing De Dios vs. CA, 274 SCRA 520)

100. Cases should be determined on the merits after all parties have been given full

opportunity to ventilate their causes and defenses, rather than on technicalities or procedural imperfections. Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to expedite the decision or resolution of cases and other matters pending in court. A strict and rigid application of rules, resulting in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must be avoided. In fact, Rule 1, Section 6 of the Rules of Court states that the Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of ensuring the just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. (Paulina Diaz, et al., vs. Carlos Mesias, Jr., G.R. No. 156345, March 19, 2004)

101. The mere issuance of an emancipation patent does not put the ownership of

the agrarian reform beneficiary beyond attack and scrutiny. Emancipation patents may be cancelled for violations of agrarian laws, rules and regulations, Section 12(g) of P.D. 946 (issued on June 17, 1976) vested the then Court of Agrarian Relations with jurisdiction over cases involving the cancellation of emancipation patents issued under P.D. 266. Exclusive jurisdiction over such

cases was later lodged with the DARAB under Section 1 of Rule II of the DARAB Rules of Procedure.

Aside from ordering the cancellation of emancipation patents, the DARAB

may order reimbursement of lease rental as amortization to agrarian reform beneficiaries, forfeiture of amortization, ejectment of beneficiaries, reallocation of the land to qualified beneficiaries, perpetual disqualification to become agrarian reform beneficiaries, reimbursement of amortization payment and value of improvement, and other ancillary matters related to the cancellation of emancipation patents. (Liberty Ayo-Alburo vs. Uldarico Matobato, G.R. No. 155181, April 15, 2005).

102. Only questions of law, however, can be raised in a petition for review on

certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Findings of fact by the CA are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to the Supreme Court, more so

if the factual findings of the appellate court coincide with those of the DARAB, an administrative body with expertise on matters within its specific and specialized jurisdiction. This Court is not thus duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over again

the evidence already considered in the proceedings below, subject to certain exceptions. (Ibid)

103. Petitioner furthermore argues that the amortization payments she made to the Land

Bank in the amount of P9,825.80 should not have been forfeited in favor of respondent. On this score, the Court finds for petitioner. While the DARAB has

jurisdiction to Order forfeiture of amortizations paid by an agrarian reform beneficiary, forfeiture should be made in favor of the government and not to the reallocatee of the landholding. (Ibid)

104. In Monsanto v. Zerna, (G.R. No. 142501, 7 December 2001) it was held that for

DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship between the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it would be essential to establish all its indispensable elements to it: (1) the parties are


the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.

In the case a bar, the element that the parties must be the landowner and the

tenant or agricultural lessee on which all other requisites of the tenancy agreement depends, is absent. Tenancy relationship is inconsistent with the assertion of

ownership of both parties. Petitioners claim to be the owners of the entire Lot No. 5198, by virtue of a Certificate of Sale of Delinquent Real Property, while private respondents assert ownership over Lots Nos. 5198-A, 5198-A, 5198-B and 5198-D on the basis of an Emancipation Patent and Transfer Certificate of Title. Neither do the records show any juridical tie or tenurial relationship between the parties predecessors-in-interest. The questioned lot it allegedly declared for taxation purposes in the name of petitioners father, Dalmacio Arzaga who does not appear to have any connection with the private respondents nor with their alleged predecessor-in-interest, Caridad Fuentebella. (Rodolfo Arzaga, et al., vs. Salvacion Copias, et al., G.R. No. 152404, March 28, 2003).

105. In Chico v. Court of Appeals, (348 Phil. 37 1998) also an action for recovery of possession, the Court was confronted with the same jurisdictional issue. The petitioner therein claimed ownership over the disputed property pursuant to a final judgment, while the respondents asserted right to possession by virtue of an alleged tenancy relationship with one who has no juridical connection with the petitioners. In holding that it is the trial court and not the DARAB which has jurisdiction over the case, the Court ruled that the absence of a juridical tie between the parties or their predecessor-in-interest negates the existence of the element of

tenancy relationship. 106. The basic rules is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by

the allegations in the complaint. Jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by the defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the defendant. From the averments of the complaint in the instant case, it is that the petitioners action does not involve an agrarian dispute, but one for recovery of possession, which is perfectly within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trail Courts. (Ibid)

