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International

dirty dealscases of corporate influence over globalenvironmental negotiations | august 2002

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International

dirty dealscases of corporate influence over global environmental negotiations* | august 2002

contents

introductionby vicente paolo b. yu III, foei wto programme officer part one | 4

case study one: local communities, indigenous peoples & theinfluence of private interests on the cbdby isaac rojas, friends of the earth costa rica/coecoceiba part two | 5

case study two: corporate interests versus biosafety concernsby juan lopez y villar, advisor on genetic engineering, foei gmo programme part three | 11

case study three: zombies & plantations – the impact ofcorporations on UN forest negotiationsby simone lovera, foei biodiversity project coordinator part four | 15

case study four: climate change & corporate lobbyingby kate hampton, foei climate change campaign international coordinator part five | 21

conclusions: toward corporate accountability & strengthenedinternational environmental governanceby vicente paolo b. yu III, foei wto programme officer part six | 26

International

* | A Friends of the Earth International (FOEI) Biodiversity Project publication compiled by Vicente Paolo B. Yu III, FOEI wto programme officer with

contributions from the FOEI Forest Campaign; FoEI GMOs (Genetically Modified Organisms) Programme; FoEI Trade, Environment, and Sustainability

Programme; and FoEI Climate Change Campaign.

4 | foei - dirty deals

Increased corporate influence,at both the national andinternational levels, is drivingand deepening the current trendfor neoliberal economicglobalization, often at theexpense of other pressing socialand environmental concerns.

One example is the powerful role ofEuropean and US services industrylobby groups in their countries’negotiating positions for the World TradeOrganization (WTO) General Agreementon Trade in Services (GATS). This is aninfluence that civil society organizationshave not yet been able to match.

This process is also very evident in thedevelopment and implementation ofmultilateral environmental agreements(MEAs), many of which have beensignificantly weakened by corporateinterests. MEAs are negotiated bystates, but their conceptualization,formulation and implementation isalmost always the result of interactionbetween multiple actors at the nationaland international levels. Corporateactors influence this process at eachlevel, as we shall see.

Even the briefest of analyses shows thisinfluence to be frequently negative. Thisstems from corporations’ focus onreducing standards and obligations likelyto adversely impinge on commercialinterests. Progressive civil societyorganizations, on the other hand, havecontinually pushed for a strongerinternational system to promote andprotect the rights and interests of peopleas human beings, in the economic,social and environmental spheres.

This trend of weakened globalenvironmental governance must cease.People and their environments mustsupersede the short-term profit motive ifwe are to develop truly fair andsustainable economies. To make thisshift we must increase the strength,status and scope of MEAs, and makecorporations accountable for theiractions and regulate their activities.Community and environmental rightsmust be protected from subordination tocorporate-motivated trade and economicrules. This stance is crucially importantin the negotiations on trade and MEAscurrently taking place in the WTO.

Governments, especially at the UNWorld Summit on SustainableDevelopment (WSSD), must:

- state explicitly that multilateralenvironmental agreements will not besubordinated to free trade rules (andthat this subordination should not bethe outcome of current negotiations inthe WTO); and

- introduce a binding internationalframework to effectively regulate theactivities of corporations.

These two steps alone would go a longway to improving global governancestructures that are designed to betterthe quality of peoples’ lives andlivelihoods and protect theirenvironment.

case studies demonstratecorporate manipulation

This publication outlines examples ofcorporate influence over four majormultilateral environmental agreements:the UN Convention of BiologicalDiversity (CBD), the CBD’s BiosafetyProtocol, negotiations on global forestpolicy, and the UN FrameworkConvention on Climate Change(UNFCCC). These case studies aredrawn from the actual experiences ofFriends of the Earth Internationalmember group experts andcampaigners. In all four case studies,the negative influence of corporatelobbying is obvious. Indeed, multilateralenvironmental governance is erodingunder corporate pressure.

introduction | part one

by vicente paolo b. yu III, foei wto programme officer

foei - dirty deals | 5

2. how it came about

The idea of developing a convention forbiological diversity arose from theInternational Law Commission of theInternational Union for the Conservationof Nature (IUCN). The original objectivewas to develop a framework that wouldunify binding legal instruments thatexisted at the beginning of the 1980sregarding conservation of naturalresources. These instruments wereregional agreements and others relatingto migratory species, (illegal) trade inendangered species, and maritimeaffairs.

There is little evidence of industryinfluence or involvement during the firstnegotiations that were formally launchedin 1988.

increasingly commercial focushas toll Over time, the negotiationsincreasingly determined that biodiversitypreservation hinged on economicincentives to local communities andindigenous peoples. This commercialapproach grew out of the economicpromise held forth by biotechnologyindustry, then a new industry reliant ongenetic information.

This logic led many governments,industries and civil society organizationsto concern themselves exclusively witheconomic benefits derived frombiodiversity conservation and use.Considerable debate took place overaccess to genetic resources andconcrete mechanisms for benefit sharingwith the relevant countries, localcommunities and indigenous peoples4

This preoccupation with economicbenefit has come at the expense of realsolutions to environmental degradation,and has disrupted the quest for betterliving conditions of populations thatsubsist amongst biodiversity.

case study one: local communities, indigenous peoples &the influence of private interests on the cbd | part two

by isaac rojas, friends of the earth costa rica/coecoceiba

1. setting the stage,defining the actors

The Convention on Biological Diversity(CBD) was perceived as an internationalinstrument to protect biodiversity, andthe rights of local communities andindigenous peoples over this diversity.Given the subject matter, a participatoryrole for these stakeholders and for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) wasconsidered important. For decision-making on biodiversity necessarilyrequires the active input of communitystakeholders, non-governmental, andgovernmental organizations, at a veryminimum.

However, ten years after the CBD’screation, the issue of participationremains a sore point. This is especiallytrue in key issues such as geneticresources and the fair and equitablesharing of derived benefits, intellectualproperty, community rights andtechnology transfer.

Citizen participation in decision-makingis not only a basic human right and aRio Declaration principle. It is also animportant element of sustainability —but one that has been neglected.Instead, the current biodiversitymanagement model being generatedand promoted is solely based oneconomic benefits achievable throughmodern technology and patentprotection. The immediate result of thismodel is the commoditization ofbiodiversity. Critically, this modelexcludes the role of local communitiesand indigenous peoples.

CBD +10 = more destruction Tenyears after Rio,1 the destruction ofbiodiversity continues unchecked.Governments unstintingly grantconcessions for oil and mining extractionin natural protected areas. Thisthreatens and in many cases totallydestroys the biological and culturaldiversity they contain. The construction

of large dams continues to beauthorized and the indiscriminatelogging of forests proceeds unabated.

Another hazard is “the appearance ofgenetically modified crops on acommercial scale. Among these, thecontamination of traditional landracevarieties is to be noted in Mexico, centreof origin of this crop. For this reason,wildlife biodiversity is threatened, suchas in the case of the Monarch butterfly.”2

only private interests satisfiedPolicies in favour of biodiversityprotection have been ineffectual overthese past ten years. Therefore publicinterest has not been satisfied. But itwould seem that private interests havebeen satisfied — at the expense ofconservation efforts.

“If State policies were more respectful oflocal populations and their traditionallife-styles were respected, if in naturalareas containing high biodiversityactivities were not launched that insome way encourage colonization -such as the mining, oil or intensive woodextraction industries - and if they were tobuild roads to serve these industries, ifin other areas of the country thereexisted living conditions that did notoblige people to migrate and settle inforest areas, the work of biodiversityconservation would be a lot easier andwould have better results, and possiblyprotected areas would not benecessary.”3

In the brief analysis which follows, wewill focus on pivotal aspects of currentdiscussions of biodiversity. We will alsoshow how collective interests becomesubverted to private ones within adevelopment model that excludes localcommunities and indigenous peoples.

2 |

3 |

Ibid.

Ibid.

4 | Bilderbeek, Simone; Biodiversity

as Political Game, in Politics and

the Life Sciences, August, 1993.

1 | Bravo, Elizabeth. El Convenio sobre Diversidad Biológica: diez años después. Paper

presented at the International Congress on Bio-piracy and Ecological Debt, March, 2002,

Quito, 7p.


biotech companies grow fearfulIt was only in March 1992, two monthsbefore the last round of negotiations forthe CBD, that US biotechnology industrybegan to fear how this future conventionmight affect their unlimited access togenetic resources located in the South.They lobbied hard for the Bush, Sr.administration to reword key provisionsin their favour. They feared most theprovisions which introduced a de factoregime of licenses regarding the exportof genetic resources, and whichregarded intellectual property rights as apotential threat to the convention’seffectiveness.

Access to genetic and biochemicalresources and intellectual property areissues that have remained controversialover the past ten years. This is due tothe negative impacts they have caused,which are mainly related to patents onlife forms, and the questionable activitiesthey have promoted, such as bio-piracy.

3. intellectual property

The language of the CBD which pertainsto international law leaves theapplication of its articles to the discretionof the state, without the activeparticipation of indigenous peoples andlocal communities. This language isespecially critical when it comes tointellectual property, a highlycontroversial issue in the biodiversitydebate. Intellectual property is also anissue which reveals the full extent ofinfluence that private interests have hadon this convention.

vague and contradictory textsCBD articles5 regarding intellectualproperty rights (IPRs) are vague andsubject to diverse interpretations. Forexample, Article 16:2 states that:

“In the case of technology subject topatents and other intellectual propertyrights, such access and transfer shallbe provided on terms which recognizeand are consistent with the adequateand effective protection of intellectualproperty rights.”

