(2003) global complexity

GLOBAL COMPLEXITY

JOHN URRY

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[,verything flows'

Time is not absolutelY defined

Heraciitus

Albert Einstein

We are observing the birth of a science that is no longer limited to

idealized and simplified situations but reflects the complexity of the

real world, a science that views us and our creativity as part of the

fundamental trend present at all levels of nature.

Ilya Prigogine

Elements are elements only for the system that employs them as unitsand they are such only through this system.

Niklas Luhmann

We are but whirlpools in a river of ever-flowing water.

Norbert Wiener

If you want to humble an empire it makes sense to maim its cathedrals.They are symbols of its faith, and when they crumple and burn, it tellsus we are not so powerful and we can't be safe.

Time Magazine, 12 September 2001

Contents

Preface

1 'Societies' and the Global

2 The Complexity Turn

3 Limits of 'Global' Analyses

4 Networks and Fluids

5 Global Emergence

6 Social Ordering and Power

7 Global Complexities

ReferencesIndex

vl11

t )

39

50

76

104

t20

t4l155

Preface

During the 1990s, like many others, I became fascinated by theidea that social relations are in some sense increasingly global. [nThe Tounst Gaze in 1990 I briefly considered how many differentplaces had to compete on a more global stage in order to attracttourists from all sorts of other places fUrry 1990, 2001J. Laterworks, such as Consuming Places [Urry ]995), brought out howpeople across the world's stage are global consumers of otherplaces and that this very importantly changes what places are like.They are on the world's stage.

More generally, Scott Lash and I ar-ralysed such global transfor-mations through the 'end of organized capitalism' thesis. Capital-ism, we argued, is shifting from an organized national, societalpattern, to global 'd isorganizat ion' f lash and Urry i987, 1994).In Economies of Signs and Space [Lash and Urry 1994) we showedthat moving rapidly in and across the world are complex andmobile economies, both of signs and of people working in, escap-ing from or seduced by various signs. These signs and peopleincreasingly flow along various 'scapes', resulting in further 'dis-

organization' of once organized capitalist societies. It was claimedthat there is a move from the 'social' to the informational andcommunicational, from national government to global disorgani-zation. Such a mobile economy of signs produces complex re-drawings of the boundaries of what is global and what is local. Wetried to elaborate some of the time and space changes involved inwhat Roland Robertson had termed 'elocalization'.

Preface ix

l.ater in the decade Phil Macnaghten and I maintained that

there is no such simple cnt i ty as 'nature' [Macnaghten and Urry

l'qqSl. There is nothing'natural', we showed, about nature. There

,r" u'variety of Contested Natures and one of these could be

t".-"a 'global nature'. We explored the emergence of what Ulrich

g".k hrt described as a 'global risk society', especially describing

in detall the international ramifications of the sad story of the

British cow roast beef BSE and new variant CJD.

This led me in Soaologt beyond Societies [Urry 2000bJ to try

to rethink the very bases of sociology. I showed there, following

Manuel Castells's trilogy on The Int'ormation Age (1996, )'997,

1998), that the emergence of giobal networks transforms the very

nature of social life. It can no longer be seen as bounded within

national societies. The concept of society is revealed to be deeply

problematic, once the scale, range and depth of various mobile

and global processes are examined. I suggested that such trans-

formations lead us to rethink the nature of sociology, which had

been mostly based upon attempts to understand the properties

and reproduction of 'societies'. I elaborated some 'new rules of

sociological method' to deal with disorganization, global flows and

the declining powers of the 'social'.

However, in all these works, I, like most other commentators,did not sufficiently examine the nature of the 'global' that wassupposedly making great changes to social life and undermining'societies'. The global was almost left as a 'black box', a deus exmachina that in and of itself was seen to have powerful proper-ties. What was not analysed I think by anyone much was just whatsort of 'system' the global is. Thus there was a rather weak under-standing of how the systemic properties of the global interactwith the properties of other entities such as those of 'society'. Theglobal is often taken to be both the 'cause' of immense changesand the 'effect' of those changes.

As I was completing Sociologt beyond Societies I became increas-ingly aware of the growth within certain of the social sciences ofsome concepts and theories from the complexity sciences. This isover and beyond economics, where complexity was initially devel-oped [see Arthur 1994b). I tried to develop some elements ofcomplexity in Sociologt beyond Societies, especially in relationshipto thinking through how time and space are transformed in a

x Preface

globalizing world. But more recently this small stream of com-plexity thinking in the social sciences has been turning into aflood. In this current book I have tried to draw on some elemenrsin a more systematic way, although I am well aware of the dangersof crass simplification and misunderstanding as disciplinaryboundaries get crossed. My formulations are qualitative, with noattempts to apply the mathematics of chaos and complexity.

The social science of globalization had taken the global systemfor granted and then shown how localities, regions, nation states,environments and cultures are transformed in linear fashion bythis all-powerful 'glob alizatton' . Thus globalization (or globalcapitalism) has come to be viewed as the new 'structure', withnations, localities, regions and so on, the new 'agent', employingthe normal social science distinctions but given a kind of globaltwist.

But complexity would suggest that such a system would bediverse, historical, fractured and uncertain. It would be necessaryto examine how emergent properties develop at the global levelthat are neither well ordered and moving towards equilibrium norin a state of perpetual anarchy. Complexity would lead one to seethe global as neither omnipotent nor subject to control by society.Indeed, it is not a single centre of power. It is an astonishinglycomplex system, or rather a series of dynamic complex systems,a huge array of islands of order within a sea of disorder, as IlyaPrigogine more generally postulates. There would be no presump-tion of moving towards a state of equilibrium.

And, as I was finishing this book, the tragic events of both l lSeptember and its bloody aftermath showed the profound hmi-tations of any linear view of the global. These events demonstratethat globalization is never complete. It is disordered, full ofparadox and the unexpected. Racing across the world are complexmobile connections that are more or less intense, more or lesssocial, more or less 'networked' and more or less occurring'at adistance'. There is a complex world, unpredictable yet irreversible,fearful and violent, disorderly but not simply anarchic. Smallevents in such systems are not forgotten but can reappear at dif-ferent and highly unexpected points in time and space. I suggestthat the way to think these notions through is via the concept ofglobal complexity.

Preface xi

And in thinking through what might be meant by 'global

complexity', I have been helped by various colleagues, especially

Lrirjof Capra, Biilent Diken, Mick Dillon, Andy Hoskins, Bob

Jessop, Scott Lash, John Law, Will Medd, Mimi Sheller, Jackie

Stacey, Nigel Thrift and Sylvia Walby.

John UrryLancaster

'societies' and the Global

Introducing the Global

It increasingly seems that we are living through some extraordi-nary times involving massive changes to the very fabric of normaleconomic, political and social life. Analogies have been drawn witha century or more ago, when a somewhat similar restructuring ofthe dimensions of time and space took pl.ace. New technologicaland organizational innovations 'compressed' the time taken tocommunicate and travel across large distances. Some of thesemomentous innovations that changed time-space a century agoincluded the telegram, the telephone, steamship travel, thebicycle, cars and lorries, skyscrapers, aircraft, the mass productionfactory, X-ray machines and Greenwich Mean Time fsee Kern1983). Together these technological and social innovations dra-matically reorganized and compressed the very dimensions oftime and space between people and places.

Today some rather similar changes seem to be occurring. The1990s saw the growth of the Internet with a take-up faster thanany previous technology. There will soon be I bill ion users world-wide. The dealings of foreign exchange that occur each day arew-orth $1.4 tril l ion, which is sixty times greater than the amountol world trade. Communications 'on the move' are being trans-formed, with new mobile phones now more common in the worldthan conventional land-line phones. There are 700 million inter-national journeys made each year, a figure predicted to pass i

2 'societies' and the Global

bill ion very soon. Microsoft pointedly asks: 'where do you want

to go today?' and there are many ways of getting 'there'.

At the same time tens of millions of refugees and asylum-seekers roam the globe, with three billion people across the worldreceiving the same total income as the richest 300. Globallybranded companies employing staff from scores of different courl-tries have budgets that are greater than those of individualcountries. Images of the blue earth from space or the goldenarches of McDonald's are ubiquitous across the world andespecially upon the blll ion or so TV sets. A huge array of publicand private organizations has arisen seeking to produce, govern,surveil, terrorize and entertain this 'spaceship earth', includingsome 17,000 trans-border civic associations.

Thus new technologies are producing 'global times' in whichthe distances between places and peoples again seem to be dra-matically reducing. Some writers even suggest that time and spaceare 'de-materializing', as people, machines, images, information,powet money, ideas and dangers are all, we might say, 'on themove', travelling at bewildering speed in unexpected directionsfrom place to place, from time to time.

Various commentators have tried to understand these excep-tional changes. Anthony Giddens [1990) has described modernsocial life as being like a massive out-of-control ' juggernaut' lurch-ing onwards but with no driver at the wheel. The journalistFrances Cairncross (1995) describes in detail the 'death of dis-tance' that these various technologies seem to produce.ZygrnuntBauman (2000) talks of the speeded-up 'liquid modernity' as op-posed to the fixed and given shapes that the modern world hadearlier taken. Manuel Castells (2001) has elaborated the growthof an 'lnternet galaxy' that has ushered the world into a whollydifferent informational structure. Michael Hardt and AntonioNegri (2000) have provocatively suggested that notions of nation-state sovereignty have been replaced by a single system of power,what they call'empire', while many writers, indeed more than 100a year, have described and elaborated the so-called globalizationof economic, social and political hfe.

In this book I show how various 'global' processes raise majorimplications for most of the categories by which sociology and theother social sciences have examined the character of social life.

'Societies' and the Global

,Globalization' debates transform many existirrg sociological con-

troversies, such as the relative significance of social structure, on

the one hand, and human agency, on the other. Investigating the

slobal also dissolves strong dichotomies between human subjects

and physical objects, as well as that between the physical sciences

and the social sciences. The study of the global disrupts many con-

ventional debates and should not be viewed as merely an extra

level or domain that can be 'added' to existing sociological analy-

ses that can carry on regardless. 'Sociology'wi l l not be able tosustain itself as a specific and coherent discourse focused upon thestudy of given, bounded or'organized' capitalist societies. It is irre-versibly changed.

So faq, howevel globalization studies are at an early stage ofrecording, mapping, classifying and monitoring the 'global' and itseffects [see Castel ls 1996, 1997,7998; Held et al . 1999; Scholte2000). A new social science paradigm, of globalization, is devel-oping and extending worldwide, but so far it remains somewhat'pre-scientific'. [t concentrates upon the nature of the global'region' that is seen as competing with, and dominating, the soci-etal or nation-state 'region'. Globalization studies pose a kind ofinter-regional competition between the global and each society,the global on such a view being regarded as an overwhelming,singular causal force.

Whether writers are critics of, or enthusiasts for, the global, glob-alization gets attributed exceptional power to determine a massiverange of outcomes. Furthermore, 'globalization' is often taken torefer both to certain processes [from the verb, to globalize) and tocertain outcomes (from the noun, the globe). Both get designatedas global izat ion, as both'cause' and'effect ' (Rosenberg 20001.

In order to develop the analysis here I suggest there are fivemajor globalization debates and claims that should be clearly dis-tinguished from each other. There is no single and agreed-uponSlobalization thesis. These five theori., u." based respectivelvupon the concepts of structure, flow, ideology, performanc" ,r,icomplexity. Each recurs at different points in this book - but Iespeciallv develoo the implications of the last. This book sets outard defends a complerity approach to globalization, an approachthat elaborates the systemic and dynamic character of what Ipreviously called'disorganized' capitalism.


The structural notion of the globaL

Chase-Dunn, Kawano, and Brewer [2000: 78) maintain that giob-

alization is defined as the increased density of international andglobal interactions, compared with such interactions at the localor national levels fsee Castells 1996; Held et al. 1999; Scholte2000). There has been an increase in structural globalization withthe greatly heightened density of such global interactions,although this is not simply a new phenomenon. This increaseddensity of interactions is seen to result from a number of causes.There is the'liberalization of world trade and the internationaliz-ing of th6 organization of much capitalist production. There isthe globalizing of the consumption of many commodities andthe declining costs of transportation and communications. Inter-regional organizations are more significant with the international-izing of investment and the general development of a 'world

system'.These together produce a revised structural relationship be-

tween the heightened density of the global and the relativelyless networked, less dense, local/national levels. Globalization isnot the property of individual actors or territorial units. It is anemergent feature of the capitalist economy as a whole, develop-ing from the interconnections between different agents, especiallythrough new forms of time-space 'distanciation' across the globeand of the compression of time-space relations (Jessop 2000:356). This produces the 'ecological dominance' of globalizingcapitalism.

Relatedly it is argued that this dominance both stems from,and reflects, the growth of a 'transnational capitalist class' that iscentred within transnational corporations that are 'more or less incontrol of the processes of globalization' (Sklair Z00l: 5). US presi-dential candidate Ralph Nader summarized this thesis throughthe concept of 'corporate globalization'.

The global as flows and mobilities

These flows are seen as moving along various global 'scapes',including the system of transportation of people by air, sea, rail,motorways and other roads. There is the transportation of objects


.,;q nostal and other systems. Wire, coaxial and fibre-optic cables

.nrry ,"t"pttone messages, television pictures and computer infor-

.-' 'r,ion and images' There are microwave channels that are used

/n'. nlobll" phone communications. And there are satellites used

for transmitting and receiving phone, radio and television signals

fApprdurai 1990; Lash and Urry 1994; Castel ls 1996; Held et al .

igbgt It is argued that, once such physical and organizational

scape structures are established, then individuals, companies,

olaces and even societies try to become nodes within such scapes.

Various potential flows occur along these scapes. Thus people

travel along transportation scapes fbr work, education and holi-

days. Objecrs that are sent and received by companies and indi-

viduals move along postal and other freight systems. lnt'ormation,

messages and images flow along various cables and between satel-

lites. Messages travel along microwave channels from one mobileohone to another.

These scapes and flows create new inequalities of access. Whatbecomes significant is the 'relative', as opposed to the 'absolute',location of a particular social group er town or society in rela-tionship to these multiple scapes. They pass by some areas whileconnecting others along information and transportation rich'tunnels'. These can compress the distances of time and spacebetween some places while enlarging those between others

[Brunn and Leinbach 1991; Graham and Marvin 2001).

Globalization as ideologt

This neo-liberal view is articulated by transnational corporationsand their representatives and by various politicians and journalistslsee Fukuyama 1992; Ohmae 1992). Such corporat ions operate ona rvorldwide basis and often lack any long-term commitment toparticular places, labour forces or even societies. Thus those witheconomic interests in promoting capitalism across the globe main-tain that globalization is both inevitable and natural and thatnational states or nationally organized trade unions should not reg-ulate or direct the inevitabie

-arch of the global marketplace. What

ls viewed as crucial is 'shareholder value', so that labour marketsshould be made more flexible and caoital should be able to investor disinvest in industries or countries at will.


In this account, globalization is seen as forming a new epoch,a golden age of cosmopolitan 'borderlessness'. National states andsocieties are thought unable to control the global flows of infor-mation. Such a borderless world is seen as offering huge newopportunities to overcome the limitations and restrictions thatsocieties and especially national states have historically exercisedon the freedom of the 44,000 trans-border corporations to treatthe world as 'their oyster'. There were incidentally only 7,000such corporations in the 1960s [Scholte 2000: 86). The WorldTiade Organization both symbolizes this neo-liberal notion ofglobalization as ideology and represents such an interest, oftenspreading such notions through closed seminars for businessleaders, academics and free-market politicians (see account andcritique in Monbiot 2000).

Glob alization as p erf ormance

Drawing on ideas about the analysis of gender as involving enact-ment, process and performance, Franklin et al. (2000: 1-17) arguethat the global is not so much a 'cause' of other effects but aneffect. It is enacted, as aspiration rather than achievement, aseffect rather than condition, and as a project to be achieved ratherthan something that is pre-given. The global is seen as comingto constitute its own domains. It is continuously reconstitutedthrough various material and semiotic processes. Law andHetherington maintain that 'global space, is a material semioticeffect. It is something that is made' []999).

And to perform the global implies that many individuals andorganizations mobilize around and orchestrate phenomena thatpossess and demonstrate a global character. A good example ofthis involves how the idea of a separate and massively threatened'global nature' has been produced and performed. What wereonce many apparently separate activities are now regarded asinterconnected components of a single global crisis of the naturalworld [see Wynne i994). This global nature has resulted fromfusing various social practices that are remaking space. Theseinclude images of the earth from space and especially the Apollo17 photograph of the 'whole earth' taken in 1972, transport poli-cies, deforestation, energy use, media images of threatened iconic


on\,ironments which are often markers of global threats, dramatic

Inr.iron-"tttal protests, scientific papers on climate change, the

"nding of the cold war, NGO campaigns, records of extreme

weather events, pronouncements by global public figures, global

conferences such as Rio and Kyoto, and so on. Together these prac-

tices are performing a 'global nature', a nature that appears to be

undergoing change that needs to be vigorously and systematically

resisted and indeed reversed.

Global complexity

This conception is nowhere developed in detail, but Rifkin [2000:l9l-3) analyses the implications of what he calls the'new physics'

for the study of property relations in the emerging capitalist world(see also Capra 2O0Z). Rifkin notes that contemporary 'science'

no longer sees anything 'as static, fixed and given'. The observerchanges that which is observed, apparent hard-and-fast entities arealways comprised of rapid movement, and there is no structurethat is separate from process. In particular, time and space are notto be regarded as containers of phenomena, but rather all physi-cal and social entities are constituted through time and throughspace. These ideas from the 'new physics' will be elaborated below,so as to explore better the extraordinary transformations of time-space that'globalization' debates both signify and enhance.

Complexity does not, of course, solve all the problems of thesocial sciences. Nor is globalization only and exhaustively com-prehensible through complexity. And most of all I am not sug-gesting that the 'social' implications of complexity are clear-cut.But I do suggest that, since the systemic features of globalizationare not well understood, the complexity sciences may provideconcepts and methods that begin to illuminate the global as asystem or series of systems [for a similar formulation from withincomplexity', see Capra 20OZ).

. In coupling together the 'global' and'complexity', the aim is toshow that the former comprises a set of emergent systems pos-sessing properties and patterns that are often far from equilibrium.Complexity emphasizes that there are diverse networked time-space paths, that there are often massive disproportionalitiesbetween causes and effects, and that unpredictable and yet


irreversible patterns seem to characterize all social and physicalsystems.

Some of this 'new physics' is also present in the so far mostsignificant examination of the new global order, ManuelCastells's The Int'ormation Age fl996, 1997, 1998). His argumentrests upon a 'complexity' conception of the global, although thlsis somewhat buried in the astonishing mass of material he pre-sents. I now set out aspects of his argument, especially relating tothe concept of 'network', before noting its 'complexity' compo-nents. His focus on networks will also be central to the analysisthat follows below.

The Network Society

Castells (2000) argues that there are various technologicalparadigms, a cluster of interrelated technical, organizational andmanagerial innovations. Their advantages lie in their superiorproductivity in accomplishlng assigned goals through synergybetween their components. Each paradigm is constituted arounda fundamental set of technologies, specific to the paradigm, andwhose coming-together into a synergistic set establishes theparadigm.

Castells views information/communication technologies [in-cluding genetic engineering) as the basis of the new paradigmthat developed within especially North America during the 1970sand 1980s. The main properties of this new informationalparadigm are that the building blocks are bits of electronicallytransmitted information. Such technologies are pervasive, sinceinformation has become integral to almost all forms of humanpractice. complex and temporally unpredictable patterns of infor-mational development occur in a distributed fashion in very spe-cific localities. Technologies are organized through loosely basedand flexibly changing networks. These different technologiesgradually converge into integrated informational systems, espe-cially the once-separate biological and microelectronic technol-ogies. Such systems permit organizations to work in real time 'ona planetary scale'. These instantaneous electronic impulsesproduce a 'timeless time' and provide material support for the


/evelopment of new scapes, with the instantaneous flows of infor-

I , ' r , ion being the precondit ion for the growth of global relat ions.

This new informational paradigm is characterized by the

,,etr lork enterpr ise (see Castel ls 1996, 2000, 2001). This is a

""i*orn made from either firms or segments of firms, and/or from

internal segmentation of firms. Large corporations are internally

decentralized as networks. Small and medium businesses are con-

nected in networks. These networks connect among themselves

on specific business projects, and switch to another network when

the project is finished. Major corporations work in a strategy ofchanging alliances and partnerships, specific to a given product,process, time and space. Furthermore, these cooperations areincreasingly based on the sharing of information. These are infor-mation networks, which, in the limit, link up suppliers andcustomers through one firm, with this firm being essentially anintermediary of supply and demand. The unit of this productionprocess is the business project.

What are important, therefore, are not'structures', which implya centre, a concentration of powe4 vertical hierarchy and a formalor informal constitution. Rather, networks 'constitute the newsocial morphology of our societies, and the diffusion of network-ing logic substantially modifies the operation and outcomes inprocesses of production, experience, power and culture . . . thenetr,vork society, characterized by the pre-eminence of social mor-phology over social action' [Castells 1996: 469). A network is aset of interconnected nodes. the distance between social oositionsbeing shorter where such posit ions const i tute nodes within anetwork as opposed to those lying outside that particular network.Netlvorks are dynamic open structures so long as they continueto effect communication with new nodes (Castells 1996: 470-I;see also Castells 2000). Networks decentre performance and sharedecision making. What is in the network is useful and necessarylor its existence.

What is not in the network will be either ignored if it is notreievant to the network's task, or eliminated if it is competing ingoals or in performance. If a node in the network ceases to performa useful function, it is phased out from the network, and thet-te.twork rearranges itselfl Some nodes are more important thanothers, but they all need each other as long as they remain within

l0 'societies' and the Global

the network. Nodes increase their importance by absorbing minformation and processing it more efficiently. If they decline itheir performance, other nodes take over their tasks. Thus, the rel-evance and relative weight of nodes come not from their speciFeatures, but from their ability to be trusted by the rest ofnetwork. In this sense, the main nodes are not centres, but switchers that follow a networking logic rather than a command logicin their function vis-a-vis the overall structure.

Networks generate complex and enduring connections stretching across time and space between peoples and things (M1995: 745). Networks spread across time and space, whlch ;advantageous, because 'left to their own devices human actiand words do not spread uery t'ar at all' [Law 1994: 24; see alsoRycroft and Kash 1999). Different networks possess different abil-ities to bring home to certain nodes distant events, places orpeople, to overcome the friction of space within appropriateperiods of time. According to Castells, there are now many veryvaried phenomena organized through networks, including net-work enterprises (such as the criminal economy), networkedstates [such as the European Union) and many networks withincivil society [such as NGOs resisting globalization or internationalterrorists).

Castells's network analysis is of major importance, because itbreaks with the idea that the global is a finished and completedtotality. And he uses various ideas that prefigure a complexityapproach to global phenomena [for a brief comment, see Cast1996: 64-5). The analysis of networks emphasizes contingency,openness and unpredictability, suggesting analogies with how the'web of life', according to Capra Q996;35), consists of 'networkswithin networks'. Castells also emohasizes how networkspower produce networks of resistance. Many social practices aredrawn to what could be called in complexity terms the 'power-

resistance attractor' [Castells \997: 362). He also argues that thestrength of networks results from their self-organizing and oftenshort-term character and not from centralized hierarchical direc-tion, as with older style rational-legal bureaucracies of the sortfamously examined by Weber [see Rycroft and Kash 1999; Rifkin2000: 2B). Specifically, Castells shows the'chaotically' subversiveeffects of the development of the personal computer in the 1980s


-- rhe workings oI the sfafe bureaucracy in the Soviet Union.

lp":l 'W;i"rian bureaucracy had historically controlled all infor-

; ; ;"" f lous, including even access to the humble photocopier.

'j l,r' i *", completely outflanked by the informational effects of

Itl 'u,",p."dlctable global spread of the PC [Castells 1996: 36-7;

1998: ch' 1J. '

b"st"l1, also notes how attempts to regulate the Internet seem

loomed to failure, since, as three American judges have written:

i"r, n, the strength of the Internet is chaos, so the strength of our

lib"rt' depends upon the chaos and cacophony of the unfettered

.,-,"".h the First Amendment protects' [Castells 1997: 259)' The

,.,J"rk r"r, of hierarchical nation states can be seen in the growth

of the 'global criminal economy' and the exceptional mobihty of

illeeal money and its transmutation [money laundering) as it

.u.""r, around global scapes, often evading detection [Castellsl99B: 201-3; this money movement being partly created by dif-

ferent nation-state regimes). This global criminal economy, or

indeed global terrorism, takes the global order far from equilib-rium, as nation states respond to such mobilities with attacks oncivil l iberties especially of mobile immigrant groups, and as globalcrime corrupts democratic politics in many societies. Castells

fl998: 162) also talks of the 'black holes' of informational capi-talism, places of time-space warping where peoples and places aredrawn into a downwards and irreversible spiral or vortex fromwhich there is no escape. He argues, similarly, as we will see, toPrigogine, that the global world is characterized not by a singletime but by what he calls multiple times. There is clock time ofthe mass production factory, the timeless time of the computerand the glacial time of the environment [Castells 1996: ch.7;1997: 125; Urry 2000b: ch. 51.

However, Castells's *ogni* opus lacks a set of interrelatedconcepts that would enable these very diverse phenomena to besystemailcally understood. The global remains rather taken forgranted and there is not the range of theoretical terms necessaryto analyse the emergent propert i ;s of the networked'global ' levei.tn particular, the term 'network' is exoected to do too much the-oret ical work in the argument. Almost al l phenomena are seenthrough the single and undifferentiated prism of 'network'. Thisconcept glosses

-o,r". ,r".y different networked phenomena. They

11

12 'societies' and the Global

can range from hierarchical networks such as McDonald's to het-

erarchic extremely inchoate'road protest movements', from spa-

tially contiguous networks meeting every day to those organized

around imagined'cultures at a distance', from those based uponstrong ties to those based on very important and extensive'weakties', and from those that are pretty well purely 'social' to thosethat are fundamentally 'materially' structured. These are all net-works, but they are exceptionally different in their functioningone from the other.

Moreoveq, the concept of network does not bring out the enor-mously complex notions of power implicated in the diversemobilities of global capitalism, such as those of the Internet [butsee Castells 2001). Movement and power are now inextricablyintertwined, and the concept of network minimizes the astonish-ing paradox, uncertainty and irreversibility of the patterns ofglobal emergence. It is the materials, concepts and argumentswithin the science of complexity that remain undeveloped inCastells's otherwise brilliant examination of intersecting globalnetworks.

The Challenge of Complexity

Thus, although hundreds of boola and articles have been writtenon the'global', it has been insufficiently theorized. In this book Iturn to the complexity theory that is now emerging more gener-ally as a potential new paradigm for the social sciences, havingtransformed much of the physical and biological sciences.

Thus 'non-linear' scientists working at one of the leading sci-entific complexity centres, the Santa Fe Institute in New Mexico,have developed some implications of complex adaptive systemsfor theorizing the nature of the global, especially the idea of globalsustainability [Waldrop 1994: 348-53). Moreover, the US-basedGulbenkian Commission on the Restructuring of the Social Sci-ences, chaired by Immanuel Wallerstein and including non-linearscientist Ilya Prigogine, has advocated breaking down the divisionbetween'natural' and'social' science through seeing both domainsas characterized by'complexity' (Wallerstein 1996). Complexity,they say, involves not 'conceiving of humanity as mechanical, but


rather instead conceiving of nature as active and creative', to makeIthe la*s of nature compatible with the idea of events, of novelty,

ond of creat iv i ty ' (Wal lerstein 1996: 61, 63). The Commission

l".o--"nds how scientific analysis 'based on the dynamics of

non-equilibria, with its emphasis on multiple futures, bifurcation

and choice, historical dependence, and . . . intrinsic and inherent

uncertainty', should be the model for the social sciences and this

would undermine clear-cut divisions between humans and nature,

and between social and natural science. However, most surpris-

ingly this Commission is silent on the study of globalization,

although the global is surely characterized by emergent andirreversible complexity and by processes that are simultaneouslysocial and natural.

I show in various chapters how concepts and theories in chaosand complexity theory bear directly upon the nature of the global.In particular, complexity examines how components of a systemcan through their dynamic interaction 'spontaneously' developcollective properties or patterns, such as colour, that do not seemimplicit, or at least not implicit in the same way, within indi-vidual components. Complexity investigates emergent properties,certain regularities of behaviour that somehow transcend theingredients that make them up. Complexity argues against reduc-tionism, against reducing the whole to the parts. And in so doingit transforms scientific understanding of far-from-equilibriumstructures, of irreversible times and of non-Euclidean mobilespaces. It emphasizes how positive feedback loops can exacerbateinitial stresses in the system and render it unable to absorb shocksto re-establish the original equilibrium. Positive feedback occurswhen a change tendency is reinforced rather than dampenedclown. Very strong interactions occur between the parts of suchsystems, with the absence of a central hierarchical structure thatunambiguously'governs' and produces outcomes. These outcomesare to be seen as both uncertarn and irreversible.

.,, Another way of expressing this is to argue that complexity canlilumine how social life is always a significant mixture of achieve-rnent and failure. Much social science is premised upon the suc-cessful achievement of an agent's or system's goals and objectives.Sociology is'imbued with a commitment to and confidenie in thepossibility of increased success in social life'; the social world to

l3

T4 'societies' and the Global

which it directs our attention 'is one conceptualised, for the mostpart, in terms of practices, projects and processes that operate rel-

attvely unproblematically' [Malpas and Wickham 1995: 38). On

this account, failure is 'an aberration, a temporary breakdownwithin the system', the exception rather than the rule fMalpasand Wickham 1995: 38J. Thus there are the svstems investisatby sociology (or the social sciences more generally) and there isfailure or breakdown. There is thought to be either one orother. It is a duality.

And yet, of course, social life is full of what we may term 'rel-

ative failure', both at the level of individual goals and especiallyat the level of social systems. Failure is a 'necessary consequenceof incompleteness' and of the inability to establish and sustaincomplete control of the complex assemblages involved in any suchsystem [Malpas and Wickham 1995: 39-40). This is well knownbut tends to be viewed in the social sciences through the conceptof unintended consequences. What is intended is seen as having arange of unintended side effects that may take the system awayfrom what seems to have been intended. However, this is a limitedand often individualistic way of formulating relative failure thatdoes not explicate just how these so-called side effects may besystemic features of the system in question. The use of complex-ity should enable us to break with such dualistic thinkins.system and its failures. Chaos and order are always interconnectedwithin anv such svstem.

It is in the light of these arguments that the emergent level ofthe global is examined below. Such a system clearly seems tocombine in curious and unexpected ways, both chaos and order.It is not simply another region like that of society, nor is it theproduct of, or to be reduced to, a pre-existing difference or somegoverning element. Global systems can be viewed as interdepen-dent, as self-organizing and as possessing emergent properties. Isuggest that we can examine a range of non-linear, mobile andunpredictable 'global hybrids' always on the 'edge of chaos'. Theseshould constitute the subject matter of sociology and of its'theory' into the twenty-first century. Examples of such globalhybrids include informational systems, automobility, global media,world money, the Internet, climate change, the oceans, healthhazards, worldrvide social protest and so on. Sociology has known


"l"ar ir deals with an open system. But the proliferation of inter-

I-..na"ntly fluid global hybrids operating at immensely varied

I.I.-ror." scales produces a quantum leap in the openness and

."rpf"l<l,v of the systems being analysed, systems always com-

Li"tti, success .and failure that are on the edge of chaos.

"^-MJr"over, although contemporary social-physical phenomena

o." undeniably networked, they should not be viewed merely as

n"i*ort r. Castells's notion of 'network society' does not capture

,h" dynamic properties of global processes. 'Network' is too undif-

i"r"niiut"d a term here. We need a significant battery of other

terms to characterize the dynamic and emergent relationships

between such networks, to develop the intense relationality of

worldwide conuections.In particula4, I examine how, given the range of possibilities that

a system may move within, the trajectories of many systems

are drawn over time to what complexity terms 'attractors'. Thestrange attractor of 'glocalization' is developed below, an attractorthat involves parallel processes through whlch globalization-deepens-localization-deepens-globalization and so on. Both theglobal and the local are bound together through a dynamic,irreversible relationship, as huge flows of resources are drawn intoand move backwards and forwards between the two. Neither theglobal nor the local can exist without the other. Diverse social andphysical phenomena, including existing societies, are attractedtowards the 'glocal', which develops in a symbiotic, irreversibleand unstable set of relationships. I try to show that both the so-called global and local levels get transformed through billions ofiterations that are irreversibly over time drawn towards, and areremade through, this glocalizing attractor.

Conclusion

Thus it is argued in this book that an appropriate analysis of the'global ase' necessitates the examination of various notions that

are not reduclble to, or explained through, single processes suchas network or empire or markets or disorganization (Rescher1998J. Rather, global ordering is so immensely complicated thatlt cannot be 'known' through a single concept or set of processes.

15

l6 'societies' and the Global

Indeed, it is epistemologically and ontologically unknowable, witefforts at comprehension changing the very world that is beininvestigated. But, because of the power of metaphor in thinking,some notions from complexitv will be interrosated in orderassess their fruitfulness in representing those processes implicain such global ordering.

The book thus seeks to discuss how much complexity can illu-minate an array of issues. First, are there emergent global systems?How is an emergent system of the 'global' developing that maybe self-producing over time, such that its outputs provide inputsinto a circular system of global objects, identities, institutions andsocial practices?

Second, what are the power and reach of such global systemsTWhat is the impact of such systems upon the 'society system'?

Third, how are the properties of such systems reproducedthrough iteration over time involving 'inhuman' combinationsobiects and social relations, or what I call 'material worlds'?

Fourth, how should we expect global 'systems' that are oftenfar from equilibrium to develop and change irreversibly over time,especially in relationship to small euents that can have big effects

[and vice versa)7Finally, what does 'global complexity' mean for the sociologi

cal problem of social order that has normally been seen as oper-ating within and through individual 'societies'? How does a socialordering emerge through diverse and intersecting material worldsoperating over varied times and moving across multiple spaces,where systems are always 'on the edge of chaos'7 Can there anylonger be societal ordering where cultures operate 'at a distance':

This array of questions and issues provides the basis for whaI have described and advocated elsewhere as 'mobile sociology'

fUrry 2000a). The next chapter turns specifically to the challenof a turn to complexity.

2

The Complexity Turn

Introduction

In this chapter some of the main characteristics of what has cometo be known as the complexity sciences are elaborated. In thisnon-mathematical account, chaos theory, the non-linear and com-plexity are treated as a single paradigm. I thus artificially stabilizea set of sciences that are in fact open-ended, uncertain, evolvingand self-organizing [see the 'complexity' account of 'complexity'in Thri f t 1999).

I am not proposing a simple 'transfer' of complexity from thephysical world into the social world. This is because complexityanyway analyses all phenomena that possess dynamic systemproperties, whether these are population of flies, firms or people.Ind.eed, significant work at the centrally important Santa Fe Insti-tute concerned the implications of increasing returns for economicpopulations [Arthur 1994a; Waldrop 1994). Complexity is thusnot simply a theory of the 'physical world' since it deals with thephysics of all populations that demonstrate statistical probabil-tties whatever their apparent provenance (Prigogine 1997: 5, 35;hence the irrelevance of P. Stewart's critique [2001) of such anaturalist move).

Moreover, most significant phenomena that the so-called socialsciences now deal with are in fact hybrids of physical andsocial relations, with no purified sets of the physical or thesocial. Such hybrids include health, technologies, the environment,

l8 The Complexity Turn

the Internet, road traffic, extreme weather and so on. Thesehybrids, most of which are central in any analysis of globalrelations, are best examined through developing complexity analy-ses of the interdependent material-social, or 'inhuman' worlds.Through examining their dynamic interdependencies via com-plexity, their emergent properties can be effectively understood.The very division between the 'physical' and the 'social' is itself asocio-historical product and one that appears to be dissolving. Thecomplexity sciences seem to provide the best means of transcend-ing such outdated divisions, between nature and society, betweenthe physical sciences and the social sciences [see Knorr-Cetina1997; Macnaghten and Urry 1998).

This book attempts to transcend these divisions as well as thoseof determinism and free will, thus developing parallel claims toCapra's recent efforts (2002) to theorize the social world ascomplex living systems. It will do so by investigating the non-linear, statistical properties of various 'global systems' that oftenmove unpredictably and yet irreversibly away from points ofequilibrium. In complexity analyses there are presumed to beneither separate agents nor deterministic laws; there is a kind of in-betweenness that is neither deterministic nor involvins free will.

Time and Space

Most of the social sciences presume that they deal with historicalphenomena, while the physical world deals with ahistorical time-less phenomena. In this section I show how twentieth-centuryscience transformed the understanding of time in the physicalworld. The physical and social sciences now appear to employrather similar notions of historical time (Adam 1990). lnTheWebof Life Fritjof Capra argues that nature 'turns out to be more likehuman nature - unpredictable, sensitive to the surrounding world,influenced by small fluctuations' [1996: 187). This thbrefore sug-gests enormous interdependencies, parallels, overlaps and conver-gences between analyses of the physical and of the social worlds

[Prigogine 1997; Capra 7002; and, from post-structuralism,Cilliers 1998; Rasch and Wolfe 2000). The absence of predictiondoes not invalidate a naturalist account of science [P. Stewart

The Complexiw Turn l9

.,o0l.328-9). Complexity authorizes 'scientific' accounts of the

il,-,r"dl.tnble but nevertheless strangely ordered.""Fr"-t*"ntieth-century science had operated with a view of time

derived from Newton. He said of what he called absolute time,

that, from 'its own nature, [it] flows equably without relation to

anything eternal . . . the flowing of absolute time is not liable to

change' (quoted in Adam 1990: 50). Such a view of absolute time

is invariant, it is infinitely dlvisible into space-like units, it is

rneasurable in length, it can be expressed as a number and it

is reversible. It is time seen essentially as space, as a kind of

Cartesian space comprising invariant measurable lengths that can

be moved along, forwards and backwards as objects can move

along the dimensions of space. Objects are viewed as containedwithin and strung out along the dimensions of absolute time andsDace.

The social sciences have historically insisted on the radical dis-tinction between this natural time and what is often known associal time. However, most of what they have seen as specificallysocial time is now comnon throughout the understanding ofthe physical world [Adam 1990). What social science had treatedas the specifically 'human' aspects of time seems now to charac-terize time within twentieth-century physical sciences.

Einstein showed that there is no fixed or absolute timeindependent of the system to which it refers. Time he saw as alocal, internal feature of any system of observation and meas-urement. It varies on where and how it is measured. There is noobjective absolute measurement of time. It can be stretched andshnrnk. Furtheq, E,instein demonstrated that time and space arenot separate from each other but are fused into a four-dimensionaltime-space curved under the influence of mass [Coveney andHighfield 1990). Amongst various consequences are the pos-stbility that the past could catch up with the future and espe-ctally the possibilities of time travel. In his How to Build a TimeMachine Paul Davies (2001b) entertainingly describes the logicalpossibilities of travelling through time down what is called a'wormhole,.

, Time and space are thus not now viewed as the container ofbodies that happen to move along the various dimensions (Castit994; Capra 1996; Prigogine 1997). The phi losopher of science

70 The Comolexiv Turn

A. N. Whitehead reflected on how twentieth'century physics

would reject the notion that time and space stand outside the very

relat ions between objects and subjects [D. Harvey 1996: 256-61) '

Time and space, he argues, are internal to the processes by whlch

the physical and social worlds themselves operate, helping to con-

stitute their very powers. Such a view leads to the thesis that there

is not a single time but multiple times and that such times appear

to flow. In the best-selling A Brief History of Time, StephenHawking summarizes how: 'Space and time are now dynamicqualities: when a body moves, or a force acts, it affects the curva-

ture of space and time - and in turn the structure of space-timeaffects the way in which bodies move and forces act' [1988: 33).