107. Section 3 thereof defines agricultural land, as land devoted to agricultural

activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. The terms agriculture or agricultural activity is

also defined by the same law as follows:

Agriculture, Agricultural Enterprises or Agricultural Activity means the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities, and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done by persons whether natural or juridical. (DAR vs. DECS, G.R. No. 158223, April 27, 2004)

108. Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the types of lands which are exempted

from the coverage of CARP as well as the purposes of their exemption, viz:

x x x x x x x x x

c) Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for national defense, school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for educations purposes, shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act.


x x x x x x x x x

Clearly, a reading of the paragraphs shows that, in order to be exempt from the coverage: 1) the land must be actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary; and 2) the purpose is :for school sites and campuses,

including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for educations purposes.

The importance of the phrase actually, directly, and exclusively used and found to be necessary cannot be understated, as what respondent DECS would want us to do by not taking the words in their literal and technical definitions. The words of the law are clear and unambiguous. Thus, the Plain meaning rules or verba legis in statutory construction is applicable in this case. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. (Ibid) (Note: To be exempt from the coverage, it is the land per se, not the income derived therefrom, that must be actually and exclusively used for educational purposes.)

109. In the case at bar, the BARC certified that herein farmers were potential CARP

beneficiaries of the subject properties. Further, on November 23, 1994, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform through the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) issued a Notice of Coverage placing the subject properties under CARP. Since the identification and selection of CARP beneficiaries are matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of the CARP, it behooves the court to exercise great caution in substituting its own determination of the issue, unless there is grave abuse of discretion committed by the administrative agency. In this case, there was none.

The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) is the bastion of

social justice of poor landless farmers, the mechanism designed to redistribute to the underprivileged the natural right to toil the earth, and to liberate them from oppressive tenancy. To those who seek its benefit, it is the means towards a viable livelihood and ultimately, a decent life. The objective of the State is no less certain: landless farmers and farmworkers will receive the highest consideration to promote social justice and to move the nation toward sound rural development and industrialization. (Ibid)

110. The settled rule in this jurisdiction is that a party cannot change his theory of the

case or his cause of action on appeal. We have previously held that courts of justice have no jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in issue. A judgment that goes outside the issues and purports to adjudicate something on which the court did not hear the parties, is not only irregular but also extra-judicial and invalid The rule rests on the fundamental tenets of fair play. In the present case, the Court must stick to the issue litigated in the DARAB and in the Court of Appeals, which is whether petitioner has the right to eject the Spouses Velasco from the land under RA 3844. (Henry Mon vs. CA, Hon. Leopoldo Serrano, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 118292, April 2, 2004).

111. Administrative Law: The power of subordinate legislation allows administrative

bodies to implements the broad policies laid down in a statute by filing in the details, and all that us required it that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of law and that the regulations be not in contradiction to but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the law. The power of subordinate legislation allows administrative bodies to implement the board policies laid down in a statute by filing in the details. All that is required is that the regulations be not in

contradiction to but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the law. One such administrative regulations is DAR Memorandum Circular NO, 6. As emphasized in De Chavez v. Zobel emancipation is the goal of P.D. 27, i.e., freedom from the


bondage of the soil by transferring to the tenant-farmers the ownership of the land theyre tilling. (Rolando Sigre vs. CA and Lilia Gonzales, 387 SCRA 15).

112. Since DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6 essentially sought to accomplish the

noble purpose of P.D. 27, it is therefore valid and has the force of law. The rationale for the Circular was, in fact, explicitly recognized by the appellate court when it stated that The main purpose of the circular is to make certain that the lease rental payments of the tenant-farmer are applied to his amortizations on the purchase price of the land. x x x The circular is meant to remedy the situation where the tenant-farmers lease rentals to landowner were not credited in his favor against the determined purchase price of the land, thus making him a perpetual obligor for said purchase price. Since the assailed circular essentially sought to accomplish the noble purpose of P.D. 27, it is therefore valid. Such being the case, it has the force of law and is entitled to great respect. (Ibid)

113. The Court cannot see any irreconcilable conflict between P.D. No. 816 and

DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6. Enacted in 1975, P.D. No. 816 provides that

the tenant-farmer (agricultural lessee) shall pay lease rentals to the landowner until the value of the property has been determined or agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR. On the other hand, DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6, implemented in 1978, mandates that the tenant-farmer shall pay to LBP the lease rental after the value of the land has been determine. (Ibid)