However, Article 16:5, states thefollowing:

“The Contracting Parties, recognizingthat patents and other intellectualproperty rights may have an influenceon the implementation of thisConvention, shall cooperate in thisregard subject to national legislationand international law in order to ensurethat such rights are supportive of anddo not run counter to its objectives”.

These paragraphs of the same articleseem to contradict each other. Why thisconfusing language? The history of theCBD negotiation process tells us thatthat Article 16:5, drafted at the secondlast negotiation meeting in February1992, was a compromise Norwegiantext which included some observationsfrom the Netherlands. There were nomajor discussions when it wassubmitted, and the United States madeno objections.

usa biotech lobby steps inHowever, the text alarmed the AmericanAssociation of Biotechnology Companiesand related industries in the UnitedStates. They realized that US policiesregarding intellectual property could beweakened. Prior to the last round ofnegotiations, the biotechnology industrysector did major lobbying that resulted inthe United States delegation arrivingwith a strong pro-industry position.

The texts which had already beennegotiated could not be re-opened fordiscussion. However, the text of Article16:2, which had not been finallynegotiated, provided the opportunity forthe United States to make an amendment.They added the sentence related to theneed for effective and adequate protectionof intellectual property rights6.

traditional rights protectionlanguishes Implementation ofprotections for traditional knowledge underthe CBD has stalled. Knowledgeassociated with biological diversitypossessed by local communities andindigenous peoples falls under CBDArticle 8(j). But this has had no furtherimplementation. Although some specificmeetings have been held on the subject,this issue has not been incorporated intolegally binding provisions to ensureeffective protection.

5 | Ibid. 6 | “It is widely known that the TRIPS framework was formulated by transnational companies, working through the United States Intellectual Property Committee, the Japanese Federation

of Economic Organisations (Keindaren), and the Union of Employees and Confederated Industries of Europe. The transnational companies participating in these chambers include

Bristol Myers, DuPont, General Electric, General Motors, Monsanto, Pfizer, Rockwell and Warner”, Singh Nijar, Gurdial; TRIPs and Biodiversity: the threat and responses: a Third

World View, Third World Network, first edition, 1996, p.9. In Rojas, Isaac: En defensa de la diversidad: derechos comunitarios y biodiversidad, in Espacios, Flacso, 1999.




One of the initiative’s objectives is toincrease the consumption of bio-products in industrialized countries andin urban areas of developing countries.This market niche has traditionally beensupplied by small producers underalternative economic schemes. Thiscurrent trade does not greatly impactlocal economies or natural resources.But attempting to market these productson a global scale could produce strongdistortions in local economies and inbiodiversity resources.

autos in the amazon basket Later,in Lyon during 1998, another initiativeknown as the Amazon Basket waslaunched, a society formed by UNCTADand the Brazilian NGO POEMA. Theobjective of POEMA is to promoteecological conservation through thedevelopment of commercial activities.An example is the collaboration betweenPOEMA and Daimler BenzAG/Mercedes Benz of Brazil, whichaims to perform research on fibres,dyes, oils, latex or resins for theautomobile industry, and to install a pilotplant to manufacture automobile partsfrom coconut and latex fibres.

It is important to note that the protectionof traditional knowledge is of a verydifferent nature to the protection grantedto patents. The latter secures individualproperty over a given period of time,creating a monopoly in favour of thepatent owner. However, protection oftraditional knowledge is incorporated inprovisions to ensure the collectiveownership by a specific community orindigenous people over a specifictraditional knowledge, to prevent it frombeing appropriated through patenting oflife forms. This guarantees thetransmission of knowledge according tothe traditions and cultural practices thatexist in these social groups.

Protection of traditional knowledgeshould be provided in a manner thatavoids creating cultural impacts. I shouldnot use mechanisms foreign totraditional systems of rights available tothe local community or indigenouspopulation. This protection is therecognition of the collective creation andthe important role that both indigenouspeoples and local communities haveplayed in the conservation, sustainableuse and enhancement of biodiversity.With this protection, neither traditionalknowledge nor biodiversity will becommercialized. This contrasts sharplywith the case of patents, which onlybenefit their owners.

4. promotion of trade: the bio-trade initiative7

The Bio-trade Initiative rendersbiodiversity a commodity. It waslaunched by UNCTAD (United NationsConference on Trade and Development)during CoP 3 to the CBD held in BuenosAires in November 1996.

This initiative seeks to stimulateinvestment and trade in biologicalresources according to the threeobjectives of CBD. It aims to takeadvantage of the emerging investmentand market opportunities for biodiversityproducts and services, particularly thoserelated to biotechnology.

Under this initiative, biodiversitycomponents are considered to be mere“products and services,” overlookingtheir spiritual and cultural value. Thereal owners of this industry areindigenous peoples and communitieswho live amongst the biodiversity orposses the relevant knowledge. But theirrights to benefits from biodiversity arevulnerable. This is due to the lack of realmechanisms to ensure that technologytransfer leads a nation to use theresulting commercial benefits to improvethe living conditions of these inhabitants.

This initiative has rendered hydrographic basins and carbon sinks ascommodities. It also has sought topromote ecotourism, as well as bio-prospecting to produce commoditiesincluding natural colorants, paints,essential oils, biochemical compounds,medicinal extracts, and final productssuch as wood, handicrafts, nuts, fruit,perfumes and medicines.

7 | Most of this item has been taken from Bravo, Elizabeth, op. cit.


5. access to genetic resourcesand biopiracy: the case of theINBIO

Access to genetic resources is an issuethat has been forcefully debate over thepast three years. Its purpose is to placeinformation contained in biodiversity andassociated knowledge on the market.

The life sciences industry8

(biotechnology industry, seeds industry,agrochemical products andpharmaceuticals) depends on access togenetic and biochemical resources todevelop a large portion of its products,which it then patents to ensure marketsuccess.

This industry has been successful atpersuading host national governments touse international negotiations to defendindustry concerns over access to theseresources. These fora have thereforemostly been promoted from the North.An excellent example is Switzerland,where many life sciences industries areheadquartered. This nation hasorganized international events to discussthe access issue, and sponsored atleast one CBD meeting on this matter.

inbio: private sales of publicgoods The access issue is an importantone for Costa Rica’s National Institute forBiodiversity (known by its Spanishacronym INBio). This private institute hastaken a leading position on the matter,and has been promoted and defendedby the various Costa Rican governments.

INBio is “a private institute with its staffappointed outside the walls of the CostaRican state, but with sufficientrepresentatives who can have aninfluence on ministers, legislators,university authorities, and some otherhigh ranking officials from the governingclass.”9 Its name leads most peoplebelieve it is a public institution. But no,this is a private body that has benefitedfrom Costa Rica’s rich national heritageof biodiversity.

In February 1989, representatives ofsixteen public institutions and NGOs metin San José, Costa Rica to formalizeplans for the creation of a biodiversityinstitute. I would collect and prepare abiodiversity inventory, integrate it intoone collection under a single entity,centralize all information on biodiversity,and place this information at the serviceof the country.

During this meeting, a planningcommission was set up to submit aproposal. The commission wassubsequently legalized through a decreeissued by Oscar Arias, then president ofCosta Rica. In October 1989, INBio wasestablished as a private, non-profitassociation with strong connections tothe political elite, and was declared tobe of public interest.

At that time, some internationalconsultants made the following, rathertelling comments:

“INBio cannot adapt itself and comeinto line with a governmentalorganizational structure, as this wouldhinder the achievement of thepurposes for which it was instituted.(...) The aims of INBio are to “protect,gather knowledge about, and use ourbiological diversity”, and its strategymust be oriented towards reaching thisaim efficiently. The wishes expressedby the donors who economicallysupport the institute, and the urgenttime-frame of the natural factors,oblige INBio to seek flexibility andachievement in its strategies.”10

Thus INBio was created with theblessing of Costa Rica’s scientific andpolitical sectors. It benefited from thetransfer of databases from importantfoundations, and from the centennialcollection of the National Museum. INBioalso obtained funding from “nature fordebt” swaps.

contract with merck INBio thenlaunched their biodiversity inventory,and proceeded to sell samples to thepharmaceutical company Merck. INBio’s1991 contract with Merck helped itposition itself as an international-levelnegotiator that received prizes, fundingand a strong advertising campaign.Later INBio won prizes andacknowledgement at the internationallevel, which led to increased renown.The training of parataxonomers andtheir socio-environmental discourse alsohad an impact on the reputation.

It is key to note that Costa Rica’senvironment minister was never presentat INBio’s negotiations, although hewould seem to be the primarystakeholder given his function and thefact that the natural resources beingsold belonged to the state. In hisabsence a contract was signed thatenabled lucrative activities to be carriedout by a private institution that usedpublic resources.

important issues overlooked TheINBio-Merck contract saw the institutereceive $US one million advance.US$100,000 was also granted to theMinistry of the Environment and Energy,to consolidate the protected area systemand encourage the possibility of newcontracts and sub-contracts. Issues ofimportance to the country such as“number of samples involved,percentage of possible royalties,ownership of the patents, consequencesof patenting on local communities, thepossibility of erosion of sovereignty werenever mentioned... “11

8 |

9 |

Rojas, Isaac; Access and Benefit Sharing, LINK, April 2002

Rodríguez, Silvia; Conservación, contradicción y erosión de la soberanía: el

Estadocostarricense y las áreas naturales protegidas, Doctoral thesis, 1993, April,

Estudios de desarrollo de la Universidad de Wisconsin, Madison; p158.

10 | Rodríguez Silvia, op.cit, p161. Rodriguez also points out that at that time, and as a

result of then-US President Reagan’s policy, greater economic support was given to

private institutions under the supposition that they were more efficient than public ones,

in an attempt to hide the intention of promoting privatisation.