Quantum theory generally describes a virtual state in which

electrons appear to try out instantaneously all possible futures

before settling into particular patterns. Quantum behaviour is

instantaneous, simultaneous and unpredictable. The interactions

between the parts are far more fundamental than the parts them-

selves. Bohm refers to this as the occurrence of a dance without

dancers fsee Zohar and Marshall 1994). Conventional notions of

cause and effect do not apply within an indivisible whole where

the interrelations between the parts are more fundamental thanthe individual parts. Really there are no parts at all as understoodin mechanistic, reductionist thinking. There are only relationships,or, as Capra expresses it: 'the objects themselves are networksrelationships, embedded in larger networks . . . the relationshipsare primary' [1996: 37). Relationality is key here, a notion I will

often return to.Chrono-biology, or the biology of time, also shows not only th

human societies experience time or organize their lives throughtime, but also that rhythmicity is a crucial principle of each organ-ism and its relationships with its e'nvironment. Humans and otheranimals themselves appear to be 'clocks'. Plants and animalspossess a system of time that regulates their functions on a twenty-four-hour cycle. Recent research has revealed timekeeping genes.

Biological time is thus not confined to ageing but expresses the

nature of biological beings as temporal, dynamic and cyclical.

Change in living nature involves the notions of becoming andrhythmicity. Adam argues therefore that: 'Past, present, and future,historical time, the qualitative experience of time, the structuring

The Complexity Turn

of ,'undifferentiated change" into episodes, all are established as

inregrirl time aspects of the subject matter of the natural sciences'

r 1g9O: i 50) and are by no means confined to the social world [see)lso Prigogine 1997) '

fulore generally, thermodynamics shows that there is an irre-

versible flow of time. Rather than there being time symmetry and

indeed a reversibility of time as postulated in classical physics, a

clear distinction is drawn between the past and future. An arrow

of time results within open systems in the loss of organization and

an increase in randomness or disorder over time. This accumula-

tion of disorder or positive entropy results from the Second Law

of Thermodynamics [Coveney 2000).Ho'uvever, there is not a simple growth of disorder. Prigogine

shorvs how new order arises, but it is far from equilibrium. Thereare what he terms dissipative structures, islands of new orderwithin a sea of disorder, maintaining or even increasing their orderat the expense of greater overall entropy. He describes how suchlocal ized order ' f loats in disorder '(c i ted in Capra 1996: 184). I tis non-equilibrium situations that are sources of new order, asdescribed below For example, turbulent flows of water and air,which appear chaotic, are highly organized. Matter continuouslyflows into the vortex funnel of a whirlpool in a bath. The systemis organizationally closed and maintains a stable form although itis far from equilibrium. Thus there is a paradoxical combinationof continual flow and 'for-the-present' structural stability. Ing.eneral, Prigogine and Stengers maintain in Order out of Chaosthat it is the 'irreversibility [of time] . . . that brings order out ofchaos' fl984: 292; see also Prigogine 1997: 164-73).

The most obvious illustration of this profound irreversibility oftime is the expansion of the universe following the singular eventot the 'big bang' fifteen blll ion or so years ago [Coveney and High-neld 1990). It is now thought that the universe began with sucha 'big bang' without a pre-existing cause. The scieniific discoveryol. the big bang cannot be reconci led with those laws of the physi-cal world that see time as reversible, deterministic and involving'classes of phenomena'. The big bang is a one-off phenomenonthat is like nothing else ever to occur within the known universe.Laws of nature are thus to be treated as historical and not uni-versal

fDavies 2001a).

21

22 The Compbxiw Turn

complexity thus repudiates the dichotomies of deteiminism ani

Moreover, the very phenomena of time and space arethemselves historical. The big bang apparently created in that verymoment both space and time. There was no pre-existing space atime: 'any attempt to explain the origin of the physical univemust perforce involve an explanation of how space and ticame into existence too' [Davies 2001a: 57). There is therefino 'time' before the big bang, and, iflwhen the universe ends ianother singular event, time [and space) will also then cease.Sga;e and time appear to have been spontaneously created, panof the systemic nature of the universe. They are suddenlv switchton, through an unpredictable and yet apparently irreversibquantum change [Hawking 1988; Coveney and Highfield 1990;Cast i 1994).

. There are many mundane examples of irreversibihty ln thphysical world: coffee aiways cools, organisms always agl, sprinfollows winter and so on. There can be no going bn&,. ,-,t ,"-absorbing of the heat, no return to youth, no spring before winterand so on. According to Eddington 'The great thi"g ubo,rt time isthat it goes on' fcited in Coveney and Highfield tggO: g3). Thearrow or flow of time results in futures that are unstable, relativelunpredictable and characterized by various possibilities. Althougtime is irreversible, time is both multiple and unpredlctabiPrigogine talks of the 'end of certainty' as the complexity scienc,overcome what he calls the 'two alienating images of a determin-istic world and an arbitrary world of pure chance' [r997: 1g9).

chancg as well as nature and society, being and becoming, stasi,and change. Physical systems do not exhibit and sustain .tnlhu.,ging structural stability. The complexity sciences elaborate hcthere is order and disorder within all physical and social phnomena, including, according to Kauffrnan [1993), within evolution itself

Systems are thus seen by complexity as being ,on the edge ofchaos'. order and chaos are in a kind of balance where the com-ponents are neither fully locked into place but yet do not fullydissolve into anarchy. chaos is not complete anarchic randomnessbut there is a kind of 'orderly disordei' present within all suchdynamic systems (see Hayles l99l , l9g9).

The Complexity Turn

Emergent Properties

A further consequence of this flowingness of time is that mrlorchanges in the past are able to produce potentially massive effectsin the present or future. Such smal l events are not, forgotten,.chaos theory in particular rejects the common-sense noti,on thatonly large chan^ges in causes produce large changes in effects.Following a perfectly deterministic set of .rr1"r, ,r.rp-.edictable yetpatterned results c-an be generated, with small causes on occasionsproducing large effects and vice versa. The classic example is thebutterfly eFfect that was accidentally discovered by Lorenz rn1961. I t was shown that miniscule changes at one iocat ion cantheoretically produce, if modelled by thiee coupled non-linearequations, very large weather effects very far in time and/or spacefrom the original site.of the hypothetical wings flapping fcasti1994: 96; Maasen and Weingart 2000: g3+'). Sol,rtior,, tt theequations in question are thus extremely sensitive to the specifi-cation of the initial conditions.

.To express this point rather simply, there is no consistentrelationship between the cause and the effect of some event.Rather, relationships between variables can be non-linear withabrupt switches occurring, so the same ,cause,

can in specific

:t-rcuTstalces produce quite different kinds of effect. Capra

describes how much of the physical world is characterized by'non-linearity': 'Nonlin"u. ph".ro-ena dominate much -o."

ofthe inanimate world than we had thought, and they are an essen-tial aspect of the network pattern of li ir.rg systems' Ir996: l22).Experiments on the pop.rl"tio., size of insect colonies show dra-matic non-linear changes occurring through often smalr changesi:^b*h 1a!es and in tlie degree oF ou"...o*dtng of that colonyl::,:

C."r,i 1994: 934). Ovei time the insect popul"tto., dramati_

)1111,.Itr:r and then falls with no movement ttwards any point ofr_qUl l lbr ium.

\ I

,^_rrevertheless there has been in western societies a historicalvtcotsposition to kinds of explanation that posit a single centralSovernor; that such explanations appear . . . more natural and con-ceptually simpler than global, in;;ractive accounts, (Fox Keller

LJ

1ALA The Complexi4t Turn

1985: 155). However, what in the end should convince are explanations that do capture this 'complexly interactive' naturesystems as a whole [Fox Keller 1985: 157J. Complexity investigates the physics of such populations and their emergent, dynamiand self-organizingsystemic properties [Prigogine 1997: 35). Ssystems are unstable. A particular agent rarely produces a sinand confined effect. Interventions or changes will tend to produan array of possible effects right across the system in questi(sometimes known as side effects). Prigogine describessystem effects as 'a world of irregulaq chaotic motions' [1997155; see also, on'system effects ' , Jervis 1997).

This notion of the non-linear or comolexitv involves tcrucial presumptions. First, there is no necessary proportionalibetween 'causes' and 'effects' of events or ohenomena. Secothere is no necessary equivalence between the individual astatistical levels of analysis. Thus what may characterize the individual will typically be very different from what is true at tstatistical or system level. Third, the statistical or system effecare not the result of adding together the individual componenThere is something else involved, normally known as emergenfJervis 1997: ch. 2).

These points can be illustrated from the simple example ofpile of sand. If we consider such a pile and place an extra grain osand on top, then the extra grain (the 'cause') either may stay theor it may cause a small avalanche. The system is self-organiwithout a 'central governor' and the effects of a particular locachange can be enormously different (Cilliers 1998: 97). There i'self-organized criticality' fwaldrop 1994: 304-6), with the piof sand maintaining itself at the critical height. It is impossiblepredict what the consequences will be of particular localiactions. The effects of the same 'cause' can be microscooic orelobal.

The central idea is that of 'emergence', that there are collectiveproperties of all sorts of phenomena. Cohen and Stewart say thatthere are those 'regularities of behaviour that somehow seem totranscend their own ingredients' [1994: 237; see also Byrne 1998:ch. 3). It is not that the sum is greater than the size of its parts -but that there are system effects that are somehow different fromits parts. Complexity examines how components of a systern

The ComplexiN'furn

through their interaction'spontaneously' develop collective prop-

"rii"r "t patterns, even simple properties such as colour, that do

l^l ."em implicit within, or at least not implicit in the same way,

,r tr f r t" incl iv idual components."-ThLrs the flavour of sugar is not present in the carbon, hydro-

-on a1d oxygen atoms that comprise it. The sublime taste of

l"-"uonnuir" is so different from its mundane components fCapra

ig,siO, Zg, Cilliers 1998). The interdependent parts of a jumbo jet,

ihrougl-t their very particular incredibly complex combination,

,rodu." the emergent property of enabling a 'plane' to fly. These

"re all striking non-linear consequences that are not present

within, or reducible to, the very many individual components that

cornprise such activities (Jervis 1997).

Such large-scale patterns or properties emerge from, but are not

reducible to, the micro-dynamics of the phenomenon in question.

Thus gases are not uniform entities but comprise a seething con-

fusion of atoms obeying the laws of quantum mechanics. The laws

governing gases derive not from the behaviour of each individual

atom but from their statistical patterning fCohen and Stewart1994: 232-31. The statistical pattern is different from and irre-ducible to the individual components. The key issue if that of rela-tionality, a dance almost without dancers, according to Bohm.

Also, if a system passes a particular threshold with minorchanges in the controlling variables, switches may occur and theemergent properties switch or turn over. Thus a liquid turns intoa gas or relatively warm weather suddenly transforms into an iceage [Cohen and Stewart 1994: 21;Byrne 1998: 23). Leading non-linear scientist Nicolis summarizes how in a non-linear system:'addlng two elementary actions to one another can induce dra-matic new effects reflecting the onset of cooperativity betweenthe constituent elements. This can give rise to unexpected struc-tures and events whose properties can be quite different fromthose of the underly ing elementary laws'f l995: 1-2J.

^ Moreover, there is the' trap of l ineari ty ' (1. Stewart 1989: 83).

so, although statisticians are aware of these complex and emer-gent properties, given the conventional 'repression of the non-linear', these normally get referred to and reduced to so-callednteraction effects. But this is problematic, since, according toByrne, 'complexity is locked away in the interaction term' [1998:

25


20.). In order to eiaborate such interaction effects and to unlockthat complexity, further concepts are necessary, especially toseparate out the different kinds of complex 'interconnections'characterizing physical and indeed social systems.

Attractors

In particular, the emergence of patterning within any given systemstems from 'attractors'. If a dynamic system does not move overtime through all possible parts of a potential or phase space butinstead occupies a restricted part of it, then this is said to resultfrom an attractor (Capra 1996: ch. 6). The simplest attractor is apoint, as with the unforced swinging of a pendulum with friction.The simple system reaches the single point attractor. Metaphori-cally it can be said that 'the fixed point at the centre of the co-ordinate system "attracts" the trajectory' (Capra 1996: 130J.

A somewhat more complex example is a domestic centralheating/air conditioning system where the attractor consists, notof a single point, but of a specified range of temperatures. Therelationship is not linear but involves what are called negatiuefeedback mechanisms. These feedbacks minimize deviance andreestablish a specified range of temperatures. It is impossible topredict exactly what the precise temperature will be - only thatit will l ie within the range that constitutes the attractor. Topologi-cally this attractor is like a doughnut, a system close to equilib-rium in which effective negative feedback loops always bring thetemperature back within the range specified within the system.This is a self-regulating and bounded system where negative feed-back is crucial. Byrne suggests that this is analogous to socialscience studies of Fordism [see Byrne 1998: Z8). An attractor andset of feedback mechanisms have for decades kept so-calledFordist societies within the range of possible alternatives withinthe doughnut ring and did not permit such societies to straybeyond the limits of the system in question.

In certain complex systems, though, there are 'strange attrac-tors'. These are unstable spaces to which the trajectory of dynami-cal systems is attracted through biil ions of iterations. What areimportant here are positiue feedbacks occurring over time that

The Complexity Turn

' 'ay take the system away from any point of equilibrium [Byrne

l!)98: 26-9). Either such a space may be indeterminate within theboundaries or there may be various sets of boundaries.

This dynamic instability can be seen in the butterfly-shaped

Lorenz attractor. fsee its two-dimensional representation in Capra1996: 133). Such attractors are immensely sensitive in the effectsgenerated to slight variations in their initial conditions. Thus 'very

imall differences in the value of control parameters at the bifur-cation point determine which of two radically different trajec-tories the system settles into' fByrne 1998: 28). And, as iterationoccurs time and time again, so an unstable and unpredictable pat-terned disorder develops that can be mathematically modelled. Itis impossible to predict which point in such space the trajectoryof an attractor will pass through, even though there are deter-ministic laws involved. Much recent science has been concernedto characterize the shaping or topology of such strange attractors.Iterations in non-linear systems result in values that topologicallyproduce a kind of repeated stretching and folding effect, oftenknorvn as the 'baker transformation' [Capra 1996: 132). Theseattractors presuppose complex mathematics and massive com-puterized calculations of the sort that has only been possible sincethe early 1970s.

Central to the patterning of attractors in time and space are thedifferent kinds of feedback mechanisms. Early cybernetic researchunder the auspices of the Macy Conferences in the post-secondWorid War period emphasized the importance of negative feed-back loops. These would have the effect of restoring the homeo-static functioning of whatever system was under examination.Such systems of circular causality involved the processing of infor-mation that resulted in the re-establishment of equilibrium andstabllity through negative feedback.

However, in later systems formulations, of complexity or thenon-linear, positive feedback loops are examined. These areviewed as exacerbating initial stresses in the system, so renderingit unable to absorb shocks and re-establishing the original equi-librium [on the history of cybernetics, see A"yl", tOOO). Verystrong interactions occur between the parts of a system and therers an absence of a central hierarchical structure able to 'govern'outcomes. Positive feedback occurs when a change tendency is

27

28 The Comobxiw Turn

reinforced rather than dampened down, as occurs with thenegative feedback involved in a cybernetic central heating/air-condit ioning system.

A social science application of positive feedback can be seen inthe economic and sociological analyses of the increasing returnsthat can occur across a whole industry or activity. This can laydown irreversible path dependence where contingent events setinto motion institutional patterns that have long-term determin-istic properties [Mahoney 2000: 507). One example of this wouldbe the way the privately owned 'steel-and-petroleum' car devel-oped in the last decade of the nineteenth century and came toexert an awesome domination over other fuel alternatives, espe-cially steam and electric power that were at the time preferable(Motavalli 2000). The 'path dependence' of the petroleum-basedcar was established and sot'locked' in.

Compiexity theory generally analyses systems as unstable, dis-sipative structures. They are thermodynamically open and capableof assimilating large quantities of energy from the environmenand simultaneously converting it into increased structural com-plexity (Reed and Harvey 1992: 360-2). Such systems also dissi-pate into their environment hieh levels of residual heat.

Such dissipative systems reach points of bifurcation when theirbehaviour and future pathways become unpredictable and newhigher order, more differentiated, structures may emerge. Dissi-pative structures involve non-linearity, a flowingness of time, noseparation of systems and their environment, and a capacity forthe autopoeitic re-emergence of a new ordering far from anysystem equilibrium [Capra 1996: 89, 187). Systems appear tohave the capability of reordering themselves into

"u"i -o.ecomplex structures following points of bifurcation.Maturana and Varela famously developed the notion that any

such systems are self-making or autopoietic [Maturana l98l;Mingers 1995). Such autopoiesis involves the idea that livingsystems entail a process of self-making or self-producing.Autopoiesis involves a network of production processes in whichthe function of each componenr is to participate in the produc-tion or transformation of other components in the network. In thisway the network comes to make itself It is produced by the com-ponents and these in turn produce the components. In a living

The Complexity Turn 29

systen-r the product of its operation is its own organization, withlire development of boundaries specifii ing the domain of its opera-tions and dgll-t _the self-making system as such (Capra 1996:98; Flayles 1999: ch. 6).

Autopoiesis can be seen in non-linear laser theory where thecoordination of the required emissions is seen as carried out bythe laser light itself through ongoing processes of self-organization(capra 1996: 91-2). t t can also be seen in the nature oF urbangrowth. Small local preferences mildly expressed in the concernsof individuals, such as wanting to live with those who are ethni-cally similat can lead to massively segregated neighbourhoodssuch as those characteristic of large American cities. Krugmanargues that residential patterns are unstable in the face of .urido-perturbations:'local, short-range interactions can create large-scaleIself-organizing] structure' [1996: l7). More generally, in thesocial sciences Luhmann has most elaborated the implications ofautopoiesis for examining the long-term functioning of socialsystems.

Thus far I have set out some of the key notions in the sciencesof complexiti'. I have_ briefly outlined the following .o.r."pi, ,,".-essary for analysing the physical and social worlds: multipie timesand spaces; the unpredi,ctabrlity and irreversibility of ti-e; orderand chaos; non-linear effects; emergence; bifurcation; negative andpositive feedback; self-organization; and various attractors. In therest of this chapter some important uses of complexity found inanalyses that interrogate certain material worlds will be examined.in subsequent chapters elements of complexity will be connectedto the very influential global debates now creating'chaos' acrossmanl ' social sciences.

Complex Systems

I", ttgn: begin by_noting that there is an emergrng.structure of

l-."ji*_,,h:t -complexity both signifies and enhln"ces (Williams

l "J; t trrift 1999). such an emergent structure involves a greater

::",t- "f conringent openness available to people, corpoiationsorrcl

_societies, of the diversity of geographies, of a charity to-wards objects and nature, of ihe diir".L and variegated pattern_

30 The Comolexiw Turn

ing of relationships, households and persons, and of the sheer

increase in the hyper-complexity of products, technologies and

socialities [Rycroft and Kash 1999: 55; Thrift 1999: 53-9; Duffield

2001).Complexity has already had a significant impact upon a huge

range of social and intellectual discourses and practices, including

alternative healing, architecture, consultancy, consumer design,

economics, defence studies, fiction, garden design, geography,

history literary theory, management education, New Age, organi-zational learnin g, philosophy, post-structuralism, sociolo gy, stock-

car racing, town planning and so on. Notions of chaos an

complexity move in unpredictable ways from discourse to dis-course, practice to practice, creating on occasions a sense of'chaos cult' [Maasen and Weingart 2000: 125).

However, while most of the non-physical sciences have 'gon

global' in the past decade, the major sociological applications ocomplexity remain strangely'societal' [see Luhmann 1990, 1Reed and Harvey 1992; Baker 1993; Francis 1993; Mingers 199Keil and Ell iott 1996; Eve et al. 1997; Biggs 1998; Byrne 1998Cilliers 1998; Hayles 1999; Rycroft and Kash 1999; Medd 2000Capra 2002).

And yet this is paradoxical, since 'complexity' practicesthemselves be conceptualized as a self-organizing global neChaos/non-linear/complexity researchers deploy the techniqof PR and branding, international meetings, guru worship, networking especially centred on certain nodes such as Santa Fethe various Research Institutes named after Prigogine, andextensive use of global media [Waldrop 1994; Thrift 1999Maasen and Weingart 2000).

We can begin here by noting how Robert Rycroft and Don KashinThe Complexity Challenge [1999: ch.4) examine the complexity of the material worlds that are involved in various technologi-cal systems. They note that there has been a huge increase insheer number of components within products. The Eli Whitneymusket of around 1800 had fifty-one components, while the spaceshuttle of the late twentieth century contained ten million'

Second, there is the massive increase in the cybernetic contri-bution performed by architectures that integrate componentsthrough feedback loops, both in products such as cars, and in the

The Complexiw Turn

orocess side of technology. The authors conclude that 'it is now

norm"l for both product and process innovation to emphasize

2jjustment and adaptation through continuous feedback'

fRycroft and Kash 1999: 55). Such systems thus increasingly

involve hardware, software and 'socialware'. Products and

Drocesses constitute systems that cannot be understood without

social organizational features. Thus there are increasingly complex

socio-technical systems or what I term material worlds.Rycroft and Kash examine how there has been a huge shift

towards complexity in contemporary economies. Even in 1970 thernost valuable products in world trade were still simple productsproduced by simple processes, such as clothes, papet yarn, meat,coffee and so on. But a mere quarter of a century late1, only 14per cent of the most valuable items in world trade are such simpleproducts produced by simple processes. By t 995 nearly two-thirdsof the most valuable products in world trade involved complexprocesses and complex products, involving vast numbers of com-ponents, cybernetic architectures and socio-technical systemsfRycroft and Kash 1999: 56-7).

This 'increasing complexity of products and processes withthe greatest export value . . . is linked with self-organizing net-works. Such network organizational systems are continuously self-reproducing themselves by developing the most sophisticatedskills and structures necessary to innovate technologies thatovercome obstacles, or create new pathways' [Rycroft and Kash1999: 6l-2). They go on to connect such self-reproduction to theimportance of positive feedback and organizational learningwithin socio-technical systems or networks.

^But if the history of recent technology shows the impossibility

ot c.onceiving of 'technologies' as merely non-human, so Stephent5udiansky's Nature's Keepers (1995) develops an excoriat ing cr i -tique of preserving apparently eternal and wild 'non-h.rman'nature. 'Strict preservation through a hands-off or "natural" man-a8ement policy has destroyed many of the very things that naturerovers claim to value the most' [Budiansky 1995: 8). Thus therets no such thing as 'nature's balance', no real or primordial naturethat would be in equilibrium if only humans had not intruded. Itts shown how the effects of humans are subtly and irreversiblywoven into the very evolution of landscape. Countless forms of

3l

JZ The Complexity Turn

human habitation have affected all such systems over the millen-

nia, especially the extensive and regular use of fire by originaldwellers to clear land for primitive agriculture [as with native

Americans in the USA). And any ecological system is immensely

complex so that there are never straightforward policies thasimply restore nature's balance. Ecological systems are always onthe edge of chaos without a 'natural' tendency towards equilirium, even if all humans were to depart forever from the

fBudiansky 1995: 11).Indeed many ecological systems themselves depend not upon

stable relationships but upon massive intrusions, of extraordinaryflows of species from other parts of the globe and of fire, light-ning, hurricanes, high winds, ice storms, flash floods, frosts, earth-quakes and so on. The "'normal" state of nature is not onebalance and repose; the "normal" state is to be recovering fromlast disaster' (Budiansky 1995: 71). And it is such disasters,swirling pattern of constant change, that produces the rich diver'sity of niches where micro-habitats can develop, althoughthese developments can only be seen over very lengthy periof time. These periods are often much longer than the livesparticular researchers or of research programmes. It is therefoinstability and change that makes for diversity and not a stabunchanging 'nature' in some supposed state of equilibrium. So,Prigogine began to show in the 1960s, systems can be ordered bfar from equilibrium.

Moreovel, the population size of a species shows noto stability, and especially not to rise smoothly to the presucarrying capacity of its environment and then to level off aremain stable. Rather populations of most species demonstraextreme unevenness, with populations often rising rapidly whenintroduced into an area and then almost as rapidly collapsing

[Jervis 1997: 28). The food consumption of animal speciesresponds in a non-linear and time-lagged fashion to changing cir-cumstances and this produces massive unevenness of populationsize with no natural or equilibrium size [see Budiansky 1995:90-5). Indeed, the chaotic properties of biological systems alsomake predictions of what favours the protection of a particularspecies pretty well impossible. Most interventions designed toprotect some particular species actually triggered unforeseen side


efTects that made the species weaker than it had inltially been

fBudiansky 1995: I 60- l) .

This stunning unpredictability of the material world can also

be seen from how even roadside and urban environments have

beconre sites in whlch rapidly expanding and apparently irre-

versible populations of various animal and plant species have

dramatically emerged. These are sites that are well away from

what would appear to be the 'natural' habitats of such species.

The 'urban' and the 'wild' are no longer exclusive categories

fBudiansky 1995; Clark 2000; Davis 2000a). Thus rats and foxes

are plentiful within European cities, while, around Los Angeles,coyotes, skunks, squirrels, rats, killer bees, wild dogs, racoons andeven mountain lions are rapidly increasing in numbers as theyswitch from specific predation to a broader-based opportunisticfeeding - in the case of lions, now feeding on small rodents, pets,human garbage and increasingly humans (on'non-linear lions', seeDavis 2000a:249).

Through a non-linear reading of the turbulent 'city', Clarkargues that 'in the very heartland of the social . . . there is aresurgence of "nature", and efflorescence of "life"' [2000: 29).There is a material world emerging in cities that is mobile, volatileand we might say cosmopolitan. There is no silent, docile 'nature',especially when confronted by new forms of 'culture'. Indeed,there are various emergent hlghly adaptable viruses, such as Aidsand ebola, new superbugs, newly lethal pathogens such as prions,and the reappearance ofTB, cholera and the bubonic plague. Sucha medicalized 'apocalypse now' stems from novel patterns ofglohal travel and trade, the heightened ineffectiveness of anti-biotics that encounter increased'iesistance', and the developmentof new powerful risk cultures beyond and especially within'medicine' itself [Van Loon 2002: ch. 6). This echtes De Landa'smore general analysis of cities. He conceives of them as complex,oynamic and open systems containing exceptional flows andmixtures of the organic and the inorganic, the living and thenon-living, the human and the non-human, culture and nature,the risky and the risk free [De Landa 1997; Clark 20001.._ Mike Davis's Ecologt of Fro, examines one such city in detail.He concentrates upoiome of the emergent material-social inter-cnanges occurring in and around the paradigm twenty-{irst

-^ The Complexity Turn

century city, Los Angeles (Davis 2000a; ch. l). What wasthought of as the l,and of Sunshine is being reinvented asApocalypse Theme Park. Between 1992 and i995 in Los Angefloods were followed by riots, by floods, by firestorms, bytornado, by an earthquake and by floods again. Nearly two millipeople were affected by disaster-related death, injury or damto home and business. Half a million people left the city withitwo years. Southern California is characterized by the catastrophiccoincidence of extreme events.

Moreover, this is not a random disorder but a dynamic patternof escalating feedback loops resulting from the pattern of urbansprawl. Conditions that have produced this include the wide-spread growth of what has been called'sloping suburbia', the over-whelming use of the automobile, the lack of public space, thconcreting of the river basin, the building of houses in ecologi-cally unsuitable areas, as well as global warming more generally.Extreme events, especially extreme weather events, demonstrate,according to Davis, 'the principle of nonlinearity where smallchanges in driving variables or inputs - magnified by feedbackcan produce disproportionate, or even discontinuous, outcomes'(2000a:19).

Malibu, the wildfire capital of North America, is particularlyillustrative here fDavis 2000a: ch. 3). Various interdependentcauses historically produce a particular intensity of fires in thisarea. What seems most significant is the non-linear relationshibetween the age structure of vegetation and the intensity of firesthat are generated. Filty-year-old trees burn fifty times moreintensely than twenty-year-old trees. Howeve4, because of thehighly influential residents living in the Malibu region, there hasbeen since I9l9 a policy of 'total fire suppression'. This has theeffect that the smaller fires that are beneficial in recycling nutri-ents do not take place, and more importantly the bulk of trees inthe area are much older and more intense in the fires that theysubsequently produce. So the limitation on small fires results ingreater and larger fires subsequently. And, further, the extremefires that are intermittently generated transform the chemicalstructure of the soil, turning it into a water-repellent layer thatdramatically accelerates subsequent sheet flooding and erosion[Davis 2000a: 100-3). Extreme fire events and massive flooding


follovr, in a non-linear way from the intervention to prevent those

iimit"d fires that would otherwise constitute a routine feature ofthe Malibu ecosystem in l-os Angeles.

This example shows that certain kinds of cause can seneratehuge end unpredictable change whi le orher examples *ould ,ho*that external causes could generate almost no significant effects.There is, therefore, a lack of proportionality bet*""n 'causes' and,effects', although we should bear in mind that there are really nosuch things as causes that are'external' to such a system.

The character of such systems is specifically explored in charlesPerrow's Normal Accidents. He argues that, given certain systemcharacteristics, multiple, unexpected and interacting failures aresystemically inevitable [Perrow 1999: 5; see also Jervis 1997).Such accidents will occur when the system is tightly coupled, sothat processes happen very fast and cannot be turned off whe'the failed parts cannot be isolated and when there is no otherway ro ke-ep the system going. With such tightly coupled systems,recovery from the initial disturbance that may lrave been reiativelytrivial is impossible. The consequences will spread quickly, chaoti-cally and irreversibly throughout the system, so pioducing'system accidents' rather than accidents caused bv individual error(Perrow 1999: I l ) .

In loosely coupled systems by contrast there is plenty of slackin terms of time, resources and organizational capacity.-They aremuch less likely to produce normal accidents sinie rncidents canbe

.coped with, so avoiding the interactive complexity foundwithin the dghtly coupled system. in the latter, moreoveq, theettects are non-linear. Up to a point, tightening the connectionsbetween elements in the system

-ill i,-r.r""se" efficiency when

lverything works smoothly. But, i f one smal l i tem goes wrong,then that can have a catastrophic knock-on effect throuehout the:)/stem The system literally switches over; from smooth [unc_ttoning to interactively complex disaster. And sometimes thisr_esults f1o1 a supposed improvement in the system. Thus

:Tptoy"q safety.within a car through the regalry enforced wearing

or seatbelts, or the enhanced safety systems on the Titanic, or theilft,V systems in raiiway signaiilng, cu.r, in very particular condi-ttons, produce correspondingly more da.,geroui behaviour and antncreased likelihood of 'normal accidents' [Adams 1995; Jeri,is


1997: 68-9). What we might call the Titanic effect is a good

example of the 'complex interconnectedness' of systems [on com-

plexity theory, see Perrow 1999: 386). As Law maintains, on the

basis of research on train crashes, 'system perfection is not only

impossible but, more strongly, it may be self defeating' (2000:14).

On occasions, system fluidities or imperfections are essential for'safety' because of the complex characteristics of the system inquestion.

There are some parallels between issues of system safety and the

curious kinds of cooperation found between American stock-car

drivers travelling at up to 190 m.p.h. on super-speedways fRonfeldt2001). These racers both cooperate and compete according to

complex and emergent sets of rules. The drivers self-organize into

cooperative draft lines and then intermittently form competitivebreak-out lines. They use radio communications to generate infor-

mation and especially to seek out allies. According to Ronfeldt,'this creates a fast-moving, dynamic structure, or system, that

exhibits a kind of order - oscillating lines in front of a milling pack,

tightly coupled and fraught with nonlinear processes - that is often

on the verge ofcriticality, chaos and catastrophe' (2001: l7). Suchstock-car racing could be seen as emblematic of US society. It

involves peculiar combinations of cooperation and competitionand results in complex system outcomes.

More generally, Manuel De Landa's AThousandYears of Non-

linear History fl997) examines through the prism of complexitydifferent kinds of systemic organization, especially of 'meshworks'

for networks of networks) and of hierarchy. He is especially con-

cerned with the organization and consequences of the flows o

various materials, especially of energy, genes and languages. Wheresuch flows were dominated by 'hierarchical' homogenization [ortight couplingJ, as occurred through centuries of Chinese historythen explosive, self-organizing urban development did not takeplace. I[ is only with meshworks and a resulting 'freedom of

motion' and 'maximum mobi l i ty ' that a 'dynamic pattern of tur-

bulent urban evolution in the West' occurs, involving intense andproductive flows of energy, transportation and money [Braudel1973: 396-7; De Landa 1997:3445). Cit ies are si tes of inter-

change between various intersecting flows - and some cities

develop the capacity for self-organization and massive growth.


Laer I argue_ that it is only with such mobilities that complexsystems develop in the 'social' world - through combinations ofrnobility and moorings.

\4ore generally, De Landa develops a wide-ranging analysisof bodies, selves, cities and societies. He views these as merelv'transitory hardenings' in the more basic flows of minerals, g..r"r,diseases, energy, information, and language that over the pastmillennium have swept across the earth's crust [De Landa ]997:259-60). In examining 'global complexity', similar analyses aredeveloped of the flows of such intersecting and non-lin".. ,-"-

terial worlds' that intermittently realize 'transitory hardenings'.

Conclusion

Thus a wide array of complexity formulations has been introducedhere; and a number of illustrative studies drawn on to suggest theusefulness of these approaches beyond the physical and blologi-cal sciences

Such complexity analyses also emphasize that scientific obser-vations are themselves components of the systems being investi-gated. There is nothing outside the system. Hence the notions ofcomplex systems undermine certain 'realist' formulations thatspeak of an 'external world'. As Heisenberg expresses it: 'Whatwe observe is not nature itself but nature exposed to our methodof questioning' fcited in Capra 1996: 40). This connectedness ofscience with its system of investigation has two major implica-tions for what follows.

First, we need to ask lf the particular physical and/or socialsystem presents itself to the current practices of social science inways that mean it can be systematically observed and analysed.What are the conditions of possibility of a science of that ,yrt".r,or systems in question? What forms could it take given the currentobservational, measurement and theoretical practices of contem-porary science? Second, we should ask if these practices of inves-tigation themselves produce complex effects upon the system inquestion, in cases resulting in a self-fulfil l ing prophecy whereresearch findings help to bring about the very effects that they arethemselves investigating.

38 The Complexi4t Turn

Both these points are pertinent to global systems. First, theenormously open character of global systems might mean thatthey are currently beyond systematic analysis. One could hypo-thesize that current phenomena have outrun the capacity of thesocial sciences to investigate. We should ask whether the global isconstituted as a fit object of [social) science investigation. Are theobservational, measurement and theoretical resources up to inves-tigating the enormously complex character of global systems? Myproposal here is that social science needs all the help that it canget to analyse such systems. This explains the necessity to turn tosome of the theoretical resources of complexity that are centrallyconcerned with the processes of large-scale emergence. It seemsreasonable to consider how and in what ways such complexitynotions may pertain to examining the many processes of globalemergence.

Second, the proliferation of huge numbers of 'global' analyseshas in a way become part of the very system being investigated.They are helping to perform the global in part in a self-fulfillingmanner. One element then of what needs investigation are themultiple ways in which across various systems the global comesto be performed through arguments, images, books, TV pro-grammes, symposia, magazines and information that increasinglyrepresent, speak and perform 'the global' [see Franklin et al.2000).

In the next chapter I consider certain of these analyses of theglobal. I show that most are as yet insufficiently 'complex', whilein subsequent chapters I develop the notion of 'global com-plexity', as the complexity turn in the social sciences is exploredand hopefully enhanced.

3

Limits of 'Global' Analvses

Introduction

In this chapter I show the limitations of many globalization ana-lyses that deal insufficiently with the complex character of emer-gent global relations. This is on the face of it surprising, becausethe paradigm of globalization would seem to connect to com_plexity ways of thinking, even where the language and techniquesof complexity are not explicitly deployed

Self-evidently, the analysis of globalization emphasizes thatevents happening in one piace importantly lmpacl upon manyother places, often remote in time and in rpu." 1fo. details, seeGoerner l9_94). Giddens defined globalization as early as 1990:.the intensification of worldwide social relations whlch link distantlocalities in such away that local happenings are shaped by eventsoccurr ing_many miles away and vice versa, [1990: 64). Theanalysis of globalization brings out the obvious lnterdeperrienciesoetween peoples, places, organizations and technological systemsstretching across the world. These interdependencies involue eco-nlnli:, social, political and military happenings. With the analysisof global izat ion no place' is an is land' .

'

,- Complexity-researcher Chris Langton further maintained that:rrom the interaction of the individual components . . . emerges

some kind of property . . . something you .orrldn't have predictedrrorn what you know of the component parts. . . . And ihe globalproperty, this emergent behaviour feeds back to influence the


behaviour . . . of the individuals that produced it' [cited Thrift

1999: 33-4; see also Waldrop 1994: 329). Global izat ion analyses

should bring out these global emergent properties, such as the for-

tunes of the world economy or global environmental change or

cultural homogenization through the global media or the world-

wide spread of representative democracies [see Held et al' 1999).

Within sociology the analysis of such global properties seems

to'solve' the debate between those advocating studying the social

whole [methodological holists) and those advocating the expla-

nation of social phenomena through accounts that begin with the

individual [methodological individualists). There appears to be a

new level of the social whole, the global, with emergent proper-

ties that are clearly not those of individuals, nor could be reduced

in any sense to individuals. The study of the global level would

appear to solve the problem of the relationship between structure

and agency, with the former'winning' the argument.However, this book is premised upon the idea that many

globalization analyses treat the emergent global properties as too

unified and as too powerful. Their analysis is simplified, static

and reductionist. This can be seen in formulations that state that'globalization' is x or alternatively that 'globalization' does x. The

advocates of, and the critics of globalization 'assume a too linear

trajectory of globalization and . . . make the paper tiger of global-

izationinto a nasty and invincible bogeyman' [R. Keil 1998: 619).'Globalization' I suggest is neither unified nor can act as a subjectnor should it be conceived of in linear fashion.

Regions, Networks and Fluids

Thus I examine the idea of the global in terms of the distinctions

between 'regions, networks and fluids' made by Annemarie Mol

and John Law [l994; see also Urry 2000b). These distinctions are

drawn on to bring out the varied spatial patterns or topologies that

characterize diverse 'global' systems. What do these terms mean?

First, there are regions in which objects are clustered together'

Regions are defined in terms of three orthogonal coordinates that

rp".ify each such cluster. Such a topology is familiar and regularly

,rr"d i.r analysing each 'society'. No.*"i[y each society is deemed

Limits of 'Global' Analyses 4l

to be a region with clear and distinct boundaries drawn aroundeach one'

second, there are networlzs that stretch across diverse regions.within a network as understood here there is a relational con_stancy between its components. These components deliver aninvariant outcome, sometimes known as 'immutable mobiles,,through the entire network crossing regional boundaries. Manvscientific communities deliver such immutable mobil.,

".-r',much of the network.Third, there are fluids where 'neither boundaries nor relations

mark the difference between one place and another. Instead,sometimes boundaries come and go, allow leakage or disappearaltogether, while relations transform themselves wlthout f.a.tr.e.Sometimes, then, social space behaves like a fluid, [Mol and Law\994: 643). Such fluids slowly transmutate as they move withinan.l across space.

Thus there are three distinct spatial patterns, region, networkand fluid, and the social sciences ha,re failed tlo distinguishbetween them satisfactorily. In particular the idea of , fl.rid i,perhaps the least familiar. Mol and Law use this notion to describehow anaemia is dealt with across the world. Mol and Law esoe-ciaily show the apparent differences between the treatmentsof anaemia in the Netherlands compared with various African'countries. They argue that there is no simple regionar differencebetween its monitoring and treatment in the Netherlands com-pared with Africa. Nor though is there a single clinical network.operating worldwide with elements that hang together throughin'ariant relations that transport the same ,anaemia, to both theNetherlands and to Africa'. Rather than either region or network,they argue that: 'We're looking at uariation without boundaries andtransformation without discontinuity. We're looking at flows. Thespace with which we are dealing is fluid' [Mol and Law 1994:658; emphasis in original).

"'Anaemia', like blood, can be seen as a fluid, flowing in and out

of different regions, across different borders, using jiverse net-works. It changes as it goes, although this is often iriways that aremore or less impercept iblc at the t ime. Anaemia as an i l lness ist tuid- l ike, s imi lar to blood, and subtect to manv transformatronseven as i t remains as'anaemia' . Flui is rr" rrrble. i to mixtures and


gradients with no necessarily clear boundaries. The objects gated may not be clearly defined. Normality is a gradient anda clear absolute. In a fluid space it is not possible to determiidentities once and for all. Various other fluids may combitogether with each other; thus a 'fluid world is a world oftures' (Mol and Law 1994: 660). Fluids are not solid or staMoreove4, fluids get around absences such as the location oflaboratory in an African war zone and are contingent. In shMol and Law fl994: 664) conclude:

The study of fluids, then, will be a study of the relations, repulsionsand attractions which form a flow. . . . So how does anaemia flow?How does it move between the Netherlands and Africa and backagain? . . . It may flow in people's skills, or as part of the attributeof devices, or in the form of written words. . . . And as it moves, itchanges its shape and character.