114. Both Memorandum Circular No. 6 and P.D. 816 were issued pursuant to and in

implementation of P.D. 27 these must not be read in isolation, but rather, in conjunction with each other. (Private respondent, however splits hairs, so to speak, and contends that the Curso case is premised on the assumption that the

Circular implement P.D. 816, whereas it is expressed stated in the Circular that it was issued in implementation of P.D. 27. These must not be read in isolation, but rather, in conjunction with each other. Under P.D. 816, rental payments shall be made to the landowner. After the value of the land has been determined/established, then the tenant-farmers shall pay their amortizations to the LBP, as provided in DAR Circular No. 6. Clearly there is no inconsistency between them. Au contraire, P.D. 816 and DAR Circular No. 6 supplement each

other insofar as it sets the guidelines for the payments of lease rentals on the agricultural property. (Ibid)

115. That P.D. 27 does not suffer any constitutional infirmity is a judicial fact that has

been repeatedly emphasized by the Supreme Court. Further, that P.D. 27 does not suffer any constitutional infirmity is a judicial fact that has been repeatedly emphasized by this Court in a number of cases. As early as 1974, in the aforecited case of De Chavez v. Zobel, P.D. 27 was assumed to be constitutional, and upheld as part and parcel of the land of the land, viz: There is no doubt then, as set forth expressly therein, that the goal is emancipation. What is more, the decree is now part and parcel of the law of the land according to the revised Constitution itself. Ejectment therefore of petitioners is simply out of the question. That would be to set at naught an express mandate of the Constitution. Once it has spoken, our duty is clear; obedience is unavoidable. This is not only so because

of the cardinal postulate of constitutionalism, the supremacy of the fundamental law. It is also because any other approach would run the risk of setting at naught this basic aspiration to do away with all remnants of a feudalistic order at war with the promise and the hope associated with an open society. To deprive petitioners of the small landholdings in the face of a presidential decree considered ratified by the new Constitution and precisely in accordance with its avowed objective could indeed be contributory to perpetuating the misery that tenancy had spawned in the past as well as the grave social problems thereby created. There can be no justification for any other decision then whether predicated on a juridical norm or on the traditional role assigned to the judiciary of implementing and not thwarting fundamental policy goals. (Ibid)


116. Eminent Domain; Just compensation; the determination of just compensation under P.D. No. 27, like in section 16(d) of R.A. 6657 or the CARP Law, is not final or conclusive unless both the landowner and the tenant-farmer accept the valuation

of the property by the Barrio Committee on Land Production and the DAR, the parties may bring the dispute to court in order to determine the appropriate amount of compensation, a task unmistakably within the prerogative of the court. The

determination of just compensation under P.D. No. 27, like in section 16 (d) of R.A. 6657 or the CARP Law is not final or conclusive. This is evident from the succeeding paragraph of Section 2 of E.O. 228: x x x In the event of dispute with the landowner regarding the amount of lease rental paid by the farmer beneficiary, the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Barangay Committee on Land Production concerned shall resolve the dispute within thirty (30) days from its submission pursuant to Department of Agrarian Reform Memorandum Circular No. 26, series of 1973, and other pertinent issuances, In the event a party questions in

court the resolution of the dispute the landowners compensation shall still be processed for payment and the proceeds shall be held in trust by the Trust Department of the Land Bank in accordance with the provisions of Section 5

hereof, pending the resolution of the dispute before the court. Clearly therefrom, unless both the landowner and the tenant-farmer accept the valuation of the property

by the Barrio Committee on Land production and the DAR the parties may bring the dispute to court in order to determine the appropriate amount of compensation, a task unmistakably within the prerogative of the court. (LBP vs. CA and Lilia Gonzales, 387 SCRA 15).

117. Republic Act No. 6657; The Court need not belabor the fact that R.A. 6657 or the

CARP Law operates distinctly from P.D. 27 R.A. 6657 covers all public and private agricultural and including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture as provided for in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229; while, P.D. 27 covers rice and corn lands. On this score, E.O. 229, which

provides for the mechanism of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, specifically states: (P)residential Decree No. 27, as amended, shall continue to operate with respect to rice and corn lands, covered thereunder. x x x It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that R.A. 6657 did not repeal or supersede, in any way, P.D.27.And whatever provisions of P.D. 27 that are not inconsistent with R.A 6657 shall be suppletory to the latter, and all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D. 27 are retained even with the passage of R.A 6657.