In another of INBio’s agreements, thistime with Diversa, it was agreed that allDNA sequences isolated by INBio forthis company would become theproperty of Diversa.13 This and otherINBio contracts unleash a storm ofunanswered questions. What is the legalbasis for giving away the country’sriches through patenting? Why haven’tauthorities promoted citizen participationor national discussion on this issue?Why is the public ownership of thesegoods not being respected, and why arethese goods being privatized? If thismodel does not compensate for thepublic nature of the goods negotiated,will other rights be respected?

what profit, to what end?Regarding economic benefits, a studyby Nagoda and Tverteraas14 shows (inUS dollars and for the period 1991 to1999) that through agreements withINBio a total of US$420,245 wasprovided to the Ministry of theEnvironment, US$856,248 toConservation Areas, US$699,336 topublic universities, and US$740,882 toothers areas. INBio15 has been given“support to protected wildlife areas,through direct payments to the Ministryof Environment and Energy, for anamount of US$512,148 in the year2000, derived from the 10 percent of theresearch budgets. ... financial support tospecific projects in conservation areas,universities and other groups for a totalamount of $2,256.259 between 1991and 2000.” For the year 2000, publicuniversities, conservation areas andothers received a total of US$40,207and the Ministry of Environment andEnergy obtained $91,903.00. Thus atotal of US$132,110 was obtained bythese institutions in the year 2000.

INBio has strengthened its position as amodel in the field of biodiversitycontracting and marketing withnumerous companies, on a national andinternational level - this being itsgreatest source of profit. It has benefitedfrom its connections with the governingelite, regardless of governing party. Ineffect, it is part of the groups that havecontrolled the Costa Rican state overthe past ten years. It has madeeconomic profit a synonymous withbenefit to the country.

Its contribution in monetary terms hasnot been what was expected from theterms of the agreement with Merck. So itmust be said that INBio has sold CostaRican biodiversity cheaply. The model ofaccess and development INBiopromotes is not the best one for thecountry. To make the INBio modeloperational, place public domain goodswere placed in private hands; that is tosay, what belongs to everyone isprivatized.

From the Merck contract onwards, INBioregarded itself as a partner and not as asupplier, because the institute only addsinformation and processing to collectedsamples. So far, INBio has signedalmost thirty trade agreements. Inreaching these agreements, it hasestablished the following requirements:“commitment by the partner to cover allthe research costs in the country, tocontribute the equivalent of 10 percentof the budget to national wildlifeprotected areas, to provide monetarycompensation in the form of royalties forthe products reaching the market andcontribute to the transfer of technology,training of Costa Rican scientists and, inmany cases, to donate the necessaryequipment and infrastructure for thedevelopment of research.”12

Some of these requirements arebeneficial to the nation and may bedeemed reasonable in the context of atrade negotiation. For example, for thepartner to fund the research budget isquite logical taking into account theirfinancial capacity and interest in thebusiness. On the issue of monetarycompensation, payment is not ensuredbecause a commercially-viable productis not always produced. Even if is, therecan be difficulties involved in extractingpayment once the company actuallypossesses the genetic resources.Finally, further investigation is necessaryto learn how other requirements havebeen complied with. For example withtechnology transfer, it would benecessary to compare the quality ofscientific equipment used by the partnerat its headquarters with that transferredto the host country under the terms ofthe contract.

11 |

12 |

Rodríguez, Silvia; op. cit. p177. For more details, consult this same work, pages 174-185.

Guevara, op.cit., p8 In Rojas Isaac, El Inbio ..., op.cit.

13 | Williams, Michael, First-ever global guidelines adopted on genetic resources, The

Hague/Nairobi, 19 April, 2002 in Rojas, Isaac; Propuesta jurídica dentro del proceso

nacional de definición de la naturaleza, alcances y requisitos de los derechos

intelectuales comunitarios, May 2002.

14 |

15 |

Nagoda, Dag and Tverteraas, Andreas; Biodiversity inventorying and bioprospecting as

management tools. A study of the impacts of the National Biodiversity Institute (Inbio)

on biodiversity management in seven Costa Rican conservation areas, University of

Oslo, 2001.

Guevara, op.cit. p.9.




6. access to genetic resourcesand bio-piracy: the internationaldebate

During the first16 week of October 1999,the first panel of experts on access andbenefit sharing took place in Costa Rica.This meeting was a result of decisionIV/8 of CoP 4 to the CBD, held inBratislava, Slovakia. Other meetingswere held in Montreal, Nairobi, Bonn,and finally at The Hague in 2002.

Fifty experts from different parts of theworld were present at this meeting,selected by the CBD Secretariat from alist of candidates sent by the Parties.This panel’s composition should makeus reflect. Many of these experts camefrom the industrial sector and frombotanical gardens. Some of the expertsfrom the government sector upheldpositions very far removed from nationalinterests, and there was a markedabsence of representatives of localcommunities and indigenous peoples.

The proposals arising from this firstmeeting underwent little changed insubsequent meetings. And in 2002, atCoP 6 in The Hague in 2002, the Partiesapproved voluntary guidelines foraccess to genetic and biochemicalresources.

many access issues remainunsolved However, some of the basicproblems over access had remainedunsolved. These problems included thefundamental inequity between theinterested parties at the time that accessto genetic resources was negotiated.There are considerable power gapsbetween local communities, indigenouspeoples, and countries of the South andthe transnational companies that havethe necessary resources to carry outthis activity. The next problem is theexistence of patents on life forms; theexpert panel considered anappropriation of life to be necessary.And then there is the real lack of

protection afforded to local communitiesand indigenous peoples for theirtraditional knowledge and other rights.

We expect that in the future bilateralagreements will be used as amechanism between parties to allowaccess to genetic resources. Thismeans that the above problems, and thedevelopment proposal they set forth, willextend into time without end. The Northwill continue its control over geneticresources, perpetuating thetransformation of biodiversity andassociated knowledge into a commodity,along with the loss of sovereignty ofSouthern nations over their publicresources.

In return for access, there is talk of fairand equitable sharing of benefitsderived from the use of geneticresources with the country of origin,according to Article 15 of the CBD. Thisincludes talk of sharing with localcommunities and indigenous peoples incases where their traditional knowledgeis used (Article 8j of the CBD). Howeverexisting experience indicates that fairand equitable sharing is not part of theformula. We stress that this theoreticalequity cannot arise from negotiations inwhich the parties are not equal. As such,talk of fair and equitable benefit sharingbecomes mere rhetoric.

7. Conclusion

Ten years after the proclamation ofCBD, there are still major issues thatremain unsolved. These issues havebeen accepted as a necessity, despiteopposition to them from major sectors ofsociety on a global level.Simultaneously, the commercial vision ofbiodiversity has been strengthened. Thismodel favours neither national interests,nor those of local communities andindigenous peoples. Instead it favoursprivate interests that have acted eitherdirectly or through their governments.

It must be concluded that in terms ofbiodiversity protection, this first decadeof the CDB has come up wanting.

16 | Rojas, Isaac; ¿Y lo justo y equitativo?, in Seedling, December 1999.


case study two: corporate interestsversus biosafety concerns | part three

by juan lopez y villar, advisor on genetic engineering, foei gmo programme

Negotiations on the text of theCartagena Protocol on Biosafety(Biosafety Protocol) wereconcluded in January 2000. Theinfluence of corporate and tradeinterests on the BiosafetyProtocol was, and continues tobe, significant. At presentcorporations and pro-biotechcountries exert very highpressure on countries thatdecide to implement strictnational measures on Biosafety.

1. the need for bindingregulatory frameworks onbiosafety

Due to the potential risks of novelrecombinant DNA technologies thatappeared during the mid-1980s, mostindustrialised countries started adoptingbinding regulatory frameworks related tothe safe handling of genetically modifiedorganisms (GMOs). In contrast, mostdeveloping countries lacked similarregulation. This provided somebiotechnology companies with regulatoryloopholes that gave them the space torelease GMOs in developing countries.For example, Monsanto carried out fieldtrials with genetically modified soybeansin Puerto Rico, Argentina and Belize atthe beginning of the 1990s.

In 1992, Professor Chetsanga of theUniversity of Zimbabwe commented that“the most common form ofbiotechnology investment encounteredin Africa involves biotechnologyenterprises in developed countrieswanting to come to Africa to carry outfield trials of genetically engineeredplants.”

GMO field trials pose risks to humanhealth and the environment in thecountries that host them. In 1989, theUK Royal Commission onEnvironmental Pollution said, “If anycountry allows releases to be carried outwithout thorough scrutiny, control andmonitoring there will be a consequentrisk to the environment and to health inthat country and more widely.”

2. towards a biosafety protocol

An Expert Panel on Biosafety wasestablished by the United NationsEnvironment Program (UNEP) in 1992.The majority of the Panel concluded in1993 that in the absence of an effectiveinternational biosafety agreement, therewas a need to work toward the adoptionof a legally binding agreement.Subsequently, the Conference of theParties (CoP) of the UN Convention onBiological Diversity (CBD) created anOpen-Ended Ad hoc working group onBiosafety. This working group hasmandated with drafting the Biosafetyprotocol.

The focus of the protocol was to be ontransboundary movement of livingmodified organisms (LMOs). Between1996 and 1999, this working group metsix times, and submitted a draft text tothe first extraordinary meeting of theCoP in February 1999 in Cartagena,Colombia. This meeting ended withoutany agreement, and the blame was puton six main agriculture export countries— the so-called Miami group — and thebiotechnology industry, which put tradeand corporate interests above biosafetyconcerns.