Mol and Law thus bring out the power of the fluid to accountthe uneven and heterogeneous skills, technologies, interventiand tacit knowledge of those that are involved in monitoringtreating anaemia in various clinics across the world. The exand power of such fluids stretching within and especiallysocietal borders raise important questions about the powersocieties fas 'regions') to implement appropriate medical tment or functioning economies. Especially the fluid of 'an

will take different forms as it gorges within, or trickles thany particular region. Such a fluid can be distinguished inof the rate of flow, its uiscosity, its depth, its consistency and i

degree of confinemenr within certain channels. The idea of a fluiis a very important notion here that provocatively captures asof how to think the slobal that the ideas of resion and netignore. In the following I show how these distinctions of regio4.,"t*o.k and fluid relate to societies and the study of the global'

Global Regions, Networks and Flows

I have shown elsewhere that social scientific work depends u

metaohors and much theoretical debate consists of con

Limits of 'Global' Analyses

hetween different metaphors (see Urry 2000b: ch. 21. In particu-

ij. ' ,n" sociological concept of society is organized around thetl,"r"ohot

of a region - namely, that'objects are clustered together

l-J Uounduries are drawn around each particular cluster' [Mol: : ; art . , 1994: 643J There seem to be many di f ferent societ ies,

"u.n *trtr its specific clustering of social institutions organized

ii.oueh a nation state, and with a clear and policed border sur-

."unding each society qua region. Society qua bounded region has

b".n ."nt.tl to notions of the nation state, democracy and citi-

zenshiP for the Past century or so.

One approach then to the study of global izat ion is also to view

the global as a region involved in increasing inter-regional com-petition with each 'society'. In the 'struggle' between these two

regions, many analysts presume that the global is winning, albeit in

coinphcated ways, vis-a-vis each nation-state society. This is whathas been called the hyperglobalist position fsee Held et al. 1999:3-71. For example, Martin and Schumann uncompromisingly writethat globalization, 'understood as the unfettering of world-marketforces and the removal of economic power from the state, is formost nations a brute fact from which they cannot escape' [1997:216). And, according to Ohmae (1992), there is already a border-less world of global relations with the regions of 'society' across theworld being wholly in retreat fsee also Fukuyama 1992;Albrow1996). The constraints of space or geography have been eliminatedbecause of denationalized flows of information. This victory of theborderless global region is highly desirable for Ohmae.

Castells characterizes the contemporary world not as border-less, but nevertheless poised between 'ih. n"*, informationaleconomy working on a global scale' [1996: 97) and' the persis-tence of nations and national governments, and . . . the role ofgovernments in using economic competition as a tool of politicalslr,ategy' II996: 99). There are thus two regions and an implac-tbl" competition between the two. Many writers of course treatthe USA as central to slobal relations and hence see a regionalconf l ict between the Ai ler ican hegemon, on the one hanJ, andindividual nation states, whether inburope, Asia or elsewhere, onthe other fchase_Dunn et al. 20001.. There aie other writers who also see a war of the regions, buttn this case where the region of the nation state is partly capable

43


of winning vis-a-vis the region of the global. Hirst and Th[]9961 particularly articulate this 'global sceptic' positionmaintain that the institutions of the nation state and especiallystate institutions do possess 'causal efficacy' vis-a-vis the glol(see aiso Mann 1997:474).

However, these are limited ways of understandine the relship between the global and societies because they all takeglobal to be in some ways a'region' . In the rest of this chapterdeficiencies are outlined. First, viewing the global as a regiinvolves the thesis of a 'territorial trap' lBrenner Ig97l.involves'a-historical state-centrism' in which the'national andglobal scales are viewed as being mutually exclusive ratherrelational and co-constitutive' fBrenner 1997 : 13 81. In the accI am criticizing, the global and the national are set apart fromother and then seen as involved in intense inter-regional comtion. This can be seen when Robertson talks of 'the world-single-place', of an unambiguous global region [cited in Franklinal. 2000: 3). Brenner argues rather that we should examinecomplex sets of socialrelations between the national and the eloThey constitute each other. In chapter 5 below the mathematicsa'strange attractor' is used to demonstrate how the global andnational can be seen as co-constitutins each other.

This issue can also be seen in those analvses of each nationsovereign society, such as Hirst and Thompson's account [l9gof how certain regions of 'national economies and societies' cre-sist the spread of 'globalization'. And, analogously, in argunof the'hyperglobal ists ' such as Ohmae [1992), i t is the gregion that is overly unified and in equilibrium (see also Heldal. 1999). Both accounts imply both a societal or global totaltion and equilibrium. The global functions both as 'process'as'outcome', as both'cause'and'effect ' .There is a related fai luto distinguish between a 'theory of globalization' fin termsanalysing a complex but incomplete set of determinants)'globalization theory' [where the global level appears to accofor and to describe almost everything). Indeed, globalizationnot itself explain anything very much, it has been said [on'follies of globalization theory', see Rosenberg 2000).

Also implicit in some of these 'regional' formulations is thspace and time are treated as relatively static 'containers' of eco-


- ;e socir l and pol i t ical ent i t ies fBrenner 1997: ]40). But in thenc'r t ' r l ' - | , , : , . . .^^ ^L^-. , - ,L^.^^^^,-r---- :L--- | : t

;.,u, .hnpt"r it was shown that complexity emphasizes howprevloulir" una spac; flow. utd

lf", productive.,They are not,tiTpY

l '^.iuin"tt or dimensions of 'objects', whether social or physical.

i"h. no,io'l of competition between the 'societal' and the 'global'

"ooions does not do justice to the complex, overlapping and evolv-

i i l , " lut ions between diverse processes, including the ways in

.f;i.h ro.i"ties do not necessarily possess properties that are also

ernergent at the global level'

Nor do such regional notions acknowledge that the 'global'

level is in fact made up of very many 'polities', not just of the

nation state and the global with a 'head-to-head' competition

between them [see Walby forthcoming). There are also regionalblocs (NAFTA, EU), globally organized religions fislam, CatholicChurch), international organizations [UN), international NGOs(GreenpeaceJ and international treaties (Kyoto). There is also onenation-state society, the USA, which enjoys exceptional centralitywithin most of the networks that criss-cross the globe fexceptcuriously in the global game of footballl).

Game'critiques many of these existing globalization analyses bysaying that'this sort of Iglobalization] project is remarkably staticand governed by a desire for stasis' (1998: 42). There is a tendencyto treat the global as characterized by the current economic, socialand political relations. However, this static view ignores whatc.omplexity also emphasizes. This is that the future is both unpre-dictable and yet irreversible. Will Hutto n in On the Eclge expressesthe importance of such irreversibility when maintaining that'change is all-encompassing and carries a new inevitabili lty; itsmomentum is a superior power to any other, even that of the state' . . the force of change is irresistible' fGiddens and Hutton Z00O:2, 20,, especially on-no.r-linearity). For Hutton, global 'turbo-capitalism' is mobile and ruthless, driving all sorti of relationsirreversibly and somewhat unpredictably onwards in terms of'shareholder '

interests.areholder' iMoreover, tthe notion of a global region implies distinct bound-

aries between what is global and what is iti environment. Thispresumes a distinction between the global as essentially 'social'and the environment as essentially :natural' (Macnaght",-,

".rdUrry 1998). Complexity theory by ctntrast maintains that systems

45

46 Limits of 'Global' AnalYses

are always located within their environment and that ther

u." .o-pl"x entropic processes as a consequence. Analogousl

'global' iro."rr", should always be seen as social and physical, a,i-r"t".iul worlds'. There are no clear-cut and sustainable bounda

ries between global social relations and the environment with

which they operate. There are material worlds with a compl,

irreversibility over time [see Latour 2000)'

Much work within this 'regional' globalization paradigm

does not interrogate the iterative character of global systems. Th

system characteristics are complexly generated from billions

actions occurring over multiple times. Hutton states that'there

a phenomenon called globalisation' [Giddens and Hutton 2

2i; emphasis added). But this does not do justice to the com

cated and contingent array of processes occurring iteratively

what is ,structure' and what is 'agency'. Actions are normally see

as 'structurally' caused, such as by the capitalist structure,

patriarchal stiucture, the age structure and so on' Such a st

iu.e is 'ordered' and is reproduced. But, since social systems c

change from time to time, the social sciences have had to dra

,rpori the concept of agency to argue that some sets of human

,g"r,t, are able to 'escape' such structures and bring about change

"ith". individually [suih as leaving a violent partner) or collec-

tively through ,ay-.1"r, actions [such as the 1917 Bolshevik

time that can produce this in particular circumstances'

Hutton's argument that there simply is globalization -is

ba

upon the conventional distinction in the social sciences betw

Revolution).Giddens (19841, howevet saw that this was not a satisfactory

way of ,rndeistanding the character of social life and social change'

He developed the idea of a 'duality of structure' in order to ovef-

come the limitations of the structure/agency divlde. Important in

this is the recursive character of social life. Giddens examines the

temporal processes by whlch'structures' areboth drawn on to gen-

erate actions, and then are the unintended outcome of countless

recursive actions by knowledgeable agents' So, rather than a

dualism between structure and agency, there is seen to be a

'duahty' in which structure und ,g".t.y are bound up together

and co-evolve over time [for counter-views, see Archer 1995;

Mouzel iz 19951.

Limits ot' 'Global' Analyses 47

flowever, Giddens insufficiently examines the 'complex' char-

^-*', of these structure-agency processes. Following the argument

l""ih" previous chapter, these processes are better understood

*irouelr ' iteration' rather than 'recurrence'. It is iteration that

". ,"rni that the t in iest of ' local 'changes can generate, over bi l l ions

^f rep"ated actions, unexpected, unpredictable and chaotic out-

.on]"r, sometimes the opposite of what agents thought they were

iryi,lg to bring about [see Urry 2000b: ch. 8). Events are not'for-

ootten' in such a system." Sr.h complex change may have nothing to do with agents

seelang to change their particular world but stem from the emerg-

ing properties over time of the system as a whole. The agents may

conduct what appear to be the same actions, indeed involving a

constant imitation of the actions of others. But, because of the

tiny modifications that occur in such actions, iteration can result

in, through the irreverslbihty of time, transformations even in

large-scale structures. Iteration produces, on occasions through

dynamic emergence, non-linear changes and the sudden branch-

ing of the global order. So change can occur without a determin-

ing'agency' producing different outcomes.The character of such iterative social interactions has been

likened to walking through a rr.aze whose walls rearrange them-selves as each new step is taken [Gleick i988: 24). And as onewalks, new sets of steps have to be made in order to adjust to thechanging location of the surrounding walls of the maze.

In such iterations relationships are extremely sensitive to initialconditions. Small changes in one place [the equivalent of the but-terfly's wings) can move the system into a completely differentphase and a resulting bifurcation of the system. Byrne describessuch large and non-linear outcomes as'the last straw [that] breaksthe camel's back' fl998: 170). They can produce radical regimechange, such as the almost overnight implosion of the Sovietsystem following the 'small' event in 1989 of demolishing theBerlin Waii [l am unaware of compiexity analyses of the collapseot the Soviet Empire).

More generally,Zohar and Marshall [1994), using notions fromquantum physics, provide further criticism of the regional con-c€pts of society and of the global. They develop and advocatethe concept of quantum society, describing the collapse of the


certainties of classical physics based upon the rigid categoriesabsolute time and space, solid impenetrable matter and strideterminant laws of motion. As we saw in the previous chapthe solid material objects of classical physics [and of sociedissolve at the subatomic level into wavelike oatterns ofabilities, and these constitute probabilities of interconnectiSubatomic particles have no status as isolated entities but canunderstood only as interconnections. Zohar and Marshall descri'the strange world of quantum physics, an indeterminatewhose almost eerie laws mock the boundaries of space, time amatter ' [1994: 33; see also Capra 1996: 30-1).

Zohar and Marshall develop analogies between the wparticle effects within physics and varied characteristics oflife. They argue that

Quantum reality . . . has the potential to be both particle-like andwave-like. Particles are individuals, located and measurable in spaceand time. They are either here or there, now and then. Waves [bycontrast] are "non-local", they are spread out across all of space andtime, and their instantaneous effects are everywhere. Waves extendthemselves in every direction at once, they overlap and combinewith other waves to form new realities (new emergent wholes).(Zohar and Marshall 1994: 326J

Social life can likewise be seen as simultaneously particle-likeand wavellke. Such a notion is found in Henri Lefebvre's classicThe Production of Space [1991). A house, he says, can be under-stood in two ways. Either it is stable and immovable with starhcold and r igid out l ines (as a'part ic le ') . I t is the'epitome ofimmovability', possessing clear and unambiguous boundaries(1991:92). I t is to think of a house as a very clear and dis-tinct 'region', to return to Mol and Law's distinctions fl994).Alternatively the house can be thought of as a 'wave', as 'perme-ated from every direction by streams of energy which run in andout of it by every imaginable route'. In the latter the image ofimmovability is 'replaced by an image of a complex of mobilities,a nexus of in and out conduits', including visitors, electricit/,watet sewerage, deliveries, gas, telephone/computer connections,radio and television signals and so on (Lefebvre l99i :93;see alsoRoderick 1997; Urry 2000b: ch. 1).


Lefebvre also elaborates how commodities involve both moor-

,^", ortl mobile networks for particles and waves). Commoditiesr t rb_ I I I

he sa}s woulo nave

no 'reality' without such moorings or points of insertion, or without

their existing as an ensemble . . . of stores, warehouses, ships, trains

and trucks and the routes used.. . . Upon this basis are super-

irnposed - in ways that transform, supplant or even threaten to

destroy it - successive stratified and tangled networks which, though

material in form, nevertheless have an existence beyond their

materiality: paths, roads, railways, telephone links, and so on.

ft.ef'ebvre l99l: 402-3, emphasis added; see chapter 7 below).

Conclusion

In the next chapter I develop these arguments, especially drawingout how various global systems can be seen as both wave- andparticle-like. We should analyse, first, global waues.Through itera-tion over irreversible times 'new emergent wholes' get generated.And, second, we nced to exarnine how such waves are made up ofcountless individual p articles, of people, social groups and networksthat are resolutely 'located and measurable in space and time'. Inlater chapters I examine the very fixities in time and space thatenable such mobilities - indeed, the more mobile the 'entity' inquestion the larger and more extensive the immobilities.

Thls distinction between global waves and particles breaks withthe relatively immobile and fixed notion both of society and espe-cially of the global criticized in this chapter. Material practices aresimultaneously particle-like and wavelike, moored and mobile.Their analysis demands a set of concepts that properly capturetheir complex, emergent characteristics that take us beyond thenotion of the global as 'region' criticized here. This notion stemstrom the application of the relatively conventional category ofregion to examine the extremely unconventional phenomenaof emergent global systems. In the next chapter I turn to someof these systems, analysed through what I call globally integratednetworks and global fluids.

49

4

Networks and Fluids

Metaphors

I begin by briefly considering what is an appropriate metaphorthe current global age. Pre-modern societies were often thof metaohoricallv in terms of various animals. as well as diffesorts of agricultural work [many are stil l powerful today). Imodern industrial societies. dominant metaohors were thosethe clock, modern machinery ftrain, car, assembly line) ancphotographic lens. The lens provided the metaphor for mepistemology based on the central importance of 'seeing' tworld (see Urry 2000b: chs Z, 4'). With the camera lens there isone-to-one relationship between each point on the object andeach point on the image of the plate or film. The metaphor of thelens implies a sequence, a separation between the parts of thepicture and the whole picture, and a relatively extended processthrough time by which the image is generated and represented(see Adam 1990: 159).

By contrast, the hologram is a plausible metaphor for a complexinformational age. Information in a hologram is not located in aparticular part of it. Ratheq, any part contains, implies and res-onates information of the whole, what Bohm calls the 'implicate

order' (cited in Baker 1993: l4Z). Hologram means 'writing thewhole'. Thus the 'focus is not on individual particles in motion,crossing time and space in succession, but on how all the infor-mation implied within a hologram is gathered up simultaneously'

Networks and Fluids

25 ao erner8ent whole (Adam 1990: 159). In the hologram the

iLo,ra,Ie of separate causes and effects is inappropriate, since con-

;:.-:,i";r are simuitaneous and instantaneous. Everything implies

.u"rvthing else and thus it is impossible to conceive of the sepa-

,ut",- if interdependent, 'parts' of a hologram. So the hologram

J"n-,onr,.",es that powerful emergent or wavelike properties are

not derived from constituent parts, nor can it be reduced to such

oarts. The metaphor of the hologram captures how relations are

instantaneous, simultaneous and networked.

Networks

In this chapter I examine various spatial topologies, all of whichinvolve hologram-like emergent relations that operate in-and-across networks. The notion of network is also a dominantmetaphor for global times, rather than say'machine' [Kelly 1998;Rycroft and Kash 1999: 107). Indeed complexity-writer Capraargues that 'networks' are the key to late-twentieth-century ad-vances in science concerned with investigating the 'web of life'.He maintains that: 'Whenever we look at life, we look at networks'

[Capra 1996: 82). And, if we think that global networks arecomplex in order to combine say the l0 million componentsmaking up a space shuttle, then we should note that modellingweather involves about I million interdependent variables or thatthe human brain contains 10 blll ion nerve cells and 1,000 bill ionsynapses [Casti 1994: ch. 3). Such networks, whether of theweathet the brain or economic and social life, comprise enormousnumbers of messages that, like relations within the hologram,move in all directions simultaneously. I will consider a number ofcharacteristics of such networks.

Initially, it is useful to note that there are three basic networktopologies. First, there are line or chain networks with many nodesthat are spread out in more or less linear fashion. Second, thereare star or hub networks, where most important relationshipsmove through a central hub or hubs. Third, there are all-channelnetworks, in which communications proceed in more or less alldirections across the network simultaneously fsee Arquilla andRonfeldt 2001: 7-8). Networks also vary as to-whether the ties

5l


within it are loosely coupled or strongly coupled, the latter beingespecially problematic, as we saw in chapter 2 in many safetysystems fPerrow 1999).

There are both strong and weak ties in all networks, withGranovetter (1983) having shown that it is especially the exten-sive weak ties of acquaintanceship and informational flows thatare particularly central to successful job searches [see also Burt1992 Z4-7). It is also argued that, where there are'srructuralholes' in networks, then this allows particular opportunitiesfor developing informational access and control (Burt lgg2).Networks also vary as to whether obligations and reciprocitiesacross the network members are one way or all ways. We shouldalso distinguish between the connections within a network thatare purely'social', based upon face-to-face connections, and thosethat are mediated by various 'material worlds' such as telephones,media, computer networks and so on fWellman 2001).

Networks also overlap and interconnect with other networks soproducing what has come to be known as the strange phenome-non of it is a small world'. Watts argues that 'even when twopeople do not have a friend in common they are separated by onlya short chain of intermediaries' [1999: 4). These distant connecitions are often crucial to the forming of trust across far-flnetworks [see David Lodge's excoriating account [1983) ofacademic 'small world'). In the following it is presumed that ican be established where one network ends and another begins.But the networked connectedness of social relationships that'small-world' phenomenon indicates shows that this is not at asimple and straightforward in many cases.

The power of any network can be said to stem from its size,indicated by the number of nodes within it, bv the densitv of networked connections between each node, and bv the connectithat the network has with other networks. Size is the most signif-icant determinant, because the value of a network does not merelyincrease arithmetically as more nodes are connected. Rather, 'thesum value of a network increases as the square of the numbermembers' (Kelly 1998: 23; emphasis added). In other words, as thenutnber of nodes increases one by one, there is an exponentialincrease in the overall value or power of the network. So addinga few more nodes, more weak ties, disproportionately increases

Networks and Fluids 53the value of that network for all the existing ,members,.

Size wasparticularly, important in the early developir"r,, oi itr"'itt,"..,"tnetwork, where a few extra participants significantiy i..."lr"a ,rr"value of the network for e,reryone. Like*ise, phone lo-pu.,i", air-proportionately gained from even small increar", i" it

"'Xl-b". of

r"retwork-users. And the value of eachfax machine greatiy increasedevery time a few more machines were purch"s"d."

Keily [1998: 25) thus describes how networks can generatemassive non-linear increases. in output. Networks ,disticallyamplify small inputs' through long-term

"'rd oft"n expJnential'increasing returns', es.pecially where all-channel n",ri-t, g",

extended technologically. Such non-linear outcomes are generatedby a system moving across what Malcorm Gladweli ir060j terms'tipping points'. Tipping points involve three notior' ih-,".,.,r".,.,and phenomena are contagious, that little .rrrr"r-.rn i"u" uigeffects, and that changes .* h"pp"n not in a gradual linear waybut dramatically at a moment when the ,yri"_ ,*ir.fr"r. U"describes the consumption of fax machin", o.

-obii"-ft orr"r,when at a moment thesystem ,r"it.h"d ,"d *Ja."f,

"r.# "fn."needed a fax machine or every mobire person needed a mobilephone. The key here is that wealth .o-", not from scarcity, as rncon'entional economicq but from abundr".". E;;h f*-_rr.nin"is so much more valuabre if everyo'" "lr"

also has a fax machinethat enables new networked .o.rn".tio's to form and extendth_enrselves [Gladwell zooto,-zi-ii-ih" b",r.fits of each extraIax machine are non-rinear. The tipping point is reached andextraordinary benefits flow throughort th1 network.The key to understanding thir i.o."r, is the idea of ,increasing

::lli.'' developed by Brian Arthur fWaldrop irr;t^Th" l, .,ot)vttat economists have normarly unierstood by the notion oflncreasing economies of scale'. Such economies are those that,#,"T.^:

and are found *i,frr"l'r;)du orgu;r",L^, ,".f, *^_",,'.

rnese economies,within such single firms increase output:,1r:

over a long time recluc. th" "u".ug"?or,,

of p.oJ,r.,ioi u,rtilsuch a point that further g"i.r, u." ,,o'Lrg". possible.By contrast, the notio., of ,in..""rirrg .",,r.ns, involves expo_

l"ntitl increases in output (and rewards lr weaith) that are spreadthroughout a networb

,;l'r"\"*;;i,pr**r,rri" which a variety oferterprises are located ""a "f"r","lia

i. ,rr" ,externaritie s, across

-1f+ Networks and Fluids

the networked relationships that can produce spectacular t

linear increases in output and income [as with the, humble

-".ni""). The 'network economy' changes how such econo

""J tft"t rewards operate, on occasions spreading

-1::iu"',ii.ou, g"ir,, and benefits, although-j\:t" will be resulting

""J l"t,t elsewhere in the system [Kelly 1998) ' There are ir

i,rf*.rr.t, that result from improved coordination between t

,1"', ""d

from the processes of organizational learning across

network [Rycroft and Kash 1999: ch' 9)'

Increasing returns are an example of the complexity. anal

p.;;,;;" f";lUu.k mechanisms' Such positive feedback in the

of increasing returns can result in astonishing escalatiti: "{

;;;; *"utitt [Waldrop 1994)' An obvious example is the In

,r"t ."uolrrtion ihat "..,ltg"d

out of the 'small' local change of

i;;;.; of the first Web browser around 1994 and the

;t;;J^;;g".." of worldwide e-commerce [see Castells

This emergence was fuelled by the break-up over-the p

decade of existing regional and national markets and the p

ation of new netwo,ki"g t"p"bility [on an insider's view as to

difference the Internethakes, see Gates 1999)' Ove^r time t

works may bear no tendency to equilibrium because of the i

tance of such positive feedback' Dynamic and irreversible <

takes place over time, change that irreversibly and unpredi

takes such a system further"from equilibrium' depending u1

particular topology' innraecins retl lrns are connected with

Moreover, such increasing retur

theory of how patterns of socio-technical development are I

dependent'. fn" ,,otio"t ti o"ift dep"endenc" "-l^h^T]itl:Ooitu.r." over time of the ordering of events or processes' t-

il;^;;"it, itt" temporal patternins in which :t:Y^:t,cesses occur ,r..y ,ig,tin""ttty i"R""nces the way.that th€y

;;it turn out"[Mahonev 2000: 536)- Caus":::^:;:l ;

h:ili'#' #ilJ;';;'-;;";ts to'h u gelv powerrul ge

processes that thr,ough increasine t"1t"'1', tf,;" *9:::l#'-ff.il?".T:J:?",if, 'fi i"1#';":'!ry;;;?;;'"ssesor

J;;:;a;, developments [North 1990: 10o) r-^.r r^, .mall.dependent developnrclrL5 Lr\urt'r 'JJv'

i"Ufirfr"a for smallfttit path dependence is typically es'

local reasons. Thus '.;;;?";#slv the QWERTY U"tT.1l".

i;fi;til';;^;;"ced in is7: in order to slow down

Networlzs and Fluids

n,..h a layout meant that the typewriter keys rvould not jam if

]i1", ,uo"a more slowly. Howeula once the keyboard layout had

Lt"" "rtnblished

for such small-scaie reasons in the late rrineteenth

i . . , rr t , this. leyout has then remained even with the rnassive

i".'nnoiogi.rl changes in the late twentieth century in what a, i .uborrd' is [see North 1990;Arthur 1994a).' -

Mor" signi f icant in i ts long-term cffect has been t he way in

which in the 1890s the petroleum-based car came to dominate

ou", f""1 alternatives to power cars. At the tirne, bolh electric

and steam power were almost certainly preferable fu el systems

iMot.u^lli 2000). But the 'path dependence' of the petroleum-

irr"d .r. got locked in, although it was not technologically prefer-

able. But once it was locked in, the rest is history, as an a-stonishing

array of other industries, activities and interests came to mobilize

around the petroleum-based car. As North writes more generally:'Once a development path is set on a particular c,ourse, thenetwork externalities, the learning process of organizations, andthe historically derived subjective modelling of the issues re-inforce the course' [1990: 99).

The key here is that'small chance events becorne margnified bypositive feedback' and this 'locls in' such systems, so th.at rnassiveincreasing returns or positive feedback result ower tirne (Brianfuthu4 cited in Waldrop 1994:49; see also Mahorrey 2000). Rela-tively deterministic patterns of inertia reinforce esiabllshed pat-terns through processes of positive feedback.This escalartes change.L, :

:l l"lSh a 'lock-in' that over time takes the system a way from

what we might i-ugine to be the point of ,equilitrriumleauiiibrium' and from

X|^.,::*.'Ln'". il:; optimal i., ,"ffi.t"r,.r;;;;; ;;;;; """-r r r r r r rLrLrrLJ tLr

YvvLKl Y keyboard or electr ic forms of poweriing cars (iMotavalli2000).

55

^rll th.::ld not be thought that there is necessarily a sirngle point

:|'!11+'P"'m tha_t can be unambiguo"rly;".ifi;d u, ih" -ortTi;::i-\t" sociological' path dependency, see lw{ahon ey 2000).

ia ,h;r' ': multiple equilibria and hence no simpl € mov e towards

th.';::,.t, system will generate. The importanc€, morreover, of

ry".-""rtl means that institutions matter a gre. at deal to howu..rii,r],l"l,etop. Such institutions can p.oduce u long--terrn irre-rev.L.i'/^,tnat is 'both more predictable and rrrore d ifficult to

-- 1. t ' rorth 1990: 104).The effects of the petroleunn car over

56 Networbs and Fluids

a century after its chance establishment is the best example

how difficult it ls to reverse locked-in institutional processes ISheller and lJtrY 2000)'

Positive feedbacks and path dependence, where conevents can set in motion institutional patterns with deterministicoutcomes, are central to the power of various networks operatiacross the globe. Such global networks are large in size, will involvidense interactions within their nodes and will interact with othernetworks, so further expanding their exceptional range and influ-ence. They do not derive directly and uniquely from human inten-tions and actions. Humans are intricately networke dwithmachines,texts, objects and other technologies. There are no purified sociainetworks, only'material worlds' that involve peculiar and complexsocialities with objects (Latour 1993; Knorr-Cetina lgg7l.

Such networks thus involve an array of new machines and tech-nologies that extend them in time-space. These include fibre-opticcables, jet planes, audio-visual transmissions, digital TV, computernetworks, satellites, credit cards, faxes, electronic point-of-sale ter-minals, portable phones, electronic stock exchanges, high-speedtrains, virtual reality, nuclear, chemical and conventional militarytechnologies and weapons, new waste products and health risla.These machines and technologies generate new fluidities of aston-ishing speed and scale fon the 'nanosecond nineties', see peters1 es2J.

These scapes heip to constitute different forms of networkedrelationships across the globe. But I have so far used the term'network' or 'networked' to refer to a wide arrav of verv differentsystems. It was noted in chapter t how Casiells likewise uses'network' to refer to varied processes that should be distinguishedfrom one another. So to capture these different modes of 'net-worked relationships', I distinguish between globally integratednetworl?s IGINs) and global fluids [GFs; see chapter 3 above; Moland Law 1994;Law and Mol 20001. In the next section I examinethe nature of GINs.

Globally Integrated Networks

GINs consist of complex, enduring and predictable networkedconnections between peoples, objects and technologies stretching

Networbs and Fluids 57

, . r, multiple and distant spaces and times (Law 1994: 24;

il -,,h 1995: 745). Relative distance is a function of the rela-

.l-, renveen the components comprising that network. The

, --'rn, outcome of a network, such as that for anaemia testing

1 :,. Netherlands, is delilered across its entirety in ways

l-,- ::ten oyercome regional boundaries' Things are made close

.-. ,,; dlgt. networked relations. Such a network of technol-

,.,.,,kills, texts and brands, a global hybrid, ensures that the

,,^. '.ruia.' or 'product' is Jelivered in more or less the same

.', r;ross the entire network. Such products are predictable,

:,...:.,ble, routinized and standardized''-.,..,.

.r. many 'global' enterprises organized through GINs'

:,.,-.rles include McDonald's, American Express, Coca-Cola'

i:.,,.,0f,, Sony, Greenpeace, Manchester United and so on' Each

,j ..., glob"i'netwoiks. 'McDonaldization', as this has been

:.::..j i ivolves companies on a global scale organized with aj.,..r.

of central oiganization (see Ritzer 1992,1997, 1998)'

l,:,:i,..ldrzrtion p.od,i."s new kinds of low-skilled standardized:.:-.,pecially fo. yo.r.tg people (McJobs), new products that radi-

.,. ;rer p.opl"'t eati;g hrbits, and new social habits worldwide'

,,-. ,t .riing standardized fast food from take-away restaurants

: : , : l fg ' ) .

.: jce?, most of the transnational companies currently roaming

:-: :irnet are organized through GINs' These 'organizations'

.::::.r11! produce iew 'failings' across the network' In part such a

::: rik exists to counter the often extraordinarily turbulent envi-

:.::.:rt rvithin which they operate. Such networks, with moreor

..,, :i,tantaneous and simultaneous communications' enable the

::.- j associated products and modes of service to roam in much

:-: ::re form across the surface of the earth [on global brands,

::r r:r' in 2000; Sklair 2001).j:retimes there is limited adaptation to local circumstances'

., ":th McDonald's in east Asia. But, even if local owner-

-r:::i0rS are involved i" ary-a-a"y management, the global net-

' ::. rn the end wins out [on ho* big Macs do all taste the same'

::: , ', 'rtSor 1997:77).ihi lnt",'t"ginf Director of McDonald's in

S:i-..,:ore explains ",

follo*r' 'McDonald's sells ' ' ' a system' not

::.:.rits.' This'system;; ;;.gh;;t Hamburger Universit-v and

'.,,:.natized in the 600-page Op erations o'l koining Manual

i'...ron f ggZ, Zi't. C".,uin'k"y ieatures of the global network


include not only standardized products but also the standardi

and monitored 'smiling service' to strangers. Such GINs

duce not only predictable material goods and services, but

calculable and controllable simulations of 'experiences' apparentl'more real than the original' fBaudrillard 1983; Eco 1986; Ri1997; Rifk in 20001.

GINs can also be found within some oppositional organizatisuch as Greenpeace. Like other global players, Grenpeace demuch attention to developing and sustaining its brand identitythroughout the world. (ireenpeace's brand identity has 'such apiconic status that it is a world-wide symbol of ecological virtuequite above and beyond the actual practical successes of theorganisation' within various societies [Szerszynski 1997 46).

These global networks are significantly 'deterritorialized'. Theymove in and through places in ways that transform and distorttime and space. Such networks constitute one of most powerfulsets of 'particles' comprising the new world order. They are mas-sively powerful, particularly because of their mobility, their net-worked character, their capacity to generate increasing returnsfrom the use and exploitation of their global brand and theirendogenous self-organ rzing character [Klein 2000).

Such GINs show three weaknesses. First, since a set of net-worked organizations can generate much greater increasing re-turns than can single companies, so these individual companiescan be outperfbrmed in the global marketplace, as IBM was in thecase of personal computers.

Second, the power of a global brand based within a GIN canevaporate almost overnight from quite minor occurrences. Thebrand of Monsanto disappeared because of the company's associa-tion with producing genetically modified food. Indeed, the morepowerful the brand, the more there is to lose. Klein [2000) showsjust how extensive are the various resistances to global brandscarried along the scapes of the emergent global order. I examinebelow the complex nature of scandals that can result in massiveconsequences for individual GINs such as Arthur Andersen, thepaper-shredding auditors of Enron.

And, third, these single companies can be very brittle andlack the capacity to bend with rapidly changing circumstances.They may not be quite like the former East European command

Networks and Fluids

econornies, but their lack of 'fluidity' and 'flexibility' may mean

ii". th"y are very vulnerable to fluid changes in desire, taste and

ll,i" ,t-rr, leave them struggling to catch up' On occasions such

]. jn, 'onni"r are insuff ic ient ly f lu id to implement appropriate organi-

)n ionnl learning [see Rycroft and Kash 1999).

In the next sections I turn to some other global hybrids, GFs,

rvhich are much more 'l iquid' in character.

Global Fluids

Emile Durkheim criticized the fluid, unstable, non-authoritative

character of 'sensuous representations'. Sensuous representations'are in a perpetual flux;they come after each other likes the waves

of a river, and even during the time that they last, they do not

remain the same thing' fDurkheim 1915/1968: 433). What is

required for science, according to Durkheim, is to abstract from

these flows of time and space in order to arrive at concepts thatare proper'collective representations'. Durkheim sees concepts aslying beneath the shifting perpetual, sensuous surface flux. Con-cepts are outside time and change. They do not move by them-selves. They are fixed and immutable and it is the task of scienceto reveal them. Science involves not being seduced by the end-lessly changing'sensations, perceptions and images' that lie on thesurface [Durkheim 191 5/1968: 432-4).

However, I dissent from this 'structural' view of concepts. Thecievelopment of a 'mobile sociology' demands metaphors that dovierv social and material hfe as being'like the waves of a river'.Such fluid notions are necessary to capture those multiple trans-formations of collective representations in which 'collective' rela-tions are no longer societal and structural. Many contemporaryrvriters are developing and elaborating various fluid metaphors tocapture aspects of contemporary social life, of the sea, rivers, flux,waves and liquidity (Bachelard 1942/1983; Urry 2000b). Williamsdescribes latent 'structures of feeling' as being a social experiencethat is ' in solut ion' (7977:133-4). Castel ls (1996) ta lks of the'power of flows'. Appadurai [1996J argues for the metaphors of' f low', 'uncertainty ' and'chaos' and Deleuze and Guattar i (1986,1988) talk of bodies in a vortex. Shields (1997) maintains that

59


flows should be seen as a whole new paradigm. White (1992characterizes the social world as constituted bv disorderlvsticky'gels and goos'. Mol and Law [1994) generally elaborate'fluid spatiality' [see also Sheller 2000).

So what then is meant here by the notion of global fluid7while fluids undoubtedly involve networks, such a notion doesdo justice to the uneven, emergent and unpredictable shapessuch fluids may take. Also such fluids are partially structured bythe various 'scapes' of the global order; the networks of machineqtechnologies, organizations, texts and actors that constitutevarious interconnected nodes along which flows can be relayed

[Graham and Marvin 2001). Global fluids travel along thesevarious scapes, but they may escape, rather like white bloodcorpuscles, through the 'wall' into surrounding matter andeffect unpredictable consequences upon that matter. Fluids moveaccording to certain novel shapes and temporalities as they breakfree from the linear, clock time of existing scapes - but theycannot go back, they cannot return, because of the irreversibilityof time.

Such fluids of diverse viscosity organize the messy power ofcomplexity processes [see Kelly 1995). They result from peopleacting upon the basis of local information but where these localactions are, through countless iteration, captured, moved, repre-sented, marketed and generalized within multiple global waves,often impacting upon hugely distant places and peoples. The 'par-ticles' of people, information, objects, money, images, risks andnetworks move within and across diverse regions forming hetero-geneous, uneven, unpredictable and often unplanned waves [seeUrry 2000b). Such waves demonstrate no clear point of depar-ture, deterritorialized movement, at certain speeds and at differ-ent levels of viscosity with no necessary end state or purpose. Thismeans that such fluids create over time their own context foraction rather than being seen as 'caused' by such a context. Theseglobal fluid systems are in part self-organizing, creating and main-taining boundaries.

I now describe some such GFs. In the next chapter I develop acomplexity analysis that shows the irreversible and non-linearintersections that occur between such GFs as they spread over,through and under multiple times and spaces. GFs are shown in

Networks and Fluids

that chapter to be utterly crucial categories of analysis in the glob-

^l;rine social world that have in part rendered both regions and

n",*ott t less causal ly powerful .

Trauelling peoples

Travelling peoples move along various transportation scapes. At

the beginning of the twenty-first century there are well over 700

million movements across international borders each year [com-oared with twenty-five million in 1950); at any time 300,000 pas-

,"ng".r are in flight aboue the USA, equivalent to a substantial

city; there are thirty-one million refugees and 100 million inter-

national migrants worldwide; and international travel, which con-

stitutes the largest movement of people across borders that hasever occurred, accounts for over one-twelfth of world trade

fMakimoto and Manners 1997: ch. 1; Papastergiadis 2000: 10,41,54;WTO 2000). A crucial component of this fluid is made up ofthe transnational capitalist class, whose pampered routeways oftravel between the major industrial, financial and service hubsshorvs by far the greatest density [on the life ofthis class, see Sklair2001 J.

This fluid of travelling peoples involves almost everywhereacross the globe [with published travel statistics for over 190countries). It involves people travelling for work-related reasons,legal and increasingly illegal, those travelling for leisure andpleasure, again legally and illegally, those travelling as refugees orasylum-seekers, and those being smuggled voluntarily as migrantsand involuntarily as short-term and disposable slaves. The mostrapidly growing form of smuggling is that of human beings movedoften across hugely policed and effective borders, with an associ-ated growth in the international 'slave' trade. There are thoughtto be more slaves now than at the height of the eighteenth-century slave trade (Bales 1999: 9).

Such very different travelling peoples intermittently encountereach other within the 'non-places of modernity', the airportlounge, the coach station, the motorway service area and so on

[Auge 1995; although 'business lounges' separate off the transna-tional capitalist class from most other travellers). These differentpeoples also overlap, with one category dissolving into anothel,

6l


giving rise not just to the travelling of peoples but also to diverss,complex and hard-to-categorize'travelling cultures' [see Clifford1997; Rojek and Urry 1997). Moreover, whlle there are 200 nationstates, there are at least 2,000 'nation peoples', all of which ex-perience various kinds of displacement, movement and ambigu-ous location [R. Cohen 1997: pp. ix-x). The most striking of such'societies' formed through the global fluid of travelling peoples isthe 'overseas Chinese' [R. Cohen ]997: ch. 4; Ong and Nonini1997). Such massive, hard-to-categorize, contemporary migra-tions, often with oscillatory flows between unexpected locationqhave been described through the language of the 'new physics'.These migration patterns are to be seen as a series of turbulentwaves, with a hierarchy of eddies and vortices, with globalisma virus that stimulates resistance, and the migration system acascade moving away from any apparent state of equilibrium[Papastergiadis 2000: 102-4, l2I).

The Internet

This rather obscure technology, designed by the American defenceintelligence in the 1970s and 1980s, unpredictably resulted in anastonishing system of many-to-many communications across theglobe. The transformation of this distributed, horizontal military-based system into the huge global Internet stemmed from varioussmall-scale changes made by American scientific and research net-works and from counter-cultural efforts to produce a computernetwork that possessed horizontal public access (students'invented' the modem in 1978 and the Mosaic web browser in1992:Rushkoff 1994). Castells notes: 'the openness of the systemalso results from the constant process of innovation and freeaccessibility enacted by early computer hackers and the networkhobbyists who still populate the net by the thousands' (1996:3s6).