118. We have repeatedly stressed that social justice or any justice for that matter

is for the deserving, whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is true that, in case of reasonable doubt, we are to tilt the balance in favor of the poor to whom the Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy and compassion. But never is it justified to give preference to the poor simply because they are poor, or reject the rich simply because they are rich, for justice must always be served for the poor and the rich alike according to the mandate of the law. (Gelos vs. CA, 208 SCRA 608, 616) (cited in Victor G. Valencia vs. CA, G.R. No. 122363; April 29, 2003)

119. From the foregoing discussion, it is reasonable to conclude that a civil law lessee

cannot automatically institute tenants on the property under to Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 3844. The correct view that must necessarily be adopted is that the civil law lessee, although a legal possessor, may not install tenants on the property unless expressly authorized by the lessor. And if a prohibition exists or is stipulated in the contract of lease the occupants of the property are merely civil law subleases whose rights terminate upon the expiration of the civil law lease agreement. (Victor Valencia vs. CA G.R. No. 122363, April 29, 2003).

120. Agrarian Reform ; Presidential Decree No. 27; Homesteads; Parcels of land,

though obtained by homestead patents under Commonwealth Act 141, are covered by land reform under Presidential Decree 27. Petitioners contention is without legal basis. Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27, under which the Emancipation Patents sought to be cancelled here were issued to respondents, applies to all


tenanted private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn under a system of share-crop or lease-tenancy, whether classified as landed estate or not. The law makes no exceptions whatsoever in its coverage. Nowhere therein

does it appear that lots obtained by homestead patents are exempt from its operation. The matter is made even clearer by Department Memorandum No. 2, Series of 1978, which states: Tenanted private agricultural lands primarily devoted

to rice and/or corn which have been acquired under the provisions of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, shall also be covered by Operation Land Transfer. Unquestionably, petitioners parcels of land, though obtained by homestead patents under Commonwealth Act 141, are covered by land reform under PD 27. (Florencia Paris vs. Dionisio A. Alfeche, et al., 364 SCRA 110).

121. The right to retain an area of seven hectares is not absolute it is premised on

the condition that the landowner is cultivating the area sought to be retained or will actually cultivate it upon effectivity of the law. Clearly, the right to retain an area of seven hectares is not absolute. It is premised on the condition that the landowner is cultivating the area sought to be retained or will actually cultivate it

upon effectivity of the law. In the case at bar, neither of the conditions for retention is present. As admitted by petitioner herself, the subject parcels are fully tenanted; thus, she is clearly not cultivating them, nor will she personally retain any portion of her landholdings. (Ibid)

122. Homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs can own and retain the

original homesteads, only for as long as they continue to cultivate them.

Indisputably, homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs can own and retain the original homesteads only for as long as they continue to cultivate them. That parcels of land are covered by homestead patents will not automatically exempt them from the operation of land reform. It is the fact of continued cultivation by the original grantees or their direct compulsory heirs that shall exempt their lands

from land reform coverage. (Ibid)

123. Although, under the law, tenant farmers are already deemed owners of the land they till, they are still required to pay the cost of the land, including interest, within fifteen years before the title is transferred to them. Thus, the court held

in Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform: It is true that PD 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmers as of October 21, 1972 and declared that he shall be deemed the owner of a portion of land consisting of a family-sized farm except that no title to the land owned by him was to be actually issued to him unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers cooperative. It was understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also had to be made first, conformably

to the constitutional requirement. (Ibid)

124. Executive Order 228; Evidently, the law recognizes that the lands exact value, or the just compensation to be given the landowner cannot just be assumed it must be determined with certainly before the land titles are transferred although Executive Order 228, provides that the total lease rentals paid for the

lands from October 21, 1972 shall be considered as advance payment, it does not sanction the assumption that such rentals are automatically considered as equivalent to just compensation for the land. Presidential Decree 27 and

subsequently Executive Order (EO) 228, which recognized the rights acquired by tenant-farmers under PD 27, provides in detail the computation to be used in arriving at the exact total cost of the parcels of land. Evidently, therefore

2007 lecture guide(discussion of tenancy)

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