3. miami group and industrywater down biosafety protocol in 1999

The US position on GMOs has beenalways governed by trade imperatives.During the Biosafety Protocolnegotiations, the US was only anobserver and could not vote. However, ithad a great influence in the talksthrough its allies, Canada and Australia.Beginning in 1998, at a meeting inMiami, the US, Canada, Argentina,Chile, Uruguay, and Australia formed anegotiating bloc for purposes of theBiosafety Protocol negotiations calledthe Miami group.

The Miami Group supported theinterests of industry organizationsrepresenting agricultural, food andpharmaceutical companies. Theseindustry organizations were representedduring the Biosafety Protocolnegotiations by a lobby group calledGlobal Industry Coalition (GIC). Itclaimed to represent more than 2,200firms from more than 130 countries andplayed a key role during the wholenegotiation process. The GIC and theMiami Group were each other’s bestsupporters. One of the major negotiatinggoals of the Miami group was to excludeall GMOs destined for human or animalconsumption from the scope ofcoverage of the Biosafety Protocol. Theyalso wanted to include a “savingsclause” in the Protocol’s text, with thegoal of subordinating the Protocol to theWorld Trade Organization (WTO)agreements.

In February 1999, the Miami Groupprevented the first attempt to reach anagreement in Cartagena, because theyfeared that the agreement coulddamage trade in commodities such ascorn and soybeans. Most corn andsoybean production in the US nowcomes from genetically modified (GM)seed. The six Miami Group countriesblocked the consensus agreement for aProtocol made by approximately 120nations.

After Cartagena it was clear that tradeand corporate interests were at the rootof this enormous failure, as one of themost active Southern organizationsinvolved in the negotiations of theBiosafety Protocol pointed out.According to Chee Yoke Ling of theThird World Network (TWN), “From thestart, the biotechnology industry,protected by the United States and otherindustrialised countries, demonstratedwhat was confirmed here: the MiamiGroup never wanted a BiosafetyProtocol, but rather a free trade treaty.”

4. introducing biotechnology atthe wto

Before the Biosafety negotiations began,the US used every tactic to block theirstart. Once the negotiations become areality the US tried to change thenegotiation parameters by focusing onthe trade aspects of biosafety traderegulation.

In this sense, the US sought to ensurethat the Biosafety Protocol wassubordinated to WTO rules. The US alsocalled for the WTO to addressbiotechnology issues. Both of theseinitiatives would have allowed corporateinterests to take clear priority overhealth, environmental, and socio-economic concerns.

Canada called for the creation of a WTOWorking Party on Biotechnology. Theystated that the WTO should “engage ina collective exercise aimed atestablishing how trade and investmentin biotechnology are covered by existingWTO provisions and whether the latterconstitute a sufficiently effective regimefrom the WTO perspective.” Thisproposal was included in the draftSeattle Ministerial Text in 1999. But thatmeeting fell prey to intense publicdemonstrations, preventing any workinggroup discussion.

To move GMO issues into the WTOwould have benefited GMO-exportingcountries due to the WTO’s pro-tradeorientation. It would also have riskedseriously undermining the relativelystronger negotiating positions ofdeveloping countries in the BiosafetyProtocol negotiations.


5. biosafety protocol finallyadopted

But in January 2000, the BiosafetyProtocol was finally concluded inMontreal, Canada. It is a heavilynegotiated and compromisedagreement. Consequently, it is not asstrong as it could have been. Some ofthe important achievements of theProtocol are the recognition ininternational law that LMOs are differentfrom non-modified organisms, theinclusion of the precautionary principle,and the necessity for an advancedinformed agreement for LMOs intendedfor deliberate release into theenvironment. Some of the weaknessesare the exclusion from the scope of theProtocol of pharmaceuticals, LMOs intransit and products derived from LMOs.

Despite not being a robust agreement,the Biosafety Protocol is a significantstep forward because it establishes thebasis for international regulation ofGMOs, something that industry and theMiami Group have strenuously tried toavoid. However, the Biosafety Protocolis not yet in force since it has not yetreached the required number of Stateratifications for it to enter into force.

6. industry and pro-biotechcountries undermine nationallegislation on GMOs

Since 2000, the US has stepped uppolitical pressure on any country thatwishes to adopt strict national legislationon GMOs, including legislation based onthe Biosafety Protocol. Leakeddocuments from the US andArgentinean governments obtained byFriends of the Earth reveal theconsequences of the overwhelmingpressure of the US threat, at the behestof industry groups. Warning that the USwill seek WTO sanctions is intended tointimidate countries like Croatia andBolivia, which seek strict GMOregulations.

The pressure has been also enormousin Asian countries such as China, SouthKorea and Thailand, which haveplanned to introduce new labelling lawsfor GMOs. In 2000, US threats to SriLanka of action under the WTO led tothe abandonment of that nation’sproposed ban on GMOs that was tohave been implemented in September2001.

But resistance to those threats has alsoemerged. Croatian environment ministerBozo Kovacevic said on January 14,2002 that Croatia is going to draftlegislation to ban production and limitimports of food containing GMOs,despite lobbying from the United States.According to Kovacevic, “the USgovernment is lobbying for the interestsof US companies, and that is their right.Our duty is to protect our interests andfollow the legislation of the EuropeanUnion.”

argentinean soya industrywaters down bolivian ban ongmos

In January 2001, Bolivia’s agricultureminister adopted Ministerial Resolution2001 which determines, "To ban, for aperiod of one year, the import ofproducts, subproducts and foodstuffs ofagricultural origin derived fromgenetically modified crops.” ThisResolution was made with the aim ofprotecting the health of the population ina provisional and preventive manner.

In a new negotiation with thegovernment on August 23, 2001 theBolivian Unique Sindical Confederationof Farmworkers managed to get theirnational government’s commitment toextend the Resolution after December2001 and upgrade it to a SupremeDecree.

However, by October 2001, the situationhad changed completely. Fiercelobbying from transnational corporationskept up pressure on the governmentand its institutions to open the gate tomodern biotechnology. That lobby, ledby the Argentinean soy export industry,attacked the Bolivian Decree thatadopted the ban on GMOs. A leakedBolivian memo asserted that "the[Argentinean] soya corporate sector isbehind [the pressure], because theyexport five thousand million dollars ofgenetically modified soy to Europe andNorth America".

Despite widespread opposition fromBolivian farmers, and environment andsustainable development leaders, thecorporate lobby succeeded in October2001 in getting the ban on import of GMproducts lifted until new rules are made.




7. the way forward

The influence of corporate and tradeinterests on international and nationalbiosafety frameworks has been highlysignificant during the multilateralnegotiations of the Biosafety Protocol.

At present more than twenty countrieshave ratified the Protocol, which needs50 ratifications to enter into force.Governments must therefore sign andratify the Protocol as soon as possible.

Because the Protocol allows nationalgovernments to introduce nationalprovisions stronger than those of theBiosafety Protocol, it is very importantthat national level biosafety frameworksgo beyond the Protocol’s somewhatcompromised provisions.

wto used as weapon Recent casesof WTO threats against small countriesthat wish to adopt strict measures onGMOs reveals how WTO rules arebeing used as a tool by the US andbiotech corporations to hammer throughacceptance of GMOs around the world.Each nation in the world should havethe right to establish a moratorium orban on the introduction of GMOs untiladequate regulatory frameworks,effective monitoring and enforcementcapabilities are in place. This right is keyto ensure sound biosafety regulation.


1. governments as forestcorporations

There are few sectors where corporateinterests have as profound an influenceon governmental policy as the forestrysector.

A peculiar characteristic of this sector isthat part of these corporate interests arerepresented by government agenciesthemselves. In many countries theforestry department is responsible forboth enforcement of forest conservationpolicy, and for the commercialexploitation of state-owned forestresources. This mingling of interests hasbeen a major cause of inadequate lawenforcement and corruption.17 Otherunderlying causes of illegal logging andcorruption are the remoteness of manyforest resources and the low salaries offorestry staff. Government officials maybe tempted to sell timber licenses andforest lands to large timber companiesand agro-industrial landholders,companies often owned by high officialsin the government itself.18

In countries where these practices arecommon, there is fierce resistance toputting issues of inadequate lawenforcement and illegal logging oninternational forest negotiation agendas.Only recently, a number of countriesrealized that illegal plundering of theirforest resources will lead to situationslike that in Thailand, where a completelogging ban had to be imposed after 90percent of the original forests wereclearcut within a couple of decades.

2. “corporatization” ofinternational forestryorganizations: the ITTA

Powerful commercial interests overforestry policies have translatedthemselves into a strong politicalmovement to create a separate forumfor international forest policy.Predictably, this forum is dominated byforestry sector interests rather thanthose of forest conservation. One typicaloutcome is the International TropicalTimber Agreement (ITTA). Negotiatedunder the auspicious of the UNConference on Trade and Development(UNCTAD), the ITTA is the first global,legally-binding instrument to dealspecifically with the interests of theforestry sector.

The ITTA did not try to hide its corporateinclinations. It its Council, which isdivided into producer and consumercountry caucuses, the producercountries seldom hide their politicalmotivation to promote commercialinterests of large-scale loggingcompanies that exploit their tropicalforests. Consumer countries maypretend to more conservation-orientedarguments, but within their delegationsthe influence of timber companies andtimber retailers has also beensubstantial.