The Internet did not originate within the business world, norfrom within any single state bureaucracy fsee Castells's brill ianthistory: 2001). In significant ways its users are key producers ofthe very technology. The autopoeitic, self-organizing character ofthe Internet is described as follows:

Networh.s and Fluids

No central hub or command structure has constructed it. . . . It has

installed none of the hardware on which it works, simply hitching

a largely free ride on existing computers, networks, switching

svstems, telephone lines. This was one of the first systems to present

iiself as a multiplicitous, bottom-up, piecemeal, self-organizingnetwork which . . . could be seen to be emerging without any

centralized control. (Plant 1997: 49)

The Internet is also the best example of how technology

invented for one purpose, military communication in the event of

a nuclear attack, unpredictably and irreversibly evolved through

iteration and a path dependence into purposes unintended and

undreamt of by its early developers. It has resulted in a massive

worldwide activity, with sixteen million users in,1995,400 million

users in early 2001, and a projected one bill ion by 2005 [Castells2001: 3). Information on the Internet doubles every few months

[Brand 1999: ]4, 87). An awesome pattern of path dependencehas been laid down, a pattern analysed by Castells as the 'winner-

takes-all system that characterizes business competition in thenew economy' (200i: i00).

The Internet enables horizontal communication that cannot beeffectively surveilled, controlled or censored by national societies.It possesses an 'elegant, non-hierarchical rhizomatic global struc-ture' [Morse 1998: 187) and is based upon lateral, horizontallryper-rext links that render the boundaries between objects within thearchive as endlessly fluid [Featherstone 2000: 187). The Internetcan be seen as a metaphor for social life that is fluid, involving thou-sands of networks, of people, machines, programmes, texts andimages in which quasi-subjects and quasi-objects mix together innew hybrid forms. Ever-new computer networks and links prolif-erate mostly in unplanned and mixed patterns. Such a fluid spaceis a world of mixtures. Messages 'find their way', rather like bloodthrough multiple capillaries. Fluids can get around absences. Suchcomputer networks are not solid or stable and are contingent.Hypertext programmes and the Net comprise 'webs of footnoteswithout central points, organizing principles, hierarchies' [Plant1997: l0; see also chapter 3 below). Such digitized information'effaceIs] the difference between cause and effect, ends and means,subject and object, act ive and passive' [Luke 1995:97).

63


Information

This GF is intimately connected with the Internet, as 'know

has been'informationalized'. Knowledge was once found incific form [the manuscript, the book, the map), located in particular places [archives, museums, libraries) and embodied withithe minds of certain people [scholars, archivists, mapmakers).'Such relatively fixed repositories of knowledge could be dei.troyed or killed. Books, manuscripts, paintings and maps, iwhole libraries such as that at Alexandria, could be burnt andthe knowledge would physically disappear [Brand 1999: ch"12).

But knowledge is now transmutating into digitized informationfFeatherstone 2000). This shows the significance of materialworlds, hybrids that combine objects, texts, technologies andbodies, to transmit around the globe tiny weightless bits of infor-mation. Analysis of either the physical or the social elements ofsuch a shift would be on its own meaningless. And nature itself isbeing transformed into genetic codes that are owned, accessed andcirculated socially, with the growth of the 'informational body'[Franklin et al. 2000: 128-9).

Further, this change can be appreciated through a shiftingmetaphoq, from the stationary, wooden, fixed 'desk' occupied bythe individual scholar [even with chained books in the medievalperiod), to the ephemeral, mobile and interchangeable 'desktop'that can be occupied by anyone. Or there is the shift from thespecific religious 'icon' to the ubiquitous and instantaneously rec-ognized computer 'icon'. With digitization, information adoptspatterns and modes of moblhty that are substantially separatefrom material form or presence [Hayles i999: 18-20). Informa-tion is everywhere fand nowhere), travelling [more or less) instan-taneously along the fluid networks of global communications. Itsrepositories cannot be burnt down as with the medieval library,although particular computers can [willl) have their memorieswiped.

The exceptional growth of networked, spatially indifferent,information is transforming commerce and work partly becauseof the dlfficulty of charging for digitized information that isephemeral and fluid [Castells 1996). This fluid of information

Networbs and Fluids

;q transforming education and science because of the expon-

"nti.tl and irreversible growth in the sheer amount and com-

"i"xity of scientific information (Rescher 1998: ch. 4; IJrry

'loOZn). More generally, the 'new artificial life-form of the

ItoUrt telecommunications Matrix' has been described as 'non-

iin"ut uty-metrical, chaotically-assembled' [lmken 1999: 92).

The media are 'migratory', with both viewers and images in

sirnultaneous circulation and recirculation. Neither fit into circuits

or audiences bound to a local or a national space (Appadurai

lee6).Wars have consequently turned into 'virtual wars', at least for

those controlling the virtual weaponry. Such'virtual wars' appear'to take place on a screen. . . . War affords the pleasures of a

spectacle. . . . When war becomes a spectator sport, the mediabecomes the decisive theatre of operations' (lgnatieff 2000: 191).And warfare more generally is being networked and informa-tionalized, with the emergence of 'network centric warfare' andwhat Arquilla and Ronfeldt [2001) call'netwars' often occurringbetween non-state actors.

World money

Strange fl986) describes this GF as being a kind of 'casino capi-talism', detached, self-organizing and operating beyond both indi-vidual national economies and the specific industries and servicesinvolved in world production and trade [see also Castells 1996;l,eyshon and Thrift 1997). Daily foreign-exchange dealings areworth sixty times more than the daily value of world exports

[Held et al. 1999: 209; the ratio grew fivefold between 1979 and1995). Money is traded for money especially in terms of its futurevalues. Such a GF is organized through 'just-in-time 24-hour net-works'. It involves calculations of and bets on, hugely uncertainfutures: 'traders are trading in time itself which is to say in themomentary forward fluctuations of price and value. The latter are. . . expressions of the most abstract sort: of money itself and, evenmore abstractly, of the price of money at some future point int ime' (Boden 2000: 189).

This commodification of the future generates extraordinarilyfluid movements across, and beyond, the regions and networks

65

l;)

I

&


in which money has been organized and regulated. Thereextensive movement of money into 'offshore' locations desito minimize taxes and to facilitate the launderine of ilfunds. Martin and Schumann [1997) describe the consequin complexity terms. They say that the 'abandonment of [6ordercontrols on capital has therefore set up a dynamic whiclr,systematically nullifying the sovereignty of nations, hasbeen seen to have disastrously anarchic implications' [Martin andschumann 1997: 6l) At the same time the national controlgare themselves now sources of financial gain since 'any nation,$financial controls appear to be made for the sole prr.pore ofbeing e.vaded' (Eatwell and Taylor 2000: 37; all emphairzed in theoriginalJ.

Moreove4, recent decades have seen the'firewalls' between dif-ferent financial markets dissolve. As a consequence, 'all segmentsof the system are now tightly interdependeni' so that 'miioeco-nomic responses can easily escalate into macroeconomic contagion'fEatwell and Taylor 2000: 45; emphasis added). This results in theextreme price swings that occur within global financial marketgespecially where so-called derivative trading is involved. Thesefinancial instruments, developed to manage the risk that the finan-cial system has itself created, in turn p.nd,r." new systemic risks.Price movements rapidly move away from equilibrium, stemmingfrom 'the cumulative effect of a beauty contest [that]'may .esuliin massive concentrations of extreme price swings' f-Eatwell andTaylor 2000: 103;and, on the role of contagion inrtipping points,,see Gladwel l 2002')

Thus, not only is money hrghly fluid but so too are slobal finan-cial crises. Eatwell and Taylor talk of the 'recent crisis in Asia andits contagior,rs spread to Russia, South Africa, and Latin America'[2000: 26; emphasis added). And so far there is no internationalbody effecting global financial regulation of such fluidities and theresulting 'prevalence of contagion', the lack of negative feedbackmechanisms and the potential of the whole system to 'serf-destruct'. The proposed Tobin tax of I per cent that would belevied on all foreign currency transactions is indeed desiened toslow down the contagious effects of such global fluidities fMartinand Schumann 1997: 821.

Networks and Fluids

Global brands or logos

Global brands or logos increasingly roam the globe. They are enor-

-outly powerful and ubiquitous. They result from how the most

.,,.."rrfr.rl corporations have shifted from manufacturing products

to b".o-ittg brand producers. Their fluid-like power stems from

rnarketing, design, sponsorship, public relations and advertising

.xp",lditrr."s, with such companies becoming'economies of signs'.

Such brands include Nike, Apple, G"p, Pepsi-Cola, Benetton, Body

Shop, Virgin, Swatch, Calvin Klein, Sony, Starbucks and so on'

Central to the branding process is the'global teen market', with

about one blll ion young people disproportionately consuming

similar consumer brands from across the globe, even within

mainland China. MTV the key scape of this global teen market,

broadcast in eighty-three countries in I999 (Klein 2000: I I 8-21).

Products thus are the effect of the brand rather than the brand

being the effect of the product [Franklin et al.2000: 168-9).The

brand creates and maintains links amongst very different products.

They thus produce 'concepts' or 'l ifestyles': ' l iberated from the

real-world burdens of stores and product manufacturing, these

brands are free to soat less as the dissemination of goods and

services than as collective hallucinations' [Klein 2000: 27)'The

power of such fluid-like brands is essentially 'cultural', not resid-

ing in the workplaces, workforces or the objects produce-d and sold

[whether these are running shoes, body lotions, aircraft journeys

or sweaters).In the ."i" of Nike, a 'company that swallows cultural space in

giant gulps', there is an enormous 'power of the swoosh', a liter-

ully free-iloating signifier [Goldman and Papson 1998; Klein 2000:

Stl. nnd this power is insidious, seeping into diverse 'cultural'

domains ,, "rih

brand replicates through cloning' As for Body

Shop and Starbucks, 'they had fostered powerful identities by

making their brand concept into a virus and sending it out into

the culture via a variety ol channels: cultural sponsorship, politi-

cal controversy, the consumer experience and brand extensions'

(Klein 2000: 2I) .Moreover, bra.tds do not just seep downwards, since they often

emerpe from street life and culture, urban black youth, New Age,

tiirl

.i

fi


political protest, labour movement, Green critiques and so qn.Brands are powerful concepts, but they are always on the movqoften ironically flowing in and out of cultures including c,rlturesof protest. Indeed, almost every organization is affected by, andbecomes an element within, this branding global fluid, with uni-versities, NGOs, governments, artists, charities, political parties,hospitals, architects and so on all increasingly part of the brandedhfe.

Such brands demonstrate increasing returns; they magnify andexpand their power through use, time and time and time again.Their power does not get used up but multiplies. The power; rangeand ubiquity of such brands are expanded even when they aresubject to massive political protest, as with the intense campaignsover Nike's use of sweatshop labour. Brands then have becomesuper-territorial and super-organic, floating free and constituting a'defining medium of exchange in global nature, global culture'(Franklin et al. 2000: t82).

Automobility

This GF of immense consequence could almost be seen as 'viral',taking off in North America and then virulently spreading intqand taking ovet most parts of the body social within all cornersof the globe. Such physical mobilities are environmentally costly,with transport accounting for one-third of COz emissions. Worldcar travel is predicted to triple between 1990 and 2050, there arewell over half a bilhon cars roaming the globe, and many newcountries, such as China, are developing an 'automobile culture'.By 2030 there may be one bilhon cars worldwide fMotavalli 2000:20-1).

The fluid of automobility uniquely combines the quintessentialmanufactured object of industrial societies [the petroleumcar), the major system of individual ownership after housing, anextraordinarily powerful machinic complex hnked to most otherindustrial and service sectors, the dominant form of quasi-privatemobility that subordinates almost all other mobilities, the leadingculture defining the nature of the 'good life' through possessing acar, the single most important form of resource use, and the maindeterminant of time fragmentation, as multitasking comes to char-

Networbs and Fluids

ccter i 'ze much social l i fe (shel ler and Urry 2000). Slater points

out tnnt the key here is not the 'car' as such but the system of

fluid interconnections: 'a car is not a car because of its physi-

.ulity bnt because systems of provision and categories of things

are "rnaterialized" in a stable form' [200]: 6).

The fluid of automobility combines the notion of the autono-

rnous self with that of a machine with the capacity for autono-

rnous movement along the paths, lanes, streets and routeways of

one society after society. It is a self-organizing, non-linear system

spreading cars, car-drivers, roads, petroleum supplies and a huge

array of novel objects, technologies and signs that petroleum-and-

steel cars presuppose and endlessly reproduce.

As I noted above, the GF of automobility stemmed from the

path-dependent pattern laid down from the end of the nineteenth

century. Once economies and societies were 'locked in' to the fluid

of automobility, then massive increasing returns resulted for those

producing and selling the petroleum car and its associated infra-

structure, products and services. And at the same time social

life got locked in to the mode of individualized mobility that

automobility generates and presupposes. This is, of course, a

mode of individualized mobility that is neither socially necessary

nor inevitable but one that seems impossible to break from (but

see Hawken et al . 1999J.

Enuironmental and health hazards

These hazards travel both geographically and temporally in non-

linear, unpredictable and irreversible fashion. For example, BSE

takes between five and twenty years to incubate, nuclear acci-

dents can affect generations that are not yet born, nuclearradiation can survive for thousands of years, hormone-disruptingchemicals appear to affect species living across all parts of the

globe, and no one knows what the environmental consequenceswill be in various unimaginable futures of the widespreadplanting of GM crops. Such fluid, moving hazards, which start

locally, roam over the globe, producing consequences that are

un-measurable and indeed 'invisible' in time-space [see Adam

1998: 25-7, 35; 2000). Colborn et al. summarize the globally

fluid and complex nature of these processes: 'We design new

70 Networhs and Fluids

technologies at a dizzying p_a9g and deploy them on an unprdented scale around the world long before we can begin to fatltheir possible impact on the global system or ourselves, [1244; see also Beck 1992;Adam et al . 2000). And, i f therelssure lesson here, it is that the physical world is as dynamic,mopolitan and productive of emergent effects as is the sworld [Clark 2000).

- _ Thus it_ was only a small local research project begun inHawaiian hut in 1958 that'accidentally' revealed the awesomrsignificant and probably irreversible forty-year increase in ghouse gases fBrand 1999: 138).The results of the Mauna Loirecords have then come to play a central role in the performarof what is now seen as a 'global nature', a nature regardedsubject to exceptio nally hazardous and irreversible levels of thstretching over an immensely lengthy period [in rvhat I'glacial time' (Urry 2000b)).

The world's oceAns

These might be viewed as an almost literal global fluid. oceansare_ increasingly seen as possessing life-making properties andwith levels of biodiversity that may help to 'save the globe'from some the hazards just outlined fsee Helmrelch 2b00).Bioprospecting the life-making attributes of the sea, such as thecuriously liminal coral reefs, involves mobile networks of re-searchers, government funding [especially from the USAJ, notionsof biodiversity, commercial companies and freezing i' ihe formof .patents. In particular: 'The marine environment . . . is beinguploaded into a world wide web which reconstitutes biodiversity. . . as a "life" force to be plugged into projects of healing forindividuals and "sustainable" use of the planet' lHelmreich zboo:26).

Such oceanic networks, under the guise of savins the individ-ual and the globe, roam the global .o--onr, biopr lspect ing theoceans for patentable properties, as life has .o-" to-b" viewedas a 'network of salty fluids' [Helmreich 2000: 2g). One ofthese webs of relationships, the Monterey Bay Aquariu- R"r"ur.hInstitute, is a leader in the use of deep robotics and of telepresenttechnologies of visualization of the deep oceans.

Networb.s and Fluids

Social mouements

7l

rlanV CofrrrTrentators have begun to characterize social move-

Y:;;, ;; fl;td-like with the exceptional and unexpected upsurges

:ff;;. ;tggt trggg) describes rapid mobilization as involving

::.i;;;;;"; ,1jf-t"infotcing processes where a small initial changeerruub---- - r ' ' i i t ive f""aUtcl" This produces a 'contagioni5 rmPlihed^ bY Pos:

eff'ect' signihcant wlthin many protest movements where strikes

nr other actions sprea<l like'forest fires'' McKay [1998: 52J simi-

ij;l;ik;il"#ni', movements as ebbing and flowing' sroup-

ing and regrouping ittp*,tf g97) describes the flows' webs and

networks that are lnvoived in many forms of artful protest [see

also Jordan 1998) '

Overall, Melucci describes movements of protest as involving

'..-."l".ptto.rr n"bt'I" oi it'dl"lnct shape-and variable density'

; ;# ' - I I3-141. Shel ler (2000) shows how these uncertain

lii*"..,"", ""i ar..-il .ir""g" involved in 'social movements'

should be analysed ihto"gh tlie. prism of non-Euclidean sticky

;;;;; u'd b"r,di,,g times'"Social movements often demonstrate

movement with no U"gi"titU or end point' Movements flow along

various channels U* il"V l."erflow'^ or 'ebb away'' They can be

more or less viscose, op"ti"lly as public domains can enable cas-

cades of action. U"f"pf" t"-po'"liti"' are involved' particularly

,r ,fr" farticles in a movement may be transformed into power-

iti -.t*

Various kinds of 'free space' can enable moveme-nts to

seep through bo.d"., "t'd

bot"'daries' reappearing -in

different

guises, especially ;;di; """*p"tt"a

lot"tiottt' Such social

movements alwavs ;;;;i;" the ihysical movements of peoples'

vehicles, texts, objects, informatio.n and so on that coalesce and

disperse, .orl.".ttrri"' u"d dissolve' pouring. u:o"11 barriers'

switching the poini of "itutk

and intermittently flooding various

spaces [sheller ZOO0; on 'network,switchings" se," Whi:: 1995)

A protest in Lonclon in 1999 is described as follows: 'the move-

ment bafflea ,n" pJf]." "fftttt

to find its center' its motive force'

its central governors; instead, f'om th" pond emerged a plague of

crawling, mobile ;i;;t" - {lgyinq ou^"t th" surface of London's

squares, roads, ".,j^iitag""

tln:tJ": 2000: 74'' on 'cellular slime

.];ldl ;* Fo; Kelle;-191s' ttt' s)' Iikewise in late 2000' a mere

2,000 people or.,",it"* "g"-tt high petrol taxes almost brought


all economic activity in Britain to a halt. For a couple ofthese protestors blocked the rer"drrery-few locarized nodesthe just-in-time delivery of petrol f".;; ";;;;;i.#;J

l1::.1",,::tors brought a large :coll.omy

,to its k"".r,. il;;achieved through a loose network of hlg[ly mobile unJ.o,(through their mobile phones) protesto"rs with no

"uiJ#to arrest and no crear organizaiion that the police .."ii ..,asue' The. fluidity of the petrol supply turned out to b" il;.susceptible to particular points oi blo.krgi bV l"iaf'

.i.^,il;ff;

il:::'j:::l,T :: :::"-t? I :" i 1 : o, a t,ge"tti n g tt' "i. "' ",,i*" .*

Networbs and Fluids 73

.ropping up like the islands of an archipelago, unexpectedly and

"t,aotically. They can appear both horizontally but also vertically,

irrir,rng in the case of international terrorists not from the wild

lnn"r of the subways of New York, but also astonishingly from

the alr as planes or as biomaterials.

11{oreover, extraordinarily rapid and unexpected switches,

or'zapping' (Emirbayer and Mische 1998) or 'turning points'

t'Abbott 2001) occur between such fluids as they pass into,

ihrough, over and under each other. Central to many of these swit-

ches or zappings between the GFs are various kinds of software

increasingly infused into the very fabric of everyday life [Thrift2001). Such pervasive computing has largely remained opaque

and uncontested. And yet software is everywhere producing

snitching and mobility between different fluids, through theInternet with its massive search engines, databases of informationstorage and retrieval, world money flows, especially through theubiquitous'spreadsheet culture', intelligent transport systems,robotic vision machines under the oceans, and vision machinesmore generally. It was calculated that in 1996 there were someseven bill ion software systems (Thrift 2001: 18).

Finally, these complex intersections between fluid spatialitiessuggest a further metaphor; what Law and Mol term'fire' [2000).By this they try to capture how a continuity of shape can be theverv effect of movement, even of abrupt and discontinuous move-ment [note the previous description of gases). The term alsoemphasizes how there is a striking dependence of presence uponrvhat happens to be absent. Indeed, more generally social life oftendepends upon peculiar combinations of the presence and theabsence. 'Fire' also brings out how the forms of absence that con-stitute a present are themselves patterned [they discuss a starpattern but there are others). There is thus a complex oscillatingpattern of presence and absence, of contradictions, within socialphenomena. There are not fixed entities with stable attributes

[Abbott 2001: 40-l) .This concept of fire characterizes contemporary communica-

tions. In intimate and unexpected forms, an array of technicaland instrumental means of communications are combined withhumans. They have partially replaced the spatiality of 'co-presentsociality' with new modes of present and absent 'strangerness'

appropriate images onto the world's media, although ''".h;i,fimedia skill was learnt during the very course of th"e p.o,& ,*ugThey thus learnt from and lontribuied ,o tt

" "nutJr"", _"Urf,protesting occurring at the same time across Westeri Europe..q

:?t^:-T:: t-r:9-90 protestors) thus chaoticully p.odr,."a, fi.r*eot certain patterns of localized refining, just_in_time deliverylinstantaneous real-time communications, globalized

-"air rnamotorized mobility, influential protest thui dirrrfi"a

-."r".-r.n

governments across much of Europe.overall, Arquilla and Ronfeldt summarize the nature ofsocial movements and ,netwars,

within. an age of complexity:'Information-age threats are ..,or" lik"l; ;. T";;;" ':rffr..,

dispersed, multi-dimensional, non_linear; and ambiguous than

::9:,Ilit-p: threats.. Metaphorically, then, future .o'r,ni.L _rvresemble the orientar game of Go more than the western gameof chess' [200]: 2) .

I have thus set out some ^strikingly

powerful fluid systems.Together with GINs, these fluids rJam the lands, th" se"s and11ner.a.nd outer space, or what we metaph.ri.;lt;;in" !ou.,0ngold 1993). These systems travel aiong and beyond variousscapes intersecting with each other in .o-p'i"*, urrp."dr.iubL

"ndtime-space compressed forms. Various times are fblded into theseroaming hybrids, including nanosecond i.rrt"r-rtun"iw 7", *t,rtthe Internet), commo-difi:j futures lgf"Uri-_;*rf,'',fri"iro__fragmentation of time [with autom.biity; u.,a "*"Jo-"

i"ru""iry!:l,l:i: "ceans).

They roam the globe, possessing the power ofraplo movement, across, over and under many apparent regions,disappearing and then reappearing, transmutating their form,

74 Networhs and Fluids

il:l j:: rr_ m", # frT*H {r':l** :Jn i.remoreness, or mobirity u"d fi*rii"r-::;:.i::y""n n€3.D€SS i

*iY:? :#:iffi :t.,m ; i: :t gt'#Hi [T.:il;ll,1^:: :: :.1 la pse;, a"r,ul

",, ;""';.:_:;:,,.1o,,, on and sta siq insi

correctiviries lose thejr bora".rl ;^:::f ,ji:i and,simulated,

a:u.' llTj i: n'y d;?",l*'h hk*:111^iil'' l "'"*'jl:::-1,,"' jh" -o]l:'ff::":'Til"*,"J',"'l

our midst - on; :;?il ::' :?'* ::': : : " i ;,, ; ;:; " : " 1". ;X HH::",l l:l::^::lt:f '"ordrin".?;,ljff :::X..","0r"j.^1.h,.u.t".i,",,u,

: *r#{'fi I iffi :,:l ir:,j ru ::,T : *tig ":iil: Hl;iiIi?d]r evotving'i.u,lro''oit;:o:r'""excellent imase

"r,i iffi:j:f +Hii :? i :1 ", *o.r.,,;;;;", ili ^]fl|.i:rs, sroups(B o ga rd 2 000 :, 0j.'il;'."r"b f, :: 1"tfi :* cybe'netic ;ril;T

,;i'ff'.,','."'; *ttu t=tr,qlt* lu*** i*iifi, t:Tr' i:TJ l"# l?'' * p' e' " ; ;; ilI,?ff ', ":,-t, ilf;' fi , :il1:,'*i'r: *il tr t_# j #,::,:i: :jil"Hh jl?r;::::;

I have thus exan

conclusion

#''""d:ff t "#lt#i,'ftii ry ll':'"n: ;,H,'ff ,,;: ir_:,."il:',|t3*i:;';;;;";';;;:I,,"i;:'J:rL,:UlJnT;i;91*i*:?Ji:*ffi ''.;11',','il":ix"ilr;::;fft i** n i;tiri tr*i :,"Jx il: "* :r, ::il:.:, J::T,:T,.,,y tn#;$"f} il:l#l3r31;T[1]f ,lj ifew

I

Networlzs and Fluids/J

:i :l rJl'i1*1r'f

n:, :jl_T_f :*ss lix e d an d s tabr e attri b utes,l::^ :"_Tf5:fI,: li: upp,opii"t,r,".*o*i,Jff::"":Ttmake,.1r"

-?l their fl uid u"d_ ryrt"-t. .f,

"*i,".;;;.r.ln the next chapter I examin" ; ; ; , ; ; irhe slobal rol,t;^-"t :^- +L -

:ematically the nature:|l5:',"iJj;*:'"."":*: * I t: F"'";'rl'::ililft*:::ffi .'"",ffi Tr:h;:"::l:::,1':t4i;;;;J:;:ffi TiTli-il:'[1il:,::r*:::f i:31'0"''**;".,;*:Jf':"f :":il"ii:3: ::;:'il,:"n: "':^ : Tl l': rl i :*, : fi ;;i ; -""ffi :,1' : "::n :j,spaces' within the entire n.ti .f gi.id"possibilities.

Global Emergence

expresses this: 'Emergence requires a population of entities, apul t i tude, a col lect ive. . . .More is di f ferent [s ince] . . . large

nunrbers behave differently from small numbers' [1995: 26).Moreover, with changes in the scientific theory and research,

the basic individual constituents of the physical world havesubstantially shifted over time (from molecules, to atoms tosubatomic particles). So there is simply no ultimately irreducibleentity within science to which larger-scale properties have beenunrversally reducible. Within quantum physics the apparent'parts'consist of probabilistic rel^ationships or patterns between sub-atomic particles, relationships that are not independent but aredetermined by the dynamics of the system as a whole. Heisenbergmaintained that: 'The world thus appears as a complicated tissueof events, in which connections of different kinds alternate oroverlap or combine and thereby determine the texture of thewhole' (c i ted Capra 1996: 30J.

'Rational action theorists' in the social sciences advocate redu-cing social patterns to various modes of individually rational, linearactions. But this seems wrong, since it presumes a clear andirreducible 'individual' whose rational actions can explain thesocial phenomena in question fsee Goldthorpe 2000). There is noreason to presume that there are such clear and unambiguousrational individuals. Certainly the history of the physical sciencesshows that there are no given and unchanging irreducible entitiesto which the complexity of the physical world has been, or couldbe, reduced. Indeed, what counts are the'individual' results frommultiple flows occurring over various times. According to Del-anda (1997: 259-60), individual bodies and selves are mere'transitory hardenings' in the more basic historical flows of min-erals, genes, diseases, energy, information, and language fsee alsochapter 2 above).

Emergent properties are also, as we have seen, never purely'social' and the processes that generate them are also never simplysocial. Complexity would always argue against the thesis that'phenomena' are bounded, that social causes produce socialconsequences, that there is a cause that generates linear effects.Causes are always overflowing, tipping from domain to domainand especially flowing across the supposedly distinct and puri-fied 'physical' and 'social' domains. For complexity, emergent

77

5

Global Emergence

Emergent Effects and the ,Locai'

The social sciences have wrestled with competing claims thatthere either are, or are not, properties of the sociul v,iorld that canbe reduced to the characteristics of individuals that make up thatworld. such debate_ has perhaps generated more heat than lightand I will not spend too long addlng to that heat.

I presume from the discussion of complexity that there areindeed emergent properties at the collectivl levei. To reduce thatlevel to 'facts about individuals' would be to lose importantknowledge of those emergent properties. And, anyway, there isno efrective way of characterizing 'individuars'- wiihout de-scribing various social linkages that make up those very emergentproperties.

I Jrave already noted how the complexity sciences have exam-ined the emergent character of various populations. I have shownthe l imitat ions of science that reduces comprex phenomena tolinear causes. cohen and stewart talk of thor" iregularities

ofbehaviour that somehow seem to transcend their ownlnsredients'(1994: 232; see also chapter 2 above). It is not that tlie sum isthought to be greater than the size ofits parts as in some formu-lations. It is rather that the system effecis are differenl from itsparts. we have seen how many notions in 'science', such as theproperties of a gas, cannot be reduced to the subatomic parti-cles whose seething movements constitute such a gas. As Kellv

7978 Global Emergence Global Emergence

properties are irreducible, interdependent, mobile and non-lrnear.Reductionism of the methodologically individualist sort is simplyruled ou_t falthough not in some complexity-influenced simula_tions). This chapter consider.s how to think through the nature ofsuch irreducible, interdependent and mobile properties emergentat the global level. How it is that such global properties'emerge,,given that there would appear to be no single centre or'governor,of the globe from which, in linear fashion, global relatiois can bederived?

It is instructive to begin with the best example of non-linearanalysis within the social sciences - namely, Marx's analysis frorna century and a half back of the unfolding 'contradictions' ofthe capitalist mode of production. He ,.gr"J that the 'need for aconstantly- changing market chases the bourgeoisie over the whole isurface of the globe. It must settle everywherg establish con-nexions everywhere' [Marx and Engels 1848/1952: 46-7;see also IFlster 1985; D. Harvey 2000). This putative globalization results .from how individual capitalist enlerprises leek to maximize \profits and hence pay their workers as little as feasible or make :them work as long as possible. This 'exploitation' of the workforce

i

continues unless the state, or collective actions by trade unions,prevents it, or unless the workers die prematurely. The conse-quences of such endlessly repeated local actions reproduce thecapitalist system and its emergent properties of class relations.Substantial profits are generated, so offsetting what Marx hypoth-esized as the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. such profitsreproduce the emergent class relations of capital and wage i"bor'that are integral to the capitalist system. out of thos"e profitscertain 'ideal collective interests' of capital are met through a'capitalist state' that secures and sustains the leeal for; ofprivate property, the availability of appropriate laboui power; theconditions of the circulation of capital and so on.

Howeve4 Marx shows that sustaining order through eachcapitalist exploiting his or her local workforce eventuall| resultsin various system contradictions [see Elster 1985). First, since itis in the interests of each enterprise fbut crucially not of all enter-prises) to minimize the wages paid to its employees, the emergentlevel of demand for capitalist commodities is iuboptimal [Elster1985: 46-7). Hence, in relationship to demand ihere will be

errerproduction, the underemployment of capitalist resources

i"specially labour power) and periodic capitalist crises, although

ih"r" ,r" subsequently mitigated through'Keynesian' policies that

increase'effective demar-rd' for capitalist commodities.

Second, the effect of capitalist competition is to produce a

,r,orkforce that is increasingly inefficient, relatively deprived and

rebellious. Emergent from ordered capitalist relations is a working

class that thro.rgh an increasingly widespread class struggle will

g;n".u," social ievolution and ultimately the establishment of a:high"r' emergent order. In seeking its own transcendence from

,rlu"g" ,lru"ry, tlh" p.ol"tariat generates a new communist order that

or,""r.o-", the emergent contradictions of the capitalist system.

Third, the limitations of existing capitalist markets lead indi-

vidual capitalist firms to seek alternative markets. The Manifesto

of the Communist Parry describes how the: 'need for a constantly

.hrngi.,g market ch"s", the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of

the globe. It must settle everywhere, establish connexions every-

*h"i" . . . the bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the

world market given a cosmopolitan character to production and

consumption in every country' (Marx and E'ngels 1848/1952:

46-7). ihis worldwiie capitalist expansion will 'smash down

Chinlse walls' and ultimately generate the emergent property of

a revolutionary proletariat streiching across the globe [Marx and

Engels 1848/i952; D. Harvey 2000). Thus capitalist relations

ove'r millions of iterations result in the opposite of what capitalists

appear to be reproducing through exploiting their particultrr

workforce. Local capitalist exploitation results, Marx argues, in

non-linear ".n".g"ni

effects of a revolutionary proletariat and

a 'catastrophic' (ln terms of the existing system) branching of

capitalism into a new emergent order of world communism [seeReed and Harvey 1992).

We now k ,o*, through the benefits of hlndsight, that his analy-

sis was'mistaken' in thai it supposedly predicted worldwide social

revolution. However, complexity can illuminate why' Complexity

shows that relatively small perturbations in the capitalist system,

such as the shift from an industrial to an informational paradigm

[Castells 1996), would have produced a branchlng different from

what was pr"ii.t"d by Marx a century and a half ago' Only a

relatively small set of causes would have been necessary to

,l1

&

80 Global Emergence

generate a radically different emergent outcome, of post-For'welfare' consumerism rather than worldwide social revolLarge effects do not necessarily need large causes, since sout of equilibrium can tip or turn one way or the other throsmall rather than large changes.

Marx's analysis brings out the key significance both of Iforms of information and action and of the emergence of syseffects that are far from equilibrium. According to Marx, eagf,capitalist firm operates under non-equilibrium conditions and iable to respond to 'local' sources of information that carries acrossa limited range. Any emergent complex system is then the resultof a rich interaction of simple elements that 'only respond to thelimlted information each is presented with' [Cill iers 1998: 5;on the implications for social simulations, see also Gilbert 1995:f 47-B).Thus, while across the world billions of actions occu1, eachis based upon localized information. People act iteratively in termsof what can be known locally and there is no global control overthe system. Agents act in terms of the local environment but eachagent adapts, or co-evolves, to local circumstances. But they adaptor co-evolve'within an environment in which other similar agentsare also adapting, so that changes in one agent may have conse-quences for the environment and thus the success of other agents'(Gi lbert 1995: 148).

In the next section I suggest that, while people know littleabout the global connections or implications of their particularactions, these local actions nevertheless do not remain local. Theyare captured, represented, transported, marketed and generalizedelsewhere. They get carried along the scapes and flows of theemerging global world, mobilizing ideas, people, images, moneysand technologies to potentially everywhere [rather like ping-pongballs in a gutterl). Examples were noted in previous chaptersof where decisions based upon local knowledge have resultedthrough multiple iterations in unpredictable and non-linearconsequences at the emergent global level. Thus the apparently'rational' decision of millions of individual people to drive carsresults in carbon gas emissions that threaten the planet's long-term survival. The Internet developed out of countless unplannedand relatively small-scale technological and organizational inno-vations occurring in a particular sequence. The almost overnight

GIobaI Emergence

-^llaose of communism across Eastern Europe seems to have

'^] | , ' . r"d once the part icular local centre of the Kremlin was

l^,r-rf" and unwilling to eliminate such rebellion."" ihu, we might say that Marx's analysis of nineteenth-century

-"-,ulir- derionstrates elements of complexity, although the

T,l"rr".a system' he analyses is demonstrably very different from

i^, "t

tod"y. Compared with the nineteenth-century system

"rrrrtr"a through ih" 'h.g"-on' of the British Empire, the

.rir"n, emergent order is structured through multiple inter-

lanend€ot organizations that are collectively performing the

,fiUrf Each Jo-errolves, demonstrating what Gilbert [1995: 151)

;;;; ."Oability to "orientate" to macro-level properties', in this

case at the global level'--

ih"r" u"ried institutions include the UN [notably the Univer-

,ri p".l^.",ion of Human Rights adopted on l0 December 1948)'

W"Aa Bank, Microsoft, World Tiade Organization, Greenpeace'

CNN, Inter-Governmental Committee on Climate Change' BBC'

News Corporation, World Intellectual Property -Organization'

International Air Transport Association, FIFA, World Health Or-

gr.r l rut io. , , IOC and soon [Held.et al ' 1999;UNDP 2000;Roche

iOOOl. Through their interiependence,_these institutions of gover-

nance and civil society are organizing the rules, structures and reg-

ulations of the newly emergent global order (on the contemporary

interdependencies "f

th" tOC, WHO' UN and so on, see Roche

2000). The nineteenth-century equivalent to this patterning was

the t-gg4 establishment of Greenwich Mean Time that synchro-

nized time zones across the world [Nguyen 1992: 33)'

Interdependent with these glob al organizations are various

signifiers tf thl, emergent global order' Besides the blue earth'

these include the Olyripic F1ag, the sea, Nelson Mandela, whales'

tigers and elephants, the sign of th" International Red Cross, the

Amazon rain forest, Mother Teresa and so on' These signifiers

reflect and perform a global imagined community uniting dlffer-

ent peopler, g"rrd"., "and

generations. The astronaut William

Anders most fimourly .o-ni"nted on the image of the blue earth

seen from space:

The earth appeared as a small, blue-green sphere like a beautiful

ornament, ,rery delicat. ".td

ii-it.a. ' ' ' fn" ancestral home of

8l

,1B382 Global Emergence

*ffi #, h: ilTliit,#;1,,T3 ;1ff ,T:r,Tiii:;;Tji "Ti T::;::T:: ;"n

wi th a'ri rr";"; ;' "l;y; ;' r,'['j*n o t b y,,, ; ;;, a;;, "d ; if:::' t;1: i B I,U,,t'a.U :"."r.l"rb,jiSuch images depict.-th:_ql"g" through signifying certain il,:T:':"ffT1":,, "1y'1""T,"1,, u_nd i,,i_"rs. And such i"also speak ror the xrobe, skil; rrftfiffl'iriff;:.i"ff#::i :::rl1o, 3.? j-"3 ""'il'"",,"'*r "u,r i magery' inway or another in their t.",rding ,"d frrr"C,rrl*.t1,marketplace.

o,jx'"1,",:t}:ii:':l' and images are fused together in va

the .^,^.1t ,.:^-.-^ .Jnexpected, mega_events. On rrah o..r'th e world vi ews i tser f ih-r-o r];i' ;:t'Ji*i, "rl":: :t ;x":ffil,:lil*:l' T'# ̂ l,"o^'l: ::i4 ̂ : r

",..e"1 E x a m p r es incrudc

Global Emergence

Strange Attractors

rn Chapter Z I discussed the idea of attractors

,urng" attractors. The latter characterize certain

,fr."r u." unstable and to which ,1",,.l?i".,o.Yi istems is attracted over time through bill ions of

.lrnccsses of Positive feedback.Y' ' 1 | . , r , , l

and especiallysystems where

of dynamicaliterations and

wort d Exp os, Li ve Ald . o".".ii- rv""r, " "' io j. o'"ii,T ijt#i:*prison' Rio Earth summit, ,tr" ,"..oiri destruction of the worrdTi"ade centre' princess Diana's a""trr"""a funerar, the olympicGames, millennial ."l9b1ati-o-.,r, W;;ii 9rpr, Beijing Women,sConference and so on {Albrow iggo,ljo, Roche zbo6, .n. 4.ln

:ili, :i :1T X,Tj' gl'k I i-' gl'" l"' p ro duced, .,..,,i*a, ...-

scre€nsaround,n"',.1ifi,"":,r"":.,11;l;ffi e**Hfr #:?'ambient television, ffur.Crr,fr i )OOif . ',,, \o:h" describes planned rn"*"_"""j;,

^hubs" "";-;;;t,.h:s,, that . . . channel, T,-:'::ilspatio-temporalflows' (2000: lggl 't-L^., mrx.and re-route global:::'^-!1990 reer,Th"t;;" ;';#ilil;'?H"J:,":? gi:|il Icondensation, involving the peculiarly intense .localization,

of Isuch global events yi:h;i ,".,i""

oi".", ar" to the fact that they :il:fi 3:'XTJT"i.']"1';dT:"kiTi't'"'po*".i"l*',r.,-,T:':Ll::t.iiy;,it",, in".n" zrjb;,i.fi;:

. into being thesern rhe next section this rerationship between grobal events andlocal host cities is examined

-".-;;;;alry. It is seen as a specificillustration of a compl""., ;;;L:,r"'lr ,f," strange attractor of'glocalization', whereby rhe connections of l.."li;;;";-].,,on,

iand global consesuences have il;;;; ';".onfigured since Mbrill iant insights from the -iddr;

;;1" .".rtr.y before rnr,.i"tt t

&'nt-

l-

t- Th"r" have been few attempts within the social sciences to

develop analyses drawing on the notion of strange attractors

fgu.n" 1997, 1998). Baker 's examinat ion [1993: i35-41) of the

tentriphery' attractor is the most interesting (see also P. Stewart

Z00l:331). Baker sees the centriphery as a dynamic pattern that

eets repeated at many different levels of the social world. The

lentriphery involves irreversible flows of energy, information and

ideas backwards and forwards between the centres and peri-

oheries, with each existing only because of the other. And the

centriphery simultaneously creates and re-creates both centres

and peripheries. The trajectory of social systems is irreversibly

attracted to this centriphery attractor. .Because centring and

peripheral iz ing involve the transformation of energy and in-

formation and, thus, the creation of entropy, the process is

irreversible.

Cer.rtering, then is an'attractor', creating order by funnelling energyand information towards itself and disorder by peripheralizingits environment. It produces a world on the periphery where theflow of energy and information is away to somewhere else . . . thecenter has an entropic effect on the periphery causing increasedrandornness and increasinq amounts of unusable resources.(Baker 1993:139)

The centriphery is rather like Einstein's conception of an objectwhose gravity warps the space around it, drawing in and generat-ing new patterns of order and of disorder. And further, Baker notesthat such centring processes are now significantly international-ized. Thus: 'toda.v, particular multinational industries center vastamounts of human activity, Iocating specific aspects of their enter-prise in different continents. In each of these cases, the exchangeof goods and services binds and lubricates a dynamic relationship

84 Global Emergence

between the center and the periphery. As- centering progresses,deepens the periphery' [Baker 1993: 140)

Baker's account is now historically dated, since it dependsthe relatively simple thesis of the internation arizing of rrduproduction. However, his argument can be developed thsuggesting that the specific form now taken by the atiractor ofcentriphery is 'glocalization'. Within the phase-space ofpossibilities, the trajectories of many social systems worlare increasingly drawn into the attractor of ,glocalization,

[on'glocal', see Robertson 199?J. By this I mean that there "i"

pa.iallel, irreversible and mutually interdependent process", br;f,';Iglobalization-deepens-loca_lization-deepens-grotalization rrrd soon. The global and the local are inextricably and irreversiblybound together through a dynamic relationship, with huge flowiof 'resources' moving backwards and forwards between ih" ,*o.Neither the global nor the local exists without the other. Theglobal-local develops in a symbiotic, unstable and irreversible setof relationships, in which each gets transformed through blllionsof worldwide iterations dynamically evolving over timel

what has produced such attractor effecti? crucial to Marx,saccount of the contradictions of nineteenth-century capitalismwas its foundation upon the localized nature of information. Eachfirm responds only to locally available information. And more gen-erally this system of localized informational limitation

-o." oJ.r,

remained in place until the late twentieth century [cill iers l99g:4). The radio, TV, letteq, telegram and fixed rine teiephone enabledsome input of information from outside each locaiity. Heideggerwrote about the first in l9l9: ' l l ive in a duil, drab colliery vifage. . . a bus ride from third rate entertainments and

" .orrrid..ubl"

iourney from any educational, musical or social advantages of afirst class sort. . . . Into this monotony comes a good radioiet andmy little world is transformed' [cited in scannell 1996: l6l). Theradio [and later the TV) began to disclose the public *o.ld ofevents, persons and happenings. People were partially thrown intothe public world disclosed on radio and TV.

But m,y claim here is that the scale, range of media and exten-sivity of informational flows developing from around i990have irreversibly transformed such 'discloir."r' from elsewhere.lnformation flows have been dematerialized from place. wth

Global Emergence

A;oitizrtion, information adopts patterns and modes of mobility

L,i.t.nttally scparate from material form or presence. Information

lli. "t"ry*here

[and nowhere) travelling more or less instanta-

l"ourfV along the fluid networks of global communications, along

*hu, *nt referred to in chapter 4 as 'all-channel' networks.

These technologies change at astonishing speed, with a hundred-

fold increase in computing power every ten years (Brand 1999].

ih" n"- 'computime' represents the abstraction of time and its

,"pu.ution from human experience, space and the rhythms of

nature. The information-based dlgital age 'is about the global

movement of weightless bits at the speed of light' fNegroponte1995: l2J.What can be accessed local ly or global ly is now more

or less identical, or at least is irreversibly becoming identical [seeCairncross 1998J. And it is this spatial indifference of information

that has called into being the strange attractor of giocalization.

This involves the remaking of social relations across the world, as

extraordinarily diverse social practices get irreversibly'drawn into'or'sucked into' the ambit of the glocalizing attractor.

A number of almost simultaneous,. and partly contingent,transformations occurred from around 1990 to 'kick-start' thisdynamically different informational order (see Castells 1996).First, Soviet Communism collapsed. The societies of Central andEastern Europe had constructed exceptionally strong frontiersboth from the 'West' and from each other. The cold war chilledinformation and culture as well as politics. But from 1989 thesystem disappeared almost overnight, partly because of the pro-found failure of Soviet Communism to develop new informationaltechnologies and the paradoxical dependence upon US comput-ing technology (see Castells 1998: ch. l). And, as it disappeared,especially following the mega-event of the demolition of theBerlin Wall, so substantial localized barriers to informational flowalso dissolved.

Sirnultaneously, there was the development of systems of globalnews reporting, as opposed to the national news reporting thatimpressed Heidegger in the 1920s. CNN television started in1980, but, s ince i ts 'success' in the Gulf War, broadcasts in over140 countries. This more or less virtual war in l99l was the firstin which the new pattern of twenty-four-hour real-time reportingoccurred across the world. This greatly increased CNN's visibility

8s

86 GLobal Emergence

and this has subsequently spread to many other broadcastershave gone global and produced a ,global

,tug"/r..""n;-il; '"events.now thoroughly mediated (Volkmer t9O9; Hoski", ZOOAnalogously in the late l9S0: all major nn"n.i"l-*-".1.moved to on-line real-time trading accesribl" ,o_"*h"." .l

"aftwenty-four hours a day. There *, . shift to "

*lobrl- rrr".."'electronic financial trading [L"yrhon ,.J irr.tri t*t).

JvrLem

. . -B.r,r.T.ort telling, in 1990 Tim Berners_Lee ,inventej,

the W;Wide Web and especially_ the concep ts .f URL, Hiii;;ifsee Castells's history: 200IJ. Together these conc;.; ;;,seamless jumps from link to ilnk without regard ,o ,h. .o,tional- geographical boundaries within whici i.rfor-"tio",,been located, stored and^curated 6riedman 2000: OS_a1.';;

li:"]:tfq from around 1990 *r.

"'.rr.rai"e **y.iio#r, "*i.lcles, web sites and symposia devoted,"

"""-?",.;iil, ffi;dffiordering. These analyses both detail the strong co-evolution ofinformational flows occurring across th" glob"'*rrtrri" *.y air-ferent domains of activity; and assist in citing, perfbrming anddrawing into existence a new global ordering ,l*"y, bdr*la onthe knife edge, 'on the edge oi.hror,.

My argument here is that there is not a global centre of poweq,let alone a global conspiracv or global ;;*;;l;-;""i,l.ir"a ,"social practice fsee the critique in"Jessop 2000). Rather ih"." i,an attractor of 'glocalization,. This is deveioping ;"

" ;;;;."rriu.lyworldwide basis and drawing more and more sets of iela-tionshipsinto its awesome power. And, as relationship,

"." d."*., _, ," ,fr.yare irreversibly remade. This is productiue of a new ordering

but not one involving a single coordinating centre. Kwa describesthis notion as 'complexity without telos. . . .Arry local changgprovided it meets the criticar requirements, can induce the restof_the population . . . to_,,co-operate,,into finding

" ,"* _"a.

"fbehaviour. All individud, ,""- to b" i.rfo.-"a iuort "".h

ott ",at the steps of the transition' (2002:42; see also Duffield z00lJ.

one illustration of the w_orkings of this attractor is how globalmega-events such as the Olympics seem both to presuppoi" th.emergence of local host cities and to reinforce ttr"i.

"rl-,'"rg"n.".These are places chosen for their supposedly ,niqre, -il*i

rtrur_acteristics that make them rspeciaily appropriate for the hostingof what are increasingly gLobaievenrs (Roche 2000J. Vor.g",_,"r-

Global Emergence

"llv, thc recent period has seen the development of a global screen

."on nuht.h localities, cultures and nations appear, to compete

,ia,o mobilize themselves as spectacle [P. Harvey 1996; Roche

uOf,tfl. These events, premised upon global media and mass

lnuriim, mean that local identity and nation are conceived of

ihrough their location within, and upon, that global screening.

Thrs'elobal screening' in turn relates to the changing nature of

nat ional i ty fMaier 1994: 149-50; McCrone 1998). Once nat ion-

ality was based upon a homogenous and mapped national terri-

ror.v, in which law was defined, authority claimed and loyalty

sought by the state within that territory. But now frontiers are

oermeable and cultural life is far more interchangeable across theglobe thtough extensive corporeal, imaginative and virtual travel.Maier concludes that 'territory is less central to national self-definition' (1994: 149). Nationality gets more constituted throughspecific local places, symbols and landscapes, icons of the nationcentral to that culture's location within the contours of globalbusiness, travel and branding fsuch as the twin towers of NewYork's World Tiade Centre).

Through glocalization, then, nation has become less a matterof the specific state uniquely determining that nation. And thenotion of nation has significantly become more a matter of brand-ing, as nation has become something of a free-floating signifierrelatively detached from the 'state' within the swirling contoursof the new global order [see P. Harvey 1996; Delanty 2000: 94).British PM Tony Blair famously talked of seeking to 'rebrandBri tain ' .

The power of the attractor of glocalization can also be seen inthe more general development of global brancls and of the oftenlocalized resistances that develop against them. I noted in the lastchapter the insidious power of such brands, a virus sent outinto the culture through various channels of sponsorship, con-sumerisnr, political controversy and marketing additions. Brandsare, moreover, always on the move, often ironically flowing in andout of cultures, including cultures of protest. Brands do not justseep downwards from the centre - they also derive from variousstreet life and cultures, turning almost every local resistance intoa rebranding opportunity [such as urban black youth, New Age,teminism, labour movement, Greens and so on).

87

88 Global Emergence Global Emergence 89Simultaneously there is a growing global opposition 1q 1'branded life'. Brands create th'"i. opiosite via- ii" p;;;gadvertisements [Cancer Country .rifr". than Marlboro C^,,.cigarettesl, through local and then global ,reclaiming.i;;

parties, through Critical Mass bike .ides, through th;;.;;;; roanti-sweatshops move-."n,,(":p:cially targeting Nike, Grp'Vl

Y:T,?:l"li11ro on for. theii localizeo labour market exploi

:i:Q and through massive NGO ."_;;;;;^^;;;;;;Y.D.lr] Ir and, glob ali zation'

- o." g.r,".rjf v if<t.i ri;.0.6b,Klein [2000: 441) shows how the

",i".,o. works:by trying to enclose our shared culture in sanitized and controledbrand cocoons, these corporations have themselves created thesurge of opposition . . they have radicalized that ;o;i l ;;. . ' ..By abandoning their traditional .ot" ,, Jlr".t, secure employers topursue their branding dreams, they have lort the i"y"lt;i;;.;protected them from citizen rage.

Thcse are virtual communities that'exist only to the extent that

.heir constituents are linked together through identifications con-

1..,,.,"d in the non-geographic spaces of activist discourses, cultural

].l"au.,t and media images' [Rose 1996: 333). And, partly throughv.i.;r

oractices of resistance to the flows, they serve to 'detotalize'

l-Jlto.ulir"' each national society. Thus 'civil societies shrink and

li.l.ti.ul"te because there is no longer continuity between the

L*ni. of power-making in the global network [global fluids, in my

,"l.rinology here] and the logic of association and representation

;n soecific societies and cultures' (Castells 1997: 1l)'

laradoxically, such groups routinely employ the machines and

technologies of globalization. Castells [1997: ch' 3) terms the

Zapatistas the 'first informational guerrillas', since they deploy

computer mediated communication and the establishment of a

slobal electronic network of solidarity groups. Similar widespread

ir" of the Internet is found amongst the American Patriots, who

believe that the federal state is turning the USA into a part of the

global economy and destroying American sovereignty and local

Irrrtu*, and culture. And the Internet has been central to those

planning the massive protests against the key symbols of the new

gtobnt o.d"., the World Tiade Organization and the meetings of

ih" CZZCS . Organizations like the WTO also came under attack

in cyberspace, as worldwide direct action used the Internet to jam

their computer system and to broadcast information on the

unfolding event.Deteriitorialized global entities are strikingly vulnerable to the

processes of democratic 'mobilization' by similarly mobile, deter-

iitorialized social movements of a fused private-in-public. On

public screens across the world the images of peaceful prot€stors

teing beaten over the head by American police are globally cir-

culaGd. The WTO has been unable to force through the new

round of trade liberalization. It was subject to public shaming via

global screening that exposed the economic private re-alm to a

gtob"t pubhc (see Sheller and Urry 2007). Moreover, this event

iuu, oniy on" of many in a wave oi proteit reverberating around

the world and its screens with similar 'anti-capitalist' events

springing up in June 1999, May Day 2000, July 2001 and so on'

As the orga.tizers put it, 'Our resistance is as global as capital'

[see http ://www. freespeech. orglmayday2k).

Y::::l:11llv, siven the, conflictual and antagonistic relationsLlons

f":y:::"{:bl':":t:" and localiz";i;"; the gloiJ ;;l;;;; .."_l""l1;, 3::' -', I i:i'-:: " ?::," id'"; ; ;; i* t,?^ if ", #:'; illl;;:::::1':::--------------'1*t'::llardtoimagine'ir*,"p)bciol'iit j..XI : . _ -^_o^-^r LrLrrup Lwwv. J) / ) . h

::l l": r, a globat,street party pointedly read: ,The

resistance will

3: :,: :lf : i,i..: "^fl,l, : : r i t, I ;, .,h i I " ".i "i*' ^. :i:i:'n T ; ffi

i.;1,.,"1ry.,."1ks of the ,united colou,. oin?iffi;.:i iilr'J"'iffi322,357).

. Yo." generally,_passionate opposition to the networks and flowsof the new global order

"rr".gir., many networked groups andassociations. Globalization generates its opposition, forming an'elaborate web' that especia*lly opposes 'McGovernment,

fKlein2001: 86). Such a resistant o.d".'_to gtoUutl;r,il;;;;,J^;;;-mented and disparate,. including the 2apatistas in Mexico, theAmerican Militia and the patriot"s

-o.. generally, Aum shinrikyoin Japan, global terrorists, many environmental NGOs, thewomen's movement concerned with the i-p;J;^"i'J"-gt.Ua

marketplace upon women and children in developing countries,New Ageists, religious fundamentalist movementq the GlobalResistance movement and so "".

Ali ;ppose aspects of the newglobal .ordering and are organized th.ough 'resistance identities,

[Castel ls 1997: 356).

90 Global Emergence

Thus new 'organizations' have developed that are globalb

mediated. People imagine themselves as members (or supporters)

of such organizations through purchases, wearing the T:shirt,

hearing the CD, surfing the organization's page on the Web, par-

ticipating in a computerized jamrning and so on. Howevet forall the power of global fluids, 'members' of organizations willintermittently come together to 'be with' others in the presen!

in moments of intensely localized fellow-feeling. These moments,

involving what has been called the 'compulsion to proximity',

include festivals, business conferences, holidays, camps, training

camps for terrorists, seminars and, of course, sites of global protest

[Boden and Molotch 1994; Szerszynski 1997; Urry 2002b).

The workings of the glocalization attractor can also be seenin global financial systems. Such systems have got progressively

disembedded from place with the commodification of markets

operating through twenty-four-hour global trading in real time.

But this global disembedding occurs only with a simultaneous

intensification of the 'local'. Because of the fragile and symbolic

communities that are formed in electronic money space, so

re-embedded particularistic spaces develop to cement relation-

ships of trust more intensely. New meeting places become nodes

of reflexivity that then resonate back over billions of iterations

across time to enhance and augment the globally organized elec-

tronic money spaces.Boden summarizes how the attractor operates:

Surrounded by complex technology and variable degrees of un-certainty, social actors seek each other out, to make the deals that,writ large across the global electronic boards of the exchanges,make the market. They come together in tight social worlds to

use each other and their shared understanding of 'what's happen-ing' to reach out and move those levers that move the world'(Boden 2000: 194)

New places of face-to-face interaction have sprung up in the City

of London, so stabilizing the informational fienty of twenty-four-

hour global trading. There is an increased importance of the-busi-

t-t"r, l"r.t.h [less d-rlnk and meat-based with 'feminization'J, the

conference, iesidential training, corporate hospitality and even the

Global Emergence 9l

business card [Leyshon and Thri f t \997:349-50). Financial prac-

tices across almost all countries are drawn into and are organized

through such relations between locally tight social worlds of

intense trust, on the one hand, and hugely disembedded and

abstracted global money space, on the other. Each strengthens and

reinforces the other; as many other trading patterns get drawn into,

and transformed through, such a glocalized attractor.Something similar seems to characterize work relations in the

softrvare industry. O Riain [2000) describes how software devel-opers rely upon intense 'team' working in order to offset two fea-tures of their global experience. First, the workforce, in this caseinvolved in software development in Ireland, is multicultural, soforms of face-to-face bonding are necessary to deal with anotherwise disruptive'difference'.' And, second, these developershave very mobile careers and relatively fleeting associations witheach other. So what is required is 'an intense experience of ashared space and culture in order to create a cohesive work team'

[O Riain 2000: 189). These places 'are increasingly "between"other places' and are part of the 'innovative regional milieu' thatis to be found in and around Dublin (O Riain 2000: i89).

A somewhat broader account of glocalization can be seen inThomas Friedman's The Lexus and the Oliue Tiee (2000). Halfthe world he says is intent on producing a better Lexus throughmodernizing, streamlining and privatizing their economies so asto thrive within a global world. This is the 'first modernity'. Andthe other half is caught up in a fight to determine who owns whicholive tree, the olive tree standing for roots, anchoring, identity,what l,ash fl999) calls 'another modernity'. Olive trees alsoinvolve excluding others. So the struggle between the Lexus andthe olive tree is taken by Friedman as a metaphor for the kinds ofrelationships that characterize the new global order. They are notalways in conflict - consider the Global Positioning System IGPS)to enable Muslim air passengers to know exactly where the planeis in relationshio to Mecca.

hr

, Ltarber [996) sees the glocal attractor in apocalyptic terms. He

oescri_bes the emergent global order as increasingly locked intoa conflict between consumerist'McWorld', on the one hand, andthe identity politics of the 'Jihad', on the other. There is a lnewworld disorder' in which McWorld and Jihad depend upon, and

9392 GLobal Emergence

globally reinforce, each other. Together they constitute a stranattractor, a spiralling global disequilibrium that threatens existipublic spheres, civil society and democratic forms. He arguqgthat 'the dialectical interaction between them suggest new xpdstartling forms of inadvertent tyranny that range from an invisiblyconstraining consumerism to an all too palpable barbari5pl-,[Barber 1996:220).

Such_a strange attractor moreover involves existing nationallyencoded notions of 'citizenship'being drawn into two alternativeiof consumerism, on the one hand, and localist identity politics, onthe other. Thus existing nationally focused notions of ;itizen;hi;are drawn into and transformed through the strange attractor of'glocalization'. All sorts of further relations get

-drawn into a

gravity effect of such an attractor. lslam, Hinduism, ,born_again,

Christianity and many 'local' religions themselves come todevelop global characteristics, each seemingly knowledgeableabout how each is developing a global vrsibrrity and respo.,iing tosuch processes of co-evolution [see Appadurai lgg6).

Finally, post-communist Hungary illuminates how the attrac-tor of glocalization can be said to draw diverse sets of relationsinto its powerful embrace (Gille 20001. Eastern Europe is typi-cally now viewed as a wasteland - of the failed politi ial projectof Communism and of an economy that generated disjropor-tionate amounts of waste. The siting of a new waste incineratorplant in Gare on the site of a waste dump funded in part by theEU relates both to the nature of the global waste incinerationindustry and to the global environmental movement. The EU isfunding the building of various waste incinerator plants in formerE-astern Europe, plants that would turn local waste into energy.However, according to the greens such sites would also incineratewest European waste, out of sight and smell of west Europeans.So the siting of a waste incinerator plant in Gare appears to bethe product of 'globalization', aided and abetted bv^ti-," EU, andexpl icable in terms of the logic of the global waste incinerat ionindustry.

However, Gille presents an analysis more consistent with thethesis of a powerful glocalization attractor. Thus one effect ofcomplex post-Communist politics within Hungary has been therelative disappearance of the national state. This enabled this

".eci6c locality of Gare to form a direct relationship with the'-"^I.,nno originally responsible for the waste dump in order to

:-; ,j. incinerator built on the site. Relationships were established

l^),ri urrlo"s other global companies, while EU funding was also

,"|"r"a. Local elites in favour of the incinerator were able

,1" -oUtt,r"

a strong sense of local history, which helped to

,iraut,-r objections to neighbourin^g localities and to global'greens'

,""f"rg to influence outcomes from outside. Gille summarizes

if-'" *f"U"t-local relationships operating here: 'The void created by

ii," i,","'t disappearance from Gar6's life . . . was quickly fil led

UV Slobul fo..", and discourses that the new [local] elite success-

tuii' '.rtilir"d in its own interests. . . . Such a direct connection

;;;i"""" local and global could not have emerged undel social-

Onr, ",

the state's umbrella shielded localities from global weath-

"rr,'r"i" or shine' [2000: 252). She thus summarizes how'global

forces . . . are less constraining and more enabling than they once

;;;;; as society after society ir dt"*n into and remade through

*h", i, t"r*"d, in this book, the glocalizing attractor (Gille 2000:

261).

Global Emergence

.r:i

ir,I'ii}:il

Global Emergence

So far I have shown that there is no global society or single centre

of global power and hence no clear-cut global'region'. There is

ulso ,ro rl.tumbigrous set of outcomes providing evidence of the

power of 'globai' processes. I thus argue against those who main-

iain that tlobaliration produces a,set _of linear effects, such as

the heighiened homogenization of culture, or itrcreased socio-

".ono-]. inequalities,lr the worldwide growth of democracies'

What is treated tt"." u, the 'global' prodt""t no single set of

effects, although it is bound up with all those processes just men-

tioned. The dJvelopment of th" attractor of glocalization entails

a wholesale shifting in the very structure of economic' social and

political relations ui.o* the globe. However, the evidence for this

ioes not consist of a set of "-ff".tt

that can provide a direct 'test'

or 'measurement ' of the 'global ' . Of course, there must be.sub-

stantial programmes of research examining these sets of putatlvely

'global' relations.

9594

tntGlobnl Emergence

According to Abbott (200f : ch. 1), much social science assumesla 'l inear reality' in which the social world consists of fixed en_,tities with variable attributes, that these attributes have only ongmeaning, that the past sequencing of events is irrelevan, u"j th.tcontext does not affect these attributes. He makes a general argu-ment against such a position, but global processes and especiallythe global-local processes that construct and reconstruct the reh_tions between the global and local further undermine the notionthat there are or indeed could be clear and unambiguous fixedentities with variable properties whose history is irrelevant. Indeedthe 'evidence' that relationships across the globe are being glob-alized is necessarily ambivalent, contradictory and contestable. Ifit is right to argue for a complexity formulation of the emergingsystem, then the research needs to reflect and capture uneven, farlfrom-equilibrium sets of interdependent processes involved in thevery making of the global and especially of the glocalizing attrac-tor fas Duffield (200]) argues for global governanceJ.

Held et al. (1999: 17) do provide massive evidence of an exten-sivity of global networks and flows, an intensity of intercon-nectedness, a velocity of mobilities around the globe and thehigh impact of such interconnectedness. And these have powerfuleffects, especially of powerful local perturbations in the systemthat resuit in unpredictabie branching emerging across the globalsystem. Examples of these local perturbations include the demo-lition of the Berlin wall, the invention of the first web browserin the USA, the release from a South African orison of NelsonMandela, and the presence of twenty bombers on four Americanplanes on 1l September 2001.

But such emergent effects are often produced by 'small causes'and these get relayed through the diverse and overlapping globalnetworks and fluids that interact physically, and especially infor-mationally, under, over and across the earth's surface, stretchingover hugely different temporal scaies. These interactions are rich,non-linear and move towards the attractor of 'glocali zation' .Thereis no simple empirical research here of unambiguous globalor local entities. Rather, the processes are much more like 'gravity' .There is an increasingly powerful gravity effect upon numerous,diverse localized patterns. Such globally complex systems, espe-cially developing from around l99o and the desubstantiation of

Global Emergence

inforrnation, involve positive feedback loops that render the global

ir,. fro. equilibrium as many entities are drawn into the attrac-

1111 relationshiPs.Further, this set of global systems is like no other social system.

Its ernergent features make it different from anything that has

eone before. Paradoxically it does have some similarities with

ieudal Europe. Some have described the globalizing world as

'neo-feudal'. In the global world there are multiple political units

beyond individual societies [see Walby 2001); there are empires,

such as Coca-Cola, Microsoft or Disney, more powerful than

societies [see Klein 2000); there are competing city states, such

as London, Sydney or Los Angeles [see Roche 2000); and there

are many wandering intellectuals, sports stars, musicians and so on,

as well as internati onal uagranfs, with declining national attach-

ments [see Urry 7007a). But there are also many differencesbetween emergent global ordering and European feudalism, espe-cially in terms of the technologies of the household and of warfare,production, circulation, distribution, and exchange, such that fewuseful lessons can be drawn from such a comparison.

Likewise the system of nation states seems to bear few resem-blances to global systems. The former is organized through anation state that 'governs' its citizens, there are clear boundariesand memberships, they possess a self-organizing character, andeach derives a unity from opposition to each'other'. There is as-vstem of competing, self-organizing nation states that character-ized the twentieth century (albeit with plenty of exceptions).Global systems, by contrast, are not governed by a central state,although there are very significant attempts by the corporateworld to draw up various rules for global governance in their inter-ests. Monbiot rather brill iantly describes the 'corporate bid forworld domination' [2000: ch. 10).

Thus we are confronted with a global social laboratory but onewithin which we have almost no guides to appropriate investiga-tion. Three things are sure. Developments towards the global areirreversible but unpredictable. The global possesses systemic char-acteristics that urgently demand investigation and are distinctfrom those of other social systems. And, since the global is likenothing else, the social sciences have to start more or less fromscratch. Existing theories such as that of class domination will not

96 Global Emergence

work when converted onto the global level. Hence there are sigr,nificant limitations of Sklair's hugely ambitious efforts [200]) iq,write class theories as global. .l

Complexity has thus been drawn on here, since it deals withodd and unpredictable systems often far from equilibrium andwithout a central 'governor'. Complexity we have seen empha-,sizes that no distinctions should be drawn between structure andprocess, stability and change, and a system and its environment

[see Duffield's analogous formulation from security studies:2001).

I have resisted defining 'globalization' as a single, clear andunambiguous 'causal' entity. Jessop similariy argues that global-ization is 'best interpreted as the complex resultant of many dif-ferent processes rather than as a distinctive causal process in itsown right' (2000: 339). If we resist distinguishing between struc-ture and processr stability and change, a system and its environ-ment, then there is indeed no 'globalization' as a causal entityinvolved in 'contests' with various other regions. There are in moreformal language no such entities with variable attributes (Abbott2001). There are 'many different processes', but the key questionis how they are organized within certain emergent irreversibleglobal outcomes that move backwards and forwards betweenthe more localized and more global levels. On such an accountthen globalization is a characterization of the system as 'effect'rather than as in any sense a'cause', although I have noted the likelyinappropriateness of such causal language [Rosenberg 2000). Thisleads me to thinking the global through the lens of performativ-ity. I will now consider such a way of thlnking the global.

First, the'globe' is an object of concern for many citizens acrossmany different countries. I noted above the remarkably wide-spread availability of global images, in TV programmes, brandingby global corporations, adverts and especially political campaigns.Also countless oppositional organizations concerned with aspectsof global governance have developed since the 1960s. There arealso many more form al organizations, especially since the found-ing of the UN in 1948, that take the whole earth as an object ofreflexive concern. The globe has become an object of widespreadreflexivity stretching across the world in the face of what hasbeen termed the'world r isk society ' lBeck 19931. With such a

Global Emergence

jevelopment we can experience at least putatively

97

the 'end of the

the global risklaboratory. But

other ' r-.-Mo.l"rrl science has created this monster

,^,-,or,,, through treating the environment as5uu'- - - , I

scienct- has arso

demonstrated that the Earth is a lonely fragile spaceship that is the

Iniu tron.," for all humanity, however riven by divisions based on

nu,i.rnntl,y, religion, colour, community or ethnicity; how it has

-ra. ,tt.*orlJ a small place with the capabilities now available

io, n-,.,u"-".rt of ideas, information, people, goods and services; and

t,onu i, has demonstrated the fundamental and essential oneness of

all l iving systems. [Menon 1997: 35-6)

Nobel prizewinner Joseph Rotblat argues that we can and must

d"u"loi an allegiance to 'humanity' rather than to the 'nation'

i iggZu, pp *-"i1. It is global interdependencebetween the world's

)op.rlutio.r that is the key to developing a universalist allegiance

io ih,rn-r",-rity' rather than to national identities. He maintains that:

The fantastic progress in communication and transportation has

transformed the world into an intimately interconnected commu-

nity, in which all members depend on one another for their well-

being. We are now abie to observe instantly what is going on in any

part of the globe and provide help where necessary' ' ' ' We must

exploit the many new channels of communication to bring us

toiether and form a truly global community' We must trecome

worlci citizens. fRotblat t09la: pp' x-xi; see also Walby Z00l)

The Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs expects

und i.,dled hopes that the global media will play a particularly

significant role in this but not only because they carry cognitive

information across the globe. Raiher, cultural work is carried

through co-present -"di"

images that are able to engender 'an

emoti,onal ."rponr" to the *o.ld events that they portray'; such

images heighten the awareness of regional and global interdepen-

,l".tl" and"put pressure on offending governments to moderate

their often offensive actions [Rotblat 1097a:14)' More generally'

Vaclav Havel describes how the 'perspective of a bette-r tuture

deoends on somethine like an international community oi citizens

ofits

&

98 Global Emergence

. . . standing outside the high game of traditional politics . . willseek to make a real political force out of . . . the phenomenon qfhuman conscience' (cited Rapoport 1997 97; on'distant others,,see also S. Cohen 2001).

Furthermore, scientists [and other groups of professionals) areincreasingly organized in a post-national manner. They are almost'quasi-nations', with their own system of globally organizedevents, timetables and rewards [such as Nobel and other prizes).And, as modern electronic communications develop, so theiequasi-nations become more important, widespread and drawninto the attractor of glocalization. Professionals indeed see theglobal village as replacing the nation state, as electronic commu-nication supplants written communication and the 'whole earth,replaces the 'territory with borders'. There is a widespread senseof the increasing role that communities that cut across nationalboundaries play in the lives of ordinary people fRotblat 1997b).Various authorities have talked of the growth of a 'transnationalcivil society as an arena for struggle' (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 33),as well as massively extensive and self-organizing 'ungroundedempires' like the overseas Chinese (Ong and Nonini 1997J.

Some analysts also argue that women are more likely to bedrawn to notions of global citizenship. Women appear to be moreopposed to wars (on the Gulf War, see Shaw 1994: 1Z7).Theyoften find the maleness of symbols of national power particularlyalienating fYuval-Davis 1997). Survey evidence shows that theyare particularly committed to conservation and environmentalissues (Anderson 1997: 174). Thus women are more likely to con-vince others of the superiority of a relatively countryless notionof citizenship and indeed to advance a notion of universal rightsunder which specific women's rights, such as freedom from sexualviolence, can be lodged (Shiva 1989; Kaplan 1996;Walby 2001).

So various social practices, of science, the media, internationalgroupings, women and so on, which stem from the putative uni-versalism of the globe as an object of reflexive concern, may beginto make or perform the global. Global Nature, Global Cuhure for-mulates a conception of the global as 'performance' (Franklin etal. 2000). Indeed, it uses various complexity notions: of ideas ofcatastrophe, chaos and fractals, of how global culture is partiallyself-organizing, of the open character of the global system, of the

irnportance of iteration and of the generally disruptive effects

.rf ,p".ifi. informational flows. There is a strong recognition of

ih" .o-pl"x, non-linear and temporally irreversible character of

" lobal processes.

" The authors draw especially on Butler's claim that performa-

tivity 'must be understood not as a singular or deliberative "act",

brrt ruth"a as the reiterative and citational practice by which dls-

.o,r.r" produces the effects that it names' [1993:2). Butler brings

out the crucial importance of iteration for performance. Struc-

tures are never fi"ed o. given for good. They always have to be

worked at over time. And naming something [such as the global)

is itself partly to call that which is named into being. Franklin,

L.rry ani Stacey argue that the global is 'performed' by itself

and is not caused by something outside itself not does it cause

effects external to it. The global is seen as auto-enabled or auto-

reproduced, although they do not use the term 'autopoeisis' from

complexity [see chapter 2 above). Thus they ex_amine how the

global is being brought into being as an emergent effect, as it comes

to constitute its own domain especially through various material-

semiotic practices [Franklin et al. 2000: 5). The global is shown to

be ,perfoimed, imagined and practised' across numerous domains

thai are operating at enormously different scales or levels'

The autho., ulro describe how the global 'enters' the self

through what they portray as the 'intimate global'. Because of

the shift from ,kind' to 'brand" they describe how nature is

being drawn into the attractor of globalization. Nature gets com-

-odihed, technologized, reanimated and rebranded' And many

material-semiotic practices - from the economic, to politics, to

medical science, to theme parks, to computer technology - are

involved in the global ,"-"kittg of culture and nature and espe-

cially the increasing fusion of the two.

Does this therefJre mean that we should conceive of the global

system as autoporetic [see chapter 2 above]7 Is the global system

,elf-m"king? Maturana writes how autopoietic systems 'are

defined as networks of productions of components that recur-

sively, through their interactions, generate and realize the network

that produ.!, th"- and constitute, in the space in which they

exist, the boundaries of the network as components that partici-

pate in the real izat ion of the network' I I981:21) ' Such a system

Global Emergence 99

100 Global Emergence

is thus not a set of relations between static components with fixedattributes. Rather there are processes of self-making throughiteration over time of the production of components that are infact necessary to make up that very system. There is continuousregeneration of the processes of production through an array offeedback mechanisms (Capra 1996: 168).

In a sociological context Luhmann has most deployed thisnotion of autopoiesis. He defines it thus: 'everything that is usedas a unit by the system is produced as a unit by the system itselfThis applies to elements, processes, boundaries, and other struc-tures and, last but not least, to the unity of the system itself'(Luhmann 1990: 3; see also Mingers 1995). Such systems deploy'communications' as the 'particular mode of autopoietic repro-duction', since only communications are necessarily social. Atheory of autopoietic systems involves the development of com-munications as the elementary component of each system. Suchcommunications are not living or conscious units but involve threeelements, information, utterance and understanding. Luhmannunderstands these as co-created within the processes of commu-nication. Social systems are not'closed systems' but open systemsthat are recursively closed with respect to such communications.Such communications result, he says, in the self-making of 'ourwell-known society' [Luhmann 1990: 13; see also P. Stewart2001). These systems increase their complexity and their selec-tivity in order to reduce the complexity of the environment inwhich they have to operate (Luhmann 1990: 84).

How relevant is autopoiesis to examining the nature of globalsystems? Certainly, the notion of autopoiesis bears some similar-ities with analyses in Global Nature, Global Cubure as to thespreading of global communications and consequential remakingof the natural and cultural domains around the world. Autopoiesisalso bears a resemblance to the argument that it is through namingthe global, and through blll ions of iterations, that the global is thenbrought into being. Luhmann talks of the differentiations involvedin the development of 'world society'.

Howevel, Luhmann's argument is couched at too high a levelof abstraction to grasp the very specific character of the global net-works and fluids that I outlined and defended above ffor a morecircumscribed application, see Medd 2000). Luhmann's account

GIobaI Emergence

is functionalist, not capturing the contingent, far-from-equlibriumprocesses implicated in the current world 'on the edge ofchaos'. Feedbacks are predominantly negative rather than positive.Luhmann refers to 'our well-known society'. But this suggeststhat the general concept of self-making cannot be connectedto the very detailed workings of networked phenomena that arecomplex, fractured entities often operating far from equilibrium.These limitations are even more problematic where such notionsof self-making weakly capture the extensivity of global networksand flows, the intensity of global interconnectedness, the height-ened velocity of mobilities around the globe and the massiveimpact of such interconnectedness.

Indeed, applying Luhmann's autopoeitic formulation to theglobal or'world society' would result in a 'global functionalism'where everything that affects the system across the globe is seenas contributing to its self-making. Thus the massive inequalitiesthat accompany globalization, or the rising of global temperaturesthrough 'global warming', or the growth of global terrorism mightall be viewed as necessary functional components of the processesof global self-making. This position is unconvincing. But so too isan alternative view that treats the global as the clear and deter-minant outcome of a partially self-conscious transnational capi-tal ist c lass [sklair 2001).

Conclusion

Thus the notion of global self-making seems plausible, but theglobal system as a whole should not be viewed as autopoeitic.How to combine these positions here?

It is necessary here to return to the discussion of Prigoginedeveloped in chapter 2. He shows how new pockets of order arisethat are often far from equilibrium. These pockets involve dis-sipative structures, islands of new order within a general sea ofdisorder. He argues that these islands of order can maintain oreven increase their order at the expense ofgreater overall entropyor disorder. Prigogine describes how each of these pockets oforder ' f loats in disorder ' [see Capra 1996: 184). I t is var ious con-texts well away from equilibrium that are sources of such new

l0 l

IIiIl

i

t02 Global Emergence

localized order. Examples of such pockets of order are turflows of water and air that appear chaotic but that are inhighly organized. Such turbulent flows involve processes ofmaking with highly effective feedback mechanisms.

It seems that Prigogine's formulation provides an importantto understanding global complexity. This position will be brisummarized, since it provides the basis for the revivedscience of the global developed in the next chapter.

First then, contrary to the claims of a number of authoritieqthere is no single equilibrating global system [see Sklair Z00li:There is also no 'other' to the global that, as with other socialsystems, is necessary for governmentality and social order.

But there are systematic forms of global interdependence orwhat is termed here global complexity. This 'system' is hugelyopen, comprising various interdependent and hybridized net-works and fluids. They move in, through and across time-spacgin remarkably different and contrasting trajectories. There is notendency of this global 'system' to move towards any obvrousequilibrium. And there is no evidence that this global system is iztoto organized through autopoeitic self-making, in part because itwould be impossible to specify what the relationships are betweenthe array of biological, social and physical processes involved insuch a system and its environment. We should avoid positing aglobal functionalism or a global conspiracy, especially in the lightof the critiques of both formulations developed over the pastcentury.

Howevel, global complexity is not simply anarchic disorder.There are many pockets of ordering within this overall patterningof disorder, processes involving a particular performing of theglobal and operating over multiple time-space with various feed-back processes. Such pockets of ordering include various net-works, fluids and governance mechanisms. These different pocketsof order develop parallel concepts and processes of what we callthe global. At different levels there are what we may term 'globalfractals', the irregular but strangely similar shapes that are foundat very different scales across the world, from the household sayto the UN.

And, as such pockets of ordering emerge, so various often verysubstantial non-linear effects of 'global-local' obiects, identities,

Global Emergence

. -":r,rrions and social practices develop. These come to form andtl'ii,l.ru," the strange attractor of glocalization. Like gravity, this

::,:;:i", can be viewed as drawing multiple sets of social rela-

L'^". f r ior worldwide into i ts tender embrace and restructur ing

llLi ."trtionships through countless iterations that occur over

i]Lr.rrrirt periods of time. The speed, range and depth_ of espe-'-iii" tt," informational and transport revolutions heighten the

in,"ra"p"naent non-linear effects of such glocalizing relationships

across the world'""ih,ls

there are pockets of order [or ordering) within a sea of

olobal disorder. And, indeed, such pockets of ordering operating

It diff".ent time-space scales heighten the turbulence, the risk

.ultrr."r, of the global sea of disorder, as I elaborate in the fol-

lowing chaPter.