Throughout the 1980s, the InternationalTropical Timber Council formed thearena for a vehement debate betweenproducer countries and consumercountries. But when little consensus onfundamental issues seemed feasible,many countries and NGOs lost interest.They turned their attention instead to theUN Conference on Environment andDevelopment (UNCED), or EarthSummit, of June 1992.

redundant instruments During thepreparatory process for UNCED a lobbyto negotiate a new legally bindinginstrument to cover all types of forestsgathered political steam. Initially, theidea of a special Forest Convention wassupported by a mixed crowd: the US,some industry interests, timberproducing countries such as Canada,and numerous, mainly Northern,NGOs.19 Ironically, the push for a ForestConvention took place in parallel tonegotiations for a Convention onBiodiversity. The latter was to cover allforms of life in all countries. It isnoteworthy then that an estimated 60percent of this global biodiversity isrepresented by forest ecosystems.However, most people realized onlyafter UNCED that the legally bindingcommitment to forest conservation theyhad sought through a new instrumenthad in fact just been adopted by morethan 160 governments in the form of thenew UN Convention on BiologicalDiversity (CBD).

case study three: zombies & plantations – the impact ofcorporations on UN forest negotiations** | part four

by simone lovera, foei biodiversity project coordinator

** |

17 |

This section was written by Simone Lovera, FoEI Biodiversity Project Coordinator, with

contributions from Elias Diaz Pena, coordinator of the FoEI Forest Program and other

staff of Sobrevivencia/Friends of the Earth Paraguay

See inter alia: Verolme H. and Moussa, J., Addressing the Underlying Causes of

Deforestation and Forest Degradation: Conclusions and Action Proposals, WRM, 1999.

18 |

19 |

See also: Laletine, A. and Urushadze, A., Underlying Causes of Forest Loss in Theory

and Practice, in Forest Cover, March 2002 and the report of the Paraguayan National

workshop on the Underlying Causes of Deforestation and Forest Degradation,

Asuncion, 2000.

Most Southern NGOs opposed a Forest Convention, as they feared it would

marginalize the role of indigenous peoples and forest-dependent communities in

management of forests.




3. the fao and finnish foresters

After UNCED, the first major forestdebate outside the BiodiversityConvention took place at the thirdmeeting of the Commission onSustainable Development in 1995. Thepolitical landscape had completelychanged. Almost all NGOs andindigenous peoples organizations(IPOs), with only a handful ofexceptions, opposed a ForestConvention, as did the US and mostother countries lacking a strong exportor import-oriented timber industry.

As the CBD became increasingly activein the field of forest policy, organizationsincluding the UN Food and AgriculturalOrganization (FAO), and nations suchas Canada and Malaysia realized thattheir forestry industry interests might beundermined. They envisioned anindependent Forest Convention as avehicle to ensure these interests wouldbe the determining forces in themanagement and conservation offorests.

The FAO’s role is especially noteworthyin this debate. This agency has arelatively small forestry department thatis almost exclusively focused on timberexploitation, but it was appointed the leadagency (task manager) for UN forestpolicy during the UNCED process, andhas held and fostered that position eversince. FAO policies are heavilyinfluenced by the Finnish forestryindustry. This influence stems from adecade-long legacy of Finnishgovernment support to this and other UNagencies through secondments ofFinnish forestry experts (rather thanthrough direct program support). This hasled to an exceptionally high percentageof Finnish nationals in forest-relatedpositions in numerous UN agencies.Many of these foresters have closepersonal links with the Finnish forestindustry and Finnish forestry consultancyfirms such as Jaakko Poyry Consulting.

Furthermore, both the Finnish andSwedish forestry industries are almostalways represented within their nations’official government delegations tointernational forestry meetings.Admittedly, many Nordic governmentofficials and individuals on UNsecondment express clear concern forthe need to combat deforestation. Butthe overall result of this forestry-orientedthinking has been the persistent removalfrom the agenda of issues such asconsumption patterns. Such is bias ofthe FAO, and the many forums it directlyor indirectly services as a secretariat.

compromise solution: newforests panel The battle betweenpro- and anti-Forestry Conventioncountries in 1995 resulted in acompromise solution to establish andIntergovernmental Panel on Forests(IPF). Thanks to the lobby work ofNGOs and others, the FAO was notformally appointed as the secretariat tothis panel. However, it did play a pivotalrole in a unique interagency task forceon forests set up to support the IPF. Italso enjoyed a de facto domination ofthe New York-based IPF secretariat,staffed by secondments of each of theagencies. The IPF has been relativelysuccessful in so far as it has produced135 Proposals for Action. But theultimate political battle concernedwhether these Proposals for Actionwould foster a negotiation process for aForest Convention.

4. towards a new forestconvention?

This battle resulted in anothercompromise, a new forum called theIntergovernmental Forum on Forests(IFF), established in 1997 by the UNGeneral Assembly Special Session toReview Agenda 21. The IFF wassupposed to promote theimplementation of the Proposals forAction, but it failed to do so. Instead itadded some 120 new Proposals forAction and squandered most of its timeon endless discussions on the need fora Forest Convention. At its last session,as still another compromise solution, afurther forum was set up, the UN Forumon Forests (UNFF).

Mirroring the structure and mandate ofthe unsuccessful IFF, the UNFF hasalso been a failure during the first twoyears of its existence. The main reasonstems from what NGOs have termed“the Convention Zombie” phenomenon,namely an idea (for a ForestConvention) that seems dead at the endof each negotiation process, yet risesfrom the grave at each new set of forestnegotiations.

Throughout the ten years of pro- andanti-Forest Convention debate, fewcountries have changed positionsmarkedly. But what is increasingly clearis the strength of the corporate lobby.This is especially true for the Canadianpro-Convention position. Canadianforestry industry associations haveunrelentingly expressed a powerful pro-Forest Convention position, and theCanadian government has pumpedmillions of dollars into intersessionalmeetings and other campaigns topromote this position.

growing cooperation Meanwhile,there is a growing cooperation betweenthe “foresters” forum, the UNFF, and theConvention on Biological Diversity. TheCBD adopted its first work program onforest biodiversity in 1998, and a

foei - wto & biodiversity | 17

subsequent, action-oriented andexpanded work program in 2002. BothCoP 6 to the CBD and the draft Plan ofAction for the World Summit onSustainable Development call forintensive cooperation on forestsbetween the UNFF and the CBD. Whilethe UNFF has not yet clearly respondedto this call for concrete cooperation, it ishoped that they will heed arecommendation adopted by the Headsof State at the WSSD. In terms ofsubstance, the recommendations of thetwo fora have become increasinglycoherent over the years, and while theirfocus is clearly different, there are fewissues on which the UNFF and the CBDreally dissent. The main exception is therole of plantations in sustainable forestmanagement.

5. forest corporations’promotion of plantations

There is a clear logic behind thedifferent approach of CBD and UNFFtowards plantations. For the CBD, thesefrequently large-scale monoculturesclearly threaten biodiversity. For theUNFF, they exemplify a healthy forestryindustry. Even today few foresters seeissue with promoting neat lines of even-aged, fast-producing trees that areundisturbed by diverse plants, wildlifeand local communities.

Plantations are the negotiation issuemost influenced by the forestry industry.Such corporate influence was clearlydemonstrated at the intersessional 1999meeting on “the Role of PlantedForests” organized by the Chileangovernment.

diverse motives Reporting to theIFF, this meeting was co-sponsored byan intriguing mix of governments. Theyincluded Chile and New Zealand,countries with highly influential andwarmly fostered large-scale plantationindustries. Portugal also formed part ofthe team, but mainly to promoteresearch on the environmental andsocial impacts of its old cork and otherplantations, research that mainlyunderlined the concerns of NGOs andIPOs over monocultures. Denmark wasthere to emphasize the need forincreased biodiversity in old Europeanplantations, and to warn Southerncountries not to follow the Northernexample of replacing forests withplantations. Finally, India was there too,with its own, unique experience of smallscale community-driven tree planting.

The only thing uniting these experienceswas the confusing term “plantedforests”, which as NGOs pointed outcombined the good (community treeplanting) with the bad (old Europeanplantations) and the evil (new large-scale tree plantations).

plantation owners satisfythemselves The meeting turned outto be a feast for the many invitedrepresentatives of large-scale treeplantations. They included WestvacoCorporation from Brazil; CorporacionChilena de la Madera, CompaniaManufacturera de Papeles y Cartones,and Smart Wood, all from Chile; theSarawak Timber Association fromMalaysia; and Fletcher ChallengeForests, Carter Holt Harvey Forest, andPlantation Focus Limited, all from NewZealand. By pointing at the Indianexperience these interests could safelyclaim that “planted forests” were sociallybeneficial. And by pointing to the Danishexperience, that they sometimes containrelatively high levels of biodiversity, andshould thus be actively promoted bygovernment subsidies.

The New Zealand governmentsubsequently took up a most active rolein the dissemination of this meeting’sreport at the IFF and other importantforest negotiations. Astonishingly, whena New Zealand governmentrepresentative presented the results at aside event during the 7th meeting of theSubsidiary Body for Scientific, Technicaland Technological Advice (SBSTTA) ofthe CBD in November 2001, he quotedthe most important recommendations,but replaced the term “planted forests”in each of the recommendations for“plantations”. With this stroke, theworkshop reported to the SBSTTA that“plantations” were socially beneficial andcontained high levels of biodiversity.





6. justifying plantations ascarbon sinks: corporatising theforests and climate changedebates

The role of tree plantations and forestsas carbon sinks in the debates relatingto the UN Framework Convention onClimate Change (UNFCCC) hasgrabbed much public attention. This hasundermined related positions indiscussions under other UN conventionsand in other intergovernmentalorganizations.

calculated lowering ofcommitments By including thecarbon storage capacity of their forestsin their calculations, industrializedcountries (mostly Annex 1 countrieslisted in the UNFCCC) were able tolower their commitments for carbondioxide emissions reductions.20 However,most major controversies arose over therole of Southern forests and plantationsunder the North-South flexiblemechanisms AIJ21 (ActivitiesImplemented Jointly), and later the CDM(Clean Development Mechanism).