103

tiljlr

tII

,&

Social Ordeing and Power

Nsrcm. They concentrated upon the characteristics of the formerin order to derive appropriate metaphors for understanding howorder within a social system is possible. They did not see how theproperties of living systems might provide appropriate analysis ofsocial order, given that order is never simplg fixed and achieved.The science of complex systems provides a way of thinking aboutsocial order that transcends the static nature of classical sociologi-cal functionalism, where the fixed parts of the social body are seenas providing specific functions within the workings of the socialrvhole.

Second, classical sociology tended to adopt a relatively simplenotion of what constitutes'social order'. In Parsons there is a hier-archy of values and norms that works through each society at alllevels, a clear notion of social equilibrium, and strong negativefeedback or steering mechanisms that can rapidly and effectivelyrestore order. But the implications of complexity, as opposed tothe early post-Second World War cybernetics that influencedParsor-rs, is that there never is such a clear and effective set of re-equilibriating processes. And, indeed,.efforts to restore social orderalmost always engender further unforeseen consequences. Theseare often of a kind that take the society further away from anyordered equilibrium. In a later section of this chapter I consi-der the extraordinarily 'complex' and unpredictable character of'mediatized scandals' as an example of the systemic workings ofsuch unforeseen consequences. The classical tradition little con-sidered the mobile patterning of social life that problematizes thefixed, given and static notions of social order. Ordering one mightsay is achieved 'on the move'.

'fhird, formulations from classical and early twentieth-centurysociology deploy a society focus with little recognition of howwhat lies beyond each society's borders is relevant to apparentsocial ordering [Urry 2000b: ch. l). For Parsons, such a notion ofautonomous self-reproducing societies stemmed from the ap-parent autonomy of American society throughout the twentiethcentury. He then universalized this characteristic to all otherapparent societies without acknowledging the specificity oftwentieth-century USA [Urry 2000b). Parsons defined'society' as'the type of social system characterized by the highest level ofself-sufficiency relative to its environment, including other social

105

6

Social Ordering and power

Social Order and Global Complexity

A long-standing issue in sociorogy and social science moregenerally concerns how some kina"of order gets established andmaintained in sociar. life. Earry formurations, ,;-;;";erbertSpencer's, maintained that the *o.t i.rg, of the ,..i"r boiu *"..analogous to those of the human boJy- And, as societies J.r,"ropand grow, there is, as with the b-ody, ".r

i.r..""r" in the structurardifferentiation of specialized f"".uLr. The social body, llkethe human b^ody, is characteriz"J uu ,rr" -i".J"f*i#" ".,aintegration of the separate parts. Expiaining any pr.ti.ri", ,o.i"tinstitution is achieved^by showing its contribution or ,function,

to the reproduction of the social"organism as a whole fspencer1 876/ l 893).

. Talc3tt Parsorrs [1960J generally argued that the central issuetor sociology is how it is that sociar ordEr is secured and sustained.In order to answer this he deveroped a normatiue functionalistanalysis' order in societies gets maintained thro"grr-".r-r,ir"

consensus rather than through either ttt" rnt".J"p'."a"".,* "rthe marketplace, as Spencer

"r.gr.a,-n. the coercive relations ofeconomic, political and ideologicai domination, as Marx andothers maintained.

^ However, for a number of reasons, these and other formulationsfrom 'classical sociology, now ,"";';; dated. First, these soci_ologists did not drsti.rguish between

" iiui,-,g organismand a livine


systems' [ l971:8). But such self-suff ic ient societ ies are rare andalmost always rely upon their domination of other societies, suchas that effected by the USA during all of the twentieth century.And no analysis of social order could now be envisaged that doesnot address the immensely complex forms of global interdepen_dence, economically, socially, politically, culturally and environ_mentally. Social order in one society always depends upon itsmultiple connections with emergent transnational relations.

Finally, it is now increasingly clear just how social order is notthe outcome of purified social processes. As Law argues: ,the

notion that social ordering is, indeed, simply social also disappears.. . . what we call the social is materially heterogeneous: talk,bodies, texts, machines, architectures, all of these and many moreare impl icated in and perform the social ' [1994: Z). ln thai senseclassical sociology's notion of accounting for a purified social orderis past and should be relegated to the dustbin of history flatour1993; Knorr-Cet ina 1997).

In this book I have elaborated some theoretical resources thatbreak with such classical notions of social order. A number ofclaims have been advanced and defended. Thus criss-crossing'societies' are diverse systems in complex interconnections withtheir environments. There are many chaotic effects that are distantin time-space from where they originate. These in part result fromthe positive as well as the negative feedback mechanisms thatmean that order and chaos are always intertwined. There are manyincreasingly powerful self-organizing global networks and fluidsthat are moving systems far from equilibrium. And there is not asocial order that can be accounted for by purified social processes.

Such complexity thinking enables our thinking to overcomethe dichotomies of determinism and free will. We can begin tosee how powerful material worlds are unpredictable, unstable,sensitive to initial conditions, irreversible and rarely 'societally'organized. Indeed, does this therefore mean, following formerUK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcheq, that 'there is no suchthing as society'? Is there no longer a societal ordering, althoughThatcher argued this for very different 'methodologically indivi-dualist' reasons?

This book seeks to show that there are 'societies', but that theirsocietal capacity has been transformed through becoming ele-

rnents within systems of global complexity. These^systems possess

.o tendencies towards equi l ibr ium and al l sorts of social relat ion-

,[tp, g", ineluctably drawn into ^the_

attractor of glocalization.

ih"." -"r"

various networks and fluids roaming the globe that,

unlike societies, possess the power of rapid movement across, over

und rrd". many societies as 'regions' [see chapter 4 above; see

also Bauman 2000J.

I will now make a few comments about how societies are trans-

formed by becoming elements within the systems of global com-

olexity. For the past couple of centuries apparently separateiro.i"ii"r' [especially those within the north Atlantic rim) have

been characterized by a 'banal nationalism' that separated one

from the other. A banal nationalism involves waving celebratory

flags, singing national anthems, flying flags on nationally important

p.tlii. b'nildi.tgt, identif ing with national sports heroes'-being

udd."rr"d in the media as a member of a given society, celebrat-

ing that society's independence day, slafng certain similar politi-

.ul "nd

c,rlt.r.ul practices and so on [Bill ig 1995)' Many of these

core components of such a natiopalism date from the late nine-

teenth century.The development of global complexity means that each such

banal natio.rulir- increasingly circulates along the global informa-

tional and communicational channels and systems' They become

fu-ili". to, and indeed part of, each society's branding, within the

wider global order. Mega events increasingly occur when the nation

and its"'banal' characte"ristics are placed upon the world's st-age for

display and consumption, especially through the global fluid of,t."u"ih.,g peoples'. Each ,r.h b"n"l nationalism is increasingly

.onrr-"i ty oth".r, compared and evaluated, and turned into a

brand. We might say that ihere is a move from banal nationalism

to brand nationalism in the new global order, especially at moments

of global celebration and consumption [Roche 2000)'

indeed, I noted utou" that therl are thought to be.at least 2'000

'nation peoples' all suffering various kinds of displacement and

u*bigrrotr, location in. CJtt"" 1997: pp' ix-x; .Papastergiadis2000i. Only a minorii of 'societies' are constituted as apparently

separate nation state societies' Most societies are not nations' let

alone nation states, the most striking of such non-nation-state soci-

eties being the'overseas Chinese'. E,ach ls increasingly drawn into

Soaal Ordering and Power 107

108 Social Ordeing and Power

the attractor and gets rebranded within global complexity. \4,over, in many places people develop multiple identitieq sioften there is no longer the o'e 'true national self,. O;;;Hiithose living in scotland consider themselves Scottish

"na i*r,

Mike Davis's Magical yrb:"i:ry (2000b) brings out some extra+ordinarv dimensions. of the fluid diaspo.lor tn9 ihi..y-.*o Li[iooor so Latinos now living within the usA. They aie the largestethnic group in Los Angeles, forming n .1q wlthin a .lty,

"ri ti.y

will soon outnumber whites living in cahfornia. or, ,o'pri' ia aif.ferently, US Latinos are already in. nftn largest ,natio-ni

withinLatin America. There are wide-ranging processes of 'cultural syn_cretism that may become a transformative template for th" *holasociety' as the USA is becoming inexorably Latinized (Davis200ob: 15). Much of this syncretism stems from 'transnational_ized communities' moving between especially Mexicq .ro* u.rymuch a'nomadic' country and the USA: 'l ike quantum particlesin two places at once' (Davis 2000b: 77). Levitt [zoor; sornewhatsimilarly describes the self-organizing'transnational villages;formed by those living more or less simultaneously in the us.q,and the Dominican Republic. There is an extensive transnational-ism from below

, This system_of global complexity is thus comprised of many

different 'islands of order', a notion elaborated in chaoter 5. Thereare not only national societies and complex hybrid d'iasporas, butother networked/fluid polities rncluding'supra-natiorr"i rt",.r',global religions or'civilizations', international organizations, inter-national meetings, NGOs and cross-borde. ."gions (perkmann2000; Duffield 20Ol; Habermas 2001; ch. 4;Wally forthcoming).

_ Any society as a particular bounded territory typically findsdiverse self-organizing 'polities' seeking to striate its space,subjecting it to diverse forms of social regulation. In particular,according to Deleuze and Guattari, nation states are necessarilyinvolved in seeking to regulate those numerous mobilities thatmove in and across such spaces. One of the fundamental task of

(McCrone 1998: 140J.

the state is, they say,

to striate the space over which it reiqns. . . . It is a vital concern ofevery State not only to vanquish no-udism, but to control migra-

Social Ordering and Power

t i .ns rrnJ, more general ly, to establ ish a zone of r ights over an ent i re,"*1.'r ior', over ail the flows traversing the ecumenon. If i t can help

it, the State does not dissociate itself from a process of capture of

flows of all kinds, populations, commodities, money or capital, etc.

. . . the State never ceases to decompose, recompose and transform

rnovement, or to regulate speed. (Deleuze and Guattari 1986:

5e-601

But global complexity means that states have increasingly shifted

away from governing a relatively fixed and clear-cut national popu-

lation resident within its territory and constituting a distinct and

relatively unchanging community of fate (Urry 2000b: ch. 8).Shifts towards global networks and fluids transform the spacebeyond each state that they have to striate. Habermas argues that"'glol:alization" conjures up images of overflowing rivers, washingaway all the frontier checkpoints and controls, and ultimately thebulwark of the nation itself' (2001: 67). States thus can be saidincreasingly to act as a legal, economic and social regulator; orgamekeeper; of practices and mobilities. that are predominantlyprovided by, or generated through, the often unpredictable con-sequences of many other entities. Social regulation is both neces-sitated by, and is only made possible through, new computer-basedforms of information gathering, retrieval and dissemination. Suchdatabases can refer to almost every economic and social institution.Such internationalized information flows derive from the emer-gence of a widespread 'audit society', a subset of the visionmachines that ubiquitous computing ushers in fPower 1994).

Thu-s one paradoxical consequence of the intensely fluij andturbulent nature of the global complexity is that 'the role of thestate. is actually becoming more, rather than less, important inqeveloping the productive powers of territory and in produ-crng new spat ial conf igurat ions' fswyngedouw I99Z:431). OneIurther consequence is that states are not converging in a uniformpowerless direct ion but are becomr:uw:rl9ss direction but are becoming much more diverse, fromtle Talibnn to the EU to the USA fW"irs 1998: ch. 71. Indeed(Weiss 1998: ch. 7). Indeed,+L' ."" .^\ ,J.^rrgLLu,urcre has been an 'enormous expansion of nat ion-state stnrcturcs,L

- JLCIL JLI t rLLUlLJ,

iJt.,.,u:fl.ies, agenda, revenues and regulatory capacities since\^ I ,o_-.-- ' lv l ) lg}Jqvr l r lJJrvorld W:r II', in order to deal with global fluids i.rch ",

infor-

lI

rll

109

rnation flows, travelling peoples, inteinational terrorism, health

11t110 SociaL Ordering and Power

and environmental risks and so on that all move acrossin dizzying and transmutating_form fMeyer et al. tg97: iSfit q1998) summarizes such developments by maintainingflglobalization produces new kinds of 'states,.

^6(rring scandals or threat of scandals. States indeed can be subject

ioi."Jtu,"d scandals', scandals that interestingly reveal substan-

,Ll ,"r,.r.,urings in the very complexities of power.

Social Ordering and Power

_ . In some ways nation states across Europe are becominqlike the E_uropean union. The EU is organized .round tliumotion of various mobilities. It has sought to d"u"lop th"freedoms of movement - of goods, services, labour

""i l"oi .tand has intervened with national state policies to

"li-i.rutJm",

Power and ComPlexitY

Much thinking about power in the social sciences has been

io.rr"d upon the interrelationships between apparently.power-

iril und apparently powerless agents. Power is conceptualized as

attributes of agents, through observing two or more human agents

and seeing in what ways, and to what degree, the actions of each

are influenced by that of the other. If one agent is able to get the

other to do something that he or she would not otherwise do, then

that is deemed to be an exercise of power. Steven Lukes's Power:

A RadicalView (1973J famously critiques this intersubjective con-

ception of power through advocating a three-dimensional view

based upon 'real interests'. Lukes shows how the most effective

exercise of power occurs when there is no overt or even covert

bending of the will of one agent by that of the other. Power is

exercised if people's real interests are secured and this is best real-ized without overt or covert intersubjective competition andstruggle. Power is thus conceived of as structural and not inter-subjective. However, this argument has remained partly buried,because Lukes uses the language of Marxism to identifii 'real' asopposed to expressed or visible interests or'false consciousness''But what is notable in Lukes's account is his critique of thesubject-oriented position and his advocacy of the analysis of'domination' as opposed to that of 'power' [A. Stewart 2001).

But in much social science power conceived as a property ofagents remains central to the analysis of social relations. In the endpower is often seen to involve human agents appearing able to gettheir way, forcing the other who is in some ways co-present to dosomething that he or she would not otherwise do, to be able tobend the will of this other. Power gets attached to agency in thecouplet agency-structure.

However, many developments described in this book subvertthis very distinction between agency and structure. Complexitytranscends the division between free will and determinism and

barriers to mobility,.trade and competition. The EU ."" t;.#as a'regulatory state', mostly involved in the monitoring

""dr.illation of the policies and practices of its individual nu"tioo ,t"t.*,that have freely joined up (Majone 1994, 1996). Its r.e"ties andDirectives are particularly powerful. They mean both that gov-ernments must bring their own legislation in line with suchTheaties, and that individual citizens in the EU can appeal directto the European court of Justice when it is believea trr.t nationalgovernments have not implemented appropriate policies (walby1_g9gl Significantly, European laws take p.".ede.ri" over nation-al iaws where they conflict and it is poisible for the actions ofindividual governments to be declared illegal.

Some states, such as the EU, indeed function as what we mightcall'midwives' for developing and enhancing global networks andfluids and are not merely subjected to them. And states increas-ingly act as catalysts of networks of countries operating at theregional or international level and hence function as onJclass ofagencies in a more dynamic system of unpredictable global com-plexitv [Hirst and Thompson r996: ch. gj. castells qiooo, rggT)more generally talks of the increasingly networked character oistates. There are many international conferences and events thatinvolve individual states forming, negotiating and signing up tointernational agreements that then have the further

"if..t of

promoting and performing the global [such as the 1997 KyotoProtocol on climate change). There has also been the growth of'networked wars' and indeed of what we might call 'networkedterrorists' (Duffield 20011.

There is also heightened mediatization such that regulatoryfailure of individual states can be brought into the op"i,

-ud!visible, and individuals and organization., .".r be shamed by the :|;'tu

t*'n, I I

I

t12 Social Ordeing and power 1l?

hence between agency and structure. It transcends the char

:* y.y ll yht:l power has. been located, ", "*"".u. tlthen would constituie a complexi,y

"ppro"ln L i"*J.r"'Power would not be regarded ",

, ' th ing o, u porr.rr ion.something that flows o. .r.,, and may b"'irlr*i"dr;.1:,.i"#^:0,";.tf:.."..i::.y or space. tt i, non-contiguorr. B",l[2000: l0-14) outlines and defends a 'post-panopticar, .ojl*tion of power. power is not necessarily

"""r.rr"d it.."gillilpri

co-presence as one agent gets another to do what h" o. rfr. *outdotherwise not have done through interpersonal threat, force ot

Soaal Ordenng and Power

rrhornpson 1995: ch. 4',Szerszynski and Urry 2001). Citizens are

l^* no, just watchers but objects of state survei l lance and moni-

,Jrtn* there is a generalized increase in 'visual reflexivity'; public

,"rJort,l"t are^increasingly expected to-provide open and trans-

l"r"nt forms of behaviour;there are new forms of impression man-

l""nl"n,' in reaction to increased media visibility; and 'mediated

.iundutr' grow more significant [Foucault 1977 ;Meytowitz 1985)."-

Bv the twenty-first century citizens are subject to informational

m"iirt"d power, forms of power that are complex in their mech-

,nir-, and consequences. On the one hand, there are extraordi-

nu.y ,r"* forms of int'ormational and mediated power with the

development of vision machines, the tens of thousands of satel-

lites, bugs, listening devices, the microscopic cameras, CCTV, the

Internet, the possibilities of sharing information, GISiGPS and so

on. And, on the other hand, the mobilities of everyday life involve

speed, lightness and distance, and the capacity to move unnoticed

tirrough even the most surveyed of societies, such as by trans-

mutating from student to tourist to terrorist back to student

and so on.Informational and mediated power is'mobile, performed and

unbounded. This is its strength and its vulnerability. Attemptedordering even by the most powerful can result in an array ofcomplex unintended effects that take the system away fromequilibrium. In such unpredictable and irreversible transforma-tions, power, and especially mediated powet is like sand. It maystay resolutely in place, forming itself into clear and boundedshapes, with a distinct spatial topology waiting say to be arrestedor bon-rbed, or it may turn into an avalanche and race away, sweep-ing much else in its wake.

This unpredictability of power, its capacity to transmute fromfbrm to form, its capacity to be nowhere or everywhere, will nowbe illustrated through examining some aspects of the contempo-rary phenomenon of scandal.

The Complexity of Scandal

The late-twentieth-century emergence of a 'mediated power'criss-crossing the globe produced distinctly new forms of

persuasion' But also power no l0nger necessarily i.rrroir"r" imag-ined co-presence within a riteral or" simulateJ ;;";;,i;;i" *h...the powerless are actualry or potentialry visible to the powerfur.By contrast, Bauman suggests that"the p.i_" -i".t"rq*

"fpower now is that of 'escape, srippage, elision u.rd ,uoiJ".,.c-e,, the'end of the era of mutual ""grg.-";i, 1zooO, r r;. rur.J"r" ,".ieties had involved a mixture ol citizenship with settlement andh5nc5 with co-presence within the confinei

"rl,p"-.ti. iJrrito.ially based society. But now the new glob4

"fit", l..r.airg .oBauman, can rule 'without burdening itself with the chores ofadministration, management, welfare"concerns,, even involvingdeveloping disposable slave owning without .o--i,-""i izooo,13; on 'disposable peoples,, see Balls lggg). Truuelli'g li;l,Ji, ,1,.new asset of power. power is all about sp"ed, lightn."rr,?istancg

the weightless, rhe global, and this is t.ue both of erites and ofthose resisting elites such. as anti-globailzation protestors or ter-rorists. Power. runs _in and especially jumps across the different91:?1t,ne.two1ks.and

tluids. power is hybridized and is not simplysoclal but mater ia l .

In particular; citizenship and sociar order have always dependedupon relations of mutu aluisibilitybetween the citizen and the state.In medieval and early modern societies, ,t

" ,t

""tri.ut, .o_pr"r"nt

visibility of the monarch to his or her court was centrar to the main-tenance of society's symbolic order and power relations. The ritualprocession or 'progress' of the king or queen around his or herlcngdom turther served to constitute his or her wider subjects as acom_munity of direct wa.yhe^rs of power. With the

"_"rg..r." of

modern societies especially.from the eighteenth century o'n*u.d.,the economy of v is ibi l i ty between ci t izen and state transmutes

i

,ft'.r,, ' I . i


mediated scandals. The complex scandal of power and theof scandal can be viewed through John Thompson,sScandal: Power and VisibiliN in the Media Age (ZOO0).

The global media disembed evenrs from local contexts andthem, often instantaneously and simultaneously, across the dGAt the same time, the breaking-down of more solid class-Lased

^-.1 character are core to the establishment and maintenance of

1'll t"ni,i-ucy of an incumbent or organization' And, the greater

i'fr. ;r;r,, the more. that character has been put on line, then the

*ettet is any ensurng scandal [other things being equal). Trust is

?" "l<l"o,ion"lly

strottg but an incredibly brittle resource' It has

l^ n" .onti"uously performed. If it stops being earned, then it will

"loa" i"r,r"t.n"o.rily, a9 w1h an individual whose character or

nood ,ru-" gets exposed and subject to scandal. Tiust may disap-

11,,. ou".tieht. Rt those subject to scandal often say, they took

i"uff b"lldlng ,rp their good 'name' .but

'their world collapsed

iu"."lght, u, ih"-r.a.,dal 'swept' over both them and their unfor-

tunate friends and familY.-- ihl.d, there is the power of exposure. This involves the making

of the private transgressive act transparent to the public and hence

lust that: publ ic fMeyerowitz_ 1985; Balkin 1999). The wide-

,rnging global -"di"

increasingly possess the techniques to make

trarisparent what the powerful would mostly seek to maintain as,p.iuate,. Such media employ technologies of observation, sur-

veillance and monitoring of people within their supposedly'private' lives. These technologies were initially develop.ed within

the secret services of states, such as eavesdropping, phone tap-

ping, secret cameras, listening devices, telephoto lenses, computer

i'tu.ki.rg, stalking and so on [with Watergate, of course, it was

Nixon's own tapes that provid'ed his downfall). But the power of

exposure is to make what is supposedly backstage or 'private',

frontstage or 'public'. And with digitization there are few if any

images lf the^private that can ever be'locked away' for good,

thaJwill remain forever private and opaque' Hoskins [2001:218) analyses the power of th" 'hidden' media images of the

L"*inkry-Clinton "mb.".",

that were then endlessly replayed

once the scandal had broken.Fourth, there is the attracto r of uisibility or transparew'Media-

ttzation involves the enhancecl visualization of power' People and

organizations across the globe are drawn into the ambit of visi-

bifity "r,d

its seductiv" ihr...r, so as to be famous for fifteen

minutes. And it is bodies that are made especially visible through

mediatized visibility, bodies that speak to the world both inti-

mately and'close .rp; ut d yet simultaneously to vast numbers' This

produces a distinc[ kind of performative biopower, an embodied

Soaal Ordering and Pouter 1r5

forms of politics means -that_

relatio_nships in most countries andregions are less organized and more fluid and mobile - more wave-iike - and hence these scandai events can mo^re rapidly emerge, andpass in, through and beyond the frontiers of given societies."

Four processes in combination generate 'complexity' outcomeswith regard to contemporary scandals. These are normative trans-gressions, the significance and vulnerability of trust, the fact ofexposure and the power to make events instantaneously andsimultaneously visible

First, then, globally mediated scandals occur where there aresignificant transgressions of particular norms of 'expected behav-iour' that characterize a given society or type of society. Accord-ing to Thompson, these transgressions normally relate to sexualbehaviour, to financial matters or to the use/abuse of power. Giventhe ambivalent, contested and often quite strict norms relating topublic figures and institutions, then 'scandalous' transgressionsregularly occur [as most citizens are well awarel). There ur"

-"rrypotential scandals, especially since public figures and institutionsare normally confronted by stricter norms of what is appropriatebehaviour than those not in the mediatized 'public' eye. But thepublic eye seduces increasing numbers of new 'subjects' into thevisual media and who are then subject to cycles of transgression,revelation and confession [what we might term Big Brothernarcissism).

Second, the power of certain incumbents of official positions,of companies and of states, rests upon a 'politics of trusf . Withparticular incumbents such trust is based on their presumed char-acter rather than on specific skills. Sometimes there appears to bea kind of 'giobai trust' (such as that enjoyed on occasions by thePresident of the USA, the General-Secretary of the UN, NelsonMandela, certain states, certain global companies and so on). Butsuch trust has to be continuously earned or performed and henceit can rapidly erode. There is much to lose, especially where trust

1iH''I

. i ,

.&

l l6 Social Ordering and Power Soaal Ordering and Power t1,7

power or a 'public intimacy' through figures made visible andrevealed on the world's media. But this immense biopower isexceptionally vulnerable - to exposure, as -figures, of pow.. canzuddenly, overnight, be seen (through) as flawed, ,s bodily ,can_dalous. All those watching on the media can bear witness to thepublic shaming, the making transparent, of the transgresser xndon occasions their public confession. Gitlin Ilgs0J described this-as The whob world k watching. The exposed individuals, c.mpa-nies or states are revealed, their scandalness is made visible andtheir biopower dissolves in front of the world's saze.

Moreover, the competitive nature of the overlapping and digi-tized media enhances the attractor of transparency. competitionenables the figure of the 'wrongdoer' to be revealed, ."pl"y.Jagain and again, and his or her global shame made visible before,and endlessly repeated across, the globe. This was paradigmaticallyseen with former President clinton and the fascination with hisimmense but vulnerable biooower.

Scandals, we might say, involve small causes fthe furtiveembrace, the tiny lie, the small payment, the hand*iitten note).These small causes can, in very particular circumstances, producedistant and catastrophic consequences for those involved'and formany others drawn into the swirling vortex of a scand alizingevent. Events are typically unpredictable, with no one able tocontrol the trajectory of a scandal [Thompson 2000: 75). Thereare unexpected, unpredictable and uncontrollable visibilities asimages flow within, and rapidly jump across, the various media.The media compete for global stories and produce what Balkin[1999: 402) terms a 'cascade effect'. Different iournalists withdiverse standards of lournalistic integrity compete with each otherfor further scandals to reveal. Especially crucial in producing suchcascades are visual images that disrupt or ridic;le or overturnexisting relations of biopower. Such images get endlessly sold andresold across the globe, as they subvert, humiliate and transgressthe apparent power of the powerful. Those who live by the mediacan also die a horrible death throueh such mediated cascades.

Scandals thus involve complex sets of events that are unpre-dictable and irreversible. They run out of control once there isexposure, because of the mobility and speed of the processes ofexposure, visualization and recirculation. The irreversible events

lead away from equilibrium, especially where those involved try

," turug" events, to cover their tracks, to lay the ghost to rest'

in"l" ui" po*".frrl positive feedback mechanisms where charac-

,"rl"a trust dissolu" ulr.rort overnight and the shame is massively

"i-,nrn."d and magnified. In complexity mode, most attempts to

nrirrimrze exposure will result in the enlargement of the scandal,

"r'".i"fty with the further scandal of 'concealment'. Efforts to

iu'-p"r-, down the evolving events produce complex magnifica-

tion with diverse and further irreversible consequences.

Indeed, once the media have peered 'backstage' then there is

escalating exposure and visualization of the scandalous figures'

grfh" (iggg, +OZ) describes the'self-amplifying focus' of a media

i""dlr-rg 'frenzy' that takes root and leaves little standing in its

*t i.tr.,ui"a patir. Scandals can possess a kind of all-consuming flow

that can 'wash' over those caught up in its wake' As Thompson

[2000: g5) argues,

,the experience i,s likely to be overwhelming,

n, "u".,,,

rapilly spin out of control', away from any movement

towards equilibrium.'Financial' and 'abuse of power' sc.andals are particularly inter-

esting in that they often occur at moments of global scrutiny con-

ductJd in, and through, the world's media. Especially significant

are those big public rneetings when the company or country- brand

is put ott ditpl"y and revealed to the world fstevenson 1997: 46

Kein ZOOOI. f" u single week in the 1990s, Rio Tinto, Shell,premier Oii Nestl€ and ICI all held Annual General Meetings in

which groups of protesters mobilized the world's media to expose

ancl to ihu..t" these companies for their misdeeds'

Significantly, these normative transgressions often and unpre-

dl.t"bly o..r'ri."d in countries far away from where the AGM was

actually held. But, of course, with instant communications there is

oft"r, ,no hlding pi"."'. The trand in question gets threatened with

exposure ,nd rh"-" at the very moment that it is being presented

upon the world's stage. The power of a brand can evaporate rapidly'

Th" "*"-ple

of Nik-e, and the threatening of its brand bec.ause of

the ,slave wages' paid to its workforce, show that 'public shan-ring

and consum". pr"rrrr." can have a mighty impact upon mighty

manufacturers' [Dionne 1998: 11; see also Klein 2000) '

Thus liquid mediated power is a key component transtormtng

power r"lutio.t, in the global age' Such symbolic power flows across

A,ft

I 18 Social Ord.ering and pou.,er I

ffiffJ: i';i:::,ln;":* the worrd's .-o-,

[*{,;tilr: i, :li ::{:i':i pl" nx *l :.i$Social Ordeing and Power

t *o in.r"rsingly components within various systems of global

to^l i l " t i ty. The discussion of scandal shows that forms of in-COl"t . , - -^.1 . ' -J

-o ' { i .+-J ^^, . ,^- . .o -^ki lo ^o"f^"-o. l

o.r liol.. 'r,i"nnl and mediated power are mobile, performed andfoli^rnd"d. This provides both their strength but also their vul-

'')i"v,ilirv.Attempted ordering even by the most powerful within

lr'.11,"r can result

^in complex unintended effects that take the

],,.r"nt i., question further away from equilibrium.

"jn ,r.h unpredictable and irreversible transformations, power,

,nd especially mediated power, is, we have seen, like sand. It may

.iav rerolttely in place forming clear and bounded shapes or it

. . ,uu ,urn into an avalanche and race away sweeping much else in

ii, *ri." What Bauman terms 'liquid modernity' is full of unex-

pected, unpredictable and irreversible movements, including the

,nor" r".".tt emergence of a culture of scandal that takes social

[fe further away from points of equilibrium.In the next chapter I return to some implications of global com-

plexity for sociology and its characteristic theories of the social

world. And I go on to explore some implications of machines,

empires and the cosmopolitan for the strangely ordered world that

seems simultaneously to be on the edge of chaos.

i19

fiTff,'ffil,ffirfif#f+ffi*t*r-ruw

Indeed, the ocr 'rr cte and much, else besides - ' 'o" 1sQ[

.,ge n era r . ; i; ;;";ii:T;; :l: tT i: ;: i : 1. r,,i, s* ".",,ng, *o.

: :: i'ri" q: l[ #,"-T fi #; * I J:,Tj #l1F *ff :: H1i:i.T,r'j';:::t*';',1xnil'.;*lii!'6,ry::Hi.,",'T;fl : ri:,T:,;':";;iliil :,fi ,.TTiii .il"f "i : ri,ilff;sen t erfect through R.os,i 1i ve r""a J".t"iri":f L:ft "jTl.",*m;;l: "JJ H:, in "' hil" *,:iflj :: in :i.ffl ::, :: * ff 3 ";;:;1::'JJ,i,FJ;: l"J,: lt :'", or p u ur i., t[ ni#[ir.;T,',',:Ttl'i::-i3;ii:i"fi f *J:;'i:"x':':H:1*Ttri.1i.{#Jii}i:t'*j;,ffi t.'T:,.hf,:r",t:j

;lfr:Lil}HHiit{il,:ilffi ,:l':ini"i:i;l",'ff H

Conclusion

This chapter has examined a var iety of mobi le processes that makesocral order cont ingen, nna unu.r i r i , io. ,"r ,es

have been shown

Global Comolexities

-,ipnces can result from drawing strict analogies between models

l i ln"norn*na developed within di f ferent domains of enquiry.

li^i""u"r, given the necessarily metaphorical nature of all science,

li" Uook has considered whether complexity could generate pro-

),,.,i"" mctaphors for the social analysis of various 'post-societal'

l r l i " r i . l rvor lds. I fol low complexi ty-theorist Br ian Arthur 's views

ihr, .o-pl"xity writers are'beginning to develop metaphors' and

that the Santa Fe Institute 'is in the business of formulating the

rnetaphors for this new science, metaphors that, with luck, will

euide the way these sciences are done over the next fifty years of

io' (1994b; 6801. Complexity thus seeks to establish pattern

similarity operating within and across many different systems,whether they are nominal ly 'physical ' or 'human'.

Special focus has been placed here upon the metaphors appro-priate for examining the material worlds implicated in the ap-parent 'globalization' of economic, social, political, cultural andenvironmental relationships. In the past decade the social scienceof the global has extensively described many of these relation-ships. However, much social science has not developed complexanalysis of global systems that transcend the societal or national.It has tended to take the global for granted and then shown how,and in what ways, various localities, regions, nation states, envi-ronments and cultures have been transformed in linear fashionby this all-powerful entity that many call 'globalization'. Thusglobalization [or sometimes global capitalism) has come to beviewed as the new'structure', with localities, regions and so on asthe new 'agent ' .

_ Ilowevel, I have shown the limitations of the structure,/agencydivide, drawing in part upon Giddens's 'duality of structure' thesisI I 9B4J This structurationist formulation breaks with linearnotions, since it sees the rules and resources of systems both beingdrawn upon by knowledgeable agents and then feeding backthrough actions to reproduce system rules and resources. InGiddens's account there are not hxecl and separate entities pos-sessing variable characteristics. There is some appreciation of rela-tionality. Moreovel, functionalist arguments partly presuppose anon-linear account, since there are circular negative feedbackmechanisms in which 'causes' and'effects' are in effect co-Dresentwithin the functionally integrated'system

tzl

7

Global Complexities

Complexity and Social Theorv

Auguste Comte fwh"ether;;';;;,yiili"ri'".ili,T,:,?:*gil,:;:,11x.?:T:;qifi :f i"n3n: if : :1,,'i:: ;: *i'

b eginni n g o r tr' " - t*",,ty-n,,t

plexity ro. .o,'t"i;;;;::':jl:,11:y'":", of the phvsics of .o*-r"; ; ;;; ffi ;:$TTL itHfflf,n1m::ifr :"ls#|,i :'rTi5:Xil

"'1."1:: " tr.'"' p-u'i-Il ari s ti c a c c ounts wi thi n spe-

B iggs I g g s, ".;,..,:il ": lJ'#:fi 'lt"J;j: Bv.n " i ges,,;',*ik,,

Moreover; thest"*-i,,;:";;'"#ff"..J1,i:i:.:,:,'1nj'"",11,,11;.l-J#:;Jjplex. for complexity ,h";-;;';; ';consid er,h " ; ;;;ii d ;i ;_;Hir1,,:_!f ?l,l,ll]; ffil::it already constitutes u .o-pl"te ,o;iui theory. Thrt i, ,rrely thewrong question' since no one wourd imagine that it is alreadytormed as such a theory

ln The Hi;rtm Connecilons, complexity_:ff n'J il;?,: i "?l'l

Qogzl ;; ; J;; ;, an an ar vsi s'oi-ii,'i',o.iurso. a I Ii re,o ayn,

'il:;,",L|' - compl ex I tf b;i ;;'

";,'.",Ju..,.rilji}fffiT?"o,1:"';' 'ci""'" models shoutd not be directry. r tr, " .. _ jr ;; ; :"i:,:ri 5 : ffi:H T :ilt,fi J :il hT:ilJ;that they purport to .hr.r.t".;;;:'Uil.r"seen ,chaotic,

conse-

ffi


But this book uses complexity to move beyond vrl::,'"::*tl_':.lnl

theory. i huu"-ro,,ght to show that'structure' and no ,agency', no ,-".r1,

"na no ,ai.l

,:::l::t":, i"i lo 'individuals', and no 'system wortd,world'. This is because each such .ro,ioi''"'"r

wulr., andentities with separate and distinct

"rr".,llTumes

that tlinrn av*---^r : . . - - - - , , . . :et that are then Iinto external juxtaposition with its oti--

";" '^r Llren bro

ll :11"1: lu i ff ._.d ;";' ;il Hf TilTs"i::l:i:simple formulations_of a finalized

""d ;;;;';;;';;.i

towards which social processes necessarily move.Overal l my argument here is onc t lu'rer a ti o n aii iv:l ir'i, o " rr,i o n i s arso ."",."it l"i::JX.il"rri:

f *f^:*Y?t ^ : gqol, 1" "".i. ", o-.,,_l,,,.,uralist ro.*,,i(Dillon 2 000j and to-criti., of g"r,"rrf rr"a" i r*rr'i:#ilfii1oô_ll^gtlol {2099: t2J maintai"";h;;, r\o party to a relatitherefore a monadic, or -mola4,

5",i.y rl"J H;{#: ;"fii:3:::::f:l *:.:n"li:,:: of ,p; 3"+_of_being-rerated andcapacity for relationarity' (see

"rro e-irioyer 1997). Reratiis hrought about through a wide

".;t;; networked or circrel ati ons hip s th at are implic a r"a *i irri" a', rr.r"""ffi #:ff ffi

:::::Ti::ll" .,.1I:1s"",

T*:dd ̂ yortds. rn examining,u.h _Jterial worlds I have noted what crr.r.îioiib, iffi"r:ilff:r?hi

"T::i,l_:::y:"1 .the,studv. of th" ,i.i"l ""d ih" ,i"i, .i ,r,.

:^":y*l that co^rresponds to it

" op"r,,r"r, .f ifr" h"_""?r**r*to the greater flux or energy, matter and life,.

.The linear metaphor of"rirles, ,;;-;, that stretching from themicro level to the macro level, or fro- th. life world to the systernworld, which has plagued so.inl ,rr".rv rr._:;;*";;,;;;r-t o,rtathus be replaced ty itr" -""prr".-.f'.o'n".tions.

Such connec-1.:r^ i.",*

be viewed as more or less intense, more or less mobilgmore or less social and more or less ,at a distance, fsee Dicken etal.2001: 702-4; on system,/rir" *".r,ir, see Sayer 20001. Latourmaintains that the social ,possesses the bi;;:;;p"ri,

"f ,*

TIX made.ol1q"^1? or structure at all, but *,rrJ, i iJing u ancuLating.entity' [1999: l7]. There are many trajectories or move-ments that are neither macro nor micro but circuraal u*..n

;::l,l: le_rys of 'speed; velocity; *.u"rl-.on.inuous flow; pulsing;

I, u,o':y.

:n,9 viscosity;, rhyth.m ; harmony; discordance; rrrj turbu_lence' fDillon 2000: l2). There is therefore ." .o ;;*,._ "f

Global ComPlexities lzJ

.^^, but rnany connections or circulations that effect rela-

socr"',1: .throush performances at multiple and varied distances'

tionaltty """"i?t iftu,'there is no zoom going from macro struc-

La|@u.r^1i.1.r" -i","ractions

' ' ' fsince] both micro and macro are

ture,torr::'rLl "r'r.r".r.t.*

,,p to ii"ulating entities' (1999: 19.)

,?I,:JfT:i;;";:'t;i?",::::l::rr,*:t.l:::::Til":;ll:::"'tri1t:::.tr:::l':"#::""i'li'*: j:::;:T1fr':'.:ild;;donal ctvt"" "--.-^'--io-"

formulations from complexity haveLobile connecilols

advance the analysis of non-equilibrium^con-

ll::"1':rudffTF,rng. rhere ur" uurioi,, .r,u.".t".i'tics of this'comPlex' relatlonatttY'";il, the.very la,ge number of elements makes such systems

unpredictable ano 'utki"g

any finalized 'order'' These elements

;;:;;.; physicallv and, blcause of various dematerializing trans-

i";;;i;r,' informationally over multiple time-spaces' They are

irreversiblydrawnto*a.dsua. ious.attractors' thatexerciseakind;i;;;;t;y'"ffect, especiallv what I have termed the glocalization

attractor. Interaction' "'"

to*plex' rich and non-linear' involving

multiple ne gative and, more- signifi c antly' p ositive f;edU5\ loons

with ineluciable patterns of increasing returns and patn oepen-

dence. Such systems interact dissipatively with their environment'

ih. "l.*"nts

within any such system operate under.conditions

that are far from equilibrium, partly because each element

responds only to 'locai' sources of information' But elements at

one location have very significant time-space effects elsewhere

through multiple connectiJns and trajectories' There can be a pro-

fo.rnidisfroportionality of 'causes' and 'effects'' Such systems

possess "

hirio.y that irreversibly evolv-es and where past events

are thus never 'f"t;;; '.;;;i;; of bif"ttution{"il}v"Be reached

when the system dru.t.h"r. And the various sciences are them-

,"1u", po*"rful elements within such systems and.have unpre-

di.trbl" ancl irreversible effects upon systemic development,

especially on the character and development. of global systems'

St.f-t tvt,"*, ,iorrld never be seen as involving simply.linear

increases in the ..f.îtâJn of the life world, or of enhanced

agency, or of greater risk.This then Jo*prir"r-u significant array of general claims' I have

tried to make some ."tt,.iUi,l"n to the f"tth"i development of the

r24

social sciences of complexity with analyses of the material worldsimplicated within processes of global ordering. Further topicswhere I think subsequent writers could also work would b", fi.rt,the enhancement of some complexity methods, data sets and sim-ulation techniques that are apposite to 'social life'. Further, it wouldbe desirable to develop formal methods for speciS'ing the bound_aries,limits and consequences of different kinds of networks, espe-cially what I have termed GINs and GFs. And, most ambitiously,complexity notions should be seen as the basis of a thoroughgoingpost-disciplinarity appropriate to the diverse material

-worldl

currently moving across the globe [see http://www.math.uptras.grl-mboudour/). Such post-disciplinarity would involvesystematic analyses to transcend the physical science/social sciencedivlde.

Global Complexities

Machines

This book has particularly emphasized the apparently more'liquid' character of contemporary global relations, involving thedematerializing of information und the unpredictable and rp"-.d.dup character of networked and fluid relationships, wheiher ofmoney, risks, tourism, terrorism or information. Indeed, key toexamining the global are the wide array of elobal networks andglobal fluids that occupy complex, contiadiciory and irreversiblerelationships with each other. some features of these have ,been elaborated; they constitute what I called, foilowingPrigogine, 'pools of order' within increasing disorder. Their impor-tance means that linear accounts of the global, such as those ihatpoint to increasing wealth, or homogenization, or democracy/ orviolence, are wrong. A1l such processes are to be found, brrt ih"yare hugely interdependent with each other; each providlng theconditions under whlch their 'other' develops.

But why is thisT trVhy does not the increasingly 'l iquid' charac-ter of the global world mean that relationality is simply unprob-lematic? Why does not 'l iquid modernity', as Bauman 12OOO1characterizes the contemporary world, generate mobile solutionsto system 'failings'7 The answer is that those mobilities connect-ing the local and global always depend upon multiple stabilities.

Global CompLexities

peterritorialization presupposes reterritorialization, as Lefebvre

f 199 I ) consistently shows [see also Brenner 1999b: 435-6;1999a).

ih" complex character of such systems stems from the multiple

time-space fixities or moorings that enable the fluidities of liquid

modernity to be realized. Thus 'mobile machines', such as mobile

ohones, cars, aircraft, trains, and computer connections, all presume

overlapping and varied time-space immobilities fsee Graham and

Marvin 2001).This relationality between mobilites and immobilities is a

tvpical complexity characteristic. There is no linear increase in flu-

idity without extensive systems of immobilities. Thus the so-far

most powerfui mobile machine, the aeroplane, requires the largest

and most extensive immobility, of the airport city employing

tens of thousands of workers (on the complex nature of such mul-

tiple 'airspaces', see Pascoe 2001). The least powerful mobile

machine, human legs, requires almost no such immobilities

[except maybe the armchairl). I now outline various immobilitiesinvolved here.

There are tempora{y moments of rest of a machine and/or itsusers and/or its messages, such as at a bus stop, voice mailbox,passport control, railway station or web site. The machine orits object or user waits in preparation for its next mobile phase.There are short periods of storage, such as the overnight stayof a car in a garage or an aircraft on an airfield or informationwithin a database or a passenger within a motel. Such modesof temporary storage often involve complex sorting and stack-ing procedures.

3 There is the long-term int'rastructural immobrlity - of airportsor CCTV cameras or railway lines or pylons or satellites thatorchestrate the intermittent mobilities throueh a literal pathdependencv.There is the inter-generational disposal of the materials from'dead' machines, such as the transforming of immobile traincarriages or cars or landlines into 'disposed' waste and recycledmaterials.These mobilities are hugely uneuen in time-space, so that somezones are rich with movement and some are movementpoor, and in fact become relatively poor as mobilities happen

t25

at26 Global Complexities

elsewhere [see Graham and Marvin 2001). States are cenimplicated in seeking to increase movements within anJlcertain zones and in compensating for the massivequences of overlapping zones of relative immobiliW.

There are therefore specialized periods and placestemporary rest, storage, infra-structural immobility, disposal aimmobile zones. How, when and where these materialize areimmense systemic consequence, relating to the organizationtime-space. The intersections of these periods and placestate or preclude the apparently seamless mobilities ofinformation, objects and equipment across time-space. Ouerailis these moorings that enable movement. And it is the dialecticmobility/moorings that produces social complexity. If alltionality were mobile or 'l iquid', then there would be noplexity. Complexity,l suggest, stems from this dialectic of mobiano .q-r"q!nngs. s frLrr' I 4r1

There have, moreover, been significant transformations inoperation of this dialectic over time. This can be seen bv briconsidering the changing nature of 'machines'. The nicentury was the century of industrial machines', machinesmainly made other machines or material obiects or that traported such machines or objects. Each technology deverelatively independently, although a key development wasemergence of steam power. Experts, who were often expertsthat machine itself and not in other machines. inhabitedindustrial machines.

The twentieth century was the era of 'familial machines' and of'war machines'. Family household members inhabited familidmachines, including white-space goods, the family caq, telephone,the radio, the household TVIVCR, the PC, heating appliancesand the camera/camcorder. Such machines were rn-ui"iy storedwithin the home/garage and helped to form twentieth-centuryfamily life. Most famiiy

-"-b"i, could operate most of these

domesticated machines. These machines depended wholly or pattJy

upon electric powet except strangely for the car. Twentieth-centurl'lr1ar machines' were non-domesticated, and included, besidertechnologies of mass destruction, various spin-offs such as jet trans'

port, nuclear energy, space travel for science, and virtuai

Global Complexities W

ffiffi

r21

. _^.. l ,r ions of work and science. These rnachines were storedfq lli, .r"cialized camps or bases where the public was forbid-il n'::;i.,;'hich had enhanced svstems of sur.r-eillance'd"l.l'j"r*"nty-first century will be the century of what I call

,,.i|'Ur,"i-.u.hi.t"r'. These are machines that are dwelt in by

ii'ji-',"Ji"tJuals or by very small groups. Such inhabited ma-ctr lErL ^ ' -

:ilH, "." -l"i"t"rrzed,

privatized, mobilized and depend upon

'::':::; -nrver.

This powei is substantially separate from material

il\ '^'^:JinvoIves erceptionaI Ievels of miniaturization and mobiI-

irrr Manv oi these -".hi.r",

are portable, carried around by'digital

l:;;;-i fMakimoto and Manners 1997)- Such machines are

i"rtr"a f"; their style, smallness and lightness and demonstrate a

"irrnd form closely interwoven with the corporeal' Early ex-

#j1'j, include walkmans, new generation mobile phones, the

inJiuid"ul T! the networked computer,/Internet, the indivi-

dualized smart car, virtual reality 'travel', srnart small personal air-

craft and others yet to emerge. These machines involve interesting

reconfigurations of storage: the portals to these machines are

carriedlrouqd with the individual, they are stored on or close to

the person and yet their digital power derives from their extensive

connectivity.These in-habiting machines enable 'people' to be more readily

mobile through space, or to stay in one place because of the capa-city for 'self-retrieval' of personal information at other times orspaces. Through s.rch machines people inFrabit global networksand fluids of information, image and mo,''ement. 'Persons' thusoccur as various nodes in these multiple machines of inhabitationand rnobility. The storage in such machines is digitized and henceis not only 'just in time' but also 'just in space'. There is a person-to-person connectivitv that represents a further shift in the dema-terialization of info.*"tion and moblllty discussed in chapter 4Gee Wellman 2001). The global fluidi of 'travelling peoples',' lnternet' and 'information' increasingly overlap ,^J .orru"tg",generating irreversible changes that further move social lifetowards what Wel lman (200i) terms 'personal ized networking' .

,l his involves the furthei linking-together of 'physical space' and

^cYberspace'. This convergence across the various global fluidsIurther transcends dluirio.r! of structure and agency, the global andthe local

Global Complexities

Empires and Multitudes

In Empire, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000the concept of ,empire,o., imo"Ji : ; :^-^,_-- , ,

:l ; t*j.,1.; : :"f:"' rj; ttll.J'i:ffi IIJ*:o r a dy n a m i c a n d n "",:bi"' ; i,ffi i ;'ff" :i;1" TTJ,lt;tally across the globe, a kind of ,sovorroh-6 r^,:!L _ .that sweeps ,"*J,6",

' a Nrrq ut Sovernance without gover. ̂ d ry " ; ;"tdd : ;' j:; il 1._"; J i:i,il.,|1 .1 :1,"_: ^ . *i o r.world" the .s inol . lnoi- ^f , , ,1 . ,

u€rergn powe4, a ' rl'#l';llifr ffi'",I:'"or'ur"'h";;;;;;)"?il'"."'I?3r'Jwith a rneroin_ ^-.,,o,u,"r"r,qnty

is deterritoriatir"a u"a al."].,g*'iil.TT'Jf,it'itt;"'il"fi,{il1{ii*$',i:;:lboundaries oi b"..i".r. The ,aso nf

-l^t-^I,-^., _ . .r l

__rrsqrrLr ur uarrrers. , lhe,age of g lobal izat ion is, t . r* . o i1;i ;,,.""*:iy i". i . j l:, d, ; ; iry ";;, ", ffi i: r 3 6 ) A n d, " _ p i..,. . r r r r rg,rr Z.UUU: IJOJ. And,empife, <Lrary generates i ts oppos.itg, whaIHa.dt

".a N"gri +;#;r,

:::::i,T:,],'f l,li',": _: nd d es i res :I r r,' "- i -

o uir " 1 m ur ti tude, t' T::f :T j[;"j? :t . "-pi." iiooo, [r]11l'r;'61" *:'

tralitv of tL- ,^.^-:ll i ie' parallels my argument as to thetra I i tv o r th e a ",".'iioi " i, Ji' *;' :':1" i,fff iiloil:it"'r'triglobal system. Howr

Nesri of rhe o,"r_*..^=lll l.h*" is little ,p"cifi."tion U, H".ji *a

r ^..^riationally 'complex' [as in Held et al'

,onallY ^1?:":il;;""pr"it *hui hupp"ns to nation statesFurther',"'.:i";- .,,.h an 'empire'. It is as though, oncel'r'llij:";iil; su'h u" 'empire'' It is as though' once

.' :::[: "'1" " " "' li5;1 " ryil*],*m : lil:n:''ntv'

th e nSion state>,o.lo. societies' All they imply is empire'

s1-^'",n:.::.?", "1'"-pire'

deployed by Hardt and Negri does

#;:ru'.;il:':^.T*i:::;'":::T::Tlin';*:1'li::iott"Ti'i j ': i;":;; be characterized as'a sovereign power that.Tet onty rrr H"' -

" /1000. p. xi).Although Hardt and Negri con-l.rerns the worta. le

Sili;+;::::^ri::::::"S.:x1fr :::':tulf#i,iHiu:i@rillliu"\'{rr, ,tinterdependent fluid globai hybrids that both

#flfi'r"Jo"lUi" matize iheir claim that 'there is world order'

Q0003) 'Rather, I suggest tnat the concept of 'empire' is a useful one'

b";;;;; ch"ura.terize overall global relations. My analysis of

il;;i-;"-Olexity.suggests that all societies could be said to be

[ecoming more libe ,empires'. contemporary societies possess

r" t*r"""tf.gly visible ."nt.", with icons of power such as build-

i.gr, f""at.Jp", ur-td brands, while beyond the centre there is a

,pi."aing of effects outwards with a relative weakness of borders'

Within such'empires' there are emergent inequalities rather than,

as in at least welfare societies, an attempt to create citizenship

rights that are common throughout the territory. In particular,

,oii.ti", are on the world's stage, showing off their trophies,

competing with each other for the best skyline, palaces, galleries,

stadia, infrastructures and so on, and seeking to avoid scandaland risk.

Global ComPlexities r29

Negri o f th e sv s t e m i' ."r u.i o,', *i ;i; ; : #:l:: ilnrtJ"lilit T;rt operates in co'dirion, fbl ft"; ;;;,1]0.,,r,',, Theirs is a remarkably undynamic account of serf-repilJ,r.ir,g grobal rerations. Theysay, for example, thrs u pp o rts,r, "' *i. u "iTffi 'il:fiJ:il?, :il**l.mt :Hi""t5#"t"t$ lf] .?y"e here ; ;;.'""; ;i il;";'^iii-'un.dtuiJft ";;;:;ii,;H:,i'"""rrl;f:'r:,#*".,.;#;i::

Societies are endlessly drawn into the glocal attractor and it isthis that remakes them as 'empires', the USA being the most pow-erful and dominant of such societal empires currently strutting theworld's stage. The USA possesses a number of exceptional centres(NY LA,Washington), many icons of power (Pentagon,Wall Street,Hollywood, Ivy ieague Universities, Texan oil wells, Silicon Valley,MOMAI, a porosity of borders (on the USAs Latinization, seeDavis 2d00bj r"d hug"'imperial' economic and social inequalities.It is the purojig- ..s" of 'society as empire'.Thus, rather than therebeing a single'empire', global complexity suggests that each societyis drawn into ttLe attractor of glocalization and is remade, sodeveloping some characteristics of 'empire'.

GIobaI ComPlexities 131130 .,,,:al Complexities

And each society qui:npire produces its opposite, itsits rebellious multitude ird the globalizing of capitalist mhas generated some str.,i-:.g new zones from which ,multi

emerge to challenge en:.:es. The events of l l Septemberto have emerged unprec.,:rbly from one of the very poorest ctries in the world, and :: are said to have irreversiblv ch

america [Graham and Marvin 2001) ' There are gated communi-

'l^- .nndominiums, shopping centres' theme parks' workplaces'ttt:;;;, ;irpo.,t, fi,tut'tiul districts and so on'The gates separatet'Tl# .lf" ,'on"r'fro- th" wild and dangerous.z:ne's within the

:il"5tTi: w",J s"t' 'o""' of the ""gou"'n"ble'

the poor and

the dispossesseo are found in many cities especially across the

ut*r,, increasingly, the time-space- edges of these safe and the

*iiJt" .omingli"to strange and dangerous new juxtapositions

.'an or oerhaps "rp".iully,"in

the Wesi' The flows from the wildCvLrr ' - -^r i .^r

zones of people, nsrs, substances' images and so on increasingly

slip under, over and iftt""gft tft" tuf" gates' suddenly and chaoti-

cally eliminating the invisibilities that had kept the zones apart'

;ffi;h ;o.'"1i t"""J;ti;;, the drug trade' urban crime' asvlum

seeking, people t-"ggfl"g, tlave tradlng and urban terrorism' the

r"L"t%i,fte wild ;ithZ safe are chaoticallv juxtaposed'""

I; ,;,;;s of glo$al co;nplexitv' wild and safe zones have

b e c o me h i ghl y tO,S,1a i'ilri' *-t' ii' "#:l :l 1:;: o " "

The r e is' time-sp a."f-pt""io'i" tto.t ffiIl the c ap i t al ist world

but also of the'a"..o'i* i"o'ld''Wild zones are now only a tele-

phone call, an Internet connection or a plane. ride away' Capital-

ist markets ft"t" U.""gltt the 'whole world' closer and this is

especially "nd

pu.udox"ically true. of those bent on its violent

destruction and ;;i;lt' ; destroving the dominance of

'Americans' within th" glotd order' 1l September^demonstrates

this new curvature oi'i"t" and time' "'

th" few feet were dra-

matically t.".tr."ndli "lttJ-

ittuitibility was no more' Suddenly

those from th" *ill-Jo""' tot" f'o- ihut zone and struck at the

vertical city that had previously beeninvisible' The wild and safe

zones collid"a in tt "

,ky "Uou"

New York in a manner no one in

the safe zones hrd ; . ;J1;ed' of course' the zones also col l ide in

Saudi Arabia, whele ,f.r" Uint obsession with cheap petrol for

one-third of the world,s cars has generated the unholy alliance

between American power and Saudi oil wealth'

Moreover, the events of 1l September are the most dramatic

"*"-fi" ro iu. of a non-territorial network war or 'netwar' involv-

i"; J;" tou"l f**, taken by the 'multitude'' And hierarchies

h"?;-g.;ut aifn."ii'"nghti',g i.,.h networks. Indeed, networks

are best "t

fightirrg tL,o-'" """g"ged

in netwars [see Arquilla and

many parameters struct;l]g economic, socral and political life.-l ISeptember demonstrat* :re c-omplexity of 'asymmetric threats,ithat 'wars' are increasL::ry fought between formally .rn.qualpowers with the appare'-r weak able to inf l ict massive Ulo*, oithe apparently powerfu. : is almost the secular equivalent of ,thufirst shall be last, and t-,,.ast shall be first,. The mightie, i, ihepower of society as eL-: :e, the greater the harm ihat can beinflicted.

_ Global complexity ca: *rus be seen in the power of the power-less to inflict the utrn;i: harm upon the institutions of im-perial powet especially::rse buildings, institutions and peoplethat symbolize the inte:it condensation of imperial power. TheUSA is the paradigm casi'i 'society as empire'. And it is the NewYork skyline that most gi:hically symbolizes its imperial power.

Moreovel, huge trans;.:mations are taking place in the veryproduction of 'empire a:i multitude' across the elobe. This canbe seen as a specific exa::le of the glocalizine atlactor. Bhabhasummarizes how: 'The g , :e shr inks ior those *ho o*n i t ; for thedisplaced or the disposs*;ed, the migrant or refugee, no distanceis more awesome than'-:. few feet across borders or frontiers'[ ]992:88).

Indeed one effect of ;'lal markets is to generate ,wild zones'of the increasingly dispos,ossed. In parts of the former USSR, sub-Saharan Africa, the Balkii. central America and central Asia arezones that are places c'.bsence, of gaps, of lack. Such zonespossess weak states witL rry limlted infrastructures, no monop-oly of the means of coer.r.n, barelv functionine economies oftendependent upon comrnurfiring lilegal materlls, an implodedsocial structure and a re.;:rtely limited set of connections to theglobal order.

In the 'West' socio-spi:.rl inequalities have remained largelyinvisible. There is a 'splir,:::ing urbanism', with the invisibihty ofthe 'other' taken to extre': lengths in the 'gated, cities of North

ijt

132 Global Complexities Global Complexities

.^,rs a 'sirnple' system of hierarchical nation states. When the world

-,.]-'.irr.'d of nation states, the 'other' society was almost always

.,]r"thing to fear, to attack, to colonize, to dominate and to keep

ut bny The other was dangerous, especially others on the move,

such as armies, migrants, traders, vagrants, travellers who might

xa.v. Crtizenship came to consist of rights attributable to tightly

specified categories of those who were unambiguouly within and

oart of the 'society'. This system of national societies involved

rnassive antagonism towards the other, with relationships nor-

mally being'nasty, brutish and short' (see Diken 1998).

But we should consider here whether a 'cosmopolitan' global

fluid is uncertainly and contingently emerging [D. Harvey 2000).

Is a set of 'global' values and dispositions becoming an emergent

and irreversible implication of global complexity? Are 'societies'

increasingly forming themselves within such an evolving complexand will they be subject to scandalized disapproval if they do notdisplay cosmopolitanism upon the global screenT Is the 'enemy'

fbr each society as empire the global risk that have few bordersor boundaries and that can be as much within the society aswithoutT These risks include asylum-seekers, terrorists, diseasesand viruses, environmental and health risks (see Van Loon 2002).Such a cosmopolitan fluid involves various characteristics [seeWaldron 1995; Tomlinson 1999; Beck 2000; Cwerner 2000;Frankl in et al . 2000;Walby 2001).

There is extensive mobility where people have the right to'travel' corporeally, imaginatively and virtually and, for signifi-cant numbers of workers, students, tourists, asylum-seekersand so on, the means to travel and to consume places, peoples,rights and environments en route.There is a cunosity about places, peoples and cultures and arudimentary capacity to 'map' one's own society and its cul-ture in terms of history and geography. There is a stance ofopenness to other peoples and cultures and a willingness/abilityto value elements of the language/culture/history of multiple,contested and fragmented 'others' to one's own culture, pro-vided that they meet certain global standards.There is a willingness to take nsks by virtue of encounteringvarious'others', combined with a semiotic skill to interpret and

133Ronfeldt z00l: r 7). Al-eaida has been likened.tl a self-3rqanizingsystem 'on the edge of ihuor'. The 'amorphousness of a-l-rgaidanot only makes it difficult to hunt down its members and pinblame on individuals: it also means it does

"o, ""."..".ijy h.uuthe same form from day to day, a clear beginning or --6,^prAeek

200IJ. Indeed, 'what they receive from Bi;Lade; ""d

hr, associ-ates is less specific orders and training than a crea4, rimple ideor-ogy, which they are expected to go out into the *o.tj

"na puainto practice on their own' fMeek 200.1). This emergeni global

fluid of international terroriim is hard i" d"f""f ;;?;;re it ismade up of very diffuent self-organizing elements. They regurarrychange their shape, form and ,Jtiuities] Such

-;,;;il cTpacity

renders them 'invisible' if on occasions awesomely p..r".*castells (2001) describes the nature of ,non-line".,

,"".r".. ,rr",

;';'Hr"ffi li",,[1nil,r"'f ,ft aiiff i.].T"i*'$kftT':*.lLsmall autonomous units posserrr"g higl, fi.. po*.f ,ie.y rapidmobility, robust communications, reai-time information' and acapacity to 'sense' the enemy. This 'non-linear warfare representsa high-tech version of the old tradition of guerrilr" rt.rggi"r. rhi,"network-centric" warfare . . . is entirely de-penden, ,roJi .ourrrt.secure communication, able to maintain constant connectionbetween the nodes of an all-channel network' fcastells z00r:16l-2; Duff ield 2001: t4J.

.l.h.l": thus suggested that, rarher than there being an,Empire,with 'its' multitude, there is what we might hypoth"'rJ" ,r-" rr"*attractor. This could be designated as 'societies as emoires,. soci-eties across the world are being drawn into developing as ,empire,.And, as they are drawn into iuch an attracto{, so new unsiableand unpredictable multitudes arise, seeking to topple those em-pires and their icons. societies as empires=u." d"u"loping somestrange new practices as systems develop to deal with the non_linear multitudes that are increasingly in their very midst.

Cosmopolitanism

But there is something else going on here within the emergentsystem of global complexity. Let me return briefly to when there


evaluate images of other natures, praces and societies, to seewhat they are meant to represent, and to know *h",, th.v r."ironic.

4 There are some global standards by which other places, cul-tures and people are positioned and can be judged Manyinternational organizations following the founding

-of th" uN

advocate and promulgate such stanJards.

Two writers that articulated the notion of the cosmopolitan areSalman Rushdie and c. L. R. James. Rushdie wrote i,, tggo, ,trThe Satanic Wrses is- anything, it is a migrant,s_eye view of theworld. It is written from the very experilnce of uprooting, dis_juncture and metamorphosis . . . that is the migrant condition, andfrom which, I believe, can be derived a metafhor for all human-ity' (cited in waldron 1995: 93). And c. L. R. James once wrote:'The relation of classes had to.h"r,g" before i discovereJlhu, ia',not quality of goods and utility that matter; but movement, notwhere you are or what you are, but where you come from, whereyou glg going and the rate. at which you are getting th"r"; [citedin Clifford 1992: 96; see also Clifforj 1997.).

Such an -emergent

global fluid stems from the intensivelymediated relations now swarming the world. This is even true inmainland china where the massive growth of diverse media isgenerating a recosmopolitanism (Ong and Nonini 1997; yang1997)' The UN commission on Grobal Governance (1995J, seiup to report on the first fifty years of the u\ talks of 'our GrobalNeighbourhood', arguing that a mediated, enforced global pro"i_ltity isgenerating cosmopolitanism fsee also Tomhnin 1999: ch.6; Beck

-2000). Nelson Mandela ofien refers to 'the p"opre of

South Africa and the world who are watching' o,, th"i. tV ri."",r,IUN Commission on Global Governance l9-95: lO7). The ,we, inM^andela's speeches almost always evokes those beyond southAfrica that view South Africa upon the global

-"di" and have

collectively. participated in the country;s rebirth through anenforced televisual proximity. when Ma,rd"la states that '#" ur.one people', he is pointing both to south Africa and to the restof the world that is witnessing. Likewise the pointing f.o* th"TV commentators to the collective 'we' at princeis Diana'sfuneral was to the astonishing 2.5 bilhon people witnessing and

Global Complexittes

sharing on the global screen, as the iconic 'global healer'sanctified by the whole world [Richards et al. 1999: 3).

Indeed, since the fallof the BerlinWall in 1989, there have beenvarious 'global events' when The Whole World is Watching fGitlin1980). On 11 September 2001, the whole world watched thesurreal and stranger-than-Hollywood moment when live planeswith live passengers flew into and demoiished two of the largestbuildings in the world. The World Thade Cente4 with up to150,000 workers and visitors, a city in the ai4, was at two strokesbombed out of existence with the whole world agog. The hugelyunlikely forming of a 'global coalition against terrorism' bothdepended upon such collective watching and helped to promotefurther the cosmopolitan fluid. Collective global disasters are thekey to the forming of such cosmopolitan global fluids, perhapsbeginning with the founding moment of the Nuremberg trials inthe immediate post-Second World War period.

Moreover, various visual representations of the earth or globeincreasingly challenge the importance of 'national' flags fseeIngold 1993; Cosgrove 1994). The iconic blue globe involvesseeing the earth in dark space, as a whole defined against threat-ening emptiness, with no lines or political colouring, freezing amoment in time. The globe functions as a symbol of authority,organization, and coverage of global infbrmation, particularly innews programmes.

More generally, images of space are often used to connote theendless possibilities of travel and the potential 'cosmopolitan' con-sumption of other places and cultured from all across the globe

[Urry 2000b: ch. 7). Hebdige concludes that a 'mundane cos-mopolitanism' is part of many people's everyday experience, asthey are world travellers, both corporeally and through the TV intheir living room: 'lt is part of being "taken for a ride" in andthrough late-2Oth century consumer culture. In the 1990severybody [at least in the West] is more or less cosmopolitan'[1990:20).

A powerful 'televisual flow' throws viewers into the flowingvisual world lying beyond the domestic regime. There is an instan-taneous mirror reflecting the cultures of the rest of the world thatare mirrored into people's homes (Williams 1974; Al|an 1997;Hoskins 2001). Arundhati Roy evocatively describes an elderly

r35


woman whose life is transformed by the instantaneous and often'live' visual perception of multiple'global others'. Roy writes:'Shepresided over the World in her drawing room on satellite ry. . . .It happened overnight. Blor-rdes, wars, famines, footbaii, sex, music,coups d'etat - they all arrived on the same train. They unpackedtogether. They stayed at the same hotel . . . whole wars, famines,picturesque massacres and Bill Clinton could be summonedup hke servants' [1997: 27). There is thus a hugely diverse andchanging array of 'reference groups' that is disclosed and exposedespecially through TV and now the Internet. The 'cosmooolitantraveller' may derive ideas, values, norms and senses of iusticefrom an incredible array of such sources [Waldron 1995; Walby2001).

Such sensations of other places can create an awareness of cos-mopolitan interdependence and a 'panhumanity' [Franklin et al.2000). The flows of information, knowledge, money, commodi-ties, people and images 'have intensified to the extent that thesense of spatial distance which separated and insulated peoplefrom the need to take into account all the other people

-which

make up what has become known as humanity has becomeeroded' [Featherstone 1993: 169). By participating in the practiceof consuming in and through the media, people experience them-selves as part of a dispersed, global civicness, sharing similar expe-riences and united by the sense at least that they are witnessingthe world and its mosaic of cultures with millions of disperseJothers [Gitlin 1980; Dayan and Katz L99Z)

Acording to the U\ this global civicness is generating somesense of the universal standards by which human development isto be judged [see UNDP 2000). One paradoxical consequence ofglobal complexity is to provide the context in which universalrights, a panhumanity, relating not only to humans but also toanimals and environments, comes to constitute a framing forcollective action. Illustrations of such panhumanity are the widerange of what we can call'global gift giving', the giving to distant[unknown) others of money, time, objects, software and infor-mation [via mega events like Liveaid, via local events or via theInternet).

Cosmopolitanism should be seen as produced by, and furtherelaborating, the glocalization attractor through transforming rela-

Global Complexities

Uons between the global and the iocal (Tomiinson i 999 194-207).The drawing of many 'localities' into the attractor of 'glocality'

provides preconditions for emergence: 'changes in our actualphysicai environments, the routine factoring in of distant politi-cal-economic processes into life-plans, the penetration of ourhomes by new media and communications technology, multicul-turalism as increasingly the norm, increased mobihty and foreigntravel, even the effects of "cosmopolitanizing" of food culture'

[Tomlinson 1999: 199-200; see also Rotblat 1997b; Beck 2000).Thus the apparently local and the apparently cosmopolitan

should not necessarily be counterposed. Powerful sets of disposi-tions in the contemporary world are neither localist and proxi-rnate nor global and universal. As Zygmunt Bauman argues inLiquid Modernity via a discussion of Derrida's to 'think travel': 'the

trick is to be at home in many homes, but to be in each insideand outside at the same time, to combine intimacy with the criti-cal look of an outsider, involvement with detachment' [2000:207). Cosmopolitan fluidity thus involves the capacity to livesimultaneously in both the global and the local, in the distant andproximate, in the universal and the particular. Such cosmopoli-tanism involves comprehending the specificity of one's localcontext, to connect to other locally specific contexts and to beresponsive to the complex threats and opportunities of a global-izing world. We can thus talk of a 'glocalized cosmopolitanism' inrvhich 'in the everyday lifestyle choices they make, cosmopolitansneed routinely to experience the wider world as touching theirlocal lifeworld, and vice versa' fTomlinson 1999: 198J.

Such cosmopolitanism as a global fluid appears increasinglywidespread through the 'shrinking world' of various intersectingglobal fluids that were outlined in chapter 4. Its increasing scaleand complex impact will irreversibly transform each civil society,altering the conditions under which 'social actors assemble, orga-nize, and mobi l ize' [Cohen and Arato 1992: 151). And, as theyassemble, organize and mobilize differently, so new unpredictableand emergent cosmopolitan identities, practices and cognitivepraxes will emerge fEyerman and Jamison 1991J. Out of TV andjet travel, the mobile and the modem, there is an emergent globalfluid of cosmopolitanism. This transforms what it is that appearsto be co-present and what is mediated, what is embodied and

t37

)aji6

fiC

-

7

Global ComPlexities Global Complexities

sources of information. But components at one location havesubstantial time-space effects elsewhere through multiple con-nections and awesome trajectories. Such systems possess a historythat irreversibly evolves and where past events are not'forgotten'.Points of bifurcation are reached when the system branches, since'causes' and 'effects' are disproportionate. There are non-linearrelationships between them, with the consequence that systemscan move quickly and dramatically from one state to another.Systems 'tip' or'turn', especially those that are organized through'networked' relationships that usher in some surprising anddistinct effects.

Finally, let me consider briefly here how this connects to thetheory of 'reflexive modernization'. It has been argued that'socialstructures, national in scope, are being displaced by such globalinformation and communication fl and C) structures' flash andUrry 1994: 6). These emergent systems of information and com-munication are the bases for increased reflexivity. Through theincreasingly structural power of information and communicationsthe 'structure' of 'societies' has progressively less purchase.

And there is heightened reflexivity produced by and throughthese new 'l and C' structures. Reflexive modernization charac-terizes social life in which individuals and systems reflexivelymonitor especially the side effects of modernity. Such reflexivitymoreover gives rise to many new structures, especially of variousexpert systems. Such reflexivity is, however, cultural as well as cog-nitive [see Lash and Urry 1994; Waldron 1995). It is not only amatter of scientific or expert systems that enable the side effectsof the modern to be monitored, organized around and in casesrectified. Rathel, reflexive modernization involves aesthetic-expressive systems that result in huge new cultural industries, averitable economy of signs.

I want though to suggest that these processes of reflexive mod-ernization stem from what I have described as the emergent globalfluid of the cosmopolitan. Cosmopolitanism provides dispositionsof an appropriate cultural reflexivity within emergent global com-plexities. The form now taken by reflexive modernization isthe global fluid of cosmopolitanism. Such a cosmopolitan fluidinvolves redrawing the speed of the global and the slowness of theontologically grounded. It irreversibly transforms the conditions

I39138

what is distant, what is local and what is global [D. Harvey 2000:

8s-6).T(e

"m"rgence of the cosmopolitan global fluid thus shows the

irreversible, ,rnp."di.table and chaotic workings of global com-

plexity. And complexity theory seems to provide the means to

!*"-ir-r" how cosmopolitanism has come to develop as a new

emergent fluid of global ordering.

Conclusion

John Gray [2001) describes the current state of the globe as,an intract"bly diro.dered world'. I have tried to show that

'complexity' provides a wide array of metaphors, concepts and

theoiies "rr"ntl"l

for examining such intractable disorderliness.

Relations across that world are complex, rich and non-linear,

involving multiple negative and, more significantly, positive feed-

back loops. There are ineluctable patterns of increasing returns

and long-term path dependencies. Such global systems, or re-gions,

GINs and GFs, are characterized by unpredictability and irre-

versibility; they lack any finalized 'equilibrium' or 'order'' They do

not exhibit and sustain unchanging structural stability. Complex-

ity elaborates how there is order and disorder within all physical

and social systems. Following Gray we can see how there is a

complex world, unpredictable and irreversible, disorderly but not

simply anarchic.Suih complexity derives from what I have described as the

dialectic of mooring s and mobilities. If, to express this far too

simply, the social world were to be entirely moored or _entirely

-obii", then systems would not be dynamic and complex' But

social life seems to be increasingly constituted through material

worlds that involve new and distinct moorings that enable, Pfo-duce and presuppose extensive new mobilities. So many more

systems are complex, strangely ordered, with new shapes moving

in and through time-space.In such ,yrt"-, the various components are irreversibly drawn

towards uuiio,r, 'attractors' that exercise a gravity effect. Such

components within any system operate under conditions that are

fu. i.o,,' equilibrium, partly because each responds to 'local'

itirli

ri

1fl

140 Global Comolexities

under which other networks and fluids operate as well ashave been historically understood as 'societies'. This ..,.,.Iry urrusr)LUULT ds suLt.crra,

.r , nts connects

to;the shift that Lash describes as the move from the .irk roll.* ,-examined by Beck, to the more senerd;;k;i;"-.;bll[iBri1998; Lash 2000). Such a risk culture has to deal wiih risks thatunambiguously run across borders. These.include post-industrialrisks, especially involved in informational flows [biotechnolog;cybersurveillance, epidemics, waste products, GM foods, .ybur,crime, international terrorism), as well as with the risk taklnj thatis part of the very processes of innovation

,[van .L9o1 zooz)."ano,corresponding to this shift is a corresponding shift from nationalsociety to the increasing power of a cosmopolitan global fluidfrom modernity to reflexive modernization, as others haveexoressed this.

And we might further see complexity theories as deriving fromand in turn enhancing cosmopolitanism. This global fluid, withmany convergent, overlapping and irreversible interdependencieswith other networks and fluids, serves to remake social relationsacross the world, but not in a linear, closed and finalized form.Complexity is the theory that cosmopolitanism produces andgeneralizes, that captures and reflects the qystenic features ofpowerful material worlds.

Thus cosmopolitanism involves an emergent global fluid thatwill in part reconfigure how the social sciences develop in a post-societal era of global complexity. It will lead to the spread of the-ories of global complexity as one of the major means of capturing,representing and performing the new world ordering that remainsbalancing 'on the edge of chaos'. Complexity theories themselvesseem irreducibly part of the emergent systems o/ global com-plexity. Thus we are going with the flow, so to speak, if wedevelop, as I have tried to here, the implications of the complex-ity sciences for the many global systems currently haunting theworld's population.

Ii!

I

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Index

Abbott , A. 73,74' 94' 96' 122

absence, and Presence r ; -

access'frec 62

inequal i t ies nf .? ̂ - . -

ecciJcrr ts, 'normal J) D

^c. t ( r r -net\vork the()rY l / l

l ; : ; : ' ; ' r .

r " , zo' ;6- f i io ' 7o

Adrms, J. 35

,r.t"".,ir"-"rttt, Parodies of 88-^*.n.r

ree structure-agency relations

Albrow. M. 43' 82.

al i_, h,rnncl netw()rks ) l - :

A1lan, S. 135American Patr iots 88' 89

anacmia, Dutch compared with African

treatrr lents 4l-Z' 57

anarchism 7l

Anclers, Wil l iam 81-2

An.lcrson, A. S)8

,^t. . i - , , ,nnt"unist i i feeding 33

anti-sweat.shoPs movement 88

,"itSt"".t ineffectiveness of 33

;\pPadurai, A' 5, 59' 65' 92

'centriPherY' 83 -1 ^^ ,,

n i* tn. . t i 'nt lnn 86 93' 94-5 98'" '

io: , tot , 123, 129' 136-7

ooeration of 88' 90

por,l'er-resistance 10'see

ako 'strange attractofs

audit societY 109

Auee, M. 61

AuL ShinrlkYo 88

automobil i tY 68-Sl ^ .^,

autoPoiesis 28-9' 9: l- tu t

Bachelard' G 59

Baker, P 30, 50' 83-4 ""'haker translirrmatlL)n ; /

Bales, K. 61, I l l

nr i i . ] " , r l l5 ' l16' I l7 ' l l8

barbarism 92

Barber, B 9l-2

barriers, Jissolut ion ot x:

BautJr i l lard,J 58 ^ ,^a ! r ) r?7

Bauman, ZYgmunt j ' . lu/ ' L t - ' - '"" i" , i l i )Mo'Jent iry l le 124' 137

BBC 8I"ul i , ' j t " .n ix,7o' 96-7' t33' 137

t40becoming 20, 22

bcing 22 c t r l l 47, 85. 9{ '

Berl in Wall , eftccts ot r i

135Berners-Lce, Tim 86

Itill

I

Arato, A. 137Archer, M 4tiarchitcctures 30--1

-^ , "Aruui l la, J. 51, d5' 7Z' 131

, l r l t ' " ] . nt ' . , " ix , I7 ' 53' 55' I2 l

. t t i " - . "" f t*s 2,61' l3 l ' 133

:iii;il';;; t a--', t s, I 23' 132' r38-e

7

L

156

Bhabha, H. 130bifurcation point 26-7, 28, 29, 47,

139173,

'B ig Bang' 2 l -2Biggs, M. 30, 120Bi l l ig, M. 107biodiversity 70biological systems, chaotic properties of

32-3biopower, performative I 15-16bioprospecting, patents and 70Blair, Tony 87blue earth 81-2, 135Boden, D. t i5, 90body,

informational 64social analogous to human 104

Bogard, W. 74Bohm, D. 20,25,50borders,

pol iced of nation states 43porosi ty of 6, 41, l2!)

boundaries,blurr ing of 74dissolution of 85-(j

bounded systems 26-7bourgeoisie 78, 79brain 5lbranching 47,79-80Brand, S. 63, 64, 70,85brands 82, 87,99, 107

cultural power o[ 67-8global 57, 67-8, 87and identi ty of opposit ionl l

organizations 58and national i ty 87public shaming of I l7

Braudel, F. 36Brenner, N. 44-5, 125ISrewer, B. 4Brit ish Empire, hegen-rony 8iBrunn, S. 5Budiansky, Stephen, Nature's Keepers

3l-3bureaucracies, Wcbcrirn l0-l IBurt, R. 52business,

competit ion 63

Indsx

ncrv places of face-to-face interaction Central and Eastcrn EuroPe 85

centriphery 83-4certainty, the end of 22chain networks 51-2chance, dcterminism and 22

change,constant ecological 32dramatic with switches 53individual or collective 46

and stasis 22, 45tendencies 27-8through' lock- in 55-d, 69

chaos 13, 22,30, 59, ! )8on the edge of 14-15, 16,22,32,86'

tOl ,132,140and order 14,21-2,29, t06

chaos theory 17,23Chase-Dunn, C. 4, 43China,

automobile culture 68history 36media in 134

Chinese, 'overseas' 62, 98, 107

Christ ianity, 'born-again' 92

chrono-biology Z0Cil l iers, P. 18, 24, 25, 3(), 80, 84

circulating entities I 22-3cities,

as complex dynamic open systems

33'gated' of north America 130-l

as interchanges between intersecting

flows 36-7nonlinear reading of 33-5self-organization 36-7see ako 'host cities'

ci t izen, and state, mutual visibi l i ty1 l2-13

cit izenship 43, l33consumerism or local identity politics

92and sett lement I 12women and global 98world 97-8

city states 95civic associations 2civil society,

networks llj

shrinkage 8!)transnational 98

Clark, N. 33,70,122class domination 95-6class reproduction 78Clifford, J. 62, 134cl imate change 81, l l0

Cl inton, Bi l l I l5, l l6cloning 67clusters, and regions 40-1,43

cNN 8r,85-6co-evolut ion 46,92co-presence \12, )21coercion 104Cohen, J.24,25,76,137Cohen, R. 62, 107Cohen, S. 98Colborn, T. 69collective, and individual levels

76-7collective action, framing of universal

standards for 136-7commodif icat ion,

of f inancial markets 90of the future 65-6, 72

commodities, rvith moorings or points

of insert ion 49communicatiotr,

computer-mediated B9horizontal of the Internet 63

communications 4, 57, 97, 100

metaphor of fire 73-4'on the move' l-2

communism,col lapse of 81,85world / : l

communit ies, transnational ized 97-8,108

community of tate 109competition,

and cooperation 36inter-regional 43-4

complex systems lZ, 18,29-37

complexity 3, 7' 8, 17, 79-80, 96, 100,

r 3 8-40the chal lengc ,r f | 2- l 5ideas 98methods 124

Index t57

90-1projects !)