Before the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to theUNFCCC, electric utilities in the USAthat were worried about the highmarginal costs of carbon dioxideabatement22 pushed for the inclusion ofthe “conservation sink” concept.Uncertainties about the policy regimerelating to climate change and the priceswithin the carbon market becameadditional incentives for financing forestconservation or plantations. The carboncontained in a native forest, secondaryforest or plantation (exotics or native)could be multiplied by a hypotheticalprice for carbon dioxide on the carbonmarket to project high levels ofspeculative profit. This attracted manyproject developers.

US companies such as AES, Texacoand General Motors massively investedin carbon sinks. Together, they represent40 percent of the total carbon accountedfor under the AIJ’s Pilot Phase Projects.Approximately two-thirds of sinksprojects are located in Latin America, aregion were the US Initiative for JointImplementation organized severalworkshops to engage governments’support for the concept.23

However, many scientific uncertaintiesremain over the real and permanentcarbon dioxide sequestration24 value offorests. Furthermore, the “side effects”have been pointed out by governments,NGOs, and the IIASA. These include thereinforcement of North-South inequity,25

socio-economic effects, biodiversity, andleakages.26 These are problems thatmust be taken into account.27

Environmental consultants, think tanks inthe EU and USA, and universityresearch centres were keen to helpmanage the associated risks and todesign or certify the projects. Projectsunder the CDM should result in“sustainable development,”28 a mistyconcept subjectively and differentlydefined by the various stakeholders.Because of the great uncertaintiesentailed in the creation of a new financialcommodity (carbon), Kyoto Protocoldebates relating to flexible mechanismsbecame increasingly technical andscientific. The sinks debate wasdominated by a small community ofscientists, economists and foresters, andthis brought accusations of conflict ofinterest and intellectual corruption.29

plantations and forest loss: apersonal testimony fromtasmania, australia

Today I went for a walk in the Tarkine. Iwas fortunate to sit beneath a wedge-tailed eagle that circled around me. Itsnest must have been nearby as itseemed to linger, most curious about myintrusion. As I wandered into that spot,so similar to many other places inTasmania’s northwest, I had thepleasure of seeing a couple of wallabiesand some rather rare trees, amongstwhich was a magnificent specimen ofnative olive. This was made all the moreunique because I was on the edge ofplantation country. This area is beingconverted from native forest to weedinfested E. nitens plantations at anextremely rapid rate. A mere six weeksago much of the cleared, piled up debristhat surrounded me was magnificentrainforest, filled with myrtle, moss, fernsand teeming with life...

By the year 2020 the area of plantationsin Tasmania will be doubled if we do notdo something now. Old growth, whichwe are led to believe is well protected, isbeing cut down, burned andwoodchipped... Thousands of jobs havebeen cut, jobs that were promisedsecurity... Forestry Tasmania tell us theirlogging is world's best practice buteveryday clearfelling and streamsidelogging occurs... Communitiesdisappear, towns are removed frommaps as family homes and farms arelevelled and put under plantations...

Matthew Campbell-Ellis, 99 VillageLane, Somerset, Tasmania, Australia(July 2002). Reprinted with permission

20 |

21 |

22 |

A political accord was reached between the 6th and 7th Conference of the Parties of

the UNFCCC by allowing large quantities of sinks to Industrialised countries through

Annex Z. For example, the volume of Russian forests doubled between these two

UNFCCC conferences of the Parties - from 17 to 33 million cubic tons). For an

evaluation on the demand and price of credits see www.wwf.org and

www.climatenetwork.org.

see www.unfccc.de/program/aij/aijproj.html.

Sinks credits are substantially cheaper than credits from renewable energy, energy

efficiency projects or national climate change policies to reduce emissions.

23 |

24 |

Costa Rica led on this question. Even before the decision to implement a Pilot Phase of

AIJ, four projects financed by US electric companies were already accepted by the US

IJI in 1995: CARFIX, ECOLAND/Piedras Blancas National Park, Klinki Forestry and

BIODIVERSIFIX. Workshops were held. The two most important before CoP 1: Chili

March 1995, Costa Rica June 1995. See also Center for Sustainable Development of

Americas www.csdanet.org.

See contributions by the German Advisory Council on Climate Change, the accounting

of Biological Sinks, and sources under The Kyoto Protocol, a Step Forward or

Backwards for Global Environmental Protection, WBGU Bremerhaven p39, or Full

accounting and the Kyoto Protocol: A systems-Analytical View Interim Report, IR-99-

025, IIASA, p35. Also see Sinks that stink and Sinks: Who win$, who lose$, FoEI 2000,

at www.foei.org.


7. planting the problem

To avoid a political impasse duringKyoto Protocol discussions onimplementation, the US, Canada,Australia and Japan were given aconcession. They could lower the coststo corporations of mitigating emissionsby allowing them to obtain credits forcarbon sink forests or forest plantations.In the South, projects that had beenintended to improve local sustainabledevelopment and help solve climatechange became showpieces forlobbyists, to parade the cost-effectiveness of buying credits fromsinks plantations.31

For example, the FACE Foundation(Forests Absorbing Carbon Emissions)established by Dutch gas and electricitycompanies played a very influential rolein Dutch politics, and through Jan Pronkon the climate negotiations in general.The EU’s official anti-sinks position wasalso plagued by dissension comingfrom, amongst others, the Finnish andFrench.

forestry, government interestsconverge here The promotion offorests as carbon sinks in the climatechange debate comes at the expense offorest peoples and biodiversity.However, it converges the interests ofgovernments and their forestryindustries.32 Establishing forestplantations makes the price ofcompliance with the Kyoto Protocol lesscostly when compared to industrialcarbon dioxide emissions reductions.This route also allows forestry industriesto seek and obtain governmentalsubsidies.

Examples of corporate influence overnegotiations in this area are found inboth private and public forestryindustries. In many countries, nationalforestry agencies have been part of theirnational governments’ Climate ChangeTask Force. In Brazil, the Aracruzcompany has influenced the Braziliangovernment position. Corporateinfluence is sometimes very explicit. Forexample the Carter Holt Harvey Forest,one of New Zealand’s biggest treeplantation companies, has advised itsgovernment and was part of NewZealand’s delegation to COP 6.2 of theUFCCC in Bonn.

lulucf heavy with northerners Aspecial report on Land Use, Land UseChange and Forestry (known as Lulucf)was mandated to provide neutralscientific, technical and economicinformation to the UNFCCC. Here,environmental consultants includingEcoSecurities, SGS, Drexler and Ass,Winrock International, and theEdinburgh Centre for CarbonManagement played pre-eminent rolesas members of the board for the Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change(IPCC) - in this case on the feasibility ofaccounting the sinks.30

Industrialized countries were over-represented, making up three-fourths ofthe authors and editors of the Lulucfreport. Furthermore, the fewSoutherners on the project actuallyworked in northern institutions. When itcame to definitions and accounting forforestry activities that could receivecredits in industrialized countries, morethan half the authors and editors werefrom the US, Canada or Australia, thethree nations most active in demandingcredits for their “national forests.”Defined under article 3.4 of the Lulucfreport, this text deals with credit for“additional land and forest activities”within national borders. These activitiesrepresent the market for many publicand private forestry industries.

25 |

26 |

27 |

28 |

29 |

See www.cesindia.org, www.wrm.org.uy.

Cadman T., 2001. The Kyoto Effect: How the push for Carbon Sinks by Industry and

Government has become a Driver for Deforestation. A report for Greenpeace

International and WWF, 20p

http://www.panda.org/resources/publications/climate/carbonsinks/carbonsinks.html.

Swiss Intercooperation, Lulucf Activities under the CDM: Opportunity or Threat to

Biological Diversity Conservation, side event at CoP 6, The Hague, 14 November 2000.

Kyoto Protocol Art 12: The CDM “shall assist countries to achieve sustainable

development.”

Democracy or Carbocracy? Intellectual Corruption and the Future of Climate Change -

Corner House, Larry Lohman 2001. See also WRM www.wrm.uy.org and Plantations

Interests of Climate Panel Queried, Lohmann, L., Multinational Monitor, September 2000.

30 |

31 |

32 |

International Panel on Climate Change. Watson, Noble, Bolin et al, Land Use, Land

Use Change and Forestry, special report of the IPCC, Cambridge University Presse

2000 www.ipcc.ch.

See treefarm projects in Tanzania and Uganda www.tree-farm.com and NorWatch

2000, CARBON DIOXIDElonialism, Norwegian Tree Plantation, Carbon Credits and

Neo-colonialism in Uganda, Norwatch/The Future in Our Hands, Oslo

www.fivh.no/norwatch.

WBSCD program Sustainable Markets - Sustainable Forestry Initiative, Sustainable

Paper Cycle, http://www.wbcsd.org




9. climate change is sinkingother meas

The use of forests or forest plantationsas carbon sinks is not a scientific,economic, environmental, sociallybeneficial or equitable solution to theproblem of climate change or the questfor environmental justice. In the reneweddebate, corporate influence geared infavour of commercial plantations can stillbe seen. Promoting single-species,large-scale plantations that entail limitedpublic participation will make thesituation worse. This trend willundermine other MEAs such as theCBD and the UN Convention to CombatDesertification, and produce little or nobenefit to the climate in the long term. Itwill also shift resources away fromcommunity-based sustainable forestmanagement (CBFM) projects thatinvolve local communities and nativespecies.