Butler, J. 99butterfly effect 23,27 , 47Byrne, D. 24, 25, 26-7, 30, 47, 83, 120

Cairncross, Irrances 2, 85capital,

lack of border controls on 66transnational 88see ,.tlso syrnbolic capital

capital ism,'black holcs' of informational l1'casino' 65crlses or /vdisorganized vi i i ,3ecological dominance of globalizing 4pmpropnt f - ' - , r t r r rec 4

end of organized viii

global see globalization' ideal col lect ive interests ' of 78

rcsistance tcl 88-9

systemic and dynamic character 3' turbo- ' 45

capi ta l is t mode of product ion,

contradict ions of 78-80

Capra, Fr i t jof 7, 10, 19,20,21,23,25,

26-7, 78, 29, 30, 37, 51, 77, 100,l0t

The Hidden Connections 120The Web of Lit'e l8

cars 68-9, 131and carbon gas emission 68, 80use of petroleum-bascd 34, 55-6,

I26cascade ef fect 71, 116Castel ls, Manuel 2, 3, 4 , 5, 15, 43, 54,

56, 59, 62, 63, 64, 65, 79, 85, 86,88-9, 110, 132

The lnformation Age ix,8-12Casti , J. 19 , 22, 23, 51catastrophe 34-5,98causality, circular 27cause-effect 3, 6, 7-8, 20,23-4,77-8,

96, l2 l ,123lack ofproport ional i ty 34-5, 139

centr ing 83-4

158

complexity cor?t.andporver l t l -13of scandal I I 3- l Isciences ix-xand social theory 120_4without telos 86

complexity theory 36, 45_6, 140as new social sciencc paradigm

l2-15complexity thinking 3g+0, 106_7complexity turn l7_J8'compulsion to proximity, 90'computime' B5computing, pervasive l0_l l , 62, 73,

8s, 89Comte, Auguste ) 20conccpts,

branding and 67as collective representations 59paral le l 102-3

connect ions 122, lZ7conscience 98consensus 104conspiracy, g lobal 102consumerism 80, 135

citizenship and !12'McWorld ' 9t-2

Cutsuming Placas (tJrry) viiiconsumptlon,

cosmopol i tan character 79global v i i i , 4

contagion 62, 7 l , l2Bmacroeconomic 66

Contested Natures (lvlacnaghten andUrryJ ix

cont ingency 10,42, 56, l0 lcontradict ions 73, 7g_g0, g4cttoperativi ty 25, 36corporations 2, 9

bid for world domination 95creating opposit ion 88global see tran-snational corporatlonsuse of global imagery 82

Cosgrove, D. 82, 135cosmopoli tanism 132-8, l3g-40

characterist ics I 33-4glcrcalized 137-40Inul to3ne l - i5

Coveney, p. lg,Zl,22cnmlnal economv l0 l lCri t ical Mrss bike , ia", ggaulturo,.tusion rvith nature ggculture industr ies 139cultures at a distance 12, 16curiosity 133Cwerner, S. 133cybernetics 27, 30_1, 105cyberspace 74,99, lZ7cyborg /4

Davies, Paul 2l-2

_ How to ,Buil.d a Time Machine 19

Davis, Mike,

r: .nla." l Pe rrPle tr l ,-Z 107 - l)

ii,po'.t't' tl"ill'j, ' ''j l | i:,;:.::, ' i itures 2 r, 28,

i59

emergent systems 7-8, l6

Emirbayer, M. 73, 122

empires 95, 129and nrult i tudes 128-32

cnergy 28, 83flows 36-7, 48-!)turning waste into 92-3

Engels, Friedrich 78, 79

enterprises, global 57

entropy 21,46,83envirol iment, as laboratorY 97

cnvironmental hazards 69-70, 110, 133

environmental issues, women and 98

environmental movement, global 92-3

environmental NGOs 88

equil ibr ium 27 , 44,55-6

Ethernet network 53

Ettrope, feudal 95European Court of Justice 1 10

European Union (EU) 10, l l0

Eve, R. 30events,

local izat ion of global 82-3, 135

mediation of global 85-ii

see also extremc events; mega-events

evolution 22expert systems 139

explanation, Western-tYPe 23-4

exposure, the Power of I I5-18

externalities, across networks 53-5

extreme events 34-5Eyerman, R. 137

face-to-face interaction 52, 90-l

fai lure,accidents and sYstem 35-6

and achievement 13-15

false conscic'rusness 1 ll

far from equil ibr ium 7-8, 1 l , 13, 21,

32, 54,80,94-6, 106, 118- le,

123, 128, 138-: lpockets of t>rder l0l-3

Ireatherstone, M. t i3, 64, l3tt

lecdback mechanisms 27 , 29 , 3O-I ' 34,

100,102see ako negative feedback; positive

feedbackf-eelir-rg, emcrging structurcs of 29, 5!)

EcoLogt of Fear 33_5MagicaL Urbanism lOg

Dayan, D. 136De Landa, Manuel 33, 77

A Thousand years of Non_IinearHistory 36_7

decision making, shared 9deep robotics 70Delanty, G. 87Deleuze, G. 59-60, 108-9dematerialization 84-5democracy 43, 89democratic politics, corruption by crime

l lDerrida, Jacques 137determinism, and free will 18, 22, 106,

I 1 l_12deterr i tor ial izat ion 44, 58, 60, 87, 125Diana, Princess, funeral of 134-5diaspora, f luid 107-8Dicken, P. 122differentiation 28, 104digit izat ion 63, 64-5, 85, l l5, lZ7Diken, B. 133Dil lon, M. l 22Dionne, E. I l7di.sasters,

col lect ive global 135in ecological systems 32,34-6

discourses, complexity in 30disembedding 90-ld isorder vt i i , 21 ,27

and order 22, 138

distantc ' - . - r 7d l -16

collap\e '_"_ ' "

re lat ive : r ,

I a1

, l iversi tY, r ' t r loglcal JZ

l l - ' . ' , , , * , t r l l rst ent lenre of I 8Ulv'" r in/ l t t, l^ f l inat i ( 'n i , rUa' r r I

inm;nt.. t t RePublic l t t8

,r- ,o t ra l t l3 I

O"m. 'U, M. 30, 86,94, 96, lu8, l l0 '

t32Durkheim, Emile 59

Jynrt ' . PrtrPt ' r t ies 3, 17 ' 24

e-comnrerce 54, 64

earth, visual representations of 81-2,

135Eastern EuroPe 92-3

col lapse of communism 81,85

Eatrvel l , J. 66Eco, LI. 58ecoiogical sYStems,

complcxity of 32dominance by global izing capital ism

4cconomics 31, 53economies of scale 53Econotit:s of Signs and Space [Lash and

Urry) vi i iecosystems, and lire intensity

34-5Eddington, A. S. 22Einstein, Albert 19, 83electr ic power 126el i te, g lobal l l2Ell iott , E. 30Elstcr, J. 78emergence 74-5, 29, 38, 54

and collcctives 77prccondit ions fbr 137see ako global emergen.:e

cmergent effects 99, 139-40and the local 76-82,94

cmcrgent proPert ies x, t l , l3-15, 18,

23-6, 39-40, 47 , 49,5 l , 77-t l

Index r6 l160

feminization 90feudal ism analogy 95FIFA B1financial cr ises, global and national 66financial markets,

interdependence of 66on-l ine real-t ime trading 86

financial systems, global 90fire,

intensity and ecosystems 34-5metaphor 73-4use in primitive agriculture 32

f lows 3,21,40-2,80from wild zones 13lthe global as 4-5, l4t)power of 59-60see also global fluids IGFsJ

fluidity, cosmopoli tan 137fluids 40-2, 59-74,124

3nd networks 5U-/5see also global fluids (GFs)

food culture, cosmopolitanization oft37

r(rrolsm Zf)Foucaul t , Michel 113Fox Keller, E. 23-4,71fractals 74,98, 102-3Francis, R. 30Frankl in, S. 6, 38, 44, 64, 67, 6g, 99,

99, 133, 136free rvi l l , and determinism 18, 22, 106,

I I t - l2Friedman, Thomas 86

The Lexus and the Oliue Tree 9lfrontiers, permeable 85-7Fukuyarna, F. 5,43funct ional ism l0l , 102, l2 l ,122

normative I04-5fundamentalism, religious 8tlfuture 19, 22,45

commodif icat ion of the 65-6,72futures trading 65

Came, A. 45Care (Hungary) 92-3Gates, Bi l l 54gaze I l6gcnder 6

generations not yet born 69genes 36-7

timekeeping 20genetic engineering 8genetically modified food 5g, 69GFs see global fluidsGiddens, Anthony 2,39, 45,46_7, l2 lgif t giving, global 136Cilbert, N. 80, 8tGil le, Z. 92, 93GINs sae globally integrated networksGit l in, T. 116, 135, 136Gladwell , Malcolm 53, 66Cleick, J. 47global, the ix, l -8

as flows and mobilities 4-5' int imate' 99and the national 44, 85as process and outcome 44as a region 43-4,49societ ies and l-16structural notion of 4

global analyses, l imits of 38, 39-49global capitalism see globalizationglobal complexity 120-40

the concept of x, 7-8, 95, 102and social order 104-l l

global emergence 93-l0lglobal l luids (cF 42-9, 56, 59-75,

94, t24, 138characteristics 72-4cosmopoliran 135, 137-40examples 60-72

CIobaL Nature, GLobaL Culture fFranklinet a l .J 98, t00

global networks see globally integratednetworks [GINs)

global order,emergent 81far from equilibrium I Iresistance to 88-9social relations in the new 9l

Global Posit ioning System [GPS) 91,1t3

global regions 42-9Global Resistance movement 88global scepticism 44global screen 87, 89, 135

elol t i r l svsrcms'

. ,,nr t l t 's istr l tzt

l , n, , t , 'Pu' t ' t i t 99-101..

1, , ' . . t iu, ' character of '16

, ' , . ln t "ud. l i tm 95.

s"li-tittnft,ng prophecies in social

science's 3 8

, l , rbr l v i l lagc, and professionals 98

l i .bal warming 34' l0 l

l i , , i . . l tu.r t rc lat ions 84 - l )3 ' 94' 102-3'

r27 , 136-7ol, rbal izat ion,' !trrPtlrate 4

debates 3-4

Giddens's de{init ion 39

Habermas on 109

as ideologY 5-6

end the nation state 43-4

ils the new structLrre x

outcomcs of 93-l0l

paradigm of 39

n, pe.fc,rm"nce 6-7, 38, 96-103

problems of definit ion 96

of relat ionshiPs I Zl

rtsistance to 44, 58, i ;2, 87-9

theory of and globalization theory 44

vs. local izat ion 88-9globally integrated networks [GlNs)

12-9, 56-9, 7 4-5 , 94 ' l0l ' lz4 '

138sclf lorganizing 106weak-nesses 58-!)

globe, as syrnbol of authoritY [35

glocal, the 84, 137glocal izat ion v i i i , 15, 82-3,84-5

attractor of 86-93,94-5, 98, 103,

ro7,123,129, 136-7Goerner, S. 39Goldman, P. 67Goldthorpe, J. 77governance,

attempts at global 95-6, 134

without government 128

governments,brands 87-8role in globalization 43

Graham, S. 5,60, 125-6

Granovetter, M. 52

gravi ty 83,92, 94, 123, l3uGra;', John 138greenhousc gases 70

Greenpeace 58,8lgreens, global see environmental

rnovementGreenwich Mean Time 8l

Guattari, F. 59-60, 108-9

guerri l las, ' informational ' 89

Gulbenkian Commission on the

Restructuring of the Social

Sciences 12-13

Gulf War 86

Habermas, Ji irgen 108, I09

habits, new social 57

Hardt, Michael 2EmPire 128-9

H"ruey, D. 20,28,30,78,79, 133, 138

Harvey, P. 87Havel, Vaclav 97-8

Hawken, P. 69Hawking, StePhcn, A Brief HktorY of

Time 70,22Hayles, N. K. 22, 27 ,29,30, 64

hazards, environmental and health

69-70, 110, 133

healing projects, marine envtronment

and 70health hazards 69-70, t l0, 133

Hebdige, D. 135

hegemonY,Brit ish EmPire 8l

usA 43,45, 85Heidegger, M. 84

Heisenberg, W. 37 ' 77

HeltJ, D. 3,4,5,40' 43, 44, 65, 81' 94'

r29Helmrcich, S. 70

Hetherington, K. 6

hierarchy 36-7,131of values 105

Highl ie ld, R. 19, 21, 22

Hinduism 92Hirst , P. 44, l l0history 2l-2, 54, I23, 139

Chinese 36hologram 50-l

t62

I loskins, A. 86, l l5, 135'host ci t ies' 82-3, 86-7hub networks 5l-2, 82human dcvelopmcnt l3t ihumanity,

and nature l l_ lJand science 97

humans, netrvorked with machinesHungary, post-Communist Sl2-3Hutron, Will, On the Edge 45, 46hybrids 63-4,74, t02

global l4-15,59, 129

Index

inequr l i t ies l0 l , i2g, 130_lof access 5

incrt ia, pattcrns of 55informarion 64-5, 83, l13, l27

t .orgtt lzed bJ

local ized 60, 80, 84, 123irrfbrmation agc ix, 8-12, 43, 50_1, 72,

56 8sinformation and communication (l and

C) structures 8, 139informarion f lows 5, 84-5, 99

co-evolut ion of 86international ized 43, 109post- industr ial r isks 140

information networks 9-l 2infcrrmation sharing 9, I l3Ingold, T. 72, 135innovat ions l , 8, 62, 140

product and process 3linstability 24, 27rnstantaneity 50, 72insti tut ions,

global 8land system dcvelopment 55-6

intellectuals, wandering 95In(er-Governmental Committee on

Climate Change 8linter-regional organizations,linteraction effects 25-6, 123interconnectedness 36, 48, t jg, 94,97,

t0linterdependence l4-15, 18,39, 79, gl ,

94, 97_8, \02, t04, t24cosmopoli tan 136, ' f f inancial markcts 6t i

interests,economic 5'real ' I I l

International Air Tiansport Association8l

intcrnation al non-gtlvernmentalorganizations (NGO{ 45

international organizations 45, 108,t34

International Rcd Cross 8linternational treaties 45, l l0international izat ion of production 4,

83-4

lntornet l , 12,54, t r2-3,73,80, 127,r36

attempts to regulate I l , t i3and informational izat ion of

knowledge 64use by opposit ion movements 89

int imacy', publ ic I I6investment, international izat ion of 4Ireland 9 Iirreducibi l i ty 77, 7Birreversibi l i ty 13, 45, 83, 95, 99, I 16,

138of t ime Zl-2,29, 46-7 , 49,60

Islam 92i terat ion \6,27, 46-7,49, 63, 83, 99,

103

Jarnes, C. L. R. 134Jamison, A. 137Jasper, J. 7lJervis, R. 24-5,32,35Jessop, 13. 4,8,96Jihad 9lJordan, J. 7l

Kaplan, C. 98Kash, Don 10,51,54,59

The Complexity Challenge 30-lKatz, E. 136Kauffman, S. 22Karvano, Y. 4Keck, M. 98Keil , L. 30Kt ' i l , R. 40, 110Kcl ly, K. 51, 52-3, 54, 60, 76-7Kern, S. Ikeyboards 54-5Keynesianism 79Klein, N. 57, 58, 67, 88, 95, 1 I 7Knorr-Cetina, K. 18, 56, 106knoivledge, informationalization of 64Krugman, P. 29Krva, C. 86Kyoto Protocol on climate change I I0

Langton, Chris 39-40languages, f lows of 36-7lascr theorv non-l inear 29

lndex 163

Lash, Scott v i i i , 5,91, 139, 140Latinos, in USA 108Latour, B. 46, 56, 106, 122-3law, European and national l l0Larv, John 6, 10, 36, 4O-2,43,48,56,

57,60,73, 106, t22Lcfebvre, Henri 125

The Production of Space 4B-9Leinbach, R. 5lens metaphor 50Levitt , P 108Leyshon, A. 65, 86,91liberalization of trade 4, 89l i fe, as nctwork or web 51, 70lifestyle choices 67, 137l ine networks 51 2linearity 25-6, 93-4, 127-3local, the,

emerpenl effects and 60, 7t j- 82'importancc of 86-7

local-global relat ions 84-93, 94, 102-3,127, t36 ,7

localization, vs. globalization 88-90' lock.in' 55-6, 69Lodge, David 52logos, global 67-8London, City of 90loosely coupled systems 35-6Lorenz, K. 23, 27Los Angeles 34-5Luhmann, N. 29,30, 100- lLuke, T. 63Lukes, Steven, Power: A Radical Vieut

i l ll-ury, C. 99

Maasen, S. 23, 30McCarthy, A. tt2McCrone, D. 87, 108McDonaldization 57-8machines 56, l24-S

changing nature of 126f-amil ial l2i ihumans networked with 56mobi le 125

McKay, G. 7lMacnaghten, Phi l ix, 18, 45Macy Conferences on cybernetics 27

of physical and social relat ions I 7_lghypercomplexity 30hyperglobal ist posit ion 43, 44hypertext 63

icon, rel igious to computer 64identities,

t tDranos and h/-u

cosmopott tan lJ /ancl f lu id i ty 42mult ip le 108resistance 88

identity politics, and new global order91_2

ideology 3, 132global izat ion as 5-6

Ignatieff M. 65images,

co-present media 97I IOW J

global 8 l -2,96-7organizations and 82

a r^-(]r spacc I J)imagined community, global 12, gl_2Imken, O. 65immobil i t ies, relat ionship with

mohl l t t les 1l)-brmpression management I I3increasing rcturns 53-4, 74, )23, l3g

of brands 68ftrr economic populat ions l7exponential of networks 53+, 5g

individual,and collective levels 76-7orvnership and mobil i ty 68-9and statistical levels of analysis 24_5

a164

Mahoney, J. 28, 54, 55Maier, C. [i7Majone, G. I l0Makimoto, T. t i l , 127Mal ibu 34-5Malpas,. l . l4Mandela, Nelson 81, 94, 134Manifesto of the Communist Party, The

79Mann, M. 44Manners, D. 61 , \27marine environment, exploitat ion of

70market, global and 'u, i ld zones' 130Marshall , l . 20, 47-8Mart in, H.-P 43, 66Marvin, S. 5, 60, 125-6Marx, Karl 78-80, 84, 104Marxism I I lmaterial worlds 16, 31, 46, 56, 64, 106,

121-2, 124,138mediation by 52systcmic features of 140unpredictabi l i ty of 33

material-semiotic practices 99Maturana, H. 28, 99measurement 19, 37Mcdd,W.30, 100, 120media,

global 86-7,97, 113, 114-17migratory 65scale and range of 84-5

mediation,by material worlds 52, 90of global events 85-6

mediat izat ion 110-11, i 15- l6medical izat ion 33medicine,

fluidity of treatme nt 4 I -2risk cultures and 33

Meek, J. 132mega-cvents, gkrh:r l S2, 8t i-7, l()7Melucci , A. 7 lMenon, M. 82, 97'meshworks' 36messages,

f low 5,63protestors 72

metaphors 16, 42-3 , 50-l , 59,64,74-5,91, I05, 122,3, t34,r38

science and I 2lmethod, signif icance of ix, 37methodological hol ism 40methodological individual ism 40, 78,

106Mexico 108Meyer, J. I l0Meyerowitz, J. I 13, I l5micro-habitats 32Microsoft 8lmigrant condit ion 95, 131migration patterr)s 6l-2Mingers, J. 30, 100Mische, A. 73mixtures 42, 63mobil i t ies 6l-2, 74-5, 78, 94, 101,

110, i l3, 133cnmnlew <rrctems ?7

and f ix i t ies in spacc and t ime 37,48-9, 124-5, r3r l

the global as .1-5, l4individualized 68-!)physical 68-9and power 12

mobll lzatton / I - ldemocratic 89

Mobius strip 74models,

network 5lrelat ions rvith phenomena 120-1

modem 62modernity,

first and other 9l' l iquid ' I19, 124, 137the'non-places'of 6 lside effects of 139

Mol, Annemarie 40-2,43, 48, 56, 60,73, t22

Molotch, H. 90Monbiot , G. 6,95money,

nows Jo-/future values 65world 65-6

money launder ing I l , 66, l3 l

Monterey Bay Aquarium ResearchInstitute 70

moorings 37,49, 125-6, 138Morse, M. 63Mosaic web brorvser 62Motaval l i , .1. 28, 55, 68Mouzelis, N. 46movement 6l-2, 134

freedoms of 110see ako mobilities

mult icultural ism 137multinational industries 83-4mrri t i tesLino t i*-Q

mult i tudes, and empires 128-32Murdoch, J. 10, 57Muslims, and use of GPS for Mecca 9l

Nader, Ralph 4naming 99, 100nation state 108-9

autopoiet ic 133clustering of social institutions 43and global izat ion 43-4, 95relat ive disappearance of 92-3scvereigntl , replaeed bi ' imperial

r 28-9national, the, and the global 44, 85national ism,

'banal '107brand 87 8, 107male symbols of 98

national i ty, and global screening 87nations, persistence of 43natural sciences, and social sciences

t2-13naturalism I 7nature,

drawn into attractor of globalization99

fusion with culture 99global ix ,6-7, 70,99and humanity l2-13laws as historical 2)-2our obscrvation of 37and the social 13, 33-5,45,122and society I 8and technology 3l-2transformeC into genetic codes 64

165

negative feedback 26,27 , 105, 123,138

Negri, Antonio 2Etnpire 128-9

Negropor-rte, N. 85neighbourhood 134neo-liberalism 5-6'netwars ' 65,72, I10, 131-2network analysis, Castells's 8-12network enterprises 9, 10, 54network society 8-i2, 15, 54rretworking, personalizr:d 54, 127networlc 8,40-2,49, 5l-6, 74,124,

139all-channel 85autopoietic 28-9characteristics 51-6defined 9and Ilulcls )t.,- / )

hierarchical I 2

over lapping and interconnect ing 52power or ) t -J, / .+

sel f -organiz ing global 30- l

structural holes ) l

use of term l1-12, l5

see ako globally intcgrated networks

(GINslNew Ageism 88new physics 7-8,62News Corporation 8lnews reporting, global 85-6Nervton, Isaac I9Nguyen, D. 8lNicol is, G. 25Nike 67, 68, 117Nixon, Richard l15nodes 9-10, 52, 60,72, \27nomadism 108-9

digital 127non-equi l ibr ium 13, 2lnon-govcrnmental organizlt ions

INGOt 4s, r08campaigns 88

non-l inearity 12, 14, 17, 73-5, 28, 29,34,47,78,102 3, l2 l 3

Nonini , D. 62, 98, 134normality, as a gradient 42norms, and scandals I i4-17

lndex Index

166

North, D. 54-5Nurerlberg tr ials 135

O Riain, S. 9 lob;ects,

i low )

socialities u,ith 56obligations 52obscnat ion lg, 37, 1 l5oceans 70crffshore banking ti6Ohmae, K.5,43,44Ong, A. 62, 98, 134open systems 21, 100_1, 102openn^ess 10, 15, 29, 62, gg, t 13, lZZ,

133opposit.ion see resistanceorder;

and chaos 14, 21, 29, 106and disorder 22,139far from equilibrium pockets of

l0 l_3' implicate' 50is lands of 21, l0g, 124

organism, and system 104_5organizational learning 31,54, 55, 59organizations,

and images g2ncw global ly mediated 90opposi t ional 59,96_7

othe4 end of the 97

'panhumanity' 136Papastergiadis, N. 61, 62, i07Papson, S. 67paradigm,

new global izat ion 3, 6-0new informational B_l 2,7g_g0technological 8

Parsons, Talcott 104, 105_tipart icles 48-9, 5g, 60Pascoe, D. 125past, and futurc 19, 20patents, and bioprospccting 70path_dependence 2U, 54-6, 63, 69, j4,

123,138performance 3, 38

global izat ion as 6-7, 96_103

Index

pc.rformativity gg_9, I ltiperiphery, effect of centre onPerkman, M. l0gPerrow, Charlcs 36, 52

Normal Accidenrs 35_6personal computer I 0_l IPeters, T. 56phenomena,

complexi ty and 77_grclat ions of models rv i th

physi ta l , the social and the46

I 20-l17_18,20,

physical sciences, and social sciences 3,18,124

Plant, S 63point,

as attractor 26see ako bi{ureat ion point

polnts of insert ion see mgoringspoli t ical units 95porr t rcs I l4populations, and statistical probability

t7posit ive feeclback 13, 26_g, 54, 55_6,

7. t ,83,95, l l7, l18, 12l , 123, t38post-disciplina rity 124post-society 128, 140post-structural ism lg, 122poverty 130_lpower,

and complexity l l l_13cl igital 127of flows 42hybridization of I t2informational I l3mediated l l3-14, l l9and mobil i t ies l2ar-rd resistance l0and social ordering 104_lgtechniquesof l l2types and machines I 26_7visibi l i ty of t I 2- l3

Power, M. 109powerless, power of the 130practices,

complexity in 30cosmopoli tan 137effects in science on results 37

^r, .s( ' t lLe, lnd absente 73-4

f r t , ' * in, ' , l lYa x, I l , 12, 17, 18, l : r , 20'

22,24,30,32,10r ' t24

Order out of Chaos 2l

^. , rbabi l i t ies 17 , 48, 77

t '6r t lduct lon,

cosmopoli tan character 79

international izat ion of 4' 83-4

products,as c'ffects of brands 67

standardized 57-8

valuablc in world trade 30-l

professionals, and the global village

98profits 78proletariat 79property relations 7

protest,anti-globalization 1 I 2

cultures of 68, 87, 88-9

rnovements 7l-2Pugwash Conference on Science and

World Affairs 97

Qaida, AI- 132quantum societY 47-8quantum theorY 20, 22,25, 47-8' 77

quasi-nations, and attractor ofglocalization 98

radio 84rainbow, global 128Rapoport, A. 98Rasch, W 18rational action theorY 77rcciprocit ies 52reductionism 20, 40, 77 -8

Reed, M. 28, 30, 79refcrence groups 136rcf lerive modernization 139-40reflexivi ty 96-7, 1 13, 139-40refugees 2, 6lregime changes 47regional blocs 45regions 40-2, 43, 49, 107

cross-border 108war of the 43-4

regulari t ies 76, l2I

relat ional i ty 15, 20, 25, 121-3, lZ4

relationships,global izat ion of l2lnetworks of 53-4probabil ist ic 77

relative, the 5religions,

global 45,88, 108local with global characteristics

9Zrepresentations,

collective 59sensuous 59

Rescher, N. l5, 65research, self-fulfilling prophecies 37

rt-sistance 10, 128antibiotic 33identities 88to global izat ion 44, 58, 62, 87-9,

96-7rhythmicity 20Richards, J. 135Rifkin, J. 7, 10, 58rights,

universal 98, i36women's 98

risk cultures, in medicine 33

risk managemcnt, in financial markets

6rir isk society ix,96-7, I40

risks,global 133wil l ingness to take 133-4

Ritzer, G. 57, 58Robertson, Roland vi i i ,44, 84

Roche, M. 81,82,86,87,95, 107

Roderick, I . 48Rojek, C. 62Ronf'eldt, D. 36, 51, 65,12' 137-

Rose, N. 89Rosenberg, J. 3, 44,96

Rotblat, JosePh 97, !18, l37

Roy, Arundhati 135-6Ru.shdie, Salman, The Satonic Verses

I34Rushkoff D. 62Rycroft, Robert 10, 51, 54, 59

The ComPlatitY Chalbnge 3tl1

Index r67

83

ItI

i

i

168

saf'ety, and system characteristics 36, 52Santa Fe Inst i tute, New Mexico 12, 17,

t2tSaudi Arabia l3lSayer, A. 122scales, l inear mctaphor of 122-3scandals,

complexity nature of 58, t l3-18financial and abuse of power I I 7mediat ized 105, 110- l 1, 113

Scannell , P. 84'scapes' vi i i ,4-5,9, 56, 60-2, 80Scholte, J. A. 3, 4, 6Schumann, H. 43, 66sclence,

and collective representations 59and humanity 97irrct lucible not ions in 76 7metaphorical nature of l2lpost-national 97-8rore ln systems IZJand system of investigation 37

Scotland 108Second Law of Thermodynamics 2lsecret scrvices l l5self

and the global 99and machine 69

self-fulfilling prophecies, in rcsearch 37self-making systems 16, 28-9, 31,

100-1,102self-organization 10, l4-15, 24, 29, 58,

60,98, 106, 132cities 36-7or lnternet ol-Jof nation states 95

scmiotic ski l ls 133-4scrvice, standardized modcs of 57shaming, publ ic 89, l l0- l l , I l4- lBshareholdcr intcrests 5, 45Shaw, M. 98Shel ler , M. 56, 60, 69, 71, 89Shields, R. 59-60Shiva, V. 98side effects 14,24,32-3, l3gsrgnrners dl , d/srgns, economies of vi i i , 67, 139Sikkink, K. 98

Index

simulat ions 58simultaneity 51Sklaia L. 4,57,61,82,96, lOt, t02Slater, D. 69slave owning I l2slave trade, international 61, 13Ismall events, with big effects 16, 23,

34-6, 47,53, 54_s, 62, 94_5, I l6small and medium businesscs, networks

of9smuggling, people 61, 131social, the

and natural 13, \22nature and 33-5,45-t tthe physical and 17-18,20,46

social lifc,and fai lure l3-14Internet as metaphor for fluid 63multitasking 69and quantum society 48recursive character 46-7

social morphology 9social movements 7l-2, 88-9social order,

and global complexity 16, 104-l l ,i l8_19

as outcome of social processes 106and power 104-19

social practices, universalism and 98-9social regulat ion 108-9social sciences,

application of positive feedback 28,83

conditions of possibility for 37individual and collective levels 76-7and natural sciences 12-13new complexity rheory paradigm

l2-15and physical sciences 3, 18, 124in post-societal era 140relevance of complexity for 1204sclf-Fulf i l l in g prophccies in

investigation of global systems37-8

social space 4l-2social systems,

autopoiet ic 29, 100-ltrajectory 83 4

social theory, and complexity l2O-4

social i ty, co-Present 73-4

'socialware'31

societ ies,autonomous self-reProducing 1 05

criss-crossing 106

and the global l-16

like empires 129-32

transformt:d within global systems

1 06-7society,

as a bounded region 43

the concept of ixas empire 129-32and nature 1BParsons's definition 105-6

and regions 40-lsociology ix, 13-15, 120

applications of comPlexitY 30

classical 104-5cstabl ishment of social order 104-l I

and globalization dcbates 3-4limits of global analyses 40'mobile' 16, 59-60

Soctologt beyond Societies (Urry) ix

software 73software industry, teamworking 9l

solidarity, electronic networks of 89

sovereignty, nation state replaced byimperial 128

Soviet Union, former,col lapse of 47, 85state bureaucracy I I

space l8-22Cartesian l9creation of 22cyberspace and physical 127dematerialization of 2fractal 74rrce / I

mult iple 29,123remaking of 6-7for systems 75transformation of ix-x, 7, 136

treated as static 44-5see abo time-space

spatial patterns 40-2spatial i ty, f luid 45,60

specles,hazards affecting 69-70population size not correlatcd with

stabiltty 32-3spectacle 65,87Spencer, Herbert I04spontaneity 25spreadsheet culture 73stabi l i ty 21, 27

population size not correlated with32-3

Stacey, J. 99standards, g lobal 134, I36star networks 5l-2stasls,

and change 22desire for 44-5

state,capitalist 78and cit izen, mutual visibi l i ty 112-13

nation detached from 87and nomadism 108-9regulatory I l0role of the 109-10

state bureaucracy, effects of personal

computers on I Istate survei l lance l l3state-centrism 44states,

'midwife ' 110networked l0weak 130

statistical, and individual levels of

analysis 24-5stcam power 126stcer ing mechanisms 105

Ster,g"is, 1., Order out of Chaos 2l

Stevenson, N. 1 17

Stewart ,A. l l l

Stewart , 1.24,25,76Stewurt , P I7, 18,83, 100' 120

,rn.t -.". racing, and US societY 36

storage 125, 127

t,-.r.'*" attractors' 26-7 ' 44' 83-93'

103et"^.-- S 65J.o, ,h\ , v. - -

1 absent 73_4stranqerness, present ano

structurationis m )'2]r -2

Index 169

t70

structure, Giclclens's duality of 46-7,t2I

structure-agency relations x, 3, 40,46-7, 80, I I l_12, lzt , t27

subject-object dichotomy 3succcss, and fai lure l3-15supra-national states 108survei l lance I 13, I 15, 127sustainabi l i ty 12, 70'swarming'132

switches 25, 53, 73, 82Swyngedouw, E. 109symDlosts /4symbolic capital, vulnerabi l i ty of I l8syncretism, cultural 108synergy 8system, and organism 104-5system accidcnts 35-6system effects 24-5, 76-7system perfection, self-defeating

character of 36systems,

autopoiet ic 99-100contr i ldtct lons /U-u(.)dynamic and complex 3, 138-40on the edge of chaos 22of global complexity 107institutions and development of

55_6located within environments 45-tiIoosely coupled 35-6, 52ordered but l'ar from equilibrium 32pattern similari t ies across l2lself-regulating 26and side eflects 14tightly coupled and accidents 35-6,

52Szerszynski , B. 58,90, l t3

taste 25Taylor, l-. 66teamworking 9ltechnology 8-9, 30-1, 56, 95

evolution 63and the human 3l-2

teen market, global 67telecommunications 65televis ion 82,84,87, l l8, 135-6

Index

territory, less central .

definition 44,8;o national self-

terror ism 11,88, l l2, l13, l3 l ,133global coal i t ion agarnst 135growth of l0linternational 73, 109, l32networked I l0urDan lJ I

Thatcher, Margaret I06thermodynamics 2lThompson, G. 44, I l0Thompson,John l l3, l16, l l7, l lgpolirical Scandal: power and V"Ut;w

in the Media Age ll4 ---r

Thrift, N. 17, 29,30,40, 65, 73, 86, 9lties, strong and weak 12, 52ugnr couplrng J5_btime 18-22

arrow of 21,22biological 20-lbiology of see chrono-blologyclock I I'computime' 85creation o€ 22dematerialization of 2f low of 20,21-3,28, 45fragmentation 68-9, 72'glacial ' 11,70historical 18, 20-1irreversibi l i ty of 2l-2,29, 46-7, 49,

60natural and social l9Newtonian absolute l9synchronization across the world 8ltimeless 8-9, I Itrading in 65transformation of ix-x, 7treated as static 44-5

time travel l9t lme-space,

compression l , 4,72, l3 l.n.uutrr." under mass l9-20, l3l

distanciation 4fixities see mooringsnetworked paths 7-8, 123

times, mult ipl e \1, 2O-1, 29'

t ipping points 53,66, 139'Titanic effect' 36

t rading,deriv:rtive

electron tc

futures 65

real-t imc 90

transnational capital ist class 4, 61' l0l

trrnrnutiunrl corPorations 4' 5-6' 57 '67-8

transnational ism 106, 108

transparerrcy I 13, I l5-16

transport ir t ion 4-5, 36, 68, 97

scapes ( i l -2travel 33, 6 l -2, 68, 135-7

travel l ing peoples 5,61-2, 107, 109,171

trust 10, 52, S)0, 91, I l4-15turning points 73, 139

UN Comrnission on Global Governance

0ees) 134

t7 l

culture of scandal I l8as glocal attractor 129-30hegemony 43,45, 85Latinos in 108Mil i t ia 88resistance to hegenrony BB, 89society and stock-car racing 36spccif ici ty of 105

values,global 133hierarchy of 105

Van Loon, J. 33, 133, 140villages,

global 98self'-orglnizing transnational I 08

violence, womcn's freedom from sexual98

virtual communities 88-9virtual reality I26-7virtual war 86viruses 33, 62,67,68,87, 118, 133viscosity 60, 7lv is ib i l i ty I l2-13, I l5-16vis ion machines 70, 113Volkmer, I. 86vortex, bodies in a 59vulnerability,

of symbolic capital I l8to fluid changes 58-9

Walby, S. 45, 95, 97, 98, 108, I10, 133,136

Waldron, J. 133, 134, 136, 139Waldrop, M. 12, 17,24,30, 40,53,54,

55Wallerstein, Immanuel l2-13war, networked see 'netwars'war machine l2[ iwars,

asymmetric 130non- l inear 132virtual 65women's opposit ion to 98

waste incincration, and globalcnvironmental movemcnt 92-3

Watergate scandal I l5Watson, J. 57

Index

Tomlinsrrn ' ]^ 1,33<

r l3 i l ' 137

toPolo8ies +"-"' ' '-, "

il'J")'; 7r" (r-i"1,) uirittud,ri.rr""t 'n" { '. 6l ' 89,

,n. j nt"J i 'u l ' " 'J 'ap' i ia lvpst ' n 'xt ' 33

66financial 86

uncertainty 13, 22UNDP 8I, I36unintended efTccts

l l9

5g

14,46-7,105, l l3,

8r,96,134, 136of Human Rights

21-2t9, 27 ,116,123,138

the'wi ld '

United Nat ions (UN)Universal Declarat ion

(1918) 8luniverse, expansion ofunpredictabil ity 10, 14,

, 29, 33, 60, 95, 1 13,uroan cr inte l3 lurban

^environment, and

JJ-5

trrban grorvth,self lorganization 29, 36_7, slopin! j suburbs, 34

urbanism, spl intcr ing 130 IU5A,

l l ,scptt 'mbcr (200 lJ x,94, t30,rr t , l35

Consti tut ion: First Amendment I I

172

Warts, D. 52ivave-particlc effects 48-9waves 48-9, 51, 59,60,62, 7lr,vealth, from abundance 53Weber, Max l0-l lWeingart, P 23, 30Weiss, L. 109rvelfare societies I 29Wellnran, B. 52, 127West,

socio-spatial inequali t ies 130-lurban development 36-7

white, H. 60,7lWhitehead, A. N. 20rvholes, new emergent 49, 50-lWickham, G. 14'wild zones' 33-5, 130-lWil l iams, R. 29, 59, 135Wolfe, C. l8women, and global ci t izcnship 98women's movement 88work,

team working 9l

Index

transformation of 64-5rvorkfbrcc, local in capitalism 7g_9working class, Marxist social revol

79World Bank 8lWorld Health Organization 8lWorld lntellectual Property

Organization 8lworld order, problematization of claim

t29world society 100world system 4World Tiade Organization [WTO) 6,

6I ,81,89World Wide Web 62, 86, 94Wynne, B. 6

Yang, M. Mei-hui 134Yuval-Davis, N. 98

Zapatistas, Mexico 88, 89'zapping,' 73Zohar, D. 20, 47-8

(2003) global complexity

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