10. forest loss and corporateinfluence: conclusions

The results of the pro-plantation lobbyare of considerable consequence. At theinternational level, we can point toseveral IPF and IFF Proposals forAction, as well as the WSSD draft actionplan which recommends the “promotionof planted forests.” The benefits toforestry industries are substantial: inmany South American countries, forexample, companies receive a subsidyfor 75 percent of the start-up costs andfor the first three years of a plantation’soperation. The results of these subsidiesare widespread destruction of nativeforests and other valuable ecosystems,displacement of indigenous peoples andlocal communities, depletion andpollution of freshwater resources, andsoil deterioration.

8. commercial plantationsagainst forests, people andsustainable development

A political agreement was finallyreached in Bonn, Germany in June2001. It accounted for national carbonstocks and sinks in relation toforestation and re-forestation activitiesunder the CDM.

The extremely low price of a carboncredit (one to two dollars per tonne ofcarbon dioxide) favours a market whichprefers large-scale exotic plantationswith short rotations because they “store”carbon more rapidly. Small-scaleprojects based on the long-term will notbe able to compete. Yet testimony of thenegative effects of large-scale industrialtree plantations33 abound. Extremecases, such as those in Indonesia orChile, reveal the dubious contributionsof monocultures of eucalyptus or pine.Do these unsustainable flows of rawmaterials truly add value and contributeto sustainable development?

33 | FoEI, FERN, WRM, Tree Trouble: A compilation of testimonies on the negative impact

of large-scale monoculture tree plantations of the Parties to the FCCC, Oct 2001,

http://www.foei.org/publications/forests/,

http://www.wrm.org.uy/plantations/material/carbonfr.rtf.


case study four: climate change &corporate lobbying*** | part five

by kate hampton, foei climate change campaign international coordinator

1. Introduction

As climate change becomes worse,corporations have lied about the scienceand sought to prevent governments fromtaking action. Even though somecompanies have realised they can nolonger dispute the evidence on globalwarming, they still refuse to supportmandatory emissions reductions and thetransition to clean energy.

In its 2001 report, the UN IPCC(Intergovernmental Panel on ClimateChange) as the world’s highest scientificauthority on the issue has reviewed thelatest scientific information from acrossthe globe, and stated unequivocally that,“There is new and stronger evidencethat most of the warming observed overthe last 50 years is attributable tohuman activities.”

The IPCC projects an increase in globaltemperature of between 1.4 and 5.8°C,against 1990 levels, by 2100. The IPCCwarns that this rate and level of changeis “very likely to be without precedent”during at least the last 10,000 years, orsince the last Ice Age. Scientists havealready documented a wide range ofimpacts that are consistent with globalwarming such as changes in sea level,snow cover, ice extent and rainfall.There have been more persistent,frequent and intense El Nino events, aswell as coral reef bleaching and shifts inplant and animal ranges. All thesechanges affect human beings, forinstance by affecting water supply,agriculture, built infrastructure anddisease patterns. Those leastresponsible for the problem will be theones to suffer the most.

2. how corporations lie

Over the last decade the international oilcorporation known as ExxonMobil (alsoknown as Esso) has consistentlychallenged the scientific consensuslinking fossil fuel use and climatechange. It has argued that any climateimpacts which arose would benegligible, or even beneficial. Theseviews have been presented not only inpublic statements by senior executivesand through ExxonMobil publications,but also by major advertising campaignsin mainstream media. ExxonMobil hasattempted to influence the scientificdebate by funding a number of climatesceptics who challenge mainstreamclimate science. They do so throughdirect contributions to thinktanks andinstitutes, and indirectly through theirmembership in business lobby groupssuch as the Global Climate Coalitionand the American Petroleum Institute.

ExxonMobil’s denial of the link betweenfossil fuels and climate changecontinues to this day. RecentExxonMobil publications maintain“science is not now able to confirm thatfossil fuel use has led to any significantglobal warming.” The company refers tomisleading evidence to back up its case.

“oregon petition” debunkedExxon Chief Executive Lee Raymondpublicises the “Oregon Petition” assupposed proof of extensive differencesof opinion in the scientific community.This petition, which dismisses globalwarming and claims 17,000 signatories,has been totally discredited. Signatorieswere misled into believing it originatedfrom the US National Academy ofSciences. Furthermore, the majority ofsignatories had no specialist climateknowledge, and many of the signatureswere false.

Advertisements challenging climatescience or intended to highlightuncertainties were also placed byExxonMobil in mainstream media suchas The Washington Post and The NewYork Times. For example, ads appearedin the New York Times in spring 2000that included graphs illustrating thedeclining temperatures recorded in theSargasso Sea. But the very scientistsresponsible for collecting this datastated it had no bearing on the globalwarming debate.

Within the scientific community a smallnumber of climate sceptics havechallenged the majority view thatdangerous climate change caused byhuman activities is taking place.ExxonMobil has extensively promotedtheir views. One of the most well knowis Fred Singer, founder of the CoolerHeads Coalition whose mission is to“dispel the myths of global warming byexposing flawed economic, scientificand risk analysis.” Singer is alsoPresident of the Science andEnvironment Policy Project, and haslinks with the Atlas Economic ResearchFoundation, the Committee for aConstructive Tomorrow, and theFrontiers of Freedom Institute, amongstothers, all of which promote the climatesceptic viewpoint.

ExxonMobil has also supported the CatoInstitute, which lists another prominentsceptic Patrick Michaels as SeniorFellow, and the George C. MarshallInstitute, whose director Sallie Baliunashas consistently argued that fossil fueluse does not contribute to globalwarming. In 2001, ExxonMobil donatedmore than US$850,000 to institutionslinked to prominent climate sceptics.

*** | This section was written by Kate Hampton, FoEI Climate Change Campaign International

Coordinator, with contributions from other FOEI climate change campaigners.




bullying the scientistsExxonMobil’s interference in the climatedebate includes attempts to directlymeddle in the conclusions andcomposition of the IPCC. During thedrafting of the IPCC’s First AssessmentReport, ExxonMobil’s chief scientificadvisor Brian Flannery opposedrecommendations for 60-80 percentcarbon dioxide cuts, citing uncertaintiesin the behaviour of carbon. Thecorporation later called for rewording ofthe IPCC’s Third Assessment Report toremove references to humaninterference on the climate.

But perhaps the most blatant example ofsuch activity was an Exxon memo to theUS White House in February 2001 byExxonMobil senior environmentaladvisor Arthur G. Randol. This memoaccused the IPCC Chair Bob Watson ofadvancing his personal agenda, leakinginformation, and being too outspoken. Itcalled for Watson’s removal. The memoaccused other members of the USdelegation to the IPCC of “aggressiveagendas” and suggested theirreplacement by climate sceptics. Thetruth is that ExxonMobil were attemptingto politically divide the IPCC. In 2002 theUS administration did ExxonMobil’sbidding and supported an alternativecandidate, leading to the first contestedelection for the post, which Watson lost.

3. what governments promisedand why they haven’t delivered

At the 1992 Rio Earth Summit,governments signed the UN FrameworkConvention on Climate Change(UNFCCC), agreeing to take action toavoid dangerous levels of globalwarming. Rich countries made acollective commitment to stabiliseemissions at 1990 levels by 2000 andprovide money to help poorer countriesreduce their vulnerability to, andprevent, climate change.

Yet in reality, few rich countries kepttheir promises. The Kyoto Protocol wasnegotiated in 1997 to provide legallyenforceable, national emissionsreduction targets but agreement on rulesfor its implementation were onlyconcluded at the end of 2001 inMarrakech. It is expected that theProtocol will enter into force in 2002,finally putting a real cap on CO2emissions from those industrialisedcountries which “ratify”, or pass thetreaty into national law.

Because the Kyoto Protocol will onlyresult in stabilisation, or a few percentreduction, in emissions from thoseindustrialised countries that implementthe agreement, it is only the first step incombating climate change. To succeed,scientists believe the internationalprocess must deliver 60 to 80 percentreductions in global emissions (against1990 levels) by 2050.

beset by corporate influence Atthe landmark climate talks in Bonn, July2001, there were at least 400 corporatelobbyists. The top sectors were thosewith a stake in conventional energy,such as:

- fossil fuel energy industry — 84lobbyists including 28 from oilcompanies;

- automotive industry — 22 lobbyists;

- nuclear industry — 21 lobbyists;

- aluminium industry — 20 lobbyists.

Energy and oil corporations are alsowell represented by broader corporateinterest groups like the BusinessRoundtable, International EmissionsTrading Association, the InternationalPetroleum Industry EnvironmentalConservation Association, the WorldBusiness Council for SustainableDevelopment, and the InternationalChamber of Commerce.

Key companies represented in Bonnwhich lobbied against the Kyoto Protocolincluded Exxon, Texaco, Chevron,General Motors, TotalFinaElf and Statoil.Others present and with little interest intough emissions targets includedToyota, BP, Daimler Chrysler, Ford,Powergen, Gaz de France, BG, Boeing,Mitsubishi, Yamaha, VW and Audi.

emissions trading a dubioussolution There has been mountinginterest in market mechanisms likeemissions trading, which discouragedomestic action to reduce emissions andsubstitute it with cheaper and lessreliable reductions in other countries.This interest is demonstrated bymanagement consultants and emissionstrading houses, which now have morelobbyists than any sector except thefossil fuel industry; enough to send 72lobbyists to the Bonn talks. Bycomparison, the renewable energy andco-generation industries only managed toassemble 18 lobbyists for Bonn. Tuvalu,a small island state that will disappearwith rising sea levels, only managed tosend four delegates, fewer than some oilor car companies on their own.


4. how corporations deliverfossil fuel dependency

The energy systems of developingcountries are being locked into a fossil-fuel dependent future, even thoughgovernments could easily take steps tore-orient global investment towardsclean and renewable sources of energyand energy efficiency. Billions arespent yearly to support fossil fuelcorporations by government-fundedmultilateral development banks andnational export credit agencies. Ratherthan propping up the deployment fossil-dependent technology, taxpayers’money should be used to supporttechnological leapfrogging and cleanenergy.

ecas shovel money towardsfossils Export credit agenciessupported upstream fossil fuel projectsand fossil fuel power projects indeveloping countries to the tune ofUS$73.8 billion between 1995 and1999. Yet only a tiny fraction of thisamount, US$2 billion, was spent onrenewable energy projects by theseagencies over the same period (WorldResources Institute, May 2000). TheWorld Bank has provided US$20 billionof fossil fuel financing for upstreamprojects and power plants since 1992,leveraging billions more in private funds(Institute for Policy Studies, October2001). This reveals how taxpayers areeffectively being used to subsidise fossilfuel companies while governments paylip service to climate protection.

5. why the US governmentdoesn’t care about climatechange

The US is responsible for one quarter ofthe world’s carbon dioxide emissions butonly harbours five per cent of the world’spopulation.

The Bush, Jr. Administration publishedits National Energy Policy in 2001,based on the findings of the NationalEnergy Policy Development Group ledby Vice President and oil industryveteran, Dick Cheney. The Groupadvocated the construction of 1,300 to1,900 new power plants over the next20 years, or between one and twopower plants per week. It is underinvestigation by the General AccountingOffice, a US government watchdog.

In March 2001, even before publicationof its energy policy, the Bushadministration rejected the KyotoProtocol at the behest of supporters inthe energy sector — including bankruptEnron and Exxon Mobil, the top twoenergy company contributors to Bush’selection campaign. The administrationhas since failed to come up with anyplan for domestic emissions reductions.The world’s biggest polluter is stilloutside the climate agreement andshows no sign of returning within thelifetime of the current government. UScarbon dioxide emissions are expectedto soar 30 per cent above 1990 levelsby 2012, instead dipping seven per centbelow as agreed in Kyoto.

warping opinion and policyBehind the US position are powerfulfossil fuel industry lobby groups thathave influenced public perceptions andworked to change policies. ExxonMobilcorporation plays the lead role in muchof this, while the most prominent lobbygroup was the Global Climate Coalition(GCC), set up in 1989. Other groupsinclude the American Petroleum Institute(API), the International Chamber ofCommerce (ICC) the US BusinessRound Table (BRT), and the GlobalClimate Information Project (GCIP).

These groups have bankrolled hugecampaigns to misinform the US publicand decision makers about the scienceof climate change, and promoted scarestories of the negative consequences ofemission reductions that suggest hugeimpacts on the US economy andstandard of living. For instance, in 1995GCC sponsored weather forecastingfirm Accu-Weather to produce a reportwhich disputed National Climatic DataCenter findings of increased weatherextremes. In 1996, API commissionedan economic model to predict the costsof reducing carbon emissions. Althoughhuge costs were shown to ensue fromlegally binding emissions reductions, thecosts of inaction were convenientlyomitted.




fossil lobbyists keen on byrd-hagel These lobby groups have alsocampaigned hard to oppose USinvolvement in the Kyoto Protocol andcommitments to mandatory greenhousegas reductions. In 1997, APIcommissioned a US newspaper adstating its support for the US Senate’sByrd-Hagel resolution in the run-up tothe US presidential elections. Thisresolution rejected US ratification of theKyoto Protocol, and imposed conditionsin direct contravention to the agreementif the president signed it in 1997, and if itwere passed into law.

millions spent against theclimate At the same time, the USlobby group BRT ran a one million dollaradvertising campaign on climate changeurging the US administration not tomake policy commitments. The GCIPalso ran a $13 million advertisingcampaign in the US press claiming thatthe “treaty isn’t global... and it won’twork” and that “Americans will pay theprice.” At a press briefing during theKyoto negotiations, the GCC warnedthat “Economic damage .... could emptyAmerican pockets....millions of joblosses, higher gasoline, food andheating bills,” and claimed USsovereignty to be at risk from a “UNbody dominated by developingcountries.”

During another climate meeting in 1998,the GCC distributed pamphlets todiplomats asserting that there was nocertainty that human activity affectsclimate. API, with a lot of help fromExxon, embarked on a seven milliondollar public relations offensive calledthe “Global Climate ScienceCommunications Action Plan” in order toquestion climate science and convincethe public that climate science wasuncertain.

“our work is done” For a time, theGCC included among its ranks some ofthe world’s most powerful corporationsand trade associations associated withfossil fuels. However, in 1997 BPwithdrew from the GCC, keen toimprove their environmental credentialsas Chairman John Brown concededgrowing evidence of anthropogenicclimate change. Their departure wasfollowed by that of Royal Dutch Shell in1998, Ford in 1999, thenDaimlerChrysler, Texaco and GeneralMotors in 2000.

Faced with such a rapid exodus ofcorporate members, the GCC wasforced to announce a “strategicrestructuring” and restrict itsmembership to trade associations. InJanuary 2002 the GCC foldedcompletely. Environmentalistscelebrated, convinced the demise wasdue to the exodus of members. TheGCC gave their own explanation. Theyannounced their work to destroy theonly international treaty to tackle globalwarming was now complete. As FrankMaisano, GCC spokesman, said, “Wehave achieved what we wanted to withthe Kyoto Protocol”


6. conclusion

As with some other MEAs, the climatechange debate has been fraught withcorporate lobbying. More often than notthis has meant that substantiveprovisions of both the UNFCCC and theKyoto Protocol, as well as theirimplementation, reflect corporateinterests. This translates to lower or lessstringent environmental standards orlower levels of binding emissionsreductions commitments. The fossil fuelindustry and related sectors such as theautomotive industry have used theirconsiderable influence to increasinglytransform the climate change debate. Aquest to ensure the very survival of theplanet and humanity has beentransformed into an exercise toguarantee that global action to avertclimate change does not harm fossil fuelindustry profit margins.


conclusions: toward corporate accountability & strengthenedinternational environmental governance | part six

by vicente paolo b. yu III, foei wto programme officer

Corporate interests are exertinga marked influence oninternational environmental lawand policy. Important debates onsocial and environmentalconcerns are distorted ascorporate profit-making andcorporate economic interestsbecome paramount.

Global environmental governance, in theform of environmental treaties and otherinternational efforts, is increasinglysubordinated to the trade and economicinterests of corporations - especiallythose of developed and industrialNorthern countries. Governments,especially Northern governments,increasingly tend to adopt as negotiatingpositions the perspectives raised bycorporations. In so doing they neglectthe concerns of those most directlyaffected by environmental problems -the poor and the marginalized. Suchpopulations are also more directlydependent on a healthy environmentand stable natural resource base forcommunity survival.

time to take corporations toaccount There is no enforceableinternational system of rights andobligations under which corporationscan be held accountable and liable forthe damage their activities may cause tolocal communities and the environment.This vacuum of accountability virtuallyguarantees that corporations willcontinue to seek influence over globaland national economic andenvironmental policy-making. They willstrive to ensure that international andnational regulatory regimes reflect theirinterests and facilitate their profit-maximizing activities. The lessregulatory restraint, the less concernedthey need be about the short-term andlong-term toll of their activities on theenvironment and the poor.

A legal framework for corporateaccountability is emphatically required. Itwould ensure the activities of corporateactors are made subject to the longerterm objectives of economicallyequitable and ecologically sustainabledevelopment. And it would make themaccountable both in terms of theircommercial operations and theirinfluence in international and nationalpolicy-making.

Business has a positive side thatdeserves to be recognized. This isparticularly true of small- and medium-sized enterprises that form part of, andare accountable to, local communities.And there is the clearly positivecontribution of “sunrise” industries suchas renewable energy, which depend onbusiness skills and creativity to deliverprogress.

But there is an urgent and deepeningdebate over how corporateaccountability can be increased. Theaccountability of corporations to ownersand shareholders is backed by detailedrules and regulations. New rules areneeded to spell out corporations’accountability to other stakeholders inthe national and global economic andenvironmental arena. These rules could

take the form of a binding corporateaccountability convention.

A corporate accountability conventionmust:

- establish mechanisms for adverselyaffected stakeholders to obtain redressthrough exercising rights;

- establish the social and environmentalduties of corporations;

- establish rules for consistent highpractices of corporations;

- create a market framework in whichprogressive companies can thrive, andgovernments can respond fairly tocitizens’ demands rather than tocorporate lobbying;

- ensure international, direct liability ofcorporations;

- establish sanctions;

- ensure the ecological debt owed bycorporations to the South is repaid;and

- secure environmental justice forcommunities threatened with orexposed to environmental injustice inboth North and South.

Furthermore, governments must ensurethat the rights, obligations, andprovisions of international environmentalagreements do not become subordinateto global free trade rules and thecorporate economic interests thesetrade rules serve. This is especiallycrucial when it comes to the rights oflocal communities, remedyingenvironmental damage, and protectingand conserving global and nationalenvironmental and natural resources.

Governments must exercise the politicalwill required to put the interests andconcerns of local communities beforethose of corporations if we are to trulyachieve economically and ecologicallysustainable livelihoods.

This publication was made possiblethrough the generous support of noviband hivos.

2002 foei [dirty eng] www 1 (page 1)archives.evergreen.edu/webpages/curricular/2005-2006/tesd...as...

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